G.R. No.

L-26760 April 30, 1971 JOAQUINA VENTURA assisted

en banc by her husband, JOSE VENTURA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. EUSEBIO BERNABE, defendant-appellee.

(Malicious prosecution)

BARREDO, J.: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, dismissing on the ground that the "complaint states no cause of action" its Civil Case No. C-628, an action for damages based upon an alleged malicious prosecution. According to the record on appeal, for the crime of falsification of a private document allegedly committed against appellee Eusebio Bernabe, appellant Joaquina Ventura stood trial in the Court of First Instance of Rizal upon the following complaint filed with the fiscal's office: The undersigned accuses JOAQUINA DE VENTURA of the crime of "Falsification of Private Document" under Art. 172 subpar. (2) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows: That on or about October 4, 1958, in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully and feloniously commit falsification in a private document, to wit: the said accused WILLFULLY, UNLAWFULLY and FELONIOUSLY presented to Mr. Eusebio B. Bernabe a supposed letter of Cmdr. Marcelino Calinawan, Jr. of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee addressed to Mr. Bernabe asking for a loan of P350.00 and the accused further stating that Cmdr. Calinawan was then in her residence waiting for the money and with the instruction to hand to her the money for delivery to Cmdr. Calinawan which Mr. Bernabe did by issuing a Bank of America Check No. 703659 dated October 5, 1958 for P350.00 and handing the same to the accused; that upon verification, it has been found out that the letter above referred to was never and has never been made by Cmdr. Calinawan and that the signature appearing on the same is not the signature of Cmdr. Calinawan; that the said check has already been cash(ed) on or about October 7, 1958 to the damage and prejudice of Mr. Eusebio B. Bernabe in the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW and was ultimately acquitted in a decision of said court as follows: During the trial of this case, Eusebio Bernabe pointed at the accused and told the Court that he had known her and her husband as early as 1958; that he and accused's husband, are compadres. Bernabe testified that Maj. Ventura, accused's husband, in the year 1958, was one of the members of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee, which was under the chairmanship of Commander Calinawan. He said that he was an agent of Ventura and as such he had some dealings with Commander Calinawan, thru Ventura; that during the year 1968, Marcelino Calinawan on five occasions asked him for sums of money thru Maj. Ventura, which sums all amounted to P2,000.00; that he gave all this money to Marcelino Calinawan thru Ventura altho he admitted that he does not know and has not yet met the said Commander Calinawan. On October 4, 1958, Bernabe said the accused went to his house and showed to him a letter purporting to be, signed by Commander Calinawan, asking for the sum of P350.00; that on the strength of this letter and the representation of the accused that Calinawan was in her house waiting for the money, he right away made a check, Exh. B, and delivered it to the said accused, Bernabe further testified that later on he went to see Commander Calinawan and inquired

whether he received the money and the latter replied that he never received any; that he showed Calinawan the letter, Exh. A, and the latter denied that he wrote the said letter. In her defense, the accused vigorously denied that she went to the house of Eusebio Bernabe and gave the letter, Exh. A. She also denied having received the check on October 4, 1962. She said that on October 4, 1962 she did not go out of her house because she has just delivered and was still weak. The accused further testified that the complainant in filing this case against her must have been motivated because of a series of misunderstandings he had with her husband. The accused claims that she does not know Commander Calinawan. After hearing the evidence of the prosecution and that of the accused the Court finds the following as established facts: That Eusebio Bernabe was an agent of Maj. Ventura. Major Ventura in turn was an agent of Commander Calinawan who was at that time the Chairman of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee. Bernabe does not know Calinawan and has no direct contact with him, and that as an agent of Maj. Ventura Bernabe has been giving money to Calinawan which totalled all in all P2,000.00. Now, on these facts, several questions puzzled the Court. Why was Bernabe giving money to Calinawan when according to his own testimony he does not know the said Calinawan? Why did Bernabe go to Calinawan in order to verify about the letter, Exh. A, and also to find out whether he has received the money that he gave to the accused when he did not do so when he gave Calinawan the sums of money that totalled all in all P2,000.00? The failure of Bernabe to explain these circumstances has made the evidence of the prosecution incoherent and vague and, eventually, affected the credibility of the said Bernabe. On the other hand, the Court finds that the testimony of the accused is more credible. The accused said that Bernabe filed the instant case because of a series of misunderstandings that the said Bernabe had with her husband, Maj. Ventura. This was not even rebutted by the prosecution. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged, and, therefore ACQUITS her, with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Subsequent to this acquittal, appellant, with the assistance of her husband, her co-appellant, filed the abovementioned civil case against appellee Bernabe praying "that judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant: (a) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00 for moral damages and another amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary and/or corrective damages; (b) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 for actual damages for attorney's fees incurred in connection with Criminal Case No. 9003, the sum of P720.00 for premium paid on plaintiff's bail bond for 4 years in connection with the Criminal Case No. 9003 and another sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees in the instant case; (c) and to pay the cost of suit and such other just and equitable reliefs and remedies in and about the premises. upon the allegation that said "defendant formulated against the plaintiff (the above) criminal charge before the Fiscal's Office, with malicious intent and/or malice aforethought, and without justifiable cause or motive whatsoever, other than to wreck vengeance on the plaintiff and her husband (against) whom defendant had an

axe to grind, and for the purpose of smearing the honor, reputation and prestige of the plaintiff and her family and to embarrass and expose her to public ridicule and contempt, which led to the filing before the Court of First Instance of Rizal of a criminal case docketed as No. 9003 for Estafa thru Falsification of Private Document; copy of the information (criminal complaint above-quoted) is hereto attached and marked Annex A of this complaint" and "by reason of defendant's malicious and unjustifiable filing of the criminal action", she suffered the damages claimed in the above-quoted prayer. In due time, appellee filed a motion to dismiss grounded thus: It is the theory of the defendant that the facts alleged in the complaint does not state a cause of action because the Supreme Court ruled that: "No civil action for damages on account of malicious prosecution can be maintained unless the court in acquitting the defendant of the criminal charge orders a criminal prosecution to be commenced against the complaining witness for false prosecution. (Gonzales Quiros vs. Palanca Tan Guinlay, 5 Phil. 675; Herrera vs. Escoto, 56 Phil. 804; Eclarin vs. Municipality of Tayabas, 32 Phil. 368; US vs. Barrera, 4 Phil. 461)" "(For) An action instituted for the recovery for (the) injury and damage as a result of a false denunciation or libelous accusation, (may) to be proper and maintainable before the courts it is indispensable that, in the judgment, whereby the accused is absolved or in the order of the final dismissal, the said denunciation or accusation is expressly certified to be false or libelous, otherwise the action cannot prosper. (Grattage vs. Standard Fuel Co., 20 Phil. 460)" As gleaned from the above-named rulings of the Supreme Court, action for damages based on malicious prosecution would only lie if the court that renders the decision acquitting the accused declares that the offense charged is false and malicious or orders the prosecution of the complaining witness. A careful perusal of the decision at bar, will show that the same does not contain such declaration or order. The Honorable Judge Andres Reyes simply absolved the accused or the herein plaintiff of the offense charged without, however, making any pronouncement or explicit statements that the accusation is false and libelous; neither did he order that the complaining witness or the herein defendant be proceeded against through an information by the prosecuting officer. Moreover, after examining the findings of the Court in the instant case, it is safe to conclude that the herein plaintiff was acquitted not because the accusation against him is fabricated but on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. and over the vigorous objection of the appellant, the trial court issued the appealed order of dismissal, pertinent portions of which read: Acting now on said motion and upon careful consideration and study of the case at bar, as well as the arguments adduced for and against said motion, the Court is of the opinion that the complaint states no cause of action. This conclusion is buttressed by the doctrine enunciated in the case of Grattage vs. Standard Fuel Co., Inc., 20 Phil. 460 wherein it is stated that: Malicious Prosecution; Declaration by the Trial Judge; Action for Damages.In order that an action for damages may lie upon a false charge or accusation of a crime of a public nature, it is indispensable that the final decree of acquittal or dismissal in such case should declare that it is false and slanderous. In the absence of such declaration, the false accuser can not be prosecuted upon a claim for indemnity under article 326 of the Penal Code.

Id; Id; Id.When in proceedings had in the investigation of a crime falsely charged, the judgment or order of
dismissal does not expressly declare that the denunciation or accusation is false and libelous, there is no basis upon which to rest a claim of civil liability, which is merely a consequence of the criminal responsibility. (Gonzales Quiros vs. Palanca Tan Guinlay, 5 Phil. Rep. 675) In this appeal, appellants' brief, which, incidentally, leaves much room for improvement, assigns three errors allegedly committed by the court below but centers its discussion only on the point that His Honor has erroneously relied on old decisions of this Court applying Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1887 which required as a condition precedent for the filing of a suit for malicious prosecution (acusacion o denuncia falsa) a previous court finding specifically to the effect that the previous accusation was false, inasmuch as, according to appellants, said Article 326 has not been carried over in the Revised Penal Code. While it is obvious that the argument that the stated requirement of the old penal code Article 326 no longer holds under the present laws under which appellants' complaint was filed is well taken, appellants' brief has left it to this Court to note by itself what in fact is the more serious and fatal error committed by the trial court, namely, that it dismissed appellants' complaint notwithstanding that it sufficiently states in form and in substance a cause of action for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 and related provisions of the Civil Code. Exercising Our discretion as authorized by Section 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court, We opt to consider said plain error on Our own initiative and, in consequence, We reverse the appealed order of dismissal. The sole point raised by appellants regarding Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code and the decisions applying the same, Grattage v. Standard Fuel Co., 20 Phil. 460; Gonzales Quiros v. Palanca Tan Guinlay, 5 Phil. 675;Herrera v. Escoto, 56 Phil. 804; U.S. v. Barrera, 4 Phil. 461 and Eclarin v. Municipality of Tayabas, 32 Phil. 368, cited by the trial court as well as by appellee, needs no elaborate discussion. People vs. Rivera, 59 Phil. 326, settled definitely that Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code "does not appear in the Revised Penal Code, which contains no offense denominated "acusacion o denuncia falsa" or its equivalent." The only provision of the Revised Penal Code which may be said to refer to the same subject is Article 363 on Incriminatory Machination providing thus: ART. 363. Incriminating innocent person.Any person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime shall be punished by arresto mayor. As has already been held in Rivera, this article does not contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution in the sense of someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court: Comparing now article 363 of the Revised Penal Code with article 326 of the old Penal Code, it will be observed that under article 326 of the former Penal Code, the gravamen of the offense is the imputation itself when made before an administrative or judicial officer, whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code the gravamen (sic) of the offense is performing an act which "tends directly" to such an imputation. Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes false prosecutions whereas article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any act which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution. It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear, it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it obscure. Such secondary sources may be resorted to in order to remove, not to create doubt. (Cf. People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499.) In the present case we think it proper to call attention to the title immediately preceding article 363 of the Revised Penal Code which is as follows: "Asechanzas Inculpatorias", as throwing some light on the classes of acts which tend directly to lead to false prosecutions. The word asechanza, as defined in standard dictionaries, means as follows:

