Introduction to Kants Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., 5-7 Presented by J.

. Sozek, 22 May 2009 I-IV, Review of key points

All cognition begins with experience, but not all cognition arises from experience. o Can we have cognitions that are wholly experience-independent? A priori cognitions? o The notion is still vague. Distinguish two kinds of a priori cognition: Impure (mixed with experience, e.g., every alteration has its cause) and Pure (unmixed with experience, e.g., every alteration must have a cause) Dismisses impure a priori cognitions. Inductive generalizations. Not his interest. o The marks of a pure a priori cognitions are necessity and/or strict universality. o Employs a regressive or transcendental argument: The reality of pure a priori principles in our cognition can be proven as necessary and universal even without examples in experience based on the indispensability of such principles for the possibility of experience itself. Some pure a priori cognitions go beyond all possible experience, especially in metaphysics. o Systems constructed to address metaphysical questions (i.e., God, freedom, immortality) make no headway. Cf. a dove wishing to fly in a vacuum. o We fool ourselves into thinking they do make headway by slipping in synthetic assertions. Cognitions are a priori or a posteriori; A priori A posteriori judgments are analytic or synthetic. E.g., all bodies E.g., every alteration o Analytic. Predicate contained in have weight; Synthetic must have a cause That car is blue the subject. Judgments of clarification. E.g., all bodies are extended. Tautologies, e.g., A is A X Analytic o Synthetic. Predicate is added to the subject. Judgments of amplification. E.g., all bodies heavy. Synthetic a priori judgments and concepts o In these you may not refer to experience (its a priori necessary and/or strict universal), but the predicate does add something new to the subject (its synthetic) o Kant regards some concepts as a priori, e.g. the concept of cause. [Cf. metaphysical deduction] o But how can we, without reference to experience, synthesize subject and predicate? V: Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason

Kants claim: Judgments in pure mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics are all synthetic a priori. Judgments in pure mathematics o Props in pure math (at least) are always a priori because they are necessary. But they are not analytic. The predicate is not contained in the subject. Arithmetic. E.g., concept sum of 7 and 5 in itself contains nothing of the concept 12. Must go outside the subject-concept, aided by intuition (e.g. five fingers). This is clear in adding large numbers, where the role of intuition (i.e., sensible admixture) is apparent. Geometry. The prop A straight line between two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition! Concept straight contains only quality, not quantity (i.e., length). Need to add to it the concept shortest. Again, help from intuition. Some geometrical principles are analytic (e.g., whole = itself, or whole > part), but are admitted only because they can be exhibited in intuition. o So, in pure math, predicates adhere to subjects with necessity, but need to be added with the help of intuition. They are synthetic a priori.

(Pure) judgments in the natural sciences o Scientific laws, e.g., are clearly synthetic, but also are necessary (and hence a priori) o E.g., in all alterations the quantity of matter remains unaltered In the concept matter I do not think persistence. So, here I add the concept of persistence to the concept of matter. This is amplification, synthesis. Judgments in metaphysics o Here we want to reveal something new; to amplify our cognitions and not merely clarify them. The judgments of metaphysics go far beyond experience (e.g., the world must have a first beginning).

VI: The general problem of pure reason

So, weve brought a multitude of investigations under the formula of a single problem. This is the real problem of pure reason: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? o No one has ever thought of this problem, or perhaps even of the analytic / synthetic distinction. o We can either solve the problem (Kant) or try to dissolve it (Hume). Hume came closest to the problem, but his view was insufficiently determinate and universal. He examined the causal principle, and on that basis concluded that metaphysics is a delusion a field in which habit takes on the appearance of necessity. He would not have concluded this if hed had the problem clearly in view (as we do). He would see that on his view pure math would also be impossible - but it is possible. o So, our problem contains two sub-problems: 1 How is pure mathematics possible?, and 2 How is pure natural science possible? o These sciences are clearly actual, so it is reasonable to ask how they are possible. Metaphysics is different. Progress is so poor that we doubt even its actuality (i.e., whether it even exists). o Yet metaphysics is certainly actual as a natural predisposition (metaphysica naturalis). Human reason is driven by its own need to questions that cannot be answered on the basis of experience. In this sense, a sort of metaphysics has always been present and always will be. Thus a third sub-problem: 3 How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible? o In pursuing these questions, unavoidable contradictions always arise. We need: Either to reach a (firm) decision concerning the nature of the objects of these questions, Or to define clearly the limits of, or to extend our understanding of, the capacity of pure reason to decide about these questions. So, a fourth sub-problem: 4 How is metaphysics possible as science? We pursue our problem and sub-problems through a critique of pure reason. o Critique leads to science. The uncritical multiplication of dogmatic assertions lead to skepticism. o The critical project is not infinite. As we become completely familiar with reasons capacity with regard to the objects that may come before it in experience, we can completely and securely determine the domain and bounds of its attempted use beyond all bounds of experience [i.e., its use in metaphysics]. o In this way all previous dogmatic metaphysics are undone! Insofar as they were analytic, they were a preparation for true, post-critical metaphysics.

