Abarquez vs. People (GR No.

150762, January 20, 2006) Nature: This is a petition for review assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista (Abarquez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. Facts: (Version of the Prosecution) On November 21, 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Paz (Paz), Ricardo Quejong (Quejong) and their friends were in the house of Boyet. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyets son. At about 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquezs son Bardie and Sonito Masula (Masula) joined Paz and Quejong. Alberto Almojuela (Almojuela), Ising and Abarquez (Dale) were also drinking near Boyets house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path. Almojuela asked Paz, Are you brave? Paz replied, Why? Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, 'You left your companion already wounded! When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. Quejong died at the hospital. Upon investigation by the police, they learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to SPO4 Soriano. (Version of the Defense)

Abarquez was informed by Almojuelas wife that the group of Paz was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. As the barangay kagawad, he went to see what happened. He was forced to fire two warning shots to stop the fight. Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking marijuana. Abarquez went to the police station to report the incident as advised by Kagawad Rudy Lego (Lego). Almojuela testified on his way back to the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez shouting, Tumigil na kayo. Winfred Evangelista (Evangelista) testified he was resting in front of his house when he heard a commotion. He noticed Paz and Quejong were quarrelling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere. Abarquez was forced to fire warning shots and the persons involved in the commotion ran away. The trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance. Abarquez appealed the trial court's Decision before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision. Abarquez filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before this Court. Issue: Whether Abarquez should be liable as an accomplice? Ruling: No. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as 'those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough. Thus: The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz's testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela's criminal design. 'Tumigil literally means 'stop. Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez's action as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquez's act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela. In People v. Fabros, [25] the Court explained: To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design.

xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principal's ) criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principal's criminal intent. Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that Abarquez's son Bardie, who was one of Paz's companions, was the one trying to pacify Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela. The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show concurrence in Almojuela's criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejong's injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion. When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus, the Court granted the petition and set aside the Decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50. The court acquitted Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of homicide.

Sumbillo vs. People (GR No. 167464, January 21, 2010) Nature: This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision as well as the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, convicting Ronnie Sumbillo of the crime of attempted murder as principal and Francisco Serico, Joselito Sericon and Felix Gayuso, Jr. As accomplices. Facts: On November 15, 1995 at about 8:00 in the evening, Pangan arrived from work and noticed the bruises on his wifes body. He decided to bring his wife to the hospital so he went outside to get his jeep which was parked 30 meters from their house. While removing the lawanit cover of his jeep, accused Ronnie Sumbillo (Sumbillo) suddenly appeared and aied his gun on Pangan. Sumbillo pulled the guns trigger but it did not fire. Pangan hid behind his jeep and covered himself with the lawanit. Pangan heard Sumbillo pulling the guns trigger several times but the gun did not fire. Pangan ran towards his house but Francis Serico, Joselito Sericon, and Felix Gayuso, Jr. stopped him and held him. However, Pangan was able to free himself. While running towards his house, Pangan heard a gunshot. Pangan fell on the pavement and was unconscious. Evelyn Pangan and Dante Morales corroborated Pangans testimomy. Evelyn Pangan added taht on November 15, 1995 at around 7:30pm, while she was walking towards Juan Luna Street she was hit at the back. She fell on the ground and saw Joselito Sericon holding a wooden stick. Then, Emelinda Sericon and Nida Almario kept pulling her hair and pushing her to the ground. Evenlyn Pangan shouted for help and eventually her relatives and neighbours rescued her while Nida Almario, Joselito and Emelinda Sericon ran away. Evelyn Pangan further stated that she sustained slight injuries sho when her husband saw her, he decided to bring her to the hospital. While her husband was getting their jeep, she saw Sumbillo pointing a gun at her husband. The trial court gave premium to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The defenses of alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification and unwavering positive assestions. The trial court was

