US Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of The Inspector General (OIG) Audit: Santa Clara Crime Lab Crime DNA Standarda Compliance

AUDI T OF
COMPLI ANCE WI TH STANDARDS

GOVERNI NG COMBI NED DNA I NDEX SYSTEM
ACTI VI TI ES AT THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
DI STRI CT ATTORNEY S CRI ME LABORATORY
SAN JOSE, CALI FORNI A
U.S. Depart ment of Just ice
Office of t he I nspect or General
Audit Division
Audit Report GR- 90- 12- 004
Sept ember 2012

AUDI T OF
EXECUTI VE SUMMARY
The Depart ment of Just ice Office of t he I nspect or General ( OI G) , Audit
Division, has complet ed an audit of compliance wit h st andards governing
Combined DNA I ndex Syst em ( CODI S) act ivit ies at t he Count y of Sant a
Clara Dist rict At t orneys Crime Laborat ory ( Laborat ory) in San Jose,
California.
Back gr ound
The Federal Bureau of I nvest igat ions ( FBI ) CODI S program combines
forensic science and comput er t echnology t o provide an invest igat ive t ool t o
federal, st at e, and local crime laborat ories in t he Unit ed St at es, as well as
t hose from select int ernat ional law enforcement agencies. The CODI S
program allows t hese crime laborat ories t o compare and mat ch DNA profiles
elect ronically t o assist law enforcement in solving crimes and ident ifying
missing or unident ified persons.
1
The FBI s CODI S Unit manages CODI S, as
well as develops, support s, and provides t he program t o crime laborat ories
t o fost er t he exchange and comparison of forensic DNA evidence.
The FBI implement ed CODI S as a dist ribut ed dat abase wit h
hierarchical levels t hat enables federal, st at e, and local crime laborat ories t o
compare DNA profiles elect ronically. The hierarchy consist s of t hree dist inct
levels t hat flow upward from t he local level t o t he st at e level and t hen, if
allowable, t he nat ional level. The Nat ional DNA I ndex Syst em ( NDI S) , t he
highest level in t he hierarchy, cont ains DNA profiles uploaded by law
enforcement agencies across t he Unit ed St at es and is managed by t he FBI .
NDI S enables t he laborat ories part icipat ing in t he CODI S pr ogram t o
elect ronically compare DNA profiles on a nat ional level. The St at e DNA
I ndex Syst em is used at t he st at e level t o serve as a st at es DNA dat abase
1
DNA, or deoxyri bonuclei c aci d, i s genet i c mat eri al found i n al most all livi ng cell s
t hat cont ai ns encoded i nformat i on necessary for buil di ng and mai nt aining li fe.
Approxi mat el y 99.9 per cent of human DNA i s t he same for al l peopl e. The di fferences found
i n t he r emai ni ng 0.1 per cent al l ow sci ent i st s t o devel op a uni que set of DNA i dent i fi cat i on
charact eri st i cs ( a DNA profi l e) for an i ndi vi dual by anal yzi ng a speci men cont ai ni ng DNA.

and cont ains DNA profiles from local laborat ories and st at e offenders. The
Local DNA I ndex Syst em is used by local laborat ories.
OI G Audi t Obj ect i v es
Our audit generally covered t he period from June 2009 t hrough
May 2011. The obj ect ives of our audit were t o det ermine if: ( 1) t he Count y
of Sant a Clara Dist rict At t orneys Crime Laborat ory was in compliance wit h
t he NDI S part icipat ion requirement s; ( 2) t he Laborat ory was in compliance
wit h t he Qualit y Assurance St andards ( QAS) issued by t he FBI ; and ( 3) t he
Laborat orys forensic DNA profiles in CODI S dat abases were complet e,
accurat e, and allowable for inclusion in NDI S.
Our review det ermined t he following:
The Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he NDI S part icipat ion
requirement s regarding up- t o- dat e t raining for Laborat ory
personnel; availabilit y and accessibilit y of NDI S procedures for
CODI S users, and adequat ely secur ing CODI S equipment locat ed in
a cont rolled laborat ory space. However, t he Laborat ory did
not maint ain adequat e document at ion in it s case files t o pr ove t wo
mat ches were confirmed and invest igat ors were not ified in a t imely
manner.
The Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he QAS we reviewed,
including: ( 1) complet ion of periodic int ernal and ext ernal QAS
reviews; ( 2) implement at ion of correct ive act ions present ed by
int ernal and ext ernal reviews; and ( 3) policies regarding ret ent ion
of evidence. We also observed t hat t he Laborat ory was in
compliance wit h QAS t hat require access t o t he laborat ory t o be
cont rolled and limit ed in a manner t o prevent access by
unaut horized personnel. Finally, we found t he Laborat ory does not
current ly out source t he analysis of it s forensic DNA samples t o
anot her laborat ory.
We reviewed 100 of t he Laborat orys 2,746 forensic profiles t hat
have been uploaded t o NDI S as of April 21, 2011. Of t he
100 forensic profiles sampled, we found t hat 68 profiles were
complet e, accurat e, and allowable for inclusion in NDI S, but
quest ioned 32 profiles.
2
Of t hose 32 profiles, we ident ified:
2
Aft er our draft audi t report was i ssued, t he Laborat ory pr ovi ded addi t ional
i nformat i on not avail able duri ng our fi el dwork, i ncl uding addi t i onal case i nformat i on for
seven of t he pr ofi l es we quest i oned. Based on t hi s new i nformat i on, we r evi sed t he fi nal
audit report and di scuss our anal ysi s i n more det ail i n Appendi x V.
- ii

( 1) 2 profiles uploaded t hat were not at t ribut able t o a put at ive
perpet rat or; ( 2) 10 profiles t hat were obt ained from t he suspect s
person or residence, ( 3) 11 profiles t hat pert ained t o an it em t hat
was not connect ed t o a crime, and ( 4) 9 profiles relat ed t o case files
t hat lacked sufficient informat ion t o det ermine eligibilit y for NDI S.
The Laborat ory also removed an addit ional 17 unallowable profiles
t hat were not in our original sample, but were also uploaded in
associat ion wit h t he case files of unallowable profiles in our sample.
Before our draft report was issued, t he Laborat ory removed 42
profiles and we recommended t hat t he FBI work wit h t he
Laborat ory t o det ermine NDI S eligibilit y for t he remaining 7
profiles.
3
I n addit ion, we recommend t he FBI work wit h t he
Laborat ory t o st rengt hen t he Laborat orys profile eligibilit y review
process and ensure t he Laborat orys forensic DNA profiles uploaded
t o NDI S from January 2006 t hrough April 2012 are reviewed t o
det ermine if t hey meet t he eligibilit y requirement s for NDI S.
We made four recommendat ions t o address t he Laborat orys
compliance wit h st andards governing CODI S act ivit ies, which are discussed
in det ail in t he Findings and Recommendat ions sect ion of t he report . Our
audit obj ect ives, scope, and met hodology are det ailed in Appendix I of t he
report and t he audit crit eria are det ailed in Appendix I I .
We discussed t he result s of our audit wit h Laborat ory officials and
have included t heir comment s in t he report as applicable. I n addit ion, we
request ed a writ t en response t o a draft of our audit report from t he FBI and
t he Laborat ory. We received t hose responses and t hey are found in
Appendices I I I and I V, respect ively. Our analysis of t hose responses and t he
st at us of t he recommendat ions are found in Appendix V.
3
I n r esponse t o our draft audi t report , t he FBI st at ed t hat t wo of t he r emai ni ng
seven profi l es wer e i neligi bl e for upl oad t o NDI S. Of t he t wo i neligi bl e profi l es, t he fi rst
profi l e coul d not be l i nked t o a cri me and t he second pr ofi l es case fil e l acked enough
i nformat i on t o det ermi ne eli gi bilit y for NDI S. The Laborat or y r emoved t he t wo i neli gi bl e
profi l es and pr ovi ded addi t i onal i nformat i on not provi ded t o us duri ng our fi el dwork
regardi ng i t s j ust i fi cat i on for r et ai ni ng t he remai ning fi ve profi l es i n NDI S. I n t ot al , t he
Laborat ory removed 44 profi l es fr om NDI S. Appendi x V di scusses t he st at us of t hi s
recommendat i on i n more det ail .
- iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I NTRODUCTI ON ................................................................. 1
Background ................................................................................. 1
OI G Audit Obj ect ives .................................................................... 1
Legal Foundat ion for CODI S........................................................... 2
CODI S St ruct ure .......................................................................... 2
Laborat ory I nformat ion ................................................................. 6
FI NDI NGS AND RECOMMENDATI ONS...................................... 7
I . Compliance wit h NDI S Part icipat ion Requirement s ................... 7
Result s of t he OI G Audit ................................................... 7
Conclusion .................................................................... 10
Recommendat ion ........................................................... 10
I I . Compliance wit h Qualit y Assurance St andards ....................... 11
Result s of t he OI G Audit ................................................. 11
Conclusion .................................................................... 14
I I I . Suit abilit y of Forensic DNA Profiles in CODI S Dat abases.......... 15
Result s of t he OI G Audit ................................................. 16
Conclusion .................................................................... 28
Recommendat ions ......................................................... 29
APPENDI CES:
I . OBJECTI VES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ............................. 30
I I . AUDI T CRI TERI A .................................................................... 33
I I I . AUDI TEE RESPONSE ................................................................ 37
I V. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTI CE RESPONSE...................................... 43
V. OFFI CE OF THE I NSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDI T DI VI SI ON
ANALYSI S AND SUMMARY OF ACTI ONS NECESSARY
TO CLOSE THE REPORT............................................................ 45

AUDI T OF
I NTRODUCTI ON
The Depart ment of Just ice Office of t he I nspect or General ( OI G) , Audit
Division, has complet ed an audit of compliance wit h st andards governing
Combined DNA I ndex Syst em ( CODI S) act ivit ies at t he Count y of Sant a
Clara Dist rict At t orneys Crime Laborat ory ( Laborat ory) in San Jose,
California.
Back gr ound
The Federal Bureau of I nvest igat ions ( FBI ) CODI S provides an
invest igat ive t ool t o federal, st at e, and local crime laborat ories in t he Unit ed
St at es using forensic science and comput er t echnology. The CODI S program
allows t hese laborat ories t o compare and mat ch DNA profiles elect ronically,
t hereby assist ing law enforcement in solving crimes and ident ifying missing
or unident ified persons.
1
The FBI s CODI S Unit manages CODI S and is
responsible for it s use in fost ering t he exchange and comparison of forensic
DNA evidence.
OI G Audi t Obj ect i v es
Our audit covered t he period from June 2009 t hrough May 2011. The
obj ect ives of our audit were t o det ermine if: ( 1) t he Count y of Sant a Clara
Dist rict At t orneys Crime Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he Nat ional
DNA I ndex Syst em ( NDI S) part icipat ion requirement s; ( 2) t he Laborat ory
was in compliance wit h t he Qualit y Assurance St andards ( QAS) issued by t he
FBI ; and ( 3) t he Laborat orys forensic DNA profiles in CODI S dat abases were
complet e, accurat e, and allowable for inclusion in NDI S. Appendix I cont ains
a det ailed descript ion of our audit obj ect ives, scope, and met hodology; and
Appendix I I cont ains t he crit eria used t o conduct t he audit .
1
DNA, or deoxyri bonuclei c aci d, i s genet i c mat eri al found i n al most all livi ng cell s
t hat cont ai ns encoded i nformat i on necessary for buil di ng and mai nt aining li fe.
Approxi mat el y 99.9 per cent of human DNA i s t he same for al l peopl e. The di fferences found
i n t he r emai ni ng 0.1 per cent al l ow sci ent i st s t o devel op a uni que set of DNA i dent i fi cat i on
charact eri st i cs ( a DNA profi l e) for an i ndi vi dual by anal yzi ng a speci men cont ai ni ng DNA.

Legal Foundat i on f or CODI S
The FBI s CODI S program began as a pilot proj ect in 1990. The DNA
I dent ificat ion Act of 1994 ( Act ) aut horized t he FBI t o est ablish a nat ional
index of DNA profiles for law enforcement purposes. The Act , along wit h
subsequent amendment s, has been codified in a federal st at ut e ( St at ut e)
providing t he legal aut horit y t o est ablish and maint ain NDI S.
2
Allowable DNA Profiles
The St at ut e aut horizes NDI S t o cont ain t he DNA ident ificat ion records
of persons convict ed of crimes, persons who have been charged in an
indict ment or informat ion wit h a crime, and ot her persons whose DNA
samples are collect ed under applicable legal aut horit ies. Samples volunt arily
submit t ed solely for eliminat ion purposes are not aut horized for inclusion in
NDI S. The St at ut e also aut horizes NDI S t o include analysis of DNA samples
recovered from crime scenes or from unident ified human remains, as well as
t hose volunt arily cont ribut ed from relat ives of missing persons.
Allowable Disclosur e of DNA Profiles
The St at ut e requires t hat NDI S only include DNA informat ion t hat is
based on analyses performed by or on behalf of a criminal j ust ice agency
or t he U.S. Depart ment of Defense in accordance wit h QAS issued by t he
FBI . The DNA informat ion in t he index is aut horized t o be disclosed only:
( 1) t o criminal j ust ice agencies for law enforcement ident ificat ion purposes;
( 2) in j udicial proceedings, if ot herwise admissible pursuant t o applicable
st at ut es or rules; ( 3) for criminal defense purposes, t o a defendant who shall
have access t o samples and analyses performed in connect ion wit h t he case
in which t he defendant is charged; or ( 4) if personally ident ifiable
informat ion ( PI I ) is removed for a populat ion st at ist ics dat abase, for
ident ificat ion research and prot ocol development purposes, or for qualit y
cont rol purposes.
CODI S St r uct ur e
The FBI implement ed CODI S as a dist ribut ed dat abase wit h
hierarchical levels t hat enables federal, st at e, and local crime laborat ories t o
compare DNA profiles elect ronically. CODI S consist s of a hierarchy of t hree
dist inct levels: ( 1) NDI S, managed by t he FBI as t he nat ions DNA dat abase
cont aining DNA profiles uploaded by par t icipat ing st at es; ( 2) t he St at e DNA
I ndex Syst em ( SDI S) which serves as a st at es DNA dat abase cont aining
DNA profiles from local laborat ories wit hin t he st at e and st at e offenders; and
2
42 U.S. C.A. 14132 ( 2006) .
- 2

