A Revolutionary Gamble - Architecting The Boeing 747 Jumbo Jet

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA VITERBI SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING
A Revolutionary Gamble
Architecting the Boeing 747 Jumbo Jet
By Chris McDonald
for fulfillment of the research paper requirement in SAE 549 Systems Architecting (Dr. Thomas L. McKendree)
01 December 2009
SAE 549 (McKendree) A Revolutionary Gamble: Architecting the Boeing 747 Jumbo Jet
McDonald, C.
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 About the Author .......................................................................................................................................... 4 1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 5 2.0 Conceptual Phase and Early Design: Dreaming Big ................................................................................ 6 2.1 The Market for a Larger Jet ................................................................................................................. 6 2.2 Early Requirements Definitions .......................................................................................................... 6 2.2.1 Single Main Deck vs. Double Deck Cabin and Fuselage Dimensions ........................................... 8 2.2.2 Engines ....................................................................................................................................... 10 2.2.3 Balancing Market Demands with Client Intentions ................................................................... 11 Figure 2: OODA loop for the airline market and design of the Boeing 747 ................................................ 12 3.0 Design of the 747 .................................................................................................................................. 12 3.1 A Note on Quality in Design .............................................................................................................. 12 3.2 Manufacturing and Logistics ............................................................................................................. 13 3.3 Wing Design ...................................................................................................................................... 13 3.4 Weight Problem ................................................................................................................................ 15 3.5 Struggle for Engine Performance ...................................................................................................... 17 3.6 Safety, Redundancy, and Fault Tree Analysis ................................................................................... 18 3.7 Another Comment on Ultraquality ................................................................................................... 19 3.8 Interior Layout and Passenger Comfort ............................................................................................ 20 3.9 Sociopolitical and Economic Concerns.............................................................................................. 21 4.0 Testing and Certification ....................................................................................................................... 22 4.1 Production Wraps Up........................................................................................................................ 22 4.2 Flight Testing ..................................................................................................................................... 22 4.3 FAA Certification ............................................................................................................................... 24
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5.0 Operations and 747 Variants ................................................................................................................ 25 5.1 Initial Operations .............................................................................................................................. 25 5.1.1 Public Perception, Logistics, and Socioeconomic Factors .......................................................... 26 5.2 The 747 Freighter and Other Variants .............................................................................................. 27 5.2.1 Sales Increase ............................................................................................................................. 27 5.2.2 The 747 Variants ........................................................................................................................ 27 6.0 The Future of the 747 ........................................................................................................................... 31 7.0 Conclusion: Success and a Sense of Timing .......................................................................................... 32 Reference List.............................................................................................................................................. 34 Works Cited ............................................................................................................................................. 34 Other useful references obtained during research ................................................................................ 34
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Abstract
The Boeing 747 wide-body jet is discussed and analyzed from a systems architecting perspective. Motivation for the development of a large passenger jet is introduced. Architectural methodologies and decisions that were utilized throughout the design process of the 747 from conception through commercial implementation are discussed. The client-builder relationship between Pan Am and Boeing is examined. The operational history of the 747 jet is discussed, including the evolution of the 747 architecture through several derivative models. Sociopolitical factors that influenced the system design are also considered. Possible changes to the system architecture that could have been implemented, which might find utility in future aircraft design, are proposed throughout.
About the Author
Chris McDonald is a graduate student in the Viterbi School of Engineering at the University of Southern California. He is pursuing a Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering with a focus on Engineering Design. He also holds a Master of Science degree in Astronautical Engineering from USC, as well as a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from Syracuse University. He is currently pursing job opportunities within the space industry in the Southern California area.
