DI POLTKA - FOREIGN POLICY A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute Vol. XXIII 1999 Nos.

1-2-3-4

CONTENTS Foreword Foreign Policy Institute, Its 25t" Anniversary Seyfi Tahan ............................................................................................ Articles Foreign Policy in the Light of Theories Selahaddin Bakan ........................................................................ The Use of Force in Relation to Self-determination in International Law Mustafa ahin .............................................................................. Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis M. Fatih Tayfur............................................................................ The Past and Present State of Turkish - Bulgarian Relations mer E. Ltem ............................................................................ The Question of Cyprus and the Question of Taiwan (ROC): A Comparison Yksel Sylemez........................................................................... Conference Notes Regional Cooperation in South East Europe: Prospects and Limitations Ali Hikmet A1p ............................................................................ The Relations between the Council of Europe and Turkey in the 50th Anniversary of the Council Metin rnekol .............................................................................. Romanian - Turkish Cooperation Emil Constantinescu ....................................................................

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6 26 48 64 78

85 90 92

FOREWORD

Foreign Policy Institute, Its 25th Anniversary

Seyfi Tahan

D Politika-Foreign Policy journal began to appear in March 1971. Its basic purpose was to provide objective analysis of foreign policy issues both to Turkish and foreign readers. It soon appeared that the main function of the Journal could not be sustained without research and other activities of an institute and this led to the creation of the Foreign Policy Institute. Since its foundation a quarter of a century ago, the Institute has had to work in an environment of constant and dynamic change in world affairs and in Turkeys own geopolitics and in internal political and economic systems and values. How has the Foreign Policy Institute responded to the events in this phase of constant transformation? At its thresholds the new Century is calling us to look towards new horizons of Turkish foreign policy; yet this might also be a good occasion to look back remember what has happened to the world and the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) in the course of those eventful 25 years. When Richard Nixon and Nikita Khruschev signed in Moscow in 1972 the documents that heralded the beginning of the period of dtente, this was met with joy in the world and with mixed feelings in Turkey. It presented the world with the prospect that the signing of these documents would lead to a thaw in East-West relations, as it was subsequently proven by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Nevertheless, Turkeys own threat perceptions from the Soviet Union had not become any weaker and furthermore, dtente could have an adverse influence on Turkeys relations with the West, since basic Western interest in Turkey was due to its strategic position as a bulwark against any possible Soviet aggression. The elimination of this danger, would not only reduce the strategic significance of Turkey, but would aggravate the disputes between Turkey and Greece on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea; because, Turkish cases, no matter how right they might have been, would no longer find obliging ears in the West, thus hardening the negotiating positions of Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks. The recognition of the illegal Makarios administration as the Government of Cyprus in 1964 when the Turks were driven out of the administration and government, and subjected to massacres had already eliminated the equi-distance policy of the West towards Turkey and Greece. The lack of a solution to the problems between Greece and Turkey until today may be to a large extent due to this abandonment of balanced Western policy.

Mr. Seyfi Tahan is the founder and current director of the Foreign Policy Institute

Signs of Western disengagement towards Turkey were not going to being delayed in appearing in the horizon. In 1973 Turkeys decision to allow poppy cultivation, although under a tight system of control, had infuriated the US Congress where calls came demanding a halt to US economic and military assistance to Turkey. The oil crisis and embargo had led European countries to slow down their economies and the Turkish guest workers were no longer welcome guests, and ties between EEC and Turkey were slackening. The military Junta in Athens thought that in view of the change in the international climate they could, with one coup, achieve their great dream of Enosis with Cyprus. With or without Western co-operation Turkey had to intervene. Turkeys pleas to the other constitutional guarantor of Cyprus, namely UK had been rejected and Turkey was not left with any other alternative than landing troops in the island in order to protect the lives of the Turkish community, which was going to be massacred once again in the hands of EOKA leadership in Cyprus. It was in 1974 that the Institute published a comprehensive volume of D PolitikaForeign Policy which proved to be an important source material on Cyprus.1 While there was national consensus in Turkey on the question of Cyprus, the countrys political system and social order suffered from extreme polarisation of domestic politics to the detriment of Western minded centre. Although the association relations between Turkey and the EEC had transformed from preparatory to transition stage in 1973; immediately thereafter however, the relations had begun to cool down with the EEC and particularly after the Cyprus intervention there was a critical deterioration both in the Turkish economy and in TurkeyEEC relations. In 1976 the DPI organised its first seminar on Turkeys relations with the West and the views expressed in that meeting centred around the basic idea that the Soviet threat had not disappeared despite dtente and there was a limit in the deterioration of Turkeys relations with the West. Acting on the belief that despite unfavourable local and international environment Turkeys relation with the West could be salvaged, the FPI organised its first international conference in Istanbul in 1978 August under the title The enlargement of EEC and Turkey. While there were elder Turkish statesmen, academics, and some businessmen who favoured immediate application for full membership in the EEC, there were many others who seriously opposed such an idea. Many businessmen and some academics continued to believe in the theories that weak countries grouped with rich countries would become weaker, and some were simply motivated by their ideological dogmas.2 The government, on its part, had already approached EEC for freezing its obligations under the Association Treaty of 1963. Had Turkey made a full membership application at that time could she have obtained a favourable result? This is still an enigma in the Turkish public opinion. It was possible that we could have been faced with a decision similar to the one taken at the Luxembourg summit of 1997; yet, it was also possible that such an application might have retarded the full membership of Greece. Our historians have not yet produced any convincing documents, and it seems that we have to await until the opening of the archives for that period. The effects of Turkish intervention in Cyprus were often quoted as the major stumbling-block for the
D Politika-Foreign Policy Vol.4, No.2-3 See: D Politika- Foreign Policy, Vol. 7, No.3-4 Special issue on the symphosium The enlargement of EEC and Turkey, stanbul, 25-26 August 1978.
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development of EEC- Turkey relations.3 Indeed, 25 years after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus to defend the lives and safety of the Turkish Cypriots, the question of Cyprus has crept into the agenda of Turkey-EC relations, and its solution together with a number of additional pre-conditions, has since become a sine qua non for the adhesion process to come to a fruition. The quality of relations have regressed and, even though a customs union was established for industrial products at the end of 1995 mainly due to Turkeys desire for appeasement, in all other areas of integration, foreseen in 1960s, a marked deterioration has become apparent. From the view-point of the FPI, Turkeys relations with the rest of Europe having a paramount importance in Turkeys external relations, no effort should have been spared to create and maintain an effective dialogue at think tank levels. The Institute, therefore, engaged itself in arranging research work and conferences with similar Institutes in Western Europe. The back issues of D Politika-Foreign Policy are full of reports of these endeavours. Yet it was clear that the European public opinion was becoming less interested in expanding its borders to the Anatolian peninsula. While Turkeys application for full membership could not be rejected for legal reasons and due to the acquis in Turkey EC relations, nevertheless the EC Commissions report on Turkey in 1989 was negative even though Turkeys eligibility for membership could not be denied. European attention after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the unification of two Germanys had reverted to central and eastern European countries saved from Soviet domination. In the meantime, Turkey had achieved a significant progress in developing its economy through an effective policy of liberalisation and globalisation as from 1980. So much so that in the beginning of 1990s, she had transformed itself form being a country marginal to different regions of the world into a central power status in the Eurasian space4. Turkeys new position imposed on her an omnidirectional foreign policy without ignoring its European status and her aspirations to become a member of the European Union. The institute put forward a set of ideas that might be taken into considerations in regard to the development of foreign policy under the new international conditions; closely studied Turkeys place in the developing new security structures in Europe and actively took part in European and EuroMediterranean NGO activities and programmes5. The FPI did its best by publishing an distributing a booklet entitled Turkey and EU, the Nebulous Nature of Relations in order to reflect Turkish views as a contribution to the EUs intergovernmental conference. The EU had already decided to reactivate the relations with Turkey that had been frozen since 1981, towards the goals of the Association Treaty of 1963 and establish a customs union. It was ironical that the eve of the coming into force of the customs union that was worked out somehow as a new EU treaty enacted in the form of a resolution of the Association Council, coincide with the Madrid declaration of the EU summit on the 25th December 1995, which categorized Turkey, along with Ukraine, Russia and the Mediterranean countries as EUs strategic neighbours while all other countries on the continent and Malta and Cyprus would eventually become members. This hard line towards Turkey was reiterated in the Luxembourg Council in 1997. This was obviously a tragic error
The Director of FPI and a member of is board were clearly told at the EEC Brussels headquarters by desk and region officers that Turkey should not dream of becoming a member of EEC unless she solved the Cyprus problem. 4 (See: Seyfi Tahan, From Marginality to Centrality, D Politika Foreign Policy Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3-4; also note that in 1999 Turkey is one of the G-20 countries). 5 See: D Politika-Foreign Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3-4, 1996 Mediterranean Security and Western Security Institutions
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on the part of the European Union and hopefully it will be corrected in the course of the preparatory period beginning with the Helsinki summit as we enter the 21st century. It will certainly possible to build economic integration on the basis of the Customs Union, thanks to the momentum gained by Turkeys economy, and its increasing relevance to the European economy. Turkeys inclusion in the G-20 group of countries will impose additional responsibilities on Turkey for the improvement of the economies and well-being of the wider region which consider Turkey as a reliable partner. As Turkish economic and social structure continues to grow and globalise and communications with the outside world increase, Turkeys relations with her neighbours are shifting from the realist model gradually to the European type liberal model. Typical improvements have already been achieved in relations with all Black Sea Economic Co-operation countries and to a lesser degree within the framework of ECO and partially through MEDA. Within the Mediterranean region Turkeys relations with Israel have acquired an especially close nature, hopefully contributing to the peace process. In 1981 the Foreign Policy Institute had commissioned a study on Turkeys economic relations with East Asia, Black Africa and Latin America6. The study had demonstrated the chances for increased relations were rather slim. Today however, the picture has begun to change radically. A conference to be organised next year with the participation of the representatives of think tanks from these regions will assess the current level of relations and great opportunities for enhancing them. On its twenty fifth anniversary the Foreign Policy working closely with the Turkish Foundation for International Relations and Strategic Studies relying on its decades of experience is continuing to strive for the development of Turkeys external relations to the best of its ability and in co-operation with academia, media and government institutions it hopes to continue its work even more effectively in the twenty-first century. The acceptance of Turkeys candidacy for membership in the European Union creates new tasks for the Foreign Policy Institute both to reflect European norms and acquis to the Turkish public opinion and in a similar way convey Turkeys view points on common European issues to the world public.

See: FPI Monograms East Asia, Black Africa and Latin America

Foreign Policy in the Light of Theories

Selahaddin Bakan 1. Introduction

This article analyses a range of foreign policy theories. It also emphasizes their usefulness (or unusefulness) to explain Turkish foreign policy. The barrier between political science and international relations literatures needs to be broken down if we are able to bring sense of critical awareness of how we can best explain foreign policies once we reject, as this article argues we should reject, both realist and determinist ideas of the origins of foreign policy. This study will explore ideas drawn from international relations and foreign policy analysis. To emphasize the importance of linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy, not in itself an original point as Wallace shows7, the next section begins by analyzing the democracy and foreign policy. Then realist theory and its critics will follow. As this article argues that the theory of interdependence can help us to explain the evolution of Turkish foreign policy, the theory of interdependence is explained. The integration theories of functionalism and federalism are also compared to the interdependence theory. Chapter ends with a set of ideas explaining how a global interdependent new world order could be created. Turkeys new role in an interdependent globe is also emphasized. Although it is often assumed that politics stops at the waters edge, domestic politics and foreign policy are closely interrelated8. As Christopher Farrands has also emphasized Foreign policy is a social process. The members of a decision making elite receive their values, assumptions and expectations about the world from a wider organized on explicitly democratic lines or not, for the way in which they handle power and authority9. In Turkey, domestic politics had limited real connection with foreign policy due to the lack of a pluralist structure. However, Turkish elite has responsibly handled foreign policy issues. Until the mid-1980s, Turkish foreign policy was the outcome of ideology of the elite. After 1983, when a relatively stable pluralist political life evolved, foreign policy issues became more of a public concern. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have eased the tension on the government. On the other hand, the stabilization of the electoral system and the improvement in the mobilization of democratic channels has created a public influence on the decisions taken by the governments. The Turkish governments decisions after the 1980s thus constrained and controlled by public scrutiny. To sum up, the internal improvements on political life and the changes in the external environment have made it difficult to distinguish Turkish domestic politics from Turkish foreign policy. That made policy makers job more difficult and increased the complexity of

nn University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Public Administration See Wallace., Foreign Policy and Political Process, Macmillan, London, 1971. 8 Hagan, Joe D., Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (eds.) Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau, Unwin Hyman Ltd. London, 1987, p.339. 9 Farrands, Christopher, State, Society, Culture and British Foreign Policy, in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1988, p.51.
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foreign policy problems. As almost in all democratic countries in the world, the line between international and domestic politics have become a line in water10. This article explains and analyses foreign policy theories related to the discussion of domestic-foreign policy interaction. The main aim of the discussion of the article is to analyze some existing foreign policy theories and try to look at relevant issues from a different angle. In this article, we sometimes referred to Turkish Foreign Policy only to show the validity (or non-validity) of the theories handled; otherwise this is not an article about Turkish Foreign Policy. Interdependence has been the primary approach in this study to the foreign policy theories. The idea of interdependence and the use of the term in the context of the study are given in detail. Realist views of interdependence also explained and criticized. In order to support the idea that foreign policy is mainly an outcome of complex pressure groups (policy communities) process and of organized societies, article begins analyzing the relation between democracy and foreign policy.

2.

Nationalism, Democracy and Foreign Policy

Since the world is allegedly becoming smaller and smaller, the foreign policy of a nation is more dependent on the variables outside the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cold war came to an end. The world now has only one superpower. America, together with regional powers, is trying to establish a new world order so that to keep peace among nations and to sustain the interest of the United States. One of the main reason for the establishment of a new world order is that America is also having economic decline and as long as relative economic decline will be in process, America will not be able to play its role as a superpower. It is therefore thought that electoral systems should be supported and encouraged throughout the world. Democratic systems are because less violent than the authoritarian ones in solving an international problem. As Rudolph Rummel empirically demonstrates, democracies do not generally make war on each other11. They may go to war nut, if they do, there is far less violence than when non-democratic states engage in warfare12. As Rummel writes, the worlds have not had a real war between democracies in over a century and a half from 1816 to 198013. To support Rummels idea, for instance, if it was not for Saddam Husseins authoritarian rule in Iraq, the war between Iran and Iraq and the latest gulf conflict would not occur. According to Rummel A necessary condition of violence between two states is that at least one of them be partially or completely nonlibertarian. Or, to turn this around, violence does not occur between libertarian states. Moreover, whether states are considered individually or dydically, the less free-libertarian-a states, the more violence it engages in. whether having common borders or not, the less freedom in states, the more violence between them14. For instance, Turkish intervention in Cyprus was due to the action of the military junta aiming to overthrow the elected president Makarios. Only 20% of population was Turk on the island and Turkey did not want to
10

Goldmann, Kjell, The Line in Water: Internal and Domestic Politics, Cooperation and Conflict, December 1989, vol.24, no.3-4, pp.103-116. 11 Rummel, Rudolph J. Libertarianism and International Violence, The Journal Of the Conflict Resolution, vol.27, March 1983, pp.27-71. 12 Wildawski, A., No War Without Dictatorship, No Peace Without Democracy: Foreign Policy As Domestic Politics, Social Philosophy and Policy, 1985, vol.3, no.1, p.186. 13 Fro more explanation and the diagrammatic data see, Rummel, Op.cit. pp.27-71. 14 Rummel, Ibid, pp.27-71.

intervene as long as Cyprus had an independent electoral system of its own. However, when military junta intervened, Turkey would not feel secure, as the island was only forty miles away from the main land. Military government in Greece did not expect that Turkey would intervene. That was an expensive misperception by Greek Generals and it cost both sides. It also destabilized the region. If it was an elected government in power, there would presumably not be a need for intervention by both sides. The 1974 military conflict between Turkey and Greece over the Island has worsened the situation15. The example shows that the nonexistence of an electoral system leaves foreign policy making in the hands of a small elite that might misperceive and misread events. In the absence of a stable electoral system, the elite does not feel any pressure from the public due to the lack of democratic channels. However, it is vitally important to emphasize that electoral systems without an organized and economically interdependent society do no bring an effective and well-weighted foreign policy. Democracies that are simply based on political parties do not produce effective and sound policies due to the fact that political parties are, most of the time, demand reducing mechanisms16. Germanys Hitler came to power through democratic channels. The lack of democratic institutions (other than political parties) and interest and pressure groups, which are vitally important in the creation of interdependent relations among people and institutions, had created a vulnerable democracy. Therefore, Hitler and his coterie, feeling themselves uncontrolled, spread the idea of nationalism through Germany and that cost Europe the Second World War, which caused the death of millions. As will be explained later in this article, the economic and social interdependence should first be created among individuals of a democratic society by creating (or allowing) civil and public organizations (particularly economic ones) in all aspects of the lifes and from all sides of the political spectrum. Morse stresses that the modernization of a nation can alter the character of its foreign policy . He explains the general characteristics of Modernization as the growth of knowledge about and control over the physical environment; increased political centralization (but economic decentralization), accompanied by the growth of specialized bureaucratic organizations and by the politicization of the masses; the production of economic surpluses and wealth generalized over an entire population; urbanization; and the psychological adjustment to change and the fleeting, rather than acceptance of the static and the permanent18. Looking at the general characteristics of a modernized society, one can say that Turkey has already gone through the process of modernization. Foreign policy is an outcome of the changes of the changes in the domestic political and economic structure as well as the external changes. Modernization has been seen to imply a relatively open system of government with a free market economy by liberals such as Morse19, even though the experience of some countries, such as those of East Asia, puts this generalization into question. The process of modernization diminishes, though might not completely eradicate, the barrier between domestic politics and foreign policy. Modernization, in this view, tends to replace the idea of nationalism with the idea of internationalism. Citizens of a modernized country thus are not (in majority) racist or nationalist but more internationalist. In other words, the more people civilized and modernized the broader their mind will be. Morse states that by modernization Morse states that by modernization First, the ideal and classical
17

For that see, Calvocoressi, Peter, World Politics Since 1945, Longmen Group U.K. Ltd., Essex, 1989, pp.200207. 16 See, Almond, Gabriel A Functionalist Approach to Comparative Politics, in the Politics of Developing Areas (eds.) Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp.3-64. 17 Morse, Edward L., The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence and externalization, World Politics, vol.22, no.3, 1970, pp.371-392. (Parenthesis added) 18 Ibid. p.374. 19 Ibid. p.371-372.

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distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs have broken down, even though the myths associated with sovereignty and the state have not. Second, the distinction between high policies (those associated with security and the continued existence of the state) and low politics (those pertaining to the wealth and the welfare of the citizens) has become less important as low politics have assumed an increasingly large role in ant society. Third, although there have been significant developments in the instrumentality of political control, the actual ability to control events either internal or external to modernized societies even those that are Great Powers- has decreased with the growth of interdependence, and is likely to decrease further20. These are general conditions of change in foreign policy. The specific instances of foreign policy will be discussed later. Wildawski offers two statements to describe the relationship between politics and world order. (1) Without dictatorship there is no war, (2) Without democracy there is no peace21. Wildawskis statements support the main theme of this study that there is a growing relationship between democracy and foreign policy. Those who do not believe that democracy is a compatible system in international politics argue that international politics is sui generis. Waltz argues that systematic features determine the foreign policy of individual states22. The incompatibility hypothesis is derived from the assumption that the international relations between nations are mainly based on the dominance of the structure of the system. It is claimed in this view that because of these systematic features all nations tend to make foreign policy in a similar and undemocratic way. Foreign policy thus cannot be subject to fully democratic procedures23. The incompatibility hypothesis is based on the assumption that international affairs take place in an anarchic environment and the power and secrecy are the only determining factors rather than international law and openness24. One main criticism can be brought to the defendants of the incompatibility hypothesis that the lack of confidence and belief in democracy is perhaps one of the main failure of this hypothesis. Democratic history of the world and establishment of democratic states go centuries back. We still, in the present world, have a great number of states where democracy either has not yet been established or where the degree of democracy is too low. Since universal norms of an electoral system took centuries to become a system in the domestic life of citizens, it will perhaps take sometime to make empirical observations of the compatibility of democratic systems to international politics. Looking at the political, economic, social and technological upheaval taking place in all over the world, it would be easier to say that creation of an interdependent (though might not be symmetric) world will not take long. The incompatibility hypothesis perhaps demonstrates a lack of confidence in the long-term prospects of democracy, which, one may at least hope, is unjustified. Another criticism, which can be brought to bear against the incompatibility hypothesis, is that the economy, particularly the international economy, has been
20 21

Ibid. p.372. Wildawski, Op.cit., p.191. 22 See, Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill Inc., London, 1979, pp.38-59. 23 Goldmann, Kjell Democracy is Incompatible with International Politics: Reconsideration of a Hypothesis, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden (eds.) Kjell Goldmann, Sten Berglund and Gunnar Sjostedt. Gower publishing co. 1986, p.11. 24 See, Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, and Bull, H., War and International Order, in A. James (ed.), The Bases of International Order, Allen&Unwin, London, 1974.

disregarded25. Military confrontations may now be less likely amongst developed states. Instead, economic competition, which will arguably create prosperity rather than creating poverty, might replace military confrontations. One point should be underlined that democratic states are based on nationalist structure. We should thus not mix democracy with each other. It is really the nationalistic structure of states that makes compatibility difficult, not democracy itself. Nationalism has the power to maintain the domestic unity of a country, but at the same time nationalism has the power to stop rational thinking and assessment and social and political affairs. It is generally felt that the main underlying course of the two world wars was nationalistic feelings amongst people. To secure the compatibility of democracy, citizens view should be broadened through a comprehensive education and that an international feeling should also be given. Turkeys situation is quiet different from the established nation-states. Turkey is reflected more of a state-nation rather a nation-state26. As Enloe and Rejai noted Europe produced nation-states, whereas Asia and Africa have produced state-nations27. Although, Turkey is not similar to a typical state-nation of Asia or Africa, it was not certainly a typical nation-state of Europe as well. Turkish Republic was because built on the remnants of an Empire where a mosaic of nations used to live. After the establishment of the Republic, a unique Turkish nation was created. Therefore, any citizen living inside the Republics boundary was Turk as long as they feel so. Whereas, Turks in Balkans and in Central Asia were not accounted as Turks. Their roots were Turk but they are identified as Azeris, Kazaks, and Kyrgyz etc. It can thus be said that, in Turkey, nation did not create the state, rather state created the nation. To quote Atatrks famous saying we have created a nation from nothing. Turkish nationalist structure thus neither was compatible with international community nor it created a stable domestic political and economic structure. That is because there was no national unity on certain political and economic matters due to the non-existence of a unique nation. That is perhaps why Turkey evolved a passive foreign policy. To sum up the argument, it can be said that non-nationalist democratic structures are positively compatible with the international politics. The degree of quality of the electoral system will determine the success of the compatibility. As a matter of fact, European Community countries have so far been successful in taking joint decisions on economic, social and political affairs. Those who criticize the argument that democracy is incompatible with foreign policy say that foreign policy needs expert diplomacy. This has been their view since Woodrow articulated his Fourteen Points28. The answer to them would be that even in internal affairs of a country, some political matters need specialized expertise. That is why politicians do not deal with bureaucratic routine but they do observe the implementation of their policies. The specialty of the diplomacy does not necessarily mean that even in democratic countries, foreign policy decisions are taken in the same way as in non-democratic countries.

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Note: For more explanation on the incompatibility hypothesis see, Goldmann, Op.cit., pp.1-43. Enloe, Cynthia H. and Rejai Mostafa, Nation-States and State-Nations, International Studies Quarterly, vol.13, no.2, pp.140-158. 27 Ibid. p.140. 28 Duroselle, J. B., Changes in Diplomacy since Versailles, in B. Porter (ed.), International Politics 1919-69, The Aberystwyth Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, pp.15-128.

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3.

Realism and its Critics

This section outlines a realist view of foreign policy, which this article argues is inadequate and insufficient to explain the foreign policies of the Post-Cold War. Realists believe that international politics take place in an anarchic environment29. Because, they say each state select her own means to overcome any problem arise in international environment. Each state thus generates their own means and their own arrangement, which might not necessarily be compatible to the other states30. Perhaps that incompatibility causes conflict and war31. The realist idea is based on four main assumptions. These assumptions constitute realist behavior in international relations. First, realists are convinced that nation states are the sovereign and independent actors. Nation states thus operate in a simple environment. Nation states are the dominant actors of the international community. The second assumption is that nation states do act or react in terms of their power. A nation state should thus be aware of and realize her power. This is both a moral and a political norm for realists. Realists neglected the complexity of relations between the nations and explained the relations of nations in a simplistic way. The third assumption is that the force is a major means of influence for the maintenance of states interest. Whereas, as it has been explained later in this study, in the short term and in the crisis situation the use of force could be the only way to preserve interest. However, long term objectives cannot be based on the use of force, as the world is becoming more complex and more interdependent. The fourth assumption of realism is that states interact around the issues of power, peace and security32. The central argument of realist thinking is that the nation state is the main actor in the system . They attach great importance to military power in order to preserve national interests, and above all national security. Military power is essential to protect the national interest34. Any attempt to establish an international organization should thus take nation-states into account. Analyzing the nation-state, Stoessinger identified some set of elements, which are created the nation state. To him, sovereignty, nationalism, language, culture and religion are important in the creation of a nation-state. Beside that national character, morale, ideology and leadership are also elements of a nation-state35. Perhaps one of the main deficiencies of realist theory is that it does not take account of the influence of the changing environment on the nation-state, and that the international environment is becoming more complex than ever with a tremendous influence directly on the internal structure and policy of a state.
33

Gilpin, Op.cit., p.7. And also see Bull, H., The Anarchical Society, Macmillan, London, 1977. Waltz, 1979, Op.cit., pp.11-112. 31 Waltz, Kenneth, Men, The State and War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, pp.159-186. 32 Bercovitch, Jacob, Super Powers and Client States: Analysing Relations and Patterns of Influence, in Superpowers and Client State in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence, edited by Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch, Routledge, New York and London, 1991, p.10. 33 See, Stoessinger, John, The Might of Nations, Fourth Edition, Random House, New York, 1973, pp.7-27. and also see, Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for power and Peace, New York, Knopf, Second Edition, 1954, pp.28-29., Booth, Ken, War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace, in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, edited by Ken Booth, Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991, p.337. 34 See, Garnett, John, The Role of Military Power, in Perspectives on World Politics, edited by Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton, Open University Press, Routledge, New York, 1981, pp.63-75. 35 Ibid. p.7-27.
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Krasner explains that the freedom of states in the international arena is absolute and it can only be limited by its international environment. Power of states determines the character of international system, but the working of the system determines the policy and position of states36. In so far the world wide political international organizations are concerned (such as United Nations), realists are half right in their claim that states exercise their power in these international organizations37. However, in so far as regional economic cooperations are concerned, the power of a small company or even a citizen prevails to the power of the state. That is why this study looks at worldwide organizations (such as OECD and United Nations) in a skeptic and pessimistic way (although their contribution cannot be denied). Whereas, regional economic organizations have been seen and approached more positively. That is because of the structure of a certain international organizations. By comparison, Pentland, an interdependent theorist, argued that international organizations could be used by the nationstates as an instrument of foreign policy. International organizations can also modify the foreign policy of member states. Finally, international organizations can become self-styled policy actors and dominate over its members, which are in fact created it38. One should not thus neglect to explain the importance of the structure of an international organization, which will be helpful in the creation of an interdependent world. To realists, for a nation-state all the other states are potential enemies. Whereas, the developed Western countries have realized that the idea of the nation state is not going to be helpful in the global age. The main cause of the two world wars was the state system of Europe, which was based on the nationality, and the conventional terms of the realist idea such as sovereignty, power, the use of force, etc. the west thus went beyond the nation state39 by establishing international political and economic cooperations. The realist explanation of the nation state is perhaps a fact of the developing nations. Developing nations of the Middle East and the Middle Asia are still trying to establish their own nationalities. Even those states, however, are aware of the danger and they are trying to establish some kind of regional economic organizations to eradicate the danger of nationalism. The developing states do not necessarily have to follow the steps that followed by the developed states of Europe. That is where the realist idea fails to explain or accept the fact that the developing states, taking lesson from the history, have had the chance to skip some of the steps and to reach, to a certain extent, the civilized nations. Then creation of a New World Order would become easier. Regional economic organizations such as European Community (EC)40, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)41 and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR)42 will help the creation of a new political and economic world order43. Those
Krasner, Stephen D., State Power and the Structure of International Trade, World Politics, vol.28, no.3, April 1976, pp.317-343. 37 For the insignificance of the international organizations see, Huntington, Samuel P., Transnational Organizations in World Politics, World Politics, vol.25, no.2, April 1973, pp.333-368. 38 See, Pentland, Charles, International Organizations and Their Roles, in Perspectives on World Politics, edited by Richard Little and Michael Smith, Routledge, London, 1991, pp.242-249. 39 See, Haas, Ernest, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964, and Cox, Robert W., Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Journal of International Studies, vol.10, no.2, 1981, pp.126-155. 40 See, Bakan, Selahaddin, Emergence of a Modernised Foreign Policy in Turkey: Domestic issues, values in relation to European Community and the other emergent organizations, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, 1995, Chapter Six. 41 See Ibid. Chapter Seven. 42 See Ibid. Chapter Seven. 43 In fact European Community has already shown a degree of success in eliminating the danger of nationalism. People in Europe have started to identify themselves as Europeans not as English, French, German or whatever it is. However, the nation-state structure in Europe ha snot yet been demolished as predicted by integrationists.
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organizations may also reduce the danger of nationalism, at least in a liberal view. Regional cooperations will also make the people aware that they are indeed citizens of a broader society. To put it more correctly, regional cooperations will, to a certain extent, damage the dangerous side of the nationalism by bringing the idea of internationalism. Having realized that the realist theory failed to account for complex reality of international relations, neo-realists, still paying central attention to power and the other conventional terms, accepted that nation-states power could be limited and balanced by the influence44. A neo-realist approach does not directly challenge realist view of state, but instead seeks to dilute its importance by economic considerations and institutional changes that reflect the reality of international relations in 1960s and 1970s45. Neo-realist theory characterized by the dtente between East and West and also by the expansion of the world trade46. Neo-realist theory, however, fails to explain and find a solution to the economic North-South division. Neo-realism, being a revision of the realism, uses the same terminology to analyze the international politics. Whereas, the changing shape of the international structure, which the economy is the major motive, cannot be analyzed by neo-realist concepts47.

4.

Functionalism, Federalism or Interdependence?

Having described the inadequacy of realist and neo-realist theories in explaining the international relations, one turns to describe the theories of functionalism, federalism and interdependence. The theory of interdependence is particularly emphasized, as it is, it will be argued, more relevant in explaining the international area. Improvements in information technology and in some other areas have created more complex international relations. The purpose of this section is to explain the theory of interdependence and to start to consider if it is useful to explain Turkish foreign policy. The fundamental base of the interdependence idea is that as the world is becoming smaller due to the development in telecommunication and transportation, nation states are not independent actors of an international community. Nor are they purely dependent to the others in classical terms. As Keohane explains countries may be interested in the welfare of others not only for instrumental reasons, but because improvements in others welfare improve their own, and vice versa, whatever the other actor does. As the world economy has become more tightly knit together since the end of World War II, situational interdependence has increased. It is bad for the United States economy for Europe of Japan to undergo a severe recession, reducing demand for American goods. Brazils prosperity is important to the United States, even apart from what might happen politically as a result of economic collapse, because a bankrupt Brazil could not pay its debt to American banks48.
Kousoulas, D. G., Power and Influence: An Introduction to International Relations, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, California, 1985, pp.12-14. 45 Gilpin, Robert G., The Richness of Tradition of Political Realism, in Keohane, Robert O., (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp.301-321. 46 Kousoulas, Op.cit., p.11. 47 See Ashley, Richard K., The Poverty of Neorealism, in Keohane, Robert O., (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, pp255-300; Halliday Fred, Rethinking International Relations, Macmillan, London, 1994, pp.31-37; and Booth, K., and Smith, S. (eds.), International Theory Today, Polity, Cambridge, 1994. 48 Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, p.123.
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Interdependence theory challenges the assumptions of political realism that nationstates are the only important actors in world politics49. Multi-national cooperations and transnational banks are examples of other actors that are important not only because of their activities in pursuit of their interests, but also because they act as transmission belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another50. Foreign policy issues in an interdependent world will thus become larger and more complex. Government policies because will become more ranged and the scope of the government will be larger. Even those policies, which are considered to be domestic, will impinge on one another51. Interdependence theory focuses on three arguments52. First of all, the world is becoming militarily more and more interdependent, as the strategic nuclear weapons can cause mass destruction and indeed those weapons are not any more usable in an international conflict. No side because will get the benefit in the use of mass destruction weapons. Secondly, the world is becoming more economically interdependent. Economic decisions taken anywhere in the world can affect somebody in somewhere. Thirdly, since the world became smaller after the advance innovations in communication and transportation technology, the world became a natural environment for all citizens53 of all states. The creation of an interdependent world is not going to be easy and painless. Interdependence faced a challenge from nation states. Some economically and politically strong nation states believed that the growing interdependence would endanger their sovereignty and autonomy. They hence reacted by erecting barriers to limit international economic interaction and, with it, interdependence54. Waltz, criticizing interdependence theory, defines interdependence in economic and political terms55. He accepts that in market terms interdependence increases sensitivity56. He, however, stresses that as advanced economic relations increase economic sensitivity, states politically become more vulnerable and dependent on each other. He thus uses the words Interdependence as mutual vulnerability to define interdependence57. He says Interdependence tends to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes; and two is the lowest possible number58. What makes Waltz and other realists pessimistic about an interdependent world is that they use their own conventional terminology of high politics to analyze the existence or necessity of interdependence. His understanding of the interdependence is limited only to the relations of politically and economically powerful nations. That kind of structure in world politics would mean the continuation of hegemony. Interdependence between the developed states but dependence between developed and less developed. As long as realists disregard the importance of the economy in their assessment of
Kroll, John A., The Complexity of Interdependence, International Studies Quarterly, vol.37, no.3, September 1993, pp.321-348. 50 Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S. Complex Interdependence, Transnational Relations, and Realism: Alternative Perspectives on World Politics, in Charles, W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene, R. Wittkopf (eds.) The Global Agenda, New York, Random House, 1984, p.245. 51 See Ibid. pp.245-260. 52 See for instance, Allot, Philip, Eunomia, Oxford University Press, London, 1990, p.xxiii. 53 See The Brand Report, International Commission on Development and Interdependence, North-South: A Program for Survival, Fontana, London, 1980. 54 See, Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of International Economic Relations, Fourth Edition, St. Martins Press inc. Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1990, pp.25-26. 55 Waltz, Op.cit., 1979, pp.139-146. 56 See, Strange, Susan, The Politics of International Currencies, World Politics, vol.22, no.1, January 1971, p.223. 57 Waltz, 1979, Op.cit., p.143. 58 Ibid. p.145.
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the international politics, they will each time draw a different conclusion about the theory of interdependence. The world is becoming so compressed and interdependence that war between nations in classic terms is not generally seen ant more as a way of solving problems. Even the powerful states are now refraining from using force. For instance, though permitted by the United Nations, the latest (1993) United States attack to Iraq has been subject to a worldwide criticism and reaction. The United States had to listen to the international community. Even France, a coalition partner, criticize the United States for being too tough and exceeding the United Nations mandate59. The use of force also in turn damages the economic stability of the countries involved in warfare. For instance, United States involvement in the Gulf Crisis caused a sharp decline in share prices and interest rates increased. As Spero states, after 1960s the world economically was based on three main systems: first, the Western system of interdependence, second, the North-South system of dependence, and third, the East-West system of independence60. As the East-West confrontation came to an end the system of independence, in Cold War terms, has essentially been damaged though it has not completely vanished. The western system of interdependence has created limited development due to the fact that it was not a global interdependence. The western system has implemented some kind of protectionist policies. These policies have created an economic division with its political implications for relations between the North and the South. The eradication of South-North system of dependence might create new opportunities for both sides and it might as well help the creation of a global interdependence. Although, the North had the capacity to produce, there was no customer in the South with a high purchasing power to sell to. For example, in transport systems, on the one hand, poor countries of the South are struggling to improve by having more rolling stock and vehicles, on the other hand, the rich countries of the North struggling to sustain (let alone increasing it) their production capacity in order to keep their economy going and tackle the problem of unemployment. The two are closely interdependent in such a way that the prosperity of each depends on growth and prosperity in the other. Western European states have realized that putting economic barriers outside their boundaries will, at the end, limit their own economic development and cause a painful economic recession in their economy. As a matter of fact the undergoing worldwide recession is perhaps the result of the protective policies of the Great Seven countries. Because of policy of using the economy as a weapon against the third world, their own economy came to a point where they cannot even sustain it at a point with the existing economic circle. If one looks at the economic growth one realizes that while Great Seven countries are undergoing a severe recession, some of the developing countries (countries in the Far East and Turkey) are in the process of economic development. For instance, development rate in 1993 will be in Turkey 4.9 %, in Singapore 11.6 %, in Thailand 11.5 %, in Hong Kong 10.2 %, in Malaysia 9.9 %, in China 8.3 %, in South Korea 7.7 %, and in Taiwan 6.8 %. Whereas in Japan 3.4 %, in Germany 2.8 %, in France 2.0 %, in Italy 2.3 %, in Great Britain 1.5 %, in the United States and Canada 2.1 %61. This shows us that developing countries are in progress, but that they have not been able to use their economic potential to escape their situation of structural dependence; they are still turning around their existing economic circle. The only way to get
Financial Times, Thursday, 21, January 1993. Spero, Op.cit., pp.11-12. 61 Predictions made by Turkish Young Employers Society (Trkiye Gen Adamlar Dernei), on the OECD report and published in Zaman, Daily Turkish Newspaper, Wednesday, 6, January 1993, p.4.
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the developed countries economic going is to widen the circle. That is only possible by creating economic cooperation between developed and developing states. Fred Halliday also believes that a worldwide cooperation system is necessary to keep the world in peace and prosperous. He uses the term internationalism. Internationalism according to Halliday is that we both are and should be part of a broader community and that of the nation or the state62. Halliday points out that there are three kinds of internationalism: first, Liberal Internationalism, second, Hegemonic Internationalism, and third Revolutionary Internationalism63. Halliday accepts the view that there is a hegemonic internationalism. The relations in that system of hegemonic internationalism are asymmetrical and integration of the countries is unequal. He saw the liberal internationalism as the only way to create a global prosperous world64. One can see that preoccupation of the Western type of liberal economic system in Hallidays ideas. Whereas, the creation of the global world will come out of functioning relations between the nations rather than by exporting the ideas of the certain nations to the other. A worldwide international system might only be possible through the regional cooperation of states. Otherwise, the idea of worldwide international system does not go beyond rhetoric. In the creation of an interdependent world, economics will play an important role as a matter of fact, the term interdependence cannot be separated as economic and political interdependence. The main ingredient of the interdependence is the economy. It is the economic relations of the countries that make them interdependent to each other. It is not that pure political friendship or noninterference agreements make the countries interdependent to each other. Economics has become closely relevant to the foreign policy issues. The increasing relevance of economics to the conduct of foreign policy with the advent of nuclear stalemate and the emergence of third world demands for greater share of the worlds wealth, issues of economic productivity and distribution have been elevated from low on the global agenda to the realm of high politics, and this shift has required a corresponding expansion of the skills and concerns of foreign policy analysts65. Political economy nowadays has a special place on the global agenda. The role of a nation state is on the process of change. The role of the state, its limits, scope, and autonomy has emerged as a prime consideration in the conduct of foreign affairs66. The growing interdependence has continuously eroded the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy. It is not clear, as Rosenau puts it, that distinction could ever be drawn with much clarity (though many study in the past purported to do so) but surely the line dividing internal from external phenomena has been greatly obfuscated, possibly even eroded in some respects, by the invent of issues and dynamics that are global in scope67. The internal structure of country plays a fundamental role in creation of a global world. There is even a close relation between the standard electrical appliances and foreign policy: standardization of products will help trade and so ease economic relations among countries. This will certainly help globalization. For the same reason, democratization process all over the world should be encouraged and supported. Democratic processes will help to
Halliday, Fred, Three Concepts of Internationalism, International Affairs, vol.64, no.2, Spring, 1988, p.187. See Ibid. pp.187-198. 64 Ibid. pp.187-198. 65 Rosenau, James N., Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (eds.) Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau, Unwin Hyman Ltd. London, 1987, p.3-4. 66 Ibid. p.4. 67 Ibid. p.4.
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create a stable political structure at the global as well as national level. To develop the process of interdependence, citizens in democratic countries should be made aware that they are a part of an international society. Once internationalist ideas prevail in a society, then a wise citizen would expect his government to follow the policy of cooperation and obey the international rules as he does for his government68. As mentioned above, political system of a country essentially affects this countrys relation with other countries. Open political systems, for instance, are less bale than others to cut themselves off from external influences, the potential exists for domestic groups to respond differently to external stimuli which may lead them to adopt and promote divergent policy prescriptions69. As Turkey is becoming a more open society, one can clearly see that Turkish foreign policy has become more complex than ever. Turkish foreign policy has gradually become multi-faceted and multi-dimensional70. Turkey, at the moment, is struggling to become a full member of the European Community. On the other hand, she has special foreign policy relations with her Islamic neighbors and more importantly with the Central Asian States. Turkeys involvement in reviving the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and BSCER71 might support the idea that the world is going towards the growing interdependence through regional cooperations. African states and the Far Eastern states are also increasingly involving in the creation of regional organizations. Turkeys involvement in the regional cooperation organizations is the result of the latest upheaval in the international order. As Keohane emphasizes the latest upheaval in the international order has increased demand for international regimes based on mutual economic relations72. He also argued in his book After Hegemony73 that it is difficult to imagine the creation of a justified international without justified international institutions and mutual economic interest between states. He criticizes the classic realist view about the role of power and the effects of hegemony. His main argument relies on the institutionalist tradition. He argues that a deterministic version of hegemonic stability, relying only on the Realist concepts of interest and power, is indeed incorrect74. His central arguments draw that cooperation can under some conditions develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that institutions,affect the pattern of cooperation that emerge75. Keohane concludes that the World Politics can no longer be sustained by hegemonic powers. Non-hegemonic cooperation, however, is possible but difficult. Although, the world politics is not a continuing state of war as realists argue, a non-hegemonic world politics cannot be easy since it takes place among independent states that are motivated more by their own conceptions of selfinterest than by a devotion to the common good76. To erode selfishness of the states and to
Bull, H., Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in H. Butterfields and M. Wight (eds.) Diplomatic Investigations, Allen and Unwin, 1966, p.35. 69 Papadakis, Maria and Starr, Harvey, Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: the Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau, Unwin Hyman Ltd. London, 1987, p.436. 70 See Smith, Michael, Beyond the Stable State? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe, in S. Smith and W. Carlsnaes (eds.), European Foreign Policy, Sage, London, 1994. 71 For both organizations see, Bakan, Selahaddin, Op.cit. Chapter Seven. 72 See, Keohane, Robert O., International Institutions and State Power, Westview Press, London, 1989, pp.101131. 73 See, Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.
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help the emergence of devotion for the common good, regional economic cooperations are indeed the necessary steps towards an interdependent global world. A functioning global interdependence might perhaps only be possible through regional economic organizations. International economic regional organizations are becoming the central focus of the international politics. Keohanes work in After Hegemony stands at an intersection between realism and liberal theory. Indeed it is theoretically painfully self-contradictory. But it also captures a practical ambiguity that many policy makers would recognize. Since it is argued that an interdependent world might only be possible through the establishments of widespread regional economic organizations, it is quite relevant and important to summarize integration theories. Doing that might help us to make a good comparison between interdependence and integration. Before explaining theories of functionalism and federalism, it is worth to mention about their relation to our study. In this study, regional integration theory will be seen as an adjunct of liberal interdependence ideas. It shares key assumptions with that theory, including a belief in institutions, in orderly cooperation, in the importance of common economic interests and in a pluralism, which does not emphasize the centrality of the state to the exclusion of people and society. Dinan has stressed the interaction of the processes of interdependence and integration in his study of recent development of the EU77. Similarly, Helen Wallaces collection of analyses of ECEFTA relations takes as a working assumption the parallel development of interdependence and integration processes, suggesting that this is not simply a general process: specific patterns of interdependence and particular forms of integration overlap and affect each other even though they do not strictly speaking cause each other78. What the contributions to her book demonstrate of the EFTA countries evolving relations with the EC is also the case with Turkey. Allen and Smith point to the growing interdependence of the context of policy79. Taylor explains functionalist idea as a sort of economic determinism80. He says they do this by tying economics to the process of integration in such a way that political integration was an automatic result of economic integration81. The Neo-functionalists82 agree the process of political integration results from economic integration (or its functional equivalent) but they do not see the process as automatic83. Political variables cannot completely be neglected as political actors (technocrats and bureaucrats) often manipulate the process and give it a political push84. The Neo-functionalists view European integration as an ad hoc step by step process characterized by gradual, continuous movement toward regional integration85.

Dinan, D., Ever Closer Union?, Macmillan, London, 1994. Wallace, H. (ed.), The Wider Western Europe: Reshaping the EC-EFTA Relationship, Pinter for the RIIA, London, 1991. 79 Allen, D. and Smith, M., The European Community in the new Europe: Bering the Burden of Change, International Journal, vol.47, Winter 1991-92, pp.1-28. 80 Taylor, Philippe Arthur, The External Relations of the European Community: Toward a Common Foreign Policy, A Common Development Policy and Economic Union, Produced from microfilm-xerography in 1979 by University Microfilms International, London, 1979, p.44. 81 Ibid. p.44. 82 For more about Neo-functionalist Theory see, Ernest, Haas, Op.cit. 1958, Schmitter, P.C. Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America, in International Political Communities: An anthology, Gordon City, Doubledge, 1966, pp.259-300, and Nye, J. S., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization, Little, Brown Co., Boston, 1971. 83 Taylor, Philippe Arthur, Op.cit., p.44. 84 Ibid. p.45. 85 Ibid. p.46.
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Federalists, however, are more interested in the measurable objectives of a cooperation. They focus on the end product orientation of the process. Federalists generally stress political solutions, political institutions, and an acceptance of the nation-state as political given that needs to be accommodated rather than abolished or circumvented in any scheme to reorganize world politics86. To conclude the section it can be said that theory of federalism artificially deals with the end result of integration of nations. Whereas, the theory of functionalism is much more patient and argues that the functioning relations of the nations can create a stable and safe integration. However, neither federalism nor functionalism is capable of creating a global economic interdependence. Both theories are based on the idea of an integrated part of the world where outsiders are neglected. Integration theory is not a theory of foreign policy. Or, at least, it was not intended as one. But it does have implication for our understanding of foreign policy. It reinforces and runs parallel to interdependence theory. Although integration theory is not capable of explaining global reality of an interdependent world, it does however explain and emphasize the importance and kinds of integration in regional economic organizations, which, we believe, are first step towards an interdependent world. Integration theory also suggests something about the context of global relations even though it would be tendentious to argue that integration is a global reality. For instance, relations between the EU and its neighbors, including Turkey, have some of the pre-conditions of integration, especially in economic, inter-elite and institutional relations87. Integration theory aims to understand the emergence and functioning of regional economic organizations. By doing that these theories develop thinking about international politics a major step forward the idea of interdependence88. The interdependence theory explains and serves best to the foreign policies of post-Cold War. While Milward and Sorensen argue Most of the (se) cold war theories of European Integration have been abandoned, partly because they proved to have little predictive value, but mainly because historical research over the last decade has demonstrated the inaccuracy of their factual underpinning89. It can be forcefully argued that while on the one hand European experience did not even follow these theories as if they were maps, but generated them as a form of explanation, on the other hand, they can be understood not only as a reaction to the Cold War but as a reaction to the growth of regional interdependence. This interdependence may be at security and cultural level as well as in economic, technological and financial terms. If integration theory is understood as an adjunct of interdependence theory, it remains relevant as economic and other forms of interdependence evolve. Milward and Sorensen, anti-Maastricht historians who want to reverse the tide of European integration, are mistaken both in their definition of policy and their and view that interdependence and integration are exclusive and not complementary ideas90.
Elazar, D. J., Federalism, International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, edited by D. Shils, London, 1972. Also for more about federalism see, Pentland, Charles, International Theory and Economic Integration, The Free Press, New York, 1973, pp.149-150, Friedrich, J. C., Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, Allen&Unwin, London, 1968, Riker, W. H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little, Brown Co., Boston, 1964, an Hay, Peter, Federalism and Supranational Organizations: Patterns for New Legal Structures, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1966. 87 Huelshoff, M. G., Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation if Integration Theory, International Studies Quarterly, vol.38, no.2, June 1994, pp.255-279; Kroll, Op.cit. 88 For a critical comparative study of interdependence or integration see, Milward Alan S. and Sorensen Vibeke, Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice, in The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992, edited by, Alan S. Milward and others, Routledge, London, 1993, pp.1-32. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid.
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The next section will deal to explain the terms Globalism and New World Order. The next section will also explain the role of international economic cooperations in the creation of a global international world order.

5.

Globalization and the New World Order

The main aim of the idea of interdependence is to explain and argue that complex mutual relations of nations might create an interdependent globe. The purpose of this section is to emphasize the globalization of foreign policies and the necessity of a new world order. Theoretical explanations of globalization might provide us the necessary theoretical background to understand the importance of interdependence theories and explain the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. Globalization as an idea is an extension of interdependence or, perhaps, a reworking of the idea in the 1990s. It does, however, put a greater emphasis on cultural as well as economic interdependence91. Tomlison argues the economic, cultural and technological process of globalization overlap, but that they are not the same, and tensions between them produce conflict within structures of interdependence92. This idea is useful in talking about EC-Turkish relations and Turkeys increasingly complex relations with her neighbors to the East. Cox ha suggested that the total context of global relations needs to be understood to understand the changing nature of interdependence, and thus the growth of a multilateral world system, in which a single country or a single conflict no longer determine international relations, shape a new possibility of interdependence, although Cox himself does not map out what that might be93. Dicken has shown the scope and intensity of global processes in a study, which underlines importance of interdependence as both structure and process in international relations94. Smith maps out the implications of this for foreign policy in his study of Modernization, Globalization and the Nation State which might be useful in explaining Turkish like states foreign policy95. The extra ordinary development in communication together with the spread of democracy has helped the globalization of the world. As Fukuyama points out the transformation that occurred in Southern Europe in less than a decade was remarkable. These countries had earlier been seen as the black sheep of Europe, condemned by their religious and authoritarian tradition to reside outside the mainstream of democratic Western European development. And yet by the 1980s each country had made a successful transition to functioning and stable democracy, so stable in fact that (with the possible exception of Turkey) the people living in them could hardly imagine the situation being otherwise. Similar democratic development took place in Latin America96. Although Fukuyama is skeptical about the democratic process and stability in Turkey, that country, though not perfect, has

Tomlison provides a broad survey of the growth of the us3e of the term in sociology and cultural studies: Tomlison, J., Cultural Globalisation and Cultural Imperialism, unpublished conference paper, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 6 March 1995, presented to the Cultural Imperialism or Global Modernisation Conference. 92 Ibid. pp.3-5. 93 Cox, R. W., Multilateralism and World Order, Review of International Studies, vol.18, no.2, 1992, pp.161180. 94 Dicken, P., Global Shift: the Internationalisation of Economic Activity, Chapman, second edition, London, 1992. 95 See, Smith, M., Modernisation, Globalisation and the Nation State, in McGrew, A. And Lewis, P. (eds.), Global Politics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991. 96 Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and The Last Man, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992, p.20.

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made an astonishing process in the establishment of a stable electoral system. One can clearly see the foreign implications of stable and more democratic domestic politics. A new international economic world order will be created, as already suggested, by the growing economic relations of the nations. The new world order therefore is a new international economic world order97. As one can easily observe, in this century, the world witnessed a great many of organizations and agreements between the nations. Most of them failed due to the lack of economic cooperation. Any friendship agreement might become void unless it is backed by the power of the economy. Before the start of the Second World War, there have been friendship agreements between the nation states. All these agreements were null and void as soon as one party does not obey it. Pure political agreements or organizations are the result of diplomatic games. They are thus very vulnerable to the diplomatic maneuvers. Economic organizations, however, can be initiated by diplomatic move but the course of events will control and determine the future of the organization. One party cannot declare economic organizations null and void. International economic organizations are because not artificial and abstract phenomenon. For instance, a no vote to the Maastricht Treaty by the people of Denmark did not cut Denmarks relations with the Community. What happened was the review of the agreement concerning Denmark and some concessions made by both sides. The vital point here s that, while non-economic organizations could loose their existence in a matter of day due to their abstract nature and due to the lack of mutual interest between parties, economic organizations could not vanish in a matter of day due to the concrete nature and the existing interest relations between the signatories. To Agnew, the new world order is an order, which is being created by the hegemony of the United States98. He, however, accepts that the United States is in an impasse on the creation of the new world order99. He says, the United States is itself caught between the (se) two process of globalization and fragmentation. The policy levers available in the past, such as military spending and national macroeconomic and tariff measures, are no longer appropriate to the problems at hand. Military spending, for example, can help some local economies, but penalizes the competitiveness of the national economy. A world largely made by American design can no longer be relied on to deliver growth to America as a whole. America is becoming just another country100. Ravenal also argued that the age of superpower passing, and the shape of entire system is moving beyond the determinative reach of either the United States or the Soviet Union101. Paul Kennedy also argued that (in fact predicted) the Soviet Union would collapse because of high military spending. The United States will also face the same result because of the high military spending and aid102. The United States led new world order is therefore not secure and stable. One way of securing a stable new world order, therefore, is to put an adequate emphasis on the importance of regional and international economic organizations. The establishment of the regional economic organization North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico might support the idea that even the United States realized that she alone can no longer economically challenge and lead the world. Turkeys response to the
See, Walters, Robert S. and Blake, David H., The Politics of Global Economic Relations, Fourth Edition, Prentice Hall inc., 1992, pp.1-12. 98 Agnew, John, The United States and American Hegemony, in Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: a Global Analysis, edited by, Peter J. Taylor, Belhaven Press, London, 1993, pp.228-233. 99 Ibid. pp.233-235. 100 Ibid. p.233. 101 Ravenal, Earl C., The Case for Adjustment, Foreign Policy, no.81, Winter, 1990/91, p.4. 102 See, Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988.
97

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establishment of NAFTA was positive and supportive. Turkish president Sleyman Demirel stated that the establishment of NAFTA was a good step towards a closer and global world. Turkey would always support such initiatives103. It is important to note that the theory of interdependence explains the new international economic order, though the Realists criticize the interdependence for being out of the reality of the world. The Realist theory itself failed to explain the reality of post-Cold War. It even legged current international issues. Those who based their theories and ideas on the framework of the Cold War had to shift their ideas to up to date them. The idea of a global international order might be criticized as being imaginary. Trend of the changes, however, in the world tells us the contrary. The supporters of the complex interdependence are correct in their claim that the international polity may become the focal point of increasing governments, primarily but not exclusively in economic terms104. The interdependence theory has thus more consciously directed attention to the nature of international order and seek satisfaction in that quarter. The appeals for a new international economic order may illustrate this trend to the extent that they are based on a recognition of the fact that individual third world governments cannot deliver (economic) development without some adjustments of the worlds economic system105. In order to deliver worldwide economic development, it is necessary to adjust the international financial and trading regimes in such a way that the less developed states would be less disadvantaged and sought to do so by such devices as adjusting the terms of trade, stabilizing commodity prices, regulating the behavior of multinational corporations and by improving poor country access both to technology and to international financial markets106. Although less developed countries tend to trade overwhelmingly with developed states; the economic relationship between the two is unequal107. Despite the unequal economic relations between developing and developed states, there is a growing interdependence between the two. One way of further improving the degree of interdependence is the existence of regional economic organizations covering all parts of the world. One precondition is that all the organizations should be compatible to each other. In other words, there should not be inward looking protectionist integration inside the organization. Instead, an outward looking policy of interdependence should be pursued108. One obstacle to the creation of a global international order is perhaps the behavior of centralized nation states. As usually small amount of elite keeps the power, the centralized nation states usually tend to close themselves to the public and to the outside world. The elite in those countries takes decisions usually according to their ideals. The objectivity and the pragmatism are not taken into account. When foreign policy issues opened to the influence of public opinion, then the increased democratization of domestic politics produces pragmatic foreign policies and important internal economic and social reforms109.

The Voice of Turkey, 26, November 1993, 3 oclock gmt. Clark, Ian, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.211. 105 Ibid. p.211. 106 Ibid. pp.38-39., On financial globalisation see also Cerny, P. G. (ed.), Finance and World Politics, Edward and Elgar, Aldershot, 1993. 107 Barke, Michael, and OHare, Greg, The Third World, Longman House, Essex, 1991, p.302. 108 Van Ham, P., The European Community after Hegemony: the Future of European Integration in a Multipolar World, International Relations, vol.11, no.5, August 1993, pp.451-467. 109 Barke, Op.cit., pp.147-148.
104

103

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Turkish Foreign Policy, until the late 1980s, for instance, was an outcome of elite processes and it was not generally compatible with the creation of global world. There were no long run foreign policy strategies due to the existence of non-competitive elite and a strong centralized system. After the 1980s, as decentralization in the economy and democratization process began, Turkish foreign policy began to be more colorful and multi-dimensional110. Turkeys foreign policy to the West and particularly to the European Community remained unchanged111. The unchanged foreign policy towards the West was not a well-planned long run policy of Turkey. Before the 1980s, affected by the external environment, Turkey for security reasons became an ally of the West against the Soviet Union. The Soviet factor was one of the major influential external factors of Turkish foreign policy112. As mentioned before, another obstacle for the creation of new world order is that the existence of nationalism and strong nationalist feelings in individual countries. Nationalist countries (however democratic their domestic politics may be) will always endure the difficulty of compatibility to the outside of their boundaries. To create a just international world order, the chief alternative to this state-centric conception of international society in one in which the individual person is regarded as the real member of international society and the proper subject of its laws113. As it is explained above, Realist idea and the new world order compete with each other as ends and means. For the realist exponents of minimum international order, the structure of hierarchical domination, while unappealing themselves, provide the essential preconditions of elementary stability upon which a more ambitious programme of world order might be constructed114. The interdependence idea has denied the realist on that issue as well blaming them that such practices might block off any prospect of world order115. Galbraith emphasizes that the new world order cannot be created without a well functioning United Nations. He says in anything that is to be called a new world order, one in which there is effective resolution of internal and external conflict and an effective attack on their causes, the United Nations must be a great deal more than it is now. It cannot, as in the Gulf War, be the justifying instrument of American policy. It must have a higher authority of its own116. Galbraith has also pointed out that poverty must be addressed as the prime source of world order117. He again stresses that education level of the people is also important in the creation and the maintenance of the world order. He says A hundred years ago in Europe and the United States, as also in Japan, popular education was seen as the essential key to economic and social progress. That has been forgotten. We must remind ourselves that in this world there is no literate population that is poor and no illiterate population that is anything but poor118. It is important to stress again in here that noneconomic international organizations, such as UN, have not been successful, because it is difficult to use sanctions against infringing countries. Whereas, intense economic relations
110 111

See, Bakan, Selahaddin, Op.cit., Chapter Five. See, Ibid. Chapter Six. 112 See, Ibid. Chapter Five. 113 Nardin, T., Law, Morality and the Relations of State, Princeton University Press, 1983, pp.43-44. 114 Clark, Op.cit., p.41. 115 Clark, Op.cit., p.41. 116 Galbraith, J. K., The Call of Arms and The Poor Man, The Guardian, Daily Newspaper, Wednesday, March 27, 1991, p.23. 117 Ibid. p.23. 118 Ibid. p.23.

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between the countries create a natural environment that parties become indispensable to each other. Regional organizations will play the major role in the establishment and maintenance of the new global order. European Community perhaps is the most remarkable international organization among the others. Although it has been established between the nation states, which were hostile to each other, it made a remarkable process in forty years. European Communitys move towards an ever closer Europe and United Nations involvement in the protection of world peace show us that the world is becoming increasingly inter-linked. The European Community has launched the Single European Act to further dismantle the commercial barriers between the member states. Single European Act became operational on the first of January 1993 was an important step for furthering the interdependence in Europe119. European Community is proceeding a global challenge by, at least, opening another gate towards interdependence by the introduction of the Single European Act120. However, the latest agreement signed in Maastricht has shown us that European Union is going too far and too fast. This kind of an artificial progress of the union will not help to the interdependence relations in Europe. On the contrary, it might create a Federal States of Europe. That is why England and some other member countries found it difficult to digest some of the agreements in Maastricht and had to put some reservations. The increasing number of international organizations will create a complex interdependence between the states and that will help the globalization of the world and world peace. As it is explained above, global interdependence will come through regional organizations. The structure of the regional economic organizations is thus of great importance. Any federalist structure of any kind of organization will eventually estrange the other organizations and the states outside. Federalist structure will be more dangerous to the international security than the non-democratic nation states. The disintegration of a federalist structure will certainly disturb the international order and will also cause a civil war which international community is witnessing in what was Yugoslavia. Federalist structure thus neither will help the creation of a complex interdependence nor will it help the economic development of the world. An ideal regional economic cooperation is the one that does not proceed towards a federalist way by closing the doors outside and by becoming economically and politically closer and closer inside the organization.

6.

Conclusion

It is argued in this article that a pluralist democratic structure is necessary in order to have stable foreign relations. Democracy is quite compatible with international politics. Turkeys own experience shows that the improvement in her democratic structure created multi-dimensional foreign policy. As the experience of the other countries also show nondemocratic countries foreign policies are usually based on the ideology, emotion and misperception of the totalitarian regimes in power. Whereas, democratic countries foreign policies are based on the mutual interest and understanding. Another aim of this study was to prove that realist theory is not capable of explaining our complex interdependent world. Some political scientists suggest that theoretical study in
119 120

For more see, Chapter Seven. See, Bressond, Albert, Beyond Interdependence: 1992 as a Global Challenge, International Affairs, vol.66, no.1, 1990, pp.47-65.

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international study is almost dead due to the fact that theories could not predict or even explain international events. This study contrarily showed that the importance of theoretical study is not decreased. However, the taboo subjects such as state, military power, which realist theory is built upon, have lost their importance in international relations. Realists believed that the state was the only actor in international arena. Whereas, supranational bodies and international institutions are becoming more and more important. Neo-realist approach does not directly challenge the realist view of state, but instead seeks to dilute its importance by economic considerations and outlooks that reflected reality in international relations of 1960s and 1970s. Neo-realist theory was characterized by the dtente between East and the West and also by the expansion of the world trade. Interdependence theory challenges the assumption of the political realism that nationstates are the only important actors in world politics. Multi-national corporations and transnational banks are examples of other actors that are important not only because of their activities in pursuit of their own interests, but also because they act as transmission belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another121. Regional economic organizations are the most important bodies in the creation of an interdependent world. However, as argued before, integration theories of federalism and functionalism cannot accomplish that mission. Federalist idea because suggests federal region economically protected against any outside intervention. Although, functionalist theory suggests that integration of the nations should be created by the economic and political functioning between the member states, its end result is also to create a protectionist economic region. It is thus argued here that interdependence rather than integration should be the main goal of regional economic organizations so that one regional economic organization can be economically compatible to the other. If economic interdependence of nations becomes the major goal, then the establishment of North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR), and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) could be seen as complementary to each other and to the European Community.

121

Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S., Complex Interdependence, Transnational Relations, and Realism: Alternative Perspectives on World Politics, in Charles, W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene, R. Wittkopf (eds.), The Global Agenda, New York, Random House, 1984, p.245.

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The Use Of Force In Relation To Self-Determination In International Law

Mustafa ahin* 1. Introduction The reasons for using force in the international arena are numerous. But in this study, the focus will be only on the use of force in relation to self-determination in international law. Moreover the legality of assisting national liberation organizations and their place in international law will be dealt with. The use of force may emerge in the form of using force by a national liberation movement or using force on behalf of a group of people struggling for independence or the use of force against these movements. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was a self-evident truth that only States could engage in wars. Many other words were used to describe other forms of violence such as insurrection, civil unrest, piracy or rebellion. At most, there was 'civil war' where the objective modified the idea and the law which applied. After the Second World War, opinions about what constitutes wars and which entities in the international arena may wage war have altered. The break up of colonial empires and the increasing consensus about the right of peoples to self-determination have directed some to conclude that the wars of national liberation are not outside the concern of international law, although they are seemingly intra-state war. Until 1946, the people of the 20th century witnessed the worst horrors of the use of force in the history of mankind. Millions of people were killed in the First and Second World Wars. That is why, the United Nations which was set up with the memories of these two World Wars, was meant to create a peaceful world. To realize that, it tried to provide means of settling disputes peacefully. Nonetheless, the UN Charter did not prohibit the use of force as a whole. While UN Charter prohibits the use of force in Art. 2(3) and 2(4), Art. 51 allows member States to use force in self-defence when they are attacked. Also under Chapter VII, the collective use of force is possible. Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) are particularly important in our subject. Article 2(4) provides: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. And Article 2(7) states: Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
*

Research Assistant at the Police Academy, currently PhD student at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.

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or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter. Like the personality issue in international law, authorities who could resort to force were strictly attributed to only States until the end of Second World War. Thomas Aquinas, who wrote in Summa Theologia in the thirteen century about war stated the three basic elements for the presence of a just war: These three elements were (1) lawful authority, (2) just cause, (3) right intention.122 Some attributed the lawful authority to wage war only to an emperor or in some cases to the Pope. Some like William of Rennes widened it so as to include all feudal lords who have no superior inside the feudal hierarchy. Some like Pope Innocent IV also concluded that the right belongs to the authorities who have no superior to them.123 As a result of the development of these arguments, the world at the end of the 19th century reached the conclusion that States were the only entities which had the exclusive right to wage war.124 In this understanding, there was a clear distinction between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.125 In this case, the conflicts which were between States were considered as international. If the other side of the conflict was not a state, the conflict was not regarded as an international one. This clear-cut division has lost its feature with the development of the concept of international right to self-determination and the popularity of 'internationalized' civil wars.126

2. The States And The Authority to Resort To Force a) In International Armed Conflict The authority of States as the only power which could resort to force was confirmed in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. Article 2 provided: In addition to the provision which shall be implemented in peace time, the present convention shall apply to all cases of declared war on any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.127 Although some commentators like Udo Wolf128 interpreted the terms of 'even if the state of war is not recognized' so as to include wars of national liberation within the scope of the conventions, the initial aim of the convention was to apply the convention when states do not recognize the state of war between themselves. Also by stating High Contracting Parties,
Lawrence T. Farley, Plebiscites and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy, (London: Westview Press, 1986), p.141 123 Frederich H. Russel, The Just War in the Middle Ages, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975) pp. 298-9 124 Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) p. 15 125 Ibid., p. 16 126 Ibid. 127 Article 2, para. 1. common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 128 Udo Wolf, ' Prisoner of War Status and the National Liberation Struggles', International Review of Contemporary Law, 1(1984)pp-31-6
122

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the convention was referring to States only. Because only States could be High Contracting Parties.129 Thus, historically, according to international law, States were the authorities which had the right to use force in an international war. b) Legitimate Authority in Non-International Armed Conflicts Until the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the prevailing view was that internal conflicts were not subject to international regulation and the conduct of them were exclusively governed by the municipal law.130 Although the acceptance of self-determination as a principle in the UN Charter and as a right in several UNGA resolutions like 1514(XV) generally make the issues131 related with it, international ones.132 Nonetheless, most of the armed struggles for the attainment of self-determination still had and have and will have many characteristics of civil wars.133 Traditional international law is speechless mostly on the use of force inside the borders of States. That is, international law deemed these things a question within the domestic jurisdiction of each country.134 Especially in the case of revolution, the silence of international law is apparent. That is, neither condemning nor condoning the revolution within an established state led some to think that there was a right to revolution. However the silence of the international law does not mean that international law recognizes the right to revolution as a part of international law or vice versa.135 Nonetheless, since international law does not accept the result of internal violence, it is not completely speechless on the use of force inside established states. After the level of the conflict reaches a certain degree, international society recognizes some groups opposed to a government in civil conflict, as the holders of some rights and duties in international law. But that entirely depends on the military and political success of the rebellious movement and the degree of the resemblance of their success to that of a sovereign state. In a way, the outcome is more important than the purpose of the rebellion according to these rules. In reality, most of these rules were disregarded. 136 Since most of the non-international conflicts, among them the wars of national liberation, are regarded as civil wars, it is advisable to deal with the civil wars at that stage. Civil wars can be classified into three with three different legal outcomes stemming from each; rebellion, insurgency and belligerency. Rebellion is an occasional challenge to the legitimate government and the rebels have no rights or duties in international law. A rebellion within the borders of a sovereign state is the exclusive concern of that state. Rebels may be punished under the domestic law and there
Supra 3, p. 21 Georges Abi-Saab, "None-International Armed Conflicts" in International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, (London: Henry Dunant Institute(UNESCO) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) p.217 131 Like the armed struggle for the attainment of it. 132 W. Ofuatey - Kodje, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law, (New York: Nellen 1977) p. 113 133 Supra 3, p.22 134 Evan Luard, ' Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations', in The International Regulation of Civil Wars, ed. Evan Luard (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972) p. 19 135 Supra 3, p. 24 136 Ibid., p. 23
130 129

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is no requirement to treat them as prisoners of war.137 Assistance to rebels constitutes unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of a State. That is why, it is banned under the traditional international law. But the legal government can be assisted as a result of lawlessness of rebels cause in international law. 138 Insurgency and belligerency constitute greater and continuous challenge to the government over a considerable period of time in a large scale and attract large members of people within the society.139 Insurgency is in the middle between rebellion and belligerency. It is generally agreed that the presence of a 'factual relation', that is, acknowledgement of the existence of an internal war is necessary to recognize insurgency. 140 But there is no exact criteria for the intensity of the violence, the size of territory controlled etc. According to Higgins recognition of insurgency imposes no duty of neutrality upon the recognizing state. And this is the only guidance that traditional international law provides.141 Wilson argues that if rebels are to be recognized as insurgents, they should have a substantial amount of control over territory and enough military might for the interests of foreign states to be affected. These are necessary for the emergence of the relationship between insurgents and outside States.142 But still, it is up to the third States whether to have relationship or not. Belligerency is the ultimate one in the continuum from rebellion to insurgency. The criteria for it are more precise than insurgency. First, there should exist widespread armed conflict within a State. Second, a substantial part of the national territory should be occupied and administered by the rebels. Third, the hostilities must be carried out in accordance with the laws of war by the insurgents. Fourth, the situation in the country in question should affect the interests of a state so that the particular state should feel itself obliged to recognize the belligerency for practical reasons.143 Despite these criteria, what constitutes 'a widespread armed conflict', 'a substantial part of national territory' and practical reasons are still the sources of the confusion for the recognition of belligerency. Nonetheless, the recognition of belligerency was still under the discretion of States in traditional international law.144 The recognition of belligerency attributes similar rights and duties to those of states in international law.145 But still, the belligerents do not have all the rights which states have. In fact, traditional international law on the recognition of insurgency and belligerency is more theoretical. Because since the Second Word War, no recognition of belligerency has taken place.146
Herbert W. Briggs(ed.), The Law of Nations, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1953), p.791 Supra 3, p. 24 139 Richard A. Falk, 'Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War', in James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Aspects of Civil Strife, (Princeton University Press, 1964) p. 197 140 Rosalyn Higgins, ' International Law and Civil Conflict', in The International Regulation of Civil Wars, p.170 141 Ibid. 142 Supra 3, p. 24 143 Supra 19, pp. 170-1 144 Supra 3, p.26 145 Ibid., pp. 26-7 146 Ibid., pp. 27-28
138 137

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Customary international law still has the understanding that the use of force by groups opposed to an established government was neither a matter of condemnation nor condonation. That is, the use of force within a state against the established government was, at the first instant, a matter for municipal law.147 There are a few relevant international conventions which appear to be regulating the use of force within states. Article 3 of 1949 Geneva Conventions can be counted among them. Article 3 gives limited humanitarian protection for 'persons taking no active part in hostilities' in the armed conflicts which do not have international character. Although Soviet Jurists suggested that Article 3 is the evidence of the 'recognition as subjects of international law not only of States, but also of nations struggling for their independence'148 it in fact did not bring any means to change the status of the combatants within states whatever their causes and to prevent them being punished like domestic criminals under the established governments rules.149

3. National Liberation Movements And The Authority To Resort To Force The right of self-determination of 'people' has gained a legal status in international law in this century. When the demands of self-determination were not met, the use of force for the attainment of it was seen one of the ways of realizing it. While many people advocate the use of only peaceful means to attain independence, some like Michael Walzer support the use of force as the only way out. He, in effect, confines any right of self-determination to those willing to define themselves as a group by the violent and bloody struggles they are willing to engage in150: 'communities which do not fight are not entitled to self-determination, for, actually, they are not genuine communities at all'.151 National liberation movements are the organizations to fight for the right of selfdetermination on behalf of particular peoples. Whether that gives them the right to use force or not and if the use of force compromises the national liberation movements as well as states are subjects to be discussed in this part of the study. The notion of sovereignty of states necessitates that the only entity which can legitimately use force, should be the States. Accepting the national liberation movements as other authorities which may use force for attaining the right of their peoples to selfdetermination, leads to undermine the sovereignty of States to a certain extent. In fact the UN Charter supports vehemently the sovereignty of the established States. Article 2(4) of the Chapter prohibits the threat or the use of force by all members against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Pomerance describes that article as the most frequently
Ibid., p. 28 George G. Ginsburg, ''Wars of National Liberation'' and the Modern Law of Nations: The Soviet Thesis', Law and Contemporary Problems, 29(1964) p.913 149 Supra 3, p.28 150 Neil MacCormick, "Is Nationalism Philosophically Credible?" in Willaim Twinning (ed) Issues of SelfDetermination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) p.8 151 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars,(New York, 1977) p.93 quoted by Juha Rikk, "On National SelfDetermination: Some Problems of Walzer's Definition" in Issues of Self-Determination, p.21
148 147

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named candidate for the status of Jus Cogens.152 The strength of that article in international law is one of the main reasons of considerable resistance in the way of recognizing the right of national liberation movements to use force for the right of their peoples to selfdetermination.153 Nonetheless there has always been some support to defend the use of force by national liberation movements in one of the very few situations in which the use of force is legitimate.154 Moreover, until now, many states both accepted the use of force by these movements and in some situations actively supported the use of force politically and sometimes financially and militarily. For example; France supported Biafra's secession from Nigeria during the secession years. Both USSR and Cuba supported Eritrean independence movements until the Dergue came to power in Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan and a number of other Arab countries supported Eritrea's independence during the armed struggle years with varying degrees of support. The USA, Israel and Iran supported the Iraqi Kurdish independence movement in Northern Iraq until 1975 with almost all possible means.155 Following the Gulf war, Iraqi Kurds revolted against the Iraqi regime. The uprising was suppressed by Iraqi government forces brutally. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran. As a result, the allied coalition forces which consisted of American, British and French forces based in Turkey established and still maintain a buffer zone in Iraq 156 under the scheme of 'Provide Comfort'. Though the buffer zone was created for humanitarian reasons, it is also helping Iraqi Kurds to attain de facto independence from Iraq. Therefore, it can be seen as another example of assistance to national liberation movements. Of course the understanding towards the use of force by national liberation movements was not easily reached. Between the First World War and the Second World War, extinguishing the rebellion in the colonial territories was an internal affair of the colonial administration.157 After the Second World War, opinions on that issue started to change. New developments had taken place. The UN Charter contains a number of articles and charts about dependent people. As these attracted support, the idea of using force legitimately within international law for the attainment of that said peoples right to self-determination by national liberation movements also attracted support. Some argued that since the continuance of colonialism is contrary to the right to self-determination, attaining that right by way of using force, if other means fail, should not be condemned.158

A) United Nations Resolutions Since the United Nations has dedicated itself to the peace after the lessons of the two world wars, the UN Charter allowed the Member States in Article 51 to use force only in cases of self-defence in return for armed attack (as it was noted earlier). There is no exception to this rule in the UN Charter. That is, there is no article explicitly or implicitly allowing self152

Michla Pomerance, Self-Deternination in Law and Practice, (London: Mantinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) p.48 153 Supra 3, pp. 91-2 154 Ibid., p. 92 155 Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1991) pp. 250-63 156 Morton H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer and Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination In the New World Order, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992) p.146 157 Supra 3, p. 93 158 Ibid., p. 94

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determination units to secure their rights by way of using force. Moreover, the Declaration on Colonialism, Resolution 1514(XV), did not recognize the use of force for the purpose of realising the right to self-determination.159 But, at the same time, the Resolution 1514(XV) declared that 'all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease'. It, in a way, prohibited the use of force against the wishes of selfdetermination of the colonial peoples. When India invaded the Portuguese colonial territories - Goa, Damao and Diu which were situated at the Indian Sub-continent in December 1961, India defended her action and alleged the Declaration on Colonialism provided firm grounds for the Indian initiative to end a colonial rule.160 In the Security Council debates on Goa issue in 1961, the United States Ambassador to UN pointed out that Resolution 1514(XV) does not authorize the use of force for its implementation. It does not and it should not and it can not, under the Charter... Resolution 1514(XV) does not and can not overrule the Charter injunctions against the use of armed force.161 A Security Council resolution deploring the Indian action could not be passed as a result of the Soviet veto, although the majority of the Security Council supported the resolution. In those years, the Soviet Block and Non-aligned Countries were supporting the right of colonial people to be emancipated from the colonial rule by using every means even by using force, if the administering State refused them the right of self-determination. That sentiment first found a ground in a General Assembly resolution in 1965. The Assembly accepted Resolution 2105(XX)that Recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and invites all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial territories.162 The ambiguous term 'struggle' in this resolution was interpreted by some States as the armed struggle; but, especially Western States did not interpret that resolution sanctioning armed struggle. At the meetings of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law in 1966, the Afro-Asian States, led by Algeria, proposed the acceptance of an interpretation that exclude the wars of national liberation from the general prohibition of the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.163 They would base the national liberation movements struggle on the selfdefence clause. But Western States objected to this interpretation claiming that the selfdefence right exclusively belonged to States and the so-called right of peoples to self-defence against colonial domination had no ground in either international law or in the UN Charter.164 As a result, the Special Committee could not reach an agreement.

Supra 31, p.48 Quincy Right, 'The Goa Incident', AJIL, vol. 56(1962) pp. 617-632 161 SCOR, 16 th Yr., 988 th Mtg., 18 December 1961, para. 93 quoted in Pomerance p. 49 162 UNGA Res. 2105(XX), adopted 20 Dec. 1965, 74:6:27 163 Supra 3, p.95 164 Arnold Fraleigh, 'The Algerian Devolution as a Case Study in International Law' in The International Law of Civil War, ed. Richard A. Falk,(London: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 190-1
160

159

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The argument on the legitimacy of the struggle of national liberation movements by arms did not confine to UNGA Resolutions. The Security Council, too dealt with the matter and it too accepted that term in relation to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council Resolution 232(1966) stated 'The inalienable right of people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration [on Colonialism] and recognis[ed] the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights'165 Even in this resolution whether the Security Council was allowing the struggles so as to include the armed ones was not clear. Despite the efforts of Third World Countries to change the interpretation of struggle with armed ones. they were not successful. In 1970, the General Assembly accepted Resolution 2708(XXV). In this Resolution, the Assembly was repeating Its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples and peoples under alien domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence by all means at their disposal.166 By accepting the term ''by all means at their disposal'', the General Assembly was sanctioning the use of force of national liberation movements without stating it explicitly. Of course most of the Western States again abstained or voted against this resolution. In fact Western States were not against the right of peoples to self-determination. But they were against the use of force for anything other than in self-defence by States against armed attack.167 They were not willing to expand the right to use force so as to include the national liberation organizations. The Declaration on the Principles of International Law known also as the Declaration on Friendly Relations was accepted unanimously in General Assembly on 24 October 1970. The issue of the struggles of national liberation movements was addressed in this Resolution. The Declaration became the first document recognising unanimously a right to selfdetermination. States also recognized that a colony or a non-self-governing territory had status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it. Declaration also stated Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives people referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In the view of Asbiborn Eide168and Georges Abi-Saab,169 this paragraph confirms that national liberation movements have the authority to use force in international law. Eide also

SC Res. 232(1966), 16 Dec.1966, 11:0:4 UNGA Res. 2708(XXV), 14 Dec. 1970, 73:5:22 167 Supra 3, p.97 168 Asbiborn Eide, 'Sovereign Equality Versus the Global Military Structure: Two Competing Approaches to World Order; in New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, vol. i. ed. Antonio Cassese, (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 1979)p. 25 169 Georges Abi-Saab, 'Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War', Annales d`etues internationales, 3 (1972) p. 101-3
166

165

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maintains that the Resolution makes it clearer than before that armed struggle for selfdetermination is legitimate. Abi-Saab, by looking at the unanimity of the Declaration, was alleging that even Western States who were against justification of the use of force for the right of selfdetermination, changed their stance. But as Wilson points out one of the reasons that the Resolution was passed unanimously was the existence of the wide range of possible interpretations of the controversial provisions of the Resolution. In fact, the Declaration clause stated above, does not permit peoples to use force to secure their right of self-determination. They can get support only in the case of force used against them, not when their right to self-determination is denied. Second, the resolution does not refer to 'resistance' as 'armed resistance'. Resistance should not necessarily be in the 'armed' form. There are other kinds of resistance such as civil disobedience, strikes or political opposition which can be effectively manipulated. Third, the final part of that clause stipulates that they can receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Since the debate revolves around what the purposes and principles do and do not allow, the last paragraph of the clause does not disperse the controversy. Despite these objections to the use of force by peoples to secure their right of selfdetermination, that clause was perceived as a political success by those who argue that wars of national liberation are legitimate. The wording of the Declaration is ignored frequently. Finally, that issue was clearly stated in Resolution 3070(XXVIII) in 1973. It reaffirmed 'the legitimacy of the peoples struggle for liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means including armed struggle'.170 The Resolution was accepted by the General Assembly by 97 votes to 5 with 28 abstentions. As Wilson remarks, this voting pattern showed that not all the States construed the Declaration on Principles of International Law as allowing peoples to use force for liberation. The Sixth Committee of the United Nations which considers legal issues brought a more important step to the issue by passing a draft sponsored by several Third World and Eastern Block States. That draft was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 3103(XXVIII), Basic Principles of the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes.171 The Resolution solemnly proclaims the following basic principles of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes without prejudice to their elaboration in the future within the framework of the development of international law applying to the protection of human rights in armed conflicts; 1. The struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination and racist regimes for the implementation of their right to self-determination and independence is legitimate and in full accordance with the principles of international law. The intention of the Resolution was not only to grant legitimate combatant status to the members of liberation movements according to the Geneva Convention, but also to secure
170 171

UNGA Res. 3070(XXVIII), 30 Nov. 1973, 97:5:28 UNGA Res. 3103(XXVIII), 12 Dec. 1973, 83:13:19

34

their right to self-determination to allow them to use force in accordance with international law.172 In the light of the approval and disapproval rate of States regarding such kind of resolutions, it can be concluded that while a significant minority of States in General Assembly were opposed to the widening of the authority to use force beyond sovereign States, the bulk of States were supporting the opinion that 'peoples who were not yet members of an independent state had the authority to use force to secure their right to self-determination'.173 This issue was tackled again in 1974 when the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression had finalised its proposal after a debate within the United Nations.174 The proposal was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly. The adoption was by consensus both in the Committee and in the General Assembly.175 Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression is related to our subject matter. It enumerates acts of aggression and counts the following as aggression. (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the act listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. If that Article is assessed solely, it can be easily deduced that, the Article is to the detriment of liberation movements because it prohibits assistance across State borders. Besides, it is deemed as aggression. As in most of the national liberation movements survival depended on outside help, that Article would mean a great blow to the struggle of national liberation movements. But fortunately for national liberation movements, the last Article saved that danger. Article 7 states Nothing in this Definition, and in particular Article 3, could in any way prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of those peoples to struggle to that end to seek and receive support in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above mentioned Declaration.176 In fact the definition also did not alter much the previous position of the national liberation movements in international law. Article 7 was a derogation from not only Article 3(g) but also the whole of Art. 3. Third World Countries assessed that as a victory for them. For them, 'struggle' meant 'armed struggle' , although the mention of the use of force was deliberately avoided.177 But the Resolution was very open to wide interpretation. Thus it got

Supra 3, p. 101 Ibid. 174 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th Ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1991) pp. 8779 175 Ibid. 176 UNGA Res. 3314(XXIV), 14 Dec. 1974, consensus 177 Supra 31, p. 58
173

172

35

the approval of even those States who were opposed to the legitimisation of the use of force by national liberation movements.178 Lastly, the UN General Assembly passed another resolution approving 'the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle.179 The Resolution was adopted 120:17:6. This voting behaviour showed that there was still a strong number of States opposing the attainment of independence by national liberation movements via the use of force. While passing these resolutions, the aim of the States were to decolonize trust or nonself-governing territories. None of these resolutions were passed as a result of an event which took place in an established State. They were most of the time meant for the people living under colonial rule of Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Rhodesia or France. Given the present situation, that is, after achievement of independence by most of the colonial territories and the collapse of the Cold War understanding, it seems very difficult to reiterate the wording of previous resolutions which accepted the use of force for independence. The reason for this could be the increasing likelihood of the presence of such movements in the non-colonial States. After the collapse of cohesive ideologies, most States realised that they are more vulnerable to break-up than the pre-colonial States. For example; two pre-Cold War period advocators of the use of force by national liberation movements disintegrated as a result of the manipulation of the right to self-determination. Two of these States are ex-Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia. Although the main States are still alive, that is, the Russian Federation and so-called Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, they are still as vulnerable as their predecessors to disintegration. For a year, the world community is also witnessing the break-up new Yugoslavia with the war in Kosovo. In Russia, there are 88 regions and Republics of which 22 consist of non-Russian ethnic minorities. And in the case of Serbia; Kosova Albanians, Sancak Muslims and Voyvodina Hungarians are still there as potential self-determination claimants. Moreover, as the holders of the privileges of sovereignty, most of the States in the UN organs will not desire to commit suicide by allowing the national liberation movements to use force against themselves. One other issue is the support of national liberation movements. In the Cold War era, those organizations which adopted a side in the equilibrium of Communist and Western States, most of the time guaranteed the support of the side with which they affiliated. Given the collapse of this system, most of the Western States and ex-Socialist States do not want to spend their money on these movements because supporting them will not bring any good to them. As a result, it can be argued that, the accumulation of these Resolutions reflect the very liberal approach of the past which is very difficult to repeat as there is no significant non-self-governing territory and trust territory left now. For example, when Namibia became independent in 1990, the last trusteeship of UN came to an end in Africa.180

178 179

Supra 3, p.103 UNGA Res. 37/43, 3 Dec. 1982, 120:17:6 180 Ali A. Mazrui, "The Bondage of Boundaries", The Economist, September 11th-17th 1993, p.34

36

B. The Practice of States Many states even those who did not support at any time the extension of the right to use force to liberation organizations, one way or another recognized and/or supported some of these movements with different motives such as protecting their nationals, their economic interests etc. Of course having a relationship between a State and a national liberation organisation does not give to that particular movement a right to use force to reach independence. But having a relationship of a kind meant for most of these organizations the approval of their acts at least implicitly. Recognition is very important for national liberation movements. Because, 'recognition' of their existence may have some part to play in their emergence as fully operational subjects in the international arena and more importantly in the opening of bilateral relationships181 between the recognizing States and recognized movements. Although in the case of civil war, States may recognize, in theory, rebellion, insurgency and belligerency with their legal consequences emanating from the State recognition, in practice there has been no recognition of insurgency or belligerency since the Second World War. In the case of national liberation movements, States have two main tendencies in recognition since the end of Second World War. They either prematurely recognize governments which have been established by liberation movements who represent a people considered to have a right to self-determination or recognize the liberation movement itself as distinct from a government formed by it, as a representative or the representative of its people.182 In the case of premature recognition, the recognized government may in fact lack some of criteria needed for the establishment of a State which were specified in Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933. Unlike the premature recognition, the legal consequences of recognition of national liberation movements are not clear. In the case of premature recognition, the practice of States since 1945 regarding the secession of territories claiming to have a right of self-determination has not been wholly consistent. The East Indies which is now Indonesia was a Dutch Colony until she was occupied by Japanese forces in the Second World War. After the collapse of the Japanese administration, Indonesian nationalists declared their independence in August 1945. The Netherlands did not recognize the nationalist government at first. But later the Netherlands, whose colonial possession Indonesia had hitherto been, only recognized the Government of Java, Madura and Sumatra while considering herself as the de jure sovereign of the territory; in return the Republican government agreed to co-operate 'in the rapid formation of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indonesia'.183 There would be a period of transition. However, there were disagreements between the Netherlands administration and Indonesians about the terms of agreement. The Netherlands was claiming that she still had de jure authority for the whole area and she was objecting the

181 182

Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, (London: Blackstone, 1990) p.70 Supra 3, p. 104 183 Ibid., p. 106

37

recognition of Indonesian government. In the meantime, Indonesia was recognized by Egypt, Syria, Iran, the United States, Britain, Australia, and China.184 The Dutch government resorted to force in July 1947 to bring back the previous status quo. That even worsened the situation. The situation was brought to the UN despite the Dutch claims of domestic jurisdiction, the Security Council discussed the matter in July and August of 1947. Frustrated with the discussion of the matter in the Security Council, the Netherlands made her second military attack on what was left of the Republic. Although in the first instance, the military attack seemed successful, it could not stop the resistance of Indonesian guerrilla movement fighting for the Republic. The failure of the Dutch government's last military attempt and the strong condemnation of it by the Security Council resulted in the resumption of talks between the nationalists and the Dutch Government. As a result, the United States of Indonesia was established on 27 December 1949. By getting independence through the use of armed struggle, Indonesia constituted the first example of its kind after the Second World War. Crawford describes Indonesian independence as secession in furtherance of self-determination.185 The most important thing related to our subject here is that Indonesia enjoyed a certain status in International law before the formal grant of independence to her on 27 Dec. 1949. As stated above, she was already recognized by a number of countries prior to her recognition, although she was probably not a fully independent State as Crawford points out.186 Similar cases are Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Western Sahara and Palestine. FLN, (Front de Liberation Nationale Algerienne) Algerian Liberation Front, started its armed campaign in 1954. On 19 September 1958, it established the provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in Tunis. 29 States recognized the new government.187 In fact, it was a premature recognition because neither the traditional standards of effective government were available, nor were the territorial ones. This premature recognition was a very significant step forward for the recognition of movements fighting for national liberation. Wilson argues that the premature recognition of a government is more consistent with the traditional international law than the recognition of liberation movements. Moreover the premature recognition of Algeria was a sign of changing attitudes of States. Instead of recognizing belligerency, the States were starting to recognize governments in the presence of strong self-determination claims like in the case of Algeria, even though these governments did not have effective control over the territory.188 Guinea-Bissau constitutes another case of premature recognition. The General Assembly recognized the State of Guinea-Bissau on November 1973, when the GuineaBissau liberation movement PAIGC was only in control of two-thirds of the territory according to the report of the UN mission sent to there.189 Moreover the General Assembly went as far as to condemn Portugal, the administering power of the territory, for repeated acts of aggression against Guinea-Bissau and for illegal occupation of portions of its territory after having affirmed the terms of Article 2(4) of the Charter.190 The Guinea-Bissau case is more interesting than Algeria in the sense that Algeria was prematurely recognized by States but
184 185

H. W. Briggs(ed.), The Law of Nations, 2nd ed.(London: Stevens and Sons, 1953), p.73 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law,(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) p. 248 186 Ibid. 187 Supra 3, p.110 188 Ibid., p. 111 189 Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pp. 153-5 190 UNGA Res. 3061(XXVIII), 2 Nov. 1973, 93:7:30

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accepted to UN only after it officially reached an agreement with France. On the other hand, Guinea-Bissau was accepted into the UN without the consent of its administering state Portugal and without having effective control over the territory. The lack of total effective control in the territory prompted severe criticism from Western Governments by claiming that the criteria for statehood were not met. That is why, 30 states abstained from recognizing Guinea-Bissau in the first instance. The international responses to such events were the signs of changing international law on the use of force in wars of national liberation. While the established governments were favoured in internal wars, the international community began to condemn the use of force by the colonial powers without agreeing expressly the use of force by national liberation movements starting in the 1960's. On many occasions, the General Assembly resolutions had encouraged or enjoined assistance, civil or military, to local insurgents either in general terms or in relation to specific territories. Such as, the General Assembly accepted Resolution 2795(XXVI) in 1971 on the Question of territories under Portuguese Administration. The Resolution was seen as sanctioning in a way the illegal intervention against the established government in civil wars, which was totally unacceptable under the traditional rules of neutrality in civil wars.191 Palestine can be added to the list of States, which were prematurely recognized. At the 19th session of the Palestine National Council in Algiers from 12-15 November 1988, the independent State of Palestine was proclaimed, with Jerusalem as its capital.192 All Arab States, except Syria, a number of non-aligned States and China immediately recognized the Palestinian State. The USSR recognized the proclamation of the State but not the State itself. Indeed, by prematurely recognizing a government, it was the view of most of the Socialist and Third World Countries to render a 'people' that had the right to selfdetermination, a separate entity in international law with the authority to use force analogous to that of sovereign States.193 On the other hand, Western States have opposed this opinion on the grounds that the right of self-determination must be pursued by peaceful means and the recognition is accorded to governments only if the latter establishes effective control over the population and territory which they purport to represent.194 It is thought that all of these should be assessed in the light of decolonization policies. Neither Socialist and Third World States nor Western States had been eager to accept secessions from established States until 1990. After that year, the collapse of cohesive ideologies may have a radicalising effect on this view especially on the part of ex-socialist and Third World States. The other State practice related to national liberation movements was to recognize them as representatives of their peoples and to include them as observers, associate members, and members of international organizations. Indeed, liberation movements such as the PLO and SWAPO were invited and participated in the work of various international organizations. The UN General Assembly, more specifically, granted observer status to both of the abovementioned liberation movements in 1974195 and 1976196 respectively. Later, two liberation
191 192

Supra 64, p. 113 Z. Lockman & J. Beinin(eds.), Intifada, (Boston: South End Press, 1989) pp. 395-9 193 Supra 3, pp. 116-7 194 Supra 53, pp. 142-8 195 UNGA Res. 3210(XXIX), 14 Oct. 1974, 105:4:20

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organisation: the Panafricanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC) which were recognized by the OAU were given observer status in the 'relevant work' of the main committees and subsidiary organs of the UN. The extension of observer status at the UN to national liberation movements recognized by the OAU was seen as a political victory in the way to internationalise wars of national liberation. It is also suggested that national liberation movements started to have some limited rights and duties in international law after the extension of observer status to them by the UNGA resolutions. Moreover, several national liberation movements participated in the drafting and signed the final act of the two Additional Protocols (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.197 With regard to the observer status granted to some of those entities, it is rightly pointed out that it does not amount to formal representation of the territory which rests with the Administering Power. Equally the participation of some national liberation movements in the drafting and signing of the 1977 Protocols must not be taken as recognition of those movements as representatives of sovereign States. The International Committee of the Red Cross has never cited them amongst the parties to the said protocols in its Annual Reports.198 Nonetheless the extension of observer status to recognized national liberation movements was deemed as a political victory for the movements involved and for their supporters. Until 1990's, the tactics of these limited international legal persons, including the use of force, had never been condemned by the UN or any other international organisation and they had often been praised for their struggle. But things appear to be altering considerably recently. For instance, UNITA was among the national liberation movements recognized by the OAU in relation to Angola in Africa. The other two liberation movements recognized by the OAU in Angola were MPLA and FNLA. Angola, like Mozambique, went directly from 15 years of revolutionary war against Portuguese colonialism (1961-1975), to a civil and tribal war that was suspended in the cease-fire of 1991.199 The cease-fire in the long Angolan civil war was signed on 31 May 1991, in Lisbon. The agreement provided that free elections would be held in 1992 which would decide the country's future.200 The UN supervised general elections were held as proposed and UNITA lost them. As a result it did not accept the outcome alleging that there was corruption in the elections despite the UN observers denial. Later, UNITA restarted the civil war in October 1992. On 15 September 1993, the UN Security Council condemned UNITA for its continuing military action and demanded its troops withdrawal from the areas it seized.201 Moreover, it imposed UN sanctions on arms and fuel supplies if UNITA did not comply with the Security Council Resolution 864. The Security Council also said that if UNITA did not obey its order by 1 November 1993, it would impose more strict sanctions, including travel restrictions on UNITA officials and trade embargo.202
196 197

UNGA Res. 31/152, 20 Dec. 1976, 113:0:13 Supra 3, p.128 198 Annual Report of the ICRC, Geneva 1987, pp. 107-110 199 Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts, (London: Bloomsbury, 1992) p.4 200 Ibid, p.3 201 Victoria Brittain, The Guardian, 17 September 1993, p.15 202 Karl Maier, "UN gives Savimbi a ceasefire deadline", The Independent, 17 September 1993, p. 16

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Furthermore, the Security Council also condemned the Abkhazians fighting for the independence of the north west region of Georgia, for not obeying the peace agreement brokered between the Georgian government, the Russian Federation and the Abkhazians. In the light of these recent developments, it does not seem wrong to suggest that the silence of international law towards civil wars and towards the use of force by national liberation movements whatever the case has started to cease. Especially imposition of the sanctions on a movement which was recognized by the OAU, is a great derogation from the previous line of non-intervention in the civil conflicts especially the one which related to the right of self-determination. One of the most aired criticisms about the practice of States towards any right of selfdetermination claims and the authority to use force to secure that right, has been the double standard accusation. While criticising the double standards of some of the Third World States, Emerson stated, "My right to self-determination against those who oppress me is obviously unimpeachable, but your claim to exercise such a right against me is wholly inadmissible".203 His remarks has always been affirmed by the fact that, no state actually confronting a national liberation organisation has acknowledged its legitimacy to use force against herself even she has been a defender of the right to resort to force for national liberation movements. For the present Yugoslavia, Serbs living in Bosnia were fighting for their self-determination right. That is why they were freedom fighters. But when Kosovo Albanians started to oppose the Serbian actions in Kosova by armed struggle, they were termed as terrorists not as freedom fighters by the Serbs.

4. Third State Involvement In The Self-Determination Conflicts A) On Behalf of National Liberation Movements Whether international law allows it or not, there have always been States who assisted and assist national liberation movements which claimed and claim the right to selfdetermination. These States have supported them by arming, financing, providing bases on their territories to them. This situation in fact is contrary to the literal rule of international law which renders States the duty of not assisting armed bands that operate on the territory of another State. There are a number of General Assembly resolutions which support the said duty. The famous three of them can be cited in here. GA Resolution 2131(XX) provides in its second paragraph that 2. No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations which interprets Article 2(4) of the Charter states Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts within another state
203

Rupert Emerson, "Self-determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization", Occasional Papers in International Affairs, no. 9 Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, December 1964, quoted in Pomerance p. 61

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Lastly, the Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression enumerated below acts as aggression as well The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out the acts of armed force against another State or its substantial involvement therein Despite these, there are some saving clauses in both the 1970 Declaration and the Definition of Aggression which provided that people 'in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination... are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter'. The appearance of these two diverse rules in the resolutions and the guerrilla manner operation of national liberation movements are the sources of controversy. If the presence of the self-determination dimension in the national liberation conflicts could be accepted as a diminishing effect on the duties of States in this regard, this time, it would mean reintroduction of the medieval doctrine of just war.204 The issues of the activities of armed bands on the territory of a State, the lawfulness of the assistance accorded to those armed bands by third States and the ways of response that the target-State of the action of armed bands is entitled to resort to against both the guerrillas and the assisting State or States, have been dealt with considerably by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case(Merits)205 between Nicaragua and the USA in 1986. The case was brought before the Court by Nicaragua because of the American government's subversive acts against her and American government's help to the Contras, Nicaraguan guerrillas fighting to overthrow the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua.206 Admittedly, the Court was not concerned with the activities of a national liberation movement 'in the process of decolonisation'.207 However the Court has stated that The principle of non-intervention derives from customary international law. It would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law, if intervention were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made by an opposition group in another State... Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition... Such a situation does not in the Court's view correspond to the present state of international law.208 Although the Court held that it was not concerned with the process of decolonization in its decision, since the classical decolonization was accomplished to a great extent, it is thought that the new national liberation movements can be listed under the heading of the opposition groups. In this instance, it would be quite controversial to admit the right of national liberation organizations to receive third State assistance. Judge Schwebel has touched on the problem of assistance to the national liberation movements in his dissenting opinion. He stated

204 205

Supra 31, p.48 ICJ Reports, 1986, 14 206 Supra 53, p. 824 207 ICJ Report 1986, p. 14 at p. 108, paragraph 206 208 ICJ Report 1986, p. 14 at para. 246

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'...It is lawful for a foreign state to give people struggling for self-determination moral, political and humanitarian assistance; but it is not lawful for a foreign state to intervene in that struggle with force...209 As that statement shows, humanitarian assistance to the national liberation movement is by all means lawful. However, the possibility of material assistance to the liberation movement by way of provision of arms, training, funds and logistical support seem to be the more problematic and controversial. Since as it is noted above sections, the 1970 Declaration as well as the Article 7 on the Definition of Aggression left undefined the type of the assistance which can be rendered to the people who struggle for their right to self-determination. The 1970 Declaration simply said that 'such people are entitled to receive support'. As recent events show, the cross border military, humanitarian, and political assistance are on the increase to the minorities which have their majority in the neighbouring states. These neighbour States use the people's right to self-determination as their reason to assist them.. The Serbian assistance and intervention to the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia, Croatian intervention and assistance to the Croats in Bosnia, Armenian intervention and assistance to the Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, Russian intervention and assistance to the ethnic Russians living in the Dniester region of Moldova, and Abkhazian intervention and assistance in Georgia can be counted among them. With the decline of ideological assistance era, the traditional way of assisting brethren in the neighbouring countries seems likely to dominate in the near future. International law in this regard seems to be concrete. First, it favours the territorial integrity of States. Second, although the humanitarian assistance is allowed, the military assistance is more controversial and most probably against the principle of non-intervention in the sovereignty of States. It is highly probable that such types of assistance and intervention are seen as for forcible territorial change rather than promoting the right of self-determination of the people of these territories. Recent intervention of Nato in New Yugoslavia on behalf of Kosovo Albanians seems that it will have serious implications for the development of Law in this regard. That is, humanitarian issues will override the territorial integrity and non-intervention principles.

B) On Behalf of The Established States The assistance and intervention on behalf of the established State is generally accepted as legitimate. But this issue is open to controversy in the case of colonial situations. It is thought that the administering Power will not be assisted in her attempt to deprive a people of the exercise of its right to self-determination.

CONCLUSION The principle of self-determination has evolved from a political principle to a legal principle in international law. Its metamorphosis from a principle to a right for all peoples has
209

ICJ Report 1986, p. 14 at p. 351, para. 180

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been confirmed in a number of UN Resolutions like 1966 Human Rights Declaration, 1970 the Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations. Self-determination has certainly become a right for the people of non-self-governing territories. It can also be considered for the people who live under discriminating and oppressive regimes. With the independence of Bangladesh, self-determination has found new applicable areas outside the colonial context. The independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia is one of the recent successful examples of the realisation of self-determination outside the colonial context. The realisation of self-determination does not necessarily lead to independence. Free association with an independent state or integration with an independent state are among options according to the GA Res. 1541(XV). It has become a reality of our time that secessionist, irredentist, and national liberation wars are the greatest killers of our time, either directly through bloodshed or indirectly through hunger or disease stemming from such wars.210 O'Loughlin and Wusten maintain that the causes of wars after 1990's will most probably be ethno-nationalist disputes211, that is, related to national liberation wars. In the last couple of years, we have been living through examples of it: the war in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechenia and lastly in Kosovo. Up until now, many General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions supported the right of self-determination for the colonial people. By the end of decolonisation to a great extent, it is suggested that self-determination in future may become a more conservative principle than has sometimes been thought or feared.212 Nonetheless, despite the guarantees of the territorial unity of the states, the recent proliferation of states from Soviet Union and Yugoslavia shows that even if the international law is very reluctant to recognise new entities as states, it nonetheless does not ignore the realities on the ground and changes that had taken place. That is, the right of self-determination may exist in the case of great violations of human rights towards distinctive communities. In the past, the use of force by people struggling for the right to self-determination was neither condemned nor condoned. The assistance to these movements even sometimes encouraged by the General Assembly resolutions. The end of decolonisation and the collapse of the Cold War system and the possibility of the proliferation of weak Third World States213 will most likely have a hardening effect on the stances of States in similar international documents. The recent decisions of the Security Council on Angola and Abkhazia may be the indications of the new approach. As it is noted earlier, for the first time in its history, the UN sanctions have been directed against a political movement as opposed to a member State. The acceptance of Eritrea to the UN and condemnation of some of the movements in the Member States show that the confusion and lack of a coherent approach still continue with regard to self-determination and the use of force for the attainment of it.
210 211

Supra 1, p.139 Peter Taylor (ed), Political Geography of the Twentieth Century, (London: Belhaven Press, 1993) p. 106 212 Supra 64, p. 100 213 Lawrence Freedman, 'Weak States and the West' ,The Economist, September 11th-17th 1993, pp. 46-50

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Let's hope that international society will find the best possible peaceful means to settle the self-determination disputes for the benefit of both distinctive people and States.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALEXANDER, Y. and FRIEDLANDER, R.A.(eds), Self-Determination: Regional and Global Dimensions,(Colorado: Westview, 1980) BROGAN, Patrick, World Conflicts, (London: Bloomsbury, 1992) BROWNLIE, Ian, Basic Documents on Human Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) BROWNLIE, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed.(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) BUCHANAN, Allen, Secession, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991) CASSESE, Antonio, International Law in a Divided World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) CLIFFE, L and DAVIDSON, B. (eds.),The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace, (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1988) CRAWFORD, James, The Creation of States in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) DE GEORGE, Richard T., "The Myth of the Right of Collective SelfDetermination" in William Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1991) -----------, The Economist, July 31st- Aug. 6th 1993 -----------, The Economist, Aug. 28th- Sep. 3rd 1993 DIXON, Martin, Textbook on International Law, (London: Blackstone, 1990) FARLEY, Lawrence T. , Plebiscites and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy, (London: Westview Press, 1986) FREEDMAN, Lawrence, "Weak States and The West", The Economist, September 11th-17th 1993 HALPERIN, M and SCHEFFER, D. and SMALL, P., Self-Determination in the New World Order, (Washington D.C.: Carnagie Endowment Trust, 1992)

45

HARRIS, D.J., Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1991) HERACLIDES, Alexis, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1991) JACKSON, Robert H., Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) LEWIS, I. M.(ed.) Nationalism and Self-Determination In the Horn of Africa,(London: Ithaca Press, 1983) LOCKMAN, Z and BEININ J.(eds.),Intifada, (Boston: South End Press, 1989) LUARD, Evan, A History of the United Nations; Volume 2: The Age Decolonization, 1955-1965, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989) of

LUARD, Evan(ed.),The International Regulation of Civil Wars, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972) MacCORMICK, Neil, "Is Nationalism Philosophically Credible", in William Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1991) MAZRUI, Ali, "The Bondage of Boundaries", The Economist, September 11th17th 1993 MICHALSKA, Anna, "Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination in International Law", in William Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1991) MOYNIHAN, Daniel P., Pandaemonium; Politics,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) Ethnicity in International

NANDA, V. P., "Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context; The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect" in Y. Alexander and R. A. Friedlander (eds.), SelfDetermination: Regional and Global Dimensions,(Colorado: Westview, 1980) NORTHEDGE, F.S., The League of Nations; Its Life and Times 1920-1946, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986) O'LOUGHLIN J. and WUSTEN, H. "Political Geography of War and Peace" in Peter J. Taylor (ed.), Political Geography of Twentieth Century, (London: Belhaven Press, 1993) OFUATEY-KODJE, W. The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law, (New York: Nellen, 1977) POMERANCE, Michla, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) POOL, David, "Eritrean Nationalism" in I. M. Lewis ed.), Nationalism and SelfDetermination In the Horn of Africa,(London: Ithaca Press, 1983)

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RIKK, Juha, "On National Self-Determination: Some Problems of Walzer's Definition of Nation", in William Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1991) SAID, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism, (London: Chatto&Windus Ltd., 1993) SHAW, Malcolm, Title to Territory in Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) SHIVJI, Issa, "The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: an African Perspective" in William Twining (ed.), Issues of Self- Determination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univ. Press, 1991) TAYLOR, Peter J.(ed.), Political Geography of Twentieth Century, (London: Belhaven Press, 1993) THORNBERY, Patrick, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) -----------, Time International, June 8, 1992, No: 14 TWINING, William(ed.), Issues of Self-Determination, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) WILSON, Heather A., International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)

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Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis*

M.Fatih Tayfur** Introduction The Turkish outlook towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has been a kind of indifference since its inception by the EU in Barcelona in 1995. Not surprisingly, the EMP is not in the immediate agenda of the Turkish foreign policy. In fact, the Turks do not find it interesting and it is emphasised that the agenda of the Turkish foreign policy is crowded with much more important issues compared to the EMP. Moreover, the status tailored for Turkey in the EMP and the relatively poor political relations between Turkey and the EU have negatively affected the Turkish attitude towards the Euro-Mediterranean project. Whatever the reasons are for the Turkish attitude towards the EMP, it is a fact that the Turkish foreign policy, at least to some extent, is a function of its geo-strategic and geopolitical location.214 Unlike many other countries, Turkey is dealing with a number of critical global, regional and national issues simultaneously due to its location in a peculiar foreign policy and security environment. Turkey is a country surrounded with reality. Indeed, the realist understanding of international relations which was erected upon an anarchical external environment in which the states primary objective is survival may, on a broader scale, explain the main motives behind the Turkish foreign and security policy. The anarchical external environment in which Turkey has been trying to survive embodies the destabilised regions of the Middle East, the Caucuses, the Balkans, Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Mediterranean the regions which are haunted with ethnic and territorial conflicts and various rivalries. Being located at the epicentre of this conflictual Eurasian region, Turkey is either a party to some of these conflicts and issues or susceptible to their spill over effects. Being aware of their countrys location at the epicentre of the post-Cold War Eurasian region, the Turkish foreign policy elite tends to be more realistic than utopian. However, it would be misleading not to take into consideration the idealistic nature of the Turkish foreign policy elite in evaluating the present course of the Turkish foreign and security policy. A good example of such an realistic-idealistic combination in Turkish foreign policy is the Black

An earlier version of this article was prepared for the EuroMesCo Working Group on Integration and SubRegional ** Co-operation in the Mediterranean ** Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations For an earlier assessment of Turkish foreign policy and tle Meditetranean region see, Kemal Kirii "A Mediterranean Pact of Stability: A Turkish Perspectve" in Mditerrane Le Pacte a construire, Paris: Publisud, 1997, pp. 109-125.
214

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Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSEC) which increases the hopes for more Turkish contribution to the peace and stability in the broader European Region. In fact, in the post-Cold War period, Turkey has been challenged by two sub-regional cooperation projects: one is in its south (EMP) and the other is its north (BSEC). However, it is interesting that while the Turks are very enthusiastic towards the BSEC in the north, they are indifferent towards the EMP in the south. Thus, the aim of this paper is, first, to briefly look at the EMP and the Barcelona Declaration and explain the Turkish vision of the EMP, and then to compare it with that of the BSEC in order to understand the Turkish indifference towards the EUs sub-regional cooperation project in the Mediterranean.

The EMP and Barcelona Declaration The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Program was launched by a declaration after a conference between the EU and Mediterranean region states in Barcelona in November 1995. Barcelona Declaration aims to establish a multilateral and lasting framework of relations among European and the Mediterranean states through the establishment of a comprehensive Partnership comprising three Chapters relating to political and security affairs, economic and financial affairs, and social, cultural and human affairs. In this general framework, Barcelona Process promote the idea of establishing a common area of peace and stability, creating an area of shared prosperity, and developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.215 In the Chapter on the Political and Security Partnership where issues of peace and stability are emphasised, the EMP stresses the need for an enhanced political dialogue, evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures, good neighbourly relations, regional cooperation, and preventive diplomacy.216 According to the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability the primary function of the enhanced political dialogue is to prevent tensions and crises and to maintain peace and stability by means of cooperative security. For this reason, during the Third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart in April 1999, it is accepted that the Charter will be endowed with the appropriate decision-making mechanisms reinforcing institutional mechanisms, and furthermore Ministers and Senior Officials will meet at regular intervals or whenever special situations or events warrant.217 The Political and Security Chapter also emphasises the importance of the development of rule of law and democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, combat against racism and xenophobia, strengthen cooperation against terrorism, organised crime drug trafficking in the region. The objectives of the Economic and Financial Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration can be enumerated as such: acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of their populations and increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region;
See, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, 27- 28 November 1995 See, Chairman's Formal Conclusion in the 'nird Euro-Mediterranean Ministezal Conference (Barcelona n, 15-16 April 1999, Stuttgart Paragraph 11.
217 216 215

Ibid.

