CHOA vs CHOA FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa were married on March 15, 1981.

Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On Oct.1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental a Complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner because Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country . The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence). The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter. Finally, the RTC issued its Order denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied the Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari. The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: SC was convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. RATIO: The SC do not agree with the contention of the respondent that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, for the SC ruled that it is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. Said the Court: that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help

and support. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Furthermore, SC ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. SC stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. PILAPIL vs IBAY-SOMERA FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. Records show that under German Law said court was legally and internationally competent for divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent had legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. HELD: NO. The SC held that respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country therefore considering him no longer the husband of the petitioner. RATIO: In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner therefore no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit