PIR-30022 07007060 EU actorness in relation to Belarus Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Trade

Aims This research aims to find, show, and explain the extent of European Unions actorness towards Belarus. To successfully achieve this, understanding of actorness in International Relations has to be reached. Which will help to establish criteria for judging European Union as an actor to Belarus, in fields of Trade and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Criteria will be used to evaluate EUs ongoing programmes in CFSP, and importance of trade between EU and Belarus. The findings will determine EUs effectiveness and potential as a global actor in relation to Belarus.

Concept of actorness in International Relations

The European Union as a Global Actor book by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler state that in conventional International Relations actor is recognised as having statehood. The book also makes comparison to actors in theatre, if theatre represent International arena, then actors are the states, and any interaction between actors/states is international relations. However the realist perception of international relations, as that between states, is outdated, or in current environment doesnt explain the whole picture, because significant interaction occurs between non-statehood actors and states. EU is not a state, however its relationship with Belarus exist, and is of importance for a state which is quite isolationist. Thus it should mean that EU is an actor for Belarus, however to be considered an actor, it should display autonomy from signatory states, which would allow to create ones own purpose. As the same book provides definition of minimal behavioural actor as entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions, and thus engaging in some form of purposive action(Bretherton,C.,Vogler,J.,2006,p.17). Also the concept of autonomy has been accorded central importance, in International Relations approach to actorness by other writers such as Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970: 12, Hopkins and Mansbach 1973: 36, and Merle 1987: 296. Gunnar Sjostedt defines actorness as capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relations

PIR-30022 07007060 to other actors in the international system (Sjostedt, 1977: 16) Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler approach EU as actor under construction (Bretherton,C.,Vogler,J.,2006,p.24), its presence, opportunity and capabilities shape its actorness in International Relations. EUs actorness will vary from state to state, depending on opportunities that exist in external environment. Presence that EU radiates to external environment, such as its values, and use of soft power, and capabilities that EU posses to act during any particular time.

Criteria

EUs potential as an actor towards Belarus in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will be judged on extent of cooperation between the two actors, number of different programmes initiated by EU will be analysed. EUs foreign and security objectives and ambitions towards Belarus will be looked at, and if they are deemed to exist, then EUs success of actorness in CFSP towards Belarus will be assessed in terms of how close it comes to achieving these objectives. EUs success at transmitting its values, such as democratic governance, rule of law, and sustainable development will be used to assess its success of actorness. Belarus cooperation with programmes such as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), or Eastern Partnership (EaP), will be used as example cases by which EUs success as an actor could be judged.

In the field of Trade EUs actorness criteria will be judged on the size of trade between the two actors. The significance of EUs market for Belarus exports will show how important EU is for Belarus, and if decisions made in Brussels effect Belarus, the extent of effects will determine strength of EUs actorness. This way European Union can significantly influence Belarus, and make it susceptible to its policy, and open to imposition of European values. Which would make EU an incredibly huge actor to Belarus, and its actorness strength would be at utmost.

Overall C.Brethertons and J.Voglers concept of actor under construction will be used to establish criteria for actorness. EUs potential opportunity in Belarus will be assessed, its

PIR-30022 07007060 presence there and capabilities to act, will provide assessment of EUs potential as an actor. Gunnar Sjostedt criteria for actorness will be given consideration, EUs relationship with Belarus will be analysed to see if EU deals with Belarus in deliberate, and active manner. Autonomy from EUs member states will be an important characteristic to look out for, to determine if EU is an actor in International Relations, and if it shows potential actorness in its dealings with Belarus. This will be best displayed by formulation of purposive action, which will be shown by having policy plans towards Belarus, and concrete steps, and actions taken towards enactment of the policy. Thus EU will be judged as an actor if it has its own policy, which it follows, and the strength of its actorness will depend on the fulfilment of that policy.

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

EUs Country Strategy Paper on Belarus 2007-2013, states that long-term goal of EU is for Belarus to become a democratic, stable, reliable, and increasingly prosperous partner with which the enlarged EU will share not only common borders but also a common agenda driven by shared values (Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, Belarus) Thus EUs actorness success towards Belarus could be judged on these mentioned objectives. EU is often described as normative power, which means that EU demands standardisation of norms of state behaviour that it deals with. Some of these norms are as stated in EU long-term goals, democratic, governed by the rule of law.

