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Ivan Pearson, Peter Zeniewski, Francesco Gracceva & Pavel Zastera (JRC) Christophe McGlade, Steve Sorrell & Jamie Speirs (UK Energy Research Centre) Gerhard Thonhauser (Mining University of Leoben) Other contributors: Corina Alecu, Arne Eriksson, Peter Toft (JRC) & Michael Schuetz (DG ENER) 2012
EUR 25305 EN
European Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport Contact information Arne Eriksson Address: Joint Research Centre, Westerduinweg 3, 1755 LE, Petten, The Netherlands E-mail: arne.eriksson@ec.europa.eu Tel.: +31 22456 5383 Fax: +31 22456 5641 http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energy-security This publication is a Scientific and Policy Report by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. This study has been undertaken by the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission's in-house science service, to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policy-making process. The scientifc output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Legal Notice Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11
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A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu/. JRC 70481 EUR 25305 EN ISBN 978-92-79-19908-0 ISSN 1831-9424 doi: 10.2790/52499 Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 European Union, 2012 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in 2012
UNCONVENTIONAL
GAS:
POTENTIAL
ENERGY
MARKET
IMPACTS
IN
THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
A
REPORT
BY
THE
ENERGY
SECURITY
UNIT
OF
THE
Ivan L. G. Pearson (European Commission, JRC F.3) Peter Zeniewski (European Commission, JRC F.3) Francesco Gracceva (European Commission, JRC F.3) Pavel Zastera (European Commission, JRC F.3) Christophe McGlade (University College London Energy Institute, UK) Steve Sorrell (Sussex Energy Group at the University of Sussex, UK) Jamie Speirs (Imperial Centre for Energy Policy and Technology, Imperial College London, UK) Gerhard Thonhauser (Mining University of Leoben, AT) Other contributors: Corina Alecu (European Commission, JRC F.3), Arne Eriksson (European Commission, JRC F.3), Michael Schuetz (European Commission, DG ENER C.2), Peter Toft (European Commission, JRC F.3)
Acknowledgements
The
authors
of
this
report
gratefully
acknowledge
comments
on
previous
drafts
from
the
following
individuals:
Michael
KILPPER
(European
Commission,
DG
ENER
A.1)
Florence
LIMET
(European
Commission,
DG
ENV
F.1)
Marcelo
MASERA
(European
Commission,
JRC
F.3)
Heinz
OSSENBRINK
(European
Commission,
JRC
F.7)
Jens
OTTO
(European
Commission,
JRC
A.3)
Nathan
PELLETIER
(European
Commission,
JRC
H.8)
Dinko
RAYTCHEV
(European
Commission,
DG
ENER
A.1)
Mihai
TOMESCU
(European
Commission,
DG
ENV
F.1)
David
WILKINSON
(European
Commission,
JRC
A)
All
errors
or
omissions
remain
the
authors
own.
ii
Executivesummary
Background Thisreportinvestigatesthepotentialimpactofunconventionalgas,mostnotablyshale gas,onEuropeanUnion(EU)energymarkets. It should be noted that Commission services are currently examining whether the environmentalchallengesofunconventionalgasproductioncanbeeffectivelymanaged throughexistingregulation,monitoringandtheapplicationofindustrybestpractices.In thisvein,theJointResearchCentre(JRC)haspreparedareportreviewingtheliterature on environmental impacts. The present report examines only the potential benefits of shale gas exploitation and should be seen together with the associated JRC report addressingenvironmentalissues. In February 2011, the European Council stated that: In order to further enhance its securityofsupply,Europe'spotentialforsustainableextractionanduseofconventional andunconventional(shalegasandoilshale)fossilfuelresourcesshouldbeassessed. Thisreportisapreliminaryattempttorespondinparttothiscallbyprovidingreliable factsforEUpolicymakers. Fossilfuels,suchasoil,naturalgasandcoalarebyfarthelargestsourcesofenergyin the EU and are widely projected to dominate the European energy mix through to at least 2030. The European Commissions Energy Roadmap 2050 identifies gas as a criticalfuelforthetransformationoftheenergysystem.Thesubstitutionofcoalandoil with gas in the short to medium term could help to reduce emissions with existing technologiesuntilatleast20302035. Conventional gas currently dominates worldwide natural gas production, accounting for over 85% of total marketed output today. In recent years, however, two key developmentshaveshiftedthefocustosocalled'unconventionals'.Thefirsthasbeen mounting concernthat growing demand forenergy worldwide would outstripsupply. The second factor has been a dramatic increase in unconventional gas production in NorthAmerica,toroughly50%ofdomesticproduction. TheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA)hasestimatedthatundertherightconditions unconventionalgasmaymeetmorethan40%oftheincreasedglobaldemandforgasby theyear2035.However,manyquestionsstillremainabouthoweasilyunconventional gasresourcescanbedevelopedoutsideNorthAmerica. Unconventional gas resources are thought to be, geographically, broadly distributed across all continents, including Europe. Their potential development may therefore offer a number of securityofsupply benefits for the Union: lower natural gas prices; more readily available gas on the European market; easing tightness in global energy markets;andaddingdiversitytotheEU'sgassupplies. However,thegrowingfocusonunconventionalgashasnotcomewithoutcontroversy. Notably, it has been argued that there may be several negative environmental and climaticaspectstoitsproduction.Inaddition,moreandcheaper(unconventional)gas may challenge investment in coal, nuclear and renewables, as well as the established gas business model. And, of course, questions have been raised about the size of the recoverableresourcebase.
iii
Conventional and unconventional gas Generally speaking, conventional natural gas is gas extracted from discrete, well-defined reservoirs and can usually be developed using only vertical wells, with recovery rates of over 80% of the original gas in place. Unconventional natural gas resources are generally found in less permeable rock formations, where resource accumulations may be distributed over a much larger area than conventional gas. Unconventional gas resources typically require well-stimulation measures in order to be made productive, but recovery rates are much lower than in conventional gas typically of the order of 15-30% of original gas in place. There are three main types of unconventional natural gas produced today, which are considered in this report: Tight gas: this is natural gas trapped in relatively impermeable hard rock, limestone or sandstone; Coal-bed methane (CBM): this is natural gas trapped in coal seams, adsorbed in the solid matrix of the coal; and Shale gas: this is natural gas trapped in fine-grained sedimentary rock called shale that has a characteristic flaky quality.
Objectives, scope and limitations The objective of this report is to investigate the impact of unconventional gas, notably shale gas, on EU energy markets. This report seeks to clarify certain controversies and identify key gaps in the evidence-base relating to unconventional gas. The scope of this report is restricted to the economic impact of unconventional gas on energy markets. As such, it principally addresses such issues as the energy mix, energy prices, supplies, consumption, and trade flows. But it also covers resource estimates and the advancement of technologies for shale gas extraction. Whilst this study touches on coal-bed methane and tight gas, its predominant focus is on shale gas, which the evidence at this time suggests will be the form of unconventional gas with the most growth potential in the short to medium term. This report considers the prospects for the indigenous production of shale gas within the EUs 27 Member States. It evaluates the available evidence on unconventional gas resource size, extraction technology (past and possible future), resource access and market access. This report also considers the implications for the EU of large-scale unconventional gas production in other parts of the world. This acknowledges the fact that many changes in the dynamics of energy supply can only be understood in the broader global context. Specifically, it reviews effects of the rapid development of shale gas production in the United States of America (USA) and its effect on European gas markets, in combination with a growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade worldwide. An energy model is used to elaborate possible future scenarios that illustrate the potential impact of unconventional gas on the European energy system. Methodology This report consists of two main components, namely:
iv
A close examination of the unconventional gas literature covering both Europe and the rest of the world. Energy system modelling of possible scenarios of future global shale gas development that illustrate the conditions under which shale gas might be integrated into the energy system in the coming 30 years.
Mindful of the fact that the unconventional gas knowledge-base is highly polarised and currently incomplete, this report identifies and describes select points of controversy in the literature that may have a bearing on the impact of unconventional gas in Europe. It then assesses the existing evidence around these points and evaluates the degree of uncertainty that currently exists. In doing so, the report draws upon a range of techniques referred to as evidence-based policy and practice that aims at giving greater weight to scientific research evidence in policy-making. Specifically, as in this report, it includes the synthesis of existing evidence through a process known as a systematic review. Simulations in this report are based on ETSAP-TIAM, a multiregional partial equilibrium model of the energy systems of the entire world that is divided into 15 regions. ETSAP- TIAM is developed and maintained by the Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme under the aegis of the IEA. Remarks Regarding regional and global estimates of unconventional gas: There are multiple and substantial uncertainties in assessing the recoverable volumes of shale gas, both at regional and global level. Even in areas where production is currently taking place, notably North America, there remains significant uncertainty over the size of the resource and considerable variation in the available estimates. For several regions of the world there are no estimates at all, but some may well contain significant resources. Given the absence of production experience in most regions of the world and the number and magnitude of uncertainties described below, current resource estimates should be treated with considerable caution. Based on an assessment of the existing literature, this report expresses the estimates of unconventional gas as technically recoverable resources (TRR). While resource estimates based on production experience are likely to be more robust, with very limited production experience it is more appropriate to incorporate estimates from studies that use a range of methodologies (expert judgement; literature review; bottom-up assessment of geological parameters and extrapolation of production experience). Thus, this report focuses on TRR and takes no account of economic viability or any other constraints on resource recovery. The review is focused on literature with original estimates of unconventional gas and provides an overview of current estimates of TRR for tight gas and coal-bed methane in four regions (USA, Canada, Europe and China) as well as globally. An estimate is given for shale gas for 15 regions worldwide. Current estimates for the TRR of shale gas suggest there may be just above over 200 trillion cubic metres (Tcm) globally. Similarly, the mean of current estimates for the global TRR of tight gas is 45 Tcm and the mean estimate of CBM is 25 Tcm. For comparison, the global TRR of conventional gas is estimated at 425 Tcm of which v
around 190 Tcm are currently classified as proved reserves (i.e. resources that can be easily recovered with the highest degree of confidence). For some regions, it was possible to obtain high, best and low TRR estimates for shale gas. In the USA, the high/best/low estimates are 47/20/13 Tcm and for China the estimates are 40/21/1.6 Tcm. As an illustration of the uncertainty in the estimates, the high and low estimates in the USA are 230% and 64% of the best estimate respectively. There is even greater uncertainty in the unconventional gas resource estimates for the rest of the world. Organisations that have provided multiple estimates for single regions have consistently, and often significantly, increased their estimates over time. The best estimate for Western Europe is 12 Tcm and for Eastern Europe it is 4Tcm. The variability and uncertainty in the reviewed estimates have a variety of sources. Studies use different methodologies for the resource estimates, often using imprecise or ambiguous terminology. For estimates based upon geological appraisals, significant source of uncertainty stems from the assumed recovery factor the fraction of the original gas in place that is estimated to be recoverable which may vary substantially (15-40%) for shale gas. For estimates based upon the extrapolation of production experience, a key source of uncertainty is the appropriate application of decline curve analysis, with no consensus on how quickly the rate of production from currently producing wells will slow in the future. Future technological progress, even if only leading to a small increase in recovery factors, could have a significant impact on the estimated ultimately recoverable resources.
Regarding technological development: The successful development of shale gas in the last decade is due to the combination of progress in two key technologies, namely horizontal (or directional) drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Progress has also been made in other stages of shale gas exploration and production, from well pad design, to water management and infrastructure planning, to microseismic monitoring. Environmental concerns have accompanied the growth in shale gas exploration and production. Some significant risks can have similar causes to those associated with conventional onshore gas. These include: gas migration and groundwater contamination due for instance to faulty well construction; blowouts; and above ground leaks and spills of wastewater and chemicals. Significant risks that arise from shale gas development require additional consideration and dedicated analysis. Factors to take into account include, for example, the larger number of wells when compared to conventional practices, and the high volume of water and fracturing fluids used. As the horizontal section of wells gets longer, multi-stage hydraulic fracturing with 10 to 20 stages per well has developed. Further improved understanding of the fracturing process may improve precision; improve the network of fractures created; reduce the number of fracturing stages per well; reduce the time needed to drill and fracture; and reduce the consumption of water. Such improvement may lead to a significant reduction in fracturing cost. Advancements in microseismic monitoring allow for the mapping and visualisation of how fracturing is progressing. It also provides information for the early detection of geo-hazards. vi
Alternative fracturing fluids are being researched to allow the use of non-fresh water and flowback water. Water treatment processes are being investigated that could potentially be used on a large scale, with the ultimate goal of achieving a closed-loop system. Multiple horizontal wells drilled from a single pad will increase the operational efficiency of gas production and reduce infrastructure costs, land use and environmental impact. A larger number of wells per pad and longer wells will lead to a corresponding increase in time spent on drilling and well completion operations on each well pad. This would favour a new, more industrialised concept for site and rig design, including highly automated drilling rigs with higher efficiency. Drilling cost reduction in the order of 30-60% is judged feasible. Additional savings can be expected from the specialisation of well design and well construction. Based on the historical development of the different components making up the process of exploration and production of shale gas, as well as judgement on potential future gains, a model for potential shale gas development in Europe is outlined, covering minimum, most likely and maximum scenarios of the key variables contributing to the cost of shale gas production.
Regarding land and resource access: There is a tight interrelationship between the regulatory, environmental, technical, social and economic challenges associated with land access for shale gas development. A series of obstacles to accessing land for unconventional gas development have been revealed: water management; protected areas; mineral right and royalties; surface disturbance; noise and visual impact; community impact; waste management; as well as the need to engage multiple small land owners and communities. Land is required to find, develop, produce and transport gas, which includes well pads, access roads, utility corridors (water and electricity lines, etc.), space for gas gathering lines, water management facilities, etc. It has become common to use a single pad for multiple horizontal wells (typically four to eight wells at present in the USA) in order to develop as much subsurface area as possible from one spot. Such pads require some one to four hectares of land. However, the effective surface area usage per well is significantly lower when constructing horizontal multi-well pads. Well density or well spacing will depend on geological and other factors. The number of well pads per square mile typically varies from 16 for single vertical wells, down to one, for horizontal multi-well configurations with six to eight wells on each pad. In addition to direct land use, there are disturbances caused by the duration and intensity of all the activities related to exploration, e.g. truck trips, noise levels and visual impacts. The duration of activities (including the construction of well pads and access roads, drilling, well completion and clean up) depend on multiple factors (number of wells per pad, and geological, logistical and regulatory factors). The
vii
duration of the complete operation typically vary from 5 to 36 months (for horizontal single and multi-well pads respectively). It is necessary to consider the cumulative impact of several horizontal wells being drilled annually over a longer period of development. The potential impacts must be balanced with other land usage, such as wildlife, agriculture and tourism, and the overall quality of life in a community.
Regarding the regulatory framework: A successful regulatory regime governing the exploitation of sub-surface minerals must reconcile the objectives of three main sets of actors: governments, with their desire to maximise rents while achieving socioeconomic and environmental objectives; market players and their desire for a return on investment that is consistent with the risk associated with the project; and finally, the needs of societal actors to preserve or improve welfare in social, monetary or environmental terms. Key regulatory issues reported can be categorised according to their technical/logistical, legal and socioeconomic dimensions. With farm plots smaller and land ownership more diffuse in Europe, a key regulatory consideration is how to manage multiple landowners and their varying claims and concerns. In the USA, this is addressed by what is known as pooling and unitisation (the combination of several small tracts of land needed to support a well or well pad, up to the field-wide operation of a producing reservoir), which allow for managing concession areas fairly and effectively. Such an approach, whereby the development of a complex of multiple well pads is managed centrally, helps to avoid duplication of infrastructure, as well as goods and service procurement. It speeds up permitting procedures and reduces environmental impact. It is often argued that because the landowners own both surface and mineral rights in the USA, this favours shale gas development (financially benefitting the landowner), whereas because the sub-surface rights would generally be owned by the state in the EU, landowners have no incentive to support development. However, the situation is more complicated in both the USA and the EU, as well as being variable between different EU Member States. The real distinction is the degree to which surface landowners have a say in granting permission to develop an area. In the USA, the law tends to favour the owner of the mineral estate, whilst often granting the right to compensation for the use of the surface. In the EU, on the other hand, there is variation between Member States in the extent to which surface landowners can restrict the development of shale gas. France, the United Kingdom and Poland all have different regimes in place.
Regarding market access: There are two principle determinants of whether new gas resources are able to reach markets: 1) their physical proximity to suitable gas transportation infrastructure; and 2) the regulatory structure of the natural gas market. Whilst the distance between the wellhead and pipelines drives up the capital and operating costs required to deliver gas to consumers, the structure of the natural gas market has important implications for how easily new supplies are able compete with established supplies.
viii
The US and EU gas transportation systems are broadly analogous in terms of gas transmission pipeline density if we take into account the dense infrastructure in certain parts of the USA that is the legacy of many years of hydrocarbon development. There are 53km of transmission pipeline for every 1000 km2 in the USA, compared with 29km in the EU. A liberalised and competitive market formed an important part of the regulatory backdrop to the unconventional gas revolution in the USA. The increased investor risk in this liberalised market has not prevented the completion of major infrastructure investments intended to bring unconventional gas to market. This is in spite of the narrower profit margins and greater uncertainty commonly ascribed to unconventional gas production. As large-scale shale gas production has so far not been observed outside of liberalised energy markets, questions remain about whether the phenomenon can be replicated in differently structured markets and, if so, how this might look. Whereas the USA has a fully liberalised market for natural gas, reforms to the EUs internal gas market are still ongoing. There have been encouraging recent developments indicating that EU market liberalisation is gathering pace. However, a recent European Commission report on market progress concedes that a truly single energy market is far from complete. Questions thus remain as to whether the EUs internal market rules can be practically applied in the context of possible unconventional gas development and be clear, non-discriminatory, timely and repeatable across large operations.
Regarding the impact of shale gas in the USA: Unconventional gas production in the USA has increased markedly in the last decade. It accounted for 58% of domestic production in 2010, causing the USA to surpass Russia as the largest gas producer in the world. Much of the expansion has been due to shale gas, which accounted for 23% of total US natural gas production in 2010. Consequently, projections for future US production have been continuously revised upwards. It was initially expected that the USA would need to import substantial quantities of LNG, which led to massive investments in the LNG infrastructure in the last decade. The reality, however, is that the USA has ended up requiring less than 10% out of its current 150 bcm re-gasification capacity. Instead there are now plans to add export capabilities. Most of the growth in demand for gas in the USA is expected to occur in the power generation sector, followed by transportation (natural gas vehicles) and in the petrochemical industries. Gas-fired power plants have cost, timing and emission advantages compared to coal-fired plants, and incremental increases in gas-fired electricity capacity have been observed since 2005, which is backed up by reported plans for the coming years. The extent to which these advantages are capitalised upon depends partly on the extent to which US producers decide to export natural gas via LNG. Cost estimates for shale gas production and the break-even price that is necessary to recoup expenditures per well vary considerably and are subject to much contestation. Break-even price estimates in the USA have been reduced lately and ix
range between $3-7/MBtu. Estimates for Europe vary between $5-12/MBtu. However, the production of natural gas liquids from shale wells is reportedly having a significantly positive effect on shale well economics in the USA, and technological learning, which has contributed to reducing total drilling and completion costs by half in the last five years, is expected to lower costs even more. Estimates of future natural gas prices in both the USA and for Europe have been repeatedly revised downwards in recent years, supported by the increase in shale gas developments. The spot price for natural gas in the USA (Henry Hub) has fallen from a peak at $13/MBtu in mid-2008 down towards $2/MBtu in 2012.
Regarding the impact in Europe to date: Global LNG trade volumes increased two-fold between 2000 and 2010, and increasing LNG liquefaction and regasification capacity looks set to continue to drive this trend for the foreseeable future. As a major consumer of natural gas, Europe is robustly contributing to this trend: the EUs current regasification capacity of 150 bcm looks set to double by 2020. There is ample evidence that LNG is changing the characteristics of global gas markets. Whereas the high cost of transporting gas had previously restricted trade to specific regions, fluctuations in supply, demand and prices are increasingly being transmitted throughout the globe. Rapidly increasing LNG capacity in receiving terminals in North-West Europe strengthened the link between UK and US gas hub prices between 2009 and 2010, enabling many EU Member States to benefit from the cheap spot-traded gas partially resulting from increased unconventional gas production in the USA. US net imports of natural gas fell 30% between 2007 and 2010. With legal and technical barriers to growing volumes of spot-traded gas disappearing as EU market reforms take effect, the sharp fall in spot prices witnessed in 2009 and 2010 occasioned widespread dissatisfaction amongst the utilities, which were locked into buying gas on oil-indexed terms as they were gradually priced out of the market. Spot gas prices were some 25% lower than oil- indexed gas during this period. The close correlation between US and EU gas hub prices came to an end around April 2010 as a result of unforeseen demand-side events, including the Fukushima disaster. However, the current balance of expert opinion suggests that the EU will continue to move slowly away from oil indexation because of the persisting risk of future exposure to discount hub prices.
Regarding potential impacts on the global energy system: To explore the uncertainty surrounding the reserve size and production costs of shale gas, a scenario analysis has been carried out with a global energy system model, ETSAP-TIAM, which is able to capture the complex and interrelated factors driving future gas supply and demand developments. Some preliminary conclusions as to what can be expected from shale gas development are summarised in the following points.
Overall, the scenario analysis highlights that shale gas does have the potential to extensively impact global gas markets, but only under strongly optimistic assumptions about its production costs and reserves. In a scenario favourable to shale gas development, natural gas as a whole has the potential to capture 30% of the worlds total primary energy supply by 2025, rising further to 35% by 2040. This would make it surpass oil as the worlds foremost source of energy. Relative to a scenario that is not carbon constrained, strict CO2 emissions targets reduce the production of natural gas, including shale gas. However, the strict CO2 emissions targets modelled do not preclude a significant absolute growth in natural gas use. The modelling results therefore support the potential role of natural gas as a bridge fuel. Shale gas is relatively evenly dispersed around the world and the majority of regions will likely witness at least some level of production in the future. The USA and China are well placed to become the top producers of shale gas, although significant production also takes place in most of the other regions. The scenario analysis suggests that shale gas will tend to be used within the regions where it is produced. No single region will produce enough shale gas so as to move from being a net importer to a net exporter. The global trade in natural gas, driven by conventional gas, will increase in any scenario. Shale gas development, however, has the potential to moderate the degree of growth, particularly for interregional LNG flows. Low LNG costs would mitigate the reduction in trade resulting from widespread shale gas development. Significant shale gas production has the potential to lower natural gas prices, although the extent of this reduction strongly depends on the way natural gas will be priced in the future. In particular, oil indexation has the potential to reduce the fall in gas prices resulting from shale gas development. The degree of penetration of gas in transport strongly depends on the oil-gas price link. A weaker link implies greater potential for shale gas to induce a significant growth of gas use in transportation. The impact on demand in an optimistic shale gas scenario is not equal across all regions. Much depends on the relative competitiveness of fuels and technologies in each region. This is particularly apparent for electricity generation. While shale gas can induce a dramatic change in the USAs electricity generation mix, its impact on Chinas mix is more limited. Shale gas production will not make Europe self-sufficient in natural gas. The best case scenario for shale gas development in Europe is one in which declining conventional production can be replaced and import dependence maintained at a level around 60%. Regarding trade flows, the structure of EU gas imports is very sensitive to the LNG cost assumptions.
xi
Index
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
.............................................................................................................................................
ii EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
............................................................................................................................................
iii INDEX
......................................................................................................................................................................
xii LIST
OF
FIGURES
...................................................................................................................................................
xvi LIST
OF
TABLES
....................................................................................................................................................
xxi ACRONYMS
..........................................................................................................................................................
xxiv 1 INTRODUCTION
..............................................................................................................................................
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5.1 1.5.2 1.6 2 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 3 3.1 3.1.1 What
is
this
report
about?
................................................................................................
1 Why
is
this
report
needed?
..............................................................................................
1 Objectives
and
scope
of
this
report
..............................................................................
8 The
European
energy
policy
context
........................................................................
10 Methodology
........................................................................................................................
11 Evidence-based
policy
and
practice
..........................................................................
11 The
ETSAP-TIAM
model
.................................................................................................
12 Report
structure
.................................................................................................................
13 Estimates:
The
global
unconventional
gas
resource
base
...............................
16 Definitions
............................................................................................................................
16 Sources
of
data
....................................................................................................................
22 Estimates
of
shale
gas
resource
..................................................................................
24 Shale
gas
estimates
in
context
.....................................................................................
30 Methods
for
estimating
the
recoverable
resources
of
shale
gas
...................
32 Description
of
approaches
.............................................................................................
33 Methodological
robustness
of
each
method
..........................................................
40 Impact
of
technology
on
resource
estimates
.........................................................
44 Summary
...............................................................................................................................
45 Decline
curve
analysis
and
the
estimation
of
recoverable
resources
.........
47 Best
estimates:
characterising
the
uncertainty
....................................................
50 Estimates
of
shale
gas
resources
................................................................................
50 Confidence
in
current
estimates
and
conclusions
...............................................
52 Introduction
to
unconventional
gas
technology
..................................................
56 Conventional
gas
................................................................................................................
56 xii
3.1.2 3.1.3 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 Definition of shale and tight gas and coal-bed methane ................................... 56 Generation of contact surface in the shale ............................................................. 59 Definition of state-of-the-art shale gas technology ............................................ 59 Drilling .................................................................................................................................... 59 Hydraulic fracturing ......................................................................................................... 63 Monitoring ............................................................................................................................ 70
3.3 Evaluation of technical and operational assumptions for shale gas development scenarios in Europe ...................................................................................................... 73 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.3.7 3.4 4 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.3 4.4 5 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.2 5.2.1 Field development pad sizing and well configuration scenario .................... 73 Drilling and completion capacity scenario ............................................................. 74 Drilling technology and cost scenario ...................................................................... 78 Fracturing technology and cost scenario ................................................................ 83 Field development infrastructure and gas processing and treatment scenario .................................................................................................................................. 84 Gas production scenario from shale developments ........................................... 85 Summary and conclusions ............................................................................................. 87 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 98 Land access ......................................................................................................................... 100 Resource access ................................................................................................................ 101 Regulatory framework .................................................................................................. 113 Market access .................................................................................................................... 123 Market structure .............................................................................................................. 124 Market access in North America ............................................................................... 126 Market access in the EU-27 ......................................................................................... 132 Indigenous production and energy security ........................................................ 138 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 143 The impact of shale gas in the United States of America ................................ 145 Projections of supply and production .................................................................... 145 Projections of demand and future energy mix ................................................... 149 Natural gas and renewable energy .......................................................................... 153 Shale gas production costs and natural gas prices ........................................... 156 The impact in Europe to date ..................................................................................... 163 Increasing LNG liquefaction and regasification capacity ............................... 165 xiii
THE IMPACT OF UNCONVENTIONAL GAS ON THE EUROPEAN ENERGY SYSTEM ................................ 145
5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 6 6.1 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.3 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.4 ANNEXES A B SYSTEMATIC REVIEW METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... II DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................................. IV B.1 B.2 C C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 D E F G H Resources, reserves and the USGS definitions ......................................................... V Estimates of shale gas resource .................................................................................. VII Description of approaches ................................................................................................ X Methods used by INTEK for the US Energy Information Administration .... X Comparison of USGS and INTEK methods .............................................................. XII Impact of technology on resource estimates ....................................................... XIV The LNG trade and global gas markets .................................................................. 171 EU Member States and the recent gas glut ......................................................... 175 The oil-gas price link ...................................................................................................... 181 Key factors for shale gas development .................................................................. 189 Upstream natural gas resources and cost ............................................................. 189 Midstream ........................................................................................................................... 196 Natural gas in power generation and other end uses ...................................... 201 Summary of key assumptions .................................................................................... 204 Scenario analysis results .............................................................................................. 207 Context and global trends ............................................................................................ 207 Upstream gas production ............................................................................................. 209 The role of gas in a carbon-constrained world ................................................... 213 Gas trade .............................................................................................................................. 216 The impact of shale gas production on imports ................................................. 221 Natural gas in power generation and end uses .................................................. 223 Power generation ............................................................................................................ 224 Gas in transport ................................................................................................................ 228 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 229
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SHALE GAS ON THE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM ....................................... 186
DECLINE RATE METHODOLOGIES ......................................................................................................... XVIII BEST ESTIMATES: CHARACTERISING THE UNCERTAINTY .................................................................. XXIV EVIDENCE BASE ........................................................................................................................................ XXV MAJOR REGULATIONS FOR THE EU INTERNAL GAS MARKET ......................................................... XXXVI EVALUATING POTENTIAL SHALE GAS WELLS AND QUANTIFYING FINDING AND DEVELOPING COSTS XXXVIII xiv
I J A BRIEF COMPARISON OF JRC AND IEA MODELLING RESULTS ON UNCONVENTIONAL GAS ............. XL REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................ XLIII
xv
List
of
Figures
Figure
1-1:
Shale
gas
production
and
wellhead
gas
prices
in
the
United
States
of
America
....................................................................................................................................................................................
3 Figure
1-2:
Primary
production
of
natural
gas
and
energy
import
dependence
in
the
EU- 27
..............................................................................................................................................................................
5 Figure
1-3:
Factors
determining
the
viability
of
natural
gas
developments
............................
9 Figure
2-1:
Resources
and
reserves
.......................................................................................................
21 Figure
2-2:
Cumulative
number
of
reports
published
providing
original
country-level
estimates
of
any
of
the
unconventional
gases
....................................................................................
22 Figure
2-3:
Estimates
of
remaining
recoverable
resources
for
unconventional
gases
in
the
USA
in
successive
Annual
Energy
Outlooks
from
the
EIA
.....................................................
23 Figure
2-4:
Distribution
of
literature
providing
original
resource
estimates
by
region,
source
and
gas
type
........................................................................................................................................
23 Figure
2-5:
US
shale
gas
resource
estimates
and
annual
production
......................................
24 Figure
2-6:
Estimates
of
global
shale
gas
resources
by
sources
considering
regions
outside
North
America
.................................................................................................................................
27 Figure
2-7:
Estimates
made
since
2008
of
the
technically
recoverable
shale
gas
resources
in
the
United
States
of
America
(above)
and
Canada
(below)
...............................
28 Figure
2-8:
All
estimates
of
the
technically
recoverable
resources
of
shale
gas
within
Europe
.................................................................................................................................................................
29 Figure
2-9:
All
estimates
of
the
technically
recoverable
resources
of
shale
gas
within
China
.....................................................................................................................................................................
30 Figure
2-10
Approaches
used
by
all
reports
providing
original
country-level
shale
gas
resource
estimates
.........................................................................................................................................
33 Figure
2-11:
Schematic
representation
of
the
steps
used
in
the
geological-based
approach
(see
Table
3-1
for
terminology)
...........................................................................................
34 Figure
2-12:
Illustrative
chart
of
typical
decline
in
shale
gas
production
.............................
48 Figure
3-1:
Vertical
vs.
horizontal
well
comparison
........................................................................
60 Figure
3-2:
Typical
wellbore
trajectory
................................................................................................
61 Figure
3-3:
Horizontal
drilling
technology
..........................................................................................
62 Figure
3-4:
Multi-well
pad
development
..............................................................................................
63 Figure
3-5:
Vertical
well
and
horizontal
well
fracture
views
......................................................
64 Figure
3-6:
Representation
of
the
new
fracturing
approach
with
respect
to
a
conventional
fracture
....................................................................................................................................
67 Figure
3-7:
Hydrajet
perforation
and
proppant
plug
diversion
to
fracture
multiple
intervals,
vertically
and
horizontally
.....................................................................................................
67 Figure
3-8:
Consumptive
water
uses
in
the
Delaware
Basin
.......................................................
69 Figure
3-9:
Distribution
of
magnitudes
of
microseismic
events
in
Barnett
Shale
..............
70
xvi
Figure 3-10: Typical hydraulic fracture monitoring configurations for horizontal treatment wells ................................................................................................................................................ 71 Figure 3-11: Map view of hydraulic fracture intersecting a pre-existing fault .................... 71 Figure 3-12: Location and orientation of the fault identified by microseismic monitoring ................................................................................................................................................................................. 71 Figure 3-13: Development of drilling performance in Europe ................................................... 74 Figure 3-14: Well drilling and completion time breakdown ....................................................... 75 Figure 3-15: Rig drilling in The Hague (NL) ........................................................................................ 78 Figure 3-16: Rig location close to a hospital ....................................................................................... 78 Figure 3-17: Field development with centralised functions and rig specialisation .......... 79 Figure 3-18: Liquid production from shale gas plays in Texas ................................................... 87 Figure 4-1: Phases and key steps in developing a Marcellus shale well ............................... 103 Figure 4-2: Total surface area requirements for developing natural gas wells ................ 105 Figure 4-3: Theoretical well densities of vertical and multi-well horizontal pads .......... 106 Figure 4-4: Current well density in US counties of comparable shale gas plays, 2009 .. 107 Figure 4-5: Timeline for shale gas development and production (single well) ................. 108 Figure 4-6: Estimated daily heavy and light truck round-trip traffic by well type .......... 110 Figure 4-7: Natural gas processing plants and production basins in the USA, 2009 ...... 112 Figure 4-8: Barnett Shale drilling in 1997 and 2009, Ft. Worth Basin, Texas, USA ......... 113 Figure 4-9: Key elements of an unconventional gas regulatory framework ....................... 115 Figure 4-10: US natural gas pipeline capacity additions versus marketed gas production ............................................................................................................................................................................... 129 Figure 4-11: Significant pipeline expansions in the USA in 2009 ............................................ 130 Figure 4-12: The US natural gas transmission network .............................................................. 133 Figure 4-13: The EUs natural gas transmission network ........................................................... 134 Figure 5-1: Projections of US natural gas production ................................................................... 146 Figure 5-2: Forecasts of US natural gas production by type ...................................................... 148 Figure 5-3: Historical and projected net US LNG imports ........................................................... 149 Figure 5-4: US electricity generation by fuel .................................................................................... 150 Figure 5-5: Planned additions to coal and gas-fired electricity capacity in the United States of America (aggregate 2011-2015) ......................................................................................... 151 Figure 5-6: Average cost of coal and gas for electricity generation in the United States of America, January 2007 - October 2011 ............................................................................................... 152 Figure 5-7: Projected non-hydropower renewable electricity generation in the United States of America, 2010-2035 ................................................................................................................. 154 Figure 5-8: Projected CO2 emissions in the United States of America ................................... 155
xvii
Figure 5-9: Total per-well production costs for shale gas .......................................................... 157 Figure 5-10: Indicative cost breakdown of a shale gas project, first three years ............. 159 Figure 5-11: Indicative cost breakdown of a shale gas project, full life cycle .................... 159 Figure 5-12: Break-even prices for unconventional gas production ..................................... 160 Figure 5-13: US natural gas production and average annual Henry Hub prices ............... 162 Figure 5-14: IEA estimates of import price for Europe under reference scenario .......... 163 Figure 5-15: Global LNG trade volumes and LNG as a percentage of global gas consumption ................................................................................................................................................... 165 Figure 5-16: EU LNG imports by Member State .............................................................................. 166 Figure 5-17: Current and planned EU-27 LNG regasification capacity (as of September 2011) .................................................................................................................................................................. 167 Figure 5-18: EU LNG imports by origin ............................................................................................... 168 Figure 5-19: Short-term trading in LNG ............................................................................................. 172 Figure 5-20: 2010 export destinations of global LNG swing suppliers ................................. 174 Figure 5-21: Euro area and EU-27 industrial production, total industry excluding construction .................................................................................................................................................... 175 Figure 5-22: Forecast US natural gas imports .................................................................................. 176 Figure 5-23: US natural gas imports and exports ........................................................................... 177 Figure 5-24: US LNG exports and gas prices ..................................................................................... 178 Figure 5-25: Henry Hub and National Balancing Point gas prices .......................................... 179 Figure 5-26: Global natural gas prices ................................................................................................. 180 Figure 6-1: Assumptions on the global, technically recoverable reserves of shale gas . 190 Figure 6-2: Global conventional gas reserves (recoverable, enhanced recovery and new discovery) ........................................................................................................................................................ 191 Figure 6-3: Conventional gas production cost estimates in 2020 ........................................... 191 Figure 6-4: Shale gas production cost estimates for 2020 .......................................................... 194 Figure 6-5: Shale gas supply curves for the United States of America in 2015 ................. 195 Figure 6-6: Illustrative costs of gas, oil and coal transportation .............................................. 198 Figure 6-7: LNG liquefaction plant capital costs ............................................................................. 199 Figure 6-8: GDP and gas consumption by region, 2005-2010 .................................................. 202 Figure 6-9: Schematic of the scenario analysis framework ........................................................ 206 Figure 6-10: Total energy demand under different scenario assumptions ......................... 208 Figure 6-11: Global primary energy supply by fuel (conservative low growth and optimistic high growth) ............................................................................................................................. 208 Figure 6-12: Total energy demand by region ................................................................................... 209 Figure 6-13: Global gas production ...................................................................................................... 210 xviii
Figure 6-14: Unconventional gas production in the optimistic high-growth scenario .. 211 Figure 6-15: Changes in relative share of total gas production in 2040 (conservative/optimistic) ......................................................................................................................... 212 Figure 6-16: Shale gas production by region in 2040: Optimistic-HG and Conservative- LG scenarios .................................................................................................................................................... 213 Figure 6-17: Total primary energy supply and CO2 emissions in the optimistic low- growth scenario (above) and a carbon-constrained optimistic low-growth scenario (below) .............................................................................................................................................................. 215 Figure 6-18: LNG exports under optimistic and conservative shale gas development .. 217 Figure 6-19: LNG exports under conservative and optimistic shale gas development with low LNG cost ......................................................................................................................................... 217 Figure 6-20: Pipeline exports by region under optimistic and conservative shale gas development ................................................................................................................................................... 218 Figure 6-21: LNG imports by region in the conservative shale gas development scenario with low LNG cost versus optimistic low growth ........................................................................... 219 Figure 6-22: Pipeline imports by region in the conservative shale gas development scenario versus optimistic low growth ............................................................................................... 220 Figure 6-23: European gas imports in conservative/optimistic shale gas scenarios ..... 221 Figure 6-24: Conservative (above) and optimistic (below) European shale gas production in the low-growth scenario .............................................................................................. 222 Figure 6-25: Gas prices in China, Western Europe and the United States of America in the optimistic and conservative shale gas scenarios .................................................................... 223 Figure 6-26: Increase in gas demand between conservative and optimistic shale gas scenarios ........................................................................................................................................................... 224 Figure 6-27: Electricity production by fuel in four scenarios: conservative vs. optimistic; optimistic with high nuclear; optimistic in a carbon constrained energy system ........... 225 Figure 6-28: Chinas electricity generation by fuel ........................................................................ 226 Figure 6-29: US electricity generation by fuel .................................................................................. 226 Figure 6-30: Europes electricity generation by fuel ..................................................................... 227 Figure 6-31: Global gas use in transport in the low growth scenarios .................................. 228 Figure 6-32: The oil-gas price ratio compared with the use of gas in transport ............... 228 Figure C-1: Map of US shale gas plays (lower 48 states) ............................................................... XII Figure D-1: Exponential and hyperbolic decline curves with equal initial production and decline rate ....................................................................................................................................................... XIX Figure D-2: Semi-log plot of exponential and hyperbolic decline curves .............................. XIX Figure D-3: Implications of varying b for estimates of URR for 44 wells in the Haynesville Shale ........................................................................................................................................... XXI Figure D-4: Variation of hyperbolic decline with the value of b .............................................. XXII
xix
Figure E-1: Examples of possible probability distributions between estimates in a selection of regions .................................................................................................................................... XXIV Figure H-1: Example of finding and development costs for range resources ............... XXXIX
xx
List
of
Tables
Table
1-1:
Differences
between
systematic
and
narrative
reviews
..........................................
12 Table
2-1:
Interpreting
the
terminology
used
for
unconventional
gas
resource
estimates
.................................................................................................................................................................................
20 Table
2-2:
Estimates
of
original
shale
gas
in
place
by
Rogner
....................................................
25 Table
2-3:
Mean
estimates
of
remaining
technically
recoverable
resources
of
conventional
gas,
CBM,
tight
gas
and
shale
gas
provided
by
the
evidence
base
(Tcm)
...
31 Table
2-4:
USGS
estimates
of
shale
gas
resource
in
the
United
States
of
America
.............
40 Table
2-5:
Advantages
and
disadvantages
of
geological
and
extrapolation
approaches
to
estimating
shale
gas
resources
.................................................................................................................
46 Table
2-6:
Estimates
of
shale
gas
resources
(Tcm)
..........................................................................
51 Table
3-1:
Summary
of
critical
data
used
to
appraise
coal-bed
and
shale
gas
reservoirs
.................................................................................................................................................................................
58 Table
3-2:
Ten-square-mile
total
surface
disturbance
of
vertical
and
horizontal
wells
..
63 Table
3-3:
An
example
of
the
volumetric
composition
of
hydraulic
fracturing
fluid
........
64 Table
3-4:
Naturally
occurring
substances
that
may
be
found
in
hydrocarbon-containing
formations
..........................................................................................................................................................
65 Table
3-5:
Water
use
by
sector
in
shale
gas
basins
..........................................................................
69 Table
3-6:
Baker
Hughes
worldwide
rig
count
..................................................................................
76 Table
3-7:
Baker
Hughes
rig
count
Europe
.........................................................................................
77 Table
3-8:
Comparison
of
drill
bit
finding
and
development
cost
per
1
000
cubic
feet
equivalent
(Mcfe)
(three-year
average)
for
different
US
operators
.........................................
82 Table
3-9:
Comparison
of
lifting
cost
per
Mcfe
of
production
(three-year
average)
for
different
US
operators
..................................................................................................................................
85 Table
3-10:
Technically
recoverable
shale
gas
resources
for
the
USA
....................................
86 Table
3-11:
Technically
recoverable
shale
oil
resources
for
the
USA
......................................
87 Table
3-12:
Typical
well
configurations
...............................................................................................
88 Table
3-13:
Typical
rig
site
configurations
..........................................................................................
89 Table
3-14:
Depth-based
cost
scenarios
...............................................................................................
90 Table
3-15:
Drilling
performance
scenarios
.......................................................................................
91 Table
3-16:
Drilling
operations
day-rate-based
cost
scenarios
..................................................
92 Table
3-17:
Drilling
cost
scenario
per
well
..........................................................................................
93 Table
3-18:
Fracturing
cost
scenario
per
well
...................................................................................
94 Table
3-19:
Field
development,
infrastructure
and
processing
costs
by
scenario
.............
95 Table
3-20:
Production
cost
scenario
combining
optimistic,
most
likely
and
conservative
cost
and
production
scenarios
..................................................................................................................
96
xxi
Table 3-21: Production cost scenarios based on the most likely production and three cost scenarios ................................................................................................................................................... 97 Table 3-22: Production cost scenarios based on optimistic production and three cost scenarios ............................................................................................................................................................. 97 Table 3-23: Production cost scenarios based on conservative production and three cost scenarios ............................................................................................................................................................. 97 Table 3-24: Shale gas cost scenarios for Europe ............................................................................... 99 Table 4-1: Surface usage for natural gas well pads and associated facilities, hectares (ha) per well .............................................................................................................................................................. 102 Table 4-2: Duration of drilling and completion activities ........................................................... 108 Table 4-3: Economic impacts of Marcellus Shale development in Pennsylvania, USA, 2009 .................................................................................................................................................................... 121 Table 4-4: Disaggregation of single test well costs (in thousand pounds sterling) ......... 123 Table 4-5: Major legislation for the US gas industry by Congress, FERC and court rulings ............................................................................................................................................................................... 127 Table 4-6: US shale gas pipeline projects in the near future ...................................................... 131 Table 4-7: Gas transmission grid density by country ................................................................... 135 Table 4-8: Major regulations for the EU internal gas market .................................................... 137 Table 4-9: Summary of the main challenges for accessing land for shale gas development in Europe .......................................................................................................................................................... 144 Table 5-1: LNG regasification terminals by region (as of June 2010) .................................... 167 Table 5-2: Qatars new liquefaction trains ......................................................................................... 168 Table 5-3: LNG liquifaction plants under construction by country ........................................ 169 Table 5-4: European spot gas prices as a percentage of oil-indexed gas prices in /MWh ............................................................................................................................................................................... 183 Table 6-1: Total unit production cost per shale gas well in Europe without liquids ...... 192 Table 6-2: Upstream costs for FRS companies, 2006-2008 and 2007-2009 ...................... 193 Table 6-3: Major interregional natural gas pipeline projects .................................................... 201 Table 6-4: Assumed maximum liquefaction capacity 2020 ....................................................... 201 Table 6-5: GDP assumptions in the model ......................................................................................... 203 Table 6-6: Summary of modelling assumptions .............................................................................. 205 Table A-1: Stages of a traditional systematic review compared to those of a realist review ................................................................................................................................................................... III Table B-1: Shale gas reports providing original country level estimates by date, countries or regions covered and type of resource estimate .................................................... VIII Table C-1: Assumed rates of technological progress in URR/well from various sources .............................................................................................................................................................................. XVII Table F-1: Documentation and classification of the evidence base ....................................... XXV xxii
Table H-1: FX Energys drilling programme in Poland and net asset value analysis ....................................................................................................................................................................... XXXVIII
xxiii
Acronyms
1P
Proved
reserves
2P
Proved
and
probable
reserves
3P
Proved,
probable
and
possible
reserves
ACER
Agency
for
the
Cooperation
of
Energy
Regulators
AEO
Annual
Energy
Outlook
report
by
the
EIA
BAU
Business-as-usual
bcm
Billion
cubic
metres
bbl
Barrel
BGR
Bundesanstalt
fr
Geowissenschaften
und
Rohstoffe
boe
Barrel
of
oil
equivalent
CBM
Coal-bed
methane
CCGT
Combined
cycle
gas
turbine
CCS
Carbon
capture
and
storage
DCA
Decline
curve
analysis
DECC
United
Kingdoms
Department
of
Energy
and
Climate
Change
DG
ENER
European
Commission
Directorate-General
for
Energy
DG
ENV
-
European
Commission
Directorate-General
for
the
Environment
DTS
Distributed
temperature
sensing
E&P
Exploration
and
production
EBPP
Evidence-based
policy
and
practice
EIA
United
States
of
Americas
Energy
Information
Administration
ENTSO
European
Network
of
Transmission
System
Operators
EPA
USAs
Environmental
Protection
Agency
ERR
Economically
recoverable
resources
ETSAP
Energy
Technology
Systems
Analysis
Programme
ETSAP-TIAM
ETSAP-TIMES
Integrated
Assessment
Model
EU
European
Union
EUR
Estimated
ultimate
recovery
EV
Electric
vehicle
F&D
Finding
and
development
FERC
USAs
Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission
FRS
EIAs
Financial
Reporting
System
FSU
Former
Soviet
Union
xxiv
FT Flat time FTE Full-time employment GDP Gross Domestic Product GHG Greenhouse gas GJ Gigajoules Gt Gigatonne GTL Gas-to-liquids Gtoe Gigatonnes of oil equivalent ha - Hectares HHV High heating values ICE Intercontinental Exchange IEA International Energy Agency ILT Invisible lost time IP Initial production KOP Kick-off point kPa Kilopascal LEL Lower explosive level LDC Local distribution companies LHS Left-hand side LNG Liquefied natural gas LOE Lease operating expenditures LPG Liquefied petroleum gas MBtu Million British thermal units mcm Million cubic metres Mcf 1 000 cubic feet Mcfe 1 000 cubic feet equivalent mD Millidarcy MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MMBtu Million British thermal units (alternative convention to MBtu) MMcf Million cubic feet MSM Microseismic Mapping Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent mtpa Million-tonne-per-annum MWD Measurement while drilling MWh - Megawatt hour xxv
NBP National Balancing Point NIMBY Not in my backyard NGL Natural gas liquid NGV Natural gas-powered vehicle NPC National Petroleum Council NPT Non-productive time NYMEX New York Mercantile Exchange NYSDEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservation NYSERDA New York State Energy Research and Development Authority OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OGIP Original gas in place PJ Petajoules ppm Parts per million PPRTVs Provisional peer-reviewed toxicity values PRMS Petroleum Resources Management System PT Productive time PV Photovoltaic RHS Right-hand side RSS Rotary steerable systems RTRR Remaining technically recoverable resources R&D Research and development SEC US Securities and Exchange Commission SGEIS Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Assessment SPE Society of Petroleum Engineers Tcf Trillion cubic feet Tcm Trillion cubic metres TDS Total dissolved solids TPA Third party access TRR Technically recoverable resources TSO Transmission system operators TWh Terawatt hours UK United Kingdom UKERC United Kingdom Energy Research Centre URR Ultimately recoverable resource USA United States of America xxvi
USGS United States Geological Survey WEC World Energy Council WEO World Energy Outlook report by the IEA
xxvii
1 Introduction
I.
Pearson
(European
Commission,
JRC
F.3)
Co-operation
and
Development
2011),
50.
2
E.J.
Moniz,
H.D.
Jacoby
and
A.J.M.
Meggs,
'The
future
of
natural
gas',
(Cambridge,
Massachusetts:
Massachusetts
Institute
of
Technology,
2010),
6.
3
Other
kinds
of
unconventional
gas,
such
as
methane
hydrates,
are
at
a
much
earlier
stage
of
development.
4
Tight
gas
is
sometimes
considered
to
be
a
continuation
of
conventional
gas
because
tight
gas
sandstone
and
limestone
are
simply
reservoir
rocks,
whereas
coal
and
shale
are
considered
to
be
both
the
source
and
the
reservoir
rock.
5
Source:
Eurostat.
1
IEA,
'Are
we
entering
a
golden
age
of
gas?',
in
World
Energy
Outlook
(Paris:
Organisation
for
Economic
contribute to total energy supply, hydrocarbons are widely projected to dominate the European energy mix through to at least 2030.6 It has long been known that global unconventional gas resources may be significant they are roughly equal to conventional gas resources, according to one widely cited estimate.7 In spite of their abundance, however, it was traditionally thought that the vast majority of the resource base was too difficult or costly to be commercially extracted. For this reason, virtually all estimates of the global oil and gas endowment up to the 1990s focused on conventional reserves and resources.8 In recent years, however, two key developments have shifted the focus to so-called unconventionals. The first has been mounting concern that growing demand for energy worldwide would outstrip supply. Whilst uncertainty over access to fossil fuel reserves persists, global population growth and rising standards of living in the developing world have pushed energy demand up considerably. These two factors have resulted in significant increases in the market prices of oil and natural gas over the last decade. The second factor has been a dramatic increase in unconventional gas production in North America. Against the backdrop of stiffer international competition for resources, unconventional gas production in the USA has robustly increased, more than offsetting the steady decline in domestic conventional gas production. Unconventional gas accounted for around 60% of all gas produced in the USA in 2010 shale gas was 23%.9 This has had a dramatic supply impact, turning the relatively tight US gas markets of 2006-07 into a buyers market with depressed natural gas prices now forecast to continue for some years to come.10 The sharp increase in shale gas production is particularly striking in light of the significant OGIP estimates of the resource not only in the USA, but globally.
Commission,
'Energy
infrastructure
priorities
for
2020
and
beyond
-
A
Blueprint
for
an
integrated
European
energy
network',
ed.
Directorate-General
for
Energy
(Luxembourg:
Office
for
Official
Publications
of
the
European
Communities,
2010).
7
H.H.
Rogner,
'An
Assessment
of
World
Hydrocarbon
Resources',
Annual
Review
of
Energy
and
the
Environment
22
(1997).
8
NPC,
'Facing
the
Hard
Truths
about
Energy:
A
comprehensive
View
to
2030
of
Global
Oil
and
Natural
Gas',
(Washington
DC:
National
Petroleum
Council,
2007),
96-97.
9
Source:
EIA.
10
EIA,
'Annual
Energy
Outlook
2011
with
Projections
to
2035',
(Washington,
DC:
US
Energy
Information
Administration,
2011).
6
European
Figure
1-1:
Shale
gas
production
and
wellhead
gas
prices
in
the
United
States
of
America11
The
recent
increase
in
unconventional
gas
production
in
the
USA
has
been
underpinned
by
technological
advancements
in
hydraulic
fracturing
and
horizontal
drilling.
These
have
been
essential
in
reducing
the
per-unit
production
cost
of
process-intensive
unconventional
gas
operations,
making
them
progressively
more
price
competitive
with
conventional
gas.
They
have
also
unlocked
access
to
resources
previously
beyond
technical
reach,
increasing
estimates
of
the
size
of
the
recoverable
resource.
These
advances
have
been
so
noteworthy
that
they
are
covered
in
greater
detail
in
Chapter
3
of
this
report.
Besides
the
technological
aspects,
however,
market
forces
are
also
relevant
to
our
understanding
of
the
US
case.
Higher
market
prices
made
previously
marginal
or
uneconomic
resources
profitable
to
extract
because
they
compensated
for
the
higher
costs
involved
in
producing
these
resources.
Price
signals
provided
important
incentives
for
switching
to
different
fuel
sources
and
they
encouraged
exploration,
which
led
to
the
discovery
of
resources
that
were
previously
unknown.
Most
significantly
in
the
case
of
US
unconventional
gas,
rising
prices
incentivised
the
development
and
deployment
of
new
technologies.
In
this
way,
the
recent
increase
in
US
unconventional
gas
production
can
be
understood
within
the
fundamental
economics
of
the
price
mechanism.12
Many
questions
still
remain
about
how
easily
unconventional
gas
resources
can
be
developed
elsewhere.
However,
at
the
time
of
writing
there
are
growing
expectations
11
Source:
Production
data
from
1982-1989
taken
from
J.A.
Slutz,
'Unconventional
gas
resources:
well
completions and production challenges' (paper presented at the Methane to Markets Partnership Expo, Beijing, China, 2007). Production data from 1990 onwards taken from EIA, 'AEO 2011'. Price data from EIA. 12 It is also important to note the effect of US Government initiatives, such as the Section 29 Non- Conventional Gas Tax Credits introduced in 1980. This provided a $0.50/Mcf incentive for gas produced from tight gas sands, coal-bed methane and Devonian shale.
that potential barriers to further unconventional gas production will be largely overcome and that increased supplies become available in other regions at costs comparable to those in North America.13 In light of the fact that rock formations potentially yielding unconventional gas can be found in abundance in many parts of the world, this has sent ripples through the energy research community. Rock that was previously considered to be of little value suddenly held the promise of changing some long-held assumptions about natural gas as an energy carrier. Although proven reserves14 of conventional gas have increased steadily since the 1970s, the distance of much of these from markets15 has prevented a greater role for natural gas in the global energy mix. This is because natural gas has much less flexibility in terms of transmission and storage when compared with, say, oil or coal, owing to its gaseous form and low energy density. Considerable capital expenditure is necessary to bring it to market, whether by pipeline or as liquefied natural gas (LNG), making natural gas relatively expensive to transport. The inflexibility and high cost of gas transit infrastructure also tends to lock buyers and sellers into long-term relationships and makes it difficult to replace lost gas supplies. Being highly import-dependent for gas and other energy products, the EU is especially affected by these concerns. The EU currently brings in well over half of the energy it consumes,16 and it estimates that, in the next 20-30 years, falling indigenous production levels will mean that up to 70% of its energy demand will have to be met through imports.17 Due to questions remaining about how quickly extraction capacity can be expanded by some of Europes most important suppliers, it is little wonder that the focus on unconventional gas has been intense, in spite of the fact that the continent itself is only at the earliest stages of exploration for shale gas the one that could be the most significant form of unconventional gas.
13
IEA,
'Golden
age',
17-18.
14
An
industry
term
for
reserves
that
can
be
easily
recovered
with
the
highest
degree
of
confidence.
15
Two-thirds
of
global
proven
reserves
of
natural
gas
are
located
in
Russia,
Iran,
Qatar,
Saudi
Arabia,
the
UAE, Venezuela and Nigeria. BP, 'Statistical review of world energy', ed. BP (2011). 16 Source: Eurostat. 17 European Commission, 'Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply', ed. Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000).
Figure
1-2:
Primary
production
of
natural
gas
and
energy
import
dependence
in
the
EU-2718
Unconventional
gas
may
offer
a
number
of
security-of-supply
benefits
for
the
Union,
helping
natural
gas
to
become
cheaper
and
more
readily
available
on
the
European
market.
Unconventional
gas
may
make
it
easier
for
the
EU
to
meet
its
future
energy
needs,
either
through
increasing
indigenous
production
levels,
or
by
reducing
demand
for
gas
elsewhere
in
the
world,
thus
freeing
up
more
supplies
that
can
be
imported.
Easing
tightness
in
global
energy
markets
has
recently
been
given
added
importance
in
light
of
waning
public
support
for
nuclear
power
following
the
Fukushima
disaster.
Given
the
concentrated
nature
of
conventional
gas
supplies
and
the
high
costs
and
risks
associated
with
long-distance
transportation,
there
may
also
be
considerable
economic
and
strategic
value
in
the
development
of
unconventional
resources
closer
to
the
European
market.
Such
supplies
would
add
diversity
to
the
EUs
gas
supplies
a
key
goal
of
EU
energy
policy.19
Many
Southern
and
Eastern
European
states
were
severely
affected
by
a
disruption
of
Russian
gas
through
Ukraine
in
2009,
and
the
continued
instability
in
other
supplier
states
as
a
result
of
the
Arab
Spring20
is
a
compelling
reminder
of
the
dangers
of
over-dependence
on
any
one
gas
source
or
supply
route.
Better
diversification
of
supplies
could
also
improve
the
EUs
bargaining
position
as
a
gas
consumer.
High
prices
for
piped
gas
in
those
EU
Member
States
with
only
a
single
18
Source:
Eurostat.
Dry
marketable
gas
production
measured
after
purification
and
extraction
of
NGLs
(Natural Gas Liquids) and sulphur. Energy dependency shows the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. The indicator is calculated as net imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy consumption plus bunkers. 19 European Commission, 'The EU energy policy: Engaging with partners beyond our borders', ed. Directorate-General for Energy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2011), 5. 20 In particular, Italian supplies of crude oil and natural gas were strongly affected by the unrest in Libya in 2011.
supplier
suggest
that
greater
economic
efficiency
can
be
achieved
through
the
introduction
of
alternative
supply
options.
Theoretically
speaking,
the
broad
geographical
distribution
of
unconventional
gas
reserves
could
also
reduce
any
nascent
gas
cartels
power
to
control
the
scarcity,
and
hence
price,
of
global
natural
gas
supplies.
Increased
unconventional
gas
production
may
also
have
climatic
and
environmental
benefits.
When
burned,
natural
gas
emits
less
CO2
and
local
pollutants21
than
other
fossil
fuels.
As
a
result
of
this,
some
have
argued
that
the
use
of
natural
gas
for
power
generation
is
among
the
cheapest
and
fastest
ways
to
reduce
CO2
emissions,
and
that
additional
unconventional
production
may
help
natural
gas
play
a
role
as
a
bridging
fuel
until
a
permanent
transition
can
be
made
to
renewable
sources
of
energy.
Gas
may
also
have
an
important
function
as
lower
carbon-backup
generation
to
help
balance
the
intermittency
of
many
renewable
energy
sources.
Finally,
substituting
imports
of
gas
extracted
far
away
with
unconventional
gas
produced
closer
to
markets
may
reduce
the
carbon
cost
associated
with
the
transportation
of
that
gas
and
hence
its
life-cycle
carbon
footprint.
Whilst
the
benefits
listed
above
are
notable,
unconventional
gas
carries
a
host
of
potential
negative
impacts
and
risks.
Environmental
concerns
include
the
risk
of
induced
seismicity,
as
well
as
the
strain
on
land
use
in
areas
developing
shale
gas.
Concerns
centre,
however,
on
the
large
volume
of
water
required
for
the
hydraulic
fracturing
process;
the
disposal
of
this
water
once
it
has
been
used;
and
the
potential
contamination
of
fresh
water
aquifers
as
a
result
of
drilling
and
well
stimulation
processes.
The
latter
point
is
especially
of
concern
because
the
treatment
of
contaminated
groundwater
can
be
a
long
and
costly
process
and
may
even
be
impossible
in
some
cases.
As
such,
moratoria
on
the
hydraulic
fracturing
process
have
been
sought
while
further
investigation
is
carried
out
in
certain
US
states,
Quebec,
South
Africa,
Bulgaria
and
France.
With
regard
to
climate
policy,
at
the
time
of
writing
there
is
growing
concern
over
the
life-cycle
emissions
from
unconventional
gas;
particularly
shale
gas.
Whilst
gas
that
is
sourced
from
unconventional
shale
or
sandstone
formations
emits
the
same
amount
of
CO2
when
burned,
the
additional
processes
necessary
to
extract
it
mean
that
more
greenhouse
gas
is
generally
emitted
at
the
mining
stage.
The
extent
of
these
additional
emissions
may
diminish,
and
in
the
worst
case
even
negate,
any
life-cycle
emissions
advantage
natural
gas
has
over
competing
fuels,
such
as
coal.
Finally,
the
International
Energy
Agency
(IEA)
has
estimated
that
under
the
right
conditions
unconventional
gas
may
meet
more
than
40%
of
the
increased
global
demand
for
gas
to
the
year
2035.22
This
raises
two
investment-related
questions.
First,
if
projections
such
as
these
come
to
pass,
then
natural
gas
will
probably
gain
a
greater
share
of
the
global
energy
mix.
But
what
will
it
displace?
Some
have
suggested
that
cheaper
gas
may
challenge
the
political
commitment
to
certain
kinds
of
renewable
energy
that
still
require
government
support
in
order
to
be
price
competitive.
Given
that
a
shift
to
gas
alone
will
not
be
sufficient
to
meet
agreed
CO2
emission
targets,
this
may
have
significant
implications
for
climate
change.
Secondly,
if
the
actual
volume
of
future
unconventional
gas
supplies
does
not
meet
expectations,
large
infrastructure
investments
could
be
diverted
from
viable
alternatives,
with
related
supply-side
21
Sulphur
dioxide
(SO 2),
nitrogen
oxides
(NOX)
and
participate
matter
(PM2.5),
for
example.
22
IEA,
'Golden
age',
29.
consequences.23
In
both
cases,
too
zealous
a
commitment
to
developing
gas
resources
could
lock
the
EU
into
an
energy
mix
that
fulfils
neither
its
security
of
supply
nor
its
climate
requirements.
In
light
of
the
possibilities
outlined
above,
questions
have
been
asked
about
if
and
how
European
policy-makers
should
respond
to
the
opportunities
and
challenges
posed
by
unconventional
gas.
The
European
Council
itself
has
stated:
In
order
to
further
enhance
its
security
of
supply,
Europes
potential
for
sustainable
extraction
and
use
of
conventional
and
unconventional
(shale
gas
and
oil
shale)
fossil
fuel
resources
should
be
assessed.24
The
difficulty
faced
by
policy-makers
is
that
the
literature
is
highly
polarised,
with
no
clear
consensus
within
the
expert
community
on
a
number
of
issues
that
are
critical
to
understanding
both
the
modalities
and
the
extent
of
the
impact
of
unconventional
gas.
One
explanation
for
this
polarisation
is
the
broad
assortment
of
stakeholders
who
either
stand
to
gain
or
lose
as
a
result
of
increased
unconventional
gas
production.
As
unconventional
gas
may
take
market
share
from
coal,
nuclear
or
renewable
energy
as
well
as
traditional
gas
suppliers
commentators
have
suggested
that
the
phenomenon
has
mobilised
the
commercial,
political
and
academic
advocates
of
each
of
these
industries.
By
this
view,
both
the
proponents
and
opponents
of
unconventional
gas
are
embellishing
its
potential
benefits
and
risks
in
order
to
generate
sufficient
public
concern
to
either
advance
or
prevent
its
expansion.25
Another,
more
tangible
explanation
for
this
polarisation
is
that
the
shale
gas
industry
is
still
in
its
infancy
and
that
this
immaturity
is
reflected
in
the
inconsistent
quality
of
the
evidence
that
has,
until
now,
been
available.
In
the
USA,
much
of
the
gas
produced
thus
far
has
come
from
the
most
fruitful
sweet
spots
that
may
not
be
representative
of
the
productivity
of
entire
formations.
There
is
a
lack
of
comprehensive
and
independently
corroborated
data
on
geology,
the
results
of
exploration
drilling
and
the
long-term
production
levels
of
wells. 26
Industry
practice
is
evolving
so
rapidly
that
ultimate
recovery
rates
and
unit
costs
of
produced
unconventional
gas
are
moving
targets,
with
some
forecasts
predicated
on
the
anticipation
of
future
technological
progress.
And
estimating
the
break-even
costs
for
shale
gas
production
is
made
more
difficult
because
of
the
possible
production
of
quantities
of
natural
gas
liquids
(NGLs),
which
fetch
a
high
market
price,
from
certain
shale
plays.
The
knowledge
deficit
is
even
more
acute
outside
the
United
States
of
America,
where
other
key
variables
such
as
drilling
service
costs,
environmental
regulation,
pricing
mechanisms
and
the
structure
of
markets
are
largely
untested.
And
finally,
one-off
events,
like
the
global
economic
crisis
and
the
slew
of
long-planned
LNG
projects
coming
online
between
2009
and
2010,
have
so
far
made
it
difficult
to
assess
the
economic
and
trade
effects
of
shale
gas
in
isolation.
23
It
should
be
noted
that
improvements
to
Europes
natural
gas
infrastructure
are
needed
regardless
of
the future contribution of unconventional gas. 24 European Council, 'Conclusions on Energy - 4 February', (Brussels: 2011). 25 Matt Ridley, 'The Shale Gas Shock', (London: The Global Warming Policy Foundation, 2011). 26 In France drilling data is available immediately production data after ten years. The UK and the Netherlands have a four-year confidentiality period for drilling data. In Sweden there is a five-year waiting period 20 years for offshore wells. In Denmark the confidentiality period is five years. In Germany data is never made publicly available.
27
Philippe
&
Partners,
'Final
Report
on
Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe',
(Brussels:
European
Commission,
2011).
Figure
1-3:
Factors
determining
the
viability
of
natural
gas
developments28
Geological
understanding
Resource
size
Too
small
/
uncertain
Extraction technology
Not developed
Resource access
Inaccessible
Regulatory framework
Market access
This
report
also
considers
the
implications
for
the
EU
of
large-scale
unconventional
gas
production
in
other
parts
of
the
world.
This
acknowledges
the
fact
that
many
changes
in
the
dynamics
of
energy
supply
can
only
be
understood
in
the
broader
global
context.
It
also
acknowledges
that
the
EU
is
a
major
importer
of
energy
and
that
it
is
therefore
heavily
affected
by
developments
in
global
energy
markets
that
are
largely
out
of
its
control.
For
example,
whilst
the
current
world
gas
trade
is
concentrated
in
three
regional
markets
(Europe,
Asia
and
North
America),
an
anticipated
growth
in
global
LNG
flows
is
likely
to
lead
to
increased
price
and
supply
interaction
between
regions.
In
spite
of
the
fact
that
any
significant
shale
gas
production
in
the
EU
is
not
expected
before
2020,
the
first
licensing
rounds
for
shale
gas
in
other
major
energy
consuming
countries,
such
as
China,
have
already
taken
place.
Given
the
large
estimated
28
Adapted
from
IEA,
'Golden
age',
47.
unconventional resource base in these countries,29 their successful development may lead to supply effects on the EU market, independent of the course of any EU production. In terms of the time horizon, this report aims to cover the impact of unconventional gas observed to date, as well as scenario analysis up to the year 2040. Geopolitical considerations are outside the scope of this study. Many commentators have written about the possibility of unconventional gas limiting the ability of major energy exporters to use their resources as an instrument to advance political objectives;30 however this report focuses on the energy market-related factors. The economic benefits to local economies and national authorities in terms of jobs and tax revenues are also excluded from this study. Experience shows that there may be a large demand for labourers at both the gas fields and support businesses, such as drilling contractors, hydraulic fracturing companies and trucking companies. Although estimations of the economic value-added of such service sector developments are often addressed in the literature, they can be viewed as being outside the field of energy economics in a strict sense, and they require a distinct knowledge-set to evaluate in detail.
10
system based largely on renewable energies. This gas will need to come from either domestic production or from imports but most likely from both. In this context, this report aims at providing reliable facts for European policy-makers and stakeholders on unconventional sources of natural gas which can, as the US example shows, have profound impacts on the assumptions and context of their work.
1.5 Methodology
This
report
consists
of
two
main
components.
Firstly,
it
closely
examines
the
unconventional
gas
literature
covering
both
Europe
and
the
rest
of
the
world.
As
a
second
component,
this
report
will
use
an
energy
model
to
elaborate
possible
future
scenarios
that
illustrate
the
potential
impact
of
unconventional
gas
on
the
European
energy
system.
It
will
carry
out
this
analysis
based
on
the
best,
current,
estimated
parameters
as
identified
in
the
systematic
literature
review.
Policy 35 (2007).
11
Systematic
reviews
seek
to
address
each
of
the
above
limitations
through
the
use
of
explicit
and
transparent
methodologies
that
are
replicable
and
updateable.
They
involve
clear
specification
of
both
the
research
question(s)
to
be
addressed
and
the
process
that
is
to
be
followed;
systematic
and
exhaustive
searching
of
the
available
literature;
explicit
criteria
for
the
inclusion
or
exclusion
of
studies;
quality
appraisal
of
the
included
studies
using
transparent
and
standardised
criteria;
objective
summaries
of
the
results,
including
the
meta-analysis
of
quantitative
data;
effective
dissemination
of
the
results
to
the
appropriate
audience;
and
regular
updating
of
the
review
results.34
Table
1-1:
Differences
between
systematic
and
narrative
reviews35
Stage
Good
quality
systematic
reviews
Deciding
on
review
questions
Start
with
clear
questions
to
be
answered
and/or
hypotheses
to
be
tested
Traditional
narrative
reviews
May start with a clear question to be answered, but more often involve general discussion of subject with no stated hypotheses Searching for relevant Strive to locate all relevant Do not usually attempt to locate studies published and unpublished all the relevant literature studies to limit impact of selection bias Deciding which studies to Include explicit description of Usually do not describe why include or exclude what types of studies are to be some studies are included and included to limit selection bias others excluded Assessing study quality Examine in systematic manner the methods used and investigate potential biases and sources of heterogeneity between study results Base conclusions on the studies that are considered to be most methodologically sound Use protocols and explicit criteria to ensure that others would reach the same conclusions if they adopted the same methods, so the results may easily be updated Often do not consider differences in study methods or study quality Often do not differentiate between methodologically sound and unsound studies Use methodologies and criteria that lack transparency, leaving the interpretation of results open to subjectivity and bias
Synthesising results
M. Petticrew, 'Systematic reviews from astronomy to zoology: myths and misconceptions', British Medical Journal 322 (2001). As quoted in Sorrel, 'Improving the evidence base for energy policy'. 36 For more information, see The Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program, http://www.iea- etsap.org/web/index.asp (cited 10/10/2011).
12
ETSAP-TIAM is a partial equilibrium model of the energy systems of the entire world, divided into 15 regions. The regional modules are linked by trade variables of the main energy forms (coal, oil, gas) and by emission permits. For each region, the model comprises explicit descriptions of more than 1 000 technologies and 100 commodities (energy forms, materials, emissions), covering extraction, processing, conversion, trading and end-uses of all energy forms. Such technological detail allows precise tracking of capital turnover and provides a precise description of technological competition. The model constructs a coherent image of the future energy system by choosing a mix of technologies to invest in and operate at each future period, with the objective of maximising total surplus, while respecting the many constraints of the model. The models variables include the investments, capacities and activity levels of all technologies at each period of time, plus the amounts of energy and material flows in and out of each technology. Endogenous trade of crude oil, petroleum products, gas, liquefied natural gas and coal, as well as greenhouse gas permits, is represented in ETSAP-TIAM.37 Key factors affecting future gas supply and demand are rendered into a set of workable assumptions about what can be considered as the primary determinants of future shale gas development. In particular, this report focuses on the size and production costs of shale gas resources, as well as global gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The model is then used to construct five possible scenarios of future shale gas development. The different trajectories borne out by these scenarios will be analysed and compared, with a particular focus on three main outputs: production, interregional trade and final use. In doing so, this report aims to shed light on the conditions under which shale gas can be integrated into the global energy system.38 One note of caution, however. Current developments suggest that NGLs may significantly lower the effective production costs of natural gas from shale wells. As a result of a lack of reliable geological data on the NGL content of shale plays outside the USA, the modelling section of this study does not address this potentially significant factor in global shale gas development.
Loulou and Maryse Labriet, 'ETSAP-TIAM: the TIMES integrated assessment model Part I: Model structure', Computational Management Science 5, no 1 (2008). 38 Despite striving for a systemic point of view, it is invariably the case that not all factors affecting shale gas development can be considered. Aspects such as environmental impacts or legal and regulatory issues are not considered in the present analysis.
13
dimension of the problem is key to understanding how much of the resource base can be viably exploited and at what price. The chapter has been prepared by Prof. Gerhard Thonhauser of the University of Loeben (Austria) and although the subject material does not lend itself to a systematic review, the chapter provides a useful reference to policy-makers. Chapter 4 of the report addresses key above-ground factors that may play a role in determining the viability of indigenous unconventional gas production in Europe. In particular, it singles out two key areas of controversy in the European context land access and market access. The chapter also provides background information for policy- makers on the complex relationship between energy independence and energy security. Chapter 5 of this report provides an overview of evidence around the impact of unconventional gas on gas supplies, gas prices, the energy mix, transnational trade flows and gas pricing regimes. To this end, the chapter reviews empirical data on the effects of unconventional gas observed so far in both the USA and Europe, as well as modelling studies covering its possible future impact. Finally, given the paucity of the existing data on shale gas production outside the United States of America, Chapter 6 aims to use an energy model to illustrate the potential impacts of unconventional gas in the future in order to aid policy-makers in identifying potential challenges and benefits. Key uncertainties are selected and tested, and scenarios are defined, based on the best, current, estimated parameters as identified in the literature review.
14
Shale
gas
and
CBM
are
clearly
defined,
based
on
the
nature
of
their
occurrence
in
either
coal
seams
or
shale.
The
case
of
tight
gas
is
more
ambiguous
since
it
exists
in
very
similar
geological
formations
to
conventional
gas,
but
exhibits
relatively
slow
flow
rates.
(For
a
more
detailed
description
of
these
forms
of
unconventional
gas,
see
Section
3.1.2.)
The
recent
interest
in
unconventional
gas
has
been
spurred
mainly
by
the
rapid
emergence
of
shale
gas
in
the
USA
and
so
this
chapter,
while
discussing
all
of
the
unconventional
gases,
will
focus
in
particular
on
shale
gas
resources.
This
chapter
provides
a
comprehensive
review2
of
the
available
evidence
on
the
size
of
unconventional
gas
resources,
based
upon
an
exhaustive
search
of
the
available
literature.
Greater
reliance
is
placed
upon
the
more
rigorous
studies
when
drawing
conclusions.
