Direct Referentialism about Proper Names - Central Theses

Vidit Desai January 10, 2011

Commonly Held Theses, Part I

T1 (Anti-descriptivism) The meaning of a proper name is not descriptive. T1a The meaning of a proper name is not identical with some set of descriptions. T1b The meaning of a proper name is not determined by some set of descriptions. T1c The meaning of a proper name does not include some set of descriptions. T1d The meaning of a proper name is not associated with some set of descriptions. T2 (Anti-Sense/Anti-MOD) The meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its referent - the object or individual it names. (The meaning of a proper name is not more than its referent - the object or individual it names.) [A proper name contributes its referent or bearer to the semantic content expressed by a sentence containing it and contributes nothing else.] T2a The meaning of a proper name is not identical with a sense or mode of presentation.

T2b The meaning of a proper name is not determined (or mediated) by a sense or mode of presentation. T2c The meaning of a proper name does not include a sense or mode of presentation. T2d The meaning of a proper name is not associated with a sense or mode of presentation. (T3 ) Incompleteness T3a If a proper name lacks a referent, bearer, or does not name an individual, then it does not contribute to the meaning of sentences containing it (If a proper name lacks a referent or bearer, then it makes no semantic contribution to the meaning of sentences containing it.) T3b If a proper name makes no semantic contribution to the meaning of sentences containing it, then sentences containing it are incomplete or not well-dened with respect to their truth-value. T3c If a proper name makes no semantic contribution to the meaning of sentences containing it, then sentences containing it are incomplete or not well-dened with respect to their meaning (propositional or semantic content). T4 (Actualist & objectual semantic constraint) The referent of a proper name must be an actual, existing individual.

Problems

According to Adams, Stecker, and Fuller (1992), Devitt (1989) identies four central problematic cases for direct reference theories for proper names. First, there is the problem of identity or coreference - explaining why certain identity statements are trivial while others are meaningful. Second, there is the problem of opacity - accounting for the inability to substitute coreferential names salva veritate in intensional contexts. Third, there is the problem for accounting for the meaning of true existentials - explaining why true existentials and true negative existentials arent redundant or meaningless. Fourth, there is the problem of empty names - explaining how empty names can be and are used meaningfully.

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Commonly Held Theses, Part II Coreference revisited: Rigid Designation & Necessity of Identity

T5 (Rigid Designation) A proper name refers to the same actual individual in all possible worlds. (If Refaw (t) = t, then w Refw (t) = t) T6a (Possibility of Coreference) Two distinct names, t1 and t2 , can refer to the same object ( t1 = t2 ). (Where Fido refer to Fido, we can represent this as Ref (Fido) = Fido. Hence, 3

Ref (t1 ) = Ref (t2 .) T6b (Possibility of No Coreference) Two distinct names, t1 and t2 can refer to two distinct objects. T7 If two distinct names, t1 and t2 refer to the same object, t1 and t2 refer to the same object in all possible worlds. (by T5 and T6a ) T8 If P (a proposition) is true in all possible worlds, P is necessarily true. C1 : Problems of meaning (i.e. Frege puzzles) need not be resolved referentially (e.g. indexicals). C2 : In cases of empty names, allow for degenerate semantic contribution of semantic character in place of semantic content or semantic character to gure as semantic content (in which cases, intuitions/dispositions concerning truth and meaning are operative). In cases of dierences in cognitive value in the absence of a dierence in semantic content, account for dierence in cognitive value as a dierence in semantic character. Motivations for accepting C1 & C2 : 1. Maintain T1ad & T2ad (Also try to oer an account of Frege puzzles without appealing to a rejection of T1ad or T2ad . 2. Allow for meaningful and truth-evaluable statements containing empty names (reject T3 or T4 ). 3. Provide a unied semantic account of names for: 4

 statements involving cross/trans world comparison standard assertoric statements (containing nonempty names) statements containing empty names

that accounts for ordinary speaker intuitions. (Reject T4 or T5 ) 4. Dont reject T4 or T5 . So, reject/reinterpret T3 or T4 and reinterpret T5 . Problems with necessity of identity (1) John Perry is Santa Claus (2) John Perry is Pegasus Necessary falsity of identity - Interpretation 1 These statements express necessary falsehoods. However, if T4 is true, its unclear how to evaluate either statement. On the one hand, both statements might be taken to be necessarily false for the same reason - there is no possible world in which there is a referent of both John Perry and Santa Claus (likewise, there is no possible world in which there is a referent of John Perry and Pegasus). Necessary falsity of identity - Interpretation 2 Alternately, there are no worlds in which there is a referent of both John Perry and Santa Claus in which the referent of John Perry is identical to the referent of Santa Claus (likewise, there are no worlds in which there is a referent of both John Perry and Pegasus in which the referent of John Perry is identical to the referent of Pegasus). 5

