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ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS

GALLEGO vs. VERA Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI of Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioners election to the office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of Dec. 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed as a school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog, Leyte, but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in Sept. 1940. Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in the election for assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940, He obtained and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for 1.5 yrs. The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time he was elected mayor there on the grounds that: 1. He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon 2. He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen 3. He obtained a residence cert from the municipality of Malaybalay ISSUE/S: Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. HELD: Yes. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as an employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate there for 1940. The decision of the CA is reversed. RATIO: In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: 1. Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality 2. An intention to remain there 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: 1. When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937 2. His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election 3. He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him 4. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government 5. He visited his family no less than three times despite the great distance between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to: exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. And the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality. Pamil vs. Teleron Facts: The novel question in this case concerns the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."

Issue: Is the prohibition imposed on ecclesiastics from holding appointive or elective municipal offices a religious test?

Held: No. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for certiorari must be granted. It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It suffices to answer that no question was raised as to its validity. Faypon vs. Quirino The ground for the quo warranto petition is the respondent's ineligibility for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur to which he was proclaimed elected by the provincial board of canvassers in the elections held on 13 November 1951. It is alleged that he lacks the residence in the province, as required in section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code. There is no question then that he was born in the municipality of Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, in June, 1895; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to the United States for the same purpose; returned to the
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, Iloilo and later on again in Manila. There is also no question that the respondent was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur with 49,017 votes cast for him as against 19,466 votes cast for the petitioner. The crucial and pivotal fact upon which the petitioner relies to have judgment of the respondent as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947. In several cases we have ruled that mere absence from one's residence or origin domicile to pursue studies engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It is contended, however, that the respondent's registration as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws on the subject, implies and means that he was a resident thereof during the six months immediately preceding such registration and of the Philippines for one year; 1 and that such being the case he was ineligible for the office to which he was elected, because No person shall be eligible to a provincial office unless at the time of the election he is qualified voter of the province, has been a bona fide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election and is not less than thirty years of age. A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. Counsel for the petitioner argues that in addition to other qualifications residence for at least one year in the municipality were the municipal officer is elected, as provided for in section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code, is sufficient; whereas the residence requirement for a provincial officer such as that of the provincial governor must be a bona fide residence in the province for at least one prior to his election, and concludes that the rule laid down in the cases cited and invoked is not applicable to and does not and cannot benefit the respondent. We fail to see the difference between the requirement of not less than one year bona fide residence for provincial officers. If any inference is to be drawn from the words "bona fide," it is that in the case of a municipal office in addition to other qualifications an actual residence in the municipality for at least one year of a candidate for municipal office would be sufficient to make him eligible for such office; whereas in the case of a provincial office in addition to other qualifications a residence in good faith in the province for not less than one year of a candidate for provincial office, although he may not actually be present therein, would be enough to make him eligible for such office. But this would be a hair-splitting differentiation. The residence requirement for elective provincial and municipal officials is the same; and the rule that a previous registration as voter of a municipal mayor-elect in a municipality other than the one in which he is elected is no ground for disqualifying him because of alleged loss or abandonment of his residence of origin in the municipality where he is elected, applies with equal force to elective provincial officials. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989] Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "naturalborn" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996] JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. [G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996] RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents. On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon: Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060 Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440 RaulR.Lee 53,304 Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925 On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor. On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon NO! 2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO! Held: 1.) It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands." 2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons: First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, just that, a second placer." "The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected. ========================================================== CONCLUSION OF THE COURT In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: "x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)." The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed. In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice. Torayno v. COMELEC G.R. NO. 137329 FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS- QUALIFICATIONS AND ELECTIONS CASE DIGESTS BY KC CANADA LLB- II USC LAW

mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor. HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997. TEODULO M. COQUILLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MR. NEIL ALVAREZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. 151914, JULY 31, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. In 1965, he joined the US Navy and was naturalized as a US Citizen. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came back to the Philippines and took a residence certificate. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the special committee on naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and on November 10, 2000, he took oath as citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Oras, Eastern Samar, in addition, on February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident thereof for 2 years. On March 5, 2001, Mr. Alvarez filed for the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation by stating thereat that the latter has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years, when in truth and in fact he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The Comelec was unable to render judgment on the case before the election. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and proclaimed mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar. On July 19, 2001, the Comelec (2nd Div) ordered the cancellation of the petitioners certificate of candidacy. Comelec en banc affirmed the order, thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to Domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines. Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a US citizen. Wherefore, the petition is without merit and DISMISSED. Teves vs. Comelec FACTS: Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
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possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic. The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude. HELD: Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law. Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
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from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law. Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to: xxxx (2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit. The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest. However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case. Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest. The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude. Grego vs Comelec Facts: In 1981, SC found Humberto Basco, then Deputy Sheriff of the City Court of Manila, guilty of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. SC ordered Basco dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or loca government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, or GOCCs ("Tordesillas ruling"). Subsequently, Basco ran for and won as Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988 local elections. He sought reelection in the 1992 election and won again. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (another candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basco ran for the third time as councilor. William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, suspension of his proclamation, and declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. T Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila. In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him.
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Issue 1: WON Section 40 (b)1 of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992. Petitioner: Although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect because the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, the provision must have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code Held: NO. While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. 2 That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense are noy deterrents to applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward Issue 2: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office. Petitioner: According to Frivaldo v. COMELEC, a candidates disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot. Held: ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT. Petitioner's argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. Petitioners' allegations that (1) Basco circumvented the Tordesillas ruling and that (2) the term "any position" therein is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration are unmeritorious. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. The term used was "reinstatement." Under the former Civil Service Decree (PD 807), the law applicable at the time Basco was administratively dismissed, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Thus, what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position. Issue 3: Is Basco's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC void ab initio?

SEC. 40, LGC. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; xxx

2 Aguinaldo v COMELEC, reiterated in Reyes v COMELEC and Salalima v COMELEC.


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Petitioner: Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of Republic Act No. 7166 3, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 66464, as well as the rulings in Duremdes v. COMELEC, Benito v. COMELECand Aguam v. COMELEC. Held: NO. RA 7166 Section 20(i) does not apply considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate. On the other hand, RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention that the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable, These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case. Issue 4: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate Held: NO. Basco was a duly qualified candidate. Petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural. Marquez vs. COMELEC Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code [Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.] was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition.

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Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166: The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has

ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. Section 6 of RA 6646: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for

any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

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Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation: de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a. The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice. Rodriguez v. COMELEC Facts: In the May 1995 elections for governor, Marquez questioned Rodriguezs candidacy via a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based on the allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" for leaving the US where a charge against him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was pending. Marquez claims that Rodriguez should be disqualified or held ineligible under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code. COMELEC then promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case filed by Marquez in 1992 elections) and SPA No. 95-089 (present disqualification case), where it found Rodriguez a fugitive from justice in line with the MARQUEZ Decisions (1995) definition of "fugitive from justice. With Rodriguezs walk-out during the hearing of the case, COMELEC considered him as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez' documentary evidence. Nevertheless, Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. However, COMELEC also made a report entitled "EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

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Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision? Held: No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. The Court also agrees with the COMELEC that: -The voluminous copy of an investigation report presented by Marquez in order to establish the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude is misleading because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged. - The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The evidence presented by Rodriguez even proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. And being a figure in the events leading to the EDSA Revolution, Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986, Governor in 1988, re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. - When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. Besides, there is no law requiring petitioner to travel to the United States and subject himself to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending himself before the country's courts. During that time, Rodriguez was also in public service. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves. TORRES, JR., J., concurring opinion: In the case at bar, the following circumstances must be taken into consideration: that petitioner was not aware of the imminent filing of charges against him; the same was filed after he has returned home; it is impractical and unjust to require petitioner to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the United States while already in this country or else be disqualified from office; and that the subject provision appears to have been a 'camaraderie provision' proposed by the House for the sake of private respondent who was then a Congressman. The fact that he remains here even after he was formally accused cannot be construed as an indication of an intent to flee, there being no compelling reason for him to go to the United States and face his accusers. On the contrary, it is his official duty, as an incumbent Governor of Quezon, to remain in the country and perform his duties as the duly elected public official. VITUG, J., dissenting opinion: Court's ruling in G.R. No. 112889 is misconstrued. COMELECs conclusion was correct. The mere fact that there are pending charges in the United States and that petitioner Rodriguez is in the Philippines make petitioner a fugitive from justice within the intent and meaning of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
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Mercado vs Manzano Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. Moreno vs. COMELEC, August 10, 2006 Facts: Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the RTC. Moreno filed an answer
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averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections. The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running. The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)1 of the Local Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefore. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC does not apply to him. Issue: Whether or not Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on WON his sentence was served Held: Morenos sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for Punong Barangay. The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC. In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession. Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. ABELLA vs. COMELEC 201 SCRA 253 Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she
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was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. Ramon Ceniza et al vs Commission on Elections, COA & National Treasurer Equal Protection Gerrymandering **Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. ** Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in charteredcities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and
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political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011 FACTS Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]? Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional? RULING [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.] 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
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In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections. 2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.] 3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours] Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

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If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid. The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
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pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours] This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are: First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. [T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires. Borja vs Comelec
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Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. Comelec ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. On motion, the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code. Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor Held: Yes

Ratio: Purpose of the three term rule: First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution provision recognizing peoples power. Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle. Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
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he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory. Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the VicePresident to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term. The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the VicePresident, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession. There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. LONZANIDA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999

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FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio but his opponent, Eufemio Muli, timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. However, the COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. RULING: The Supreme Court has held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the case at bar, the two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
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of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term porvided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside. RAYMUNDO ADORMEO VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002

Facts: Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms. Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowedthis comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress. Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
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Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides: Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001 LATASA V. COMELEC FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995 and 1998. In September 2000, a plebiscite was conducted to convert the municipality to City of Digos. This marked the end of the term of Latasa as mayor of the municipality. However, the charter of the new city provides that Latasa will stay in position in a hold-over capacity until the next election. In 2001 elections, Latasa again filed a COC to run as mayor. He argues that although he has already served three consecutive term in municipal mayor, this is his first bid as a city mayor. His opponent in the election Romeo Sunga filed a disqualification case against Latasa in the Comelec on the ground of violation of the three-term rule. Comelec granted the petition. Latasa filed a MR that was not acted upon until the day of election and hence, he won and proclaimed as the mayor. ISSUE: WON Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos City after serving three terms as mayor of municipality of Digos.
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HELD: The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court believes that Latasa did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor unlike in Lonzanida case, where petitioner for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office. In this case, there was no interruption in the holding of office and hence, the three consecutive term is completed. Since Latasa was proclaimed but later on disqualified, the second placer Sunga, cannot assume the position but the vice mayor. FRANCIS G. ONG vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FACTS: Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on the threeconsecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed winner. Alegre filed an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, but the decision came out only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect. Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said petition of Alegre. Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution6 reversing the resolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor in the May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor. The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong should be denied due course and the election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates. ISSUE: a) whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis. HELD:
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a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post cannot be sustained. c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. RIVERA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007 FACTS: The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales. Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 1995-1998 (1st term), then elected again for the term 1998-2001 (2nd term), and then finally from 2001-2004 (3rd term). For the 2004 elections, Morales ran again as a candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. After filing his certificate of candidacy, Attys. Rivera and De Guzman filed a petition to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he was already elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat thus his candidacy violates Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of R.A. 7160. After being proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 2004 elections, Anthony Dee, in the second case, filed a petition for quo warranto against Morales asserting that since the latter has already served for three consecutive terms, he is no longer eligible to serve the 2004-2007 term as this is already his 4th term. For both cases, Moraless argues that he isnt precluded from running for the 2004-2007 election because he served the 1998-2001 term only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since he was not validly elected for that 2 nd term by virtue of the decision of the RTC of Angeles City dated April 2, 2001 declaring his proclamation as mayor to be void and he was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999. Since in the petitions of Rivera and Dee, both the COMELEC and the RTC respectively ruled in favor of Morales, they appealed to the SC. Morales argues that the 2004-2007 term is not his 4th term because his 2nd term of 1998-2001 to which he was elected and which he served, should not be counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC of Angeles City. He also argues that his discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor of Mabalacat is that of a de facto officer or mayor and so his continuous service for 3 consecutive terms has been severed. ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated the three-term limit rule when he ran for re-election as mayor in the 2004 elections. RULING: Yes, Morales violated the three-term limit rule and is thus precluded from running for Mayor for the term 2004-2007. There are two conditions for the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
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apply, (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the RTC of Angeles City in April 2, 2001 declaring his proclamation as mayor for the 2nd term 1998-2001 does not constitute as an interruption in serving the full term. Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by Dee ousting him as mayor. His assumption of office for the second term constituted service for the full term and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the threeterm limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. This case is a reiteration of the ruling in Ong v. Alegre, a case with similar facts decided the year before. ROBERTO L. DIZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO P. MORALES Facts: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat because under Section 43 of the Local Government Code, no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms for the same position. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality. Morales, on the other hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He avers that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Morales also alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is not applicable to him. According to COMELECs second division, Respondent was elected mayor of Mabalacat in 1995,1998, and 2001. When he ran in 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in May 2007 (3 years later) that respondent has violated the three-term limit and thus was not considered a candidate in the 2004 elections. The vicemayor assumed office as mayor from May 2007-June 2007. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in the 2007 elections. Issue: WON Morales, in running for mayor in the 2007 elections, has violated the three-term limit rule Held: No. The petition has no merit. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. However, according to the SC, it unseated Morales in its May 2007 decision by canceling his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998; 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001; 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004; and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