The
chapter
addresses
the
following
four
questions:
1
Adsorbed
gas
refers
to
gas
molecules
which
have
formed
some
adhesion
to
the
solid
surface
of
the
2
M.
medium in which it is contained. Petticrew and H. Roberts, Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: a practical guide (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
15
1) What estimates have been made of unconventional gas resources? Section 2.1 examines the range of literature on all three types of unconventional gas resources in both Europe and the rest of the world, with a particular focus on shale gas resources. It also discusses the different classifications and definitions of resource estimates, indicating where these are comparable, where they differ and in which reports these definitions are used. 2) How do we explain the variability in shale gas resource estimates? Section 2.2 explores the differing methods used to derive shale gas resource estimates and provides an assessment of their relative strengths and weaknesses. 3) What does experience in the Unites States of America tell us about the resource estimation? Section 2.3 examines the relevance of production decline rates from individual wells, summarises some of the recent controversies over this issue in the USA, and assesses the implications for the robustness of resource estimates. 4) What is the range of uncertainty over the size of unconventional gas resources? Section 2.4 draws together the evidence in preceding chapters and attempts to characterise the uncertainty surrounding estimates of global unconventional gas, and particularly shale gas, resources.
2.1.1 Definitions
Resource
definitions
Estimates
for
unconventional
gas
resources
may
be
provided
for
different
levels
of
spatial
aggregation
(e.g.
country,
region,
geological
play,3
fields,
well)
and
may
either
refer
to
quantities
of
gas
that
are
estimated
to
be
present
or
quantities
of
gas
that
are
3
A geological play is defined as A set of known or postulated oil and gas accumulations sharing similar geologic, geographic, and temporal properties, such as source rock, migration pathway, timing, trapping mechanism, and hydrocarbon type. United States Geological Survey, 'Chapter GL Glossary', in World petroleum assessment 2000: new estimates of undiscovered oil and natural gas, including reserve growth, outside the United States (Reston, VA: US Department of the Interior, 2000).
16
estimated
to
be
technically
or
economically
recoverable.
In
the
latter
case,
these
estimates
may
be
expressed
probabilistically
and/or
given
to
different
levels
of
confidence
(e.g.
probable
or
possible).
Clear
definitions
and
appropriate
interpretation
of
the
figures
stated
is
important
as
confusion
or
problems
frequently
arise
when
different
estimates
are
incorrectly
compared.
Within
this
chapter,
the
specific
definitions
given
below
will
be
used.
However,
the
wide-ranging
nature
of
the
evidence
means
that
not
all
of
the
reports
use
the
same
definitions.
In
some
cases,
the
definition
being
used
is
not
stated
explicitly
or
at
all;
in
others,
similar
terms
are
used
but
with
slightly
different
interpretations;
while
in
further
reports,
ambiguous
terms
that
could
refer
to
any
of
the
definitions
are
employed
(e.g.
recoverable
resources).
This
often
compounds
the
problem
mentioned
above
of
comparing
different
estimates.
Wherever
possible,
definitions
have
been
compared
only
when
they
are
equivalent
or
are
judged
to
be
effectively
equivalent.
A
problem
that
frequently
occurs
is
the
use
of
terms
applicable
to
conventional
gas
resources
when
referring
to
unconventional
gas
resources,
where
it
would
be
clearer
and
less
ambiguous
to
use
alternative
terms.
An
example
of
this
is
the
use
of
the
terms
discovered
and
undiscovered.
In
contrast
to
conventional
oil
and
gas
resources,
the
location
of
the
petroleum
source
for
unconventional
gas
is
usually
known
and
so
they
are
not
undiscovered
in
the
traditional
sense:
a
well
drilled
into
an
area
holding
unconventional
gases
will
probably
yield
some
volumes
of
gas.
However,
if
these
regions
have
not
been
extensively
drilled,
the
precise
characteristics
of
the
geology
may
not
be
well
known
and
there
may
be
corresponding
uncertainty
regarding
the
technical
and
economic
feasibility
of
gas
production.
The
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers
(SPE)
Petroleum
Resources
Management
System
(PRMS)
indicates
that
discovered
shale
gas
resources
require
collected
data
[that]
establish[es]
the
existence
of
a
significant
quantity
of
potentially
moveable
hydrocarbons.4
To
meet
this
criterion,
the
SPE
indicates
that
there
must
be
sufficient
evidence
of
the
existence
of
hydrocarbons
from
well
tests,
core
and
log
data,
together
with
evidence
that
areas
which
are
similar
to
that
under
investigation
(analogues)
can
support
commercially
viable
gas
production.
This
appears
to
be
a
reasonable
requirement,
especially
given
the
heterogeneity
found
in
many
unconventional
gas
plays
(see
Section
2.1.3).
However
it
does
not
allow
one
to
distinguish
between
geological
areas
that
contain
Resources
postulated
from
geologic
information
and
theory
to
exist
outside
of
known
oil
and
gas
fields
(the
traditional
definition
of
undiscovered
conventional
hydrocarbons
used
by
the
United
States
Geological
Survey,
USGS5)
and
those
areas
that
are
known
but
do
not
meet
the
above
requirement.
Unless
otherwise
stated,
use
of
the
term
undiscovered
in
this
chapter
refers
only
to
the
traditional
definition
i.e.
gas
that
is
estimated
to
exist
outside
of
known
formations.
When
reporting
unconventional
gas
volumes,
the
largest
figure
that
can
be
given
is
the
initial
or
original
gas
in
place
(OGIP);
this
is
the
total
volume
of
natural
gas
that
is
estimated
to
be
present
in
a
given
field,
play
or
region.
This
figure
only
conveys
part
of
the
necessary
information
to
estimate
recoverable
resources,
however.
The
fraction
of
the
OGIP
that
is
estimated
to
be
recoverable
the
recovery
factor
is
equally
important
4
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
'Guidelines
for
Application
of
the
Petroleum
Resources
Management
System',
(London:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2011).
5
United
States
Geological
Survey,
'Chapter
GL
Glossary'.
17
and can vary substantially depending on the geological conditions, technology used and prevailing gas prices. The ultimately recoverable resource (URR) of a field or region is the sum of all gas that is expected to be recovered from that field or region over all time. This figure includes any gas that is estimated to be undiscovered (using both of the above interpretations), is not recoverable with current technology, and/or is not currently economic but which is expected to become so before production ceases. The fraction of the gas in place that can be classified as URR therefore takes into account anticipated technological developments, changes in market conditions and/or exploration efforts. Estimates of URR will therefore be sensitive to the assumptions used and are likely to be particularly uncertain during the early stages of a regions development. The industry-standard term for discussing the ultimate recovery from an individual well is the estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) usually denoted as EUR/well and also sometimes referred to as the productivity. EUR is essentially identical to URR, although URR is usually preferred when referring to areas or regions larger than a well, and so the notation of URR/well has been used throughout this report instead of EUR/well to avoid confusion. A more detailed description of the relationship between URR and EUR is provided in Annex B. An alternative estimate that can be given is the technically recoverable resources (TRR). TRR is the resource figure most frequently provided by the literature; however, complete and clear definitions of TRR are rarely provided. Sources reviewed in this chapter agree that TRR is the fraction of the gas in place that is estimated to be recoverable only with current technology; however, ambiguity remains over whether sources include undiscovered volumes of gas from their definitions and what they mean by the term undiscovered. The majority of the sources that provide explicit definitions do appear to include undiscovered volumes of gas within their estimates of TRR. The report authors have therefore employed a definition whereby TRR is gas that is estimated to be recoverable with current technology in: a) discovered formations that are considered to meet the SPE/PRMS requirements; b) discovered formations that are not considered to meet the SPE/PRMS requirements; and c) undiscovered formations. If cumulative production to date is subtracted from the estimated TRR, the residual is referred to as the remaining technically recoverable resources (RTRR). In practice, given the infancy of unconventional gas production outside a few areas in North America, these two terms are effectively equivalent in the majority of regions. Where relevant and possible, estimates can be converted to the definition stated (TRR, URR, etc.) using the cumulative production data shown in Figure 2-5. Since not all of the technically recoverable resources will be economic to recover, for example in fields with low production rates and high costs, a further subset of the technically recoverable resources is often given: the economically recoverable resources (ERR). Similar to TRR, this estimate typically includes any gas that is in: a) discovered formations that are considered to meet the SPE/PRMS requirements; b) discovered formations that are not considered to meet the SPE/PRMS requirements; and c) undiscovered formations. However, unlike TRR, the ERR must be considered to be both technically and economically recoverable. In principle, if the market price was to increase or the production costs decrease, the estimated volume of economically recoverable resources would be expected to increase (and vice versa). The concept of economically recoverable resources of unconventional gas in undiscovered areas is strange: there appears to be little basis for assumptions about the 18
economic
viability
of
resources
within
regions
which
have
not
yet
been
found,
have
not
been
drilled
and
about
which
very
little
information
is
available.
However,
a
number
of
sources6
report
the
economically
recoverable
resources
for
conventional
oil
and
gas
in
undiscovered
areas.
So
in
order
to
provide
consistency,
gas
in
undiscovered
areas
within
the
reports
definition
of
ERR
for
unconventional
gas
has
also
been
included
here,
although
it
could
equally
be
argued
that
it
should
be
excluded.
Reserve
definitions
The
final
subset
of
resources
is
reserves.
The
exact
definition
of
reserves
varies
from
one
source
to
another,
but
they
are
generally
those
portions
of
the
economically
recoverable
resources
that
have
been
discovered
(i.e.
fulfil
the
SPE/PRMS
criterion
described
above)
and
are
estimated
to
have
a
specified
probability
of
being
produced.
Reserve
estimates
are
frequently
given
to
three
levels
of
confidence,
namely:
proved
reserves
(1P);
proved
and
probable
reserves
(2P);
and
proved,
probable
and
possible
reserves
(3P).
In
principle,
an
estimate
of
economically
recoverable
resources
includes
both
reserves
and
the
estimated
volumes
of
undiscovered
gas
that
is
considered
to
be
economically
recoverable.
However,
estimates
of
ERR
are
rarely
given
a
probabilistic
interpretation,
so
typically
it
is
not
clear
whether
they
are
based
upon
1P,
2P
or
3P
reserve
estimates.
Definitions
of
the
1P,
2P
and
3P
reserves
vary
widely
from
one
country
to
another
and
from
one
company
to
another,
with
some
employing
a
deterministic
definition
(certain
qualitative
criteria
must
be
satisfied)
and
others
using
a
probabilistic
definition
(reserve
estimates
are
based
upon
a
probability
distribution
of
resource
recovery).
For
example,
the
SPE/PRMS
allows
one
to
associate
1P,
2P
and
3P
with
either
deterministic
or
probabilistic
definitions.
Descriptions
of
the
deterministic
definitions
are
given
with,
for
example,
1P
reserves:
those
quantities
of
petroleum
which,
by
analysis
of
geoscience
and
engineering
data,
can
be
estimated
with
reasonable
certainty
to
be
commercially
recoverable.
Under
the
SPE/PRMS
probabilistic
definitions
1P,
2P
and
3P,
reserve
estimates
are
commonly
expressed
as
P90,
P50
and
P10
respectively.
P90
(1P)
estimates
are
then
interpreted
as
the
volume
of
gas
production
that
is
estimated
to
have
a
90%
probability
of
being
exceeded
by
the
time
production
ceases.
Similarly,
P50
(2P)
and
P10
(3P)
estimates
refer
to
volumes
of
gas
production
that
are
estimated
to
have
a
50%
and
10%
probability
respectively
of
being
exceeded.
Under
this
interpretation,
2P
(P50)
is
equivalent
to
a
median
estimate
of
reserves.
This
leads
to
two
additional
problems,
however.
The
first
is
whether
available
reserve
estimates
actually
correspond
to
these
precise
statistical
definitions. 7
The
second
relates
to
the
aggregation
of
reserve
estimates:
for
example,
in
deriving
regional
reserve
estimates
by
summing
the
reserve
estimates
of
individual
fields.
Statistically,
it
is
only
valid
to
arithmetically
sum
reserve
estimates
if
these
correspond
to
mean
estimates
of
recoverable
resources.
If,
instead,
1P
(P90)
reserve
estimates
are
6
E.D.
Attanasi
and
P.A.
Freeman,
'Economic
analysis
of
the
2010
U.S.
Geological
Survey
assessment
of
undiscovered oil and gas in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska', (Reston, VA: United States Geological Survey, 2011); Minerals Management Service, 'Assessment of Undiscovered Technically Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources of the Nations Outer Continental Shelf', (Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, 2006). 7 Steve Sorrell et al., 'Global oil depletion: An assessment of the evidence for a near-term peak in global oil production', (London: UK Energy Research Centre, 2009).
19
arithmetically
summed,
the
aggregate
figure
will
underestimate
the
total
reserves.
Similarly,
if
3P
(P10)
reserve
estimates
are
arithmetically
summed,
the
aggregate
figure
will
overestimate
the
total
reserves.8
Aggregation
of
2P
reserve
estimates
should
lead
to
smaller
errors,
but
the
magnitude
and
sign
of
these
errors
will
depend
upon
the
difference
between
mean
and
median
estimates
and
hence
the
precise
shape
of
the
underlying
probability
distribution
(which
is
rarely
available).
In
practice,
aggregation
of
1P
estimates
is
more
common,
thereby
leading
to
underestimation
of
regional
reserves.
A
comparison
of
the
different
resource
definitions
is
presented
in
Table
2-1
and
in
the
form
of
a
modified
McKelvey
box
in
Figure
2-1.9
It
should
be
clear
from
the
above,
however,
that
the
use
of
resource
and
reserve
terminology
is
inconsistent,
imprecise
and
in
need
of
standardisation.
Given
the
early-stage
production
of
this
resource
and
the
very
large
uncertainty
in
all
resource
estimates,
considerable
overlap
is
anticipated
between
URR,
TRR
and
ERR
estimates
despite
the
conceptual
distinction
between
them.
Table
2-1:
Interpreting
the
terminology
used
for
unconventional
gas
resource
estimates
Includes
gas
in
undiscovered
formations
P
P
Includes
gas
not
economically
recoverable
with
current
technology
P
P
Includes
gas
that
is
not
recoverable
with
current
technology
P
P
Includes
gas
that
is
not
expected
to
become
recoverable
P
Name
Short description
Original gas in place Ultimately recoverable resources Technically recoverable resources Economically recoverable resources 1P/2P/3P reserves
Total volume present Total volume recoverable over all time Recoverable with current technology Economically recoverable with current technology Specific probability of being produced
8
R.
Pike,
'Have
we
underestimated
the
environmental
challenge?',
Petroleum
review
(2006):
26-27,
Sorrell
et
al.,
'Oil
depletion'.
9
V.E.
McKelvey,
'Mineral
resource
estimates
and
public
policy',
American
Scientist
60
(1972):
32-40.
20
Figure
2-1:
Resources
and
reserves10
Natural gas is generally reported on a volumetric basis in either imperial (cubic feet) or metric (cubic metres) units. In the imperial system, a prefix of M usually denotes a thousand (so MMcf is a million cubic feet), while in the metric system m corresponds to a million (so mcm is a million cubic metres). For resource estimates, the most common prefixes are B for a billion and T for a trillion, both of which are commonly used with cubic metres and feet. At 60oF (15.56oC) and 14.73 psi (1 atmosphere or 101.325kPa), cubic feet can be derived by multiplying cubic metres by 35.3, i.e. 1 Tcm = 35.3 Tcf. Although the majority of existing literature uses one or more of the above categories of resources, there is one important exception: the United States Geological Service. The USGS states that it provides estimates of undiscovered volumes of unconventional gases in different geological areas of the United States of America. The USGS reports do not provide a clear definition of the term undiscovered, but information contained in two USGS methodological papers11 indicates that these figures should be interpreted as potential additions to reserves. The authors conclude that an estimate of the remaining technically recoverable resources for the whole of the USA may be derived by summing the available estimates of the following. US proved reserves; US inferred reserves;12
10
Source:
Modified
from
Ibid.
Charpentier and T.A. Cook, 'Improved USGS methodology for assessing continuous petroleum resources', (Reston, VA: United States Geological Service, 2010), 22; J.W. Schmoker, 'US Geological Survey Assessment Concepts for Continuous Petroleum Accumulations, in Petroleum Systems and Geologic Assessment of Oil and Gas in the Southwestern Wyoming Province, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah.', ( Denver, CO: United States Geological Survey, 2005). 12 The definition of the term inferred reserves is unclear as it is used by different organisations to mean different things. The USGS in 1995, for example, used it to refer to reserve growth in conventional fields, while the EIA indicated that it most likely corresponds to probable reserves. The authors prefer this later definition since it is more recent and more applicable to unconventional gas resources. Probable reserves appear to be equivalent to 2P minus 1P reserves. EIA, 'Estimation of reserves and resources - appendix G', in US Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids reserves report (Washington, DC: 2009), D.L. Gautier and United States Geological Survey, '1995 national assessment of United States oil and gas
11 R.R.
21
the USGS mean estimates of potential additions to reserves in known formations; and mean estimates of undiscovered technically recoverable resources.
The addition of contemporaneous estimates of total cumulative production gives an estimate of the total technically recoverable resource of the USA.
Relatively
few
organisations
or
individuals
provide
periodic
resource
estimates
for
all
three
of
the
unconventional
gases
on
a
consistent
basis.
One
notable
exception
is
the
EIA,
whose
Annual
Energy
Outlooks
(AEO)
have
provided
estimates
of
the
remaining,
technically
recoverable,
unconventional
gas
resources
in
the
USA
since
1997.
Each
AEO
reports
the
remaining
recoverable
resources
from
two
years
prior
to
publication,
so
the
first
estimate
of
remaining
recoverable
resources
is
for
1995. Figure
2-3
demonstrates
that
the
estimates
of
the
remaining
technically
recoverable
tight
gas
and
CBM
have
increased
by
25%
and
134%
respectively
since
1995,
while
the
estimates
for
shale
gas
have
increased
by
a
factor
of
15.
The
majority
of
the
increase
in
tight
gas
and
CBM
resource
estimates
has
occurred
since
2007,
with
estimated
volumes
increasing
by
around
50%
and
100%
respectively.
Shale
gas
estimates
have
increased
by
200%
in
the
same
timeframe.
resources
results,
methodology,
and
supporting
data
',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
1995).
22
Figure
2-3:
Estimates
of
remaining
recoverable
resources
for
unconventional
gases
in
the
USA
in
successive
Annual
Energy
Outlooks
from
the
EIA13
Figure
2-4:
Distribution
of
literature
providing
original
resource
estimates
by
region,
source
and
gas
type14
As indicated in Figure 2-4, a great number of reports have provided estimates for shale gas resources in North America. There is, however, a huge variation between these estimates and US estimates have risen dramatically in the past six years. Figure 2-5 illustrates the trend in US shale gas resource estimates since 1982. These increased from an average of 1.8 Tcm between 1983 and 2005 to an average of 18.4 Tcm between 2006 and 2010. This rise coincided with a roughly tenfold increase in annual shale gas production over the same period. Since the rapid increase in the estimated volume of recoverable resources has coincided with a dramatic increase in drilling across the USA and therefore provided a greater knowledge and understanding of the resource base, the more recent estimates are likely to prove more accurate.
13
Source:
EIA, 'Annual Energy Outlook', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, Various). The 1998 and 1997 AEOs provided estimates of the remaining ERR while all the others provided estimates of the remaining TRR. 14 Note: A number of reports provide estimates for more than one country or gas type. These are reported separately in each category and so the absolute numbers within each chart will not be identical.
23
Figure
2-5:
US
shale
gas
resource
estimates
and
annual
production15
24
estimate
of
the
global
OGIP
for
unconventional
gas
was
920
Tcm,
of
which
50%
was
shale
gas.
Rogner
neither
provided
a
breakdown
of
OGIP
in
any
individual
countries,
nor
did
he
indicate
the
fraction
of
these
values
that
were
likely
to
be
recoverable.
However,
numerous
organisations
have
derived
technically
recoverable
resource
estimates
by
applying
percentage
recovery
factors
to
Rogners
figures.
Some
values
suggested
or
used
include
15%
by
Mohr
and
Evans,18
10-35%
by
the
Massachusetts
Institute
of
Technology
(MIT)19
and
40%
by
both
ARI20
and
the
IEA21.
To
put
these
recovery
factors
in
context,
ARI22
uses
a
range
of
15-35%
for
the
recovery
of
shale
gas
from
each
geological
area
analysed,
while
recovery
from
conventional
gas
wells
is
often
around
70-80%.23
Table
2-2:
Estimates
of
original
shale
gas
in
place
by
Rogner24
Region
North
America
Latin
America
and
the
Caribbean
Western
Europe
Central
and
Eastern
Europe
Former
Soviet
Union
Middle
East
&
North
Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Centrally
Planned
Asia
&
China
South
Asia
Other
Pacific
Asia
Pacific
OECD
Total
Original
shale
gas
in
place
(Tcm)
108.3
59.7
14.4
1.1
17.7
71.8
7.7
99.4
65.2
8.8
0
454.1
Using
Rogners
OGIP
estimates,
a
15%
recovery
factor
would
give
a
global
estimate
of
68
Tcm
for
the
TRR
of
shale
gas,
while
a
40%
recovery
factor
would
increase
this
to
181.3
Tcm.
Hence,
the
range
of
15-40%
in
the
recoverable
fraction
of
Rogners
OGIP
corresponds
to
an
uncertainty
of
around
113.3
Tcm
on
a
global
scale.
This
approximates
to
one-third
of
the
Bundesanstalt
fr
Geowissenschaften
und
Rohstoffe
(BGR)s
estimate
of
the
remaining
global,
technically
recoverable
resource
of
conventional
gas
(~425
Tcm).25
18
S.H.
Mohr
and
G.M.
Evans,
'Shale
gas
changes
N.
American
gas
production
projections',
Oil
and
Gas
resource assessments, with major resource country reviews', (Cambridge, MT: Massachusets Institute of Technology, 2010). 20 V.A. Kuuskraa, 'Worldwide gas shales and unconventional gas: a status report', (Arlington, VA: Advanced Resources International Inc., 2009). 21 The IEA does not explicitly state the recovery factor used for each of the three unconventional gases, but provides figures from which it can be calculated. IEA, 'World Energy Outlook 2009', in World Energy Outlook (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009). 22 Advanced Resources International, 'World shale gas resources: an initial assessment of 14 regions outside the United States', (Washington, DC: Advanced Resources International Inc., 2011). 23 C. Besson, 'Resources to reserves: oil & gas technologies for the energy markets of the future', (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2005). 24 Rogner, 'Assessment of World Resources'. 25 H.J. Kmpel, 'Energy Resources 2009: Reserves, Resources, Availability', (Hannover, Germany: Bundesanstalt fr Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, 2009). 187 Tcm, or 44% of the total remaining technically recoverable resources of
25
A more recent report by the World Energy Council (WEC) in 2010 also provided OGIP figures for regions similar to those used by Rogner,26 although it combined South Asia, Other Pacific Asia and OECD Pacific into one region. Some of the estimates provided are significantly different to Rogners, with the estimated OGIP for Latin America and Centrally Planned Asia & China decreasing to 10.6 Tcm and 10.5 Tcm (a reduction of around 80% and 90% respectively from Rogners figures) while the OGIP estimated for the Former Soviet Union is 153 Tcm (an increase greater than eightfold). Regarding recovery factors, it is mentioned that nearly 40% of this endowment would be economically recoverable, corresponding to a global ERR of around 170 Tcm. Given that the costs of extraction and market conditions at the time when the resource will be extracted is highly uncertain, particularly in areas where there is currently no shale gas production, it is likely that the WECs estimate actually corresponds more closely to TRR rather than to ERR. Two other recent independent reports have been undertaken that estimate technically recoverable shale gas resources on a global scale.27 Nevertheless, even these do not attempt to assess all shale plays and indicate that there is limited geological information available for a number of plays anticipated to hold shale gas. ARI, for example, ignores regions where there are large quantities of conventional gas reserves (Russia and the Middle East) or where there is insufficient information to carry out an assessment.28 Similarly, Medlock et al. only assess the shale gas potential in six countries29 outside North America and justify the exclusion of unassessed shales by suggesting that they are unlikely to be economically recoverable. 30 Hence, neither review provides a global estimate of technically recoverable shale gas resources. ARI produced an earlier and much smaller estimate in 2009. It noted that a number of other shale plays were likely to contain resources but had not been quantitatively assessed, so its estimate was therefore anticipated to grow with time and new data.31 The majority of the increase between ARIs estimate in 2009 and 2011 comes from this increase in the geographical coverage of the later survey (see Figure 2-6). Finally, three other estimates of global shale resources have been made, but these were produced some time before the recent increase in US production and are predominantly based upon expert judgment.32
conventional
gas,
is
classified
as
proved
reserves
in
BP,
'Statistical
review
2011'.
Note,
however,
that
this
'proved'
figure
covers
all
four
types
of
gas
(conventional,
tight,
CBM
and
shale)
to
differing
degrees
in
different
countries,
depending
upon
the
state
of
development
of
the
resource.
26
WEC,
'Survey
of
Energy
Resources:
Focus
on
Shale
Gas',
(London,
UK:
World
Energy
Council,
2010).
27
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources',
Medlock,
Jaffe
and
Hartley,
'Shale
Gas
and
National
Security'.
28
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
29 The
nine
countries
analysed
are:
the
United
States
of
America,
Canada,
Mexico,
Austria,
Germany,
Poland,
Sweden,
China
and
Australia.
30
Medlock,
Jaffe
and
Hartley,
'Shale
Gas
and
National
Security'.
31
Ibid.
32
V.A.
Kuuskraa
and
R.F.
Meyers,
'Review
of
world
resources
of
unconventional
gas'
(paper
presented
at
the
fifth
IIASA
conference
on
energy
resources:
Conventional
and
unconventional
world
natural
gas
resources,
Laxenburg,
Austria,
1980);
J.
Laherrre,
'Natural
gas
future
supply',
in
IIASA-IEW
(Paris,
France:
2004);
R.
Sandrea,
'Global
natural
gas
reserves
a
heuristic
viewpoint',
(Tulsa,
OK:
IPC
Petroleum
Consultants,
Inc.,
2005).
26
Figure
2-6:
Estimates
of
global
shale
gas
resources
by
sources
considering
regions
outside
North
America33
North America As can be seen from Figure 2-5, estimates of the recoverable resources of shale gas within the USA have been increasing rapidly, with the more recent reports likely to provide more accurate estimates. Figure 2-7 therefore presents the more recent reports, chosen here to be those produced since 2008, which provide estimates of the recoverable resources of shale gas within the USA and Canada. There have been a total of 18 reports providing estimates for the USA and 12 for Canada over this period. Some of these, for example those by ICF34 or ARI,35 are updates of older reports but are reported here separately. It is noticeable that despite the variation in resource estimates between these reports (even those of similar dates), only three of these give a range of uncertainty in the values quoted. Even within this short timeframe, the estimates made in the past year are higher on average than those made in 2008.
33
Note:
Different
studies
cover
different
countries
and
regions
and
none
provide
a
truly
global
estimate.
Laherreres estimate is URR, while Medlock et al.s estimates are likely to be closer to ERR. The OGIP estimate by Rogner is converted to TRR using 15% and 40% recovery factors and the WECs estimate is converted to ERR using a 40% recovery factor. 34 K.R. Petak, 'Impact of natural gas supply on CHP development' (paper presented at the US Clean Heat & Power Associations (USCHPA) Spring CHP Forum, Washington, DC, 2011). 35 V.A. Kuuskraa, 'Unconventional gas: an exportable North American revolution?', in The changing fundamentals of global gas markets Europe as the battleground? (Washington, DC: Advanced Resources International Inc., 2010).
27
Figure
2-7:
Estimates
made
since
2008
of
the
technically
recoverable
shale
gas
resources
in
the
United
States
of
America
(above)
and
Canada
(below)36
Europe In contrast to the USA, very few estimates are available of the recoverable resource of shale gas within Europe. However, since 2009, a number of reports have been published that provide estimates of technically recoverable resources within Europe. These are presented in Figure 2-8 and range from 2.3 Tcm to 17.6 Tcm, with a mean of 7.1 Tcm. Note that ARIs estimate from 2009 ignored a number of plays.37
36
Points
in
yellow
correspond
to
estimates
that
were
stated
as
referring
to
economically
recoverable
resources.
28
Figure
2-8:
All
estimates
of
the
technically
recoverable
resources
of
shale
gas
within
Europe38
China Relatively few estimates of the Chinese shale gas resource are available and even fewer provide an estimate of the TRR or ERR, preferring instead to estimate the OGIP. ARI39 estimates an OGIP of 144.5 Tcm and a TRR of 36.0 Tcm, which suggests a recovery factor of around 25%. Since there is little agreement on this factor, the authors have again converted any estimates of OGIP into TRR using a range of recovery factors between 15% and 40%. The range in the estimate of Zou et al. results from applying this variation in recovery factor to the range of OGIP provided by the authors (28.3-99.1 Tcm).40 The World Energy Councils estimate is for Centrally Planned Asia (which includes Cambodia, Hong Kong, PDR Korea, Laos, Mongolia and Vietnam) as well as China, but for illustrative purposes all of the resource was assigned to China. The variation in currently available estimates for TRR in China is therefore even larger than that in Europe and North America.
38
The
point
in
yellow
corresponds
to
an
estimate
that
was
stated
as
referring
to
economically
recoverable
resources. The range for Rogners estimate is derived using a 15-40% recovery factor within Western and Eastern Europe. Values for Wood Mackenzie and IHS CERA come from Ruud Weijermars et al., 'Unconventional gas research initiative for clean energy transition in Europe', Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 3, no 2 (2011). 39 Advanced Resources International, 'World shale gas resources'. 40 Caineng Zou et al., 'Geological characteristics and resource potential of shale gas in China ', Petroleum exploration and development 37, no 6 (2010).
29
Figure
2-9:
All
estimates
of
the
technically
recoverable
resources
of
shale
gas
within
China41
resources.
42
Petak,
'Impact
of
natural
gas
on
CHP'.
43
WEC,
'Survey
of
Energy
Resources'.
BGR,
'Reserves,
resources
and
availability
of
energy
resources:
2010',
(Hannover,
Germany:
Bundesanstalt
fr
Geowissenschaften
und
Rohstoffe
(BGR)
Federal
Institute
for
Geosciences
and
Natural
Resources,
2010).
45
Paul
Stevens,
'The
"Shale
Gas
Revolution":
Hype
and
Reality',
(London:
Chatham
House
(The
Royal
Institute
of
International
Affairs),
2011).
44
30
demonstrated
by
observing
that,
within
the
USA,
estimated
volumes
of
technically
recoverable
resources
of
undiscovered
shale
gas
only
make
up
7%
of
the
total
shale
gas
TRR.
Nevertheless,
there
has
been
extensive
geological
mapping
of
the
rocks
underlying
many
countries
worldwide.
Despite
limited
onshore
drilling
in
the
UK,
for
example,
various
geological
studies
provide
a
complete
cross
section
of
the
rocks
throughout
the
UK.46
There
is
therefore
unlikely
to
be
any
undiscovered
shale
gas
plays
in
the
UK.
While
this
may
not
be
the
case
for
all
countries,
it
suggests
that
the
volumes
of
gas
in
currently
undiscovered
shale
plays
will
likely
be
overshadowed
by
volumes
in
discovered
but
undeveloped
plays.
Table
2-3:
Mean
estimates
of
remaining
technically
recoverable
resources
of
conventional
gas,
CBM,
tight
gas
and
shale
gas
provided
by
the
evidence
base
(Tcm)47
Region
United
States
of
America
Canada
Europe
China
(Implied
rest
of
world)
Global
Conventional
27.2
8.8
11.6
12.5
(364.9)
424.9
Tight
12.7
6.7
1.4
9.9
(14.6)
45.4
CBM
3.7
2.0
1.4
2.8
(15.6)
25.5
Lowest
estimate
8.0
1.4
2.3
4.2
7.1
Shale
Mean
of
estimates
23.5
11.1
8.9
19.2
(34.7)
97.4
Highest
estimate
47.4
28.3
17.6
39.8
186.4
As
noted
previously,
the
global
estimates
do
not
all
cover
the
same
regions,
do
not
use
the
same
definitions
and
are
based
on
a
number
of
different
methodologies
and
assumptions
(e.g.
for
the
recovery
factor),
which
helps
to
explain
the
significant
variation
in
estimates.
The
mean
estimate
for
shale
gas
is
also
skewed
by
the
low
estimates
of
Sandrea48
and
Laherrere,49
which
are
both
relatively
old
and
based
on
expert
judgment
alone.
If
these
are
excluded,
the
mean
estimate
increases
to
130
Tcm
46
T.
Harvey
and
J.
Gray,
'The
unconventional
hydrocarbon
resources
of
Britains
onshore
basins
shale
gas',
(London,
UK:
Department
of
Energy
and
Climate
Change,
2011).
Shale
gas
reports
in
Figure
2-7,
Figure
2-8
and
Figure
2-9
as
well
as
the
following:BGR,
'Reserves,
resources
and
availability';
F.M.
Dawson,
'Cross
Canada
check
up
unconventional
gas
emerging
opportunities
and
status
of
activity'
(paper
presented
at
the
CSUG
Technical
Luncheon,
Calgary,
AB,
2010);
EIA,
'Annual
Energy
Outlook
2010
with
Projections
to
2035',
(Washington,
DC:
US
Energy
Information
Administration,
2010);
V.A.
Kuuskraa,
'Economic
and
market
impacts
of
abundant
international
shale
gas
resources',
in
Worldwide
Shale
Gas
Resource
Assessment
(Washington,
DC:
Advanced
Resources
International
2011);
Kuuskraa,
'Status
report';
S.H.
Mohr
and
G.M.
Evans,
'Long
term
forecasting
of
natural
gas
production',
Energy
Policy
39,
no
9
(2011);
Moniz,
Jacoby
and
Meggs,
'Future
of
natural
gas';
Potential
Gas
Committee,
'Potential
Gas
Committee
reports
substantial
increase
in
magnitude
of
US
natural
gas
resource
base',
(Golden:
CO:
Colorado
School
of
Mines,
2011);
Rogner,
'Assessment
of
World
Resources';
Sandrea,
'Global
natural
gas
reserves';
R.G.
Smead
and
G.B.
Pickering,
'North
American
natural
gas
supply
assessment',
(Chicago,
IL:
Navigant
Consulting,
2008);
Total,
'Tight
reservoirs:
Technology-intensive
resources',
(Paris,
France:
2006);
WEC,
'Survey
of
Energy
Resources';
Weijermars
et
al.,
'Unconventional
gas
research
initiative'.
Notes:
Implied
rest-of-world
figures
derived
by
subtracting
each
mean
regional
estimate
from
the
mean
global
estimate.
48
Sandrea,
'Global
natural
gas
reserves'.
49
Laherrre,
'Natural
gas
future
supply'.
47
Sources:
31
and the lowest global estimate then becomes that provided by Medlock et al. at 42.9 Tcm.50 Focusing on the mean estimates within Table 2-3, the figures suggest that the USA holds around 25% of the global TRR of shale gas, while Europe holds around 10%. Similar percentages are obtained in both regions if the highest estimates are compared, but the European and USAs share may be smaller than this in practice since many regions are excluded from the global estimates. It is also of interest to place global shale gas resources into context with the global remaining recoverable resources of conventional gas. The mean estimate given by the current literature of the global TRR for shale gas is around 23% of the remaining recoverable resources of conventional gas, which increases to 30% if Sandreas and Laherreres shale gas estimates are excluded. The remaining global TRR of all natural gas consists of the sum of the mean estimates of conventional gas and the three unconventional gases. On a global scale, shale gas is estimated to make up 16% of the total figure of 593.2 Tcm. On a regional basis, however, shale gas can form a much larger proportion of the remaining TRR. For example, using the mean estimates, shale gas is estimated to represent 43% of the remaining TRR of natural gas in China, 39% in Canada, 38% in Europe and 35% in the USA. This suggests that the impact of shale gas is likely to be greater at the regional level than at the global level.
32
role
technology
could
play
in
increasing
current
estimates
of
technically
recoverable
shale
gas
resources,
while
Section
2.2.4
provides
the
conclusion.
Figure
2-10
Approaches
used
by
all
reports
providing
original
country-level
shale
gas
resource
estimates51
This
category
differs
from
those
reports
classified
as
Method
not
stated,
as
it
is
thought
that
these
estimates
have
been
derived
using
one
of
the
four
broad
approaches
described;
it
is
not
possible
to
determine
which
approach
has
been
used,
however.
54
Moniz,
Jacoby
and
Meggs,
'Future
of
natural
gas'.
55
Mohr
and
Evans,
'Long
term
forecasting';
Mohr
and
Evans,
'Shale
gas
changes
production
projections'.
56
Smead
and
Pickering,
'North
American
supply
assessment'.
53
33
estimate
for
each
shale
play.
The
WEC
appears
to
have
used
a
literature
review,
but
provides
no
description
of
its
methodology
other
than
noting
that
most
credible
studies
were
used.
It
also
does
not
provide
details
of
the
literature
referred
to
other
than
the
names
of
the
organisations
that
produced
the
estimates.57
An
alternative
approach
is
followed
by
Medlock
et
al.
who
indicate
that
they
use
peer- reviewed,
scientific
assessments
of
the
properties
of
shales
to
develop
technically
recoverable
resources.
However,
Medlock
et
al.
do
not
specify
the
precise
approach
used
and
fail
to
cite
the
relevant
peer-reviewed
sources.
In
addition,
they
note
that:
A
reduction
of
the
technically
recoverable
shale
gas
resource
base
in
areas
with
potential
water
constraints
is
primarily
done
because
the
cost
of
development
has
been
deemed
prohibitive.
In
explaining
the
difference
between
theirs
and
ARIs
estimates,
Medlock
et
al.
also
note
that
the
clay
content
of
the
shale
can
constrain
recoverability.
Clay-rich
shales
will
have
lower
production
rates
and
higher
costs
and
so
are
excluded
from
their
estimates
of
recoverable
resources.
Since
these
constraints
do
not
appear
to
be
employed
by
other
sources
estimating
TRR,
Medlock
et
al.s
resource
figures
may
correspond
more
closely
to
ERR.58
Bottom-up
analysis
of
geological
parameters
This
approach
uses
geological
knowledge
of
the
extent
and
characteristics
of
the
shale
rock
to
estimate
the
volume
of
shale
gas
that
is
present.
A
recovery
factor
is
then
applied
to
this
estimate
to
produce
an
estimate
of
the
technically
recoverable
(or
ultimately
recoverable)
resources.
ARI 59
employed
this
approach
to
determine
the
volumes
of
gas
that
exist
in
worldwide
shales
for
which
there
was
little,
or
no,
drilling
experience
or
production
data.
Figure
2-11
summarises
the
approach,
indicating
the
geological
parameters
used
at
each
step
in
the
process.
Figure
2-11:
Schematic
representation
of
the
steps
used
in
the
geological-based
approach
(see
Table
3-1
for
terminology)
Depth,
mineralogy,
total
organic
content,
thermal
maturity,
geographical
location
Gas
pressure,
temperature,
porosity,
shale
thickness,
gas
saturation
Total
shale
area
Free gas
Adsorbed gas
57
WEC,
'Survey
of
Energy
Resources'.
58
Medlock,
Jaffe
and
Hartley,
'Shale
Gas
and
National
Security'.
59
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
34
The first step involves determining the total areal extent of the shale being examined. This is next reduced to the prospective area, which, depending on estimates or determinations of various properties of the rock, describes the area of shale that is expected to contain an appreciably high concentration of gas to make development viable. The geographic location of the shale is also taken into account at this stage, with shale in offshore regions being removed from the prospective area. Within shale plays, natural gas can be stored either in pore spaces within the rocks (free gas) or adsorbed60 on to the rocks. Equations can be used to estimate the volume of this stored gas, which require estimates of various geological parameters, such as the pressure of the gas in place and the porosity of the rocks. Two further factors are then determined that represent the confidence of the authors in their estimates, given their extent of knowledge of the geology and the prior exploration and development of the play. These factors are the play success probability factor, which represents the probability that suitably high flow rates will be achieved from the play to make development likely, and the prospective area success factor, which represents the probability that there will not be any geological complications or problems in the prospective area that would reduce the volumes of gas present. For the plays in ARIs report, the play success probability factor ranged from 100% to 30% with a mean for all of the shale plays analysed of 58%, while the prospective area success factor ranged from 75% to 20% with a mean of 50%. The application of these factors to the estimated gas in place yields an estimate of the risked gas in place. Using the above mean factors of 58% and 50%, the risked gas in place would therefore be 29% of the gas in place. A number of other approaches use comparable success factors to reduce volumes of gas that are estimated to exist. Finally, a recovery factor is estimated to reflect the anticipated fraction of this volume that is likely to be technically recoverable. The product of the recovery factor and the risked gas in place gives an estimate of the technically recoverable resource. ARI61 indicates that the recovery factor is established on the basis of the shale mineralogy, the properties of the reservoir and the geological complexity. The values chosen typically lie in the range 20-30%, although factors of 35% and 15% are used in a few exceptional cases. As can be seen from Figure 2-11, there are a large number of parameters which must be estimated or calculated when using geological methods to determine recoverable volumes of gas. These parameters range from the area and geographical location (onshore/offshore) of the shale rock, to the total organic content (measured as a percentage of the total weight) of the shale, to the minerals (clay/quartz, etc.) contained within the shale. A number of these parameters are used at more than one stage of the process. There are also some factors, whose estimation, although dependent on a number of these parameters, is largely subjective. Examples are the recovery factor and the two factors for converting the OGIP estimate into a risked OGIP estimate. ARI sets out which factors have been used in an appendix; however, of the 11 other sources
60 Adsorbed
gas
is
gas
attached
to
the
surface
of
the
rock.
61
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
35
using
this
approach,
only
three62
provide
figures
for
both
TRR
and
OGIP
from
which
the
assumed
recovery
factors
can
be
determined.
Extrapolation
of
production
experience
This
approach
relies
upon
analysing
the
production
experience
in
shales
for
which
there
is
a
sufficiently
long
history
of
production
and
then
extrapolating
these
results
to
either
undeveloped
areas
of
the
same
shale
or
to
new
shales.
There
are
two
general
methods
employed.
The
first,
commonly
applied
at
the
play
level,
is
to
estimate
shale
gas
volumes,
either
OGIP
or
TRR,
by
multiplying
the
estimated
shale
play
area
(or
mass)
by
an
estimated
yield
per
square
area
(or
mass).
The
yield
per
unit
area
is
often
called
the
productivity
and
measured
in
mcm/km2.
For
undeveloped
shale
play
areas,
the
values
for
such
calculations
are
typically
based
upon
measurements
or
estimates
from
geologically
similar
regions
(analogues)
where
more
information
is
available.
The
second
method
differs
in
its
complexity:
the
investigated
area
is
split
into
more
and
less
productive
sectors
and
more
precise
gas
yields
per
area
are
determined
by
using
a
greater
number
of
parameters,
including
the
URR
per
well
and
the
well
spacing
(number
of
wells
per
unit
area).
Estimates
of
the
URR
per
well
require
the
extrapolation
of
production
from
currently
producing
wells
with
the
help
of
decline
curve
analysis
discussed
in
more
detail
in
Section
2.3.
A
key
issue
for
the
extrapolation
of
production
experience
method
is
the
validity
of
taking
estimates
of
well
spacing
and
the
URR/well
from
one
area
and
applying
these
to
a
second,
potentially
very
different,
area.
US
shale
gas
plays
that
are
currently
producing
are
very
heterogeneous,
with
production
rates
between
neighbouring
wells
varying
by
a
factor
of
three
and
across
an
entire
shale
play
by
a
factor
of
ten.63
It
is
commonly
the
case
that
some
areas
within
the
shale
have
significantly
higher
productivity
and
ultimate
recovery
than
others.
These
are
commonly
referred
to
as
sweet
spots.
In
addition,
there
also
appears
to
be
significant
variation
in
the
productivity
of
wells
within
sweet-spot
areas,
although
this
distinction
partly
depends
on
how
sweet
spots
are
defined.64
Given
this
heterogeneity,
it
is
important
not
to
assume
single
values
for
the
URR/well
and
well
spacing
across
the
whole
area
of
a
shale
play.
This
is
particularly
relevant
when
extrapolating
historical
URR/well
and
well
spacing
estimates,
since
these
will
only
be
available
from
the
areas
of
the
shale
play
that
have
been
developed
first
and
which
tend
to
be
the
most
productive.
Each
of
the
above
methods
has
been
used
by
two
reports.
The
first
and
simpler
method
was
used
by
Rogner65
and
the
UKs
Department
of
Energy
and
Climate
Change
(DECC).66
Surprisingly,
given
the
reliance
that
has
been
placed
upon
his
work,
Rogner
appears
to
have
used
a
relatively
crude
approach
on
which
he
provided
very
little
information.
He
62
S.
Hennings,
'Shale
gas
resources
and
development'
(paper
presented
at
the
IIR
inaugural
shale
gas
briefing, Brisbane, 2010); C. Theal, 'The shale gas revolution: The bear market balancing act', (2009); H. Vidas and B. Hugman, 'Availability, economics, and production potential of North American unconventional natural gas supplies', (Fairfax, VA: ICF International, 2008). 63 EIA, 'Various AEOs'. 64 V.A. Kuuskraa, 'Case study #1. Barnett Shale: The start of the gas shale revolution', in Gas shale development workshop (Beijing, China: 2010); R.F. Strickland, D.C. Purvis and T.A. Blasingame, 'Practical Aspects of Reserves Determinations for Shale Gas' (paper presented at the North American Unconventional Gas Conference and Exhibition, Woodlands, TX, 2011). 65 Rogner, 'Assessment of World Resources'. 66 Harvey and Gray, 'Unconventional resources of Britain'.
36
notes simply that: the ratio of the US estimates for natural gas from shale formations to the in-place shale volume was used as a guide to calculate the regional natural gas resource from fractured shale resource potentials...based on the assumption that shale oil occurrences outside the United States also contain the US gas value of 17.7 Tcf/Gt (gigatonne) of shale-in-place. Rogner therefore appears to have used only a single analogue to estimate worldwide shale gas resources. DECC also used this simpler approach in order to estimate shale gas resources in the UK. More than one analogue was used with the Barnett, Antrim and a more conservative play, identified as possible analogues for the three shale plays in the UK. The choice of analogues significantly affects the resource estimates produced, with the productivity of the most productive analogue play (the Barnett at 7.6 mcm/km2) being 13 times greater than that of the least productive analogue play (the more conservative play at 0.6 mcm/km2). The second approach requires substantially more information from areas that are already being developed, but is likely to be more reliable. As a result, this approach has been used by two of the main sources providing shale gas resource estimates for the USA, namely INTEK for the EIA67 and the USGS.68 The approach taken by the USGS is described in detail below and serves to illustrate the types of issues that are raised. A map of all US shale gas plays and detailed description of the INTEK method are presented in Annex C.2. Methods used by the US Geological Survey As indicated above in Section 2.1.1, the USGS undertakes analysis of geological areas within the USA and provides estimates of the potential additions to reserves for unconventional gas from those areas. While it does not provide an estimate of TRR for the whole of the USA, such an estimate can be compiled using the following: USGS mean estimates of the potential additions to reserves for all individual shale plays; estimates of total proved US shale gas reserves;69 estimates of inferred reserves of shale gas;70 estimates of technically recoverable resources in undiscovered shale gas plays;71 and cumulative shale gas production.
The
approach
taken
by
the
USGS
is
described
in
two
methodological
papers,72
one
of
which
is
a
2010
update
of
the
method
used
previously.
These
two
methods
differ
slightly;
the
earlier
method
excludes
any
shale
gas
that
was
estimated
to
exist
in
non- sweet-spot
areas
from
the
estimates
of
potential
additions
to
reserves
that
were
67
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
68
For
example
Coleman
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas'.
Available
from
EIA,
Shale
gas:
proved
reserves
(2011,
cited
22/11/2011);
available
from
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_enr_shalegas_a_EPG0_R5301_Bcf_a.htm
70
Available
from
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
71
Also
available
from
Ibid.
72
Charpentier
and
Cook,
'Improved
USGS
methodology';
Schmoker,
'Assessment
concepts
for
continuous
petroleum
accumulations'.
69
37
produced.
In
addition,
the
earlier
method
refers
to
dividing
the
area
under
investigation
into
cells
with
particular
drainage
areas
(number
of
cells
per
unit
area)
rather
than
wells;
however,
cells
and
wells
are
essentially
identical.73
Nevertheless,
the
general
approach
of
both
methods
is
similar:
the
shale
play
is
split
into
individual
areas
and
then
estimates
are
made
of
the
areal
extent
of
each
area;
the
drainage
area
of
wells
(or
cells)
within
those
areas;
and
the
mean
URR/cell
or
URR/well
within
those
areas.
A
further
difference
between
the
two
USGS
methods
is
in
the
estimation
of
a
success
ratio.
In
the
newer
method,
this
is
estimated
separately
for
the
sweet-spot
and
non- sweet-spot
areas
and
represents
the
percentage
of
wells
that
the
USGS
estimates
will
produce
at
least
the
minimum
URR/well.
It
modifies
the
product
of
the
above
parameters,
tending
to
reduce
the
volume
of
gas
estimated
to
be
technically
recoverable.
The
earlier
method
also
estimated
a
factor
similar
to
the
success
ratio,
but
this
was
not
used
in
the
volumetric
calculations.
The
application
of
the
success
ratio
(if
used)
to
the
above
parameters
yields
an
estimate
of
the
discovered
technically
recoverable
resources.
The
USGS
removes
cumulative
production
and
an
estimate
of
gas
considered
to
be
reserves
in
order
to
yield
its
estimate
of
the
potential
additions
to
reserves.
The
USGS
periodically
updates
its
resource
assessments
for
individual
US
shale
plays
or
areas
of
the
plays
and
produces
an
end-of-year
summary
combining
all
of
the
latest
surveys
it
has
carried
out.
When
estimating
the
overall
TRR
for
shale
gas
in
the
USA
from
the
USGS
figures,
it
is
important
that
within
each
shale
play,
the
figures
to
be
added
must
be
contemporaneous
with
the
date
on
which
the
USGS
carried
out
its
assessment.
One
cannot,
for
example,
simply
add
current
estimates
of
proved
reserves
to
the
USGS
figures,
since
volumes
of
gas
that
were
not
considered
reserves
when
the
USGS
made
its
assessment
but
are
now
included
as
reserves
would
be
double
counted
since
they
have
moved
from
the
USGS
potential
additions
to
reserves
category
into
the
reserves
category.
A
similar
situation
exists
with
cumulative
production.
The
latest
resource
assessments
are
summarised
in
Table
2-4.
Although
a
number
of
these
assessments
were
produced
after
2010,
recently
released
USGS
data74
suggests
that
the
old
methodology
was
used
for
all
of
these.
As
described
above,
the
earlier
assessment
methodology
excluded
volumes
of
gas
estimated
to
exist
in
non-sweet-spot
areas
and
so
is
likely
to
underestimate
the
total
play
TRR.
Since
a
detailed
breakdown
of
proved
reserve
figures
is
only
available
from
2007
and
only
a
single
aggregate
estimate
of
inferred
(i.e.
probable
minus
proved)
reserves
is
available,
it
is
not
possible
to
derive
a
rigorous
assessment
of
the
USGS
estimate
of
the
TRR
within
each
shale
play.
In
the
early
2000s,
the
potential
of
shale
gas
production
was
not
fully
realised
(as
can
be
seen
from
the
low
level
of
resource
estimates
in
Figure
2-5)
and
so
the
majority
of
shale
plays
assessed
at
that
time
were
unlikely
to
have
contained
any
proved
reserves,
with
the
exception
of
the
Barnett
and
Antrim
Shales.
Therefore,
for
those
shales
which
were
assessed
prior
to
2007,
it
is
assumed
that
proved
reserves
are
zero,
except
in
the
Barnett
and
Antrim
Shales.
For
the
Barnett
Shale,
historic
estimates
73
Charpentier
and
Cook,
'Improved
USGS
methodology'.
74
USGS
Marcellus
Shale
Assessment
Team,
'Information
relevant
to
the
U.S.
Geological
Survey
assessment
of the Middle Devonian Shale of the Appalachian Basin Province', (Reston, VA: United States Geological Survey, 2011).
38
of proved reserves are available,75 however no data is available for historically proved reserves in the Antrim Shale and so we use the earliest data available from 2007. The fifth and sixth columns of Table 2-4 therefore give an approximation of contemporaneously proved shale gas reserves and cumulative production respectively. Summing the mean estimates of the potential additions to reserves, proved reserves and cumulative production for each shale play leads to an estimate of 11 Tcm for the total technically recoverable resource in these plays. To obtain an estimate for the total technically recoverable shale gas resource in the USA, estimates of undiscovered resources (1.6 Tcm) and inferred reserves (0.56 Tcm) both taken from INTEK76 have been added in. This leads to an estimate of 13.1 Tcm,77 which compares to a mean estimate of 23.5 Tcm and a range of 8.0-47.4 Tcm from the review of studies presented in Section 2.2. However, since the earlier USGS methodology excluded non-sweet spots, which are now expected to contain significant volumes of shale gas, it may have underestimated the potential additions to reserves in those plays.
See
EIA,
'Barnett
shale,
Ft
Worth
Basin,
Texas.
Wells
by
year
of
first
production
and
orientation',
(Washington
DC:
Department
of
Energy,
2011).
76
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
77
Some,
but
not
all,
double
counting
is
eliminated
by
this
process.
75
39
Table
2-4:
USGS
estimates
of
shale
gas
resource
in
the
United
States
of
America78
Assessment
date
2011
2010
2010
2010
2007
2007
2004
2003
2002
2002
Major
shale
plays
analysed
Marcellus
shale
Haynesville
and
Eagle-Ford
Woodford
shale
Fayetteville
and
Woodford-Caney
Barnett- Woodford
New
Albany
Antrim
Barnett
Niobrara
Devonian
(Ohio)
shale
Mean
estimate
provided
(Tcm)
2.39
3.62
0.70
0.76
0.99
0.11
0.21
0.75
0.03
0.11
9.67
Proved
Cumulative
reserves
at
production
at
time
of
time
of
assessment*
assessment**
0.13
0.31
0.18
0.25
0
0
0.09
0.10
0
0
1.07
0.01
0.05
0.03
0.05
0
0
0.04
0.02
0
0.07
0.27
Report Coleman et al. (2011) Dubiel et al. (2011) Higley et al. (2011) Houseknecht et al. (2010) Schenk et al. (2008) Swezey et al. (2007) Swezey et al. (2005) Pollastro et al. (2004) Higley et al. (2003) Milici et al. (2003) Total
figures are only available at a state level and so some judgement is required to assign these to the shale plays. * Source: EIA, 'Barnett shale wells', EIA, Shale gas: proved reserves (cited). ** Sources: Lippman Consulting (taken from J.B. Curtis, 'The Contribution of Shale Gas to Future U.S. Production: A View of the Resource Base' (paper presented at the AAPG Annual Convention, Denver, CO, 2009); R. Dougher, 'Natural gas and America's energy future' (paper presented at the Marcellus shale lecture series, New York, NY, 2011).) 79 Mohr and Evans, 'Shale gas changes production projections'.
40
On
the
other
hand,
reports
relying
on
literature
reviews
are
potentially
open
to
subjectivity
over
which
sources
are
to
be
included
and
which
are
relied
on
more
heavily.
The
extent
to
which,
and
the
reasons
for
which,
certain
sources
have
been
favoured
over
others
is
rarely
made
clear.
It
is
also
not
always
clear
how
the
quoted
literature
has
been
used.
MIT
for
example,
cites
ICF,
USGS
and
the
National
Petroleum
Council
(NPC)
as
the
sources
used
for
its
unconventional
gas
estimates.80
The
mean
value
chosen
by
MIT
for
US
shale
gas
corresponds
to
the
values
used
by
ICF;
however
it
is
unclear
how
MITs
P10
and
P90
estimates
rely
upon
the
USGS
and
NPC
figures.
Bottom-up
analysis
of
geological
parameters
The
geological
approach
employs
well-known
and
well-understood
equations
to
estimate
the
volumes
of
free
and
adsorbed
gas
in
place.
A
number
of
problems
exist,
however.
The
first,
and
perhaps
the
most
important,
is
the
inherent
subjectivity
in
choosing
the
recovery
factor
to
apply
to
the
estimated
gas
in
place.
It
was
for
this
reason
that
the
USGS
chose
not
to
use
this
approach
stating:
the
estimation
of
an
overall
recovery
factor
must
sometimes
be
quite
qualitative.
ARI81
attempted
to
remove
some
of
the
subjectivity
in
its
estimates
of
recovery
factors,
which
lay
between
20%
and
30%
in
most
circumstances,
by
linking
this
to
the
mineralogy
of
the
source
rocks;
however,
recovery
factors
of
15-40%
have
been
used
by
other
authors,82
while
Strickland
et
al.83
report
that
some
recoveries
can
be
as
low
as
1-2%.
When
the
volumes
of
gas
in
place
are
so
large,
this
corresponds
to
a
huge
range
of
uncertainty
in
the
technically
recoverable
resources.
An
additional
problem
relates
to
the
estimation
of
the
geological
variables
required
for
this
method.
It
is
important
to
remember
that
data
may
only
be
available
for
a
subset
of
these,
and
for
unexplored
shale
plays
such
estimates
must
necessarily
have
large
confidence
bounds.
Hubbert
remarked
that
for
conventional
petroleum
resource
estimates:
it
is
easy
to
show
that
no
geological
information
exists
other
than
that
provided
by
drilling...that
has
a
range
of
uncertainty
of
less
than
several
orders
of
magnitude.84
Even
when
exploratory
drilling
has
taken
place,
the
range
of
uncertainty
may
still
be
wide.
For
example,
it
is
often
difficult
to
estimate
the
gas
saturation85
from
well-log
data,
a
key
parameter
in
the
estimation
of
the
gas
in
place.86
A
third
problem
relates
to
the
issue
of
sweet
spots.
As
mentioned
above,
there
is
significant
heterogeneity
between
sweet
spots
and
non-sweet
spots.
Simply
extrapolating
geological
values
from
certain
areas
within
the
sweet
spot
across
the
entire
extent
of
the
shale
is
likely
to
overestimate
the
resource
potential;
segregating
the
shale
play
area
is
necessary
to
avoid
this.
ARIs
concept
of
prospective
area
indicates
an
attempt
to
disregard
areas
of
shale
that
are
likely
to
be
less
productive.
The
next
step
would
be
to
delineate
the
prospective
area
into
sweet-spot
and
non-sweet-
80
Ejaz,
'Background
material
on
natural
gas
resource
assessments'.
81
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
82
IEA,
'WEO
2009';
Kuuskraa,
'Status
report';
Mohr
and
Evans,
'Long
term
forecasting'.
83
Strickland,
Purvis
and
Blasingame,
'Reserves
Determinations'.
84
M.K.
Hubbert,
'Techniques
of
prediction
as
applied
to
the
production
of
oil
and
gas',
in
Oil
and
gas
supply
modeling
(Washington,
DC:
1982).
The
gas
saturation
is
the
fraction
of
the
porosity
of
the
shales
filled
with
gas
rather
than
water.
86
Hubbert,
'Techniques
of
prediction';
W.J.
Lee
and
R.
Sidle,
'Gas-Reserves
Estimation
in
Resource
Plays'
(paper
presented
at
the
SPE
Unconventional
Gas
Conference,
Pittsburgh,
PA,
2010).
85
41
spot
sectors,
but
ARI
was
unable
to
do
this.
The
frequency
and
extent
of
sweet
spots
and
the
degree
of
variation
between
sweet
spots
and
other
areas
remains
uncertain,
even
in
comparatively
well-developed
shales.
A
fourth
point
is
that
this
approach
does
not
depend
particularly
upon
prior
production
experience.
Drilling
is
the
only
reliable
means
of
assessing
the
extent
and
volumes
of
shale
gas
that
exists,
as
can
be
seen
by
the
large
number
of
wells
that
have
been
drilled
outside
the
sweet-spot
areas
within
the
USA.
This
shows
that
the
productivity
of
these
areas
can
vary
enormously
and,
although
displaying
some
correlation
with
parameters
such
as
the
shale
thickness,
is
not
really
known
until
drilling
is
well
under
way.87
The
final
and
most
important
problem
is
the
absence
of
a
rigorous
approach
to
uncertainty.
While
some
reports
mention
the
uncertainty
in
values
in
passing
or
give
a
range
in
final
resource
estimates,
no
reports
placed
in
this
category
provided
a
thorough
description
of
the
uncertainties
that
had
been
analysed
or
present
their
results
in
the
form
of
a
probability
distribution.
There
is
no
reason,
except
potentially
because
of
an
absence
of
relevant
data,
why
the
uncertainties
in
individual
geological
parameters
(particularly
those
used
more
than
once
or
which
are
especially
uncertain,
such
as
the
areal
extent
of
the
shale),
cannot
be
estimated,
stated
and
accounted
for.
Extrapolation
of
production
experience
This
approach
avoids
some
of
the
above
problems
but
unfortunately
introduces
some
more,
one
of
which
is
currently
somewhat
controversial.
It
is
first
interesting
to
note
that
the
only
source
providing
a
detailed
methodology,
the
USGS,
chose
to
employ
this
approach.
The
key
general
additional
problem
introduced
regards
the
methods
for
estimating
the
URR
from
individual
wells.
As
explained
in
detail
in
Section
2.3,
these
methods
rely
upon
modelling
the
anticipated
decline
in
the
rate
of
production
from
individual
wells.
Different
choices
are
available
for
the
shape
and
rate
of
future
production
decline,
and
the
limited
historical
experience
at
present
does
not
constrain
these
choices
especially
well
with
different
choices
potentially
leading
to
very
different
estimates
of
the
URR.
As
explained
in
Section
2.3
there
is
concern
that
current
practice
may
be
overestimating
the
URR
for
individual
wells.
To
the
extent
that
these
form
the
basis
of
regional
resource
estimates,
these
too
could
be
overestimated.
An
additional
problem
that
applies
to
the
simple
analogy-based
approach
used
by
DECC88
and
Rogner89
concerns
which
analogue
to
choose.
The
choice
of
an
analogue
is
extremely
important:
as
noted
DECCs
choices
of
analogues
varied
by
a
factor
of
ten.
The
USGS
suggested
using
a
probabilistic
approach
with
more
than
one
analogue
to
reduce
this
problem,90
which
appears
to
be
a
sensible
approach
given
the
uncertainties
that
exist.
A
further
problem,
given
both
the
complexity
and
heterogeneity
of
the
geological
determinants
and
the
absence
of
a
long
history
of
production
data,
is
the
validity
of
the
87
R.R.
Charpentier
and
T.A.
Cook,
'Applying
probabilistic
well-performance
parameters
to
assessments
of
shale gas resources' (paper presented at the American Association of Petroleum Geologists annual convention and exhibition, New Orleans, LA, 2010); Kuuskraa, 'Case study #1. Barnett Shale: The start of the gas shale revolution'. 88 Harvey and Gray, 'Unconventional resources of Britain'. 89 Rogner, 'Assessment of World Resources'. 90 Charpentier and Cook, 'Probabilistic well-performance parameters'.
42
assumptions made for the productivity of areas outside those currently being produced. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, historic production has focused upon sweet spots and upon the most productive areas within those sweet spots. Extrapolating a mean URR/well from this area to the whole of the sweet spot could potentially overestimate the resource potential. If these estimates are then extended across the entire shale play, the resource potential of the region could be greatly overestimated. The USGS attempted to mitigate this problem by mapping a range of geological factors and using these to estimate the possible productivities outside the area currently being produced, although it has not, in the assessments it has performed so far, attempted to estimate the productivity of non-sweet-spot areas. Nevertheless, its approach is relatively transparent and has the advantage that uncertainties are explicitly accounted for. It is clear, therefore, that careful delineation of the shale play is necessary to avoid overestimating productivity in undeveloped areas, but delineation is itself challenging. This is particularly relevant when splitting the shale play into sweet-spot and non- sweet-spot areas. Given the heterogeneity even within sweet spots, it is preferable to define and isolate the shale into an even greater number of areas of differing productivity: a procedure used by the USGS through the differentiation of shale plays into smaller assessment units. As mentioned above, INTEK also used this approach to derive estimates of the TRR in the USA for the EIA.91 Its method is described in Annex C which also provides a detailed comparison of these two methods; however, a brief examination of their assessments for the Marcellus Shale play is given in Box 2-1.
91
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
43
Box
2-1:
Comparison
of
Marcellus
Shale
play
assessments
Recently
released
data92
from
the
USGS
allows
one
to
attempt
a
like-with-like
comparison
between
the
assessments
carried
out
by
the
USGS93
and
INTEK94
of
the
Marcellus
Shale.
The
USGS
estimate
is
of
potential
additions
to
reserves
while
INTEKs
estimate
is
of
unproved
discovered
technically
recoverable
resources.
Despite
these
different
names,
both
exclude
any
volumes
of
proved
reserves
from
their
estimates
and
it
is
assumed
both
exclude
inferred
reserves.
The
two
estimates
should
therefore
be
comparable.
The
authors
include
below
only
the
mean
estimates
of
the
data
provided
by
USGS:
reproducing
the
estimates
provided
would
require
a
rigorous
handling
of
the
ranges
it
provides.
There
are
some
errors
introduced
by
this
but
the
overall
difference
between
the
calculated
value
and
quoted
figure
provided
by
the
USGS
is
only
0.4%.
There
are
two
major
differences
that
can
be
seen
in
the
table
below
that
result
in
the
difference
between
the
headline
figures
of
2.4
Tcm
by
the
USGS
and
11.6
Tcm
by
INTEK.
First,
the
USGS
excludes
shale
gas
in
non-sweet-spot
areas,
which
INTEK
indicates
makes
up
57%
its
estimate.
INTEKs
resource
estimate
within
its
sweet-spot
area
is
still
110%
larger
than
USGSs,
however,
and
so
the
second
major
difference
can
be
seen
to
be
the
values
used
for
URR/well.
INTEKs
URR/well
is
over
three
times
the
productivity
within
the
Interior
assessment
unit,
the
most
productive
of
USGSs
assessment
units.
In
fact,
INTEKs
non- sweet-spot
productivity
is
equivalent
to
the
mean
productivity
within
the
sweet-spot
area
of
the
USGSs
most
productive
assessment
unit.
Countering
this
to
an
extent
is
USGSs
larger
overall
sweet-spot
area,
which
is
around
90%
greater
than
that
used
by
INTEK.
The
two
non-sweet-spot
areas
are
almost
identical.
INTEK
Assessment
unit
Sweet-spot
area
Area
(km2)
27
511
Well
spacing
(wells/km2)
3.1
URR/well
(mcm/well)
99.2
Success
factor
60%
Calculated
gas
volume
5.06
(Tcm)
Quoted
gas
volume
(Tcm)
5.06
Non-sweet-spot
area
Area
(km2)
218
261
Well
spacing
(wells/km2)
3.1
URR/well
(mcm/well)
32.6
Success
factor
30%
Calculated
gas
volume
6.59
(Tcm)
Quoted
gas
volume
(Tcm)
6.59
Total
(Tcm)
11.65
Foldbelt
2
469
1.7
5.9
0.024
0.022
46
903
Interior
42
840
1.7
32.6
2.315
2.305
74
114
USGS
Western
Margin
7
151
2.1
3.7
Not
used
0.056
0.058
96
043
Total
52
460
2.395
2.385
217
060
Not assessed
2.385
92
USGS
Marcellus
Shale
Assessment
Team,
'Information
relevant
to
assessment
of
Appalachian
Basin'.
93
Coleman
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas'.
94
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
44
namely: a 2004 report by Kuuskraa,95 a paper by the US National Petroleum Council96 and a number of the EIA AEOs.97 In each case, technological progress is represented by annual percentage increases in the URR/well. It is important to note that it was not the introduction of new technologies, i.e. technologies that had not been employed elsewhere and whose potential was unknown, but the adaptation and utilisation of existing technologies that has led to the large increases seen in the URR/well recently (ARI98 for example indicates that the URR/well within the Barnett Shale between 1985 and 1990 averaged around 11.3-14.1 mcm/well, but in 2007-2008 had increased to around 65.2 mcm/well). New technological breakthroughs can never be ruled out, however. Two technologies identified by the EIA AEOs, stimulation99 and horizontal drilling, are now much more widely used than in 2000. It therefore seems likely that there is less potential for a step increase through switching from vertical wells without stimulation to horizontal wells with stimulation, in addition to there now being a better understanding of the current and future potential of these technologies. There has also been a significant body of work analysing the geology of individual shale plays. One would therefore expect shale geology to be now also much better understood and hence the scope for future improvements in URR/well to be better appreciated. These two factors suggest that such a step change in URR/well as witnessed between 1985 and the present is less likely to occur again in the future. However, another way to look at the role of technology is by examining the influence of changes in shale gas recovery factors. Even a very small increase in average recovery factors can have very significant impacts on estimated global recoverable volumes of shale gas. For example, using ARIs global estimate of shale gas OGIP of around 708.2 Tcm,100 a 1% increase in recovery factors globally would lead to an increase in global URR of 7.1 Tcm over twice the global production of all natural gas in 2010.101 The significant impact that even a small improvement in technology can have on the URR, and the possibility of major future technological breakthroughs, means that estimates of future technological progress must always be interpreted with considerable caution.
2.2.4 Summary
Nearly
all
of
the
sources
examined
acknowledge
that
the
estimates
they
provided
are
liable
to
change.
Despite
this,
the
majority
present
their
results
as
single
figures
rather
than
a
range
(see
for
example
Figure
2-7
to
Figure
2-9).
Given
the
limited
production
95
V.A.
Kuuskraa, 'Natural gas resources, unconventional', in Encyclopedia of Energy, ed. C.J. Cleveland (London: Elsevier, 2004). 96 S.A. Holditch, 'Unconventional gas topic paper #29', (Washington, DC: National Petroleum Council, 2007). 97 See, for example, EIA, 'AEO 2010'. 98 Kuuskraa, 'Case study #1. Barnett Shale: The start of the gas shale revolution'. 99 Stimulation, also known as hydraulic fracturing, involves pumping fluids consisting primarily of water and sand...injected under high pressure into the producing formation, creating fissures that allow resources to move freely from rock pores where it is trapped. American Petroleum Institute, 'Hydraulic fracturing: unlocking Americas natural gas resources', (Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute, 2010). 100 Advanced Resources International, 'World shale gas resources'. 101 BP, 'Statistical review 2011'.
45
experience
with
shale
gas,
the
limitations
of
the
resource
assessment
methodologies,
the
level
of
uncertainty
associated
with
many
of
the
relevant
variables,
the
high
degree
of
subjectivity
involved
and
the
huge
changes
that
have
occurred
in
US
estimates
over
the
past
few
years,
this
greatly
overemphasises
the
certainty
with
which
the
estimates
should
be
interpreted.
The
table
below
summarises
some
of
the
advantages
and
disadvantages
of
the
two
main
resource
assessment
methodologies.
The
choice
between
them
will
depend
upon
the
extent
of
development
of
the
region,
the
level
of
access
to
the
relevant
data,
and
the
human
and
financial
resources
available.
While
a
high-level
of
uncertainty
is
inevitable
at
this
stage
of
the
development
of
the
resource,
this
can
be
addressed,
or
at
least
mitigated,
through
the
use
of
probabilistic
methods.
The
absence
of
such
methods
is
the
primary
weakness
of
the
available
literature.
Table
2-5:
Advantages
and
disadvantages
of
geological
and
extrapolation
approaches
to
estimating
shale
gas
resources
Bottom-up
analysis
of
geological
parameters
Advantages
Disadvantages
Extrapolation
of
production
experience
Advantages
Disadvantages
No need to Robust and well- Limited data and wide range of assume a Decline rate problem for established geological uncertainty in many of the recovery URR/well approach geological parameters factor Reduces emphasis on Difficulties in delineating Difficulties in delineating the use of analogues sweet-spot areas sweet-spot areas Subjectivity in choice recovery factor(s) of Subjectivity in choice of key variables such as success factor Estimation of productivity in undeveloped areas Risk of using inappropriate analogues
Within
the
analysis
of
geological
parameters
category,
ARIs102
report
is
not
only
the
most
ambitious
in
scope
but
also
provides
the
most
detailed
description
of
the
methods
used.
It
also
attempts
to
address
some
of
the
general
disadvantages
of
the
approach
discussed
above.
One
criticism,
however,
is
its
lack
of
handling
of
uncertainty.
Within
the
extrapolation
category,
the
INTEK
report
is
widely
cited
and
influential,
but
has
a
number
of
important
limitations
as
described
in
Annex
C,
including:
the
inaccurate
delineation
of
sweet-spot
areas;
the
subjective
choice
of
success
factors;
the
reliance
upon
out-of-date
information;
and
the
inadequate
treatment
of
uncertainty.
The
USGS
approach
is
significantly
more
transparent
and
robust,
but
there
are
difficulties
in
using
the
available
USGS
literature
to
estimate
the
overall
US
TRR.
All
of
the
USGS
assessments
were
undertaken
using
a
methodology
that
excluded
resources
contained
within
non-sweet-spot
areas.
The
absence
of
suitably
disaggregated
reserve
and
production
data
also
creates
the
risk
of
double
counting.
These
two
effects
could
however
potentially
act
in
opposite
directions,
the
first
leading
to
an
underestimate
and
the
second
to
an
overestimate
of
recoverable
resources.
The
102
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
46
most commendable feature of the USGS approach is the explicit treatment of uncertainty, which is one reason why the results may be considered more reliable than those from INTEK. Furthermore, reliability should improve once updates using the new USGS methodology are undertaken for the shale plays that have not been assessed for some time. One major drawback of both the geological and extrapolation methods are their sensitivity to a single parameter, namely the recovery factor with the geological approach and the assumed functional form for the production decline curve with the extrapolation approach (see Section 2.3). Both of these parameters are poorly understood with regard to shale gas production and remain controversial. It is generally accepted that estimation of the recovery factor is challenging, but little progress appears to have been made regarding its estimation in shale areas, even when the geology is relatively well understood. The controversy regarding estimation of the URR/well is more recent and the reasons behind the differing assumptions used by reporting organizations are not well understood. It is for this reason that Section 2.3 below examines the issue in more detail and attempts to find common ground between the polarised views. In principle, the reliability of the extrapolation method should improve as production experience increases. Hence, we would expect approaches based upon actual production experience to provide more reliable resource estimates in the medium term. At present, however, the level of uncertainty from these methods appears to be comparable to that from geological methods. As recommended by Lee and Sidle,103 future studies that seek to derive mean estimates of the TRR for a region, should use as many different approaches as possible. Given these multiple limitations, it is essential to address and report on the level of uncertainty in the estimates, whichever approach is adopted. The failure of the majority of the existing literature to do this is a major limitation. To date, only the USGS has handled uncertainty in a rigorous manner, but there is no reason why other studies could not do so.
103
Lee
and
Sidle,
'Reserves
Estimation'.
47
Figure
2-12:
Illustrative
chart
of
typical
decline
in
shale
gas
production
Such
methodologies,
termed
decline
curve
analysis
(DCA),
are
well-established
and
widely
used.104
However,
the
appropriateness
of
specific
methodologies
for
shale
gas
plays
has
been
questioned,
with
suggestions
that
future
decline
rates
have
been
underestimated,
and
both
well
longevity
and
ultimate
recovery
overestimated.105
These
individual
well
URR
estimates
form
a
key
input
into
the
extrapolation
of
production
experience
approach
for
estimating
the
regional
URR
of
shale
gas
described
in
Section
2.3.
