IBP1516_12 THE RATIONAL USE OF TIME AND SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES TO IMPROVE WELL CONTROL EVENT OUTCOMES 1 Helio Santos

, Paul Sonnemann2

Copyright 2012, Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute - IBP

This Technical Paper was prepared for presentation at the Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012, held between September, 1720, 2012, in Rio de Janeiro. This Technical Paper was selected for presentation by the Technical Committee of the event according to the information contained in the final paper submitted by the author(s). The organizers are not supposed to translate or correct the submitted papers. The material as it is presented, does not necessarily represent Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute opinion, or that of its Members or Representatives. Authors consent to the publication of this Technical Paper in the Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Proceedings.

Abstract
There are times during well control events when immediate action is desirable or may even be required. These events result in personnel, environmental and financial risk which may increase if events are mishandled. The increasing magnitude of such risks, along with reduced public tolerance for loss of well control, is illustrated by various recent, well publicized events in the US, Brazil, UK and Nigeria. However, there are other times during well control events when immediate action is not recommended, and if the wrong action is taken it may worsen the situation. This paper describes several well control events which fall into each of the above categories and highlights the use of software, when time is available, to simulate alternative solutions while determining the best route to be taken. The software also helps the crew in charge to differentiate the situations in real time and decide whether there is time available to evaluate the options. The paper finally shows some cases where action was taken immediately, following standard kill procedures, but where those actions actually made the problem worse. A simple and quick simulation before implementing kill procedures would likely have prevented well control events like these from becoming a serious problem.

1. Introduction
It is well established that some types of well control events are best mitigated by immediate, active intervention. These classic well control events may be characterized by one or more of the following: Pressure building within an apparently static, closed-in wellbore Example: Post-shut-in gas migration requiring management to avoid excessive or damaging wellbore pressure Physical evidence of self-sustaining flow of mud or formation fluids that poses a current or future threat to personnel, the environment, or the rig Example: Well flow to the surface which needs to be diverted when shut-in is not possible (i.e. on shallow well without a BOP installed) Evidence of a previously anticipated event for which a plan has been developed that can be reasonably expected to manage or mitigate the event, but will become less effective if executed after a time delay Example: the need to replenish a gas-free mud cap during Pressurized Mud Cap MPD operation when indications exist of mud cap contamination by gas or fluid gravity segregation

In each of these cases, unnecessary response delay can make the situation worse, or even unmanageable; in each case, Time is the enemy.

______________________________ 1 Ph.D., Petroleum Engineer - SafeKick 2 B.A. Psychology, Well Control Expert - SafeKick

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In preparation for such potential events, and to attempt to avoid worsening them, it is reasonable to train and expect on-site personnel to take immediate action. Most kick response training strongly, and sometimes exclusively emphasizes response methods appropriate for these conditions. Since delay here is undesirable, processes that may lead to paralysis by analysis must be avoided; clear decision-making hierarchies must be in place, and potential delay due to information management must be avoided. It is also appropriate to avoid dependence on non-pre deployed systems or resources, meaning the rig and on-site personnel must be fully prepared to independently implement standard required actions as a matter of course. But there are many situations in which it may be argued that immediate action is not required.

2. Avoiding Inappropriate, Immediate Use of Standard Procedures

Immediate active response is not required when, for example, a kick has been detected and shut-in while drilling, but confining surface pressures are remaining steady rather than increasing. While this situation is clearly different from the much feared classic kick situation involving immediately migrating gas, most well control procedures and related training fail to include, as a dependent contingency or separate optional step, the rational use of additional time which may be available in such a case, prior to initiating further control actions. Because of this omission, crews often lose the opportunity to identify and take advantage of extra time to prepare control strategies that might enhance conventional kill operations or perhaps identify alternative control options more applicable to the exact well situation. Even worse, the opportunity may be lost to recognize that use of standard methods in some cases may add to the risk or be contra-indicated for certain situations. Here are several examples of situations in which even proper application of a standard method (such as Drillers or Wait & Weight Circulation methods) may actually worsen a situation: A well that is successfully shut-in, but beyond its open hole design limits, thereby predictably susceptible to weak point failure during circulation to remove a large gas influx leading to a possible underground blowout A well successfully shut-in, but with a gas influx currently suspended in solution within a synthetic or oil-based mud; estimates of surface conditions when circulating such an influx through the choke may leave crews unprepared to anticipate/mitigate fluid handling limitations (i.e. limited mud/gas separator capacity) A large gas kick in a highly deviated or horizontal open hole section of a well with the last casing shoe (weak point) set in a relatively more vertical section A gas kick located well below the circulation point (i.e. a kick taken with the drill string well off bottom) A kick that, when first shut-in, has already resulted in a cross-flow or underground blowout condition

