PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs.

PETE PRADO FACTS: Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privilege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law. ISSUES: WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional. - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. - Violative of the Equal protection clause. RULING: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional.

The Comelec made resolutions for the implementation of the said act. After such, the Comelec issued several directives in reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations. The petitioners felt that they are unfairly treated. Hence, petitioners found their way to this Court via a present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189. The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. Issue: Whether or not sec 44 of R.A. 8189 contravenes the constitutional precept of Article 6 section 26(1) and violates the equal protection clause. Held: RA 8189 does not contravene the constitutional precept of Article 6 section 26(1) enshrined in the Constitution and does not violate the Equal protection Clause. Reasoning: Equal Protection Clause In the case at bar, it is said that the singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. There is no impairment or emasculation of COMELECs power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain. The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions. 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law. 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof," are: 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; 2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and 3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.

AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR et al., v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000] Facts: RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. In the case at bar, the validity of section 44 of the said act is challenged. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."

Hence, section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied in this case. The title of R.A. 8189 is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFORE. It could not be denied that section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers---is relevant to the subject matter of registration. It seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. Thus, it is not an alien provision but one that is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.

ABAKADA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 469 SCRA 1 (2005) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY The House of Representatives introduced and approved House Bill No.3555 and House Bill No.3705. Meanwhile, the Senate introduced and approved Senate Bill No.1950. The Senate then agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills. Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and conference," recommended the approval of its report. On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337. The court however issued a temporary restraining order on the implementation of said act This case involves five consolidated cases filed against Executive Secretary Ermita, Finance Secretary Purisima and Commissioner Parayno by the following petitioners: 1. ABAKADA Partylist who questions the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 2. Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et al. question the constitutionality of said provisions and the socalled stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of astand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. 3. Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al.,assailed that Section 8 and Section 12 of RA

9337 amending Section 110 and Section 114 of the NIRC respectively unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory.Petitioners argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. 4. Members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escuderofiled this petition questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the grounds that Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution; that the Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on; and the insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of some provisions, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. 5. Governor Enrique T. Garcia alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public purposes and expenditures. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity. ISSUES: 1. Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. 2. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, Article VI, Section 28(1), and Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution. 3. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate Article VI, Section 28(1), and Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. RULING: I. A. The Bicameral Conference Committee The Court ruled that all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order."Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress

provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court cited ruling of Osmea v. Pendatun case that"Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure." Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile" and "harmonize."To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill wouldbe carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions. B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "NoAmendment Rule" Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case. Art. VI. 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills Petitioners argue that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. The argument does not hold water.Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads: Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the

Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Court cited the ruling in Tolentino case, To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our countrys fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments. II. A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law. III. A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty of property without due process of law, as embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Petitioners stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,82 "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation

Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times. C. Progressivity of Taxation Petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive. It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences. The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. Inother words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." DECISION: Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED. There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.

Petitioners: Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows: A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTALLAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS. B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS ITFAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OFFUNDS ARE TO BE MADE. C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THESAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVINGAPPROPRIATIONS. D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVEPOWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE. E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THEIMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THEPHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. Respondents: Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288(1936) as basis for the petition's dismissal.In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador , G.R. Nos. 68379-81,September 22, 1986, We stated that:The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom have gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case.

DEMETRIA V ALBA The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44provides:The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau,or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commisions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of the irrespective appropriations

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing (2) Whether or not Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 is unconstitutional. HELD:Yes! RATIONALE: (1) It is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. (2) Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. As correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No.1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency."

The petitioner seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then Pres. Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; the legislative power was then restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitutions was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law; and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 and PD No. 1967 are inoperative under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution. Issue: Are the subject presidential decrees unconstitutional? Held: Petitioners argument is that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII and Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution. In relation to Section 24 of Article VI, petitioners argue that bills have to be approved by the President, and then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. They further assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation; otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. Moreover, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that: "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

GUINGONA V CARAGUE Facts: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 81, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of RA 4860, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No. 1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds for the Purpose.

The Court found the argument unmeritorious. Section 3 of Article XVIII, being a transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. An examination of the subject presidential decrees in controversy shows the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance. The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies. Thus, the argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Section 24 of Article VI and Section 3 of Article XVIII is without merit. There is no reason to declare such presidential decrees inconsistent with the Constitution at this point of controversy. Further, petitioners argument that the presidential decrees in issue at the case at bar is inconsistent with Section 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among others, that all appropriationsbills authorizing increase of public debt must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is rendered untenable. In addition, the Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury. The Court, therefore, finds that RA 4860, as amended by PD no 81, Section 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same. PCA vs ENRIQUEZ 235 SCRA 506(1994) FACTS: - House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994) - passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. - imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President and authorize members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. - On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law: Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). - On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. -No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto on special provisions is constitutional and valid? G.R. No. 113105 The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 . 1. Countrywide Development Fund Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. SC: Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are

likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project. 2. Realignment of Operating Expenses Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category, claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution: Constitution grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to augment items in an appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation. Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated. SC: Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made. 3. Highest Priority for Debt Service While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding (Section 5(5), Article XIV). SC: This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. 4. Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA of 1994 The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article. The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded

by the Constitution. Or differently put, Whether or not he has, as the President, the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill. SC: The President vetoed the entire paragraph in one of the Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.