Hence,
if
the
URR/well
is
being
overestimated,
there
is
a
risk
that
the
regional
URR
will
be
overestimated
also.
However,
other
commentators
contest
this
interpretation
and
point
to
the
impressive
recent
history
of
shale
gas
production
as
evidence
that
future
estimates
are
realistic.106
While
the
roots
of
this
disagreement
lie
in
the
technical
assumptions
underpinning
decline
curve
analysis,
the
economic
importance
of
shale
gas
has
led
to
a
very
public
and
politicised
debate.107
In
brief,
DCA
involves
statistically
fitting
a
hyperbolically
declining
curve
to
a
time
series
of
historical
production
data
from
a
well.
This
fitted
curve
can
then
be
extrapolated
to
derive
the
future
production
estimate
or
URR
for
that
well.
The
typical
hyperbolic
equation
used
involves
three
key
terms:
the
initial
production
rate;
the
initial
decline
rate;
and
a
constant
termed
b,
which
defines
the
rate
at
which
decline
rate
arrests
(see
104
Ram
G.
Agarwal
et
al.,
'Analyzing
Well
Production
Data
Using
Combined-Type-Curve
and
Decline-Curve
Analysis
Concepts',
in
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition
(New
Orleans,
LA:
1998);
J.J.
Arps,
ed.,
Analysis
of
Decline
Curves.
Petroleum
Technology
(Houston,
Texas:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
1945);
M.J.
Fetkovich,
'Decline
Curve
Analysis
Using
Type
Curves',
SPE
Journal
of
Petroleum
Technology
06
(1980);
D.
Ilk
et
al.,
'Integrating
Multiple
Production
Analysis
Techniques
To
Assess
Tight
Gas
Sand
Reserves:
Defining
a
New
Paradigm
for
Industry
Best
Practices',
in
CIPC/SPE
Gas
Technology
Symposium
2008
Joint
Conference,
ed.
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers
(Calgary,
Alberta:
2008).
105
A.E.
Berman,
'Shale
Gas-Abundance
or
Mirage?
Why
The
Marcellus
Shale
Will
Disappoint
Expectations'
(paper
presented
at
the
ASPO
USA
2010
World
Oil
Conference,
Washington,
DC,
17/10/11
2010).
106
W.A.
Featherston
et
al.,
'Energy
Sector:
NYT
Shale
Gas
Allegations
Seem
Exaggerated',
in
UBS
Investment
Research
(New
York:
UBS,
2011).
107
Berman,
'Shale
Gas-Abundance
or
Mirage?
Why
The
Marcellus
Shale
Will
Disappoint
Expectations';
John
Dizard,
'Debate
over
shale
gas
decline
fires
up',
Financial
Times
2010;
Featherston
et
al.,
'NYT
Allegations
Exaggerated';
I.
Urbina,
'Insiders
Sound
an
Alarm
Amid
a
Natural
Gas
Rush',
New
York
Times
2011.
48
Annex
A).
Both
initial
production
and
initial
decline
can
be
measured
from
a
short
production
experience.
The
appropriate
b
constant,
however,
is
significantly
less
certain
until
several
years
production
experience
is
available.
The
impact
of
increasing
b
is
to
increase
the
production
rate
to
which
the
fitted
curve
is
asymptotically
approaching.
Therefore
a
higher
b
constant
leads
to
higher
estimates
of
URR
for
that
well.
Typically
b
varies
between
0
and
1,
but
the
initial
production
from
wells
with
a
high
initial
decline
rate
(such
as
shale
gas)
can
be
approximated
by
hyperbolic
curves
with
b
constants
greater
than
unity.
At
present,
it
remains
unclear
whether
subsequent
production
rates
from
these
wells
will
remain
consistent
with
these
fitted
curves.
Hence,
the
correct
b
constant
for
such
wells
has
become
a
focus
of
controversy.
Based
on
both
simulated
and
empirically
observed
well
behaviour,
some
authors
have
suggested
that
assuming
b
>
1
results
in
resource
estimates
that
are
2-100
times
greater
than
the
reasonable
values
derived
from
completed
wells
or
other
estimation
techniques.108
Shale
gas
companies
currently
active
in
the
four
main
US
shale
gas
plays
have
used
hyperbolic
decline
curves
with
b
constants
of
between
1.4
and
1.6.109
Analysis
of
1957
horizontal
wells
in
Barnett,
Fayetteville
Woodford,
Haynesville
and
Eagle
Ford
shale
plays110
suggests
that
b
constants
above
1
may
be
appropriate
for
unconventional
gas
in
some
instances,
though
b
constants
such
as
the
1.4
to
1.6
indicated
above
are
not
supported.
Guidelines
from
SPE
identify
a
possible
range
for
the
b
constant
of
between
0
and
1.5
for
shale
gas,
but
suggest
that
a
conservative
decline
rate
(lower
b)
be
used
to
derive
proved
reserve
estimates.
A
more
optimistic
decline
rate
(higher
b)
may
be
used
for
proved
and
probable
(2P)
reserves.111
Critics
of
the
use
of
decline
rates
in
shale
gas
have
suggested
that
operators
may
assume
overly
optimistic
b
constants112
based
upon
only
limited
production
experience.
In
an
analysis
of
44
wells
with
over
12-months
production
experience
in
the
Haynesville
shale,113
a
hyperbolic
curve
was
fit
to
the
average
production
with
a
b
constant
of
1.1.
This
resulted
in
a
mean
URR
estimate
for
the
44
wells
of
185
mcm/well.
Some
have
argued
that
this
estimate
is
optimistic
and
it
has
been
shown
that
curves
with
a
range
of
different
b
constants
fit
the
data
comparably
well
(see
Annex
A).
For
example,
a
hyperbolic
curve
with
a
b
constant
of
0.5
would
give
a
mean
URR
estimate
of
only
85
mcm/well.
It
has
already
been
seen
that,
under
some
circumstances,
a
b
constant
of
over
1
may
be
estimated.
However,
it
can
be
shown
that
the
sensitivity
of
URR
estimates
to
b
increases
with
the
assumed
value
of
b,
suggesting
that
small
variations
in
b
where
b
>1
have
more
impact
on
URR
estimates
than
similar
variations
in
b
where
b
<
1.
Shale
gas
analyst
Arthur
Berman
examined
the
implications
of
this
analysis
for
shale
gas
economics
and
suggested
that
a
well
with
an
estimated
URR
of
85
mcm
(the
outcome
for
108
L.
Mattar,
'Production
Analysis
and
Forecasting
of
Shale
Gas
Reservoirs:
Case
History-Based
Approach',
in
SPE
Shale
Gas
Production
Conference,
ed.
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers
(Fort
Worth,
TX:
2008);
J.A.
Rushing
et
al.,
'Estimating
Reserves
in
Tight
Gas
Sands
at
HP/HT
Reservoir
Conditions:
Use
and
Misuse
of
an
Arps
Decline
Curve
Methodology',
in
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition,
ed.
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers
(Anaheim,
CA:
2007).
109
Chesapeake
Energy,
'Institutional
investor
and
analyst
meeting',
(2010).
110
Jason
Baihly
et
al.,
'Shale
Gas
Production
Decline
Trend
Comparison
Over
Time
and
Basins'
(paper
presented
at
the
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition,
Florence,
Italy,
2010).
111
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
'Guidelines
for
Application
of
the
Petroleum
Resources
Management
System'.
112
Berman,
'Shale
Gas-Abundance
or
Mirage?
Why
The
Marcellus
Shale
Will
Disappoint
Expectations'.
113
Chesapeake
Energy,
'Investor
and
analyst
meeting'.
49
b=0.5 in the case of average Haynesville production decline) is likely to require a gas price of ~$7 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf), which compares to current US gas prices of only ~$3.5.114 This debate has subsequently been explored by the press, with articles in the Financial Times and the New York Times discussing the argument over b constants and the range of opinion over the economic viability of shale gas in the USA.115 These articles have in turn prompted response from some analysts defending the future profitability of shale production in the USA. 116 However, even from this defensive position, it is highlighted that a gas price of between $5.5 and $6 per Mcf of gas is required to support shale gas production in most of the US regions. A recent analysis of 8 700 horizontal wells in the Barnett Shale117 lends some support to a more optimistic position. This analysis groups wells by the number of years they have been in production and uses non-linear regression to find the best fit decline curve for each group. The results suggest hyperbolic decline with b values ranging from 1.3 to 1.6, with a mean of 1.5. This leads to a mean URR/well of 56.6 mcm when extrapolating production over an assumed 30-year lifetime. The same analysis also shows that older wells perform better (i.e. decline less rapidly) and speculates that this may be due both to newer wells targeting poor quality rock and/or to reduced spacing between wells. Re-stimulation of wells leads to higher production in the short term, but it is too early to tell whether this also leads to higher ultimate recovery. In summary, if b constants are overestimated, the US shale gas reserve is likely to be overstated by studies relying upon the extrapolation of historical production experience (e.g. the USGS). But the empirical evidence remains equivocal at present and several more years of production experience is likely to be required before any firm judgement can be made. In the interim, continued controversy can be anticipated.
50
this
stage
to
incorporate
estimates
from
studies
that
use
a
range
of
methodologies.
Since
experience
with
production
and
resource
estimation
is
growing
rapidly,
it
is
also
important
to
use
the
most
recent
estimates.
Organisations
that
have
provided
multiple
estimates
for
single
regions
(e.g.
Kuuskraa/ARI118
and
the
EIA119)
have
consistently,
and
often
significantly,
increased
their
estimates
over
time.
As
shown
in
Table
2-6,
it
was
only
possible
to
obtain
high,
best
and
low
estimates
of
recoverable
resources
for
four
regions
namely,
Canada,
USA,
China
and
Other
developing
Asia.
For
these
regions,
the
high
estimate
is,
on
average,
250%
of
the
best
estimate,
while
the
low
estimate
is
31%
of
the
best
estimate.
In
the
USA,
the
corresponding
figures
are
230%
and
64%.
This
serves
to
demonstrate
that
the
range
of
uncertainty
in
these
estimates
is
extremely
large,
even
for
the
USA.
Given
the
comparative
absence
of
production
experience
in
most
other
regions
of
the
world,
the
resource
estimates
should
be
treated
with
considerable
caution.
Table
2-6:
Estimates
of
shale
gas
resources
(Tcm)
Africa
Australia
High
Best
Low
29.5
6.3
ARI120
Average
of
Medlock
et
al.121
and
ARI.
Cannot
assume
that
estimate
from
ARI
is
the
high
estimate
as
this
is
reported
as
a
conservative
assessment
Only
estimates
from
2010
and
after
have
been
chosen
High:
Highest
estimate
provided
in
Skipper122
Best:
mean
of
several
studies123
(ICF
estimate
assumed
to
be
TRR)
Low:
Medlock
et
al.
High:
All
of
Centrally
planned
Asia
from
Rogner 124
with
40%
recovery
factor
Best:
Average
of
Medlock
et
al.
and
ARI
Low:
All
of
Centrally
planned
Asia
from
WEC 125
with
15%
recovery
factor
Notes/sources
Canada
28.3
12.5
4.7
China
39.8
21.2
1.6
118
Advanced
Resources International, 'World shale gas resources'; Kuuskraa, 'Economic and market impacts'; V.A. Kuuskraa, 'Gas shales drive the unconventional gas revolution' (paper presented at the Washington energy policy conference: the unconventional gas revolution, Washington, DC, 2010); Kuuskraa, 'Gas resources, unconventional'; Kuuskraa, 'An exportable North American revolution?'; V.A. Kuuskraa, 'Unconventional gas: Resource potential estimates likely to change', Oil and Gas Journal 105, no 35 (2007); Kuuskraa, 'Status report'; Kuuskraa and Meyers, 'Review of world resources'; V.A. Kuuskraa and T. Van Leeuwen, 'Economic and market impacts of abundant shale gas resources, in Global Leaders Forum: 'The natural gas revolution: U.S. and global impacts'', (Arlington, VA: Advanced Resources International Inc., 2011). 119 EIA, 'Annual Energy Outlook 2008 with Projections to 2030', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2008); EIA, 'AEO 2010'; EIA, 'AEO 2011'; S.A. Jikich and A.S. Popa, 'Hyperbolic Decline Parameter Identification Using Optimization Procedures, (paper presented at the SPE Eastern Regional Meeting, Morgantown, WV, 2000). 120 Advanced Resources International, 'World shale gas resources'. 121 Medlock, Jaffe and Hartley, 'Shale Gas and National Security'. 122 K. Skipper, 'Status of global shale gas developments, with particular emphasis on North America', in IIR inaugural shale gas briefing (Brisbane: 2010). 123 Advanced Resources International, 'World shale gas resources'; K. Downey, 'Fueling North Americas energy future: The unconventional natural gas revolution and the carbon agenda - Executive summary', (Cambridge, MA: IHS CERA, 2010); Medlock, Jaffe and Hartley, 'Shale Gas and National Security'; Moniz, Jacoby and Meggs, 'Future of natural gas'; Petak, 'Impact of natural gas on CHP'; Skipper, 'Status of global shale gas developments'. 124 Rogner, 'Assessment of World Resources'. 125 WEC, 'Survey of Energy Resources'.
51
Central
and
South
America
Eastern
Europe126
Former
Soviet
Union
India
Japan
Middle
East
Mexico
High
Best
Low
61.2
28.7
34.7
4.3
1.8
0
11.6
2.7
2.8
ARI
Average
of
Medlock
et
al.
and
ARI
for
Poland
High:
WEC
with
40%
recovery
factor
Low:
Rogner
with
15%
recovery
factor
ARI
No
sources
report
any
shale
gas
to
be
present
in
Japan
High:
whole
of
Rogners
MENA
region
with
40%
recovery
factor.
Low:
half
of
WEC
MENA
region
(as
assumed
by
ARI)
with
15%
recovery
factor
Average
of
Medlock
et
al.
and
ARI
WEC
reported
OECD
Asia
and
Other
Asia
collectively
cannot
be
used
High:
Rogner
Other
Pacific
Asia
and
Centrally
Planned
Asia
regions
with
40%
recovery
factor
minus
best
estimate
of
China
from
above
Low:
Other
Pacific
Asia
only
(as
assume
all
of
Rogners
Central
Planned
Asia
is
China)
and
assuming
a
15%
recovery
factor.
This
is
similar
to
estimate
for
Pakistan
only
from
ARI
No
sources
report
any
shale
gas
to
be
present
in
South
Korea
Notes/sources
22.1
1.3
47.4
Only estimates from 2010 and after have been chosen High: highest estimate available ICF127 (assumed to be TRR) 20.0 13.1 Best: mean of three estimates from each category judged to be most suitable128 Low: lowest estimate available USGS Average of Medlock et al. and ARI for Sweden and Germany, and 11.6 ARI and DECC 130 for the UK. ARI for France, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark and Medlock et al. for Austria
Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria,
Croatia,
Czech
Republic,
Hungary,
Macedonia,
Montenegro,
Poland,
Romania,
Serbia
(Kosovo),
Slovenia,
Slovakia
127
Petak,
'Impact
of
natural
gas
on
CHP'.
128
Kuuskraa,
'Economic
and
market
impacts';
Medlock,
Jaffe
and
Hartley,
'Shale
Gas
and
National
Security'.
As
well
as
USGS.
129
Including
Austria,
Belgium,
Cyprus,
Denmark,
Finland,
France,
Germany,
Greece,
Iceland,
Ireland,
Italy,
Luxembourg,
Malta,
the
Netherlands,
Norway,
Portugal,
Spain,
Sweden,
Switzerland,
United
Kingdom.
130
Harvey
and
Gray,
'Unconventional
resources
of
Britain'.
126
Including
52
excludes
the
resource
estimates
published
in
an
influential
study
by
the
IEA.131
The
IEA
takes
most
of
its
shale
gas
resource
estimates
directly
from
ARI,132
while
for
the
Middle
East
the
estimates
are
based
upon
the
seminal
study
by
Rogner133
assuming
a
20%
recovery
factor.
Rogner
is
also
the
source
of
the
IEA
tight
gas
and
CBM
resource
estimates,
assuming
a
40%
and
25%
recovery
factor
respectively.
Whether
such
reliance
upon
Rogner
is
reasonable
is
discussed
below.
Only
within
North
America,
and
predominantly
the
USA,
are
any
shale
gas
resources
considered
proved
reserves
and
these
comprise
only
a
small
proportion
of
the
estimated
technically
recoverable
resources.134
It
is
thus
very
important
not
to
confuse
reserves
with
resources.
As
indicated
above,
resource
estimates
are
inherently
uncertain
and
all
the
more
so
for
a
resource
that
is
at
such
an
early
stage
of
development.
Moreover,
this
uncertainty
is
compounded
by
the
use
of
imprecise
or
ambiguous
terminology.
This
often
results
from
employing
terminology
that
has
been
derived
for
conventional
hydrocarbons
but
is
not
necessarily
appropriate
for
unconventional
resources
(e.g.
undiscovered
resources).
Hence,
uncertainty
could
be
reduced
by
more
careful
and
consistent
use
of
terms
and
definitions
or,
better
still,
the
development
of
an
appropriate
standard
such
as
the
SPE/PRMS.
Four
general
methods
have
been
used
to
generate
resource
estimates
of
shale
gas,
namely:
expert
judgement;
literature
review;
bottom-up
assessment
of
geological
parameters
and
extrapolation
of
production
experience.
These
have
been
described
in
detail
and
the
strengths
and
weaknesses
of
each
discussed.
While
the
extrapolation
of
production
experience
is
potentially
the
most
robust
methodology,
it
relies
upon
data
that
is
unavailable
for
most
regions
of
the
world.
While
analogues
can
be
used,
the
results
are
sensitive
to
the
particular
analogue
that
is
chosen.
With
the
current
state
of
development
of
the
literature,
the
differences
in
resource
estimates
between
institutions
using
a
similar
methodological
approach
are
as
significant
as
the
differences
between
those
using
different
approaches.
For
example,
looking
at
estimates
of
the
US
TRR,
the
differences
between
the
estimates
of
the
USGS
and
INTEK135
within
the
extrapolation
category
are
as
great
as
between
Medlock
et
al.136
(literature
review),
USGS
(extrapolation)
and
ICF137
(geological).
A
primary
source
of
these
differences
is
the
uncertainty
over
the
recovery
factor
and
the
URR/well.
Hence,
emphasis
needs
to
be
placed
on
constraining
these
parameters
to
a
greater
131
IEA,
'Golden
age'.
Most
of
the
IEA
shale
gas
resource
estimates
were
taken
directly
from
ARI,
while
the
Middle
Eastern
estimates
were
based
upon
Rogner
assuming
20%
recovery
factor.
The
tight
gas
resource
estimates
for
all
regions,
and
the
CBM
resource
estimates
for
North
America
and
Asia/Pacific,
were
all
taken
from
Rogner
assuming
40%
and
25%
recovery
factors
respectively.
The
IEA
also
provides
a
CBM
resource
estimate
for
Eastern
Europe/Eurasia,
but
it
is
not
clear
how
this
was
derived.
The
figure
of
85
Tcm
would
require
a
75%
recovery
factor
to
correlate
to
Rogners
estimate
of
CBM
OGIP. Alternatively,
an
OGIP
of
340
Tcm
would
be
required
if
a
25%
recovery
factor
is
assumed
which
is
significantly
greater
than
any
other
estimate
of
global
CBM
OGIP.
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources',
Rogner,
'Assessment
of
World
Resources'.
132
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
133
Rogner,
'Assessment
of
World
Resources'.
134 Proved
reserves
reported
by
the
EIA
for
2009
are
1.7
Tcm
and
so
comprise
only
9%
of
the
best
estimate
of
TRR
given
in
Table
2-6.
EIA,
Shale
gas:
proved
reserves
(cited).
135
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
136
Medlock,
Jaffe
and
Hartley,
'Shale
Gas
and
National
Security'.
137
K.R.
Petak,
D.
Fritsch
and
E.H.
Vidas,
'North
American
Midstream
Infrastructure
Through
2035
-
A
Secure
Energy
Future',
(ICF
International,
2011).
53
degree
than
at
present
and
on
incorporating
probabilistic
techniques
to
capture
their
inherent
uncertainty.
There
is
an
absence
of
rigorous
studies
for
a
number
of
key
regions
across
the
world.
This
includes
Russia
and
the
Middle
East,
which
are
estimated
to
hold
potentially
very
large
resource
volumes
(Table
2-6).
While
Rogner138
and
the
World
Energy
Council139
provide
independent
estimates
for
these
regions,
they
provide
very
little
information
on
their
methodology
and
their
methods
are
potentially
flawed.
For
example,
Rogner
used
a
single
analogue
from
the
USA
to
estimate
recoverable
resources
across
the
whole
world.
But
since
subsequent
US
experience
has
demonstrated
a
wide
variation,
both
within
and
between
shale
plays,
the
choice
of
a
different
analogue
could
have
led
to
very
different
results.
The
WEC
provides
no
references
for
the
literature
relied
upon
for
its
study.
This
makes
reliance
on
other
studies
preferable
whenever
possible,
although
in
many
regions
Rogner
and
the
WEC
are
the
only
sources
that
are
available.
As
mentioned
above,
the
estimates
produced
by
bottom-up
geological
assessments
are
very
sensitive
to
the
assumed
recovery
factor.
While
it
is
generally
accepted
that
estimating
recovery
factors
is
challenging,
little
progress
appears
to
have
been
made
in
establishing
such
factors
for
shale,
even
when
the
geology
is
well
understood.
Uncertainty
over
this
factor,
which
is
currently
estimated
to
be
between
15%
and
40%
for
shale
gas
production,
makes
an
accurate
estimate
of
TRR
very
difficult
even
assuming
the
OGIP
can
be
established
with
any
confidence.
In
a
similar
manner,
many
of
the
estimates
produced
by
extrapolation
methods
are
sensitive
to
the
assumed
URR/well
and
hence
to
the
choice
and
parameterisation
of
the
relevant
decline
curves.
The
application
of
decline
curve
analysis
to
shale
gas
production
is
contested,
with
no
consensus
on
how
quickly
the
rate
of
production
decline
will
slow.
Of
particular
concern
is
the
fact
that
a
small
change
in
assumptions
in
these
analyses
may
have
a
large
effect
on
the
estimated
URR
of
a
well
and
hence
on
the
estimated
URR
for
a
region.
It
is
therefore
important
to
focus
attention
on
refining
these
techniques
and
developing
comprehensive
assessments
of
their
accuracy.
A
significant
amount
of
work
has
been
conducted
in
recent
years
into
refining
extrapolation
methods,
but
further
work
is
needed
to
prove
these
new
methods
and
establish
them
as
best
practice
if
genuine
improvement
is
to
be
achieved.
It
is
important
to
note
that
while
bottom-up
estimates
are
uncertain,
they
are
informed
by
some
level
of
historical
experience
and
are
often
bounded
at
the
individual
well
or
play
level.
This
may
limit
the
uncertainty
relative
to
that
for
top-down
estimates
of
regions
or
countries
where
there
is
limited
or
no
historical
experience
and
where
the
estimates
of
URR
or
TRR
may
be
sensitive
to
small
changes
in
assumptions.
Another
uncertainty
influencing
shale
gas
estimates
is
the
practice
of
simply
delineating
shale
play
areas
into
more
and
less
productive
areas.
Splitting
a
shale
play
into
only
these
two
areas
implies
that
comparable
production
rates
and
URR/well
will
be
experienced
across
the
whole
of
these
areas.
This
assumption
belies
the
true
heterogeneity
of
shale
plays.
In
addition,
production
to
date
has
focused
upon
areas
with
the
highest
productivity
and
URR/well.
Assuming
that
comparable
production
rates
will
be
experienced
across
the
remainder
of
the
play
is
likely
to
lead
to
overestimates
of
the
TRR.
The
large
areal
extent
of
many
shale
plays
means
that
138
Rogner,
'Assessment
of
World
Resources'.
139
WEC,
'Survey
of
Energy
Resources'.
54
inadequate delineation could a have large effect on the results, although this source of uncertainty should reduce as drilling continues and the extent to which different areas can be grouped together becomes more obvious. A related uncertainty is the validity of assumptions for URR/well and well spacing in areas outside those from which production is currently taking place. Even though assumptions for these areas are necessary to estimate the resource potential of the whole shale play, the level of confidence in these assumptions is much lower than that for developed areas. There is also uncertainty over the impact that technology will have on increasing current estimates of TRR. Previous forecasts of the potential impact of technological improvements failed to anticipate the increase in URR/well that has occurred since the 1980s. The technologies currently being used for shale gas extraction are now better understood, having been much more widely studied and utilised than previously. In addition, shale geology is now much better understood, suggesting that potential improvements in technology can now be better characterised. Nevertheless, technological progress, even if only leading to a small increase in URR/well or recovery factor, can have a significant impact on the estimated ultimately recoverable resources and it is impossible to rule out future major technological breakthroughs. Finally, the potential for shale gas in as yet undiscovered basins is likely to be low but probably not insignificant and requires further investigation. In conclusion, there are multiple and substantial uncertainties in assessing the recoverable volumes of shale gas at both the regional and global level. Even in areas where production is currently taking place, there remains significant uncertainty over the size of the resource and considerable variation in the available estimates. For undeveloped regions where less research has been conducted, one estimate of resources may be all that is available and the range of uncertainty cannot be characterised. For several regions of the world there are no estimates at all, but this does not necessarily mean that such regions contain only insignificant resources. Therefore, given the absence of production experience in most regions of the world, and the number and magnitude of uncertainties described above, current resource estimates should be treated with considerable caution.
55
56
Shale
is
a
sedimentary
rock
that
is
predominantly
comprised
of
consolidated
clay
and
silt-sized
particles.
Compaction
of
the
clay
particles
occurs
during
post-deposition
as
additional
materials
accumulate
above
these
particles,
resulting
in
the
formation
of
thin,
laminated
layers.
Laminated
layers
are
formed
because
clay
grains
align
as
a
result
of
compaction.
The
thin
layers
that
make
up
shale
result
in
a
rock
with
limited
horizontal
and
vertical
permeability.4
Gas
can
be
sorbed
on
to
organic
material
or
can
exist
as
free
gas
in
natural
fractures
and
micro
porosity.
Tight
gas
Tight
gas
refers
to
natural
gas
produced
from
reservoirs
that
have
very
low
porosity
and
permeability.
Such
reservoirs
are
usually
sandstone,
although
carbonate
rocks
can
also
be
tight
gas
producers.
The
standard
industry
definition
for
a
tight
gas
reservoir
is
a
rock
with
matrix
porosity
of
10%
or
less
and
permeability
of
0.1
millidarcy
or
less,
exclusive
of
fracture
permeability.5
Coal-bed
methane
Coals
are
sedimentary
rocks
containing
more
than
50wt%
organic
matter,
whereas
shales
contain
less
than
50wt%
organic
matter.
Methane
is
either
generated
by
bacterial
(biogenic
gas)
or
geochemical
(thermogenic
gas)
processes
during
burial.
The
gas
can
be
stored
by
multiple
mechanisms,
including
as
free
gas
in
micro-pores
and
sorbed
gas
on
the
internal
surfaces
of
the
organic
matter.
Nearly
all
coal-bed
gas
is
considered
to
be
sorbed
gas,
whereas
shale
gas
is
a
combination
of
those
two
mechanisms.
Coal-bed
gas
reservoirs
contain
an
orthogonal
fracture
set
called
cleats
that
are
orientated
perpendicular
to
the
bedding
and
provide
the
primary
conduit
for
fluid
flow.
Gas
diffuses
from
the
matrix
into
the
cleats
and
flows
to
the
wellbore.
In
shale
gas
reservoirs,
gas
is
sometimes
produced
through
more
permeable
sand
or
silt
layers,
interbedded
with
the
shale
through
natural
fractures
or
from
the
shale
matrix
itself.
In
coal-bed
reservoirs,
the
key
parameters
controlling
the
amount
of
gas
in
place
include
coal-bed
thickness,
coal
composition,
gas
content
and
gas
composition.
Coal
composition
refers
to
the
amount
and
type
of
organic
constituents
in
the
coal,
which
has
a
significant
effect
on
the
amount
of
gas
that
can
be
sorbed.
Gas
contents
in
coal
seams
vary
widely
(<1
to
>25m/ton)
and
are
a
function
of
composition,
thermal
maturity,
burial
and
uplift
history,
and
the
addition
of
migrated
thermal
and
biogenic
gas.
Production
rates
are
mainly
influenced
by
the
coal-beds
permeability,
which
is
in
the
order
of
millidarcies
or
tens
of
millidarcies.
Shale
gas
reservoirs
typically
are
thicker,
and
have
lower
sorbed
and
freer
gas
in
the
pore
space.
In
addition,
shale
gas
reservoirs
usually
have
much
lower
permeabilities,
commonly
in
the
nanodarcy
range.
Both
are
not
density-stratified,
do
not
contain
a
gas-water
contact
and
may
be
spread
over
a
very
large
geographic
area.
The
challenge
is
not
to
find
gas
but
to
find
areas
that
will
produce
gas
commercially.
See
Table
3-1
for
the
most
critical
reservoir
evaluation
parameters.
4
J.
Daniel
Arthur
et
al.,
'Evaluating
Implications
of
hydraulic
fracturing
in
Shale
Gas
Resevoirs',
in
SPE
Americas
E&P
Environmental
and
Safety
Conference
(San
Antonio,
TX:
2009
).
5
Leslie
Haines,
'Tight
Gas',
Oil
and
Gas
Investor
2006.
57
Table
3-1:
Summary
of
critical
data
used
to
appraise
coal-bed
and
shale
gas
reservoirs
Analysis
Gas
content
Results
Provides
volumes
of
desorbed
gas
(from
coal
samples
placed
in
canisters),
residual
gas
(from
crushed
coal)
and
lost
gas
(calculated).
The
sum
of
these
is
the
in-situ
gas
content
of
a
given
coal
seam.
Assesses
the
petroleum-generative
potential
and
thermal
maturity
of
organic
matter
in
a
sample.
Determines
the
fraction
of
organic
matter
already
transformed
to
hydrocarbons
and
the
total
amount
of
hydrocarbons
that
could
be
generated
by
complete
thermal
conversion.
Total organic Determines the total amount of carbon in the rock including the amount of carbon carbon present in free hydrocarbons and the amount of kerogen. Gas composition Core description Sorption isotherm Proximate analysis Determines the percentage of methane, carbon dioxide, nitrogen and ethane in the desorbed gas. Used to determine gas purity and to build composite desorption isotherms. Visually captures coal brightness, banding, cleat spacing, mineralogy, coal thickness and other factors. Provides insights about the composition, permeability and heterogeneity of a coal seam. A relationship, at constant temperature, describing the volume of gas that can be sorbed to a surface as a function of pressure. Describes how much gas a coal seam is capable of storing and how quickly this gas will be liberated. Provides the percentage of ash, moisture, fixed carbon and volatile matter. Used to correct gas contents and sorption isotherms to an ash-free basis, correct the isotherms for moisture and determine the maturity of high-rank coals.
Mineralogical Determines bulk mineralogy using petrography and/or X-ray diffraction and clay analyses mineralogy using X-ray diffraction and/or scanning electron microscopy. Vitrinite reflectance Calorific value Maceral analysis Bulk density Conventional logs Special logs Pressure- transient tests 3D seismic A value indicating the amount of incidental light reflected by the vitrinite maceral. This technique is a fast and inexpensive means of determining coal maturity in higher rank coals. The heat produced by combustion of a coal sample. Used to determine coal maturity in lower rank coals. Captures the types, abundance and spatial relationships of various maceral types. These differences can be related to differences in gas-sorption capacity and brittleness, which affect gas content and permeability. Relationships between bulk density and other parameters (such as ash content and gas content) can be used to establish a bulk-density cut-off for counting coal and shale thicknesses using a bulk-density log. Self-potential, gamma ray, shallow and deep resistivity, microlog, caliper, density, neutron and sonic logs. Used to identify coals and shales, and to determine porosity and saturation values in shales. Image logs to resolve fractures and wireline spectrometry logs to determine in-situ gas content. Pressure build-up or injection fall-off tests to determine reservoir pressure, permeability, skin factor and to detect fractured reservoir behaviour. Used to determine fault locations, reservoir depths, variations in thickness and lateral continuity, and coal/shale properties.
58
Drilling in shallow coal-bed methane reservoirs is often done with underbalanced percussion drilling, which has the advantage of a high drilling rate and nearly no formation damage. For coal-bed reservoirs, coiled tubing or multiple cased-hole fracture stimulations are conducted on thin individual seams by use of gelled fluids with sand as the proppant. Water is usually flushed at rates of <5bbl/min.6
3.2.1 Drilling
As
already
stated,
horizontal
drilling
is
one
of
the
keys
that
made
unconventional
gas
economically
viable.10
Since
the
thickness
of
the
pay
zone
is
often
insufficient,
horizontal
wells
are
drilled
within
each
shale
layer.11
Figure
3-1
compares
a
vertical
and
a
horizontal
well
that
are
producing
from
a
shale
formation.
D.
Jenkins
and
Charles
M.
Boyer,
'Coalbed-
and
Shale-Gas
Reservoirs',
Journal
of
Petroleum
Technology
February
(2008).
7
Arthur
et
al.,
'Evaluating
Implications
of
hydraulic
fracturing
in
Shale
Gas
Resevoirs'.
8
Don
R.
Watson
et
al.,
'One-Trip
Multistage
Completion
Technology
for
Unconventional
Gas
Formations',
in
CIPC/SPE
Gas
Technology
Symposium
2008
Joint
Conference
(Calgary,
Alberta:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2008).
9
ALL
Consulting,
'Modern
Shale
Gas
development
in
the
United
States
-
a
primer',
(Tulsa,
OK:
ALL
Consulting,
2009).
10
Ibid.
11
Mark
Zoback,
Saya
Kitasei
and
Brad
Copithorne,
'Addressing
the
Environmental
Risks
from
Shale
Gas
Development',
in
Briefing
Paper
(Washington,
DC:
Worldwatch
Institute,
2010).
6
Creties
59
Figure
3-1:
Vertical
vs.
horizontal
well
comparison12
In
addition
to
horizontal
drilling,
drilling
from
pads
is
a
field
development
strategy
that
can
reduce
the
surface
footprint,
environmental
disturbance,
logistical
issues,
etc.13
US
drilling
activity
highlights
the
importance
of
horizontal
drilling
technology.
In
the
Barnett
Shale,
the
number
of
horizontal
wells
drilled
has
increased
from
76
in
March
2001
to
1
810
in
August
2007
(see
Figure
3-3).
On
the
other
hand,
vertical
wells
have
decreased
from
2
001
to
131
in
the
same
time
period.14
The
latest
data
from
the
USA
shows
that,
over
the
period
2005-2010,
the
percentage
of
horizontal
rigs
has
increased
from
10%
to
58%
of
the
total
rig
count.15
Horizontal
drilling
technology
In
order
to
drill
within
the
horizontal
layers,
directional
drilling
technology
is
applied.
This
is
conventionally
done
by
using
standard
down-hole
motors.
New
developments
also
utilise
directional
drilling
automation
or
rotary
steerable
systems.
As
can
be
seen
from
Figure
3-2,
a
typical
well
is
drilled
nearly
vertically
(depending
upon
the
situation)
from
surface
down
to
the
kick-off
point
(KOP).
At
the
KOP,
the
trajectory
starts
deviating
from
the
vertical
with
build
rates
of
about
10/30m
to
20/30m.
In
practice
this
means
that
the
KOP
is
about
100m
to
200m
vertically
above
the
horizontal
section.
In
the
USA
the
length
of
the
horizontal
section
of
the
well
is
between
1
000m
to
2
000m
on
average.
Horizontal
lengths
of
up
to
6
000m
have
been
reported.16
Oil
and
Gas,
Why
Multiple
Horizontal
Wells
from
centralized
well
pads
should
be
used
for
the
Marcellus
Shale
(West
Virginia
Surface
Owner's
Rights
Organization,
2012,
cited
04/05/2012);
available
from
http://www.wvsoro.org/resources/marcellus/horiz_drilling.html
13
Krisanne
L.
Edwards
et
al.,
'Marcellus
Shale
Hydraulic
Fracturing
and
Optimal
Well
Spacing
to
Maximize
Recovery
and
Control
Costs',
in
SPE
Hydraulic
Fracturing
Technology
Conference
(Woodlands,
TX:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2011);
Florence
Gny,
'Can
Unconventional
Gas
be
a
Game
Changer
in
European
Markets?',
(Oxford:
Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies,
2010).
14
3
Legs
Resources,
'Introduction
to
Shale
Gas'.
15
Abu
M.
Sani
and
Efe
A.
Ejefodomi,
'Horizontal
Wells
Drilling
Activity
in
South
Texas
Unconventional
Gas
Resources
and
Micro-seismic
Hydraulic
Fracturing
Montioring
Application
to
Reduce
Risk
and
Increase
the
Success
Rate',
in
SPE/DGS
Saudi
Arabia
Section
Technical
Symposium
and
Exhibition
(Al-Khobar,
Saudi
Arabia:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers
2011).
16
Sandeep
Janwadkar
et
al.,
'Innovative
Design
Rotary
Steerable
Technologies
Overcome
Challenges
of
Complex
Well
Profiles
in
a
Fast
Growing
Unconventional
ResourceWoodford
Shale',
in
SPE/IADC
12
Chief
60
Figure
3-2:
Typical
wellbore
trajectory17
State-of-the-art
technologies
currently
in
use
include
down-hole
motors,
often
utilised
in
conjunction
with
directional
drilling
automation
or
rotary
steerable
systems
(RSS).
A
downhole
motor,
as
shown
in
Figure
3-3,
mainly
consists
of
two
parts
connected
through
a
joint
that
permits
the
lower
end
to
be
directed
by
some
degrees,
allowing
directional
drilling.
The
rotational
energy
used
to
turn
the
motor,
and
hence
the
drill
bit
connected
to
it,
is
provided
by
the
drilling
fluid.
To
enable
directional
control,
parameters
such
as
stand
pipe
pressure
and
torque
are
closely
and
constantly
monitored.
Finally,
to
get
feedback
as
to
whether
the
wellbore
being
drilled
matches
the
planned
trajectory,
measurement-while-drilling
tools
(MWD)
are
used.18
Drilling
Conference
and
Exhibition
(Amsterdam,
the
Netherlands:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2009);
Sandeep
Janwadkar
et
al.,
'Barnett
Shale
Drilling
and
Geological
Complexities
-
Advanced
Technologies
Provide
The
Solution',
in
IADC/SPE
Drilling
Conference
(Orlando,
FL:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2008);
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
'Draft
SGEIS
on
the
Oil,
Gas
and
Solution
Mining
Regulatory
Program
',
(Albany,
NY:
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
2009);
Benny
Poedjono
et
al.,
'Case
Studies
in
the
Application
of
Pad
Drilling
Design
in
the
Marcellus
Shale',
in
SPE
Eastern
Regional
Meeting
(Morgantown,
WV:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2010);
Junichi
Sugiura
and
Steve
Jones,
'Rotary
Steerable
System
Enhances
Drilling
Performance
on
Horizontal
Shale
Wells',
in
International
Oil
and
Gas
Conference
and
Exhibition
in
China
(Beijing:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2010);
S.
Zargari
and
S.
D.
Mohaghegh,
'Field
Development
Strategies
for
Bakken
Shale
Formation',
in
SPE
Eastern
Regional
Meeting
(Morgantown,
WV:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2010).
17
geology.com,
Mineral
Rights:
Basic
information
about
mineral,
surface,
oil
and
gas
rights
(2012,
cited
15
March
2012).
18
Baker
Hughes
INTEQ,
Drilling
Engineering
Workbook:
A
Distributed
Learning
Course
(Houston,
TX:
Baker
Hughes
INTEQ,
1995);
William
C.
Lyons,
Working
Guide
to
Drilling
Equipment
and
Operations,
First
Edition
ed.
(Burlington,
MA:
Gulf
Publishing,
2010);
H.R.
Motahhari,
G.
Hareland
and
J.A.
James,
'Improved
Drilling
Efficiency
Technique
Using
Integrated
PDM
and
PDC
Bit
Parameters',
Journal
of
Canadian
petroleum
Technology
49,
no
10
(2010);
Schlumberger
Ltd.,
Oilfield
Glossary:
Steerable
Motor
61
One
option
for
increasing
horizontal
drilling
efficiency
and
improving
directional
control
is
utilising
directional
drilling
automation
technology.
A
rocking
motion
is
applied
from
the
top
where
the
torque
measurement
is
monitored,
hence
breaking
the
drag
down
the
hole
and
using
the
torque
as
a
feedback
to
control
motion.19
Figure
3-3:
Horizontal
drilling
technology20
In principle, RSS provides the same control of wellbore trajectory; however, no directional drilling automation technology is required to overcome drag, and thus curved sections can be drilled faster and more accurately. Despite these significant and highly desired advantages, downhole motors are found to be more practical due to their lower cost.21 Drilling from pads In shale drilling, it is becoming increasingly common to use a single pad, as in Figure 3-4, to develop as much subsurface area as possible from one spot. One surface location can be used for multiple wells. Pad drilling increases the operational efficiency of gas production and reduces infrastructure costs, land use and environmental impacts.22
(Schlumberger
Ltd,
2011,
cited
27
March
2012);
available
from
http://www.slb.com/resources/publications/oilfield_review/ori/ori002/01/01a.aspx
19
Eric
Maidla,
Marc
Haci
and
Daniel
Wright,
'Case
History
Summary:
Horizontal
Drilling
Performance
Improvement
Due
to
Torque
Rocking
on
800
Horizontal
Land
Wells
Drilled
for
Unconventional
Gas
Resources',
in
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition
(New
Orleans,
LA:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2009).
20
Eric
Maidla
and
Marc
Haci,
'Understanding
Torque:
The
Key
to
Slide
Drilling
Directional
Wells',
in
IADC/SPE
Drilling
Conference
(Dallas,
TX:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2004).
21
Steve
Jones,
Junichi
Sugiura
and
Steve
Barton,
'Finding
optimal
balance
in
rotary
steerable
systems',
Offshore
Magazine
68,
no
9
(2008).
22
3
Legs
Resources,
'Introduction
to
Shale
Gas'.
62
Figure
3-4:
Multi-well
pad
development23
The
footprint
of
a
pad
usually
ranges
from
12
000m
(100m
x
120m)
to
20
000m.
Wells
are
often
placed
next
to
each
other
at
distances
of
between
7m
and
8m.
A
typical
pad
includes
upwards
of
6
wells,
with
up
to
24
being
reported.24
The
wells
are
drilled
parallel
in
the
shale
for
a
distance
of
about
200m
to
500m,
with
a
horizontal
length
of
about
1
000m
to
2
000m.
The
difference
in
total
surface
footprint
between
vertical
and
horizontal
wells
is
shown
in
Table
3-2.
Table
3-2:
Ten-square-mile
total
surface
disturbance
of
vertical
and
horizontal
wells25
Spacing
option
Number
of
pads
Total
disturbance
drilling
phase
%
Disturbance
drilling
phase
Multi-well
640
acres
10
50
acres
(5
ac.
per
pad)
0.78
Single
well
40
acres
160
480
acres
(3
ac.
per
pad)
7.5
23
Ruth
Wood
et
al.,
'Shale
gas:
a
provisional
assessment
of
climate
change
and
environmental
impacts',
(Manchester: Tyndall Centre, University of Manchester, 2011). 24 Travis Garza et al., 'Gyro Guidance Techniques and Telemetry Methods Prove Economical in Onshore Multiwell Pad Drilling Operations in the Piceance Basin', in IADC/SPE Drilling Conference and Exhibition (New Orleans, LA: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2010); Gny, 'Unconventional Gas'; M.M. Reynolds and D.L. Munn, 'Development Update for an Emerging Shale Gas Giant Field - Horn River Basin, British Columbia, Canada', in SPE Unconventional Gas Conference (Pittsburgh, PA: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2010). 25 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 'Draft SGEIS'.
63
the
flow
of
gas.
Whilst
water
and
sand
are
the
main
components
of
hydraulic
fracture
fluid,
chemical
additives
are
often
added
in
small
concentrations.26
Figure
3-5:
Vertical
well
and
horizontal
well
fracture
views
Conventional
fracturing
fluid
Table
3-3
illustrates
that
the
chemicals
used
can
have
a
range
of
toxicities.
For
instance,
sand,
polyacrylamide,
guar
gum
and
hydroxyethyl
cellulose
are
relatively
benign
materials.
Acids
and
bases
may
cause
an
irritant
response
upon
dermal
or
inhalation
exposure,
but
more
acute
responses
are
possible.
Chronic
toxicity
has
been
associated
with
some
identified
chemicals,
such
as
ethylene
glycol,
glutaraldehyde
and
N,N- dimethyl
formamide.
Naturally
occurring
metals
also
exert
various
forms
of
toxicity
even
at
low
concentrations.27
Table
3-3:
An
example
of
the
volumetric
composition
of
hydraulic
fracturing
fluid
Product
category
Water
Sand
Other
Acid
Antibacterial
agent
Breaker
Corrosion
inhibitor
Crosslinker
Main
ingredient
Approximately
99.5%
water
and
sand
Approximately
0.5%
Hydrochloric
acid
or
muriatic
acid
Glutaraldehyde
Ammonium
persulfate
N,N-dimethyl
formamide
Borate
salts
Helps
dissolve
minerals
and
initiates
cracks
in
the
rock
Eliminates
bacteria
in
the
water
that
produces
corrosive
by-products
Allows
a
delayed
breakdown
of
the
gel
Prevents
the
corrosion
of
the
pipe
Maintains
fluid
viscosity
as
temperature
increases
Swimming
pool
chemical
and
cleaner
Disinfectant,
steriliser
for
medical
and
dental
equipment
Used
in
hair
colouring,
as
a
disinfectant
and
in
the
manufacture
of
common
household
plastics
Used
in
pharmaceuticals,
acrylic
fibres
and
plastics
Used
in
laundry
detergents,
hand
soaps
and
cosmetics
Purpose
Expand
fracture
and
deliver
sand
Allows
the
fractures
to
remain
open
so
the
gas
can
escape
Other
common
uses
Landscaping
and
manufacturing
Drinking
water
filtration,
play
sand,
concrete
and
brick
mortar
26
3
Legs
Resources,
'Introduction
to
Shale
Gas'.
27
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
'Draft
Plan
to
Study
the
Potential
Impacts
of
Hydraulic
Fracturing
on
Drinking Water Resources ', (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency, 2011).
64
Product
category
Friction
reducer
Gel
Iron
control
Clay
stabiliser
pH
adjusting
agent
Scale
inhibitor
Surfactant
Main
ingredient
Petroleum
distillate
Guar
gum
or
hydroxyethyl
cellulose
Citric
acid
Potassium
chloride
Sodium
or
potassium
carbonate
Ethylene
glycol
Isopropanol
Purpose
Slicks
the
water
to
minimise
friction
Thickens
the
water
in
order
to
suspend
the
sand
Prevents
precipitation
of
metal
oxides
Creates
a
brine
carrier
fluid
Maintains
the
effectiveness
of
other
components,
such
as
crosslinkers
Prevents
scale
deposits
in
the
pipe
Used
to
increase
the
viscosity
of
the
fracture
fluid
Other
common
uses
Used
in
cosmetics
including
hair,
make-up,
nail
and
skin
products
Thickener
used
in
cosmetics,
baked
goods,
ice
cream,
toothpaste,
sauces
and
salad
dressings
Food
additive,
food
and
beverages,
lemon
juice
~7%
citric
acid
Used
in
low-sodium
table
salt
substitute,
medicines
and
IV
fluids
Used
in
laundry
detergents,
soap,
water
softener
and
dishwasher
detergents
Used
in
household
cleansers,
de- icer,
paints
and
caulks
Used
in
glass
cleaner,
multi-surface
cleansers,
antiperspirant,
deodorants
and
hair
colour
Table
3-4:
Naturally
occurring
substances
that
may
be
found
in
hydrocarbon-containing
formations
Type
of
contaminant
Formation
fluid
Gases
Examples
Brine
Natural
gas
(e.g.
methane,
ethane),
carbon
dioxide,
hydrogen
sulphide,
nitrogen,
helium
Trace
elements
Mercury,
lead,
arsenic
Naturally
occurring
radioactive
Radium,
thorium,
uranium
material
Organic
material
Organic
acids,
polycyclic
aromatic
hydrocarbons,
volatile
and
semi- volatile
organic
compounds
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) anticipates that an initial database search and ranking of high, low and unknown-priority chemicals will be completed for a 2012 interim report. Additional work using high-throughput screening tools is expected to be available in a 2014 report, as well as the development of chemical-specific Provisional Peer Reviewed Toxicity Values (PPRTVs) for high-priority chemicals.28 It must be pointed out that the fracturing fluid composition presented here reflects the fluids used in the USA; however, in Europe this composition could be different, with hazardous elements eliminated or their concentrations reduced. Multi-stage fracturing Due to the length of the lateral section, it is usually not possible to maintain sufficient downhole pressure to stimulate its entire length in a single event. Thus, in shale gas wells, stimulation is achieved by isolating portions of the lateral and performing treatments in multiple stages.
28
Ibid.
65
Each fracture stage is performed within an isolated interval of the lateral, where a cluster of perforations is created using a perforation tool to establish communication between the formation and the wellbore. The fracture stages are isolated with packers. In the area of Eagle Ford Shale, the range of fracturing stages is between 12 and 21 stages per horizontal well, with an average of 17 stages per well.29 Alternative fracturing fluids Fluids for fracturing operations that do not require high-purity fresh water as a base are being developed. Various components that allow for the reuse of fracturing flowback water have been developed, such as salt compatible, nano-particle friction reducers; neutral pH iron controls; blended and targeted scale controls; aqueous biomass controls; and low-toxicity clay stabilisers.30 Alternative chemicals have been created to replace toxic 2-butoxyethanol, which have a far superior environmental profile and perform even better in well flowback enhancement.31 Apart from this, liquefied petroleum gas and foam fluids are being developed and utilised. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is a mixture of petroleum gases existing in a liquid state at ambient temperature and moderate pressure. Once the well treatment is complete, the propane and natural gas in the LPG remains in either a multi-phase or a single vapour phase at formation conditions.32 Foam fluids are essentially two-phase fluids that consist of an inner phase, which is either liquid (N2) or vapour/gaseous (CO2), and an outer phase, which is primarily composed of a saline-water mixture with either a surfactant or gallant.33 Alternative fracturing methods Channel fracturing is claimed to provide significantly higher fracture conductivity, better fracture cleanup, lower pressure loss within the fracture and longer effective fracture half-length. The idea is basically to substitute the homogeneous proppant pack in the fracture with a heterogeneous structure containing a network of open channels (Figure 3-6). The fracture is held open by discrete conglomerations of propping
Centurion,
'Eagle
Ford
Shale:
A
Multistage
Hydraulic
Fracturing,
Completion
Trends
and
Production
Outcome
Study
Using
Practical
Data
Mining
Techniques',
in
SPE
Eastern
Regional
Meeting
(Columbus,
OH:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2011).
30
M.E.
Blauch,
'Developing
Effective
and
Environmentally
Suitable
Fracturing
Fluids
Using
Hydraulic
Fracturing
Flowback
Waters',
in
SPE
Unconventional
Gas
Conference
(Pittsburgh,
PA:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2010).
31
Jonathan
J.
Wylde
and
Bill
O'Neil,
'Environmentally
Acceptable
Replacement
of
2-Butoxyethanol
with
a
High
Performance
Alternative
for
Fracturing
Applications',
in
SPE
International
Symposium
on
Oilfield
Chemistry
(Woodlands,
TX:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2011).
32
Eric
H.
Tudor
et
al.,
'100%
Gelled
LPG
Fracturing
Process:
An
Alternative
to
Conventional
Water-Based
Fracturing
Techniques',
in
SPE
Eastern
Regional
Meeting
(Charleston,
WV:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2009).
33
A.
Kumar
et
al.,
'Prospects
of
Foam
Stimulation
in
Oil
and
Gas
Wells
of
India',
in
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Energy
Resources
Conference
(Port
of
Spain,
Trinidad:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2010).
29
Sergio
66
materials.
The
open
channels
act
as
low-resistance
paths
for
the
flow
of
reservoir
fluids.34
Figure
3-6:
Representation
of
the
new
fracturing
approach
with
respect
to
a
conventional
fracture
Hydra-jetting
(Figure
3-7)
represents
another
notable
alternative
fracturing
process.
Tensile
failure
of
the
rock
occurs
at
the
jetting
point
without
exposing
the
wellbore
to
breakdown
pressures.
This
enables
precise
control
of
the
location
of
the
fracture
initiation.
Multiple
fractures
can
be
created
by
simply
moving
the
jetting
tool.35
Figure
3-7:
Hydrajet
perforation
and
proppant
plug
diversion
to
fracture
multiple
intervals,
vertically
and
horizontally
Best practices in water management Water used for drilling and making up frac fluids can come from surface water bodies, groundwater, municipal portable water supplies, or flowback water from a previously fractured well.
34
M.
Gillard
et
al.,
'A
New
Approach
to
Generating
Fracture
Conductivity',
in
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition
(Florence,
Italy:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2010).
35
Glenda
Wylie,
Mike
Eberhard
and
Mike
Mullen,
'Trends
in
Unconventional
Gas',
Oil
&
Gas
Journal
105,
no
47
(2007
).
67
The water required for drilling a typical shale gas well ranges from 2 300 to 4 000 m. The volume needed to fracture a well range is from 8 700m to 14 500m.36 Once the frac job is finished, the pressure is released. Then, flowback and produced water (30% to 70% of the fluid injected), which typically contains very high levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) and other constituents (possibly including heavy metals and naturally occurring radioactive materials) returns to the surface.37 Flowback may be directed to tanks or lined pits and centralised impoundments for management. These impoundments should provide structural integrity and have a natural or artificial liner designed to prevent downward flow. They should also be placed at an appropriated distance from surface water to prevent overflows from reaching the surface water.38 Generally, the TDS concentration of flowback and produced water is higher than the desired TDS range for new frac fluids. Thus, thermal distillation can be used, or the flowback and produced water can be blended with fresh water, to reduce TDS concentration and other constituents.39 Operators must manage flowback and produced water in a cost-effective manner that complies with regulatory requirements. The primary options are: Injection underground through a disposal well (not possible under EU law); Discharge to a nearby surface-water body (permission and treatment are required); Haul to a municipal wastewater treatment plant (limitations due to issues with TDS treatment); Haul to a commercial industrial wastewater treatment facility (limited to allow TDS discharges without violating surface water quality); Reuse for a future frac job, either with or without treatment.40
Disposal
options
are
dependent
on
the
availability
of
suitable
zones
and
the
possibility
of
obtaining
permits
for
injection
into
these
zones;
the
capacity
of
commercial
and/or
municipal
water
treatment
facilities;
and
the
ability
of
either
operators
or
such
plants
to
successfully
obtain
surface-water
discharge
permits.41
Municipal
sewage
treatment
facilities
must
have
a
state-approved
pretreatment
programme
for
accepting
any
industrial
waste.
Facilities
must
also
notify
appropriate
regulatory
authorities
of
any
new
industrial
waste
they
plan
to
receive,
and
certify
that
their
facility
is
capable
of
treating
the
pollutants
that
are
expected
to
be
in
that
industrial
waste.
They
are
generally
required
to
perform
certain
analyses
to
ensure
they
can
handle
the
waste
without
problems
to
ensure
that
water
quality
standards
are
36
John
A.
Veil,
'Water
Management
Technologies
Used
by
Marcellus
Shale
Gas
Producers',
(Washington,
Petroleum Institute, 'Water Management Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing', in API Guidance Document (Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute, 2010). 39 Veil, 'Water Management Technologies'. 40 Ibid. 41 American Petroleum Institute, 'Water Management'.
68
maintained
at
all
times.
Thus,
it
may
be
required
that
operators
provide
information
pertaining
to
the
composition
of
the
fluid.42
In
Figure
3-8,
water
consumption
among
different
industries
is
presented.
Using
an
initial
drilling
rate
of
200
wells
in
a
one-year
period
with
an
average
consumptive
water
use
of
12
500
mper
well
would
yield
a
volume
of
250
000
mof
water,
which
would
be
consumptively
used
for
natural
gas
development
on
an
annual
basis.43
Figure
3-8:
Consumptive
water
uses
in
the
Delaware
Basin
Although
the
water
required
for
hydraulic
fracturing
is
only
partially
recovered
(contrary
to
other
industrial
uses),
such
water
is
typically
a
small
percentage
of
the
water
use
in
any
shale
basin.
While
other
industries
use
water
on
a
continuous
basis,
hydraulic
treatment
only
requires
water
for
short
periods.44
Table
3-5:
Water
use
by
sector
in
shale
gas
basins
Shale
play
Barnett
Fayetteville
Haynesville
Marcellus
Public
supply
82.70%
2.30%
45.90%
11.97%
Industrial
and
mining
4.50%
1.10%
27.20%
16.13%
Power
generation
3.70%
33.30%
13.50%
71.70%
Irrigation
6.30%
62.90%
8.50%
0.12%
Livestock
2.30%
0.30%
4.00%
0.01%
Shale
gas
0.40%
0.10%
0.80%
0.06%
Total
water
use
(bl.
m/yr)
1.77
5.07
0.34
13.51
Given
the
constraints
on
both
underground
injection
and
discharge
in
the
USA,
serious
investments
will
be
needed
to
advance
treatment
technologies
that
enable
companies
to
reuse
fluids
for
subsequent
fracturing
jobs.
Recycling
water
minimises
both
the
overall
amount
of
water
used
for
fracturing
and
the
amount
that
must
be
disposed
of.
Many
water
treatment
processes
are
currently
being
investigated
that
could
potentially
be
used
on
a
large
scale
with
the
ultimate
goal
of
developing
a
closed-loop
system.45
42
Ibid.
43
J.
Daniel
Arthur
and
David
J.
Bockelmann,
'Analysis
Of
Delaware
River
Basin
Commission
Proposed
(Article
7)
Natural
Gas
Development
Regulations',
(Tulsa,
OK:
ALL
Consulting,
2011).
44
J.D.
Arthur
and
B.J.
Coughlin,
'Cumulative
Impacts
of
Shale-Gas
Water
Management:
Considerations
and
Challenges', in SPE Americas E&P Health, Safety, Security, and Environmental Conference (Houston, TX: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011). 45 Zoback, Kitasei and Copithorne, 'Environmental Risks from Shale Gas'.
69
3.2.3 Monitoring
Due
to
the
fluids
in
each
fracturing
treatment
containing
a
different
subset
of
chemicals
and
because
some
of
these
chemicals
could
be
hazardous
in
sufficient
concentrations,
baseline
water
testing
conducted
at
each
site
might
play
an
important
role
in
ensuring
that
possible
exposure
is
detected.
This
would
help
to
limit
the
environmental
and
health
risks
posed
by
fracturing
fluids
in
the
case
of
contamination.
Monitoring
could
also
play
an
important
role
regarding
the
surface
footprint
of
drilling
activities,
the
safe
transport
and
disposal
of
drilling
fluids
and
cuttings,
and
air
and
noise
pollution.
Microseismic
fracture
monitoring
Microfractures
inducing
shear-slip
or
microseismic
events
that
generally
have
magnitudes
of
less
than
1.5
on
the
Richter
scale
(see
Figure
3-9)
have
about
as
much
energy
as
that
released
by
a
bowl
of
milk
dropped
from
chest
height
to
the
floor.
Due
to
the
small
magnitudes
of
these
events,
which
represent
micro-earthquakes
about
one- millionth
the
size
of
tremors
that
might
be
detected
by
inhabitants
of
a
populated
area,
operators
must
deploy
ultrasensitive
seismometers
in
nearby
wells
in
order
to
detect
them.46
Figure
3-9:
Distribution
of
magnitudes
of
microseismic
events
in
Barnett
Shale
Microseismic
mapping
(MSM)
provides
insight
into
the
development
of
fracture
propagation
and
the
mechanisms
by
which
this
is
occurring,
permitting
the
real-time
analysis
of
fracture
treatments
and
thereby
reducing
risks
and
challenges.
A
hydraulic
fracture
induces
an
increase
in
the
formation
stress
proportional
to
the
net
fracturing
pressure,
as
well
as
an
increase
in
pore
pressure
due
to
fracture
fluid
leak-off.
Large
tensile
stresses
are
generated
ahead
of
the
cracks
tip,
thus
generating
large
amounts
of
shear
stress.
Pore
pressure
and
formation
stress
increases
affect
the
stability
of
the
planes
of
weakness
surrounding
the
hydraulic
fracture,
causing
these
planes
of
weakness
to
undergo
shear
slippage
and
emit
seismic
energy,
which
is
detectable
as
compressional
(P)
and
shear
(S)
waves
by
receivers
placed
in
a
nearby
well.
In
recent
years,
MSM
has
become
a
critical
technology
for
imaging,
quantifying
and
evaluating
fracture
geometry
dynamics.
It
also
provides
useful
information
on
the
fracture
azimuth
(which
is
beneficial
for
well
spacing
and
in-fill
drilling
programmes)
and
gives
good
indications
regarding
the
hydraulic
fracture
complexity,
which
helps
in
the
estimation
of
the
volume
of
the
reservoir
that
has
been
stimulated.
Microseismic
mapping
has
also
been
vital
in
observing
the
interaction
or
communication
of
the
46
Ibid.
70
created
fractures
with
other
fractures
and
with
geohazards
that
can
be
detrimental
to
the
productivity
of
the
wellbore.
MSM
has
been
used
in
conjunction
with
wellbore
images,
resistivity
logs
and
sonic
logs
to
characterise
different
geological
intervals
in
relation
to
natural
fractures,
induced
fractures
near
the
wellbore
and
stress
contrast
regions.
This
helps
to
identify
the
appropriate
perforation
location
and
spacing,
as
well
as
the
best
fracture
stimulation
staging
and
technique
to
deploy
(Figure
3-10).47
Figure
3-10:
Typical
hydraulic
fracture
monitoring
configurations
for
horizontal
treatment
wells
Figure
3-11:
Map
view
of
hydraulic
fracture
Figure
3-12:
Location
and
orientation
of
the
intersecting
a
pre-existing
fault48
fault
identified
by
microseismic
monitoring49
Monitoring of surface leakages The traditional gas detection systems available today are based on two main concepts, which are called sniffing technologies: Point detectors, where the gas has to be in physical contact with the detector;
47
Sani
and
Ejefodomi,
'Horizontal
Wells
Drilling
Activity
in
South
Texas
Unconventional
Gas
Resources
and Micro-seismic Hydraulic Fracturing Montioring Application to Reduce Risk and Increase the Success Rate'. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.
71
Open path detectors, where the gas has to be within a predefined path of infrared light to be detected.
Both detection concepts are based on LEL (lower explosive level) measurements. However, in outdoor installations, the gas cloud from a gas leak often either dilutes or drifts away in the wind before it reaches the gas detection point. Another gas leak detector utilised is an ultrasonic gas leak detector, which is based on airborne ultrasound emitted from the gas leak. It gives an instant alarm as soon as the leak is detected. However, if the hole through which the gas leaks is too large, the pressure drop across the hole will be too small and no ultrasound will be detected.50 Hydrocarbon processing facilities are equipped with gas detection system with sensors. There are two types of detectors: 1) flammable gas detectors, which detect leakages of flammable gas exceeding 20% LEL of concentration; and 2) toxic gas detectors, which detect leakages of H2S exceeding 10 ppm.51 Underground flow monitoring Distributed temperature sensing (DTS) is a method for downhole leak detection, where the thermal profile can be instantaneously detected along the entire wellbore in real- time. This allows the precise identification of when and where thermal events occur. An enclosed fibre-optic cable is deployed into the well to allow a continuous, real-time snapshot of the wells temperature profile.52 Other methods are spinners, temperature logs, downhole cameras, thermal-decay logs and noise logs. It is rather difficult to detect small leaks with these tools, because small leaks result in velocity and temperature changes that may be less than the resolution of these logging tools. Noise logs can detect fluid movement but must be used in a stationary mode and more distant noise sources may confuse interpretation. Downhole cameras can be useful in finding a variety of leaks but require the wellbore to be filled with optically clear fluid. For the detection of small leaks, ultrasonic leak-detection is used. It is known that leaks, regardless of phase, will produce an ultrasonic frequency when active. The sensor is capable of detecting the sound generated by a leak through various media encountered in a downhole environment.53 In August 2009, the EPA released the results of a site investigation near Pavillion, Wyoming, USA: EPA found elevated levels of arsenic, methane, petroleum hydrocarbons and other chemicals in drinking water wells. The presence of 2-butoxyethanol, a known
T.
Olesen,
'Can
the
Petrochemical
Industry
Feel
Safe
with
Traditional
Gas
Leak
Detection?',
(Ballerup,
Denmark:
Innova
Gassonic).
51
Fares
Al
Mansouri
and
Mohammad
Aftab
Alam,
'Sources
of
Hydrocarbon
Leaks
&
Spills
in
Upstream
Oil
Industries
-
Its
Potential
Reasons
&
Preventive
Measures',
in
SPE
International
Conference
on
Health,
Safety,
and
Environment
in
Oil
and
Gas
Exploration
and
Production
(Nice,
France:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2008).
52
J.Y.
Julian
et
al.,
'Downhole
Leak
Determination
Using
Fiber-Optic
Distributed-Temperature
Surveys
at
Prudhoe
Bay,
Alaska',
in
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition
(Anaheim,
CA:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2007).
53
J.E.
Johns
et
al.,
'Applied
Ultrasonic
Technology
in
Wellbore-Leak
Detection
and
Case
Histories
in
Alaska
North
Slope
Wells',
SPE
Production
&
Operations
24,
no
2
(2009).
50
Martin
72
constituent in hydraulic fracturing fluids, was confirmed by EPA. EPA will continue the investigation.54 In January 2009, there were several reports of methane gas migrating to the surface and at least one report of a drinking water well exploding in Dimock, Pennsylvania, USA.55 However, as indicated in the reports, the causes of contamination were poor well integrity, surface spills, etc, rather than fracking. In order to provide more accurate and continuous underground flow monitoring, sniffing well technology is currently being developed. These are basically slim-hole wells that are drilled to the groundwater level. Sensors are run in, so that they can monitor underground conditions prior to drilling for base-line measurements, during fracking and during production until the end of the wells life. These wells can also be used for running microseismic geophones.
3.3 Evaluation
of
technical
and
operational
assumptions
for
shale
gas
development
scenarios
in
Europe
In
the
following
subsection,
we
discuss
the
development
of
shale
gas
fields
in
Europe
and
the
related
cost
scenarios.
These
scenarios
may
be
used
to
show
the
impact
of
technological
developments
on
the
overall
development
of
shale
gas
in
Europe
as
part
of
a
technological
gap
analysis.
They
are
based
on
the
sources
cited
and
the
authors
own
assessment
of
future
developments
in
Europe.
(For
a
review
of
how
others
have
attempted
to
quantify
the
impact
of
technological
improvements
on
shale
gas
extraction,
see
Section
2.2.3.)
Environmental Impacts of Industrial Gas Drilling', (Ossining, NY: Riverkeeper Inc., 2010).
73
wells with vertical reservoir sections per pad, with a well density of one well per km2. Complex, deep wells may take up to 180 days of drilling time initially. Future pad sizing developments The area to be covered from one pad may be extended by drilling longer horizontal well sections for each well. Laterals up to 5 km in length, for example, would extend the theoretical reach from one pad to 100 km2. Extended reach wells may be drilled to departures of 10 km and more, but their feasibility is limited by the ability to complete and hydraulically fracture these long wellbores. The required areal density of wells will set the limit of the number of pads required for a field development. In addition, the size of a pad will be limited by the number of wells that can be drilled from a single pad. The consequence of drilling longer departure wells is a greater average length per well, thus not directly reducing drilling time. More wells are required per pad to reach the same areal density but the impact on the environment will be reduced by the use of more concentrated surface infrastructure.
57
Ketil
Andersen et al., 'Case History: Automated Drilling Performance Measurement of Crews and Drilling Equipment', in SPE/IADC Drilling Conference (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2009).
74
Drilling
and
completion
operational
aspects
One
key
element
in
drilling
capacity
management
is
the
mitigation
of
drilling
problems
and
the
reduction
of
operational
inefficiency.
The
total
potential
improvement
in
this
area
may
be
quantified
as
up
to
50%
of
overall
drilling
time.
Figure
3-14:
Well
drilling
and
completion
WellbDuration58
Total time
reakdown
Productive Time
The time required to drill a well may be broken down into the following categories: Productive time (PT) is defined as the bit-on-bottom time, where the hole is drilled. PT may be improved by using better bit technology or finding better operating parameters to enhance performance. Generally PT may range from as low as 10% to above 40% of overall well construction time. Non-productive time (NPT) comprises the time required for solving problems that cause deviations from the plan. NPT may be within a range of 15-25 % of overall well construction time and represents one of the major improvement potentials for drilling performance. Invisible lost time (ILT) is defined as the difference between actual operation duration and a best practice or benchmark performance. ILT may be within a range of 15-25 % of overall well construction time and represents another major improvement potential for drilling performance. Flat time (FT) comprises the time required for operations not directly implied in drilling, e.g. running casing, tripping the drill string in and out of hole, etc. FT may be improved by managing the critical path and optimising operating procedures. These keep NPT and ILT as low as possible. In order to translate drilling performance to useable figures, the drilling performance statistics from Figure 3-13 are used. The average well construction time for a well of about 5 000 m total depth (including an average 1 500 m horizontal section) should be in the range of: 62.5 days/well for low performance, assuming an average rate of penetration of about 80 m/day as reached in the years 1989 to 1998; 45 days/well as medium performance, a level at about 100 m/day; 38 days/well as a high -performance scenario, where the average performance of the years 2000 to 2006 is attained approximately 130 m/day.
Flat Time
Non-Productive Time
Future
well
construction
performance
targets
can
be
reached
by
utilising
existing
savings
potential
in
terms
of
NPT
and
ILT.
This
could
be
accomplished
by
means
of
the
industrialisation
of
the
field
development
process
and
specialisation,
in
combination
with
purpose-built
well
designs,
which
are
discussed
in
the
next
section.
The
58
Hermann
Spoerker,
Gerhard
Thonhauser
and
Eric
Maidla,
'Rigorous
Identification
of
Unplanned
and
Invisible
Lost
Time
for
Value
Added
Propositions
Aimed
at
Performance
Enhancement',
in
SPE/IADC
Drilling
Conference
(Amsterdam,
The
Netherlands:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2011).
75
development
of
new
drilling
technologies,
with
a
focus
on
compact
rig
designs,
minimal
environmental
footprint
combined
with
a
high
degree
of
automation,
will
be
key
enablers
to
achieve
these
performance
targets
in
terms
of
cost,
but
more
importantly,
in
terms
of
environmental
compliance.
Drilling
and
completion
well
design
aspects
One
key
element
for
the
efficient
development
of
shale
gas
resources
is
purpose- designed
wells,
which
have
the
potential
to
add
significant
cost
savings
to
a
field
development
campaign.
Exploration
or
scouting
wells
can
be
leaner
in
diameter
and
size,
and
specifically
designed
to
find
geological
information.
If
purpose-built
equipment
is
used
(for
example,
using
slim-hole
drilling
technology
for
exploration)
savings
potentials
of
up
to
30%
of
well
cost
may
be
realised.
Equipment
building
capacity
A
key
element
of
effective
shale
gas
field
development
in
Europe
is
the
ability
to
increase
the
drilling
and
fracturing
equipment
building
capacity.
The
current
European
land
rig
count
is
approximately
70
rigs
of
different
specifications.59
The
majority
of
these
rigs
are
based
on
traditional
technology.
Table
3-6:
Baker
Hughes
worldwide
rig
count60
North
America
Europe
Middle
East
Africa
Latin
America
Asia
Pacific
World
Total
December
2011
Land
2
440
70
263
48
349
151
3
321
Offshore
43
42
41
31
89
96
342
Total
2
483
112
304
79
438
247
3
663
Change
-15
-10
-4
-7
16
0
-20
November
2011
Land
2
460
74
269
55
335
150
3
343
Offshore
38
48
39
31
87
97
340
Total
2
498
122
308
86
422
247
Land
2
084
56
236
53
313
157
Last
year
Offshore
24
49
31
26
72
125
327
Total
2
108
105
267
79
385
282
3
226
3 683 2 899
Digger,
European
Rig
Count
Data
(Feb.
2012)
(Energy
Digger,
2012,
cited
27
March
2012);
available
from
http://www.energydigger.com/rig-counts/european-rig-counts.aspx;
Upstream,
Rig
Pulse
(Upstream,
2012,
cited
27
March
2012);
available
from
http://www.upstreamonline.com/marketdata/rigmarket/?view=rigpulse/worldrigcount
60
Baker
Hughes
Inc.,
International
Rotary
Rig
Count
(Baker
Hughes
Inc.,
2012,
cited
27
March
2012);
available
from
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/BHI/1749209798x0x550380/982E1735-B2EB- 4DC7-9629-2462B7A6E8B8/International_Rig_Count_February_2012.xlsx
59
Energy
76
Table
3-7:
Baker
Hughes
rig
count
Europe
Albania
Austria
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Greenland
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Lithuania
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Sakhalin
(RU)
Slovakia
Spain
(1)
Switzerland
Turkey
United
Kingdom
Europe
4
2
2
0
1
0
1
5
0
0
1
0
2
1
0
0
11
0
10
3
1
0
0
24
2
70
December
2011
Land
Offshore
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
4
10
0
0
0
7
0
1
0
1
14
42
Total
4
2
2
0
1
3
1
5
0
0
1
0
4
1
4
10
11
0
10
10
1
1
0
25
16
112
Change
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
-1
0
-1
0
0
-3
0
2
-9
1
0
0
1
0
-1
-1
0
1
-10
4
2
2
0
1
0
1
6
0
0
1
0
5
1
0
0
10
0
10
3
1
1
1
23
2
74
November
2011
Land
Offshore
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
2
19
0
0
0
6
0
1
0
2
13
48
Total
4
2
2
0
1
2
1
6
0
1
1
0
7
1
2
19
10
0
10
9
1
2
1
25
15
122
Land
1
3
0
0
2
2
0
7
0
0
2
0
3
0
2
0
6
0
13
2
1
1
1
10
0
56
Last
year
Offshore
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
5
19
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
20
49
Total
1
3
0
0
2
2
0
7
0
0
2
0
4
0
7
19
7
0
13
4
1
1
1
11
20
105
Full-scale shale gas field development will require the design and construction of new drilling rigs. Assuming a field development scenario of 2 500 wells, with an average well length of 5 000 metres, it would require drilling 12.5 million metres of hole (average reservoir depth 3 000 metres, with an assumed build section and a horizontal section of about 1 500 metres). With an average performance scenario, as outlined above, 113 600 drilling days will be required, which equates to about 334 rig years (assuming 340 productive drilling days a year). Thirty rigs will work for about 11 years in this particular field. Each pad (25 to 36 wells) would see drilling activities for about 3.5 to 5 years. If 50 such fields were to be developed in Europe, 500 rigs would work for 33 years, respectively. Two hundred and fifty rigs would work for 66 years. These values only hold if all rigs would be available immediately from the start of the campaign. In order to build this required rig fleet within a reasonable time, the capacity to manufacture 20 rigs per year would lead to 25 years of fleet building. To achieve a reasonable timeframe, a building capacity of 30 to 40 rigs per year would be required. 77
Similar numbers apply for fracturing units. Personnel building capacity Assuming the above scenarios for a large-scale development of shale gas in Europe, a significant increase of human resources is required. A typical rig crew today consists of five people per shift plus supervisors, rig mechanic and electrician. Assuming three shifts per day, a total of about 30 people is required to run a rig. Using the above number of 500 rigs operating, about 15 000 people would be required to man the rig crews. In addition, a similarly large number of service company personnel will be required for operational tasks. With equipment manufacturing, supplier personnel etc., it can be expected that more than 100 000 jobs would have to be directly or indirectly created and the required training provided.