convinced that petitioners conspired with one another in the commission of crime. However, since there was no allegation of conspiracy in the Information, Franciso Sericon, Joselito Sericon and Felix Gayuso, Jr. were considered as accomplices. The simultaneous act of holding Pangan while Sumbillo was pulling the trigger was aimed to deprive Pangan the chance to escape or put up a defense, thus facilating the commission of the crime. The trial court rendered its decision, finding Sumbillo guilty of the crime of Attempted Murder as principal and Francisco Sericon, Joselito Sericon, and Felix Gayuso, Jr. as accomplices. The trial court sentenced Sumbillo to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from four years, two months and one day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to six years and one day of prision mayor minimum as maximum. The accomplices were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from six months and one day of prision correccional minimum as minimum to four years, two months of prision correccional medium as maximum. On appeal, petitioners contended that the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the incredulous testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which were conflicting and inconsistent. Petitioners alleged that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the imputation of the crime was merely fabricated. The Court of Appeals ruled that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to immaterial and collateral matters that do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners alibi and denial are bereft of merit in the light of the positive and categorical assertions made by the prosecution witnesses. Hence, this appeal. Issue: What penalty should be imposed on the accomplices? Held: The penalty of indeterminate prison term ranging from six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years, two months of prision correccional as maximum should be imposed on the accomplices. Thus, the penalty imposed on the accomplices, Francisco Sericon, Joselito Sericon and Felix Gayuso, Jr. should be modified. However, the trial court was correct in holding Sumbillo, Francisco Sericon, Joselito Sericon and Felix Gayuso, Jr. jointly liable to pay Pangan P12,000 representing medical expenses. The court further held in the case of People v. Continente (393 Phil. 367):

On the other hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder and attempted murder, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Donato Continente shall be the medium periods of reclusion temporal and prision correccional, respectively. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in both cases, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Continente as an accomplice to the crime of murder is the medium period of reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor, while the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said appellant as an accomplice to the crime of attempted murder is the medium period ofprision correccional and the minimum shall be arresto mayor.

People vs. Cachola (GR No. 148712, January 21, 2004) Nature: Automatic review of the Decision of the trial court. Facts: Jessie E. Barnachea, a 12-year-old, lost his mother, an elder brother, an uncle, and a cousin as a result of the carnage that took place at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December 1999 right inside their house. Russel Tamba witnessed a jeep passed by him going towards the Barnachea residence with a marking El Shaddai in front, aside from the marking fruits and vegetables dealer on the sides. Francisco Andrada noticed the jeep, with the El Shaddai marking pass by. Not long after, both heard gunshots and later saw the jeep pass by again, running very fast. The incident was immediately reported to the police, and the description of the El Shaddai jeep used by the malefactors was relayed through radio to the police stations. At a checkpoint, the jeep was intercepted and on board were eight appellants. No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and eight appellants were thereafter brought to the police station. Jessie was invited to be identify the suspects. He was able to identify Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the two armed men who entered his house and killed his relatives. On the third confirmatory investigation, which was present Jessie with photographs of the suspects, Jessie identified the two for the third time.

The eight appellants were thereafter subjected to a paraffin test. But only the right hands of Cachola and Amay yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates. The trial court rendered a decision convicting Cachola and Amay as principals and Marquez, Laegan, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio and Echabaria as accomplices. Issue: Whether Sagun, Ignacio, Marquez, Guerzo, Laegan and Echabaria should be held as accomplices? Ruling: No. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.18 In the present case, neither element was proved. The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre.That they were found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two hours after the commission of the crime does not constitute previous or simultaneous act. Absent a link between the crime and their presence in the jeep two hours later, we cannot consider their participation even as accessories to the crime. It is a basic evidentiary rule in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to discharge that burden, the accused need not present any evidence. Thus, for utter lack of evidence against the six appellants, their acquittal is in order. Art. 211 Miro vs Dosono Facts: Respondent Reynaldo M. Dosono (respondent) is an examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) at its district office in Mandaue City, Cebu. As such, respondent takes care in assessing tax liabilities. On 14 July 2003, the spouses Vicente G. Igot and Paterna C. Igot (complainants) went to the BIR office in Mandaue City for an assessment of their tax liabilities from the transfer of two parcels of land. Dosono assessed the properties of the complainants, the capital gains tax amounted to P89,800 however believed it was too high. They asked Dosono to re-compute and he agreed but told them to follow him to his table. When it was re-computed the CGT amounted to

