Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abstract
This
paper
looks
into
the
century-long
history
of
the
cooperative
movement
in
the
Philippines
and
identifies
the
factors
to
which
the
unsustainable
cooperative
operations
(or
failures)
are
attributed.
The
common
factors
across
the
three
stages
of
cooperative
development
are
poor
governance,
lack
of
capital,
no
or
low
government
support,
and
lack
of
managerial
competence.
Based
on
the
propositions
of
Nicholls
and
Opal,
and
Banks
on
cooperatives
and
on
the
arguments
of
various
authors
in
deliberative
or
participative
development,
this
paper
thus
argues
that
cooperatives
in
the
Philippines
need
both
institutional
support
and
managerial
capacity
to
become
sustainable
and
effective
agents
of
participative
development
in
the
country.
From
the
experience
of
select
cooperatives
in
the
country
and
other
materials
on
cooperatives,
recommendations
are
drawn,
which
are
mainly
enhancing
existing
or
exploring
possible
institutional
partnerships
with
the
following:
local
government
units,
Cooperative
Development
Authority,
other
cooperatives,
non- government
organizations,
and
the
microfinance
institutions
and
social
enterprises.
Table
of
Contents
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................1
Research
Question .........................................................................................................................2
Limitation ..........................................................................................................................................2
Methodology.....................................................................................................................................2
Review
of
Literature ..........................................................................................................................3
Cooperatives
in
the
Philippines ....................................................................................................6
The
Cooperative
Described........................................................................................................6
A
Sector
Overview..........................................................................................................................7
Brief
History:
Why
Cooperatives
Failed ...............................................................................7
1895-1941....................................................................................................................................7
1941-1986....................................................................................................................................8
1986-present...............................................................................................................................9
Policy
Environment.................................................................................................................... 10
Select
Cases
of
Cooperatives
in
the
Philippines.................................................................. 12
NGO-supported
cooperatives................................................................................................. 12
SMMPC:
A
Faith-based
Cooperative.................................................................................... 13
The
Big
Brothers.......................................................................................................................... 15
Conclusions
and
Recommendations ........................................................................................ 16
LGUs .................................................................................................................................................. 16
CDA .................................................................................................................................................... 17
Other
Cooperatives..................................................................................................................... 18
NGOs ................................................................................................................................................. 18
MFIs
and
SEs.................................................................................................................................. 19
Works
Cited ........................................................................................................................................ 21
Cooperative
is
one,
if
not
the
most
ideal
form
of
organization
in
the
light
of
participative
development,
because
it
is
member-managed
and
in
most
of
its
forms,
community-based
(exemptions
are
the
likes
of
employee
cooperatives).
In
the
Philippines,
cooperatives
comprise
a
significant
portion
of
the
civil
society
group,
numbering
77,701
in
2008
(Mina,
2011),
while
the
development-oriented
non-government
organizations
(NGOs)
in
2007
were
estimated
to
be
somewhere
between
3,000
and
5,000
only
(Asian
Development
Bank,
2007).
The
number
of
cooperatives
in
the
country,
however,
shows
interesting
pattern
over
the
last
three
decades:
from
over
3,000
in
1985,
peaking
to
77,701
in
2008,
then
dropping
to
18,484
in
2010
(see
Figure
1).
Figure
1:
Number
of
Cooperatives
in
the
Philippines
Sources:
Cooperative
Development
Authority
website,
Gray
Wine
Think
Tank
in
Sibal
(2001),
and
Mina
(2011)
The growth in their number between 1985 and 1993 could be attributed to the support extended to the sector by the Aquino and Ramos administrations. The drop in 2009, on the other hand, may have been caused by the issuance of a circular by the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) that required cooperatives to register and confirm with the authority within a certain period. This process required the cooperatives to submit their articles of cooperation, bylaws, and latest audited financial statements, which many cooperatives failed to comply with. The result was unsurprising because to begin with, only 28 percent of the cooperatives in 2008 were operating; the rest were dormant, dissolved, or cancelled. As the Asian Development Bank (2007) observed the civil society sector in the Philippines is large and vibrant by developing country standards, even though a large number of organizations are small, struggle financially, and have weak capacity.
Research
Question
The
phenomenon
of
non-surviving
cooperatives
is
not
unique
to
the
Philippines.
Two
authors
attributed
this
global
concern
to
these
factors:
1)
Nicholls
and
Opal
(2005)
explained
that
social
market
failures
at
a
grassroots
level
are
typically
the
product
of
a
lack
of
institutional
support
at
either
a
macro
or
micro
level
that
generates
the
need
for
a
new
community
action;
and
2)
Banks
(1972),
in
his
analysis
of
different
approaches
to
management
and
their
values-orientation
with
reference
to
Robert
Owen
(and
his
cooperative
movement),
noted
that
managerial
skills
could
be
deployed
to
address
social
problems.
This
paper
thus
argues
that
cooperatives
in
the
Philippines
need
both
institutional
support
and
managerial
capacity
to
become
sustainable
and
effective
agents
of
participative
development
in
the
country.
It
then
aims
to
answer
this
question:
How
can
institutional
relations
and
managerial
capacities
of
cooperatives
in
the
Philippines
be
strengthened
to
make
them
more
sustainable
and
effective
agents
of
participative
development?
Limitation
This paper considers only the case of primary cooperatives, which comprise almost 99 percent of the sector and whose members are individual persons; it will not look into the secondary cooperatives (such as unions and federations where members are primary cooperatives) or tertiary cooperatives (an apex organization composed of secondary cooperatives).
Methodology
This
paper
shall
use
secondary
materials
on
the
cooperative
movement
in
the
Philippines
as
well
as
case
studies,
both
published
and
unpublished,
covering
three
general
categories:
a
group
of
cooperatives
supported
by
an
NGO;
a
faith- based
cooperative;
and
the
general
view
of
the
big
players
in
the
sector.
Page 2 of 20
Review
of
Literature
The
following
materials
on
participative
development
are
hereby
examined:
Cornwall,
A.,
&
Brock,
K.
(2005,
November).
Beyond
Buzzwords:
"Poverty
Reduction",
"Participation",
and
"Empowerment"
in
Development
Policies.
Overarching
Concerns
Programme
Paper
(No.
10).
United
Nations
Research
Institute
for
Social
Development
(UNRISD).
Evans,
P.
(Winter
2004).
Development
as
Institutional
Change:
The
Pitfalls
of
Monocropping
and
the
Potentials
for
Deliberation.
Studies
in
Comparative
International
Development,
38
(4),
30-52.
Grindle,
M.
S.
(2004).
Good
Enough
Governance:
Poverty
Reduction
and
Reform
in
Developing
Countries.
Governance:
An
International
Journal
of
Policy,
Administration,
and
Institutions,
17
(4),
525-548.
March,
J.
G.,
&
Olsen,
J.
P.
(1986).
Sovereignty
and
the
Search
for
Appropriate
Institutions.
Journal
of
Public
Policy,
6
(4),
341-370.
Stiglitz,
J.
E.
(2002).
Participation
and
Development:
Perspectives
from
the
Comprehensive
Development
Program.
Review
of
Development
Economics,
6
(2),
163-182.
Evanss
work
serves
as
the
foundation
of
this
review.
Evans
and
Grindle
discussed
institutions
and
their
role
in
development
at
different
levels:
Evans
presented
a
model
or
approach
in
development
from
macro
or
strategic
perspective
of
institution
building,
while
Grindle
viewed
them
mainly
from
project/program
standpoint.
The
work
of
Stiglitz
is
included
in
the
review
because
it
supports
Evanss
argument
with
a
macro
level
analysis
of
development
strategies.
Likewise,
March
and
Olsens
discourse
was
on
the
functions
of
the
institutions
in
the
midst
of
changing
global
trends,
albeit
without
a
specific
focus
on
development.
The
discourse
of
these
authors
will
be
used
in
the
analysis
of
the
institutional
reforms
and
relations
of
the
cooperatives.
Cornwall
and
Brock,
on
the
other
hand,
provided
historical
discourse
of
development
programs
that
relates
well
to
the
arguments
of
Grindle.
Thus
the
combined
works
of
Cornwall
and
Brock
and
of
Grindle,
both
taking
on
the
project
or
micro
perspective,
will
serve
as
guide
in
the
analysis
of
cooperatives
management
capacities.
Evans
proposed
a
deliberative
development
which
relies
on
popular
deliberation
of
set
goals
and
allocated
goods,
and
requires
a
participatory
form
of
political
institution.
He
explained
that
uncoordinated
and
decentralized
actions
of
civil
society
are
insufficient
for
the
emergence
or
sustenance
of
deliberative
(or
participatory
political)
institution,
thus
the
formal
organization
apparatuses
of
politics
play
a
central
role.
(p.43)
Page 3 of 20
In
support
of
Evanss
foundation
of
participatory
political
institutions,
Stiglitz
espoused
the
development
strategies
arrived
at
through
open,
transparent,
and
participatory
processes
that
extend
the
fruits
of
development
in
a
sustainable
way
to
all
citizens
(p.179).
Stiglitz
defined
participation
not
only
as
a
desired
outcome
but,
more
importantly,
as
a
process
that
addresses
both
the
issue
of
equity
and
the
principal-agent
problem,
that
is,
the
discrepancy
between
the
action
taken
by
the
representative
and
the
interests
of
those
represented.
(p.165).
Cornwall
and
Brock
offered
some
explanation
as
to
how
this
problem
arises.
In
practice,
they
said,
participation
could
be
interpreted
as
merely
engaging
the
intended
beneficiaries
rather
than
involving
the
people
in
defining
their
own
development,
and
that
participation
has
been
reduced
at
times
to
cost
sharing
and
consultation,
without
the
explicit
goal
of
empowerment.
(p.7).
At
times,
too,
participation
runs
under
time
constraints
that
often
push
the
development
agents
to
expedite
the
process
to
meet
their
deadlines,
sacrificing
the
level
or
quality
of
participation
along
the
way.
Further,
participatory
process
may
be
done
merely
out
of
compliance
such
that
development
agents
would
invite
civil
society
organizations
but
whose
views
seldom
find
their
way
into
the
final
document.
And
even
if
reforms
are
made
participatory,
it
can
be
invested
with
meanings
that
are
radically
different
from
the
consensus
narrative:
the
process
may
mean
that
participants
cannot
ask
questions
or
are
told
what
to
do,
(p.12- 13)
hence
the
resulting
principal-agency
problem.
Participation
then
simply
becomes
a
ritual
necessary
to
make
the
exogenous
development
agenda
palatable.
March
and
Olsen
recognized
the
same
agency
problem,
adding
that
peoples
preferences
could
be
influenced
by
the
political
leaders
themselves
and
the
media.
(p.355-356)
These
narratives
could
very
well
be
the
reason
why
citizen
education
is
crucial,
as
emphasized
by
Evans
and
Stiglitz
(Evans,
2004:
31;
Stiglitz,
2002:
169) without
it,
people
could
be
used,
abused,
and
even
manipulated
by
the
external
development
proponents.
Highly
educated
citizenry
should
be
able
to
make
their
own
choices
and
bring
in
information,
their
commitment,
and
effort
to
the
process.
(Evans,
2004:36;
Stiglitz,
2002:168)
On
the
institutions
side,
March
and
Olsen
proposed
a
way
of
assessing
both
the
competence
and
integrity
of
integrative
institutions1,
which
essentially
include
cooperatives.
Questions
of
competence,
both
in
technical
knowledge
and
in
understanding
community
needs
and
possibilities,
are
thus:
Does
the
process
develop
and
use
genuine
expertise
of
relevance
to
the
problem?
Does
it
strengthen
the
capabilities
of
citizens
to
understand
and
act
on
issues
on
public
policy
and
to
select
competent
representatives
and
advisors?
Question
of
integrity,
based
on
a
set
of
publicly
defined
values,
is
basically
this:
Does
the
process
ensure
that
participants
act
in
a
manner
dedicated
to
the
common
good
and
uncorrupted
by
their
personal
ambitions
or
interests?