Well Location
Examples show that such technology is already partly deployed utilising European engineering and manufacturing know-how (see Figure 3-15 and Figure 3-16 above).61 It is possible today to drill in densely populated areas if state-of-the-art technology is used and the emissions and environmental footprint are minimised. Concepts of lightweight drilling equipment (for example, aluminum or composite drill pipes as well as casings) have the potential to reduce the required lifting capacity, thus enabling the use of significantly smaller rigs. Hole size requirements have to be reviewed, as smaller hole sizes reduce the consumption of mud, cement and casing, which in return reflects a significant savings potential.
61
Eric
Quinlan
et
al.,
'The
Impact
of
Rig
Design
and
Drilling
Methods
on
the
Environmental
Impact
of
Drilling Operations', in AADE National Technical Conference and Exhibition (Houston, TX: 2011).
78
This
development
should
go
hand
in
hand
with
the
specialisation
of
the
drilling
machine.
Parts
of
the
well
construction
and
field
development
should
be
managed
by
dedicated
equipment,
e.g.
surface
section
drilling
rigs,
horizontal
well
drilling
rigs,
etc.
Figure
3-17:
Field
development
with
centralised
functions
and
rig
specialisation
Base
Company Logistics Service
Company Superintendent
(per
rig
type)
Field Base A
Rig Fleet
Rig A Rig B
Rig site construction As rig and fracturing operations will span over multiple years on individual drilling pads, new concepts of constructing rig sites should be adopted. Drilling pads will require a certain size as they are used to drill a large number of wells. The rig site, as well as the rig itself, should be embedded in the environment in the least intrusive way. Wellhead installations and other permanent surface installation should ideally be moved sub-surface. Rigs may be completely housed in order to avoid noise emissions and light emissions during the night. Well sites should possibly have access to the power grid to avoid the use of diesel- generated power on-site. Noise would thereby be reduced and power could be used from environmentally friendly sources. The rig site may be constructed as a more or less permanent installation and fully housed where drilling activities on a pad are to span over multiple years. This allows for the development of completely new rig sites and rig concepts as a small industrial plant, rather than a conventional rig site. The means to reduce truck trips to and from the rig site have to be found; for example, through the use of pipelines to supply the rig with fluids. Closed-loop systems should be investigated, which offer the possibility of the reinjecting formation water and cuttings into suitable formations. Directional drilling technology Directional and horizontal wells today are drilled with a down-hole motor or a rotary steerable system. Using the rotary steerable system, the drill string and the bit are rotated simultaneously during the drilling process. 79
For
technological
reasons,
the
mud
motor
can
be
used
either
in
a
sliding
or
in
a
rotating
mode.
In
the
rotating
mode,
the
drill
string
and
the
down-hole
motor
with
the
bit
are
rotated,
but
to
increase
or
decrease
the
hole
inclination
(=
angle
measured
from
vertical),
the
assembly
has
to
be
used
in
a
sliding
mode,
which
means
that
only
the
down-hole
motor
and
the
bit
rotate.
In
longer,
deviated
or
horizontal
sections,
the
friction
borehole,
which
results
from
the
drill
string
lying
on
the
bottom
of
the
borehole,
creates
technical
problems
with
well
path
control.
In
order
to
overcome
these
friction
problems,
alternative
or
additional
systems
were
developed,
namely
axial
oscillation
technology, 62
friction-reducing
oscillation
technology63
and
directional
drilling
automation,64
all
aiming
in
a
quasi
rotated
drill
string,
as
in
the
rotating
mode
of
a
mud
motor.
Downhole
communication
and
measurement
systems
In
order
to
enable
a
high
level
of
rig
automation
and
to
mitigate
non-productive
time,
the
means
to
link
down-hole
measurement
systems
with
surface
rig
automation
system
have
to
be
developed
and
implemented.
The
early
recognition
of
downhole
problems
will
lead
to
alarms
and
allow
the
rig
crew
or
future
rig
control
systems
to
take
mitigation
measures.
Technological
developments,
which
will
lead
to
such
improvements,
will
have
to
take
place
in
the
area
of
heavy
machinery
automation,
autonomous
machines,
machine
learning,
high-temperature
and
high-pressure
electronics
and
sensor
systems.
Such
technologies
will
allow
for
a
significantly
reduced
NPT
and
ILT,
and
lead
to
the
required
performance
improvements.
Converted
to
a
large-scale
European
shale
gas
62
Ahmed
Al-Zain,
Abdulwafi
Al-Gamber
and
Rifat
Said,
'Smart
Combination
of
Technology
Tools
Resulted
in Successful Rigless Stimulation on a Tri-Lateral Well, Case Study', in SPE/DGS Saudi Arabia Section Technical Symposium and Exhibition (Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011); A. Al Ali, S. Barton and A. Mohanna, 'Unique Axial Oscillation Tool Enhances Performance of Directional Tools in Extended Reach Applications', in Brasil Offshore Conference and Exhibition (Maca, Brazil: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011); Franklin Baez and Steve Barton, 'Delivering Performance in Shale Gas Plays: Innovative Technology Solutions', in SPE/IADC Drilling Conference and Exhibition (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011); Franklin Baez, Steve Barton and Aref Alali, 'Drilling Performance Improvement in Shale Gas Plays Using a Novel a Novel Drilling Agitator Device', in North American Unconventional Gas Conference and Exhibition (Woodlands, TX: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011); John E. McCormick and TzuFang Chiu, 'The Practice and Evolution of Torque and Drag Reduction: Theory and Field Results', in SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition (Denver, CO: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011). 63 Canrig Drilling Technology Ltd., ROCKIT (Canrig Drilling Technology Ltd., 2012, cited 27 March 2012); available from http://www.canrig.com/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=205; Colin Gillan et al., 'Applying Precision Drill Pipe Rotation and Oscillation to Slide Drilling Problems', in SPE/IADC Drilling Conference and Exhibition (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2009); Colin Gillan et al., 'Applying Computer Based Precision Drill Pipe Rotation and Oscillation to Automate Slide Drilling Steering Control', in Canadian Unconventional Resources Conference (Alberta, Canada: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2011). 64 Maidla and Haci, 'Understanding Torque: The Key to Slide Drilling Directional Wells'; Eric Maidla et al., 'Field Proof of the New Sliding Technology for Directional Drilling', in SPE/IADC Drilling Conference (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2005); Maidla, Haci and Wright, 'Case History Summary: Horizontal Drilling Performance Improvement Due to Torque Rocking on 800 Horizontal Land Wells Drilled for Unconventional Gas Resources'.
80
development initiative, a 10% increase of efficiency can be equated to 50 rigs operating for 30 years, or 45 billion in potential cost savings (at current drilling spread cost). Drilling cost The following cost items form the major elements of drilling-related cost for typical land rig operations in Europe. As a general rule, the total cost can be estimated to range between 75 000 and 126 000 per day as the spread cost (overall well cost divided by number of drilling days). This cost is the sum of a number of key cost items, which are given in greater detail below. Cost items can be split into rig site cost, depth-based cost and day rate-based cost. As can be seen, the drilling cost is driven by day rates, which highlights the importance of improving drilling efficiency in terms of drilling duration. Rig site cost The rig site cost per well is a function of pad size and number of wells drilled per pad. Construction costs in Europe can be estimated to be three to five times higher than in the USA due to rigorous regulations concerning surface water protection and waste management. Rigs site costs for shale gas may have to include the cost for building complete housing for the rigs and the equipment for noise and light protection. This may be particularly necessary for rig sites where activities will span over a considerable period of time. Day rate cost The rig cost is typically charged as a day rate service with rig rates for relevant size rigs ranging from 15 000 to 28 000 depending on the rig capacity. The rig cost has a strong personnel and maintenance cost component, which has the potential to be reduced by automation and the highest equipment quality standards, as well as rigorous maintenance programmes. The directional drilling cost is a day rate service, which is available at different levels of complexity, ranging from 10 000 to 15 000. Service includes directional drilling equipment rental as well as service personnel. If vertical drilling is possible in thick reservoirs, the cost may be significantly reduced to basic measurement services. Utilising rotary steerable system technology may more than double typical rates. Alternative directional drilling technologies, as described above, have the potential to significantly lower drilling costs, meaning that the quality levels of rotary steerable systems can be achieved in the most likely scenarios used in this study. The evaluation cost is the cost to perform formation evaluation and other measurement services during the well construction process. This cost strongly depends on the type of measurements performed and is typically based on service day rates for individual tools, especially when used as a logging-while-drilling service. Depth based cost Casing, cementing and wellhead costs constitute a significant cost item, which is hole- size and wellbore-length dependent. This cost is typically dominated by material costs (e.g. for steel or bulk volumes of mud material), where the cost depends on the quantity used per well and the market price. Overall, this cost item contributes to 20-30% of the total well cost. The mud cost may be split into a) bulk material costs, with base fluid; and b) additives and the mud service cost. Mud cost may vary between 400 and 2 000 per m3 81
depending
on
the
type
of
mud.
Mud
service
cost
is
dependent
on
the
number
of
personnel
involved.
A
decisive
factor
in
predicting
mud
cost
is
the
ability
to
reuse
mud
for
multiple
wells,
which
in
return
depends
on
the
ability
to
recycle
a
maximum
mud
volume.
The
bit
cost
has
lost
its
former
significance
over
the
years
and
may
only
contribute
a
few
per
cent
to
the
total
well
cost.
The
evaluation
cost
covers
performing
formation
evaluation
and
other
measurement
services
during
the
well
construction
process.
This
cost
strongly
depends
on
the
type
of
measurements
performed.
The
waste
and
water
management
cost
is
the
cost
related
to
managing
waste
and
water,
which
is
dependent
on
the
volume
used
and
the
type
of
waste
generated.
The
waste
management
cost
is
related
to
hole
diameter
and
wellbore
(cuttings)
volume,
and
thus
linked
to
the
mud
volume
required.
For
the
drilling
and
development
costs
of
shale
gas
resources
in
the
USA,
please
refer
to
the
table
below.
Table
3-8:
Comparison
of
drill
bit
finding
and
development
cost
per
1
000
cubic
feet
equivalent
(Mcfe)
(three-year
average)
for
different
US
operators65
Drill
bit
F&D
cost
per
Mcfe
(3-year
average)
Ultra
Petroleum
$0.75
Quicksilver
Resources
$1.15
XTO
Energy
$1.67
Range
Resources
$1.89
Cabot
Oil
&
Gas
$1.99
EOG
Resources
$2.10
EnCana
$2.12
Southwestern
Energy
Company
$2.21
Devon
Energy
$2.44
Apache
$2.53
Denbury
Resources
$2.92
Newfield
Exploration
$3.08
Forest
Oil
$3.66
Noble
Energy
$4.09
St.
Mary
Land
&
Exploration
$4.30
Pioneer
Natural
Resources
$4.41
Cimarex
Energy
$4.42
Swift
Energy
$6.08
Anadarko
Petroleum
$6.09
Chesapeake
Energy
$6.18
Future developments in drilling cost The improvement of drilling efficiency may contribute to a drilling cost reduction of 20 to 40% by mitigating ILT and NPT, which is directly reflected in better overall drilling performance. This will be possible by introducing manufacturing-type principles to large well construction campaigns.
65
Southwestern
Energy
Company,
Form
8-K
(US
Securities
and
Exchanges
Commission,
2009,
cited
27
82
Additional contributions from rig automation and alternative drilling technologies (for example, directional drilling and evaluation) have the potential to add savings of another 10-20% of the overall drilling cost. These savings can potentially go hand in hand with a reduction of well construction elements, such as the cost for casing, cementing and the well head, if novel well designs are used and steps towards the specialisation of well designs are taken. For specific cases, additional reductions of drilling costs of up to 30% may be expected.
Packers Plus, QuickFRAC (Packers Plus, 2012, cited 27 March 2012); available from http://www.packersplus.com/products/quickfrac.php
83
A well with ten fracturing stages produces 25 000 bbl of back flow. Numbers for disposal and treatment costs are in the range of $7.5 per bbl. Industry analysts have assumed $1.56 million for one transverse fracture and $70 000 per each additional fracture interval for economic analysis.67 In Horn River Basin, British Columbia, Canada, fracturing costs were estimated around $300 000 per stage.68 In the cost scenario presented in this report, hydraulic fracturing costs for Europe are divided into a fixed cost element and a stage-based cost. A value of 250 000 to 350 000 has been used per stage. Mobilisation and demobilisation, as well as water supply costs and water disposal costs, with the management of backflow water (250 000), are estimated to be between 500 000 and 700 000 per well. The scenario considers large-scale fracture jobs, which have not yet been performed in Europe. Future developments in fracturing cost Investigations of fracturing efficiency using production logging in the USA showed that in the cases investigated, 70% of the production came from only 30% of the perforations of a well.69 This indicates that there is heterogeneity in the productivity of different formation intervals. As a consequence, technology has to be developed to identify the zones of highest productivity for fracturing. Such technology will depend on a deep geo-mechanical understanding of the reservoir in terms of the physical properties of the rock and the local stress field in the relevant region near the wellbore. The recent developments of multiport fracturing technology allows surface-pumped fracture stages to be reduce from 8 to 15 stages, with a parallel reduction in fluid volumes used. If such technology could be successfully deployed, a significant reduction in fracturing cost could be achieved by less fracturing stages, ideally with only a small reduction in production. Combining more efficient fracture stage location selection with highly efficient fracture technology (see above) has the potential to significantly reduce the environmental impact of fracturing, as well as the cost.
3.3.5 Field
development
infrastructure
and
gas
processing
and
treatment
scenario
Technology
The
pad-based
development
of
shale
gas
field
infrastructure
will
lead
to
such
infrastructure
being
more
concentrated.
Surface
installations
should
ideally
be
moved
subsurface
where
it
is
possible
to
avoid
an
impact
on
the
environment
in
terms
of
visibility,
noise,
etc.
Gas
processing
and
treatment
should
be
managed
in
centralised
facilities.
67
Watson
et
al.,
'One-Trip
Multistage
Completion
Technology
for
Unconventional
Gas
Formations'.
68
European
Energy
Exchange
AG,
Strom
Terminmarkt
(European
Energy
Exchange
AG,
cited
27
March
in SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition (San Antonio, TX: Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2006).
84
Cost
It
can
be
expected
that
infrastructure
costs
in
Europe
will
be
higher
than
in
the
USA.
This
is
based
on
the
higher
cost
of
labour,
geographic
situation,
population
density
and
environmental
regulations.
For
typical
conventional
field
developments,
the
infrastructure
cost
may
be
considered
to
be
equal
to
the
drilling
and
completion
cost,
which
may
also
be
used
as
a
first
initial
approach
for
modelling
shale
gas
field
developments.
Due
to
the
investment-intensive
nature
of
shale
gas
drilling
and
fracturing,
and
the
highly
concentrated
infrastructure,
it
may
be
considered
to
assume
lower
cost
figures
in
relation
to
drilling
and
completion.
Actual
cost
values
will
highly
depend
on
the
local
situation
and
the
availability
of
existing
infrastructure,
e.g.
in
areas
with
a
hydrocarbon
exploration
and
production
history.
In
this
chapter,
the
cost
is
estimated
to
be
30%
of
the
drilling
and
completion
cost.
The
numbers
in
the
table
below
outline
lifting
costs
for
a
number
of
shale
gas
operators
in
the
USA.
They
can
be
put
in
relation
to
the
drilling
and
development
cost
in
Table
3-8
to
calculate
a
cost
ratio.
Table
3-9:
Comparison
of
lifting
cost
per
Mcfe
of
production
(three-year
average)
for
different
US
operators70
Lifting
cost
per
Mcfe
of
production
(3-year
average)
$0.88
$1.12
$1.16
$1.17
$1.19
$1.23
$1.24
$1.37
$1.53
$1.54
$1.60
$1.63
$1.73
$1.75
$1.77
$1.78
$1.84
$1.87
$1.88
$2.56
Southwestern
Energy
Company
Noble
Energy
Chesapeake
Energy
Ultra
Petroleum
EOG
Resources
EnCana
Range
Resources
Pioneer
Natural
Resources
Devon
Energy
XTO
Energy
Newfield
Exploration
Forest
Oil
Cimarex
Energy
Cabot
Oil
&
Gas
Anadarko
Petroleum
Apache
Quicksilver
Resources
St.
Mary
Land
&
Exploration
Swift
Energy
Denbury
Resources
85
calculation
in
the
next
section
is
based
on
the
values
depicted
in
Table
3-10
and
Table
3-11.
The
most
likely
scenario
used
here
considers
an
ultimate
recovery
of
57
mcm
or
0.68
million
MWh.
The
production
profile
for
a
typical
well
is
not
discussed
here.
Only
commercial
development
will
demonstrate
how
long
the
productive
life
of
a
well
can
be
sustained
in
Europe
before
the
well
reaches
its
economic
limit.
Current
examples
from
the
USA
indicate
an
economic
limit
at
a
production
rate
of
100
Mcf
per
day,
but
production
histories
hardly
exceed
ten
years
(Barnett
Shale).
The
economic
limit
is
defined
as
the
production
rate
at
well
operating
cost
break-even.
However,
optimistic
projections
may
reach
three
to
four
decades
(see
Figure
4-5).
Table
3-10:
Technically
recoverable
shale
gas
resources
for
the
USA72
Technically
recoverable
resource
Oil
Gas
(Tcf)
(BBO)
410.34
7.4
13.53
8.46
10.95
19.93
1.44
472.05
74.71
20.81
4.37
99.99
31.96
22.21
5.72
59.88
43.38
32.15
75.52
3.77
11.63
6.61
21.02
43.03
750.38
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Area
(sq.
miles)
Leased
10
622
8
675
45
844
22
914
1
600
12
000
NA
101
655
3
574
1
090
2
429
7
093
9
000
4
700
688
14
388
4
075
2
691
6
766
16
416
7
506
NA
6
589
30
511
160
413
Unleased
84
271
1
994
41
900
128
272
5
426
5
426
2
383
2
383
36
081
Average
EUR
Gas
(Bcf/well)
1.18
0.33
0.3
0.19
1.1
0.28
0.12
0.74
3.57
5
0.9
2.99
2.07
2.98
5.2
2.45
1.42
3.07
1.85
0.18
1.3
0.45
1
0.69
1.02
Oil
(MBO/well)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Play
Marcellus Big Sandy Low Thermal Maturity Greater Siltstone New Albany Antrim Cincinnati Arch Total Northeast Haynesville Eagle Ford Floyd-Neal & Conasauga Total Gulf Coast Fayettsville Woodford Cana Woodford Total Mid-Continent Barnett Barnett Woodford Total Southwest Hilliard-Baxter-Mancos Lewis Williston-Shallow Niobraran Mancos Total Rocky Mountain Total Lower 48 United States
71
Robert
B.
Kennedy,
'Shale
Gas
Challenges
/
Technologies
Over
the
Asset
Life
Cycle',
(Washington,
DC:
72
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
However,
see
Chapter
2
for
the
weaknesses
in
the
methodology
86
Table
3-11:
Technically
recoverable
shale
oil
resources
for
the
USA
Technically
Recoverable
Resource
Gas
Oil
(Tcf)
(BBO)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
3.35
3.35
1.58
1.58
3.59
3.59
15.42
15.42
23.94
Area
(sq.
Miles)
Leased
Unleased
3
323
3
323
1
313
1
313
6
522
6
522
1
752
1
752
12
910
Average
EUR
Gas
Oil
(Bcf/well)
(MBO/well)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
300
300
300
300
550
550
550
550
460
Play
Eagle Ford Total Gulf Coast Avalon & Bone Springs Total Southwest Bakken Total Rocky Mountain Monterey/Santos Total West Coast Total Lower 48 United States
Liquid
production
from
gas
shale
is
steadily
increasing
and
plays
a
key
role
in
shale
gas
economics
in
the
USA,
as
depicted
in
Figure
3-18
below.73
Figure
3-18:
Liquid
production
from
shale
gas
plays
in
Texas
87
More
information
about
the
individual
cost
elements
can
be
found
in
the
respective
chapter
references
column
in
the
tables
below.
Table
3-12:
Typical
well
configurations
Typical
Well
Configurations
Low
Most
High
likely
3
000
5
000
7
000
Unit
of
measure
m
Description
of
model
cost
component
Average
well
length
Chapter
ref.
3.3.1
Comments
and
dependencies
385
641
898
m3
3.3.3
The wellbore length will depend on the local geological situation and reservoir depth. It will also depend on the length of the horizontal hole sections (if required). Hole size is assumed to be an average 12.25 inch hole over the entire wellbore length. Based on this hole size assumption, the total mud volume is assumed to be 1.5 hole volumes on average (whereas a factor 2 would typically be used with accurate hole size numbers).
The typical well configurations reflect a range of wellbore length scenarios as they may be drilled for different geological situations. For the cost scenarios outlined below the most likely well configuration scenario was considered to establish a number of cost scenarios.
88
Table
3-13:
Typical
rig
site
configurations
Typical
rig
site
configurations
Low
Most
High
likely
Unit
of
measure
Description
of
model
cost
component
Construction
cost
per
pad
Chapter
ref.
Comments
and
dependencies
3.3.1
15
25
36
wells
3.3.1
233 333
160 000
138 889
/well
3.3.1
Estimated cost per pad considering a concrete rig site, surface water management system, etc. Pad may have to be maintained for 3 to 15 years for drilling and the following production. Additional cost is considered for housing of the rig and equipment components to minimise noise and light emissions. Roads, etc. are considered in infrastructure cost. Numbers of wells drilled depends on the local geological and surface location situations. The rig site cost per well is calculated based on assuming a certain pad size and the number of wells drilled per pad.
The rig site configuration scenarios, shown in Table 3-13, range for pads from 15 to 36 wells. These numbers are based on wells with longer lateral extensions and the need to minimise the number of rig sites. In the following, only the most likely scenario with 25 wells per pad is considered.
89
Table
3-14:
Depth-based
cost
scenarios
Drilling
depth-based
cost
Optimistic
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
Chapter
Comments
and
likely
measure
of
model
ref.
dependencies
cost
component
250
275
300
/m
Casing,
3.3.3
The
cost
of
well
cementing
installations
in
terms
of
and
casing,
cement
and
wellhead
wellhead
are
assumed
to
be
cost
rather
constant
as
they
are
dominated
by
prices
of
steel,
cement
and
additives.
More
expensive
cement
additives
may
increase
the
cementing
efficiency.
7
5
3
-
Mud
re-use
3.3.3
Mud
may
be
re-used
for
factor
multiple
wells,
so
cost
is
distributed
over
multiple
wells.
This
number
could
potentially
be
increased
significantly
with
investment
in
mud
management
and
centralised
mud
supply
facilities
in
the
field.
Limits
are
given
by
mud
which
is
deposited
with
cuttings
and
mud
losses,
which
may
be
encountered.
400
1
000
2
000
/m3
Mud
3.3.3
Higher
mud
cost
will
material
cost
typically
lead
to
higher
performance
due
to
a
reduction
in
wellbore- related
problems.
A
strong
link
to
drilling
performance
can
be
expected.
3
264
660
1
320
/m Waste
and
3.3.3
Waste
management
cost
is
water
estimated
to
be
reflected
by
management
considering
66%
of
mud
cost
cost
required
to
manage
the
volume
of
generating
cuttings.
The
type
of
mud
plays
a
central
role
in
defining
the
ability
to
recycle
versus
deposition.
Based on the depth and day rate alternatives, we will consider three scenarios, with the conservative scenario reflecting todays costs by utilising current technology and the current average drilling performance in Europe. In this context it is important to note that the depth and size of the well drives in Depth- based cost (Table 3-14) and the drilling performance is the driver of Day rate-based costs in Table 3-15. The amount of metres a rig is capable of drilling per day on average defines the duration of the drilling project (see Table 3-16 and Table 3-17).
90
The
most
likely
scenario
reflects
a
cost
situation
which
should
be
reasonably
achievable
with
cost-effective
well
designs
and
an
achievable
increase
in
efficiency
by
drilling
process
improvements
reducing
non-productive
and
invisible
lost
time.
Technology
development
in
this
first
phase
will
focus
on
developing
environmentally
acceptable
ways
to
drill
and
perform
hydraulic
fracturing.
Technology
development
will
also
have
to
aim
at
generating
cost-effective
technology.
It
should
be
realistic
to
achieve
this
level
of
technological
improvement,
as
well
as
performance
and
cost
levels
within
a
timeframe
of
five
years.
The
optimistic
scenario
assumes
a
future
scenario
where
field
development
has
undergone
industrialisation
utilising
manufacturing-type
processes
and
technologies
with
a
high
degree
of
specialisation
of
rigs
and
equipment.
Fields
are
developed
with
large-scale
drilling
campaigns
and
with
a
high
degree
of
optimisation.
New
technologies
minimalise
drilling
risks;
for
example,
downhole
sensing,
real-time
communication
between
down-hole
sensors
and
the
rig,
highly
automated
rigs,
which
enable
early
detection
of
drilling
problems.
Drilling
crews
are
highly
trained
specialists,
who
use
highly
automated
drilling
machines.
They
consistently
work
in
the
same
field,
combining
local
geological
expertise
and
benefiting
from
learning
curve
effects
and
a
high
degree
of
process
optimisation.
Technologies
used
are
cost-effective
as
they
can
also
be
manufactured
in
industrial
quantities.
It
seems
plausible
to
assume
that
building
large-scale
drilling
activities
in
Europe,
combined
with
the
necessary
investment,
will
allow
the
development
of
such
processes
and
technology
within
a
timeframe
of
10
to
15
years
from
now
and
reach
widespread
deployment.
Table
3-15:
Drilling
performance
scenarios
Optimistic
Drilling
performance
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
Chapter
Comments
and
likely
measure
of
model
ref.
dependencies
cost
component
110
80
m/day
Drilling
3.3.2
Drilling
performance
is
performance
derived
from
past
European
experience.
There
is
the
potential
to
increase
performance,
which
will
tentatively
lead
to
higher
depth-based
and
day
rate- based
drilling
costs
as
more
technology
and
higher
performance
products
and
services
are
used.
130
For the following cost scenarios, different process and technological assumptions are combined. Summarising the above, the results show the following: Conservative scenario essentially reflecting todays cost; Most likely scenario achievable within a five-year time frame; Optimistic scenario assuming 10 to 15 years of technology and process development.
The first row in Table 3-16 below shows the values (in bold) for the total day rate-based cost for wells. 91
Table
3-16:
Drilling
operations
day-rate-based
cost
scenarios
Drilling
operations
day
rate
cost
Optimistic
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
Chapter
Comments
and
likely
measure
of
model
ref.
dependencies
cost
component
34
800
49
500
78
000
/day
Drilling
3.3.3
Total
cost
as
sum
of
the
operations
cost
items
below.
day
rate
cost
(total)
15
000
20
000
28
000
/day
Rig
cost
3.3.3
Shallower
wells
require
significantly
smaller
rigs
with
lower
day
rates.
6
000
8
000
15
000
/day
Directional
3.3.3
Vertical
wells
may
not
drilling
cost
need
directional
drilling
costs,
whereas
highly
deviated
or
horizontal
drilling
would
require
directional
drilling
tools
and
services.
3
000
5
000
8
000
/day
Mud
service
3.3.3
Costs
to
maintain
the
mud
cost
system
and
to
perform
solid
control
work.
The
cost
depends
on
the
mud
system
complexity.
800
1
500
2
000
/day
Bit
cost
3.3.3
The
bit
cost
is
considered
as
part
of
the
day
rate
cost
in
a
range
between
1%
and
2%
of
total
well
cost.
Bit
cost
itself
does
not
reflect
a
significant
cost
driver.
The
drilling
performance
in
the
productive
time
(PT)
as
a
consequence
of
bit
selection
has
a
significant
impact.
10
000
15
000
25
000
/day
Evaluation
3.3.3
Evaluation
cost
may
range
cost
from
standard
wire-line
logging
to
using
logging
while
drilling
systems.
For
highly
deviated
wells,
evaluation
tools
have
to
be
run
on
the
drill
string,
so
using
LWD
is
a
viable
option.
In the cost model below, the most likely rig scenario is combined with the most likely cost and performance scenarios.
92
Table
3-17:
Drilling
cost
scenario
per
well
Optimistic
160
000
5
000
301
34
800
38
3
003
000
78
078
601
Cost
scenarios
Most
likely
Conservative
160
000
5
000
385
49
500
45
4
337
000
95
414
867
160
000
5
000
506
78
000
63
7
565
000
121
040
1
513
Unit
of
measure
m
/m
/day
days
/day
/m
Depth
Drilling
depth-based
cost
Drilling
operations
day
rate
cost
Well
duration
Total
well
drilling
cost
(rounded)
Average
cost
per
day
Average
cost
per
metre
Site
cost
per
well
(25
wells
per
pad)
In terms of the fracturing cost, a similar approach is taken where numbers of stages, as well as cost are considered in three scenarios, which show a technological evolution over a timeframe that is similar to the drilling technology above.
93
Table
3-18:
Fracturing
cost
scenario
per
well
Typical
fracturing
configurations
Optimistic
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
Chapter
Comments
and
likely
measure
of
model
ref.
dependencies
cost
component
8
12
15
stages
Number
of
3.3.4
A
reduction
in
number
of
surface
fracturing
stages
is
based
on
fracture
the
assumption
that
reports
stages
show
that,
in
examples,
70%
pumped
per
of
the
production
is
coming
well
using
from
30%
of
the
multiport
perforations.
fracturing
technology
Fracturing
cost
Optimistic
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
Chapter
Comments
and
likely
measure
of
model
ref.
dependencies
cost
component
500
000
600
000
700
000
Fixed
cost
3.3.4
A
fixed
cost
per
shale
gas
per
fracture
well
is
assumed
to
job
account
for
infrastructure
set-up,
mobilisation,
etc.
and
water
management
cost.
Using
closed-loop
fracture
fluid
systems
and
reuse
of
fluid
will
have
a
significant
impact
on
waste
management
cost.
250
000
300
000
350
000
/stage
Cost
per
3.3.4
A
variable
cost
is
assumed
stage
to
account
for
cost
of
materials
and
services
per
fracture
stage.
The
cost
per
stage
will
greatly
depend
on
the
type
of
fracturing
fluid
that
is
utilised.
No
estimate
for
potential
reuse
of
fluid
is
made.
Most
likely
well
with
three
cost
scenarios
Optimistic
Most
likely
Conservative
12
3
500
000
12
4
200
000
12
4
900
000
stages
Unit
of
measure
Number
of
stages
Fracturing
cost
Field development and infrastructure costs will be highly dependent on the local situation in the individual field. Cost scenarios will vary with complexity and existing infrastructure in terms of pipeline and processing capacity. The possibility of reusing existing pipeline and processing capabilities will allow for cost reductions in certain shale gas regions in Europe. Larger sized pads will allow for more centralised
94
infrastructure,
which
in
turn
leads
to
reduced
costs.
In
the
following
study,
a
simplified
approach
is
taken
to
the
estimation
of
costs.
Considering
the
high
degree
of
uncertainty
and
the
potential
cost
savings
from
manufactur-ing-type
developments
with
highly
centralised
infrastructure,
the
estimated
cost
for
field
development
and
infrastructure
is
reflected
as
30%
of
drilling
and
completion
cost
in
Table
3-19.
Table
3-19:
Field
development,
infrastructure
and
processing
costs
by
scenario
Field
development
and
infrastructure
and
processing
costs
Optimistic
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
of
Chapter
Comments
and
likely
measure
model
cost
ref.
dependencies
component
3
251
500
4
268
500
6
232
500
Field
3.3.5
Lifting
cost
is
development,
assumed
to
be
30%
infrastructure
of
drilling
and
and
production
costs.
processing
Cost
is
estimated
on
cost
the
basis
of
assuming
pad
type
development
with
concentrated
surface
infrastructure.
In the following, a cost summary is provided (with optimistic, most likely and conservative cost estimates), based on the considered scenarios. The cost scenarios are combined with three production scenarios to reflect a range of possible outcomes for a specific well and rig site configuration. Using liquid production values from Table 3-11, the importance of the impact of condensate production on the overall economics of shale gas plays is shown., The cost per MWh is significantly influenced by the high energy content per barrel of liquid production. The numbers given below demonstrate the high economic interest in resources with liquid potential in the USA. The production estimates below combine liquid and gas production rates per well using different scenarios. The amount of liquid potential depends on the maturity of the resource as a consequence of geological situation and deposition history. A realistic assessment of gas-liquid ratios that could possibly be achieved in Europe will have to be proven by intensive exploration.
95
Table
3-20:
Production
cost
scenario
combining
optimistic,
most
likely
and
conservative
cost
and
production
scenarios
Production
scenario
Optimistic
Most
Conservative
Unit
of
Description
Chapter
likely
measure
of
model
ref.
cost
component
85
57
21
mcm
Estimates
of
3.3.6
technically
recoverable
resources
from
a
gas
shale
1.01
0.68
0.25
Million
Energy
3.3.6
MWh
produced
per
well
from
gas
500
000
300
000
100
000
bbl
Estimates
of
3.3.6
technically
recoverable
resources
from
a
shale
oil
well
0.84
0.50
0.17
Million
Energy
produced
per
MWh
well
from
liquids
1.85
1.18
0.42
Million
MWh
Total
energy
produced
from
well
3.3.6
Comments
and
dependencies
Conversion of gas production to energy Ultimate liquid recovery scenarios based on US references.
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
production
scenarios
without
liquid
production
Optimistic
Most
likely
Conservative
Unit
of
measure
9
754
500
12
805
500
18
697
500
Total
cost
per
well
9.64
18.87
74.79
/MWh
Cost
per
MWh
not
considering
liquid
production
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
production
scenarios
with
liquid
production
Optimistic
Most
likely
Conservative
Unit
of
measure
9
754
500
12
805
500
18
697
500
Total
cost
per
well
5.28
10.86
44.84
/MWh
Cost
per
MWh
considering
liquid
production
If the most likely production is combined with the three cost scenarios, it can be seen how the production cost may develop over a timeframe of 5 to 15 years.
96
Table
3-21:
Production
cost
scenarios
based
on
the
most
likely
production
and
three
cost
scenarios
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
most
likely
production
scenarios
with
liquid
production
Optimistic
1.18
9
754
500
8.27
Most
likely
1.18
12
805
500
10.86
Conservative
1.18
18
697
500
15.85
Unit
of
measure
Million
MWh
/MWh
Total
energy
produced
from
the
well
most
likely
Total
cost
per
well
Cost
per
considering
production
MWh
liquid
This
comparison
can
be
done
in
a
similar
manner
for
optimistic
and
conservative
production
scenarios,
as
depicted
in
the
following
two
figures
below.
Table
3-22:
Production
cost
scenarios
based
on
optimistic
production
and
three
cost
scenarios
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
optimistic
production
scenarios
with
liquid
production
Optimistic
1.85
9
754
500
5.28
Most
likely
1.85
12
805
500
6.93
Conservative
1.85
18
697
500
10.12
Unit
of
measure
Million
MWh
/MWh
Total
energy
produced
from
the
well
most
likely
Total
cost
per
well
Cost
per
considering
production
MWh
liquid
Table
3-23:
Production
cost
scenarios
based
on
conservative
production
and
three
cost
scenarios
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
conservative
production
scenarios
with
liquid
production
Optimistic
0.42
9
754
500
23.39
Most
likely
0.42
12
805
500
30.71
Conservative
0.42
18
697
500
44.84
Unit
of
measure
Million
MWh
/MWh
Total
energy
produced
from
the
well
most
likely
Total
cost
per
well
Cost
per
MWh
considering
liquid
production
Global development scenarios The development of technology and processes to produce shale gas will globally move in a similar direction. The scenarios will be characterised by very cost conscious and performance orientated field developments. In the current operator/contractor/service company business model, technology in terms of tools and processes will be available on the global market place. Variation will most likely be driven by different personnel costs and local price variations influenced by tax regimes or the like. An additional potentially dominating factor, leading to technology and cost variations, will be variations in environmental standards. 97
An alternative may develop. Based on US examples, it seems very likely that the business model may undergo changes. Operators will return from an almost exclusive outsourcing policy, which they followed over the past decades, to insourcing again. The drive for that is to combine the highest possible efficiency with competitive advantage. Business success in shale gas plays is not driven by exploration risk but by manufacturing competence at the highest possible environmental standards. Such capability will be key for economic success and potentially the biggest differentiator for companies competing for reserves. Operators, developing unique capabilities in this direction, will have an advantage globally in successfully exploiting shale gas.
3.4 Conclusions
The
success
of
shale
gas
development
in
Europe
will
greatly
depend
on:
1) the
ability
to
increase
the
efficiency
of
drilling
by
industrialising
the
drilling
process,
and
utilising
rig
automation
technology
and
equipment
by
aiming
at
zero
harmful
emissions,
thus
producing
the
lowest
possible
environmental
footprint;
2) the
related
reduction
of
drilling
and
fracturing
cost,
with
could
aim
at
50%
cost
reductions
for
large-scale
drilling
campaigns;
3) the
development
of
clean
fracturing
technology
in
combination
with
a
deep
understanding
of
the
relationship
between
geomechanical
properties
of
the
rock,
fluid
flow
and
chemical
interactions,
and
between
formation
and
stimulation
fluid;
4) the
required
investment
in
research
and
development
to
establish
and
build
the
required
technology
in
Europe;
5) the
building
of
human
resource
capacity
to
support
large-scale
field
developments
with
several
hundreds
of
rigs
operating
in
Europe
for
many
decades,
and
to
develop
and
build
the
required
infrastructure.
The
development
of
shale
gas
will
only
be
successful
in
Europe
if
the
environmental
and
economic
boundary
conditions
can
be
fulfilled.
The
chapter
concludes
with
developing
cost
scenarios
for
future
shale
development
in
Europe
leading
to
the
following
total
cost
per
MWh.
These
cost
estimates
are
in
line
with
the
current
break-even
costs
for
shale
gas
production
in
Europe
proposed
by
other
notable
studies,
which
lie
between
either
13.5-32/MWh
or
$5-12/MBtu
given
January
2012
market
conditions
(see
Figure
5-12).
98
Table
3-24:
Shale
gas
cost
scenarios
for
Europe
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
production
scenarios
without
liquid
production
Optimistic
9
754
500
9.64
Most
likely
12
805
500
18.87
Conservative
18
697
500
74.79
Unit
of
measure
/MWh
Total
cost
per
well
Cost
per
MWh
not
considering
liquid
production
Most
likely
well
and
rig
site
scenario
versus
Three
cost
and
production
scenarios
with
liquid
production
Optimistic
9
754
500
5.28
Most
likely
12
805
500
10.86
Conservative
18
697
500
44.84
Unit
of
measure
/MWh
Total
cost
per
well
Cost
per
MWh
considering
liquid
production
99
extent of land use required by unconventional gas development, the second section will discuss the wide range of regulatory issues in Europe that may constrain or enable these surface-level operations. Of primary interest is the extent to which surface-level issues, whether technical, legal or socioeconomic in nature, can be effectively managed by a robust regulatory framework. The key question in this context is whether the interests of three broader sets of actors (market, state and societal) can be effectively balanced by such a framework, and what major issues have been identified in the literature as being critical to successful shale gas exploitation activities. Many of the references used for this section have been drawn from detailed impact assessments of shale gas development in different US states. These reports are based on the cumulative knowledge and feedback of industrial players, community stakeholders, independent consultancies, scientific experts and public policymakers; therefore, they serve as a relatively authoritative source of information. By drawing on such reports as well as their supporting documentation/annexes, it has been possible to extract a relatively clear picture of the surface-level impact of shale gas development. This picture has been further refined by an extensive review of other literature specific to Europe.
2
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources',
V-2,
Cleantech,
'Shale
Gas
Investment
Guide',
(Warsaw:
Cleantech
Poland
Sp.,
2011),
41.
1
Source:
Deloitte,
Arcmap
GIS.
101
Table
4-1:
Surface
usage
for
natural
gas
well
pads
and
associated
facilities,
hectares
(ha)
per
well3
Single
vertical
(<2
000
ft)
Single
vertical
(5
000-12
000
ft)
Single
horizontal
Multi-horizontal
(4
wells
per
pad)
Exploration
0.98
1.60
1.39
2.69
(0.67
per
well)
Development
1.93
2.72
2.79
4.64
(1.16
per
well)
Production
0.73
0.91
0.89
1.39
(0.35
per
well)
3
Includes
size
of
well
pads,
access
roads,
utility
and
transportation
lines
and
processing
units.
Bureau
of
Land Management, 'Arkansas: Reasonably foreseeable development scenario for fluid minerals', (Jackson, MS: Dept of Interior, 2008), 50-55.
102
Figure
4-1:
Phases
and
key
steps
in
developing
a
Marcellus
shale
well4
4
William
E.
Hefley
et
al.,
'The
Economic
Impact
of
the
value
chain
of
a
Marcellus
shale
well',
in
Pitt
Business
Working
Papers,
ed.
Katz
Graduate
School
of
Business
(Pittsburgh,
PA:
University
of
Pittsburgh,
2011).
103
The development cycle of a typical horizontal well, together with its economic implications, has been explored by a team of researchers at Pittsburgh University (US). As depicted in Figure 4-1 above, a considerable amount of inputs are necessary to prepare, construct and develop a single drill site. Once all the necessary permitting procedures have been completed, site preparation commences in the form of levelling and access road construction to make way for multiple trucks carrying diverse drilling equipment. Power generators, living quarters with sanitary facilities and security gates must be constructed, in addition to the construction of water pipes and other utility lines. Drilling mud principally water but also chemicals and additives must be purchased and transported in order for drilling to commence. Flowback water must be processed, treated and recycled, while casing operations are applied to the wellbore. The fracturing process, once begun in earnest, requires significant and continuous activities in the form of water and wastewater hauling, the construction of water ponds to hold frac fluids and the eventual installation of a gathering system of pipes and compressors to accommodate gas flows from the permanent wellhead. The production life cycle is subject to continuous monitoring and maintenance whilst partial site reclamation operations are initiated. Workover and well stimulation efforts may include additional fracturing operations, which require roughly the same level of initial development activity as the original fracturing process. As shown in Figure 4-2 below, horizontal well pads require a greater surface area than single vertical wells. This is due to the need for a larger pad to accommodate horizontal drilling equipment, as well as more water management facilities given the necessity to use water-intensive well fracturing technologies during development. Other studies providing estimates of total surface area requirements tend to corroborate the finding that pads containing multiple wellbores occupy the greatest total surface area on a per well-pad basis.
104
Figure
4-2:
Total
surface
area
requirements
for
developing
natural
gas
wells5
However,
a
point
is
often
raised
that
overall
surface
disturbance
of
multi-well
pads
is
in
fact
much
smaller
than
for
single
vertical
wells.
Indeed,
much
of
the
literature
on
land
access
for
unconventional
gas
production
has
highlighted
the
importance
of
well
spacing,
e.g.
the
maximum
area
that
one
well
would
efficiently
and
economically
extract
gas
from
based
on
geologic
and
engineering
characteristics.6
It
is
often
pointed
out
that
there
are
different
well
spacing
requirements
for
horizontal
drilling
operations
that
target
continuous
rock
formations
rather
than
conventional
reservoirs.
Whereas
single
vertical
well
pads
are
said
to
be
spaced
at
16
sites
per
square
mile,
single
horizontal
pads,
by
virtue
of
accessing
longer
subsurface
laterals,
can
reduce
this
figure
to
approximately
nine
pads
per
square
mile.
Further
reduction
can
be
attained
by
5
Robert
M.
Anderson,
'Environmental
Assessment
of
Southwestern
Production
Corp's
proposed
8
well
horizontal
drilling
programme
in
the
Hornbuckle
Field,
Wyoming',
(Casper,
WY:
Anderson
Environmental
Consulting,
2009);
Arthur
and
Bockelmann,
'Analysis
of
Proposed
Article
7
',
Bureau
of
Land
Management,
'Arkansas';
Bureau
of
Land
Management,
'Reasonably
Foreseeable
Development
Scenario
for
Oil
and
Gas
for
the
George
Washingtion
National
Forest
Virginia
and
West
Virginia',
(Jackson,
MS:
Dept
of
Interior,
2011);
Bureau
of
Land
Management,
'Surface
Disturbance
associated
with
Oil
and
Gas
Activities',
in
Draft
Resource
Management
Plan
for
Pinedale,
Wyoming
(Jackson,
MS:
Dept
of
Interior,
2007);
Cuadrilla
Resources,
'Economic
Impact
of
Shale
Gas
Exploration
&
Production
in
Lancashire
&
the
UK',
(Altrincham,
Cheshire:
Regeneris
Consulting,
2011);
Hefley
et
al.,
'Economic
Impact',
Nels
Johnson
et
al.,
'Marcellus
Shale
Natural
Gas
and
Wind',
in
Pennsylvania
Energy
Impacts
Assessment
(Arlington,
VA:
The
Nature
Conservancy,
2010);
National
Park
Service,
'Potential
Development
of
the
Natural
Gas
Resources
in
the
Marcellus
Shale
New
York,
Pennsylvania,
West
Virginia,
and
Ohio',
(Denver,
CO:
Department
of
the
Interior,
2008);
NTC
Consultants,
'Impacts
on
Community
Character
of
Horizontal
Drilling
and
High
Volume
Hydraulic
Fracturing
in
Marcellus
Shale
and
Other
Low-Permeability
Gas
Reservoirs,
Final
Report
Prepared
for
NYSERDA',
(Saratoga
Springs,
NY
2009).
6
In
the
United
States,
minimum
well
spacing
requirements
are
determined
by
state
and
local
authorities;
in
some
cases,
however,
these
regulations
have
not
adapted
to
the
characteristics
of
horizontal
wellbores,
whose
lateral
length
can
reach
up
to
3
000
metres.
105
constructing
a
multi-well
configuration
in
which
six
to
eight
(or
possibly
more)
wells
are
drilled
from
a
single
pad.7
This
can
yield
well
densities
as
low
as
one
per
square
mile.
Based
on
these
assumptions,
a
Supplemental
Generic
Environmental
Impact
Assessment
(SGEIS)
for
the
Marcellus
shale
play
by
the
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation
(NYSDEC)
concludes
that
there
clearly
is
a
smaller
total
area
of
land
disturbance
associated
with
horizontal
wells
for
shale
gas
development
than
that
for
vertical
well.8
This
difference
is
largely
explained
by
the
reduced
need
for
individual
well
pads
and
associated
access
roads,
gathering
lines
and
other
utility
corridors
(as
illustrated
in
Figure
4-3
below).
Figure
4-3:
Theoretical
well
densities
of
vertical
and
multi-well
horizontal
pads9
However,
there
is
a
point
of
contention
in
the
literature
concerning
the
extent
to
which
multi-well
pad
drilling
actually
reduces
overall
surface
disturbance
associated
with
gas
development
and
production.
Indeed,
most
of
the
above
figures
on
shale
gas
well
spacing
are
ultimately
derived
from
a
single
consulting
firm,
which
has
published
several
reports
presenting
essentially
the
same
data.10
A
caveat
is
therefore
in
order
about
the
assumptions
made
regarding
reduced
well
density
and
surface
disturbance
brought
about
by
multi-well
horizontal
drilling.
Indeed,
another
set
of
literature
has
argued
that,
though
it
may
be
the
case
that
multi-well
pad
spacing
begins
at
one
site
per
square
mile,
this
does
not
preclude
vertical
infill
drilling
between
such
areas.11
The
US
case
demonstrates
that
once
an
area
proves
to
be
commercially
viable,
there
is
a
tendency
for
firms
to
perform
infill
drilling,
creating
what
is
known
as
downspacing.
As
one
report
points
out,
spacing
histories
of
the
Barnett,
Fayetteville,
Antrim,
New
Albany,
Ohio
and
Woodford
shales
all
trend
from
larger
to
smaller
spacing
units.
For
the
Marcellus
Shale,
it
is
reasonable
to
expect
320-acre
[130
ha]
or
160-acre
[65
ha]
spacing
initially
and
eventually
some
areas
experiencing
infill
drilling
to
80-acre
[32
ha]
or
even
7
J.
Daniel
Arthur
et
al.,
'Hydraulic
Fracturing
Considerations
for
Natural
Gas
Wells
of
the
Fayetteville
Shale',
(Tulsa,
OK:
ALL
Consulting,
2008).
8
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
'Draft
SGEIS'.
9
Matthew
D.
Alexander
et
al.,
'Considerations
for
Responsible
Gas
Development
of
the
Frederick
Brook
Shale
in
New
Brunswick',
(Saint
John,
NB:
Fundy
Engineering
and
Atlantica
Centre
for
Energy,
2011).
10
ALL
Consulting,
'Modern
Shale
Gas
development';
Arthur
and
Bockelmann,
'Analysis
of
Proposed
Article
7
';
Arthur
et
al.,
'Hydraulic
Fracturing
Considerations';
J.
Daniel
Arthur
and
Dave
Cornue,
'Technologies
Reduce
Pad
Size
Waste',
American
Oil
and
Gas
Reporter
2010,
August
edition
(2010
).
Reports
that
draw
heavily
on
this
literature
include
Alexander
et
al.,
'Considerations
for
Responsible
Gas
Development',
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
'Draft
SGEIS';
Wood
et
al.,
'Shale
gas
provisional
assessment'.
11
NTC
Consultants,
'Impacts
on
Community
Character',
7.
106
40-acre
spacing
[16
ha]
should
infill
drilling
be
economic.12
This
is
corroborated
by
other
reports
citing
common
spacing
of
one
well
every
40-160
acres
(16-65
ha).13
Figures
from
a
recent
EIA
Report
on
emerging
shale
plays
in
the
USA
show
a
range
of
2- 11
wells
per
square
mile,
with
a
mean
of
6.5.14
The
figure
below
indicates
that
well
densities
in
shale
plays
do
indeed
increase
over
the
course
of
development.
Moreover,
due
to
more
dispersed
gas
in
place
for
shale
plays,
one
report
notes
that,
with
shale
gas
plays
covering
large
areas
and
requiring
a
greater
number
of
wells
drilled
more
closely
together
compared
with
conventional
fields,
this
implies
a
greater
surface
footprint
over
a
wider
area
for
shale
gas.15
Figure
4-4:
Current
well
density
in
US
counties
of
comparable
shale
gas
plays,
200916
Duration
and
intensity
of
well
drilling
The
argument
that
multi-well
pad
horizontal
drilling
reduces
surface
disturbance
is
based
on
a
calculation
of
total
surface
area
and
average
well
spacing
which,
by
themselves,
do
not
necessarily
serve
as
sufficient
indicators
for
overall
land
use
requirements.
A
more
comprehensive
method
would
consider
both
the
duration
and
intensity
of
drilling
and
completion
activities.
Due
account
must
be
taken
of
factors
such
as
water
consumption,
truck
trips,
noise
levels
and
visual
impacts,
all
of
which
may
significantly
affect
the
land
access
issue,
particularly
in
Europe.
The
duration
of
development
for
a
multi-well
pad
differs
significantly
according
to
the
number
of
wells
drilled.
Many
drilling
activities,
such
as
fracking
or
clean-up
operations,
Park
Service,
'Potential
Development
of
Marcellus
Shale';
Joel
Parshall,
'Barnett
Shale
Showcases
Tight-Gas
Development',
Journal
of
Petroleum
Technology
September
(2008):
55;
Lisa
Sumi,
'Shale
Gas:
Focus
on
the
Marcellus
Shale',
(Washington,
DC:
Earthworks,
2008),
18.
13
Of
course,
there
are
spacing
arrangements
as
high
as
one
per
square
mile;
ALL
Consulting,
'Modern
Shale
Gas
development';
National
Park
Service,
'Potential
Development
of
Marcellus
Shale';
Sumi,
'Shale
Gas'.
14
See
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources',
Appendix
B.
15
Howard
Rogers,
'Shale
Gas
-
the
unfolding
story',
Oxford
Review
of
Economic
Policy
27,
no
1
(2011):
128.
16
Hazen
and
Sawyer,
'Final
Impact
Assessment
of
Natural
Gas
Production
in
the
New
York
City
Water
Supply
Watershed',
(New
York,
NY:
New
York
City
Department
of
Environmental
Protection,
2009),
23.
12
National
107
can
only
be
carried
out
for
one
well
at
a
time;
thus,
the
greater
number
of
wells,
the
longer
pre-production
operations
are
liable
to
take.
Since
drilling
and
completion
activities
are
also
contingent
on
a
number
of
geological,
logistical
and
regulatory
factors,
estimates
of
their
duration
tend
to
vary.
Moreover,
whereas
some
studies
provide
figures
for
the
total
amount
of
time
necessary
to
develop
an
entire
well-pad
(e.g.
including
the
construction
of
access
roads
and
utility
lines),
others
focus
on
the
duration
of
drilling
and
fracking
activities.
Table
4-2
below
summarises
the
figures
provided
by
these
various
reports.
Despite
these
differences,
a
point
of
agreement
in
the
literature
rests
on
the
fact
that
drilling
horizontally
generally
takes
around
double
the
amount
time
as
for
a
vertical
well.17
Table
4-2:
Duration
of
drilling
and
completion
activities
Duration
500-1
500
days
Up
to
18
months
Energy
Resources
Conservation
Board
(2011)
12-36
months
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation
6-13
months
(2009)
Cuadrilla
Resources
(2011a)
6-8
months
Wood
et
al.
(2011)
Downey
(2010)
Hazen
and
Sawyer
(2009)
ICF
International
(2009)
Anderson
(2009)
NTC
Consultants
(2009)
4-10
months
2-4
months
2
months
1-2
months
Source
Type
6-well
pad
Multi-well
+
pad
Multi-well
+
pad
Single
horizontal
well
+
pad
Single
horizontal
well
+
pad
Single
horizontal
well
+
pad
Single
horizontal
well
Single
horizontal
well
Single
horizontal
well
Figure
4-5:
Timeline
for
shale
gas
development
and
production
(single
well)18
The
duration
of
drilling
for
each
horizontal
well
is
particularly
important
in
the
case
of
Europe,
which
has
far
fewer
active
land-based
gas
drilling
rigs
than
the
USA.
This
means
that
should
several
shale
gas
plays
in
different
countries
be
deemed
commercially
viable,
competition
over
bookings
for
well
drilling
can
become
a
crucial
developmental
bottleneck.
In
addition,
one
overlooked
point
in
determining
well
drilling
times
is
the
18
Downey,
'Fueling
North
America's
future'.
It
must
be
borne
in
mind
that
the
life-span
of
a
shale
gas
well
is
yet
unknown,
and
that
various
estimates
have
been
presented
in
the
literature
study.
17
NTC
Consultants,
'Impacts
on
Community
Character',
18.
108
delay
caused
by
force
majeure,
both
in
terms
of
surface
level
disturbances
(e.g.
weather- related
delays)
or
unforeseen
sub-surface
difficulties.
Indeed,
Cuadrilla
Resources
experienced
all
of
these
developmental
bottlenecks
whilst
attempting
to
build
a
test
well
in
Lancashire.19
In
New
York
state,
the
regulatory
limit
on
well
drilling
activity
per
site
is
three
years,
which
is
indicative
of
the
maximum
time
it
may
take
for
a
single
site
to
experience
drilling
and
completion
activities.20
It
is
also
important
to
consider
that
within
this
span
some
pads
may
not
be
fully
developed
in
one
consecutive
period
of
time.
According
to
a
consultancy
report
for
the
New
York
State
Energy
Research
and
Development
Authority
(NYSERDA),
operators
may
drill
one
or
two
wells
on
a
pad
to
determine
its
productivity
before
deciding
to
drill
the
remaining
wells;
the
decision
to
further
develop
a
site
may
also
be
contingent
on
favourable
market
conditions.21
Finally,
if
re-fracking
or
other
stimulation
and
workover
efforts
are
deemed
necessary
to
prolong
the
life-span
of
a
well,
a
renewed
period
of
intense
development
activity
may
occur
several
months
after
the
production
phase
has
started.
Thus,
given
that
six
to
ten
wells
are
expected
to
be
required
to
fully
exploit
the
natural
gas
resources
in
a
640-acre
spacing
unit,
it
is
reasonable
to
expect
that
a
given
well
site
will
be
undergoing
a
relatively
high
and
constant
level
of
industrial
activity
for
at
least
one
and
up
to
three
years.22
Thereafter,
one
study
maintains
that
drilling
operations
continue
for
the
whole
field
life
and
they
are
required
to
maintain
the
production
plateau.23
Shale
gas
development
requires
heavy
truck
traffic
to
and
from
the
site
for
this
period
of
time.
Few
figures
on
the
intensity
of
road
traffic
during
well
construction
are
available.
One
of
the
few
original
estimates
available
stems
from
NYSDEC,
which
estimates
approximately
4
300-6
600
truck
visits
for
a
multiple
horizontal
well-pad
in
the
development
phase
of
a
shale
gas
project.24
For
single
horizontal
well
pads,
a
related
analysis
carried
out
for
NYSERDA
estimates
two
scenarios
of
1
420
and
2
000
truck
trips.25
The
majority
of
this
transportation
activity
is
for
water
and
wastewater
hauling
during
the
development
and
fracking
phase,
which
is
relatively
unique
to
shale
gas
development.
The
report
concludes
that
because
of
this
the
truck
traffic
associated
with
drilling
a
horizontal
well
with
high-volume
hydraulic
fracturing
is
2
to
3
times
higher
than
the
truck
traffic
associated
with
drilling
a
vertical
well.26
In
terms
of
the
timeframe
of
trucking
activities,
the
table
below
shows
the
daily
distribution
of
traffic
over
a
50-day
period
during
initial
well
pad
development
of
horizontal/vertical
wells.
However,
it
has
been
argued
that
the
marked
increase
in
truck
traffic
for
horizontal
19
Cuadrilla
Resources,
'Planning
Application
for
Preese
Hall
Exploration
Site:
Temporary
Planning
Permission
for
a
Hydrocarbon
Exploration
Borehole',
(Lichfield,
West
Sussex:
2011).
20
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
'Draft
SGEIS',
3-4,
5-30.
The
Tyndall
Centres
report
uses
NYSDEC
figures
to
arrive
at
a
duration
of
500-1
500
days
for
all
operations
prior
to
production
of
a
six-well
pad.
It
is
unclear
how
these
figures
were
calculated.
Wood
et
al.,
'Shale
gas
provisional
assessment'.
21
ICF
International,
'Well
Permit
Issuance
for
Horizontal
Drilling
and
High-Volume
Hydraulic
Fracturing
to
Develop
the
Marcellus
Shale
and
Other
Low
Permeability
Gas
Reservoirs',
(Albany,
NY:
New
York
State
Energy
Research
and
Development
Authority,
2009),
9.
22New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
'Draft
SGEIS',
Section
4.
23
M.
Guarnone
et
al.,
'An
unconventional
mindset
for
shale
gas
surface
facilities',
Journal
of
Natural
Gas
Science
and
Engineering
6
(2012).
24
Wood
et
al.,
'Shale
gas
provisional
assessment',
24.
25
NTC
Consultants,
'Impacts
on
Community
Character',
13.
26
New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
'Draft
SGEIS',
6-301.
109
wells
would
be
offset
by
the
fewer
number
of
pads
necessary
to
develop
a
given
shale
play,
given
that
rigs
and
equipment
would
only
need
to
be
delivered
and
removed
one
time
for
the
drilling
and
stimulation
of
all
the
wells
on
a
given
pad.27
This
argument,
however,
can
be
contested
by
the
earlier
reference
made
to
the
practice
of
drilling
one
or
two
wells
to
determine
productivity
before
further
developing
a
well
site.
Figure
4-6:
Estimated
daily
heavy
and
light
truck
round-trip
traffic
by
well
type28
Two additional issues associated with land use intensity and lengthier construction periods are noise and visual impacts. Noise sources, which are most prominent during the drilling phase, include various rigging operations, pipe handling, compressors and operations of trucks, backhoes, tractors and cement mixing. In most cases, moderate to significant noise impacts may be felt within 300 metres of a well site.29 In more highly developed or more densely populated areas, these noise impacts may serve as constraints to the 24-hour drilling activity that is typical for several weeks during the drilling phase of a single horizontal well. In any case, noise impacts are best mitigated through well site location and design. As for visual impacts, it is common for horizontal drilling rigs to reach over 40 metres, compared with 10-30 metres for conventional vertical well-drilling equipment and for their substructure to occupy a larger surface area.30 Thus, although the noise and visual impact stemming from horizontal drilling are both larger and lengthier than those arising from vertical well construction, the theoretically reduced number of well-pads for a given spacing unit may offset the discrepancy. There are other technological developments that have been identified as potential mitigating factors on future levels of surface disturbance; for example, reuse of
27
Ibid.,
6-304.
28
Ibid.
29
NTC
Consultants,
'Impacts
on
Community
Character',
15.
30
Ibid.,
18.
110
water
that
can
reduce
the
requisite
trucking
or
horizontal
drilling
technology
that
allows
a
certain
level
of
flexibility
in
pad
placement.31
Associated
infrastructure
Beyond
the
immediate
surface-level
requirements
for
constructing
and
operating
a
shale
gas
well
pad,
it
is
also
necessary
to
consider
the
surrounding
infrastructure
necessary
to
support
potentially
large-scale
development
of
a
much
wider
area.
As
one
report
notes,
large
scale
development
of
shale
gas
resources
in
a
continuous
play
requires
facilities
to
support
high-volume
hydraulic
fracturing
(e.g.
water
withdrawal,
storage
and
treatment
facilities).
Besides
the
access
roads
and
utility
lines
required
for
individual
well
pads,
it
is
necessary
to
develop
gas
gathering
systems,
offsite
production
and
processing
facilities,
and
transmission
lines,
as
well
as
other
activities
to
bring
the
gas
resource
into
productionon
a
more
consolidated
and
centralized
basis
because
of
the
overall
vision
for
development
and
the
potential
for
achieving
economies
of
scale.32
Depending
on
the
proximity
to
areas
of
gas
demand,
drilling
companies
may
opt
either
to
construct
additional
pipelines
to
connect
into
the
main
gas
pipeline
network
or
create
on-site
electricity
generation
which
is
then
connected
to
the
grid.
According
to
a
report
commissioned
by
Cuadrilla
Resources
UK,
under
either
approach
a
substantial
body
of
additional
labour
and
equipment
is
required
to
put
in
place
the
necessary
infrastructure,
which
will
grow
in
scale
as
the
number
of
wells
in
any
one
location
increases.33
In
comparative
terms,
the
dearth
of
upstream
onshore
gas
production
infrastructure
in
Europe
is
commonly
identified
as
an
impediment
to
large-scale
shale
gas
production.34
In
the
USA,
by
contrast,
two
of
the
larger
shale
plays
are
overlaid
by
extensive
gas
transport
and
processing
infrastructure
(e.g.
in
New
York
and
Texas,
respectively)
owing
to
these
states
previous
historical
development
of
conventional
gas
resources.
Even
in
these
well-developed
markets,
necessary
investments
in
mid-stream
infrastructure
to
support
additional
gas
production
have
incurred significant additional costs. For example, construction of gas gathering systems and processing facilities constituted 15% of industry spending by Marcellus gas producers in Pennsylvania in 2009.35 A
recent
study
on
the
surface
facilities
needed
to
accommodate
shale
gas
production
in
Europe
makes
the
valid
point
that
the
identification
of
sweet
spots
on
the
basis
of
geological
and
reservoir
parameters
alone
may
not
sufficiently
reflect
the
optimal
location
for
shale
gas
extraction.36
Rather,
a
multi-disciplinary
mindset
is
required
for
anticipating
the
need
for
transport
and
processing
infrastructure,
as
well
as
the
surface- level
restrictions
brought
about
by
environmental
or
other
land
use
regulations.
These
issues
of
surface-level
downstream
transport
capacity
will
be
taken
up
in
Section
4.2
through
a
discussion
of
pipeline
transmission
and
distribution
grid
density.
31
Ibid.,
26.
32
Ibid.,
4.
This
type
of
centralised
infrastructure
roll-out
also
importantly
affects
the
commercial
viability
of a given play. 33 Cuadrilla Resources, 'Economic Impact in Lancashire'. 34 Memorandum submitted by Shell in House of Commons, 'Shale Gas: Fifth Report of Session 2010-12', ed. Energy and Climate Change Committee (London: House of Commons, 2011), points 17, 19 and 21. 35 Timothy J. Considine, Robert Watson and Seth Blumsack, 'The Economic Impacts of the Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Play: An Update', (Altoona, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2010), 5. 36 Guarnone et al., 'Unconventional mindset'.
111
Figure
4-7:
Natural
gas
processing
plants
and
production
basins
in
the
USA,
200937
Cumulative
impacts
This
section
has
presented
the
land
access
requirements
for
shale
gas
development
in
a
bottom-up
manner
by
employing
a
per
well
approach.
However,
in
order
to
adequately
consider
shale
gas
surface
requirements
and
associated
land
access
issues,
it
is
necessary
to
consider
the
cumulative
impact
of
several
horizontal
wells
being
drilled
annually
over
a
longer
period
of
development.
Cumulative
impacts
are
the
effects
of
two
or
more
single
projects
considered
together.
Since
some
countries
may
have
considerable
quantities
of
the
resource,
some
studies
have
speculated
on
the
cumulative
effects
of
large-scale
build-outs.
For
example,
a
recent
study
of
potential
shale
gas
development
in
the
UK
has
provided
an
estimate
of
the
resources
required
to
produce
10%
of
UK
gas
consumption
from
shale;
it
argues
that,
to
sustain
this
level
of
production
for
20
years
in
the
UK
would
require
around
2,500-3,000
horizontal
wells
spread
over
some
140-400km2
and
some
27
to
113
million
tonnes
of
water.38
Such
a
large-scale
activity,
with
multiple
rigs
operating
at
the
same
time
in
a
continuous
area,
may
lead
to
a
number
of
potentially
negative
impacts
on
water
quality,
land
use,
wildlife
and
natural
resources,
agriculture,
tourism
and
the
overall
quality
of
life
in
a
community.
These
impacts,
of
course,
may
differ
depending
on
the
scale
of
development
which,
as
Section
4.1.2
will
address,
can
be
monitored
or
potentially
restricted
by
the
regulatory
regime
in
place.
Whatever
rules
are
in
place,
it
is
important
to
recognise
that
cumulative
impacts
could
be
considered
excessive,
even
when
individual
operators
meet
or
even
exceed
regulatory
requirements.
Indeed,
the
combination
of
impacts
from
37
EIA,
'Natural
Gas
Processing
Plants
in
the
United
States:
2010
Update',
(Washington,
DC:
2011).
38
Wood
et
al.,
'Shale
gas
provisional
assessment',
53.
112
multiple
drilling
and
production
operations,
support
infrastructure
(pipelines,
road
networks,
etc.)
and
related
activities
can
overwhelm
ecosystems
and
communities.39
For
Europe,
what
would
be
the
cumulative
impact
of
a
large-scale
roll-out
of
unconventional
gas
development
and
production?
A
birds-eye
view
of
the
most
productive
shale
plays
in
the
USA
may
be
an
instructive
analogue.
Indeed,
comparing
the
two
maps
below
of
the
Barnett
Shale
in
Texas
illustrates
the
scale
of
development
currently
in
operation.
Figure
4-8:
Barnett
Shale
drilling
in
1997
and
2009,
Ft.
Worth
Basin,
Texas,
USA40
However, several positive factors would likely militate against such a large-scale build- out in Europe, principal among which is the improvement in technology that allows for multi-well pad drilling. Other technological developments, such as efficiency gains acquired through refined fracking and water management techniques, as well as improved seismic evaluation methods that avoid the need to drill multiple test wells, may alter the degree of surface-level disturbance as fewer sites with less lengthy well construction activities become the norm.41 This issue of technological learning and its impact on future development activities is further explored in Chapter 3 and Section C.4 of the Annexes.
(paper presented at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Paris, 2011).
113
desire to maximise rents while achieving socioeconomic objectives; market players and their desire for a return on investment that is consistent with the risk associated with the project; and finally, the needs of societal actors to preserve or improve welfare in social, monetary or environmental terms. 42 The regulatory framework must accommodate these overlapping spheres of interest that often may conflict with one another (see Figure 4-9). This is largely because the three sets of actors tend to use different criteria for evaluating their respective needs. For example, societal actors will judge the desirability of shale gas development from the point of view of welfare effects and related indicators, such as the provision of public goods or the environmental impact of gas drilling, whereas market actors will assess their investments on the basis of the net present value of assets or the internal rate of return for a given project. Regulatory frameworks governing hydrocarbon production must balance these interests so as to encourage investment, prevent environmental degradation and distribute the gains (and losses) of shale gas development fairly. In most European countries particularly those with indigenous hydrocarbon production there exists a raft of regulations and procedures governing the various operations associated with sub-surface mining activities. Given the partial degree of overlap between conventional and unconventional gas development, several of the legal regimes in place apply to activities associated with the latter. There are, of course, regulatory challenges unique to unconventional gas. Additional national and EU legislation may apply to activities associated with advanced well stimulation techniques, such as that governing water management and the use of chemicals. 43 However, detailing the requisite EU, national and local permits, concessions, licences and potential gaps in legislation for each European country is beyond the scope of this section. A preliminary investigation of these issues has been provided by a legal study commissioned by DG ENER.44 However, it is important to note that this study did not assess the applicable EU requirements and covered permitting and licensing requirements in a limited number of Member States (DE, FR, PL and SE); further legal assessment is on-going in the frame of a study commissioned by DG ENV. Drawing on this and other literature, it is useful to highlight the key points that have been raised in relation to surface accessibility for shale gas development. These regulatory issues can be broadly summarised according to their technical/logistical, legal and socioeconomic dimensions.
42
Adapted
from
Silvana
Tordo,
'Fiscal
Systems
for
Hydrocarbons,
WP
123,'
in
World
Bank
Working
Paper
114
Figure
4-9:
Key
elements
of
an
unconventional
gas
regulatory
framework45
SOCIETAL
ACTORS
Landowners
Local
communities
Activists
/
Protesters
Lobby
groups
Trade
Unions
NGOs
/
transnational
civil
society
-Land use permitting -Fees/royalties/compensation -Ingress/Egress -Job/wealth creation -Community -Environmental impact Outreach assessment and mitigation -Monitoring/ -Mineral Rights Regime Reporting -Dispute Resolution Procedures -Spatial regulations ( e.g. pooling, unitization, well spacing)
STATE
ACTORS
Local
Councils
Regional
Government
District
Courts
Mining
Authority
Energy
Regulator
Parliaments/Legislation
Government
Ministries/
Executive
MARKET
ACTORS
-Planning/Permitting
Procedures
-Regulatory
restrictions
-Concessions/Licensing
Areas
-Incentives/Credits
-Taxes/Royalties
Regime
-Penalties/Fines
Drillers Contractors Service Companies [Third party] Suppliers Operators Energy firms Investors Risk-Reward (CBA)
Technical/logistical
issues
Once
a
prospective
drilling
area
is
deemed
commercially
viable,
companies
must
secure
a
concession
and
a
right
to
drill
from
the
owners
of
the
mineral
resources
(which
are
usually
administered
in
Europe
by
state
departments
e.g.
mining
authorities
or
equivalent).
At
the
same
time,
drillers
must
also
acquire
consent
to
access
the
surface
area
overlaying
the
shale
gas
play;
this
involves
negotiations
with
local
authorities
as
well
as
private
landowners.
According
to
Florence
Gny,
there
are
three
methods
whereby
land
can
be
accessed
in
Europe,
namely
through
negotiating
a
fee
for
renting
the
land,
a
compulsory
purchase
45
Based
on
analysis
by
ALL
Consulting,
'Modern
Shale
Gas
development';
Sally
Kornfeld,
'Socio-Economic
Considerations in Shale Gas Development' (paper presented at the Atlantic Council Meeting, 2011); New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 'Draft SGEIS'; Tordo, 'Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons'.
115
by
government
(or,
in
extreme
cases,
via
eminent
domain)
or
through
acquisition
of
the
land
by
the
drilling
company.46
Gny
claims
that
concessions
granted
by
European
governments
are
small,
with
one
block
generally
comprising
2.6
km2,
making
it
highly
difficult
to
conduct
exploration
activities.47
However,
it
is
unclear
how
this
figure
has
been
calculated
and
there
may
in
fact
be
much
variation
hidden
behind
such
a
generalisation.
For
example,
a
report
on
shale
gas
by
the
British
Geological
Survey
notes
that
the
UK
uses
100km2
blocks
in
its
licensing
rounds
(the
most
recent
13th
Onshore
Licence
Round
awarded
55
new
licences
covering
more
than
7
000
km2).48
In
Poland,
too,
the
rule
is
that
a
single
concession
cannot
exceed
an
area
of
1
200
km2,
but
even
here
there
is
no
limit
as
to
the
number
of
concessions
one
entity
can
hold.49
Nonetheless,
even
such
larger
dimensions
for
concession
holders
may
not
be
sufficient
to
evaluate
shale
gas
plays
to
the
scale
witnessed
in
the
US
case.
A
report
by
IHS
CERA
contrasts
a
typical
240
km2
concession
block
in
Europe
with
a
single
US
operators
concession
area
in
the
Fayetteville
shale
covering
over
3
500
km2.50
This
has
a
bearing
on
the
amount
of
landowners
that
drilling
companies
must
engage
with
in
order
to
secure
access
to
land,
not
only
for
purposes
of
drilling
but
also
for
play
evaluation
and
thoroughfare
(for
example,
extensive
use
of
access
roads).
Indeed,
since
open
agricultural
areas
are
the
most
likely
candidates
for
shale
gas
drilling,
it
has
been
noted
that
the
size
of
farming
plots
in
Europe
are
much
smaller
than
in
the
USA.51
Returning
to
the
example
of
Poland,
most
farms
are
10-20
hectares
in
size,
meaning
that
drillers
will
have
to
engage
several
landowners
for
permission
to
construct
a
drilling
pad
and
the
type
of
factory-scale
production
where
well
pads
are
placed
at
regular
intervals
is
impossible.52
This
is
compounded
by
the
oft-repeated
point
that
exploration
for
shale
gas
requires
a
much
larger
initial
surface
area
than
for
conventional
gas.
Indeed,
it
is
of
crucial
importance
to
locate
a
shale
plays
sweet
spots
from
which
the
gas
can
be
extracted
under
the
most
favourable
geological
conditions.
Moreover,
in
this
context
comparisons
are
often
made
between
the
population
densities
surrounding
US
shale
formations
versus
those
found
in
Europe.
It
is
commonly
argued
that
the
comparatively
low
population
density
in
the
United
States
is
particularly
amenable
to
land-intensive
exploration
and
drilling
operations.53
To
make
this
point,
many
studies
are
content
to
overlay
national
spatial
population
density
data
with
prospective
shale
plays
or
compare
the
population
densities
of
US
states
with
those
of
46
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas'.