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1.0 Introduction
Although the Boeing 747 first carried passengers on 21 January 1970, thereby ushering in a new era for intercontinental air travel, the road that led to this first flight was long and arduous. Evolving specifications, an almost impossible schedule, lack of financial resources, and strained client-builder relations all threatened to curtail the 747 program on more than one occasion. It is hard to fully appreciate the pressures under which those involved in the 747 design were subjected to. Boeing was involved with several other projects at the time the 747 program was launched, including the supersonic transport (SST) aircraft, 707, 727, and 737 commercial jets. Financial resources were already being stretched within the company, yet they would need to dedicate over two billion dollars to the 747 program (Kuter, 1973). Had the program failed, either during the design phase or after commercial implementation, Boeing would have faced financial ruin. Furthermore, the team had just 28 months to go from conception to flight (Sutter, 2006). As a result, Boeing had to ensure that quality was instilled in every aspect of the aircraft design, that operations ran smoothly, and that any problems that might arise in the process were mild and could be fixed quickly at little cost. Most importantly, however, was ensuring that the 747s primary client, Pan Am, was satisfied with the aircraft at all stages of design, including the 747s evolving specifications and modifications, and the management of the project itself. As will be seen, this was not always the case, and it was the 747s chief engineer (Joe Sutter) who ensured that the client-builder relationship was maintained throughout. The Boeing design team was led by a relatively young engineer named Joe Sutter. Sutter would become the key architect for the 747, seeing it through its conception, design, testing, certification, and entry into service. Rechtin identifies the essential attribute of a systems architect as one who has the ability to conceptualize, because that is the essence of architecting (Rechtin 1991, p. 290). Sutter certainly exhibited this attribute in all aspects of the project, for example, in seeing the advantage of utilizing a single main deck configuration over a double deck configuration while everyone else was fixated on the latter. Chignell, in (Rechtin 1991, p. 290), identifies several personality traits of the systems architect. Sutter certainly exhibited several of these traits, of which the most important were leadership, charisma, and a drive to succeed. Many of the engineers on the 747 project had been individuals passed over on the SST program, which was seen as the project to be on, and therefore were prone to low morale and motivation. Sutter, through exhibiting the above traits at all stages of the program, ensured that morale remained high, and that everyone working on the project felt not only a sense of purpose, but also pride in what they were doing. Had a different chief engineer been selected, the group might not have been given the title, The Incredibles, and the program may not have made it through the difficult times that it did.
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2.0 Conceptual Phase and Early Design: Dreaming Big 2.1 The Market for a Larger Jet
Predicting the future may be impossible, but ignoring it is irresponsible (Rechtin, 1991). As a result of the availability and convenience that air travel produced, the airline industry was growing at a rate of 15% per year during the 1960s (Norris, 1997). Airlines looked at these passenger trends and saw that this growth was likely to continue into the 1970s. A crucial problem had been identified. Specifically, it was realized that the narrow-body jets such as the 707 were unlikely to satisfy this growing market, and that a larger aircraft was needed. Among those who realized this early on was Juan Trippe, a charismatic visionary who was the genesis of Pan American Airways. Trippe approached Boeing in 1965 asking them to build a jetliner that could carry 400 people over a range of 5000 kilometers, and also would have the ability to transport cargo (March, 2008). In architecting any system, it is important to identify ways in which that system might find utility in ways other than for their original intended purpose. Architecting versatility and adaptability into the system from the beginning is one likely way to ensure the system succeeds and endures the test of time. Supersonic travel was expected to be the future of long distance passenger transport, and a subsonic jet like the 747 was expected to become obsolete. However, the need to transport cargo would continue to persist, and travel times would not need to be so quick as to warrant the use of supersonic aircraft. Therefore, by incorporating both passenger and cargo carrying capabilities into one aircraft, Trippe would ensure that Pan Am would remain competitive for years to come. Pan Am was crucial to the success of the 747 program. At the time, Pan Am dominated the US market in air travel, and for the 747s attractiveness and utility to become visible Boeing needed a committed client. December 22, 1965 marked the date on which the statement of intent for Boeing to build and deliver the 747 to Pam Am was signed (Kuter, 1973). In this statement, it was determined that there would be a two month assessment period in which the basic specifications and characteristics of the 747 would be explored. As will be seen, the clientbuilder relationship would become strained at many stages of the design, and it was at these times that the tradeoff between satisfying the client and doing what is technically and resourcefully feasible was pushed to its limit.
2.2 Early Requirements Definitions

Be prepared for reality to add a few interfaces of its own (Rechtin, 1991). Figure 1 shows how the eight recurring themes in systems architecting relate to the Boeing 747. From the beginning, it was apparent that the 747 would be a complex project. Never before had a jet been designed to carry the number of people the 747 would be capable of handling. In fact, passenger capacity would be more than twice that of any previous airliner (Sutter, 2006). The lack of previous examples to work from and the unprecedented size of the 747 meant that solid
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Figure 1: Eight Recurring Themes of Systems Architecting in the context of the Boeing 747
systems architecture was crucial. In order to manage any complex system, simplification where possible is a valuable asset. Boeing had decided to first look at expanding the 707s airframe, which had proven to be successful in operation. The 707 had already been stretched which resulted in the 707-320 and -420 variants, known as intercontinentals (March, 2008). The problem with stretching the fuselage even further was that it would require major redesign, especially in expanding the wing area to account for the larger engines that would inevitably need to be installed (March, 2008). Rechtin (1991) advises us that an element good enough in a small system is unlikely to be good enough in a larger one. A complex system cannot just be scaled up in the hope that no significant changes will be necessary. There are too many boundaries and interfaces in complex systems that create countless numbers of interrelationships between that systems elements, making it likely that some element will fail or be inadequate in the larger system. This may not be realized until the system is far into the design or even testing phase. By then, any changes would likely be too costly, and the program could come to a halt. This was realized early on, and was important to accept if the 747 was to define a new niche for commercial jets and truly become successful. The 707 had appeared to reach a point of diminishing returns, and it was clear that a completely new airplane would need to be designed.
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2.2.1 Single Main Deck vs. Double Deck Cabin and Fuselage Dimensions
The design of the cabin was crucial. Although Pan Am was Boeings primary client, Sutter and his team had to anticipate whether other airlines would have different requirements with regard to layout and seating capacity. The client base would extend beyond just Pan Am in the future, provided that the 747 succeeded, and understanding the requirements of this extended base was imperative. Rechtin (1991) states that predicting the future may be impossible, but ignoring it is irresponsible. Certainly, there might be consequences in building a system tailored to one clients needs while ignoring those of others. These consequences could affect their sales, reputation, and existence. What if Pan Am went out of business1? What if other airlines had a bigger market to satisfy than Pan Ams? How would ignoring their needs affect Boeings other sales to these airlines? Seeking input and defining the needs of these other airlines was a necessity.
We began making drawings of the kinds of airplanes we could make using these high-bypass-ratio enginesWe took the brochure to most of the major airlinesand asked themWhat size do you want? (Sutter, as cited in March, 2008, p.5).
As it turned out, all of the airlines wanted the largest capacity airplane in this brochure. In considering this, along with Trippes requirement that the plane be able to transport cargo as well, the initial consensus was that a double-decker configuration should be the way forward. To many, including some engineers within Boeing, the simplest way to double seating capacity was to include a second deck that extended to the back of the fuselage. Furthermore, Trippe felt that the term double-decker would be appealing to the general public, thus providing a source of marketing as well (Irving, 1993). Sutter, however, felt differently. He was thinking about the system in a larger context. Safety is crucial to any system, but certainly in the case of a system carrying hundreds of passengers. In the event of an emergency, all of these passengers would need to be evacuated in less than 90 seconds per FAA guidelines. Aside from the logistics of the evacuation, how likely would it be that the passengers would be willing to slide down an evacuation chute three stories high? Furthermore, if the 747 was to be designed for dual passenger/cargo use, what was the best way to design the cabin? What was the optimal way to carry freight? How do you balance this dual use with the available space, and in the most efficient way so as to keep weight to a minimum? How does the cabin layout affect other elements in the system? What exogenous factors such as public perception and satisfaction of the cabin layout would affect the systems implementation? How would implementation determine success or failure in the long run? The complexity of the system required every decision to be analyzed carefully, observing and predicting how that decision would affect the rest of the system.
1
The 1973 energy crisis, lost business to other airlines, and several high-profile terrorist incidents including the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbee, Scotland on 21 December 1988 ultimately forced Pan Am to declare bankruptcy in 1991.
