Islam: Introduction

to the History
of the Religion
Editor: Daphna Ephrat
Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion
The Open University of Israel is the leading academic publisher in Israel.
It had published over 1500 textbooks in all major disciplines, written
by scholars and experts from its own faculty and from all major Israeli
universities. These books are well known for their excellent academic
quality, and they are being used by students and faculty in all colleges and
universities throughout the country.

In the following pages you will find the preface and epilogue of our series
Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion, edited by Prof. Daphna
Ephrat.

This series of four volumes on Islam is one of the only efforts to cover the
entire history of Islam – from its birth in the 7th century until modern-day
fundamentalism. Also, while most other publications may deal with the
rise, development and spread of Islam in specific countries, few provide
such an extensive and comprehensive look at Islam throughout the world
and by country to country as does this series.

Furthermore, most other publications divide Islam into two distinct periods:
classical Islam which developed in the 11th century and modern day Islam
which evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, this publication
also places great emphasis on the golden era of Islam in the Middle Ages,
when much of Islamic science, art and literature developed.

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2 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 3
Preface
This book series marks the first attempt in Hebrew, and one of the few
in other languages, to write the history of the Islamic religion from its
emergence to the modern period. Its approach differs from that of many
other general studies of Islam, which typically focus on two major periods:
classical Islam, until the 11th century, and modern Islam, during the 19th
and 20th centuries. Instead, this series proposes a narrative of continuity
that highlights the importance of the late medieval period, which lasted
from the 12th to the 18th centuries. This period, which is left unexplored by
numerous books on Islam, witnessed the shaping of many of the patterns
that came to characterize the Islamic religion by the time it began its
decisive encounter with the West in the 19th century.

The other innovation offered by this series, as reflected in its subtitle,

is its emphasis on the history of the Islamic religion, which should be
understood as distinct, albeit closely related, from the political and social
history of Islam that are discussed by most books on the subject. As in
other religions, in Islam there is a tendency to preserve what has been
hallowed and to oppose change. This may explain its casting as fixed and
unchanging. This series highlights the dynamic aspect of the religion, and
traces the institutional and conceptual transformations within Islam that
stemmed from its changing historical circumstances across time and space.

Whereas most books on Islam in the heart of the Muslim world limit their
focus to the Arabs, the Persians, and the Turks, this series offers a broader
examination, one that encompasses the entire Muslim world, based on the
understanding that most Muslims live in the vast periphery stretching from
Southeast Asia and China, through India, to Africa. Only through such
a comprehensive view of the Muslim world is it possible to understand
major phenomena in the history of the Islamic religion, such as the spread
of Islam, the role of Sufi orders in the public arena, and the important roles
by movements of Islamic revival and renewal.

The series employs a plethora of translated excerpts from Islamic sources

that illustrate the topics introduced in the lectures, and convey the manners
in which Muslims of different generations viewed their religion and

4 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

their past. Particularly helpful are the many excerpts from Ibn Khaldun's
Muqaddima, which introduce the reader to this influential North African
Islamic thinker's view on various issues, such as the relationship between
conquerors and conquered populations in the intercultural context of
conversion to Islam; the distinction between precepts of the body and
precepts of the heart; Greek wisdom's penetration of Islam; the approach
of the Mamluks; the prosperity of Cairo; the locking of the gates of
individual legal reasoning (ijtihad); the centrality of studying the Koran;
the refuting of philosophy; and the decline of the 'foreign sciences' in
Islam. The series also features a large number of illustrations, photographs,
maps, chronological tables, and supplementary readings on a wide variety
of subjects.

The series consists twelve chapters and an epilogue divided into four
volumes:

Volume I
1. The Birth of the religion
2. The sects in Islam
3. From Arabism to Islam

Volume II
4. The development of Islamic law
5. Theological debates and their political implications
6. Islamic mysticism

Volume III
7. The 'Ulama' and the political rulers in the later middle ages
8. The institutionalization of Islamic religious law, education and
mysticism
9. The spread of Islam in Asia and Africa

Volume IV
10. Renewal and reform on the verge of the modern era
11. In the face of the Western challenge: Islamic modernism and
secularization
12. Protest and revolution in modern Islam

Epilogue: Debating Islam

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 5

The first chapter explores the unique phenomenon of the birth of a new
religion within a society exposed to the external influences of Judaism
and Christianity. Through a process of separation and crystallization,
Islam emerged as a religion that was distinct from the pre-Islamic system
on the one hand and from Judaism and Christianity on the other hand.
This chapter draws on the work of Prof. Michael Cook, a virulent critic of
Muslim historiography, and presents Islam from the traditional perspective,
reflecting the religion's comprehension of its self.

Almost every chapter in the series tackles several subjects in a manner

that lays the groundwork for more detailed consideration in the proceeding
chapters. The first chapter suggests understanding of the famous
immigration of the Prophet of Islam from Mecca to Medina (the hijra)
as a model of a religious, social, and political process that can potentially
take place in different historical contexts. Based on an anecdote about a
Bedouin who was asked by the Prophet if he had come to offer the oath
of the immigrant or the oath of the Bedouin who returns to his tribe, we
develop the idea of two models of conversion to Islam. One reflecting
a total transformation and the other reflecting continuity. These models
can be understood as corresponding to the phenomena of individual and
collective conversion to Islam.

The second chapter focuses on the birth and early evolution of Shiite
Islam. The book begins with the crisis of inheritance that followed the
death of the Prophet and the civil war that threatened to destroy the nascent
Islamic community. The traumatic civil war and the desire to prevent the
repetition of such an event resulted in the crystallization of the pragmatic
political approach espoused by the central stream of Islam. Although Sunni
Islam had four schools of thought, theological disputes, and dozens of Sufi
orders, it never underwent a split. This achievement stemmed from the fact
that Sunni Islam refrained from binding the legitimacy of rule to the right
derived from a direct line of succession from the Prophet Muhammad.
In contrast, the Shi'a retained its emphasis on a direct line of succession
from the Prophet, a factor that helps explain the subsequent splits in Shiite
Islam.

6 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

The third chapter discusses the conversion to Islam of the conquered
peoples who came under Muslim rule and the transition from Arab identity
to Islamic identity. The conquest did not result in a mass process of
conversion that lasted hundreds of years, and it was only in the 10th century
that Muslims accounted for half of the population of the areas in question.
This stems from the fact that Islam allows Christians and Jews to maintain
their religions as long as they observe a well defined code of behavior.
However, two processes exacerbated the treatment of non-Muslims in the
conquered areas. The first was the change in emphasis from Arab identity
to Islamic identity, which sharpened the distinction between Muslims and
non-Muslims. The second was the significant increase in the number of
Muslims, which transformed the group into a majority of the population
by the mid-10th century.

The fourth and fifth chapters in the series cover the evolution of
Islamic law and the political significance of Islamic theological debates
respectively. The sixth chapter explores Islamic mysticism, or Sufism.
Each chapter explores the evolution of relevant concepts, ideas and
institutions and traces their development in the context of relevant social
and political changes. Our discussion of these three subjects brings us up
to the 11th and 12th centuries.

The seventh chapter provides background for the transition from the early
medieval, or classical period to the late medieval, or post-classical period.
This transitional period is characterized by the decline of the middle class,
the rise of the Turks as a ruling military elite, religious leaders' increased
dependence on the government, and the victory of the traditionalists over
the rationalists.

The eighth chapter in the series looks at the impact of these developments
on what we regard as the most important phenomenon of the late medieval
period: the institutionalization of Islam. The religious and intellectual
agitation of the 9th and 10th centuries caused social and political unrest,
which religious leaders and Turkish rulers shared a common interest in
calming. They did so by institutionalizing three main areas of Islam: law,
which was institutionalized in schools of thought (madhahib) and the
locking of the gates of ijtihad; education, which was institutionalized

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 7

in the schools of legal learning (madaris); and mysticism, which was
institutionalized in the Sufi orders. Institutionalization in each of these
areas had two critical aspects: the casting of content within institutional
structures, and the linkage of these structures to the governing regime.

The ninth chapter follows the spread of Islam beyond the borders of
the military conquests into the diverse cultures and societies of Asia and
Africa, which is without a doubt one of the most fascinating phenomena in
the history of civilization.

The tenth chapter examines the changes that took place within the Sufi
orders that played an important role in the daily lives of Muslims during
the late medieval period. Until the 17th century, Sufi orders had weak
organizational frameworks and their ability to influence the public realm
was limited to the performance of rituals of holy personages and the ability
of sheikhs to turn charisma into economic and political power. However, in
the 18th century, Sufi orders became hierarchical centralized organizations
with significant involvement in social and political issues. This structural
change provides one explanation for the role played by the Sufi orders in the
Islamic revival and renewal movements, which appeared simultaneously
in different parts of the Muslim world during the 18th century.

The eleventh chapter explores the 19th century and the early 20th century,
during which most of the Muslim world was ruled by the Christian powers
of Europe. It examines the different responses to this challenging encounter
with the West, which usually resulted in Muslim attempts to adopt aspects
of social organization that they regarded as providing the West with an
advantage over the Muslim world.

The twelfth chapter brings us up to the present day with an examination

of the growth in size and power of the Islamic extremist movements, which
reject Western ways and look for renewal within Islam itself as the solution
to the difficulties facing the religion. The radical extremists leading these
movements espouse Islamic models of renewal that were identified
during the entire course of Muslim history, with the aim of ridding Islam
of the corruption and foreign influences with which it has been infected;
restoring the initial power of Islam; and establishing an Islamic state based

8 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

on Islamic law (the Shari'a). During the 20th century, like the 18th century,
these movements emerged out of processes that were internal to Islam and
that were fueled by recognition of the discrepancies between the Islamic
political and religious ideal on the one hand and the realities of the Muslim
world on the other hand. It was this discrepancy that generated a sense that
both renewal and reform were urgent necessities for Islam.

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 9

Epilogue: Debating Islam
It seems that during the 20th century, Islam's trademark in the eyes of
foreign observers has been rebellion and revolution in the name of
religion. Most public and scholarly attention has been paid to Islamic
movements that have positioned themselves against the "new paganism"
of local regimes and the "new crusade" represented by the West and its
protégé Israel. Modern Islamic discourse, however, has by no means been
homogenous. In addition to elements of defiance and subversion, it also
contains expressions of tolerance and coexistence that form ideological
and historical continuity with the Islamic reform movement of the 19th
century, which called for intercultural dialogue and for raising the social
status of women and religious minorities. This approach had not assumed
the form of an organized effort with a set doctrine, and its proponents
have come from all parts of the Islamic spectrum, from religious leaders
associated the establishment to Islamists to members of Sufi orders.
Although these spokespeople live in the shadow of religious extremism,
they have managed to create for themselves a space in the ideological and
public arena that ensures that their voices are heard in all public debates
regarding the character of Islam in modern times.

The concept of moderation in modern Islam has two meanings: a narrow

one and a broad one. Many followers of Islam, from the ranks of the
establishment and the opposition alike, have actively opposed religious
extremism, viewing it as an "ideological distortion and psychological
deviation". They have rejected the right of Muslims to accuse their peers
and political leaders of heresy and to engage in violence. From their
perspective, the combative meaning of jihad is less important than its
spiritual and social meaning: the ongoing struggle of humans to overcome
their inner urge to give in to temptation (jihad al-nafs), and its implications
for the development of community life. These circles defined Islam as a
religion that rejects the use of force in spreading the faith, and maintained
that the obligation of jihad is only applicable in the case of self defense
against a foreign attack. Some have denounced the phenomenon of
"suicide attacks" that gained a foothold in the Muslim-Arab landscape in
the late 20th century, including attacks against Israel and the West. They
have portrayed the perpetrators of such attacks as devoid of faith in Allah

10 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

and as Muslims who will be deprived of a place in paradise when they die.
However, many have also adopted a stringent approach to moral and social
issues and were partners in the extremists' formative platform regarding
the Islamization of the public domain.

Islamic discourse also contains other voices, to which the present discussion
now turns. These are voices that did not stop at denouncing religiously
motivated violence but that strived to revise modern Islamic thought and
called for the establishment of a pluralistic political community based on
basic principles such as civil liberties, freedom of expression, and freedom
of assembly. The most prominent representatives of this "other Islam"
were members of the wastiya (central) political stream and the Sufi orders.

Al-Wastiya
The "other Islam" left a clear trail in the Arab Middle East due largely to the
activity of two al-Wasat (center) parties established by breakaway members
of the Muslim Brotherhood, one in Egypt in 1996 and the other in Jordan
in 2001. According to their social cross section, activists of these parties
consisted primarily of the urban middle class, while their professional cross
section revealed a variety of professions, including a high representation
of the free professions. The average age of their members was between 35
and 45, and many held positions on academic campuses, as well as in the
professional unions that had been under Muslim Brotherhood control in
Egypt and Jordan in the 1980s and 1990s. Their roles in community life
endowed them with practical organizational experience and increased their
political aspirations. As a result of the old leadership's success in preventing
them from capturing leadership positions and blocking the access of
Islamic streams to national politics through local regimes, these activists
resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood, their mother party, and established
the al-Wasat parties in Egypt and Jordan. This effort to politically organize
the middle generation marked a turn toward the political center and toward
public consensus, and won the parties' official recognition by the state.

Indeed, the al-Wasat stream provided modern Islamic discourse with a

refreshing creative breath of air by going even farther than its ideological
founders, who were led by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi. Al-Qardawi
represented a different face of Islam – an Islam without a monopoly on

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 11

the absolute truth, and one that supports ideological and political pluralism
based on the belief that all political and social forces have the right and
the obligation to find expression in the public arena. His spokespeople
declared their loyalty to the national interest and denounced violence as a
perversion of Islam. They also demonstrated a willingness to work with the
nationalists and the political left and to open their movement to all citizens,
including women and Christians, who were now defined as full partners in
Arab and Muslim society. The open thinking of the al-Wasat parties was
influenced by the 19th century reformist idea of Sheikh Muhammad Abduh
and resulted in a vibrant Islamic discourse that was influenced by the
realities surrounding it, aware of its limitations, and open to compromise.
This discourse was subject to an abundance of criticism and condemnation
on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood, which portrayed the proponents
of the new parties as deviating from the true path of Islam in their pursuit
of media coverage. The ruling regimes in Egypt and Jordan were also
hesitant to embrace the al-Wasat parties, and regarded them more as a
political weapon to weaken their sworn rivals among the Islamists than as
legitimate partners in shaping society.

The al-Wasat parties in Egypt and Jordan shared a common feature with
the Party for Justice and Development (Hizb al-Adalah wa-'l-Tanmiyah)
that was established in Morocco in 1997. This party defined itself as a
civil party, striking the demand for the application of Shari'a law from
its platform and declaring its loyalty to the monarchy as a deeply rooted
institution in Moroccan life. The moderate image won the party official
recognition by the ruling regime, and some of its members were elected as
parliamentary deputies in the general elections of 1997. Three years later, in
the 2000 general elections, the party tripled its electoral strength, winning
42 of the 325 parliamentary seats, making it the third largest party in the
Moroccan parliament. Despite its disassociation with religious dogmatism
and its adoption of secular political principles, the party continued its
efforts to improve the moral quality of the state in the spirit of Islam,
maintaining that its struggle against bribery and corruption was guided
by the principles of the Shari'a, as was its opposition to the Moroccan
government's initiative to amend personal status law in an attempt to
improve the status of women. Moderate openness toward the 'other' was
also espoused by the al-Wasat parties of Egypt and Jordan, who expressed

12 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

support for constructive dialogue between various ideological streams but
at the same time attempted to mark out qualifications for debates regarding
issues of faith. For instance, although they called for breaking down social
barriers between Muslims and non-Muslims, they also promoted the
bolstering of cultural barriers between Islam and the West.

Despite these qualifications, which were intended to preserve cultural

authenticity in an age of globalization and obfuscation of cultural
borders, the three parties presented themselves as ideological and political
alternatives to the proponents of modern Islam's two primary working
strategies: the communal strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
revolutionary strategy of the radical groups. In order to bring about
change from the political center, they attempted to play an active role in
national parliamentary politics. Demands for religious innovation and
strengthening of the foundations of civil society were also advanced in the
Saudi Wahhabi Kingdom, considered by many Westren observers as the
foremost hotbed of Islamic fundamentalist groups (including al-Qaida).
There, some religious leaders joined Saudi academics and politicians
in calling for a moderate Islamic discourse based on understanding and
dialogue with different ideological streams as part of the effort to intensify
national unity in the country.

Such moderate and mediating voices could be heard not only in Sunni
circles but in Shiite Iran as well. For example, two senior religious
leaders – Mojtahed Shabestari and Muhsin Kadiwar – emphasized that
the suppression of freedom and thought would ultimately cause damage to
Islam itself. According to them, the power of religion lies in the conscious
and willing acceptance by believers, not in coercion. Moreover, they hold,
it is simply impossible to keep a society impervious to outside ideas in the
current age of technology and modern communications. As they see it,
ideological pluralism is not only unavoidable but is necessary in order to
ensure that religion maintains its vitality.

The pluralist discourse of the al-Wasat parties of Egypt and Jordan, the
Moroccan Party of Justice and Development, and religious leaders in
Saudi Arabia and Iran never enjoyed significant expression in the political

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 13

realm due to the relatively minor social influence of these ideas in each
country. To a great extent, this discourse has been an intellectual exercise
that charts a course for society of which both Islamists and government
authorities in these countries have been extremely critical. Real progress
was made in Turkey, where the Turkish Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkinma) imbued pluralist Islamic discourse with far-reaching
practical import for the first time. So far, the party has been victorious in
two general elections, in 2000 and 2007. Under the charismatic leadership
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish party generated an integrated
synthesis between Islam, modernity, and democracy, and, under the
watchful eye of the Turkish military, refrained from involving Islam in the
shaping of government policy. The party's emphasis on a commitment to
issues of democracy and human rights have been accompanied by concrete
measures undertaken as part of far-reaching changes to the constitution,
such as the abolition of the death penalty; the institutionalization of gender
equality in state law; the easing of limitations on the construction of sites
of worship for other religions; the decommissioning of the courts for state
security; and the honoring of international agreements signed by Turkey,
particularly with Europe and the United States.

These changes did little to dispel the concerns of local and Western observers
that the moderate Islamic appearance of Erdoğan and his party was merely
one component of a secret scheme to establish an Islamic religious state at
some point in the future – an "Iran on the Bosporus Straits." Some saw early
stages of such a conspiracy in the promotion of certain initiatives relating
to the veiling of females, the establishment of state schools for study of
the Koran, and attempts to appoint religious officials to positions within
the Turkish government and legal systems. Nonetheless, the Justice and
Development Party's commitment to democracy must be considered within
the unique historical context of the internal consensus that has emerged
within the Turkish state, which views Islam and modernity as compatible
with one another. Indeed, it appears that Ataturk's secularization project
of the 1920s and 1930s, which attempted to circumscribe religion within
the walls of mosques and the private lives of individuals, has failed. Islam
has again claimed a space and asserted its existence in Turkish national
consciousness, but more as a complimentary element than as a fundamental
building block challenging or undermining the existing order.

14 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

Indonesia has also experienced noteworthy developments. Led by the
Justice and Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) that was established
in 1990, Islamic political circles in this Southeastern Asian country have
attempted to highlight the ethical side of Islam while downplaying its legal
side. This party advanced a new civil agenda of social justice, education,
and transparency within the country's administrative and political
systems. Its innovative, progressive image was based to a large extent
on a strong pluralist tradition, which recognized a variety of legitimate
ways to be a good believer, reflecting the country's ethnic and religious
mosaic (Muslims, Hindus, and Christians). In addition to this tradition, the
influence of the Islamic reformism of Muhammad Abduh of Egypt could
be detected in Indonesian religious discourse from the early 20th century
onward. Ironically, the reformist school of thought that emerged from
Egypt never achieved momentum in its natural, immediate surroundings
in the Arab Middle East, but rather laid roots in farther away regions such
as Indonesia.

Sufism
Sufi circles also contributed to the enhancement of the moderate voice of
modern Islam. Sufism – which in the early 12th century began to develop
out of the asceticism movement of the early days of Islam into an all
encompassing social organization within the framework of orders (sing.:
tarika; plur.: turuk) – understood itself as a guardian of the living spirit of
Islamic tradition, emphasizing internality over externality, spirituality over
materialism, and closeness to Allah over distance from him. These views
had great influence over the general masses, but from time to time they
incited the anger of strict religious leaders, who expressed their opposition
to some of their mystical practices, such as extreme asceticism, pilgrimage
to the graves of holy personages, and the performance of dhikr ceremonies,
a devotional act involving the repetition of the name of Allah to music
and ascetic dancing, at times in the presence of women. Proponents of
Sufism describe it as an integral part of Islam, while opponents describe
it as a forbidden innovation (bid'a). The anti-Sufi controversy, however,
never developed into a sweeping denunciation of Sufism, and this can be
seen as an indication of its solid status in Muslim society. Only in the 19th
century, when Muslim society entered the modern era, did Sufi orders face
significant opposition.

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 15

In the 19th century Middle East, modernization enveloped not only
governing and economic institutions but most aspects of lifestyle and
culture as well. It negatively impacted the social status of the Sufi orders
(as well as the orthodox institutions), primarily in urban centers. The
growth of the modern state, with its centralist tendencies, meant that Sufi
orders were now subject to government supervision, as a new educated
class appeared on the scene and began playing a role in the shaping of
social values. Moreover, at the beginning of the modern era, beliefs and
rituals which until that point had served as an integral component of Islamic
culture were now debated and denounced by foreign and local observers.

The denouncers of Sufism came from modernist and nationalist circles.

However, some Islamists also attempted to promote a dynamic and more
aggressive interpretation of Islam. They saw mysticism as promoting
passivity, a sense of distance from the critical issues of the time, and – as
a result of the cultural syncretism inherent in Sufism – a blurring of the
borders between Islam and other religions. Because of the rituals related
to holy personages, they also regarded it as a blow to the principle of the
unity of Allah.

Although the anti-Sufism campaign did push some Sufi orders into the eye
of the storm, eulogies (including some offered by Western researchers)
were entirely premature. First, in tribal and semi-tribal parts of the
Muslim world, such as Asia and North Africa, Sufism continued to play
an important role in community and social life, and was even involved
with leading the resistance movements against colonial regimes. As these
areas did not experience sweeping modernization and urbanization, they
also did not witness the emergence of a strong educated sector with a
high representation of free professions, from which most Islamists have
typically emerged. Second, although Sufi orders suffered a decline in
power and prestige as a result of the transition from tribal society to urban
society in metropolitan centers, some orders found ways to survive and
even to generate new momentum, despite the changing circumstances.
After all, modernization in the Muslim world has not been expressed in
harmonious, linear processes, but was rather characterized by political and
social vicissitudes that also fueled social confusion. In this context, the Sufi
heritage continued to provide the general public with a source of comfort

16 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

and stability, as well as a psychological refuge from the hardships of daily
life. Even the political elite made efforts to nurture Islamic mysticism as a
counter-weight against the challenge of religious extremism, although they
also worked to moderate and control the Sufi ceremonies carried out in the
public sector.

Sufism also had an influence on its ideological rivals, the modernists,

who were inspired by the role of social conscience in Sufis' promotion
of their humanistic approach on the basis of the principle of "public
interest" (maslaha). It also influenced the Islamists, who mobilized Sufi
themes such as self purification, loyalty to a spiritual guide (suhba), and
community altruism (ihsan) as ways of shaping the ideal believer, imbued
with discipline and a sense of mission. In the end, Sufism also remained
an intellectual point of meeting for Muslims and European Christians,
and this was indicative of a bidirectional movement of cultural ideas and
values between Europe and the Arab-Muslim world.

Other contributions made by the remnants and the renewed momentum

of Sufism in the modern era included the efforts made by some orders to
revive mystical thinking and the mobilization of modern organizational
practices, technologies, and communication media to disseminate their
messages and to address their critics in a meaningful way. Some continued
the longstanding tradition of social and economic activity in the public
interest, maintaining an open mind under the changing circumstances. The
active adaptation to modern realities was particularly noteworthy among
orders associated with the Naqshbandiyya order of Sufi Islam, named
after Baha ad-din al-Naqshbandi (d. 1389). Ironically, the Naqshbandiyya
– which throughout its history was known to be particularly close to
orthodox Islam, emphasizing the centrality of Shari'a law and opposing
Sufi ceremonies that included music and dancing – ended up giving rise to
powerful modernist tendencies.

During the last third of the 20th century, a few branches of the Naqshbandiyya
in Turkey laid the groundwork for a new Islamic discourse. Alongside of
educational and community activity, these orders became increasingly
involved in the newly privatized world of business and communications,
generating a synthesis between tradition and modernity and transforming

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 17

Islam into a tradition of economic initiative and a facilitator of a vibrant
civil society. They also had a marked influence in the political arena. One
example was the Iskenderpasa order, which provided an ideological home
for Islamist politicians who were willing to resolve political differences
in a democratic manner and who rejected the principles of "Islamic
revolution" and "Islamic state." In its ideological writing, another order
known as the Norculuk, which was associated with Said Nursi (d. 1960),
endowed Islam with a modern liberal interpretation that was disseminated
by its proponents throughout Turkish immigrant communities in Europe
and central Asia. Nursi's most prominent successor, Fethullah Gülen (b.
1938) also helped bolster the cosmopolitan face of Turkish Islam through
diverse educational and cultural activity emphasizing Turkish nationalism,
the free market, and modern education.

Another branch of the Naqshabandiyya, the Kuftariyya of Syria,

characterized all religions as drawing on one universal religion and placed
more of an emphasis on moral and ethical issues than on law and politics.
The Kuftariyya's religious tolerance was consistent with the agenda of
the secular Alawite dominated Ba'athist regime, which used the order to
weaken the Muslim Brotherhood and to reinforce the regime's religious
basis of legitimacy. In the neighboring country of Lebanon, it was the
Ahbash order, established in 1983 by Sheikh Abdullah al-Harari from the
Ethiopian town of Harar, that waved the banner of moderation (i'tidal). This
found practical expression in the order's involvement in Lebanese politics
and its cooperation with the country's Christians and the Maronites. Most
of the order's agenda was focused on a frontal confrontation with religious
extremism through diverse journalistic and on-line activity throughout
Europe, Australia, and the United States. It conducted a particularly
virulent debate with its rivals the Wahhabis both inside and outside Saudi
Arabia, who were accused of religious ignorance and heresy for turning
Islam into a band-aid and tainting it with violence and tyranny in the eyes
of the world.

This renewal in Sufi thinking, which took the Muslim public arena by
storm, also took place in parts of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa.
In Yemen, Sufi orders made widespread use of modern communication
technologies and educational methods to expand their social activity in

18 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

their public struggle against falsehoods promoted by the Wahhabis, whom
they branded as devoid of historical depth and as distorters of the religion.
The Sufi struggle for the soul of the Muslim believer was also waged in
Morocco, where the impact of the Budshishiyya, established by Abu Madyan
ibn Munawar al-Budshish (d. 1956) in the early 1940s, was particularly
notable. The order attracted many educated members of society, including
students and instructors in the religious colleges and academic universities
of the main cities, which Islamist circles had designated as targets to be
controlled. In addition to its diverse educational activity, the conferences
it organized, and the newspaper it published, the Budshishiyya was also
active on the internet and received widespread coverage in the French
media. The order worked to undermine the negative images of Sufism being
promoted by local and foreign critics – such as deviation from religion –
by highlighting its loyalty to the precepts of the Shari'a and its moderation
of controversial rituals, such as the dhikr and the pilgrimage to the graves
of holy personages. Defending Sufism was presented as defending Islam,
which the order portrayed as dynamic and tolerant, in stark contrast to its
closed, violent image in Western discourse.

A quick glance at the Arab-Muslim world reveals that the Sufi orders
have not only reclaimed their place in the Muslim public arena but have
also extended their reach into the West, particularly as a result of the
immigration of Muslims to Europe and the United States in the mid-1970s.
Globalization also played an important role in this process, ushering in
the easy and rapid flow of capital, information, and people from place to
place around the globe. Human and technological mobility has worked
to the benefit not only of revolutionary Islamists such as al-Qaida, but
also of Sufi orders with spiritual agendas stressing spiritual correction.
Globalization provided these groups with the opportunity to reach new,
previously inaccessible populations.

Indeed, Sufism grew increasingly widespread during the final decades of

the 20th century, gaining followers in the West and yielding a rich literature.
The Sufi tradition, as part of Eastern spiritualism, captivated European
intellectuals who were disgusted by the unbridled materialism of modern
society and who protested the spiritual crisis of Western civilization, or
the "depletion of spirit." Some of these European intellectuals belonged to

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 19

the "traditionalism" movement, which emerged in the 1930s with an aim
of rejuvenating the metaphysical element of human activity that had been
marginalized by the forces of rationalism and secularization.

In the spiritual interaction between East and West, Sufism functioned as

an agent of cultural dialogue highlighting the pacifist side of Islam. The
spiritual meaning of jihad – people's struggle against their own internal
urges was portrayed as the true meaning of the term, overshadowing the
concept of military jihad. One prominent personality involved in this
inter-religious dialogue was Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who was exiled from
Iran after the Islamic revolution and who currently lives in the United
States. In a book written in 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11th
terrorist attacks, Nasr described Sufism as "the heart of Islam," and as the
embodiment of harmony, brotherhood, and tolerance toward other cultures.
Sufi orders in different countries of Western Europe and North America –
such as the Haqqaniya of Sheikh Nazim al-Kibrisi, which positioned itself
as a bridge between East and West – translated the message of openness
into practical activity.

Many Sufi orders now had exposure to Western audiences, and its marketing
to Western societies, primarily by its Western followers, often involved
reinterpreting Islamic Sufism in a manner that was inconsistent with their
original aims. In some cases, they lost their unique Islamic character and
came to be regarded as universal mystical approaches similar to the Hindu
and Buddhist traditions. Moreover, the diverse social and welfare system
that characterized many of the orders in the Muslim world was all but
unknown in Western Sufism, which had more to with individuals' personal
quest for spiritual fulfillment. Some orders in Europe and the United
States even selected women as their leaders. These developments led
many Islamist critics to refer to it as "pseudo Sufism," or Sufism "without
sacrifice, without tradition, without the Koran, and without Allah."

Despite its weaknesses, Sufi circles throughout the Arab-Muslim world, and
even more so in the West, made an important contribution to the pluralism
of modern Islamic thought. In this way, their voice joined the restrained
voice of moderation and mediation that characterized groups such as the al-
Wasat parties of Egypt and Jordan, the parties of Justice and Development

20 Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion

in Morocco and Turkey, and the Justice and Welfare Party in Indonesia.
Together, these forces created a community based on a more open Islamic
discourse which – despite its internal weaknesses, the political challenges
it has faced, and its existence in the shadow of fundamentalist extremism –
has been able to claim the public and ideological space necessary to make
itself heard.

Islam: Introduction to the History of the Religion 21

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