While the second interpretation allows for a distinction between the reasons for the necessary falsity of the two statements (the worlds in which there is a referent of both John Perry and Santa Claus are non-identical to the worlds in which there is a referent of both John Perry and Pegasus), the rst interpretation does not allow for such a distinction (since, on the rst interpretation, the reasons for the necessity of falsity of the two statements is the same - there are no such worlds in which there is a referent of both names). While a rejection of T4 is compatible with the second interpretation, the rst interpretation seems natural, given the following views (specically, that empty names are rigid nondesignators):

4.1

Necessity of Identity

from T7 and T8 , since t1 and t2 refer to the same object in all possible worlds, then necessarily t1 and t2 refer to the same object. ( Ref (t1 ) = Ref (t2 )) (If t1 = t2 , then t1 = t 2 )

That is, according to rigid designation, if two names corefer (a contingent relation), they necessarily corefer in all possible worlds (a necessary relation). But how can a contingent linguistic fact ground a metaphysical relation? Consider the very plausible, common sense possibility (T6b ): Ref (t1 ) = Ref (t2 ) Therefore, these Kripkean theses cannot be consistently held without either rejecting 6

some (versions) of T1 - T4 or T5 - T8 . Salmon quoting Kripke: I hold the metaphysical view that, granted that there is no Sherlok Holmes, one cannot say of any possible person, that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed. Several distinct possible people, and even actual ones such as Darwin or Jack the Ripper, might have performed the exploits of Holmes, but there is non of whom we can say that he would have been Holmes had he performed those exploits. For if so, which one? (Salmon 1998, 292) Metaphysical view, not a thesis about the semantics of names. However, Kripkes views on metaphysics and the semantics of names intentionally overlap. So, Salmon rightly comments that On Kripkes view, the name Sherlock Holmes is a rigid nondesignator, designating nothingnot even a merely possile thingwith respect to every possible world (Salmon 1998, 292). Salmon also includes the following remark from Kaplan: The myth [of Pegasus] is possible in the sense that there is a possible world in which it is truthfully told. Furthermore, there are such worlds in which the language, with the exception of the proper names in question, is semantically and syntactically identical with our own. Let us call such possible worlds of myth, M worlds. In each M world, the name Pegasus will have originated in a dubbing of a winged hose. The Friend of Fiction, who would not have anyone believe the myth ..., but yet talks of Pegasus, pretends to be in an M world and speaks its language. .... It has been thought that proper names like Pegasus and Hamlet were like Aristo7

tle and Newman-1, except that the individuals denoted by the former were more remote. But regarded as names of our languageintroduce by successful or unsuccessful dubbings, or just made upthe latter denote and the former do not. (Ibid.) Here, Kaplans remarks concern the denotation or reference of our language, which is answerable to the facts of our world. However, Kaplan also freely makes use of the same names (or homophones) (for example, Pegasus) to 1) hold xed the properties and predicates commonly (thought) attributed to the names referent and 2) to talk about possible worlds wherein such referents are denoted. Although Kaplan accounts for ctional or mythical (or perhaps metactional or metamythical) discourse in terms of pretense, are we also to take Kaplan to be engaging in pretense (about pretense)? (Since there seems to be no world in which the myth of Pegasus is told as true, since Pegasus is a rigid nondesignator.) If so, the implicit reasoning here requires acceptance of the following claim. Any relevant causal dierences in possible worlds results in a distinct referential framework (hence a distinct name). This follows from a strict adherence to T4 and T5 , meaning we cannot even plausibly speak of nonactual states of aairs (as Kripkes oddly Quinean remarks indicate). For, not only can we only refer to individuals dubbed in the language of our actual world (with its actual history), but our account of all counterfactual/nonactual states of aairs (worlds) will be as lacking in reference as are account of ctional or mythical states of aairs. Surely this is an extreme consequence and, I claim, unacceptable. 8

Not only does this view struggle to make sense of statements such as John Perry is thinner than Santa Claus, but it also makes a mystery of how cross modal statements 1) can be evaluated and 2) meaningfully uttered with natural ease by competent speakers and 3) are not carefully or routinely distinguished from how standard assertoric statements containing only nonempty proper names are used, understood, and truth-evaluated. Even if one invokes the notion of a semantic category, whereby utterances containing empty names are categorically dierent from standard assertoric utterances containing only nonempty proper names, the a posteriori knowledge of the nonexistence of the referent of a proper name does not alter the truth-values or meaningful use of statements containing empty names unless the statements are existentials or depend (for their truth) on the truth of such existentials. The natural response to an unnatural semantic adherence to T4 is to recover reference (hence meaning) through allowing meaning relations (perhaps not, strictly speaking, reference, but we can surely coin a dierent term or adopt a dierent use of the term) to nonactual objects. Of course, admitting meaningful talk about nonactual objects commits one to specic metaphysical theses concerning these objects no more than admitting a coherent interpretation of substitutional quantication commits one to metaphysical quietism
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In particular, see Kripke (1976, especially pages 379-382), where in a critical response to Wallace and

Tharp, he concludes, Let us review the situation which produced the papers of Wallace and Tharp. Underlying these papers there is an ever-present fear that it will be shown, using substitutional quantication,

However, instead of rejecting T4 , we can allow for a revised T3a . We can distinguish between two readings of T3a . T3a (strong reading) If a proper name lacks a referent, bearer, or does not name an individual, then it does not contribute to the meaning of sentences containing it (If a proper name lacks a referent or bearer, then it makes no semantic contribution to the meaning of sentences containing it.) T3a (weak reading) If a proper name lacks a referent, bearer, or does not name an individual, then it does not properly contribute to the meaning of sentences containing it. (If a proper name lacks a referent or bearer, then it makes no proper semantic contribution to the meaning of sentences containing it.) Then, we can introduce the notion of degenerate semantic contribution (Everett 2000)
that nothing exists or at least that English assertions never commit us ontologically to anything but expressions. The argument comes from an application of criteria for ontological commitment. Wallace and Tharp surely take themselves to be defending plain common sense against such assertions, and surely they are right to wish to do so. Unfortunately, they think the rescue must come in a drastic waysubstitutional quantication must be proved unintelligible at all costs, lest it serve to show that our ontology collapses. A delicate application of Tarskis restrictions ... comes to the rescue and shows that the substitutional quantier must be interpreted using a hidden concept of denotation. We can thank Tarski, and the intricacies of Convention T, for being able to claim that our discourse is committed to the existence of ships and molecules, of buildings and lemons, after all (413). And later, Why did anyone think that the existence of substitutional quantication created the danger of ontological collapse? (414).

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to resolve problems with empty names, coreference and identity, and existence. Namely, we can allow that: supplement1 to T3a If a statement containing a proper name is meaningless - either incomplete/gappy (statements containing empty names), trivial (identity statements and problems of coreference), or redundant (true existentials and negative existentials) - due to a strong reading of T3a and T4 , then the proper name must be taken to oer a degenerate semantic contribution of its semantic character as (in the place of) semantic content. supplement2 The semantic character of a proper name N is the causal chain of reference connecting tokenings of N to the bearer of N. supplement3a When the semantic character of a proper name N makes a degenerate semantic contribution, it semantically contributes the causal prole of N. supplement3b When the semantic character of a proper name N makes a degenerate semantic contribution, it semantically contributes the causally relevant properties that would need to be true of the bearer of N in order to support the causal chain of reference connecting tokenings of N to the bearer of N. - (ne-grained case of truth conditions) In the case of nonempty names, the causally relevant properties are determined by the actual referent and its actual history. - (coarse-grained case of truth conditions) In the case of empty names, the causally relevant properties are determined/delimited by the works of art, cultural artifacts, folklore, traditions, or institutions responsible for (allegedly) oering support to the causal chain of reference connecting tokenings of N to the bearer of N. 11

e.g. JP is SC - If there are no worlds containing both the referent of John Perry and the properties supporting the causal chain connecting uses of Santa Claus, then the statement John Perry is Santa Claus is necessarily false. Languages used in worlds where it is not known that Hesperus and Phosphorus corefer: in such worlds, statements like Hesperus is Phosphorus are not necessarily true. Since the statement would be trivially true, the statement expresses degenerate semantic content. Namely, in addition to the referents, Hesperus and Phosphorus, the semantic content it expresses also includes the properties that would need to be true of Hesperus in order to support the causal chain of reference connecting tokenings of Hesperus to Hesperus and the properties that would need to be true of Phosphorus in order to support the causal chain of reference connecting tokenings of Phosphorus to Phosphorus. Since, prior to the knowledge of their coreference, the causal chains are distinguished by being supported by distinct relevant causal properties The information that one name or term was once used exclusively to refer to a star visible during a certain temporal interval, tH i - tH i+n while the other name or term was used exclusively to refer to a star visible during a certain temporal interval, tP i - tP i+n where {tH i , ... , tH i+n } = {tP i , ... , tP i+n }, is a feature of how each name became established and used independently. Further, this information helps distinguish between causal chains that would support each chain in worlds in which it is known that the two names refer to the same object and in worlds in which it is not known that the two names 12