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Sutter, having thought about these questions, decided that the best solution to these issues would be a simpler design based on a single main deck configuration. Crucial in the decision for Boeing to ultimately utilize a single main deck, wide-body configuration was the way in which cargo would be carried. The standard at the time was 8x8 pallets. Economically, having a single row of pallets would not be practical, so the plan was to place two pallets side by side. In doing so, the width of the cabin was set to 20 feet. The passenger capacity requirements applied to this width then determined the cabin length. When performing any changes to a system, the client must be fully involved. Trippe, as the client, needed to be informed to the benefits of utilizing a single main deck configuration. It was important for Sutter to inform rather than persuade Trippe to change his decision. After all, the client determines relative value. The architects job is simply to inform the client as to what his options are, and to decide technical feasibility of the system. Never should the architect decide on what is best for the client. This was just one of several points at which the decision to appease the client had to be balanced with what was practical and advantageous. Choosing the wrong configuration could prove to be the downfall of the 747, but ultimately, the client determines what is to be built. This was a difficult realization because although Pan Am was committing over $550M in their initial purchase of 25 747s in 1966, Boeing was investing over $2B of its own money in the program (Kuter, 1973). If the 747 failed to succeed, Boeing would face financial ruin. In this context, it could be argued that, while Boeing was not a client, they were a stakeholder, and therefore should have the ability to help decide what is in the best interest of their company, not just what was in the best interest of Pan Am. Sutters best option was to send their chief cabin designer to try and make Trippe see the utility and benefits of the new design (Sutter, 2006). This man was Milt Heinemann. Heinemann now had to decide how to best present his case to a client who was likely reluctant to change his mind. Scrapping the engineering approach, Heinemann was able to at least cause Trippe to think about the change in design. By measuring out Pan Ams board room with a piece of rope, he discovered that its dimensions were almost exactly the same as the wide-body cabin layout that Boeing was proposing. Simply mentioning this to those in the board room caused disbelief, as they recognized the immense space passengers would be given (Sutter, 2006).2 With safety being the primary concern of the design team, it was clear that placing the cockpit and cargo on the same deck might result in serious injury or death of the pilots if an accident were to occur. Therefore, the decision was made to place the cockpit on the second deck, while placing cargo on the primary deck. In addition to ensuring the safety of the pilots, the configuration also had several other advantages. The most recognizable is the ability of the nose
2
Although Sutter seems to imply that the board room meeting changed Trippes decision to go from double-deck to single main deck, the decision wasnt made until Trippe and his team walked through mock-ups of the two configurations. Upon realizing the disadvantages of the double-decker, Trippe told Sutter that he made the right decision (Sutter 2006).
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of the 747 to rotate up for front-loading of cargo. Simplification of other elements such as cabin environment, evacuation, and flight attendant services were also realized with this layout.
2.2.2 Engines
As has previously been mentioned, Pan Am had approached Boeing in 1965 with a preliminary set of requirements, namely, a 400 seat aircraft with a range of 5000 kilometers. Fundamentally, a larger aircraft meant that an engine with significant thrust would be needed to get the 747 airborne.3 In many instances, engine technology lags behind aircraft design. For the 747, the timing appeared to coincide with the engine technology. Development of high-bypass turbofan engine technology was ongoing, and their implementation was seen as being only a few years away.4 Moreover, this engine promised to offer a 30% improvement in pound per fuel over previous engine technology (Kuter, 1973, p.5). The decision to implement new technology should not be taken lightly. Being new, it brings inherent uncertainty in its safety, reliability, and acceptance. While most jet engines had previously been utilized and proven safe and reliable in military aircraft, the JT9D would see its first applicability in powering the 747. As the jet would be carrying hundreds of people at any given time, it was imperative for the architect to analyze the risks and tradeoffs of choosing to utilize high-bypass turbofan technology and the JT9D engine. What would be the standards for testing, certification, and acceptance? Could documentation and processes from previous jet engine testing and certification be modified and used to test the JT9D? What parts of the engine are most susceptible to reliability and safety issues? What happens if the engine is proven reliable in testing but suffers failure in flight? Sometimes, there are very few choices in which technology can be implemented in a system to make it work, and realizing that the use of high-bypass turbofan engines was the only way a 747 would get airborne, all that had to be determined was who would build the engine. At the time, the three big engine manufacturers were GE, Rolls Royce, and Pratt and Whitney. With the last two promising to come through on the technology, the decision on which company to go with had to be made wisely. At one end, Rolls Royce had the highest reputation of the three. From a quality standpoint, they would seem to be the best fit. However, their research was underfunded, and the likelihood of developing the engines on time and with the desired specifications was suspect (Irving, 1993). In a project that was under significant schedule and financial constraints,
3
Once an airplane is off the ground, the amount of thrust needed to keep the plane in flight is significantly reduced due to lift generated by airflow over the wing. In the case of the 747, around 40,000 lbs of thrust was needed to takeoff, yet less than 10,000 lbs of thrust was needed to maintain flight.
