POSITIVISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES In the 1900s emerged the scientific paradigm of positivism, wherein researchers participate in the

community of study in order to gather data, and to write according to what they seein an objective, detached manner (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Positivism suggests that societies can be studied in a scientific manner like that of the natural sciences (Babbie, 2001) as the social world follows the same organized, linear and observable laws as the natural world (Baldus, 1990). Stace (1944: 215) attempts to operationalize the definition of positivism:

A set of words purporting to express a factual proposition P is significant only if it is possible to deduce or infer from it.some propositions (at least one) Q, the truth or falsity of which it would be logically possible to verify by direct observation. If no such directly observable deductions from P are possibleP is not really a proposition

Positivism in this essence requires direct observation of phenomena in order to prove a hypothesis. Failure to achieve direct observation renders the hypothesis invalid. Stace (1944) however qualified this statement and added that since some facts are not directly observable and we cannot reject their truthfulness, direct observation cannot be considered as a must, but indirect or partial observation qualifies to determine the truth. Positivism requires observation and rejects abstraction. A hypothesis then for positivism can only be proven through experiential and experimental observation. There is no room for speculations and unexamined assumptions that are not proven by observation. Abbagnano (1967) discusses three forms of positivism: the social positivism of SaintSimon (which later influenced the works of Auguste Comte) which says that the scientific man through the destruction of theological and metaphysical doctrines had freed himself from the shackles of the Middle Ages and is now free to reunite and organize itself according to a new system and hence humans are evolving; evolutionary positivism which supports social positivism but forwards that progress is in a biological and physical sphere; and lastly, critical positivism, which states that facts are relatively stable groups of sensations connected to and dependent on each other. Critical positivism posits that science is the only tool that humans can use to be able to confront the numerous sensations he encounters to be able to survive; the purpose of science to

humans is as such to help it to survive by helping it adapt, and not by giving it faculties for speculation or contemplation. This brand of positivistic natural sciences is not entirely applicable to the social sciences due to the differences in their focus and goals of research. Unlike in the natural sciences, results derived from experimentation or observation are not consistent over time and space. People are dynamic and animate. The positivism of the natural sciences looks for generalizations and laws uniformity and consistencythat cannot be achieved in the study of human relationships. Results may vary over cultures, time and geographical locations whereas there is a certain degree of constancy and universalism when it comes to the objects of research in the natural sciences. In addition, the methods used to derive these results are sometimes unrepeatable. The positivist approach also does not allow for metaphysical contemplation, assumptions which are based from abstraction or logic and not from scientific experience. Positivisms demand for scientific evidence and the detachment of the researcher from the research in order to avoid input of abstracted information is an aim towards an objective trutha value- free research. What do we exactly mean if we say value- free? It is not, Weber (1949) points out, the same as value-indifference, because apathy is not the same as objectivity. Instead, Momin (1972) clarifies, it is the isolated and impartial empirical investigation of social phenomena. It is therefore to function as an objective scienceobjective in the sense that it should be observed from a certain distance, like pulling oneself out from the picture in order to see the picture. Max Weber (1949) contends that the social sciences cannot be absolutely value- free. Social science research should be value-neutral, though, because in the gathering and investigation of phenomena a researcher must be able to be objective but the formation of systems in a society can never be value-free. He differentiates the social scientist from the natural scientist, saying that social scientists must take into account the meanings that actors attribute to their interactions when considering connections (Weber 1949). This level of familiarity with the participants should not extend so much, however, that the researcher can no longer pull himself apart from the perspective of the community, or his own perspective for that matter, that he can no longer see the whole picture. It is impossible, however, according to Weber (1949) for a researcher to arrive at a rational understanding of any phenomena if not for a logical and historically-defined standard of value beyond individual sentiment. He debunks Nietzsches (1982) perspectivist stance