( 3) t he Local DNA I ndex Syst em ( LDI S) , used by local laborat ories. DNA
profiles originat e at t he local level and t hen flow upward t o t he st at e and, if
allowable, nat ional level. For example, t he local laborat ory in t he Palm
Beach Count y, Florida, Sheriffs Office sends it s profiles t o t he st at e
laborat ory in Tallahassee, which t hen uploads t he profiles t o NDI S. Each
st at e part icipat ing in CODI S has one designat ed SDI S laborat ory. The SDI S
laborat ory maint ains it s own dat abase and is responsible for overseeing
NDI S issues for all CODI S- part icipat ing laborat ories wit hin t he st at e. The
graphic below illust rat es how t he syst em hierarchy works.
Ex ampl e of Sy st em Hi er ar chy w i t hi n CODI S
NDI S
Maint ained by t he FBI
LDI S Labor at or i es ( par t i al l i st ) :
DuPage Count y Sheriffs Office
I llinois St at e Police, Chicago
I llinois St at e Police, Rockford
SDI S
Labor at or y
Springfield, I L
Broward Count y Sheriffs Office
Miami- Dade Police Depart ment
Palm Beach Count y Sheriffs Office
SDI S
Labor at or y
Tallahassee, FL
Orange Count y Sheriffs Depart ment
San Bernardino Count y Sheriffs Depart ment
San Diego Police Depart ment
SDI S
Labor at or y
Richmond, CA
Nat ional DNA I ndex Syst em
NDI S, t he highest level in t he CODI S hierarchy, enables laborat ories
part icipat ing in t he CODI S program t o elect ronically compare DNA profiles on
a nat ional level. NDI S does not cont ain names or ot her PI I about t he
profiles. Therefore, mat ches are resolved t hrough a syst em of laborat ory
t o- laborat ory cont act s. NDI S cont ains t he following eight searchable
indices:
- 3

Convict ed Offender I ndex cont ains profiles generat ed from persons
convict ed of qualifying offenses.
3
Arrest ee I ndex is comprised of profiles developed from persons who
have been arrest ed, indict ed, or charged in an informat ion wit h a
crime.
Legal I ndex consist s of profiles t hat are produced from DNA
samples collect ed fr om persons under ot her applicable legal
aut horit ies.
4
Det ainee I ndex cont ains profiles from non- U.S. persons det ained
under t he aut horit y of t he U.S. and required by law t o provide a
DNA sample for analysis and ent ry int o NDI S.
Forensic I ndex profiles originat e from, and are associat ed wit h,
evidence found at crime scenes.
Missing Person I ndex cont ains known DNA profiles of missing
persons and deduced missing persons.
Unident ified Human ( Remains) I ndex holds profiles from
unident ified living individuals and t he remains of unident ified
deceased individuals.
5
Relat ives of Missing Person I ndex is comprised of DNA profiles
generat ed from t he biological relat ives of individuals report ed
missing.
Given t hese mult iple dat abases, t he main funct ions of CODI S are t o:
( 1) generat e invest igat ive leads t hat may help in solving crimes, and
( 2) ident ify missing and unident ified persons.
The Forensic I ndex generat es invest igat ive leads in CODI S t hat may
help solve crimes. I nvest igat ive leads may be generat ed t hrough mat ches
bet ween t he Forensic I ndex and ot her indices in t he syst em, including t he
Convict ed Offender, Arrest ee, and Legal I ndices. These mat ches may
3
The phrase quali fyi ng offenses r efers t o l ocal , st at e, or federal cri mes t hat
requi re a person t o pr ovi de a DNA sampl e i n accordance wi t h appli cabl e l aws.
4
An exampl e of a Legal I ndex pr ofi l e i s one from a person found not guilt y by
reason of i nsani t y who is r equi red by t he rel evant st at e l aw t o provi de a DNA sampl e.
5
An exampl e of an Uni dent i fi ed Human ( Remai ns) I ndex pr ofi l e from a l ivi ng person
i s a profi l e from a chil d or ot her i ndi vi dual , who cannot or r efuses t o i dent i fy t hemsel ves.
- 4

provide invest igat ors wit h t he ident it y of suspect ed perpet rat ors. CODI S
also links crime scenes t hrough mat ches bet ween Forensic I ndex profiles,
pot ent ially ident ifying serial offenders.
I n addit ion t o generat ing invest igat ive leads, CODI S furt hers t he
obj ect ives of t he FBI s Nat ional Missing Person DNA Dat abase program
t hrough it s abilit y t o ident ify missing and unident ified individuals. For
inst ance, t hose persons may be ident ified t hrough mat ches bet ween t he
profiles in t he Missing Person I ndex and t he Unident ified Human ( Remains)
I ndex. I n addit ion, t he profiles wit hin t he Missing Person and Unident ified
Human ( Remains) I ndices may be vet t ed against t he Forensic, Convict ed
Offender, Arrest ee, Det ainee, and Legal I ndices t o provide invest igat ors wit h
leads in solving missing and unident ified person cases.
St at e and Local DNA I ndex Syst ems
The FBI provides CODI S soft ware free of charge t o any st at e or local
law enforcement laborat ory performing DNA analysis. Laborat ories are able
t o use t he CODI S soft ware t o upload profiles t o NDI S. However, before a
laborat ory is allowed t o part icipat e at t he nat ional level and upload DNA
profiles t o NDI S, a Memorandum of Underst anding ( MOU) must be signed
bet ween t he FBI and t he applicable st at es SDI S laborat ory. The MOU
defines t he responsibilit ies of each part y, includes a sublicense for t he use of
CODI S soft ware, and delineat es t he st andards laborat ories must meet in
order t o ut ilize NDI S. Alt hough officials from LDI S laborat ories do not sign
an MOU, LDI S labor at ories t hat upload DNA profiles t o an SDI S laborat ory
are required t o adhere t o t he MOU signed by t he SDI S laborat ory.
St at es are aut horized t o upload DNA profiles t o NDI S based on local,
st at e, and federal laws, as well as NDI S regulat ions. However, st at es or
localit ies may maint ain NDI S- rest rict ed profiles in SDI S or LDI S. For
inst ance, a local law may allow for t he collect ion and maint enance of a
vict im profile at LDI S but NDI S regulat ions do not aut horize t he upload of
t hat profile t o t he nat ional level.
CODI S becomes more useful as t he quant it y of DNA profiles in t he
syst em increases because t he pot ent ial for addit ional leads rises. However,
t he ut ilit y of CODI S relies upon t he complet eness, accuracy, and qualit y of
profiles t hat laborat ories upload t o t he syst em. I ncomplet e CODI S profiles
are t hose for which t he required number of core loci were not t est ed or do
not cont ain all of t he DNA informat ion t hat result ed from a DNA analysis and
may not be searched at NDI S.
6
The probabilit y of a false mat ch among DNA
6
A l ocus i s a speci fi c locat i on on a chr omosome. The pl ural form of l ocus i s l oci .
- 5

profiles is reduced as t he complet eness of a profile increases. I naccurat e
profiles, which cont ain incorrect DNA informat ion or an incorrect specimen
number, may generat e false posit ive leads, false negat ive comparisons, or
lead t o t he misident ificat ion of a sample. Fur t her, laws and regulat ions
exclude cert ain t ypes of profiles from being uploaded t o CODI S t o prevent
violat ions t o an individuals privacy and fost er t he publics confidence in
CODI S. Therefore, it is t he responsibilit y of t he Laborat ory t o ensure t hat it
is adhering t o t he NDI S part icipat ion requirement s and t he profiles uploaded
t o CODI S are complet e, accurat e, and allowable for inclusion in NDI S.
Labor at or y I nf or mat i on
The Laborat ory provides it s services t o law enforcement and ot her
agencies locat ed wit hin Sant a Clara Count y, which includes 15 cit ies and a
t ot al populat ion of approximat ely 1.8 million people. I n addit ion, t he
Laborat ory provides, on a fee- for- service basis, it s services t o law
enforcement and ot her organizat ions locat ed out side of Sant a Clara Count y.
Some examples of ot her organizat ions t hat t he Laborat ory has served
include: St anford Universit y, Amt rak, t he Count y of Alameda, Marin Count y
Sheriffs Office, t he Cit y of San Rafael, and San Jose St at e Universit y. I n
t ot al, t he Laborat ory has processed DNA evidence for more t han 50 different
law enforcement and ot her agencies. The Laborat ory part icipat es in t he
CODI S program as a LDI S laborat ory. I n 1992, t he Laborat ory began
analyzing DNA as a means of processing evidence in criminal cases and in
1998 it began uploading profiles int o NDI S. The Laborat orys part icipat ion in
NDI S is limit ed t o uploading forensic profiles t o t he Forensic I ndex.
The Laborat ory was first accredit ed in April 1996 by t he American
Societ y of Crime Laborat ory Direct ors/ Laborat ory Accredit at ion Board
( ASCLD/ LAB) . The Laborat ory maint ained it s ASCLD/ LAB accredit at ion
t hrough June 2011. A 6 mont h ext ension of accredit at ion followed by
anot her 3 mont h ext ension of accredit at ion was grant ed under t he
ASCLD/ LAB Legacy program unt il March 2012. The ext ensions were grant ed
t o provide sufficient t ime for t he Laborat ory t o t ransit ion t o t he ASCLD/ LAB
I nt ernat ional program for a period of 5 years. The Laborat ory received
ASCLD/ LAB I nt ernat ional program accredit at ion on March 20, 2012.
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FI NDI NGS AND RECOMMENDATI ONS
I . Compl i ance w i t h NDI S Par t i ci pat i on Requi r ement s
The Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he NDI S
part icipat ion requirement s regarding updat ed NDI S
eligibilit y t raining for it s personnel, maint enance of
CODI S- relat ed t raining and proficiency t est ing
records for CODI S users, and backing up t he CODI S
server in accordance wit h NDI S requirement s.
However, we found t hat t he Laborat ory did
not maint ain adequat e document at ion in it s case files
t o prove t hat mat ches were confirmed and t hat
invest igat ors were not ified in a t imely manner for
t wo mat ches.
The NDI S part icipat ion requirement s, which consist of t he MOU and
t he NDI S Procedure Manual, est ablish t he responsibilit ies and obligat ions of
laborat ories t hat part icipat e in t he CODI S program at t he nat ional level. The
MOU describes t he CODI S- relat ed responsibilit ies of bot h t he Laborat ory and
t he FBI . The NDI S Procedure Manual is comprised of t he NDI S Operat ional
Procedures and provides det ailed inst ruct ions for laborat ories t o follow when
performing cert ain procedures pert inent t o NDI S. The NDI S part icipat ion
requirement s we reviewed are list ed in Appendix I I of t his report .
Resul t s of t he OI G Audi t
We found t hat t he Laborat ory did not comply wit h all of t he NDI S
part icipat ion requirement s we reviewed. Specifically, t he Laborat ory did not
maint ain complet e document at ion for t wo of t he five mat ches we reviewed
in our sample. We describe t hese findings in more det ail below.
Mat ch Disposit ion
The NDI S I nt erst at e Candidat e Mat ch Operat ional Procedur es defines
procedures for NDI S part icipat ing laborat ories t o follow when confirming
mat ches t hat are ident ified in NDI S. I n addit ion, t he NDI S Operat ional
Procedures require t hat t he CODI S Administ rat or must review and make his
or her best effort t o disposit ion mat ches wit hin 30 business days.
We select ed a j udgment al sample of five NDI S mat ches and reviewed
available document at ion t o det ermine if t he Laborat ory confirmed t he
mat ches in a t imely manner. We were able t o det ermine t hat t he Laborat ory
confirmed t wo of t hese mat ches in a t imely manner and a t hird mat ch was
- 7

confirmed in 34 business days because t he Laborat ory sent t he mat ch
confirmat ion request 27 days aft er it ident ified t he mat ch.
For t he remaining t wo mat ches, which occurred in 2003 and 2006,
t here was not enough document at ion in t he case files for us t o det ermine
whet her t he confirmat ion process occurred in a t imely manner or t hat t he
Laborat ory not ified t he respect ive law enforcement agency of t he mat ch.
The CODI S Administ rat or st at ed t hat one of t he case files did not cont ain
sufficient document at ion because it was before t he Laborat ory t racked
mat ches in t he CODI S Mat ch Manager module.
7
The CODI S Administ rat or
did not provide us wit h a reason for why t he ot her case file lacked sufficient
document at ion t o indicat e whet her t he confirmat ion process occurred and
whet her it occurred in a t imely manner. Aft er we informed t he Laborat ory of
t he lack of document at ion in t wo of it s case files, t he CODI S Administ rat or
cont act ed t he local law enforcement agencies t hat provided t he DNA t o t he
Laborat ory for analysis and inclusion in NDI S. The CODI S Administ rat or
st at ed t hat one of t he local law enforcement agencies was unable t o confirm
or deny t hat it was informed of t he mat ch, but confirmed t he case had been
closed because t he offender whose profile mat ched t he forensic profile was
deceased. The second local law enforcement agency confir med t hat it had
been not ified of t he NDI S mat ch by t he Laborat ory, but it was unable t o
provide a dat e of t he not ificat ion. The CODI S Administ rat or showed us a
report in t he CODI S Mat ch Manager module in which t he disposit ion cat egory
was changed t o confirmed in a t imely manner. The CODI S Administ rat or
added t he report t o t he case file.
The Laborat orys mat ch policy requires t hat t he CODI S Administ rat or
complet e a CODI S DNA Mat ch Dat a Request form and submit it t o t he ot her
laborat orys CODI S Administ rat or. The CODI S Administ rat or is t hen
responsible for ensuring t hat a copy of t he mat ch report is maint ained in t he
Laborat orys case file along wit h a complet ed nat ional mat ch det ail report .
Furt her, t he Laborat ory is required t o not ify t he Sant a Clar a Count y Dist rict
At t orney' s Office of t he NDI S mat ch as well as t he local law enforcement
agency t hat provided t he DNA sample t o t he Laborat ory for analysis and
inclusion in NDI S. However, we concluded t hat t he Laborat ory did not
maint ain t his informat ion for t wo of t he mat ches we reviewed. Forensic
QAS 5.3.4 st at es t hat t he casework CODI S Administ rat or is responsible for
7
Mat ch Manager i s a modul e wi t hin t he CODI S soft war e t hat i dent i fi es mat ches
bet ween pr ofi l es and cont ains i nformat i on about t hose mat ches, such as t he dat e t hey wer e
i dent i fi ed.
I n response t o our draft audi t report , t he Labor at ory i nformed us al l mat ches ar e
i dent i fi ed i n Mat ch Manager and t racked i n a CODI S Hi t s excel spreadsheet . Thi s
spr eadsheet was not pr ovi ded duri ng our audi t fi el dwork; t her efor e we coul d not veri fy
whet her i t cont ai ned t hese mat ches i n quest i on.
- 8