1
An
integrative
institution
presumes
an
order
based
on
history,
obligation,
and
reason
and
is
concerned
with
rights
and
reasoned
deliberation
in
search
of
the
common
good,
as
opposed
to
aggregative
institution
that
presumes
an
order
based
on
rationality
and
exchange
and
is
concerned
with
efficiency,
preferences,
and
endowments.
(p.344)
Page 4 of 20
Stiglitz
presented
the
current
debate
about
the
participatory
process
inhibiting
the
kind
of
quick
decision-making
required
for
rapid
economic
growth.
(p.170)
Grindle,
acknowledging
that
consolidation
of
good
governance
can
take
a
great
deal
of
time,
thus
suggested
that
greater
tolerance
be
extended
to
the
less-than- ideal
institutions
while
economic
growth
occurs
and
poverty
is
reduced.
(p.533)
Besides,
adopting
institutional
changes
that
are
not
strictly
necessary
can
have
serious
opportunity
cost
implication,
as
institutions
are
costly
to
establish
and
run.
(pp.526-530)
Therefore,
Grindle
proposed
that
short-term,
direct
ways
of
responding
to
the
needs
of
the
poor
be
undertaken,
while
the
longer-term
institutional
changes
for
good
governance
are
debated,
discussed,
and
initiated.
(p.535).
Further
citing
Rodrik
and
others
(2003)
and
Goldsmith
(2002),
Grindle
argued
that
institutional
innovations
can
be
introduced
in
the
wake
of
reform
rather
than
as
a
pre-condition
to
it
and
that
getting
the
institution
right,
especially
in
terms
of
accountability
and
transparency,
was
not
a
necessary
condition
for
development.
(p.531).
Thus
the
author
proposed
a
good
enough
governance
which
refers
to
minimally
acceptable
government
performance
and
civil
society
engagement
that
do
not
significantly
hinder
economic
and
political
development
and
that
permits
poverty
reduction
initiatives
to
go
forward.
(p.526)
This
argument
is
in
contrast
with
that
of
Evans:
participatory
institution
is
a
pre- condition
to
development,
and
that
existing
institutions
are
likely
to
reinforce
rather
than
dissolve
poverty
traps
(p.32),
thus
the
debate
between
reforming
institutions
in
order
to
achieve
the
desired
development
outcomes
and
working
on
both
institutional
reforms
and
poverty
alleviation
simultaneously.
However,
Rodrik
and
Subramanian
(2003)
supported
Evanss
point:
in
countries
where
institutional
pre-conditions
such
as
transparency
and
accountability
were
missing,
conditionality
(of
policies
and
target
outcomes)
was
less
likely
to
succeed,
and
therefore
finding
the
right
institutional
pre-conditions
is
more
essential
than
micromanaging
the
outcomes.
(p.34)
Evans
was
right
in
arguing
that
that
existing
institutions
are
likely
to
reinforce
rather
than
dissolve
poverty
traps,
which
is
especially
true
in
the
Philippine
case:
how
much
of
the
local
government
units
budget
is
allocated
to
basic
social
services
and
poverty
reduction
programs
and
how
much
is
allocated
to
the
executives
administrative
and
discretionary
expenses?
How
much
is
earmarked
for
the
next
election?
How
much
is
actually
lost
to
corruption?
The
Philippine
case
therefore
challenges
Goldsmiths
claim
that
getting
the
institutions
right
especially
in
terms
of
accountability
and
transparency
was
not
a
necessary
condition
for
development.
In
the
Philippines,
it
is.
Sustainability
of
institutional
reforms
or
of
deliberative
institutions
is
yet
another
issue.
Evans
said
that
the
technocrats
have
to
be
patient
with
the
process
while
the
people,
who
might
find
the
process
a
bit
too
demanding,
must
have
some
kind
of
staying
power.
(p.38)
What
could
enrich
Evanss
model
is
providing
immediate
impact
economic
intervention
based
on
Nederveen
Pieterses
(2000)
discourse
on
alternative
development,
which
the
author
equated
to
participative
development.
Nederveen
Pieterse
differentiated
the
development
model
driven
by
social
transformation,
such
as
participative
Page 5 of 20
development, from that driven by growth using various contours. Among these contours is developmental method. While growth model uses industrialization, import substitution and the like, social transformation uses participation, sustainability, democratization, and microcreditthe first three are consistent with Evanss propositions. What Nederveen Pieterse contributes to the discussion is the inclusion of a mechanism, not necessarily micro credit, which has immediate economic impact on the poor. In their study, Bebbington and Bebbington (2000) also observed that the most successful initiatives of the participatory groups, aside from the literacy training, was the organization of village banks (which is a mechanism for micro credit). (p.14)
The Cooperative Code of the Philippines of 2008 defines cooperative as an autonomous and duly registered association of persons, with a common bond of interest, who have voluntarily joined together to achieve their social, economic, and cultural needs and aspirations by making equitable contributions to the capital required, patronizing their products and services and accepting a fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in accordance with universally accepted cooperative principles. (Art.3) It is as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice.(Art.2) These definitions hence make cooperative a form of organization that is ideal for participative development. Cooperatives are distinct from the NGOs in that the former are not necessarily non-profitthey do business, earn profit, and distribute these profits to the owners/members in the form of dividends. They are distinct from the regular business, however, in that they are organizations of the poor aimed at self-help and economic empowerment. While cooperatives are member owned, the NGOs are typically middle-class led and managed. (Abao, 2011) In terms of operations, the cooperatives service areas are normally limited to their local community, while the NGOs do not have the same geographic restriction and therefore can expand their operation much faster than the cooperatives do. Historically, the NGOs played a role in cooperative development. Aside from the several NGO-assisted cooperatives, NGO coalitions were also formed to promote the formation of cooperatives and to help them become self-reliant. (Encarnacion-Tadem, 2010) What is very similar to the functions and operations of cooperatives are the POs. Both are members-owned and aim to promote the interests of the low-income group. However, POs, like NGOs, are strictly non-profit. They do not do business but instead, advocate public interests. As of 2010, POs have the largest estimated number of 100,000 among the civil society groups. (Abao, 2011)
Page 6 of 20
A
Sector
Overview
Cooperatives
work
on
seven
basic
principles,
which
are
congruent
with
that
of
participative
development:
1)
voluntary
membership;
2)
democratic
member
control;
3)
member
economic
participation;
4)
autonomy
and
independence;
5)
education,
training,
and
information;
6)
cooperation
among
cooperatives;
and
7)
concern
for
community.
