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Demystifying Class of One and the application of the 14th Amendment

In a recent case involving police officials issuing bogus parking tickets to a Chicago man the 14th Amendment was invoked, refused by the district court, but accepted by a three-judge panel of the 7th Circuit Appeals Court. The decision is interesting in that a clear distinction is seen between the application of the 14th amendment by the district court and the appeals court, and the ultimate ratification of the rare one man class in the instant case to prevent and penalize discrimination.

In short, the facts of the case is that Plaintiff Mark Geinosky received twenty-four bogus parking tickets from the police department and filed a federal case under the 14th Amendment. The district court applied strict interpretation of the 14th Amendment and held that the plaintiffs classof-one equal protection claims failed to meet the set benchmarks as established by McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1009 (7th Cir. 2004), and held that Geinoskys case did not have merit as he could not identify a similarly situated individual who was treated differently. However, the appeals court overturned the dismissal and held: In selective investigation or prosecution cases such as McDonald, a meaningful application of the similarly situated requirement serves to distinguish between constitutional claims for discrimination and ordinary tort claims, and the plaintiff must eventually offer evidence of a similarly situated person. Id. But as we explain below, in a straightforward official harassment case like the allegations here, forcing the plaintiff to name a person not so severely harassed serves no such purpose (and in any event certainly is not necessary in the complaint itself). Commenting further on the application of the 14th

amendment and the powers of the police, the appeals court stated that, To state a so-called class-of-one equal protection claim, Geinosky must allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601 No. 11-1448 (2008), citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). We have held that class-of-one claims can be brought based on allegations of the irrational or malicious application of law enforcement powers. E.g., Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that Engquist exemption for public employment decisions does not extend to law enforcement decisions). Although the police are necessarily afforded wide discretion in performing their duties, that discretion does not extend to discriminating against or harassing people. The facts found by the appellate court concluded that all of Geinoskys parking tickets concerned the same Toyota car and were issued over a fourteen-month period beginning October 2007. The tickets arrived in main in batches of three and four, and were written by officers of Unit 253 of Chicago Police Department. Many of the tickets were inconsistent with each other having been issued simultaneously and showing the

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Toyota was in two places at the same time. Thirteen of the tickets were issued on various dates by the same officer. Surprisingly most of the violations showed the timing to be exactly 10.00 am, as if the first duty of the officer after walking into the department was to

punctually issue tickets to the defendant, and then start on the days work. The case is Mark Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 11-1448 (7th Cir. 2012).

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