"Intriga, lazo, red, zancadilla, tranquilla, amao, engao, artificio, trama, treta especie de maquinacion urdida, de celada dispuesta contraalguno, bien sea para perderlo enteramente, bien para jugarle (sinhundirlo) alguno mala pasada. Engao o artificio para hacer dao a otro. Usase, por lo comun, en el plural, asechanzas". Accion y efecto de asechar. It seems to us a forced extension of the term asechanza to bring aformal criminal complaint within the conception of intriga, engao, artificio, etc. It seems the more reasonable and sensible interpretation to limit article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to acts of "planting" evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. Appellants do not pretend, neither have they alleged in their complaint that appellee has planted evidence against them. At the most, what appellee is alleged to have done is that he had filed the criminal complaint above-quoted against appellant Joaquina Ventura without justifiable cause or motive and had caused the same to be prosecuted, with him (appellee) testifying falsely as witness for the prosecution. These acts do not constitute incriminatory machination, particularly, because Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishing said crime expressly excludes perjury 1 as a means of committing the same. To be sure, for the purposes of the present civil case, it is of no moment that there is no such crime of malicious prosecution in the Revised Penal Code. The present civil action need not be based on the existence of such a crime Article 2219 of the Civil Code which provides that "moral damages may be recovered in the following cases: (8) Malicious prosecution" would more than sufficiently serve as a basis for relief in court against a party who has maliciously caused another to baselessly and unjustifiably undergo a criminal prosecution for an offense he knows the latter has not committed. Related provisions like Article 21 of the same code providing, "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage" and Article 2176 on torts or quasi-delict may also serve the purpose. We have referred to Rivera only to show that the provision of Article 326 of the Spanish Penal Code to the effect that "no se procedera, sin embargo, contra el denunciador o acusador sino en virtud de sentencia firme o auto, tambien firme de sobreseimiento del tribunal que hubiere conocido del delito imputado", whether it referred to a subsequent civil or criminal proceeding, has no counterpart in the articles of the Civil Code just mentioned nor in any other law or rule of court. Thus, all that the aggrieved party in a case of malicious prosecution has to prove to merit the award of damages is that he has been denounced or charged falsely of an offense by the defendant, that the latter knows that the charge was false, that the said defendant acted with malice and, of course, the damages he has suffered. In Martinez v. United Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-24017, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 524, Mr. Justice Makalintal, speaking for the Court, held: Malicious prosecution, to be the basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice and want of probable cause in the prosecution of an action against the plaintiff. A third element is that the defendant must himself be the prosecutor or the instigator of the prosecution, which ended in acquittal. These elements are discussed in the case of Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban, (32 Phil. 363.) thus: "To support an action for malicious prosecution under American law the plaintiff must prove, in the first place, the fact of the prosecution and the fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, or that he instigated its commencement, and that it finally terminated in his acquittal, that, in bringing it, the prosecutor had acted without probable cause, and that he was actuated by legal malice, i.e., by improper or sinister motives. These three elements must concur; and there is no distinction between actions for criminal prosecution, and civil suits. Both classes require substantially the same essentials. Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary damages. But malice alone does

not make one liable for malicious prosecution, where probable cause is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought for the mere purpose of vexing, harassing and injuring his adversary. In other words, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action." (Quoted in Rehabilitation Finance Corp. v. Koh, L-15512, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 535, 540.) It is true that in that case of Martinez, this Court sustained the order of dismissal of the complaint for malicious prosecution partly because a preliminary investigation had been conducted by the fiscal who had found probable cause for the filing of an estafa case against Martinez, but the main consideration for such action of this Court was the fact that from the recitals in the judgment acquitting the plaintiff, it appeared that although the court found that said plaintiff had been guilty of deceit, the issue resolved by the court was that in law such deceit did not constitute estafa, a matter which had been passed upon by the fiscal in a different way, naturally, without any fault on the part of the defendant. In other words, in Martinez case, the findings of the criminal court in the decision of acquittal negatived the imputation of malice on the part of the defendant in charging plaintiff with estafa before the fiscal. In the case at bar, the complaint alleges, as earlier stated, that "defendant formulated against the plaintiff (the above) criminal charge before the Fiscal's Office, with malicious intent and/or malice aforethought, and without justifiable cause or motive whatsoever, other than to wreck vengeance on the plaintiff and her husband (against) whom defendant had an axe to grind, and for the purpose of smearing the honor, reputation and prestige of the plaintiff and her family and to embarrass and expose her to public ridicule and contempt, which led to the filing before the Court of First Instance of Rizal of a criminal case docketed as No. 9003 for Estafa thru Falsification of Private Document; copy of the information (criminal complaint abovequoted) is hereto attached and marked Annex A of this complaint" and "by reason of defendant's malicious and unjustifiable filing of the criminal action", she suffered the damages claimed in the above-quoted prayer. Unlike in the Martinez case, We cannot say that the aforequoted decision that acquitted Bernabe suggests clearly that said respondent had good reasons to accuse appellant Joaquina Ventura as he did. Quite on the contrary, the findings of the court that the "testimony of the accused is more credible" and that the testimony of said accused that "Bernabe filed the instant case because of a series of misunderstanding that the said Bernabe had with her husband, Maj. Ventura was not even rebutted by the prosecution", would seem to indicate otherwise, that is, that the exculpatory version of the accused was the true one. In any event, whether or not all the circumstances would show actual or legal malice is a matter of proof. At this juncture, the only question before Us is whether or not the complaint of appellants make out a case of damages for malicious prosecution. In Palma vs. Graciano, 99 Phil. 72, penned by no less than our present Chief Justice Concepcion, it was pertinently pointed out: ... The order of dismissal complained of is predicated upon the theory that the filing of the information above referred to, is "presumed" to have been made "in good faith" and that, in fact, the proper court had found the existence of probable cause against plaintiff herein, contrary to the allegations in the complaint, which specifically charges "bad faith", lack of "any probable cause", desire to give vent to "personal hatred and vengeance," and intent to harass and embarrass the plaintiff and to besmirch his honor and reputation. The only question for determination by the court, at the time of the issuance of said order, was whether or not the

complaint states a cause of action. This implied that said issue was to be passed upon on the basis of allegations of the complaint, assuming them to be true. Instead, his honor, the trial judge inquired into the
truth of said allegations and, in effect, found them to be false. And this it did without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove his aforesaid allegations. Thus, the lower court had, not only exceeded its jurisdiction, by going beyond the purview of the issue posed by defendants' motion to dismiss, but, also, denied due process

of law to plaintiff herein, by, in effect deciding the case on the merits, before it had been submitted for decision and before plaintiff had a chance to introduce evidence in support of the allegations of his complaint." As may be noted, the phraseology of the material allegations of the complaint in this case and those in the above case of Palma are practically identical, for which reason, a similar result is called for. After all, what could be a safe test as to whether or not there is malicious prosecution is indicated in Buenaventura, et al. v.

Sto. Domingo and Ignacio, 103 Phil. 239, thus:

It is true that the present action is not criminal but civil in nature, but the provisions of the Civil Code in making reference to malicious prosecution must necessarily imply that the person to be held liable to pay moral damages should have acted deliberately and with knowledge that his accusation of the person subject to such malicious prosecution, was false and groundless. The same thing is true as regards the demand for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation authorized under Article 2208, No. 3 of the Civil Code. Substantially, if not literally, and on the whole, this is what the complaint here in question alleges, hence Our conclusion that the same states a cause of action. For the rest, it might just as well be clarified here, lest some statements in Martinez and Buenaventura relative to the materiality of the fiscal's having filed an information on the question of malice of the accuser may be misunderstood, that such participation of the fiscal is not decisive and that malice may still be shown, the holding of a preliminary investigation and the finding of probable cause by the fiscal notwithstanding. The same may be said of cases where preliminary investigations are conducted by judges. The determination of the issue of malice must always be made to rest on all the attendant circumstances, including the possibility of the fiscal or judge being some-how misled by the accuser's evidence. No doubt, the very purpose of preliminary investigations is to avoid baseless and malicious prosecutions, still, whether or not in a particular case such an objective has been duly pursued is a matter of proof. Just as it is bad to encourage the indiscriminate filing of actions for damages by accused persons after they have been acquitted, whether correctly or incorrectly, a blanket clearance of all who may be minded to charge others with offenses, fancied or otherwise, without any chance of the aggrieved parties in the appropriate cases of false accusation to obtain relief, is in Our opinion short of being good law. In this connection, it may be mentioned that in the original draft of the Civil Code prepared by the Code Commission, the present provisions on human relations, evidencing concern so that offended parties in criminal cases may have redress in civil actions independently of the fate of the corresponding criminal case or even without this, were in a sense counter-balanced by a proposal to make the state itself liable in damages to anyone who might, on the other hand, be erroneously or falsely charged with an offense by the government prosecutor. As has happened, however, such an idea did not gain legislative approval. This accounts for the absence of any specific provision on malicious prosecution in the chapter on human relations, but it also indicates that in the mind of the legislators the primary responsibility for a false charge is with the person who initiates or instigates the criminal prosecution and Articles 2219, 21 and 2176 may be availed of in particular instances where such person is actuated by malice or other evil motive. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is reversed and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent with the above opinion, with costs against appellee.

G.R. No. 168301

THIRD DIVISION Petitioners,

ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT,

-versus MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT, RAMON H. MONFORT, JACQUELINE M. YUSAY, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER S. MONFORT, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and CITY PROSECUTOR OF CADIZ CITY, Respondents. Promulgated: March 5, 2007 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners Antonio B. Monfort III and Ildefonso B. Monfort seek to set aside the Decision dated 28 January 2005[2] and Resolution dated 26 May 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67109. In its Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolutions dated 11 October 2000[4] and 15 August 2001,[5] of the Secretary of Justice which dismissed the petitioners criminal complaint for perjury against private respondents Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra, Paul Monfort, Ramon H. Monfort, Jacqueline M. Yusay, Yvette M. Benedicto and Ester S. Monfort.