47
Ibid.
49
Ewa
Zalewska,
'The
Concession
granting
policy
for
prospecting,
exploration
and
production
of
hydrocarbons
in
Poland',
Przeglad
Geologiczny
55,
no
12/1
(2007).
50
IHS
CERA,
'Gas
from
Shale:
Potential
Outside
North
America?',
(Cambridge,
MA:
IHS
CERA,
2009).
51
Centrica
Energy,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe:
Response
to
DECC
Consultation',
(Windsor:
2010),
House
of
Commons,
'Shale
Gas:
Fifth
Report
of
Session
2010-12',
ed.
Energy
and
Climate
Change
Committee
(London:
House
Of
Commons,
2011).
This
document
contrasts
the
average
farm
size
of
12
ha
in
Poland
with
160
ha
or
210
ha
in
Oklahoma
and
Texas,
respectively;
see
also
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas',
74.
52
Cleantech,
'Investment
Guide',
59.
53
Rick
Carr
and
Chuck
Chakravarthy,
'Natural
Gas:
Revoluiton
or
evolution',
(New
York,
NY:
Deloitte
Development
LLC
2011);
Centrica
Energy,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe';
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas';
Andreas
Korn,
'Prospects
for
unconventional
gas
in
Europe',
(Dsseldorf:
E.ON,
2010);
Maximilian
Kuhn
and
Frank
Umbach,
'Strategic
Perspectives
of
Unconventional
Gas:
A
Game
Changer
with
Implications
for
the
EUs
Energy
Security',
in
EUCERS
Strategy
Paper,
ed.
European
Centre
for
Energy
and
Resource
Security
(London:
Department
of
War
Studies,
King's
College
London
2011);
Stevens,
'Hype
and
reality'.
48
Harvey
and
Gray,
'Unconventional
resources
of
Britain'.
116
several
European
countries.54
This
kind
of
coarse
analysis,
however,
does
not
provide
a
rigorous
insight
into
the
bottom-up
prospects
for
shale
gas
development
for
a
given
area.
Indeed,
as
one
of
these
studies
freely
admits,
to
fully
grasp
the
problem
of
surface
accessibility
caused
by
spatial
constraints,
it
is
necessary
to
do
an
analysis
at
the
most
local
level
possible.55
Given
these
technical
and
logistical
constraints
in
Europe,
an
important
consideration
reveals
itself
namely
how
to
manage
multiple
landowners
and
their
varying
claims
to
restrict
and/or
require
compensation
for
accessing
their
property.
This
constitutes
one
of
the
key
factors
highlighted
by
Centrica,
an
energy
firm,
in
its
assessment
of
the
potential
for
unconventional
gas
development
in
Europe.56
It
is
all
the
more
pertinent
given
the
additional
need
for
extensive
utility
line
placement
in
the
context
of
local
opposition
to
any
activities
that
may
potentially
spoil
landscapes
or
require
extensive
excavation
activities.
Legal
issues
The
literature
on
shale
gas
development
prospects
often
notes
that
European
and
US
land
ownership
rules
differ;
whereas
in
the
latter,
landowners
own
both
surface
and
mineral
rights,
in
the
former,
sub-surface
rights
are
generally
owned
by
the
state.57
The
argument
runs
that
mineral
rights
regimes
in
European
countries
pose
greater
challenges
for
drilling
because
surface
owners
are
not
entitled
to
royalties
or
signing
bonuses
and
hence
have
little
incentive
to
support
shale
gas
development.58
However,
this
argument
may
obscure
the
complexity
of
mineral
rights
in
the
USA,
which
are
governed
by
myriad
state
laws
and
where
the
leases,
sales,
gifts
and
bequests
of
the
past
have
produced
a
landscape
where
multiple
persons
or
companies
have
a
partial
ownership
of
or
rights
to
many
real
estate
parcels.59
Particularly
in
areas
where
there
has
been
extensive
historical
oil
and
gas
development
(e.g.
the
Barnett
and
Marcellus
shales)
it
is
common
for
the
mineral
and
surface
estates
to
be
owned
by
different
people
(e.g.
a
split
estate).60
This
phenomenon
may
be
under-reported
because
the
extent
of
severed
rights
is
very
difficult
to
estimate
empirically
because
of
the
lack
of
easily
accessible
records.61
Thus,
the
real
distinction
between
US
and
European
land
access
rights
is
not
necessarily
ownership
but
rather
the
degree
to
which
surface
landowners
have
a
say
in
granting
permission
to
develop
an
area.
In
the
USA,
state
and
local
laws
tend
to
favour
the
holder
of
the
mineral
estate.
Indeed,
where
split
estates
exist
in
Texas,
surface
owners
must
allow
the
holder
of
the
mineral
estate
to
freely
use
the
surface
estate
to
the
extent
reasonably
necessary
for
the
exploration,
development
and
production
of
the
oil
and
54
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas';
House
of
Commons,
'Shale
Gas:
Fifth
Report
of
Session
2010-12';
Roderick
Kefferputz, 'Shale Fever: Replicating the US gas revolution in the EU? CEPS Policy Brief no 210', (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010); Stevens, 'Hype and reality', 16. 55 Gny, 'Unconventional Gas'. 56 Centrica Energy, 'Unconventional Gas in Europe'. 57 Gny, 'Unconventional Gas'. 58 Harvey and Gray, 'Unconventional resources of Britain', 30, House of Commons, 'Shale Gas: Fifth Report of Session 2010-12', 28. 59 geology.com, Mineral Rights (cited). 60 Anthony Andrews et al., 'Unconventional Gas Shales: Development, Technology, and Policy Issues', (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 27. 61 David Kay, 'The Economic Impact of Marcellus Shale Gas Drilling. What Have We Learned? What are the Limitations?', in Working Paper Series (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2011).
117
gas
under
the
property.62
This
includes
comprehensive
access
to
the
land
for
carrying
out
seismic
tests,
drilling
wells,
building
roads
and
utility
lines
and
so
on.
Similar
laws
exist
in
other
US
states,
under
which
surface
owners
must
provide
reasonable
access
to
the
land
in
exchange
for
the
right
to
protection
from
unreasonable
encroachment
and
damage
and
compensation
for
the
use
of
the
surface.
63
In
Europe,
by
contrast,
there
seems
to
be
some
confusion
as
to
the
extent
to
which
surface
landowners
can
restrict
the
development
of
shale
gas.
A
legal
study
on
shale
gas
development
in
Europe
commissioned
by
the
EU
does
not
provide
a
clear
answer.
On
the
one
hand
it
is
claims
that
property
owners
may
not
be
willing
to
permit
a
company
on
to
its
land
if
he
is
not
being
compensated
by
a
financial
incentive
yet
elsewhere
in
the
same
report
it
is
stated
that
such
consent
from
landowners
is
unnecessary
for
the
exploration
and
exploitation
of
state-owned
sub-surface
minerals. 64
Whereas
some
studies
state
that
land
owners
can
be
a
significant
hindrance
to
shale
gas
drilling
operations65,
others
argue
that
hydrocarbons
are
mostly
nationalized,
so
there
is
no
need
for
gas
firms
to
negotiate
with
many
different
landowners
(though
the
owner
of
the
site
of
the
actual
drilling
pad
will
surely
need
compensation).66
This
confusion
may
stem
from
the
variable
importance
assigned
to
landowner
consent
in
different
Member
States.
Under
French
law,
for
example,
the
Mining
Code
stipulates
that
any
holder
of
an
exploration
licence
is
entitled
to
conduct
all
necessary
prospection
activities
regardless
of
whether
the
surface
owner
lends
his
consent
to
such
activities.67
In
the
UK,
by
contrast,
it
is
stated
that
the
rights
granted
by
landward
licenses
do
not
include
any
rights
of
access,
and
the
onus
is
upon
the
licensee
to
obtain
all
the
relevant
planning
permissions
from
the
respective
authorities
and
landowners.68
Moreover,
a
court
case
has
laid
a
precedent
for
requiring
permission
from
landowners
under
whose
land
a
horizontal
section
of
a
gas
well
passes.69
In
particular
the
court
ruled
that
the
owner
of
the
surface
is
the
owner
of
the
strata
beneath
it,
including
the
minerals
that
are
to
be
found
there,
unless
there
has
been
an
alienation
of
them
by
conveyance,
at
common
law
or
by
statute,
to
someone
else.70
In
Poland,
the
authorisation
holder
always
needs
to
have
approval
from
the
concerned
land
owners
as
a
conditio
sine
qua
non
before
any
authorisation
can
be
granted.71
Drilling
companies
and
regulators
in
the
USA
have
addressed
the
problem
of
obtaining
access
from
multiple
landowners
by
initiating
what
is
known
as
unitisation
and
pooling. 72
These
processes
both
involve
negotiations
with
multiple
landowners
for
receiving
a
pro-rated
share
of
royalties
based
on
their
respective
acreage
overlaying
the
gas
reservoir.
While
pooling
refers
to
the
combination
of
several
small
tracts
of
land
to
62
Texas
Railroad
Commission,
'Oil
&
Gas
Exploration
and
Surface
Ownership',
(Austin,
TX).
63
Andrews
et
al.,
'Unconventional
Gas
Shales'.
64
Philippe
&
Partners,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe',
8
and
26,
respectively.
65
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas';
Kuhn
and
Umbach,
'Strategic
Perspectives';
Stevens,
'Hype
and
reality'.
66
Ridley,
'Shale
Gas
Shock',
17.
68
Rhian
67
Philippe
&
Partners,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe'.
Kendall, Nigel Smith and Andrew Bloodworth, 'Alternative Fossil Fuels: Mineral Planning Factsheet', (Keyworth: British Geological Survey, 2011). 69 Antoinette Harvey, ' Inquiry concerning shale gas licensing', correspondence with Peter Zeniewski (2011). 70 Ibid. 71 Philippe & Partners, 'Unconventional Gas in Europe', 26. 72 See Krista Weidner, 'Natural Gas Exploration, a landowners guide to leasing land in Pennsylvania', (Altoona, PA: PennState College of Agricultural Sciences, 2008).
118
meet
the
spacing
requirements
for
a
single
well,
unitisation
refers
to
field-wide
or
partial
field-wide
operation
of
a
producing
reservoir
involving
multiple
adjoining
land
tracts.
With
farm
plots
smaller
and
land
ownership
more
diffuse
in
Europe
than
in
the
USA,
both
unitisation
and
pooling
may
be
an
option
required
for
managing
concession
areas
fairly
and
effectively.
Moreover,
both
pooling
and
unitisation
can
contribute
to
a
reduced
surface
footprint
by
reining
in
excessive
drilling
brought
about
by
the
rule
of
capture
principle
(whereby
sub-surface
minerals
can
be
extracted
from
adjacent
property
tracts).
Since
much
of
the
sub-surface
in
Europe
is
state-owned,
legal
uncertainties
surrounding
the
rule
of
capture
in
many
cases
are
moot,
but
the
centralised
approach
to
drilling
programmes
implied
by
pooling
and
unitisation
can
be
viewed
as
a
useful
practice
applicable
to
the
European
context.
Indeed,
lessons
from
unitisation
and
pooling
can
be
drawn
not
necessarily
from
the
fair
distribution
of
royalties
but
as
a
model
for
efficiently
extracting
gas
over
a
given
surface
area.
Gas
fields
in
the
USA
that
have
been
pooled
or
unitised
have
helped
to
reduce
surface
disturbance
by
avoiding
unnecessary
wells
and
infrastructure
while
maximising
a
fields
ultimate
recovery
according
to
shared
technical
or
engineering
information
among
different
operators
and
licence
holders.
In
this
way,
benefits
are
accrued
by
licensing
authorities
as
well
as
landowners.
Some
industry
experts
also
endorse
this
method;
indeed,
it
is
synonymous
with
the
recommendation
of
E&P
experts
at
Italys
ENI
that
shale
gas
exploitation
be
pursued
according
to
a
modular
facilities
approach,
whereby
development
and
production
from
a
complex
of
multiple
wellpads
is
managed
centrally
in
order
to
avoid
duplication
of
infrastructure,
goods
and
service
procurement,
and
to
speed
up
permitting
procedures.73
This
top-down
low-cost
strategy
contrasts
with
the
US
experience
of
factory-style
drilling
and
resonates
instead
with
conventional
gas
field
development
in
continental
Europe,
which
has
by
and
large
been
driven
by
environmentally
conscious,
regulated
drilling
programmes.
Socioeconomic
issues
Public
acceptance
is
regularly
acknowledged
as
a
major
constraint
to
shale
gas
operations
in
Europe.
A
key
dimension
of
this
issue
relates
to
the
greater
sensitivity
in
Europe
toward
activities
affecting
the
environment,
health
and
safety.
Several
analysts
point
out
that
zoning
restrictions
and
tighter
regulations
on
the
use
of
public
lands
can
hinder
onshore
prospecting
for
hydrocarbons
in
much
of
Europe.
In
most
cases,
drilling
activities
encounter
constraints
in
areas
considered
out
of
bounds,
such
as
environmentally
protected
areas
or
those
in
close
proximity
to
building
or
residential
zones.
This
is
complemented
by
the
European
Unions
biodiversity
policy,
known
as
Natura
2000,
which
protects
over
25
000
nature
conservation
areas
collectively
covering
around
800
000
km2,
or
roughly
20%
of
the
total
land
area
of
the
EU.
74
In
the
case
of
Poland,
this
policy
has
a
particularly
important
bearing
on
obtaining
rights
since
land
exploitation
occurring
in
proximity
to
such
protected
sites
are
subject
to
a
mandatory
environmental
impact
assessment.
More
generally,
analysts
have
flagged
up
what
is
considered
a
greater
environmental
awareness
in
Europe
than
in
the
USA.75
73
Guarnone
et
al.,
'Unconventional
mindset'.
74
European
Commission,
'Guidance
Document:
Non-energy
mineral
extraction
and
Natura
2000',
ed.
Directorate-General
for
Environment
(Luxembourg:
Office
for
Official
Publications
of
the
European
Communities,
2010).
75
Kefferputz,
'Shale
Fever'.
119
Public
acceptance,
it
is
said,
can
be
secured
in
large
part
by
providing
adequate
financial
recompense
for
populations
affected
by
shale
gas
drilling.
Indeed,
it
is
commonly
argued
that
local
communities
in
the
USA
are
more
amenable
to
fossil
fuel
exploitation
on
their
land
given
the
financial
incentives,
and
the
long
history
of
gas
and
oil
development
in
areas
containing
shale
gas
resources.76
A
report
on
North
Americas
gas
market
by
IHS
CERA
states
that
gas
development
provides
landowners
with
royalties,
rental
payments
and
bonuses,
at
the
same
time
as
creating
jobs
from
road
building,
land
clearing
and
local
service
provisions.77
In
Europe,
however,
several
analysts
have
noted
the
limited
benefits
accrued
by
local
populations
and
the
concomitant
potential
for
considerable
opposition
to
drilling.
As
Paul
Stevens
of
Chatham
House
writes:
Large-scale
disruptions
caused
by
drilling
and
hydraulic
fracturing
are
likely
to
generate
huge
local
opposition,
especially
given
concerns
over
environmental
damage.
While
some
operations
are
beginning
to
face
increased
local
opposition
in
the
United
States,
there
is
a
financial
incentive
for
local
communities
to
suffer
the
inconveniences
because
the
resource
is
the
property
of
the
private
landowner
and
not
the
state.
In
Europe,
by
contrast,
the
state
will
reap
the
financial
rewards
of
the
resource
and
provide
no
financial
incentive
for
the
local
community.78
Another
set
of
literature
argues
that
such
claims
may
amount
to
over-simplification,
since
it
is
not
strictly
true
that
landowners
in
Europe
are
not
entitled
to
any
benefits
from
hydrocarbon
production.
According
to
a
study
by
Phillipe
&
Partners,
France
and
Sweden
grant
surface
owners
part
of
the
royalties
acquired
from
production
licences.79
Still,
this
does
not
preclude
cases
where
opposition
generates
a
political
backlash
that
makes
shale
gas
drilling
untenable
(such
as
in
the
case
of
France
and
Bulgaria).
In
the
absence
of
European
landowners
directly
reaping
the
rewards
from
sub-surface
resource
extraction,
it
is
all
the
more
necessary
to
clearly
communicate
other,
more
indirect
economic
benefits
that
can
be
potentially
accrued
by
local
communities.
In
this
context,
studies
observing
the
local
economic
impact
of
shale
gas
activities
are
an
important
source
for
considering
the
degree
of
public
acceptance
of
shale
gas
development.
The
term
economic
impact
refers
to
the
contribution
a
given
investment,
policy
or
project
(in
this
case,
shale
gas
operations)
may
make
to
the
existing
local
economy. 80
Several
studies
have
explored
this
impact
in
different
US
shales.
For
example,
a
three-part
study
led
by
Timothy
Considine
at
Pennsylvania
State
University
analysed
the
economic
impact
of
Marcellus
shale
gas
development
by
calculating
the
sum
of
the
direct,
indirect
and
induced
spending,
set
off
from
the
expenditures
by
natural
gas
producers.81
In
other
words,
the
infusion
of
money
from
the
gas
industry
to
'Unconventional
Gas',
Kefferputz,
'Shale
Fever',
Ridley,
'Shale
Gas
Shock',
Stevens,
'Hype
and
reality'.
77
Downey,
'Fueling
North
America's
future'.
78
Stevens,
'Hype
and
reality',
17.
79
Philippe
&
Partners,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe',
45.
80
Kay,
'Economic
Impact
of
Marcellus
Shale'.
81Timothy
J.
Considine
et
al.,
'An
Emerging
Giant:
Prospects
and
economic
impacts
of
developing
the
Marcellus
shale
natural
gas
play',
(Altoona,
PA:
Pennsylvania
State
University,
2009),
18.
Indirect
spending
refers
to
gas
and
oil
companies
purchase
of
goods
and
services
from
other
businesses
(e.g.
supply
chain
expenditure).
Induced
spending
derives
from
the
resulting
increase
in
household
incomes,
76
Gny,
120
the
local
economy
was
quantified
by
observing
the
provision
of
goods
and
services,
as
well
as
the
payment
of
taxes
and
royalties.
These
were
modelled
using
input-output
analysis,
a
widely-used
method
for
measuring
how
these
factors
contribute
to
other
sectors
of
the
economy.
The
study
concluded
that,
in
2008,
the
Marcellus
shale
gas
industry
generated
$2.3
billion
in
total
value
added,
more
than
29,000
jobs,
and
$240
million
in
state
and
local
taxes.82
Table
4-3
below,
summarising
the
work
of
Considine
and
his
colleagues,
shows
the
metrics
used
to
quantify
the
economic
impacts
of
shale
gas
development.
Table
4-3:
Economic
impacts
of
Marcellus
Shale
development
in
Pennsylvania,
USA,
200983
Direct
Indirect
Induced
Total
Total
(direct
/
indirect
only)
5
326
2
810
Gross output ($million) Gross value added ($million) Employment (FTE jobs) Tax impacts (state/fed/local, $million)
3 769 1 982
1 557 828
1 844 1 066
7 170 3 876
21 778
8 732
13 587
44 098 1 446
30 510
However,
economic
impact
assessments
of
hydrocarbon
extraction
often
generate
a
high
level
of
controversy,
mainly
due
to
the
numerous
assumptions
contained
therein.
Indeed,
such
assessments
rely
first
and
foremost
on
the
expected
expenditures
and
revenues
of
oil
and
gas
companies
and,
as
a
corollary,
on
likely
natural
gas
production
rates.
Assumptions
must
therefore
be
made
about
the
number
of
wells
drilled
in
a
given
surface
area
annually
over
an
extended
period
of
time
(as
shown
in
the
note
accompanying
Table
4-3
above).
These
assumptions
must
be
underpinned
by
a
relatively
clear
idea
of
the
amount
of
gas
extracted
by
a
given
well
(ideally
accompanied
by
decline
rate
analysis
and
the
approximate
cost
of
well
stimulation
techniques).
Moreover,
it
is
also
necessary
to
calculate
production
costs,
which
are
crucially
reliant
on
projections
of
future
natural
gas
prices.
These
costs
vary,
inter
alia,
according
to
the
type,
location
and
length
of
the
well
(in
addition
to
other
important
variables
such
as
technological
learning
curves,
lease
payments,
royalty/tax
rates,
price
pressures
resulting
from
heightened
demand
for
products
and
services,
and
so
on).
Finally,
the
extent
to
which
expenditure
and
revenue
is
divided
between
external
and
locally
sourced
goods
and
services
has
an
important
bearing
on
whether
positive
economic
gains
are
felt
by
the
communities
closest
to
drilling
operations.
Related
to
this,
the
which
stimulates
spending
on
local
goods
and
services.
See
also
Wood
Mackenzie,
'U.S.
Supply
Forecast
and
Potential
Jobs
and
Economic
Impacts
(2012-2030)',
(Wood
Mackenzie,
2011).
82
Considine
et
al.,
'An
Emerging
Giant'.
Although
not
within
the
scope
of
the
present
section,
there
is
an
interesting
meta-analysis
that
critically
engages
with
studies
analysing
the
economic
impact
of
shale
gas
development
see
Kay,
'Economic
Impact
of
Marcellus
Shale'.
83
Note:
based
on
710
new
wells
in
a
year
and
an
average
daily
production
rate
of
327mcf.
Considine,
Watson
and
Blumsack,
'Economic
Impacts
of
Marcellus'.
121
extent to which landowners spend their royalty payments in the local economy (an important input for calculating induced effects) can only be inferred. Only by making such assumptions is it possible to estimate the gross output, value added and employment impacts of natural gas operations in different sectors of the economy (whether in the form of direct, indirect or induced impacts). With so many variables and an inherent range of uncertainty in each, it is small wonder that the results of such studies are so frequently contested. 84 On a deeper methodological level, the input-output models processing the data are also criticised for being incapable of evaluating the implications of rapid and substantial changes in the economy.85 The neglect of boom/bust cycles associated with resource extraction is an important omission, as are the supply/demand effects that crucially inform assumptions about both the profitability and cumulative impacts of additional wells.86 There are also certain overlooked risks to longer-term development that resource extraction may bring to bear on local economies. Indeed, as Kays meta-analysis notes, although large-scale drilling would increase the wealth and income of various individuals and communities at least during parts of the Marcellus development cycle it would also bring new risks and most unavoidably, significant change. Whether natural gas development would lead to economic diversification or overspecialized dependency is an important economic development concern. Finally, there are additional caveats pertaining to the applicability of US-based economic impact assessments to Europe. As noted by a study probing the possible impact of shale gas in the UK, the scale of reserves, geography, drilling costs and royalty payments are all significantly different between the two sides of the Atlantic.87 On the last point in particular, drilling companies payments to private landowners in the USA make up the bulk of total spending, according to Considines report. 88 If these expenditures were re-directed to the national level in the form of state taxes and royalties, then the benefits to the local economy would be far less tangible. Fortunately, a recent study carried out for Cuadrilla Resources in the UK quantifies the expected impact of a single test well drilled in the region of Lancashire, based only on the sunk costs incurred by site preparation and well drilling/fracturing operations (and not assuming royalties, taxes, gas production rates or additional wells drilled). The results were presented accordingly:
84
See
Kay,
'Economic
Impact
of
Marcellus
Shale',
Thoman
Kinnaman,
'The
Economic
Impact
of
shale
gas
extraction; a review of existing studies', in Other Faculty Research and Publications (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University, 2010). 85 European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market ', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009). 86 Kay, 'Economic Impact of Marcellus Shale', 5-6. 87 Cuadrilla Resources, 'Economic Impact in Lancashire', 11. 88 Considine et al., 'An Emerging Giant', 22.
122
Table
4-4:
Disaggregation
of
single
test
well
costs
(in
thousand
pounds
sterling)89
Labour
Subsistence
Bought
in
goods
&
services
(incl.
depreciation)
Overheads
Profits
Total
Workers
&
suppliers
based
in
Lancashire
303
385
801
115
125
1
729
17%
Rest
of
UK
1
983
77
1
793
691
752
5
296
50%
Total
UK
2
285
462
2
594
806
877
7
024
33%
Overseas
TOTAL
547
51
2
102
345
376
3
422
2
833
513
4
696
1
151
1
254
10
446
As shown in Table 4-4, a single test well drilled over a 12-month period costs 10.5 million, of which roughly 17% is deployed on local workers and suppliers, with the rest split between the rest of the UK, and goods and services procured overseas.
123
unconventional gas in these areas.93 Regarding the scale of the challenge faced, the World Energy Council drew attention to the fact that only 32 of the 142 basins that contained shale worldwide had any existing infrastructure that could reduce initial capital expenditures related to the exploitation of shale gas.94 Moving beyond the mere presence of infrastructure, however, the role played by a liberalised energy market has received even greater attention in the literature. The IEA, for example, has been quick to point out that even in markets where extensive pipeline systems are already built, regulations about third party access to such infrastructure can be important as a means of minimising transport costs.95 Much of the discussion is driven by the fact that, whereas the US natural gas market is liberalised, the market liberalisation process in Europe is still ongoing. A number of notable reports thus contrast the fully deregulated US market with the European market a market that they judge to be still dominated by few players.96 These reports add that certain European countries still maintain restrictions on third-party access, 97 and that transmission pipelines in Europe are still not independent but are affiliates of major national producers. 98 By this view, such factors introduce an added degree of uncertainty to unconventional gas production in Europe.
23. 94 WEC, 'Survey of Energy Resources', 3-4. 95 IEA, 'Golden age', 47. 96 Stevens, 'Hype and reality', 17. 97 However, this will be required to change as the EU 3rd Package of gas regulations becomes law in early 2011. Gny, 'Unconventional Gas', 39. 98 Kuhn and Umbach, 'Strategic Perspectives', 37. See also Farid Gasmi and Juan Daniel Oviedo, 'Investment in transport infrastructure, regulation, and gas-gas competition', Energy Economics 32 (2010). 99 James T. Jensen, 'The LNG Revolution', Energy Journal 24, no 2 (2003): 4.
124
example. Competition in the market is encouraged and the greater variety of companies can help the market to react to outside shocks more smoothly and flexibly. Additionally, unbundling results in efficiency gains and consumer savings by removing regulatory haze, excess capacity and central planning.100 The neoclassical assumptions outlined above are often referred to as the structure- conduct-performance paradigm: The structure of markets is considered a crucial driver for the conduct of firms and the eventual economic performance.101 After the adoption of the Single European Market objective in 1985, this paradigm became the point of departure for the European Commission, which used it as an instrument to tackle the prevailing intra-communal barriers to trade.102 When applied to the natural gas market, the paradigm implies that the main objectives for the regulator are: 1) full unbundling and maximum entry in the potentially competitive segments of the value chain; and 2) market liquidity and effective access and performance regulation in the natural monopoly segments of the value chain.103 In fact, whilst the structure-conduct-performance paradigm presents a parsimonious blueprint for regulators, theorists influenced by the new institutional economics school of thought104 have questioned the assumption that integration in the utilities sector should always be prevented or removed. These theorists highlight that vertical integration and contracting structures may lead to greater economic efficiency because they help to offset the uncertainty and risk involved in the large up-front payments necessary in natural gas infrastructure investment. Liberalised markets may increase the cost of capital and reduce investment if the size of firms in the market falls, or if regulatory risk is increased due to increased (and inefficient) regulatory oversight of investment decisions.105 At the heart of the issue lies the concept of transaction costs, which are not explicitly considered in neoclassical economics. These include the direct costs of writing, monitoring and enforcing contracts, plus the costs associated with the risk of ex ante investments having an ex post performance that is lower than anticipated as a result of contractual hazards and other uncertainties.106 When one considers that investments in gas markets along the entire value chain are often very large and predominantly
100
P.
Joskow
and
J.
Tirole,
'Transmission
rights
and
market
power
on
electric
power
networks',
RAND
Journal
of
Economics
31,
no
3
(2000).
Bain,
Barriers
to
New
Competition:
Their
Character
and
Consequences
in
Manufacturing
Industries
(Cambridge,
Massachusetts:
Harvard
University
Press,
1956).
102
Janne
Haaland
Matlry,
Energy
policy
in
the
European
Union
(Basingstoke:
Palgrave
Macmillan
1997).
103
Aad
Correlje
and
John
Groenewegen,
'The
Gas
market,
transaction
costs
and
efficient
regulation
',
in
Conference
on
Applied
Infrastructure
Research
(Berlin:
Workgroup
for
Infrastructure
Policy
at
Berlin
University
of
Technology,
2006),
1-2,
6;
Dieter
Helm,
'The
Assessment:
The
New
Energy
Paradigm',
Oxford
Review
of
Economic
Policy
21,
no
1
(2005).
104
Or
transaction
cost
economics.
See
O.
E.
Williamson,
The
Economic
Institutions
of
Capitalism
(New
York:
The
Free
Press,
1985).
105
Correlje
and
Groenewegen,
'The
Gas
market,
transaction
costs
and
efficient
regulation
'.
106
Ibid.
101
J.
125
irreversible (sunk), then it becomes easy to see how potential transaction costs can play a central role in deciding the economic viability of a gas project.107 To illustrate, take the following example, sometimes referred to as the investment hold- up problem. Prior to investing in a gas pipeline, the investor has a relatively strong bargaining position because the consumer depends on him for undertaking the investment. Once laid, however, the pipeline has very limited, if any, alternative use. This ties the investor to the market for the foreseeable future, shifting the bargaining power to the consumer. The consumer can now adapt his policy to increase his own (or his societys) rents at the expense of the investors. This may be done through renegotiation, by determining lower prices, or by freely permitting entry to the infrastructure. Investors therefore demand that future customers commit to paying the sunk costs which they, the investors, provide up-front. Without such assurances against so-called regulatory risk, the decision to build a pipeline could never be made.108 Viewed in this light, the task for regulators is to establish a workable balance between maintaining the pressure for a dynamically competitive market (neoclassical theory) and providing a sufficient degree of stability and coordination to facilitate investments in the system (new institutional economics). 109 The question for potential unconventional gas in Europe is not just whether the market is sufficiently liberalised, but also whether regulators are able to find a form of governance that allows both traditional suppliers and market entrants to minimise transaction costs and their exposure to ex post risks.
Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-up Problem', in DIW Berlin Discussion Papers, ed. European Investment Bank (Berlin: Deutsches Institut fr Wirtschaftsforschung, 2008). 108 Aldo Spanjer, 'Regulatory intervention on the dynamic European gas market - neoclassical economics or transaction cost economics? ', Energy Policy 37 (2009): 3252. 109 Correlje and Groenewegen, 'The Gas market, transaction costs and efficient regulation '.
126
decades.
The
first
steps
took
place
in
1978
with
the
passage
of
the
Natural
Gas
Policy
Act
under
the
initiative
of
the
US
Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission
(FERC).
This
removed
wellhead
ceiling
prices,
which
were
later
deregulated
altogether
with
the
Natural
Gas
Wellhead
Decontrol
Act
(1989).
In
1984,
FERC
Order
380
released
local
distribution
companies
(LDCs)
from
long-term
take-or-pay
contracts,
marking
the
beginning
of
the
liberalisation
of
the
gas
transportation
market.
Known
as
the
Open
Access
Order,
FERC
Order
436
in
the
very
next
year
established
a
voluntary
framework
for
non-discriminatory
third-party
access
to
gas
transmission
pipelines
a
scheme
that
all
major
pipeline
systems
eventually
participated
in.
And
in
1992,
FERC
Order
636
made
the
fundamental
vertical
unbundling
of
transportation
and
sales
activities
compulsory,
additionally
obliging
pipeline
companies
to
publish
information
about
the
availability
of
services
and
to
expand
access
to
interstate
storage
capacity.110
Table
4-5:
Major
legislation
for
the
US
gas
industry
by
Congress,
FERC
and
court
rulings111
Date
1954
1978
Legislation
Court:
Phillips
decision
US
Congress
Natural
Gas
Policy
Act
Principal
objective
Federal
Power
Commission
must
enforce
wellhead
price
control
and
use
authority
to
regulate
E&P
industry
Provide
for
gradual
phase-out
of
producer
rate
regulation
and
incremental
pricing
guidelines
for
industrial
gas
sales;
led
to
upscaling
of
cogeneration
of
electricity
in
major
industrial
heat
producers
in
conjunction
with
Public
Utility
Regulatory
Policies
Act
FERC
order
436
Third-party
access
to
gas
transmission
pipelines
encouraged,
activate
discounts
for
shippers
and
producers
FERC
order
500
Open
access
to
gas
transmission
pipelines
further
regulated
and
shift
cost
of
long-term
obligations
to
producers
and
shippers
in
case
of
no
take-up
of
gas
volumes
FERC
order
497
Separate
operating
employees
of
interstate
natural
gas
pipelines
from
their
marketing
affiliates
to
function
independently
of
each
other
US
Congress
Natural
Complete
deregulation
of
wellhead
gas
prices
Gas
Wellhead
Decontrol
Act
US
Congress
Energy
Reduce
US
dependence
on
foreign
oil
(federal
bodies
should
use
Policy
Act
natural
gas
engines
and
utilities)
and
provide
funding
for
research
to
recover
more
natural
gas
from
conventional
and
unconventional
resources
FERC
order
636
Mandate
full
third-party
access
to
gas
transmission
pipelines
FERC
order
889
Enforce
employees
of
the
transmission
providers
engaged
in
transmission
system
operations
to
function
independently
of
marketing
employees
FERC
order
637
Provide
full
transparency
about
tariffs
and
capacity
via
Open
Access
Same-time
Online
Information
Platform;
daily
auctions
FERC
order
2004
Corporate
separation
of
marketing
and
title
transfer
services
to
shippers
and
gas
transmission
services,
overruled
by
landmark
court
ruling
in
2006
and
CFR
18
revision
in
2008
US
Congress
Energy
FERC
obtained
Penal
Authority
to
penalise
companies
that
do
not
Policy
Act
abide
with
FERC
Code
of
Conduct
and
Regulation
Orders
Aranoa
and
B.F.
Blair,
'An
ex-post
welfare
analysis
of
natural
gas
regulation
in
the
industrial
sector',
Energy
Economics
30,
no
3
(2008),
Christian
von
Hirschhausen,
'Infrastructure,
regulation,
investment
and
security
of
supply:
A
case
study
of
the
restructured
US
natural
gas
market
',
Utilities
Policy
16,
no
1
(2008).
111
Sources:
EIA,
Key
FERC
Orders,
1984-2008
(2009,
cited
03
May
2012);
Ruud
Weijermars,
'Value
chain
analysis
of
the
natural
gas
industry:
Lessons
from
the
US
regulatory
success
and
opportunities
for
Europe',
Journal
of
Natural
Gas
Science
and
Engineering
2,
no
2-3
(2010).
110
K.G.
127
Date
2006
Legislation
Court
ruling
in
National
Fuel
Gas
Supply
Corporation
versus
FERC
FERC
order
712
Principal
objective
Court
rejects
the
treatment
of
Energy
Affiliates
in
FERC
order
2004,
implying
FERCs
corporate
separation
between
energy
and
marketing
affiliates
is
not
required
so
long
as
functional
no-conduit
rule
is
fulfilled
More
efficient
pipeline
capacity
release
standards
2008
Revision CFR 18 part Revision of Orders 497, 889 and 2004 based on 2006 Court ruling to 358 allow integrated planning and competitive solicitation of and transmission capacity; limited to a strict functional separation of transmission function employees and marketing function employees
The
restructuring
of
the
US
gas
market
has
had
a
substantial
impact.
End
users
now
have
a
number
of
options
to
source
their
natural
gas.
They
are
able
to
choose
the
best
purchase
and
transportation
arrangements
from
the
wellhead
to
the
pipeline.
Alternatively,
they
may
choose
to
turn
to
the
LDC
for
a
bundled
product
and
leave
the
arrangements
for
sourcing
and
interstate
transportation
of
the
gas
to
the
LDC.
The
number
of
gas
marketers
(companies
that
coordinate
the
business
of
bringing
natural
gas
from
the
wellhead
to
end-users)
jumped
from
50
in
1986
to
some
260
in
the
1990s.
The
number
of
market
centres,
or
hubs,
have
also
increased,
as
has
the
size
of
the
financial
market,
which
helps
to
ensure
supply
security
through
contracts
that
hedge
against
price
changes.112
Not
all
of
the
effects
of
the
new
regime
have
been
positive.
For
example,
price
spikes
in
California
over
the
summer
of
2000
brought
charges
of
market
abuse
and
raised
broader
questions
about
both
the
effectiveness
of
competitive
pressures
in
increasing
the
economic
efficiency
of
the
gas
market
as
well
as
how
successfully
the
US
pipeline
system
can
support
arbitrage.113
In
spite
of
certain
localised
and
transient
occurrences
however,
the
general
consensus
is
that
the
new
regime
has
been
successful
in
facilitating
competition
in
the
US
gas
market
and
this
has
been
a
major
improvement
on
the
previous
system
of
vertically
integrated
utilities.
Comparable
fuel
purchases
became
much
less
expensive
halved,
in
some
cases
and
artificial
inefficiencies
were
reduced
in
the
gas
supply
chain.114
A
liberalised
and
competitive
market
thus
formed
an
important
part
of
the
regulatory
backdrop
to
the
unconventional
gas
revolution
in
the
USA.
But
the
brief
theoretical
review
presented
earlier
in
this
chapter
then
raises
another
question:
whether
the
increased
regulatory
risk
in
this
liberalised
market
has
prevented
infrastructure
investment
a
question
more
significant
for
unconventional
gas
developments
because
of
their
narrower
profit
margins.
In
the
USA,
most
shale
gas
is
either
proximal
to
the
intended
market,
as
in
the
case
of
the
Marcellus,
or
close
to
major
pipelines,
as
in
the
case
of
the
Barnett,
Haynesville
and
Woodford.
Nevertheless,
significant
shale
reserves
lie
outside
the
existing
US
pipeline
112
Weijermars,
'Value
chain
analysis'.
Hirschhausen,
'Infrastructure,
regulation,
investment
and
security
of supply'. 113 P. Joskow and Edward Kahn, 'A quantitative analysis of pricing behavior in California's wholesale electricity market during summer 2000', The Energy Journal 23, no 4 (2002). 114 IEA, 'USA Review', in Energy Policies of IEA Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2002): Tooraj Jamasb et al., 'International benchmarking and regulation of European gas transmission utilities. Report prepared for the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)', (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Electricity Policy Research Group, 2006).
128
grid
and
require
capital
investment
to
build
the
infrastructure
necessary
to
utilise
the
gas.
In
2009,
the
Interstate
Natural
Gas
Association
of
America
estimated
that
$133-210
billion
would
need
to
be
invested
during
the
following
20
years
to
process
the
gas
coming
from
shale
and
other
tight
gas
formations.115
Figure
4-10:
US
natural
gas
pipeline
capacity
additions
versus
marketed
gas
production116
Figure
4-10
above
presents
new
US
gas
pipeline
additions
and
annual
marketed
gas
production
for
the
period
1999
to
2010.
It
can
be
seen
that
whilst
both
measures
appear
either
stagnant
or
in
slight
decline
in
the
years
between
1999
and
2005,
the
period
between
2005
and
2010
is
marked
by
a
significant
increase
in
marketed
gas
production
a
trend
known
to
be
underpinned
by
greater
unconventional
production
and
an
even
more
striking
jump
in
additional
pipeline
capacity.
According
to
the
EIA,
2008
was
the
most
active
year
for
US
natural
gas
pipeline
construction
in
more
than
a
decade.
Eighty- four
projects
and
close
to
6
500
kilometres
of
pipeline
were
added.
Much
of
the
construction
was
driven
by
unconventional
supply
growth,
particularly
in
northeast
Texas,
which
saw
13
new
pipelines
related
to
the
development
of
gas
supplies
from
the
Barnett,
Woodford
or
Fayetteville
shale
formations.117
Pipeline
construction
activity
in
2009
was
also
considerable,
albeit
well
below
the
exceptionally
high
pace
of
additions
in
2008.
At
least
43
natural
gas
pipeline
projects
were
completed
in
2009
in
the
lower
48
states,
adding
close
to
4
800
kilometres
of
pipeline
to
the
natural
gas
grid
and
representing
an
investment
of
about
$9.9
billion.
115
INGAA
Foundation
and
ICF
International,
'Natural
Gas
Pipeline
and
Storage
Infrastructure
Projections
Through
2030
',
(Washington
DC:
Interstate
Natural
Gas
Association
of
America
Foundation
2009).
116
Source:
Energy
Information
Administration,
GasTran
Natural
Gas
Transportation
Information
System,
Natural Gas Pipeline Projects Database. Cited in California Energy Commission, 'Current Trends: Natural Gas Infrastructure', in Staff Workshop: 2011 Integrated Energy Policy Report (2011). 117 Andrews et al., 'Unconventional Gas Shales', 6.
129
Figure
4-11
below
shows
three
projects
of
particular
interest
that
illustrate
how
increased
unconventional
gas
production
has
impacted
regional
patterns
in
pipeline
utilisation.
Figure
4-11:
Significant
pipeline
expansions
in
the
USA
in
2009118
Both
the
Midcontinent
Express
and
Texas
Independence
pipelines
allow
greater
deliverability
from
the
Barnett
Shale
to
regional
markets. 119
However,
the
longest
natural
gas
pipeline
project
completed
in
2009
was
the
1
000-kilometre
Rockies
Express-East
pipeline.
This
marked
the
end
of
the
construction
of
a
2
700-kilometre,
$5
billion
pipeline
system
stretching
from
Colorado
to
Ohio.
Natural
gas
resources
within
the
Rockies
are
found
primarily
in
unconventional
formations, 120
and
the
pipeline
demonstrates
that
a
combination
of
shale
gas,
CBM
and
tight
gas
development
has
also
driven
very
significant
infrastructure
projects
in
the
USA.
For
the
near
future
at
least,
unconventional
gas
looks
set
to
continue
to
transform
the
US
transmission
network.
Table
4-8
below
shows
a
list
of
pipelines
set
to
come
into
service
between
2011
and
2014
with
the
express
purpose
of
bringing
shale
gas
to
market.
Whilst
the
majority
of
such
pipeline
developments
in
previous
years
centred
on
the
Barnett
Shale
in
northeast
Texas,
most
of
the
projects
in
the
immediate
time-horizon
will
service
the
Marcellus
Shale
and
are
located
in
the
states
of
Pennsylvania,
West
Virginia
and
New
York.
Source:
EIA,
'Natural
Gas
Year-In-Review
2009',
(Washington,
DC:
US
Energy
Information
Administration,
2010).
119
Ibid.
120
Tight
gas
sands
are
widely
distributed
in
the
Green
River
Basin
of
south-western
Wyoming
and
the
Piceance
Basin
of
north-western
Colorado.
The
Rocky
Mountain
region
is
also
the
location
of
two
of
the
most
prolific
coal-bed
methane
basins
in
the
world:
the
San
Juan
Basin
in
south-western
Colorado
and
north-western
New
Mexico,
and
the
Powder
River
Basin
in
eastern
Wyoming.
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
'An
Assessment
of
the
Environmental
Implications
of
Oil
and
Gas
Production:
A
Regional
Case
Study
',
(Washington
DC:
Environmental
Protection
Agency,
2008),
2-5.
118
130
Table
4-6:
US
shale
gas
pipeline
projects
in
the
near
future121
Name
Status
Expected
service
date
2014
2012
2012
2011
2011
Value
($million)
500
272
635
46.76
NA
Distance
(km)
106
80
177
26
161
Add.
capacity
(Mcm/d)
5.67
8.88
13.71
9.91
28.3
Route
Iroquois NYMarc Announced Project Sunrise Project Completed Appalachian Construction Gateway Project Tioga County Construction Extension Project Barnett Intrastate Announced Gas Pipeline Project
NJ NY PA WV WV PA PA NY TX TX
to to to to to
Across
the
border
in
Canada,
there
is
also
evidence
that
unconventional
gas
production
is
changing
gas
trade
flows
and
driving
new
infrastructure
investment.
The
Canadian
and
US
natural
gas
markets
operate
as
a
single
integrated
market
and
have
a
number
of
similarities.
For
example,
the
Canadian
natural
gas
market
has
a
highly
liberalised
structure
as
a
result
of
far-reaching
regulatory
reforms
that
began
in
1985.122
Canada
has
relatively
well-developed
pre-existing
pipeline
infrastructure
that
has
been
built
around
historical
conventional
production.
And
finally,
Canada
has
experienced
a
significant
increase
in
unconventional
gas
production
in
the
last
decade.123
Canadian
tight
and
shale
gas
developments
are
primarily
focused
on
the
Montney
and
Horn
River
Basin
plays
in
northeast
British
Columbia.
Whilst
the
transmission
infrastructure
in
British
Columbia
as
a
whole
has
benefitted
from
decades
of
conventional
gas
production,
Canadas
National
Energy
Board
forecasts
that
a
slew
of
modest
expansions
will
be
necessary
to
connect
new
unconventional
supplies
to
the
substantial
existing
long-haul
capacity
that
brings
gas
to
the
major
consuming
regions
of
eastern
Canada
and
beyond.124
Projects
in
this
vein
include
the
Groundbirch
(recently
completed)
and
Horn
River
Mainline
pipelines
(planned)
that
connect
supplies
in
the
Horn
River
Basin
to
the
Alberta
system.
More
significantly,
the
ambitious
Pacific
Trail
Pipeline
project
will
move
gas
from
northeast
British
Columbia
to
the
planned
Kitimat
LNG
terminal
for
export
to
premium
markets
in
Asia
when
the
two
are
completed
in
2014.
So
what
does
the
North
American
experience
tell
us
about
the
role
that
market
access
plays
in
unconventional
gas
development?
Due
to
the
fact
that
large-scale
shale
gas
production
has
so
far
not
been
observed
outside
of
liberalised
energy
markets,
questions
remain
about
whether
the
phenomenon
can
be
replicated
in
differently
structured
markets
and,
if
so,
how
this
might
look.
What
this
section
does
show,
121
Source:
US
Energy
Information
Agency.
Information
as
of
December
2011.
122
A.
Serletis and R. Rangel-Ruiz, 'Testing for common features in North American energy markets', Energy Economics 26 (2004), P. I. Wilson, 'Deregulation and natural gas trade relationships: lessons from the Alberta-California experience ', Energy Policy 25 (1997). 123 Tight and shale gas production accounted for 36% (34% from tight, 2% from shale) of total domestic gas production in 2010, up from 18% in 2000. National Energy Board, 'Canadian Energy Overview 2010', (Ottawa: National Energy Board, 2011). 124 National Energy Board, 'Canadas Energy Future: Infrastructure Changes and Challenges to 2020', (Ottawa: National Energy Board, 2009).
131
however, is that an institutional framework can be found to enable investment in major unconventional gas infrastructure projects in even the most highly liberalised markets. This is in spite of the narrower profit margins and greater uncertainty commonly ascribed to unconventional gas production.125 In this regard, tax incentives and loan guarantees, such as those offered under the US Energy Policy Act (2005) and British Columbias Infrastructure Royalty Credit Program, may play a key role in ensuring an acceptable rate of return for investors in such projects.
125
This
echoes the empirical analysis of investment trends in US LNG revealing that infrastructure investment is forthcoming during favourable economic conditions, and that after the 1992 implementation of Order 636, the natural gas pipeline system underwent an investment boom. Hirschhausen, 'Infrastructure, regulation, investment and security of supply'. 126 Michael Pollitt, 'The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks', Energy Policy 36, no 2 (2008 ).
132
Figure
4-12:
The
US
natural
gas
transmission
network127
127
Source:
EIA,
Office
of
Oil
and
Gas,
Natural
Gas
Division,
Gas
Transportation
Information
System.
133
Figure
4-13:
The
EUs
natural
gas
transmission
network128
128
Source:
European
Commission,
Platts,
IHS.
134
Figure
4-12
and
Figure
4-13
show
the
transmission
pipeline
infrastructure
in
the
USA
and
Europe
respectively.
The
USA
was
the
first
country
to
develop
its
natural
gas
resources
and
has
what
can
be
considered
a
well-developed
transmission
network.
According
to
the
EIA,
there
were
an
estimated
490
000
kilometres
of
interstate
and
intrastate
transmission
pipeline
in
the
USA
at
the
close
of
2008
over
53
km
of
transmission
pipeline
for
every
1
000
km2
of
land.129
Although
there
are
significant
differences
between
individual
Member
States
(see
Table
4-7),
the
equivalent
statistic
for
the
EU
is
comparable
roughly
29
km
of
transmission
pipeline
per
1
000km2.130
Table
4-7:
Gas
transmission
grid
density
by
country131
Gas
grid
(km)
/area
(1
000km2)
United
States
Italy
Sweden
United
Kingdom
45
Total
EU
aggregated
29
53
110
Although
these
figures
suggest
that
the
US
and
EU
gas
transportation
systems
are
analogous,132
readers
should
be
aware
of
several
factors
that
complicate
the
direct
comparison
of
the
two
markets
on
simple
pipeline
density
terms.
First,
whilst
pipeline
age
and
efficiency
can
be
considered
to
be
alike,
differences
in
both
the
geographical
distribution
of
pipelines
in
relation
to
unconventional
plays
and
their
current
levels
of
utilisation
need
to
be
taken
into
account.133
Secondly,
differences
in
patterns
of
pipeline
development
also
need
to
be
factored
in.
For
example,
the
USA
is
both
a
major
producer
and
consumer
of
gas
and
the
dense
transmission
infrastructure
in
states
such
as
Texas
and
offshore
in
the
Gulf
of
Mexico
are
a
legacy
of
many
years
of
hydrocarbon
development.
Being
primarily
a
consumer
of
natural
gas,
Europe
does
not
have
regions
that
are
as
tightly
networked
and
this
may
have
the
effect
of
lowering
the
aggregated
length
of
pipelines
per
km2.
Finally,
the
possibility
that
unconventional
gas
supplies
can
be
produced
close
to
markets
may
lessen
reliance
on
transmission
pipelines
altogether.
In
government
testimony,
Shell
has
stated
that
successful
shale
gas
development
in
Europe
is
likely
to
first
meet
local
market
demand,
thus
potentially
freeing
up
supply
to
other
parts
of
Europe.134
In
the
USA,
Pennsylvania-based
UGI
Utilities
is
investigating
the
possibility
of
adding
consumer
value
by
selling
locally
produced
Marcellus
shale
gas
directly
through
their
distribution
system
a
sort
of
shale
gas
micro-grid.135
Whilst
this
is
an
exceptional
case,
it
illustrates
how
widely
distributed
unconventional
gas
resources
may
challenge
traditional
assumptions
about
the
role
infrastructure
plays
in
resource
development.
About
U.S.
Natural
Gas
Pipelines
-
Transporting
Natural
Gas
(2011,
cited
12
December
2011);
available
from
http://205.254.135.7/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/index.html
130
Source:
European
Commission,
Platts,
IHS.
131
Sources:
EIA,
Natural
Gas
Pipelines
(cited),
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
187.
132
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas',
46.
133
In
the
US,
a
huge
number
of
pipeline
debottlenecking
projects
have
been
necessary
to
sustain
shale
gas
production
growth,
despite
the
fact
that
the
main
producing
regions
(e.g.
Texas,
Rockies,
Oklahoma)
are
in
the
vicinity
of
dense
pipeline
networks.
Ibid.,
98.
134
Memorandum
submitted
by
Shell,
in
House
of
Commons,
'Shale
Gas:
Fifth
Report
of
Session
2010-12'.
135
David
Falcheck,
'UGI
links
shale
gas
to
system:
Utility
celebrates
first
Marcellus
connection',
Scranton
Times-Tribune
2011.
129
EIA,
135
If the EU shares certain broad similarities with the USA in terms of the development of its energy infrastructure, then energy market structure similarities are less apparent. This is because the USA has a fully liberalised market for natural gas but reforms to the EUs internal gas market are still ongoing. The liberalisation of gas markets in Europe began in the UK with the 1982 Oil and Gas Act, designed to bring competition to the transmission and distribution of natural gas. In 1986, the UK market was opened for non-domestic customers and British Gas the largest integrated gas utility company in the world at the time was privatised. Dramatic changes continued with the 1995 Gas Act, which laid the groundwork for the introduction of full retail competition by creating licensing schemes for companies to engage in the transport and supply of gas. Then in 1996 the Network Code was introduced a legal document that set the rules for system balancing, capacity acquisition and trading, and gas transportation and trading in the pipeline system.136 The UK experience demonstrated that it was possible to move from a monopoly to a competitive environment in natural gas without structural reforms in an EU Member State.137 The EU began the liberalisation of the European natural gas sector at the supra-national level in 1998 with the adoption of what has become known as the First Gas Directive.138 This sought to break monopolies and create an open and competitive market by requiring that integrated companies unbundle their internal accounts and not abuse commercially sensitive information. It also mandated that network operators provide third-party access to their infrastructure and that Member States gradually introduce market opening. The legislation aspired to bring choice to consumers, accessibility for all suppliers and improvement to security of supply through diversity. Several subsequent legal acts introduced in Table 4-8 below and covered in more detail in Annex G have progressively built upon the objectives of the First Gas Directive, albeit with varied success. The most recent Third Internal Market Package took direct effect on 3 March 2011.139
136
lvaro
Carteaa
and
Thomas
Williams,
'UK
Gas
Markets:
the
Market
Price
of
Risk
and
Applications
to
137
Andrej
Juris,
'Market
Development
in
the
United
Kingdom's
Natural
Gas
Industry',
(Washington
DC:
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas ', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998). 139 European Union, 'Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (Text with EEA relevance)', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009); European Union, 'Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (Text with EEA relevance)', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009); European Union, 'Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 (Text with EEA relevance)', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009).
136
Table
4-8:
Major
regulations
for
the
EU
internal
gas
market140
Date
August
1998
June
2003
2004
March
2005
Oct
2007
Nov
2008
April
2009
EU
Directives
and
Acts
98/30/EC
First
Gas
Directive
Regulation
for
an
internal
natural
gas
market
2003/55/EC
Second
Amended
Gas
Directive
acceleration
directive
First
Strategic
Review
European
Gas
Regulatory
Forum
EU
Commission
Report
An
Energy
Policy
for
Europe
Second
Strategic
Energy
Review
Third
Legislative
Energy
and
Gas
Package
Principal
objective
Guarantee
TPA
to
improve
competitiveness
and
improve
security
of
supply.
Encourage legal unbundling of transmission system operators from gas trading companies on a voluntary basis. Deregulate gas markets by July 2004 and have full TPA by July 2007, including TPA for storage systems. Energy Directions on security of supply. Guidelines on services and rules for TPA compiled by the Forum Diverging views within EU; France and Germany favour independent TSOs as in the Netherlands since July 2005. Securing an energy future. Creation of ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) and ENTSO (European Network of Transmission System Operators).
It
is
too
early
to
tell
what
the
long-term
effects
of
the
Third
Package
will
be.
On
the
one
hand,
there
have
been
encouraging
recent
developments
indicating
that
liberalisation
is
gathering
pace.
A
wave
of
corporate
mergers
and
demergers
was
occasioned
by
the
reforms,
heralding
a
change
in
the
industrial
organisation
model
in
the
European
utility
sector
from
single
product
national/regional
companies
towards
a
multi-energy
pan- European
model.141
On
the
regulatory
front,
signs
of
market
integration
have
been
observed,
along
with
price
decreases
in
Member
States
that
have
diversified
supply.
Traded
volumes
on
the
three
most
liquid
gas
spot
markets
rose
by
4.45%
to
reach
1
455
terawatt
hours
(TWh)
in
2009.142
And,
in
combination
with
the
arbitrage
possibilities
created
by
the
increasingly
dense
pipeline
structure 143 ,
the
market
liberalisation
process
in
Europe
is
being
credited
by
some
observers
for
the
growth
in
pressure
from
EU
consumers
to
revise
long-term
oil-indexed
gas
contracts
towards
market-based
pricing
(see
Section
5.2.4). 144
With
any
substantial
European
unconventional
gas
production
not
expected
before
the
end
of
this
decade,
some
analysts
are
hopeful
that
the
liberalisation
process
will
have
made
significant
progress
by
then.145
On
the
other
hand,
market
concentration
remains
high,
changes
observed
in
interregional
connectivity
have
only
been
modest
and
the
switching
rate
continues
to
remain
low
in
most
Member
States.
For
these
reasons,
the
latest
Commission
report
on
140
Weijermars,
'Value
chain
analysis'.
(Oxford:
Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies,
2011),
20.
Commission,
'Commission
Staff
Working
Document:
2009-2010
Report
on
progress
in
creating
the
internal
gas
and
electricity
market',
ed.
Directorate-General
for
Energy
(2011).
143
By
2013,
pipeline
interconnections
will
allow
LNG
arriving
in
Greece
to
be
delivered
to
a
range
of
south
and
central
European
countries
as
far
north
as
Austria;
or
vice-versa
for
gas
to
be
delivered
from
the
central
European
Gas
Hub
to
Greece.
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
16.
144
Miharu
Kanai,
'Decoupling
the
Oil
and
Gas
Prices:
Natural
Gas
Pricing
in
the
Post-Financial
Crisis
Market
',
(Paris,
Brussels:
Institut
franais
des
relations
internationales
2011).
145
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas',
84,
98.
142
European
141 Jonathan Stern and Howard Rogers, 'The Transition to Hub-Based Gas Pricing in Continental Europe ',
137
market progress concedes: a truly single energy market is far from complete.146 Questions thus remain as to whether the EUs internal market rules can be practically applied in the context of possible unconventional gas sources to be clear; non- discriminatory, timely and repeatable across large operations. Moreover, there is an important factor which may make the European transition more complicated than historical precedents suggest. In the words of one notable commentator: in both North America and the UK, the vast majority of the parties involved in the market reform process were under the same political and legal jurisdiction (or in the case of the United States and Canada, similar jurisdictions). In the case of Continental Europe, not only are there a large number of importing companies with differing legal systems, but their suppliers in particular Russia and Algeria, but not forgetting a large number of LNG exporting countries operate under fundamentally different legal/regulatory frameworks.147 Turning the question on its head, at least two observers have suggested that indigenous unconventional gas production may facilitate the creation of a genuine single market for gas across the EU by allowing new players to challenge incumbent firms in regions where gas-to-gas competition may not otherwise be observed.148 The economic theory of contestable markets states that market power, such as monopoly, can be controlled if there is a genuine possibility of entry by new suppliers. Actual entry of competing suppliers is not necessary, simply the threat that the market might be contestable is sufficient to stimulate behaviour associated with a competitive market.149 In this light, if there are real prospects of significant gas supplies from domestic shale sources, this could have a very powerful influence on the behaviour of Europes current external gas suppliers forcing them to lower prices in order to maintain market share.150 For a continuation of this point, see Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4.
138
produced commodity or service.151 As such, reliable access to affordable energy is an important national security concern. In spite of its crucial importance, energy security lacks both a common definition and a methodology for its evaluation. Although its meaning varies between different countries and organisations, in general it may be used to signify some of the following: Reliability of supply; Self-sufficiency; Security of infrastructure; Stability and diversity of suppliers; Reduced consumption through energy efficiency; Diversity of energy carriers; and increasingly Environmental sustainability.152
In
the
UNs
World
Energy
Assessment,
energy
security
is
described
as
the
continuous
availability
of
energy
in
varied
forms,
in
sufficient
quantities,
and
at
reasonable
prices.153
In
2003,
the
UK
Department
of
Trade
and
Industry
(now
the
Department
for
Business,
Innovation
and
Skills)
reduced
the
problem
of
ensuring
energy
security
to
one
of
ensuring
reliable
supplies
of
energy
at
predictable
prices
delivered
through
the
market.154
The
International
Energy
Agency
described
it
as
the
uninterrupted
physical
availability
at
a
price
which
is
affordable,
while
respecting
environmental
concerns.155
And,
finally,
the
European
Commission
refers
to
the
uninterrupted
physical
availability
of
energy
products
on
the
market
at
an
affordable
price
for
all
consumers,
whilst
respecting
environmental
concerns
and
looking
towards
sustainable
development.156
Each
of
the
aforementioned
definitions
of
energy
security
carries
a
good
measure
of
commonsense
value.
However,
energy
security
is
a
multi-faceted
concept.
The
following
pages
will
further
unpack
the
concept
with
specific
reference
to
certain
key
elements
of
the
European
Commissions
definition,
provided
above.
In
particular,
the
phrases
for
all
consumers;
uninterrupted
physical
availability;
on
the
market
at
an
affordable
price;
and
respecting
environmental
concerns
will
be
explored
in
order
to
clarify
a
handful
of
important,
but
problematic,
issues
surrounding
energy
security.
As
one
notable
commentator
remarks:
scholarly
understanding
of
the
challenges
at
the
intersection
of
energy
and
national
security,
and
of
the
various
policy
tools
available
to
151
Christof
Rhl,
'Global
Energy
After
the
Crisis:
Prospects
and
Priorities',
Foreign
Affairs
March/April
(2010).
from
Estonian
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
Energy
Security
(2011,
cited
4
January
2011);
available
from
http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/4116
153
United
Nations
Development
Programme,
'World
Energy
Assessment',
(New
York:
UNDP,
2000),
113.
154
UK
Department
of
Trade
and
Industry,
'Our
energy
future
-
creating
a
low
carbon
economy',
(London:
2003),
73.
155
IEA,
Energy
Security
(2012,
cited
4
January
2011).
156
European
Commission,
'Towards
a
European
strategy
for
the
security
of
energy
supply'.
152
Adapted
139
address
them,
is
surprisingly
weak.157
One
of
the
reasons
for
this
is
that
the
concept
of
energy
security
is
inherently
value-laden.
That
is
to
say,
energy
security
means
different
things
to
different
people.
As
Daniel
Yergin
writes:
Energy-exporting
countries
focus
on
maintaining
the
security
of
demand
for
their
exports,
which
after
all
generate
the
overwhelming
share
of
their
government
revenues.
For
Russia,
the
aim
is
to
reassert
state
control
over
strategic
resources
and
gain
primacy
over
the
main
pipelines
and
market
channels
through
which
it
ships
its
hydrocarbons
to
international
markets.
The
concern
for
developing
countries
is
how
changes
in
energy
prices
affect
their
balance
of
payments.
For
China
and
India,
energy
security
now
lies
in
their
ability
to
rapidly
adjust
to
their
new
dependence
on
global
markets,
which
represents
a
major
shift
away
from
their
former
commitments
to
self-sufficiency.
For
Japan,
it
means
offsetting
its
stark
scarcity
of
domestic
resources
through
diversification,
trade,
and
investment.158
The
European
Commissions
definition
of
energy
security
speaks
of
providing
a
supply
of
energy
products
for
all
consumers.
This
highlights
the
fact
that
energy
security
in
a
European
context
usually
refers
to
the
consumer-centric
notion
of
security
of
supply.
But
even
security
of
supply
is
itself
context
dependent.
The
level
of
risk
to
a
country
is
a
function
of
the
flexibility
of
its
energy
system
and
its
economy
to
accommodate
supply
shocks,
as
well
as
the
tightness
of
the
energy
market
concerned.159
Key
analytical
factors
to
consider
include:
1) The
security
of
the
network
infrastructure
essential
to
delivering
energy
supplies
to
customers
(electricity
grids,
gas
and
oil
pipelines,
etc);
2) The
degree
to
which
a
country
is
dependent
on
imports;
3) Diversity
in
the
types
of
primary
energy
an
economy
relies
on
(the
so-called
energy
mix),
in
the
sources
of
this
energy
and
in
the
means
through
which
this
energy
is
delivered;
4) The
extent
to
which
various
types
of
energy
and
fuels
can
be
substituted
for
each
other
in
the
economy;
5) Environmental
constraints
on
the
type
and
amount
of
energy
used;
6) Fundamental
market
conditions;
7) The
political
circumstances
of
countries
and
regions
influencing
the
supply
chain.
Energy
independence
is,
therefore,
just
one
of
a
series
of
factors
that
determine
security
of
supply
and
not
a
sufficient
condition
of
security
of
supply.
Countries
that
are
energy
157
Michael
Levi,
'Energy
Security:
An
Agenda
for
Research',
in
Working
Papers
(New
York:
Council
on
140
self-sufficient may also suffer from energy insecurity due to market failures, force majeure or technical stoppages. Equally, increasing reliance on energy imports may not necessarily be incompatible with increasing energy security if suppliers are reliable or if undelivered supplies can be easily substituted in the energy system. In this context, even imported unconventional gas supplies could mitigate the high costs and risks associated with long-distance gas transportation by offering an alternative to supplies sourced from further afield and an additional source of gas in times of shortage. Put simply, unconventional gas could introduce new supply shock absorbers to respond to disruptions and market imbalances.160 As a result of its conceptual elasticity, energy security has been used to justify a variety of policies. Recently, one major debate in Europe has centred on how to manage declining indigenous natural gas production and increasing import dependence. The terms energy security and energy independence are often used interchangeably; however, they are distinct concepts. Energy imports may exacerbate trade deficits: the development of indigenous energy sources can boost national economies; and tax revenues from energy production can bolster governmental budgets. However, strictly speaking these are not energy security issues per se. Moreover, energy independence as a policy goal in and of itself could be considered misleading and costly as most EU Member States do not have the resources to be self-sufficient.161 By referring to the uninterrupted physical availability of energy, the European Commission Green Paper correctly highlights the most basic aspect of security of supply. Energy resources like natural gas are private commodities that are subject to the same market forces as other commodities, such as steel, wheat, or pork bellies.162 Large, flexible and well-functioning energy markets are capable of providing a considerable source of physical security by absorbing shocks and allowing supply and demand to reallocate physical supply more quickly and with greater ingenuity than a controlled system could.163 Only in extreme circumstances, such as embargoes, strikes or wars, is energy physically unobtainable in developed countries. In the words of one notable economist in the field, Supply can almost always be made equal to demand, provided the price is allowed to adjust.164 This brings us to the issue of the price of energy products another fundamental component of security of supply. The European Commissions reference to the availability of energy on the market at an affordable price raises the tricky question of how to define affordability. It must be recognised that a consumers point of view on this issue will clash fundamentally with a producers. In fact, the only way that energy prices can enhance energy security is when they are high enough to guarantee adequate return on investment for producers and low enough to stimulate economic growth in
160
Downey,
'Fueling
North
America's
future',
ES-6.
161
House
of
Commons,
'UK
Energy
Supply:
Security
or
Independence?
Eighth
Report
of
Session
201012',
ed. Energy and Climate Change Committee (London: House Of Commons, 2011), 6. 162 Andreas Goldthau, 'A Public Policy Perspective on Global Energy Security ', International Studies Perspectives 12, no 4 (2011): 3. 163 Yergin, 'Ensuring Energy Security': 80. Pierre Noel, 'Beyond dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas', (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). 164 Emphasis in the original. Dieter Helm, 'Energy policy: security of supply, sustainability and competition ', Energy Policy 30, no 3 (2002): 175.
141
the
consuming
countries.165
Put
simply,
low
prices
are
as
dangerous
to
energy
security
as
high
prices.166
In
this
context,
the
market
plays
an
essential
role
in
security
of
supply
by
deciding
the
most
suitable
and
sustainable
price
for
energy
products
based
on
supply
and
demand.
(This
is
provided,
of
course,
that
the
market
is
functioning
well!)
Viewed
in
this
light,
unconventional
gas
could
play
a
significant
role
by
reducing
the
scarcity
of
natural
gas
and
fundamentally
rebalancing
supply
and
demand.
As
the
natural
gas
supply
curve
becomes
more
elastic,
as
is
the
case
with
an
increasing
abundance
of
unconventional
gas
resources,
it
will
become
increasingly
difficult
to
price
natural
gas
above
marginal
cost.167
This
could
lower
the
market
price
of
gas,
improve
the
EUs
bargaining
position
as
a
gas
consumer
and
make
it
easier
for
the
EU
to
meet
its
future
energy
needs.
Although
the
market
plays
an
important
role
in
ensuring
energy
security,
energy
is
generally
considered
by
policy-makers
to
be
too
important
to
be
solely
entrusted
to
the
market
alone.
Moreover,
energy
markets
suffer
from
multiple
market
failures.
Amongst
other
things,
they
are
strongly
distorted
by
the
rent-seeking
behaviour
of
states
and
large
businesses
attempting
to
capture
special
monopoly
privileges
rather
than
earning
profits
through
competitive
trade.
One
notable
source
of
market
failure
is
the
fact
that
energy
can
be
considered
both
an
economic
and
a
political
good.168
In
recent
years,
analysts
have
often
commented
on
the
manner
in
which
natural
gas
is
used
as
a
political
lever
in
the
Russian-Ukrainian
relationship
a
practice
that
has
greatly
distorted
both
the
price
and
reliability
of
the
natural
gas
delivered
to
Ukraine.169
However,
in
the
broader
historical
context,
the
most
noteworthy
example
of
the
use
of
energy
for
political
ends
is
the
deployment
of
the
so- called
oil
weapon.
The
switch
from
international-private
to
national-public
ownership
of
the
international
oil
market
from
1973
onwards
paved
the
way
for
a
number
of
noteworthy,
politically
motivated
interventions
in
crude
oil
reserves
and
production
by
OPEC
governments.170
Short-term
domestic
concerns
continue
to
influence
the
energy
agendas
of
many
producer
countries
today,
a
fact
that
some
claim
has
contributed
to
the
recent
volatility
of
energy
markets.171
It
is
therefore
seen
that
national
and
international
political
and
strategic
issues
play
a
very
important
role
in
security
of
supply.
There
is
a
clear
economic
case
for
government
intervention
in
markets
where
some
form
of
market
failure
is
taking
place.
In
light
of
the
indispensable
importance
of
the
markets,
the
goal
for
policy-makers
is
to
set
a
165
A.F.
Alhajji,
'What
is
Energy
Security?
Definitions
and
Concepts',
Middle
East
Economic
Survey
L,
no
45
(2007).
166
Because
of
this,
some
economists
have
even
suggested
that
energy
security
can
largely
be
considered
relatively stable prices over time rather than dwelling on price levels producers and consumers may be in tension over how much energy should cost, but the importance of energy to their economies means that they can both agree on the desirability of steady and predictable prices. Helm, 'Energy policy': 176. 167 Medlock, Jaffe and Hartley, 'Shale Gas and National Security', 31. 168 Clingendael International Energy Programme for European Commission Directorate-General for Transport and Energy, 'Supply Security and Geopolitics', 31. 169Jim Nichol, Steven Woehrel and Bernard A. Gelb, 'Russias Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine: Context and Implications', (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), Simon Pirani, 'Ukraines Gas Sector', (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2007). 170 Clingendael International Energy Programme for European Commission Directorate-General for Transport and Energy, 'Supply Security and Geopolitics', 50. 171 Rhl, 'Global Energy After the Crisis'.
142
framework which will ensure that the market operates with a minimum of distortion and energy is produced and consumed efficiently.172 To this end, factoring in the political dimension of energy is essential to both understanding and mitigating the effects of events such as those mentioned above. As mentioned earlier, security of supply is not an end in itself. It is one of many means of providing for basic human needs and social welfare. When put into this broader human context, it becomes clear that the production and use of energy should neither endanger the quality of life of current and future generations nor exceed the carrying capacity of ecosystems.173 Climate change as a result of rising greenhouse gas emissions represents a threat to international peace, security and development. More than two thirds of the worlds carbon dioxide emissions come from the way we produce and use energy, so energy policy has to play a major part in meeting this challenge.174 It is for this reason that the European Commission makes respecting environmental concerns one of the fundamental components of its definition of energy security. By doing so it acknowledges that the short-term benefits of securing energy supplies without due respect for the environment will be outweighed by the long-term costs, both in monetary terms as well as in social welfare.
4.4 Summary
The
challenges
facing
shale
gas
drilling
and
development
in
Europe
are
not
insurmountable.
However,
should
the
size
and
commercial
viability
of
technically
recoverable
resources
translate
into
large-scale
production,
there
will
be
a
wide
range
of
issues
in
need
of
attention.
Clearly
there
can
be
no
neat
separation
between
the
regulatory,
environmental,
technical,
social
and
economic
challenges
associated
with
land
access
for
shale
gas
development.
As
the
analysis
has
revealed,
these
issues
are
intimately
related
and
affect
one
another
in
inextricable
ways.
Nonetheless,
the
table
below
provides
an
indicative
summary
of
the
main
obstacles
to
accessing
land
for
unconventional
gas
development
that
have
been
revealed
by
the
literature
review.
Surveying
these,
it
becomes
clear
that
land
access
is,
above
all,
a
local
issue.
Studies
that
analyse
land
access
issues
at
the
regional
or
country
level
will
inevitably
yield
generalisations
that
abstract
from
local
specificities.
While
it
is
important
to
highlight
national
regulations
governing
the
exploitation
of
conventional
and
unconventional
hydrocarbons,
in
practice
the
first
mover
that
crucially
determines
the
extent
to
which
development
activities
will
encounter
significant
obstacles
are
local
authorities.
Therefore,
a
top-down
analysis
of
national
regulations
and
centralised
infrastructure
planning
for
large-scale
development
and
production
of
shale
gas
should
be
complemented
by
a
bottom-up
analysis
of
the
surface-level
constraints
and
opportunities
present
in
each
shale
gas
play.
172
Lawson,
quoted
in
Helm,
'Energy
policy':
175.
173
United
Nations
Development
Programme,
'World
Energy
Assessment',
31.
174
UK
Department
of
Trade
and
Industry,
'Meeting
the
Energy
Challenge:
A
White
Paper
on
Energy',
143
Table
4-9:
Summary
of
the
main
challenges
for
accessing
land
for
shale
gas
development
in
Europe
Environmen tal
Regulatory
-
Water
management
[Stevens175,
Tyndall176]
-
Natural/protected
sites
[Gny177]
-
No
sub-surface
property
rights
[Kuhn
&
Umbach178,
Stevens,
Gny]
-
Duration/intensity
of
drilling
[Tyndall]
-
Proximity
to
residential
areas
[Centrica 179 ,
Tyndall]
-
Noise/visual
impacts
[Tyndall;
IHS
CERA]
-
Well
size,
spacing
and
density
-
Zoning
restrictions
(Gny)
-
Multi-well
pad
permitting
(e.g.
adjacent
plots)
-
Smaller
land
parcels
[Kuhn
&
Umbach,
Gny,
Centrica]
-
Royalties
for
the
state
[CRS,
Gny,
Stevens,
Phillipe
and
Partners184]
-
Permitting
costs
-Licensing/con-cessions
Environmental
Social
Technical/logistic al
Social
- NIMBYism [Stevens, Kuhn & Umbach] - Community impacts [Kornfeld 180 , House of Commons181]
Technical/ logistical
- Inaccessible terrain - Force majeure [Cuadrilla182] - Obligation to conduct environmental impact assessment - Waste disposal - Site protection (Kornfeld)
- Population density 183 [E.ON , Centrica, Gny, Stevens, Kuhn & Umbach, House of Commons] - Utility line placement - Lack of financial incentives for landowners/loc al communities [Gny, Kuhn & Umbach, Stevens] - Higher labour costs (Kefferputz185) - Equipment/rig transport - Access to distribution/trans mission system [Stevens, Gny] - service availability [House of Commons]
Economic/ market
175
Stevens,
'Hype
and
reality'.
176
Wood
et
al.,
'Shale
gas
provisional
assessment'.
177
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas'.
178
Kuhn
and
Umbach,
'Strategic
Perspectives'.