4
Turbofan engines work by passing a large volume of air through a bladed fan at the front of the engine. Highbypass implied that a large volume of this air would bypass the core of the engine and travel to the exhaust end, producing significantly higher thrust than conventional jet engines at the time. In passing by the core, the airflow also quieted the noise of the engines, thus producing a more pleasant flight for passengers.
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Boeing could not afford to take the risk. A reliable engine able to meet the desired specifications would cross several boundaries, including those impacting client satisfaction, schedule, cost, safety, and reputation. Minimizing the impact of failure on all of these elements meant choosing a client who was likely to succeed in producing the technology on time and successfully. Ultimately, Pratt and Whitney was determined by Boeing to be the most likely to succeed. The client determines relative value, and since it was Pan Ams airplane, it would have been their decision. However, Trippe did not care what engine manufacturer was chosen, so long as the engine produced the necessary thrust to meet Pan Ams desired specifications for the 747. As will be seen later, the schedule imposed on the 747 project directly impacted the performance and utility of these engines, threatening to derail the 747 program and Boeing itself.
2.2.3 Balancing Market Demands with Client Intentions

Before discussing the design of the 747, a few things must be said regarding the balance between satisfying the airline market and satisfying the primary client. As mentioned previously, Pan Am dominated the U.S. airline industry in the 1960s. Although Pan Am was the only customer interested in utilizing the 747 for intercontinental travel, other airlines had been interested in purchasing 747s as well for transcontinental operations. However, by making such a large investment early on in the program through the purchase of 25 747s, Pan Am largely had control over the airplanes design (Irving, 1993). The company had wanted to delay delivery of the 747 to other airlines by six months so they could take control of the wide-body market. Boeing, on the other hand, knew that the success of the 747 would largely depend on expanding the 747s operations as much as possible. However, by choosing to satisfy Pan Am and giving them a competitive edge, Boeing risked losing their loyal 707 base. Which customer was more important? Was it possible to satisfy both markets? The answer to the latter question is yes, but not until the 747 had entered service and proved to be a success. The decision to satisfy Pan Am was probably a smart one, given the companys influence on the airline industry. Trippe had proven his power when Boeing failed to build the 707s cabin as wide as he had wanted. The result was a purchase of 20 707s, but also 25 Douglas DC-8s! Sutter (2006) says, That split order was a wakeup call of seismic proportions. It told us that we werent listening well enough to our customers (p. 64). The development of a solid system architecture relies primarily on listening to the customer. The customer defines what the problem is and proposes the initial requirements that allow the system architect to deduce further information from the client that helps form the rest of the architecture. Any other initial approach means that the architect is doing a job that isnt his making the decisions for the client. Such an approach is destined to produce frustration and dissatisfaction among the client. In concluding this section, Figure 2 presents a hypothetical OODA loop representing the airline market and the decisions that were made in designing and implementing the 747.
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Figure 2: OODA loop for the airline market and design of the Boeing 747
3.0 Design of the 747 3.1 A Note on Quality in Design

Quality cannot be tested in, it has to be built in (Rechtin, 1991). This heuristic would guide the 747 design throughout. The 747, like any new system, would face concern and skepticism from the public and media regarding its safety. With the amount of money being invested in the project, it was clear from the beginning that safety, reliability, and efficiency were crucial in winning over the airlines and passengers. Boeings CEO, Bill Allen, and the 747s chief designer, Joe Sutter, realized the importance of instilling quality from the very beginning. Sutter (2006) states that, You dont design safety into an airplane; instead you design an airplane to have excellent airworthiness characteristics (p.128). This point was not lost on the Boeing engineers. Allen told them that they would have only one shot to get the 747 right and that they needed to make sure it was as flexible and versatile as possible (Irving, 1993). Versatility and flexibility in a system ensures that it will survive changes related to client and market demand as time passes. The architect and design team must not be so short sighted as to lose perspective of how changing requirements and exogenous factors will shape the way a system is utilized by its users and perceived by the user and the public in general. For example, if the 747 had been built to meet the bare minimum quality that was satisfactory to Trippe and that required to pass FAA certification, the 747 would probably have been pushed aside within a few years as new requirements would become realized. The 747 would not be able to adapt to these changes, Boeing would have lost a lot of money and their reputation, and Pan Am would simply seek a builder who could produce a quality airplane able to withstand the changing market.
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Therefore, the builder and the architect must plan for the long term. Predicting the future may be impossible, but ignoring it is irresponsible (Rechtin, 1991).
3.2 Manufacturing and Logistics

It was clear from the beginning that the complexity and size of the Boeing 747 project would entail the need for a large facility for manufacturing, as well as rely on outsourcing for the assembly of many of the airplanes components. The site chosen for assembly was Paine Field near Everett, Washington. At a cost of $200M, the assembly plant was the worlds largest building by volume 205 million cu ft (March, 2008). Since many of the sub-assemblies would be coming from other sites5, a rail line was built to deliver the parts as well. Sutter (2006) points out that he would have liked to keep all aspects of manufacturing and design in-house, but the financial constraints, manpower, and space would prohibit it. The architecture of a support element must fit that of the system that it supports (Rechtin, 1991) would eventually come back to cause problems for Boeing. The boundary of design now extended beyond Boeings integrated manufacturing facilities. With each subcontracted job, additional complexity was added to the design process, which introduced an additional likelihood that a problem would occur. The fact that parts of these subcontracted jobs were then sub-subcontracted to other companies only made matters worse. Communication was lacking, and as such, different design methodologies and processes were utilized at each facility, resulting in dissimilar parts that didnt fit into the overall system design. Boeing was left to sort everything out, likely negating the financial and time benefits of outsourcing in the first place. In a complex system, how does the architect plan around limited resources and scattered production? What is required is an integrated architecture that is able to manage both manufacturing and design, regardless of how spread out the work is. Marx, Mavris, and Schrage (1994) propose the development of a knowledge-based system that would be able to integrate manufacturing and design by replacing additional human labor with computational power. Although the 747 preceded the computational advancements needed to make such a system work, it nevertheless offers a solution in which future projects facing similar logistical and financial issues may benefit.
3.3 Wing Design

It was mentioned earlier that Boeing had invested $750,000 in obtaining its own wind tunnel. In doing so, they were able to conduct wind tunnel tests on various wing configurations, thus refining their swept wing design. During the conceptual phase, Trippe had stated that he wanted an aircraft capable of traveling at Mach 0.89. In keeping with safety, however, it became necessary to challenge this extreme requirement. Indeed, it was clear that Trippe wanted an aircraft that would be capable of flying close to the speed of sound, but at Mach 0.89 a sweep
5
17,000 prime and sub-contractors spread across the United States and eight countries worldwide (March, 2008)