During the early years of Belarus independence relationship with European Union was stable, positive, and that of mutual development. However the relationship started running into difficulties then autocratic leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka got elected as president. From 1994, European Union has been criticising Presidents Lukashenkas regime, due to violations of constitution and abuses of human rights. In 1996, EU froze its negotiations with Belarus on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and suspended other technical assistance, due to lack of democracy. Democracy is the main EU normative conditionality, by suspending PCA it aimed to penalise Belarus. PCA is mostly economic assistance, and tool for democratisation. Because Belarus is dictatorial, not fully free-market state is beneficial for them not to implement

PIR-30022 07007060 the agreement, as a way to preserve regimes status-quo. Otherwise more open liberal society, would devolve Lukaschenhas statist hold on power.

In 1997 European Council decided to restrict all political contacts below ministerial level. Because of this most current policy links and interaction between EU and Belarus is at lower political levels. This would show that EU actorness was reduced, because of decrease in contact between the two actors. During 2000 opposition leaders Yuri Zakharenko, Viktor Gonchar, and Anatoly Krasovsky went missing, and were likely to be murdered. In February 2004, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) released report, which linked the disappearances to Byelorussias regime. In response to the report, EU Commission banned those mentioned from travelling to EU countries. But already as of 19 November 2002, eight Belarusian high-ranking politicians, including Lukashenka had visa bans. If the main leader of the regime is banned from travelling into the economic region that is one of the richest, and most influential in International Relations. When EU must definitely be an actor to the regime, because it manages to impose its will, in its own capacity by forbidding travel.

However after release of three other political prisoners in 2008, EU gave encouragement to Belarus, by engaging more actively at senior and technical levels. EU removed travel bans for temporary period of six months. Also reduced number of conditions as requirement to improve relationship between EU-Belarus. These conditions included an end to the detention of political prisoners, improving the electoral standards, conditions of independent newspapers and the law of mass media; improving the working conditions of NGOs; and freedom of political groups. (Marples,D., 2009, p.770) This shows EU actorness that have acted autonomously, providing incentives to Belarus for meeting conditions, and behaving to somewhat similar EU value standard.

However this has been criticised for ignoring legitimate political opposition of Belarus, and for solely concentrating on the unautocratic regime in Minsk. Trade-off being too small concessions from Belarus, in exchange for EUs engagement.

PIR-30022 07007060 European Union could be described as having a twin-track approach towards Belarus. Relationship with the regime is kept to strict conditional demands for democratic reforms, while attempts to win the heart and minds of Belarusian people, is the other track. (Bosse,G., 2009, p.217) Because of this twin-track approach towards Belarus by EU, its difficult to build a clear, strong strategy for democratisation. Hard-power is being used to influence regime by imposing conditions for financial incentives. While soft-power is used as EU presence in active engagement with local population and civil societies, by spreading European values in media campaigns, through cultural, educational exchanges. However EU soft-powers fall short in such aspects as visas, after accession of CEE countries for Belarusians to travel into EU, which is most of their neighbours, cost 60. When GDP per capita is 3,704 (Eurostat, 2010), visa cost is very high in proportion to average income, which does not only restrict exchange of people, income to EU from tourism, but also stifles the uptake of European normative values.

European Commissions assistance to Belarus has been designed from the decisions made by GAERC (General Affairs & External Relations Council). In 1997 European Council strictly limited assistance only to humanitarian and regional projects that benefited democracy, while in November 2005 Council concluded to support the needs of the population and democratisation notably by humanitarian, regional and cross-border cooperation and by projects supporting directly and indirectly democratisation and democratic forces in Belarus. (Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, Belarus, p.14) This assistance is aimed to engage with broadest and largest mass of Belarusian population. Such as Decentralised Cooperation program promotes relationships between Belarus civic society and local government, to foster social, cultural rights, alleviation of poverty, and tolerance for minorities. In 2004-2005 over 1.9 million been provided towards furthering and achievement of EUs normative objectives. (Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, Belarus, p.14)

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is perceived as an attempt to offer countries such as Belarus assistance in sustainable development of state institutions, and in general a catch up on EU member states. Programme provides financial support for Belarus civil society and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), to increase democratic awareness among population, in ess