24,960.00 but he demanded 30,000 and suggested that he be paid after they paid the taxable amount. Complainants sought the help of the police and arranged an entrapment. Respondent was brought to the police and complainants filed a case on the Ombudsman. , the Ombudsman found respondent liable as charged and dismissed him from service. The Ombudsman gave credence to complainants allegation on respondents extortion attempt, prompting them to seek police assistance. The Ombudsman found pivotal the presence of fluorescent powder on respondents hands. The Ombudsman rejected respondents unsubstantiated frame-up theory as inadequate to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties clothing the acts of the arresting policemen. On the complainants failure to testify, the Ombudsman did not consider this fatal in light of the testimonies of the arresting policemen. However, the CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals found the Ombudsmans findings unsupported by substantial evidence. Further, the Court of Appeals held that complainants failure to testify during the hearings rendered their joint affidavit hearsay and the testimonies of the arresting policemen baseless. Issue: The question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in exonerating respondent for grave misconduct involving extortion. Held: The SC reinstate the ruling of the Ombudsman. We are loathe to relax the beneficent rule limiting reviews under Rule 45 to questions of law. Nevertheless, we are sometimes called to review rulings which reverse initial factual findings,draw unreasonable inferences or overlook relevant facts, constraining us to widen the scope of review to cover factual questions. This is one such case. As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies. Because administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed), reasonable doubt does not ipso facto result in exoneration unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.This hornbook doctrinal distinction undergirds our parallel findings of administrative liability and criminal acquittal on reasonable doubt for charges arising from the same facts.

We affirm the Ombudsmans ruling. To a reasonable as opposed to a suspicious mind, the circumstances leading to the filing of the complaint against respondent, his arrest following his entrapment, and the results from the laboratory tests are more than adequate to support the conclusion that respondent illegally solicited money from complainants and was caught redhanded receiving the pay-off money. This is clear-cut grave misconduct corrupt conduct inspired by an intention to violate the law, or constituting flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules. The Court of Appeals found the evidence inadequate because it dwelt on the doubts respondent conjured to weaken the case against him. In doing so, the Court of Appeals unwittingly mutated this proceeding to a quasi-criminal litigation and employed heightened standard of proof approximating proof beyond reasonable doubt. How else could it explain its invocation of Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan,a criminal appeal of a verdict rendered by the Sandiganbayan finding the respondent guilty of Indirect Bribery under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. In the process, the Court of Appeals discarded without basis the crucial presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the arresting policemen and took respondents word as veritable truth. Yet, a considered study of respondents defense reveals that the so-called doubts respondent conjured are not even reasonable.

PD 1612 Fransisco vs People Facts: The petitioner, Ernesto Fransisco, was charged of violating P.D. No. 1612 under the Information filed on June 23, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads: That in or about the month of November 1991, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, the said accused Ernesto Francisco y Spenocilla, with intent to gain for himself, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess and acquire from one Pacita Linghon y Liza, not the owner, several pieces of jewelry, to wit: 1 pair of earrings-P400,000.00,White Gold Bracelet-150,000.00,Diamond Ring-100,000.00 and Ring with Diamond -5,000.00 with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to Jovita Rodriguez y Cruz, which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Jovita Rodrigues together with her husband hired Pacita Linghon as a house helper but sometine in May 1991, she left the employment of the Rodrigues Family. Sometime in October 1991, he contacted his brother Macario to sell some piece of earring and sold it to Ernesto. Later in the month of November, Jovita knew about the loss of her jewelries and suspected Pacita.