There are two strategies that can be used to help avoid the problem caused by use of standard methods where they may not be optimal: 1) Identify in advance (i.e. during DWOP, pre-spud and pre-job safety meetings) wells in which standard circulating methods are not to be used at all, or only to be used if expected stable shut-in conditions dont exist. This could include drilling situations involving, for example: Potentially gas-bearing kicks when presence of H2S cannot be ruled out Kicks taken in or below a long, highly deviated hole section when the last casing seat is in a substantially more vertical section of the hole 2

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Potentially gas-bearing kicks taken in a deep, HPHT well (which could result in unacceptably high gas loads or surface pressures during control operations) Kicks taken in wells in which extra wellbore integrity was marginal or non-existent prior to the kick (i.e. narrow window drilling conditions where Kick Tolerance is known to be low)

2) Where the first strategy doesnt apply, include, as a specific decision making step in emergency well control procedures, the identification of conditions that would trigger further evaluation and consultation before any additional circulation is begun. This could include requiring observations after shut-in to identify if: Well is shut-in with stable shut-in casing pressure Well is shut-in with drill string (circulating path) above potential influx Well is shut-in with pit gain and/or SIDPP close to or above pre- calculated Kick Tolerance or Well is shut-in with evidence of loss of well integrity (i.e. fluctuating shut-in casing pressure).

3. Field Cases Where Standard Well Control Kill Procedures Should Have Not Been Used
Sadly, most contractor and operator emergency well control procedures lack application of either or both of the strategies mentioned to help avoid use of standard procedures for non-standard situations. Numerous examples exist of crews rushing into the use of standard kill procedures even when such procedures could have been reasonably expected to, and did, end up making problems worse. Below are some examples of actual cases: A US land well with an 8 bbl swabbed kick taken while running back into a well (the swabbed kick should have been taken while tripping out of the hole, not tripping in, right?), but not all the way to bottom after a kick was observed while pulling drill pipe Off bottom use of Drillers Method resulted in > 5000 psi at surface causing a debilitating mud/gas separator overload and need for Lube and Bleed operations. An Asian Land well shut in with SICP 100 psi above MAASP, but with gas at surface. Attempts to use the Drillers Method without application of additional surface pressure led to open hole breakdown and complete loss of ability to circulate, resulting in a need to apply Lube and Bleed procedures in a very delicate and high risk operation. A deep HTHP land well in the US with a gas kick taken while using OBM (no migration). Initial attempts to use the Wait & Weight Method were thwarted by unexpected flow properties (high gel strength). Concern over the crews inability to clearly determine correct circulating pressures triggered communication with base office, fortunately preventing initially attempted use of selected standard kill rate that would have easily overloaded mud/gas separator capabilities at a critical stage of the kill operation. A shallow US land well blowout in a steam flood project that resulted from an attempt to kill a temperaturerelated kick using pressure-related procedures (Drillers Method) Broaching of an offshore well which had its last casing shoe located in a nearly vertical hole, while circulating out a kick that was initially fully contained and located in a deeper horizontal portion of the same open hole section Inadvertent hydraulic communication to an adjacent wellbore, and eventually to surface, of an H2S kick in Asia while attempting a Drillers Method kill without wellbore integrity, resulting in multiple fatalities A small volume influx from an unexpectedly high pressure, but low permeability formation that resulted in multiple days of non-productive time on a deep water US well

It is worth noting that only one of these cases involved relatively rapid increases in surface pressure while shutin; in all the others, crews applied standard emergency kill procedures when time would have been available for further evaluation and planning. And in the one case in which shut-in pressures were rapidly increasing, the known possibility of H2S should have precluded use conventional kill operations. 3

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 With strategies in place to avoid such inappropriate immediate application of standard procedures to situations where they are known in advance to be inapplicable, or in which conditions dont require immediate action, valuable extra time may become available during which more carefully selected kill options may be considered. In some cases, this extra time may lead to selection of less well known, but conventionally accepted and appropriate practices (i.e. use of Volumetric Method while handling a kick while off bottom or bullheading when influx presents toxic hazards). In other instances, unexpected well behavior may suggest a need for special actions in order to ascertain minimum containment pressures (i.e. remove excessive overpressure), modify fluids in use (i.e. pump heavier mud or LCM), or consider potentially beneficial use of open-hole friction (i.e. use higher circulating rate to increase ECD while lowering circulating casing pressure).

