PDFlib PLOP: PDF Linearization, Optimization, Protection Page inserted by evaluation version www.pdflib.com sales@pdflib.

com

Three Questions for a Big Book: Collinss The Sociology of Philosophies*

Michle Lamont Princeton University
This essay first describes some of the impressive theoretical and empirical contributions of The Sociology of Philosophies, namely, to cultural sociology. Second, it offers a criticism of Collinss argument by focusing on the conceptions of the self it posits; its lack of specificity concerning the relationship between intellectual networks and imagined communities of scholars; and its neglect of how the law of small numbers is affected by the size of a field. Against a priori definitions of the selves of intellectuals posited by Collins, I advocate approaching the diversity of their selves as an empirical issue. Against Collinss overemphasis on personal network centrality in the making of philosophical greatness, I propose that the transcendent values of intellectual work are insufficient but nonetheless necessary conditions for philosophical greatness.

To put it in the most simple of terms, The Sociology of Philosophies is a remarkable achievement.1 It is undoubtedly Randall Collinss crowning intellectual contribution to date, and it firmly establishes him as one of the most creative and wide-ranging sociologists working today. Paradoxically, the book embodies beautifully the transcendent virtues that Collins indirectly displaces by providing a thoroughly sociological analysis of philosophical creativity and greatnessin good sociological fashion, he shows that philosophical greatness is not produced by individual geniuses but by generations of philosophers engaged in collective streams of arguments.2 If the book stands so tall in comparison with how the median sociologist practices or understands the craft today, it is primarily by its empirical range and remarkable breadth. The book is thoroughly Weberian in its comparative ambition, as Collins uses the comparative method to develop a general theory about the emergence of philosophical creativity and the functioning of intellectual networks. In the process, he provides a historical analysis of the development of philosophy in ancient Greece, China, India, Japan, Judaism, the Arab world, and European Christianity. He also examines the changing relationships and displacements between philosophy and neighboring fields such as mathematics, the social sciences, rhetoric, medicine, theology, and religion ~including astrology, occultism, and mysticism! across these sites. Moreover, for all these sites, he develops a detailed analysis of changes in the institutional settings and material and social bases for intellectual production, ranging from private teaching, monasteries, and royal courts to state administration, publishing markets, and research universities. He is particularly concerned with
*This paper draws on comments presented at the Author Meets the Critics session, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, DC, August 2000. Address correspondence to: Michle Lamont, Department of Sociology, Wallace Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: mlamont@princeton.edu. 1 Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change ~Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988!. 2 Collins expresses this succinctly when he writes concerning creativity The theme of my sociological argument is that creativity is not a one-shot event, but a process stretching around the persons in whom it manifests itself, backwards, sideways and forwards from the individuals whose names are the totemic emblems thrown up by their networks. It is intergenerational networks dividing up attention space that make history in every sense. The creativity of the thinkers of our own century is literally not fully created yet ~621!. Sociological Theory 19:1 March 2001 American Sociological Association. 1307 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005-4701

THREE QUESTIONS FOR A BIG BOOK

87

the level of autonomy that these various bases give philosophers in developing their research agendas and in reaching higher degrees of abstraction and reflexivity. Collins uses these various levels of comparison to sharpen his theory and to draw theoretical generalizations. The main challenge with writing a book of this scope is to maintain its theoretical focus and intellectual unity. Throughout Collinss attention remains sharply centered on a range of questions that can be traced back directly to his long-lasting interest in conflict theory, credentialism, geopolitics, and interaction ritual chains. These questions include the following: ~1! How does the sacredness of philosophical creativity differ from that of religion? ~2! How does the competitive public attention space within which intellectual creativity can emerge appear? ~3! When does rivalry produce creativity, and when does it produce stagnation? ~4! What produces philosophical synthesis or syncretism and splintering or fractionation? and ~5! What generates higher levels of abstraction and critical selfreflection in metaphysics or epistemology? Alternatively, what leads philosophical discourse to fall to a more concrete and particularistic level, manifested for instance in religious cults and anthropomorphic doctrines? Drawing on Simmel, Collins suggests that conflict increases solidarity and conformity within a group, which helps explain why philosophers lose higher levels of abstraction achieved by earlier generations and revert to crude reification, dogmatism, and name-calling rather than analytical advance ~163!. At another level, the book can be read as making a general contribution to cultural sociology by analyzing the dynamics of cultural production. Collins proposes a two-step ~380!, and sometimes a three-step ~324!, model where outer conditions of social conflicts between schools are connected to inner shifts within intellectual organizations, which shape networks of producers of ideas and the idea-substance of intellectual life. To quote, Political and economic changes bring ascendancy or decline of the material institutions which support intellectuals; religion, monasteries, schools, and publishing markets rise and fall with these external forces. Intellectuals then readjust to fill the space available to them ~380!. The book also contributes to reception theory by analyzing intellectual networks as communities of implicit awareness in relation to which participants develop their own intellectual stancein a modified version of George Herbert Meads concept of generalized others: cultural producers internalize an invisible community of diverse viewpoints, which constitutes a web of opposition in relation to which they define their stance ~791!. In addition to its many theoretical contributions, the book also offers remarkable empirical riches that captivate the readers imagination. A few examples will suffice to provide a flavor of these and of the empirical range of the book: One of the most interesting sections concerns the simultaneous emergence of the Enlightenment in Japan, Germany, and France, where we find parallel tensions between secularist-naturalists and antiquarian-nationalists, who are described as network-cousins, that is, as a debating pair ~chap. 7, esp. 32324, 361 68!. We read the fascinating story of how Indian Buddhism was delegitimated by Hinduism and Brahmanism at a time when, under weakly centralized, ephemeral states, there was room for the elaboration of complex kinship structures regulated through marital and ritual conventions. At the same time, Brahmans shifted from a priest class familiar with the Vedas to an educational status group engaged in lengthy scholastic routines involving the display of debating virtuosity ~chap. 5!. The description of the metaphysical battle between Dominicans and Franciscans, which opposed Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, as well as Paris and Oxford, is

88

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY particularly intriguing. Collins shows how Duns Scotus redefines the terms of debate to move beyond the positions available around 1300 ~chap. 9!.

We learn that under Tokugawa Japan in the late eighteenth century, a huge educational expansion produced not the kind of abstract thinking that is the territory of philosophy but rather the development of a gentry aesthetic high culture taught by schools of specialized art, including swordsmanship, painting, poetry, flower arranging, and tea ceremonies ~chap. 7, esp. 339, 354!. Collins also tells the story of how the appearance of rapid discovery science undermined the law of small numbers that keeps the philosophical community divided: it builds on procedures and techniques in mathematics and empirical research that produce new discoveries and make results repeatable and exportable in standardized form to new locations ~524!. This leads to a restructuration of philosophy, with greater centrality given to epistemological discussion ~526! and with neo-Kantian concerns for negotiating the boundary between philosophy and the various sciences. It would be unfair to only praise a book of such magnitude. Indeed, the material simply has too much analytical complexity and richness to escape the critical gaze. My comments and probing concern three specific theoretical points, namely: ~1! the conception of the self posited by Collinss theory; ~2! the theoretical elaboration of an unstated tension between networks and imagined communities; and ~3! the relationship between the law of small numbers and the size of the field. Conception of the Self In line with his earlier writings on conflict theory, Collins describes the dynamics of the field of philosophy as one where actors compete for attention space and to avoid being pushed to the periphery of discussions. Drawing on Goffmans concept of interaction rituals, he adopts a concept of the self according to which individuals gain emotional energy from encounters with others and with the symbols that define the sacred values of the group. They use this energy to construct other relationships in an ongoing chain of interaction. This energy gives them charisma. To quote Collins: Encounters produce an ongoing flow of social motivations, as people come away from each situation with a store of charged symbols ~which can be called cultural capital! and with emotional energies. Persons are attracted to those situations in which they can make the best use of their previously acquired cultural capital and symbolic resources. ~24! At worst, this framework could be interpreted as positing as an ideal type of the self that of an other-directed high school student, who is primarily motivated by, and vies for, popularity among classmates, the ability of locating her- or himself in the middle of the hot center of group attention ~30, 34!. This model of the self is antithetic to that of a centered individual who would find motivation and energy in her or his long-term goals and satisfaction. Instead, the posited self is one that is almost entirely defined by the ebbs and flows of group life. Of course, Collins is too subtle an analyst to unequivocally propose so unidimensional a model of the self. He acknowledges that intellectuals and academics are often lonesome types who spend countless hours working by themselves on projects they believe in. He also writes that creative people often develop their energies by directing them toward