179
Centrica
Energy,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe'.
180
Kornfeld,
'Socio-Economic
Considerations'.
181
House
of
Commons,
'Shale
Gas:
Fifth
Report
of
Session
2010-12',
48.
182
Cuadrilla
Resources,
'Economic
Impact
in
Lancashire'.
183
Korn,
'Prospects
in
Europe'.
185
Kefferputz,
'Shale
Fever'.
184
Philippe
&
Partners,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe'.
144
145
Figure
5-1:
Projections
of
US
natural
gas
production1
Other
well-regarded
sources
for
energy
data
have
also
significantly
revised
their
estimates
of
future
US
gas
production.
The
IEAs
2010
World
Energy
Outlook
(WEO)
baseline
new
policies
scenario
initially
expected
production
to
grow
to
a
moderate
578
bcm
in
2020
and
606
bcm
by
2035,
equivalent
to
an
annual
average
growth
rate
of
0.2%
over
the
2008-2035
period.2
By
contrast,
the
more
recent
2011
report
has
predicted
US
gas
production
in
2020
to
be
685
bcm
and
710
bcm
in
2035.3
While
the
EIAs
AEO
is
predominately
focused
on
the
USA,
the
IEAs
analysis
has
also
reflected
on
the
impact
of
US
shale
gas
production
on
the
OECD
and
wider
world.
In
general,
the
IEA
predicts
that
natural
gas,
boosted
by
the
prospects
for
commercial
exploitation
of
unconventional
deposits
in
different
parts
of
the
world,
will
play
an
increasingly
important
role
in
the
global
energy
mix.
In
the
2011
WEO,
the
IEA
emphasises
the
chief
attractions
of
gas:
its
softer
environmental
impact
relative
to
other
fossil
fuels;
its
ability
to
act
as
a
backup
fuel
for
intermittent
renewable
power
generation;
and,
more
recently,
the
growing
interregional
trade
of
natural
gas
brought
on
by
LNG
markets
(which
will
be
discussed
in
another
section).
Key
drivers
for
increased
natural
gas
consumption
include
the
recent
turn
away
from
nuclear
energy
in
the
wake
of
the
Fukushima
plant
disaster
in
2011,
Chinas
announcement
of
a
major
push
to
expand
domestic
natural
gas
use
and
the
growing
competitiveness
of
gas-fired
power
generation
vis--vis
other
fuels
such
as
coal.
Other
research
highlighted
the
potential
for
gas
to
serve
as
an
effective
bridge
to
a
lower
CO2
emissions
future.4
This
1
EIA,
'Various
AEOs'.
'World Energy Outlook 2010', in World Energy Outlook (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 2010). 3 IEA, 'Golden age'. 4 Downey, 'Fueling North America's future', E.J. Moniz, H.D. Jacoby and A.J.M. Meggs, 'The future of natural gas: Interim report', (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), 36.
2 IEA,
146
portended a debate about whether gas is a competitor to, or facilitator of, renewable energy goals (both in an environmental as well as economic sense). This section will address these issues in terms of their reciprocal impact on the future development of unconventional gas, principally in the USA but also for the rest of the world. Despite optimistic forecasts for future natural gas production, the wide range of scenarios offered by the IEAs WEO reinforces the degree of uncertainty concerning the future development of the global energy mix. The new policies scenario incorporates the policy commitments and plans that have been announced by countries around the world to address all energy-related policy priorities (e.g. climate change, energy security, efficiency, competitiveness and so on). The current policies scenario, by contrast, presents projections under the assumption that government policies will remain unchanged from what has already been agreed. The 450 scenario assumes a policy agenda of limiting an increase in average global temperature to 2C. Finally, the Gas scenario considers a positive future outlook for natural gas due to high demand in non-OECD countries, increased production from unconventional sources and competitive prices in relation to other fuels. The variation in assumptions given by each of these scenarios leads to a wide range of possible outcomes in the supply and demand of various forms of energy over the next two decades. However, as repeatedly stressed by these reports, natural gas is the only fossil fuel for which demand rises in all four scenarios. 5 Therefore, the IEA notes that there is much less uncertainty over the outlook for natural gas: factors both on the supply and demand sides point to a bright future, even a golden age, for natural gas.6 One of the primary drivers of this gas-friendly outlook is the estimates of global unconventional gas reserves and production. Both the IEA and EIA have estimated a significant global presence of shale gas, in the USA in particular but also in Asia Pacific, Latin America, Africa and Europe. Many analyses now ponder whether unconventional gas is an appropriate term for shale gas, when its resource base is estimated at 200 Tcm, or a quarter of total global gas reserves.7
5
IEA,
'World
Energy
Outlook
2011',
in
World
Energy
Outlook
(Paris:
Organisation
for
Economic
Co- operation
and
Development
2011),
156.
6
Ibid.,
42.
7
Ibid.,
163.
147
Figure
5-2:
Forecasts
of
US
natural
gas
production
by
type8
Given
these
impressive
figures,
it
is
small
wonder
that
energy
analysts,
gas
firms
and
political
bodies
have
sought
to
understand
the
factors
enabling
the
US
shale
gas
phenomenon
and
test
their
application
in
other
regions
of
the
world.
The
caveat,
of
course,
is
that
in
the
early
stages
of
this
technological
breakthrough
the
one
certainty
is
that
much
remains
uncertain.
Projections
of
the
impact
of
shale
gas
development
in
the
USA
and
elsewhere
in
the
world
crucially
rely
on
estimates
of
technically
recoverable
resources
and
assumptions
about
the
economic
viability
of
their
extraction.
Although
this
has
been
taken
up
in
greater
depth
in
Chapter
2,
it
is
useful
to
note
that
even
reserve
estimates
for
established
shale
gas
plays
are
subject
to
contestation
and
perennial
revision.
A
recent
analysis
by
the
EIA
helped
underscore
this
phenomenon
by
making
a
significant
downward
adjustment
to
the
technically
recoverable
resource
base
for
Marcellus
shale.
This
contributed
to
a
wider
revision
of
total
US
shale
gas
reserves,
from
an
earlier
estimate
of
827
tcf
in
the
AEO20109
to
482
tcf
one
year
later
(a
figure
that
is
60%
less
than
the
one
originally
put
forward).
Such
stark
revisions
to
the
US
gas
reserve
base
as
a
result
of
shale
gas
exploration
have
had
knock-on
effects
on
estimates
of
other
gas
supply
data
in
the
USA.
The
most
obvious
change
has
occurred
in
predictions
concerning
US
natural
gas
imports.
It
was
initially
expected
that
the
USA
would
begin
importing
substantial
quantities
of
LNG.
These
expectations
led
to
massive
investments
in
the
infrastructure
needed
to
import
and
process
liquefied
natural
gas,
while
stimulating
investments
in
producer
states
anticipating
a
surge
in
demand
for
LNG.
The
reality,
however,
was
that
the
USA
ended
up
importing
only
around
13
bcm
of
LNG
in
2009
(out
of
a
re-gasification
capacity
of
nearly
150
bcm).
Now
there
are
serious
proposals
to
add
export
capabilities
8
EIA,
'AEO
2011'.
9
EIA,
'AEO
2010'.
148
(liquefaction
plants)
to
underused
LNG
import
terminals.
As
noted
by
Howard
Rogers,
a
price
differential
between
US
and
destination
markets
of
between
$3-4/MBtu
would
be
required
to
ensure
a
reasonable
return
on
investment
for
this
export
market.10
Under
present
circumstances,
however,
North
America
will
remain
largely
self-sufficient
and
therefore
will
essentially
remain
isolated
from
interregional
trade.11
Figure
5-3:
Historical
and
projected
net
US
LNG
imports12
The issues of resource size and LNG development deserve their own treatment and are therefore explored in greater depth in Chapter 2 and Section 5.2. For now, it suffices to draw attention to the great deal of uncertainty surrounding shale gas development and the concomitant divergence in the predictions of its size and impact. These uncertainties aside, there have been tangible impacts on US natural gas infrastructure as a result of unconventional gas production. Substantial investments have been witnessed in mid and down-stream processing, transport and storage capacities. The latter in particular has seen impressive growth as the North American markets have been warehousing gas to accommodate surplus supply, whilst the minimum working gas inventory has been rising to levels considerably above the volumes required for winter demand.13
importance of Asian demand and North American supply', (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2012), 27.
149
commercial sectors are considered mature markets with little growth prospects.14 Since 2005, incremental increases in gas-fired electricity generation have been observed (as shown in Figure 5-4 below). Although coal retains its position as the fuel of choice for most powergenerating units (a legacy of US policy advocating coal as a generating source in the 1970s), this role has recently been challenged by a notable rise in natural gas consumption in the power generation sector. According to IHS CERA, natural gas-fired power plants have cost, timing and emissions advantages compared to coal-fired plants.15 Whether these advantages are capitalised upon partly depends on the extent to which US producers decide to export natural gas via LNG liquefaction terminals, which would increase the price of natural gas domestically and possibly deter investments in gas-fired electricity generation (at least according to recent EIA analysis16).
Figure
5-4:
US
electricity
generation
by
fuel17
Nonetheless,
in
the
nearer
term
it
is
already
apparent
that
gas-fired
electricity
generation
is
gaining
ground.
As
shown
in
Figure
5-5
below,
data
on
generating
capacity
reveals
a
sizeable
difference
in
coal
and
gas-fired
investments
in
the
USA
over
the
next
four
years.
Moreover,
as
large
numbers
of
coal-fired
generators
are
scheduled
for
retirement,
it
is
likely
that
investments
in
combined
cycle
gas
turbines
(CCGTs)
will
gain
ground,
boosted
by
the
recently
narrowed
gap
between
the
costs
of
gas
versus
coal
for
electricity
generation
(Figure
5-6).
However,
a
caveat
is
that
the
incremental
costs
of
coal
remain
lower
than
for
natural
gas,
even
despite
the
recent
surge
in
shale
gas
14
Downey,
'Fueling
North
America's
future'.
15
Ibid.
16
EIA,
'Effect
of
Increased
Natural
Gas
Exports
on
Domestic
Energy
Markets
as
requested
by
the
Office
of
17
EIA,
'Electric
Power
Monthly:
January
2012',
(Washington,
DC:
US
Energy
Information
Administration,
150
production
and
the
corresponding
decline
in
natural
gas
prices.
This
means
that
the
capacity
utilisation
rate
for
gas-fired
plants
is,
on
average,
much
lower
than
for
coal
(although
the
higher
efficiencies
of
CCGTs
relative
to
coal-fired
power
plants
should
be
taken
into
account).
Moreover,
the
fuel
costs
of
combined-cycle
plants
account
for
60- 75%
of
total
generation
costs
(compared
with
0-40%
for
renewables,
nuclear
or
coal),
meaning
that
these
gas-fired
plants
are
far
more
sensitive
to
changes
in
fuel
prices.18
Still,
according
to
ConocoPhillips,
the
full-cycle
costs
of
building
new
power
plants
are
currently
more
favourable
for
combined
cycle
gas
plants
than
alternatives
run
on
coal
(despite
lower
fuel
prices),
nuclear,
renewables
and
fossil
fuels
accompanied
by
CCS
technology.
This
is
largely
due
to
the
relatively
low
capital
expenditures
of
CCGTs
in
relation
to
these
alternatives.19
Figure
5-5:
Planned
additions
to
coal
and
gas-fired
electricity
capacity
in
the
United
States
of
America
(aggregate
2011-2015)20
'Energy
Technology
Perspectives:
Scenarios
&
Strategies
to
2050',
(Paris:
Organisation
for
Economic
Co-operation
and
Development
2006).
19
This
is
assuming
a
price
of
$7/mcf.
Marianne
Kah,
'The
future
role
of
natural
gas
in
the
US'
(paper
presented
at
the
UT
Energy
Symposium,
Austin,
TX,
2011).
20
EIA,
'Electric
Power
Monthly:
January
2012'.
18
IEA,
151
Figure
5-6:
Average
cost
of
coal
and
gas
for
electricity
generation
in
the
United
States
of
America,
January
2007
-
October
201121
Besides
its
growing
role
in
electricity
generation,
natural
gas
may
very
well
become
an
important
component
of
the
transportation
sector,
whether
directly
in
natural
gas- powered
vehicles
(NGVs)
or
via
the
generation
of
electric
power
to
recharge
the
batteries
of
an
electric
vehicle.22
An
MIT
interdisciplinary
study
also
concludes
that
the
two
most
significant
opportunities
for
addition
market
share
for
natural
gas
are
power
generation
and
transportation. 23
This
has
been
confirmed
by
IEA
analysis,
which
modelled
a
significant
penetration
of
NGVs
as
a
result
of
favourable
price
differentials
between
natural
gas
and
oil.
The
introduction
of
such
vehicles
leads
to
a
predicted
expansion
of
gas
in
the
road
transportation
sectors
global
energy
mix,
from
1%
to
between
3-5%
in
2035.24
In
addition
to
fostering
investment
in
gas-fired
electricity
generation
and
boosting
the
prospects
for
gas-powered
transport,
the
surge
in
US
shale
gas
production
has
also
had
impacts
on
the
transformation
sector,
particularly
the
US
petrochemicals
industry.
As
a
result
of
this
energy-intensive
industry
requiring
a
substantial
amount
of
ethane
and
other
natural
gas
liquids,
its
competitiveness
is
heavily
dependent
on
the
price
of
these
liquids,
as
well
as
the
price
of
competitive
feedstocks
more
generally
(such
as
propane,
butane
and
naphtha).
In
this
context,
increases
in
the
ratio
of
the
price
of
oil
to
the
price
of
natural
gas
(from
a
low
of
5.5:1
in
2003
to
15.9:1
in
2009)
have
been
favourable
for
US
exports
of
petrochemicals,
plastics
and
other
derivatives.
The
American
Chemistry
Council
has
therefore
been
upbeat
about
its
future
prospects,
noting
that
with
the
development
of
new
shale
gas
resources,
the
US
petrochemical
industry
is
announcing
21
Ibid.
22
Downey,
'Fueling
North
America's
future'.
24
IEA,
'WEO
2011',
171.
23
Moniz,
Jacoby
and
Meggs,
'Future
of
natural
gas'.
152
significant expansions of petrochemical capacity, reversing a decade-long decline.25 However, it must not be assumed from this trend that shale gas has reinvigorated demand in the US industrial sector as a whole; dramatic efficiency gains, coupled with drops in productivity due to the global recession and anticipated regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, have offset increases in demand.26
25
American
Chemistry
Council,
'Shale
Gas
and
New
Petrochemicals
Investment:
Benefits
for
the
Economy,
Jobs,
and
US
Manufacturing
',
(Washington,
DC:
American
Chemistry
Council,
2011).
26
Downey,
'Fueling
North
America's
future'.
27
EIA,
'EIA
projects
U.S.
non-hydro
renewable
power
generation
increases,
led
by
wind
and
biomass',
153
Figure
5-7:
Projected
non-hydropower
renewable
electricity
generation
in
the
United
States
of
America,
2010-203528
Much debate has centred around the impact of shale gas development on renewable energy and climate change goals. Whereas proponents invoke the argument that gas is the cleanest fossil fuel and can displace coal while serving as a backup fuel for intermittent renewable power, opponents claim that cheap and reliable gas-fired power generation will divert investment away from renewable energy projects, and that even the comparatively low carbon footprint of natural gas will nonetheless equal increases in overall GHG emissions as global demand for energy continues to grow. Evidence can be presented in favour of both sides, as there is still much uncertainty over climate change policies and the longer-term incentives for market players to invest in renewable and/or gas-based power generation. After all, the planning horizons for energy infrastructure investments, as well as GHG emission reduction goals, are both measured in decades; should countries such as the USA where fossil fuels constitute over 80% of total primary energy supply decide on carbon reduction regulations (such as cap-and-trade or an emissions ceiling), this will affect the operating margins of a substantial portion of the energy industry, particularly those players that have chosen the wrong fuel. Compounding this longer-term uncertainty is the outlook for natural gas prices, which historically have been far more variable than coal (see Figure 5-6 above), as well as the need to quantify the opportunity cost involved in choosing gas over renewables (and, indeed, vice versa).
28
Ibid.
154
Figure
5-8:
Projected
CO2
emissions
in
the
United
States
of
America29
As an unconventional fossil fuel, shale gas has sparked a related debate on whether additional carbon emissions are emitted from its relatively unique method of extraction. It is not the purpose of this section to unpack in any detail the arguments put forward in this context, but merely to draw attention to the differences in life-cycle emissions analyses related to shale gas. 30 Robert Howarth and fellow researchers at Cornell University have put forward a controversial claim that fugitive methane emissions from shale gas development contribute to an overall GHG footprint equal to coal over a 100- year time scale.31 However, others have countered that life-cycle analysis of emissions from natural gas need to account for the relative efficiencies of different fossil fuels used for power generation. For example, it has been argued that the numbers in the Cornell study are based on the high heating values (HHV) of shale gas and coal for CO2 emissions, without taking into account the higher efficiency of shale gas in power generation, which would result in less CO2 per unit power output.32 One study has noted a caveat in this respect, highlighting the variability of emissions due to site- specific factors, such as the pressure of the fluids brought to the surface; the effectiveness of on-site gas capturing equipment; the control efficiency of any flaring that is done; the chemical composition of the gas and hydrocarbon liquids at the drill
29
EIA,
'AEO
2011'.
30
See
EIA,
'Emissions
of
Greenhouse
Gases
in
the
United
States
2008',
(Washington,
DC:
2009),
Jinsheng
Wang, David Ryan and Edward J. Anthony, 'Reducing the greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas', Energy Policy 39, no 12 (2011). 31 Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro and Anthony Ingraffea, 'Methane and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations', Climatic Change 106 (2011): 67990. 32 Wang, Ryan and Anthony, 'Greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas'.
155
site; and the duration of drilling and completion work before the start of regular production.33 More generally, the debate on the role of gas in the transition to renewables has evoked ideological arguments concerning the use of fossil fuels. A provisional assessment of the impact of shale gas on the environment and climate change carried out by UK researchers argues that whilst world demand for fossil fuels remains high, any new sources of fossil fuel (even if relatively low carbon per unit of useful energy) will be purchased, combusted and consequently added to the global emissions burden. It will not substitute for other fossil fuels and in this regard claiming shale gas as a viable low carbon option for the UK cannot be reconciled with the spirit of UK commitments on climate change.34 This statement makes it clear that natural gas may be a burden or boon to the carbon agenda depending on ones criteria and expectations. Given the complexity of the issues and the changing incentives of state, market and societal actors under various political, economic and social conditions, it is likely that the evolution of the gas/renewables relationship will be far more nuanced than the stark positions on either side of the debate. In other words, natural gas will at times constrain and at others enable investments in renewable energy. Possible technological and regulatory breakthroughs may yet alter the supply balance in the USA and elsewhere, contributing to a substantially revised outlook for longer-term investments in both renewable and non-renewable energy infrastructure.
33
Al
Armendariz,
'Emissions
from
Natural
Gas
Production
in
the
Barnett
Shale
Area
and
Opportunities
for
156
Figure
5-9:
Total
per-well
production
costs
for
shale
gas35
As
discussed
in
Chapter
3,
the
range
of
shale
gas
production
costs
is
influenced
by
a
number
of
physical
and
commercial
factors.
The
former
includes
factors
such
as
the
geological
characteristics
of
the
play
in
question
(e.g.
depth,
permeability,
total
organic
carbon
content,
etc.),
the
number
of
frac
stages,
the
length
of
the
horizontal
sections
of
the
wellbore
and
the
number
of
drilling
days.
Decisions
on
drilling
programmes
rely
on
evaluations
of
the
possible,
probable
and
proved
reserves
following
test
drilling
and
seismic
monitoring
results
(which
commonly
yield
a
chance
of
success
expressed
in
percentage
terms).
Commercial
factors,
on
the
other
hand,
include
taxes,
royalty
rates
and
the
cost
of
services
and
materials
for
drilling,
completion
and
building
the
supporting
infrastructure
for
gathering,
processing
and
compressing
produced
gas.
Once
in
the
production
stage,
well
performance
indicators
such
as
IP
rate,
the
EUR
of
gas
from
the
well,
the
reserves-to-production
ratio
and
the
decline
curve
all
affect
the
net
present
value
of
the
well
(as
well
as
the
rate
of
return
for
the
drilling
company).
Examples
of
the
way
in
which
shale
gas
drilling
companies
evaluate
potential
wells
and
quantify
finding
and
developing
costs
are
presented
in
Annex
H. There
are
several
indirect
factors
that
have
been
known
to
significantly
affect
the
cost- competitiveness
of
shale
gas
wells
in
the
USA,
either
positively
or
negatively.
One
such
factor,
for
example,
is
the
cost
of
water.
A
consulting
report
notes
that
an
individual
shale
gas
well
commonly
requires
the
acquisition
and
treatment
of
between
2-6
million
gallons
of
water.
Currently,
the
costs
of
this
water
are
estimated
to
range
between
35
Mohsen
Bonakdarpour
et
al.,
'The
economic
and
employment
contributions
of
shale
gas
in
the
United
States', in IHS Global Insight (Washington DC: IHS Cera, 2011); Centrica Energy, 'Unconventional Gas in Europe'; Cleantech, 'Investment Guide'; Cuadrilla Resources, 'Economic Impact in Lancashire'; FX Energy, 'Poland; A unique play on the strong European gas market', (FX Energy, 2012); Hefley et al., 'Economic Impact'; IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets'; Mark Kaiser, 'Profitability assessment of Haynesville shale gas wells', Energy 38, no 1 (2011).
157
$0.25/Mcf to as high as $1.38/Mcf.36 This range reflects uncertainties concerning water quantities as well as the appropriate treatment strategy (which, in turn, are importantly affected by sub-surface interactions between fracturing fluids and shale rocks). The World Energy Council, moreover, believes that steadily increasing costs related to water reclamation and chemical cleanup have the potential to drive up production costs to $6- 8/Mcf.37 Other such issues bearing on production costs include: changes to tax credits for unconventional fuels; environmental considerations limiting both sub-surface drilling practices and land access for well drilling and completion activities (see Section 4.1 for a more detailed treatment of this issue); and revised fiscal regimes in US states situated atop unexplored shale gas deposits. Analysts often note a number of potential service sector bottlenecks, such as the availability of land-based rigs equipped to horizontal drilling specifications and the sufficiency of skilled human resources. An absence of these may increase the cost base and challenge the commercial viability of well-drilling projects.38 It is, therefore, not surprising that the range of production costs is so great. Nonetheless, analysts have attempted to provide rules of thumb that extrapolate from drilling experience. It is commonly argued, for example, that most of the life-cycle costs of developing a single shale gas well are expended under the categories of finding and development (F&D) and lease operating expenditures (LOE). 39 These broader categories can be further sub-divided into constituent cost components. According to IHS CERA, the well capital expenditures that form part of F&D costs can be divided into three main categories drilling (40%), completions (including fracking, 50%) and facilities (10%).40 However, for Europe these cost ratios may not reflect the absence of upstream infrastructure in several countries with shale gas prospects. There is also some scope for debate as to the largest cost components for developing a shale play. Some studies have noted that F&D costs represent the most significant proportion of total well costs and as such are pivotal for determining break-even prices.41 However, other analysts have pointed out that F&D costs make up a considerable proportion of total expenditure only in the first three years, but subsequently the costs are more evenly dispersed when taking into account the full life cycle of a well.42 This bias may be due to the observation that gas drilling firms typically require a pay-out within the first three years of their initial investment.43
36
Black
&
Veatch,
'Growing
shale
resources;
understanding
implications
for
North
American
natural
gas
prices',
(prepared
for
the
state
of
Alaska
by
Black
&
Veatch
Management
Consulting,
2010).
37
WEC,
'Survey
of
Energy
Resources',
14.
38
Rogers,
'Shale
gas':
134.
39
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas',
80.
40
Bonakdarpour
et
al.,
'Economic
and
employment
contributions',
15.
The
cost
of
land
acquisition
seems
to
have
been
considered
separately.
41
Michelle
Foss,
'The
Outlook
for
US
Gas
Prices
in
2020:
Henry
hub
at
$3
or
$10?',
(Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies,
2011).
42
Guarnone
et
al.,
'Unconventional
mindset'.
43
A.E.
Berman,
'Shale
gas
-
the
eye
of
the
storm'
(paper
presented
at
the
Middlefield
Investment
Conference,
Calgary,
Canada,
14
July
2011,
2011).
158
Figure
5-10:
Indicative
cost
breakdown
of
a
shale
gas
project,
first
three
years44
Figure
5-11:
Indicative
cost
breakdown
of
a
shale
gas
project,
full
life
cycle45
The
production
costs
of
natural
gas
need
to
be
assessed
in
relation
to
gas
prices
in
order
to
determine
whether
the
resource
is
economically
viable.
However,
estimates
of
the
so-
44
Guarnone
et
al.,
'Unconventional
mindset'.
45
Ibid.
159
called
break-even
price
of
natural
gas,
which
is
necessary
to
recoup
per-well
expenditures,
vary
and
are
subject
to
much
contestation.
As
noted
by
the
IEA,
conventional
wisdom
in
2008
converged
around
a
price
range
of
$6-8/MBtu
for
shale
gas
to
be
economic.
Since
then,
this
range
has
been
progressively
lowered
and,
writing
in
2010,
the
IEA
estimated
a
price
between
$3-6/MBtu
for
North
America.46
Early
estimates
for
break-even
costs
in
Europe
(specifically
Poland
and
Germany)
were
provided
by
an
analysis
carried
out
by
the
Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies
and
range
from
$8-12/MBtu.47
The
IEAs
assumptions
regarding
costs
were
estimated
on
a
life- cycle
production
basis
only
and
were
hence
limited
to
finding/developing
costs,
operating
expenditures
and
decommissioning
costs
(all
of
which
were
discounted
by
the
cost
of
capital).48
However,
neither
transportation
costs
nor
the
cost
of
liquids
production
were
taken
into
account,
despite
the
latter
having
been
noted
as
a
significant
factor
positively
affecting
shale
well
economics
in
the
USA
(see
Chapter
3).
Figure
5-12:
Break-even
prices
for
unconventional
gas
production49
The
effect
of
shale
gas
development
on
prices
has
already
been
felt
in
the
USA.
As
shown
in
Figure
5-13
and
Figure
5-25,
US
Henry
Hub
prices
began
a
sharp
decline
in
2008,
which
corresponded
with,
amongst
other
factors,
the
steady
increase
in
natural
gas
production
in
the
USA.
Of
course,
US
market
conditions
are
quite
variable,
as
average
Henry
Hub
spot
prices
have
ranged
from
under
$3
to
over
$12
per
MBtu
in
the
past
five
years.
Much
of
this
impact
has
been
due
to
the
global
recession
in
2008,
contributing
to
46
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
183.
47
Gny,
'Unconventional
Gas',
87.
48
IEA,
'Golden
age',
49.
49
Centrica
Energy,
'Unconventional
Gas
in
Europe';
Economist
Intelligence
Unit,
'Breaking
new
ground:
A
special report on global shale gas developments', (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011); Gny, 'Unconventional Gas'; Korn, 'Prospects in Europe'; Wood Mackenzie, 'Global unconventional gas trends', (Wood Mackenzie, 2009); Medlock, Jaffe and Hartley, 'Shale Gas and National Security'; Moniz, Jacoby and Meggs, 'Future of natural gas'.
160
a
pronounced
fall
in
the
US
gas
price
and
a
corresponding
reduction
in
the
number
of
rigs
actively
drilling
for
gas.50
It
was
therefore
initially
anticipated
that
depressed
prices
in
the
USA
would
ease
indigenous
production
of
gas,
as
the
break-even
extraction
costs
would
no
longer
be
covered
by
wellhead
prices.
However,
contrary
to
this
belief,
the
margins
have
improved
as
the
technological
learning
curve
has
driven
down
per-well
development
costs.51
Moreover,
gas
producers
sold
production
forward
on
gas
futures
and
the
expectation
of
higher
prices.
This
hedging
strategy,
propped
up
by
a
bullish
forward
price
curve,
helped
to
cushion
producers
from
depressed
gas
prices
in
the
second
half
of
2008.
However,
some
research
has
recently
concluded
that
the
production
costs
claimed
by
various
shale
gas-producing
companies
are
optimistically
low
and
that
in
reality
these
independent
producers
have
actually
been
selling
their
gas
at
large
negative
economic
margins.52
A
study
undertaken
by
Weijermars
et
al.
in
2011
compared
conventional
vs.
unconventional
gas
producers
according
to
earnings,
capital,
shareholder
return,
value
driver
inventory
and
margin
analysis;
it
was
revealed
that
unconventional
producers
regularly
underperformed
in
relation
to
their
conventional
gas-producing
counterparts.
A
key
conclusion
of
the
study
was
that
sustained
shale
gas
production
and
the
avoidance
of
a
liquidity
crisis
crucially
relies
on
better
well-flow
rates,
lower
production
costs
and
significant
research
and
development
(R&D)
in
order
to
enable
a
lower
F&D
cost
base. 53
Another
study
that
modelled
and
simulated
shale
play
economics
in
Haynesville,
USA
similarly
concluded
that,
given
high
initial
capital
expenditures
for
developing
shale
gas
resources,
the
majority
of
wells
fail
to
break-even
on
a
full-cycle
basis
at
prevailing
gas
prices
[~$4/MBtu].54
Compounding
these
challenging
economics
is
the
relatively
steep
decline
curves
for
shale
gas
wells,
implying
that
continuous
drilling
is
required
to
maintain
a
flat
production
profile.
One
element
that
must
be
factored
in
to
any
examination
of
the
strong
and
sustained
growth
in
US
shale
gas
production
is
NGL
production
a
topic
already
touched
upon
in
Chapter
3
(see
Table
3-11,
Table
3-21and
Table
3-22,
for
example).
For
decades,
natural
gas
traded
at
a
relative
price
to
oil
of
between
6:1
and
10:1.
Crude
oil
prices
have
since
risen
and
North
American
gas
prices
have
dropped
to
yield
ratios
of
almost
20:1
at
the
time
of
writing.
High
oil
prices
mean
that
US
drilling
rigs
are
migrating
from
dry
shale
plays,
such
as
the
Marcellus,
to
liquids-rich
plays
in
the
Mid
West,
such
as
the
Anadarko,
Bakken
and
Permian.
As
the
price
of
NGLs
is
determined
by
the
price
of
oil,
such
plays
are
much
more
commercially
attractive,
but
the
significant
amounts
of
dry
gas
incidentally
produced
from
such
plays
are
sold
on
the
gas
market
regardless
of
the
already-low
market
prices.
If
this
trend
continues,
the
US
market
for
natural
gas
could
be
in
for
an
extended
period
of
very
competitive
prices.55
See
Box
6-2
for
additional
elaboration
of
this
point.
50
Rogers,
'Shale
gas':
125.
51
EIA,
'AEO
2011'.
52
Weijermars
et
al.,
'Unconventional
gas
research
initiative'.
See
also
Berman,
'Eye
of
the
storm',
Foss,
'US
161
Furthermore,
it
remains
to
be
seen
whether
the
margins
underpinning
shale
play
economics
can
be
improved
by
the
technological
learning
curve.
Analysts
at
ARI
International,
a
consulting
firm,
have
provided
evidence
on
improved
well
performance
in
the
form
of
reduced
drilling
days,
increases
in
the
average
IP
rates
of
producing
wells
and
ever-longer
lengths
of
horizontal
sections
of
wellbores. 56
These
factors
have
contributed
to
a
reduction
by
half
in
total
drilling
and
completion
costs
in
the
last
five
years
of
shale
gas
drilling,
and
portend
future
efficiency
gains
that
may
offset
the
precipitous
fall
in
US
wellhead/spot
prices.
Figure
5-13:
US
natural
gas
production
and
average
annual
Henry
Hub
prices57
Disregarding
the
numerous
debates
revolving
around
shale
gas
well
economics
and
the
extent
of
cost
optimisation,
it
is
already
apparent
that
shale
gas
development
in
the
USA
has
had
a
significant
effect
on
the
outlook
for
future
gas
prices.
Indeed,
whereas
the
AEO2011
reference
case
projects
gas
prices
to
reach
$7.07/MBtu
in
2035,
a
scenario
of
high
EUR
of
shale
gas
yields
a
price
of
$5.35/MBtu.
Conversely,
a
low
shale
EUR
case
predicts
prices
as
high
as
$9.26/MBtu.58
That
the
estimated
range
of
prices
varies
so
significantly
as
a
result
of
different
production
rates
for
shale
gas
bears
testament
to
its
importance
for
the
future
of
the
US
energy
balance.
However,
it
remains
to
be
seen
what
impact
the
progressive
decline
in
prices
from
an
average
of
$4.50/Mbtu
in
2010,
to
$4.00/Mbtu
in
2011,
to
the
recent
ten-year
lows
of
around
$2/Mbtu
will
have
on
the
margins
of
independent
unconventional
gas
producers
over
the
coming
years.
Setting
the
US
case
in
a
wider
global
context,
the
IEAs
World
Energy
Outlook
has
revised
its
natural
gas
price
assumptions
in
all
three
of
its
scenarios
due
to
what
it
considers
to
be
improved
prospects
for
the
commercial
production
of
unconventional
56
Kuuskraa,
'Economic
and
market
impacts',
9.
57
BP,
'Statistical
review
2011'.
58
EIA,
'Effect
of
Increased
Natural
Gas
Exports'.
162
gas.
In
particular,
the
report
notes
that
higher
projected
output
of
unconventional
gas
acts
to
keep
increases
in
the
price
of
natural
gas
below
the
level
envisaged
in
WEO- 2010,
increasing
its
competitiveness
against
other
fuels.
Indeed,
although
average
gas
import
prices
in
Europe
have
since
recovered
from
an
earlier
five-year
low
of
$6.34/Mbtu
in
August
2009
(or
4.51/Mbtu),
each
IEA
WEO
since
2008
has
nonetheless
revised
its
projections
of
gas
import
costs
for
Europe
into
the
coming
decades.
As
shown
in
Figure
5-14,
the
average
import
prices
under
the
IEA
reference
and
new
policies
scenarios,
although
steadily
rising,
have
nonetheless
been
repeatedly
revised
downwards
in
recent
years
(the
WEO
2011
Golden
Age
of
Gas
scenario
is
added
for
a
reference
lower
bound
price
estimate).
Figure
5-14:
IEA
estimates
of
import
price
for
Europe
under
reference
scenario59
163
revolution in the USA being felt worldwide. The natural gas system has gone from being comprised of distinct regional or national markets to one where interregional trade flows have a noticeable impact on physical supply-demand dynamics and in some circumstances even large shifts in prices. Global growth in the trade of LNG has underpinned this transformation. Whereas the concept of a world gas market was almost unthinkable ten years ago, a surge of new global LNG liquefaction capacity, much of which is inherently destination flexible or self-contracted, has introduced the first elements of interregional gas price competition.61 In early 2010, the development of the increasingly globalised LNG market coincided with two other key factors to create a perfect storm62 that resulted in a glut of global gas supply: a) the boom in unconventional gas production in the USA; and b) demand levels below those anticipated due to the economic recession.63 This section explains how these issues came together, heralding significant changes in the natural gas system that allowed unconventional gas to significantly impact European markets years before any prospective indigenous production within Europe itself. It also looks at the implications on investment in infrastructure, as well as the implications on the way natural gas is priced in the EU.
61
Jensen,
'LNG
Revolution':
8.
62
Howard
V.
Rogers,
'LNG
Trade-flows
in
the
Atlantic
Basin:
Trends
and
Discontinuities
',
(Oxford:
Oxford
164
Figure 5-15 above shows a two-fold increase in global LNG trade volumes in the period 2000-2010. In proportional terms, this growth rate far exceeds incremental growth in global gas consumption, resulting in an ever greater percentage of the gas consumed globally currently around 10% being transported by LNG. It is expected that interregional gas trading will increase from 590 bcm in 2009 to around 1 150 bcm in 2035. More than half of this growth will come from LNG, increasing the share of LNG in interregionally traded gas from 31% in 2008 to 42% in 2035.65
64
BP,
'Statistical
review
2011'.
65
IEA,
'WEO
2011',
93.
165
Figure
5-16:
EU
LNG
imports
by
Member
State66
As a major consumer of natural gas, Europe is robustly contributing to this trend. Figure 5-16, above, shows a strong growth in LNG imports into Europe from 2008 to 2010. In this period, North West Europe saw the commissioning and start-up of substantial new LNG terminal import capacity. The Zeebrugge expansion in Belgium, together with three new UK terminals (Isle of Grain Phase II, South Hook LNG and Dragon LNG), added a total LNG import capacity equivalent to 43.5 bcm a year a volume greater than the total gas demand in the Netherlands alone.67 As Figure 5-17 below shows, the EU currently has a regasification capacity of over 150 bcm, which looks set to double in the period to 2020.68
66
Source:
Eurostat.
NB:
There
are
differences
in
the
way
different
Member
States
have
reported
LNG
import
volumes
must
be
taken
into
account
when
considering
this
chart.
67
Morten
Frisch,
'Current
European
Gas
Pricing
Problems:
Solutions
Based
on
Price
Review
and
Price
Re-
Opener Provisions', in International Energy Law and Policy Research Paper Series (Dundee: Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy, University of Dundee, 2010), 9. 68 Kuhn and Umbach, 'Strategic Perspectives', 44.
166
Figure
5-17:
Current
and
planned
EU-27
LNG
regasification
capacity
(as
of
September
2011)69
In
2010,
Europe
accounted
for
22%
of
the
worlds
regasification
capacity,
Korea
and
Japan
44%
and
North
America
25%.70
Given
the
steep
decline
in
actual
and
forecast
natural
gas
imports
to
the
USA
(examined
further
later
in
this
section),
it
is
likely
that
these
ratios
will
change
in
the
coming
years.
The
sharp
increase
in
US
gas
prices
in
the
winter
of
2001/02
had
given
rise
to
a
rash
of
regasification
terminal
proposals,71
but
given
that
the
latest
EIA
energy
outlook
sees
the
USA
becoming
a
net
exporter
of
LNG
in
2016
and
an
overall
net
exporter
of
natural
gas
in
2021,72
most
of
the
projects
awaiting
final
investment
decisions
are
unlikely
to
move
forward.
With
a
number
of
planned
LNG
regasification
projects
in
the
USA
on
hold,
Europe
looks
set
to
become
the
region
with
the
fastest
growing
regasification
capacity
globally,
soon
overtaking
the
USA
to
become
the
second
largest
regional
market
for
LNG
after
Asia
in
terms
of
regasification
potential
(see
Table
5-1).
Table
5-1:
LNG
regasification
terminals
by
region
(as
of
June
2010)73
Region
Asia
Europe
Middle
East
and
Africa
North
America
Latin
America
Total
Operation
418
173
3
165
14
772
Construction
59
24
4
49
2
137
Planned
131
244
11
282
8
674
69
Source:
Gas
Infrastructure
Europe,
'GIE
LNG
Investment
Database',
(2011).
70
IEA,
'Golden
age',
71.
71
As
of
June
2010,
49
bcm
of
regasification
capacity
was
under
construction
in
the
USA,
bringing
the
forecast for total US capacity to 214 bcm by 2013. Fifteen projects were awaiting final investment decisions. IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets', 262. 72 EIA, 'Annual Energy Outlook 2012: Early Release Overview', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2012). 73 IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets', 254.
167
The
large
increase
in
LNG
import
capacity
in
North
West
Europe
has
coincided
with
the
start-up
of
a
number
of
large
LNG
liquefaction
plants
around
the
world.
In
a
much- anticipated
development,
Qatar
launched
six
7.8
million-tonne-per-annum
(mtpa)
LNG
trains
between
April
2009
and
December
2010,
adding
80
bcm
to
global
liquefaction
capacity
(Table
5-3).
The
sudden
rise
in
Qatari
output
is
reflected
in
the
profile
of
EU-27
LNG
imports
as
illustrated
in
Figure
5-18,
below.
Along
with
new
LNG
developments
in
Russia,
Yemen
and
Peru,
the
Qatari
projects
helped
to
bring
total
global
liquefaction
capacity
to
around
370
bcm
in
mid-2011.74
Table
5-2:
Qatars
new
liquefaction
trains75
Project
Qatargas
2
Qatargas
3
Qatargas
4
RasGas
3
Partners
Qatar
Petroleum,
ExxonMobil,
Total
Qatar
Petroleum,
ConocoPhillips,
Mitsui
Qatar
Petroleum,
Shell
Qatar
Petroleum,
ExxonMobil
Capacity
7.8
mtpa
7.8
mtpa
7.8
mtpa
7.8
mtpa
No,
of
trains
2
1
1
2
Start
date
Apr.
2009
Sep.
2010
Dec.
2010
Sep.
2009
Feb.
2010
Figure
5-18:
EU
LNG
imports
by
origin76
At
this
point,
it
is
worth
touching
on
the
apparent
mismatch
between
global
liquefaction
and
regasification
capacity.
As
of
June
2010,
the
worlds
regasification
capacity
stood
at
74
IEA,
'Golden
age',
167.
76
Source:
Eurostat.
75
Kanai,
'Decoupling
Oil
and
Gas
Prices',
26.
168
roughly
770
bcm
roughly
2.5
times
its
liquefaction
capacity.77
While
this
means
there
will
be
global
competition
for
LNG
shipments
when
world
gas
supply
tightens,78
surplus
regasification
capacity
provides
a
very
important
flexibility
for
seasonal
load-balancing
purposes
and
may
improve
security
of
supply.
For
example,
the
value
of
Japans
excess
regasification
capacity
was
clearly
demonstrated
following
the
2011
earthquakes
and
tsunami,
because
it
allowed
extra
spot
supplies
to
reach
gas-fired
power
plants
in
order
to
bridge
the
shortfall
in
electricity
generation
caused
by
the
loss
of
the
Fukushima
reactors.79
With
the
expected
completion
of
projects
in
Australia,
Angola
and
Algeria,
the
trend
in
liquefaction
growth
looks
set
to
continue
into
the
immediate
future,
increasing
overall
capacity
by
an
expected
50%
in
the
five-year
period
from
2008
to
2013.80
Looking
further
ahead,
the
Papua
New
Guinea
and
Gorgon
projects
will
add
significant
LNG
supplies
to
Asian
markets.
Final
investment
decisions
were
taken
in
2009
and
they
are
scheduled
to
start
by
2014.81
Also
of
interest
are
three
projects
in
Queensland,
which
are
the
first
in
the
world
to
be
based
on
CBM.
Based
on
currently
operating
and
sanctioned
projects,
Australian
LNG
export
capacity
could
exceed
70
bcm
by
2015,
making
it
the
second-largest
global
LNG
exporter
after
Qatar.82
Table
5-3:
LNG
liquifaction
plants
under
construction
by
country83
Algeria
Angola
Australia
Indonesia
Papua
New
Guinea
Plant
Skikda
(rebuild)
Gassi
Touil
Angola
Pluto
Gorgon
Gladstone
LNG
Queensland
Curtis
Donggi
Senoro
PNG
LNG
Capacity
(bcm)
(mtpa)
6.1
6.4
7.1
6.5
20.4
10.6
11.6
2.7
9.0
4.5
4.7
5.2
4.8
15.0
7.8
8.5
2.0
6.6
Start
date
2013
2013
2012
2012
2014
2014
2015
2014
2014
Yet
further
down
the
line,
projects
totalling
over
500
bcm
of
additional
liquefaction
capacity
are
being
evaluated
to
come
online
in
the
period
2015-2020.
Liquefaction
projects
typically
take
four
or
more
years
to
permit
and
build,
and
are
planned
to
run
for
at
least
20
years.
These
long
lead
times
mean
the
maximum
amount
of
supply
that
can
be
attained
within
the
next
five
years
is
fairly
well
known,
although
project
delays
often
result
in
lower
capacity
than
anticipated. 84
Forecasts
ahead
of
this
five-year
window
are
subject
to
greater
uncertainty
and
it
can
be
expected
that
many
more
LNG
projects
are
reported
in
the
trade
press
than
are
ever
actually
built.
77
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
253.
78
Weijermars
et
al.,
'Unconventional
gas
research
initiative':
404.
79
IEA,
'Golden
age',
71.
80
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
14,
168,
71;
IEA,
'WEO
2011',
167.
81
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
171.
82
IEA,
'WEO
2011',
168.
84
Ibid.,
55.
83
Source:
IEA,
'Golden
age',
68.
European
Commission
analysis.
169
With
Henry
Hub
gas
trading
below
$3/Mbtu
during
the
mild
winter
of
2012,85
an
increasing
number
of
applications
for
liquefaction
projects
were
submitted
in
the
USA.
These
would
allow
applicants
to
export
domestic
supplies
of
natural
gas
to
higher
priced
overseas
markets
as
LNG.
As
well
as
the
recent
successful
request
to
build
the
Sabine
Pass
liquefaction
terminal
in
Louisiana,
seven
more
applications
for
liquefaction
projects
have
been
submitted.
If
approved
by
the
regulator,
these
projects
would
see
roughly
18%
of
current
US
gas
production
shipped
to
markets
worldwide.86
However,
the
debate
on
whether
to
allow
such
exports
is
ongoing.
Proponents
have
emphasised
job
creation
at
the
LNG
plants,
while
opponents,
such
as
industrial
consumers,
stress
the
impact
on
US
business
in
light
of
findings
that
more
natural
gas
exports
would
lead
to
higher
gas
prices.87
Notwithstanding
this
debate,
the
long-term
effectiveness
of
any
effort
to
resist
market
forces
that
naturally
incentivise
greater
US
LNG
exports
may
be
undermined
by
the
possibility
of
gas
re-exports
from
Canada.
Canada
has
an
existing
free
trade
agreement
with
the
USA
and
therefore
US
law
requires
the
Department
of
Energy
to
grant
gas
export
applications
to
Canada
without
modification
or
delay.88
Without
a
destination
clause,
cheap
US
pipeline
imports
could
either
be
directly
shipped
on
to
Asian
markets
via
Canadian
terminals,
or
be
used
to
meet
domestic
Canadian
demand,
thereby
freeing
greater
volumes
of
Canadian-produced
gas
for
export.
Moreover,
any
effort
to
keep
natural
gas
prices
in
the
USA
artificially
low
may
prove
self-defeating
in
the
long
run.
As
Section
4.3
shows,
low
gas
prices
are
as
dangerous
to
energy
security
as
high
prices
because
they
undermine
investment
in
extraction
and
production.
This
means
that,
should
gas
exports
from
the
USA
be
constrained,
low
gas
prices
would
only
be
a
transitory
phenomenon
until
the
price
mechanism
reduced
US
gas
production
to
sustainable
levels
for
domestic
demand.
Prices
would
then
rise
again.
The
dramatic
rise
in
investment
in
global
regasification
and
liquefaction
capacity
outlined
so
far
in
this
section
stands
in
contrast
to
seemingly
slow
progress
in
other
major
natural
gas
infrastructure
projects.
The
period
2010-2013
will
see
European
regasification
capacity
increase
by
roughly
25%.
Meanwhile,
only
two
major
new
interregional
pipeline
projects
Medgaz
and
the
much-awaited
Nord
Stream
pipeline
between
Russia
and
Germany
will
have
come
online
in
the
same
period.
In
the
words
of
the
IEA:
Across
regions,
LNG
regasification
terminals
seem
to
be
making
more
progress
than
pipelines.89
One
explanation
for
this
disparity
is
the
fact
that
an
increasing
proportion
of
undeveloped
gas
reserves
are
located
further
away
from
major
markets.
LNG
plays
a
vital
role
in
bringing
this
gas
to
the
consumer
when
distance,
geographical
or
political
obstacles
make
pipeline
transport
impossible.
Looking
to
the
future,
technological
85
Gregory
Meyer,
'Mild
winter
adds
to
pressure
on
US
gas',
Financial
Times,
10
January
2012,
2012.
Crooks, 'US industry hits at LNG export plan', Financial Times, 10 January 2012, 2012; US Department of Energy, 'Energy Department Approves Gulf Coast Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas: Conditional Authorization for Sabine Pass LNG Terminal Could Bring Thousands of Jobs', (Washington DC: Department of Energy, 2011). 87 EIA, 'Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports'. 'Statement of Christopher Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oil and Natural Gas, US Department of Energy ', in United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate (Washington DC: 2011). 88 Section 3(c) of the Natural Gas Act. US Congress, 'Exportation or importation of natural gas ', in 15 USC 717b (Washington DC: 1938). 89 IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets', 144, 251.
86 Ed
170
progress will continue to drive this trend. The worlds first floating LNG liquefaction project90 was commissioned by Shell in May 2011.91 Floating LNG provides a way of developing stranded gas reserves far out at sea, which would otherwise be too difficult to pipe to land-based liquefaction plants. Another explanation for the difference in growth between pipeline and LNG projects lies in their distinct investment risk profiles. Section 4.2.1 describes the investment hold-up problem faced by companies looking to invest large amounts in relatively inflexible energy infrastructure projects, such as pipelines. Such assets are subject to a great deal of locational specificity, meaning that they are dependent on the availability and price of resources from a limited geographical area. They are also usually dedicated assets that are particular to a certain customer. Dedicated assets sink investments into a pre- defined market and create a bilateral relationship between the supplier and buyer that incentivises bargaining over rents ex post. The anticipation of this dilemma complicates the decision to invest ex ante. Seen in this light, the reduced locational specificity and dedication of an LNG terminal may sometimes make it a less risky investment option, even though operating costs may be marginally higher when compared with a pipeline.92
offshore gas fields. LNG and other products are then loaded directly on to carriers for delivery to market, eliminating the need for pipelines to shore or land-based plants. 91 The Shell floating LNG vessel will be stationed at the Prelude field, off the coast of Western Australia, for an anticipated deployment period of 25 years before potentially being moved to other assets in the region. IEA, 'Golden age', 69, 177. 92 Spanjer, 'Regulatory intervention': 3252. Although the mobile nature of floating LNG vessels means that although they are very expensive investments, they cannot be considered an entirely sunken infrastructure cost in the same way that a pipeline or onshore liquefaction plant might be. 93 Jensen, 'LNG Revolution': 21. 94 Kuhn and Umbach, 'Strategic Perspectives', 18.
171
independent
and
competitive
corporate
entities.
Competition
does
exist
between
projects,
but
not
among
the
individual
participants
in
the
project
itself.95
This
traditional
model,
however,
is
being
challenged.
Contract
terms
have
loosened
on
both
price
and
volume,
and
can
be
negotiated
for
shorter
periods
of
time
(see
Figure
5-19). 96
And
increasingly,
one
or
more
joint
venture
partners
are
contracting
for
destination-flexible
volumes
that
they
can
market
independently.
The
development
of
LNG
projects
with
de-integrated
and
competitive
links
in
the
chain
over
the
last
decade
has
meant
that
cross
shipping
with
its
inherent
inefficiencies
has
become
increasingly
common.
This
is
supported
by
an
increasing
number
of
uncommitted
LNG
carriers
that
are
free
to
operate
in
the
short
term
market.
In
some
respects,
the
transformation
resembles
the
onshore
gas
market
liberalisation
process
covered
earlier
in
Sections
4.2.2
and
4.2.3.97
Figure
5-19:
Short-term
trading
in
LNG98
The
Nigerian
LNG
project
at
Bonny
Island,
which
began
commercial
operation
in
1999,
is
a
good
example
of
the
new
model.
Although
the
first
three
trains
of
the
project
were
originally
contracted
under
traditional
terms,
trains
4
and
5
were
contracted
with
Shell
and
Total
to
be
destination-flexible.
The
shift
towards
increased
destination
flexibility
is
also
reflected
in
Atlantics
LNG
venture
in
Trinidad
and
the
Egyptian
LNG
development
east
of
Alexandria.
These
facilities
liquefy
volumes
of
gas
for
sellers
at
a
fixed
fee
(so- called
LNG
tolling)
allowing
sellers
to
then
market
this
LNG
directly
to
buyers.99
The
inherent
physical
possibility
of
flexible
transport
with
LNG
coupled
with
the
changes
within
the
LNG
industry
just
described
have
resulted
in
increased
numbers
of
95
For
an
excellent
overview,
see
Jensen,
'LNG
Revolution':
5.
'The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Status & Outlook', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2003). 97 Jensen, 'LNG Revolution': 5, 29. 98 Including contracts of three years or less. Source: James T. Jensen, 'Fostering LNG Trade: Developments in LNG Trade and Pricing ', (Brussels: Energy Charter Secretariat, 2009). 99 Ibid., 23.
96 EIA,
172
varying and more complex LNG trading routes. Underpinning and driving this diversification is the price incentive to move natural gas from low to high-value markets. High prices in Asia and Europe thus represent a potential opportunity for LNG sellers who are able to undercut traditional suppliers in these markets. This process, in turn, contributes towards gas price convergence across the various regions in a global market that is growing less fragmented.100 LNG cargo arbitrage101 in the Atlantic Basin between the USA and continental Europe can be traced back to the early to mid-2000s following the start-up of the Trinidad and Nigerian projects. 102 The Atlantic Basin currently has the greatest proportion of destination-flexible volumes a full 41% of capacity in 2008 meaning that supplies to the basin (i.e. between the North American and European gas markets) can be expected to be the most reactive to demand fluctuations.103 As the Middle East is capable of acting as a swing supplier to both the Atlantic and Pacific Basins, Asian LNG markets have become increasingly involved in inter-basin arbitrage following the addition of new capacity in the region from 2005. As liquefaction capacity in the Middle East grows and the industry liberalises, Europe has found itself in an interesting competitive buying position as the closest major LNG market to major Middle Eastern supplies i.e. the market with the lowest transportation costs compared with competing Asian or US destinations. 104
100
M.
J.
Oudeman,
'Advisory
letter
on
the
emergence
of
unconventional
gas',
Letter
to
Mr
M.J.M.
Verhagen,
101
The
term
is
in
inverted
commas
because
true
arbitrage
involves
the
simultaneous
buying
and
selling
of
the same product in different markets at different prices. In spite of this, the general idea of taking advantage of a price difference between two or more markets to achieve a near risk-free profit at near zero cost holds. 102 Boriss Siliverstovs et al., 'International Market Integration for Natural Gas? A Cointegration Analysis of Gas Prices in Europe, North America and Japan', in Globalization of Natural Gas Markets Working Papers (Berlin: Deutsches Institut fr Wirtschaftsforschung, 2004), 16. 103 Jensen, 'Fostering LNG Trade', 23. 104 Jensen, 'LNG Revolution': 16-17, 21, 23, 33; Rogers, 'LNG Trade-flows', 1.
173
Figure
5-20:
2010
export
destinations
of
global
LNG
swing
suppliers105
1%
0%
14%
4%
48%
47%
67% 0%
11%
North
America 34%
30%
Europe
23%
In
the
words
of
the
IEA:
Europe,
whether
it
has
noticed
it
or
not,
is
now
effectively
competing
with
China
for
LNG. 106
The
constant
price-driven
rebalancing
of
LNG
exports
from
key
interregional
swing
suppliers,
such
as
those
shown
in
Figure
5-20,
means
that
previously
isolated
national
and
regional
gas
markets
are
increasingly
interacting
with
each
other.
Howard
Rogers
has
provided
a
detailed
account
of
the
recent
supply,
demand
and
price
dynamics
of
the
three
major
regional
gas
markets
in
North
America,
Europe
and
Asia
that
demonstrates
how
these
markets
have
become
connected
through
LNG. 107
The
following
subsection
will
describe
how
the
links
between
UK
and
US
gas
hub
prices
have
enabled
many
EU
Member
States
to
benefit
from
the
unconventional
gas
revolution
in
the
USA.
But
before
we
continue,
an
important
caveat
should
be
addressed.
Although
there
is
a
growing
consensus
that
gas
markets
are
globalising,
the
markets
are
not
fully
globalised
yet.
The
IEA
highlights
that
there
are
still
countries
that
remain
largely
insulated
from
broader
market
developments
and
that
two-thirds
of
the
worlds
gas
is
still
consumed
in
the
country
where
it
is
produced.108
Whereas
the
agency
does
105
BP,
'Statistical
review
2011'.
106
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
158.
107
Rogers,
'LNG
Trade-flows'.
108
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
158.
174
see the interregional trade in gas growing in the years ahead, it believes this growth will only be gradual from 19% of all gas consumed in 2009 to 25% in 2035. Similarly, it expects considerable price differences between the US, European and Japanese gas markets to persist into 2035, despite a gradual trend towards price convergence.109 Claims of a global market for natural gas have therefore been downplayed as over simplistic and at best premature by notable observers who highlight that the inherent physical characteristics of the commodity will always put it at a transportation disadvantage when compared with oil and oil products, dampening momentum towards the realisation of a truly global market.110
The
general
backdrop
to
the
price
coupling
seen
in
2009-2010
was
the
global
economic
crisis,
which
caused
both
pipeline
gas
and
LNG
demand
to
be
reduced
in
most
countries
of
the
world.
Seasonally
adjusted
gas
demand
data
for
OECD
Europe
showed
that
consumption
in
winter
2009-10
fell
back
to
2003-2004
levels
before
being
buoyed
by
the
especially
cold
winter
in
the
following
year.113
The
dramatic
fall
in
EU
industrial
109
IEA,
'WEO
2011',
63,
93.
110
Rogers,
'LNG
Trade-flows',
77;
Stevens,
'Hype
and
reality',
6.
111
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
158.
113
Anouk
Honor,
'Economic
recession
and
natural
gas
demand
in
Europe:
what
happened
in
2008- 2010?',
(Oxford:
Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies,
2011),
3.
112
Source:
Eurostat.
175
production
that
was
the
source
of
this
sharp
drop
in
demand
is
illustrated
in
Figure
5-21.
The
slump
in
global
gas
demand
coincided
with
an
increasing
and
unexpected
withdrawal
of
North
America
from
the
LNG
market.
Figure
5-22
below
shows
that
in
2006
the
EIA
like
most
analysts
was
expecting
the
USA
to
import
increasingly
larger
volumes
of
LNG
to
offset
falling
local
production
and
increasing
consumption.
As
recently
as
2008,
the
administration
was
reporting
in
its
Annual
Energy
Outlook
that
it
expected
US
gas
markets
to
be
tight
throughout
the
projection
because
of
competition
for
LNG
supplies
across
the
world.114
Significant
investments
were
being
made
in
regasification
facilities
and
major
importers
of
gas
were
bracing
themselves
for
a
sellers
market
in
the
foreseeable
future
in
spite
of
the
imminent
large
increase
in
Middle
Eastern
liquefaction
capacity.115
Figure
5-22:
Forecast
US
natural
gas
imports116
Instead,
total
year-on-year
US
gas
production
increased
by
4.5%
in
2008,
2.5%
in
2009
and
then
again
by
3.5%
in
2010
as
a
result
of
increased
unconventional
gas
production.117
This
reduced
LNG
import
requirements
to
a
meagre
ca.10%
of
total
US
regasification
capacity
during
that
period.118
As
a
result
of
a
significant
proportion
of
US
LNG
import
volumes
being
flexibly
sold
under
short-term
contracts, 119
the
USA
114
EIA,
'AEO
2008',
78.
115
Oudeman,
'Advisory
letter'.
116
Source:
Reference scenario figures from successive US Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook reports, 2004-2011. 117 Source: EIA. 118 IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets', 14. 119 They represented 80% of US trade in LNG in 2003 and 70% in 2004. Don Maxwell and Zhen Zhu, 'Natural gas prices, LNG transport costs, and the dynamics of LNG imports', Energy Economics 33, no 2 (2011): 220.
176
effectively
became
a
large
virtual
gas
exporter,
with
LNG
cargoes
originally
destined
for
US
shores
diverted
to
other
customers.120
Figure
5-23:
US
natural
gas
imports
and
exports121
In fact, not only was the USA a large virtual exporter of natural gas, but its actual natural gas exports were also growing (see Figure 5-23 above). The overwhelming majority of these exports were dispatched via trunk pipelines to Canada and Mexico. However, recently released data also reveals a startling two-fold jump in LNG exports in the year 2010 (Figure 5-24). The figures are made even more surprising when considering some of the new export destinations for US LNG. The USA had only one operational LNG liquefaction plant in 2010,122 and its location in Alaska made it unsuitable for supplying the UK and Spanish markets. In fact, the growth in LNG exports in 2010 was driven by re-exports: shipments that were previously imported, offloaded into above-ground LNG storage tanks at regasification terminals and then subsequently reloaded on to new tankers for delivery to other countries.123 This highly irregular practice is a testament to the scale of the disruption to the established global supply and demand equilibrium for natural gas during the period.
120
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
181.
121
Source:
EIA, 'U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports: 2010', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2011). 122 ConocoPhilips Kenai LNG plant. 123 EIA, 'Natural Gas Imports & Exports'.
177
Figure
5-24:
US
LNG
exports
and
gas
prices124
On the other side of the Atlantic, newly completed receiving terminals in Wales, France and Italy enabled a number of EU Member States to absorb some of the LNG originally earmarked for the US market from swing suppliers such as Trinidad and Tobago. However, combined with the large increase in liquefaction capacity from Qatar,125 the displaced US supplies still occasioned a fall in European spot prices that started mid 2008 and continued well into 2009. Figure 5-25 below shows that the worlds two major spot markets both saw extremely low prices in 2009 ($4/MBtu at the US Henry Hub and $5/MBtu at the UK National Balancing Point).126 It also reveals a remarkably close correlation between those two markets from early 2009 to early 2010 a price coupling that was a direct result of both saturated supply and a largely shared pool of LNG suppliers that were able to feed these two markets.
124
Source:
Ibid.
125
105
bcm
of
global
liquefaction
capacity
came
online
over
the
2009-2010
timeframe.
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
170-1.
126
Ibid.,
196.
178
Figure
5-25:
Henry
Hub
and
National
Balancing
Point
gas
prices127
16 $/MMBtu 14 $/MMBtu 12 $/MMBtu 10 $/MMBtu 8 $/MMBtu 6 $/MMBtu 4 $/MMBtu 2 $/MMBtu 0 $/MMBtu
08/Jul/08 13/Jul/09 17/Mar/08 19/Mar/09 25/Mar/10 20/Jul/10 13/May/08 18/May/09 25/May/10 25/Nov/08 02/Nov/09 30/Nov/09 09/Nov/10 18/Feb/08 19/Feb/09 25/Feb/10 23/Dec/08 30/Dec/09 05/Aug/08 10/Aug/09 17/Aug/10 07/Dec/10 02/Sep/08 30/Sep/08 07/Sep/09 14/Sep/10 10/Feb/11 11/Mar/11 21/Jan/08 22/Jan/09 28/Jan/10 10/Jun/08 15/Jun/09 22/Jun/10 15/Apr/08 20/Apr/09 27/Apr/10 12/Jan/11 28/Oct/08 05/Oct/09 12/Oct/10 08/Apr/11
Writing
during
this
period
of
Atlantic
Basin
price
convergence,
some
believed
the
supply-and-demand
fundamentals
underpinning
this
buyers
market
for
gas
would
sustain
it
until
the
middle,
or
even
the
end,
of
the
decade.128
In
fact,
the
close
correlation
between
Henry
Hub
and
NBP
prices
came
to
an
end
around
April
2010
as
a
result
of
unforeseen
demand-side
events
that
effectively
reduced
oversupply.
The
major
factor
in
Europe
was
the
extremely
cold
weather
in
the
first
three
and
the
last
two
months
of
2010,
which
broke
records
established
over
many
decades
in
several
countries.
Uncertainty
and
supply
disruptions
resulting
from
the
Arab
Spring
over
the
course
of
2011
were
other
factors
which
continued
to
push
European
hub
gas
prices
away
from
low
Henry
Hub
levels
and
towards
the
higher
German
border
price
an
indicator
of
oil- linked
contract
gas
prices
in
North
West
Europe.
More
significantly,
Asian
LNG
demand
rose
by
18%
in
2010,
removing
perhaps
half
of
the
global
LNG
surplus.129
This
strong
trend
would
continue
into
2011
as
natural
gas
imports
to
Japan
increased
sharply
in
order
to
offset
the
shortfall
in
baseload
nuclear
power
generation
resulting
from
the
Fukushima
disaster.
In
2011,
Kansai
Electric
almost
quadrupled
its
LNG
imports
from
Trinidad
and
Tobago
through
the
use
of
short- term
contracts,
from
58
240
mt
the
year
before
to
216
696
mt.
The
shipments
were
unusual
because
of
their
longer-than-usual
voyage
compared
with
other
suppliers,
but
this
concretely
illustrates
how
the
interregional
flexibility
of
LNG
is
enabling
the
global
energy
system
to
more
easily
absorb
supply
shocks
and
regional
markets
to
become
increasingly
interlinked.130
The
corollary
is
that
spot
prices
in
Europe
can
be
expected
to
climb
should
the
trend
of
growing
Asian
consumption
continue
without
sufficient
new
gas
supplies
entering
the
global
market.
127
Source:
European
Commission,
'Quarterly
Report
on
European
Gas
Markets,
October
2010
-
December
the rapid decline of European domestic production. IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets', 142. it will be many years before the tide starts to turn the other way (to a sellers market). In the view of the Energy Council, this could take 10 years or more rather than 5 years. Oudeman 'Advisory letter'. 129 Stern and Rogers, 'Transition to Hub-Based Pricing', 8. 130 Takeo Kumagai, 'Japan's Kansai Electric hikes Trinidad LNG imports Tokyo', Platts 2011.
179
Figure
5-26:
Global
natural
gas
prices131
Looking at the broader context, Figure 5-26 shows how the relationship between North American, European and Japanese spot prices appears to have changed since 2009. Before that time, they predominantly traded in a narrow band, with temporary price differences reflecting local conditions, such as storage. However, in 2009 and 2010, the differences have grown and appear to be more lasting, with European prices hovering somewhere between the low US prices and higher predominantly oil-indexed Japanese LNG prices. James Jensen calls this the emergence of a bipolar gas-pricing world, where Atlantic basin arbitrage puts downward pressure on European prices.132 By this view, regional gas prices reflect relative market exposures to: a) the unit price of oil at the top end: and b) low Henry Hub prices. As for Europe, a modest but persistent difference between lower NBP prices and higher German border prices reflects both the effects of oil-indexation and deep systemic factors that continue to hinder the liberalisation of the EU gas market.133 It is a reminder that, although many Member States in North West Europe were able to profit from the availability of cheap LNG in 2009 and 2010, the remainder of the continent received only small amounts of that additional supply as the EU gas system remains relatively fragmented. Buyers in Central and Eastern Europe paid on average 0.55/MWh more for their gas than their Western European counterparts in 2008, a figure that sharply
131
Source:
BP,
'Statistical
review
2011'.
Note:
cif
=
cost
+
insurance
+
freight
(average
prices).
132
James
T.
Jensen,
'LNG
-
Creating
a
World
Gas
Market?'
(paper
presented
at
the
MIT
Energy
Initiative
Fall
Research
Conference,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
2011).
133
The
situation
at
the
time
of
writing
is
foretold
in
Frisch,
'European
Gas
Pricing
Problems',
14.
180
increased to 4.86/MWh in 2009.134 This two-tier price system for natural gas in the EU135 is the topic of the next section of this report.
134
European
Commission,
'Non
paper:
The
internal
energy
market
time
to
switch
into
higher
gear',
ed.
Directorate-General
for
Energy
(2011).
135
Frisch,
'European
Gas
Pricing
Problems',
1.
136
Kanai,
'Decoupling
Oil
and
Gas
Prices',
2;
Jonathan
Stern,
'Continental
European
Long-Term
Gas
Contracts:
is
a
transition
away
from
oil
product-linked
pricing
inevitable
and
imminent?',
(Oxford:
Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies,
2009);
Jonathan
Stern,
'Is
there
a
rationale
for
the
continuing
link
to
oil
product
prices
in
Continental
European
long-term
gas
contracts?
',
(Oxford:
Oxford
Institute
for
Energy
Studies,
2007);
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
2.
137
In
spite
of
this
confidentiality,
publicly
available
border
price
data
has
allowed
the
key
variables
of
these
contracts
to
be
inferred
over
time.
138
IEA,
'WEO
2011',
345.
139
Kanai,
'Decoupling
Oil
and
Gas
Prices',
2;
Stern,
'European
Long-Term
Gas
Contracts';
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
2.
140
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
2.
141
See,
for
example,
IEA,
'Golden
age',
22.
181
Alternatively, gas prices may be set freely by the forces of supply and demand for natural gas itself not oil in a paradigm known as spot trading or gas-to-gas competition. Spot trading has the theoretical advantage of allocating resources and setting prices more efficiently than oil-indexation. This does not necessarily mean that consumer prices will always be cheaper,142 but by allowing the price mechanism to more directly incentivise gas production, dampen consumption and reallocate physical supplies when supplies get tighter, spot pricing helps to ensure stable and sustainable prices for both consumers and producers of natural gas (see Section 4.3). Spot pricing has become prevalent in an increasing number of liberalised markets the world over, including North America, the United Kingdom and Australia. The IEA estimates that one-third of the worlds gas may be priced in gas-to-gas competition. In spite of recent efforts to liberalise the EU gas market, however, just one quarter of continental European gas is spot traded. Hold-out advocates of oil-indexation maintain that a continuing lack of liquidity and depth on certain EU gas trading hubs may lead to excessive volatility and the risk of price manipulation. Oil-indexation, by this view, constrains volatility through averaging provisions and by providing a link to the deep, liquid and global market for oil.143 Until recently, discussion of the merits and demerits of oil-indexation in Europe was, to some extent, an academic exercise. The market power of many sellers of pipeline- imported gas meant that they were largely able to decide the terms of its sale and these sellers preferred oil-indexation. However, this situation changed as the gradual process of liberalisation impacted on gas market structures in continental Europe. The advent of competition and third-party access means that customers have increasing access to alternatives to the oil-linked supplies once forced upon them by their traditional utility providers. This may explain International Gas Union data showing that the relative share of spot pricing in European wholesale gas price formation increased from 15.5% to more than 28% between 2005 and 2009, whereas oil indexation decreased from 79.1% to 67% in the same period.144
142
If
a
general
and
durable
transition
to
more
spot
indexed
prices
were
to
occur,
the
result
is
likely
to
be
lower gas prices on average in Europe in the near to medium term, (at least for some types of consumers) while spare supply capacity exists in the European market. But in the long term, gas prices could actually turn out to be higher at certain times than they would otherwise have been; for example, strong demand during cold winters or through a surge in gas-fired power demand could see prices rise steeply. Ibid., 76. 143 Ibid., 72-75. 144 Mike Fulwood, 'Trends in Wholesale Gas Price Formation Mechanisms: results on the 2009 IGU Survey ', International Gas Union Magazine 2011, International Gas Union, 'Wholesale Gas Price Formation: A global review of drivers and regional trends ', (Oslo: International Gas Union, 2011).
182
Table
5-4:
European
spot
gas
prices
as
a
percentage
of
oil-indexed
gas
prices
in
/MWh145
January
2011
December
2010
November
2010
October
2010
September
2010
August
2010
July
2010
June
2010
May
2010
April
2010
March
2010
February
2010
January
2010
Average
2010
TTF
average
22.24
24.15
19.50
18.56
18.95
18.12
19.52
19.28
16.78
13.53
11.99
13.72
14.48
17.38
NWE
GCI
25.84
26.13
25.98
25.54
25.07
24.21
23.55
22.62
21.80
21.56
21.00
20.74
20.02
23.19
TTF/GCI
86%
92%
75%
73%
76%
75%
83%
85%
77%
63%
57%
66%
72%
75%
With
legal
and
technical
barriers
to
growing
volumes
of
spot-traded
gas
disappearing,146
the
sharp
fall
in
spot
prices
witnessed
in
2009
and
2010
occasioned
widespread
dissatisfaction
amongst
the
utilities
locked
into
buying
gas
on
oil-indexed
terms
as
they
were
gradually
priced
out
of
the
market.147
Table
5-4
above
shows
that
spot
gas
prices
on
the
Dutch
TTF
trading
hub
were
an
average
of
25%
lower
than
oil- indexed
gas
prices
for
North
West
Europe
over
2010
and
January
2011.148
With
spot
prices
so
low,
midstream
gas
players
sought
to
replace
as
much
of
their
oil-indexed
wholesale
volumes
with
spot
gas
as
was
possible
within
the
limits
imposed
by
infrastructure
and
their
existing
take-or-pay
contracts.
As
a
result
of
the
abundant
supplies
on
the
spot
market,
even
after
buyers
had
reduced
their
nominations
of
oil- indexed
gas
to
the
minimum
off-take
limits
and
replaced
the
difference
with
spot
volumes,
a
large
disparity
between
spot
and
oil-indexed
prices
still
existed.
This
forced
utilities
into
either
selling
gas
to
consumers
at
a
loss
or
being
undercut
by
competitors
able
to
source
cheaper
gas
from
LNG
terminals
or
the
UK
market.149
Some
estimates
put
pipeline
imports
in
Contract
Year
2008/2009
at
92%
of
take-or-pay
levels,
implying
that
some
midstream
players
may
have
been
compelled
to
risk
contractual
penalties
because
of
these
testing
market
conditions.150
the
Table
shows
TTF
day-ahead
prices
compared
with
the
Platts
North
West
Europe
Gas
Contract
indicator
(NWE
GCI),
which
indicates
a
typical
price
for
long-term
oil-indexed
supplies.
The
final
column
shows
TTF
as
a
percentage
of
NWE
GCI.
Source:
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
5.
146
Physically
traded
volumes
on
the
seven
continental
spot
markets
Zeebrugge
(Belgium),
TTF
(the
Netherlands),
NCG
(Germany),
Gaspool
(Germany),
PEG
(France),
PSV
(Italy)
and
CEGH
(Austria)
increased
from
just
over
100
bcm
in
2007
to
almost
300
bcm
in
2009.
IEA,
'WEO
2010',
207.
147
Rogers,
'LNG
Trade-flows',
1;
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
33.
The
advances
in
gas
market
liberalisation
currently
being
implemented
in
Europe
at
large,
but
in
Germany
in
particular
are
playing
an
important
part
in
creating
the
changes
in
the
European
gas
market
environment
which
can
now
be
observed.
Frisch,
'European
Gas
Pricing
Problems'.
148
For
an
in-depth
overview,
see
also
European
Commission,
'2009-2010
Report
on
progress
in
creating
the
internal
gas
and
electricity
market',
ed.
Directorate-General
for
Energy
(Luxembourg:
Office
for
Official
Publications
of
the
European
Communities,
2011).
149
For
a
more
complete
explanation
of
this
process,
see
Rogers,
'LNG
Trade-flows',
24.
150
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
23.