Most
of
these
principles
are
mentioned
in
Evans
and
Stiglitzs
literature
on
participative
development.
However,
nice
theories
do
not
necessarily
translate
to
effective
and
successful
practice,
as
in
the
case
of
the
cooperatives
in
the
Philippines
that
is
marked
by
successes
as
well
as
failures
over
the
years.
There
are
20
different
types
of
cooperatives
according
to
their
services
offered;
the
more
popular
ones
are
credit
(comprised
9
percent
of
the
sector),
marketing
(2
percent),
consumer
(3
percent),
producer
(3
percent),
service
(5
percent),
and
multi-purpose
(combination
of
any
two
or
more
of
the
other
types,
77
percent).
As
of
2010,
the
cooperative
sector
had
an
asset
base
worth
Php158
billion
and
a
membership
of
over
7
million.
Of
the
18,484
cooperatives
in
2010,
76
percent
are
micro2
in
size
but
they
accounted
for
merely
5
percent
(at
Php8.5
billion)
of
the
total
asset
base
of
the
sector.
On
the
other
extreme,
only
1
percent
of
the
cooperatives
are
considered
large-scale3
but
they
accounted
for
55
percent
(Php87
billion)
of
the
total
assets
of
the
sector.
Around
16
percent
are
small4
while
the
remaining
6
percent
are
medium-sized5
cooperatives.
The
ADB
is
therefore
accurate
in
describing
the
sector
as
having
a
large
number
of
organizations
(that)
are
small,
struggling
financially.
4 Assets are worth between Php3 million and Php15million 5 Assets are worth between Php15 million and Php100 million
Page 7 of 20
Marketing Law was enacted and approved to bring the agriculture products to the market more efficiently. In 1935, however, about 90 percent of these cooperatives were inactive with no funds left in their treasury. By 1939 only 164 societies were actually organized with a total membership of around 5,000 farmers and only 20 percent were active. The experiment on rural financing through cooperatives was a failure. (Cooperative Development Authority, 2011) Figure 2 on page 10 enumerates the reasons cited by cooperatives failed then. 1941-1986 In the 1940s, cooperatives primarily served as instruments for trade and relief operations of the government. In the 1950s, the government focused on agricultural development, passing several laws that supported the farmers on national scale including the establishment of Farmers Co-op Marketing Associations (FACOMAS). The following decade, credit services to the farmers were further intensified, while non-agricultural cooperatives, such as electric cooperatives, began to rise. (Naces) Alongside with this event was the issuance of the Roman Catholic Church of a resolution in 1957 calling for the organization of credit cooperatives in parishes all over the country as part of their social action projects. (Sibal, A Century of the Philippine Cooperative Movement, 2001) Sibal (2001) reported, however, that the state-initiated FACOMAs failed as in the past, again due to corruption and incompetent management. Only 99 of the 255 FACOMAs survived and of the millions lent, only 28 percent remained collectible (sic). (p.5) He added that the church-based and/or organized cooperatives proved to be more successful and sustainable. The cooperative movement was given a shot in the arm with the issuance of Presidential Decree 175 Strengthening the Cooperative Movement in 1973. The law aimed to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a means of increasing income and purchasing power of the low-income sector. The sectors performance hardly change thoughthe state-initiated cooperatives grew but were too politicized that the programs failed, except for the electric cooperatives that were in charge of the rural electrification program and the least politicized. (Sibal, A Century of the Philippine Cooperative Movement, 2001) Figure 2 on page 10 enumerates the constraints that caused cooperatives to fail during this period. Nevertheless, what could be considered cooperative movement's most dramatic accomplishment during the period was in the area of establishing strong federated structures at the regional and national levels. Enhanced coordination between cooperative federations and unions had, by the early 1980s, effectively transferred leadership responsibility for the development of the cooperative movement away from government to the private sector. (Van Steenwyk, 1987) Perhaps it would have been more accurate to say that the leadership responsibility was transferred from government to the civil society, although the
Page 8 of 20
author was correct it saying that this transfer was indeed an accomplishment, solving the oxymoron concept of state-initiated participation. 1986-present The Aquino Administration, which began in 1986 and which marked the third stage of cooperative development, learned from the past failures of excessive government loans or credit support to cooperatives as in the FACOMAs. This time, government agencies, which were prevented from organizing coops, channeled their development programs through the network of cooperatives, NGOs and peoples organizations (POs) especially in food distribution, family planning, barrio facilities and livelihood projects. Further, under the Local Government Code of 1991, which decentralized power to the local government units (LGUs), the local development councils at the LGUs were established, giving the cooperatives, NGOs, and POs the opportunity to actively participate in local governance. Because the succeeding administration of Ramos had the same stance, cooperatives continued to grow so much so that from 1985 to 1993 their number had grown by 6.5 times. (Sibal, A Century of the Philippine Cooperative Movement, 2001) Despite this number and the asset growth of viable cooperatives by 100 times over (from P 1.05 billion in 1985 to P 118.4 billion in 1995), there was still a considerable rate of failure since more than 80 percent of the total registered coops in 2000 were not functional. The main reasons for failure are presented in Figure 2 on page 10. Figure 12 is constructed to see patterns in the causes of failures of the cooperatives. Over the three periods of cooperative development, four factors were consistently mentioned: 1) incompetent management; 2) poor governance; 3) low level of capitalization; and 4) lack of government support. These results very well support Bankss (1972) claim that cooperatives need to build their managerial/management capacities, and partly Nicholl and Opals (2005) proposition that grass-root organizations such as the cooperatives need institutional support, in this case, from the government. However, both poor governance- and capitalization-related concerns may be addressed by harnessing the support of other institutions, which will be discussed later in this paper. The issue of poor governance also affirms the principal-agent problem mentioned by Stiglitz (2002), Cornwall and Brock (2005), and March and Olsen (1986). Quite remarkable, however, is the movements ability to develop its human resources and organizational culture in line with cooperative principle, and to overcome the issues of politicization, such that these problems were not anymore mentioned as causes of failure in the period beginning 1986.
Page 9 of 20
Policy
Environment
The
countrys
legal
framework
supports
growth
and
formation
of
cooperatives
as
people
power
at
the
local
level,
especially
after
the
1986
revolution
when
a
new
space
for
civil
society
was
created.
Among
the
most
significant
legislations
are
the
following:
The
1987
Constitution
recognizes
cooperatives
as
a
legitimate,
private
sector
force
within
society
to
contribute
to
the
furtherance
of
social
justice
and
economic
development
objectives
(Van
Steenwyk,
1987)
Creation
of
CDA
in
1990
(R.A.
6939)
whose
mandate
is
to
promote
the
viability
and
growth
of
cooperatives
as
instrument
of
equity,
social
justice,
and
economic
development.
The
Local
Government
Code
of
1991
(R.A.
7190)
mandates
the
local
development
council
be
formed
at
the
village
level,
with
a
stipulation
that
at
least
one
quarter
of
the
local
development
councils
membership
must
come
Page 10 of 20
from civil society or the private sector and that the civil society representatives must come from locally-accredited organizations. It also contains a provision for the establishment of other local committees, such as cooperatives. (Chapter I-Sec. 17.2.i, 3.i; 50.b.i)
Tax
Code
of
1997
(R.A.
8424)
and
the
Revenue
Regulation
20-2001
exempt
cooperatives
transacting
with
their
members
from
taxes
while
the
members
transactions
shall
be
exempt
from
taxes
such
as
tax
on
deposits
and
documentary
tax.
Transactions
with
non-members
shall
also
be
tax-exempt
provided
that
the
cooperatives
total
reserves
and
net
savings
is
not
more
than
Php10
million
(usually
these
are
the
micro
and
small
cooperatives,
which
account
for
92
percent
of
the
sector).
The
2008
Cooperative
Code
of
the
Philipines
(R.A.
9520),
amending
the
1990
Cooperative
Code
of
the
Philippines
(R.A.
No.
6938),
outlines
in
greater
detail
the
requirements
in
professionalizing
the
management
and
operation
of
cooperatives,
while
providing
a
monitoring
and
evaluation
tool
for
the
cooperatives
to
conduct
assessments
of
its
managerial,
financial,
and
social
objectives.
In
Congress,
as
well,
a
Committee
on
Cooperatives
has
been
established
to
govern
all
matters
relating
to
cooperatives,
both
urban
and
rural-based,
including
but
not
limited
to
farm
credit
and
farm
security,
cooperative
movements,
marketing
and
consumers'
organization,
and
the
implementation
of
the
Cooperative
Code
of
the
Philippines.
(Rule
X,
Section
13
(11))
(Senate
of
the
Philippines)
At
the
national
level,
the
government
is
not
amiss
in
providing
support
to
the
sectorbeyond
giving
recognition
it
has
created
a
policy
framework,
a
governing
body,
and
a
political
space
in
Congress
both
in
terms
of
governing
committee
and
in
representation
were
extended
to
it.
In
the
1998
and
2010
party
list
elections,
for
example,
three
and
five
sector
representatives,
respectively,
from
cooperative
movement
were
elected
in
the
Congress.
According
to
Sibal
(2011)
the
cooperative
movements
involvement
in
parliamentary
struggle
avoided
politization
(sic)
and
too
much
state
intervention
under
the
principle
of
subsidiarity.
(Sibal,
The
Philippine
Cooperative
Movement:
Problems
and
Prospects
(1986
Present),
2011)
Among
the
laws
passed
included
the
Cooperative
Code
in
2008,
expansion
of
tax
exemption
incentives
for
cooperatives,
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Program
Extension
with
Reforms
Act,
and
strengthening
of
crop
insurance
program.
(Mina,
2011)
Incentives
are
also
generousin
fact,
too
generous
that
it
has
led
to
the
formation
of
many
fake
cooperatives,
(that
is)
corporate
cooperatives
seeking
tax
exemptions
and
government
subsidies.
(Munoz
and
Battulayan,
1989
in
Sibal)
Page 11 of 20
With the devolution of power to the local government units (LGU), however, the national government can only do so much and thus the LGUs play an important role in promoting and supporting the cooperative sector. Based on the cases following this section, the LGUs in general (except for a few) seem to be an inactive entity in the cooperative movement and development.
Beginning
1994,
this
NGO
has
engaged
in
providing
training
programs
to
the
senior
technical
personnel,
trainers,
leaders,
and
second-liners
of
various
cooperatives
nationwide.
Its
goals
are
to
develop
cooperatives
along
the
concepts
and
framework
of
Germanys
credit
unionism
and
to
establish
knowledge
and
resource
centers.
However,
over
the
years,
these
goals
have
evolved
from
engaging
the
cooperatives
in
business
value
chain
(that
is,
from
raw
material
production
to
delivery
of
goods
to
the
buyers),
to
developing
management
capabilities,
to
promoting
consolidation
among
cooperatives,
to
posing
a
challenge
to
the
cooperatives
for
them
to
achieve
economic
development.
Although
the
NGO
admitted
its
weakness
in
the
program
design
(not
learner-centered)
and
consequently
in
its
impact
assessment,
it
had
made
contributions
to
its
partner-cooperatives,
as
summarized
in
Figure
3.
These
statements
were
results
of
the
various
focus
group
discussions
(FGDs)
conducted
with
the
representatives
of
partner-cooperatives,
where
they
were
asked,
what
impact
have
the
training
programs
had
on
their
organizations.
Figure
3:
Impact
of
the
NGOs
Training
Programs
on
Its
Partner-Cooperatives
6
This
section
is
based
on
unpublished
documents
of
the
subject
NGO,
which
has
not
given
its
permission
to
reveal
its
identity
at
the
time
of
writing.
Page 12 of 20
Comparing this table with Figure 2 on page 10, three of the impact areas identified by the participating cooperatives in the FGDs matched with three of the four top causes why cooperatives failed in the past: governance, financial approach/condition, and government support. This means that the training provided helped the cooperatives address these three failure factors. Although two groups (Visayas and Mindanao 2) are yet planning to approach their respective LGUs for support, their stance is proactive or empowered. The same thing is true with the financial approach and more specifically, in the area of governancemembers actually made their demands known to their leaders and set rules for them (e.g. whereas in the past, membership was based solely on the candidates interest to be part of the board or on their popularity, now the candidates have to meet certain requirements). Since the NGO provided these cooperatives with only training programs, three things can be drawn from its experience: 1) that Evans and Stiglitz are correct in their argument that citizen education is crucial in the participative process, as highly educated citizenry can make their own choices and bring in information, their commitment, and effort to the process; 2) that Evans is correct in saying that participatory institution is a pre-condition to development, and that existing institutions are likely to reinforce rather than dissolve poverty traps (imagine if members do not address the issue of corruption in their cooperatives); and 3) with the participatory institutions, i.e. the cooperatives, compelling the LGUs for their support they are actually improving the quality of other institutions and eventually of development performance. (Evans, pp.31, 45) This case also provides evidence to two statements: 1) that principal-agent problem is real; and 2) that institutional reform and management capacity building are indeed needed by the cooperatives.
political
sides,
thus
making
it
difficult
for
them
to
establish
an
alliance
with
the
LGU.
This
is
not
because
of
the
inherent
political
empowerment
in
the
organization,
but
because
of
people
who
have
indeed
used
the
cooperatives
to
run
for
public
office.
Even
the
public
has
started
perceiving
cooperative
activities
as
mere
politicking.
(Sebastian,
SMMPC
(A):
The
Beginnings
of
a
Cooperative,
2005)
Perhaps
that
a
priest
or
church
leader
runs
it
has
helped
SMMPC
and
hence
people
do
not
see
the
cooperative
as
part
of
someones
political
ploy.
Other
issues
identified
have
to
do
with
leadership
and
governance
(vested
interests,
lack
of
skills
and
professionalism),
operational
concerns
(people
management,
poor
attendance)
and
financial
matters
(lack
of
capital,
credit
delinquency).
Note
that
these
issues
are
quite
similar
to
the
ones
presented
in
Figure
2
on
page
10.
SMMPC
has
identified
two
things
that
are
crucial
in
cooperatives
survival
and
success.
One
is
governance;
the
other
is
having
professional,
efficient,
and
effective
management.
Faith-based
cooperatives
have
a
different
culture
from
the
regular,
community- based.
People
in
faith-based
cooperatives
tend
to
choose
board
candidates
based
on
sincerity
of
intent
or
servant-leadership,
not
on
competence.
People
also
tend
to
trust
the
church
leaders
much
easier
than
they
trust
the
lay
so
much
so
that
they
often
blindly
follow
whatever
the
priest
or
the
church
leader
says.
(Sebastian,
SMMPC
(C):
The
Cooperative
Revisited,
2005)
Although
this
kind
of
environment
of
trust
is
good
in
any
organization
in
general,
it
defeats
the
participative
design
of
a
cooperative.
Further,
March
and
Olsens
argument
on
the
importance
of
integrative
institutions
having
both
competence
and
integrity
proves
to
be
true
in
SMMPCs
case,
albeit
at
the
individual
level
that
governs
the
institution.
SMMPC
tried
to
professionalize
this
culture
by
implementing
strict
selection
of
board
members
based
on
competence,
for
example.
Aware,
too,
that
people
need
to
be
empowered
amidst
this
culture
of
(absolute)
trust,
SMMPC
structured
its
membership
by
dividing
them
into
small
groups
called
Pook
Tulungan
(PT)
with
each
having
a
group-elect
PT
leader
and
a
PT
secretary.
PT
is
a
venue
for
information
dissemination
and
gathering
of
feedback,
monitoring
of
loans
and
obligations,
and
policy
discussions,
thus
keeping
the
process
within
SMMPC
still
participative
despite
the
trust-based
leadership
of
a
priest.
Education
both
at
the
board
and
management
level,
and
at
the
membership
level
plays
an
important
role
in
the
success
of
SMMPC.
It
is
one
way
of
improving
the
skills
of
the
people
running
the
cooperative
as
well
as
keeping
them
attuned
to
the
principles
of
the
cooperatives.
As
well,
it
shapes
the
values
of
the
members,
promoting
responsibility,
sincerity,
honesty,
service,
and
unity.
Two
things
can
be
concluded
from
this
case:
1)
both
propositions
of
Nicholls
and
Opal
on
institution,
and
of
Banks
on
managerial
capacity
of
cooperatives
proved
valid;
and
2)
Evans
and
Stiglitzs
argument
that
citizen
education
is
crucial
in
the
participative
process
holds
true.
Further,
the
case
shows
that
the
concerns
of
the
Page 14 of 20
cooperatives are not necessarily culture-sensitive, that is, common trends and issues apply despite the unique, trust-based culture of the faith-based cooperative.
LGUs
Foremost
institution
mentioned
by
the
cooperatives
that
can
and
should
support
them
is
the
LGUs.
At
the
very
least,
the
LGUs
can
fulfill
its
mandate
to
establish
local
development
councils
and
allow
participation
of
the
cooperatives
as
prescribed
by
the
law.
At
present,
not
all
LGUs
have
created
the
local
development
council
and/or
appointed
cooperative
representatives
in
the
said
council.
(Sibal,
The
Philippine
Cooperative
Movement:
Problems
and
Prospects
(1986
Present),
2011)
Subsequently,
appropriate
budget
can
be
allocated
to
cooperative
development,
without
the
intent
to
using
the
allocation
for
political
favors.
The
budget
may
be
used
for
training
programs
and/or
overall
reinvigoration
of
the
cooperative
movement
in
the
locality.
