EFFECT ON IMPROVEMENT G.R. No. L-11284 October 13, 1917 SIMEON BLAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ and MARIANO MELENDRES, as sheriff of Rizal, defendants-appellees. Buildings Facts: 1. March 20, 1911: an action was commenced in the Court of Land Registration by the defendant Vicente de la Cruz for the registration under the torrens system of several pieces or parcels of land. 2. June 14, 1912: Simeon Blas presented his opposition, alleging that he was the owner of a portion of the lands described in the petition of the plaintiff. 3. Hearing was had in the Court of Land registration; that portion of the land claimed by Simeon Blas was excluded from the lands included in the petition of the plaintiff Vicente de la Cruz; 4. March 16, 1915: Vicente de la Cruz appealed to the Supreme Court: LCs decision was modified and that portion which was claimed by Simeon Blas was ordered to be registered in the name of Vicente de la Cruz 5. A final judgment was rendered in the cause and the case was returned to the lower court upon the 19 day of April, 1915; that the land involved in the present action is the same land which was brought into question in the decision of the Supreme Court above referred to. 6. The purpose of the present action was to obtain an injunction against the defendants to prevent them from destroying certain buildings and improvements upon a certain piece or parcel of land particular described in paragraph 2 of the complaint. The present action had it original in the following facts: Issue: WON the decree ordering the registration of land under the Torrens system include the buildings and improvements thereon when they have not been expressly excluded in said decree? Held: YES. 1. The general purpose of the Torrens system is to forever foreclose litigation concerning the title to land. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated by the law. The decree of registration shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, unless fraud is proved within a period of one year after said decree is rendered (section 38 of Act No. 496). 2. Section 39 of said Act (No. 496), makes certain exceptions to the rule just stated. Section 39, as amended, provides that, "every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration . . . shall hold the same free of all incumbrance except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following incumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:

First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippines Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands can not require to appear of record in the registry. Second. Taxes within two years after the same have become due and payable. Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral therefor, where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined. But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner. 3. Buildings and improvements upon the land are not included in that exception, and that, unless the objector, during the pendency of the litigation for the registration of land makes claims to improvements of the character of those in the present action, and does have them excluded from the decree of registration, they will be included as a part and parcel and appurtenances to the land; and that the objector will not be permitted, in a separate action subsequently brought, to question the right of such improvements. 4. If he may, then the certificate of registration does not guarantee to the owner of the land the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of his title which the Torrens system was adopted to secure. 5. Plaintiff herein did not, during the pendency of the litigation for the registration of the lands in question, have excluded therefrom and have noted upon the certificate of title his alleged rights and interests in the improvements mentioned herein and noted upon the certificate of title issued 6. He thereby lost his right to such improvements; and therefore, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

OTHER IMPORTANT VOLUNTARY DEALINGS MORTGAGE G.R. No. 158682. January 31, 2005 SPOUSES BIENVENIDO R. MACADANGDANG and VIRGINIA C. MACADANGDANG, petitioners vs. SPOUSES RAMON MARTINEZ and GLORIA F. MARTINEZ, respondents.

2. Declaring the deed of sale with mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees Bienvenido and Virginia Macadangdang as valid and ordering them to pay defendant Omalin the balance of the price in the sum of P110,000. 3. Ordering defendants-appellants to deliver the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 146553 to plaintiffs-appellees, subject to the existing encumbrance and the right of defendants-appellants to foreclose the property should defendant Omalin fail to pay her obligation. 4. Ordering defendant Emma A. Omalin to pay plaintiffs-appellees the amount of P30,000 as moral damages and P20,000 as attorneys fees and costs of suit.

Sold and Mortgaged Facts: 1. December 20, 1986: Macadangdang spouses offered to buy the property from Emma Omalin (Parkhomes Subd, Tunasan, Muntinlupa, MM TCT 146553) for P380,000 on installment basis. 2. Same date: the Macadangdang spouses made a downpayment of P5,000 through the broker, Sto. Nino Realty Services, Inc. 3. On January 3, 1987, they paid another P175,000. Thereafter, Omalin executed a deed of sale with mortgage dated January 5, 1987. The deed provided for the payment of the balance of P200,000 in three installments. 4. Jan. 18, 1987: Macadangdang spouses took possession of the house and lot 5. April 22, 1987, they paid P60,000 and on October 1, 1987, another P30,000. After the Macadangdangs had paid a total of P270,000, the parties agreed that the balance of P110,000 was to be paid upon delivery of the TCT. 6. January 29, 1988, Omalin executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Macadangdang spouses. However, the latter did not pay the P110,000 balance because Omalin failed to deliver the TCT. It turned out that the property was mortgaged to private respondent spouses Ramon and Gloria Martinez (Martinez spouses). 7. March 5, 1987, a certain Atty. Paterno Santos, a broker, offered to mortgage the subject property to the Martinez spouses for P200,000. Atty. Santos was in possession of a clean TCT No. 146553 and a fire insurance policy covering said property. The spouses Martinez accepted the mortgage with interest at 36% p.a. and duly recorded it at the Registry of Deeds of Makati. The proper annotation was made at the back of the title. 8. September 1987 to March 9, 1988: Omalin paid the monthly interest of P6,000 but failed to pay the subsequent interest from April 1988 to October 1989 amounting to P114,000. 9. The Macadangdang spouses filed a criminal case for estafa against Omalin and a combined action for specific performance, annulment of contract and damages against the spouses Martinez and Omalin. 10: Makati RTC: rendered a decision in favor of the Macadangdang spouses: Defendants Emma A. Omalin, Ramon Martinez and Gloria Martinez are hereby ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 146553, free from the encumbrance under Entry No. 30110 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, upon plaintiffs payment of the balance of P100.000. 11. CA: modified the decision of the Makati RTC: Considering that defendant Omalin remains to be the owner of the property despite the existence of a valid mortgage, she has the right to sell it. Hence, we rule that the sale in favor of plaintiffs-appellee is likewise valid, subject to the right of defendants-appellants to foreclose the property for failure of defendant Omalin to pay her indebtedness. 1. Declaring defendants-appellants Ramon and Gloria Martinez as mortgagees in good faith.

Hence, this petition.. Issue: WON the Martinez spouse has the right to foreclose the property should Omalin fail to pay her obligation? Held. YES. 1. The petition lacks merit. Between two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the registered transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right. The act of registration operates to convey and affect the registered land so that a bonafide purchaser of such land acquires good title as against a prior transferee, if such prior transfer was unrecorded. 2. Sections 51 and 52 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, are pertinent: Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, lease or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make Registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. 3. It is clear from the foregoing that the registration of the deed is the effectual act which binds the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Prior registration of a lien creates a preference as the act of registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the land. 4. Considering that the prior sale of the subject property to the Macadangdang spouses was not registered, it was the registered mortgage to the spouses Martinez that was valid and effective. For sure, it was binding on Omalin and, for that matter, even on the Macadangdang spouses, the parties to the prior sale. 5. The rule on prior registration is subject only to one exception, that is, when a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquires a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.[9] 6. The Martinez spouses claimed they had never met the Macadangdang spouses and were unaware that Omalin had already sold the property to them. Hence, the appellate court declared the Martinez spouses as mortgagees in good faith and innocent mortgagees for value.

7. Where innocent third persons rely on the lack of defect of a certificate of title and acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights. Otherwise, public confidence in the certificate of title and ultimately, in the entire Torrens system will be impaired, for every one dealing with registered property will have to inquire at every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. 8. On this note, being innocent registered mortgagees for value, the Martinez spouses acquired a superior right over the property. 9. The registered mortgage contract of the Martinez spouses has given them the superior right, not as owners but only as mortgagees. Consequently, they are entitled to be paid the amounts due them under the real estate mortgage registered in their favor. In the event Omalin, as mortgagor, fails to pay the mortgage obligation or, should any party, for that matter, who may have an interest in the mortgaged property like the petitioners herein fail to redeem it from the mortgagees, the latter, as declared by the Court of Appeals, may enforce their rights against the property by foreclosing on the mortgage, regardless of who its owner may be, considering that the registered mortgage attaches to the property. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the October 25, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32018 is AFFIRMED.

LIS PENDENS Nature Grounds Sec 76 PD 1529, Rules 13-14 ROC G.R. No. L-45252 January 31, 1985 TIMOTEO LAROZA and CONCHITA URI, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. DONALDO GUIA, defendantappellee. Notice of Lis Pendens is a notice to the world Facts: 1. Action to quiet title filed by appellants Timoteo Laroza and Conchita Uri in the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City versus appellee Donaldo Guia over a parcel of land in San Pablo with coconuts, etc. 2. Appellants, in their complaint, alleged that they bought the above-described property in good faith and for valuable considerations from Francisco Guia on June 30, 1973, after they had seen the documents of ownership of said Francisco Guia 3. That they were in continuous possession of the said property from the time they acquired the same from Francisco Guia until appellee intruded upon the said peaceful possession by attempting to survey the above-described property and to partition the same by virtue of a decision of this Honorable Court dated December 29, 1966.; that the attempt of herein defendant to survey and partition the above-described property beclouds the title of herein plaintiffs for which reason, they were constrained to institute the present action. 4. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging, among others, "that the land subject matter of the complaint has already been the subject of a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. SP-488, hence, plaintiffs (appellants) have no cause of action, or if there be any, the same is barred by a prior judgment." 5. Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss maintaining that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action and prayed that the motion to dismiss be denied. 6. Lower Court, on October 30, 1974, issued an order dismissing appellants' complaint saying that the property is that of the defendants as declared final and executor in SP-488. 7. Appellants went to the then Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court erred (1) in holding that the instant case is already barred by a previous judgment 8. CA: affirmed the LCs decision. There is no room for doubt or for controversy that all the requisite elements of res judicata or bar by prior judgment are present here. Plaintiffs are the supposed purchasers of the property from Francisco Guia, defendant in SP-488. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the plaintiff-appellants (Laroza) are entitled to the said property. Held: NO.

There is no merit in this appeal. 1. Records show that long before appellants had acquired subject property, a notice of lis pendens (Civil Case No. SP 488) had already been registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City affecting the property. Lis pendens is a notice of pending litigation; a warning to the whole world that one who buys the property so annotated does so at his own risk. 2. Notwithstanding, appellants bought the land from Francisco Guia, defendant in Civil Case No. SP 488. Having purchased the property with notice of lis pendens, appellants took the risk of losing it in case the decision in the said civil case, is adverse to their predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Guia. 3. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienation's pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. 4. Furtheremore, there is no res judicata because there is no Identity of causes of action since the case at bar is an action to quiet title, whereas, Civil Case No. SP-488 is one of filiation and partition. ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-69303 July 23, 1987 HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN, namely, Teofilo, Isabel, Maximina, Anicia, and Francisco, all surnamed Marasigan, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIA MARRON, respondents. Late Registration Facts: 1. April 24, 1975, Civil Case No. 97479 entitled "Maria Marron v. Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S. Bazaar" was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The action sought to compel defendants Bazar to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of their lot covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 in favor of Maria Marron. 2. January 27, 1976, while Civil Case No. 97479 was still pending, the private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of T.C.T. No. 100612. 3. February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 97479 favoring the plaintiff and against the defendants: Bazars as vendors to execute in favor of Marron a Deed of Absolute Sale in a public instrument over the residential lot covered by TCT No. 100612 and to deliver to plaintiff sufficient copies of such deed of sale, together with the Owner's copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 4. The above judgment became final and executory so Maria Marron filed a motion for execution which was granted. A writ of execution was issued by the court on July 12, 1976. 5. The spouses Bazar, however, refused to surrender their title to the property in question and to execute the required deed of sale in Marron's favor. On November 29, 1978, the lower court finally ordered the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouses. When the said deed was presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled. 6. It appears that on December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale T.C.T. No. 100612 was executed by Fe S. Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan for and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). 7. However, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Consequently, T.C.T. No. 100612 was cancelled and a new title was issued in Maria Marasigan's name. 8. When the Register of Deeds of Manila issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126056 naming Maria Marasigan as the new owner of Lot 2-A, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by Marron on the Bazar's title was carried over on the said new title. 9. May 26, 1977, the Bazaars filed a petition for relief from the judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. While their petition was still pending, they moved to set aside the said judgment on June 22, 1979 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons. 10. On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted L.R.C. Case No. 7680 captioned "Maria Marron v. Maria Marasigan" which prayed for a court order requiring the Register of Deeds of Manila to register the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court in behalf of the Bazaars.

Said case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to institute the appropriate civil action before the proper court 11. On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case docketed as Civil Case No. 126378 to have Marasigan's TCT 126056 cancelled conformably to the procedure outlined in the decision of the above land registration court. On July 30, 1980, the parties submitted said case for decision. 12. February 18, 1982, the CFI of Manila dismissed Marron's complaint for being premature since the decision rendered by the CFI, Branch XIII in Civil Case No. 97479 had not yet become final and executory considering that it was still the subject of a petition for relief from judgment. 13. August 7, 1984: CA ruled that Marron is entitled to the property under litigation by virtue of the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Maria Marasigan's title. The appellate court further ruled that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executory because the petition for relief from judgment of the spouses Bazar was filed out of time. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered (a) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel T.C.T. No. 126056 in the name of Maria Marasigan and issue another in the name of Maria Marron by virtue of the Deed of Sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch XIII; Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the Heirs of Marasigans are the legal owners of the land in question. Held: NO. 1. We find no merit in the present petition. 2. There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the property in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the filing of Civil Case No. 97479, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act 496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) provides: Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance ... affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. 3. There is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her transfer certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila then carried over to the new title the notice of lis pendens which the private respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of the Bazar's title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issueds. Otherwise, if he cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons (The Director of Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177). A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk (Rehabilitation

Finance Corporation v. Morales, 101 Phil. 171). It was also a clear notice to Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting her rights to the property she had purchased. 4. The late Marasigan's transferors did not interpose any appeal from the adverse judgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. The 30-day period under the old rule (Rule 41, section 3 of the Revised Rules of court) within which the Bazaars may have taken an appeal started to run from May 12, 1976 when they were served with a copy of the said decision. On June 11, 1976, the February 24, 1976 decision in Civil Case No. 97479 became final and executory. At this point after the finality of the said decision, the Bazaars no longer had the right to alienate the property subject of the litigation. Any transaction effective during the period of litigation is subject to the risks implicit in the notice of lis pendens and to the eventual outcome of the litigation. 5. Moreover, we agree with the finding of the appellate court that the petition for relief from judgment by the Bazaars dated May 26, 1977 was filed beyond the two periods provided in Section 3 Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. There may have been some errors in the computations but the petition itself was out of time. Rule 38, Section 3 of said Rules provides, in part, that: Sec. 3. Time for filing petition. ... A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was taken. ... 6. The 60-day period must be reckoned from May 12, 1976 when the Bazaars were served with a copy of the assailed decision. Therefore, the 60-day period expired on July 11, 1976. It was only after 379 days or more than 12 months after they learned of the judgment that the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from said judgment. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.

CANCELLATION G.R. No. L-58193 August 30, 1984 LEONORA A. PUNONGBAYAN, petitioner, vs. HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILIGAN CITY, respondents. Hearing Before Cancellation of Lis Pendens Facts: 1. Leonora Punongbayan and St. Peter's College, Inc. were the owners of two parcels of land described in TCT No. 296 and TCT No. 7546, respectively. 2. They mortgaged the two properties to the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank, for short) to guarantee a loan of P550,000.00. 3. Subsequently, St. Peter's College, Inc. sold the property with TCT No. 7546 to Angel Bautista, the latter to assume the obligation of paying the outstanding balance of the mortgage to the Manila Bank. Angel Bautista, however, failed to pay the assumed obligation and as a result, the properties were extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction to the Manila Bank as the highest bidder for the price of P131,467.58. 4. Within the one year redemption period, Leonora Punongbayan redeemed the property with TCT No. 296 for the amount of P28,327.09 and a certificate of redemption was issued in her favor and the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 296 was likewise delivered to her by the Manila Bank. 5. Within almost the same period, Angel Bautista paid the amount of P148,316.05 to the Manila Bank as payment of the redemption price of the two parcels of land. The Manila Bank issued a certificate of redemption in favor of Angel Bautista with respect to the land with TCT No. 10937 (formerly TCT No. 7546) only, alleging that the redemption referred to his property only as the other property with TCT No. 296 had been redeemed by Leonora Punongbayan. 6. The Manila Bank likewise returned to Angel Bautista the amount of P28,327.09, which the latter refused to accept and instead made several demands from the Manila Bank to issue a certificate of redemption in his favor with respect to the two parcels of land. The Manila Bank denied the request. Thus a complaint was filed by Angel Bautista against the Manila Bank (Civil Case No. 24992) for Specific Performance with Damages before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI. 7. CFI: After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Angel L. Bautista. 8. CA: The Manila Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, Angel L. Bautista filed an ex-parte petition before the lower court for the issuance of a certificate of final conveyance (sale) over the two properties, which the trial court granted. By virtue of such certificate of final conveyance, TCT No. 296 was cancelled and a new TCT No. 19417 was issued in the name of Angel L. Bautista. 9. Upon knowing this, Leonora Punongbayan caused the annotation of an adverse claim and notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No. 19417 and filed before the lower court a motion to set aside the order of the respondent judge directing the issuance of a certificate of final conveyance (sale), which the trial court denied.

10. Angel L. Bautista thereafter filed an ex-parte manifestation and motion praying for the cancellation of Entry No. 434. The trial court issued an order granting the motion without giving Leonora Punongbayan a chance to be heard. 11. Leonora Punongbayan then filed a motion to set aside such order, which the trial court denied. Thus, by virtue of such order, the Register of Deeds of Iligan City cancelled the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens. Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction with prayer for a restraining order to annul and set aside the order of respondent judge with respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens to reannotate the notice of lis pendens Issue: WON the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T-19417, under Entry No. 434, was properly and legally ordered cancelled. Held: NO The petitioner, Leonora Punongbayan claims that the cancellation was illegal since no notice was sent to her concerning the hearing of the motion for cancellation of said annotation and was consequently denied the right to be heard. 1. The rule for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens provides that there should be notice to the party who caused it to be recorded so that he may be given a chance to be heard and show to the court that the notice is not for the purpose of molesting the adverse party and that it is necessary to protect his right. (last paragraph of Section 24, Rule 14 of Rules of Court) In the case of Sarmiento vs. Ortiz, et al., the Court ruled: A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens on a certificate of title where there was no unnecessary delay attributable to plaintiff and his counsel in the resolution of the main case for annulment of said certificate; especially when such cancellation was ordered without notice to plaintiff's counsel. 9 And in the case of Natano vs. Esteban et al., the Court ruled For three reasons, the order directing the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens should be set aside: First, it was granted ex-parte. Plaintiffs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on notice. Second, the order dismissing the complaint had not yet become final. That order in effect had placed plaintiffs at a disadvantage. It opened the floodgate to the commission of a fraud. What if, after the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the office of the Register of Deeds, defendants should thereafter sell the land to a purchaser in good faith and for value ? Third, There is no showing that the notice of lis pendens "is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." 10 In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order directing the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens without notice to the party who caused its annotation. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby GRANTED and the questioned order directing cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is hereby ordered to reannotate the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 19417. The temporary restraining order issued by the court is hereby made permanent. With costs against the private respondent Angel L. Bautista.

G.R. No. L-33770 August 8, 1930 PACIFICO VICTORIANO, petitioner, vs. LEOPOLDO ROVIRA and PEDRO MA. SISON, Judges of First Instance, FRANCISCO J. GONZALEZ, JOSE MARTINEZ DE SAN AGUSTIN, and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents. Bond for Lis Pendens Facts: 1. May 29, 1922: Victoriano purchased a lot, with the buildings thereon, from one Narciso Javier for the sum of P80,000. 2. The property was incumbered with two mortgages to the total amount of P72,000, and the petitioner paid only P8,000 in actual cash and assumed the payment of the mortgages, the remaining part of purchase money. 3. In the meantime, the petitioner organized a school named "Colegio Liceo de Manila" of which he was the director, and the property referred to was used for the purposes of the school. 4. The respondent Gonzalez also seems to have had an interest in the school and held one of the mortgages which was given as security for the sum of P47,000. The other mortgage was held by the Shanghai Life Insurance Company, Ltd., and it being a first mortgage, it seems that it eventually became necessary for Gonzalez to settle the matter with the insurance company in order to protect the second mortgage held by him. 5. The petitioner seems to have been unable to pay the interest on the mortgages, and in the beginning of May, 1928, Gonzalez threatened to foreclose the mortgages and thus compelled the petitioner to make a settlement so as to prevent the transfer of the school to other quarters. The accounts then showed that, including overdue interest, the amount due Gonzalez on the mortgages was P78,426.61 6. May 3, 1928, two documents were executed, one of which was a deed of sale to Gonzalez of the petitioner's remaining interest in the aforesaid property in consideration of the payment of P2,500. The other document was a lease of the property executed by Gonzalez in favor of the petitioner, the stipulated rent being P700 per month. Two days later, transfer certificate of title to the property was issued in favor of Gonzalez. 7. The petitioner failed to pay the rent, and on May 2, 1929, an action of unlawful detainer was brought against him by Gonzalez in the municipal court of the City of Manila. 8. Five days later, the petitioner brought an action against Gonzalez and the latter's attorney, Jose Martinez de San Agustin, for the annulment of the documents executed on May 3, 1928, on the ground that he, the petitioner was led to execute said documents by reason of insidious and fraudulent machinations of the defendants and by their threats. 9. Municipal court refused to take jurisdiction of the unlawful detainer suit and certified it to the Court of First Instance, where it eventually was consolidated with the action for the annulment of the aforesaid documents. 10. The cases were assigned for hearing several times, but were continued at the instance of counsel for the herein petitioner, and no evidence was taken until February 27 of the present year, when Doctor

Victoriano and three of his assistants testified. The cases were again continued, and, so far, no further evidence appears to have been presented. 11. Apparently becoming impatient, the defendant Gonzalez, on May 21, filed a motion in the Court of First Instance praying that the plaintiff, Pacifico Victoriano, be ordered to give a bond in the sum of P10,000 to respond for the damages resulting from the fact that said plaintiff, in connection with the action brought by him, had filed a notice of lis pendens with the register of deeds of Manila, which prevented Gonzalez from disposing of the property in question. 12. Judge Rovira: this court issued an order to the plaintiff advising him that if he desired to have the lis pendens annotation continued, he must within five days from notice hereof give bond in the amount of five thousand pesos to answer for any damages that may be occasioned the defendant by such annotation; provided, however, that should he FAIL to do so, the register of deeds shall proceed to cancel the lis pendens annotation, leaving it without effect. 13. A motion for reconsideration was presented by Doctor Victorano's counsel, but the then acting judge, Pedro Ma. Sison, denied the motion. 14. The present petition for a writ of prohibition was thereupon brought before this court, the petitioner maintaining that his notice of lis pendens was duly filed in accordance with the provisions of section 79 of the Land Registration Act and that under our laws, the courts had no power to order the cancellation of the notice before a final judgment of the case to which it related had been rendered. Issue: WON the judges exceeded their jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens. Held: NO 1. Ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case cannot be cancelled, while the action is pending and undetermined, except in cases expressly provided for by statute. But there may be exceptions, and it has been held that a court has the inherent power in the absence of statute to cancel a lis pendens in a proper case. 2. The petitioner did not bring his action until over a year after the sale to Gonzalez, and the evidence he has presented up to the present time does not bear out the main allegations of the complaint. 3. He must also be held responsible for most of the continuances of the trial of the two cases before the Court of First Instance, with a view to hold possession of the property in question as long as possible without paying rent. 4. When we further take into consideration that the rent stipulated in the lease was P700 per month and that the petitioner therefore must have owed Gonzalez over P17,000 in overdue rent, we cannot say that the court below erred in requiring him to give bond in the modest sum of P5,000 and in ordering the cancellation of the list pendens in the event that the petitioner failed to present the bond. 5. Writs of prohibition go to the jurisdiction, and as we cannot hold that the court below exceeded such jurisdiction, the petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-39433 CLEMENTE A. LAZARO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs. FELICIANA MARIANO, ET AL., defendants. CARMEN JULIANA GARRICHO and FRANCISO AGUADO, appellees. Non-appearance! Facts: 1. November 26, 1928: plaintiffs-appellants Clemente A. Lazaro and Maria Simon filed a complaint, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, against Feliciana Mariano (alias Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, and Feliciana Mariano Sarangaya), claiming that the contract of sale Exhibit A be declared rescinded and that an order be issued directing the cancellation of certificate of title No. 9303 of the registry of deeds of Nueva Ecija and the issuance of another in lieu thereof in the name of the said plaintiffs-appellants. 2. November 26, 1928, at 11:03 a. m., a notice of lis pendens was filed in the office of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, which notice was noted on the back of said certificate of title No. 9303. 3. July 2, 1929: the aforementioned civil case No. 5073 was called for hearing. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs failed to appear and their counsel was not ready for trial, the court, upon petition of the defendants counsel, dismissed the case. 4. July 27, 1929: the plaintiffs filed a motion for reinstatement -- denied September 11, 1929. 5. July 30, 1929: the order of dismissal dated July 2, was noted on the back of said certificate of title No. 9303. 5. September 23, 1929: Feliciana Mariano, the defendant in the aforesaid civil case No. 5073, constituted two mortgages on the parcel of land described in the aforementioned certificate of title No. 9303, in favor of the herein defendants-appellees Carmen Juliana Garricho and Francisco Aguado: the first mortgage for the sum of P10, 000 (Exhibit B) and the second for P6,500 (Exhibit C). Issue: Whether or not the notation of the order of dismissal of civil case No. 5073 on the back of the certificate of title No. 9303 is legal and valid and operated as a cancellation of the notation of the notice of lis pendens. Held: 1. Section 127, case 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that the court may dismiss an action when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial, and the defendant appears and asks for the dismissal; in which case the said dismissal shall not be a bar to another action for the same cause. 2. By provision of law, such dismissal does not therefore give to the subject matter so dismissed, the character of res judicata and consequently the order of dismissal does not finally determine the controversy and is not appealable, in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of the same Code. 3. The plaintiff has no other remedy but to ask for the reinstatement of the case or to file another complaint upon the same cause. Upon failure to resort to either remedy, there will be no pending case before the court, which may be noted in the registry of deeds. 4. The notation of the order of dismissal issued in civil case No. 5073, which eliminated it from the courts docket, operated as a cancellation of the notation of the pendency thereof. At any rate,

due to the delay in the filing of the new complaint, which was done on June 10, 1930, the dismissal having taken place on July 2, 1929, the herein plaintiffs-appellants lost the benefit of the lis pendens In view of the foregoing, this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) That the order dismissing a civil case, upon petition of the defendant by reason of the plaintiffs failure to appear, is not final and does not constitute res judicata, and therefore, not appealable; and (2) that the dismissal of a civil case upon petition of the defendant by reason of the plaintiffs failure to appear, operates as a cancellation of the notation of lis pendens. Wherefore, not finding any error in the appealed judgment, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-13389-90 September 30, 1960 CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., and MONTELIBANO SUBDIVISIONS, movants-appellees, vs. ALFREDO LOPEZ MONTELIBANO and CONCEPCION MONTELIBANO HOJILLA, oppositorsappellants. Late Registration Facts: These are appeals from two orders entered by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, acting as land registration court, in Cadastral Case No. 9, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 86. GR 13389 1. April 10 1957: Capitol Subdivision, Inc. and Montelibano Subdivisions filed a motion in the CFI of Occidental Negros alleging that Lot No. 21 of subdivision plan No. Psd-12392, a part of Lot No. 77 of the Silay Cadastre, registered in the names of Alfredo Montelibano and Alejandro M. Montelibano, share and share alike, covered by TCT No. T-5979, was sold to Corazon J. Lacson of Silay, Occidental Negros, payable by installment; 2. August 1947, the vendors mortgaged the said parcel of land together with other properties of the petitioners to the Philippine National Bank, Bacolod Branch, which mortgaged was duly noted at the back of TCT No. T-5979. 3. 24 September 1954: vendee paid in full the agreed price of the parcel of land and on the same date the vendors executed the deed of sale in her favor 4. 29 January 1957: the mortgagee executed a deed of release of real estate mortgage on the parcel of land in question 5. 12 March 1957: Alfredo L. Montelibano and Concepcion Montelibano Hojilla brought an action against Alfredo Montelibano in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros civil case No. 4272) and, pursuant to the provisions of section 79, Act No. 496, as amended, and section 24, Rule 7, of the Rule of Court, who caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated in the title to all the realities of the defendant in the province of Occidental of Negros, including that sold to Corazon J. Lacson; and that the vendee was an innocent purchaser. 6. They prayed that the Register of Deeds of the province of Occidental Negros be directed to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of TCT No. T-5979, insofar as it affects Lot No. 21, and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title in favor of Corazon J. Lacson free from the annotation of the notice of lis pendens. GRANTED. 7. On 22 May 1957 the oppositors Alfredo L. Montelibano and Concepcion Montelibano Hojilla filed a motion for reconsideration. 8. On 3 June 1957 the petitioners filed an objection thereto. On 11 November 1957 the Court denied their motion. Hence this appeal interposed by the oppositors. G.R. No. L-13390 1. 6 May 1957: same petitioners filed a motion in the same court and cadastral case alleging that Lot No. 28 of the same subdivision plan, registered also in the names of Alfredo Montelibano and

Alejandro M. Montelibano, covered by TCT No. T-5986, was sold to Marcelino Lalantakan of Silay, Occidental Negros, payable by installment. 2. 29 of June 1936: the vendee paid in full the agreed price of the parcel of land and on the same date the vendors executed the deed of sale in his favor; 3. Same facts mortgage brought a case against Alfredo Issue: WON Held: 1. The deed of sale in favor of Corazon J. Lacson, executed by the vendors on 24 September 1954, was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds on 9 May 1957 (entry No. 48590), after the notice of lis pendens had been noted on back of the title to the property on 12 March 1957. In the second case, the deed of sale in favor of Marcelino Lalantakan executed by the vendors on 29 June 1936 was not registered at all. 2. The parcels of land in question covered by transfer certificates of title Nos. 5979 and 5986 were registered in the name of Alfredo Montelibano and Alejandro Montelibano and Alejandro M. Montelibano, share and share alike. 3. Although an unrecorded sale of a parcel of land registered under the Torrens System is binding upon the parties, yet "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land . . . ." Such being the law any acquired right in a registered land is effective as between and binding upon the parties and their privies but not as to third parties. 4. The sale made of the two lots by the registered owners to Corazon J. Lacson and Marcelino Lalantakan, respectively, not having been registered, such sales do not affect third parties. The lots continue or remain the property of the registered owners. And when the latter are sued by a party concerning or involving or affecting the lots thus sold by the registered owners and the suing party causes a notice of lis pendens to be noted on the back of the certificates of title to the lots sold, such notice cannot be cancelled upon motion of the vendors or vendees predicated upon the fact that the vendees had acquired the lots prior to the noting of the notice of lis pendens. 5. If judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the action brought against the registered owners, the unrecorded right acquired by the vendees in the lots sold to them is subject or subordinate to the right of the plaintiffs in whose favor judgment is rendered. If judgment is rendered against the plaintiffs in the action, the notice of lis pendens noted on the certificate of title to the lots loses its efficacy or is ipso facto cancelled. The orders appealed from are reversed, with costs against the petitioners and appellees.