assuring t hat mat ches are disposit ioned in accordance wit h NDI S
operat ional procedures. As a result , we believe t hat t he Laborat ory should
st rengt hen it s policy t o help it ensure it will be followed. For example, t he
Laborat ory should consider specifying in it s policy t he t ype of document at ion
t hat should be ret ained t o provide evidence of key act ions, such as mat ch
not ificat ion involving ot her laborat ories, result ing confirmat ion, and law
enforcement not ificat ion.
Ot her NDI S Requirement s
Besides t he issue st at ed above, we had no ot her significant concerns
relat ed t o t he Laborat orys compliance wit h t he ot her NDI S part icipat ion
requirement s we reviewed. The result s of our audit regarding compliance
wit h NDI S part icipat ion requirement s ar e described in more det ail below:
The NDI S General Responsibilit ies Operat ional Procedures manual
requires t hat part icipat ing laborat ories ensure t hat CODI S users are
not ified of and provided access t o revised NDI S Operat ional
Procedures and ot her document at ion necessary t o properly
part icipat e in NDI S. I n addit ion t o it s availabilit y on t he FBI s
Criminal Just ice I nformat ion Syst emWide Area Net work, t he
Laborat orys CODI S Administ rat or st at ed t hat t he Laborat ory
provides it s personnel wit h copies of t he NDI S procedure manual.
The CODI S Administ rat or st at ed t hat she also has an enlarged FBI
decision t ree diagram locat ed on t he wall by t he CODI S t erminal, so
t hat each CODI S user can refer t o it when needed. Finally, we
j udgment ally select ed 2 of t he 18 CODI S users t o int erview and
det ermined t hat bot h users were aware of t he NDI S procedures and
could access t he pr ocedures if needed.
The NDI S Securit y Requirement s st at e t hat t he NDI S part icipat ing
Laborat ory shall be responsible for providing adequat e physical
securit y for t he CODI S servers and t erminals against any
unaut horized personnel gaining access t o t he comput er equipment
or t o any of t he st or ed dat a. We found t hat only CODI S users
wit hin t he Laborat ory have access t o CODI S and t he Criminal
Just ice I nformat ion Syst emWide Area Net work locat ed in t he
CODI S server room. Access t o t his room is limit ed by key card
reader and biomet ric fingerprint ident ificat ion. Wit hin t he CODI S
server room, access is furt her limit ed t o one comput er workst at ion.
Furt hermore, we learned t hat all CODI S users have t heir own
CODI S account s, unique passwords, and must undergo annual
CODI S t raining.
- 9

CODI S users are required t o complet e annual DNA Records
Accept ance t raining. The FBI provided a list t o us of Laborat ory
personnel who had received t his mandat ory annual t raining, which
we compared t o a list provided by t he Laborat ory. We found t hat
all aut horized personnel have successfully complet ed t he annual
t raining.
For each CODI S user, t he FBI requires t hat a part icipat ing
laborat ory submit fingerprint cards, background informat ion, CODI S
user informat ion, and ot her appropriat e document at ion t o t he FBI .
We verified t hat all necessary document s were provided t o t he FBI
for all 18 CODI S users at t he Laborat ory.
At t he t ime of our audit , t he NDI S General Responsibilit ies
Operat ional Procedures manual required part icipat ing laborat ories
t o maint ain records of CODI S users, including report s concerning
proficiency t est ing, and any ot her report s or audit s required by t he
FBI , for a period of 10 years. We det ermined t hat t he Laborat ory
maint ained hard copies of personnel files for it s CODI S users for at
least 5 years, t hough before any records are sent t o st orage or
purged, t he Laborat ory scans t hem int o elect ronic files and t he
digit al copy is maint ained indefinit ely, which is in accordance wit h
it s in- house policy and it is in compliance wit h t he NDI S Operat ional
Procedures 10- year ret ent ion requirement .
Concl usi on
We found t hat t he Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he NDI S
part icipat ion requirement s t hat we reviewed, wit h one except ion. The
Laborat ory failed t o follow it s NDI S mat ch policy and did not maint ain
document at ion t o show t hat it confirmed mat ches and not ified t he respect ive
law enforcement agency in a t imely manner.
Recommendat i on
We recommend t hat t he FBI :
1. Ensure t he Laborat ory abides by it s NDI S mat ch policy, including
maint aining appropr iat e document at ion in it s case files.
- 10

I I . Compl i ance w i t h Qual i t y Assur ance St andar ds
We found t hat t he Laborat ory complied wit h t he
Qualit y Assurance St andards ( QAS) we t est ed.
Specifically, we found t hat t he Laborat ory:
( 1) followed prot ocols wit h regard t o amplified
samples being maint ained in separat e r ooms from
t he evidence examinat ion, DNA ext ract ion, and
polymerase chain react ion ( PCR) set up areas;
( 2) underwent Qualit y Assurance St andard reviews
wit hin designat ed t imeframes; and ( 3) had policies in
place t o help ensure t hat access t o t he laborat ory
was cont rolled.
During our audit , we considered t he QAS issued by t he FBI .
8
These
st andards describe t he qualit y assurance requirement s t hat t he Laborat ory
must follow t o ensure t he qualit y and int egrit y of t he dat a it produces. We
also assessed t he t wo most recent QAS reviews t hat t he laborat ory
underwent .
9
The QAS we reviewed are list ed in Appendix I I .
We found t hat t he Laborat ory complied wit h t he QAS issued by t he
FBI . Specifically, we found t hat t he Laborat ory: ( 1) followed prot ocols wit h
regard t o amplified samples being maint ained in separat e r ooms from t he
evidence examinat ion, DNA ext ract ion, and PCR set up areas; ( 2) underwent
QAS reviews wit hin designat ed t imeframes; and ( 3) had policies in place t o
help ensure access t o t he laborat ory was cont rolled. These result s are
described in more det ail below.
The QAS requires laborat ories t o undergo an annual review, including
an ext ernal review every 2 years. During our fieldwork in May 2011, we
found t hat t he Laborat ory had an ext er nal QAS review performed in
8
Forensi c Quali t y Assur ance St andards refer t o t he Qual it y Assurance St andards for
For ensi c DNA Test i ng Laborat ori es, effect i ve July 1, 2009.
9
The QAS r equi re t hat laborat ori es undergo annual audi t s. Every ot her year , t he
QAS r equi res t hat t he audit be performed by an ext ernal agency t hat per forms DNA
i dent i fi cat i on anal ysi s and i s i ndependent of t he l aborat or y bei ng revi ewed. These audi t s
are not requi red by t he QAS t o be performed i n accordance wi t h t he Government Audit ing
St andards ( GAS) and ar e not performed by t he Depart ment of Just i ce Offi ce of t he
I nspect or General . Therefore, we wi ll refer t o t he QAS audi t s as r evi ews ( ei t her an i nt ernal
l aborat ory r evi ew or an ext ernal l aborat ory r evi ew, as appl i cabl e) t o avoi d confusi on wi t h
our audi t s t hat are conduct ed i n accordance wi t h GAS.
- 11

December 2010 and an int ernal QAS review performed in June 2009. The
frequency of t hese reviews met t he QAS requirement s.
We reviewed t he Laborat orys prior 2 years of QAS review report s.
Bot h t he int ernal and ext ernal reviews were conduct ed using t he FBI s QAS
Review Document . The FBI confirmed t hat at least one of t he QAS reviewers
for bot h reviews had successfully complet ed t he FBI QAS Review t raining
course. I n addit ion, we reviewed responses and subsequent act ions wit h
regard t o t he report findings and det ermined t hey had been addressed.
We asked each of t he QAS reviewers who conduct ed t he most
recent ext ernal QAS reviews t o cert ify t hat t hey had no
impairment s t o independence. All five QAS reviewers provided us
wit h t his cert ificat ion.
We reviewed t he Laborat orys policies on physical securit y of t he
facilit y, as well as t he access key card assignment s t o Laborat ory
personnel for access t o t he secured areas of t he Laborat ory. We
also t oured t he Laborat ory and observed t hat t he facilit y remains
locked and closed t o t he public at all t imes. Aut horized Laborat ory
personnel ent er using a key card and must wear ident ificat ion
badges at all t imes while in t he building. All ot her visit ors must
push t he call but t on and speak t o a recept ionist in order t o gain
ent ry t hrough t he fr ont doors of t he building. Once inside, t hey
must be escort ed by a st aff member and sign a visit or log in order
t o obt ain a badge and t o ent er t he locked Laborat ory wings. The
main elevat ors leading up t o t he Laborat ory floors require a badge
act ivat ion t o funct ion. We found t hat overall ext ernal securit y at
t he Laborat ory is adequat e and in compliance wit h t he QAS
requirement s we t est ed.
The QAS requires amplified DNA t o be generat ed, processed, and
maint ained in a room separat e from t he evidence examinat ion, DNA
ext ract ion, and PCR set up areas. We observed t hat t he Laborat ory
has separat e rooms for DNA examinat ion and ext ract ion, PCR
set up, and DNA amplificat ion. The PCR set up room has dedicat ed
whit e laborat ory coat s for DNA Analyst s t o wear when working in
t hat space in order t o prevent cont aminat ion. The PCR post -
amplificat ion room has dedicat ed blue laborat ory coat s for DNA
Analyst s t o wear. Known and unknown samples are separat ed by
space and t ime during t he PCR set up and all evidence flows forward
only t hrough a specimen window t o t he amplificat ion room. Based
upon our observat ions, we did not ident ify any mat erial deficiencies
wit h regard t o t he Laborat ory performing various DNA analysis
processes in separat e t imes and separat e spaces.
- 12

We reviewed t he policies and procedures for t he Laborat orys
separat ion of known and unknown DNA samples. According t o t he
Laborat orys Forensic Biology Procedures Manual, reference samples
are ext ract ed separat ely in t ime or space from evidence samples,
vict im- derived samples are analyzed separat ely from suspect -
derived samples, and evidence samples predict ed t o cont ain high
levels of DNA are ext ract ed separat ely from evidence samples
predict ed t o cont ain relat ively low levels of DNA. We did not
ident ify any mat erial deficiencies wit h r egard t o t he Laborat orys
separat ion of known and unknown DNA samples.
We reviewed t he Laborat orys policy for evidence sample cont rol,
which st at es t hat a clear and well- document ed chain of cust ody
must be maint ained from t he t ime t he evidence is first received
unt il it is released and will include signat ure or init ials of each
individual receiving or t ransferring t he evidence, t he corresponding
dat e for each t ransfer, and t he evident iary it em t ransferred. The
chain of cust ody is document ed in t he Laborat ory I nformat ion
Management Syst em t hrough a bar code placed on each it em of
evidence. Each t ime an evidence it em is removed from t he
Propert y Cont rol Unit , t he bar code is scanned and t he Propert y
Cont rol Unit records which DNA Analyst is t aking t he evidence.
DNA Analyst s are assigned locked refrigerat ors t o secure t he
evidence while it is not in t he Analyst s cust ody. Upon complet ion
of DNA analysis, t he Laborat ory ret urns t he evidence t o t he police
depart ment or agency where t he it em came from. I f an agency
does not pick up t he evidence, t he laborat ory maint ains t he
evidence indefinit ely, except blood alcohol samples, which are
disposed of aft er 1 year. The Laborat orys policies regarding
int egrit y of physical evidence were in accordance wit h t he QAS
requirement s t hat we t est ed.
We learned t hat t he Laborat ory does not current ly out source t he
analysis of it s forensic DNA samples t o anot her laborat ory and has
not done so in t he past 2 years.
The NDI S Qualit y Assurance St andards operat ional procedure
ent it led Qualit y Assurance St andards Ext ernal Audit Review
Procedures requires t hat an ext ernal qualit y assurance review be
forwarded t o t he FBI s NDI S Cust odian wit hin 30 days of t he
part icipat ing laborat orys receipt of t he report . We reviewed t he
submission of t he most recent ext ernal review and found t hat t he
report was submit t ed t o t he FBI s NDI S Cust odian in a t imely
manner.
- 13

Concl usi on
We found t hat t he Laborat ory complied wit h t he FBI s Forensic QAS
t hat we t est ed. Specifically, we found t hat t he Laborat ory: ( 1) followed
prot ocols wit h regar d t o amplified samples being maint ained in separat e
rooms from t he evidence examinat ion, DNA ext ract ion, and PCR set up
areas; ( 2) underwent Qualit y Assurance St andard reviews wit hin designat ed
t imeframes; and ( 3) had policies in place t o help ensure access t o t he
laborat ory was cont rolled. We made no recommendat ions concerning our
review of Qualit y Assurance St andards.
- 14

I I I . Sui t abi l i t y of For ensi c DNA Pr of i l es i n CODI S Dat abases
We quest ioned 32 of t he 100- profile sample t hat we
reviewed.
10
Specifically, we found: ( 1) 2 profiles
t hat were not at t ribut able t o a put at ive perpet rat or;
( 2) 10 profiles t hat were obt ained from t he suspect s
person or residence; ( 3) 11 profiles t hat pert ained t o
an it em t hat was not connect ed t o a crime; and
( 4) 9 profiles relat ed t o case files t hat lacked
sufficient informat ion t o det ermine eligibilit y for
NDI S. The Laborat ory also agreed t o remove an
addit ional 17 unallowable profiles t hat were not
included in our original sample, but wer e also
uploaded in associat ion wit h t he case files of t he
unallowable profiles in our sample. Before our draft
report was issued, t he Laborat ory removed
42 profiles and we recommended t hat t he FBI work
wit h t he Laborat ory t o det ermine NDI S eligibilit y for
t he remaining 7 profiles.
11
I n addit ion, we
recommended t hat t he FBI ensure t he Laborat ory
st rengt hens it s profile eligibilit y review process and
reviews t he NDI S eligibilit y of it s forensic DNA
profiles t hat were uploaded t o NDI S bet ween January
2006 and April 2012.
We reviewed a sample of t he Laborat orys Forensic DNA profiles t o
det ermine whet her each profile was complet e, accurat e, and allowable for
inclusion in NDI S.
12
To t est t he complet eness and accuracy of each profile,
we est ablished st andards t hat require a profile include all t he loci for which
10
11
I n r esponse t o our draft audi t report , t he FBI st at ed t hat t wo of t he seven
remai ni ng profi l es were i neli gi bl e for upl oad t o NDI S. Of t he t wo i neli gibl e profi l es, t he fi rst
profi l e coul d not be l i nked t o a cri me and t he second pr ofi l es case fil e l acked enough
i nformat i on t o det ermi ne eli gi bilit y for NDI S. The Laborat or y r emoved t he t wo i neli gi bl e
profi l es and pr ovi ded addi t i onal i nformat i on not provi ded t o us duri ng our fi el dwork
regardi ng i t s j ust i fi cat i on for r et ai ni ng t he remai ning fi ve profi l es i n NDI S. I n t ot al , t he
Laborat ory removed 44 profi l es fr om NDI S. Appendi x V di scusses t he st at us of t hi s
recommendat i on i n more det ail .
12
When a l aborat orys uni verse of DNA pr ofi l es in NDI S exceeds 1,500, our sampl e
i s t aken fr om SDI S rat her t han di rect l y from NDI S. See Appendi x I for furt her descri pt i on of
t he sampl e sel ect i on.
- 15

t he analyst obt ained result s, and t hat t he values at each locus mat ch t hose
ident ified during analysis. Our st andar ds are described in more det ail in
Appendix I I of t his report .
The FBI s NDI S Operat ional Procedures est ablish t he DNA dat a
accept ance st andar ds by which laborat ories must abide. The FBI also
developed a flowchart as guidance for t he laborat ories t o det ermine what is
allowable in t he forensic index at NDI S. Laborat ories are prohibit ed from
uploading forensic profiles t o NDI S t hat clearly mat ch t he DNA profile of t he
vict im or anot her known person t hat is not a suspect . A pr ofile in NDI S t hat
mat ches a suspect may be allowable if t he cont ribut or is unknown at t he
t ime of collect ion, however, NDI S guidelines prohibit profiles t hat mat ch a
suspect if t hat profile could reasonably have been expect ed t o be on an it em
at t he crime scene or part of t he crime scene independent of t he crime. For
inst ance, a profile from an it em seized from t he suspect s person, such as a
shirt , or t hat was in t he possession of t he suspect when collect ed is
generally not a forensic unknown and would not be allowable for upload t o
NDI S. The NDI S pr ocedures we reviewed are list ed in Appendix I I of t his
report .
As part of our review, we examined each of t he 100 forensic profiles in
our sample t o det er mine it s allowabilit y based on NDI S guidelines such as:
( 1) whet her a crime was commit t ed; ( 2) whet her t he profile was obt ained
from t he crime scene; and ( 3) whet her t he profile was at t ribut able t o a
put at ive perpet rat or. We select ed a random sample of 100 profiles out of
t he 2,746 forensic profiles t hat t he Laborat ory had uploaded int o NDI S as of
April 21, 2011. Of t he 100 forensic profiles sampled, we found t hat 68 were
complet e, accurat e, and allowable for inclusion in NDI S. We quest ioned t he
suit abilit y of 32 profiles.
13
I n addit ion, we ident ified 17 unallowable profiles
t hat were not included in our sample of 100 profiles, but were also uploaded
in associat ion wit h t he case files of unallowable profiles in our sample.
These specific except ions are explained in more det ail below.
Laborat orys Profile Review Procedures
According t o t he FBI s Qualit y Assurance St andards for Forensic DNA
t est ing Laborat ories and t he Laborat orys Forensic Biology Qualit y Assurance
13
- 16

and Qualit y Cont rol Manual, all cases ar e required t o be t echnically reviewed
by a qualified DNA Analyst for clerical and t echnical accuracy. The
Laborat orys policy st at es t he Technical Reviewer is responsible for verifying
eligibilit y of all profiles t o be ent ered int o NDI S. The verificat ion of NDI S
eligibilit y by t he Technical Reviewer is recorded on t he CODI S document
called a Green Sheet , which is at t ached t o t he final t echnical review report
and is required t o be complet ed before t he profile is uploaded int o NDI S.
According t o t he Laborat orys CODI S Administ rat or, from 2000 unt il
2007 t he Laborat ory did not require it s Technical Reviewers t o verify t he
NDI S eligibilit y of pr ofiles before t he profiles were uploaded t o NDI S. As a
result , during t his period t he Laborat ory uploaded all of t he profiles t hat
were analyzed by it s Analyst s, including ineligible profiles. The CODI S
Administ rat or st at ed t hat dur ing t his t ime t he Technical Reviewers were not
reviewing t he DNA profiles list ed on t he Green Sheet t o det ermine t heir
eligibilit y for inclusion in NDI S. The det erminat ion as t o which profiles t o
upload was made by t he former CODI S Technician, who did not possess a
DNA analysis background and st at ed t hat she was t asked wit h det ermining
which profiles on t he Green Sheet t o ent er and upload int o NDI S. The
former CODI S Technician also st at ed t hat t he former CODI S Administ rat or
inst ruct ed her t o upload profiles even when t he Technician deemed t he
profiles t o be ineligible. I n 2005, t he Laborat ory ended it s pract ice of
indiscriminat ely ent ering profiles, including ineligible profiles, t o NDI S when
it appoint ed a new CODI S Administ rat or. The new CODI S Administ rat or
began reviewing all profiles for eligibilit y before t hey were uploaded t o NDI S.
Furt her, in 2007, t he Laborat ory modified it s Green Sheet t o include a
signat ure line for it s Technical Reviewer t o cert ify t hat t he profiles were
reviewed for NDI S eligibilit y. While CODI S Technical Reviewers were
required t o have a DNA background, only since 2010, has t he Laborat ory
required it s CODI S Technicians t o have a DNA analysis background. I t also
now requires t he DNA Analyst and t he Technical Reviewer t o det ermine and
verify profile eligibilit y.
During our file review, we found many of t he cases did not cont ain
enough informat ion about t he crime, t he crime scene, or how t he evidence
relat ed t o t he crime. This was prevalent in t he case files t hat were
est ablished before 2005 when t he laborat ory st at ed it st rengt hened it s
review of profile eligibilit y. However, we came across profiles t hat had been
uploaded aft er 2005 t hat st ill did not meet t he st andards for NDI S eligibilit y.
When we quest ioned t he Laborat ory Dir ect or and t he CODI S Administ rat or
about t hese issues, t hey surmised t hat unallowable profiles cont inued t o be
uploaded aft er 2005 due t o it s DNA Analyst s general lack of underst anding
of t he NDI S eligibilit y requirement s. Furt her, alt hough t he CODI S eligibilit y
flowchart was int roduced by t he FBI in 2006, t he Laborat ory cont inued t o
upload unallowable profiles int o NDI S aft er 2006. Specifically, half of t he
- 17

unallowable profiles we ident ified in our review were uploaded int o CODI S
aft er 2006.
Based on our discussions wit h t he Laborat ory Direct or and t he CODI S
Administ rat or, as well as our review of t he informat ion t hat was available in
t he case files, we believe t hat some DNA Analyst s may not have a clear
underst anding of t he CODI S eligibilit y requirement s, even t hough t hey t ake
and pass t he Annual Review of DNA Accept ed at NDI S t est annually. We
also found several inst ances of Laborat ory personnel not basing DNA profile-
eligibilit y conclusions on document ed informat ion from wit hin it s case files.
For example, a police report may provide crit ical informat ion t o help t he DNA
Analyst s make a decision on whet her a profile is allowable or unallowable for
inclusion in CODI S. However, t here are some circumst ances where
addit ional informat ion may be necessary. We found t hat case files for
28 percent of t he unallowable profiles we ident ified in our review did not
cont ain sufficient informat ion t o det ermine eligibilit y. Therefore, we
recommend t hat t he FBI ensure t hat t he Laborat ory obt ains sufficient
informat ion t o det ermine a profiles eligibilit y prior t o uploading it t o NDI S.
Quest ioned Profiles t he Laborat ory Ret ained at NDI S
I n our draft report , we quest ioned t he eligibilit y of 49 profiles we
reviewed, but t he Laborat ory disagreed wit h our quest ioning of seven of
t hose. I n response t o our draft , t he Laborat ory provided addit ional
informat ion about t he eligibilit y of five of t hose profiles, which we added t o
t his final report . Also in response t o our draft report , t he FBI concluded t hat
t wo of t he seven quest ioned profiles were ineligible for NDI S and should be
delet ed. As a result , t he Laborat ory removed a t ot al of 44 profiles. Below
we discuss t he det ails of t hose seven pr ofiles.
OI G Sample CA- 02
Sample CA- 02 was t aken from a cigaret t e but t found in t he asht ray of
t he vehicle t hat t he vict im was sit t ing in at t he t ime he was murdered. The
DNA profile from t he cigaret t e but t was from 1 of 28 cigaret t e but t s found in
t he vict ims vehicle and t est ed for DNA. At t he t ime our draft audit report
was issued, we deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t here was
insufficient evidence in t he case file t o connect t his it em, and ot her relat ed
cigaret t e but t s, t o t he perpet rat or or t he murder. The case file did not
cont ain any informat ion t hat placed t he put at ive perpet rat or inside t he car
where t he cigaret t e but t was found, but rat her indicat ed t hat t he perpet rat or
was out side t he car when he or she commit t ed t he crime. Specifically,
broken glass was found inside t he vehicle indicat ing t hat t he vict im was shot
from out side t he vehicle rat her t han inside where t he cigar et t e but t
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was found. Therefore, it does not appear t hat t he perpet rat or left t he
cigaret t e but t in t he asht ray when he or she commit t ed t he crime.
Aft er t he draft audit report was issued, t he Laborat ory provided
addit ional informat ion about t he crime indicat ing t hat t he perpet rat or may
have been inside t he car before t he murder. As a result of t hat addit ional
informat ion not provided t o us dur ing our audit sit e work, we do not
quest ion t he eligibilit y of t his profile.
OI G Sample CA- 05
Sample CA- 05 was t aken from saliva on a post age st amp t hat was
affixed t o an envelope. According t o t he undocument ed recollect ions of t he
Laborat ory Direct or and CODI S Administ rat or, t he offense was a parole
violat ion dur ing which t he parolee sent a let t er t o an individual t hat he was
not allowed t o cont act . However, t here was no document at ion in t he case
file t o support t hat any crime had been commit t ed. Therefore, we deemed
t his profile t o be unallowable. Before our draft audit report was issued, t he
CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or disagreed wit h our
assessment and t hey st at ed t hat t he pr ofile should remain in NDI S. The
CODI S Administ rat or st at ed t here was not enough informat ion t o remove t he
profile from NDI S based on t he assumpt ion t hat eligibilit y was correct ly
det ermined when t he profile was first uploaded. However, t he Laborat ory
could not provide any evidence t o prove t hat a cr ime was commit t ed, nor
was t here document at ion in t he case file t o support t he profiles eligibilit y.
General Principal Number 1 of t he FBI s NDI S allowabilit y flowchart st at es
t hat I f t he document at ion does not indicat e t hat a cr ime was commit t ed,
t he profile is not allowable. Therefore, we disagreed wit h t he Laborat orys
assessment t hat t his profile was allowable and we recommended t hat t he
FBI work wit h t he Laborat ory t o det ermine t he profiles eligibilit y for
inclusion in CODI S. Aft er t he draft audit report was issued, t he Laborat ory
removed t his profile from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 27 and Sample CA- 89
Samples CA- 27 and CA- 89 were t aken from blood found on t he floor at
t he scene of a gang fight t hat occurred inside a night club. The scene inside
t he night club cont ained blood evidence from several individuals involved in
t he fight . However, according t o t he case file, t he crime t hat was being
invest igat ed was a homicide t hat had occurred out side of t he night club t hat
same evening. According t o informat ion we were provided in t he case file,
t he murder vict im was not involved in t he gang fight t hat occurred inside t he
night club. Aft er our draft report was issued, t he Laborat ory provided
addit ional informat ion about t he crime. As a result of t hat addit ional
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informat ion not provided t o us dur ing our audit sit e work, we no longer
quest ion t he eligibilit y of t his profile.
OI G Sample CA- 67
Sample CA- 67 was a swab t aken from a firearm t hat was allegedly
used by t he suspect in a drive- by shoot ing. According t o t he CODI S
Administ rat or, t he firearm was t aken from t he t runk of a vehicle st opped by
t he California Highway Pat rol for speeding short ly aft er t he drive- by shoot ing
was report ed. The case file lacked any support ing document at ion, such as a
police report , but t he informat ion t hat it did cont ain indicat ed t hat t he it em
was collect ed direct ly from t he suspect s vehicle inst ead of t he crime scene.
There was no addit ional informat ion in t he case file t o connect t he gun or t he
car t o t he drive- by shoot ing. Based on t he limit ed informat ion in t he case
file, we quest ioned t he eligibilit y of t his profile in our draft audit report .
However, aft er our draft report was issued, t he Laborat ory provided
addit ional informat ion relat ed t o t he driver of t he car from which t he gun
was seized, as well as t he guns link t o t he crime. As a result of t hat
addit ional informat ion, we no longer quest ion t he eligibilit y of t his profile.
OI G Sample CA- 83
Sample CA- 83 was t aken from a cigaret t e but t found next t o a bench
in a park across t he st reet from where t he vict im was shot in a vehicle. We
deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he it em was not connect ed
t o a crime. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he
Laborat ory Direct or, who disagreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and
st at ed t hat t he profile should remain in NDI S. The CODI S Administ rat or
st at ed t he police officers t heory was t hat t he suspect sat in t he park
smoking before crossing t he st reet t o commit t he homicide. The CODI S
Administ rat or felt t his t heory was reasonable enough t o upload t he cigaret t e
but t as part of t he invest igat ion t o examine all possible leads in order t o
develop a suspect profile from t he crime scene. However, we found no
evidence in t he case file t o support t he officers t heory and we were not
provided any addit ional evidence t o support t his t heory. As a result , we
report ed in t he draft audit report t hat t he profile was inappropriat e for NDI S
and recommended t hat t he FBI work wit h t he Laborat ory t o det ermine t he
profiles eligibilit y for inclusion in NDI S. Aft er t he draft audit report was
issued, t he Laborat ory removed t his pr ofile from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 88
Sample CA- 88 was a swab t aken from a beer bot t le collect ed by
undercover police officers during an undercover operat ion t o negot iat e t he
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purchase of an illegal dest ruct ive device. The crime was conspiracy t o
commit a crime. Before our draft audit report was issued, we deemed t his
profile unallowable because it appeared t o have been a deduced suspect
profile and not a for ensic unknown. Specifically, quest ion V from t he NDI S
allowabilit y flowchart asks was t he it em seized by law enforcement from t he
suspect s person, or was t he it em in t he possession of t he suspect when
collect ed by law enforcement ? The flow chart indicat es t hat if Yes, t he
profile is not allowable at NDI S. However, aft er t he draft audit report was
issued t he Laborat ory provided addit ional informat ion concerning t he
collect ion of t he bot t le. As a result of t hat addit ional infor mat ion not
provided t o us during our audit sit e work, we no longer quest ion t he
eligibilit y of t his profile.
Quest ioned Profiles t he Laborat ory Removed from NDI S
Below we discuss t he remaining profiles t hat t he Laborat ory removed
from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 03
Sample CA- 03 was t aken from a cigaret t e but t found in a car t hat was
set on fire. There were mult iple cigaret t e but t s t aken from t he crime scene
during t he arson invest igat ion, and t he profile uploaded t o NDI S was female
even t hough t he polices suspect t hat was killed in t he fire was male. We
deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he profile was not
at t ribut able t o a put at ive perpet rat or. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S
Administ rat or and Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was
unallowable and removed it from NDI S. Similarly, t he Laborat ory removed
an addit ional four profiles from NDI S t hat had been t aken from cigaret t e
but t s found at t he crime scene.
OI G Sample CA- 04
Sample CA- 04 was t aken from a swab of a t rigger on a gun t hat an
invest igat or brought t o t he Laborat ory for comparison t o shell casings found
at t he crime scene. The gun was ret rieved from a different locat ion and was
submit t ed for comparison t o t he shell casings at t he crime scene. The
profile uploaded t o NDI S was not t aken from t he crime scene. We deemed
t his profile t o be unallowable because t he profile was not r et rieved from t he
crime scene and was not at t ribut able t o a put at ive perpet rat or. We
present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or who
agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and removed it from NDI S.
- 21

OI G Sample CA- 14
Sample CA- 14 was t aken from a pair of shoes t hat t he suspect was
wearing while in police cust ody aft er being arrest ed. We deemed t his profile
t o be unallowable because it is not a forensic unknown and it was not
ret rieved from t he crime scene. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S
Administ rat or and Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was
unallowable and subsequent ly t he Laborat ory removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 15
Sample CA- 15 was t aken from a st ain on bedding in t he suspect s
room where a rape had occurred. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable
because t he profile was t aken from t he suspect s bed and is considered a
deduced suspect pr ofile rat her t han a forensic unknown pr ofile. The
Laborat ory or t he law enforcement agency invest igat ing t he crime could not
provide evidence t hat t he st ain was at t ribut ed t o t he crime. We present ed
t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h
agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and subsequent ly r emoved it from
NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 19
Sample CA- 19 was t aken from clot hing collect ed in t he suspect s
residence and not fr om t he convenience st ore where t he armed robbery had
t aken place. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he profile
was t aken from t he suspect s home and is considered a deduced suspect
profile rat her t han a forensic unknown profile. We present ed t his t o t he
CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his
profile was unallowable and subsequent ly removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 25
Sample CA- 25 was t aken from a st ain on a couch collect ed in t he
suspect s residence. We deemed t his pr ofile t o be unallowable because t he
profile was not t aken from t he crime scene but rat her t he suspect s home,
which was not t he locat ion of t he crime scene. This is considered a deduced
suspect profile rat her t han a forensic unknown profile. We present ed t his t o
t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat
t his profile was unallowable and subsequent ly removed it fr om NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 29
Sample CA- 29 was t aken from a sock collect ed in t he suspect s
residence and not at t he crime scene. We deemed t his profile t o be
- 22

unallowable because t he profile was t aken from t he suspect s home and is
considered a deduced suspect profile rat her t han a forensic unknown profile.
We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or,
who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and t hey subsequent ly
removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 40
Sample CA- 40 was t aken from blood found on a knife collect ed from
t he suspect s residence. According t o t he CODI S Administ r at ors recollect ion
and int erpret at ion of t he evidence in t he case file, she st at ed t hat when
police officers arrived at t he suspect s home, t he suspect had already inj ured
himself wit h a knife and he t hreat ened t o kill himself. When police
at t empt ed t o t ake t he knife away from t he suspect , he charged t he police
officers and t he police officers shot and killed him. We deemed t his profile
t o be unallowable because t he case file lacked sufficient evidence t o indicat e
t hat t his profile was a forensic unknown. This case was also part of a
rout ine and required invest igat ion int o t he officers shoot ing incident . We
present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who
bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and subsequent ly removed it
from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 41
Sample CA- 41 was t aken from t he suspect s sweat pant s seized from
his house. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he profile was
t aken from t he suspect s home and it is reasonable t o conclude t he suspect s
DNA would be found on his clot hing locat ed inside of his home. We
bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and t hey subsequent ly
OI G Sample CA- 43
Sample CA- 43 was t aken from a cigaret t e but t collect ed out side t he
front of a business where a robbery had occurred. We deemed t his profile t o
be unallowable because t here was no evidence in t he case file linking t he
it em t o t he crime. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he
Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and
subsequent ly removed it from NDI S. The laborat ory removed an addit ional
t wo profiles from NDI S t hat had been t aken from cigaret t e but t s found in t he
same vicinit y.
- 23

OI G Sample CA- 50
Sample CA- 50 was t aken from a swab of a bullet collect ed from t he
suspect s vehicle. The suspect was shot by police officers while sit t ing in his
vehicle. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he profile was
t aken from inside t he suspect s vehicle from one of t he rounds which hit t he
suspect , on which t he suspect s DNA is expect ed t o be found. I n addit ion,
t his case was a rout ine and required invest igat ion int o t he officers act ion
and not an invest igat ion of a cr ime commit t ed by an unknown perpet rat or.
As a result , t his profile was not a forensic unknown. We pr esent ed t his t o
t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat
OI G Sample CA- 57
Sample CA- 57 was t aken from a flashlight found at t he suspect ' s
residence. The vict ims family report ed t hat t he vict im was sodomized wit h
a flashlight . However, no vict im DNA was found on t he flashlight . Only t he
suspect s DNA was found t o be on t he flashlight . There was not enough
informat ion in t he case file t o ascert ain whet her t he it em was considered
evidence t aken from t he crime scene. Also, t he profile was generat ed from
an it em t hat was t aken from t he suspect s home rat her t han t he crime
scene. Therefore, t his was considered a deduced suspect profile. We
bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and t hey subsequent ly
OI G Sample CA- 62
Sample CA- 62 was a swab t aken from t issue paper found inside t he
suspect s residence, which was near a st reet where a homicide had t aken
place. There was no evidence in t he case file t o indicat e t hat t he t issue
paper was connect ed t o t he crime. Also, t he profile was t aken from t he
suspect s home and t herefore was considered a deduced suspect profile. We
present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and Laborat ory Direct or, who
bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and subsequent ly removed it
from NDI S. The CODI S Administ rat or also removed t wo addit ional profiles
from NDI S: ( 1) one of t he profiles was t aken from t he suspect s residence
and it mat ched t he suspect s brot her and ( 2) t he ot her profile was t aken off
of a t hird individuals shirt .
OI G Sample CA- 69
Sample CA- 69 was t aken from a cigaret t e but t found out side t he st ore
ent rance where an armed robbery t ook place. The police report shows t he
- 24

suspect as male and t he DNA profile uploaded was a female. We deemed
t his profile t o be unallowable because t he it em was not connect ed t o t he
crime. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory
Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and t hey
subsequent ly removed it from NDI S. Furt her, t he Laborat ory removed an
addit ional five profiles from NDI S t hat had been t aken from cigaret t e but t s
found out side t he st ore.
OI G Sample CA- 71
Sample CA- 71 was a swab t aken from t he arm rest of t he drivers door
of a vehicle. The DNA profile collect ed was from a car t hat mat ched t he
descript ion of a car leaving t he scene of t he crime. Aft er t he profile was
uploaded t o CODI S, t he Laborat ory received a hit on t he profiles record.
The police officer on t his case was not able t o connect t he person ident ified
by t he CODI S hit t o t he crime. Addit ionally, t he vict im was unable t o
ident ify a suspect . We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he
it em did not appear t o have been connect ed t o a crime. We present ed t his
t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who agreed t hat
t his profile was unallowable and t hey subsequent ly removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 73
We could not det er mine where Sample CA- 73 was t aken fr om or t he
nat ure of t he crime because t he case file lacked t his informat ion. As a
result , we asked t he CODI S Administ rat or for more informat ion and she
cont act ed t he law enforcement agency t hat had collect ed t he evidence on a
swab from which t he DNA profile was developed. Following t his cont act , t he
CODI S Administ rat or st at ed t hat t he it em t hat was swabbed was t aken from
t he right rear out side door of a st olen vehicle. However, t he CODI S
Administ rat or also informed us t he law enforcement agency was
invest igat ing a homicide t hat occurred at a rest aurant when it came across
t he st olen vehicle. We discussed t his informat ion wit h t he CODI S
Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who agreed t hat t his profile was
unallowable and subsequent ly removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 75
We were unable t o det ermine t he source of Sample CA- 75 or t he
nat ure of t he crime because t he case file lacked t his informat ion. As a
result , we request ed addit ional informat ion from Laborat ory officials. The
CODI S Administ rat or cont act ed t he law enforcement agency t hat collect ed
t he it em and found out t he sample was t aken from t issue paper. The t issue
paper was found at a bank t hat had been robbed. The police st at ed t he
suspect s in t he case were male and t he DNA profile t aken from t he t issue
- 25

paper and uploaded was female. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable
because t he it em was not connect ed t o a crime. We present ed t his t o t he
CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who agr eed t hat t his
profile was unallowable and removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 78
Sample CA- 78 was a swab t aken from t he ext erior of a condom found
at t he scene of a homicide. However, t he case file did not indicat e t hat a
sexual offense had occurred, nor did it link t he condom t o t he crime. The
uploaded DNA profile mat ched t he vict ims boyfriend, a suspect in t he case.
Lat er, anot her DNA profile in t he case, t he origins of which we could not
ident ify because t he case file lacked sufficient informat ion, r esult ed in a
CODI S hit . The hit led t o t he ident ificat ion of t he perpet rat or, who was not
t he boyfriend. The perpet rat or was ult imat ely convict ed of t he crime. We
deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t here was no informat ion in
t he case file t o connect t he DNA profile from t he condom t o t he homicide.
We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or,
who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and removed it from
NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 79
Sample CA- 79 was a swab t aken from t he shoes t hat t he suspect was
wearing. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he profile was
t aken off of t he suspect s person and is considered t o be a deduced suspect
profile rat her t han a forensic unknown. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S
Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his profile
was unallowable and removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 84
Sample CA- 84 was a swab t aken from a sunflower seed. The case file
lacked informat ion r egarding t he sunflower seeds relat ion t o t he crime,
t herefore, t he CODI S Administ rat or cont act ed t he law enforcement agency
t hat collect ed t he it em and found out t hat t he sample was t aken from a
sunflower seed found in a rent al car t hat t he suspect used while fleeing a
crime scene. The crime commit t ed by t he suspect was ident it y t heft and use
of st olen credit cards. However, t he car had been ret urned t o t he rent al car
agency and it was unclear whet her t he car had been rent ed again t o
someone else aft er t he commission of t he crime by t he suspect . The DNA
profile t aken did not mat ch t he suspect convict ed of t he crime. We deemed
t his profile t o be unallowable because t here was insufficient evidence in t he
case file t o indicat e t hat t he profile was at t ribut able t o t he put at ive
perpet rat or. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he
- 26

Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and
OI G Sample CA- 86
Sample CA- 86 was a cut t ing from a black wig. The case file lacked
informat ion regarding t he wigs relat ion t o t he crime, t her efore, t he CODI S
Administ rat or cont act ed t he law enforcement agency t hat collect ed t he it em
and found out t he sample was t aken fr om t he crime scene of a robbery. The
DNA profile obt ained from t he wig was a female profile while ot her evidence
collect ed from t he crime scene and t est ed cont ained a male DNA profile.
The CODI S Administ rat or informed us t hat t he wig was handled by a
court room j ury before DNA t est ing was performed. Therefore, t he result ing
profile might be at t r ibut able t o one of t he j urors and not t o t he perpet rat or
of t he crime. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he DNA
profile uploaded was not at t ribut able t o a put at ive perpet rat or, and t he it em
was handled by innocent persons aft er it had been ret rieved. We present ed
t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or, who bot h
agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and removed it from NDI S.
OI G Sample CA- 90
Sample CA- 90 was t aken from t he inside of a lat ex glove found at t he
suspect s residence and not from t he crime scene. We deemed t his profile
t o be unallowable because t he profile was t aken from t he suspect s home
and is considered a deduced suspect pr ofile rat her t han a forensic unknown
profile. We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory
Direct or, who agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and subsequent ly
OI G Sample CA- 96
Sample CA- 96 was t aken from a bloodst ain on a rock. The case file
lacked informat ion r egarding t he connect ion bet ween t he rock and t he
crime. Therefore t he CODI S Administ rat or cont act ed t he law enforcement
agency t hat collect ed t he it em and found out t he sample was t aken from an
area where an assault wit h a baseball bat occurred. The crime involved
mult iple vict ims at a st reet int ersect ion, but t he informat ion in t he case file
did not indicat e how t he blood on t he rock may have been at t ribut able t o t he
perpet rat or, or how it relat ed t o t he crime. The Laborat ory sought vict im
eliminat ion samples, but was not successful in obt aining t hose. The profile
uploaded int o CODI S did not mat ch t he suspect who pled guilt y t o t he crime.
We present ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and Laborat ory Direct or, who
det ermined t his profile was inappropriat e for NDI S and subsequent ly
removed it .
- 27

OI G Sample CA- 98
Sample CA- 98 was a swab t aken from t he st eering wheel of t he
suspect s vehicle. The crime was a home invasion and at t empt ed homicide
wit hin a residence. We did not find any evidence in t he case file t ying t he
vehicle t o t he crime scene. We deemed t his profile t o be unallowable
because t he profile was not ret rieved from t he crime scene. We present ed
t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and Laborat ory Direct or, who agreed t hat
OI G Sample CA- 100
Sample CA- 100 was t aken from a cigaret t e but t picked up out side t he
front door of an apart ment building where a robbery had occurred. We
deemed t his profile t o be unallowable because t he it em was not connect ed
t o t he crime. We pr esent ed t his t o t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he
Laborat ory Direct or, who agreed t hat t his profile was unallowable and
subsequent ly removed it from NDI S. The laborat ory removed an addit ional
t hree profiles from NDI S t hat had been t aken from cigaret t e but t s found
out side t he front door of t he apart ment .
Concl usi on
I n our draft report we ident ified a t ot al of 49 profiles t hat we believe
were inappropriat e for NDI S. The Laborat ory removed 42 of t hese profiles
from NDI S, but disagreed wit h our quest ioning of seven profiles. I n
response t o our draft , t he Laborat ory provided addit ional informat ion about
t he eligibilit y of five of t hose profiles, which we added t o t his final report .
Also, as a result of our draft report , t he FBI concluded t hat t wo of t he
profiles were delet ed. As a result , t he Laborat ory removed a t ot al of 44
profiles from NDI S.
We consider 44 t o be a large number of inappropriat e profiles result ing
from an OI G CODI S audit . We underst and t hat in 2005 t he Laborat ory
enhanced it s profile eligibilit y review procedures, and in 2006 t he FBI
promulgat ed addit ional guidance for det ermining profile eligibilit y for NDI S.
However, half of t he inappropriat e profiles in our sample of 100 were
uploaded aft er 2006. As a result , it does not appear t hat t he Laborat orys
enhanced procedures were effect ive in prevent ing ineligible profiles from
being uploaded t o NDI S. I n our opinion, t he cause of t hese deficiencies is
relat ed t o t he lack of sufficient and necessary case file evidence t o det ermine
profile eligibilit y. I n addit ion, we believe DNA Analyst s at t he Laborat ory
may not have a clear underst anding of CODI S eligibilit y guidelines.
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As a result of t hese deficiencies, we recommend t hat t he FBI work wit h
t he Laborat ory t o st rengt hen it s NDI S eligibilit y review process t o ensure it
properly reviews it s DNA profiles for eligibilit y pr ior t o NDI S upload. This
review process should be based on sufficient case file and evidence
document at ion, which is necessary t o det ermine NDI S eligibilit y. We also
recommend t hat t he FBI work wit h t he Laborat ory t o ensure t hat t he
appropriat e forensic DNA profiles current ly in NDI S are reviewed for
eligibilit y using a st r engt hened eligibilit y review process and t he NDI S
eligibilit y flowchart . Specifically, t his review should focus on t hose profiles
t hat t he Laborat ory assessed aft er it revised it s procedures and t he FBI
promulgat ed clarifying NDI S eligibilit y guidance. This would include t hose
profiles reviewed by t he Laborat ory from January 2006 t hrough Apr il 2012.
Recommendat i ons
We recommend t hat t he FBI :
2. Work wit h t he Labor at ory t o det ermine NDI S eligibilit y for t he
remaining seven quest ioned profiles which t he Laborat ory believed
t o be allowable.
3. Ensure t he Laborat ory st rengt hens it s profile eligibilit y review
process t o include: ( 1) proper reviews of each forensic profile for
NDI S eligibilit y pr ior t o upload, ( 2) basing it s eligibilit y review
process on sufficient case file and evidence document at ion, and
( 3) only uploading eligible profiles t o NDI S. Sufficient
document ed informat ion is necessary t o det ermine a profiles
eligibilit y prior t o NDI S upload.
4. Ensure t he Laborat ory re- reviews it s forensic DNA profiles t hat
were originally uploaded t o NDI S bet ween January 2006 and April
2012 by applying a st rengt hened profile review process and t he
NDI S eligibilit y flowchart . The Laborat ory may exclude t hose 100
profiles t hat were reviewed as part of t his audit and should
remove from NDI S any addit ional ineligible profiles found.
- 29

APPENDI X I
OBJECTI VES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
We conduct ed t his performance audit in accordance wit h generally
accept ed government audit ing st andards. Those st andards require t hat we
plan and perform t he audit t o obt ain sufficient , appropriat e evidence t o
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit obj ect ives. We believe t hat t he evidence obt ained pr ovides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
obj ect ives.
Our audit generally covered, but was not limit ed t o, t he period from
June 2009 t hrough May 2011. The obj ect ives of t he audit were t o det ermine
if t he: ( 1) Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he NDI S par t icipat ion
requirement s; ( 2) Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he Qualit y Assurance
St andards ( QAS) issued by t he FBI ; and ( 3) Laborat orys forensic DNA
profiles in CODI S dat abases were complet e, accurat e, and allowable for
inclusion in NDI S. To accomplish t he obj ect ives of t he audit , we:
Examined int ernal and ext ernal Laborat ory QAS review report s and
support ing document at ion for correct ive act ion t aken, if any, t o
det ermine whet her: ( a) t he Laborat ory complied wit h t he QAS,
( b) repeat findings were ident ified, and ( c) recommendat ions were
adequat ely resolved.
14
I n accordance wit h t he QAS, t he int ernal and ext ernal laborat ory
review procedures are t o address, at a minimum, a laborat orys
qualit y assurance program, organizat ion and management , personnel
qualificat ions, facilit ies, evidence cont rol, validat ion of met hods and
procedures, analyt ical procedures, calibrat ion and maint enance of
inst rument s and equipment , proficiency t est ing of analyst s, correct ive
act ion for discrepancies and errors, review of case files, report s,
safet y, and previous audit s. The QAS require t hat int ernal and
ext ernal reviews be performed by personnel who have successfully
complet ed t he FBI s t raining course for conduct ing such reviews.
14
The QAS r equi re t hat laborat ori es undergo annual audi t s, whi ch ever y ot her year,
must be per formed by an ext ernal agency t hat performs DNA i dent i fi cat i on anal ysi s and i s
i ndependent of t he l aborat ory bei ng revi ewed. The QAS does not requi re t hese audi t s t o be
performed i n accordance wi t h t he Government Audit ing St andards ( GAS) and t hey are not
performed by t he Depar t ment of Just i ce Offi ce of t he I nspect or General . Ther efor e, we
refer t o t he QAS audi t s as ei t her i nt ernal or ext ernal l aborat or y r evi ews, as appl i cabl e, t o
avoi d confusi on wi t h our audi t s t hat are conduct ed i n accordance wi t h GAS.
- 30

As permit t ed by GAS 7.42 ( 2007 revision) , we generally relied on
t he result s of t he Laborat orys ext ernal laborat ory review t o
det ermine if t he Laborat ory complied wit h t he QAS.
15
I n order t o
rely on t he work of non- audit ors, GAS requires t hat we perform
procedures t o obt ain sufficient evidence t hat t he work can be relied
upon. Therefore, we: ( 1) obt ained evidence concerning t he
qualificat ions and independence of t he individuals who conduct ed
t he review and ( 2) det ermined t hat t he scope, qualit y, and t iming
of t he audit work performed was adequat e for reliance in t he
cont ext of t he current audit obj ect ives by reviewing t he evaluat ion
procedure guide and result ant findings t o underst and t he met hods
and significant assumpt ions used by t he individuals conduct ing t he
reviews. Based on t his work, we det ermined t hat we could rely on
t he result s of t he Laborat orys ext ernal laborat ory review.
I nt erviewed Laborat ory officials t o ident ify management cont rols,
Laborat ory operat ional policies and procedures, Laborat ory
cert ificat ions or accredit at ions, and analyt ical informat ion relat ed t o
DNA profiles.
Toured t he Laborat ory t o observe facilit y securit y measures as well as
t he procedures and cont rols relat ed t o t he receipt , processing,
analyzing, and st orage of forensic evidence and convict ed offender
DNA samples.
Reviewed t he Laborat orys writ t en policies and procedures relat ed t o
conduct ing int ernal reviews, resolving review findings, expunging
DNA profiles from NDI S, and resolving mat ches among DNA profiles
in NDI S.
Reviewed support ing document at ion for 5 of 32 NDI S mat ches t o
det ermine whet her t hey were resolved in a t imely manner. The
Laborat ory provided t he universe of NDI S mat ches as of May 31,
2011. The sample was j udgment ally select ed t o include bot h case-
t o- case and case- t o-offender mat ches. This non- st at ist ical sample
does not allow proj ect ion of t he t est result s t o all mat ches.
Reviewed t he case files for select ed forensic DNA profiles t o
det ermine if t he profiles were developed in accordance wit h t he
15
We al so consi der ed t he resul t s of t he Laborat orys i nt ernal l aborat or y r evi ew, but
coul d not r el y on i t because i t was not performed by personnel i ndependent of t he
Laborat ory. Furt her, as not ed i n Appendi x I I , we performed audi t t est i ng t o veri fy
Laborat ory compl i ance wi t h speci fi c Quali t y Assurance St andards t hat have a subst ant i al
effect on t he i nt egri t y of t he DNA pr ofi l es upl oaded t o NDI S.
- 31

Forensic QAS and were complet e, accurat e, and allowable for
inclusion in NDI S.
Working in conj unct ion wit h t he cont ract or used by t he FBI t o
maint ain NDI S and t he CODI S soft ware, we obt ained an elect ronic
file ident ifying t he 2,746 Short Tandem Repeat ( STR) forensic
profiles t he Laborat ory had uploaded t o NDI S as of April 21, 2011.
We limit ed our review t o a sample of 100 profiles. This sample size
was det ermined j udgment ally because preliminary audit work
det ermined t hat risk was not unaccept ably high.
Using t he j udgment ally- det ermined sample size, we randomly
select ed a represent at ive sample of labels associat ed wit h specific
profiles in our universe t o reduce t he effect of any pat t erns in t he list
of profiles provided t o us. However, since t he sample size was
j udgment ally det ermined, t he result s obt ained from t est ing t his
limit ed sample of profiles may not be proj ect ed t o t he universe of
profiles from which t he sample was select ed.
The obj ect ives of our audit concerned t he Laborat ory' s compliance wit h
required st andards and t he relat ed int ernal cont rols. Accordingly, we did not
at t ach a separat e st at ement on compliance wit h laws and regulat ions or a
st at ement on int ernal cont rols t o t his report . See Appendix I I for det ailed
informat ion on our audit crit eria.
- 32

APPENDI X I I
AUDI T CRI TERI A
I n conduct ing our audit , we considered t he NDI S part icipat ion
requirement s and t he Qualit y Assurance St andards ( QAS) . However, we did
not t est for compliance wit h element s t hat were not applicable t o t he
Laborat ory. I n addit ion, we est ablished st andards t o t est t he complet eness
and accuracy of DNA profiles as well as t he t imely not ificat ion of DNA profile
mat ches t o law enforcement .
NDI S Par t i ci pat i on Requi r ement s
The NDI S part icipat ion requirement s, which consist of t he
Memorandum of Underst anding ( MOU) and t he NDI S operat ional procedures,
est ablish t he responsibilit ies and obligat ions of laborat ories t hat part icipat e
in NDI S. The MOU requires t hat NDI S part icipant s comply wit h federal
legislat ion and t he QAS, as well as NDI S- specific requirement s
accompanying t he MOU in t he form of appendices. We focused our audit on
specific sect ions of t he following NDI S r equirement s.
DNA Dat a Accept ance St andards
DNA Dat a Accept ed at NDI S
Qualit y Assurance St andards Reviews
NDI S DNA Aut osearches
Confirm an I nt erst at e Candidat e Mat ch
General Responsibilit ies
I nit iat e and Maint ain a Laborat orys Part icipat ion in NDI S
Securit y Requirement s
CODI S Users
CODI S Administ rat or Responsibilit ies
Access t o, and Disclosure of, DNA Records and Samples
Upload of DNA Records
Qual i t y Assur ance St andar ds
The FBI issued t wo set s of Qualit y Assurance St andards: ( 1) QAS for
Forensic DNA Test ing Laborat ories, effect ive July 1, 2009, ( Forensic QAS) ;
and ( 2) QAS for DNA Dat abasing Laborat ories, effect ive July 1, 2009,
( Offender QAS) . The Forensic QAS and t he Offender QAS describe t he
qualit y assurance requirement s t hat t he Laborat ory should follow t o ensure
t he qualit y and int egrit y of t he dat a it produces.
- 33

For our audit , we generally relied on t he report ed result s of t he
Laborat orys most recent annual ext ernal review t o det ermine if t he
Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he QAS. Addit ionally, we performed
audit work t o verify t hat t he Laborat ory was in compliance wit h t he QAS
list ed below because t hey have a subst ant ial effect on t he int egrit y of t he
DNA profiles uploaded t o NDI S.
Facilit ies ( Forensic QAS and Offender QAS 6.1) : The laborat ory shall
have a facilit y t hat is designed t o ensur e t he int egrit y of t he
analyses and t he evidence.
Evidence Cont rol ( Forensic QAS 7.1) : The laborat ory shall have and
follow a document ed evidence cont rol syst em t o ensure t he int egrit y
of physical evidence. Where possible, t he laborat ory shall ret ain or
ret urn a port ion of t he evidence sample or ext ract .
Sample Cont rol (Offender QAS 7.1) : The laborat ory shall have and
follow a document ed sample invent ory cont rol syst em t o ensure t he
int egrit y of dat abase and known samples.
Analyt ical Procedures ( Forensic QAS and Offender QAS 9.5) : The
laborat ory shall monit or t he analyt ical procedures using [ appropriat e]
cont rols and st andards.
Review ( Forensic QAS 12.1) : The laborat ory shall conduct
administ rat ive and t echnical reviews of all case files and report s t o
ensure conclusions and support ing dat a are reasonable and wit hin
t he const raint s of scient ific knowledge.
( Offender QAS St andard 12.1) : The laborat ory shall have and follow
writ t en procedures for reviewing DNA records and DNA dat abase
informat ion, including t he resolut ion of dat abase mat ches.
[ Reviews] ( Forensic QAS and Offender QAS 15.1 and 15.2) : The
laborat ory shall be audit ed annually in accordance wit h [ t he QAS] .
The annual audit s shall occur every calendar year and shall be at
least 6 mont hs and no more t han 18 mont hs apart .
At least once every 2 years, an ext ernal audit shall be conduct ed by
an audit t eam comprised of qualified audit ors from a second
agency( ies) and having at least one t eam member who is or has
been previously qualified in t he laborat orys current DNA
t echnologies and plat form.
- 34

Out sourcing ( Forensic QAS and Offender QAS St andard 17.1) : A
vendor laborat ory performing forensic and dat abase DNA analysis
shall comply wit h t hese St andards and t he accredit at ion requirement s
of federal law.
( Forensic QAS 17.4): An NDI S part icipat ing laborat ory shall have
and follow a procedure t o verify t he int egrit y of t he DNA dat a
received t hrough t he performance of t he t echnical review of DNA
dat a from a vendor laborat ory.
( Offender QAS St andard 17.4) : An NDI S part icipat ing laborat ory
shall have, follow and document appropriat e qualit y assurance
procedures t o verify t he int egrit y of t he dat a received from t he
vendor laborat ory including, but not limit ed t o, t he following: Random
reanalysis of dat abase, known or casework reference samples;
I nclusion of QC samples; Performance of an on- sit e visit by an NDI S
part icipat ing laborat ory or mult i- laborat ory syst em out sourcing DNA
sample( s) t o a vendor laborat ory or accept ing ownership of DNA dat a
from a vendor laborat ory.
Of f i ce of t he I nspect or Gener al St andar ds
We est ablished st andards t o t est t he complet eness and accuracy of
DNA profiles as well as t he t imely not ificat ion of law enforcement when DNA
profile mat ches occur in NDI S. Our st andards are list ed below.
Complet eness of DNA Profiles: A profile must include each value
ret urned at each locus for which t he analyst obt ained result s. Our
rat ionale for t his st andard is t hat t he probabilit y of a false mat ch
among DNA profiles is reduced as t he number of loci included in a
profile increases. A false mat ch would require t he unnecessary use
of laborat ory resources t o refut e t he mat ch.
Accuracy of DNA Profiles: The values at each locus of a pr ofile
must mat ch t hose ident ified during analysis. Our rat ionale for t his
st andard is t hat inaccurat e profiles may: ( 1) preclude DNA profiles
from being mat ched and, t herefore, t he pot ent ial t o link convict ed
offenders t o a crime or t o link previously unrelat ed crimes t o each
ot her may be lost ; or ( 2) result in a false mat ch t hat would require
t he unnecessary use of laborat ory resources t o refut e t he mat ch.
Timely Not ificat ion of Law Enforcement When DNA Profile Mat ches
Occur in NDI S: Laborat ories should not ify law enforcement
personnel of NDI S mat ches wit hin 2 weeks of t he mat ch
confirmat ion dat e, unless t here are ext enuat ing circumst ances.
- 35

Our rat ionale for t his st andard is t hat unt imely not ificat ion of law
enforcement personnel may result in t he suspect ed perpet rat or
commit t ing addit ional, and possibly more egregious, crimes if t he
individual is not deceased or already incarcerat ed for t he
commission of ot her crimes.
- 36

li:m F1l Cl l
Labori'li ory DireCtor
A<.:(rcdi ced I)" Cile Ameri C<l n SOCielY of crime U'lboralOr), OireccorSlLaiJorruory AccredhaUOll Boord.
APPENDI X I I I
AUDI TEE RESPONSE
County of Santa Clara
Crilile Laboratory
OI'1k:c.; of the Distric t " Horney
250 Wesl HecKling 51 reel
SWI Jose. Calil ornia 95 1 10
80850ClQ
.It' l f w ), F. Rosen
I\HOrney
David J. Gaschke
Regional Audit Manager
San Francisco Regional Audit Office
Office or the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
1200 Bayhill Dri ve, Suite 201
San Bruno, California 94066
May 3, 2012
Dear Mr. Gaschke:
Here is our official response to the draft audit repan on the Audit of Compliance with
Standards Governing Combined DNA Index System (COOlS) Activities at the County or
Santa Clara Di stri ct Attorney' s Crime Laboratory, dated April 12, 2012:
We question the accuracy of a few statements in the draft audi t report, and request
cl arification on several other statements:
Page ii - "Our audit generall y covered the period from June 2009 through May 2011."
Page I - "Our audit covered the period from June 2009 through May 2011 .'
Response: Our understanding is that the audit covered COOlS entries and procedures
dating back to 1998.
Page 6 - " In 1998, the Laboratory began analyzi ng DNA as a means of processing
evidence in criminal cases . .. "
Response: In 1998, the Laboratory began perfonning STR DNA analysi s with the
Profi ler Plus ampli ficati on kit. The Laboratory actuall y began analyzing DNA as a
means of processing evidence in criminal cases in 1992 using DQa, and added D I S80 in
1996.
Page 8 - " For the remaining two matches . .. not enough documentation in case fil es . .. "
and page 8 to age 9 - " Forensic QAS 5.3.4 states that the casework COOlS Admini strator
is responsible for assuring that matches arc di spositioncd in accordance with NDIS
- 37 -

operational procedures. As a result, we believe that the Laboratory should strengthen its
policy to help it ensure it will be foll owed."
Response: We feel that a date should be added for these two matches, since they
occurred prior to updates in Laboratory and QAS procedures. In addition, all QAS audits
of our Laboratory. to date, have resulted in no findings pertaining to QAS 5.3.4. Note
that on page 14, the conclusion states, " We found that the Laboratory complied wi th the
FBI's Forensic QAS that we tested." Thus, it is unclear to us why the OIG feels that the
Laboratory should further strengthen i t ~ poli cy in regards to QAS 5.3.4.
Page 8 - "The COOlS Admini strator stated that one of the case files did not contain
suffi cient documentation because it was before the Laboratory tracked matches in the
COOlS "Match Manager. "
Response: All matches from LDIS, SDIS, and NDIS are recorded in Match Manager, and
tracked in our in-house COOlS Hits Excel spreadsheet. We are uncl ear how
documentation in the case file relates to tracki ng matches in Match Manager. We would
appreciate clarification on this statement.
Page 12 - "The PCR setup room has dedicated blue lab coats for DNA Analysts to wear
when working in that space in order to prevent contamination. "
Response: For clarification, the PCR post-amplificati on room has dedicated blue lab
coats for DNA Analysts to wear. The PCR setup room is pre-ampli fication, so white lab
coats are worn in there.
Page 17 - "Since 20 I 0, the Laboratory now requi res its Technical Reviewer to have a
DNA analysis background."
Response: Since the inception of the DNA program in 1992, DNA casework technical
reviewers have always had a DNA analysis background. For cJarifi c8lion, the review
process was strengthened in 2007 by adding the requirement that the DNA technical
reviewer sign the COOlS entry sheet, verifying COOlS eligibility of the profile(s).
Page 17 - "Based on our discussions with Laboratory officials and our review of the
information that was available in the case files, we believe that some Laboratory officials
may not have a clear understanding of the COOlS eli gibility requirements."
Response: We are unclear what DIG means by "Laboratory officials." The COOlS
Admini strator and CODlS users do have a clear understanding of COOlS eligibility
requirements. They take and pass the Annual Review of ON A Data Accepted at NOIS
test each year.
- 38 -

Action Items
Page iii -
work wit h FBI to determine NDIS eli gibility for the remaining 7 profiles (sec
disputed profiles section for details on these cases)
work with FBI to strengthen procedures
review profiles uploaded from January 2006 to April 2012
Response: Profiles entered inlo COOlS from 2006 to 20 I 0 have already been reviewed.
We have found significantly more documentation in 2010 than 2006 with increasing
documentation from year to year. The 20 1 0 review is not finding many issues. The
Laboratory does not feel that profil es entered in 201 1 and 2012 need to be reviewed, as
these newer COOlS entries have been performed under updated Laboratory procedures
and with observatiQns from the OIG audit in mind.
Page 10-
Recommendation - " We recommend that the FBI: 1. Ensure the Laboratory abides by its
DIS match policy, including maintaining appropriate documentation its case files. "
Response: We updated our Laboratory COOlS procedures in 2010 after we began using
CHOP (California's CODIS Hit Outcome Project) and in 201 1 pri or to our ASCLDiLAB
ISO inspecti on.
- 39 -

Response to Disputed Profiles
The Laboratory consulted with the FBI regarding seven disputed profiles. As a resull,
one additional profile was removed from COOlS, and the remaining six were left in. Our
justifications follow:
CA-02 This is a murder case. The victim was a known homosexual who often picked
up men and took them to a parking garage. It was a known place for
homosexual males to "hangout". The victim was shot dead while in the driver
seat of h i ~ vehicle. This case is cold and there are no leads. Cigarette butts
from the victim's car and from the parking garage around the car were tested
and the profiles uploaded to CODIS.
The OIG auditors state, "We acknowledge that the cigarette butt may have been
at the crime scene, but, at the same time it is unknown how long it had been in
the victim's car and it does not appear it was connected to the crime. " We
based our COOlS entry, in part, on infonnation and theories provided to us by
the crime scene investigators. While some of the cigarette butts may not be
attributable to the perpetrator, one may be. Unfortunately, in this case, there is
no way of collecting elimination samples from people who potentially left
cigarette butts in the car or garage. The Laboratory's position is that the
cigarette butts were collected from the crime scene, and it is reasonable to infer
that one of the cigarette butts may be attributable to the perpetrator. (1995 case,
2007 report).
CA-05 A threatening letter was sent to a female. A male she knew was suspected of
the crime. Sending her a letter was a violation of his probation. A DNA profile
was obtained from the stamps/envelope of the threatening letter and uploaded to
COOlS. The Laboratory did not have a reference from the listed suspect. The
evidence profile hit to the li sted suspect in COOlS (hit to unconfinned suspect).
The agency never submitted a reference sample for confinnation. In 20 II,
during the 010 audit, we attempted to obtain a police report, but the police
department stated they purge these records every ten years. There is no way 10
obtain the police report to see what the li sted crime type is. (1999 case, 1999
report)
RESOLVED: Because the ori ginal police report has been purged and the case
was not submitted to the Laboratory with a crime type, we have removed this
profile from CODIS.
CA-27/ CA-89 - Both are from the same case. The victim was riding in a car that was at
a night club, left the club, and entered the freeway. A victim was shot and
killed while in a car on the freeway. The car was being pursued by another car
that also originated at the night club. The police think the shooter was in a fight
- 40 -

at the club earlier that night. Blood swabs were coll ected from the club and
parking lot/sidewalk where police thought the suspect may have ned. Three
proliles were entered into COOlS (CA-27, CA-89, and a third). A thi rd profile
(not chosen for the audit) hit to an offender and was subsequently removed
because poli ce thought that particul ar person was not related to the homicide.
The other two remain as unknowns in COOlS. (2009 case, 20 I 0 report)
The Laboratory's position is that, based on facts provided by police, it is
reasonable to infer that one of the bloodstai ns may be attributable to the
perpetrator of the shooting.
CA-67 A shooting into an inhabited dwelling (246 PC) occurred and was being
investigated by the police department (PD). A car in the dri veway of the
dwelling was also shot, accordin. g to the police report. On the same day, the
Cali forni a Hi ghway Patrol (CHP) in the same jurisdiction pulled over a vehicle
for traveli ng 90 mph. The CHP realized the individuals they pulled over may be
suspects in the PO case. CHP confiscated a loaded handgun from the trunk of
the vehicle. There were two people in the vehicle (driver and passenger). The
gun (from the CHP traffic stop) was linked to the PO case by firearms analysis.
The fireanns report was in the case fil e for the auditors to look at. The fireanns
examiner swabbed the gun for DNA. The DNA examiner obtained a profil e
from the gun swab and entered it into COOlS. (2007 case, 2009 report)
We obtained a copy of the CHP report during the a la audit . They charged the
dri ver of the vehi cle from the traffic stop with a series of vehicle code
violations. The dri ver gave the CHP fal se infannation, and said he was a gang
member. Officers from the PO stated that they believed that the shooting at the
dwelli ng was gang-related. The Laboratory' s position is that, based on facts
provided by police, it is reasonable to infer that the DNA on the gun may be
attributable to the perpetrator in the PO case.
CA-83 The PO suspect the shooter in thi s homicide was wailing for the victim to return
home and believe he may have smoked some cigarenes near a park bench across
the street from the victim's house. DNA was obtained from the cigarette butts
and upl oaded to COOlS. Auditors feel lhat cigarette butts near a park bench
could belong to anyone and should not be uploaded to COOlS, even ifpolice
believe they could belong to the perpetrator. (2006 case, 20 II report)
During the OIG audit, the CODIS Admini strator spoke to a police offi cer, who
stated her theory and reasoning for submitting the cigarette butts. The
Laboratory has requested more documentation from the police department. At
the current time, the Laboratory' s position is that, based on known
circumstances about the case at thi s time, it is reasonable to infer that the DNA
from one of the cigarette butts may be attributed to the perpetrator of the
shooting.
- 41 -

CA-88 The following is a quote from a ODA at the Santa Clara County District
Attorney's Office. "This beer bottle was given to a guy who was negotiating
with undercover PO Officers to sell them a destructi ve device (See PC 12301 et
seq.). There is no vict im if yOll wi ll in the case so no victim sample. In looking
at the COPIS match report, this profile goes to the co-defendant. The beer
bottle was submitted before he was ID' d and arrested to figure out who the
suspect was. Since he was later found and pled guilty, we never did have to
submit a follow up sample for 10 purposes. I believe that sample is in COOlS
as a suspect profi le properly." (2007 case, 2007 report) The e-mail from the
DDA was sent during the OIG audit and shown to the auditors.
The crime scene was the location of the negotiation for the sale of a destructive
device. The perpetrator, while attempt ing to sell an explosive device, left the
beer bottle at the crime scene, as witnessed by the undercover police officer.
The Laboratory' s position is that the DNA from the beer bottle was uploaded to
CODIS to try to detennine the identity of the perpetrator.
If you have any questi ons, please don' t hesi tate to contact us.
Sincerely,
Ian Fitch
Laboratory Director
Brooke Barloewen
COOlS Manager
- 42 -

. '
APPENDI X I V
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTI CE RESPONSE
- 43 -
u.s. ne,:..rt".111 or J"'tic.
Federal Bureau ofInvestigation
O.c. lOSJs.iOL
May 11.2012
David J. Gasch!:e
Regional Audit Manager
San Franci$CO Regional Audil Office
Office of the Inspector General
1200 Bayhill Drive. Suile 201
San Bruno. CA 94066
Dear Mr. Oa.schke:
Your memorandum to Director Mueller forwarding the draft audit report for the County
of Santa Clara District Attorney's Crime Laboratory, San Jose, California ("Laboratory"), has been
referred 10 me for response.
Your draft audit report contained four recommendations relating to the Laboratory's
compliance with the FBI's Memorandum of Understanding and Quality A$$l/I'Q1Ice Standards/or
Forensic DNA Tes/ing lAboratories.
With respect to recommendation one relating 10 the adherence of the Laboratory to ilS
NDiS match policy, the FBI COOlS Unit is working with the Laboratory to reach a mutually acceptable
plan for the maintenance case file documentation.
With respect to fOITLmendation two relating 10 NDIS eligibility of scven questioned
profiles, it has been determined by the Laboratory and tile FBI COOlS Unit that profilu CA02, CA-27,
CA-S9, CA-67 are allowable and profiles CA.()S and CA-S3 have been deleted.
With respe<:tlO three relating 10 profile eligibility review prO<:c$$CS, the
FBI CODIS Unit believcs that detailed discussion$ with thc 010 and COOlS Unit personnel has allowed
the LaborntOl)' 10 have a c1cartr understanding ofNDIS eligibility rcquimnenlS and the importance of
ma!:ing eli gibility decisions based upon complete and appropriate ease file documentation. Henceforth.
the LaboralOl)' will endeavor to only upload truly allowable profiles to NDiS.
With respect 10 recommendation four relating 10 the re-review offorensic profiles 10
ensure the allowability of those profiles uploaded 10 NDIS between January 2006 and April 20 12, the
LahoratOl)' has completed its review of all of the profiles from 2006 to 2010. It is anticipated that the
Laboratory will be able to submit documentation sUpPOrting its review of the forensic profiles soon. The
fBI coors Unit is in contact with the taboratory and continues to work with its staffon a mdtually
a<:<:eptable plan regardi ng the rc-review of the mnaining profiles. The COOlS Unit continues to monitor
the Laboratory's progress in oompleling this tas!: .