4. What Should be Done When Extra Time is Available?

What should the rig crew do instead of conventional well killing circulation when such extra time becomes available? One might properly recommend Do Nothing (i.e. leave the well shut-in until an optimal plan can be developed). But experience has shown that it is often very difficult to get rig crews to do nothing. This is particularly true for on-site supervisors when egos are involved, but its also true for many high quality rig hands, as it runs against many of their normal and often desirable traits. In fact, it is sometimes true that instead of simply monitoring conditions, experienced supervisors may instead chose to do something they dont understand and which may not be appropriate, but is either thought to be acceptable or has been pre-authorized. The idea that Its better to do something wrong rather than nothing at all still exists in our industry, and often contributes to multi-step failures. This attitude underlies the need for robust and specific stop work authority programs, but stubbornly persists in spite of the presence of many such programs today. To help overcome the pressure to take immediate action, it can be constructive to identify, in advance, specific actions to perform while doing nothing. These are actions that help buy time while ensuring that the well remains successfully shut-in. They include actions such as: monitoring BOP accumulator systems documenting mud pit or fluid condition performing a bubble watch on offshore rigs establishing barriers to keep personnel out of potentially dangerous areas (potentially high pressure areas or gas-prone rig locations) monitoring and double-checking manifold line-ups establishing a formal log of activities and well parameters ensuring ready access to mud supplies providing situational information to off-tour personnel securing relevant pre-kick drilling information accessing relevant well kill procedural guidance documents ensuring and confirming alarm readiness/use

By better defining these as acceptable, or even preferred responses in specified circumstances, crews are more likely to perform these actions and feel less likely to jump ahead with procedures that could turn out to be counterproductive. With a strategy in place to formally identify availability of extra time, it is important to efficiently use whatever time is available to select and refine optimal control procedures, whether standard or not. Even when time is not the enemy, time still clearly matters and shouldnt be squandered.

5. Using A High Performance Software Tool to Use Time Efficiently

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 One way to maximize the use of time available is to use modern software as a routine part of emergency well control operations. It may be very helpful to have, already in operation prior to the kick, a comprehensive computer-based model that is kept up to date with current known well conditions. Using the same models for simulations prior to drilling helps to identify well-specific conditions included in the well design (such as mud density adjustments needed to maintain adequate kick tolerance in a particular hole section), or the applicability of a particular, non-standard control method (like use of bullheading due to potential presence of H 2S). By then using the same system during actual drilling operations, with the ability to share output of such a system via the Internet, remote experts and/or decision-makers can very quickly be brought up to date regarding well status. Ideally this should give them the same, high quality understanding of current well conditions as those on site. Additionally, a computer-based model may provide the ability to run simulations of proposed control processes. Simulations can highlight and quantify the relative challenges and benefits of various operational sequences being considered. A more novel use of a valid computer simulation involves its ability to provide, in real time, calculated values of down hole conditions that are generally unavailable by any other means. For example, a system that can calculate ECD values with reasonable accuracy during drilling operations (as documented by comparison with real-time PWD measurements) may be used to provide ECD values during kill operations, when PWD measurements are typically unavailable. This can provide either corroboration during conventional well control procedures, or entirely new control options when they provide attractive risk reduction benefits. Finally, the same system, if used for collection and presentation of real-time data prior to the kick, can be used for supervisors both on and off the rig to play back the events just prior to the well shut-in. This could provide valuable insight as to the likely down hole conditions (such as recognition that a kick started long before it was detected, which might indicate a much less serious condition, as much of the influx volume could already be reliably assumed to be above the open hole weak point). These four uses of a real-time computer based model are particularly useful when time is available, but limited. While most real well situations provide some frequently overlooked time opportunities, it is nevertheless true that excess time taken to make appropriate decisions may lessen the chances of success of any applicable plan. So for many situations, the time efficiency gained by having the model available and in routine use prior to the event can contribute to the quality of the outcome by minimizing time needed to transfer basic information and apply tools helpful to offsite personnel involved in developing, choosing and planning the best response option. A specially designed software for well control has been developed, covering operations with the BOP open or closed, which can be used for well planning, simulating rig operations, and for real time monitoring of well conditions. It can be used for evaluating options to be used when drilling the well, and when in real time use during kick events, can be used to run simulations or what if scenarios to define the best kill option to be adopted. Figure 1 illustrates what this software tool would show shortly after the detection of an oil and/or gas kick in a well, which has thereafter been successfully shut-in by the rig crew. In this case, the well has been shut-in and the casing pressure has stabilized after a short time at 450 psi. The crew has been trained to monitor and record casing pressure, but to not pump fluids into, or bleed fluids out of the well unless pressure increases by 100 psi (i.e. as per Strategy #2 mentioned earlier, not begin Drillers Method circulation without further consultation). With the system providing real-time access to the same screenshot at the on-shore operation headquarters, it should be possible to see how easy it would be for on-shore supervisors to quickly assess the situation and provide relevant advice. They could determine, for example, that based on indicated surface pit gain (35 bbls in this example, but not shown on the screenshot) and SIDPP (334 psi, which corresponds to a 0.43 ppg Kick Intensity) this kick exceeds the wells indicated Kick Tolerance (20.3 bbls with 0.5 ppg KI above Mud Weight, as plotted on the systems KT graph). While the crew may immediately perceive this as a difficult to manage situation, the ECD curve illustrates the worst case condition at this time (a single gas bubble near bottom). The graph suggests that pressure at the casing seat 5