Page 16 of 20
The LGUs resource allocation is an indicator of their support and commitment to the sector. While the allocation for the mayors office of the very few LGUs that make their budget public ranges between 27 percent and 36 percent of the total appropriation, the item cooperative development gets only 0.53 percent of the social development budget (one of the so many items under the total appropriation) in one of the even fewer LGUs that have allocation for cooperatives. Moreover, this measly 0.53 percent of the social development budget is even shared with the housing and community development item; of this budget, only 11 percent or over Php8,000 was actually spent during the fiscal year covered. One LGU does not even have an allocation for social development, defending that it is already embedded in the budget items. The LGU support need not be monetary all the time. Allowing the cooperatives to use public venues for free, for example, will facilitate the organizing functions of the cooperatives. It is also necessary that the LGU-cooperative relationship becomes depoliticized so they can work better and, more importantly, so people can start trusting the cooperative movement as agent of development. For some LGUs, cooperatives may be a threat to them given the political power of the organizations; on the flip side, they can also look at the cooperatives as allies who can share political power with them by connecting them to the grassroots. It is a matter of changing the LGU mindset.
CDA
According
to
Abao
(2011),
there
seems
to
be
tension
between
civil
society
and
government,
particularly
in
the
issue
of
regulation.
Although
civil
society
recognizes
the
need
for
it
to
prevent
the
proliferation
of
fly-by-night
organizations,
they
contend
that
they
should
remain
self-regulating
to
maintain
the
spirit
of
voluntary
and
non-government
functions.
Still,
there
are
some
groups
that
want
more
regulation
from
the
government.
Over
the
century,
the
cooperatives
wanting
government
support
but
not
government
interference,
as
presented
in
Figure
2,
has
existed.
Perhaps
the
two
parties
can
draw
the
line
for
government
interventions.
Clearly,
however,
the
cooperative
sector
does
not
want
the
company
of
fake
cooperatives
and
the
CDA
has
successfully
weeded
them
out
in
2009.
CDA
should
do
such
monitoring
on
a
regular
basis,
working
beyond
mere
collection
of
reports
and
documentary
requirements
from
the
cooperatives,
and
instead
implement
the
cooperative
rating
standards.
(Mina,
2011)
The
Department
of
Finance
undersecretary
also
recommended
that
CDA
cover
cooperatives
engaged
in
savings
and
credit
operations.
(Beltran,
2011)
These
kinds
of
cooperatives
handling
public
funds
should
be
closely
guided
as
the
banks
are
by
the
Bangko
Sentral
ng
Pilipinas
to
safeguard
public
interest.
Finally,
some
cooperatives
think
that
the
CDA
should
let
the
federations
conduct
Page 17 of 20
the cooperative education or training programs unless only CDA can offer them. (Mina, 2011) Rightly so, for CDA can then focus on its more strategic functions. The abovementioned recommendations are specific actions but ultimately, CDA should have teeth in monitoring institutional performanceboth the social development and financialof the cooperatives.
Other
Cooperatives
Cooperation
and
collaboration
among
cooperatives
are
not
new
conceptsthese
are
in
fact
the
foundation
why
unions
and
federations
were
established
in
the
first
place.
The
secondary
and
tertiary
cooperatives,
as
well
as
the
big
primaries,
can
help
the
smaller
primaries
through
various
ways:
knowledge
transfer,
technology
development,
business
opportunities,
and
even
financing.
What
could
be
done
further
is
cooperation
among
primaries.
It
is
not
unusual
for
a
producer
cooperative,
for
example,
to
turn
down
a
sales
transaction
only
because
it
cannot
single-handedly
meet
the
requirements.
If
a
good
number
of
primaries
producing
the
same
goods
had
pulled
their
resources
together,
then
they
could
have
made
that
sale,
benefitting
all
of
them.
Another
area
of
cooperation
is
along
the
business
value
chain,
especially
that
the
nature
of
cooperatives
instinctively
follows
this
model:
from
production
of
raw
materials
and
production
of
finished
goods
(farmers
and
producers
cooperative),
to
financing
(credit
cooperatives),
to
selling
(marketing
and
consumers
cooperatives).
Given
their
number
and
their
various
locations
in
the
country,
the
cooperatives
must
realize
the
power
they
have
if
they
pull
they
acts
together,
in
working
to
complete
a
value
chain,
for
example.
This
cooperation
will
help
address
the
issues
of
capital
and
cooperatives
sustainability.
At
present,
many
social
enterprises
(which
will
be
discussed
later)
are
doing
the
linking
of
cooperatives
to
the
business
value
chain.
While
this
in
itself
is
not
bad,
the
cooperatives,
if
they
do
the
linking
themselves,
will
capture
more
economic
value
that
now
goes
to
the
social
enterprise-middleman.
The
term
cooperation
is
deliberately
used
here
to
differentiate
the
concept
from
that
of
consolidation
that
has
been
proposed
to
the
sector
for
years
now.
While
consolidation
is
aimed
at
achieving
operational
and
financial
efficiency
by
merging
the
small
primaries,
cooperation
will
maintain
the
identities
of
the
primaries
and
will
allow
them
to
function
without
changing
any
institutional
element.
In
short,
the
concept
of
cooperation
may
be
perceived
more
as
economic
than
political.
NGOs
The
NGOs
have
played
a
significant
role
in
the
history
of
cooperative
development,
thus
an
NGO-cooperative
partnership
is
not
a
breakthrough
solution.
The
NGO-cooperative
partnerships
are
often
in
the
field
of
education
and
training,
as
in
the
case
of
an
NGO
presented
in
this
study.
The
value
of
education
of
the
members
or
citizenry
in
participative
development
has
been
discussed
in
this
paper
in
length,
because
without
educated
members
Page 18 of 20
participative development will likely just create a new political arena for the new breed of local political elites. And as presented in the case, the partnership between an NGO and cooperatives worked in empowering the cooperatives members, thereby strengthening the institutions themselves. At the same time, the cooperatives learned to professionalize their operations (writing feasibilities studies before project implementation, for example), thus building their management capacity. Unfortunately, however, the development-oriented NGOs engaged in training are slowly disappearing due to pressure to become financially sustainable. Although there are still grants available for education programs, they are not always enough to cover the costs. Generally, training programs in development are cost- centers and hardly generate revenues for the organization.
Microfinance
(MF)7
is
relatively
much
younger
than
the
cooperative
movement
yet
it
has
gained
recognition
globally
as
a
means
to
poverty
alleviation
at
turn
of
the
century.