that the interpretation of data involves unavoidable bias and selective observation from the point of view of the researcher because the researcher could only see so much. Weber (1949) countered this by saying that once a particular end or value has been established, social science can be viewed objectively and the researcher can proceed to be objective in data gathering and interpretation. Several critiques emerged as a reaction to Webers methods of sociological research. One such writer is Alvin Gouldner (as cited in Chriss, 1999) who lamented over social scientists blind devotion to positivism, to objectivity, because in doing so are throwing away their human potentials, to quote, their playful impulses, their unverified hunches, and speculative imagination all for the sake of an unverified speculation that objective science is the best science. Positivism requires the researcher to record data as it is and not tamper the objectivity by interpreting it, therefore mixing subjectivity into the research which allegedly dilutes the reliability of the data. A researcher in the positivistic field is not an interpreter, but a record- keeper. However, the very nature of social science research requires the researcher to make sense of different phenomena via interpretation. As Gouldner (1962) says, value-free science is absurd because it requires rationality but throws away the worth of experience, experience which actually separates the social scientist from the average person and thus distinguishes the work of a social scientist from one who is not. Such a dispassionate framework only puts to waste the knowledge drawn from experience of a social scientist, as he differs from the common man by his ability to understand and explain what he sees around him, and not act as a mere recorder. If the researcher cannot separate himself from the object of research, we may ask, then does this not mean that his interpretation is prejudiced at some point and therefore unreliable? In the social sciences, there is what we call the emic (insider) and the etic (outsider) perspective, and these two points of view may collide (Harris, 1976), because the insiders view of his/her actions may be in discrepancy of the outsiders judgment of the insiders actions. As researchers seeing the etic perspective, we hold certain ethical standards because as interpreters of data we have the power to mislead our readers, even ourselves, and thus in the process devalue our participants. The whole interpretation of research in the social sciences must then adhere in relation to its participants. It is against the ethical researcher to disregard the emic perspective and unwise even to do so.

In dealing with the society at hand, then, rigid scientific methods cannot work because the researcher needs to be in a certain level of immersion in the society or the community to be able to understand and thus interpret. Absolute objectivity in the natural sciences is possible only because they deal with inanimate objects and living beings which are not as complex as humans. The very impersonality of an objective social science delegates the members of society to that of an object as the natural sciences tend to treat their study. The aura of the dispassionate and the detached is the prevailing social condition during those times, and so, according to Gouldner (1971) the proposition of such a value- free social science is just that: maintaining the status quo. What is the consequence of such an action? As social scientists we are expected to address the problems of humanity through the study of humanity. How indeed can the social sciences be of any particular help to the plight of the people if it chooses to separate itself from the very beings that it wishes to support, from the very circle from which it wants to enact change and progress? For the social sciences to be adapting a value-free methodology is in support of the anomic status quo which the discipline must be solving. An impersonal social science can never yield solutions to personal problems. Elbridge Sibley (1971) sums the problem in her statement: "sociologists are simultaneously charged with irresponsibility in standing aloof from the struggles for social justice and with serving assiduously as handmaidens of the forces of social injustice. Positivism entails value- free social sciences, but value-free social sciences washes its hands from the responsibility of dealing with the problems of society because it cannot possibly know the nature of its problems, the very cause and effect of it, without being involved. We cannot of course reject the assertion of Weber in defense of objective research. Weber (1949) says that when teaching, sociologists should avoid indoctrinating students with their own perspectives and judgments and instead teach them the facts. This is the same with treating social science as value free, then, if we take it from Weber, that in order not to taint social research with our own biased interpretations, we should take care not to insist on our own beliefs, which could be wrong, in order to deliver the truth. In general, positivism becomes a problem in social science especially in research primarily because it is not possible to separate experience from research. To do so would be apathetic, because the study of human beings requires the social scientist to be well- acquainted with the participants to be able to provide solutions or in the least explanations for their problems.

We can say therefore that it is not altogether possible to be very objective in social research because of the nature of the study of human beings does not deal with constant entities like that in the natural sciences. It requires a certain degree of awareness of the plight of the people because there are many angles and many reasons to explain a single phenomenon. Since we are dealing with complex and multidimensional beings, we need a great deal of experience to be able to decide for ourselves the best course of going about in a research. Not all knowledge is acquired through formal education, but also from tradition. Hence not all phenomena can be explained by rigid science because some beliefs are entirely unscientific. As opposed to the natural sciences, humans are not governed by an easily-distinguishable and irrefutable universal law, and therefore it is unwise for a researcher to assume that since Society A is X then Society B is also X. Likewise, a biased social science is not also what we are aiming for. We are not saying that because the social sciences is not value-free, it is excusable for a researcher to exaggerate or input his prejudice in a research. The social sciences is still a science, and therefore a researcher as opposed to a layman has knowledge and experience enough to hold his prejudices from rendering his research invalid. Instead, it is profitable for a researcher to hold in check these biases not from distancing himself from his participants but by gaining a more thorough understanding of them through an interactive, two- way communication.

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