August 1992, Jovita filed a case against Pacita and her mother. Pacita admitted that he sold the jewelry to Ernesto. Macario was made as a witness against Ernesto. The court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant of arrest. The petitioner averred any connection with Macario. RTC rendered judgement and finding the accused guilty beyong reasonable doubt of violating PD 1612. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Held: The petition is meritorious. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.32 Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing. The SC agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said criminal cases. In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from Macario and Pacita are the following: the

testimony and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo. Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be credible and reliable.36 In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be dubious; hence, barren of probative weight. The testimonies of Macario are even contrary to the averments of the Information, that the petitioner received the said jewelry from Pacita. Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is no evidence on record that the petitioner knew that they were stolen. Significantly, even Macario did not know that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that his sister Pacita told him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they belonged to a friend of hers. It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator: In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Capili vs CA Facts: Gabriel Capili y Recto (GABRIEL) together with his wife Ferma Capili y Inot were charged with violation of Presidential Decree 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information that reads: That on or about November 5, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other. With intent to gain

for themselves or for another, did then and there willfully and knowingly receive, possess, keep, acquire and sell or dispose of the following, to wit: Assorted pieces of jewelry and Several pieces of old coins (U.S. dollar), all valued at P3,000,000.00, which they knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of a (sic) crime of theft. Christine Diokno testified that at 4:00 P.M. on November 4, 1993, when she went home from her office, she discovered that some of her (sic) items at (sic) her closet and the jewelries (sic) and money at (sic) her mothers room were taken. Upon call, two Makati police responded and surveyed the room where the robbery took place. Police prepared the police report and concluded that Michael Manzo, her former houseboy, committed the offense so a case against Manzo was filed. She described all the properties that were taken as those reflected in the police report because according to her she gave the police a list of the items and is part of her statement. Allegedly the value is about 3 Million pesos, some were of 20 years and some were of 30 years vintage, acquired by her parents since their wedding in 1945. Some from abroad, States or Hongkong acquired during trips. On November 27, 1993, Quiapo sub-station informed her that Michael Manzo was there. She talked to Michael Manzo who admitted the commission of the stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili and his wife forP50,000.00. Gabriel Capili denied any knowledge about the charge against him and declared that what Michael Manzo stated in court that he agreed to pay P50,000.00 but paid only P1,800.00 is not true. RTC acquitted his wife but found him guilty of the crime charged for violation of of PD 1612. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC considering the actual value of the fenced articled were not correctly established by the prosecution. Held: The petition is partly meritorious. Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. All these elements are present in the case at bench. Thefact of theft was proved by prosecution witness, Christine Diokno (DIOKNO) who testified that several pieces of jewelry, watches and money were stolen from her mothers bedroom. She reported the theft to the police who after conducting an investigation, concluded that her houseboy, Michael Manzo (MANZO), committed the offense. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. DIOKNOs testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole the jewelry from DIOKNO. And that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered them to the petitioner, GABRIEL with the information that the jewelry was stolen and for the purpose of selling the same. He identified GABRIEL in court as the person to whom he delivered the stolen jewelry. MANZO testified that GABRIEL was not a participant in the theft of the jewelry and that he told GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He also established the fact that the petitioner agreed to pay fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the stolen jewelry which clearly manifests intent to gain on the part of the petitioner. Consequently, MANZOs testimony proves the second, third and fourth elements of the crime of fencing. Although DIOKNOs testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of determining the value of the stolen items inasmuch as her testimony was not based on her own personal knowledge but on the appraisals made by jewelers and what her mother told her, MANZOs testimony remains unrebutted. MANZO established that he sold the stolen items to GABRIEL for P50,000.00 and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, said amount is presumed to be the value thereof as it is the only value established by the prosecution. Besides, the valuation of the stolen items made by the trial court is a factual issue and factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and generally should not be disturbed on appeal. Gatdula vs People Facts: That on or about and sometime during the period January 9, 1994 to March 10, 1994, in Pasay City, Philippines, the above named accused, Eduardo Gatdula, with intent to gain for himself, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy a motor vehicle, an Isuzu Gemini Sonic Taxi with engine no. 235358 and with Serial Chassis no. 5F69DOF203249 valued at P140,000.00 which he knows to have been derived from the proceeds of carnapping. After presenting their case in chief, on September 29, 1995, the prosecution rested its case and filed its offer of exhibits.