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 is currently above expected fracture limits at this depth, something not uncommon when an FIT test or less than a full LOT is used to determine the fracture limit; additional build up of surface pressure would surely be undesirable and some procedure to avoid this may be quickly required.

Figure 1. Screenshot illustrating the situation shortly after a well has been successfully shut-in by the rig crew and pressures have stabilized.

But the same ECD graph also shows that pressure at the casing seat will likely decrease significantly quite soon after starting circulation (i.e. after pumping only about 80 bbls, which should move the influx into the liner). Therefore, an optimal kill strategy might involve initial, careful use of Drillers Method kill procedures with minimal safety factors. As long as at least partial returns can be obtained while displacing clean mud from the bottom of the well to the casing seat it should then be possible to use a higher pump speed, 168 gpm in this example, to benefit from open hole friction while removing the influx. Once circulating at this higher rate, it should be possible to use more substantial pressure safety factors at least until influx nears surface, at which time circulation rate may need to be again reduced in order to respect limits of mud/gas separator capability and choke manipulation challenges. Figure 2 shows a simulation of the proposed operation after pumping about 100 bbls, with a current circulation rate of 168 gpm. Bottom hole pressure is currently 12.86 ppg EMW, which is 80 psi above the 12.76 ppg EMW kick zone pressure (as shown in Figure 1 as the ESD at the bottom of the hole with the well shut in while just balancing formation pressure). Pressure at the casing shoe is now 200 psi below the recorded fracture pressure, a 330 psi reduction from the highest shoe pressure required to contain this kick. Any loss of mud or influx to the formation at this depth will likely stop by this point, due to this significant reduction in pressure that has occurred since circulation was started. Subsequent successful, even efficient, kill operations should now be possible. With a system like the one shown here in use prior to the kick, supervisors can use even limited time resources to quickly identify and test refined response strategies such as this. And where conventional methods are recognized as less than optimal, alternatives approaches can be efficiently evaluated, such as immediate placement of a heavy pill in the open hole sufficient to provide hydrostatic control while gas is removed from the annulus. The systems display of relevant down hole conditions ensures that whatever time is available is not wasted in simply trying to get all decision makers on the same page.

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Figure 2. The same well as in Figure 1 while circulating after pumping 100 bbls.

6. Conclusions
In conclusion, strategies are available that can provide extra response time prior to initiation of conventional kill procedures in both predictable and unpredictable situations. Use of a real-time system that continuously simulates up-to-date of well conditions facilitates use of any available extra time to assess standard and/or optional control methods that might provide critical benefits. As a result, kill operations can be optimized for the actual situation involved, rather than potentially compromised by use of less applicable, standard procedures.

7. Bibliography
WATSON, D., Brittenham, T., Morre, P.L. Advanced Well Control, SPE Textbook Series, Vol. 10, Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2003. Aadnoy, B. Modern Well Design, A.A. Balkema, 1999. Bourgoyne Jr., A., Millheim, K., Chenevert, M., Young Jr., F.S. Applied Drilling Engineering, SPE Textbook Series, Vol. 2, Society of Petroleum Engineers, 1991.