145
Note:
183
Understandably, the situation placed enormous pressure on utilities facing the rapid erosion of their market share. Caught between their long-term contractual obligations and pressure from their (principally industrial) customers to supply cheaper gas, these utilities have in turn pressed their suppliers for contract renegotiations on price and volumes.151 As Howard Rogers writes, Europes newfound ability to substitute pipeline imports with cheaper LNG had partially undermined the national incumbent gas purchaser in Europe.152 Exemplifying this point, Dr Bernhard Reutersberg, the chairman of E.ON Ruhrgas, made a strong and public plea to adapt long-term contracts to the changed circumstances in October 2009.153 In response, suppliers such as GasTerra, Statoil and, in the end, Gazprom made several concessions to their customers. Sources suggest that several companies were allowed to roll over volumes not taken below minimum take-or-pay levels to future years. GDF Suez, Distrigas and Swissgas were granted a partial decoupling from oil-based pricing by GasTerra during their 2009 contract extension negotiations, and Statoils customers were allowed to link up to 25% of their volumes to spot prices in early 2010. It was only in February 2010 that Gazprom and E.ON Ruhrgas announced that they had agreed on linking 15% of their volumes to spot prices for the following three years.154 Rebounding crude prices in 2010 will have buoyed Gazproms revenues, but figures from the IEA reveal that its hard-line strategy on oil-indexation may have cost it in the longer run: Gazproms share of EU gas imports declined a substantial 4% in 2010 as it gradually lost market share to competitors more willing to spot-index their pricing formulas.155 The steady recovery of European hub prices since then has made the benefits of spot- indexation less apparent, blunting the immediate competitive challenge to oil- indexation. In spite of this near-term illusion of stability, however, the current balance of expert opinion suggests that the EU will move slowly away from oil-indexation because of the persisting risk of future exposure to discount hub prices.156 Jonathan Stern has been one of the most prominent advocates of this view. In 2007, he questioned the rationale of the continuing linkage of prices in long-term gas contracts to those of oil products.157 Then, in 2009, he argued that a transition away from oil product-related pricing was inevitable and imminent, and that the endpoint of the transition would be hub-based prices.158 Commenting on poll results showing that only 16% of respondents at the 2010 European Autumn Gas Conference agreed to the proposition that recent pricing and contractual changes towards spot-indexation were temporary, Stern wrote:
151
IEA,
'Oil
and
Gas
Markets',
195.
152
Rogers,
'LNG
Trade-flows',
1.
153
Bernhard
Reutersberg,
'Key
issues
to
Address
Sustainabie
Supply
and
Demand
of
Natural
Gas'
(paper
presented at the 24th World Gas Conference, Buenos Aires 2009). See also Klaus Schfer, 'Natural gas markets in Europe - Challenges and developments' (paper presented at the ONS 2010 - Secure Sustain Supply Stavanger, 2010). 154IEA, 'Oil and Gas Markets', 200, Kanai, 'Decoupling Oil and Gas Prices', 3; Stern and Rogers, 'Transition to Hub-Based Pricing', 26. 155 IEA, 'WEO 2011', 345. 156 Jensen, 'Creating a World Gas Market?'. See also Frisch, 'European Gas Pricing Problems', 1; Kanai, 'Decoupling Oil and Gas Prices', 39; Oudeman, 'Advisory letter'. 157 Stern, 'Continuing link to oil product prices'. 158 Stern, 'European Long-Term Gas Contracts'.
184
What we are observing here is a fundamental mindset change on the part of the traditional buyers from one which was appropriate for those in a dominant position with a relatively captive market, to one which increasingly reflects the competitive environment of access to liquid gas hubs and the trading culture of European utilities.159
159
Stern
and
Rogers,
'Transition
to
Hub-Based
Pricing',
27.
185
To
answer
these
questions,
the
authors
present
not
a
forecast
or
projection
but
an
exploration
of
uncertainty
around
the
future
of
shale
gas.
Indeed,
the
potential
for
development
and
production
of
this
resource
cannot
be
considered
in
isolation
from
the
existing
fuels,
trade
flows,
technologies
and
infrastructures
that
make
up
the
global
energy
system.
The
extent
to
which
shale
gas
can
meaningfully
penetrate
this
system
is
contingent
on
the
dynamic
interactions
of
a
considerable
number
of
supply-
and
demand-side
drivers
and
techno-economic
developments.
The
methodological
approach
followed
in
this
chapter
is
a
two-step
analysis
carried
out
from
an
energy
system
perspective.
First,
we
select
the
key
factors
affecting
future
gas
supply
and
demand
and,
as
a
corollary,
the
pace
and
scale
of
unconventional
gas
development.
A
discussion
of
these
factors
will
be
rendered
into
a
set
of
workable
assumptions
on
what
can
be
considered
the
primary
determinants
of
future
shale
gas
development.
In
particular,
we
focus
on
the
size
and
production
costs
of
shale
gas
resources,
as
well
as
global
economic
growth
as
a
driver
of
energy
demand.
A
similar
analysis
was
recently
carried
out
by
the
IEA2;
the
key
similarities
and
differences
are
elaborated
in
Annex
I.
A
model
is
then
used
to
construct
a
set
of
possible
scenarios
for
future
shale
gas
development.
The
different
trajectories
borne
out
by
these
scenarios
will
be
analysed
and
compared,
with
a
particular
focus
on
three
main
outputs
production,
interregional
trade
and
final
use.
In
doing
so,
it
is
hoped
that
light
will
be
shed
on
the
conditions
under
which
shale
gas
can
be
integrated
into
the
global
energy
system.3
1
For
example,
see
IEA,
'Golden
age'.
2
IEA,
'Golden
Rules
for
a
Golden
Age
of
Gas',
in
World
Energy
Outlook
(Paris:
OECD
2012).
3
Despite
striving
for
a
systemic
treatment
of
factors
affecting
shale
gas
development,
it
is
invariably
the
case
that
not
all
of
them
can
be
considered.
Aspects
such
as
environmental
impacts
or
legal
and
regulatory
issues
are
not
considered
in
the
present
analysis.
186
As
the
model
used
in
the
analysis
divides
Europe
into
Eastern
and
Western
parts
(EEU
and
WEU),
any
reference
to
Europe
as
a
whole
in
the
subsequent
text
will
be
taken
to
mean
the
sum
of
all
of
the
countries
in
these
two
groupings
(see
Box
6-1
below).
Box
6-1:
ETSAP-TIAM
and
its
main
characteristics
The
ETSAP-TIMES
Integrated
Assessment
(ETSAP-TIAM)
model
is
a
multi-region
partial
equilibrium
model
of
the
energy
systems
of
the
entire
world
divided
in
several
regions,
linked
by
trade
variables
of
the
main
energy
forms
(coal,
oil,
gas)
and
of
emission
permits.
It
has
been
initially
developed
and
is
maintained
by
the
Energy
Technology
Systems
Analysis
Programme
(ETSAP),
a
consortium
of
member
country
teams
that
maintain
and
expand
the
analytical
capabilities
of
the
MARKAL/TIMES
family
of
models.3
These
models
are
used
by
diverse
institutions,
such
as
the
IEA
and
EIA,
to
generate
in-depth
national
and
multi-country
analyses
of
energy
systems
several
decades
into
the
future.
The
ETSAP-TIAM
model
used
in
this
assessment
is
the
version
distributed
to
the
ETSAP
partners
(such
as
DG
JRC)
in
April
2011,
then
further
developed
by
JRC
towards
a
more
detailed
and
updated
representation
of
the
global
gas
market.
The
ETSAP-TIAM
model
used
in
this
assessment
contains
detailed
descriptions
of
technologies
and
energy
flows
used
in
all
the
different
sectors
of
the
energy
system
e.g.
residential,
industrial,
agricultural,
etc..
The
interaction
of
these
variables,
which
number
in
the
millions,
is
driven
by
an
underlying
mathematical
structure;
in
a
process
of
linear
optimisation
an
intertemporal
dynamic
partial
equilibrium
on
energy
markets
is
computed.
The
model
chooses
energy
supply
services
at
minimum
global
cost
by
simultaneously
making
decisions
on
equipment
investment,
equipment
operation,
primary
energy
supply
and
energy
trade.4
By
incorporating
the
whole
of
the
energy
supply
chain,
TIMES
is
a
vertically-integrated
model
of
the
entire
energy
system.
The
ETSAP-TIAM
model
is
particularly
amenable
to
exploring
possible
long-term
energy
futures
based
on
different
sets
of
assumptions
or
scenarios
about
the
future
drivers
of
the
energy
system.
This
makes
it
particularly
amenable
to
exploring
possible
long-term
energy
futures
based
on
different
sets
of
assumptions
or
scenarios
about
the
future
drivers
of
the
energy
system.
Beginning
with
a
base
year,
in
this
case
2005,
the
model
is
furnished
with
real
data
on
the
processes,
commodities
and
flows
making
up
the
energy
economy.
Countries
are
grouped
into
15
regions.
For
each
region
ETSAP-TIAM
contains
explicit
descriptions
of
more
than
1
000
technologies
and
100
commodities
(energy
forms,
materials,
emissions),
logically
interrelated
in
a
Reference
Energy
System
covering
extraction,
processing,
conversion,
trading
and
end-uses
of
all
energy
forms.
Logical
inter-relationships
exist
between:
Technologies
(or
processes):
these
represent
physical
devices
that
transform
commodities
into
other
commodities.
There
are
primary
processes
that
come
directly
from
the
source
(e.g.
upstream
or
imports
of
gas)
or
processes
that
transform
these
commodities
(e.g.
refineries
that
produce
oil
products);
Commodities:
these
are
energy
carriers,
energy
services,
materials,
monetary
flows
and
emissions.
A
commodity
is
generally
produced
by
some
process(es)
and/or
consumed
by
other
process(es);
Flows:
this
is
the
amount
of
a
given
commodity
produced
or
consumed
by
a
given
process.
For
example,
natural
gas
is
a
commodity,
whereas
natural
gas
for
combined
cycle
turbine
is
a
commodity
flow.5
Trade variables of energy commodities (and of emission permits) link the regions, permitting energy forms such as coal, crude oil, petroleum products and gas/LNG to be endogenously traded.
3
www.iea-etsap.org
5Ibid.:
14.
4Loulou
and
Labriet,
'ETSAP
TIAM'.
187
AFR Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Other Africa. AUS CAN CHI Australia, New Zealand, Oceania Canada China
CSA Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Other Latin America EEU Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia (Kosovo), Slovenia, Slovakia FSU Armenia, Azerbaidjian, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russian Federation IND JPN India Japan
MEA Bahrain, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Turkey, Cyprus MEX Mexico ODA Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam and Other Asia SKO USA South Korea United States of America
WEU Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom As a partial equilibrium model, ETSAP-TIAM is vulnerable to the standard criticisms of the simplifying assumptions made in economics. For example, linear optimisation means that the system chooses technologies that are most cost-effective, unencumbered by endogenous political or socioeconomic constraints. However, even if the model assumes competitive energy markets with perfect foresight, its choice of fuels, technologies, investments and trade patterns is, in fact, subject to many constraints, such as supply bounds (in the form of supply curves) for the primary resources;
188
technical
constraints
governing
the
creation;
operation
and
abandonment
of
each
technology;
balance
constraints
for
all
energy
forms
and
emissions;
timing
of
investment
payments
and
other
cash
flows;
and
the
satisfaction
of
a
set
of
demands
for
energy
services
in
all
sectors
of
the
economy.
(Energy
demand
is
endogenous,
whereas
energy
service
demand
is
exogenous
aspects
such
as
passenger
kilometres
or
residential
space
heat,
which
are
projected
by
a
set
of
drivers
such
as
GDP
growth
and
population,
number
of
households
and
sectoral
outputs.)
It
is
important
to
remember
that
no
modelling
effort
can
lay
claim
to
a
completely
accurate
or
even
comprehensive
account
of
the
energy
system,
let
alone
provide
a
fully
defensible
prediction
of
its
future.
Thus,
the
main
goal
of
using
the
ETSAP-TIAM
model
is
not
to
forecast
the
future
but
to
explore
the
possibilities
presented
by
shale
gas
in
ways
that
can
support
decision-making.
Used
in
this
way,
the
ETSAP-TIAM
model
is
an
appropriate
and
powerful
tool
of
analysis
for
considering
the
broader
trends
affecting
the
future
global
energy
mix.
189
Figure
6-1:
Assumptions
on
the
global,
technically
recoverable
reserves
of
shale
gas
It is useful to consider these unconventional gas resource estimates in the context of the worlds existing conventional gas reserves. Figure 6-2 below reveals that the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Middle East region retain the largest conventional natural gas reserves. Russia in particular possesses a vast potential for expanding and developing its conventional reserves, which are remotely located and underdeveloped (such as in the Yamal Peninsula or other parts of eastern Siberia). Hence, the projected increase in exports from these two regions is a significant consideration when gauging the future penetration of indigenous unconventional gas, particularly in import- dependent regions such as Europe. The increase in exports from the FSU and the Middle East, in turn, relies on capacity constraints and the price differential between imports and potential indigenous production. In Europe it is down to developments in regional gas pricing, competition from other markets and the corresponding expansion of flexible LNG cargoes, which will crucially affect the quantities of gas bought under long- term piped gas contracts. Finally, other unconventional fuels may look set to add to the global reserve base; unconventional oil resources, including extra-heavy oil and kerogen oil, have a large potential; however, many technical, commercial and political obstacles need to be overcome before they can be fully developed.6 The systemic approach adopted here for the scenario analysis means that, even if the specific uncertainty surrounding unconventional oil is not explored here, any of the following scenarios takes into account the potential competition between unconventional oil and unconventional gas.
6
IEA,
'WEO
2011'.
190
Figure
6-2:
Global
conventional
gas
reserves
(recoverable,
enhanced
recovery
and
new
discovery)
Conventional and unconventional gas production costs The assumptions about the costs of producing conventional gas resources by 2020 are noted in Figure 6-3, taking into account the variable costs of exploiting existing reserves, as well as developing new fields. Shale gas production costs have been discussed in Section 5.1, as well as in Chapter 3. Clearly there is much variation in the costs of finding, developing and producing unconventional gas, which depend on prevailing market conditions, the characteristics of the well, the regulatory context and the profile of the operating company. For the scenario analysis, the cost estimations have been based partly on the analysis of other sources provided in Section 5.1.4 and partly from the final cost assumptions made in Section 3.3. The caveats and assumptions made for these figures have been discussed in the relevant section and need not be elaborated upon here. The conservative, most likely and optimistic estimates were respectively employed in ten-year intervals (2010- 2030) to capture the reduction in costs attributed to technological development.
191
Figure
6-3:
Conventional
gas
production
cost
estimates
in
20207
Table
6-1:
Total
unit
production
cost
per
shale
gas
well
in
Europe
without
liquids
/GJ
2010
2020
2030
Optimistic
4.56
3.23
2.68
Most
likely
7.22
5.24
4.42
Conservative
20.78
15.40
13.17
To
better
capture
regional
differences
in
production
costs,
the
authors
have
constructed
a
modifying
factor
based
on
the
EIAs
Financial
Reporting
System
(FRS),
which
is
a
statistical
database
on
the
functional
and
financial
performance
of
major
US
energy- producing
companies,
including
their
operations
abroad.8
Data
on
the
upstream
cost
of
finding,
developing
and
producing
gas
and
oil
wells
were
used
to
derive
a
total
per-unit
production
cost
for
the
six
regions
for
which
data
is
available
(see
Table
6-2).
These
were
compared
against
a
European
base
case
to
construct
multipliers
for
these
respective
regions.
The
rationale
for
using
this
dataset
is
that
the
expertise
of
US
drilling
and
service
companies
is
currently
a
key
ingredient
for
initially
exploring
shale
gas
resources
in
regions
of
interest.
Most
of
the
companies
reporting
through
the
FRS
have
7
The
average
is
the
mean
value
of
the
minimum
and
maximum
costs
of
exploiting
three
categories
of
reserves: recoverable, enhanced recover, and undiscovered/new discovery For each category, a three- step supply curve is assumed, where the minimum cost is the cost of the lowest step of the supply curve for recoverable reserves, while maximum costs are for the highest step of enhanced recovery. 8 EIA, 'Database: The Financial Reporting System Public Data', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2012).Bear in mind that FRS companies have represented 40-60% of the total US energy- producing industry over the last 30 years; therefore, aggregate production statistics of FRS companies are only a representative sample of the total
192
portfolios
that
include
shale
gas
exploration
activities
in
different
countries
(alongside
their
conventional
oil
and
gas
assets).
Table
6-2:
Upstream
costs
for
FRS
companies,
2006-2008
and
2007-20099
$/boe
United
States
of
America
Canada
Europe
Former
Soviet
Union
Africa
Middle
East
Other
Eastern
Hemisphere
Other
Western
Hemisphere
2006-8
41.49
38.75
72.32
16.7
42.24
17.09
21.18
33.88
2007-9
33.76
24.76
53.37
20.96
45.32
16.88
16.56
26.64
Modifying
factor
0.63
0.46
1.00
0.39
0.85
0.32
0.31
0.50
Resource
and
data
availability
issues
preclude
a
more
accurate
representation
of
regional
differences
in
shale
gas
production
costs,
so
the
interpretation
of
this
data
should
be
approached
with
the
usual
level
of
caution. 10
Even
so,
the
upstream
production
costs
incurred
by
major
US
energy
firms
represent
a
proxy,
albeit
an
imperfect
one,
for
the
relative
level
of
investment
needed
in
each
respective
region.
As
the
upstream
costs
noted
above
are
for
conventional
oil
and
gas
wells,
extrapolating
these
to
shale
gas
requires
a
differentiation
of
the
key
cost
components
of
conventional
gas
versus
unconventional
shale
gas
production. 11
In
technological
terms,
the
key
difference
between
conventional
and
shale
gas
extraction
lies
in
the
latters
use
of
horizontal
drilling
and
hydraulic
fracturing
techniques
for
targeting
gas
trapped
in
continuous
rock
formations.
Compared
with
conventional
gas,
this
requires
lengthier
wellbores,
a
greater
amount
of
land,
more
water
(or
drilling
mud),
more
frequent
truck
trips
and
expenses
unique
to
fracturing
and
directional
drilling.
To
provide
a
conservative
representation
of
these
costs,
the
modifying
factor
above
has
only
been
applied
to
the
proportion
of
expenses
in
Chapter
2
that
represent
additional
costs
required
to
drill
and
develop
a
horizontal,
hydro-fracked
shale
gas
well.
These
are
essentially
the
day
rate
costs
discussed
in
Table
3-16,
which
cover
the
rig
rental,
directional
drilling
cost,
mud
servicing,
and
bit
and
evaluation
expenditure.
Together,
these
components
are
estimated
to
make
up
around
25%
of
total
per-well
production
costs
of
shale
gas
in
2015
(followed
by
18%
and
14%
in
2025
and
2030
respectively,
reflecting
technological
learning
curves
and
greater
economies
of
scale).
The
9
EIA,
'Performance
Profiles
of
Major
Energy
Producers',
(Washington,
DC:
2009).
Note:
Upstream
costs
are finding costs plus lifting costs. Natural gas was converted to equivalent barrels of oil at 0.178 barrels per thousand cubic feet. Sum of elements may not add to total due to independent rounding. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-28 (Financial Reporting System). 10 Indeed, upstream costs for US energy firms operating abroad may not reflect average costs for all market players in a given region. Moreover, there is considerable variation in cost components within the different regions that may influence total production expenditure. Notably, operating expenditures and production taxes vary due to different labour, service, regulatory and infrastructural constraints in different countries. 11 One caveat underpinning this approach is that the productivity of shale gas wells in the USA are higher than for conventional wells, meaning a potentially lower per-unit production cost over the entire life of a shale well despite more substantial capital expenditures. Bonakdarpour et al., 'Economic and employment contributions', 8.
193
calculations
have
yielded
the
following
costs
of
shale
gas
for
the
15
world
regions
in
2020.
Figure
6-4:
Shale
gas
production
cost
estimates
for
2020
As shown, conservative cost estimates drive up the range of uncertainty. For the energy model used to carry out the scenario analysis, supply curves have been defined by assuming that a proportion of the estimated reserves provided in Chapter 2 can be developed at a certain cost. In an optimistic case of high proven reserves and low production costs for example, 45% of potential shale gas reserves in any region are set to be extractable at the optimistic production cost described in Table 6-1, while 50% are set to be extractable at the most likely production cost and 5% are set to be extractable at the conservative production cost. Conversely, a conservative scenario of low proven reserves and high production cost will make only 5% of reserves extractable at the optimistic cost, with 50% extractable at the most likely cost and 45% at the conservative production cost. 12 Figure 6-5 below shows how, in an optimistic case, the USA can produce around 30 000 bcm of shale gas resources at around $5.00 per gigajoule (GJ), followed by an additional 30 000 bcm at a production cost of around $9.00/GJ. On the contrary, in the conservative case, the USA can produce around 1 000 bcm of shale gas resources at around $5.00/GJ, followed by an additional 9,000 bcm at a production cost of around $9.00/GJ.
the
ETSAP-TIAM
model
optimises
the
balance
of
fuels
and
technologies
based
on
cost,
just
considering
scenarios
of
highest
or
lowest
figures
would
either
preclude
commercially
viable
shale
gas
production
in
any
region
(including
the
USA
and
Canada)
or
on
the
contrary,
assume
that
shale
gas
is
strongly
competitive
in
any
region.
The
supply
curve
approach
leads
to
a
more
realistic
assumption,
where
even
a
conservative
scenario
can
yield
some
level
of
production.
12
As
194
It
is
informative
to
compare
the
two
shale
gas
supply
curves
below
with
that
used
in
another
notable
modelling
study
by
MIT.13
The
curves
used
in
the
aforementioned
study
lie
clearly
between
the
two
curves
used
in
the
present
analysis;
that
is
to
say,
the
curves
used
here
cover
a
wider
range.
In
particular,
the
optimistic
case
used
in
the
present
study
assumes
three
times
more
low-cost
shale
gas
than
the
MIT
study
does.
The
supply
curves
in
the
present
study
therefore
represent
more
extreme
cases
on
both
sides,
reflecting
the
great
uncertainty
in
the
data
that
has
been
identified
and
addressed
by
earlier
chapters.
This
is
important
to
bear
in
mind
when
considering
the
results.
Figure
6-5:
Shale
gas
supply
curves
for
the
United
States
of
America
in
2015
Together
with
its
own
production
cost,
a
further
factor
affecting
the
competitiveness
of
shale
gas
is
the
production
cost
of
the
other
types
of
unconventional
gas,
i.e.
coal-bed
methane
and
tight
gas.
The
supply
curves
for
both
types
of
unconventional
gas
have
been
built
in
line
with
IEA
(2011):
the
production
cost
of
coal-bed
methane
ranges
between
$3
and
$8/GJ,
while
the
production
cost
of
tight
gas
ranges
between
$4
and
$8/GJ.
The
role
of
natural
gas
in
a
carbon-constrained
world
At
the
international
level,
reliance
upon
a
system
of
voluntary
national
pledges
of
emission
reductions
by
2020,
as
set
out
initially
in
the
Copenhagen
Accord,
leaves
uncertainty
concerning
the
likely
structure
of
any
future
agreements
that
may
emerge
to
replace
the
Kyoto
Protocol.
The
absence
of
a
clear
international
regime
for
mitigating
GHG
emissions
in
turn
raises
questions
about
the
likely
stringency
of
national
policies
in
both
industrialised
countries
and
major
emerging
economies
over
the
coming
decades.
Particularly
in
the
power
sector,
the
relative
costs
of
different
technologies
may
shift
13
Moniz,
Jacoby
and
Meggs,
'Future
of
natural
gas',
31.
195
significantly
in
response
to
research,
development
and
demonstration,
as
well
as
CO2
emissions
prices.
A
carbon
tax
would
increases
the
absolute
cost
of
energy
from
fossil
fuels.
These
costs
would
be
passed
on
to
the
final
consumer
in
the
form
of
higher
prices
that,
in
turn,
would
lower
overall
demand.
Given
the
relative
efficiencies
and
carbon
emissions
of
different
energy
technologies
or
fuels,
the
technology
mix
of
the
whole
energy
system
would
be
affected.
However,
much
depends
on
how
substantial
the
carbon
tax
or
other
climate
change
policies
will
be.
In
power
generation,
gas-fired
electricity
generation
will
be
less
affected
by
a
carbon
tax
than
coal.
But
there
is,
after
all,
a
point
at
which
gas- fired
power
generation
loses
its
competitiveness
to
non-emission
generating
sources,
such
as
nuclear
or
renewables.
As
the
extent
and
nature
of
the
GHG
mitigation
measures
that
will
be
adopted
is
one
of
the
key
uncertainties
surrounding
the
future
development
of
the
global
gas
market,
the
scenario
analysis
includes
a
specific
sensitivity
analysis
exploring
the
impact
on
the
global
energy
system,
particularly
on
gas,
of
a
future
carbon
constrained
world,
i.e.
a
world
committed
to
halve
CO2
emissions
by
2050.
Box
6-2:
The
impact
of
liquids
on
shale
gas
production
costs
An
important
issue
to
highlight
when
discussing
shale
gas
production
costs
is
the
presence
or
absence
of
associated
liquid
hydrocarbons,
in
the
form
of
natural
gas
liquids
(NGLs)
that
need
to
be
separated
in
a
processing
plant,
such
as
butane,
propane
or
ethane.
Production
and
processing
of
such
liquids
can
serve
to
lower
per-unit
production
costs
and
raise
the
economic
profitability
of
wells.
Thus,
even
if
the
proportion
of
total
dry
gas
production
dwarfs
total
liquids
production
from
a
given
shale
well,
the
energy
content
and
market
price
of
the
latter
makes
for
a
compelling
business
case
to
target
liquid-rich
shale
plays.
Moreover,
there
have
been
substantial
recent
additions
to
proved
US
wet
gas
reserves
e.g.
gas
that
includes
lease
condensates
and
natural
gas
plant
liquids;
the
EIA
has
reported
a
9%
increase
in
proved
reserves
of
natural
gas
plant
liquids
and
a
14%
increase
in
lease
condensates
from
2008
to
2009.14
However,
despite
its
growing
role
in
shale
gas
economics,
the
figures
on
unit
costs
of
production
per
well
that
are
used
in
the
model
do
not
include
liquid
production.
This
omission
was
made
to
better
reflect
existing
estimates
of
break-even
costs
of
shale
gas
wells,
such
as
those
found
in
the
IEAs
recent
Golden
Age
of
Gas
report,
which
explicitly
do
not
account
for
the
value
or
cost
of
liquid
production.15
6.1.2
Midstream
Gas
transportation
costs
and
capacities
Despite
the
recent
surge
in
interest
in
Europes
unconventional
gas,
many
analyses
nevertheless
continue
to
project
significant
growth
in
imports
of
conventional
pipeline
gas
and
LNG
for
the
European
gas
market. 16
This
serves
as
a
reminder
that
the
prospects
of
unconventional
gas
gaining
market
share
depends
not
only
on
its
competitiveness
vis--vis
other
fuels
such
as
coal
or
nuclear,
but
also
on
its
relationship
to
conventional
gas,
as
well
as
the
various
ways
in
which
gas
is
transported.
In
this
respect,
the
cost
competitiveness
of
different
modes
of
gas
transport
(LNG
and
pipeline)
is
a
factor
of
interest
for
considering
future
gas-supply
market
dynamics
and
the
degree
of
market
penetration
of
unconventional
gas
reserves.
14
EIA,
'Summary: U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Proved Reserves 2009 ', (Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2010). 15 IEA, 'Golden age', 49. 16 EIA, 'Various AEOs'; IEA, 'WEO Various'.
196
Significant growth in LNG infrastructure and trade has the potential to either foster or deter investments in unconventional gas production; just as LNG can encourage gas- producing countries to export their indigenous production, so too can regasification terminals for importing countries given favourable costs relative to domestic shale gas production serve as an alternative to the latter. Analysts have already begun to ponder a future scenario in which significant and ongoing US and Canadian shale gas production leads to LNG flows from North America to European and Asian markets.17 If interregional LNG trade sees such exponential growth, this may reduce the incentive to invest in shale gas production outside of North America (particularly given the regulatory and service-sector bottlenecks that could moderate its degree of development in Europe). Conversely, if high reserves and low production cost stimulate considerable shale gas production in all regions, this may dilute the importance of LNG by challenging the profitability of long-distance interregional trade. Given these uncertainties, the scenario analysis must take into account the important role played by gas transportation costs, which will crucially inform the price differential between competing sources of natural gas supply as interregional gas trade develops (a differential which must, of course, remain bound by contractual and capacity constraints). In Figure 6-6 below, James Jensen has provided a rough approximation of the difference in costs of gas (and oil) transport in terms of distance, type, diameter and capacity of supply line. Natural gas must be cooled to minus 162C in order to condense it into a liquid form. This reduces its volume by approximately 600 times, thereby allowing it to be cost-effectively shipped by tanker. Building and running the liquefaction plants that cool and condense the gas into a liquid is expensive and energy-intensive; however, shipping LNG is less costly than pipeline transport on a per-MBtu basis. As a result of this, LNG usually costs more to ship than pipeline gas over distances less than 1 500 miles. Over distances of more than 2 500 miles, however, LNG is generally cheaper to transport than even the most efficiently piped gas.18
17
Rogers,
'Impact
of
a
globalising
market'.
18
James
T.
Jensen,
'The
Future
of
Gas
Transportation
in
the
Middle
East:
LNG,
GTL
and
Pipelines'
(paper
presented at the The Annual Conference of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies & Research, Abu Dhabi, 2004).
197
Figure
6-6:
Illustrative
costs
of
gas,
oil
and
coal
transportation19
The
traditional
LNG
project
has
been
described
as
a
chain
with
four,
or
occasionally
five,
links:
1)
field
development;
2)
in
some
cases,
a
pipeline
to
the
coast;
3)
the
liquefaction
facility;
4)
tanker
transportation;
and
5)
the
regasification
terminal.20
For
a
typical
LNG
value
chain,
exploration
and
production
of
feedstock
supplies
represent
15- 20%
of
total
capital
costs,
liquefaction
comprises
30-45%
of
costs,
shipping
accounts
for
another
10-30%
and
gasification
and
storage
account
for
the
remaining
15-25%.21
Each
link
in
the
chain
is
capital-intensive,
with
most
LNG
projects
costing
several
billion
dollars.
There
is
some
debate
as
to
the
direction
in
which
LNG
production
costs
are
heading.
Up
until
the
early
2000s,
technological
progress
had
led
to
a
sharp
decrease
in
the
large
initial
capital
cost,
and
hence
life-cycle
operating
cost,
of
liquefaction
plants
the
principal
cost
component
in
the
LNG
chain.
The
average
investment
for
a
liquefaction
plant
dropped
from
some
$550
a
tonne
per
year
of
capacity
in
the
1960s,
to
approximately
$200
in
the
early
2000s.
Several
factors
accounted
for
this
trend.
Studies
highlighted
economies
of
scale
in
the
construction
phase
that
reduced
the
marginal
cost
of
each
additional
liquefaction
train
built
at
the
same
greenfield
site
by
20-30%.22
In
a
similar
vein,
larger
LNG
train
sizes
resulting
from
the
shift
from
steam-driven
to
gas
turbine-driven
compressors
drove
down
liquefaction
costs
as
well.
19
James
T.
Jensen,
'The
Development
of
a
Global
LNG
Market:
Is
it
Likely?
If
so,
when?',
(Oxford:
Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies, 2004), 7. 20 Jensen, 'LNG Revolution': 26. 21 Maxwell and Zhu, 'Dynamics of LNG imports': 219. 22 Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe, 'LNG Cost Reductions and Flexibility in LNG Trade add to Security of Gas Supply', in Energy Prices and Taxes, 1st Quarter 2005, ed. IEA (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 2005), xxix.
198
More
recent
analyses,
however,
contend
that
investment
costs
for
liquefaction
terminals
have
increased
by
about
20%
over
the
last
five
years.23
Writing
in
2009,
the
IEA
estimated
that
LNG
liquefaction
plants
commissioned
in
the
period
from
2009-2013
would
cost
about
$830/tonne
compared
with
$430/tonne
for
those
commissioned
in
2005-2008
(see
Figure
6-7
below). 24
Another
study
provided
a
similar
range
of
liquefaction
costs
over
the
decade
to
2009,
capturing
their
rise
from
$300/tonne
to
between
$600-1400/tonne
per
annum.25
Figure
6-7:
LNG
liquefaction
plant
capital
costs26
As
for
other
links
in
the
LNG
chain,
shipping
costs
have
fallen
markedly,
as
competition
between
shipyards
reduced
the
construction
cost
of
LNG
tankers
from
about
$280
million
for
a
138,000
cu.
metre
ship
in
1995
to
$150-160
million
by
the
mid-2000s.27
Larger
tankers,
enjoying
greater
economies
of
scale
also
reduced
operating
costs.
Tanker
sizes
have
increased
from
some
40
000
cubic
metres
for
the
first
generation
to
135
000-140
000
cubic
metres. 28
In
addition,
the
EIA
found
in
a
2003
report
that
regasification
terminal
costs
seemed
to
have
fallen,
although
this
trend
was
more
difficult
to
verify
as
the
costs
varied
more
by
location.29
All
of
the
abovementioned
cost
components
of
the
various
stages
of
the
LNG
chain
hinge
on
supply-and-demand
dynamics,
thus
implying
a
considerable
degree
of
uncertainty
for
the
future.
Moreover,
the
extent
to
which
the
cost
of
LNG
production
witnesses
substantial
change
also
depends
on
the
cost
of
raw
materials
(steel,
nickel
and
aluminium),
labour
and
services
(which
come
at
a
premium
during
periods
of
significant
global
investments
in
capacity),
as
well
as
a
range
of
project-specific
factors
such
as
plant
location
and
construction
times.
Lochner
and
Jan
Richter,
'The
impact
of
recent
gas
market
developments
on
long-term
projections
for
global
gas
supply',
Energiewirtschaft
34
(2010).
24IEA,
'WEO
2009',
451.
25Andrew
Morris
and
Keith
Messenger,
'Global
gas
&
LNG
markets
&
GB's
Security
of
Supply;
a
report
to
Department
of
Energy
and
Climate
Change',
(Poyry
Consulting,
2010).
26
IEA,
'WEO
2009',
451.
27
Maxwell
and
Zhu,
'Dynamics
of
LNG
imports':
221.
28
Cornot-Gandolphe,
'LNG
Cost
Reductions',
xxx.
29
EIA,
'Global
LNG
Market',
42.
23 Stefan
199
For the scenario analysis, the costs of regasification and liquefaction terminals are calculated on the basis of initial investment costs, fixed operating and maintenance costs, the plant availability and any losses incurred, which are annualised according to the lifetime of the plant and subjected to a discount rate (in this case 5%). More specifically, the cost of liquefaction plants is in line with the more recent estimates, which, as mentioned, are higher than those given for the first half of the 2000s. The main set of scenarios assume a capex of about $6 billion for an LNG chain producing 10.6 bcm/a (i.e. 8 mtpa). For pipelines, the primary determinants of construction costs are the length and diameter of the pipeline, the operating pressure (and the corresponding need for higher grade steel) and the terrain.30 Operating costs, in turn, vary depending on the number of compressor stations and the price of their generating fuel. The total per-unit cost will depend on average capacity utilisation and load factors. According to analysts at the IEA and Cedigaz, the investment required to lay a long distance, large diameter line amounts to $1-1.5 billion per 1 000km.31 Since this figure was presented in 2004, some analysts have found that pipeline costs have increased by 30% for onshore and as high as 70% for offshore projects. 32 Recent analysis carried out within the ETSAP community concludes that an onshore pipeline carrying 20bcm per annum over a distance of 1 000km costs between $0.47-0.80/Mbtu.33 For sub-sea pipelines, earlier IEA analysis set the capex on a baseline 500km, 12 bcm/pa offshore pipeline at $2 billion, implying a total gas transportation cost of $0.70 to $0.80/MBtu for this distance.34 As with for LNG transport costs, the most recent estimates have been used for pipelines in the scenario analysis. However, in order to explore the uncertainty surrounding gas transportation costs and its potential impact on the development of indigenous production in the different world regions, a sensitivity analysis has been carried out, by assuming LNG costs decreasing to the levels of the early 2000s. As for capacity, Table 6-3 and Table 6-4 also show assumptions about medium-term capacity forecasts for both interregional LNG and piped gas, which are derived from recent IEA data. The figures for 2020 are then progressively increased until they are doubled in 2040 to provide a rough approximation of the maximum capacity available in at this time.
30
There
are,
of
course,
other
factors
to
consider
that
vary
according
to
local
conditions,
such
as
labour
costs,
service
costs,
securing
rights
of
passage,
honouring
safety
regulations,
and
so
on.
Cornot-Gandolphe
et
al.,
'The
challenges
of
further
cost
reductions
for
new
supply
options
(pipeline,
LNG,
GTL)
',
in
22nd
World
Gas
Conference
(Tokyo,
Japan:
Cedigaz,
2003).
32Lochner
and
Richter,
'Impact
of
gas
market
developments'.
33Pernille
Seljom,
'Oil
and
Natural
Gas
Logistics',
in
IEA
ETSAP
Technology
Brief
P03
(ETSAP,
2011).
34IEA,
'WEO
2009',
451.
31Sylvie
200
Table
6-3:
Major
interregional
natural
gas
pipeline
projects35
Origin
Destination
CHI
SKO
FSU
WEU
Altai
Russia
-
Asia
Pacific
Nord
Stream
Nord
Stream
2
South
Stream
Nabucco
ITGI
(Interc.
Turkey
Greece
Italy)
MEA
WEU
TAP
(Trans
Adriatic
Pipeline)
IGAT
9
(Iranian
Gas
Trunkline)
CHI
ODA
MEA
ODA
AFR
IND
MEA
CHI
WEU
CAGP
CAGP
expansion
TAPI
IPI
Arab
Gas
Pipeline
Myanmar
-
China
GALSI
(Gasdotto
Algeria
Sardegna
Italia)
Total
Major
pipelines
bcm/a
30.0
10.0
27.5
27.5
63.0
31
12
20
37
35
25
30
8
10
12
8
386
FSU
Table
6-4:
Assumed
maximum
liquefaction
capacity
2020
AFR
AUS
CAN
CHI
CSA
EEU
FSU
IND
JPN
MEA
MEX
ODA
SKO
USA
WEU
bcm/a
547
138
195
59
618
196
57
201
between
GDP
and
natural
gas
consumption
in
a
set
of
mainly
developing
regions
by
showing
their
respective
values
for
the
regions
over
the
period
from
2005-2010.
Figure
6-8:
GDP
and
gas
consumption
by
region,
2005-201037
At the time of writing, the global economic climate is gloomy, particularly for the worlds advanced economies as complex financial and fiscal challenges continue to threaten overall recovery from recession. Current projections of global GDP development, therefore, assign most of the growth to developing countries, implying more substantial increases in global energy demand as these countries catch up with the advanced industrialised economies. In the longer term, as well, most forecasts assume that non-OECD countries in particular China will account for most of the economic growth in the coming decades and, as a corollary, the majority of growth in energy demand (see Table 6-5 below). Any output from the model will be highly sensitive to these assumptions about global growth. To capture the consequent uncertainty, the scenario analysis will distinguish between low and high growth cases as shown in Table 6-5. However, both cases do not deviate from the assumption of relative economic convergence, i.e. low income regions growing faster than high income regions.
37
EIA,
2010).
202
Table
6-5:
GDP
assumptions
in
the
model
Average
growth
in
%,
PPP
OECD
North
America
United
States
of
America
Canada
Mexico
OECD
Europe
OECD
Asia
Japan
South
Korea
Australia/New
Zealand
Total
OECD
Non-OECD
Europe
and
Eurasia
Russia
Other
Non-OECD
Asia
China
India
Other
non-OECD
Asia
Middle
East
Africa
Central
and
South
America
Brazil
Other
Central
and
South
America
Total
Non-OECD
Total
World
Low
growth
2010-2020
2020-2040
2
2
2.1
1.4
1.5
1.4
0.8
2.8
1.9
1.7
3
2.6
3.5
5.2
6
5.1
3.7
3.4
3
3.5
3.7
3.3
4.4
3
2
1.8
1.6
3.7
1.4
0.7
-0.2
2.1
2
1.6
2.3
2.4
2.1
3.7
3.8
3.5
3.6
3.1
2.7
2.8
3.4
2.2
3.3
2.6
High
growth
2010-2020
2020-2040
3.4
3.6
3.2
2.4
2.6
2.5
1.9
3.9
3
3
4.1
3.7
4.6
6.3
7.1
6.2
4.8
4.5
4.1
4.6
4.7
4.4
5.5
4.2
3.2
3
2.6
4.7
2.4
1.7
0.8
3.1
3
2.7
3.3
3.4
3.1
4.7
4.8
4.5
4.6
4.1
3.7
3.8
4.4
3.2
4.3
3.6
Gas-fired,
nuclear
and
renewable
power
generation
Natural
gas
has
the
potential
to
capture
a
greater
share
of
the
global
mix
of
electricity- generating
fuels
(largely
by
muscling
in
on
coals
current
dominance).
This,
of
course,
depends
on
the
natural
gas
price,
which
represents
the
majority
of
operating
costs
for
relatively
efficient
combined
cycle
plants
and
the
concomitant
investment
decisions
within
the
industry.
The
penetration
of
natural
gas
in
the
electricity
generation
mix
also
depends
on
the
policies
enacted
by
governments
to
regulate
and
tax
carbon
emissions.
Indeed,
the
IEAs
WEO
for
2011
has
identified
carbon
pricing
and
subsidies
to
renewables
as
the
two
government
policies
that
will
have
the
most
significant
impact
on
the
electricity
generation
mix
over
time.38
To
explore
these
issues
a
specific
sensitivity
analysis
has
been
carried
out
in
order
to
assess
the
robustness
of
the
results
(see
Figure
6-9).
Gas
use
in
transport
and
the
gas/oil
price
link
A
central
question
that
has
arisen
in
the
analysis
is
whether
to
assume
a
coupling
or
de- coupling
of
oil
and
gas
prices.
Much
has
been
written
recently
about
the
logic
of
the
price
linkage
of
gas
to
oil.
As
discussed
in
Section
5.2.4,
commentators
have
questioned
38
IEA
WEO
2011
p.
178
203
the long-term viability of oil indexation given the gradual devolution of substitution possibilities between gas and oil products. Analysts have also noted that abundant unconventional gas production in the USA has served to weaken the linkage between oil and gas prices, leading to a NYMEX crude-to-gas futures contract ratio of 43:1 in January 2012, the highest in the last two decades.39 Thus, contemporary wisdom holds that global unconventional gas development will play a key role in enabling a gradual break from gas-oil price linkages as the two fuels and their markets develop their separate ways. However, uncertainties regarding future technological developments may turn this logic on its head. A persistently high oil-to-gas ratio would create incentives to invest in gas- based transport technologies that are currently deemed uncompetitive against a sector dominated by oil. Indeed, in addition to stimulating growth in natural gas-powered vehicles (NGVs), significant shale gas production could also make gas-to-liquids (GTL) technology attractive. Although Shells recently completed Pearl GTL plant in Qatar represents a significant step forward for industry, the process that converts dry gas to distillates such as diesel, heating oil and jet fuel had long been regarded as a prohibitively costly investment, justified only in areas where gas reserves are stranded and could not access markets.40 However, with a high enough oil-to-gas price ratio and a large enough resource base, GTL plants become increasingly commercially viable, serving as competitors to gasoline and diesel from conventional oil refineries. Paradoxically, then, some of the same forces that are currently driving a wedge between oil and gas prices can, in the longer term, enable their re-coupling, by stimulating investments in technologies such as GTL that once again make gas and oil substitutable fuels. Of course, much hinges on the natural gas and oil price link over a period of decades: in its discussion of the potential of future gas-to-liquids production, the EIA Annual Energy Outlook states that only with the highest [oil] prices in the Reference case and the low end of GTL plant costs do the break-even economics favour [such] project[s].41 Significant shale gas development may very well enable such a scenario. In the scenario analysis, a basic assumption has been used across all the main scenarios: that natural gas can be priced according to its own specific market economics, i.e. independently from the conditions prevailing in the oil market. However, as this is in fact a strong assumption, in order to explore this factor of uncertainty a specific sensitivity analysis has been carried out, to assess how the results of the analysis change if the assumption of decoupling is removed.
LNG technology, which enhances the mobility of gas, also reduces the incentive to invest in GTL processes.
204
expenditures
as
diverse
as
the
cost
of
water
or
the
price
of
materials
for
building
gathering
systems).
Table
6-6:
Summary
of
modelling
assumptions
Category
Variables
Unconventional
gas
resource
size
Unconventional
gas
production
costs
Gas
transport
costs
Oil/gas
price
link
Total
global
energy
demand
Gas-fired
power
generation
Gas
use
in
transportation
sector
Carbon
tax
Regulation
Notes/assumptions
Uncertainty
Criticality
Technically
recoverable
reserves
of
High
High
shale
gas
Costs
per
GJ
for
F&D
and
producing
shale
gas,
including
cost
reductions
High
High
over
time
Cost-competitiveness
of
imported
LNG
and
piped
gas
versus
indigenous
shale
Medium
Medium
gas
production
The
difference
between
oil
and
gas
prices
expressed
as
a
ratio
(in
energy
High
High
equivalent
terms)
Global
GDP
growth
is
the
main
driver
of
High
High
future
demand
for
energy
services
The
cost-competitiveness
of
CCGT
in
relation
to
other
power
generation
Medium
Medium
technologies
Depends
on
competing
fuels/technology
like
biofuels,
hybrids,
Low
Medium
EVs,
etc.
Also
relies
on
favourable
gas/oil
price
differential
A
carbon
tax
crucially
alters
the
energy
supply
mix
by
incentivising
Medium
High
investments
in
renewable
carbon- neutral
energy
Upstream
Downstream
Final use
Three of these factors have been chosen as pivotal, both in terms of their future uncertainty as well as how critical they are for the eventual penetration of unconventional gas in the global energy system. These are the resource size and production cost of shale gas on the one hand and global GDP growth on the other. Therefore, the four main scenarios ConLG, ConHG, OptLG and OptHG reflect the combination of assumptions regarding these factors. Accordingly, there are two scenarios with either optimistic or conservative assumptions about shale gas production cost and reserve size (Opt/Con), and another two scenarios with either optimistic or conservative assumptions about global growth (HG/LG). To explore the impact of a lower oil-gas price ratio, an additional differentiation was applied to the conservative-low growth scenario (as shown in Figure 6-9). Combined, these yield five scenarios covering a range of possible outcomes over the period until 2040. A primary advantage of employing this framework is that either set of assumptions about high/low demand and optimistic/conservative supply can be held constant while probing the effects of each. Interpreting the respective results of these scenarios, along with some key sensitivities, will hence reveal the range of uncertainty underpinning future global shale gas development.
205
Figure
6-9:
Schematic
of
the
scenario
analysis
framework
Opt-HG
Con-HG
Opt-LG
Con-LG
Sensitivity
analyses
Carbon
constrained
global
energy
system
Social
of
acceptance
of
nuclear
power
Oil/gas
price
linkage
LNG
transportation
costs
X
X
X
X
X
X
Scenario
Description
Shale
gas
resources
corresponding
to
the
upper-level
estimates,
most
of
Optimistic- low
growth
which
are
deployable
at
low
production
costs.
Low
GDP
growth
(Opt-LG)
at
regional
level
Variation
for
sensitivity
analysis
OPT-LG+LCO2:
Optimistic
low
growth
with
the
additional
assumption
of
CO2
reduction
Opt-LG+HNUC:
Optimistic
low
growth
with
the
additional
assumption
of
possible
higher
nuclear
penetration
Opt-LG+LCLNG:
Optimistic
low
growth
with
the
additional
assumption
of
lower
LNG
transport
costs
Con-LG+CP:
Conservative
low
growth
with
the
additional
assumption
of
oil
and
gas
prices
still
coupled
in
the
long
term
Con-LG+LCLNG:
Conservative
high
growth
with
the
additional
assumption
of
lower
LNG
transport
costs
Opt-HG+CP:
Optimistic
high
growth
with
the
additional
assumption
of
oil
and
gas
prices
still
coupled
in
the
long
term
Shale gas resources corresponding Conservative- to the lower-level estimates, most of Low Growth which are deployable at high production costs. Low GDP growth (Con-LG) at regional level Shale gas resources corresponding to the upper level estimates, most of Optimistic- High Growth which are deployable at low production costs. High GDP growth (Opt-HG) at regional level Shale gas resources corresponding Conservative- to the lower level estimates, most of High Growth which deployable at high production cost. High GDP growth at regional (Con-HG) level.
206
207
Figure
6-10:
Total
energy
demand
under
different
scenario
assumptions
Figure
6-11:
Global
primary
energy
supply
by
fuel
(conservative
low
growth
and
optimistic
high
growth)
208
Figure
6-12:
Total
energy
demand
by
region
209
Figure
6-13:
Global
gas
production
In the scenario most favourable to shale gas development, there are a number of regional trends worth highlighting. As shown in Figure 6-14, the USA captures the lions share of unconventional gas production in 2020 by producing 70% of the worlds total. However, over time the US share declines to 30% as new entrants slowly enter the unconventional gas-producing market. In particular, East Asian markets see a surge in shale gas production after 2020 such that within 20 years these countries provide 28% of the global unconventional gas supply (with China alone producing three quarters of this figure). Other regions witness more moderate but steady growth; significant production takes place in Central/South America (9%), in Europe (8%), in Africa (7%) and in Canada (6%) in 2040.
210
Figure
6-14:
Unconventional
gas
production
in
the
optimistic
high-growth
scenario
Traditional conventional gas suppliers, on the other hand, do not exploit their potential for shale gas development. Thus, even in the optimistic case, neither the Former Soviet Union (which includes the Russian Federation and Caspian region) nor the Middle East significantly produces reserves during the period under scrutiny. Some significant shale gas production starts in FSU at the very end of the time horizon, but a more careful analysis of the results shows how, despite having potentially vast shale gas reserves, the margins between conventional and unconventional gas remain tilted in favour of the former. This trend is more strongly visible in the Middle East. This means that both regions relative share in total global gas production declines proportionately to the increase in shale gas production in other regions (yielding an average of 3-4% less gas over the period from 2010-2040 in a case of significant shale gas production). In the case of the Middle East, shale gas production checks the rise in this regions share of total global gas production, such that a peak share of 17% reached in 2025 begins to decline despite increases in production from 1 000bcm to over 1 500 bcm in 2040. Much of this lost market share is picked up by production in the USA and to a lesser extent by Asia and Europe.
211
Figure
6-15:
Changes
in
relative
share
of
total
gas
production
in
2040
(conservative/optimistic)
In terms of cumulative production, traditional gas-producing regions also see a slight reduction in their output volumes compared with a situation of cheap and plentiful shale gas. Indeed, a look at the optimistic and conservative scenarios reveals that the Former Soviet Union (FSU) produces an average of 20% less conventional gas than would be the case in a situation where shale gas reserves are less abundant and more expensive to develop. The difference is greater for the Middle East, where there is an average reduction of 15% in total conventional gas production between the two scenarios over the period 2010-2040. These figures imply that in an optimistic case there is enough room for new sources of unconventional gas to be developed alongside conventional production, but there is also some level of competitive substitution. Overall, it seems that shale gas will be developed under any combination of scenarios. However, this statement belies the vast differences in total volume produced. As shown in Figure 6-16, shale gas production is subject to high levels of variation depending on which assumptions eventually bear fruit.
212
Figure
6-16:
Shale
gas
production
by
region
in
2040:
Optimistic-HG
and
Conservative-LG
scenarios
Box
6-3:
Number
of
European
shale
gas
wells
How
many
wells
would
need
to
be
drilled
to
sustain
the
most
optimistic
scenario
of
shale
gas
development
in
Europe?
There
is
no
easy
way
of
calculating
such
a
figure
and
any
general
estimations
must
either
make
several
simplifying
assumptions
or
explain
away
crucial
factors
such
as
success
rates,
decline
curves,
well
types
(e.g.
dry,
exploratory,
development),
ramp-up
periods
and
a
whole
host
of
project
and
play-specific
circumstances.
Nonetheless,
an
attempt
to
provide
an
indicative
estimate
is
presented
here.
The
cumulative
production
of
shale
gas
in
Europe
in
an
optimistic
case
of
high
demand,
low
costs
and
plentiful
reserves
would
total
close
to
3
trillion
cubic
metres
over
the
period
2025-2040,
an
average
withdrawal
rate
of
200
bcm
per
annum.
Two
independent
assessments
made
within
this
report
have
estimated
the
ultimate
recovery
of
gas
from
a
single
well
to
stand
at
approximately
57
mcm
over
an
assumed
lifetime
of
30
years.43
Extrapolating
from
the
US
experience
over
the
last
ten
years,
the
authors
assume
the
need
for
ten
exploratory
wells
and
the
presence
of
ten
dry
holes
for
every
100
shale
gas-producing
wells
drilled.44
Cumulatively,
in
this
case
63
000
wells
would
need
to
be
drilled
during
the
period
2025-2040
to
maintain
this
rate
of
production,
or
roughly
4
200
wells
drilled
on
an
annual
basis.
However,
it
must
be
stressed
that
the
range
of
uncertainty
is
wide.
Indeed,
in
a
conservative
case
of
low
growth,
costly
production
and
scarce
resources,
the
total
number
of
wells
drilled
over
the
same
period
could
be
as
low
as
7
900
(yielding
a
cumulative
production
of
374
bcm).
Thus,
these
estimates
should
be
seen
as
purely
indicative,
even
though
they
roughly
correspond
to
similar
ratios
identified
in
other
sources.45
from http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_enr_wellend_s1_a.htm
213
constrained scenario is consistent with the objective of halving CO2 emissions by 2050? Are the most optimistic projections about the future role of natural gas in the global energy mix consistent with a carbon emissions path towards an average global temperature rise of no more than 2C? Will natural gas be a cost-effective bridge to a low-carbon future? To assess these key issues, a specific sensitivity analysis was carried out, adding to one of the two optimistic shale gas scenarios described so far (the Opt-LG scenario) to take a path consistent with the target. Figure 6-17 shows how the global energy mix can change in a strongly carbon- constrained scenario, with a reduction in overall CO2 emissions of about 40% in 2040 compared with 2010 emissions levels. What is interesting is that a higher carbon tax does not necessarily prevent natural gas a subset of which includes shale gas from being developed in an optimistic scenario. 46 Rather, the amount of all natural gas produced is lower as the carbon tax progressively rises. The significant change comes in 2040, when the amount of gas produced in a carbon-constrained world is 30% less than one in which a lower carbon tax is in place. In other words, the strict emission targets modelled do not preclude a significant growth in natural gas use. Therefore the modelling results support the potential role of natural gas as a bridging fuel. However, there is one qualification the reader should bear in mind in interpreting these results. Although the model used here factors in emissions of the different fuels when burned, it does not consider GHG emissions during mining or transportation. Only a complete life-cycle comparison of all the major fuels in the energy system can comprehensively address the controversy surrounding the life-cycle emissions of shale gas.
46
The
reader
should
bear
in
mind
that
the
carbon
content
of
conventional
and
unconventional
gas
are
the
same in the model, and that the analysis does not incorporate life-cycle emissions analysis from their differing methods of extraction.
214
Figure
6-17:
Total
primary
energy
supply
and
CO2
emissions
in
the
optimistic
low-growth
scenario
(above)
and
a
carbon-constrained
optimistic
low-growth
scenario
(below)
215
Global gas trading is likely to increase in any scenario, independent of high or low GDP growth or optimistic/conservative conditions for shale gas. This is true for both liquefied natural gas, which increases two to threefold depending on which scenario is considered and also for pipeline trading, which witnesses around a doubling in total volumes traded between regions during the same period (2010-2040). The main cause behind this increase is the massive growth in demand expected in Asia, primarily in China, a country which is set to import between 570-730 bcm of LNG alone by 2040. Despite these general trends, a closer look at the scenarios reveals that shale gas does indeed affect the total volume of trade, particularly for LNG. As demonstrated in Figure 6-18 and Figure 6-19, when comparing all scenarios, it appears that conditions of high growth and low shale gas development are most amenable to interregional trade. This implies that shale gas production is predominately reserved for internal use only; there are no cases where significant additions to a regions gas exports occur as a result of shale production. Shale gas production and the global LNG trade show a particularly strong interrelationship. With all other factors held constant, the scenario with cheaper and more plentiful shale gas leads to a corresponding reduction in interregionally traded LNG volumes compared with the scenario of more costly and limited shale gas. This is a result of the relatively cheaper cost of indigenous production and transport of gas within regions. In China, for example, LNG imports will see a 12% drop in a situation of considerable shale gas production, correspondingly reducing the exports of LNG from other developing Asian countries, as well as the Middle East.
216
Figure
6-18:
LNG
exports
under
optimistic
and
conservative
shale
gas
development
Figure
6-19:
LNG
exports
under
conservative
and
optimistic
shale
gas
development
with
low
LNG
cost
But would more favourable conditions for gas trading make a difference to this result? In other words, would a lower transport cost for LNG favour imports over indigenous shale gas production? Figure 6-19 shows that the above holds if a lower LNG cost is 217
assumed
for
both
scenarios,
even
if
total
LNG
trade
would
be
much
higher
in
this
case:
Again
the
impact
of
an
optimistic
shale
gas
scenario
is
that
it
reduces
total
trade.
However,
a
second
insight
comes
from
the
comparison
between
total
LNG
trade
in
the
conservative-HG
scenario
(Figure
6-18)
and
the
optimistic
scenario
plus
low
LNG
cost
(Figure
6-19).
This
suggests
that
a
shale
gas
development
would
only
reduce
LNG
trade
volumes
under
conditions
of
the
currently
high
LNG
transportation
costs.
The
MEA
region
exports
the
most
in
any
of
the
scenarios,
followed
by
the
Africa,
ODA
and
AUS
regions.
Low
LNG
transportation
costs
increase
exports
from
each
of
these
regions,
but
particularly
from
Australia.
LNG
exports
from
Australia
are
also
the
most
reduced
in
the
optimistic
shale
gas
scenario.
For
pipeline
trading
(Figure
6-20),
the
trend
is
somewhat
different
as
piped
gas
records
increases
in
all
scenarios,
independent
of
growth
or
shale
gas
production
assumptions.
Looking
east,
in
the
conservative
case,
the
FSU
begins
to
export
piped
natural
gas
to
non-Chinese
eastern
markets
in
2020
and
volumes
eventually
triple
to
reach
90bcm
by
2040.
But
in
a
case
of
significant
shale
gas
production,
this
trade
link
remains
undeveloped.
Nonetheless,
the
overall
loss
in
FSU
exports
is
negligible
as
this
market
is
comparatively
small
in
relation
to
the
link
between
the
FSU
and
China,
which
is
unaffected
by
significant
shale
gas
production
and
grows
threefold
to
270bcm
over
the
same
period.
As
for
North
America,
similar
reductions
in
interregional
pipeline
trade
occur
depending
on
the
amount
of
shale
gas
output;
comparing
the
optimistic
with
conservative
cases,
the
USA
reduces
the
need
for
pipeline
imports
from
Canada
by
an
average
of
27%
over
the
30-year
period.
Figure
6-20:
Pipeline
exports
by
region
under
optimistic
and
conservative
shale
gas
development
218
Looking at imports, Figure 6-21 shows the two extreme scenarios for LNG trade, i.e. the conservative shale gas with low LNG cost and the equivalent scenario with optimistic shale gas assumptions. In both cases, the main importing region is China, which is also the region where LNG imports decrease the most, assuming high shale gas development. LNG imports also decrease in the Western Europe and Other Developing Asia regions. Figure 6-22 shows how the impact of optimistic shale gas assumptions is less significant in pipeline trading than in LNG. In fact, pipeline imports seem more robust to the development of shale gas than LNG, as can be seen by the small difference in pipeline imports to China in the figure below. There are only marginal reductions in all other regions. Now turning to Europe in more detail (see Figure 6-23 below), piped gas from the FSU and Africa record steady increases in both the conservative and optimistic cases. However, this does not mean that shale gas does not affect interregional pipeline trade. Assuming that high-capacity/long-distance lines such as South Stream, Nabucco and Nord Stream II are constructed, their competitiveness and full capacity use is only assured in a situation where shale gas reserves are costly to develop. Otherwise, shale gas and pipeline imports compete for European market share and, in a scenario of optimistic shale gas resources and low growth, Europes pipeline imports from the FSU become less competitive over time. This trend is more pronounced in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. Indeed, whereas the former reduces total imports by about 30% with significant shale gas production, the latter can only claim a net reduction of 10% in the same scenario. This is likely to be due to the comparatively low transport costs for piped gas relative to new production from shale gas resources. This means that Eastern Europes imports of pipeline gas from the FSU record steady increases over the period from 2010-2040. Even in an optimistic case of cheap and plentiful shale gas, import dependence in this region remains flat at around 75%. However, this trend also depends on the degree of growth in energy demand. Where there is a relatively high level of GDP growth, shale gas takes a proportionally smaller share of Europes total gas supply from FSU imports around 10% over the period until 2040. As a final comment, the scenario analysis shows the low robustness of the results with respect to LNG cost. Figure 6-23 shows how the structure of EU gas imports is very sensitive to LNG cost assumptions. If LNG costs remain at the current high levels then an optimistic shale gas scenario mainly decreases LNG imports; in the low LNG cost scenario, it is the pipeline routes that are mainly affected. Assuming a conservative level of shale gas development under conditions of high growth, Europes LNG imports until 2025 are set to rise by an average of 3.6 bcm per annum (with most of the volumes sourced from the Middle East region). Only after this period does the slow expansion of shale gas production stop this upward climb. In an optimistic case of shale gas development, on the other hand, LNG imports see a much sharper decrease. In this case, LNG imports fall to zero by 2040 as significant indigenous shale gas reduces the need for relatively costly LNG.
219
Figure
6-21:
LNG
imports
by
region
in
the
conservative
shale
gas
development
scenario
with
low
LNG
cost
versus
optimistic
low
growth
Figure
6-22:
Pipeline
imports
by
region
in
the
conservative
shale
gas
development
scenario
versus
optimistic
low
growth
220
Figure
6-23:
European
gas
imports
in
conservative/optimistic
shale
gas
scenarios
221
Figure
6-24:
Conservative
(above)
and
optimistic
(below)
European
shale
gas
production
in
the
low-growth
scenario
222
In the USA, the total volume of net imports is relatively unaffected by unconventional gas development. The higher deployment of shale gas in the optimistic cases is mainly absorbed by the US gas market, as natural gas serves as a substitute for coal in the power generation sector. Indeed, if shale gas is cheap and abundant under lower growth assumptions, coal will generate only 400TWh of electricity in 2040, instead of the 1 800 TWh resulting from a case of limited shale gas production. This substantial gap of 75% is filled by gas-fired power generators, explaining not only the threefold rise in the share of gas used for electricity generation over the period from 2010-2040 but also the lack of significant export of natural gas.
223
Figure
6-26:
Increase
in
gas
demand
between
conservative
and
optimistic
shale
gas
scenarios
As discussed on the following pages, in terms of final energy use, the main impact of favourable shale gas development can be expected in the power generation and transportation sectors. As a matter of fact, the scenario analysis shows how unconventional sources help natural gas to challenge the dominance of coal in electricity generation and of oil in the transport sector.
constrained),
where
the
CO2
emission
trajectory
is
consistent
with
the
target
of
limiting
the
global
temperature
rise
to
2C.
Assuming
that
electricity
generation
with
CCS
will
be
available,
this
scenario
projects
an
electricity
mix
which
is
progressively
decarbonised.
The
share
of
carbon-free
electricity
is
already
above
50%
in
2030
and
reaches
90%
in
2040
(if
generation
with
CCS
is
included
in
the
figure).
With
respect
to
the
role
of
gas
in
the
electricity
mix:
while
in
the
long
term
its
use
without
CCS
is
less
than
a
third
compared
to
the
other
optimistic
shale
gas
scenarios,
this
reduction
is
partially
compensated
by
an
increase
in
its
use
in
plants
with
CCS.
As
already
seen
in
Figure
6-17,
the
strict
emissions
target
modelled
does
not
preclude
a
stronger
role
for
gas
in
the
energy
system,
even
if
the
results
of
this
section
highlight
how
this
conclusion
relies
on
the
future
availability
of
CCS.
Figure
6-27:
Electricity
production
by
fuel
in
four
scenarios:
conservative
vs.
optimistic;
optimistic
with
high
nuclear;
optimistic
in
a
carbon
constrained
energy
system
However, this broader trend of substitution is not uniform across regions. Much depends on regional specificities, in particular the relative competitiveness of the various fuels and technologies used in the electricity generation sector. A look at three key regions illustrates the different types of impacts that optimistic or conservative shale gas production can have in this respect. In China, for example (see Figure 6-28 below), the difference between a conservative and optimistic case for shale gas does little to change the underlying evolution of the electricity generation sector. Demand for electricity in China will grow significantly even when using more conservative figures for GDP growth, while the share of gas used for electricity generation records steadily increases in both scenarios. But overall there is only a minor difference between conservative and optimistic shale gas development trajectories. This implies that coals dominance is not seriously threatened by an increase in shale gas production; instead, forces outside the unconventional gas market are driving the increase in gas-fired power generation. 225
Figure
6-28:
Chinas
electricity
generation
by
fuel
Figure
6-29:
US
electricity
generation
by
fuel
The same cannot be said for the USA, where changes in the electricity generation mix are much more dependent on production of shale gas. Indeed, Figure 6-29 shows a stark difference between the conservative and optimistic cases; in the latter, the percentage share of natural gas in electricity generation doubles, from 21% to 44% by 2040 (an 226
average
annual
growth
rate
of
3.4%).
This
increase,
in
turn,
causes
a
correspondingly
massive
reduction
in
the
use
of
coal-fired
power
generation,
such
that,
by
the
end
of
the
period
under
scrutiny,
coal
generates
just
400
TWh
of
electricity
compared
with
2
200
TWh
generated
from
natural
gas.
In
a
scenario
where
there
is
less
US
shale
gas
production
however,
gas
use
in
power
generation
actually
witnesses
a
decrease
by
20%
over
the
same
period
(an
average
decline
of
1.3%),
while
the
share
of
coal
stays
relatively
buoyant.
This
means
that
much
of
the
future
development
of
the
US
electricity
generating
sector
hinges
on
the
shale
gas
supply
curve.
As
regards
Europe
(see
Figure
6-30),
coal
is
set
to
lose
relative
market
share
over
time.
But
unlike
the
US
case,
the
difference
between
a
conservative
and
optimistic
case
of
shale
gas
production
is
far
less
dramatic.
In
the
former,
coal
loses
slightly
less
of
its
share
of
overall
generation,
dropping
an
average
of
0.3%
per
annum
compared
with
0.6%
in
a
more
optimistic
case.
Given
this
slow
evolution,
the
increase
in
the
relative
share
of
gas
used
for
power
generation
is
only
visible
after
2030,
when
gas
takes
a
2%
share
from
coal
and
a
1%
share
from
renewable
energy.
This
modest
development
suggests
that
shale
gas
will
not
significantly
boost
the
competiveness
of
gas-fired
power
generation
or
alter
pre-existing
patterns
of
development
in
electricity
generation.
Since
none
of
the
two
scenarios
depicted
in
Figure
6-30
take
into
account
a
significant
carbon
tax
regime,
renewables
lose
their
relative
share
in
the
electricity
generation
mix
as
overall
demand
rises,
independent
of
whether
shale
gas
is
produced
or
not.
Figure
6-30:
Europes
electricity
generation
by
fuel
227
The results set out above seem particularly optimistic. Hence, a contrast must be made with a case in which no significant oil-gas price de-linkage occurs. This is done by comparing two variants of the conservative low-growth scenario, revealing a significant role played by the gas-to-oil price ratio in determining the use of natural gas in the transportation sector. With coupling, there is a lower oil-gas ratio and hence investments in new technologies like gas-to-liquids are more constrained. This causes the share of gas in transportation to be at a significantly lower level than a case where gas and oil prices are more strongly linked. Figure 6-32 below shows this relationship.
228
Figure
6-32:
The
oil-gas
price
ratio
compared
with
the
use
of
gas
in
transport
6.4 Conclusion
This
section
presented
an
exploration
of
uncertainty
rather
than
a
prediction
of
the
future
impact
of
unconventional
gas.
The
latter
is
only
justified
in
cases
where
there
is
greater
certainty
surrounding
the
reserve
size
and
production
cost
of
shale
gas.
As
these
factors
become
increasingly
known,
it
will
be
possible
to
narrow
the
range
of
possible
outcomes.
In
the
interim,
highlighting
the
complex
and
interrelated
outcomes
of
future
gas
supply
and
demand
developments
constitutes
a
necessary
first
step
toward
understanding
the
potential
impact
that
shale
gas
can
make
on
the
global
energy
system.
Each
scenario
presented
here
must
be
seen
primarily
as
an
internally
consistent
and
reproducible
set
of
assumptions
about
the
key
relationships
and
driving
forces
of
change.47
This
set
of
assumptions
has
been
derived
from
the
authors
understanding
of
the
current
situation
of
the
global
energy
system,
in
particular
the
gas
system,
and
have
been
discussed
as
extensively
as
possible.
The
following
summarises
some
preliminary
conclusions
as
to
what
can
be
expected
for
Europe
and
the
rest
of
the
world
from
shale
gas
development,
and
the
key
factors
that
can
affect
this
development:
Overall,
the
scenario
analysis
highlights
that
shale
gas
does
have
the
potential
to
extensively
impact
global
gas
markets,
but
only
under
optimistic
assumptions
about
its
production
costs
and
reserves.
47
Nebojsa
Nakicenovic
et
al.,
'Special
Report
on
Emissions
Scenarios',
(Geneva:
Intergovernmental
Panel
on
Climate
Change,
2000).
229
In a scenario favourable to shale gas development, natural gas as a whole has the potential to capture 30% of the worlds total primary energy supply by 2025, further rising to 35% by 2040. This would make it surpass oil as the worlds foremost source of energy. Although the strict CO2 emission targets were modelled to reduce natural gas production including shale gas these targets do not preclude a significant growth in natural gas use. The modelling results therefore support the potential role of natural gas as a bridging fuel. Shale gas is relatively evenly dispersed around the world and the majority of regions will likely witness at least some level of production in the future. The USA and China are well placed to become the top producers of shale gas, although significant production also takes place in most other regions. The scenario analysis suggests that shale gas will tend to be used within the regions where it is produced; however, no single region will produce enough shale gas so as to move from being a net importer to a net exporter. The global trade in natural gas, driven by conventional gas, will increase in any scenario. Shale gas development, however, has the potential to moderate the degree of growth, particularly for interregional LNG flows. Low LNG costs would mitigate the reduction in trade resulting from widespread shale gas development. Significant shale gas production has the potential to lower natural gas prices, although to what extent strongly depends on the way natural gas will be priced in the future. In particular, oil indexation has the potential to reduce the fall in gas prices resulting from shale gas development. The degree of penetration of gas in transport strongly depends on the oil-gas price link. A weaker link implies greater potential for shale gas to induce a significant growth of gas use in transportation. The impact on demand in an optimistic shale gas scenario is not equal across all regions. Much depends on the relative competitiveness of fuels and technologies in each region. This is particularly apparent for electricity generation. While shale gas can induce a dramatic change in the US electricity generation mix, its impact on Chinas mix is more limited. Shale gas production will not make Europe self-sufficient in natural gas. The best case scenario for shale gas development in Europe is one in which declining conventional production can be replaced and import dependence maintained at a level of around 60%. With regard to trade flows, the structure of EU gas imports is very sensitive to the LNG cost assumptions.
230
ANNEXES
Pawson
et
al.,
'Realistic
synthesis:
an
introduction',
in
ESRC
Research
Methods
Programme
(Manchester:
2004).
2
Robert
Gross
et
al.,
'The
Costs
and
Impacts
of
Intermittency:
An
assessment
of
the
evidence
on
the
costs
and
impacts
of
intermittent
generation
on
the
British
electricity
network',
(London:
UK
Energy
Research
Centre,
2006).
3
Sorrell
et
al.,
'Oil
depletion'.
1
R.
II
Table
A-1:
Stages
of
a
traditional
systematic
review
compared
to
those
of
a
realist
review4
Traditional
systematic
review
Identify
and
refine
a
specific
review
question
Search
for
primary
studies,
using
clear
predefined
inclusion
and
exclusion
criteria
Appraise
quality
of
studies
using
a
predefined
appraisal
checklist,
emphasising
relevance
to
the
research
question
and
methodological
rigour
Extract
standard
items
of
data
from
all
primary
studies
using
a
template
Synthesise
data
to
obtain
effective
size
and
confidence
interval
and/or
transferable
themes
from
qualitative
studies
Make
recommendations,
especially
with
reference
to
whether
findings
are
definitive
or
whether
further
research
is
needed
Realist
review
Clarify
scope
and
purpose
of
review
with
client
and
articulate
the
key
theories
to
be
explored
Search
for
relevant
evidence,
refine
inclusion
criteria
in
the
light
of
emerging
data
Appraise
quality
of
studies
using
judgement
to
supplement
formal
checklist
and
considering
relevance
and
rigour
from
a
fit
for
purpose
perspective
Extract
different
data
from
various
studies
using
an
eclectic
and
iterative
approach
Synthesise
data
to
achieve
refinement
of
relevant
theory
i.e.,
to
determine
what
works
for
whom,
how
and
under
what
circumstances
Make
recommendations,
especially
with
reference
to
contextual
issues
for
particular
policy-makers
at
particular
times
4
Source:
Sorrel,
'Improving
the
evidence
base
for
energy
policy'.
III
B Definitions
The
industry-standard
term
for
discussing
the
ultimate
recovery
from
an
individual
well
is
the
estimated
ultimate
recovery
(EUR),
usually
denoted
EUR/well
and
also
sometimes
referred
to
as
the
productivity.
EUR
is
essentially
identical
to
URR,
although
URR
is
usually
preferred
when
referring
to
areas
or
regions
larger
than
a
well.
As
described
in
detail
in
Chapters
3
and
4,
a
common
procedure
for
estimating
the
recoverable
resources
from
a
country
or
region
is
through
extrapolating
values
of
EUR/well
across
an
area.
Confusion
can
occur
over
whether
these
recoverable
resources
should
be
interpreted
as
the
ultimately
recoverable
or
the
technically
recoverable.
It
is
important
to
remember
that
the
estimates
of
recoverable
resources
derived
in
this
way
rely
upon
the
extrapolation
of
existing
estimates
of
EUR/well,
not
just
to
areas
currently
being
produced
but
often
into
new
areas
which
have
experienced
little
or
no
previous
production.
The
estimates
of
EUR/well
are
based
upon
the
use
of
current
technology
and
so
extrapolating
them
into
new
areas
would
be
expected
to
give
the
recoverable
resources
in
those
areas
using
current
technology.
Our
interpretation
is
therefore
that
estimates
derived
using
EUR/well
should
be
seen
as
the
technically
recoverable
resources
(which
assume
current
technology
only),
unless
it
is
explicitly
stated
that
future
technological
advances
have
been
incorporated
into
the
analysis.
If,
by
whatever
means,
economic
factors
are
taken
into
account
for
example
if
an
author
estimates
that
some
areas
will
have
very
low
rates
of
production
or
will
require
excessively
complex
drilling
procedures
and
hence
discounts
resources
in
these
areas
the
remaining
resources
are
the
economically
recoverable
resources.
Since
EUR
and
URR
are
identical
terms,
throughout
the
report
the
notation
of
URR/well
instead
of
EUR/well
is
used
to
avoid
confusion.
In
addition
to
the
competing
definitions
of
resources
and
reserves,
some
other
definitions
are
relevant
to
the
interpretation
of
published
estimates.
These
are
summarised
and
explained
in
Box
B-1.
Box
B-1:
Measurement
of
natural
gas
volumes
and
energy
content
Natural
gas
is
generally
reported
on
a
volumetric
basis
either
in
imperial
(cubic
feet)
or
metric
(cubic
metres)
units.
In
the
imperial
system,
a
prefix
of
M
usually
denotes
a
thousand
(so
MMcf
is
a
million
cubic
feet),
while
in
the
metric
system
m
corresponds
to
a
million
(so
mcm
is
a
million
cubic
metres).
For
resource
estimates,
the
most
common
prefixes
are
B
for
a
billion
and
T
for
a
trillion,
both
of
which
are
commonly
used
with
cubic
metres
and
feet.
It
is
also
important
to
know
the
temperature
and
pressure
at
which
natural
gas
volumes
are
reported.
The
EIA
and
API
(the
American
Petroleum
Institute)
indicate
that
volumes
of
gas
in
the
USA
are
measured
at
60oF
(15.56oC)
and
14.73
psi
(1
atmosphere
or
101.325kPa).1
The
UKs
Department
of
Energy
and
Climate
Change
(DECC)
on
the
other
hand
indicates
that
European
natural
gas
data
is
generally
reported
again
at
atmospheric
pressure
but
at
a
slightly
lower
temperature
of
15oC.2
These
different
definitions
correspond
to
a
volumetric
difference
of
around
4%.
The
majority
of
the
evidence
base
presented
below
has
been
produced
by
North
American
institutions
or
by
organisations
relying
upon
North
American
data
and
so
the
volumes
presented
are
most
likely
to
correspond
to
the
EIA
and
API
definitions.
At
these
conditions,
cubic
feet
can
be
derived
by
multiplying
cubic
metres
by
35.3
i.e.
1
Tcm
=
35.3
Tcf.
1
C.
Augustine,
B.
Broxon
and
S.
Peterson,
Understanding
Natural
Gas
Markets
(Boston,
MA:
Lexecon,
2006),
DECC,
'EMS:
Atmospheric
emissions
Calculations',
(London:
Department
for
Energy
and
Climate
Change,
2008).
2
DECC,
'EMS'.
IV
Gas
can
also
be
reported
in
terms
of
dry
or
wet
volumes:
dry
gas
is
the
volume
of
gas
that
remains
after
any
liquefiable
or
non-hydrocarbon
portions
of
the
gas
stream
has
been
removed,
while
wet
gas
includes
both
dry
gas
and
these
liquefiable
or
non-hydrocarbon
components.3
Very
little
of
the
evidence
base
states
whether
dry
or
wet
volumes
of
the
unconventional
gases
have
been
reported.
SPE/PRMS
indicates
however
that
when
the
gas
is
used
in
the
end
sector
separately
from
any
liquefiable
fractions
contained
within
it,
reported
resource
figures
should
be
of
dry
gas.4
For
this
reason,
it
is
likely
that
most
of
the
evidence
base
reports
dry
natural
gas
figures,
which
will
be
assumed
throughout
this
report.
Gas
can
also
be
measured
in
terms
of
energy
content.
The
most
common
unit
as
used
on
the
New
York
Mercantile
Exchange
(the
Henry
Hub
pricing
point)
is
the
British
Thermal
Unit
(BTU),
usually
reported
in
MBtu
(convention
used
here)
or
MMBTU
(both
1
million
British
Thermal
Units).
An
alternative
unit
used
to
price
gas
in
the
UK
on
the
Intercontinental
Exchange
(ICE)
at
the
National
Balancing
Point
(NBP)
is
the
therm,
equivalent
to
100
000
BTU.
One
BTU
of
dry
natural
gas
at
60oF
corresponds
to
around
1
055J.
Conversion
between
volumes
and
energy
depends
on
the
calorific
value
of
the
natural
gas,
which
varies
over
time
and
with
the
wetness
of
the
gas.
Yearly
data
from
the
USA
since
1949
indicates
that
there
are
around
1
029
BTU
in
a
cubic
foot
of
dry
natural
gas
with
a
standard
deviation
of
4
BTU,
while
wet
gas
has
an
energy
content
around
7.5%
higher
than
dry
gas.5
One
cubic
foot
of
dry
natural
gas
at
60oF
is
therefore
equivalent
to
around
1.08MJ.
B.1
Although
the
majority
of
existing
literature
uses
one
or
more
of
the
categories
of
resources
described
in
Chapter
2,
there
is
one
important
exception:
the
USA
Geological
Service.
The
USGS
states
that
it
provides
estimates
of
undiscovered
volumes
of
unconventional
gases
in
different
geological
areas
of
the
USA.
Two
of
its
most
recent
studies
for
example
provided
the
undiscovered
resources
in
areas
of
the
Marcellus,
Haynesville
and
Eagle
Ford
shales.6
These
reports
do
not
have
a
clear
definition
of
the
term
undiscovered.
One
interpretation
of
the
resource
figures
given
by
the
USGS
is
given
in
a
paper
on
its
methods
for
estimating
unconventional
gas
resources.7
The
USGS
states
that
essentially
all
of
the
moveable
oil
or
gas
in
almost
any
[unconventional]
accumulation
that
can
be
envisioned
has
become
recoverable
from
a
purely
technical
standpoint...
more
restrictive
conditions
are
imposed,
to
the
extent
that
assessed
petroleum
volumes
must
not
only
be
technically
recoverable
but
must
also
have
the
potential
to
be
added
to
reserves.
This
indicates
that
the
criteria
required
for
gas
to
be
included
in
the
resource
figures
are
more
stringent
than
simply
requiring
the
gas
to
be
technically
recoverable.
Although
an
updated
methodological
paper
issued
in
2010
appears
to
contradict
this
by
stating
USGS
oil
and
gas
estimates
are
of
technically
recoverable
resources,
it
later
refers
to
figures
being
potential
additions
to
reserves
on
the
required
data
forms.8
3
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers
et
al.,
'Petroleum
resources
management
system',
(Allen,
TX:
Society
of
Petroleum
Engineers,
2008).
4
Ibid.
5
EIA,
'Annual
Energy
Review
2010',
(Washington,
DC:
US
Energy
Information
Administration,
2011),
Appendix
A4.
6
Coleman
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas',
R.F.
Dubiel
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resources
in
Jurassic
and
Cretaceous
strata
of
the
Gulf
Coast',
(Reston,
VA:
Unoted
States
Geological
Survey,
2011).
7 The
USGS
uses
the
term
continuous
for
unconventional
oil
and
gas
resources
to
emphasise
the
geological
difference
between
these
and
conventional
oil
and
gas
deposits.
These
terms
are
essentially
identical
however.
Schmoker,
'Assessment
concepts
for
continuous
petroleum
accumulations'.
8
Charpentier
and
Cook,
'Improved
USGS
methodology'.
Both
of
these
methodology
papers
therefore
suggest
that
figures
provided
by
the
USGS
should
be
interpreted
as
potential
additions
to
reserves.
A
possible
confusion
that
remains
is
whether
the
potential
additions
to
reserves
estimates
provided
by
the
USGS
for
shale
plays
include
undiscovered
unconventional
gas
in
areas
outside
known
formations.
Contacts
with
the
USGS
indicate
that
it
does
not.
To
provide
an
equal
basis
for
comparing
the
USGS
figures
to
the
estimates
provided
by
other
organisations,
the
USGS
figures
are
hence
interpreted
as
being
a
subset
of
remaining
technically
recoverable
resources
that
exclude
both:
a)
resources
that
have
already
been
classified
as
reserves;
and
b)
resources
in
undiscovered
areas.
An
estimate
of
reserves
and
undiscovered
resources
must
therefore
be
added
to
the
USGS
figures
in
order
to
determine
an
estimate
of
the
remaining
technically
recoverable
resources
of
the
USA.
Similar
to
aggregating
reserve
figures,
it
is
only
statistically
correct
to
arithmetically
sum
estimates
of
reserves
and
resources
if
these
correspond
to
the
mean
estimates.
As
indicated
above,
an
estimate
of
2P
reserves
is
closest,
although
not
identical,
to
the
mean
estimate
of
reserves
and
so
these
should
be
added
together
to
mean
estimates
of
potential
additions
to
reserves
and
resources
in
undiscovered
areas.
1P
reserve
estimates
within
the
USA
are
publically
available,
while
INTEK9
also
provide
estimates
of
US
inferred
reserves.
The
definition
of
the
term
inferred
reserves is
unclear
as
it
is
used
by
different
organisations
to
mean
different
things.
The
USGS
in
1995
for
example
used
it
to
refer
to
reserve
growth
in
conventional
fields,10
while
the
EIA
indicated
that
it
most
likely
corresponds
to
probable
reserves. 11
This
later
definition
is
preferred
since
it
is
more
recent
and
more
applicable
to
unconventional
gas
resources.
Probable
reserves
are
different
from
the
description
of
proved
and
probable
2P
reserves
given
above
in
that
those
reserves
classified
as
proved
reserves
have
been
subtracted.
Probable
reserves
would
appear,
therefore,
to
be
equivalent
to
2P
minus
1P
reserves.
It
is
therefore
concluded
that
an
estimate
of
the
remaining
technically
recoverable
resources
for
the
USA
may
be
derived
from
the
sum
of:
1) US
proved
reserves;
2) US
inferred
reserves;
3) the
USGS
mean
estimates
of
potential
additions
to
reserves
in
known
formations;
and
4) mean
estimates
of
undiscovered
technically
recoverable
resources.
The
addition
of
contemporaneous
estimates
of
total
cumulative
production
gives
an
estimate
of
the
total
technically
recoverable
resource
of
the
USA.
9
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
Reserve
growth
is
indicated
by
the
USGS
to
be
resources
expected
to
be
added
to
reserves
as
a
consequence
of
extension
of
known
fields,
through
revisions
of
reserve
estimates,
and
by
additions
of
new
pools
in
discovered
fields.
Also
included
in
this
category
are
resources
expected
to
be
added
to
reserves
through
application
of
improved
recovery
techniques.
Gautier
and
Survey,
'Assessment
of
US
resources'.
11
EIA,
'Estimation
of
reserves
and
resources'.
10
VI
B.2
A total of 50 sources provide original country or regional-level estimates of shale gas resources and these are listed in Table B-1. No distinction is made between whether total or remaining technically recoverable resources have been reported, as the difference is relatively minor and can be easily transformed from one to the other. As indicated previously, a number of sources do not indicate whether they have included estimates of undiscovered volumes of shale gas in their estimates of TRR. The likelihood of this can be deduced by examining whether they only consider individual, discovered shale plays and/or make any reference to the potential for shale gas to be found outside these plays. INTEK12 estimates that there are 1.6 Tcm of undiscovered shale gas resources in the USA. Hence, it is possible to convert estimates of discovered TRR in the USA to estimates of full TRR by adding in the INTEK figure. There are no estimates of undiscovered shale gas outside the USA since the focus to date has been on those shale plays that are known to exist.
12
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
VII
Table
B-1:
Shale
gas
reports
providing
original
country
level
estimates
by
date,
countries
or
regions
covered
and
type
of
resource
estimate
Author/organisation
Mohr
and
Evans
USGSa
Medlock,
Jaffe
and
Hartley
INTEK
(for
EIA)
Petak
Kuuskraa
EIA
(AEO)
Potential
Gas
Committee
Advanced
Resources
International
(for
EIA)
Henning
Kuuskraa
and
T.
Van
Leeuwen
Zou
et
al.
Medlock
and
Hartley
Kuuskraa
(a)
WEC
Mohr
and
Evans
Moniz,
Jacoby
and
Meggs
Dawson
Skipper
Hennings
Kuuskraa
(b)
Petrel
Robertson
Consulting
Ltd
Downey
Harvey
and
Gray
Kuuskraa
Potential
Gas
Committee
Theal
ICF
(reported
by
Ejaz)
IHS
CERA
Mackenzie
ICF
(Vidas
and
Hugman)
Smead
and
Pickering
Kuuskraa
Sandrea
Laherrre
Kuuskraa
Rogner
Kuuskraa
and
Meyers
Date
of
Countries/regions
report
covered
Sep-11
Continental
regions
Aug-11
USA
Jul-11
Jul-11
May-11
May-11
Variouse
Apr-11
Apr-11
Mar-11
Jan-11
Dec-10
Oct-10
Oct-10
Sep-10
Jul-10
Jun-10
May-10
Mar-10
Mar-10
Mar-10
Mar-10
Jan-10
Jan-10
Dec-09
Jun-09
May-09
Mar-09
Feb-09
Jan-09
Nov-08
Jul-08
Jul-07
Dec-05
Jun-04
Jan-04
Jan-97
Jan-83
Resource
estimate
URR Potential additions to reserves 9 North American, TRRb European and Pacific countries USA Unproved, discovered TRRc USA. Canada ERRd USA TRR USA TRR (1999-2010) ERR (1997 and 1998) USA TRR 32 individual countries OGIP and TRR USA, Canada USA China USA, Canada USA Nine continental regions USA, Canada USA Canada USA, Canada USA USA, Canada Canada USA, Canada UK USA, Canada, Poland, Sweden, Austria, South Africa USA USA, Canada USA Europe Europe USA, Canada USA USA USA, Global Global USA Continental regions USA, Canada, ROW ERR4 TRR OGIP TRR TRR OGIP URR TRR ERR TRR OGIP and TRR TRR OGIP TRR TRR Recoverable resources TRR OGIP and TRR ERR4 TRR TRR OGIP and TRR TRR URR Recoverable reserves' URR TRR and URR OGIP TRR
VIII
a) b)
USGS estimate based on several studies.13 Medlock indicates that resource should be commercially viable so his definition, although described as technically recoverable resources, could be closer to ERR. This is discussed in further detail in Section 3.2. TRR can be derived by adding the EIA and INTEK figures for contemporaneous proved and inferred reserves, undiscovered resources and unproved discovered technically recoverable resources, all of which are reported separately. ICFs 2011 report14 indicates that there is a total of 61.5 Tcm of economically recoverable resources in the USA and Canada. It provides a supply cost curve indicating that this volume is only recoverable at gas prices greater than $14/Mcf. Since this price is four times higher than current gas prices (around $3.5/Mcf on 15 December 2011), the authors consider that all of ICFs estimates are better interpreted as TRR. There have been a total of 15 Annual Energy Outlooks between 1997 and 2011. The AEO in 2003 used the same unconventional gas figures as 2002, while the 2011 estimate was based entirely on INTEK (2011) and so is reported separately. There are therefore a total of 13 AEOs included in this row.
c)
d)
e)
13
Coleman
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas';
D.K.
Higley
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resources
of
the
Anadarko
Basin
Province
of
Oklahoma,
Kansas,
Texas,
and
Colorado,
2010',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2011);
Debra
Higley
et
al.,
'2002
USGS
assessment
of
oil
and
gas
resource
potential
of
the
Denver
Basin
Province
of
Colorado,
Kansas,
Nebraska,
South
Dakota,
and
Wyoming',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2003);
David
W.
Houseknecht
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
natural
gas
resources
of
the
Arkoma
Basin
Province
and
geologically
related
areas,
2010',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2010);
Robert
C.
Milici
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resources
of
the
Appalachian
Basin
Province,
2002',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2003);
Richard
M.
Pollastro
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resources
of
the
Bend
Arch-Fort
Worth
Basin
Province
of
North-Central
Texas
and
Southwestern
Oklahoma,
2003',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2004);
C.J.
Schenk
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resources
of
the
Permian
Basin
Province
of
West
Texas
and
Southeast
New
Mexico,
2007',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2008);
Christopher
S.
Swezey
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resources
of
the
Illinois
Basin,
2007',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2007);
Christopher
S.
Swezey
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas
resourcesof
the
US
portion
of
the
Michigan
Basin,
2004',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2005);
United
States
Geological
Survey,
'National
assessment
of
oil
and
gas
resources
update',
(Reston,
VA:
United
States
Geological
Survey,
2010).
14
Petak,
'Impact
of
natural
gas
on
CHP'.
IX
C.2
INTEK3
undertook
a
review
of
all
shales
within
the
USA
for
the
latest
edition
of
the
EIAs
Annual
Energy
Outlook
as
shown
in
Figure
C-1.
INTEK
sought
to
estimate
the
unproved
discovered
technically
recoverable
resources4
within
19
individual
shale
plays
in
the
USA.
Aggregate
estimates
of
the
proved
reserves,
inferred
reserves5
and
undiscovered
resources
for
the
whole
of
the
USA
are
provided
within
INTEKs
report.
The
sum
of
1
Sorrell
et
al.,
'Oil
depletion'.
2
Petak,
Fritsch
and
Vidas,
'American
Midstream
Infrastructure'.
3
INTEK,
'Review
of
emerging
resources'.
4
Elsewhere
in
the
report
these
are
described
as
undeveloped
technically
recoverable
resources.
Neither
of the two definitions provided is particularly satisfactory. The first uses the term discovered in a manner that differs from the SPE/PRMS definition described in Section 2.1.1, which would describe the figures produced by INTEK as undiscovered. The second implies that proved and inferred reserves can only be in developed areas, which is not necessarily the case. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 'Modernization of the Oil and Gas Reporting Requirements: Conforming version (proposed rule)', in RIN 3235-AK00, ed. United States Securities and Exchange Commission (2008). 5 As indicated in Section 2.1.1, inferred reserves are assumed to be equal to probable reserves. The sum of proved and inferred reserves will therefore give an estimate of the 2P reserves.
these,
together
with
INTEKs
estimates
of
the
unproved
discovered
technically
recoverable
resources
from
each
shale
play,
gives
an
estimate
for
the
remaining
TRR
for
the
entire
USA.
The
total
TRR
can
then
be
estimated
by
adding
a
contemporaneous
estimate
of
cumulative
production.
The
undiscovered
resources
are
indicated
by
INTEK
to
be
estimated
at
1.2
Tcm
in
Southern
California
and
0.4
Tcm
in
the
Rocky
Mountain
region.
For
each
shale
play,
INTEK
first
split
the
whole
play
area
into
two
areas
it
termed
the
active
area
and
the
undeveloped
area.6
For
a
few
plays
INTEK
judged
the
whole
shale
play
area
to
be
active
and
so
did
not
differentiate
the
play,
but
in
general
each
of
the
two
areas
within
each
shale
play
was
considered
separately.
Based
upon
a
variety
of
technical,
commercial
and
industrial
reports,
INTEK
estimated
the
URR/well
and
well
spacing
within
each
area
of
each
shale
play.
The
product
of
the
URR/well
and
well
spacing
with
the
areal
extent
of
the
area
under
consideration
coupled
with
an
assumed
success
factor7
yields
an
estimate
of
the
unproved
discovered
technically
recoverable
resources
within
that
particular
area.
The
sum
of
the
active
and
undeveloped
areas
finally
gives
the
unproved
discovered
technically
recoverable
resources
within
the
whole
shale
play.
INTEKs
success
factor,
a
percentage
that
can
vary
between
0%
and
100%,
was
assumed
to
depend
upon
three
factors:
whether
the
estimates
for
URR/well
and
the
well
spacing
currently
used
were
considered
to
be
representative
of
what
can
be
expected
across
the
whole
(active
or
undeveloped)
area;
how
much
experience
there
was
of
geological
factors
that
can
affect
production;
and
how
much
gas
had
already
been
produced
or
added
to
reserves.
Choice
of
appropriate
values
for
the
success
factor
appears
to
be
relatively
subjective
and
varies
between
10%
in
the
active
area
of
the
Fayettesville
shale
to
100%
in
the
active
areas
of
the
Eagle-Ford
and
Barnett-Woodford
Shales.
The
arithmetic
means
success
factor
across
all
the
shale
plays
is
49%.
Currently
producing
US
shale
gas
plays
are
very
heterogeneous,
with
production
rates
between
neighbouring
wells
varying
by
a
factor
of
three
and
across
an
entire
shale
play
by
a
factor
of
ten.8
A
key
issue
for
this
method,
therefore,
is
the
validity
of
taking
estimates
of
well
spacing
and
the
URR/well
from
one
area
and
applying
these
to
a
second,
potentially
very
different,
area.
It
is
commonly
the
case
that
some
areas
within
the
shale
have
significantly
higher
productivity
and
ultimate
recovery
than
others.
These
are
commonly
referred
to
as
sweet
spots
and
correspond
with
the
area
INTEK
called
the
active
area.
In
addition,
there
also
appears
to
be
significant
variation
in
the
productivity
of
wells
within
sweet-spot
areas,
although
this
distinction
partly
depends
on
how
sweet
spots
are
defined.9
Given
this
heterogeneity,
it
is
important
not
to
assume
single
values
for
the
URR/well
and
well
spacing
across
the
whole
area
of
a
shale
play.
This
is
particularly
relevant
Again
this
is
not
a
particularly
satisfactory
term
to
use
since
some
parts
of
the
active
area
have
not
yet
been
developed.
7 INTEK
refers
to
applying
a
recovery
factor
to
the
product
of
the
URR/well
and
well
spacing.
This
is
easily
confused
with
the
recovery
factor
used
to
estimate
the
TRR
from
the
OGIP.
INTEKs
recovery
factor
more
closely
resembles
the
factor
that
geologists
apply
to
estimate
the
risked
OGIP
from
the
total
OGIP
and
so
the
term
success
factor
seems
more
appropriate
to
avoid
confusion.
8
EIA,
'Estimation
of
reserves
and
resources'.
9Kuuskraa,
'Case
study
#1.
Barnett
Shale:
The
start
of
the
gas
shale
revolution',
Strickland,
Purvis
and
Blasingame,
'Reserves
Determinations'.
6
XI
when
extrapolating
historical
URR/well
and
well-spacing
estimates,
since
these
will
only
be
available
from
the
areas
of
the
shale
play
that
have
been
developed
first
and
which
tend
to
be
the
most
productive.
Hence,
they
are
unlikely
to
be
representative
of
what
will
be
encountered
in
the
remainder
of
the
shale.
It
was
for
this
reason
that
INTEK
split
most
shale
plays
into
two
areas.
INTEK
assumed
a
lower
value
for
at
least
one
of
three
relevant
variables,
namely
the
URR/well,
well
spacing
or
success
factor
in
its
undeveloped
(non-sweet-spot)
areas.
Which
variable
was
lower,
and
to
what
extent
it
was
lower,
depended
on
the
shale
play
under
consideration.
Finally,
INTEK
assumes
that
the
sweet-spot
area
is
the
total
area
leased
by
shale
gas
producers. 10
As
discussed
in
Section
2.2.2,
this
is
unlikely
to
be
an
appropriate
assumption.
Figure
C-1:
Map
of
US
shale
gas
plays
(lower
48
states)11
C.3
The
INTEK
approach
differs
in
a
number
of
important
respects
to
that
used
by
the
USGS.
First,
the
USGS
acknowledges
the
considerable
uncertainty
in
all
of
the
above
factors
and
uses
Monte
Carlo
sampling
techniques
to
combine
these
uncertainties
and
estimate
a
probability
distribution
for
the
relevant
variables.
Second,
when
developing
estimates
such
as
the
URR/well
or
the
areal
extent
of
the
shale
(and
in
estimating
the
uncertainty
in
these
values),
the
USGS
takes
geological
factors
into
account,
such
as
the
shale
thickness
and
mineralogy.
The
USGS
indicates
that
these
factors
should
be
plotted
as
maps
and
that
they
can
affect
the
assumed
success
ratios
and/or
URR/well.
However,
little
detail
is
given
as
to
how
these
factors
are
actually
used.
Third,
the
USGS
splits
a
10
S.
Nome
and
P.
Johnston,
'From
shale
to
shining
shale:
a
primer
on
North
American
natural
gas
shale
XII
particular
shale
play
into
smaller
assessment
units, 12
and
assesses
each
of
these
individually.
It
therefore
differentiates
between
sweet-spot
and
non-sweet-spot
areas
on
a
smaller
scale
than
INTEK.
The
recent
USGS
assessment
of
the
Marcellus
Shale13
for
example
split
the
play
into
three
assessment
units.
Each
of
these
units
is
divided
into
sweet
and
non-sweet
spots;
the
USGS
therefore
identified
six
different
areas
within
the
Marcellus
Shale,
each
with
different
sizes
and
productivities,
while
INTEK
only
split
it
into
two.
Fourth,
the
USGS
periodically
updates
its
resource
assessments
for
individual
US
shale
plays
or
areas
of
the
plays
and
produces
an
end-of-year
summary
combining
all
of
the
latest
surveys
it
has
carried
out.14
The
latest
resources
assessments
were
summarised
in
Table
2-4.
It
can
be
seen
that
some
areas
have
not
been
examined
since
2002.
One
would
expect
that
those
assessments
produced
after
2010
would
have
relied
upon
the
updated
assessment
method
described
above,
but
this
does
not
appear
to
be
the
case.
The
USGS
recently
released
the
data15
it
used
in
its
most
recent
assessment
for
the
Marcellus
Shale.16
This
data
consists
of
the
ranges
assumed
for
the
parameters
required
to
estimate
potential
additions
to
reserves,
for
example
the
mean
URR/cell
and
indicates
that
the
old
assessment
method
was
used.
While
data
for
the
other
assessments
undertaken
since
2010
are
not
available,
it
seems
likely
that
the
old
methodology
was
used
for
all
of
these.
As
described
above,
the
earlier
assessment
methodology
excluded
volumes
of
gas
estimated
to
exist
in
non-sweet-spot
areas
and
so
is
likely
to
underestimate
the
total
play
TRR17.
This
represents
another
important
difference
between
the
assessment
results
of
the
USGS
and
INTEK.
Extrapolating
a
mean
URR/well
from
this
area
to
the
whole
of
the
sweet
spot
could
potentially
overestimate
the
resource
potential.
If
these
estimates
are
then
extended
across
the
entire
shale
play,
the
resource
potential
of
the
region
could
be
greatly
overestimated.
The
USGS
attempted
to
mitigate
this
problem
by
mapping
a
range
of
geological
factors
and
using
these
to
estimate
the
possible
productivities
outside
the
area
currently
in
production,
although
it
has
not,
in
the
assessments
it
has
performed
so
far,
attempted
to
estimate
the
productivity
of
non-sweet-spot
areas.
Nevertheless,
its
approach
is
relatively
transparent
and
has
the
advantage
that
uncertainties
are
explicitly
accounted
for.
In
contrast,
INTEK
does
not
provide
any
detail
on
how
it
estimates
either
the
URR/well
or
the
well
spacing
in
undeveloped
or
non-sweet-spot
areas
and
there
appears
to
be
little
empirical
basis
for
the
values
chosen.
The
USGS
relies
upon
geological
assessments
to
classify
sweet
spots,
while
INTEK
uses
the
area
leased
by
companies
as
a
proxy.
While
the
latter
is
a
simpler
and
cheaper
approach,
it
is
likely
to
over-simplify
the
problem
for
a
number
of
reasons.
Firstly,
the
acreage
details
used
appear
to
be
significantly
out
of
date.
Within
the
Marcellus
Shale,
for
example,
XTO
Energy,
purchased
by
ExxonMobil
in
2009
when
it
held
around
280
000
acres,
is
listed
as
holding
150
000
acres.
Similarly,
Talisman
Energy
Inc.
is
An
Assessment
Unit
is
defined
as
areas
that
encompasses
fields
(discovered
and
undiscovered)
which
share
similar
geologic
traits
and
socio-economic
factors.
United
States
Geological
Survey,
'Chapter
GL
Glossary'.
13
Coleman
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas'.
14
United
States
Geological
Survey,
'National
assessment
of
oil
and
gas
resources
update'.
15
EIA,
Shale
gas:
proved
reserves
(cited).
16
Coleman
et
al.,
'Assessment
of
undiscovered
oil
and
gas'.
17
Charpentier
and
Cook,
'Improved
USGS
methodology'.
12
XIII
reported to hold 640 000 acres yet in a May 2010 investor report indicates that it held around 218 000 acres.18 A second problem regarding INTEKs choice of sweet-spot areas is its reliance upon a report published in 2008.19 Since only a limited number of wells had been drilled by that time (e.g. only 234 in Pennsylvania), the productivity of the leased areas was not known with any confidence.20 There is therefore no real justification why the area leased in mid-2008 should correspond to the sweet-spot area. Furthermore, as mentioned above, given the heterogeneity of sweet-spot areas, assuming current productivity will likely provide an overestimate for the remainder of the sweet-spot area. One final drawback with the INTEK report is its reliance upon highly subjective estimates of the success factor to translate historical production experience into an estimate of recoverable resources for the whole shale. The updated USGS methodology includes a comparable success ratio that reflects the percentage of wells estimated to produce at least the minimum URR. The updated USGS methodology, which requires estimating the success ratio, was not actually used for any of the assessments that were presented in Table 2-4. Nevertheless, the new USGS methodology estimates success ratios at a lower level of spatial aggregation, basing its assumptions to a greater extent on the results from drilling activity and using probability distributions to reflect the associated uncertainties. Hence, it should have a lower degree of subjectivity.
C.4
The
studies
reviewed
above
have
focused
upon
estimating
the
volume
of
shale
gas
that
could
be
recovered
using
currently
available
technology.
As
the
USGS
comments:
"The
USGS
oil
and
gas
estimates
are
of
technically
recoverable
resources
as
opposed
to
in-place
resources.
Technological
and
economic
assumptions
are
conservative
and
limited,
in
that
the
production
data
used
for
calculating
well
URRs
are
contemporary
to
the
time
of
the
assessment...
large
improvements
in
technology
or
increasing
petroleum
prices
could
possibly
increase
recovery
factor
substantially
in
the
future.
Because
this
new
methodology
is
tied
to
contemporary
well-production
data,
such
improved
recovery
factors
are
not
used
as
part
of
this
assessment
methodology"
As
indicated
in
Section
2.2,
assessment
methods
that
explicitly
allow
for
future
technological
advances
are
likely
to
lead
to
substantially
larger
estimates
of
recoverable
resources.
Only
three
reports
that
attempt
to
quantify
the
effects
of
future
technology
development
have
been
identified,
namely
a
2004
report
by
Kuuskraa,21
a
paper
by
the
US
National
Petroleum
Council 22
and
a
number
of
the
EIA
AEOs 23 .
In
each
case,
18
Talisman
Energy,
'Investor
open
house
May
2010:
North
American
operations',
(Calgary,
AB:
Talisman
Energy,
2010).
19
Nome
and
Johnston,
'From
shale
to
shining
shale'.
20
Marcellus
Shale Advisory Commission, 'Governors Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission report', (Canonsburg, PA: 2011). 21 Kuuskraa, 'Gas resources, unconventional'. 22 Holditch, 'Unconventional gas'.
XIV
technological
progress
is
represented
by
annual
percentage
increases
in
the
URR/well.24
This
percentage,
extrapolated
over
a
given
time
frame
and
multiplied
by
a
contemporary
estimate
of
TRR,
will
yield
an
estimate
of
the
URR.
For
example,
if
TRR
in
a
particular
region
is
estimated
at
2.8
Tcm
and
technological
progress
is
estimated
to
increase
URR/well
by
30%,
then
all
else
being
equal,
the
URR
for
that
region
will
be
3.7
Tcm.
Table
C-1
illustrates
the
assumed
annual
improvement
in
recovery
and
the
implied
overall
increase
over
a
30-year
time
period.
The
mean
of
all
medium
estimates
of
the
increase
in
TRR
that
is
estimated
to
occur
from
future
technological
progress
is
36%
over
a
30-year
period
(this
mean
has
been
weighted
by
the
number
of
reports
giving
each
technological
progress
and
so
takes
into
account
that
more
than
one
AEO
is
included
in
the
first
and
third
rows).
The
EIA
from
2000
to
2009
identified
three
technologies
that
it
expected
would
contribute
to
a
greater
URR/well
for
shale
gas
(and
the
other
unconventional
technologies
but
at
different
rates).25
These
were:
geology
technology
modelling
and
matching,
more
effective,
lower
damage
well
completion
and
stimulation
technology
and
advanced
well
completion
technologies,
such
as
cavitation,
horizontal
drilling,
and
multi-lateral
wells.
The
first
two
of
these
contribute
an
annual
increase
in
URR/well
and
the
third
an
aggregate
increase,
presumably
resulting
from
switching
from
vertical
to
these
new
drilling
technologies,
over
the
timescale
of
the
AEOs,
generally
around
20- 25
years.
It
can
be
seen
that
different
AEOs
assumed
slightly
different
rates
of
progress.
These
technologies
are
assumed
to
be
complementary
and
so
the
figures
indicated
in
Table
C-1
are
the
sum
of
the
contribution
from
each,
converted
into
an
annual
increase
and
the
total
increase
in
the
30-year
period.
The
latest
two
AEOs
(2010
and
2011)
use
a
slightly
different
approach
and
indicate
that
the
pace
at
which
technology
performance
improves
and
the
probability
that
the
technology
project
will
meet
the
program
goals
for
URR
for
shale
gas
was
8%
for
developing
resources
and
7%
for
undiscovered
resources.26
It
is
not
clear
what
these
terms
mean
or
how
these
percentages
are
actually
used
and
as
very
little
explanation
is
provided,
they
are
therefore
not
include
in
Table
C-1.
Two
of
the
three
technologies
(stimulation27
and
horizontal
drilling)
mentioned
above
are
indeed
the
technologies
that
have
spurred
the
recent
increase
in
TRR
estimates.
The
rate
at
which
they
would
increase
URR/well
has
been
vastly
underestimated,
however.
ARI28
indicates
that
the
URR/well
within
the
Barnett
Shale
averaged
around
11.3-14.1
23
For
example,
EIA,
'AEO
2010'.
24
Other
metrics
for
measuring
the
impact
of
technological
progress
on
recoverable
volumes
of
shale
gas
can also be used. For example the usual metric for estimating impacts of technology on conventional oil and gas recovery is by increases in the recovery factor IEA, 'World Energy Outlook 2008', in World Energy Outlook (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008). 25 For example, EIA, 'AEO 2008'. 26 For example, EIA, 'AEO 2010'. 27 Stimulation, also known as hydraulic fracturing, involves pumping fluids consisting primarily of water and sand...injected under high pressure into the producing formation, creating fissures that allow resources to move freely from rock pores where it is trapped. American Petroleum Institute, 'Hydraulic fracturing'. 28 Kuuskraa, 'Case study #1. Barnett Shale: The start of the gas shale revolution'.
XV
mcm/well
between
1985
and
1990
but
in
2007-2008
had
increased
to
around
65.2
mcm/well.
This
corresponds
to
around
a
410%
increase
in
URR/well
in
about
a
20-year
period
and
has
occurred
primarily
through
the
more
widespread
and
improved
use
of
horizontal
drilling
and
stimulation.
The
fastest
rate
of
increase
in
URR/well
anticipated
in
Table
C-1,
which
includes
increases
resulting
from
switching
from
vertical
to
horizontal
wells
and
the
use
of
hydraulic
fracturing,
implies
an
increase
of
only
50%
over
a
comparable
timeframe.
This
significant
underestimation
of
the
role
of
technological
progress
in
the
past
demonstrates
the
difficulty
in
estimating
future
technological
progress,
even
when
using
a
wide
range
of
potential
values.
Nevertheless,
it
is
important
to
note
that
it
was
not
the
introduction
of
new
technologies,
i.e.
technologies
that
had
not
been
employed
elsewhere
and
whose
potential
was
unknown,
but
the
adaptation
and
utilisation
of
existing
technologies
that
led
to
the
large
increases
seen
in
the
URR/well.
The
potential
for
the
utilisation
of
entirely
new
technologies
for
shale
gas
recovery
has
not
been
discussed
in
any
of
the
EIA
AEOs.
This
suggests
that
it
is
the
existing
technologies
of
stimulation
and
horizontal
drilling
that
will
continue
to
be
used
in
the
future
and
that
increases
in
URR/well
will
be
driven
by
their
more
widespread
usage
and
improvements
in
how
they
are
used.
New
technological
breakthroughs
can
never
be
ruled
out,
however.
These
two
technologies,
stimulation
and
horizontal
drilling,
are
now
much
more
widely
used
than
in
2000,
when
the
estimates
of
technological
progress
in
URR/well
were
first
given
by
the
EIA.
It
therefore
seems
likely
that
there
is
less
potential
for
a
step
increase
through
switching
from
vertical
wells
without
stimulation
to
horizontal
wells
with
stimulation,
in
addition
to
there
now
being
a
better
understanding
of
the
current
and
future
potential
of
these
technologies.
There
has
also
been
a
significant
body
of
work
analysing
the
geology
of
individual
shale
plays.
One
would
therefore
expect
shale
geology
to
be
now
also
much
better
understood
and
hence
the
scope
for
future
improvements
in
URR/well
to
be
better
appreciated.
These
two
factors
suggest
that
such
a
step
change
in
URR/well
as
witnessed
between
1985
and
the
present
is
less
likely
to
occur
again
in
the
future.
However,
another
way
to
look
at
the
role
of
technology
is
by
examining
the
influence
of
changes
in
the
shale
gas
recovery
factors.
Even
a
very
small
increase
in
average
recovery
factors
can
have
very
significant
impacts
on
estimated
global
recoverable
volumes
of
shale
gas.
For
example,
using
ARIs
global
estimate
of
shale
gas
OGIP
of
around
708.2
Tcm,29
a
1%
increase
in
recovery
factors
globally
would
lead
to
an
increase
in
global
URR
of
7.1
Tcm
over
twice
the
global
production
of
all
natural
gas
in
2010.30
In
conclusion,
the
ranges
of
technological
progress
suggested
by
literature
as
presented
in
Table
C-1
are
likely
to
represent
a
better
approximation
of
the
role
of
future
technological
progress
than
they
have
previously.
However,
the
significant
impact
that
even
a
small
improvement
in
technology
can
have
on
the
URR
and
the
possibility
of
major
future
technological
breakthroughs,
means
that,
in
principle,
estimates
of
URR
will
always
be
more
uncertain
than
estimates
of
TRR.
Estimates
of
future
technological
progress
must
therefore
be
interpreted
with
considerable
caution.
29
Advanced
Resources
International,
'World
shale
gas
resources'.
30
BP,
'Statistical
review
2011'.
XVI
Table
C-1:
Assumed
rates
of
technological
progress
in
URR/well
from
various
sources31
Source
EIA
AEO
Kuuskraa
NPC
Mean
Date
2004-2009
2003
2001-2002
2000
2004
2003
(updated
in
2007)
Low
0.3%
0.4%
0.6%
0.3%
0.2%
0.3%
Annual
increase
Medium
1.3%
0.5%
0.8%
0.5%
0.8%
0.9%
1.0%
High
2.0%
0.6%
1.2%
1.1%
1.5%
1.5%
Implied
30-year
increase
Low
8%
13%
19%
9%
7%
9.6%
Medium
49%
16%
25%
16%
27%
30%
36.1%
High
80%
19%
43%
41%
56%
56.3%
31
Note:
the
mean
figures
have
been
weighted
by
the
numbers
of
reports
providing
each
percentage.
Sources: EIA, 'AEO 2010', Holditch, 'Unconventional gas', Kuuskraa, 'Gas resources, unconventional'.
XVII
Equation D-1
Where q(t) is the rate of production at time t, qi is the initial rate of production at t=0 and D is a constant reflecting the decline rate ( D 0 ). The corresponding equation for hyperbolic decline is:
Equation
D-2
Where
Di
is
the
initial
decline
rate
(t=0)
and
b
is
a
constant,
commonly
termed
the
Arps
decline
constant,
which
typically
(but
not
always)
lies
between
0
and
1.0. 7
The
appropriate
value
of
this
constant
is
often
the
focus
of
disputes
in
decline
curve
analysis.
These
two
functional
forms
are
illustrated
in
Figure
D-1.
For
two
curves
with
the
same
initial
production
rate
and
the
same
initial
decline
rate,
the
hyperbolic
curve
flattens
earlier,
maintaining
a
greater
production
rate
for
any
given
time.
The
area
under
the
1
R.
Arnold
and
R.
Anderson,
'Preliminary
report
on
Coalinga
oil
district',
in
US
Geological
Survey
Bulletin
(1908).
2
W.C.
Cutler,
'Estimation
of
underground
oil
reserves
by
oil-well
production
curves',
(Washington,
DC:
Department
of
the
Interior,
1924).
3
C.S.
Larkey,
'Mathematical
determination
of
production
decline
curves',
Trans
AIME
71
(1925).
4
Arps,
ed.,
Analysis
of
Decline
Curves.
5
Ibid,
Fetkovich,
'Decline
Curve
Analysis'.
6
Ilk
et
al.,
'Integrating
Multiple
Production
Analysis
Techniques
To
Assess
Tight
Gas
Sand
Reserves:
Defining
a
New
Paradigm
for
Industry
Best
Practices';
P.P.
Valko,
'Assigning
Value
to
Stimulation
in
the
Barnett
Shale:
A
Simultaneous
Analysis
of
7000
Plus
Production
Histories
and
Well
Completion
Records'
(paper
presented
at
the
SPE
Hydraulic
Fracturing
Technology
Conference,
Woodlands,
TX,
2009).
7
D.
Ilk
et
al.,
'Exponential
vs.
Hyperbolic
decline
in
tight
gas
sands:
understanding
the
origin
and
implications
for
reserve
estimates
using
Arps'
decline
curves'
(paper
presented
at
the
SPE
Annual
Technical
Conference
and
Exhibition,
Denver,
CO,
2008).
XVIII
decline
curve,
from
when
production
begins
to
when
it
finally
ends
represents
the
ultimately
recoverable
resource
from
the
well.
Figure
D-1:
Exponential
and
hyperbolic
decline
curves
with
equal
initial
production
and
decline
rate
Exponential Hyperbolic
q(t)
The
exponential
decline
curve
exhibits
a
constant
rate
of
decline,
D
(i.e.
the
percentage
change
in
production
between
time
t
and
time
t+1
is
constant)
and
a
plot
of
the
natural
log
of
production
against
time
takes
the
form
of
a
straight
line
(Figure
D-2).
In
contrast,
the
hyperbolic
decline
curve
exhibits
a
reducing
decline
rate
over
time,
so
a
plot
of
the
natural
log
of
production
against
time
takes
the
form
of
a
curve
(Figure
D-2).
The
constant
b
represents
the
rate
with
which
that
decline
rate
reduces.
Figure
D-2:
Semi-log
plot
of
exponential
and
hyperbolic
decline
curves
Exponential Hyperbolic
ln q(t)
While originally applied to oil production, decline curves are now commonly applied to gas fields, including shale gas. However, given the relatively recent nature of most shale gas plays, the historical evidence with which to estimate decline curves is relatively limited. The level of uncertainty may be expected to increase with the time period over XIX
which
curves
are
extrapolated,
but
to
estimate
the
URR/well,
extrapolation
over
long
time
periods
is
required.
In
addition,
the
rapid
technical
developments
over
the
past
few
years
are
likely
to
have
affected
the
pattern
and
rate
of
production
decline
so
newer
wells
may
not
necessarily
behave
in
the
same
fashion
as
older
wells,
even
when
the
geology
is
similar.
These
factors
have
fuelled
the
debate
regarding
the
appropriate
choice
and
use
of
decline
curves
in
shale
gas
areas.8
Whilst
the
exponential
decline
curve
is
simpler,
the
hyperbolic
curve
is
often
found
to
provide
a
more
accurate
model
of
conventional
oil
and
gas
fields,
since
the
rate
of
production
decline
typically
slows
rather
than
remaining
constant.
Production
from
conventional
gas
wells
typically
declines
by
25-40%
per
year
in
the
early
stages,9
but
production
from
shale
gas
wells
declines
even
faster
for
example,
by
as
much
as
63- 85%
per
year.10
But
rather
than
focusing
on
the
initial
rate
of
decline,
which
is
apparent
after
only
a
few
months
of
production,
the
contentious
question
is
how
quickly
and
by
how
much
will
these
decline
rates
reduce?
The
debate
has
sometimes
been
characterised
as
an
argument
between
hyperbolic
and
exponential
decline.11
However,
exponential
decline
can
be
viewed
as
a
special
case
of
hyperbolic
decline
where
b=0.
The
debate
may
therefore
be
recast
as
what
is
the
appropriate
value
of
b?
Figure
D-4
illustrates
the
change
in
hyperbolic
decline
as
b
varies
between
0.01
and
0.99.
The
theoretical
basis
for
a
hyperbolic
decline
curve
assumes
boundary-dominated
flow
where
the
influence
of
the
reservoir
boundaries
affects
the
flow-rate
behaviour.
In
these
circumstances,
b
is
normally
found
to
be
between
0
and
1.
However,
shale
gas
and
other
unconventional
gas
resources
exhibit
more
transient
or
heterogeneous
flow
rates12
and
it
is
possible
to
fit
curves
with
b
constants
greater
than
1.
To
correct
for
the
anomaly
that
hyperbolic
decline
suggests
infinite
production,
a
point
of
economic
truncation
must
be
assumed,
where
the
value
of
produced
gas
drops
below
some
assumed
cost
of
operation.
The
well
is
then
assumed
to
be
no
longer
profitable
and
is
shut-in.
Such
calculations
require
assumptions
about
the
capital
and
operating
cost
of
the
well,
the
expected
price
of
gas
over
the
well
lifetime
and
the
period
of
time
over
which
these
costs
should
be
amortised.
Some
estimates,
based
on
a
gas
price
of
$5/
thousand
cubic
feet,
suggest
that
wells
in
the
Barnett
Shale
are
no
longer
profitable
when
producing
below
1
million
cubic
feet
per
month.13
While
estimates
of
b
constants
greater
than
1
are
possible,
URR
estimates
appear
to
be
more
sensitive
to
variation
in
these
higher
values
of
b.
Figure
D-3
presents
the
outcome
of
an
analysis
of
44
fields
in
the
Haynesville
play.14
In
this
figure
URR
estimates
are
presented
on
the
y
axis
while
b
constant
values
are
presented
on
the
x
axis.
Both
initial
production
and
initial
decline
are
fixed.
Based
on
this
analysis,
the
change
in
URR
8
Ibid,
J.P.
Spivey
et
al.,
'Applications
of
the
Transient
Hyperbolic
Exponent'
(paper
presented
at
the
SPE
Rocky Mountain Petroleum Technology Conference, Keystone, CO, 2001). 9 J.D. Hughes, 'Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century?', (Post Carbon Institute, 2011). 10 Chesapeake Energy, 'Investor and analyst meeting'. 11 Dizard, 'Debate'. 12 Transient or heterogeneous flow is defined as a changing flow rate over time. In the context of shale gas this means that the flow rate is more volatile than boundary-dominated flow rates, with the potential rate of change being more dramatic. 13 The method of calculation of this figure and assumptions are not given. Berman, 'Shale Gas-Abundance or Mirage? Why The Marcellus Shale Will Disappoint Expectations'. 14 Ibid.
XX
estimates
over
a
change
in
b
constant
appears
to
increase
as
b
increases.
This
implies
that
even
small
errors
in
the
assumed
b
constant
will
have
large
impacts
on
the
estimated
URR.
It
is
also
suggested
in
this
analysis
that
different
b
constants
create
hyperbolic
curves
that
fit
the
data
equally
well.
This
underlines
the
possibility
of
making
a
small
error
in
assumed
b
constant
potentially
leading
to
a
significant
error
in
estimated
URR
if
b
is
assumed
to
be
greater
than
1.
Figure
D-3:
Implications
of
varying
b
for
estimates
of
URR
for
44
wells
in
the
Haynesville
Shale15
Estimated URR
Evidence suggests that shale gas wells are likely to be closed down after relatively short periods of production. In an analysis of well data from the Barnett Shale between 2001 and 2008, Sutton et al.16 found that 10% of the horizontal wells used to produce shale gas were shut-in within 40 months of initial production. This compares to vertical wells in the same region which took over 70 months to lose the same percentage of producing wells. The difference in expected longevity between horizontal and vertical wells is a function, amongst other things, of the decline rate and the cost of well construction and operation. The implications, therefore, are that using vertical well decline rates to estimate horizontal well behaviour will likely overestimate future well longevity. However, some authors have suggested that shale gas wells have been maintained past this economically rational point in order to avoid downgrading company reserve estimates.17
b Constant
15
Source:
Arps,
ed.,
Analysis
of
Decline
Curves.
Sutton, S.A. Cox and R.D. Barree, 'Shale Gas Plays: A Performance Perspective', in Tight Gas Completions Conference, ed. Society of Petroleum Engineers (San Antonio, TX: 2010). 17 Berman, 'Shale Gas-Abundance or Mirage? Why The Marcellus Shale Will Disappoint Expectations'; Berman, 'Abundance or Mirage?'.
16 R.P.
XXI
Figure
D-4:
Variation
of
hyperbolic
decline
with
the
value
of
b
q(t)
Geologists
typically
estimate
decline
curves
for
wells
or
groups
of
wells
with
the
help
of
non-linear
regression
techniques.18
However,
this
form
of
curve
fitting
may
have
limited
accuracy
if
only
short
periods
of
historical
data
are
available.
A
key
difficulty
is
that
curves
with
different
functional
forms
and/or
parameter
values
can
fit
short
periods
of
data
comparably
well
but
lead
to
substantially
different
estimates
of
the
URR
(see
Figure
D-3
and
surrounding
discussion).
In
these
circumstances,
an
alternative
is
to
base
the
choice
of
curve
and
parameters
on
data
from
analogues
that
is,
wells
with
a
longer
production
history
that
are
in
areas
with
similar
geological
characteristics.
The
guidelines
on
what
may
be
considered
an
appropriate
analogue
are
now
well
defined.19
Nevertheless,
some
commentators
argue
that
resource
estimates
are
frequently
based
upon
inappropriate
analogues.20
The
considerable
variability
in
decline
rates
between
different
shale
gas
areas
highlights
the
potential
error
associated
with
using
inappropriate
analogues.21
This
variability
also
affects
the
minimum
gas
price
needed
to
support
gas
production
in
different
shale
gas
areas.
For
example,
between
2008
and
2009,
a
shale
gas
price
of
$4/Mcf
would
support
production
in
the
Barnett
and
Fayetteville
Shales,
while
a
price
of
$6/Mcf
feet
would
be
required
in
the
other
areas.22
Due
to
the
difficulties
associated
with
hyperbolic
decline
curves,
several
authors
have
suggested
using
a
new
decline
curve
formulation
known
as
the
power-law
exponential
rate
relation
for
shale
gas
wells
instead. 23
But
while
this
new
formulation
could
potentially
succeed
the
hyperbolic
decline
curve
as
best
practice,
it
seems
unlikely
to
have
a
significant
impact
on
the
estimation
of
URR
in
shale
gas
wells
for
some
time.
The
continuing
concern
over
the
accuracy
of
hyperbolic
decline
curves
has
also
prompted
18
Jikich
and
Popa,
'Hyperbolic
Decline
Parameter
Identification'.
Estimation of Petroleum Reserves' (paper presented at the SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, San Antonio, TX, 2006); R. Sidle and W.J. Lee, 'An Update on the Use of Reservoir Analogs for the Estimation of Oil and Gas Reserves', SPE Econ & Mgmt 2 no 2 (2010). 20 Hodgin and Harrell, 'Reservoir Analogs'. 21 Chesapeake Energy, 'Investor and analyst meeting'. 22 Baihly et al., 'Shale Gas Production Decline Trend Comparison'. 23 Ilk et al., 'Integrating Multiple Production Analysis Techniques To Assess Tight Gas Sand Reserves: Defining a New Paradigm for Industry Best Practices'; Ilk et al., 'Exponential vs. Hyperbolic decline'; Strickland, Purvis and Blasingame, 'Reserves Determinations'.
19 J.E. Hodgin and D.R. Harrell, 'The Selection, Application, and Misapplication of Reservoir Analogs for the
XXII
some authors to suggest that their use may not qualify under the US Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) guidance on the reporting of reserves.24 Finally, analytical models, or their combination in hybrid methodologies, provide an alternative route to derive the b constant.25 Decline curves have traditionally been an empirical technique in which future estimates are derived by extrapolating historical data. These curves may better reflect the later stages of shale gas well production, the so called boundary-dominated flow. 26 Newer analytical models seek to derive flow characteristics from horizontal, fractured wells through computer simulations, which model the shape, pressure and characteristics of these wells. 27 These analytical techniques may represent the initial transient flow more accurately.28 By applying a combination of these techniques, geologists have created hybrid methodologies that help to balance the potential bias of each technique as the well transitions from transient flow to boundary-dominated flow. These hybrid methods are new and it is unclear whether they will prove valuable given the effort associated.
24
Lee
and
Sidle,
'Reserves
Estimation'.
25
Ray
J.
Ambrose
et
al.,
'Life-Cycle
Decline
Curve
Estimation
for
Tight/Shale
Reservoirs'
(paper
presented
at the SPE Hydraulic Fracturing Technology Conference, Woodlands: TX, 2011); J.M. Thompson, V.O. Mangha and D.M. Anderson, 'Improved Shale Gas Production Forecasting Using a Simplified Analytical Method-A Marcellus Case Study', in North American Unconventional Gas Conference and Exhibition, ed. Society of Petroleum Engineers (The Woodlands, TX: 2011). 26 Ambrose et al., 'Life-Cycle Decline Curve Estimation'. 27 L. Larsen and T.M. Hegre, 'Pressure-Transient Behavior of Horizontal Wells With Finite-Conductivity Vertical Fractures, (paper presented at the International Arctic Technology Conference, Anchorage, AK, 1991). 28 Ambrose et al., 'Life-Cycle Decline Curve Estimation'; Thompson, Mangha and Anderson, 'Improved Shale Gas Production Forecasting Using a Simplified Analytical Method-A Marcellus Case Study'.
XXIII
US
Normalised
probability
(x10-4)
3 2.5
2 1.5 1
China
0.5 0
10
20
30
40
50
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
V.
Voudouris,
'The
ACEGES
Project:
An
ACE
Model
for
the
Availability
of
Global
Conventional
Oil
Supply',
in
16th
International
Conference
on
Computing
in
Economics
and
Finance,
ed.
Society
for
Computational
Economics
(2010).
XXIV
F Evidence
base
Table
F-1:
Documentation
and
classification
of
the
evidence
base
Author
Aluko
ARI
(Kuuskraa)
Date
Aug-01
May-11
Peer
review
No
No
Countries/
regions
covered
11
countries
USA
Gas
analysed
CBM
Shale
Type
resource
estimate
TRR
TRR
of
Approach
used
Literature
review
Method
not
stated
Notes
It
is
likely
that
Kuuskraa
adopts
a
bottom-up
analysis
of
geological
features
approach
as
used
in
ARI
April
2011
report,
but
this
is
not
stated
Recovery
factor
of
40%
suggested
ARI (Kuuskraa, Apr-11 Stevens et al.) ARI (Kuuskraa) ARI (Kuuskraa) ARI (Kuuskraa) ARI (Kuuskraa) Jan-11 Oct-10 Mar-10 Dec-09
Yes No No No No
Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Method not stated Method not stated Method not stated Method not stated Method not stated Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) and IEA WEO 2009 Method not stated
ARI (Kuuskraa)
Jul-07
No
CBM Shale
Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) and IEA WEO 2009 Method not stated Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters
XXV
Author
Date
Peer
review
No
Countries/
regions
covered
Individual
countries
worldwide
Continental
regions
Gas
analysed
CBM
Tight
CBM
Shale
Type
resource
estimate
URR
URR
TRR
OGIP
of
Approach
used
Notes
BGR (Kmpel)
Nov-09
Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Method not stated Not independently assessed: based on Holditch and Chianelli, Kawata and Fujita, and Rogner Not independently assessed: based on Holditch and Chianelli, Kawata and Fujita, and Rogner Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Not independently assessed: based on Holditch (2007) Method not stated
Tight
OGIP
Yes No No
Indications based on Petrel Robertson Consulting (2010) report; however, this report does not include any ERR figures.
No
UK
XXVI
Author
Date
Peer
review
No
Countries/
regions
covered
USA
Gas
analysed
Shale
Type
resource
estimate
TRR
of
Approach
used
Notes
EIA (AEO)
Various
FERC
May-10
No
USA
Shale
TRR
Gny
Dec-10
No
Europe
CBM
TRR
Tight
TRR
Shale
TRR
No
Global
Shale CBM
Not independently assessed: based on American Clean Skies Foundation Not independently assessed: based on Wood Mackenzie Unconventional Hydrocarbons Multi- client Study Not independently assessed: based on Wood Mackenzie Unconventional Hydrocarbons Multi- client Study Not independently assessed: based on IHS CERA Gas from Shale: Potential Outside North America? Not independently assessed: based on ARI report Not independently assessed: based on ARI report
There have been a total of 15 Annual Energy Outlooks between 1997 and 2011. The AEO in 2003 used the same unconventional gas figures as 2002, while the 2011 estimate was based entirely on INTEK (2011) and so is reported separately.
XXVII
Author
Date
Peer
review
No
Yes
Countries/
regions
covered
USA
Continental
regions
Gas
analysed
Shale
Shale
Type
of
Approach
used
resource
estimate
OGIP
and
TRR
Bottom-up
analysis
of
geological
parameters
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Rogner
(1997)
(although
not
stated)
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Rogner
(1997)
(although
not
stated)
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Rogner
(1997)
(although
not
stated)
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Tight
Gas
Sands
Holditch
(2006)
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Tight
Gas
Sands
Holditch
(2006)
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Tight
Gas
Sands
Holditch
(2006)
OGIP
Not
independently
assessed:
based
on
Rogner
(1997)
taken
from
Kawata
and
Fujita
(2001).
No
recovery
factor
stated
Notes
CBM
Tight
Holditch
Jul-07
No
Continental regions
Shale
CBM
Tight
Holditch
Jun-06
Yes
Continental regions
Shale
XXVIII
Author
Date
Peer
review
Countries/
regions
covered
Gas
analysed
CBM
Type
resource
estimate
OGIP
of
Approach
used
Notes
Tight
OGIP
ICF
Mar-09
No
USA
Shale
TRR
Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) taken from Kawata and Fujita (2001). No recovery factor stated Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) taken from Kawata and Fujita (2001). No recovery factor stated Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters
ICF (Petak)
Jun-11
No
USA. Canada
Reported by MIT supplementary paper (Ejaz (2010) SP2.2) The authors consider that all of ICFs estimates are better interpreted as TRR The authors consider that all of ICFs estimates are better interpreted as TRR The authors consider that all of ICFs estimates are better interpreted as TRR. This report indicates that there is a total of 61.5 Tcm of economically recoverable resource in the USA and Canada. It provides a supply cost curve indicating that this volume is only recoverable at gas prices greater than $14/Mcf. Since this price is four times higher than current gas prices (around of $3.5/Mcf on 15 December 2011), the authors consider that all of ICFs estimates are better interpreted as TRR.
XXIX
Author
Date
Peer
review
No
No
Yes
Countries/
regions
covered
USA,
Canada
USA,
Canada
Continental
regions
USA,
Canada
Europe
Gas
analysed
Shale
Shale
CBM
Tight
Shale
Type
resource
estimate
ERR
of
Approach
used
Notes
Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Method not stated Method not stated Not independently assessed: based on ARI report (Kuuskraa, Stevens et al. 2011) Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Method not stated Unknown
The authors consider that all of ICFs estimates are better interpreted as TRR.
Jan-10 Feb-09
No No
Recovery factor of around 25% suggested Recovery factor of around 40% suggested Reported by R. Weijermars et al., Unconventional gas research initiative for clean energy transition in Europe. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, 2011. 3(2): p. 402-412. TRR can be derived from this figure by adding proved and inferred reserves; undiscovered resources are reported separately No recovery factor suggested No recovery factor suggested
Jul-11
No
USA
Shale
Extrapolation of production experience Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997)
Apr-01
No
Continental regions
Shale CBM
XXX
Author
Date
Peer
review
Yes
No
No
Countries/
regions
covered
Continental
regions
USA
12
countries
Gas
analysed
Tight
Shale
CBM
Tight
Shale
CBM
Type
resource
estimate
OGIP
of
Approach
used
Notes
OGIP and TRR TRR TRR URR and TRR OGIP and TRR
Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Not independently assessed: based on BGR1 Not independently assessed: based on BGR Not independently assessed: based on BGR Method not stated Method not stated
No recovery factor suggested Reported in Kuuskraa, V.A., Natural gas resources, unconventional, in Encyclopedia of Energy, C.J. Cleveland, (ed.). 2004, Elsevier Inc. p. 257-272. Could equally be an expert opinion Could equally be an expert opinion
No No No No
OGIP and TRR URR and TRR URR and TRR OGIP and TRR OGIP and TRR OGIP and TRR URR TRR
Extrapolation from coal resources Method not stated Method not stated Literature review Literature review Bottom-up analysis of geological factors Expert judgment Literature review
1
BGR,
'Reserves,
resources
and
availability'.
XXXI
Author
Date
Peer
review
Yes
Countries/
regions
covered
Gas
analysed
Type
resource
estimate
TRR
of
Approach
used
Notes
Medlock et al.
Jul-11
9 North American, Shale European and Pacific countries USA Continental regions Continental regions USA, Canada 12 countries Shale CBM Tight Shale CBM Tight Shale CBM Tight Shale CBM Tight CBM
Literature review
TRR TRR TRR OGIP OGIP OGIP URR URR URR URR URR URR OGIP
Literature review Literature review Literature review Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) Literature review Literature review Literature review Literature review Literature review Literature review Adaptation of existing review (Kuuskraa et al 1992)
Medlock indicates that resource should be commercially viable so his definition, although described as technically recoverable resources, could be closer to ERR. Figures are reported without proved reserves so 1.7 Tcm gas have been added Figures are reported without proved reserves so 0.54 Tcm gas have been added Figures are reported without proved reserves so 2.3 Tcm gas have been added Reported in Appendix 2A. Recovery factor between 10-35% suggested Reported in Appendix 2A. Recovery factor between 10-35% suggested Reported in Appendix 2A. Recovery factor between 10-35% suggested
XXXII
Author
Date
Peer
review
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Countries/
regions
covered
USA
12
regions/
countries
Canada
USA
USA
USA
USA
Continental
regions
12
regions/
countries
Gas
analysed
Shale
CBM
Tight
CBM
Shale
CBM
Tight
Shale
CBM
Shale
CBM
Shale
CBM
Tight
CBM
Type
resource
estimate
TRR
TRR
TRR
OGIP
OGIP
OGIP
OGIP
TRR
TRR
TRR
TRR
OGIP
OGIP
OGIP
OGIP
of
Approach
used
Notes
Navigant Consulting (Smead & Pickering) Palmer Petrel Robertson Consulting Potential Gas Committee Potential Committee Rogner Ryan
Literature review Literature review Literature review Not independently assessed: based on Kuuskraa (1992) Literature review Literature review Literature review Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters Extrapolation of production experience Literature review Literature review Not independently assessed: based on Wood Mackenzie Unconventional Hydrocarbons Multi- client Study
The global figure was modified to regional estimates based on the distribution of conventional gas
XXXIII
Author
Date
Peer
review
Countries/
regions
covered
Gas
analysed
Tight
Type
resource
estimate
OGIP
of
Approach
used
Notes
No Yes No No No No
USA USA, Global Europe USA, Canada USA, Canada 5 regions Global USA
Not independently assessed: based on Wood Mackenzie Unconventional Hydrocarbons Multi- client Study Extrapolation of production experience Expert judgment Expert judgment
No recovery factor suggested USGS resource estimate based on Coleman et al. (2011); Dubiel et al. (2011); Higley et al (2011); Houseknecht et al. (2010); Schenk et al. (2008); Swezey et al. (2007); Swezey et al. (2005); Pollastro et al. (2004); Higley et al.(2003); Milici et al (2003; and USGS (2010).
Not independently assessed: based on Rogner (1997) TRR Method not stated OGIP and TRR Bottom-up analysis of geological parameters TRR Method not stated OGIP and TRR Method not stated Potential to be Extrapolation of added to production experience reserves
CBM Tight
XXXIV
Author
Date
Peer
review
No
Countries/
regions
covered
Europe
Gas
analysed
Shale
Type
resource
estimate
TRR
of
Approach
used
Notes
Wood Mackenzie
Jan-09
Nov-06
No No
Energy Sep-10
Reported by R. Weijermars et al., Unconventional gas research initiative for clean energy transition in Europe. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, 2011. 3(2): p. 402-412. Reported by Ryan (2008) and Gny (2010). Figures appear to be similar to Rogners Reported by Ryan (2008) and Gny (2010). Figures appear to be similar to Rogners Recovery factor of 40% suggested to convert to ERR
XXXV
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003). 2 See, for example, European Commission, 'Third benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market', ed. Directorate-General for Transport and Energy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007). 3 European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007). 4 European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)', (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007). 5 See, for example, European Commission, 'Commission acts to ensure effective and competitive energy market across Europe', (Brussels: 2009); European Commission, 'Commission brings actions before Court
XXXVI
2009 Commission report noted that the implementation of the second Electricity and Gas Directive was still incomplete. With respect to market concentration, the Commission found that the three largest wholesalers had a market share of 90% or more in 12 Member States. Ownership unbundling was implemented by only 12 of the EUs gas transmission system operators (TSO).6 Considering that the internal energy market could not be realised under the prevailing rules, the Commission initiated work on its Third Internal Market Package in 2007 a collection of regulations and directives that took direct effect on 3 March 2011.7 The package set more stringent conditions for pipeline access and gave stronger powers and independence to national energy regulators. It introduced new measures to harmonise pan-European market and network operation to facilitate cross-border trade and reduce transaction costs. It also created new institutions to promote the completion and functioning of the internal market, including an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and an association of gas transmission system operators.8 The inception of the Third Package coincided with a big legal push against abuse of dominance in the natural gas sector, with the Directorate-General for Competition bringing cases against Distrigaz, E.ON, ENI, GDF and RWE in the period 2007-2011.9
of
Justice
against
several
Member
States
for
incorrect
transposal
of
Electricity
and
Gas
Directives',
(Brussels:
2008);
European
Commission,
'The
Commission
takes
action
against
Member
States
which
have
still
not
properly
opened
up
their
energy
markets',
(Brussels:
2006);
European
Commission,
'Energy
markets:
five
Member
States
to
be
taken
before
the
Court
of
Justice',
(Brussels:
2005);
European
Commission,
'Opening
up
of
energy
markets:
ten
Member
States
have
still
not
transposed
the
new
EU
rules
',
(Brussels:
2005).
6
European
Commission,
'Communication
from
the
Commission
to
the
Council
and
the
European
Parliament
-
Report
on
progress
in
creating
the
internal
gas
and
electricity
market
'.
7
European
Union,
'Directive
2009/73/EC
of
the
European
Parliament
and
of
the
Council
of
13
July
2009
concerning
common
rules
for
the
internal
market
in
natural
gas
and
repealing
Directive
2003/55/EC
(Text
with
EEA
relevance)';
European
Union,
'Regulation
(EC)
No
713/2009
of
the
European
Parliament
and
of
the
Council
of
13
July
2009
establishing
an
Agency
for
the
Cooperation
of
Energy
Regulators
(Text
with
EEA
relevance)';
European
Union,
'Regulation
(EC)
No
715/2009
of
the
European
Parliament
and
of
the
Council
of
13
July
2009
on
conditions
for
access
to
the
natural
gas
transmission
networks
and
repealing
Regulation
(EC)
No
1775/2005
(Text
with
EEA
relevance)'.
8
In
order
to
properly
facilitate
investments,
both
the
second
Gas
Directive
and
a
third
package
contain
provisions
for
alternative
coordination
mechanisms,
such
as
derogations
from
the
third-party
access
provisions
and
long-term
supply
contracts.
9
European
Commission,
'Antitrust
/
ENI
case:
Commission
opens
up
access
to
Italy's
natural
gas
market
',
(Brussels:
2010);
European
Commission,
'Antitrust:
Commission
accepts
commitments
by
GDF
Suez
to
boost
competition
in
French
gas
market
',
(Brussels:
2009);
European
Commission,
'Antitrust:
Commission
fines
E.ON
and
GDF
Suez
553
million
each
for
market-sharing
in
French
and
German
gas
markets',
(Brussels:
2009);
European
Commission,
'Antitrust:
Commission
opens
Belgian
gas
market
to
competition',
(Brussels:
2007);
European
Commission,
'Antitrust:
Commission
opens
German
gas
market
to
competition
by
accepting
commitments
from
RWE
to
divest
transmission
network',
(Brussels:
2009).
XXXVII
H Evaluating
potential
shale
gas
wells
and
quantifying
finding
and
developing
costs
Table
H-1:
FX
Energys
drilling
programme
in
Poland
and
net
asset
value
analysis1
1
FX
Energy,
'Poland'.
XXXVIII
Figure
H-1:
Example
of
finding
and
development
costs
for
range
resources2
2
Range
Resources
is
an
upstream
player
active
in
the
Marcellus
Shale
play.
Range
Resources,
Finding
and
development
cost
calculation
(SEC
Filings,
2011,
cited
12
February
2012);
available
from
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=101196&p=irol-sec&submit.x=0&submit.y=0
XXXIX
The following pages compare the modelling methodology and results of this report with those of the recently-released 'Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas' report by the IEA.3 Framework The JRC-IET builds a framework around four base scenarios for the period to 2040. They result from the combination of either optimistic or conservative assumptions about shale gas production cost and reserve size (Opt/Con) and high or low assumptions about global GDP growth (HG/LG). The four scenarios are subsequently submitted to 6 additional sensitivities, to explore the supply and demand side factors that can constrain or enable unconventional gas development, i.e.: a stronger or weaker oil/gas price link, the social acceptance of nuclear energy, a carbon constrained energy system, a less or more costly LNG transport. Thus, the results are an exploration of uncertainty. The model used by JRC is the ETSAP-TIMES Integrated Assessment (ETSAP-TIAM) model, a multi-region partial equilibrium model of the energy systems of the entire world divided in 15 regions, linked by trade variables of the main energy forms (coal, oil, gas). It is based on the MARKAL/TIMES family of models. The IEA report sets out projections from two scenarios for the period to 2035, both built on the IEAs New Policies Scenario (2011 World Energy Outlook). The two scenarios compare favourable versus unfavourable conditions for unconventional gas. In the Golden Rules (GR) case, all potential obstacles to unconventional gas development are overcome; supportive policies and a lack of constraints leads to an assumed lower unconventional production cost, greater recoverable reserves, more favourable demand-side policies, lower gas prices, and less gas-oil indexation. The Low Unconventional (LU) case models the opposite case, where there is an absence of supportive policies and a lack of public acceptance. The IEA uses the World Energy Model (the same used for the annual World Energy Outlook) to project the potential impact of two different trajectories for unconventional gas development.
Assumptions The JRC-IETs variables are the size of the recoverable reserves and their production cost, which are used to build supply curves (the rate of increase in production costs of the resource base). These curves represent the range of uncertainty facing unconventional gas development without explicitly linking them to specific factors (e.g. adherence to golden rules). The third key variable is the rate of GDP growth, a main driver for gas demand. Gas prices are endogenous in TIAM, i.e. they result from the supply/demand equilibrium in any given scenario. All other assumptions remain
3
IEA,
'Golden
Rules
for
a
Golden
Age
of
Gas'.
XL
constant
from
TIAM
reference
scenario,
which
can
be
considered
similar
to
the
Current
Policies
case
of
WEO-2011
(it
does
not
account
for
future
policies).
The
IEA
does
not
directly
model
the
impact
of
different
degrees
of
adherence
to
the
Golden
Rules.
Rather,
the
report
assumes
that
a
lack
of
supportive
policies
(e.g.
failure
to
abide
by
the
golden
rules)
translates
into
less
recoverable
gas
reserves
than
in
the
GR
case.
They
also
assume
that
the
rate
of
increase
in
production
costs
is
higher
in
the
Low
Unconventional
case
than
in
the
GR
case.
Thus,
the
two
main
variables
are
the
size
of
the
recoverable
reserves
and
their
production
costs,
which
are
varied
to
reflect
hypothetical
adoption
of
these
rules.
GDP
assumptions
were
updated
from
the
baseline
WEO-2011
case
and
applied
to
both
the
LU
and
GR
case.
Gas
price
assumptions
are
exogenous;
the
IEA
assumes
that
the
gas
price
in
the
Low
Unconventional
case
is
15-30%
higher
than
in
the
Golden
Rules
case,
with
a
more
rapid
rate
of
increase
over
time.
All
other
assumptions
remain
constant
from
the
New
Policies
Scenario
of
WEO-2011,
which
takes
into
account
policies
and
declared
future
intentions
as
of
mid-2011
(e.g.
national
pledges
to
reduce
GHG
emissions
and
phase
out
subsidies4).
Key
Assumptions
JRC
IEA
Recoverable
Reserves
(tcm)
Conventional
gas
403
421
Shale
gas
149-417
30-208
Production
Cost
($/Mbtu)
low/best/high
USA
(Shale)
4
-
6.5
-
19
3-7
EUROPE
(Shale)
4.4
-
7
-
21
5-10
Avg.
Annual
Global
GDP
growth,
%
(2012-35)
2.7-3.7
3.5
Results
Due
to
the
different
assumptions
used
in
the
two
analyses,
the
results
can
be
compared
only
broadly.
However,
the
tables
below
show
similarities
in
terms
of
some
key
results.
Key
Results
(Low/High
Unconv.
Gas)
Total
Gas
Demand
Unconv.
Gas
Production
UG-USA
UG-China
JRC
(2035)
4.9
/
5.6
tcm
1
/
2.1
tcm
500
/
940
bcm
170
/
350
bcm
IEA
(2035)
4.6
/
5.1
tcm
0.6
/
1.6
tcm
274
/
580
bcm
112
/
391
bcm
IEA
(2035)
-23%
59%
/
n/a
7
100
/
8,780
Key
Results
Total
gas
trade
-
High
vs
Low
UG
Europe
import
dependency
-
High
vs
Low
UG
EU
gas
import
(Low-High
UG)
Electr.
prod.
from
nat.
gas
(TWh)
JRC
(2035)
-11%
57%
/
72%
430
/
470
bcm
6
144
/
7,966
4
It
is
important
to
note
that
the
IEA
report
does
not
explicitly
or
systematically
present
the
way
in
which
the
assumptions
are
used
in
the
model.
Therefore,
the
methods
used
to
model
the
assumptions
can
only
be
inferred.
XLI
Further significant results are the following: A consistent significant result is the impact on gas prices of more unconventional gas. The JRC model results are similar to the IEAs exogenous assumptions: the optimistic shale gas case assumes a reduction of gas price between 20% (Europe) and 30% (USA) in the IEA report, while the JRC report analysis estimates a reduction between 15% (Europe) and 25% (USA). Both studies agree that the best case scenario for shale gas development in Europe is one in which declining conventional production can be replaced by unconventional gas, with import dependence maintained at a level around 60%. A result consistent across the two studies is that greater unconventional gas has only a slight impact on renewable energy. The specific JRC analysis on the potential impact of a carbon constrained world shows that strict CO2 targets do not preclude a significant growth in natural gas use.
XLII
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XLVIII
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European Commission EUR 25305 EN Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport Title: Unconventional Gas: Potential Market Impacts in the European Union Authors: Ivan Pearson, Peter Zeniewski, Francesco Gracceva & Pavel Zastera (JRC) Christophe McGlade, Steve Sorrell, & Jamie Speirs (UK Energy Research Centre) Gerhard Thonhauser (Mining University of Leoben) Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2012 324 pp. 21.0 x 29.7 cm EUR Scientific and Technical Research series ISSN 1831-9424 ISBN 978-92-79-19908-0 doi: 10.2790/52499
z LB-NA-xxxxx-EN-N
As the Commissions in-house science service, the Joint Research Centres mission is to provide EU policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy cycle. Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, and sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and food security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and security including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach.