So Ping Bun Facts: So Pek Giok, entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C.

Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). The (4) lease contracts used the areas to store its textiles for a oneyear term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis. After he died So P ek Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own t extile business. Then, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplis h the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's part. Privat e respondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts we re not rescinded. Issues: WON Respondent is liable for interference with contractual obligations Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterp rise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest i n the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on recor d imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. The conduct herein compl ained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of an other's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered w ith, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cau se of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) kn owledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) in terference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. This m ay pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or v iolate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before us, petitioner's Tre ndsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property righ t. He may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, jus tification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where t he actor's motive is to benefit himself. Wrongful and malicious motives are nega tived, for he acts in self-protection. Where there was no malice in the interfer ence of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper busine ss interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious inter ferer.

Shell Company Facts: Insular is a registered limited partnership, whose principal business is collect ing used lubricating oil which, thru a scientific process, is refined and market ed to the public at a price much lower than that of new lubricating oil. The low -grade oil that was sold to said operator was contained in a drum with the petit ioner's mark or brand "Shell" still stenciled. Uichangco was apprised beforehand that a Shell drum would be used, and in fact t he instruction of Crespo to Uichangco could mean to buy Insoil oil contained in a Shell drum. The buyer could not have been deceived or confused that he was not b uying Insoil Oil. There is reason to believe that the transaction was consummate d in pursuance of a plan of Mr. Crespo to obtain evidence for the filing of a ca se. The oil was never sold to the public because the plaintiff never intended or contemplated doing so. Issues: WON Insular can be held liable for unfair competition Held: No. Ratio: It was merely a shell dealer or an operator of a Shell Station who purchased the drum not to be resold to the public, but to be sold to the petitioner company, with a view of obtaining evidence against someone who might have been committing unfair business practices, for the dealer had found that his income was dwindli ng in his gasoline station. The point we would like to drive home is that if a SHELL dealer wants to fool th e public by passing off INSOIL as SHELL oil he could do this by the simple exped ient of placing the INSOIL oil or any other oil for that matter in the "tall boy s" and dispense it to the public as SHELL oil. Whatever container INSOIL uses wo uld be of no moment in the absence of a clear showing that INSOIL and the SHELL dealer connived or conspired Cuizon Facts: Moises Cuison, a boy 7 years of age, the son of the plaintiff, was on his way to the Santa Mesa School, some large pieces of lumber on a truck which had stopped fell from it pinning the boy beneath, and causing his almost instant death. The truck was rented by Ora to Norton & Harrison Co. On the truck were the lette rs "N-H," which were the first letters of the firm name. Ora was in the employ o f Norton & Harrison Co. as a capataz. It was his duty as such employee to direct the loading and transportation of the lumber. When the accident occurred the lu mber had become loosened, and it was to rearrange it that the truck halted. Issue: WON The Petitioner Norton Harrison can be held liable for damages Held: No. The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat superior but the relation ship of paterfamilias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately

on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. Ratio: The defense of independent contractor would be a valid one in the Philippines ju st as it would be in the United States. Here Ora was a contractor, but it does n ot necessarily follow that he was an independent contractor. The reason for this distinction is that the employer retained the power of directing and controllin g the work. The chauffeur and the two persons on the truck were the employees of Ora, the co ntractor, but Ora, the contractor, was an employee of Norton & Harrison Co., cha rged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of the lumber. An d it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck which caused the death of the unfortunate boy. On the facts and the law, Ora wa s not an independent contractor, but was the servant of the defendant, and for h is negligence defendant was responsible. Conceding that the record discloses a most unusual state of facts, and conceding that the evidence is not as ample as it should be, nevertheless on the record a s it is and on the law as it is, it is incumbent on the court to rule that error was committed in the lower court in not awarding the father of the dead boy dam ages for the wrongful death of his son.