refer to the same object. Obviously, not all distinctions in this condition will result in dierent causal proles. The dierence must make a dierence semantically. A good test is to consider counterfactual situations. For example, the temporal intervals picked out in the naming and initial use of Hesperus and Phosphorus coincide with counterfactually distinct situations involving the humanly observable environmental lighting conditions on Earth and humanly observable heavenly bodies from Earths surface. Once it is known that these two names corefer, the causal chains that would need to be true in order to support the use of each name are dierent, since the causal chains coincide or converge. In such cases, historically obsolete distinctions in causal chains are irrelevant to contemporary use (such as the dierences in use that owed to the relevant distinction in temporal intervals mentioned above). At the level of character, there should be two distinct types of identity possibly speciable for the referent. Semantic character or linguistic meaning is understood as a function from contexts to contents, but also as a linguistic rule. Rules specify allowable syntactic criteria. These criteria restrict domains (a singular term cannot serve as a predicate without modication). So ... Frege puzle? Avoid strictures imposed by strong reading of T4 without abandoning T4 (? compatibility with possible worlds semantics, modal realism without abandoning commitment to 13

causal chain account of reference) (even if we reject T4 , we still need to supplement with an account of a semantic mechanism (intensions as contents, contexts or operators distinguishing contexts or rules of semantic contributions of terms)) Give a positive account of the role of causal chain (response to q2) in questions of meaning (q2 + Frege puzzles) - semantic character and its role in being sensitive to properties of referent (corresponding to truth conditions of descriptions of referent in uses of referents name) without incorporating descriptive content to x reference relation to referent (i.e. determination relation is reversed) and resolve Freges puzzles on his own terms (semantic, rather than usual semantic v. pragmatic distinction) Accept T5 without relying on questionable premises concerning (cross world) identity (metaphysical question of haecceities) Given these commitments, there seem to be no plausible candidates for meeting Soames condition for the meaning of a proper name (understood as semantic content): However, semantic character ... how content is uniformly specied across (modal) contexts - only plausible candidate for uniform/consistent contribution (ti , ti+1 , ... tn , Rn ) t1 R1 represents a 1-place relation (a property) 14

t1 t2 R2 represents two terms/objects standing in a 2-place relation t1 t2 ...tn Rn represents n objects standing in an n-place relation t1 is believed to be the morning star belief-dependent predicate Introduce by using examples to explain form (ti = , a = , ...) e.g. 3-place: LA is physically less distant from NY than Paris (1) a=a

aRb (a, b, R) (2) a=b

aRa (a, Rn ); where n = 1, Rn represents a 1-place relation (a property) (3) a =s

(where =s represents the relation/property of self-identity) The Mutability Reduction Test (MRT): If two statements, s1n , s2n , both of the form ti , ti+1 , ...tn , Rn cannot both be transti , ti+1 , ...tn1 , Rn1

formed into analogous statements, s1n1 , s2n1 , both of the form

while preserving: i) their truth conditions or ii) the worlds at which they are true, the form of each statement encodes distinct semantic properties (or, at least, is non-identical). When a=a is meaningful, its form is a=b a dierence in linguistic meaning a = a , which in the case

must be attributed to each tokening of the expression a in

of singular terms represented by a and b just is the [intended] dierence between a and b 15

(since these symbols codesignate). The only ways to eectively represent this dierence are either to use distinct terms or to associate distinct causal proles with each tokening (in which case, each tokening is eectively of a distinct term). If a=a is contrasted with a=b , a=a has no meaningful use in ordinary

language (it cannot be used to impart valuable information) C1 : a=a is not trivial and a priori

For meaningless platitudes like It is what it is, After all, he is Michael Jordan, He is he, we can interpret these based on a violation of Gricean maxim and account for meaningful imparted information via Gricean implicatures. C2 : Freges puzzle, properly understood, concerns why there are statements that assert an identity relation between two tokenings of the same term (and/or whether such statements are meaningful or even meaningfully used). C3 : Freges puzzle, posed for theories of direct reference for proper names, directly threatens T5 , rather than T1 - T4 . The thesis of Rigid Designation (a name refers to the same individual in all relevant worlds) also relies on a notion of identity of referent. It is necessarily true that Hesperus is Phosphorus. However, it is not necessarily true that Hesperus and Phosphorus are coreferential. (this type of necessary truths entails a linguistic truth, but does not entail a necessary linguistic truth) (Salmon 1998, 292). 16