THREE QUESTIONS FOR A BIG BOOK

89

independence and innovation ~34!. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that his theory makes room for the diversity of selves found among intellectual creators. This is particularly clear in his description of how individuals understand competition. He posits that intellectuals enjoy the confrontation with their enemy and thrive on conflict. He writes Intellectuals seem to be drawn to their opponents; they seek them out, like magnets tugging at each others opposite poles. . . . @They# are excited by the flow of ideas @. . .#, by their struggles with their enemies ~73!. I, for one, can easily think of highly productive academics that are resolutely conflict averse. I can also think of fields where a culture of conflict is not widely spread and where professional conflict avoidance is the dominant mode. Because the conception of the self favored by Collins gives such a central role to competition in the pursuit of attention, the most damning criticism that could be addressed to it is that, perhaps like rational choice theory, it posits a logic of profit maximization. I find this unsatisfactory because it predefines the cultural orientation of actors. Collins provides us evidence of such a rapprochement when he writes that in intellectual fields, actors attempt to match up their CCs @cultural capitals# and EEs @emotional energies# to their best advantage as an open bargaining process. . . . Each person is trying to get the best intellectual status membership he or she can, not only directly but also vicariously. Everyone is attracted to thinking high-status ideas as well as associating with highstatus persons. ~39! If he is right, we would all spend our time at professional meetings trying to get closer to luminaries instead of, say, hanging out with old friendsand this particularly if we happen to be among the creative individuals who have a high level of emotional energies due to our centrality in the field ~45!.3 Against these a priori definitions of the self of intellectuals, I advocate approaching the diversity of their selves as an empirical issue, by using an open-ended and inductive approach. I am not arguing here against Collinss notion of interaction ritual chains as it applies to the field of philosophy. Instead, I am suggesting that it needs to be supplemented by a more fully developed concept of the self that would reflect what I believe to be the diversity of cultural orientation found among culturally central and creative intellectuals. Networks or Imagined Communities? In his book, Collins focuses squarely on the networks of process at work within the field of philosophy. His presentation of the data focuses largely on the shift from one school to another and on intergenerational patterns of exchanges and proximity and divergences. Hence he identifies formal structured processes that are central to the production of philosophy over time and across space. He describes the history of philosophy as the discovery of exploitable lines of opposition. For instance, he shows how in the twentieth century, existentialists and logical positivists define their positions in opposition to one another. He writes that Comparably important philosophers appear contemporaneously, their rivalry
3 Note that Collins may share with Bourdieu a zero-sum view of the functioning of power fields ~see Michle Lamont, Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class @Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992#, chap. 7!. However, in an interesting twist, in contrast to Bourdieu, he suggests we are attracted to the symbols that give us an optimal sense of group membership ~49!. Hence, for him, the pursuit of profit maximization is in sync with the strengthening of collective identity, as opposed to serving exclusively personal aggrandizement and narcissistic inclinations.