The factual antecedents are as follows: Petitioners are children of the late Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., one of the original stockholders/incorporators of the Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation (MHADC).[6] On 28 October 1998, petitioners filed a letter-complaint for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz against private respondents. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 8009. In the said complaint, petitioners claimed that the private respondents made false statements in their respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 which the latter had executed and submitted to the City Prosecutor of Cadiz in connection with another complaint for perjury, docketed as I.S. No. 7883, earlier filed by the petitioners against the private respondents. The alleged false statements referred to the declarations of the private respondents that the 1996 annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected as board directors of the MHADC during the same meeting. Petitioners insisted that the 1996 annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held, not on 16 October 1996, but on 27 November 1996 as stated in the 1996 General Information Sheet (GIS) accomplished by the MHADC and submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Iloilo Extension Office. Further, there is nothing in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC which states that an election of the board of directors of the MHADC took place on 16 October 1996.[7]

Subsequently, private respondents filed their joint counter-affidavits dated 9 December 1998 in I.S. No. 8009 before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz. They alleged that they are stockholders of record of the MHADC; that a stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 where they were elected as board directors of MHADC; that the MHADCs corporate accountant, Litonjua, Desabelle and Associates (LDA), was responsible for the preparation of the MHADCs GIS; that the LDA made erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS of MHADC; that the erroneous statements refer to the date of the MHADCs annual stockholders meeting and the persons

composing the MHADCs board of directors; that the LDA had admitted having committed such honest error; that the LDA had rectified the same by submitting a letter to the SEC informing the latter that the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC for the year 1996 was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27 November 1996; that what transpired on 27 November 1996 was not the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC but merely a special meeting of the board of directors thereof; and, that, the private respondents were elected as board directors of the MHADC during the annual stockholders meeting on 16 October 1996.[8]

Private respondents thus argue that they cannot be held liable for perjury since one of the elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is that the assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that the terms willful and deliberate imply malice and evil intent in asserting falsehood; and that this element is lacking in the case at bar.[9]

Thereafter, Investigating Prosecutor Abraham E. Tionko (Investigator Tionko) issued a Resolution dated 14 April 1999 in I.S. No. 8009 dismissing the letter-complaint for perjury of the petitioners for lack of probable cause.[10] Investigator Tionko noted that the statements in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC are indeed erroneous. The 1996 GIS stated that the stockholders meeting and election of the board of directors took place on 27 November 1996. If such information were true and correct, then according to Investigator Tionko, it would have been impossible for some of the board directors to be elected as such on 27 November 1996 since they were already deceased at that time.[11] Moreover, if the 1996 annual stockholders meeting of MHADC was indeed held on 27 November 1996 which fell on a Wednesday, it would have been inconsistent with the bylaws of the MHADC which states that the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC shall be held on the last Thursday of November, which, according to the 1996 calendar, fell on 28 November 1996. As to the matter of whether or not the stockholders may hold their annual meeting on a date other than that specified in its by-laws, Investigator Tionko opined that such is not within the province of his office to rule.[12]

He, thereafter, made the following findings: that it was not impossible for the MHADC stockholders to have conducted their annual meeting on 16 October 1996; that there would have been willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the part of the private respondents only if no error was committed in the preparation of the 1996 GIS of MHADC; that private respondent Ramon H. Monfort was not aware of the said errors at the time he subscribed and swore to the correctness of the 1996 GIS of MHADC as Vice-President thereof; that upon the discovery of the errors, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC providing the latter with the correct information; that such should be considered as mere negligence and imprudence on the part of private respondent Ramon H. Monfort; and that the crime of perjury cannot be committed by negligence or imprudence. The dispositive portion of Investigator Tionkos Resolution states:

WHEREFORE, the undersigned believes there is no probable cause to support a finding of perjury against all of the respondents and this complaint is hereby dismissed.[13]

Petitioners appealed the aforementioned Resolution to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor for Region VI. In his Resolution dated 19 November 1999, Regional State Prosecutor Vicente E. Aragona (Prosecutor Aragona) denied due course to petitioners appeal as the same was filed out of time.[14] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by Prosecutor Aragona in his Resolution dated 22 December 1999.[15] Prosecutor Aragona sustained the claim of the private respondents that the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 at Agmac Building, Bacolod City, where they were elected as board directors since this is supported by evidence on record consisting of the notices of stockholders meeting and registry return receipt.[16] He also affirmed that patent errors were committed in the preparation of the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. Pertinent portions of the 22 December 1999 Resolution of Prosecutor Aragona reads:

We then ruled and so rules here, that an erroneous document is incorrect and therefore not the truth. It cannot be used as basis to charge the respondents for Perjury, for the simple reason that it is not an evidence that they lied under oath. In fact, it is an evidence not only of it being an incorrect document but also of the fact that the November 27, 1996 meeting written in it was a mistake and that the dead persons listed as elected officers in that meeting is likewise a mistake. This evidence has no probative value to establish prima facie case for perjury because of its nature as being worthless due to its inherent incredibility to establish that November 27, 1996 is the true date of the Annual Stockholders Meeting of the Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation.

In view of the foregoing, the appeal should be, as it is hereby dismissed.[17] Petitioners, then, appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Finding no reversible error in Prosecutor Aragonas Resolution dated 22 December 1999, Undersecretary of Justice Regis V. Puno dismissed petitioners appeal in his Resolution dated 11 October 2000,[18] to wit:

This resolves the appeal from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI, Iloilo City in the above-entitled case dismissing the complaint against Ma. Antonia M. Salvatierra, et. al. for perjury.

Section 9 of Department Order No. 223 dated June 30 1993, as amended, (now Section 12 in relation to Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70 dated 3 July 2000), prescribing rules on appeals from resolution in preliminary investigations provides that the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright an appeal if there is showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution. We have carefully examined the record of the case and we found no such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify a reversal of his resolution, which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.[19]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of Undersecretary Punos Resolution dated 11 October 2000 but this was denied in the Resolution dated 15 August 2001 of Undersecretary of Justice Manuel A.J. Teehankee since no new matter was raised to warrant the review of the same,[20] viz: A perusal of the motion shows no new matter which was not taken into consideration in our review of the case. Hence, we find no compelling reason to alter or modify our resolution.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality.[21] Petitioners appealed the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 11 October 2000 and 15 August 2001, respectively, to the Court of Appeals. On 28 January 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the said resolutions.[22] It ruled that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion since its non-finding of probable cause for perjury against private respondents is based on law, jurisprudence and evidence on records. It also held that the private respondents had sufficiently established the fact that a stockholders meeting of the MHADC actually took place on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected during the said meeting as board directors. It further stated that willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood, as one of the elements of perjury, is not present in the instant case.[23] The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Resolutions dated October 11, 2000 and August 15, 2001 respectively, issued by the public respondent Secretary of Justice.[24]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 26 May 2005.[25]

Petitioners filed the present petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the Secretary of Justice that there is no probable cause to indict the private respondents for the crime of perjury.[26]

According to the petitioners, the insistence of the private respondents that the annual stockholders meeting of MHADC took place on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected during the said meeting as board directors constitute willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood because it is not in harmony with the constitution and by-laws of MHADC which provides that the annual stockholders meeting and the election of board directors shall be held every last Thursday of November for each year. They stressed the fact that the date 16 October 1996 is not the last Thursday of November in the year 1996. They also claimed that the notices of meeting dated 1 October 1996 received by the private respondents are incompetent to prove that the annual stockholders meeting and the election of directors of the MHADC took place on 16 October 1996. Further, the intent of the private respondents to commit a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood is

evident in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC which does not specify that an election of board directors took place on 16 October 1996.[27]

Petitioners also averred that the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in the 1996 GIS of MHADC was made by the LDA, MHADCs corporate accountant, only after the lapse of two years from the execution of the said document. They argued that the same was a futile attempt on the part of the private respondents to escape criminal liability since: a) at the time the corrections were made, they had already charged private respondent Ramon H. Monfort with perjury and falsification of private document for including in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC the names of stockholders who were already deceased as elected board directors of MHADC;[28] b) the alleged errors in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC, particularly in the composition of the alleged elected board of directors, is belied by the 1997 GIS of MHADC filed by private respondent Ramon H. Monfort which reiterated the names of the deceased stockholders as elected directors of MHADC; this is not just one mistake but two mistakes already; c) there was ill-motive on the part of the private respondents when it sent, through LDA, a letter to the SEC to correct the alleged errors because at the time such letter was received by the SEC, the City Prosecutor of Cadiz had already issued a resolution in I.S. No. 7883 finding probable cause for perjury against private respondents; and d) at the time of the correction of errors, a total of six or more criminal cases for perjury were already filed by the petitioners against private respondents and some are still pending resolution.[29]

Petitioners further asseverated that the private respondents statements in their respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 in I.S. No. 7883 that they were elected board directors during the 16 October 1996 annual stockholders meeting show willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood since the private respondents had made these same statements as their bases in filing civil cases for forcible entry and delivery of personal property against petitioners which cases, however, were eventually dismissed by this Court in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472.[30] They posited that this Court had dismissed the civil cases as the private respondents failed to establish the fact that they were duly elected as board directors of MHADC and, as such, were not authorized to file the said cases. Based on these premises, petitioners concluded that there is more than enough evidence to support the finding of probable cause for perjury against private respondents.[31]

These contentions are devoid of merit. It should be emphasized at the outset that the function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.[32] It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence of a probable cause that would warrant the prosecution of a case.[33] Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual or positive cause; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[34]

In this proceeding, the prosecutor is vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of corresponding information.[35] If the prosecutor found probable cause to indict the respondent for a criminal offense, it is his duty to file the corresponding information in court.[36] However, it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.[37] Pineda,[38] thus: We explained the rationale in the case of People v.

A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspects right to due process - the sporting idea of fair play - may be transgressed. x x x.

Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter.[39] Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code states the definition of and penalty for perjury, thus:

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly make untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned made in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the elements of perjury are as follows: (a) (b) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter. That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. (c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d)

That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal. purpose. [40]

The third element of perjury requires that the accused had willfully and deliberately asserted a falsehood. A mere assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. The assertion must be deliberate and willful.[41] In the instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the fact that the private respondents made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in their counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998.

Private respondent Ramon H. Monfort had sufficiently and reasonably explained the circumstances surrounding the preparation and his signing of the erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. He narrated that as Vice-President of the MHADC, he signed and certified the same under oath; that he was not, however, aware of the erroneous statements therein at the time when he signed it; that it was LDA as MHADCs corporate accountant which had solely prepared the 1996 GIS of the MHADC; that he always relied on the accuracy of LDA; that he hastily signed it since, at that time, the LDA representative was in a hurry to beat the deadline in submitting the same to the SEC; that after being informed of the erroneous statements, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC informing the latter of the mistakes and supplying the correct informations therein; that the erroneous statements were due to the oversight of the LDA; and, that he admitted that he was negligent in not carefully reading and analyzing the statements therein.[42]

The nave reliance of the private respondents on the foregoing circumstances in executing their respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 negates willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused.[43] Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth.[44] It must appear that the accused knows his

In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith that, based on the above-explained events, their statements in their respective counter- affidavits dated 11 June 1998 are true and correct. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the allegation of deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases.[45]

It should also be borne in mind that perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense.[46] The private respondents had consistently claimed that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is erroneous on its face. They have maintained all along their stand that the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27 November 1996. They also submitted documentary evidence to prove that the annual stockholders meeting took place on 16 October 1996, and that the LDA had already communicated to the SEC the mistakes and corrections in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC.[47] In addition thereto, they also submitted a

letter coming from the SEC which acknowledged the corrections therein and had noted that the same now form part of the records of the MHADC.[48]

Further, the Secretary of Justice had found that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is patently erroneous.