ATITIW V ZAMORA Nestor G. Atitiw, as taxpayer, Lawyer and in his capacity as Chief Executive of the Cordillera Bodong Administration v Ronaldo B. Zamora Facts: When President Corazon Aquino assumed presidency, she was confronted with the insurgency in the Cordilleras. Thus, her government initiated peace talks and it was centered on the establishment of an autonomous government in the Cordilleras and resulted a Join Memorandum of Agreement on September 13, 1986, whereby Armed Forces of the Philippines and Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) had agreed to end hostilities. On February 2, 1987, the Filipino people ratified the 1987 Philippine Constitution where Section 15, Art. X ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras and Section 18, Art. X mandates the congressional enactment of the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions. On March 27, 1987, Joint Statement of the Government Panel and Cordillera Pane -- drafting of an executive order to authorize creation of a policy-making and administrative body of the Cordilleras and to conduct studies drafting of organic acts for the autonomous region, was signed. Thus, by virtue of her residual legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 220 on July 15, 1987 creating CAR. Interim and preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the Cordilleras composed of provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. On October 23, 1989, congress enacted R.A. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region which subsequently, a plebiscite was held for vote casting and ratification of the said organic act. The result showed that the organic was approved by majority in Ifugao provinces only and rejected by the rest of the provinces. InOrdillo v COMELEC, the court ruled that Ifugao provinces cannot constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) thereby disapproving the Organic Act but the E.O 220 was still in force and effect until repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations

Act (GAA) which includes the assailed special provision, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended to it by virtue of E.O 328. The 2000 GAA appropriated a total of P18,379,000.00 for the CARs general administration and support services that year, in contrast to the annual appropriation of P36,000,000.00 in the previous years. The petition seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of special provision of R.A. 8760 (GAA 2000) directing that the appropriation of CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and retirement benefits of all affected members and employees. Issues: Whether the assailed special provisions in R.A. 8760 (GAA 2000) is a rider and as such is unconstitutional. Whether the Philippine Government, through congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O 220. Whether the republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in E.O. 220 Ruling: In relation to article VI section 25 (2) and section 26 the Court said that xxx an appropriation bill covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. The title of an appropriation bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title embraces all the details included in an appropriation bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of the R.A 8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriations. On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O. 220 is rejected, there is no such thing as an irrepealable law. And anything could prevent the Congress from amending or repealed E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law. On the last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect. Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while toe sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR. ~~same~same~same~same~same~same~same~same~same~same~same~same~ It is a jurisprudential axiom that respect for the inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of the lawmaking body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of separation of powers, requires that its enactments be accorded to the presumption of constitutionality. Proving the unconstitutionality of a statute rests upon the challenger and failure to prove so will defeat the challenge. The petition falls short of the requirement to prove the unconstitutionality. The rationale against inserting a rider in an appropriation bill under the specific appropriation clause embodied in Sect. 25 (2), Art VI of the Constitution is similar to that of the one subject in the title clause provided in Section 26 (1) also of Art. VI, which directs that every provision in a bill must be germane or has some reasonable relation to the subject matter as expressed in the title thereof. The unity of the subject matter of a bill is mandatory in order to prevent hodge-podge or log rolling legislation to avoid surprise or fraud upon the legislature, and to fairly appraise the people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered. In order that a provision or clause in a general appropriations bill may comply with the test of germaneness, it must be particular, unambiguous, and appropriate. A provision or clause is particular if it relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation bill. It is unambiguous when its application or

operation is apparent on the face of the bill and it does not necessitate reference to details or sources outside the appropriations bill. It is an appropriate provision or clause when its subject matter does not necessarily have to be treated in a separate legislation. The CAR was not abolished, as concluded by petitioners, with the reduction of its budgetary allocation; what took place was only a discontinuance of its programs and activities. In fact, E.O No. 328, the implementing rule of the questioned Special Provisions, provides only for the deactivation of the CAR bodies upon the lapse of its operational period as provided in the E.O. The three branches of the government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, the Congress, the President, and Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The Court has consistently stressed that the doctrine of separation of powers call for the executive, legislative, and judicial department being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect; by and between the three department of the government. Compliance with requirement under Section 25 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory but not be construed so strictly as to tie the hands of Congress in providing budgetary policies in the appropriation bill. It simply requires that in general appropriations bill are either appropriation items or non appropriation. The CAR created by virtue of E.O 220 is not the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. A reading of E.O 220 is a step preparatory to the grant of autonomous to the Cordilleras a consolidation and coordination of the delivery services of line department and agencies of the National Government. It has created region, covering specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. They merely constitute the mechanism for an umbrella that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethnolinguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in converted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