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There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term and did not hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Thus, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap. As a result, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the threeterm limit rule. The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three year. The SC notes that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation or proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering. NICASIO BOLOS, JR., vs COMELEC FACTS For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol from 1994 to 2002. In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the 2007 Barangay Elections. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for the Position of Punong Barangay in the 2007 Barangay Elections. HELD Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. However, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office asPunong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay. ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO FACTS: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)? The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 19982001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course
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to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. SAMBARANI V COMELEC, 438 SCRA 319 G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004 Facts: A Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections were held on July 15, 2002 in Lanao del Sur. Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ran for re-election as punong barangay in their respective barangay, namely: Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud and Tatayawan South. The COMELEC subsequently issued Resolution No. 5479 which sets the date for special elections on August 13, 2002, due to failure of elections in eleven barangays including the five barangays mentioned. On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael Maulay issued a certification that there were no special elections held on August 13, 2002. The petitioners filed a joint petition for holding of another special election. They also contend that the failure of election was due to the failure of Maulay to follow the directive of Commissioner Sadain to use the ARMMs 2001
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computerized voters list and voters registration records. Since Maulay failed to file a written explanation, the COMELEC moved for the resolution of the case. It directed the DILG to appoint Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads in the five barangays mentioned in pursuance to RA 7160. The petitioners filed an instant petition to hold another special election which the COMELEC subsequently denied on the ground that the 30-day period already lapsed. Issue: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its decision in denying the petition to hold another special election. 2. Whether the DILG can appoint barangay and SK officials as directed by the COMELEC. Held: 1. Yes. The COMELECs decision denying the petition for another special election is void. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which is the basis of the COMELECs denial of the petition is merely directive and not mandatory. Section 45 also provides that in case of postponement or failure of election the COMELEC shall set the elections within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for postponement. The elections may be held anytime within the thirty day period from the time the cause of the postponement ceased. 2. No. The DILG cannot appoint barangay and SK officials due to Section 5 of the RA 9164 which provides for a hold over period where an incumbent officer may remain in office until their successors have already been elected and qualified. Therefore, the petitioners can assume office in a hold-over capacity pending the assumption of a successor into office.

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