Insofar as they pretended to be synthetic (i.e., to add new knowledge), they were shams, contradictory, and have lost their authority. Doves in a vacuum. Not knowledge. Post-critical metaphysics will be different, but will still address perennial questions. It will chop down every stem that has shot up (i.e., all previous metaphysics) but will be nourished by same root (i.e., the metaphysica naturalis)

VII: The idea and division of a special science under the name of a critique of pure reason

We need a post-critical system of pure reason, transcendental philosophy (TP). It will be: o Transcendental, concerning not objects but our mode of [a priori] cognition of objects. o Comprehensive, containing in itself all principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori (both analytic and synthetic a priori cognitions). o Pure, being unmixed with anything empirical or with any form of experience. o Systematic, providing an new organon of pure reason.

But this demands too much. As yet we have no idea how it could even be possible. First, then, we need a critique of pure reason (CPR) to estimate reasons sources and boundaries. o This is a propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy. Critique is only negative, not a doctrine. Will keep speculation pure and free from contradictions. o In this book, our only concern is the nature and possibility of the principles of a priori synthesis i.e., the problem indicated above: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? o This will be a touchstone of the worth of all a priori cognitions, analytic and synthetic. In the end we shall be able to exhibit reasons capacity to amplify or limit cognitions of either sort. o This is possible because our object is not the nature of things, which are infinite in number, but the nature of the human understanding of things which we may hope to understand exhaustively. Kants will not critique other books or systems of pure reason, but focus on the pure faculty of reason itself. From this ground one may assess the various books and systems. Without this ground, one can merely pose ones own groundless assertions against the groundless assertions of others. o CPR outlines architectonically the complete plan for this new special Selective outline of the Critique of Pure Reason science (TP), and does so with a full guarantee for the completeness and 1. Prefaces and Introduction certainty of all the components [of] this 2. Doctrine of Elements edifice. o CPR does not contain an exhaustive a. Transcendental Aesthetic [Mathematics] analysis of all human cognition a priori, i. Space and time are shown to be pure intuitions as TP shall do. by metaphysical and transcendental expositions. CPR lays the concepts b. Transcendental Logic before us, but refrains from i. Transcendental Analytic [Natural science] 1. Analytic of Concepts analyzing them. a. Metaphysical deduction of categories If one gets the a priori b. Transcendental deduction of categories concepts right, in the future TP 2. Analytic of Principles will be easy to complete. a. Schematism (bridging chapter) b. Four Principles of Pure Understanding, In sum: CPR is the showing how the categories give rise to complete idea of TP, but goes objects in space and time. only so far in analysis as is i. Refutation of Idealism requite for the complete c. Objects as phenomena and noumena estimation of synthetic a priori ii. Transcendental Dialectic [Metaphysics] cognition. 1. Paralogisms of Pure Reason (immortal soul) Why is morality not included in CPR or TP? 2. Antinomy of Pure Reason (freedom of will)
3. Ideal of Pure Reason (existence of God) 4. Appendix: On speculative theology

o Because it is essential to both that cognition should remain pure of all experience. Although
the fundamental concepts of morality are a priori (for Kant), it necessarily involves reference to experience. The divisions of TP, and structure of the book o TP will consist of a Doctrine of Elements, and a Doctrine of Method. o In this book, and in the project of CPR, we begin by recognizing two stems of human cognition. These may have a common but to us unknown root: Sensibility, whereby objects are given. Passive capacity; we undergo intuitions. Understanding, whereby objects are thought. Spontaneous faculty; we form concepts. o Need to start with sensibility, with a transcendental doctrine of the senses, since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given precede those under which objects are thought.

On the metaphysical deduction of the categories Kant begins by outlining all possible forms of judgment. Fig. 1 Table of Judgments (cf. syllogistics, Aristotles theory of the categories)
Quantity Universal (All S) Particular (Some S) Singular (The S) Quality Positive (P) Negative (not-P) Singular (non-P) Relation Categorical (All S is P) Hypothetical (If S is P, then S is R) Disjunctive (S is either P or R) Modality Problematic (S is possibly P) Assertoric (S is [actually] P) Apodictic (S is necessarily P)

On this basis he argues that each of these forms correspond to a category or pure concept in the mind. Our experience is structured and constituted by these categories, and to this extent is knowable necessarily and universally.

Fig 2 Table of Categories / Pure Concepts (intended to replace Aristotles categories)

Mathematical/Constitutive Of Quantity Unity Plurality Totality Of Quality Reality Negation Limitation Dynamical/Regulative Of Relation Substance Cause Community Of Modality Possibility Existence Necessity

The third thing linking the subject and predicate in synthetic a priori judgments is the structuring role of these mental categories.