David I. Gaschke, Regional Audit Manas
Page 2
Thank you for sharing the draft audit repOrt with us. If you have any questions, please
feel free to contact Jennifer Wendel, Chief of the COOlS Unit, at. (103) 632-83 IS.
Sincerely,
d k u l < . ~
Aliee R. ls.enberg
Section Chief
Biometries Analysis Section
FBI Labontory
- 44 -

APPENDI X V
OFFI CE OF THE I NSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDI T DI VI SI ON
ANALYSI S AND SUMMARY OF ACTI ONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The OI G provided a draft copy of t his audit report t o t he Laborat ory
and t he FBI . I ndividual responses from t he Laborat ory and t he FBI are
incorporat ed in Appendices I I I and I V, respect ively. The following provides
t he OI G analysis of t he responses and summary of act ions necessary t o
close t he report .
Anal ysi s of Audi t ee s Response
I n response t o our report , t he FBI and t he Laborat ory did not explicit ly
st at e whet her t hey agreed wit h each recommendat ion. I n addit ion, t he
Laborat ory provided addit ional informat ion in it s response t o t he draft audit
report , as discussed below and in t he discussion of each recommendat ion.
As a result of t his new informat ion, we made some clarificat ions t o t he
report .
Before addressing t he responses t o each of our recommendat ions and
t he act ions necessary t o close t hose recommendat ions, we address some
clarificat ions t he Laborat ory request ed in it s response t hat do not pert ain t o
individual recommendat ions. Specifically, t he Laborat ory quest ioned t he
ident ificat ion of our audit scope, which generally covered t he period from
June 2009 t hrough May 2011. We det ermined t hat our scope was correct ly
present ed, but based on Sant a Claras r esponse it appears it may have
misunderst ood t he applicat ion of our audit scope. Our audit scope does not
rest rict our analysis of issues t hat occur red prior t o t he st ar t of our audit
scope as t hey relat e t o our audit obj ect ives. I n addit ion, based on
informat ion t he Laborat ory provided t o us during our audit ent rance
conference, we report ed in our draft audit report t hat t he Laborat ory began
analyzing DNA as a means of processing criminal evidence in 1998. I n it s
response, t he Laborat ory clarified t hat it began analyzing DNA as a means of
processing criminal evidence in 1992 using DQa t echnology. We clarified t he
background sect ion of t his final report based on t he new informat ion t he
Laborat ory provided in it s response.
Recommendat i on Number :
1. Resol v ed. The FBI and t he Laborat ory responded t o our
recommendat ion t hat t he FBI ensure t he Laborat ory abides by it s
NDI S mat ch policy, including maint aining appropriat e document at ion
- 45

in it s case files. The FBI st at ed in it s r esponse t hat it s CODI S Unit is
working wit h t he Laborat ory t o reach a mut ually accept able plan for
t he maint enance of appropriat e case file document at ion.
The Laborat ory st at ed in it s response t hat it had updat ed it s mat ch
policy in 2010 and again in 2011, prior t o t he Laborat orys ASCLD/ LAB
I SO inspect ion. However, t he Laborat ory did not st at e how it planned
t o ensure it maint ains appropriat e document at ion in it s case files as
evidence t hat t he Laborat ory is adhering t o t he NDI S mat ch policy. As
we st at e in our report , we concluded during our audit t hat t he
Laborat ory did not maint ain informat ion in t he case file t o det ermine
whet her or not t he disposit ion occurred in a t imely manner for t wo of
t he five mat ches we reviewed.
The Laborat ory also request ed t hat we add dat es of t he mat ches
because t hey occurred prior t o updat es t o Laborat ory and QAS
procedures. We added t ime frames for t he mat ches, but furt her not e
t hat t he NDI S Oper at ional Procedures in effect at t hat t ime ( 2003 and
2006) also required confirmat ion of mat ches and not ificat ion of law
enforcement . As explained in our draft report , we were unable t o
verify whet her t he law enforcement agency was not ified of one mat ch
and were not able t o confirm t he dat e of law enforcement not ificat ion
for t he ot her mat ch. I n addit ion, t here was insufficient document at ion
in t he case files t o verify t he t ime frames of t he confirmat ion process
for t he mat ches. As a result , we could not verify whet her t he
Laborat ory adhered t o NDI S requirement s.
The Laborat ory also st at ed in it s response t hat it is unclear why t he
OI G feels it should furt her st rengt hen it s policy wit h regard t o
QAS 5.3.4. in view of our conclusion t hat t he Laborat ory complied wit h
all of t he Forensic QAS t hat we t est ed. However, t he audit report does
not st at e t hat t he Laborat ory should furt her st rengt hen it s policy wit h
regard t o QAS 5.3.4. I nst ead, we cit e t he requirement QAS 5.3.4,
which discusses laborat ories mat ch policies, as it is relevant for t he
finding t hat t he Laborat ory should st rengt hen it s pract ices r egarding
mat ches. Our audit report does not conclude t hat t he Laborat ory is in
violat ion of QAS 5.3.4.
The Laborat ory also st at ed in it s response t hat all mat ches from LDI S,
SDI S, and NDI S are recorded in CODI S Mat ch Manager, and t racked in
it s in- house CODI S Hit s Excel spreadsheet . The Laborat ory st at ed t hat
it was unclear how document at ion in t he case file relat es t o t racking
mat ches in CODI S Mat ch Manager. However, t his is new informat ion
which was not provided t o us during our audit sit e work. Specifically,
t he Laborat ory did not disclose t o us t hat it t racked all mat ches wit h
- 46

it s in- house CODI S Hit s Excel spreadsheet unt il aft er our draft report
was issued. As we st at e in our report , in response t o our inquiries
regarding t his mat ch t he Laborat orys CODI S Administ rat or st at ed t hat
t he mat ch occurred before it was t racked wit hin t he CODI S Mat ch
Manager. Because t he Laborat ory did not provide document at ion t hat
t his mat ch was t racked in Mat ch Manager, we did not revise t his
informat ion in our r eport .
To help ensure t he int egrit y of t he Laborat orys mat ch confirmat ion
and law enforcement not ificat ion processes, we recommended t hat t he
Laborat ory adhere t o it s NDI S mat ch policy t o include maint aining
document at ion t hat should be ret ained as evidence of key act ions,
such as mat ch not ificat ion involving ot her laborat ories, result ing
confirmat ion, and law enforcement not ificat ion.
This recommendat ion can be considered for closure when we receive
t he FBI s and t he Laborat orys plan for how t he Laborat ory will adhere
t o it s NDI S mat ch policy and maint ain appropriat e case file
document at ion. Based on t hese plans, we may request addit ional
evidence t hat correct ive act ions have been implement ed.
recommendat ion t hat t he FBI work wit h t he Laborat ory t o det ermine
NDI S eligibilit y for t he remaining seven quest ioned profiles, which t he
Laborat ory believed t o be allowable. The FBI st at ed in it s response
and in our subsequent follow- up communicat ions t hat t he Laborat ory
and t he FBI CODI S Unit det ermined t hat five profiles ( CA- 02, CA- 27,
CA- 88, CA- 89, and CA- 67) are allowable and should remain in CODI S,
while t wo profiles have been delet ed ( CA- 05 and CA- 83) .
I n t he Laborat orys response, t he Laborat ory provided significant
addit ional case informat ion t hat was not provided t o us when we
reviewed t he Laborat orys case files before we issued t he draft audit
report for comment . The addit ional informat ion for t he five profiles
ult imat ely det ermined by t he FBI t o be allowable is discussed below,
and we made appropriat e revisions t o t his final report due t o t his new
informat ion.
CA- 02 The Laborat ory disclosed in it s response t o our draft
report addit ional informat ion indicat ing t he perpet rat or may have
been in t he vict ims vehicle prior t o t he murder.
CA- 27/ CA- 89 The Laborat ory disclosed in it s response t o our
draft report addit ional informat ion regar ding t he profiles link t o
t he crime and at t ribut ion t o t he perpet r at or.
- 47

report addit ional informat ion relat ed t o t he driver of t he car from
which t he gun was seized, as well as t he guns link t o t he crime.
report addit ional informat ion concerning t he collect ion of t he
bot t le.
This recommendat ion can be closed when we receive evidence
document ing t hat CA- 05 and CA- 83 have been removed from NDI S, as
well as evidence support ing t he addit ional informat ion t he Laborat ory
described, which served as t he basis for t he FBI s and t he Laborat orys
decision t o ret ain t he five profiles in NDI S.
recommendat ion t hat t he FBI ensure t he Laborat ory st rengt hens it s
profile eligibilit y review process t o include: ( 1) proper reviews of each
forensic profile for NDI S eligibilit y pr ior t o upload, ( 2) basing it s
eligibilit y review process on sufficient case file and evidence
document at ion, and ( 3) only uploading eligible profiles t o NDI S.
Sufficient document ed informat ion is necessary t o det ermine a profiles
eligibilit y prior t o NDI S upload. The FBI st at ed t hat it s CODI S Unit
believes t hat det ailed discussions wit h t he OI G and CODI S Unit
personnel has allowed t he Laborat ory t o have a clearer underst anding
of NDI S eligibilit y requirement s and t he import ance of making
eligibilit y decisions based upon complet e and appropriat e case file
document at ion. I n addit ion, t he FBI st at ed t hat t he Laborat ory will
endeavor t o only upload t ruly allowable profiles t o NDI S.
I n it s response t o our draft audit report , t he Laborat ory st at ed it will
work wit h t he FBI t o st rengt hen it s profile eligibilit y review process.
However, beyond t hat st at ement , t here was no addit ional informat ion
on how t he Laborat ory planned t o st rengt hen it s profile eligibilit y
review process.
I n addit ion, t he Laborat ory st at ed in it s response t hat it was unclear
about our use of t he t erm Laborat ory officials in our discussion
regarding individuals having a clear underst anding of t he CODI S
eligibilit y requirement s. For clarificat ion, we added t o t he body of t he
report a reference t o t he individuals t o whom we spoke, specifically
t he CODI S Administ rat or and t he Laborat ory Direct or. The Laborat ory
Direct or, in his response t o our draft report , st at ed he felt t hat
individuals at t he Laborat ory did have a clear underst anding and t o
support his posit ion st at ed t hat all CODI S users at t he Laborat ory
undergo and have passed t he Annual Review of DNA Accept ed at NDI S
- 48

t raining required by t he FBI . However, based on t he result s of our
audit , it appears t hat t he DNA Analyst s at t he Laborat ory may not
have a clear underst anding of t he CODI S eligibilit y requirement s even
in considerat ion of t he required t raining t hey complet e. Specifically,
we ident ified a large number of ineligible profiles t hat t he Laborat ory
removed from NDI S, 44 in t ot al, of which a t hird were uploaded t o
NDI S aft er 2006 when t he guidelines were clarified. Furt her, t he
maj orit y of t he profiles we reviewed were only det ermined t o be
eligible aft er t he Laborat ory obt ained, upon our request , addit ional
informat ion from t he submit t ing agency. The maj orit y of pivot al
informat ion det ermining eligibilit y was not document ed in t he case file
unt il we request ed it during our audit , which indicat es t hat t he
analyst s did not document in t he case file a j ust ifiable basis on which
t o upload more t han half of t he profiles in our sample. I n our opinion
and in considerat ion of NDI S guidelines, t his is a concern.
Also in it s response, t he Laborat ory clarified t he qualificat ions of it s
Technical Reviewer and we have revised t he final report accordingly.
This recommendat ion can be closed when we receive evidence t hat t he
Laborat ory has st rengt hened it s profile eligibilit y review process. This
should include: ( 1) proper reviews of each forensic profile for NDI S
eligibilit y prior t o upload, ( 2) basing t he eligibilit y review process on
sufficient case file and evidence document at ion, and ( 3) only uploading
eligible profiles t o NDI S.
recommendat ion t hat t he FBI ensure t he Laborat ory re- reviews it s
forensic DNA profiles t hat were originally uploaded t o NDI S bet ween
January 2006 and April 2012 by applying a st rengt hened pr ofile review
process and t he NDI S eligibilit y flowchart . The FBI st at ed in it s
response t hat t he Laborat ory has complet ed it s review of all profiles
from 2006 t o 2010 and ant icipat es t hat t he Laborat ory will be able t o
submit document at ion support ing it s review of t he forensic profiles
soon. The FBI s CODI S Unit also st at ed t hat it is in cont act wit h t he
Laborat ory and cont inues t o work wit h Laborat ory st aff on a mut ually
accept able plan regarding t he re- review of t he remaining profiles and
will cont inue t o monit or t he Laborat orys progress in complet ing t his
t ask.
I n it s response t o our draft audit report , however, t he Laborat ory
st at ed t hat alt hough it has reviewed profiles ent ered int o CODI S from
2006 t o 2010, it does not believe t hat profiles ent ered int o CODI S in
2011 and 2012 need t o be reviewed because of t he increasing amount
of document at ion it found in t he case files from one year t o t he next
- 49

bet ween 2006 and 2010. I t furt her st at ed t hat t he review of t he 2010
profiles for CODI S eligibilit y has not revealed many issues. The
Laborat ory st at ed t hat profiles ent ered int o CODI S in 2011 and 2012
have been performed under updat ed Laborat ory procedures and wit h
observat ions made from t he OI G audit in mind.
As a result of our audit , we ident ified a t ot al of 44 profiles t hat we
believe were inappropriat e for NDI S and were subsequent ly removed.
We also found inst ances of Laborat ory personnel not basing DNA
profile- eligibilit y conclusions on document ed informat ion from it s case
files. I n fact , of t he 100 profiles in our sample, 53 percent did not
cont ain sufficient informat ion t o det ermine eligibilit y unt il we
request ed it during our audit and even aft er we request ed addit ional
informat ion, t here were profiles t hat cont inued t o lack sufficient
informat ion. We consider 44 t o be a lar ge number of inappropriat e
profiles result ing from an OI G CODI S audit and based on t he issues
discussed in our report , we believe t he Laborat ory may have addit ional
ineligible profiles in NDI S. To help ensure t he int egrit y of t he
dat abase, laborat ories must st rict ly abide by federal regulat ions
governing which pr ofiles are appropriat e for upload. Due t o t he
significant findings revealed in t his audit , we believe t hat t he
Laborat ory should r eview each of t he remaining profiles uploaded
t hrough April 2012 t o ensure t hey adhere t o t hese federal guidelines.
This recommendat ion can be closed when we receive evidence of t he
Laborat ory complet ing it s review of profiles from 2006 t hrough April
2012, including informat ion on how many profiles were removed from
CODI S as a result of t he review.
- 50

US Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of The Inspector General (OIG) Audit: Santa Clara Crime Lab Crime DNA Standarda Compliance

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