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International Experts Meeting on Protection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (IEM3) Paper PR28 THE SEISMIC SAFETY EVALUATION PROGRAMME OF THE ATUCHA I (CNA-I) NPP-ARGENTINA AT THE LIGHT OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NPP ACCIDENT
Technical Session 2: Seismic and Tsunami Safety
A.R. Godoy and J.J. Johnson (James J. Johnson & Associates) Alicia Couto and Carolina Romano (Nucleoelctrica Argentina S.A. (NA-SA))

IAEA IEM September 2012

Background: Atucha I
Atucha I
PHWR (Heavy water reactor) - KWU (Germany), 357 MWe capacity; CNA I started in June 1968 and commercial operation in June 1974; 72% availability over 37 years; Internal event PRA models; Operator - Nucleoelctrica Argentina S.A. (NA-SA) No seismic design.

Seismic Safety Evaluation Program


Needed to comply with safety evaluations against external events as a result of the Fukushima accident in Japan In compliance with new updated international safety standards and worldwide recognized engineering practice for such assessments.
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Main Objectives of the Seismic Safety Evaluation Programme for Atucha I NPP
Evaluate and quantify the seismic capacity of CNA-I
Ability to cope with a specified earthquake ground motion at the site CNA-I as-is conditions Estimate the seismic safety margin defined by High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Take into account the lessons learned from the experience of all recent strong earthquakes in Japan and their effects on nuclear power plants.

Specific Objectives of the Seismic Safety Evaluation Programme for Atucha I NPP
Demonstrate the seismic safety margin conditional on Review Level Earthquake ground motion (RLE) Confirm no cliff edge effects exist Identify weak links and vulnerabilities in physical and operational aspects due to seismic events. Provide input for risk informed decision making. Identify and prioritize possible upgrades.

Comprehensive Five-Phase Programme


Phase 1: Scoping Study and Preliminary Plant Walkdown
Completed November 2011

Phase 2: Development of the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), System Walkdown, Training Class
SSEL for walkdown April 2012, Final August 2012

Phase 3: Seismic Response and Structure Capacity Evaluation


In-progress

Phase 4: Seismic Capability Walkdown Screening Process SSC HCLPF


Walkdown complete May 2012, HCLPF in progress

Phase 5: Detailed Analysis and Evaluation for Seismic Qualification


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Phase 1: Scoping Study and Preliminary Walkdown: Status


Complete 30 November 2011 Report
Initial Issue 30 November 2011 Living document to incorporate additional data, e.g., success paths systems, safe shutdown equipment list

Phase 1 Main Results


Assumptions for the seismic safety evaluation program of CNA I:
Methodology of evaluation: US EPRI SMA; two success paths to safe shutdown, others; Critical relay review Phase 5 Review level earthquake (RLE); Operational assumptions: loss of off-site power and no recovery in a 72 hour period; no outside assistance; Requirements of systems to mitigate earthquake induced plant events: such as loss of off-site power, station blackout and small LOCA;

Easy fixes (cabinet top bracing, raised floors, batteries/battery racks, DG flooding potential) Many easy fixes were installed during outage!!
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Phase 2: Development and Review of Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), System Walkdown, and Training Course
Success paths
Two for safe shutdown - one mitigates small LOCA; Containment and containment isolation; Spent fuel cooling. Refuelling Machine and tilting bottle (continuous operation) Fire extinction system

NA-SA-CNA I personnel (systems, operations and engineering staff) developed success paths (training and peer reviewed by JJJ Team) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
627 items In accordance with methods applied to address Fukushima issues, e.g., European stress tests

Status 99% complete (some refinements on-going) 10 10

Phase 2: Development and Review of Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), System Walkdown, and Training Course Training Course:
Familiarity and training NA-SA staff in Seismic Evaluation Methods (SMA and GIP) approaches for Plant Walkdown (Phase 4) and maintaining seismic capacity in the future (configuration control) Participants
Atucha I and II, Embalse, NA-SA Headquarters, CAREM (about 25 personnel) Systems, engineering (civil/structural, mechanical, electrical, I&C, etc.), operations Completed 5- 9 March 2012 Buenos Aires (Monday Thursday) and Atucha site (Friday) Training materials delivered (hard copy, electronic copy)
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Phase 3: Seismic Response and Structure Capacity Evaluation: Part 1 Seismic Response
Seismic response
Structures and buildings housing SSEL systems and components Seismic demand (80% NEP conditional on RLE)
In-structure response spectra generated at the levels required by the location of the SSEL items Forces/moments in structures for capacity evaluation

Structures to be analyzed (5) Demonstrated in many studies to be one of the most important elements in seismic safety evaluation programmes
Excessive conservatism leads to un-needed upgrades and modifications and may lead to mis-identification of important contributors to HCLPF or risk Key for fracture mechanics evaluation of RCS as in CNA-II
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Phase 4: Seismic Capability Walkdown Screening Process


Steps in the EPRI SMA methodology 1. Selection of Review Level Earthquake (RLE) 2. Selection of Assessment Team (6 members 240 yrs experience) 3. Pre-walkdown and Pre-Calculation Preparation 4. Selection of Success Paths 5. Ruggedness Screening 6. Seismic Capability Walkdown

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1. Review Level Earthquake (RLE): Basis


Spectral shape accounting for two PSHAs and procedure of US NRC RG 1.208 (ASCE 43-05) JJJ & Associates PSHA Study Peer Review of AECL PSHA Study Recommendation enveloped response spectra for conservatism PGA = 0.1g, Peak spectral acceleration = 0.23g (5% damping) Presentation and report submitted to ARN on 14 March 2012 for review - approval May 2012

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Atucha NPP Site:

Recommended and Accepted DBE/RLE


ATUCHA NPP SITE - PROPOSED ENVELOPE RLE-DBE
0.5000 RLE-DBE

Spectral Acceleration (g)

0.4000

0.3000

0.2000

0.1000

0.0000 0.10 1.00

Frequency (Hz)

10.00

100.00

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown


Perform in-plant seismic capacity evaluation of SSEL items
Find and evaluate all items on the SSEL (currently 647) Apply screening rules from EPRI NP-6041 Rev. 1 (note, meeting screening rules may allow capacity verification to be for PGA=0.3g conditional on anchorage evaluation and seismic systems interaction issues) Performed during outage Evaluate seismic systems interaction issues Document SSEL item data

Status
Detailed plant walkdown 4 weeks, completed 4 May 2012 Documentation near completion
HCLPF calculations on-going
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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown


Document SSEL item data using iPad system
Seismic Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) SEWS 27 categories of equipment/components/structural elements Drawings, photos, videos, field notes, etc. iPAD data processing and storage Uploaded to server daily

Advantages
Consistent electronic record of walkdown results long term storage, printed copies, revisions for future activities Summary Excel table yielding data for decision-making (operator, regulator, reviewers)

Disadvantages
Dressed out use difficult Need additional photos from those of iPad lighting, resolution
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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown


Status: SSEL = 627 total items
Completed data = 627 items Acceptable = 76%, including Rule-of-the-Box Unknown (meaning more information needed or analysis to be performed) = 12% Not acceptable = 12% (examples on following slides)

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: Observations


Excellent cooperation and support from staff (systems, engineering, operations) very knowledgeable Atucha I is very clean and appears well maintained Mechanical equipment generally met the seismic experience-based screening criteria Electrical equipment needs evaluation and possible bracing Structures evaluation required (secondary heat sink building, steep slope, etc.) Housekeeping issues

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: Observations


Piping not seismically supported generally, judged OK based on earthquake experience data and EPRI screening guidelines Piping not supported at valve locations - generally, judged OK based on earthquake experience data HVAC ducts weak or missing supports to be evaluated on a sample basis Raised floors well restrained horizontally lack of vertical uplift restraints to be evaluated Connection of grout pads to floors to be evaluated, e.g., vertical tanks Secondary heat sink building capacity evaluation needed Unreinforced masonry walls in vicinity of SSEL equipment to be evaluated
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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: EDGs potential flooding and falling hazards

Feedwater tank floor above day tank no anchorage - block wall adjacent
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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: To be evaluated

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: To be evaluated

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: To be evaluated

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iPad Data Collection

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: Summary from iPad Data Collection


Equipment ID No. Equipment Description EPRI Equip Class SEWS No. Remarks
Valve to reduce air pressure on quick-opening valv Identical to TB11S06 Identical to TB11S06 Cabinet with Command Modules Cabinet for Interlocking Logic Cards. Identical to H Safety valve from Steam Generator 1 Isolation Valve of the vent from Steam Generator 1 Isolation Valve of the vent from Steam Generator 2 Vent valve to atmosphere Vent valve to atmosphere Cable for interconnection Cabinet for Electric Interconnection between CNAISwitchgear 6,6kV CNAII Diesel Generator

Safety Success System Path

Building
Reactor Building-S Reactor Building-S Reactor Building-S Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building CNAI - CNAII CNAII CNAII CNAII

Floor Item Room Row/Col/ Elevation Elevation No. Cabinet (m) (m)
0.50 0.50 0.50 6.00 6.00 23.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 -2.00?? 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 1.50 0.47 0.47 0.00 1.70 1.70 2.00 2.00 -2.00?? 1.50 0.00 0.00 1-307 1-307 1-307 2-311 2-311 2-600 2-600 2-600 -600 2-600 Tunnel CNAII CNAII CNAII

TB11S06 Pressure Reducing Valve GEN SEWS-25-251 Pressure Reducing Valve GEN SEWS-25-252 TB21S06 TB31S06 Pressure Reducing Valve GEN SEWS-25-253 HA51 Cabinet I&CP SEWS-05-002 HB53 Cabinet I&CP SEWS-05-003 RA01S04 AOV SEWS-13-001 Pressure safety valve (m RA01S06 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-004 RA02S06 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-005 RA07S01 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-006 RA07S02 Motor Operated Valve MOV SEWS-14-007 IXION CABLE C Cable DS SEWS-26-008 Cabinet IXIONCabinet IXION I&CP SEWS-05-010 BAZ16 Switchgears MCC, LVS, MVSSEWS-01-011 XKA -20 Diesel Generator EG SEWS-09-009

HA HB RA RA RA RA RA IX IX IX IX

1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01 1-SP01

HA51 HB53 HB03 HB03

Equipment ID No.

BELOW Lead for CAP SPEC DEM SPEC CAP>DEM? EVAL OK? AUX EVAL RELAY OK? ANCHOR INTER OK? Master EQUIP OK? same / ROB with Same as Similar to ~40'? (B) (B) (B) (C) OK? (D) (E) OK? (F) (G) for ROB? (B) similar?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA 1.2g P SGA N/A 0.8g P SGA 0.8g P SGA RLE Peak RLE Peak RLE Peak RLE Peak RLE Peak ISRS ISRS ISRS ISRS ISRS N/A RLE Peak RLE Peak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Unknown N/A N/A N/A Unknown Unknown N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Unknown Yes Yes Yes Yes No No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Unknown Unknown L No No L No No L No L No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No M No TB11S06 TB11S06 HA51

TB11S06 TB21S06 TB31S06 HA51 HB53 RA01S04 RA01S06 RA02S06 RA07S01 RA07S02 IXION CABLE C Cabinet IXION BAZ16 XKA -20

RA01S06 RA07S01 BAZ16

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

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6. Seismic Capability Walkdown: Observations


75% of SSEL items meet EPRI Screening Tables for PGA = 0.3g
Anchorage capacity and seismic systems interaction issues determine HCLPF

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Phase 5: Detailed Analysis and Evaluation


High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) calculations high importance items not treated in Phase 4 due to resource limitations refueling machine, NSSS components, etc. Structure/building capacity evaluation NSSS fracture mechanics evaluation for double-ended guillotine break as needed (CNA-II like analyses)

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Future Activities
Phase 5 Configuration Management Essential to maintain seismic capacity of CNA-I Procedures to be developed
Designs include engineering Sign offs on new installations and replacement items engineering, systems, operations Can use SEWS methodology as aid and documentation

Containment and containment systems evaluated to seismic hazard probability of exceedance of 10-5

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Future Activities
Geotechnical to be evaluated (steep slope pump house and plant grade, etc.) Seismically- induced fire and flooding evaluation Collaboration with CNA-I fire and flooding experts In-building seismically induced flood (sprinkler system, tank failures, etc.) - completed during walkdown Yard sources of seismically induced flood External to plant boundary flood potential Consequences to turbine building DG flooding, etc.

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Future Activities

Seismic instrumentation
None installed. In the process of procurement. Shutdown and re-start decisions difficult if earthquake ground motion is felt

Operations
Need procedures to address occurrence of ground motion at Atucha site. IAEA SR 66 is being used. Training

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Questions and Answers

THANK YOU

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