INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS MEETING ON PROTECTION AGAINST EXTREME EARTHQUAKES AND TSUNAMIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA

DAIICHI NPP IEM3 4-7 September 2012

OPENING REMARKS
ANTONIO R. GODOY CHAIRPERSON

OBJECTIVES OF THE IEM3

To share the lessons learned from recent
extreme earthquakes and tsunamis, including the Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 March 2011; To exchange information on the development of recent technologies and on the results of ongoing research programmes related to site evaluation and NPP safety, aimed to provide protection against these external hazards; and To identify issues which should be further investigated. Framework: IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
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BEFORE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

At international level, what IAEA has done before March 2011? The establishment of a set of safety standards (requirements and guides) for site selection and site evaluation, and related design aspects.

BEFORE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Key events to improve knowledge and standards: In 1986, the Chernobyl accident; At the 90s, the break-up of the former Soviet Union; The reaction to 9/11 event in 2001; The extreme external flooding events, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004; The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Case, July 2007
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BEFORE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT And at national levels, what has been done before Fukushima?: Specific and detailed design criteria against earthquakes and external hazards, in general, in the 60s and 70s, by technology supplier countries. Requirement on periodic safety reviews Safety re-evaluation programmes, particularly, on seismic safety. Stagnation period, the 90s.
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BEFORE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Did we pay enough and proper attention to the Warning Calls we received?:

In Japan, the Kobe earthquake in 1995, and

others in 2005 and March 2007; The Indian Ocean Tsunami, December 2004; Kashiwazaki-Kariwa , July 2007.

BEFORE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

BEFORE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, a success story: Underestimation of earthquake ground motions; Conservatism in the SSCs design; Strong influence of local society and media, transparency and openness; International cooperation and world nuclear community participation; Development of new procedural documents (e.g. IAEA SR 66).
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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT On 11th March 2011, at 2:46pm, a Magnitude 9 earthquake occurred in the subduction zone offshore of the Pacific Coast of Japan. The combination of two extreme natural events that occurred sequentially led to the Fukushima Daiichi accident: the first initiating event was the earthquake and the following ensuing event was a tsunami.
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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Conclusion 3: There were insufficient defence-in-depth provisions for tsunami hazards. In particular:
although tsunami hazards were considered both
in the site evaluation and the design of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP as described during the meetings and the expected tsunami height was increased to 5.7 m (without changing the licensing documents) after 2002, the tsunami hazard was underestimated;
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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Conclusion 3: thus, considering that in reality a dry site was not
provided for these operating NPPs, the additional protective measures taken as result of the evaluation conducted after 2002 were not sufficient to cope with the high tsunami run up values and all associated hazardous phenomena (hydrodynamic forces and dynamic impact of large debris with high energy);

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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Conclusion 3: moreover, those additional protective measures

were not reviewed and approved by the regulatory authority; because failures of structures, systems and components (SSCs) when subjected to floods are generally not incremental, the plants were not able to withstand the consequences of tsunami heights greater than those estimated leading to cliff edge effects; and severe accident management provisions were not adequate to cope with multiple plant failures.
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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Conclusion 5:

An updating of regulatory requirements and guidelines should be performed reflecting the experience and data obtained during the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, fulfilling the requirements and using also the criteria and methods recommended by the relevant IAEA Safety Standards for comprehensively coping with earthquakes and tsunamis and external flooding and, in general, all correlated external events. The national regulatory documents need to include database requirements compatible with those required by IAEA Safety Standards. ..
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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Lesson 1: There is a need to ensure that in considering external natural hazards:
the siting and design of nuclear plants should
include sufficient protection against infrequent and complex combinations of external events and these should be considered in the plant safety analysis specifically those that can cause site flooding and which may have longer term impacts;

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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Lesson 1: There is a need to ensure that in considering external natural hazards: plant layout should be based on maintaining a
dry site concept, where practicable, as a defence-in-depth measure against site flooding as well as physical separation and diversity of critical safety systems; common cause failure should be particularly considered for multiple unit sites and multiple sites, and for independent unit recovery options, utilizing all on-site resources should be provided;
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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT Lesson 1: There is a need to ensure that in considering external natural hazards:
any changes in external hazards or understanding
of them should be periodically reviewed for their impact on the current plant configuration; and an active tsunami warning system should be established with the provision for immediate operator action.

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AFTER FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

Are these conclusions and lessons

learned still valid, today? Were those lessons learned, already and effectively, by Japan and the nuclear international community? Was this accident preventable? What has been done since then?

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FINAL REMARKS
one in one million it does not mean that is
impossible; hazard assessment based on pre-historical and historical database; less complacent with human errors in the decision making process and the governance deficiencies; peer reviews by independent peers: effective way to learn and to generate changes and improvements
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Thank you for your attention