In
the
Philippines,
some
cooperatives
reacted
negatively
to
the
rising
popularity
of
the
microfinance
institutions
(MFIs),
saying
that
they
were
first
to
extend
loans
to
the
poorwhich
is
true,
but
the
MFIs
have
had
remarkable
repayment/collection
rates
of
between
95
and
98
percent
over
the
years.
Some
even
considered
the
MFIs
as
a
threat,
even
blaming
the
MFIs
for
bringing
in
credit
pollution
to
the
low-income
market.
Some
cooperatives,
instead
of
competing
with
the
MFIs,
have
joined
the
MF
bandwagon.
On
the
other
hand,
the
concept
of
social
entrepreneurship
came
later
in
the
1990s
and
gained
popularity
beginning
the
2000s.
According
to
Nicholls
(2006),
the
general
goals
of
social
enterprises
(SEs)
include
the
provision
of
goods
and
services,
which
the
market
or
public
sector
is
either
unwilling
or
unable
to
provide;
development
of
skills;
creation
of
employment;
and
social
integration
of
the
excluded.
Among
the
specific
activities
of
social
enterprises
are
poverty
alleviation
through
empowerment,
such
as
the
microfinance
movement;
health
care;
education
and
training,
including
widening
of
participation
and
the
democratization
of
knowledge
transfer;
environmental
preservation
and
sustainable
development;
community
regeneration;
and
advocacy
and
campaigning,
such
as
fair
trade
and
human
rights
promotionessentially,
these
are
the
very
same
elements
of
participative
development,
only
that
SEs,
as
well
as
MFIs,
use
business
models
as
means
to
achieve
the
social
goals.
These
two
institutions
are
placed
together
as
potential
cooperative
partners
because
they
both
introduce
a
different
take
on
business
models
as
development
method.
Cooperatives
may
partner,
if
not
learn,
from
the
MFIs
and
SEs
skills
such
as
poverty
profiling
of
their
member,
targeting
or
recruitment,
product
and
7
The
microfinance
methodology
from
Bangladeshsmall,
uncollateralized
loans,
with
weekly
payments
spread
over
at
least
six
months,
extended
to
the
poor
to
finance
their
micro
enterpriseswas
first
adopted
in
the
Philippines
in
the
1980s.
It
grew
rapidly
in
the
1990s,
and
was
recognized
as
an
affective
mechanism
for
poverty
alleviation
in
2000s,
with
even
the
formal
banking
system
adopting
it.
Page 19 of 20
business
development,
among
others
(there
are
venues
for
knowledge
sharing
among
civil
society
organizations
where
MFIs
and
SEs
are
already
included).
Many
of
these
MFIs
and
SEs
are
deliberately
targeting
the
marginalized
communities
by
using
various
poverty
index
tools
to
prevent
leakage
to
the
better-off
groups.
In
terms
of
providing
basic
needs,
many
of
them
have
multi- product
offering,
going
beyond
credit
and
financial
services
(although
there
has
been
debate
that
access
to
financial
services
is
indeed
a
basic
need,
if
not
a
human
right)business
skills
and
livelihood
training,
medical
assistance,
and
some
even
water
and
power
supply
in
communities,
among
others.
They
also
use
local
knowledge
in
designing
more
appropriate
and
responsive
products
and
services.
Finally,
MFIs
and
SEs
employ
various
means
to
measure
and
monitor
impact
of
their
programs
on
their
served
clients
or
members.
With
these
lessons
from
the
MFIs
and
SEs,
the
cooperatives
will
likewise
be
able
to
address
their
concerns
on
managerial
capacity
building.
On
the
other
hand,
the
MFIs
and
SEs
can
learn
from
cooperatives
the
bottom-up
development
approach.
MFIs
and
SEs
often
use
top-down
development,
normally
for
the
purpose
of
efficiency
following
Stiglitzs
point
the
participatory
process
inhibiting
the
kind
of
quick
decision-making
required
for
rapid
economic
growth.
(p.170)
However,
a
few
MFIs
and
SEs,
recognizing
the
empowering
and
equitable
nature
of
cooperatives,
have
changed
their
legal
personalities
into
cooperatives.
Ironically,
while
cooperatives
are
supposed
to
work
on
self-help
and
economic
empowerment
of
the
poor,
they
are
criticized
for
being
a
social
justice
force
rather
than
economic
development
(Van
Steenwyk,
1987).
Similarly,
participative
development
has
been
criticized
for
the
insufficient
attention
(it
pays)
to
the
economic
dimensions
of
alternatives
(Bebbington
&
Bebbington,
2001)an
issue
addressed
by
both
the
MFIs
and
the
SEs.
Again,
cooperatives
may
learn
from
the
MFIs
and
SEs
and
adopt
their
economic
development
programs,
or
partner
with
them
so
while
they
(the
cooperatives)
work
on
the
communities
political
empowerment,
somebody
else
will
work
on
their
economic
development.
Besides,
Nederveen
Pieterses
(1998)
proposal
to
include
a
mechanism,
which
has
immediate
economic
impact
on
the
beneficiary- community
but
not
necessarily
micro
credit,
could
enhance
the
sustainability
of
both
the
cooperative
and
its
members.
Of
the
five
institutions
mentioned,
the
roles
and
responsibilities
of
the
LGUs
and
the
CDA
are
not
optional.
Whether
or
not
cooperatives
choose
to
work
with
them,
they
should
be
doing
their
jobs
and
they
should
be
doing
them
well.
On
the
other
hand,
partnering
with
other
cooperatives,
primaries
or
otherwise,
NGOs,
and
MFIs
and
SEs
is
the
choice
of
the
cooperatives.
Since
there
is
no
one
solution
by
a
single
development
agent
to
a
multitude
of
social
concerns,
institutional
partnership
is
worth
exploring.
Besides,
with
the
very
essence
of
cooperatives,
cooperation
should
not
be
difficult.
The
recommendations
presented
in
this
paper
are
not
really
newthey
have
been
done
and
proved
to
have
worked but
replicating
what
works
only
makes
sense
so
the
cooperatives
can
avoid
the
failure
factors
that
have
been
prevalent
in
the
sector
over
the
last
century.
Page 20 of 20
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