PIR-30022 07007060 2005-06 ENP contributed 10m. (Bosse,G., 2009, p.221) European Neighbourhood Policy builds relationships with EUs neighbours, by nurturing stability and prosperity in the region surrounding EU, which Belarus is a member. It has si similar framework to the one used for Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) that have accessed EU in 2004, however EU membership is not included in the policy. For Belarus to be able to participate in ENP, it has to pass certain democratic reforms that EU demands. EU framework for CEEC worked in similar effect to carrot and stick approach. Carrot as CEE countries were offered rewards for complying with EU demanded conditions, and stick for punishment that would be imposed for not complying with conditions, or falling back on European values, with the ultimate golden carrot of EU membership. However the rewards for Belarus would be reduction in visa and border crossing requirements, support for Belarus free-market enterprises, increased educational institution interaction, and student exchange. ENP aims of being a value diffuser has failed, because PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) has to be signed for states full participation in ENP, which Belarus has not, and is left to isolation. None of the EU documents intend to use a word failure, but EU has been unsuccessful in exporting its values to Belarus. And thus ENP programme has little impact on Belarus, because it has little to offer in terms of value.

Nation Tacis (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programme was very important and major programme that has helped to re-orient ex-Soviet Union states to free market, and democracy from early years of 1991 independence. Under Tacis between 1991 and 2004, a total of 221m, have been contributed to Belarus. This programme streamed funds to important projects, such as EIDHR.

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) provides 5m to Belarus, Which has contributed 2m towards TV/radio programme which raises democratic awareness, and provides freedom of speech for political opposition in Belarus. There are some short falls to this, because project partners are outside Belarus, radio-station is in Poland, and European Humanities University is in Vilnius, Lithuania.

PIR-30022 07007060 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) from 2007 replaced Tacis framework for financing democracy programmes. Financial assistance focuses on support for democratic institutional, legal and administrative reform. ENPI initiates programmes called Democracy and Human Rights and Non-state Actors and Local Authorities development, financial aid is provided for Chernobyl catastrophe effected areas. ENPI was designed particularly to strengthen autonomy and democracy of Belarus institutions, and to alleviate pollution of Chernobyl disaster, which heavily effected environment and health of east-southern Belarus population.

European Unions programme of Eastern Partnership (EaP), which was created by Czech republics presidency of EU, promises increased level of legal, institutional and administrative cooperation for Belarus. (Eastern Partnership Proposal 2008, Commission of the European Communities 2008b) This represents another tool for EUs actorness towards Belarus, because it aims to transmit its normative objectives. However how successful its actorness, depends on Belaruss take up of EaP. Which is also conditional, and tied up to democratisation, and respect for human rights.

Belarus participates in EUs Cros-border Cooperation (CBC) programmes: Latvia-LithuaniaBelarus, Poland-Belarus-Ukraine, and the Baltic Sea Programmes. It has itself hosted some of the meetings of project selection committees. EU regards Belarus especially constructive in areas of cross-border cooperation (CBC). Belarus engages in Soderkopin Process, their experts attend training events in issues of asylum, migration, and border management. Meetings are held by migration and border officials of senior and working commission level. However most of the CBC EU-Belarus interaction takes place at semi-official networks on issues of mutual interest, those of realist, security threats, such as energy, border control. Instead of sharing mutual values thu integration of political interaction. But programmes like this also demonstrate EUs actorness towards Belarus, because the two actors do interact, and they interact in EU purpose designed programme, of border management. However as mentioned before its European Unions realist objective of security, and does not contribute much to the aim objective of creating democratic society.

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It can be argued that European Union is concerned with realist, security threats emanating from Belarus. Such as cross-border crime, human trafficking, illegal migration, and especially the security of gas supplies coming from Russia to EU member states. Energy security has been a major motivator for European Commission to negotiate with Lukashenkas regime. Rather then completely ignoring the high-ranking officials of the regime. EUs approach towards Belarus has been divided between idealist values, and realist concerns for security threats, and state stability. From this it could be concluded that EU holds member states objectives above its own values. However from this EU actorness shouldnt be diminished, because once Russia cuts its supplies to Belarus, EU was very quick to react to make sure its supply contracts were fulfilled. EU has the right to protect its member states, and it did exactly that. It can be pointed out that due to EU pressure Russias gas cuts to Belarus were resolved sooner. Thus concluded that EU actorness is considerable in the region, and state of Belarus.

Belarus autocratic leaders Lukashenkas regime receives heavy economic and political support from Russia. Putin has said $6 billion revenues from energy deals is our support for Belarus economy, if we recall that Belarus budget in 2007 was $14bln. in total, when our subsidies equal to about 41% of that figure (Korosteleva, E., 2009, p.238). Because of strong Russian presence in Belarus, EUs presence and capabilities for democratic reform has been diminished, and mostly ineffective. Most of the current Byelorussian elite depend on Lukashenka support, and are unwilling to move against regimes status-quo, towards reforms. EUs influence will be ineffective till Belarusian relations with Russia change. Their relationship change was beginning to be noticed from 2008 financial crisis, when Russia started increasing gas prices to reflect world market. Which in the end resulted in gas cuts due to accrued debts. Domestic conditions are hugely important for influence towards Belarus. But because Belarus neighbours these two major actors, it can play each other off, and never has to be only dependent on EU. Thus EU influence and actorness has been minimal in this respect.

Using C.Brethertons and J.Voglers concept of actor under construction, we can see that EU opportunity exist there in Belarus. To democratise, and shape a state of 10m. people to

PIR-30022 07007060 normative European values, of providing prosperity, and stability in the region. EUs presence of soft-values exist in fostering its values in civil society, which demands greater rule of law, and respect for democratic elections. During the most recent Presidential elections in December 2010, EU flag was chosen by Belarus political opposition to represent demands for freedom, and regime change. EU also has substantial capabilities to act, it provides funds for number of different programmes, and conditions for the regime to positively move the relationship along.

Trade

From 2001 till 2008 Belarus economy has experienced growth, with 10% GDP growth levels reached in 2006, 2008.(DG TRADE, 2010) However with onslaught of financial crisis, Belarus has experienced economic difficulty. Its trade regime with European Union is still covered by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was signed in 1989 by USSR. Reasons for non-renewal, or progress in trade regimes, are due to Belarus lack of state modernisation and improved human rights record. ed

Belarus in 2009 was EUs 52nd import partner with 2,551,800, 37th export partner with 4,987,500, overall ranking 43rd trade partner, with overall volume at 7,539,200. While EU for Belarus was 2nd import partner with 4,927,300, making up 25,0% of imports from 27 EU member states, while being 1st export partner with 5,342,300 making up 38,9% all goods exported were to the EU, overall EU was ranked as 2nd major partner for Belarus with total of 10,262,500 worth of goods traded. (Eurostat, 2010) This shows how important EU is for Belarus, apart from Russia, EU is the most important trade partner. Thus EU should be able to influence Belarus just through its trade policy. However impositions of heavy import duties, would hurt Belarus populations, especially the poor and young. Which could counteract because EU is attempting to gain the support of Belarussian people. Also Belarus in response could raise import duties, which would hurt EU businesses exporting to Belarus. Thus EU actorness in trade policy area to influence Belarus is constrained.

Since 2004 accession of new members states from central-eastern Europe, Belarus has been

PIR-30022 07007060 further negatively effected by rises in import duties. Previously it was able to negotiate bilaterally with Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland for access to their markets, now it has to deal with 27 member state economic union. However this increase in size of EU market, provides EU with higher sway in Belarus economy. Especially because countries like Lithuania and Polands are Belarus neighbours and main trading partners.

The larger the proportion of European Community trade with Belarus, it increases Belarus elites susceptibility to changes in EU trade policy. Because decisions made in Brussels would be increasingly effecting interests in Belarus. And demands for reform would work better if elites would be willing to comply with EU conditions, and positive relations with EU would benefit them. This way with increasing trade, EU influence can be increased in achieving it normative objectives. A point in relationship has to be reached then non-compliance with EU conditions is not in Belarus interest, similar to structure of CEEC accession or ENP framework based on it.

In January 2003, EU Commission withdrew General System of Preferece (GSP) from Belarus, due to abuses in trade union law of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), of which Belarus is a member. GSP is a tool used by EU to provide post Soviet Union states with preferential trade treatment. Because Belarus violated trade union rules, that it has itself signed up for, EU penalised Belarus by withdrawing it from the treaty. This is an example of EU actornerss, were for not following normative conditionality, EU acted autonomously, in its own capacity to punish Belarus with the tools available.

Interim Agreement and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that effect EU-Belarus trade and financial assistance, has not been agreed between the two states. Because Belarus fails to meet human rights normative that European Union requires. This is perfect example of EU actorness in the field of trade, where EU acted autonomously, in its own capacity.