G.R. No. L-27594 February 27, 1976 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch III, PARANAQUE INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C . TAMAYO, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents. G.R. No. L-28144 February 27, 1976 ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAAQUE INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors-appellants. The infirmity of the grounds asserted by respondent-appellee, Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration would have been easily discernible from a careful reading of the judgment of this Court. For the. guidance of the members of the bar and the information of the parties, it may, however, be useful to explain further why the judgment, insofar as respondent Tamayo is concerned, has not become final during the pendency of the appeal, and therefore, the decree was issued arbitrarily and the Torrens Certificate of Title based thereon a nullity. 1. Alipio Alinsunurin (now succeeded by Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation) and Roman Tamayo based their claim of title as heirs of the deceased Maria Padilla, on the informacion posesoria of Maria's father, Melecio Padilla, and the alleged continuous, peaceful and adverse possession over the land under concept of ownership since time immemorial of their aforementioned predecessors-in-interest. 2. Thus, in his answer in LRC N-675, respondent Tamayo did not assert a claim adverse to that of the appellant Alinsunurin, but on the contrary, alleged that he and the afore-mentioned appellant Alinsunurin and his wife, "have all been in actual, continuous, public and peaceful possession as coowners of the land subject herein since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessorsin interest, namely, Maria Padilla and before her, her late father Melecio Padilla, who obtained same from the Spanish government under possessory information title granted on February 5, 1895 ..." and prayed that the title be registered in favor of the testate estate of Maria Padilla", or in the alternative, "in favor of appellant Alipio Alinsunurin, together with respondent Roman C. Tamayo, with the first two to have 2/3 interest and the last 1/3 interest". 3. This communality of interest was further shown during the hearing, when the counsel for respondent Tamayo did not present any evidence of his own but merely joined Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation, successor of Alinsunurin, in the presentation of its evidence. 4. It is not disputed that the evidence in support of the claim of title of respondent Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation is the same as that and inseparable from that of respondent Roman C Tamayo, and if such evidence of the former is considered untenable, it is inconceivable how the latter respondent's claim of title could stand by itself. 5. It must be remembered that the appeal of the petitioners is from the entire judgment in LRC N-675 and not merely from separate and distinct portions thereof. 6. Consequently, the reversal of the judgment insofar V, Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation's alleged ownership of 2/3 of the property pro indiviso is concerned would necessarily

result in the reversal of the judgment with regard to respondent Roman C. Tamayo's alleged title to 1/3 pro indiviso of the land. 7. For whether or not an appeal by one or several parties in the case will affect the liability of those who did not appeal must depend upon the facts of each particular case. 8. Ordinarily, a reversal of a judgment is binding only on the parties in the suit but does not control the interest of the parties who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal; but where the rights and liabilities of those who did not appeal and those of the parties appealing are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, a reversal of the judgment as to one would operate as a reversal as to all. 9. Moreover, no substantial right of respondent Tamayo appears to have impaired by the non-service of the notice of appeal to said party. It must be noted that respondent Tamayo's formal entry as ."oppositor"" in LRC N-675 was apparently done without the knowledge of petitioners. The copy of the motion of said respondent to lift partially the Order of General Default and the copy of the order of the respondent court granting said motion were not served upon petitioners. 10. Petitioners, however, upon their discovery of the existence of Roman C. Tamayo's pleading in the record's of LRC N-675 on January 3, 1967, immediately furnished a copy of their second motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, as well as the copies of the original and amended record on appeal, to said respondent. 11. There is no question that the record on appeal and the amended record on appeal were filed within the period granted by the court. We have held that filing of the record on appeal on time necessarily implies the filing of a notice on appeal and is equivalent thereto, the reason being that the filing of a record on appeal is more expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of notice to do so. 12. Besides, there being no showing that it had adversely affected any substantial right of said respondent, petitioners' failure to serve respondent Tamayo a copy of the notice of appeal within thirty (30) days after notice of judgment cannot considered enough ground to dismiss the appeal with respect to said respondent, or to consider the judgment final as to said party. 13. As to the claim of respondent Paranaque and Development Corporation that Honofre Andrada, et al. were denied their day in court, it should be noted that such claim is not asserted by the party directly involved. In any case, it may be recalled that the notice of lis pendens was entered on the Day Book (Primary Entry Book) of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija on April 12, 1967. On June 5, 1967, this Court issued a restraining order enjoining (a) the respondent judge from issuing a writ of possession in LRC No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, of the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija; (b) the respondents Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo, all their agents or representatives, from taking possession and/or exercising acts of ownership, occupancy or possession over the property in question subject matter of LRC No. N-675; and (c) restraining the Register of Deeds from accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land until petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman C. Tamayo and Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation. Accordingly, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, a notice of lis pendens which is duly entered and annotated on June 23, 1967 in the memorandum of encumbrances on Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 under Entry No. 12032/0-3151, as follows:

It is, therefore, manifest from the foregoing that the order of .Judge Florencio Aquino in Civil Case No. 4696 on September 23, 1968 for the issuance of "clean transfer certificate of title to Honofre Andrada, et al." was made subsequent to and entry. It is well-settled that in "in involuntary registration such as an attachment, levy on execution and lis pendens entry thereof on the Day Book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim. It is not necessary that the notice of lis pendens be annotated on the back of the corresponding original certificate of title. The notice should, of course, be annotated on the back of the corresponding original certificate of title, but this is an official duty of the Register of Deeds, which may be presumed to have been regularly performed." 4 Being transferees pendente lite, said parties are bound by the judgment against the transferor. ACCORDINGLY, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is denied.