It

concluded that the same is worthless and has no probative value in evidence because it does not establish the fact that the true date of the annual stockholders meeting for the year 1996 took place on 27 November 1996. This finding was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 28 January 2005.

As a general rule, this Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against an offender.[49] As an exception, however, this Court may inquire into the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation if, based on the records, the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.[50] In the case at bar, the City Prosecutor of Cadiz, the Regional State Prosecutor for Region VI, and the Secretary of Justice had consistently ruled that there is no probable cause to indict the private respondents for the crime of perjury. We find no grave abuse of discretion or manifest error on their part considering the fact that their non-finding of probable cause is supported by the evidence on record. It is well to state, too, that the resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is accorded high respect and generally conclusive on this Court.[51] We find no exceptional reasons to deviate from this principle.

The pronouncements of this Court in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472[52] do not automatically imply that there is sufficient evidence or probable cause to indict the private respondents for the crime of perjury. It should be underscored that in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472, there is no finding with regard to the correct date of the 1996 annual stockholders meeting and the election of the board of directors as to bind this Court in the Petition at bar.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67109 dated 28 January 2005 and 26 May 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

ROBERT LASTRILLA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 160257

Present:

Puno, J., Chairman, - versus Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ. Sandoval-Gutierrez,

RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Respondent. January 31, 2006

Promulgated:

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, J.: Petitioner Robert Lastrilla seeks the partial reversal of the July 18, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 26273 which modified the May 8, 2002 Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ), finding probable cause to file three (3) informations charging him with the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code. The facts are as follows:

Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses Rafael and AuroraGranda, who died in June 1989 and September 16, 2000, respectively. The Granda spouses had ten children, namely: Blanquita Serafica, Jesse[1] Granda, Aurora Sumcad, Violeta Cuenca, Rafael R. Granda, Olivia Walker, Lourdes Manabat, Fernando Granda, Benjamin Granda and Silvina Granda. Respondent's father, JesseGranda, predeceased the spouses. During Aurora's lifetime, she owned several parcels of land with some improvements thereon inTacloban City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-249, T-1312, T-816 and T-9874, all registered in her name.[2] Said parcels of land were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses, as evidenced by the following deeds of absolute sale, all dated December 7, 1985, witnessed by petitioner and the deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina and notarized by Atty. Camilo Camenforte, to wit: (a) The first Deed of Absolute Sale involved two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-249 and T-1312, which were sold by the Granda spouses, as vendors, in favor of petitioner's siblings Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, as vendees, for a consideration of P3,800,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by the spouses;[3] (b) The second Deed of Absolute Sale involved two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-816, which were likewise sold by the Granda spouses, as vendors, in favor of petitioner's siblings Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, as vendees, for a consideration of P5,000,000.00, receipt of which was also acknowledged by the spouses;[4]and (c) The third Deed of Absolute Sale involved three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-6736, which were sold by the Granda spouses, as vendors, in favor of petitioner and his spouse Norma Lastrilla, as vendees, for a consideration of P200,000.00, receipt of which was also acknowledged by the deceased spouses.[5]

On February 28, 2000, the deeds of absolute sale involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1312, T816 and T-249 were annotated at the back of their corresponding TCTs. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-1312, T816, and T-249 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400, and T-54401, respectively, were issued in the names of the respective vendees.[6] The deed of absolute sale involving the properties covered by TCT No. 6736 was not annotated as said TCT was found to be non-existent. On February 21, 2001 or more than five months after Aurora's death, respondent filed the instant complaint[7] for Violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner, Silvina, Atty.Camenforte, Norma Lastrilla, Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, docketed as I.S. No. 2001-343. Respondent claimed that a month after his grandmother's death, he learned that all of the latter's properties in Tacloban were sold to different persons sometime in 1999-2000. To verify such reports, he requested copies of the purported deeds of absolute sale with the Register of Deeds and was able to obtain copies of the three (3) deeds of absolute sale in question. Upon careful scrutiny of the subject deeds, he noticed that the signatures of his deceased grandparents were falsified. Upon verification, the examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed that the signatures of respondent's deceased grandfather Rafael in the deeds and his specimen signatures "were not written by one hand and the same person." They also found that the signatures of his deceased grandfather and the signatures of the deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina "reveal some similarities in stroke structure, indicative of one writer." Likewise, the examining officers found that the signatures of respondent's grandmother Aurora in the questioned deeds and her specimen signatures "were not written by one and the same person."[8] Respondent

also claimed that the three deeds of absolute sale were antedated. While the sales took place in 1999 or 2000, it was made to appear that the transactions took place on December 7, 1985, at a time when both of the Granda spouses were still alive. Respondent alleged that: (a) Petitioner himself told respondent that it was in 1999 that he bought the lots covered by TCT No. T-816; (b) Silvina could not have signed as a witness on December 7, 1985 as she was then cloistered in the Cariana Movement Monastery under Fr. Odon Castro who certified that as a member of said religious community, she could "not go out of the monastery unless there was a very valid reason" and "she was not sent out for any errant (sic) nor went to the province" for the whole year of 1985;[9] (c) Aurora was still exercising rights of ownership over the properties subject of the assailed deeds after December 7, 1985, as evidenced by the General Power of Attorney (GPOA), [10] dated February 14, 1999, executed by Aurora in favor of her youngest daughter Silvina, to administer her properties subject of the assailed deeds and to collect and receive all rentals from the occupants of the buildings therein; (d) As attorney-in-fact, Silvinaexecuted lease contracts dated February 4, 2000[11] with some of the lessees of the office spaces in the commercial building located in the two lots covered by TCT Nos. T-1312 and T-249; (e) As per Certification from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region, the three deeds of absolute sale were not among the available notarized documents submitted to said office for the year 1985; and (f) the subject deeds were registered with the Register of Deeds only on February 28, 2000 or almost fifteen (15) years after the alleged sales. Respondent claimed that petitioner conspired with Silvina and Atty. Camenforte in falsifying the three deeds by signing as an instrumental witness therein. Also, petitioner and the other vendees allegedly conspired by benefiting from the use of said public documents in transferring the titles of the properties from the name of Aurora to their names. Petitioner's co-respondent sibling Elsa Uy submitted her counter-affidavit,[12] averring that sometime in 1998, Aurora repeatedly offered the sale of the subject properties to her. After conferring with her siblings, she agreed to buy Aurora's properties for a total consideration of P18,000,000 subject to the conditions: (1) That the preparation, documentation, notarization and registration of the document of sale, the cancellation of theTCTs in Aurora's name and the issuance of the new TCTs in the names of the vendees would be Aurora's sole and exclusive responsibility; (2) That all the expenses for documentation, registration of documents, capital gains tax, documentary stamps tax, transfer tax, sales tax, fees for the cancellation and issuance of titles and expenses for similar purposes would be for the exclusive and sole account of Aurora; (3) That as soon as theTCTs in the names of the vendees are issued, Aurora would turn over the new TCTs to them; (4) That all the necessary documents would be executed by Aurora and/or by any and all persons who may have any interest, lien or claim over the properties at the instance of Aurora and at her expense, in order that the said properties would be free from any lien or encumbrance; and (5) That the mode and manner of payment for the consideration of the sale would be as directed by Aurora. Aurora allegedly agreed to the said terms and conditions subject to an increase in the total consideration from P18,000,000 to P18,800,000. As advance directed by Aurora, of P1,000,000 periodic each payments were were made to her totalingP8,800,000. Partial payments likewise made to Aurora's

children Silvina andLourdes. Thereafter, Elsa and her siblings, Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Rosa Uy, Tinong Uy and Andres Uy, gave Aurora's children P1,000,000 each or a total of P8,000,000. The share of Aurora's deceased son JesseGranda was divided equally among the latter's seven (7) children, one of whom is respondent, who received his share of P142,857.14. Subsequently, all the heirs of Aurora executed separate documents denominated as "Deed of Assignment."[13] The Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000, signed by respondent under the name "Rafaelito" on "2/16/2000," together with the latter's siblings, states that:

For and in consideration of the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, receipt of the amount from MARY UY CUA, NECITA UY, ELSA UY, ANDRES UY, TINONG UY and ROSA UY, is hereby acknowledged and confessed by us to our entire and full satisfaction x x x and We do hereby confirm and acknowledge the fact that our grandmother, Aurora Ratcliffe deGranda, has the lawful right to dispose of the above described parcels of land and such other real properties she has wherever located, as she is the absolute and exclusive owner being her exclusive and paraphernal properties.[14] (citation

omitted)