On October 9, 1995, petitioner filed his comment/opposition specifically objecting to the offer of exhibits on the ground that they were taken from him without the presence and assistance of counsel and that they were obtained during his unlawful arrest and for being hearsay. On October 11, 1995, the trial court ordered the admission of all the exhibits of the prosecution and granted petitioner permission to file a demurrer to evidence. On October 17, 1995, petitioner filed with the trial court a demurrer to evidence. On October 19, 1995, the trial court issued orders admitting all the evidence of the prosecution and holding the resolution on the demurrer in abeyance until petitioner has presented evidence. On November 15, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the trial courts orders admitting all evidence of the prosecution and holding in abeyance the resolution on petitioners demurrer to evidence until he has presented evidence. On February 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision that denied the petition and affirmed the two orders of the trial court. On May 4, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. On September 8, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the two orders of the trial court on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Held: The petition is without merit. The established principle is that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. If the rule were otherwise, there simply would be no end to the trial of cases, for any litigant, not satisfied with the trial courts ruling admitting or excluding any profferred oral or documentary evidence, would then indefinitely tie up the trial while elevating the ruling for review by the appellate court. It has been held that the question of [W]hether or not the evidence presented by the prosecuting attorney, at the time he rests his cause, is sufficient to convince the court that the defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime charged, rests entirely within the sound discretion and judgment of the lower court.

On the other hand, the trial court must rule either to grant or deny the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner. The trial court has a specific duty under the Rules to act on petitioners demurrer to evidence, either by granting or denying the same. The denial of the demurrer may be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari if there was grave abuse of discretion. Perhaps, the trial court really wanted to deny the demurrer to evidence that is why it deferred resolution thereon until petitioner has adduced evidence. In such case, the court must expressly deny the demurrer. Nevertheless, the error is not jurisdictional, and certiorari is not available to correct errors in judgment or conclusions of law and fact not amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The Petition for certiorari is denied. PD 533 Facts: On April 16, 1994, private complainant Rita Khayad of Bontoc, Mt. Province discovered that her 3-year-old white and black-spotted cow which was grazing at Sitio Taed with her 4 other bovines, was missing. She and her children searched for it but to no avail. She was later informed by her grandson that in the afternoon of April 15, 1994, he saw a cow similar to that of his grandmothers loaded in a blue Ford Fiera driven along the national highway by accused Manochon. With Manochon in the Fiera was his helper, petitioner Pil-ey. Manochon was a butcher and meat vendor. Rita reported the matter to the police and tagged as the primary suspects were petitioner Pil-ey, his co-accused, Manochon and Anamot. On April 17, 1994, Rita, Annie and Ronnie went to the station to file their respective affidavits. During the confrontation between the parties, petitioner Pil-ey admitted that they were the ones who took the cow. Since they were relatives, Pil-ey asked for a settlement of the case. Rita, however, rebuffed the request. On separate occasions, Anamot and Manochon went to the house of Rita, to offer a compromise, but again, Rita refused. Traversing the prosecution evidence, accused Manochon and Pil-ey testified that on April 12, 1994, Anamot went to Manochons house and offered his cow for sale and butchering for P7,000.00. In the afternoon of April 16, they were surprised when they were invited by the Bontoc Police for investigation in view of the complaint of Rita Khayad who claimed to be the owner of the cow. He denied offering a settlement and explained that he went to Rita Khayads house to deliver the P6,000.00. Petitioner Pil-ey denied asking forgiveness from private complainant and insisted that the cow they took was Anamots.