CHAVEZ V PCGG Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information3 and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,4 demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves

an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. Issues: W/N the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement. Held: Yes. The PCGG clearly violates the Constitution. Rationale: The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.58 Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable. Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay.60 Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due.61 In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised. Petition Granted. LUNG CENTER V. QUEZON CITY GR 144104 JUNE 29, 2004 Facts: The Lung Center of the Philippines, a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of PD 1823, was the owner of a parcel of land in Quezon City. Aside from its income from paying patients, it also received government subsidies. The Lung Center accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or

professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional services. Almost of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue was vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, was being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Issues: 1) Whether or not Lung Center is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and under the Constitution. 2) Whether or not the real properties of the Lung Center are exempt from real property taxes. Held: 1) Yes, the Lung Center is a charitable institution. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating it, its purpose, by-laws, services and nature/ use of properties. Under PD 1823, the Lung Center is a nonprofit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the Philippines with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. The Articles of Incorporation of Lung Center provide that its medical services are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. A charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is used for the Charitable objective it is intended for, and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. In this case, the money received by the Lung Center becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to public trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit. Under PD 1823, the Lung Center is entitled to receive donations. The Lung Center does not lose its character as a charitable institution simply because of government subsidies (donation). 2) Partly No, not all are exempt from real property tax. The portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, a claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Under PD 1823, the Lung Center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties and buildings. If the intentions were otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section 2 thereof. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption of property tax, the Lung Center should prove that a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. Thus, exclusively means SOLELY. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property

for charitable purposes is the DIRECT, IMMEDIATE, ACTUAL application of the PROPERTY itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of income of the property w/c is the controlling factor (to exempt). In this case, while portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients, other parts are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center." Thus, portions of the land leased to private entities and individuals are not tax exempt, while those used for patients, paying and nonpaying, are exempt.

3.It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and 4. It must be reasonable. First requisite satisfied. According to Article VI, Section 28 (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. There is an exception to the second requisite, namely legislative rules. EO 156 is a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid, and there being no objection from the respondents (in the present case) as to the procedure in the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law. As for the third and fourth requisites, RA 7227 must be examined. The Rules and Regulations implementing RA 7227 specifically define the territory comprising the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227 as "a separate customs territory consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Base Agreement. Its aim was to attract foreign investors and produce jobs for Filipinos. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227 considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The problem is with respect to the application of the importation ban to the Freeport. The Court finds no logic in the allencompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. Pursuant to the separability clause of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. Used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the May 24, 2004 Decisions of Branch

EXECUTIVE V SOUTHWING Facts: On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156 entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines". It enumerates the only types of used motor vehicles allowed in the country. The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed by herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are classified as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles. All three separate actions had judgment rendered in favor of the petitioners Southwing (Civil Case No. 20-0-04), Macro Ventures (Civil Case No. 22-0-04) and Association (Civil Case No. 30-0-2003), declaring EO 156 Article 2, Section 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal. The present consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional. Said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. Issue(s): Whether or not there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, reasonable and within the scope provided by law. Held: By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, police power may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power (authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations). To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; 2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

72, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63284, are MODIFIED insofar as they declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 void in its entirety.

ALVAREZ V GUINGONA G.R No. 11803 January 31, 1996 Provision discussed in the case: article 6 Sec. 24: "All appropriation, revenue, or tarrif bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the house of representatives, but the senate may propose or concur with amendments." Facts: On April 18, 1993 House Bill no. 8817 entitled " An act converting the municipality of Santiago into an independent component city to be knows as the City of Santiago" was filed in the house of representatives, with Antonio Abaya as the principa sponsor. On May 5, 1993 the said bill was referred to the house committee on local government and house committee on appropriations. between May 19 to Dec 1, 4 public hearings were conducted on HB 8817 by the committee. on Dec. 9, 1993 thecommittee submitted favorable reports with amendments to the house. Senate Bill On May 19, 1993, Senate Bill 1243 (a counterpart of HB 8817) entitled " An act converting the municipality of Santiago into an independent component city to be known as the City of Santiago" was introduced by Sen. Vincente Sotto III as the principal sponsor. On Feb 23, 1994 Senate committee on Local Government conducted a public hearing on SB 1243 March 1- committee submitted commitee report no. 378 on house bill 8817 with recommendation that it be approved without amendment. On March 22 the house of representatives approved the amendments proposed by the senate. April 12- the enrolled bill was submitted to the president. on May 5, the president signed the bill as R.A 7720 July 13, plebiscite was held and majority of the people were in favor. Issue: whether or not the RA 7720 is valid. validity is being questioned on two grounds: Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city. whether or not, considering that the senate passed SB 1243, their own version of HB 8817, RA 7720, can be said to have orginated in the house of representatives. Holding: To answer the first issue: the IRA are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRA's regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasurty without the need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus, constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. for purposes of converting the municipality of Santiago in to a city, the the Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)

consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income. to answer the second issue: HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 is considered as introductory or percursive to not only the Act in question but also to SB 1243 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. The petition was dismissed