European Union from 1993 has been imposing highly restrictive quotas on Belarus textiles exports, the quota has been left unchanged from 1993, till 2009. In January, 2009 EU lifted its quotas on Belarus. High quotas on textiles, was another area where EU showed its actorness

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PIR-30022 07007060 and ability to influence. In 2009, 62,9 million worth of textiles were imported into EU, from nto Belarus, making it 2,5% of total textile imports, into EU. .(DG TRADE, 2010) The lifting of textile quotas were in connection to healthier EU-Belarus relations, especially the Belarus move in 2008, by releasing three political opposition prisoners. In this situation Belarus was behaving to EU conditionality, and receiving awards for expected behaviour. EU acted autonomously, taking advantage of available opportunity Belarus willingness to reform. Used its capabilities of trade regime to succumb Belarus to its presence normative value adoption. However this warming up in relations only lasted briefly. During 2010 December presidential elections, 7 out of 9 members of political opposition were arrested, as well as protest from political opposition was violently put down by police, as well as special forces. EU is still to provide a response to what is seen as obvious infringement of EU conditionality, and human rights rules. EU concluding response will be released 5 PM on 12 of January, 2011. After special joint meeting on situation on Belarus, from Foreign Affairs Committee, the sub-committee on Human Rights, the European Parliament Euronest delegation and the EP delegation to Belarus together with EP president Jerzy Buzek.

The statistics clearly indicate that European Union is a substantial actor for Belarus. Policies made in Brussels regarding trade, effect Belarus business, and consequently its economy. In 2009 Belarus imports made up 0,2%, while exports 0.5% of the overall trade for EU (Eurostat, 2010). Thus for EU, trade with Belarus has little importance, it would hardly be effected by any changes to its trade with Belarus. But Belarus has a lot to lose, and gain from changes to trade agreement with EU. However by following twin-track approach EU is stuck, because its not engaging with current regime to move the relationship along, or neither isolating regime enough to force changes.

Conclusion

From the discussion we can conclude that European Union is an actor towards Belarus, because it has presence and opportunity in both fields of CFSP and Trade. This has been illustrated by the way EUs penalised Belarus on number of occasions, such as withdrawing

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PIR-30022 07007060 GSP, or imposing a travel ban for leader Lukashenka. It might be perceived as minor effects on Belarus, however they still had an affect, and thus EU is an actor. But how successful its actorness has bee, as stated in the introductory part of the discussion depends on achievement of its objectives. EUs normative goals for Belarus was a democratic, human rights respective, stable region, and prosperous states, which recent elections confirm that its not. EU has achieved success in very minor fields, such as release of political prisoners, spread of its presence, and values among the mass population. But overall Lukashenkas dictatorial regime is as strong as ever, it seemed to have survives the financial crisis, and public relation damage after protest from contested elections in 2010.

Belarus regime is value opposite to European Union, Lukashenka depends on the current status-quo of the regime to keep him and his allies in power. Because democratic elections would diminish their power, thus EU expectations of major reforms are high expectations from Belarus. If expectations were to succeed, Unions normative objectives would be achieved. In this case EU would be an enormous actor towards Belarus, because it would be transforming a whole state, into its own norms. This can only be achieved if elites would be in position to benefit from EU integration. A point in relation between the states has to be reached, when noncompliance incurs negative consequences, and its against their interest.

Because EU values are opposite to Belarus regime, it leans closer towards Russia for support. However during disagreements with Russia, European Union becomes the other side. Which is the time of opportunity to use its capabilities to increase EUs presence in Belarus. Belarus has two main actors that have strong influence, and presence upon its foreign policy.

Effectiveness and potential of the EU as a global actor depends on closeness of the state to European Unions economic territory. However even though Belarus is European Unions neighbour, its normative values havent had affect, because regimes reason for existing is to oppose democratic values, for its legitimacy to exist. Still EU is an important actor to the country, it displays actorness in both fields looked at, CFSP, and trade. It just havent been able to enact coup detat to replace current regime, with more democratic one, which seems to be

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PIR-30022 07007060 the only realistic way of reforming, and modernising Belarus state. Alyaksandr Lukashenka is in his 50s, same generation as Vladimir Putin, both men were made in Soviet macho man environment, and opposition to their alpha masculinity is a threat, hence European Union normative values are alien to Lukashenkas regime. Belarus Leaders governance can be more compared to Russias, which resembles autocratic democracy.

Belarus might prove to be another example of velvet revolution. Then without much expectation from the West, and outsiders, just like in 1989, Lukashenkas regimes might fall. Fall might occur just as quickly, and peacefully, as communist regimes did in central-eastern Europe. Or it might last till Alyaksandr Lukashenka death, and afterwards, well, he has three sons.

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