Elsa contended that she and her siblings were innocent purchasers in good faith and for valuable consideration. It was sometime in September 2000 when TCT Nos. T-6696 and T-54401 were presented to them, together with the ten (10) separate Deeds of Assignment executed by Aurora's heirs. Her siblings, namely Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, never met or personally conferred with Aurora or her heirs. Nor were they in possession or control of the three (3) subject deeds and the owner's duplicates of TCT Nos. T-1312, T-249, T-816 and T-9874 as said documents remained in the absolute control of Aurora. They were never involved in the preparation, execution, notarization and registration of the three (3) deeds of absolute sale and the payment of the required fees, taxes, the cancellation of the certificates of title and the issuance in their names of TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400 and T-54401 as the same were all made and effected by Aurora. She denied having taken advantage of or profited from the subject deeds and certificates of title. She contended that the filing of the instant complaint is "an act of utter bad faith, done for some evil motives and with malicious criminal intent"[15] as complainant was the very same person who gave his conformity and consent to the questioned sales, confirmed the sales and acknowledged receipt of P1,000,000 by executing, together with his siblings, the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000. Allegedly, it was complainant who unjustly enriched himself at their expense when he received from them his share ofP142,857.14. That respondent filed the instant case only after his grandmother's death allegedly shows his sinister scheme to preclude his grandmother from divulging the truth. She claimed that complainant was a party to the alleged falsification and perpetrated an act of fraud to their damage and prejudice. Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, petitioner's other siblings, Necita Uy, Rosa Uy, MaryUy Cua, Tinong Uy and NormaLastrilla, filed her affidavit[18]containing Andres Uy, own filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit[16] and petitioner's his spouse, countercontending counter-affidavit.[17] Atty. Camenforte also submitted

his personal defenses. In response, respondent filed his Reply

Affidavit,[19]

that petitioner and Silvina should be deemed to have admitted the allegations in the complaint for their failure to file their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice. Petitioner eventually submitted his own counteraffidavit[20] on the same day that his co-respondent siblings and spouse filed their Rebuttal-Affidavits.[21] In his defense, petitioner adopted the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as they were material to the charges against him. He contended that the charge against him is "malicious and bereft of truth, designed mainly to cast a cloud of doubt on the title of the vendees."[22] He claimed that the filing of the complaint was merely aimed at making him and his siblings submit to additional monetary consideration being demanded by respondent

who must have felt shortchanged because he had to share his deceased father's P1,000,000-share with his six (6) siblings. Respondent allegedly threatened him with criminal prosecution after he and his siblings refused to heed his demands. Petitioner claimed that it was only Elsa and Aurora who negotiated for the sale of the properties in question. His other siblings participated only with respect to their respective contributions to the purchase price and he was the one tasked to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and genuine as they were parting with millions of hard earned money. Upon Aurora's request, he readily agreed to affix his signatures in the subject deeds as a witness, thinking that such act would seal the validity of the sale. He contended that the fact that the sale was only registered on February 28, 2000 is not evidence of falsification. In fact, he and his wife were the named vendees in one of the deeds and paid a total ofP200,000 for the properties therein described. However, they did not benefit from the said sale because contrary to what was stated in the deed of sale, only Lot 4691 was covered by T-6736, Lot 2455 was an unregistered land and has an adverse claimant thereto while Lot 4693 was covered by TCT No. T-9874. In view of the misrepresentation, they never acquired title to the properties they bought and in fact suffered pecuniary loss in the amount of P200,000. Further, petitioner claimed that "although the Application in the Office of the Register of Deeds ofTacloban City, denominated as Control No. 183, requesting registration of title to the properties" subject of the deeds of absolute sale bears his signature, the same "is not evidence that it was not Aurora Granda who caused the registration of said Deeds of Sale... because the truth of the matter is that the same application was just given to [him] by someone sent by Aurora Granda requesting that [he] affix [his] signature thereto." It is likewise "not evidence that [he] was the one who personally submitted the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds."[23] He did not deny that the corresponding real property tax and special (SEF) tax for the parcels of land were in his name and that of Washington Trading but he contended that the same does not prove that respondent vendees were the ones who paid said taxes, for the truth of the matter is that Aurora, in consonance with her agreement with Elsa Uy, fulfilled her part of the conditions of the sale that she would cause the preparation, documentation and notarization of the deeds of absolute sale and paid the taxes in his name and Washington Trading. On May 5, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecution of Tacloban issued a Resolution, the dispositiveportion of which states: In view of the foregoing, it appearing that Camilo Camenforte and Silvina Grandaconspired with each other to falsify the three Deeds of Sale, the filing of three (3) informations, one for each Deed of Sale, charging the respondents with the crime of Falsification by Public Officers by forging the signatures of Aurora and Rafael Granda to make it appear that the said persons have participated in an act or proceedings when they did not in fact participated (sic) penalized and defined in Art. 171, sub-par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.[24] In dismissing the complaint against petitioner, his wife and his siblings, the investigating prosecutor reasoned that: The question to be resolved is, [w]ho falsified these documents? It can not be the respondents, Elsa Uy, Tinong Uy, Necita Uy, Andres Uy, Mary Uy Cua, as alleged by the complainant since they have paid a total amount of P18,800,000.00 to Aurora Granda and her heirs for the purchase of said properties. It must be noted that the complainant himself never denied that they received the amount. In fact, in the Deed of Assignment that the complainant and his co-heirs executed they admitted having received P1,000,000.00 as their share in the purchase of the said properties. It is highly improbable for someone to part with such an amount as a consideration for the purchase of a property and at the same time conspire to forge the very

same documents that is the basis of the sale. Why pay P18.8M and risk losing the said amount on a forged document? Nor can it be Robert and Normal (sic) Lastrilla for the same reason. In fact, these two respondents incurred losses since they have already paid the consideration of P200,000.00 without having acquired the property since the description of the property in the Deed of Sale is erroneous. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Sandangdiego, 81 SCRA 120, cited by the complainant does not apply to the above-named respondents because it cannot be said that they took advantage of it and profited thereby since the respondents acquired the said properties for valuable consideration.[25]

Respondent filed a petition for partial review of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecution ofTacloban with the DOJ, questioning the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner, his spouse and his siblings. The petition for partial review was dismissed by then Secretary Hernando B. Perez, holding that: Suffice it to state that apart from the bare allegations of complainant that respondents-appellees conspired with respondents Silvina Granda and Camilo Camenforte in the falsification of the subject deeds, no evidence has been presented to substantiate the charge. From the record, it is unclear how respondentsappellees participated in the falsification of the subject documents. x x x While respondent-appellee Robert signed as a witness in all of the three (3) subject documents, the determination of probable cause against him will not depend alone on a finding of forgery because a careful scrutiny of the evidence adduced reveals that there are valid and complete defenses available in his (Robert) favor that would negate any criminal intent on his part to commit the offense of falsification. Firstly. It is significant to note that the complainant did not question the effectiveness and consummation of the sale transactions in questions (sic) much less did he assail the authority of Aurora to do so. In fact, complainant himself confirmed the validity of the sale made by Auroraof her properties by executing the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000 and which deed he signed on February 16, 2000, the day he received his share from the proceeds thereof as one of the children of the late Jessie Granda. Secondly. Neither did complainant allege that the sales transactions were without or for inadequate, fictitious or simulated consideration. It is without dispute that respondent-appelleeRobert Lastrilla, together with his brothers and sisters, paid the sum of P18.8 M. By paying such a substantial sum of P18.8 M, it was unlikely for respondent-appellee Robert to have intentionally and maliciously participated in the falsification of the subject documents because it would be adverse to his own interests and that of his siblings. It would be the height of absurdity that respondent-appellee would have consented to having falsified documents evidencing the subject transactions considering that his primary and paramount concern was to protect his own interests and that of his siblings. Thirdly. It is worthy to note that complainant was not joined in his complaint by any of the surviving heirs of Aurora Granda. If, indeed, complainant and the other heirs of the estate ofAurora were cheated by respondents-appellees of the properties in question because of the execution of the subject documents, the least that the other heirs could have done was to join complainant in the instant complaint. Such failure lends credence to the claim of respondents-appellees that the sale transactions in question were regular and that they bought the subject properties from Aurora in good faith and for a valuable consideration.

Fourth. No right of complainant was violated by the execution of the subject deeds. The deceased Aurora had the free disposition of the properties such that whatever means and method adopted by Aurora in causing the transfer of her properties to the respondents-appellees is beyond complainant's concern much less did he have any right whatsoever to question the said disposition. Obviously, complainant could not allege that he had sustained damage as a result of the sale simply because no right of his could have been violated. On the contrary, complainant admittedly benefited from the sale. Fifth. We find it rather odd for complainant to have initiated the instant action only after the death of her (sic) grandmother Aurora. It is noted that as early as October 1999 and February 2000, complainant admits having learned about the sale of Aurora's properties to other persons. In fact, as earlier stated, on February 16, 2000 he signed a document denominated as Deed of Assignment wherein he not only recognized the validity of the sale by Aurora in favor of the respondents-appellees of the properties described therein but he also acknowledged receipt of the amount of P142,857.14 representing his share of the proceeds of the said sale as heir of the deceased Jesse Granda. These facts clearly create doubt as to the real motive of the complainant in filing the instant complaint. Indeed, the foregoing circumstances clearly establish respondent-appellee Robert Lastrilla'slack of criminal intent in the falsification of the subject document. Par. no. 1 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Par. no. 1 of Article 171 of the same Code penalizes a private individual who forges a signature of another in public document. However, in the absence of criminal intent, there is no falsification and the absence of damage negates criminal intent. x xx[26]

Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA. In its Decision dated July 18, 2003, the CA modified the Resolution dated May 8, 2002 issued by the Secretary of Justice, as follows: WHEREFORE, Office of the the Resolution dated May 8, to 2002 issued issue a by the Department for of Justice of is

hereby MODIFIED. Finding probable cause against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, we hereby direct the Prosecutor of Tacloban City recommendation thefiling three (3) informations charging Robert Lastrilla of the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.[27] (emphases supplied)

The CA ratiocinated that: In the case of Robert Lastrilla, there are allegations that: first, he knew that the three deeds of sale were falsified and, despite such knowledge, he still signed them as an instrumental witness; second, he was personally and directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City; third, he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora Granda; finally, he effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates of Title. The foregoing circumstances convinces us of the presence of probable cause against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, as the evidence will show that there is a reasonable ground for presumption that a falsification

exists as would lead the prosecutor to believe that he is probably guilty of the offense charged and can be held for trial.[28]

Petitioner's partial motion for reconsideration proved futile.[29] Hence, he filed the instant petition, assigning as lone error that: [THE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST [PETITIONER] ROBERT A. LASTRILLA FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER ARTICLE 172 (1), IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171 (1), (2), AND (5) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.[30]

Articles 172 (1) and 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code, state that: Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.-- The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; xxx Article 171. x x x 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; x x x 5. Altering true dates; x x x

In the case at bar, there is no question that all the elements of falsification are present. The issue is whether there is probable cause to engender the belief that petitioner is one of the authors of the falsification. Petitioner questions the findings of the CA that: (a) he knew that the three deeds of absolute sale in question were falsified but still signed the same as an instrumental witness; and (b) despite such knowledge, he personally and directly caused the registration of the same with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban, the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of Aurora and the issuance of the new TCTs in the names of the respective vendees. He contends that the decision of the CA finding probable cause to file three (3)informations for Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code against him is merely based on the allegations of respondent, unsubstantiated by any evidence on record.[31] We disagree. In a preliminary investigation, probable cause for the filing of an information by the prosecutor has been defined as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,

acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."[32] It is well-settled that "a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt."[33] From the records, there is no question that petitioner signed as an instrumental witness to the subject deeds of absolute sale. As such, he attested that the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed the said deeds in his presence on December 7, 1985. By petitioner's own admission, however, the negotiations for the sales only started in 1998, thus, the deeds were admittedly antedated. The investigating prosecutor, the DOJ and the CA also unanimously found probable cause to believe that the signatures of the Granda spouses were falsified as evidenced by: (a) the PNP Crime Laboratory report which concluded that the specimen signatures of the spouses did not match the signatures affixed in the subject deeds; and (b) the undisputed fact that vendorspouse Rafael died in June 1989. The disputable presumption is that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act and takes ordinary care of his concerns.[34] This presumption assumes greater significance to the case of petitioner who, as "the one tasked [by his siblings] to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and genuine," is naturally expected to not have voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deeds unless he understood the clear significance of his act. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner "was personally and directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City" and that "he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora" and "effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates of Title." The following pieces of evidence support such findings: (a) a copy of Control No. 183 dated February 28, 2000 and the certification of the Register of Deeds state that petitioner "presented for registration" the three deeds in question to the Register of Deeds;[35] and (b) a copy of the entries in the Receiving and Releasing Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City and the Certification dated July 4, 2001 of the Register of Deeds show that the deeds in question were released to petitioner on March 3, 2000.[36] Petitioner's defense that it was actually Aurora who effected the transfer cannot overcome the presumption in favor of the Register of Deeds that in issuing the certifications, official duty has been regularly performed.[37] Notably, other than his bare assertion, petitioner did not present any other evidence to corroborate his claim, i.e., the testimony of the alleged representative of Aurora who made him sign the questioned application form. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger of said document. [38] If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.[39] The presumptions elicited by the evidence on record are not of little significance. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.[40] Petitioner lays stress on the ruling of the DOJ that "in the absence of criminal intent, there is no falsification and the absence of damage negates criminal intent." The following circumstances allegedly show lack of criminal intent on his part, viz: (a) Respondent did not question the effectiveness and consummation of the sale transactions in question or assail the authority of Aurora to do so. In fact, complainant himself confirmed the validity of the sale made by Aurora of her properties by executing the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000; (b) Petitioner and his siblings paid the sum of P18,800,000, hence, could not have intentionally and

maliciously participated in the falsification of the subject documents as it would be adverse to their interests; (c) The other heirs of Aurora did not join respondent in filing the instant complaint, thus, giving credence to the claim of petitioner that the sale transactions were regular, done in good faith and for valuable consideration; (d) Respondent had no right which was violated by the execution of the subject deeds as Aurora had the free disposition of her properties during her lifetime; and (e) It is rather "odd" for complainant to have initiated the instant action only after the death of his grandmother Aurora. Finally, petitioner also invokes the defense of good faith. He contends that assuming he knew or had a hand in the falsification of the three (3) deeds of absolute sale and used the same to process the issuance of the new TCTs, said act is not a punishable act of falsification as the same was authorized by the heirs of Aurora, including respondent.[41] The arguments are unmeritorious. The mentioned circumstances in the ruling of the DOJ which allegedly negate the existence of criminal intent on the part of petitioner are unavailing. First, the contention that the validity of the sale transactions was not disputed is contrary to the allegations of respondent and the evidence on record. In his complaint-affidavit, respondent alleged that "the purported sale of the subject properties on 07 December 1985 is false and fraudulent."[42] Moreover, the new TCTs issued in the names of the vendees through the deeds in question have an annotation of respondent's adverse claim that "the deed[s] of sale are simulated."[43] Second, petitioner's reliance on the deeds of assignment signed by respondent and his co-heirs to prove the validity of the sale transactions is shaky. By said deeds, the heirs of Aurora merely acknowledged that they received certain sums of money from the Uys and that they "assign[ed], transfer[red] and convey[ed] unto and in favor of" Aurora "all [the] rights, interests, and participation that [they] have or may have in any and all parcels of land,[44] wherever located, together with all the improvements thereon, two parcels of land" of which were particularly described as the ones covered by TCT No. T-816. No reference was made to the alleged contracts of sale between Aurora and the Uys. Likewise, said deeds contain a marked contradiction: if indeed, the properties were the "exclusive and paraphernal properties" of Aurora, why was there a need for her heirs (which included respondent) to assign their rights to her? Finally, the attribution of ill-motive to respondent by the fact that the complaint was only filed after Aurora died and that respondent was not joined in by his coheirs in filing the complaint are speculative and are not sufficient to overcome the legal presumptions establishing aprima facie case for falsification against petitioner. In any case, even assuming that the payment of the sum of P18,800,000 shows lack of damage on the part of respondent and his co-heirs, petitioner's conclusion that there can be no criminal intent in the absence of damage is hasty, to say the least. Criminal intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person.[45] We have clarified that the absence of damage does not necessarily imply that there can be no falsification as it is merely an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent to commit falsification.[46] It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. [47] In this case, petitioner's voluntary acts of: (a) signing as witness to the three antedated notarized deeds of absolute sale, attesting that the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed the same in his presence, when there is probable cause to believe that such signatures were falsified; and (b) knowingly causing the registration of the three falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds to effect the cancellation of the old TCTs and the issuance of the new TCTs in and the names of his siblings, evidence malice and willful transgression of the law. his name

We likewise reject petitioner's defense of good faith. As pointed out by respondent, the contention that even assuming petitioner had a hand in the falsification and use of the falsified instruments, he is not liable because he was authorized by Aurora and her heirs, was belatedly raised on appeal. Also, as logically pointed out by respondent, he is an heir of Aurora and definitely, he did not authorize petitioner to falsify the subject deeds and use the same to effect the transfer of the TCTs from the name of Aurora to his name and that of his siblings. Furthermore, the finding that there is probable cause to believe that the signatures of both Aurora and Rafael were falsified and the dates of the instruments were antedated lay serious doubt on the claim that the conveyance was indeed authorized by Aurora herself. To further sow doubt on the claim of authority, respondent's claim that in 1999, his grandmother Aurora was already "too sickly and frail to execute said documents," finds support in the evidence on record. A certain Rebecca Araza, a househelp in the residence of Aurora, attested that in 1999, she was one of those who took care of Aurora who was then "very sickly," "could hardly recognize faces, remember names and events and very rarely talked" and whose "condition worsened starting January the 1999."[48] Also GPOA bolstering respondent's 1999 in claim favor is the noticeable fact that Aurorasigned dated February signature.[49] 14, of Silvina by affixing

her thumbmark instead of her customary

While it is this Courts general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause,[50] we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority.[51] Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.[52] From the records of the case at bar, it is clear that a prima facie case for falsification exists against petitioner. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The July 18, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26273 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO CERTIFICATION

Associate Justice

Chairman, Second Division

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
[38]

Serrano v. CA, 404 SCRA 639, 651 (2003), citing Roh Tieck Heng v. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 CA, 256 SCRA 718, 734 (1996), citing Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116

(1990); Maliwatv.

(1994), Caubong v. People, 210 SCRA 377 (1992), People v. Caragao, 30 SCRA 993 (1969) (other citations

omitted).
[39]

Serrano

v.

CA, supra, citing People

v. Sendaydiego,

81

SCRA

120,

141

(1978); Maliwat v.

CA, supra, citing People v.Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 (1934), People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28 (1926), People v. de Lara, 45 Phil. 754 (1924), U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453 (1906) (other citations omitted).
[40]

Republic v. Vda. de Neri, 424 SCRA 676, 692-693 (2004), citing Francisco, The Revised Rules of

Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 7.

[44]

Note that the deeds of assignment of siblings Benjamin R. Granda, Rafael R. Granda, Violeta Granda-

Cuenco state that they conveyed to Aurora the "rights, interests and participation that [they] have or may have in the following parcels of land, together with all the improvements thereon" which were particularly described as the two lots covered by TCT No. T-816; Id. at 92, 96, 98.
[45]

Soriano v. People, 88 Phil. 368, 374 (1951). Luague v. CA, 112 SCRA 97, 101 (1982). Lumancas v. Uriarte, 347 SCRA 22, 33-34 (2000), citing People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913, 918

[46]

[47]

(1955).
[50]

Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman, 380 SCRA 325 (2002), citing Sebastian, Sr. v. Garchitorena, 343 SCRA

463 (2000);Camanag v. Guerrero, 268 SCRA 473 (1997); Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680 (1992).
[51]

We stated the following exceptions in Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. CA, 426 SCRA 460, 470

(2004), viz: (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over

the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
[52]

Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293 (2001), citing Herrera O.M. Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 2001 ed., p.

231, citing Ortiz v. Palaypon, 234 SCRA 391 (1994) and La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391 (1984).

G.R. No. L-62634 June 26, 1992 ADOLFO CAUBANG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition filed by the accused Adolfo Caubang to review the Court of Appeals decision which affirmed in toto his conviction of the crime of falsification of a public document punished under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2. At the time Caubang was charged with committing the crime, he was the incumbent mayor of Baganga, Davao Oriental. The information charging him with the offense alleged: That on or about the 15th day of January, 1975, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of falsification on a Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc., which is a public and/or official document identified as Document No. 95, Page No. 15, Book No. 27, Series of 1975 of the Notary Public Justo Agtarap of the City of Manila, by then and there forging, falsifying and simulating, or causing to be forged, falsified and simulated the signature of the treasurer thereof, Baltazar Pagaduan, appearing on the lower, right hand portion of the said document, thus making it appear, as it did appear, that the said document was made, prepared and signed by the said Baltazar Pagaduan, thereby attributing to the latter participation and intervention in the making and preparation of said document by signing his name and affixing his signature thereon when in truth and in facts as the said accused well knew, the said Baltazar Pagaduan did not so participate, neither did he authorize the herein accused or anybody else to prepare and sign the same. (See RTC decision, pp. i and ii in Rollo, p. 51) The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: That in 1954, the accused his brother, Melquiades Caubang, Florencio Teves and Teodoro Diaz organized a stevedoring service in Davao Oriental called the Banganga Mutual Association. This was operating without permit from the Bureau of Customs since its establishment. In 1966, Solomon Baja also organized the East Coast Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc., also in Davao Oriental. Baltazar Pagaduan was one of the members thereof who was its manager since 1967. In 1974, the Collector of Customs at Mati, Davao, suggested that the two arrastre companies merge into one. Following the suggestion, the respective officials of both organizations entered into a merger agreement with the signing of a document to that effect (See Exh. A-1). Thereafter, they drew up and signed the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. H) of a new merged organization which they called the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc. Baltazar Pagaduan was elected Treasurer of the merged corporation and he executed and signed his Treasurer's Affidavit (Exh. H-1). After the execution of the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. H) and the Treasurer's Affidavit (Exh. H-1), the accused brought to Manila these papers, as well as the sum of P2,500.00 on the paid-up capital and P500.00 for filing fees, for the registration of the new corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC

for short). During the process of its registration in Manila, the accused accomplished and signed an information sheet (Exh. C) and an undertaking to change the corporate name in the event that another person, firm or entity has acquired a prior right to use the same or one similar to it (Exh. D). He also wrote at the bottom of Exhibit D a promise to submit the TAN (Tax Account Number) of his brother, Melquiades (should be Clemente) Caubang now marked Exhibit D-1. On the 15th day of January, 1975, the corporation was registered with the SEC which issued a Certificate of Registration (Exh. B-1). The Certificate of Registration (Exh. B-1), together with the letter of transmittal (Exh. F-1), was received by the accused who brought and hand-carried the same to Davao Oriental. Disputed is the authorship of the forgery of the signature of Baltazar Pagaduan, marked Exhibit B-2-a, found in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc., marked Exhibit B-2, which was submitted to the SEC as required by SEC as a pre-requisite to the registration of the new corporation. (RTC decision, p. 111 in Rollo, p. 51) The plaintiff-appellee, People of the Philippines, admits that the officials of the two arrastre companies originally agreed to a merger between the Banganga Mutual Association (BMA) and the East Coast Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc. (ECASSI). It notes that' the BMA which was partly owned by petitioner had been operating without a business permit since 1957, a fact explicitly admitted by petitioner in a letter to the Social Security System for exemption from coverage by the system in the years prior to 1967. (Exhibit "O", Table of Exhibits, p. 37) Thereafter, or on December 18, 1974, the officials of both arrastre companies executed the Articles of Incorporation for the newly-formed Baganga Consolidated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Incorporated (BCASSI) and elected Baltazar Pagaduan, as Treasurer, who then accomplished a Treasurer's Affidavit. For failure to receive P500.00 as initial payment of subscription from each of the incorporators except Solomon Baja and himself, Pagaduan claimed to have announced to the rest of them, namely, Melquiades Caubang, Clemente Caubang and Federico Teves, that the merger will not push through. (See Rollo, p. 44; TSN, August 16, 1976, p. 23) Pagaduan said that he left the Treasurer's Affidavit, which he signed, with the accused. He was surprised to learn more than a month after he signed the affidavit, or in February 1975, that the proposed merger was already registered with the securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He also learned that he had supposedly executed and signed a Statement of Assets and Liabilities on February 15, 1975 before a notary public who was not known to him. The bulk of the evidence for the prosecution consists of testimonies of Pagaduan, Solomon Baja, and the persons who received for processing the incorporation papers in the SEC, namely, Juana Jularbal and Atty. Bernardo Espejo. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused-petitioner was the person who had possession and use of the papers for incorporation including the questioned Statement of Assets and Liabilities. For his part, the accused-appellant denies having been the one who personally went to and handed over the documents before the SEC. This, notwithstanding his statement that since he frequently travelled to Manila on official business, the incorporators requested and authorized him to file the Articles of Incorporation and the Treasurer's Affidavit, and to present the P2,500.00 paid-up capital for registration of the newly-formed company with the SEC. The following is his own narration of events: 5. Because petitioner frequently travelled to Manila on official business, the incorporators requested him to register the articles of incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner agreed and brought the papers to Manila on January 14, 1975. His associate Luis Granados, who had been previously

notified by his son of his coming, met him at Avenue Hotel at (sic) Manila. Because he had to attend to official matters of his municipality in the Department of Local Governments, petitioner entrusted the filing of the articles of incorporation to Granados to whom he gave P2,500.00 representing the paid-up capital of the corporation, plus expense money. 6. In the afternoon of January 14, 1975, Tuesday, Granados went to the SEC to register the articles. While there he negotiated with a fixer named "Pete" who agreed to file the articles for a fee of P300, but who, after consultation with an SEC clerk, found that certain papers were lacking. Pete thereupon typed the general information sheet and an undertaking to change the name of the corporation should there be any already registered with that name placing thereat the name of petitioner as "authorized representative" after Granados told him that the president, Clemente Caubang, was not available but that his brother, the petitioner, was in town. Pete asked for the TAN of Clemente Caubang but since Granados did not have it with him, he returned to Avenue Hotel with the papers prepared by Pete. Late in the afternoon, he met the petitioner and after showing him the additional papers prepared by Pete, petitioner signed them. Petitioner did not have with him the TAN of Clemente Caubang but nevertheless wrote on the undertaking to change the corporate name that the TAN will be submitted upon the filing of the by-laws of the corporation. 7. On January 15, 1975, Wednesday, Granados returned to the SEC and gave the papers to Pete. The articles were filed by Pete who thereupon got the agreed fee of P300 from Granados. Pete they followed-up the papers in the SEC while Granados waited outside upon the advice of Pete, Later, Pete fetched him to appear before a lady employee at the SEC to whom he presented the P2,500 paid-up capital of the corporation. After counting the money, the lady returned it to Granados. Then Pete told him to return on the following Friday, January 17, 1975. 8. On the agreed day Pete gave Granados an envelope full of papers and told him that the articles were already registered. Granados left and returned to the hotel where he found the petitioner. He gave him the papers saying they were already approved. 9. As it now appears, the SEC approved the articles of incorporation of the merged companies on January 15, 1975. Among the papers filed with the SEC was the statement of assets and liabilities of BCASS that the company had total assets in the form of cash in the amount of P2,500 and liabilities to shareholders in the same amount. The statement was signed by Baltazar Pagaduan as Treasurer and sworn to before Notary Public Justo Agtarap of Manila on January 15, 1975. 10. Claiming that the signature on the statement of assets and liabilities was not his, Pagaduan then filed with the Department of Justice a complaint for forgery of his signature against the petitioner. Solomon Baja also commenced against petitioner the following complaints: a. With the SEC for cancellation of the registration of Baganga Consolidated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.; b. With the Department of Local Governments; c. With the Office of the Secretary of National Defense; and d. With the Office of the President; in his efforts to unseat petitioner as mayor of Baganga, Davao Oriental and to put out of business the arrastre company of his (Adolfo's) brother, Melquiades Caubang. During this period, all local elective officials were

undergoing performance audit and the President had declared that officials with pending charges will be removed from office. The charges were given wide publicity in the radio and newspapers circulating in Mindanao. Significantly, after Baja signed the articles of incorporation of BCASS, Inc., he nevertheless continued to operate his former stevedoring company. (Rollo, pp. 16-20) On July 31, 1976, the trial court found the accused petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of a public document and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and. one (1) day ofprision correctional, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision

correctional as maximum, and to pay: (1) a fine of P3,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day but not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty, and (2) the costs. The court also allowed him a credit of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence to the extent of four-fifths. On August 7, 1978, petitioner filed a notice to appeal the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision finding no grounds for its reversal. Hence, this petition where the following issues are raised: 1. Whether or not the exception to the general rule and not the general rule itself on the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses being binding on the appellate court, is to be applied in this case where the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as laid down in People v. Peruelo, 78 OG No. 16, pp. 2024, 2031; 2. Whether or not the exception to the general rule, and not the general rule itself on the finality of findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, is applicable and must govern in this case where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are: a) Contrary to the established fact, as decided in Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 642, 650-651, and, therefore, should be reversed by this Court; b) Overlooked matters of substance in the evaluation of the evidence, as held in Lim Yhi Luya v. Court of

Appeals and Hind Sugar Company, 78 OG No. 25, pp. 3208, 3229 or misinterpreted the significance of some fact or circumstance, as held in People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 472, and, therefore, should be reversed by this
Court. 3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction for falsification of the official document in question where the entries therein are not absolutely false and no damage was caused to the government or third parties, and in the absence of criminal intent, contrary to the ruling in Beradio v.

Court of Appeals, et al., 77 OG. No. 48, pp. 6315, 6327. (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
After an in depth examination of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that there is strong evidence that leaves no doubt as to the guilt of the accused. The first two questions raised by petitioner pertain to one and the same issue of the correctness or propriety of the factual findings of the court, including the finding on credibility of witnesses. The Court restates that the credibility of witnesses who testified in court becomes a matter of great significance in order to determine whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met.(People v. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587 [1991])

It is a well-settled rule, however, that appellate courts generally will not disturb, but instead uphold and respect the factual findings of the trial court which had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their deportment as well as the manner of. testifying during the trial, and which was in a better position to decide the case. (People v. De Mesa, 188 SCRA 48 [1990]; People v. Arbolante, G.R. No. 96713, October 17, 1991; People v. Caraig, G.R. No. 91162, October 3, 1991; People v. Aguiling, G. R. No. 91662, March 11, 1992) Moreover, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law and not errors of fact. (Bernardo de los Santos v. Faustino B. Reyes, et al., L-45027, January 27, 1992) This doctrine will not apply only where, as alleged in the case at bar, the judge has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (People v. Javier, 183 SCRA 702 [1990]; Peoples. Belibet, supra) As will be seen later, the court did not overlook material points as to avoid application of the general rule. Contrary to the submission of petitioner, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court and the respondent appellate court are sufficient to establish the fact that the accused-petitioner was responsible for the falsification of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. (Exhibit "B-2", Table of Exhibits, p. 5) The Court found that the following papers were submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the registration of the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. (BCASSI): (1) the Articles of Incorporation (Exhibit "H", Table of Exhibits, p. 15); (2) Treasurer's Affidavit (Exhibit "A", Ibid, p. 1); and (3) the Statement of Assets and Liabilities (Exhibit "B-2", Ibid., p. 6). Additionally, the following were also submitted and made part of the records; (1) a General Information Sheet (Exhibit "C", Ibid., p. 9) on which appears the signature of petitioner as the one who certified the truthfulness of the data placed therein; and (2) typewritten letter also signed by the accused expressing willingness to change the corporate name in case of a prior registrant bearing the same or a similar name (Exhibit "D", Ibid., p. 10) on which there was a handwritten promise to submit the Tax Account Number (TAN) of one of the incorporators, Clemente Caubang. At the trial, the petitioner admitted having affixed his signature on Exhibits "C" and "D". The records also reveal the report of SEC Examiner Juana Jularbal dated January 15, 1975 on which she declared that: I have made a physical count of the paid-up capital of the Baganga Consolidated Arrastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. in the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS, P2,500.00 presented by Mr. Adolfo Caubang as representative of the corporation. . . . (See Exhibit "E", Table of Exhibits, p. 11) Petitioner himself states that he came to Manila from Baganga, Davao on January 14, 1975 bringing with. him only the Articles of Incorporation, the Treasurer's Affidavit, and the cash amount of P2,500 paid-up capital. He did not mention the Statement of Assets and Liabilities to be among those carried by him for purposes of registration. Despite this, the records show that there was on file a copy of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities executed on January 15, 1975 and notarized on the same date by a notary public in Manila, Atty. Justo Agtarap, and bearing a signature purporting to be that of Baltazar Pagaduan. The signature appears to be written in crooked strokes. A comparison of that signature to those sample signatures of Pagaduan appearing in Exhibit "L" on page 32 of the Table of Exhibits, on the Treasurers Affidavit, and on the Articles of Incorporation proves that it is not genuine nor authentic. Considering that the accused-petitioner acted as the representative of the new corporation to file the documents and that the named-officers were in Davao in January 1975, it was physically impossible for Pagaduan to have signed the statement and subscribed it before Atty. Agtarap in Manila.

The fact that accused-petitioner did not carry with him the statement throws open the question of how that document came into being and who caused its execution. Having represented himself to be the authorized person to register the company, it logically follows that petitioner had knowledge about the existence of the document, which along with Exhibits "C" and "D", was an equally important requirement for the registration of a corporation. Thus, it behooved upon the accusedpetitioner to shed light on the sudden appearance of the spurious document. Instead, the petitioner insists on his own version that it was some other person, i.e., a fixer named Pete who personally appeared before the SEC in all stages of the process for a fee until the claiming of the certificate of registration. He alleges that Pete finished the registration upon agreement with Luis Granados, from whom the petitioner asked for assistance. The arguments of the petitioner are mere denials which, if weighed against documentary evidence as well as the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Ms. Jularbal and Atty. Espejo of the SEC, do not lay down a convincing ground to reverse the respondent court's decision. The main thrust of the petitioner's arguments refers to the inapplicability to this case of the presumption of law that a person who is found in possession of a forged document and who used the same is the forger thereof. He attempts to enlighten the Court by relating some intervening circumstances to disprove his possible knowledge or interference in the making of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities prior to the submission of the latter to the SEC. The petitioner states that the trial court admitted in its decision the failure of prosecution witness, Juana Jularbal, to Identify the accused as the one who presented the P2,500.00 cash. Non-identification of the accused as the present or allegedly defeats the evidence of a report naming him to be the one. A careful reading of the decision, however, reveals that the trial court did not actually make such an admission. After comparing the testimony of defense witness Luis Granados and that of Jularbal, the trial court gave credence to the latter's testimony. Granados testified that he was the one who gave the money to Jularbal. The court distinctly noted, however, that Granados' testimony "lacks detail as to keep the court wondering on how Juana Jularbal could have known the name of Adolfo Caubang as the representative of the registrant corporation to enable her to put this fact in Exhibit 'E'." (RTC decision, p. xiii in Rollo, p. 51) The defense theory, therefore, is not in accord with human experience. Thus, in the absence of contradictory evidence, the trial court correctly based its judgment on the factual statement appearing in Exhibit "E", i.e., that the P2,500.00 was presented by Adolfo Caubang as the authorized representative. The petitioner denies having signed Exhibit "D" (or the typewritten undertaking to change the corporate name with a written promise to give Clemente Caubang's TAN)in the presence of Atty. Espejo. He alleges that he accomplished it in his hotel room on January 14, 1975 upon being asked by Granados to do so. He also states that there was no written evidence in Exhibit "D" to indicate that he signed in the office of Atty. Espejo. The vacillations of Atty. Espejo did not make human unreliable witness. The Court has held several times that inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not dispel the credibility of the witness (People v. Sabellano, 198 SCRA 196 [1991]; People v. Custodio 197 SCRA 538 [1991]).

The Court has earlier ruled that: The most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the veracity and testimony on material points. (People v. Belibet, supra, at page 592) The material facts pointing to the accused-petitioner as the one who accomplished and signed Exhibit "D", wherever he may have done so, remains undisputed. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to prove his active participation in the completion of the registration requirements. The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court erred in finding that it was he who followed up the registration of the Articles of Incorporation with the SEC. The respondent court, he alleges, overlooked the fact that he gave the Articles of Incorporation, the Treasurer's Affidavit and the cash of P2,500.00 to Granados on January 14, 1975. From that time on, he never saw the papers again, except for Exhibits "C" and "D", until the completion of the process. It was allegedly the fixer who took charge of the registration in order to expedite it. He denies having received and signed the letter transmitting the certificate of incorporation (Exhibit "F", Table of Exhibits, p. 13) and the Certificate of Incorporation dated January 15, 1975 (Exhibit "G", Ibid, p. 14). The Court finds that the accused-petitioner has consistently made use of the fixer as a necessary character to block the possibility of his having gone to the SEC. The petitioner not only had to use the person of Luis Granados but also a third person whose shadowy character and shady occupation do not help at all to convince us of the veracity of the defense theory. There was no way of verifying the existence of the fixer in the defense version. It is quite likely that no fixer in his right mind would audaciously volunteer to disclose his true identity in court and testify that the acted as such. Whatever the reason for the non-production of this key participant, utilizing a fixer as part of the scenario becomes a convenient ploy to divert the mind of the court from the more plausible inference that the accused-petitioner engineered the spurious statement of assets and liabilities. Even assuming that the defense story was true such that the accused-petitioner could not have been the one who personally received the letter of transmittal and the certificate of incorporation, the circumstances point to the vital fact that being the real authorized representative, any representations made at his own instance by another before the SEC and for the newly-formed corporation, were absolutely made on behalf of the accused Adolfo Caubang. The principle of estoppel in pais is made applicable to the situation wherein the accused, either by himself or through another person made a representation by submitting a supposedly validly executed statement of assets and liabilities to form part of the registration requirements, and thereafter, by receiving the certificate of incorporation and the letter transmitting the certificate of incorporation. The accused acted in a manner as to make the SEC believe that the person transacting was duly authorized to do so and was faithfully complying with the lawful requirements of the agency. The presumption juris et de jure: that whenever a party has by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission be permitted to falsify it more appropriately solves the disparity between the factual narrations of the defense as well as those of the prosecution.

Even if the allegation that some other person filed and followed up the registration papers was true, the accused-petitioner would still be subjected to the same conclusion. It is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution "would not always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely." (Koh Tieck Heng v. People, 192 SCRA 533 at 546 [1990]) This is the reason why the court a quo and the respondent appellate court had to rely on circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Esparcia, 187 SCRA 282 [1990]) The version of facts as presented and proven by the People deserves more credence for being in consonance with human experience and normal conduct and for being based on documentary evidence admitted by the accused-petitioner. (People v. Aguiling, supra) Having been the one responsible for the filing of the registration papers, including the means he felt necessary to accomplish the registration, the accused must likewise be accountable therefor. As the authorized representative, he is deemed to have been the one in custody or possession, or at least the one who has gotten hold even for a short while, of the papers which included the statement of assets and liabilities. That he knew of the execution of the statement is a possibility not too difficult to imagine under the circumstances. We are satisfied that the court a quo and the respondent court did not err in relying upon the presumption that the possessor and user of a falsified document is presumed to be the forger thereof (People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120 [1978]; People v. Caragao, 30 SCRA 993 [1969]; Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 688 [1967]; Dava v. People, G.R. No. 73905, September 30, 1991). The evidence conclusively shows that the statement of assets and liabilities was not among those brought by the petitioner from Davao to Manila. The statement was not an authentic representation of the assets and liabilities of the BCASSI. It was surreptitiously signed by someone who imitated the signature of Baltazar Pagaduan. Indeed, no forger would ever do this in the open. Forgery could easily be consummated only by the forger alone or in the confidence of persons in connivance with him. The filing of the previously inexistent document subjects the accused-petitioner to the inference that he used it as part of the registration papers. In the absence of a credible and satisfactory explanation of how the document came into being and then filed with the SEC, accused is presumed to be the forger of the signature of Pagaduan, and the one who prepared doubtful information on the financial status of the proposed corporation (People v. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906 [1935]). The Court has similarly ruled in United States v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453 [1906] regarding the utterance of a check: The utterance of such an instrument, when unexplained is strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the utterer either himself forged the instrument or cause it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken

together with the further evidence set out . . . and brought out on the trial of the caseestablishes the guilt of
the accused with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (At p. 455; emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, the filing of the statement of assets and liabilities remained unexplained. This fact, together with other proofs presented by the prosecution, is strong evidence tending to show that the accused Adolfo Caubang either himself forged the statement or caused it to be forged by someone else. Worthy of note is the willingness of the accused to accomplish all that were necessary to acquire a certificate of incorporation.

Contrary to the denials of the accused, the Court upholds the finding that "he was the one, or through someone else as he claimed, who received the Certificate of Registration (Exhibit "6") from the SEC and who brought it home to Davao" (RTC decision, page x in Rollo, p. 51). We find no reason to believe the assertion that the respondent appellate court erred in relying on the factual determination by the trial court. The petitioner contends that there were absolutely no false entries in the statement of assets and liabilities as to make its execution injurious or damaging to the government or third parties. The claim is without merit. In the falsification of a public document such as Exhibit "B-2", it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. The ruling in Beradio v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 567 [1981], alleged by petitioner to be applicable is not binding in the instant case. In that case, the official document involved was a time record, the accomplishment of which was for the purpose of proving rendition of service in the interest of the public. The reason why the Court ruled that there was no damage to the government was because under the facts proven, the time record had already served its purpose. The time record could thereafter be set aside for being worthless. Moreover, the submission of a time record was not strictly required of election registrars as a matter of legal obligation, but only for administrative procedural convenience. The Court, however, did not fail to distinguish a time record from other public documents I "with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified." (Beradio v. Court of Appeals,supra, p. 584) This is not to say that Exhibit "B-2" is a public document the falsification of which must have the effect of damage that must first be proven. The Court is of the view that mere falsification by forgoing the signature of Baltazar Pagaduan as to cause it to appear that Pagaduan has participated in the execution of Exhibit "B-2" when he did not in fact so participate, makes the accused-petitioner criminally liable. In a crime of falsification of a public or official document, the principal thing punished is the "violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." (People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 [1924]; People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 [1955]; Sarep v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440 [1989]) Thus, intent to gain or to injure is immaterial. Even more so, the gain or damage is not necessary. The petitioner states that the respondent appellate court erred in finding that the merger, through which the new corporation was formed, did not materialize. It is unfortunate that petitioner gravely misunderstood not only the manner by which the respondent court presented the facts, but also their simple meaning. In quoting the narration prepared by the prosecution, the appellate court did not additionally indicate nor give the impression that the merger did not push through. The quotation, as again quoted by petitioner, related that: . . . [H]e (referring to Pagaduan) told the subscribers that the merger will not push through. ( Rollo, p. 30) In his last attempt to dwell on prevarications, the petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses, Baltazar Pagaduan and Solomon Baja had an ulterior motive to destroy his integrity by instituting the charge of falsification against him. He stated that Baja, his political rival for mayoralty at that time, was inclined to unseat him as mayor.

The Court finds this an effort to befuddle what has been established by the evidence on record. The respondent court correctly ignored the infusion of political or partisan matters where the evidence was found to be wrong to convict the accused-petitioner of falsification beyond reasonable doubt. The questions raised are factual. We see no reason to deviate from the usual respect accorded to factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for absence of reversible error on the part of the respondent court. The appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.