For his part, Anamot denied having conspired with his co-accused in taking the subject cow. He testified that in 1993, he and Rita co-owned a white female cow, which was hacked and sold for butchering to Manochon. On April 12, 1994, he went to see Manochon at his house in order to collect his share of the payment. He further claimed that, aside from the cow he co-owned with Rita, he had three other cows grazing near the road going to Guina-ang but he had nothing at Sitio Taed; hence, he denied seeing and talking to Manochon and Pil-ey and instructing them to get a cow at Sitio Taed. He stated that after the meeting on April 12, 1994, he saw his co-accused again when they were already behind bars. He further alleged that he went to Ritas place not to ask for a settlement but only to ask from the latter why he was included in her complaint. RTC rendered its Decision finding the three accused guilty of violating PD 533. And CA affirmed. Issue: Whether or not, based on the evidence on record, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the provisions of P.D. No. 533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. Held: Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner or raiser, of any cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass or other domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things; and it includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser. Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the concurrence of the following elements: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Considering that the gravamen of the crime is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser, conviction for the same need only be supported by the fact of taking without the cattle owners consent. In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Rita Khayads white and black-spotted cow was taken from Sitio Taed where it was grazing; that its taking was without Ritas consent; and that the said cattle was later seen in the possession of the petitioner and his co-accused. Thus, the foregoing elements of the crime of cattle-rustling are present. Its takers have not offered a satisfactory explanation for their possession of the missing bovine. It is the rule that when stolen property is found in the

possession of one, not the owner, and without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he is presumed to be the thief. This is in consonance with the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. Indeed, petitioners defense of mistake of fact, i.e., he and his employer Manochon were of the erroneous belief that the cow was owned or raised by Anamot, is unacceptable. This defense crumbles in the light of Anamots testimony that his purpose in going to Manochons house on April 12, 1994 was to exact payment of a white female cow sold for butchering in 1993, and not to sell the white and black-spotted cow subject of this case. He further stated that he did not have cows grazing at Sitio Taed. Petitioners admission in the course of the trial that he and his co-accused took the cow is buttressed by the testimony of prosecution witness Ronnie Faluyan that he saw Manochon and Pil-ey with the subject cow in a blue Ford Fiera. This judicial admission, which binds the declarant and which does not need any further presentation of evidence, reinforces petitioners conviction. Thus, petitioners argument that his alleged offer of settlement during the informal confrontation at the police station is inadmissible in evidence because it was made without the presence of counsel, is no longer material. After all, the crime of cattle-rustling and the fact that petitioners and his coaccused are the perpetrators thereof had been established by ample evidence other than the alleged inadmissible extrajudicial confession. The same holds true even if we do not apply the presumption of guilt under Section 755 of P.D. No. 533. All told, we hold that the evidence on record sufficiently prove the unanimous findings of the RTC and the CA that the petitioner and his co-accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the provisions of P.D. No. 533. There is no cogent reason to reverse the said rulings. Be that as it may, we, however, find that the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous. While it correctly imposed reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum penalty, it erred in imposing prision mayor in its maximum period as the minimum penalty. As in Canta v. People, the RTC in this case considered P.D. No. 533 as a special law and applied the latter portion of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.57 However, as we have declared in Canta, the computation of the penalty should be in accordance with our discussion in People v. Macatanda, which we quote herein for emphasis, thus: We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. No. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the

nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable x x x. Hence, in the instant case, considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. We, thus, modify the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court to be four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. Canta vs People Facts: That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, Southern Leyte, Philippines, the above-named accused, Exuperancio Canta, with intent to gain steal and carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at (P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to his damage and prejudice in the amount aforestated. It appears that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay(caretaker) took the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he came back for it at past 9 o'clock in the morning of March 14, Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Canta had taken the animal. Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte. As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim. Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal treasurer. On 1997, trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated from the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is indubitable that it was accused Canta who actually took the cow away without the knowledge and consent of either the owner. That the

taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but separated by a hill. The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming ownership however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on February 27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal Franklin Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even categorically declared that it was only on March 24, 1986 that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos, when he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on February 27, 1985. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the accused violated PD 533 Held: P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as . . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission of the crime.

P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the law provides: The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The SC Affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification on the prison penalty. People vs Escarda Facts: That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, Sagay, Negros Occidental, , and the first 2 above-named accused, Joselito Escarda and Jose Villacastin Jr., in company of their 2 other co-accused, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo, both still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually help[ing] one another, with intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 2 female carabaos, valued in the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS belonging to JOEL BARIESES, without the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforestated amount. Upon arraignment, accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. One witness(Himaya) testified that he saw the 2 accused removing the carabaos from its coral and stealing it. In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda claimed that he was sleeping in the house of Gilda Labrador during the incident while Villacastin declared that he too was sleeping in his house at that time. Specifically, Escarda testified he didnt know any of his co-accused and the owner of the 2 carabaos. He alleged that he was only forced to admit the loss of the carabaos because he was maltreated. Villcastin also alleged that he was maltreated so he admitted the stealing. RTC found the testimonies of the witnesseses credible and charged the 2 accused. Alegre and Canedo were acquitted for insufficiency of evidences. Both accused appealed but Escarda withdrew his appeal. Issue: Whether or not, the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Appellant contends that the element of taking away of carabaos by any means, method or scheme without the consent of the owner was not proven

by the prosecution. He also alleges that his identity was not established beyond reasonable doubt, thus, he should be acquitted. He adds that the prosecution failed to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by presenting the certificate of ownership, as required by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law. Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser. In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling is the taking away of the carabaos by the accused without the consent of the caretaker testified that he saw appellant cut the cyclone wire used as corral for the carabaos. The taking was confirmed Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, who declared that after she was informed by Himaya about the incident, she went right away to the corral and discovered that indeed the two carabaos were missing. Appellants assertion that his identity was not positively established deserves no serious consideration. Prosecution witness Dionisio Himaya identified appellant and Escarda as the rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said he was awake at that time as he was watching over his cornfield nearby, and there was enough illumination from the moon. He was just four arms length away. He saw appellant and Escarda unleash the two carabaos. He stated that appellant rode on one carabao while Escarda rode on the other, and both immediately went away. He said he easily recognized appellant as he knew him long before the incident. According to the witness, appellant was the nephew of his wife and used to visit them before. During the trial, the witness positively identified appellant as the same person who stole the carabaos. Appellants contention concerning lack of proper identification is, in our view, baseless and unmeritorious. Similarly, appellants assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented the certificate of ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his conviction, is untenable. It is to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner. The owner includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle. In this case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the taking away of the carabaos. She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the carabaos were stolen and reported the incident to the police. Note that the carabaos ownership was never put in issue during the trial in

the lower court and is now raised belatedly. It is settled that, generally, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Appellants alibi must likewise fail. The rule is settled that alibi cannot prosper unless it is proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed.In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time of the incident. Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only a fifteen-minute walk from appellants house. We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, unlawful entry and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance. The prosecution, however, failed to specify these circumstances in the charge filed before the trial court, as now required expressly by the Code of Criminal Procedure effective December 1, 2000 but applicable retroactively for being procedural and pro reo. Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. In its decision, the trial court merely mentioned that appellant was convicted for cattle rustling under Criminal Case No. 627-S on February 8, 1993, at the time when the case at bar was being tried. It did not state that said conviction was already final. Even the records did not show that appellant admitted his previous conviction. As we had held before, there can be no recidivism without final judgment. The best evidence of a prior conviction is a certified copy of the original judgment of conviction, and such evidence is always admissible and conclusive unless the accused himself denies his identity with the person convicted at the former trial. P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under Articles 309 and 310 under the Revised Penal Code. It merely modified the penalties provided for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 by imposing stiffer penalties thereon under special circumstances.[25] Under Section 8[26] of P.D. 533, any person convicted of cattle rustling shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty ofreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.