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and encouragement of regional cooperation and integration.218 With a view to achieving these objectives the Declaration envisages, the establishment of the free-trade area by 2010, the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas, and a substantial increase in the EUs financial assistance to its partners. The Work Programme of the Declaration emphasised the need for harmonisation of rules and procedures and standards, elimination of unwarranted technical barriers to trade, and cooperation among statistics organisations.219 Furthermore, in the Work Programme cooperation in the fields of investment, industry, agriculture, transport, energy, regional planning, tourism, environment, science and technology, water and fisheries are given prime importance. In the ad hoc Ministerial meeting in Palermo, the Economic and Financial Chapter is defined as the engine of the Euro-Med Partnership and Partners are encouraged to reinforce South-South cooperation.220 In the Chapter on the Partnership in Social, Culture and Human Affairs of the Barcelona Declaration221 the EMP, first of all, emphasises the necessity of the development of human resources through enhancing educational level throughout the region and the need for the involvement of municipalities and regional authorities in the operation of the Euro-Med Partnership program. Dialogue between cultures and civilisations, close interaction between the media, and the youth exchanges between the Euro-Mediterranean partners are considered other important issues under this third pillar of the Declaration. For this reason, exchanges between Civil Societies, and officials, scientists, academics, businessmen, students and sportsmen of the EMP area are given special emphasis in the Declaration. The EMP also envisages contributing to the social development through improving the living and working conditions and increasing the employment level of the population of the Mediterranean partner states. Finally, this chapter promotes the cooperation in the fields of health, migration, terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime, and illegal migration.

Having argued briefly the basic pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Program and the Barcelona Declaration, now lets look at the Turkish position towards the EUs challenging initiative.

The Agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy in 1999 and the EMP It can be argued that Turkish foreign policy elite has been preoccupied mainly with three issues in 1999. These issues are the Caspian Oil-Pipeline issue; the Cyprus problem; and the relations with Greece. Priority is given to any one of these issues conditional upon the developments in these areas. In the Caspian oil and gas pipelines issue, it is expected that the decision on the main pipeline route will be taken soon in favour of Baku-Ceyhan. The Turks are very sensitive on this issue because of the political and economic benefits to be obtained. The pipelines issue is important from the point of the EMP because if the Baku-Ceyhan route
See, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, 2728 November 1995 219 See, Chairman's Formal Conclusion in the 'nird Euro-Mediterranean Ministezal Conference (Barcelona n, 15-16 April 1999, StuttgarG Paragraph 11. 220 Ibid. 221 See, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995
218

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is realised, the strategic importance of eastern Mediterranean will increase. The Cyprus issue, on the other hand, entered into another phase after the PKK leader Ocalan was captured in Kenya with a Greek Cypriot passport. This development which followed the S-300 missile crisis has considerably affected the security perceptions of the Turkish foreign policy elite and increased the stakes in eastern Mediterranean. However, the worst came in the sphere of Turco-Greek relations. The shelter provided to Ocalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya despite the proclamations made by the Greek Prime Minister that Greece had no relations with PKK, was a serious blow to the essentially problematic relations between Greece and Turkey. The Turks, who have already been experiencing an all out diplomatic war declared by Greeks against the Turkish interests in the EU and in all the other international forum, were now convinced about the unfriendly behaviours of the Greek government. The Greek attitude in the Ocalan affair, coupled with the earlier incompetent Italian policy regarding Ocalan and PKK, have caused the Turkish foreign policy elite to think twice of the effectiveness of the Euro- Mediterranean Cooperation and the Barcelona Process which have emphasised the importance of and the need for cooperation among the Mediterranean countries against terrorism. Not surprisingly, these developments negatively influenced the Turkish outlook of the EMP project. However, the friendly atmosphere that has been created between Turkey and Greece after Yorgos Papandreou became foreign minister, and the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece, seem to have opened a new chapter in the relations between the two countries and increased the hopes for the promotion of the EMP idea in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean Region in Turkish Foreign Policy There is no single comprehensive definition and understanding of the Mediterranean region in Turkish foreign policy. There is no one desk or department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that deals solely with the Mediterranean region and Mediterranean issues. Instead, the Mediterranean region is under the surveillance of different functional departments. In the words of a Turkish diplomat the Mediterranean has never been conceptualised as a totality in Turkish foreign policy.222 The Turks perceive the Mediterranean region as composed of the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans, and Europe. In particular, the concept of "the Mediterranean" means mainly "eastern Mediterranean" in Turkish foreign and defence policy thinking. This is primarily because "eastern Mediterranean" is full of problems and Turkey perceives important threats from the region directed against its territorial integrity and vital interests. The problems with Greece and Syria, the Cyprus problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its spillover effects in the region constitute the main preoccupations of the Turkish foreign policy elite in the Mediterranean region. On the other hand, the relatively stable western Mediterranean from where Turkey do not perceive any serious threat is not considered a priority area by many of the foreign policy elite. On the other hand, Turkish policy makers see the EU as not an effective actor and an honest broker in the Mediterranean and this perception directly affects the Turkish vision of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership. Especially, the EU's decision to start negotiations with Cyprus for full membership after the EU's Luxembourg summit of
See, Barcelona Declaration, Annex on "Work Programme" Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995
222

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December 1997 strengthen the view that the European interests clashes with the vital Turkish interests, and that the EU takes side with the Greeks against Turkish interests in the Mediterranean. The Turks have felt that the Europeans deceived them. Having not being considered even among the secondary group of "prospective EU members" category (which includes Bulgaria, Romania, etc.) while Cyprus - with all its problems - was given the promise of starting negotiations for full membership, the Turks, who have been an associate member of the Union since the early 1960s, have lost alinost all their faith in the Union. The Turks believe that the EU has named Greeks as its strategic partner in the "eastern Mediterranean" and accordingly sacrificed the friendship of Turkey, which had meant a lot to their security during the Cold War years. In the Turkish-EU relations even an optimist Turk thinks that the EU has been taken hostage by Greece. Accordingly, the Turks have suspended the political dialogue with the EU and let the Union go ahead in the way it deems appropriate. Moreover, the Turks are not happy with the status given to them in the EMP by the EU. According to the Turkish foreign policy elite the EMP is not suitable for Turkey because it reduces the status, of Turkey in the EU into a neighbouring country.223 They argue that Turkey cannot be taken together with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries that have no aspirations for any kind of membership in the EU. On the other hand, it is argued that the EU has financial responsibilities towards Turkey stemming from the Association and Customs Union Agreements but no money has been transferred to Turkey since 1980. However, the EU's decision to transfer these funds to Turkey through the Mediterranean Program rather than through the EU channels is considered a kind of political behaviour that proves the EU's exclusionary policy towards Turkey.224 Furthermore, regarding the security issues, the Turks think that Turkey is both a full member of NATO and an associate member of the WEU and accordingly, it should not be considered together in the same group with the other Mediterranean countries.225 It is clear that these developments did not help the promotion of the EMP cause in Turkey but considerably weakened the hands of the pro-EU circles.

Turkish Understanding of Regional Cooperation and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership In principle, Turkey sympathises with all kinds of regional cooperation initiatives. Turkish foreign policymakers believe that the regional cooperation is one of the important means for promoting peace, stability and economic development and thus, they express their willingness to actively contribute to such initiatives.226 It is argued that such initiatives like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSEC), Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) - which includes Turkey, Central Asian Republics, Iran, Pakistan-, The Developing 8 (D-8) - which includes Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Indonesia and Malaise- are the examples of the Turkish outlook towards regional cooperation. Indeed, in all these organisations Turkey plays an active role being the architect of them. The Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is an ambitious and comprehensive regional
223

See Concluding Statement by Robin Cook, UK Presidency, Euromed ad hoc Ministerial Meeting, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998, paragraphs, 9 and 21. 224 See, Barcelona Declaration, and Part IV in the Annex on "Work Programme" 225 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 226 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999.

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project of the EU, which naturally includes Turkey. However, as is mentioned elsewhere, the mainstream Turkisl understanding is not very enthusiastic about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership program. Indeed, it sounds strange that Turkey, a country leading various regional cooperations in its region, is not excited with the EMP idea. However, Turkish policymakers do not conceal their indifference towards the EMP. In the words of a Turkish diplomat, From the beginning, Turkey has been an affiliate to the program but as a reluctant partner.227 According to the Turks, the EU's perception of the Mediterranean has played the most important role in the creation of the EMP project because the EU has long been disturbed to be surrounded by economically poor regions in its southern periphery.228 For instance, migration from the south, especially from North Africa, to the EU due to economic reasons has been one of the immediate concerns of the Europeans. In fact, economic underdevelopment coupled with domestic and regional political problems, as in Algeria, may lead to a more unstable region in the periphery of the Union which, in turn, would affect the peace and the well-being of the Europeans. Thus, the EU in order to meet this security challenge and contain its poor southern periphery came up with a Mediterranean project envisaging economic and security cooperation in the region, which could not be otherwise, established by the regional states themselves. In other words, according to the Turks, the EMP is imperative for the security of the Union. In fact, the Turks welcome this initiative which promotes the economic development and aims to reduce the internal and external political tensions in the region. Turkish diplomats argue that Turkey is willing to cooperate on economic matters with the other Mediterranean countries however it is not generally the economic issues but the political and security considerations of the regional states that often dominate the discussions in the official Euro-Med meetings.229 In general, the Turkish indifference toward the EMP is based neither on economic considerations nor on the aims of the EU in the Mediterranean. It is mainly based on the political assessments of the Union regarding the status of Turkey in this regional cooperation project and on the utopian nature of the cooperation in the security field. Turkey simply refuses to be considered in the periphery of the EMP.230 The perception of the Turkish foreign policy elite is that Turkey is offered a place in the Mediterranean program and invited to stay there permanently. This is what the Turks do not accept and it may explain why they developed an indifferent attitude towards the EMP. The Turkish foreign policy elite argues that Turkey and the EU signed the Association and Customs Union Agreements that envisage full membership and thus, the EMP can by no means be an alternative to the Turkey's ultimate aim of integration with the Union.231 In this context, according to the foreign policy elite, Turkey has no objections and participates in the EMP idea but it is not considered indispensable and not a priority in the foreign policy agenda. In Turkey's relations with the EU, the priority, they say, has always been the integration with the EU. Secondly, they argue that Turkey looks at the EMP somewhat cold because Turkey was not given a perspective for full membership and thus, sits at the "other" side of the table.232 However, they also emphasise that there is no reason to stay out of the EMP and they see no problem in low-profle participation in it and supporting constructive projects. In short, they expect

S.Tahan "Avrupa Birlii' nin Akdeniz Politikas ve Trkiye" ~ Politika Derisi (in Turkish) , Cilt.VII. Say. 3-4, 1997. p.28. 228 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 229 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 230 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 231 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 232 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999.

227

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neither any major gain nor any major loss from participating in the EMP project.233

In the economic sphere, Turkey supports the EU's goal of the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area in the year 2010.234 Turkish policymakers believe that the EU aims at the creation of an economic sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and to this end it is trying to complete bilateral commercial agreements among the Mediterranean states. Turkey, they say, supports this process. However, for the Turks the question is again on the status of Turkey in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The Turks ask as to where Turkey sits at the table: at the European side or at the Mediterranean side? According to the Turks, Turkey, an associate and Customs Union member in the EU, must be normally at the European side of the table.235 They argue that Turkey, has already accepted the EU's commercial agreements with the third countries as a result of the Customs Union Agreement, and accordingly signed "identical" agreements with the Mediterranean countries. Until now Turkey signed such commercial agreements with Israel, Tunisia and Egypt and started another one with Morocco. On the other hand, the Turks view the EU's policy of supporting "south-south" economic relations (ie. economic relations among southern Mediterranean countries) as utopian on the grounds that there is almost no tradeable goods among these countries and moreover, there are serious bilateral political problems among the regional states.236 Another thorny issue between Turkey, EU and EMP is related to the financing of the MEDA projects.237 For political reasons no money has been extended to Turkey from the EU's Mediterranean funds. This has been partly as a result of the Greek veto, and partly due to the precondition imposed by the EU that the grants must be spent in southeast Turkey and on human rights projects. Turkey rejected these preconditions on the grounds that no condition can be accepted for the allocation of MEDA funds. Yet, here a technical reason has been that the Turks also have not prepared draft projects for the MEDA funds. In the security sphere, the Turkish outlook of the EMP is rather pessimistic and it is viewed as an extremely utopian initiative.238 Turkish policymakers see no future for the EMP in the field of hard security issues primarily because that the Arab-Israeli conflict marks its stamp on every single security issue in the Mediterranean region. According to the Turks, there is nothing much to do in this area because almost all the hard security problems in the region are one way or another is linked with the Middle East Peace Process. In fact, Turkey views the Middle East not through the EMP lenses. The Turks emphasise the importance of the Middle East Peace Process for the solution of the problems in the region. Thus, at the multilateral level they give their support to the initiatives taken by the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, at the bilateral level, the Turks promote the improvement of relations with the regional countries and accordingly have taken initiatives that would complement the peace process in the Middle East.
233 234

Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 235 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 236 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 237 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 238 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999.

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For the Turks, what is missing in the security field of the Barcelona Process is that Turkey is not one of the member states of the EU. Turkish policymakers argue that in the NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and in the OSCE, Turkey is one of the member states whereas in the EU's EURO-MED initiative it has only an "associate" status.239 They say that, in the security field too, Turkey sits at the "other" side of the table. Accordingly, the Turks put emphasis on the NATO's initiatives regarding the security of the Mediterranean.240 The Turks argue that Turkey is powerful in NATO both in military and political terms and is able to shape the policies of NATO because it participates in the decision-making process of the Organisation. In the words of a Turkish diplomat, ...in the Mediterranean initiatives of the EU, Turkey has an disadvantageous position because it does not take part in the decisionmaking process. The decisions will be taken by the EU and dictated on Turkey.241 The Turks argue that in accordance with the peripheral the status of Turkey in the EMP, they pursues a low-profile participation in the EU's initiatives and mainly opt for bilateral relations in the security issues in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Turkey gives its full support to multilateral relations and initiatives in the security of the Mediterranean if it is organised under the NATO's umbrella. Furthermore, Turkish policymakers argue that Turkey is not desperate for EU initiatives in the Mediterranean because it has already established very good cooperation with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on security issues.242 Moreover, the recent Adana agreement with Syria and improving relations with Iran are the other steps taken by Turkey to improve the security environment in the region. The Turkish policymakers emphasise that all these bilateral and multilateral initiatives of Turkey in the region complement the EU's aim of creating a peaceful and secure environment in the Mediterranean.243 They also point out that the EMP is not the only mechanism through which relations are established among the Mediterranean countries. Finally, Turkish policymakers believe that the EU's Mediterranean initiative will not bring about significant outcomes for Turkey in the feld of security. Thus, they ask, "why should Turkey give its potential to this initiative in which it has no expectations?" In relation to "soft security" issues, Turkey, a country, which has been suffering from terrorism for many decades, has strongly been in support of international cooperation against terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. However, the Turks are more than convinced about the weakness of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation against terrorism in the recent Ocalan case. The tolerant and even protective attitudes shown by the EU's Mediterranean countries of Italy, and especially Greece toward the PKK leader, whose organisation has been declared a terrorist organisation and aimed at the disintegration of their ally, Turkey, have been noted carefully by the Turkish policymakers and the public opinion. On the other hand, a group of foreign policy elite from different circles thinks that the EMP, which was erected upon the Barcelona Process, is an unrealistic project mainly because of the heterogenous characteristics of the states in the region.244 It is argued that the
239 240

Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 241 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 242 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. On this point, see also, S.Tahan "Meditemaean Security and Wester Security Institutions" Foreign Policy (The Quarterly of the Turkish Foreign Policy lnstitute), Vo).XX. No, 3-4. 1996, p.31. 243 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 244 See, S. Tahan "Mediterranean Security and Western ... ', p. 29, 31 and 33.

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internal problems of the countries, and the intra-regional conflicts make the EMP not a promising cooperation idea. At the same time, it is argued that the establishment of a global cooperative model for the Mediterranean is very difficult to achieve because of the relative importance of the hard and soft security issues in the eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean respectively.245 And even some others find Barcelona process an imperialistic project designed to promote the interests of the advanced countries in the region.246 In this context, the Turks believe that if the EU does not want to give a perspective to Turkey and does not take into account the Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean, there is little reason for Turkey to take part in the EU policies and strategies in the region.247 Thus, under these circumstances Turkey, they argue, is to develop its own policy in the Mediterranean by taking advantage of its strategic location, historical ties and its experience in organising regional cooperations like, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Developing-8, etc. Among these regional initiatives of Turkey the Black Sea Economic Cooperation may constitute an interesting reference point for the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation on two accounts. First, it would be interesting to compare these two initiatives with similar objectives developing in the periphery of the EU. Second, it would be interesting to see why Turkey, a reluctant partner in the EMP, enthusiastically promotes the BSEC idea.

Organization of the Black Sea Econonic Cooperation (BSEC) and EuroMediterranean Partnership: Two Tales of Two Seas or A Tale of Two Seas?

The BSEC Initiative248 The Black Sea Economic Cooperation or with its recently acquired official name, The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation249 (BSEC) is a regional initiative of Turkey. It was founded in Istanbul in June 1992 to promote regional economic cooperation and to enhance prosperity, stability and security in the region. BSEC also aims at the integration of the economies of the member states into the European and the world economy. The economic cooperation in the region is considered an effective means for preventing conflicts and the peaceful settlement of the existing problems among the regional states. The principal areas of cooperation in BSEC are listed as trade and economic development; banking and finance; communications; energy; transport; environmental protection; tourism; science and technology; combating organised crime,
See, S. Tahan Mediterranean Security and Western ... , p.31 See. S.Tahan "Avrupa Birliinin Akdeniz ..." p. 28, and S.Tahan "Mediterranean security and Western ..." p.61. 247 See, S.Tahan "Tle Peripheries: Adjusting to Change" Foreign Policy (Tle Quarterly of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute) Vol.XXI, No. 1-2, 1997, p.61 248 For detailed information on BSEC see also, Oral Sander "Turkey and the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation " in K.Karpat (ed.) Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments Madison: Wisconsin, 1996, pp.61-72; Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, signed in Yalta 5 June 1998; and Karadeniz Ekonomik birlii Bilgi Notu, T.C. Dileri Bakanl, 1999 249 The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was converted into The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in Tblisi/Georgia on the 1st of May 1999. However, BSEC remained as the acronym of the Organisation. In the text I use the old and the new names of the Organisation interchangeably.
246 245

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illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and radioactive materials; all acts of terrorism and illegal migration. The participants of BSEC are as follows: Full members: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, The Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. Observers: Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Poland, The Slovak Republic, Austria, Italy, Germany, France and Energy Charter Conference.250 On the other hand Macedonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Iran and Uzbekistan are in line for full membership while Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Cyprus, have applied to acquire an observer status. The European Commission does not have any status in BSEC but is being invited to relevant meetings on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, in the Tblisi Ministerial resolution of 1 May 1999 the European Commission was invited to obtain observer status in BSEC.251 Following its establishment in 1992, BSEC was involved in a speedy process of institutionalisation for consolidating its international legal status and this process has just been completed on 1 May 1999 during the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Tblisi, Georgia, and the BSEC was turned into an international organisation. Within the six years time since its establishment (between 1992-1998) the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat (in Istanbul); Parliamentary Assembly of BSCE (secretariat is in Istanbul), the Business Council (in Istanbul), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (in Thesalloniki) and the Centre for Statistical Data and Economic Information Exchange (in Ankara) were established. During the BSEC Yalta summit of June 1998, the member states signed the "Charter of the BSEC" which transformed the existing intergovernmental mechanism into a fully-fledged regional economic organisation. After the ratification of the Charter by the parliaments of the sufficient number of the member states, BSEC gained its international legal personality on 1 May 1999 and it is expected that BSEC will be given an observer status in the UN General Assembly soon. At the moment, eighteen working groups have been carrying out projects in the fields of transportation, energy, commerce, tourism, environment and agriculture, etc.252 One of the long-term objectives of BSEC is to gradually establish a BSEC free trade area and to this end BSEC is committed to trade liberalisation and harmonisation of foreign trade regimes in accordance with the WTO rules and practices.253 BSEC also emphasises the importance of the private sector in the process and encourages the cooperation among the business communities of the member states.254 The recent establishment of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank is envisaged to become the main financial pillar of BSEC in the near future.
German, French and Energy Charter Conference's (ECC) applications for the observer status were accepted in the last Ministerial meeting in Tblisi on the 1 of May 1999 251 Platform for Cooperation Between the BSEC and the EU, Attachment 3 to the Annex V, BSEC Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations, paragraph 11. Tblisi, 1 May 1999. For the activities of the working groups see, Karadeniz Ekonomik birlii Bilgi Notu, T.C. Dileri Bakanl, 1999 and BSEC Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations Annex V, pp.6-7. Tblisi, 1 May 1999. 253 See, BSEC Yalta Summit Declaration, 5 June 1998 and Piatform for Cooperation Between the BSEC and the EU", Attachment 3 to the Annex V, BSEC Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations, paragraph18, Tblisi, 1 May 1999. 254 See, BSEC Yalta Summit Declaration, 5 June 1998 and BSEC Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Resolutions, Decisions and Recomtnendations, Tblisi, 1 May 1999.
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Another objective of BSEC is to further develop the already established cooperation with the European Commission, OSCE, WTO, UN, UNIDO and other international organisations and regional initiatives. In this context, the BSEC-EU relations are of particular importance. After the 4-5 June 1998 BSEC Council Summit in Yalta, the EU Presidency on behalf of the European Union declared its full support for Black Sea Cooperation.255 In the declaration, the EU Presidency announced its recognition and support to "...the work of the BSEC in promoting regional economic cooperation and thus, enhancing stability, security and prosperity in the region". According to the EU Presidency declaration, "The BSEC has a positive contribution to make in the development of the region in several areas, including transport, power, telecommunications, and the environment", and thus " the EU looks forward to build on its existing cooperation with the BSEC and stands ready, where appropriate, to provide practical support through the relevant Community programs". Accordingly, the EU declared its willingness to contribute to the regional cooperation in the Black Sea primarily through PHARE, TACITS, MEDA and INTERREG programs. The BSEC Presidency, on the other hand, declared its enthusiasm in the BSEC-EU cooperation in the aforementioned fields of transport, energy, telecommunication networks, trade, etc, and emphasised the ultimate aim of progressively shaping the EURO-BSEC Economic Area.256 Being aware of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration - which aim at the creation of a free trade area among the participants of the EMP by the year 2010 - the BSEC initiative views the Black Sea Region as an integral part of the European economic integration process and declares its intention to establish a EURO-BLACK SEA FREE TRADE AREA through the inter and intra-regional free trade agreements by 2010.257 On the political sphere, it is believed that BSEC, while accelerating economic and social progress, is to consolidate the democratic institutions in all member countries and prepare the ground for integration into the United Europe of the 21st century.258 In this framework, Turkey has been supporting the strengthening of BSEC- EU relations.259 On the politico-military sphere, the Turks, again, came with a challenging initiative in the BSEC region. Having emphasise the importance and the need for a multinational cooperation in the security and the defence fields, the Turks proposed the creation of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) for the enhancement of peace and stability in the Black Sea during the meeting of the second chiefs of the Black Sea Navies in Varna in April 1998. As a means to develop a set of confidence and security building measures in the Black Sea, this new cooperation platform among the navies of the Black Sea littoral states was welcomed by the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine, and consequently the experts from these countries and Turkey have participated in a meeting in Ankara in October 1998 in which all the participants showed their willingness for the establishment of such a force. In this respect, the participants agreed
255

Black Sea Economic Council Summit, 4-5 June: EU Presidency Declaration, London, 6 June 1998.

256

BSEC States Declaration of Intent for the Establishment of the Euro-Black Sea Free Trade Area, Istanbul, 7 February 1997; and also see, "Platform for Cooperation Between the BSEC and the EU", Attachment 3 to the Annex V, BSEC Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations, Tblisi, 1 May 1999.

BSEC States Declaration of Intent for the Establtshment of the Euro-Black Sea Free Trade Area, Istanbul, 7 February 1997 258 See, BSEC Yalta Summit Dectaration, 5 June 1998. 259 For a detailed information on the Turkish perception of BSEC-EU relations, see Ercan zer "The Black Sea Economic cooperation and the EU" Perceptions Vol.l, Number 3,1996, .72-86.

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that the mission of the Force will be to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confdence among the Black Sea littoral states as well as to improve peace and stability in the region through contributing to the enhancement of cooperation and inter-operability between their maritime forces. They also agreed that the BLACKSEAFOR should be a multinational force and that "military exercises", "search and rescue operations", "humanitarian assistance" and "port visits" could constitute the possible areas of cooperation between the participant states.260 Today, the Turks believe that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region has proved itself a successful organisation in which "the participating states have put aside their differences and undertook joint economic projects for their mutual benefit."261 At the same time, the BSEC clearly showed that the Islamic and the Christian states would cooperate smoothly in a regional organisation without any religious or cultural friction. According to a senior Turkish foreign policy elite, "...since its inception the BSEC has asserted itself to be an important confidence building measure and, as such, an essential element of peace ad stability in the region. The varying national interest, differing political assessments and diverse stages of development of the participating states have not prevented them from seeking common solutions to their problems through dialogue, economic cooperation, and creating an environment conducive to regional stability"262

The Turkish Outlook of BSEC and EMP Having argued the basic characteristics and the objectives of the BSEC which indeed are not very much different from the EMP, now, let us look at and understand how the Turks compare these two sister initiatives emerging in the vicinity of the EU, and examine how and why the Turks distinguish BSEC from the EMP. The Turkish policymakers' definition of BSEC as the "child of Turkey"263 unquestionably explains the Turkish outlook towards this regional cooperation initiative. Like a caring mother, they fell themselves responsible for and as the benefactor of BSEC, and accordingly, they are very enthusiastic on BSEC related issues. However, as is mentioned elsewhere, the Turkish foreign policymakers are mainly indifferent towards the EuroMediterranean Cooperation though it has similar objectives as BSEC. It is true that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation may provide a guideline for more Turkish contribution to the EMP because the goals of both projects are very similar. First, both aim to increase the economic prosperity and the welfare of the member countries through cooperation, interdependence and integration with the world economy. Second, they are both erected upon the belief that the regional cooperation is an effective confidence building measure and accordingly, it contributes to regional stability. One of their goals is to build a
For more information on the BLACKSEAFOR, see Black Sea Naval cooperation Task Group, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unclassifed information bulletin, 5 January 1999. 261 Ercan zer "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security" Perceptions, Vol. II, Number 3, 1997, p.104 262 Ercan zer "'1'te Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security" Perceptions, Vol. II, Number 3, 1997, p.104. 263 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999.
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sense of common interest which foster friendly relations and reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts. Thirdly, both aim at reducing organised crime, terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal immigration, racism, xenophobia and discrimination. A fourth common aim of these sub-regional projects is to increase formal and informal dialogue channels among the individuals, groups and institutions that would lead to a better understanding of the common and bilateral problems in their regions. On the other hand, according to its founding fathers, The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region is based on universally shared values such as; democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity through economic liberty and social justice and equal security for all participating states264 - values which are shared by the EMP initiative. In this context, the charter "aims at ensuring that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and prosperity, striving to promote friendly and good-neighbourly relations" - the goals which are also tailored for the Mediterranean region by EMP. Moreover, like EMP, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation basically provides soft security in the region and tries to contribute to the hard-security issues through cooperation and dialogue. In order to contribute to the hardsecurity in the region, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation also provides various levels of dialogue and platforms for interaction between the governments and their representatives, parliaments and parliamentarians, private sectors and businessmen, local administrations, non-governmental organisations, universities and academics, etc. Furthermore, similar to the Mediterranean region, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region embodies a number of states that have political and economic differences. Furthermore, again like in the Mediterranean, there are continuing disputes, mistrust and rivalries among some of the member states and thus, the risk of tension and potential friction is high in the region. For instance, there are problems between Moldova and Russia for Trans-Dniester; between Russia and Ukraine for Crimea; between Georgian government and Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adzharia; and between Armenia and Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabagh, etc.265 In addition to these political differences, again, like in the Mediterranean, differences in the levels of economic development, forced and illegal migration, the existence of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms trafficking, etc., are the other factors that lead to the escalation of tension in the Black Sea region. Although the Turkish foreign policymakers agree about the similarities between the two regions and the two sister initiatives, they point out some important differences, which make the EMP, in their eyes, a less promising idea, compared to BSEC.266 First of all, according to the Turks, the initiative for cooperation in the Mediterranean came from the EU primarily because there was no strong motive or willingness among the regional states for cooperation, and, indeed, they were unable to carry out such a cooperation program by themselves. However, in the case of BSEC, although the initiative and the leadership came from Turkey, there has always been a strong discretion and will among the regional countries to participate in such cooperation since its inception. In other words, the successful cooperation in BSEC has been the outcome of the willingness demonstrated by the member states. Secondly, despite the socialist past of the many of the BSEC states and some of the differences among them, the level of political and economic development is relatively higher and the level of differences among them are relatively less pronounced than the differences among those states in the EMP area. Thirdly, compared to the EMP
264 265

Charter of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation For furtler information on the intra-regional problems in the Black Sea region, see Ercan zer "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security" Perceptions, Vol. II, Number 3, 1997, pp. 84-85. 266 Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999.

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region states, the BSEC states have had much stronger historical and cultural ties with Europe. Accordingly, they are keen on cooperating with the Europeans and becoming a part of the greater Europe. Fourthly, the BSEC states, unlike many of their counterparts in the EMP area, took important steps in the establishment and consolidation of the parliamentary system in their domestic political structures. Finally, although there are bilateral political problems in the region, the BSEC states, unlike in the Mediterranean, are determined for not letting the political problems to spoil the cooperation in the economic sphere. Furthermore, the political problems in general are not as tough as those in the Mediterranean and the parties to those political problems in the BSEC region are not as passionate as their counterparts in the EMP region. When it comes to the question of whether the Turks have "two tales of two seas" or "a tale of two seas", the answer is simply they have "both".267 On the one hand the Turkish policymakers argue that in the foreseeable future there, would be "two tales of two seas" because, the actors are different in both regions. In the Mediterranean, there are the EU, Middle Eastern and North African states - a conglomerate of states ranging from Lebanon to France and to Morocco etc. However, mainly Europeans, they argue, dominate the Black Sea, and despite some differences there are no big political and economic gaps among the BSEC states. Here, the relatively heterogeneous and the homogeneous characteristics of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea states respectively are responsible for two different tales. However, among the Turkish policymakers it is argued that these initiatives in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea will eventually turn into "a tale of the two seas" in time. It is primarily because the EU does not want to be surrounded by economically and politically unstable regions and thus, it pays increasing attention to the stability of its periphery. This is necessary for the survival of the Union. Accordingly, the EU, the Turks say, gave the signals of this policy of "a tale of two seas" by openly supporting the BSEC process. The Turks also underline the importance of the Turkish initiatives at the European Commission that made the EU to support BSEC and furthermore, to start to prepare an EU strategy for the Black Sea region.268 According to a group of foreign policy elite who sympathises with a global European approach towards the Mediterranean, the EU initiatives both in the Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean are considered as a global approach aiming to solidify the Europeanisation of a greater area.269 According to this group, Turkey, being located at the heart of the Eurasian region, has already contributed to this process through establishing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. For them, Turkey, as in the Black Sea, should firmly support and contribute to the process of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean. It is because the future of a prosperous Europe lies in an area stretching from the Balkans to the Russia-Ukraine region and from there to the Caucuses and ending in the Middle East and Magreb. Thus, Turkey, the country situated at the heart of the Eurasian region and the Black Sea and the Mediterranean will certainly benefit from this process of cooperation and increasing prosperity in the region. These seemingly two different answers to the question of the "number of the tales" in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, in fact, clearly reflect the Turkish attitude towards
267 268

Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. Interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, January 1999. 269 Tanu Bleda "The Mediterranean and tle Black Sea" Perceptions Vol. I, Number 3, 1996, pp. 67-71.

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these regions. It is not surprising to see that those who narrate the "two tales of two seas" belong to political and security departments while those who pronounce the "a tale for two seas are from the economics departments of the Turkish Foreign Office. In short, the Turkish vision of cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions can be summarised as such: In the economic sphere, the Turks are supportive of the cooperation and are willing to participate and contribute it in both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. In the political and the security sphere, while they are enthusiastic and are taking initiatives in BSEC, they are not optimistic about the viability of EMP and furthermore they do not accept the role given to Turkey in the EMP by the EU.

Conclusion The Turkish vision of the EMP can be analysed in two contexts. First of all, the Turks, generally, do not see the EMP as a promising initiative in the political and security fields. The problems in the Middle East, according to the Turks, are the main obstacles for the success of the EMP. They emphasise the importance of the Middle East Peace Process and support the NATO's Mediterranean dialogue in the security field. It seems that, the Turks are more sympathetic to US-led initiatives in the Mediterranean security issues. The Turks, however, support the EMP in the economic sphere and are willing to contribute to this process. Yet, they make it clear that it is not a priority in the agenda and by no means constitutes an alternative to Turkey's full membership in the EU. A second and perhaps a more important reason for the indifferent Turkish attitude towards the EMP is the role tailored for Turkey in the Mediterranean. Despite the Association and Customs Union Agreements the EU considers Turkey a peripheral country in the EMP. In fact, for a long time, the EU not only in the EMP but also in all other issues has seen Turkey as a peripheral country between Turkey and the EU. Accordingly, Turkey has not been given a perspective for full membership, and was not even considered among the second category countries for the prospective enlargements of the Union. As a response to this policy, Turkey suspended the political dialogue with the EU, which in turn negatively affected the essentially indifferent Turkish attitude toward the EMP. On the other hand, the EU has long been demanding more democracy and significant improvements in the human rights records in order to give full membership perspective to Turkey. By pointing out the level of democracy which considerably fall short of the EU standards and the violations of human rights, the EU emphasises on the necessity of harmonising the political system of Turkey with that of the EU. In fact, unlike the other southern European countries of Greece, Spain and Portugal, Turkey has been unable to consolidate a European style democracy. Accordingly, the EU makes clear that as long as the necessary political transformations are not made, Turkey will be considered and thus, will remain in the periphery of the EU. In this context, despite the EU's criticisms and the possible steps that might be taken by the new Turkish government towards more democracy, one can argue that the Turkish view and attitude towards the EMP in the political and security fields will not change at least in the medium term primarily because the Turkish foreign policy elite has no significant

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expectations from the EMP. They see NATO as the most effective institution in the Mediterranean security. In the economic sphere, however, Turkish-EU cooperation seems possible in the context of the EMP depending on the attitudes of the other Mediterranean littoral states. The Turkish foreign policy elite, on the other hand, sees BSEC, from a different perspective. Being a Turkish initiative, BSEC is given a prime importance and every possible initiative is taken to consolidate it as an effective international organisation. The Turks argue that this is "reel politik" and emphasise Turkey's interests in promoting BSEC in the economic, political and security spheres. In other words, while the Turks see vital interests in BSEC, they have little expectations from the EMP. As a conclusion, it can be argued that given the attitude of the EU towards Turkey and Turkish attitude towards the EU it seems that Turkey will remain in the periphery of both the Union and the EMP at least for the near future. However, a point that should be kept in mind is that the Barcelona Declaration is not just a declaration. It has started a process for cooperation in the Mediterranean. First of all, it is a process, not an end in itself It envisages the institutionalisation of cooperation in the region in time. Secondly, this process is initiated in one of the most difficult and problematic regions of the world. Having in mind that what has been devised in Barcelona is a process and aims at establishing cooperation in a region full of intractable conflicts, one should expect the progress to be incremental in the Euro-Med Partnership process. From this point of view, it is not unrealistic to think that both Turkey and the EU might come to terms in the Euro- Med Cooperation in time. If Turkey - though incremental take decisive and determined steps towards more an more democracy and if the EU revise its exclusionary policy towards Turkey, a common ground may be found for a lasting and effective cooperation in the EMP. The willingness of both sides to understand each other's sensitivities is the key for a successful Turkey-EU cooperation in this process. Moreover, developing an EU policy for financial and political support for the development of BSEC may also significantly contribute to a change in the Turkish vision of the EMP in the future. Finally, although the political relations between Turkey and the EU have been strained since the Luxembourg summit, membership in the EU is still one of the priorities of the TFP. Accordingly, the BSEC is by no means an alternative for the EU orientation of the Turkey. Like the EMP, it is seen as a complementary sub-regional process in the integration of the greater European area. In this framework, it is more likely that increases in the level of relations between Turkey and the EU, and a redefinition of the status of Turkey in the EMP will lead to a significant change in the Turkish outlook of the EMP project.

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The Past and Present State of the Turkish - Bulgarian Relations

mer E.Ltem Formative Years After the independence of Bulgaria and especially after the Second World War, the core of Turkish-Bulgarian relations was the status of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. This issue, which lost some of its importance in recent years, could again be on the agenda of the two countries in the coming years and therefore it deserves further study and consideration. The Ottomans conquered Bulgaria easily. They were not con- fronted with the fierce resistance that the Serbians showed in Kosovo (1389) and the Hungarians in Mohacs (1526). Being near the Ottoman capital and on the road to other Balkan countries and the Austrian Empire, Bulgaria was of outmost importance for the Ottomans who, chiefly for security reasons, begun to settle Turkish tribes in these lands, which at the time were scarcely populated. Up to the l9th century, Ottoman administration was beneficial to the peoples of Bulgaria, Muslims and Christians alike. Population and income increased in contrast to Anatolia, the Turkish heartland and there was no notice- able uprising in these regions. This rather positive picture began to change at the beginning of the XIXth century. Ottoman administration was no longer as efficient as it used to be and Russia, after the Napoleonic wars had emerged as an ambitious world power, with imperialistic designs, among others, in the Balkans. On the other hand, Bulgarian intelligentsia, under the influence of the French Revolution, opted for freedom and independence as ideals and was strongly encouraged by the Bulgarian Church. The country became restless, reforms performed by talented governors like Mithat Pasha were of no use, Russian inspired and supported rebellions began to occur here and there, and the biggest of them at Batak was harshly suppressed by the Ottoman irregulars, thus creating indignation all over Europe, especially in England. Russia taking this opportunity declared war to the Ottoman Empire. Due to Ottoman resistance, this war lasted more than a year, but in the end, Russian troops were victorious. The Russians even reached the Ottoman capital but yielding to the other European powers' requests, they did not enter Istanbul. Russia imposed on the Ottomans the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, which gave independence to Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro and created a huge Bulgaria comprising today's Bulgaria, Macedonia, northern Greece and large parts of Turkish Thrace. This Treaty was opposed by Austria-Hungary and the British, who rightly suspected that the new Bulgaria would in fact be a Russian satellite. The San Stefano Treaty was revised in Berlin in the same year. The new Bulgaria, which resulted from this Treaty, was a small principality under Ottoman nominal sovereignty. The southern part of Bulgaria became, under the name of Eastern Rumelia, an autonomous Ottoman Province, which was soon to be annexed to the Principality (1885). Although they did not take part actively in the Turco-Russian war, Bulgarians were

Retired Ambassador of Turkey

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very much disappointed with the Treaty of Berlin. The realization of "Great Bulgaria" became a national ideal. As the lands they coveted were in the hands of Ottomans, antiTurkish propaganda spread out rapidly. Ottomans were accused of holding the Bulgarians under their yoke for centuries, and it was claimed that the Ottoman rule was the main cause of their underdevelopment. Nobody remembered that except political rights, the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire enjoyed religious and cultural freedoms, and moreover, was encouraged to undertake economic activities. The Muslims living in the Ottoman lands, which later became Bulgaria initially, constituted nearly half of the total population. What happened to them is rather tragic. During the war, the Russian troops and especially Cossack raiders attacked Muslim populations to expel them from their lands and at the slightest resistance slaughtered them. This caused an immense migration towards Istanbul. The lands that they left behind were immediately occupied by the ethnic Bulgarians. According to the Bulgarian census of 1887, the Muslim population decreased nearly fifty per cent with regard to prewar times. Still, in spite of the continuous migration and vexations of the local authorities, a large number of Turks and other Muslims remained in Bulgaria due to the fact that building a new home elsewhere, and even in the motherland Turkey, was not an easy task. According to the Treaty of Berlin, Muslims of Bulgaria should not be discriminated, should freely practice their religion, educate their children, and own their mosques as well as their schools and the properties of the religious foundations (vakf). In fact, the new conditions that existed in Bulgaria were extremely difficult for the Turks. Most of the mosques and the Muslim's schools were destroyed. (A striking example is Sofia. Before the war there were 44 mosques in the city. Today only one remains). Few Turks were able to retake their lands from their Bulgarian neighbours. They were not allowed to participate in the political life of the country and they were kept from be- coming high-ranking civil servants or officers in the army. Despite their rights guaranteed in the Treaty of Berlin, Turks were in fact discriminated against as second class citizens of the country. This unwritten status of the Turks lasted more than a century and began to change only after 1989. In pursuing the ideal of "Great Bulgaria", Bulgaria began to follow an irredentist and revisionist policy under Prince Ferdinand who were taking the opportunity of the turmoil caused by the Young Turks revolution and declared the independence of Bulgaria in 1909 and took the title of Czar, dreaming that he shall be soon crowned in Constantinople. But the Ottoman possessions in Europe were also coveted by Serbia and Greece and it was more than 30 years after the Turco-Russian war of 1877 that the three countries reached an apparent agreement for the partition of the territories in question. Bulgarians won the First Balkan War and lost the Second. Through peace treaties Bulgarians received some Macedonian land, secured an outlet to Aegean Sea and annexed the Kurdzali region whose population were nearly all Muslims. In this way Bulgaria became in a sense more "Turkish" and on the other hand Pomaks became a new problem. The origin of the Pomaks is not clear. It seems that some of the ethnic Bulgarians, probably from the Bogomil confession, accepted Islam in the early Ottoman period. During and just after the Balkan Wars some chauvinists with the connivance of civil and military

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authorities of the newly conquered regions began converting Pomaks to Christianity by using force. The idea behind this was that ethnic Bulgarians should only be Christians. After the war, strong Otto-man protests and massive immigration of the Pomaks to Turkey obliged Bulgarian Government to intervene and stop these practices, which in a way had been aiming at correcting history. However the efforts to "bulgarise" the Pomaks continued afterwards under every political regime reaching its climax with the Communists in the 1970's when Muslim names of the Pomaks were forcibly changed to Bulgarians names. Since the Balkan Wars had established the frontiers between Turkey and Bulgaria there were no more territorial claims of either sides. The only important question, which remained, was the Turkish/Moslem minority. Just after the proclamation of independence in 1909 Bulgarian Government had reaffirmed the rights of the Muslim minority in the country and after the Balkan Wars, by the Peace Treaty and the convention on the Muftis in 1913 conceded more rights especially in religious matters. Thus, as far as the agreements between the two countries were concerned all Muslims of Bulgaria possessed adequate minority rights. The problem however remained with the implementations of these agreements. The Bulgarian authorities, and especially the local authorities, were generally unwilling to adhere to the provisions of the above-mentioned agreements. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire participated in the First World War as allies of the Central Powers. However their aim was quite different from each other. Ottomans expected that the war put an end to the continuous dismemberment of their territories, hoping to assure in this way the survival of their state. Bulgarians hoped that, once victorious they would be able to realize greater Bulgaria. The Central Powers lost the war. In fact the Peace imposed on Bulgarians in Neuilly (1919), created a smaller Bulgaria by depriving it from its outlet to the Aegean Sea and giving Dobrudza to Rumania. The Otto- man Empire on the other hand was totally dismembered at Sevres (1920). Bulgaria was obliged to comply with the peace treaty. Turkish nationalists refused to do so and continued to fight. After the defeat of the Greeks a new treaty signed in Lausanne (1923) recognized Turkish sovereignty on Anatolia. In Europe the frontiers of 1913 were preserved. In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party Leader and Prime Minister Stamboliyski put aside the ideal of Great Bulgaria and tried to heal the wounds of war. He established good relations with the Turkish/Muslim minority of his country which being mostly farmers were at the same time his supporters. After the assassination of Stamboliyski in 1923 his successors kept their distance Turkish/Muslim minority but were careful to maintain good relations with the newly established Turkish Republic. On l8th October 1925 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship which stated that there would be unbreakable, cordial and eternal friendship between them. As this treaty had no time limit and as it is not abolished, it is still in force from the legal point of view. In a Protocol annexed to the Treaty Bulgaria recognized that the Muslims living in its territory will enjoy all the provisions of the Neuilly Treaty and Turkey accepted that the Bulgarians in Turkey will enjoy all the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. This meant that the Muslims of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians of Turkey were to enjoy all rights concerning religious matter, language, education etc. The two countries signed a Convention of Settlement in the same date. The second article of this document stipulates that the two parties would create no obstacles to the voluntary emigration of the Turks in Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in Turkey.

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We notice that the Turkish side, despite having obtained the minority rights for the all the Muslims of Bulgaria, accepted only the emigration of the Turks. It is obvious that the main concern of the new Turkish Republic was the Turks in Bulgaria. The other Muslims of Bulgaria i.e. Pomaks and Muslim Gypsies were not given the right to voluntary emigration. Instead they were told to seek the permission of Bulgarian as well as Turkish authorities. In practice, however, Turkey always welcomed the emigration of Pomaks in the 1920's and 1930's as for the Muslims Gypsies, although they were Turkish speaking their emigration was discouraged and in the 50ies practically forbidden. In the 1920's the two countries enjoyed good relations al- though their political objectives were quite different. Turkey, that had no territorial claims from her neighbours, since her aim was to establish an era of peace in which she could carry out her reforms. Bulgarians, always bearing in mind the ideal of great Bulgaria were following revanchist and revisionist policies although in those years they were not in a position to defend these views. In the 1930's the situation changed. Fascists in Italy were successful and the German Nazis, after some electoral gains came to power. Bulgaria, like some other Balkan countries was influenced by these developments. In 1934 with the consent of the King a military coup ended the shaky Bulgarian democracy and a form of fascist regime that lasted about ten years was installed. The Turks of Bulgaria suffered a great deal during those ten years. The successive Bulgarian governments tried to isolate the Turkish minority from Turkey and by forcing Turkish children to go to Bulgarian schools initiated the assimilation policy. Turkey accepted the Latin alphabet in 1928; Turks of Bulgaria did the same. In 1934 the Bulgarian Government obliged the Turkish schools to teach Arabic characters again. All the newspapers in Turkish were ordered to print with Arabic characters. The Commissions, which administered Turkish schools, were abolished and their task was given to the Muftis who were against the reforms undertaken in the Turkish Republic. Many Turkish schools were closed under the pretext that they were not responding to the standards and their pupils were sent to Bulgarian schools. In 1944 only 397 Turkish primary schools remained of the 1673 which existed in 1934. By 1944 all Turkish newspapers were closed. All the Turkish associations gradually were suppressed and some of their members imprisoned where some died. Before 1877 many names of towns, villages, valleys creeks etc. were in Turkish. After the Turco-Russian war some of those names were changed. The governments, which came to power after 1934, systematically changed almost all Turkish names even the names of the villages inhabited only by Turks. It is needless to say that Turkey opposed these measures strongly. But the Bulgarian Governments although they needed at that time to have good relations with Turkey resisted and gave only one concession in restoring in 1938 the Latin alphabet for Turks. But as the Turkish schools and newspapers were gradually closed down that gesture meant little. Four Balkan countries (Turkey, Greece, Romania, Serbia) signed in 1934 a pact and guaranteed mutual territorial integrity. Bulgarians stayed out of this initiative. This was rightly interpreted that Bulgaria had territorial claims on her neighbours. In 1938 Bulgaria signed an agreement of non-aggression with Balkan countries without guaranteeing their territorial integrity. At the beginning of the war Bulgaria, although very pro-German, remained neutral. When Germans obliged Rumania to restore southern Dobruja to Bulgaria an 67

active cooperation with the Axis powers began and in March 1941 Bulgaria officially joined the Axis. Bulgarian troops following German forces occupied Macedonia, Greek Thrace and some parts of Serbia. The dream of Great Bulgaria had become true. King Boris who repeated his father Ferninand's mistake by becoming a German ally died under mysterious circumstances in 1943. In September 1944, when Soviet troops began to cross the Danube, a coup overthrew the government. A "Fatherland Front" com- posed of the agrarians; communists and some officers governed the country. Soviet forces pursuing the retreating German forces invaded whole Bulgaria. In the following years, under the protection of the Soviet army a communist regime led by Dimitrov was established in Bulgaria which became the most faithful ally of the Soviet Union. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 returned Bulgaria to her prewar frontiers. However she was allowed to keep Southern Dobruja. Turkey, who since 1923 had remained neutral, found it facing Soviet claims on the straits and on some of her eastern provinces. Turkey established close relations with the United States and other western countries, benefiting from the Marshall Plan (1948), sending troops to Korea (1951) and joining NATO (1952). Thus the two countries found themselves in opposing and hostile camps. The Turks of Bulgaria who had suffered a great deal after 1934 and especially during the war welcomed the Fatherland Front that first seemed to support Turkish claims. Turkish schools were re-opened but soon expropriated. This meant that those schools were no longer to be run by the Turkish community but by the Bulgarian State, although they were to continue to teaching in Turkish. Turkish newspapers were allowed to be published again on the condition that they support government policies. Soon however, the Communist regime under the influence of the cold war began to treat the Turkish minority with distrust. In December 1947 Dimitrov warned the Turks to look towards Sofia instead of Istanbul and Ankara and asked them not to act as agents of the enemies of Bulgaria. (i.e. Turkey, United States, Great Britain etc..) In 1949 agricultural lands were expropriated. Turks who practically were all farmers were affected severely by this measure. The already long queues in front of the Turkish Embassy and consulates formed by those hoping to obtain emigration visa for Turkey become even longer. The economic situation of Turkey was not apt to receive a large number of emigrants. Nevertheless Turkey, until August 1950 gave more than 26.000 visa. The unrest among the Turkish population did not diminish; the queues in front of the Turkish Missions became longer still. With a note-dated l0th of March 1951 the Bulgarian Government accused Turkey of instigating the Turkish minority to emigrate but at the same time not issuing enough visas. The note stated that the Bulgarian Government was ready to give to 250.000 people passports and according to the 1925 settlement agreement asked Turkey not to place any obstacle before the emigration of these persons. Moving 250.000 persons in three months time was more a form of deportation than emigration. This haste could be explained by the fact that Bulgarians were probably acting on behalf of the Soviets who wished to "punish" Turkey for its participation in the Korean War. Seeing this reality and taking into consideration the economic difficulties that this kind of mass emigration was sure to create, Turkey did not accept the Bulgarian proposal but did increased the number of visas issued. On this basis the emigration continued. Turkey stopped the emigration twice because Bulgaria was sending gypsies instead of Turks. On 30th November 1951 emigration was definitively ended by the Bulgarian Government. Up to that date 154.393 persons had immigrated to Turkey. 68

In the following 12 years the Turkish-Bulgarian relations reached their lowest level. Turks of Bulgaria were strictly forbidden to immigrate to Turkey. On the other hand they continued to be discriminated more than ever. Few Turks were elected to the Central Committee and Parliament. Although faithful communists and representing more than ten per cent of the population, they never became members of the Politburo, minister or viceministers. Turks were not allowed to be generals, not even officers in the combat units of the army. In 1959, Turkish schools were united with the Bulgarian schools. This meant that Turkish children were to be taught in Bulgarian but they would at the same time learn Turkish. This measure hardly noticed at that time constituted the first step of the gradual assimilation policy of the communist regime. The dissatisfaction of the Turks continued to grow. In the years 1962 and 1963 Turkish missions in Bulgaria received more than 380.000 petitions from Turks asking to emigrate. After the Cuban crisis, when a period of "detente" was witnessed, the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union improved. Bulgarians followed their ally. The main perhaps the only important question between the two countries was the Turkish minority. After lengthy negotiations the two sides agreed to solve this problem by emigration. In fact neither Turkey nor Bulgaria wanted emigration. The economic problems of Turkey made the settlement of big numbers of emigrants very difficult. But as Turkish public opinion very much favored emigration, Turkish diplomacy tried to negotiate an agreement on this subject. Bulgaria needed the cheap Turkish man- power for agriculture as ethnic Bulgarian was leaving the countryside for big towns. But to comply with the Soviet wishes Bulgarians accepted to conclude an agreement on emigration. The two countries signed in 1968 an agreement, which allowed the close relatives of the persons who immigrated up to 1952 to Turkey, to immigrate to that country as well. The implementation of the agreement took ten years. During this period about 120.000 persons immigrated to Turkey. After the above-mentioned agreement the relations between the two countries improved considerably. The two sides signed many agreements on transportation, trade, tourism, visas etc. In the political field Bulgaria never openly took sides with Greece or Southern Cyprus. This gesture was much appreciated in Ankara. The official contacts increased. Between 1968 and 1984 one can count 22 high level visits. Yet the efforts to assimilate Turks continued slowly but surely. The changing of the names of the Pomaks in 1971-1972 was a clear sign for the future. Turkey and other states showed almost no reaction to this event. In reality individuals were obliged to renounce their names and forced to accept a new one that they had not asked for, therefore there was a clear violation of human rights. In 1974 Turkish language lessons witch were compulsory for the ethnic Turks' children in the schools became optional. As Turks were "discouraged" from taking this option and asking that their children learn Turkish, consequently no Turkish classes were opened. This meant that after 1974 the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was in fact forbidden to learn its own language. This constituted the second step of the gradual assimilation of the Turkish minority. Ten years passed before the communist regime introduced the third and final step for the assimilation of the Turkish minority. In the last days of December 1984 a wide campaign for the changing of more than one million ethnic Turks' names to Bulgarian names was 69

initiated and successfully completed in a less than three months. The system that the Bulgarian officials used for this was simple. In the countryside where most of the Turks lived, police and in some cases army units surrounded the villages, nobody was allowed to come in or to go out, people were gathered in the main square and asked to choose a Bulgarian name for themselves from the already prepared lists. Those who refused were beaten and/or imprisoned for some time. In case of the rare organized protest, the army intervened and during the clashes some Turks died. Those who were arrested were sent to Belene prison, a kind of concentration camp. Soon all resistance ceased. The main reason for this was that without the new identity cards bearing Bulgarian names, members of the Turkish minority were not accepted in banks, hospitals, public buildings etc. Other measures of assimilation followed: Bulgarian Radio's broadcasts for the Turkish minority in Turkish ended. There was only one newspaper and one monthly review which was published half in Turkish, half in Bulgarian. Henceforth these were published only in Bulgarian. Speaking Turkish was forbidden and fined up to 20 levas. Listening to Turkish music, wearing traditional Turkish clothes were also forbidden. Turks were not allowed to celebrate Muslim feasts. They were forced to follow Bulgarian ceremonies for births, marriages and burials. In some places Turkish parents were obliged to send their young children to nurseries. The idea behind this measure was to accustom the children to their Bulgarian names and teach them Bulgarian before their mother tongue. All these measures were accompanied by a media campaign, which was designed to convince the Turks that there was to be no more emigration to Turkey. It was expected that the Turks would lose all hope to emigrate and that they would comply with their new conditions in Bulgaria. A second press campaign tried to picture Turkey as a backward country where there was massive unemployment, poverty, abuse, fraud etc. i.e. as a country which is not worth emigrating to. The assimilation campaign against the Turks did not go unnoticed as that which the Pomaks faced had. On the contrary it drew the attention of the Turkish and international press very much. The Turks who had previously emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey learned from their relatives what was happening in Bulgaria and alerted the Turkish press. The Western press which first repeated what the Turkish press printed was able soon to make its own inquiries on the spot. In the third week of January 1985 a Warsaw Pact summit meeting was planed in Sofia. On that occasion several western newspapers sent their correspondents to Bulgaria. But due to the illness of the Soviet Union's Communist Party Secretary General Chernenko the meeting was adjourned (Chernenko eventually died on March 10). Thus these correspondents were able to spend more time on the issue of the Turkish minority. The Bulgarian officials that they questioned categorically denied the existence of a name changing campaign. But as the journalists were not allowed to travel the regions where Turks lived in large numbers, the official explanations were not found to be convincing. After a while Bulgarian officials began to state that some Bulgarian citizens wishing to return to their origins were voluntarily taking Bulgarian names. But they were not able to explain how in a short period of time more than one million people chose unanimously to change their names. At the same time a "scientific" explanation of the name changing campaign began to appear in the press. According to this the Turks of Bulgaria were not in fact Turks but Bulgarians who in the past were forcibly converted to Islam and turkified by the Ottomans. This was why a "rebirth process" had been born and these people having found the Bulgarian 70

conscience again began to change their name voluntarily. All this is historically incorrect. The Turks of Bulgaria are the descendants of the Turks who during the Ottoman period settled in Bulgaria. There is a great deal of material in the Ottoman archives to prove this point. On the other hand it is natural that some of these Turks married with Bulgarian girls and especially with the Pomaks. It is also natural that some the Bulgarians preferred to convert them- selves to Islam considering that Muslims during Ottoman period had advantages like not paying taxes and holding high official positions.

Racist theories no longer have any value. Today's science accepts that it is not the ethnic origin but the cultural identity, which determines the national consciousness of the people. From that point of view the Turks of Bulgaria have a completely Turkish culture and al- ways considered themselves as Turks. What the Bulgarians Communists did was to try to Bulgarise the Turks by force without paying any attention to their cultural identity. This was not very far from some Nazi practices. As the bilateral relations were at their highest point (in 1981 General Evren visited Bulgaria and President Zhivkov visited Turkey in 1983) the name's changing campaign caught Turkey by surprise. In mid January President Evren sent the Secretary General of the Presidency and his Private Secretary as emissaries to Present Zhivkov who denied everything and repeated that Bulgaria wished to have good neighbourly relations with Turkey. As the name changing campaign continued the Turkish Government faced uproar of the opposition parties and the press. After a special meeting of the National Assembly, the Turkish Government, as a solution of the emerging crisis pro- posed on 22nd of February a new emigration agreement to Bulgaria. An exchange of notes, which lasted about four months, followed. However it was clear from the beginning that Bulgaria was considering the matter purely an internal affair and consequently had no intention of signing a new emigration agreement. Turkey responded by restricting bilateral relations. The trade between the two countries decreased. Electricity imports from Bulgaria were stopped. Relations in the cultural fields as well as in sports frozen etc. On the other hand Turkey informed all friendly states of the situation of the Turkish minority and asked them to intervene. As a last resort Turkey brought the issue to international organizations like the Interparliamentary Union, NATO Assembly, Council of Europe, CSCE, UNESCO and the relevant bodies of the United Nations. It was the Bulgaria's turn to be caught by surprise. The position that other countries took on the Turkish minority's situation differed from each other. United States and United Kingdom supported Turkey's claims and intervened on behalf of Ankara. Germany, France Italy and other members of the European Union were not in favor to rise the matter bilaterally with Bulgaria and recommended that, as it was a human rights issue it should be handled in the CSCE. During the discussions in meetings of this organization they supported Turkey moderately. Greece was the only EC member that openly acted in favor of Bulgaria. The relations of the two countries improved so much that in September 1986 they signed a declaration of friendship, good neighborly relations and cooperation in which they agreed to consult each other in case a threat to the security of either party should arise. It was argued afterwards Turkey that this was not compatible with Greece's NATO's obligations. With the exception of few sates like Syria and Yemen, the great majority of the 71

Muslim countries supported Turkey and the Islamic Conference adopted a resolution on the subject in January 1986 which expressed solidarity with the Muslim minority of Bulgaria and urged his member countries to seek political solutions with the aim of ensuring the religious and cultural rights of this minority. On the other hand the Conference approved that a three-member contact group be appointed to examine the conditions of the Muslims in Bulgaria. The Soviet Union surprisingly did not commit itself to her most faithful ally. This displayed the dissatisfaction of the Soviets with Bulgaria, not only on the minority issue but also with the Zhivkov administration, which was reluctant to implement perestroika. In private, Soviets leaders stated that they considered the minority issue to be an internal affair and advised their Turkish counterparts to try to negotiate with Bulgaria. Non-governmental organizations also took interest in the Turkish minority issue. The prestigious Amnesty International, in a report titled "Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks - Human rights abuses during the forced assimilation of the ethnic Turkish minority" gave all the details of the exactions that the Turks suffered during the name changing campaign. This report was published in 1986 just before the l3th Communist Party Congress and constituted a serious blow for the Bulgarian Government. At the end of that year Naim Sleymanov (bulgarised as Shalamanov), world featherweight weight lifting champion while in Melburn with the Bulgarian national team escaped to Turkey and declared to the press that the name changing was not voluntary but compulsory. This event also caused much embarrassment to the Bulgarian Government. In spite of its very difficult position the Bulgarian Government did not change its stand. This was probably due to the fact that Zhivkov and his close collaborators had reached a point of no return on the Turkish minority issue. To yield to the pressures would probably be considered as a failure and could end their political career. On the other hand the Turkish Government had began to realize that the policy to expose the wrongdoings of the Bulgarian government, al- though successfully led and supported by many countries produced no concrete result. At that point of deadlock the Soviets intervened at proposed that the two sides held talks. During the discreetly held negotiations it was very clear from the beginning that Bulgaria had no intention at all of recognizing the fact that a Turkish minority exists in their country and consequently they did not accept discussing an emigration agreement. They could only agree to consent to some family reunification on humanitarian basis. Some Turks who emigrated or took refuge in Turkey were obliged to leave their family in Bulgaria. It was a common practice of the communist regimes not to allow all the members of one family to travel abroad together. At least one of them and in most cases a child was kept behind as a kind of hostage to deter the parents from taking refuge in foreign countries. As far as Turkey was concerned there were around hundred children in that situation. In 1987 and 1988 Bulgarian sent them to Turkey, to their parents. In the favorable atmosphere created by this event the two countries decided to make official the negotiations that they held since the end of 1986 and to that end signed in February 1988 a protocol which established two working groups. The first one aimed at finding solutions to the problems existing in bilateral relations including the field of humanitarian relations and preparing a draft declaration containing the principles of good neighbourliness. The second working group would deal with economics, trade, tourism, technology, transport, communication and culture. The work of this group was promising. In 72

the First Working Group Turkish officials tried to raise the Turkish minority issue as a problem which existed in bilateral relations. Bulgarians denied the existence of a Turkish minority in their country. It was at this point that the negotiations never were officially never broken off had in fact ended. In 1989 Bulgarian Parliament, to be in conformity with the CSCE's principles adopted a new passport law liberalizing foreign travel to a certain extend. At the same time some "undesirable" Turks were expelled to Yugoslavia and Austria. On the 20th of May in a village named Todor Ikonomovo (Turkish name Mahmuzlu) mainly inhabited by the Turks of northern Bulgaria some Turks argued with policemen about the new passport law. Policemen lost control of the situation and fired and killed some of the villagers. The next day there were some manifestations in the neighbouring villages. Again police forces intervened. According to official figures a total of seven persons died. President Zhivkov, in a television speech delivered on the 29th of May, after praising the communist regime for what it did for the welfare of the Bulgaria's Muslims, asked Turkey in a challenging tone to open its frontiers for the Bulgarians who wished to go there. Prime Minister zal replied that the Turkish borders were open and had never been closed and invited the Bulgarian Government to negotiate a comprehensive emigration agreement. Bulgarian Government began to deport some Turks to Turkey. On the other hand thousands of Turks benefiting from the new passport law asked to go to Turkey. They were not obstructed. Thus the biggest exodus in Europe in the period of detente began. Bulgarian Government which in 1985 and in the following years had refused The Turkish proposal for an emigration agreement in fact started the emigration in 1989. That contradiction could be explained by the fact that President Zhivkov did not understand the true nature of the events of May 20 and 21. He most probably believed that these pacifistic manifestations were some kind of a riot and that if he gave the Turks what they wanted, i.e. the chance to immigrate to Turkey, the crisis would come to an end. By doing so he surely over- looked the damage that the emigration of the Turks was to cause to the Bulgarian economy. On the other hand as the settlement of the immigrants would create huge problems for Turkey, the decision to let the Turks emigrate aimed most probably also to "punishing" the receiving country. Immigrants came to Turkish border gates in big numbers. Although they were permitted to enter rapidly there were queues for kilometers. People came in old lorries and cars with all their belongings, children and elderly peoples suffering from the heat and malnutrition as well as dehydration. When they entered Turkey although well received, most of them did not know what to do. Some took refuge with their relatives. Others were obliged to go to the tents of the Turkish Red Crescent where they could sleep and found food. Few jobs were available immediately. Soon annoyance and despair spread. Some returned to Bulgaria but most of them persevered. In mid-August the number of the immigrants reached 300.000. At that pace it was expected that one million immigrants would arrive by the end of the year. It seemed that all the Turks of Bulgaria wished to emigrate. The Turkish Government who used at that date all its capacity of accommodation halted on the 2lst of August the free emigration and declared that up to 1.000 emigration visa would be granted each day. This should have been a victory for President Zhivkov but Bulgaria had other problems at that time and the Turkish decision was hardly criticized.

73

To compensate the deficiency in manpower, which resulted from the emigration of the Turks, Bulgarian Government issued a decree ordering all able men and women to join work battalions. Although partially implemented, those measures caused much discontent among the population. On the other hand the definite departure of hundred thousands of people created a great deal of confusion and some disorder in the country. The "rebirth process" had ended pitifully and the Government and the Communist Party had failed. Since totalitarian regimes could not endure failure the end of Zhivkov was near. In mid-October a CSCE meeting on environmental protection was held in Sofa. Some opposition groups like Eco-Glasnost and Podkrepa (unofficial trade union) which were not recognized but tolerated by the Government organized demonstrations asking for more democracy believing that the presence of many foreign representatives and journalists would be in their favor. Foreign Minister Mladenov who was severely criticized by Zhivkov for allowing the CSCE meeting to take place in Sofia, apparently obtained the support of the Soviets to oust him. Unable to obtain the majority in the Politburo meeting on the 9th of November, Zhivkov resigned the following day. Thus the career of a perfect Stalinist, Khrushchevist and Brezhnevist who was not able to adapt himself to the glasnost policies of Gorbachev and who persecuted the innocent Turkish minority ended after thirty-five years in office. Mladenov replaced Zhivkov. Demonstrations asking more liberties and democratic reforms continued. The Government gave in by organizing round table meetings at which all opposition groups participated. On the 28th of December about 5.000 Turks gathered outside of the National Assembly asking for the restoration of their real names. The following day, upon the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party the Government condemned the arbitrary changing of names, affirmed the freedom of religion and the right of every one to speak an other language than Bulgarian in their non-official communications and to freely practice their customs. During the first week of January 1990 some 10.000 ethnic Bulgarians of the regions inhabited mainly by Turks organized demonstrations shouting anti-Turkish slogans and asking for the resignation of the Government. These demonstrations showed that Zhivkov's racial hate policies had some popular support. However the Government stood firms and even released from prisons about 40 Turks who in the past resisted to the changing of the Turkish names. By doing so Mladenov and the new members of the Politburo aimed to ease the tensions and disorder that Zhivkov's assimilation policies caused in the country and hoped to correct the tarnished Bulgarian image in the international public opinion. The Communist Party tried to adapt himself to new conditions. The articles of the Bulgarian Constitution which stated that the Bulgarian Communist Party was the leading force in the society and State was abolished. Lukanov, known as the best reformist in the Party, became Prime Minister. Mladenov transferred the title of the General Secretary of the Communist Party to the veteran Lilov and contented himself as Head of State. Finally the Communist Party changed its name to Bulgarian Socialist Party. BSP, obtaining 47.15 % of the votes won the election on the 10th of June. Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF), the main opposition party won 34.84 %, the historical Agrarian Party (BZNS) 8% and the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) founded mainly by ethnic Turks 6.03 %. However BSP was not able to profit from this victory. Mladenov was obliged to resign on July 6th because he was heard saying during a manifestation in December 1989 "The best thing to do is to bring the talks in". It was 74

obvious that a politician raised in an authoritarian regime could not easily become democrat. The opposition leader Zhelyu Zhelev was elected President on August 1st, 1990. BSP candidate Kyuranov was far from obtaining the two-thirds of the existing votes. On the other hand Lukanov government, unable to solve the ever increasing economic problems resigned on November 29th, after a general strike. The Bulgarian "socialists" although maintaining the majority in the National Assembly participated with the UDF and the Agrarians in the coalition government of Dimiter Popov who himself had no party affiliation. As expected BSP lost its majority in the general election held on October l3th, 1991. They won the general election in December 1994 again. But the Government of Zhan Videnov, the BSP President, could only last two years and in the early general election of April 1997 the socialists lost again. BSP failure to stay in power can be explained by the fact that while the country needed real reforms BSP tried to maintain as much as of the communist regime structures and policies as possible. The Union of Democratic Forces is a political party composed of several democratic parties and political groups with the common goal of opposing the communist regime. As those parties and groups maintained their own identity, UDF always had a problem of cohesion, which resulted in slowness in decision-making and sometimes inefficiency in action. That is why the UDF lost the 1990 election; obtained nearly the same percentage of votes with the communists in the 1991 elections and only after the support of Turkish representatives (MRF) that they were able to form a government which did not last long and was replaced by the Luben Berov government. UDF lost again the 1994 elections. After the nearly complete failure of the BSP Zhan Videnov government and because they constituted the only alternative to BSP, the UDF won the 1997 elections. UDF found certain cohesion under the rather authoritarian leadership of Ivan Kostov whose government, having the support of the President Petar Stoyanov, resolutely began to pursue reformist domestic policies. On the other hand by asking for memberships in the European Union and NATO the Kostov Government definitely engaged Bulgaria in democratic Europe. The Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) is the third political force of post communist Bulgaria. Founded mainly by Turks who were persecuted during the Zhivkov regime as well as some ethnic Bulgarians, this party headed by Ahmet Doan basically defends the rights of the minorities in Bulgaria i.e. Turks, Pomaks, gypsies etc. MRF was attacked by BSP and in a lesser degree by UDF for being founded on ethnic basis and therefore not being constitutional. After long legal disputes MRF was recognized by the Constitutional Court and was able to register itself as a "party" in a regional court. Since new accusations of being an ethnical Party was always possible and could lead its suspension, MRF has always been very keen to operate as a regular "Bulgarian" party. This was true to such extend that when MRF supported the "expert" government of Luben Berov in 1992 the post of Deputy Prime Minister that was offered to MRF was not taken by Ahmet Doan in his capacity of the party leader but an- other member of the party, Mr. Evgeni Matinchev, an ethnic Bulgarian. The concern for survival of the MRF did not prevent it from strongly defending the Turkish minority rights in the Parliament. Subsequently Turkish was taught as an optional subject to children of Turkish origin, a newspaper in Turkish was published, national radio and television was allowed to broadcast in Turkish, three religious schools were opened with the aim of teaching the basics of Islam etc. Yet as the Bulgarian Constitution did not mention minority rights all these achievements had a temporary nature, given that the Parliament or the Governments which adopted these measures could under different political circumstances repeal them. 75

Some members of MRF accused the Party of not being able to defend the Turkish minority's rights vigorously and resigned to form other parties or joined UDF. This weakened MRF, which formed The Union for National Salvation with small monarchist and centrist groups and obtained in the 1997 election 7.6 % of the votes and 19 seats. MRF which is no longer unanimously supported by the Turkish minority is still the unique guarantee of their rights in Bulgaria. After the restoration of the Turkish names in December 1989 the strained TurkishBulgarian relations eased. However it was obvious that the socialists who usually followed the line of the Soviets and later the Federation of Russia, and who in the Balkans favored Greece were very reluctant if not unwilling to cooperate with Turkey. On the other hand UDF Governments always tried to be on good terms with Turkey and urged cooperation. The socialists began in 1990 to voice concern about the military strength of Turkey. This preoccupation increased after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In fact it was mainly a concealed attempt to put pressure on Turkey. The Turkish governments tried to assure Bulgaria and to this end signed in 1991 in Sofia and on 1992 in Edirne two documents on confidence building measures in the military field and concluded several agreements on military cooperation in the following years. The Treaty of Friendship, good-neighbourly relations, Cooperation and Security signed by Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitur Popov, the visit of the Turkish President of the Republic Turgut zal in 1993 in Bulgaria, the visit to Turkey of the Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev in 1994 and the return visit of the President of the Re- public Sleyman Demirel in the following year and many agreements signed during these visits contributed very much to building mutual confidence and gave impetus to the collaboration of the two countries. The socialists came to power at the beginning of 1995. Without formally rejecting the achievements of the last years they did nothing to further them. After two years standstill the visit of the newly elected Bulgarian President Peter Stoyanov to Turkey constituted a breakthrough in the relations of the two countries. In his speech to the Turkish National Assembly Bulgarian President asked forgiveness for what had been done to the Turkish minority in his country. This act of courage was much appreciated by the Turkish government. The Prime Ministers Ylmaz and Kostov met several time and decided to increase the cooperation between the two countries and expressed their determination to find solutions to some issues inherited from the past. Indeed the experts of two countries quickly agreed on the demarcation of the frontier adjacent to the Black Sea. The solution of this problem, which was unsuccessfully debated for a half of a century, brought a new atmosphere of goodwill to the relations. On the other hand the trade between the two countries and Turkish investments in Bulgaria increased considerably. Finally the two countries cooperated closely on the issues concerning the security and stability of the Balkans, Nowadays everybody agrees to qualify Turkish-Bulgarian relations as excellent. It is obvious that it is in the interest of the two countries to try to maintain their relations on this high level. However the future stumbling block of the relations could once again be the Turkish minority. Although all forms of official persecutions has ended, the discrimination still exists in practice and Turks, especially those of Kurdzali and very dissatisfied with their conditions, continue to immigrate to Turkey.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES The main book on the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and on the Turkish-Bulgarian relations up to 1985 is "The Turks of Bulgaria" (London 1988) by Bill N. imir. The newly published "The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (1878-1908)" (Ankara, 1998) by mer Turan is interesting but does not go beyond 1908. "Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria" (London, 1997) by Ali Eminov draws the attention by the information given on the Pomaks and Muslim Gypsies. "The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Cultural and Political Fate of a Minority" (Istanbul, 1990) edited by K.H. Karpat contains articles by well know historians. The Turkish Presence in Bulgaria (Ankara, 1985) contains the communications presented to a seminar having the same title. The persecutions the Turks suffered during the name changing pain is best described in "Bulgaria: imprisonment of Ethnic Turks - Human rights abuses during the forced assimilation of the ethnic Turkish Minority" (London 1986) by Amnesty international. On the history of Bulgaria Michael Kiel's "Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period" (Assign/Maastricht, 1985) gives a fair idea on the Ottoman period. R.J. Cramptons books A Short History of Bulgaria (Cambridge, 1987) and Bulgaria 1878-1918, A History (New York, 1983) are considered classics. For the Kings Ferdinand and his son Boris two books give inside information: "Foxy Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria (London 1979) by Stephen Constant and "Crown of Thorns - The Reign of King Boris of Bul-garia, 19181943" (London, 1987) by S. Groueff and J.d. Velkov. For the Communist period one can mention Bulgarian Communism - The Road to Power, 1934-1944 (Westport, 1971) by Nissan Oren and "Bulgaria Under Communist Rule" (New York, 1970) by F.G. Brown but also "Bulgaria-Politics, Economics and Society (London 1988) by Robert J. McIntyre. There is unfortunately no valuable biography of Todor Zhivkov. For the new period which begins in 1990, Albert P. Meloyes "Creating Parlimentary Government: The Transition to Democracy in Bulgaria" gives useful information on domestic policies of today Bulgaria.

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The Question of Cyprus and the Question of Taiwan (ROC): A Comparaison

Yksel Sylemez It is possible to observe certain similarities between the question of Cyprus and the question of Taiwan (ROC), as much as there are dissimilarities, as the two questions have different backgrounds, different characteristics, and different history. The first similarity is geographical. Cyprus is an island (of 9251 square kilometers), and so is Taiwan (ROC) (some 35,000 sq. km), The next geographical similarity is that both islands are in close proximity to the two respective mainlands; that is to say, the island of Cyprus is as close as 40 km to the nearest part in Turkey, and the island of Taiwan (ROC) is same 160 km distance to the nearest point in mainland China, Fujian Province. The geographical proximity has no doubt created some historic, political, military, and even cultural advantages and disadvantages in both cases, which may be a subject for another study. The two questions from the politico-historic point of view have some parallels: the island of Cyprus through the ages was colonized, invaded by, and subject to, various ethnic and political influences such as the Portuguese, Dutch, Chinese, and Japanese, for long periods of time, as was the case in Cyprus, where 'Venetian, Otto- man, British, and Greek influences have left their mark. At that point the general similarity gives way to dissimilarities, as the island of Cyprus is now divided into two parts, one Turkish (the north) and one Greek (the south), although there is no such division in question on the island of Taiwan (ROC). This may be a striking dissimilarity, but in case the division or the concept of partition is carried to its extreme, it may be possible to differentiate, also in the case of the partition of Mainland China, and the Chinese people between mainland China and Taiwan (ROC), and the existence of two separate and even opposing units thereon and consequently, a parallel also a division. In both cases, and in particular, from the political point of view, there is no doubt that firstly the de facto, and even in the de jure point of view, there exist two separate units, and that as a result of this there are striking political similarities between the two distant cases, such as: A) The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (KKTC) at one hand, and Taiwan (ROC) on the other, both claim to be independent, and in that major policy statement they share the same political base by coincidence.

Ambassador Retired, Co-Chairman of the Foreign Policy Institute

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B) The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (KKTC) and on the other hand, Taiwan (ROC), as a natural consequence of their claim of independence, further claim that they are sovereign states. This is a fundamental political similarity of approach. The civil war in Mainland China and the domestic strife in Cyprus are no doubt a similarity in its generality. It is true that on the part of Mainland and in Taiwan (ROC), there was not an ethnic problem, or consequent ethnic friction, and the question on the island of Cyprus when reduced to its basic elements is an ethnic matter, and there is no C) Thereupon as a natural and legal consequence of their sovereignty claim, KKTC, on the hand, and RCI on the other, vis--vis their opponents, such as the PRC and the Greek Cypriot Administration in the south of the island of Cyprus, both claim that they can negotiate only as the equal of their opponents, which is yet another important similarity between the two cases. D) Finally, it is obvious that the above mentioned claims and hardened situations create strong reaction on the part of their opponents, such as Taiwan (ROC) and the Greek Cypriot Administration in the south of Cyprus, and outright rejection on their parts of these positions force both cases into a political stalemate which may be described as yet another common characteristic. Consequently, both these questions present themselves as having extremely complex elements, and remain insoluble from one day to the next, which is yet another parallel. Another observation in their common outlook is the fact that both questions are sensitive and vulnerable to outside influences. In other words, the question of the ROC with the PRC, with the active participation of the USA, has assumed a triangular nature. Similarly, the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, as opposed to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Cyprus in the south, joined by Turkey and Greece, with the addition of the UK as a guarantor power, and the EU's interest in Cyprus for possible membership of the Greek Cypriot element of the island in the south and last but not least, with the interest of the USA in Cyprus, there is a quasi octagonal relationship, as opposed to triangular one. In other words, in both cases, there are foreign interests and influences bearing heavily upon that are over and above the directly interested parties themselves. In search of similarities, the domestic or civil strife element is yet another similarity. That is to say, the division between Taiwan (ROC) and Mainland China was based on ideological strife, and the division between the Turks and the Greeks of Cyprus was based on ethnic separation and religious difference- Greek Orthodox versus Islam, which may be counted among the dissimilarities. The civil war in Mainland China and the domestic strife in Cyprus no doubt constitute a similarity. It is true that on the part of Mainland and Taiwan (ROC), there was not an ethnic problem, per se and consequently ethnic friction, and the question on the island of Cyprus where reduced to its basic elements is an ethnic matter, and there is no cultural difference or opposition between mainland China and Taiwan (ROC), since one can reduce the problem of Cyprus to a clash of cultures, however superficial it may be. From the economic angle, it is possible to observe the huge volume of economic and commercial relations between Taiwan (ROC) and Mainland China, in spite of the underlying political tension in these relations, because of same culture and language, despite the fact

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that there is no direct transport or communication link between the two opposing parties. Between the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Administration in the south, there is similarly an in-direct, or covert, border trade, in spite of the fact that there is a blockade against the state of North Cyprus by their Greek Cypriot opponents. This may be added, in a way, also to the list of similarities. That is to say, in both cases, direct trade is forbidden, and legally speaking, non-existent, although Taiwan (ROC) trade volume in 1997 amounted to more than 26 billion US dollars. Also dissimilarities are not few. Between the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot Administration in the south, there are no physical contact and no tourism; there are no visits allowed, especially from the Greek side. In the case of Taiwan (ROC) over the years, more than 1 million Taiwanese have visited Mainland China, and mainland Chinese are not allowed on Taiwan (ROC). One more important element as a common characteristic may be added to the long list: there is a lack of political will for the solution of these two longstanding problems on the international agenda. Taiwan (ROC) and Mainland China, in unofficial or semi-official capacities, have sat around a negotiating table, although not negotiating, no less that 16 times within the last decade or so. In the same vein, between the Turkish Cypriots in the north and the Greeks in the south, since the beginning of the problem, after the independence of Cyprus in 1960 and the emergence of the inter- communal friction in 1973, both sides have sat down for talks under the aegis of the UN. But because of lack of political will, and the overriding problem of everpresent lack of confidence, and indeed an overriding crisis of confidence, no political solution was possible. To add some more similarity, there is also Taiwan (ROC)'s multi-party political system, free elections, free press, and democratic society, which is not enough to be considered as part of the international community for Taiwan (ROC). And the same can be said for the Turkish Cypriot State in the north, as both cases are such examples of international isolation As a result of a crisis of confidence, there is an unfortunate competition in armaments. Taiwan (ROC) considers its military buildup as its best means of defense and as a matter of vital importance. The same kind of situation exists on the island of Cyprus, both in the north and in the south. As a consequence, both cases are at all times ready to explode as a potential hotbed of international crisis points. It is this common characteristic which has also drawn the close interest of the international community and the vested interest of superpowers in both areas. One China, one Cyprus. The international community in both cases shares the view that there is one China and one Cyprus, although this is contravenes the actual situation in both cases. In Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot Administration claims that there is one unitary Cyprus state, which must remain unitary, in spite of the fact that they pay lip service to a federal formula, which is anathema to the Turkish Cypriots. Although Taiwan (ROC) finds it politically convenient to agree theoretically that there is one China, it asserts that the one China is a divided China. This is yet another similarity. One more similarity is Mainland China's claim on Taiwan (ROC) as a province,

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as Greece has had historic intentions to annex the island of Cyprus, which has long been described as enosis, which is anathema both to Turkish Cypriots and to Turkey. This was the reason for Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 following the Colonehs Coup, which pushed far the annexation of Cyprus to mainland Greece. Both questions are beyond doubt complex and difficult to solve, as the Gordian Knot proved a challenge for the sword of Alexander. There is a common characteristic of both questions, and that is each can negatively contribute, or constitute a threat at any time to, regional peace and security, The ROC - PRC question has a back- ground of some fifty years, and the question of Cyprus has again a running file on the international political agenda, also for about half a century. As was underlined in both cases, in spite of all the international pressures and diplomatic initiatives, there is a common atmosphere of stalemate, which is valid for both entities. The only hope, which is common on both cases, is that both the players in Taiwan (ROC) and in Cyprus eventually want a peaceful solution and not a solution by force. As a natural consequence of these two problems, there has been an overseas migration dimension and in the case of the Chinese, and among the 35 million overseas Chinese, some of whom come from mainland China, but also a good part of them are Taiwanese overseas Chinese. As much as the overseas Greeks, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have left the island of Aphrodite as mi- grants looking for a new life in foreign lands because of the pressures described herein is yet another common trait. There are similarities in the political solutions for both cases in the form of a federal or a confederate government model, both for China and for Cyprus. There is a school of thought among the political scholars and think tanks that a federal or confederate solution, with the pitfalls and obvious difficulties they would entail, may be a solution in both situations, starting from a modus vivendi concept to calm down the tensions, leaving the questions to gradually solve themselves in a more natural and progressive way, rather than by political force or diplomatic coercion. The question of Taiwan (ROC) and Taiwan (ROC)'s existence as a de facto state is little known in the international arena, as Taiwan (ROC)'s hopes and concerns are little appreciated by the international community. The same is true for the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. In other words, there is a significant degree of ignorance in both cases on the part of the international community, and consequently, very little sympathy, not to say understanding, of these problems. The PRC, from all overwhelming international point of view, is the only legal government of China, and its counterpart on the is- land of Cyprus is the Greek Cypriot state in the south, which is recognized as the government of Cyprus, according to the UN Security Council resolution dated 4 March 1964. With that resolution, Turkish Cypriots in the north were reduced to a lower status, and began to be referred to as the Turkish Cypriot community. The word community has a re1igious connotation within a political context. The PRC has no political control over Taiwan (ROC), and no administrative power over Taiwan (ROC) as such, although such a state of affairs concerning the "only" government of China, legally speaking, can best be described as surrealistic, and as a consequence of international realpolitik from the academic point of view. The same kind of surrealistic situation exists on the island of Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots have their own fully functional state in the north, with its democratic institutions, elections, parliament, 81

government, opposition parties, and free press, as yet unrecognized by any member of the international community except Turkey. This, no doubt the question of recognition, or nonrecognition, for that matter is another similarity. Taiwan (ROC) lost the seat of China at the UN General Assembly and the Security Council in 1972, and since then, has been actively involved in "pragmatic diplomacy" to secure diplomatic recognition, which is a policy bitterly opposed by the PRC. The ROC, with tremendous zeal and patience, is thoroughly committed to its international campaign for recognition. This pragmatic diplomacy for recognition, with its pluses and minuses, may not be described as a zero-sum game, yet it is continuously debated as to what Taiwan (ROC) has gained and what it has lost through the process. The answer is not simple, but all indications are that Taiwan (ROC) will continue to follow this line. In December 1998, some 26, small states mostly among the worlds least developed in the Pacific Africa, and Central America, officially recognize Taiwan (ROC). They are as follows: the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland, Burkino Faso, Gambia, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Grenada, St Christopher & Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Nicaragua, the Marshall Islands, and the Holy See (Vatican). Taiwan (ROC)-Nigeria diplomatic relations is yet another example of the diplomaticrecognition pendulum swinging back and forth since 199Z, which ended with Nigeria breaking off relations in 1996. 1998 was a bad year for Taiwan (ROC), when three African countries South Africa Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau broke off relations Tonga followed soon after. The Marshall Islands, which came into the fold at the end of I998, where a consolation prize. Most of these are small and relatively unimportant poor countries; to what extent they contribute to the international diplomatic image of Taiwan (ROC) is a valid question. The opposing view is that Taiwan (ROC) should concentrate all its efforts on the crucial element of US support, vis--vis the US congress and media. Pragmatic diplomacy no doubt creates tensions with the PRC, and the fight to win new diplomatic recognition continues unabated in the international arena. However, the Turkish State in Northern Cyprus for the last 15 years has not embarked upon a diplomatic recognition campaign so far, which may be quoted as a point of dissimilarity in the area of pragmatic action or diplomacy. To give a few examples of the degree of allegiance that some of these small and leastdeveloped states demonstrate toward Taiwan (ROC): in Africa, Central African Republic, since its independence in 1960, in as changed sides no fewer than 3 times, as a kind of pendulum between the PRC and ROC, depending on which side contributed financially more toward its own recognition. Guinea Sissau-ROC-PRC relations is another example which has an outstanding fle going back to 1990. Yet another example is Senegal. Independent since 1960, Senegal established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (ROC) that same year, only to end them in 1964, reinstitute them in 1969, and break them once more in 1971 establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC and then to reestablish. Taiwan (ROC) ties once again.

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Taiwan (ROC) -Republic of South Africa relations was cut in 1998, although the Kuomintang's relations with South Africa date back to the 1924s. Bilateral trade in 1995 was about $ 2 billion US dollars. There are 31 bilateral cooperation projects, and 270 Taiwanese companies have a total investment of $ 1.5 billion US DOLLARS worth of investments in South Africa. After the apartheid regime, President Mandela received support for the PRC, and South Africa broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan (ROC), which has been the heaviest blow suffered by Taiwan (ROC) in the diplomatic arena in recent years, the previous alliance having; been a maf or force in boosting Taiwan (ROC)'s international image. Taiwan (ROC)-Nigeria diplomatic relations is yet another example of the diplomatic recognition pendulum swinging back and forth since 1992, which ended with Nigeria breaking off relations in 1996. 1998 was a bad year for Taiwan (ROC), when three African countries South Africa; Central African Republic, and Guinea-Bissau broke off relations; Tonga followed soon after. The Marshall Islands, which came into the field after the end of 1998, were a consolation prize. Taiwan (ROC), in response to the establishment of diplomatic relations, provides technical cooperation, technical advice, and add to the list of poor and least-developed countries. In the government budget for 1999, such direct aid under technical cooperation amounts to about 183 million US DOLLARS, which may not be considered a big amount, yet the Taiwan (ROC) government is known to have the intention to triple this modest figure. The practical diplomacy of Taiwan (ROC) is described by the PRC as "unlimited checkbook diplomacy", which may not be unlimited, for all intents and purposes. Taiwan (ROC) lost some of its allies in the diplomatic arena as required sums were declared by Taiwan (ROC) to be too exorbitant to meet. In fact, remuneration in cash and kind, or in cooperation, is different than in other examples of international diplomacy, as "money talks". According to the Taiwan (ROC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs study, in 1997 alone, the PRC has extended economic support to South Africa in the neighborhood of $ 850 billion US dollars. It is reported that Taiwan (ROC)'s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an annual budget much below this amount. Moreover, it is also claimed that the PRC has committed itself to buying South African goods in the region of $ 420 million US dollars, and will extend $ 430 million US dollars in credit to South Africa. In other words, the means of international diplomacy are not much different from once source of influence to the next. In the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, there is no similarity in this respect; there is no "practical diplomacy" in action. Taiwan (ROC) is a member of APEC, the ADB, and the IOC, among a few other international entities, under the name of "Chinese Taipei". Taiwan (ROC) is an observer to the WTO and to numerous NGOs. The Turkish State in northern Cyprus is an observer to the Islamic Conference, and has no designs on UN membership, unlike Taiwan (ROC). In Taipei, Taiwan (ROC), there are 42 foreign representative offices; the most recent of which are those of Cambodia and Tibet. The representative office of this last is religious and cultural in nature, apart from a number of resident embassies of countries that officially recognize Taiwan (ROC). Cyprus falls under the West Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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ROC, which covers 28 countries, including Turkey. Greece, because of its membership in the EU, falls under the European Department. Due to geographical division, Turkish Cyprus in the North and Greek Cyprus in the south are treated together, which puts them in the same category. It must be noted that until nine years ago, Taiwan (ROC) had a representative office in southern Cyprus under the Greek Cypriot Administration, which was closed in 1990. The reason for this was said to be that there is no direct trade between the Greek Cypriot south and Taiwan (ROC). Bilateral relations between Taiwan (ROC) and Greece are not significant. In Taipei there is an honorary Greek representative in the Greek trade office run by a Taiwanese Chinese. This office is not visible among the others. Taiwan (ROC)-Greece trade volume in 1997 was somewhere around $ I8, 698,000 US dollars, as opposed to Turkey's official trade with Taiwan (ROC) being at $ 537 million US dollars, the same year. The official view of the West Asia Department of Taiwan (ROC)'s Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be paraphrased in this manner: The question of Cyprus and that of Taiwan (ROC) do not present any similarities. The question of Cyprus is born out of the conflict between two communities. With the Taiwan (ROC) question, there is one Chinese nation. Therefore, there is no similarity between the two questions." This view, in case it does not reflect the general concerns of Taiwan (ROC), is an indication of the overview or indeed the Birdseye view from a diplomatic angle of the Taiwan (ROC) diplomacy, and consequently explains why and how Taiwan (ROC) is uninterested in following the developments in the question of Cyprus. This may explain, perhaps, why there is no recollection of an article or a study to compare and contrast the question of Taiwan (ROC) and that of Cyprus, either encouraged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan (ROC), run by scholars, among others. Taiwan (ROC)'s pragmatic diplomacy targets small, underdeveloped, economically vulnerable, credit-hungry African, Central American, Caribbean, and Pacific Island states supported by "Checkbook Diplomacy". This method so far is not resorted by the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, would provide a similar kind of recognition to the TRNS. One would possibly assume a diplomatic counter-attack by the Greek Cypriot Administration in the south and by Greece itself, and the creation of competition for diplomatic recognition which would encourage potential diplomatic partners to raise their stakes higher and higher in each case-not to mention the possible negative influence of the former colonialists or great powers such as the UK, France, and the USA in such a situation.

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CONFERENCE PAPERS

Regional Cooperation in South East Europe: Prospects and Limitations

Ali Hikmet Alp

1. Europe nowadays reached almost a point of saturation in terms of regional cooperation initiatives, organisations institutions, in principle; this is a good sign, since it reflects a change in approach and mentality in our part of the Continent after so many years of division and isolation. Regional cooperation is a must for several reasons: a- A prerequisite for integration with Euro-Atlantic structures: Integration requires more or less even level of development and cooperation. No organisation would like to have new members, unable to cooperate with their neighbours or having problems with them. Such problems have a potential of becoming problems for the whole community, b- At present, most of the security risks are at a regional or indigenous character. Regional cooperation will certainly help to eliminate them, or at least will prepare the ground for fair and mutually acceptable solutions. c- In the region of SEE, several of the problems are common: democratisation, administrative reforms, economic development and reconstruction, ethnic issues, protection of national minorities, organised crime, etc. d- Interdependence for major transportation-communication arteries and energy supplies as well as economic relations are matters of common interest. e- Security-stability: Containment of intra-regional tensions and risks as well as defence cooperation will be easier in a cooperative environment.

2. However, despite net mutual benefits and advantages and growing awareness of the need for better regional cooperation there are still obstacles from within and from outside: a- Traditional lack of trust, which have real or imaginary roots and in particular exploitation of the issues for internal political consumption are not rare phenomena in the region. Populist policies are still capable to exploit dormant extremist nationalisms. Regional

Presented at the Conference of IRIS at Varana, Bulgaria, on 24-26 September 1999 Retired Ambassador of Turkey

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countries, including my own, need to redefine nationalism. "The image of the other" is distorted; it needs to be changed by concerted effort. b- In most of the countries membership in EU and NATO being a national policy priority, regional cooperation does not receive the attention which it deserves, Some circles go as far as arguing that a developed intra-regional cooperation will be perceived by a reluctant, EU or NATO as alternative to their countries' membership. I would dare to say also that, while both EU and NATO use the membership prospects as leverages for regional stability, they can do more to promote regional integration, or "horizontal cooperation". c- Public opinions are (sometimes understandably) divided on their perceptions of the regional tensions and conflicts. Traditional allegiances (ethnicity, religion, cultural affinities) are still influential enough to force the governments to be cautious and reluctant even when international cooperation and actions are in question. This is not simply a matter of "policy options" for governments, but an element which can negatively affect, even create compatibility problems for integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. d- Major power centers (political and economic) are outside of the region. Governments and political parties think, justifiably, that economic, financial and other assistance will not come from within the region. There are no strong enough regional centers to serve as engines for integration, while the habit of looking towards the Western Europe for problem solving continues. At least in non-economic matters, a conscious effort is necessary to change it. Regional countries should assume more collective or coordinated responsibility on issues of security and stability. More elements can be added to the list, which may look as negative, even pessimistic. But I believe that the picture should rather be qualified as realistic.

3. Let us briefly review the elements or trends which may well inject optimism: a- First of all, we cannot ignore the fundamental change which occurred since late 1980's: maybe with the exception of a well-known crisis area, ideological, political, economic and military barriers have been eliminated. All the countries aspire for a Western style democratic system of government and market economy. Most regional countries have substantial human resources. T'he region is not "under-developed" in the classical sense of the term, but in a process of transformation, reformation and statebuilding. b- Although in many areas problems remain (and petty nationalistic selfpromotion and isolation survives) the atmosphere, as well as the actual level of cooperation is much different than even a few years ago. Some of the problems have been solved or are on the way for resolution. At least, with well-known exceptions, there is a political will supported by majority and issues are increasingly taken up by a constructive dialogue, with less emotional approaches. c- Balkan cooperation did not start from the scratch: it had a continuity, even a tradition, despite divisions of the cold war period and before. In political, security and military areas it could not have the prospects which it has today. But in areas such as cultural exchanges, youth, sports, trade etc. a serious effort was made. Ironically, we are

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less good in the second category. One should also note that 1930's were good years of the Balkan Cooperation despite limitations of scope and serious political differences. Some scholars tend to minimize this process. But, if they compare it to what was happening in Europe at the same period, they may have second thoughts. Balkans are in search of a different place and role in the international arena which, in many respects, have drastically changed. Countries themselves have the primary responsibility to develop this role, which cannot be possible without of common, at least convergent perceptions on problems of security, stability and development. The World cannot go on to solve problems for them. d- The negative "image of the other" too is changing. Thanks to the opening of borders (among themselves but not to the same degree with Europe) citizens travel, meet with each other freely. I remember the days when, as a Turkish diplomat, I was not allowed to stray from the main road while transiting by car through Bulgaria. We do not have such absurdities anymore. e- There is an improvement, in some cases a marked improvement the way respective national minorities are perceived and treated. I may cite the Turkish-Bulgarian example: I believe it is now better understood that the intention of Turkey is not to encourage secessionism in Bulgaria and we Turks have seen the benefits of a policy principle that "national minorities, while being free from oppression, should be good citizens of their country". Strict observance of international norms and conventions and democratisation will help immensely. e- We should also duly take note of a very important development: The character of economic relations are changing. The trade volume as well as investments from on to another are on the rise. There is more complementarily between the economies. (Example: Turkey came to fifth position last year among the trading partners of Romania). Such developments indicate a very important change in traditional patterns. With more reforms, with the elimination of the artificial political and bureaucratic obstacles to intra-regional economic relations, potentials will be better exploited. Let us have a look at the actual state of the regional cooperation: a- With few exceptions bilateral relations and cooperation are on an upward trend; high level contacts and consultations are frequent and solidarity at regional level slowly emerges. This is so even among the military establishments, well known for their conservatism. b- On multilateral level, despite good intentions, progress is slower: to be frank it is not at par with developments in bilateral cooperation. In areas where joint actions are needed (which are extensively elaborated in Ministerial Declarations) the actual implementation is low, although much can be done. This slow progress can be explained by the "negative factors" which I have mentioned, the most important one among them, being the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Conflicts in the region did not help the development of intraregional cooperation, but the basis have been established. However the record is improving: The SEE Cooperation Process continues to develop despite (we hope) temporary FRY absence. As in the Case of joint humanitarian initiatives during Kosova crisis, the establishment of the Multinational Force and an effort

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to harmonize positions for the Stability Pact, progress in the preparation of a Charter, there are concrete actions. 4. To these factors, I should add the impact (negative) of the state of relations between Greece and Turkey: although they have made a deliberate and quite successful effort to keep their own bilateral relations out of the SEEC process, this obviously is not enough. In order to give a push to the realisation of common objectives one needs more than a simple "setting-aside" procedure. The present state of affairs encourages in my opinion new formats of multilateral cooperation outside of the SEECP, as "trilateral or "quadrilateral" cooperation arrangements. More or less the same subjects are treated, but one version with Turkish participation and the other with Greek one, the other partners being practically the same. I hope that this divisive, even slightly immature practice will end. 5. On the top of all we have to take into account Balkan individualism or pride, which sometimes provokes harmful competition. This might be one of the reasons why in the SEECP, among the projects, initiatives and proposals vary few have been materialized. We also hear views which consider the regional cooperation useful to the extent it serves their objective of membership in the EU and NATO. Such views are not compatible with the founding principles of these organisations and they can well obstruct integration. NATO, for example has to use membership criteria different from those which had been used during the cold-war period. Support for integration from "insiders" exists, but it is not unconditional: principles of equality and mutual benefits should be strictly observed. 6. Reintegration of the FRY in the Balkan cooperation is necessary. At present, positions of the international community, ongoing stabilisation processes and the regime of this regional country do not allow its participation in multilateral efforts. It is obvious that, Kosovo crisis in particular will have long-term effects on a future security structure and on Serbia in particular, accentuating compatibility problems. These are at the same time additional reasons for a more developed cooperation and gradual inclusion of FRY. The SEEC process does not need criteria as strict as of the EU and NATO, but its development should not be prevented by the absence of a natural member. 7. In summary, there is, in my opinion, imperative necessity for and great potential in regional cooperation, despite the obstacles and inhibitions. It is supported at political levels and by democratic forces. Development of a culture of consultations, dialogue and cooperation will thus be encouraged. Even a regular coming together of the leaders for consultations is by itself an achievement. Still, more should be done, in particular in the following areas: - To focus systematically on specific areas where cooperation is most needed and can be result oriented, - At all levels wended more openness, less rhetoric and more courage in taking up difficult issues; we cannot solve all the problems, (the situation in the former Yugoslavia is an example) but we can play an important role in containing them, preparing the ground for solutions and can offer our own, as appropriate, harmonised or collective contribution. - Systematic encourement of the grass root participation, NGOs parliamentarians, local administrations, associations, youth, cultural and educational institutions, etc. is a must.

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This needs special attention and support by the governments. A more developed, independently organised civil or civic society will provide a counter- balance against the excesses of political extremism or outdated nationalism.

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The Relations between the Council of Europe and Turkey in the 50th Anniversary of the Council

Metin rnekol

The Council of Europe, which was founded 50 years ago by 12 European countries, desiring not to line once again the bitter experiences of the World War II, continues to function effectively with a different mission and composition than the one for which it was established. Up to May 1989, the Council of Europe had only 23 members. But after the breakdown of the Berlin Wall, which symbolized the Cold War, Central and Eastern European countries were gradually integrated into its structure. Today the Council of Europe is an international organization covering the largest area in Europe with 41 member states. The Council of Europe has played, during its 50 years of activity, an important role in spreading respect to democracy and human rights in all over Europe. While protection and strengthening of human rights and supremacy of law constitute the principal aims of the organization, they also endeavor to find solutions to problems related to intolerance, xenophobia, social exclusion, environment and social security. As one of the oldest members of the Council of Europe, Turkey has taken an active part in all activities of the organization for the past 50 years. She has become a party to most of the 173 treaties elaborated by the Council, aiming at creating a common legal system and principles and norms applicable all over Europe. Our country also endeavors at the revision and renovation of some of the important conventions, which no longer respond to the conditions of our day as a result of the long period of time, elapsed after their coming into force. As part of this effort, we give priority to the revision of the existing conventions of the Council of Europe in order to make more effective the international cooperation in fighting terrorism; since terror constitutes the biggest threat to human rights which the Council of Europe advocates and violates, foremost of all, the basic human right, which is the right to life. Fighting against terrorism within the rule of law and defending the basic human rights are fundamental obligations of every democratic country. However, at the present time, terrorism has shifted its dimensions and has acquired an international character. In the fight against such terrorism, we argue that a more effective cooperation is essential within the mechanisms of the Council of Europe and this necessitates the redrafting of the existing treaties in the field of fight against terrorism, elaborated within the framework of the Council of Europe, taking into consideration the prevailing conditions of our day. Our efforts have recently begun to give favorable results. All aspects of the question were discussed at the Conference entitled "European Democracies Facing up to Terrorism organized in Strasbourg, in October 1998, as a result of our initiatives in the Parliamentary

Text of a speech at the Ankara University in October 1999

Ambassador of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Director of Multilateral Political Affairs

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Assembly. The Conference laid special emphasis on strengthening the Council of Europe mechanisms in conformity with our proposals. The results of this Conference were discussed at the September 1999 Session of the Parliamentary Assembly and a recommendation was adopted on the basis of a report, which reflected the conclusions of the above-mentioned Conference. In the resolution that was adopted the terrorist action has been defined in conformity with our views. The resolution recommends to the Committee of Ministers revise the Convention on the Fight against Terrorism (1977) and the Extradition Convention (1957) with a view to respond to the present requirements and to prevent protection of terrorism on political grounds. We will persistently follow up these favourable developments in order to obtain concrete results and we believe that, as a result, some member countries of the Council of Europe will terminate their wrong policies and some organs of the Council will end their treatment of the issue on the basis of double standards. We are convinced that the establishment of an effective mechanism of cooperation in fighting against terrorism will, thus, enhance respectability of the Council of Europe. Another field of study of the Council, which our country is especially interested in and provides support for, is the fight against intolerance and racism. For this purpose, Turkey has worked hard for the constitution of the "European Commission against Racism and Intolerance", briefly known as ECRI, within the framework of the Council. The Commission examines deficiencies in the field of racism and intolerance in member countries and submits reports. Turkey has supported the studies of the ECRI and has endeavored to strengthen this Commission. However, accomplishments of the ECRI depend on its objectiveness and functioning in conformity with its terms of reference. The adoption of a working method that gives greater credit to the claims and views of some extremist circles will take the ECRI to nowhere than a marginal club in the fight against racism and intolerance that have significant relevance to today's Europe. European Convention on Human Rights has probably been the most important convention put into force by the Council of Europe since its inception. The Convention was opened for the signature of member countries in 1950 and came into force in 1953. Its aim has been to guarantee the basic human rights and freedoms in member countries. Our country has given great importance on the application of the provisions of this Convention devoid of political considerations and double standards. The provisions of the Convention should be applied without any discrimination to the member states of the Council of Europe, none of which is perfect in the field of human rights. The organs of the Council of Europe should be able not to disregard the fact that human rights cannot be uniformly applied and that a balance should be established between human rights and the security requirements of societies. As we enter into a new century, the struggles made in the history for today's political geography of Europe should not be forgotten. The authorized organs of the Council should seriously perceive that an approach, which allows free declaration of divisive political views even under the dress of pacific method, would constitute a concrete threat for the present political geography and to the very existence of human rights. The Council of Europe can, only through such a perception, reach its aim of an establishing a union formed by close ties among its members, as stated in the preamble of its statute. The Council of Europe is in the process of redefining its position and function within the reconstruction of Europe on the brink of the third millennium. As a founder member of the Council of Europe, Turkey attaches great importance to take her right place in the new architecture of Europe and supports its expansion and the enhancement of its activities. The priority of our country is to develop our relations on a 91

ground based on mutual assistance and understanding devoid of subjective criticisms.

Romanian -Turkish Cooperation

Emil Constantinescu Today I have the honor to address the members and the guests of the Foreign Policy Institute. This establishment is one of the prestigious centers for research and analysis of Turkey's relations with the other states in the dynamic and complex environment of the world I am particularly privileged to have this opportunity on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Institute this year. For the next century I wish you even more substantive contributions in the shaping of the relations which Turkey, as a stable and prosperous country, will further develop with its allies. Talking today about the Romanian-Turkish relations is both an easy and a difficult task. It is easy because there is no element of contention, no area in our bilateral relations, which we should elude diplomatically. On the contrary, there are meaningful, outstanding ties and the biannual institutionalized political dialogue, including my current visit, is so far unique for the relations of Romania with other countries. On the other hand, it is difficult because of the complexity of our relations in the political, diplomatic, economic, cultural fields, which cannot be summarized without unavoidably oversimplifying them. It is the reason for allowing me to select only few elements, which I consider to be essential for our bilateral relations, without pretending of exhausting the subject. It is also a clarification that I deem necessary to make in front of an accurately minded audience. In the past few years, Romania and Turkey have developed an active political partnership, whose effectiveness is driven by several obvious facts. Both countries have similar geopolitical features. Turkey has a strategically pivotal role in the area encompassing the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East and Mediterranean space. Similarly, Romania straddles South Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, Ukraine and Central Europe. All these regions are in need of stability and cooperation pillars. Turkey and Romania have proved to be such pillars in the past few years. Secondly, Romania and Turkey have passed the threshold of implementing the officially established relations through an exemplary political and diplomatic cooperation, promising dynamics for economic relations and overall effective cooperation, which could represent a model for the countries in the region.

Text of the Lecture given by Mr. Emil Constantinescu, the President of Romania, at the Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara on July 6, 1999

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Turkey has permanently and unconditionally supported Romanias candidature for NATO membership, including the unequivocal statement of President Demirel on the occasion of the Washington Summit. Romania is upholding the necessity of Turkey's membership in the European Union. At the upcoming OSCE Summit in Istanbul, we know that Turkey will support Romania's candidature for the chairmanship of this important organization for the year 2001. We can also talk about remarkable cooperation at the regional level. We are active partners in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, where Turkey has played a key role for its establishment and consolidation. We fully cooperate within the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process, whose chairmanship-in-office is held by Romania this year, the Multinational Peacekeeping Force of South-Eastern Europe, SECI or the Naval Cooperation Group in the Black Sea. A Trilateral scheme of dialogue and engagement was established by including Bulgaria, in order to give a fresh impetus to the regional cooperation, with concrete results in major fields of interest such as telecommunications, fight against terrorism and organized crime. The Kosovo crisis has called for new ways and means of cooperation between our countries. Throughout the crisis Romania behaved as a true member of NATO, defending with the same fervor the same values, not only through statements but mostly by deeds. We followed thoroughly and with concern the development of the crisis and I had steadfast consultations with President Demirel. Last March, from Bucharest, together with His Excellency and the President of Bulgaria we jointly made an appeal to Slobodan Milosevic for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, through reopening the dialogue and the cessation of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In the new regional environment our countries can contribute significantly to bring about an action package for the most suitable implementation of the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe. We both have a deep knowledge of the region and we both know that sustainable economic development entails longstanding peace and stability. We believe that the time of war has passed and alongside the military agreements and KFOR deployment, a substantive and realistic investment program should be carried on. We have a genuine and, probably, a unique chance to remove permanently, through durable means, the spectrum of Europe divided by concrete walls and painful gaps of development. Now, ten years after the cold war ended, we have the opportunity to erase its most dangerous consequences. Both our countries have to speak loudly during this stabilization and development process. Effort in the crisis hit areas and in the more accelerated development of South East Romania is preparing to use its potential for the participation in the reconstruction Europe. We know that Turkey has the same goal and this will open a new window of opportunity for strengthening the bilateral cooperation within the regional and international fore.

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I cannot talk about the current relations between Romania and Turkey without a short evaluation of the prospect of our economic cooperation. The Turkish investments in Romania have already gone beyond the first stage when the small business was the dominant component. The success of many investments has turned into a real "critical mass" and has managed to open new avenues of cooperation in major areas. Currently, about 5600 joint Romanian-Turkish companies are operating in Romania, with about 200 million dollars investment capital. There is a strategy for the development or our economic cooperation, which gives priority to financing, energy and infrastructure. The conclusion of bilateral agreements, such as the ones avoiding double taxation, mutual protection of investments and, particularly, the Free Trade Agreement, have made a valuable contribution to the enhancement of the economic relations. The dynamism of Turkish investments is, first of all, the result of very good knowledge of the situation in my country. It is for this reason that your businessmen have invested with understanding and courage from the very beginning in an economic environment which many others would have considered under the influence of risk factors. Turkish companies like Bayndr or Bayraktar made strong investments in the financial structures in Romania as the Turkish-Romanian Bank and Robank. Turkish groups invested in Romania significantly in tourism, energy and construction infrastructures and they have similar programs of development in the transportation system. In turn, Romanian companies are interested in the economic projects in Turkey, especially in energy and infrastructure. We intend to join our efforts for projects on third countries markets and in sectorial alliances between companies of both countries, following the pattern established by Romgaz and Bota in the natural gas sector. An important step towards this goal is the establishment of the Istanbul Office of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania. Last year, we agreed that the strategic economic goal of our relations would be to increase the bilateral trade to one billion dollars. In order to reach this goal, we have to expand the contacts between our businessmen, we have to use all the facilities provided by the already established legal framework, in particular the Free Trade Agreement. We have to speed up the dialogue between the Chambers of Commerce and the businessmen committees as well as other nongovernmental bodies. This is in fact a major part of my visit. A large Romanian businessmen delegation is accompanying me and tomorrow in Istanbul, I will meet several Turkish investors. In this economic area, Turkey could be also a source of experience for Romania. In the past fifteen years Turkey has adopted an ambitious policy of liberalization and the privatization process represents a priority of the Turkish Government. These are also the objectives of the Romanian Government, notwithstanding different economic conditions, but on the basis of the same principles and values. This pragmatic overview of our bilateral relations was, is, and will be complemented by an exemplary cultural cooperation. Cultural exchanges imply the deepening of mutual knowledge of the most sensitive and specific features. Modern theories emphasize that

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economic and political relations can not become substantial, unless they are not founded on tangible cultural cooperation, which would ensure the preservation of identity and common experience. While I am speaking on this subject, I cannot help recalling the last year excellent exhibition in Istanbul dedicated to the Romanian masters of modern painting and remembering the restoration by the Romanian Government of significant historical monuments which the Turkish community erected in Romania, particularly in the Dobrogea region. Ladies and Gentlemen, Where there is no dispute between two countries, there is neither any stumbling block for the development of longstanding and mutually rewarding relations. This is the main conclusion, which an experienced observer can draw while examining the course of developments between Romania and Turkey. I am confident that we can further develop our cooperation on the same basis of friendship, confidence and mutual respect and in the years to come we can prove it. I thank you for your attention and I wish you, once again, the best of success in your future endeavours.

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