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angle of around 40 degrees would be required. At this angle, wing buffet and other aerodynamic phenomena had the ability to create undesirable flight characteristics (Sutter, 2006). However, with a sweep angle of 37.5 degrees the team could still design the airplane to fly at Mach 0.85. This marked a reduction in speed by approximately 23 mph. What the architect needed to consider here was the complexity of the situation coupled with the time constraints in design. Under those conditions, extreme requirements such as the aircrafts desired speed need to be challenged. Extreme requirements can introduce too many unknowns. The clients value judgment needs be challenged as well, and the architect must ensure that safety will not be compromised. As always, safety came first, and Sutters team felt that the reduction in speed outweighed the risks of meeting Trippes requirement. This brings up an important point in defining an architecture; evaluate what the real needs of the client are, and modify their proposed requirements if safety or stability would be jeopardized otherwise. In simplest terms, Trippe wanted an aircraft that would fly fast. Even at Mach 0.85, this would be faster than any airplane on the market at the time, so the tradeoff was deemed acceptable. An element good enough in a small system is unlikely to be good enough in a more complex one (Rechtin, 1991). One of the most challenging aspects of the wing design was balancing the need for efficient, high-speed flight with stability and safety at low landing speeds. It is widely known that increasing the wing area decreases wing loading and increases lift. As a result of increased lift, an airplane is able to take off and land at lower speeds. However, larger wings tend to move more air, and consequently, decreases speed. Therefore, wing area creates the inherent need for tradeoff between speed and aerodynamic performance. In choosing the wing design, other factors needed to be considered. The complexity of the 747 necessarily implied that choosing a particular wing configuration would affect other elements of the design as well. What will be the weight of the airplane on takeoff? How does this weight affect the wing loading of the airplane? What length of runway is available for the airplane to take off and land on? Are there other restrictions that a particular airport may implement with regard to speed that might prevent the airplane from landing there? What effect would this have on service routes, profits, and utility? Did the client consider these factors when choosing the system requirements? Boeings solution to this tradeoff was to utilize triple-slotted flaps. These flaps would increase lift by 90% and wing area by 21%, thus decreasing wing loading, and allowing the airplane to take off and land at lower speeds (Norris, 1997). This in turn, would result in the airplane needing less runway length to take off and stop upon landing. Furthermore, the larger wing area allowed for the transport of more fuel, extending the range of the jet. This came at a price of decreased speed, but once again the benefits of safety and other utility outweighed this loss. Trippe was not happy about the loss in speed, but he ultimately accepted it. The choice between
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architectures may well depend upon which set of drawbacks the client can handle best (Rechtin, 1991). Simplify. Simplify. Simplify. (Rechtin, 1991). A major problem that arose during the wing design was the complex interactions that occurred between the dynamic, aerodynamic, and structural elements imposed on them (Irving, 1993). Under certain loads and at certain speeds the wing would fail. This proved to be incredibly frustrating, because the wing was a crucial component of the 747. If the failure mechanisms could not be eliminated in the design facility, it certainly would not make it to flight. In fact, the strict schedule deemed any lengthy delay in design unacceptable. The stress of a tight schedule coupled with the problems faced with the wings was taking its toll on the engineers. At this point, the VP of product development decided to have Sutter and his team look for a solution to the problem while another team led by another engineer performed their own investigation. What came out of the investigation were two differing views Steiner (the other engineer) felt that the only way to solve the aerodynamic and structural problem was to twist the entire wing at a particular angle. Doing so would mean fundamental structural changes, especially at the wing/fuselage interface. Again, following Steiners advice would mean more schedule slips and ballooning development costs. Sutters team expanded the problem, and felt that there was a much simpler solution. If they twisted only the outer portion of the wing from the outer engine to the wing tip, the load distribution over the entire wing would change. All that needed to be determined was the correct twist angle (Irving, 1993). Pause and reflect (Rechtin, 1991) certainly paid off in this instance, as this partial twist prove to be only 1/10th as costly as Steiners proposal to twist the entire wing (Sutter, 2006). The simplest solution proved to be the correct one, and is now known as Sutters twist (Sutter, 2006).
3.4 Weight Problem

From the very beginning, weight was a major issue in the design of the 747. Although it was clear that a jet carrying more than twice the number of passengers than any other in history would necessarily entail a weight increase, what wasnt obvious until later in the design was just how complex the weight problem was. The initial specifications had placed the gross weight at 550,000 lbs. (Kuter, 1973), and this weight had a direct impact on the engine thrust necessary to power the 747. However, the complexity of the situation was much greater than that. An increase in weight meant that passenger and cargo carrying capacity dropped. Fewer passengers and/or cargo meant lost revenue on each flight. Over the course of days, months, or years, this could mean significant losses for Pan Am and other airline customers. The gross weight was increasing by the week. In fact, it had risen from 550,000 lbs. in 1965 to 710,000 lbs. in 1967, and this was straining the client-builder relationship. Boeing was placing the blame on Pan Am due to their continuing desire to add more amenities to the airplane, such as passenger lounges, more lavoratories, more complex cargo systems, etc (Sutter, 2006).