90

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

underpinning one anothers fame. . . . New ideas unfold by negating the major points of rival positions on a shared topic of argument and a common level of abstraction ~379!. One of the tensions of the book hinges on the relative centrality of face-to-face relationships versus symbolic communities in the constitutions of networks and their impact on the distribution of emotional energy. Early in the first chapter, Collins states that intellectual life hinges on face-to-face situations because interaction rituals can take place only on this level ~26; also 379!. He discusses the importance of lectures and formal debates, when one individual holds the floor to deliver a sustained argument on a particular topic. In fact, he describes the ideal intellectual interaction ritual where one expounds a worldview, a claim for understanding taken as an end in itself ~26!. Yet, he also envisions an isolated intellectual who writes while having in mind a virtual network, a symbolic community of some sort, in relation to which he defines his ideas, making coalitions of the mind. I find myself wishing for an explicit and exhaustive discussion of the connection between this symbolic community or virtual network and the personal connections that shape ones work. Having ones work referred to certainly provides emotional energy, but how is this different from face-to-face contact? Was face-to-face dueling more important for, say, members of the Socratic circles than for twentieth-century intellectuals participating in the book publishing business? I also find myself with a lingering doubt concerning whether the book overemphasizes the importance of networks in intellectual creativity and the making of reputations. We all know of academic entrepreneurs/brokers who are at the center of networks but have yet to produce a genuinely original intellectual project, an agenda that demonstrates intellectual coherence and integrity over time ~precisely the kind of achievement so beautifully provided by The Sociology of Philosophies!. Thinking of such exemplars makes me wonder whether Collinss emphasis on personal network centrality in the making of philosophical greatness leads him to put too much emphasis on brokering functions and on the control of material resources. Granted, he provides a few examples of key intellectuals who were outside the networks and whose work survived largely by the power of their originality Ibn Khaldun and Avicenna ~or Ibn Sina! for instance 4 Frege is also described as marginal to the networks of his contemporaries ~704!. However, Collins views these individuals as exceptions that prove the rule. At a time when the ability to muster resources in order to shape the agenda of other academics is so highly valued ~perhaps as a result of the great wealth of foundations in the wake of an extraordinary financial boom!, it is important to underscore the centrality of the transcendent character of intellectual work in achieving philosophical greatness, both to avoid reductionism and to maintain an appropriate focus on what Collins correctly, in my opinion, views as the fountainhead of creativity. These transcendent values are insufficient, but nonetheless necessary conditions for philosophic greatness. Moreover, the energies that are invested at one level generally eat away at those that can be invested in more creative, original, and transcendental endeavorsCollins would not have written this book had he invested considerable energy in being at the center of all networks. Perhaps we have yet to come to terms with the relative weight of the various aspects of this philosophical greatness equation.
4 Ibn Sina, like other very great intellectuals, was an energy star. He wrote encyclopedically and fundamentally on numerous subjects. This outpouring of energies was what carried his work to later generations, despite the fact that his personal network broke off with a few minor local disciples ~420!. Of Ibn Khaldun, Collins writes @he# worked in Algeria, remote from intellectual centers; indeed, the central networks no longer existed. Without significant structural ties of his own, Ibn Khalduns critique was without consequence for Islamic philosophy ~ibid!. Another exception is Averroes ~Ibn Rushd! who had great emotional energies but little in the way of disciples ~445!.

THREE QUESTIONS FOR A BIG BOOK The Law of Small Numbers and the Size of the Field

91

One of the key elements of Collinss theoretical contribution is the law of small numbers, which says that at any point in time there can be only a few successful knots of arguments within an intellectual space ~between three and six to be more exact!. To quote, The attention space is limited: once a few arguments have partitioned the crowds, attention is withdrawn from those who would start yet another knot of argument ~38!. This translates into first-mover advantages and bandwagon effect. This law of small numbers is intuitively appealing. However, it raises questions that may have been overlooked by Collins. More specifically, one would want to know whether and how this law is affected by the size of the intellectual field under consideration. Did classical Greek philosophy work the same as Anglo-American twentieth-century philosophy, despite the fact that it brought together considerably fewer people? Does the zero-sum competition for attention function the same in small and large intellectual fields alike? One would expect larger fields to allow for many more knots of arguments than six and perhaps for more pluralism and diversity. This, again, is an empirical question, and it is a particularly important one because, in bypassing this issue, one may run the risk of viewing the law of small numbers as a deus ex machina or making the teleological assumption that the fields functioning can be explained by it serving the law of small numbers! 5 To bring this discussion to a close, I cannot resist raising one last issue: In his conclusion, Collins explores whether his theory applies to philosophy, as opposed to neighboring disciplines including the social sciences. This discussion makes me wonder how intellectual interaction rituals function in fields such as sociology, which have a less high status object of inquiry than philosophy. How is the sacred or transcendent character of our substantive work and collective identity maintained, despite the fact that we engage in the sociologization of everything? How are collective rituals established in the face of the relative scarcity of charismatic views of what it means to be a sociologist today? We certainly engage less naively and wholesomely in the production of the symbolic value of our object of inquiry than, say, physicists or philosophers, precisely because we are so attuned to processes of canon formation. In light of this, what Collins calls the speech act of being engaged in the intellectual activity itself, in a situation-transcending dialogue ~28!, may simply not have the same significance across fields or the same impact on the creation of rituals of disciplinary membership. Hence, is the relationship between the transcendental and organizational aspects of intellectual work and collective identity constant across fields? How would one go about addressing this question?

5 For instance: Just after 400 B.C.E., the intellectual community discovered the school as an institutional structure that can be deliberately created. There was a huge outpouring of foundations, leading to a crisis in the attention space because it overflowed the limits of the law of small numbers ~91!. Also, Hindu philosophy was in the shade of Buddhist philosophies in this period because its inchoate tendencies considerably exceeded the upper limits of the law of small numbers ~228!.