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Furthermore, Trippe had wanted a superfreighter in addition to the passenger model, which would require extensive redesign, the technology to power it which would not be available for years (Irving, 1993). On the other end, Pan Am felt that Boeings engineers had significantly underestimated the gross weight of the airplane from the beginning, and their incompetence and failure to anticipate design changes was causing the weight to balloon, resulting in a sacrifice in performance not agreed to when signing the contract. So whose fault was it? From an architecting perspective, it appears that the issue was lack of understanding of the clients requirements initially. Pan Am had laid out some basic specifications for what they had wanted, but Boeing failed to account for possible additions or changes to the system that might adversely affect its design later on. It might even be said that this could have been due to lack of communication between the two parties. Had Pan Am known that they would want these additional features and not disclosed them to Boeing because they thought the additions would present no issues? Had Boeing really understood what it was that Pan Am had wanted? Were they only looking at performance and not considering other elements such as passenger comfort and cabin layout that would cross over into the weight boundary? No sources researched by the author answer these questions, but nevertheless, it is important to consider their implications. Had any of the above factors been taken into consideration, perhaps the weight problem would not have been as serious as it was. Conversely, perhaps the issue arose not from lack of communication or understanding, but rather that was a result of having no previous similar industry examples to reference, as Sutter (2006) suggests. The 747 was unprecedented in its size, and the true complexity in its design may have been anticipated, but couldnt have been fully predicted until design had begun. Regardless of the cause of the weight increase, the following heuristic would provide some guidance on how to proceed: When choices must be made with unavoidably inadequate information, choose the best available and then watch to see whether future solutions appear faster than future problems. If so, the choice was at least adequate. If not, go back and choose again (Rechtin, 1991). The only solution was to try and remove as much excess weight as possible by looking at each component and optimizing its weight or eliminating unnecessary parts altogether. In doing so, it was important to look at the interrelationships between the parts, analyzing their effects on other parts across the boundaries and interfaces of the system. Unfortunately, Boeing management felt that instead of letting Sutter and his team do this, a team of Boeing engineers recently pulled from the failed SST program would perform a weight audit (Sutter, 2006). As one of the reduction ideas, they suggested reducing the 747 from triple-slotted flaps to double-slotted-flaps. Sutter refused to do this, mostly because it would affect the performance standards that were set out in the Pan Am contract. As Pan Am was already frustrated enough with the weight problem, any further reduction in performance could mean they would back out of their order
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commitment. As any architect should, it was crucial for Sutter to look at the situation from a wider perspective and observe not only how one change would directly affect the system itself, but how exogenous factors caused by these changes would affect the system as well. In this case, the exogenous factor was client satisfaction and how that satisfaction would directly impact the 747s and Boeings success. Sutter (2006) says,
It seems to me essential that a project leader not fixate on one design parameter to the exclusion or detriment of others. Airplane design is the ultimate exercise in compromiseThe design teams job is therefore to define the optimal balance between these elements that yields the best results (p.156).
Ultimately, Boeings engineers were able to shave off 20,000 lbs. from the airframe, and the final gross weight was agreed to be 710,000 lbs. (Irving, 1993). Unfortunately, this weight issue would prove to be a bigger problem in relation to the 747s engine design, and threatened to delay the 747s entry into service.
3.5 Struggle for Engine Performance

Out of all the issues that arose during the 747s design, no single one was more serious than Pratt and Whitneys struggle to develop a reliable high-bypass turbofan engine. As was mentioned earlier, P&W had been selected as the engine manufacturer over both General Electric and Rolls Royce. Pratt had been awarded a development contract in the competition to power the Air Forces C-5 Galaxy in the first half of the 1960s. The C-5 was to be a heavy lift intercontinental plane used to transport troops and supplies overseas. Although they lost the bid to General Electric, they had gained significant knowledge on high-bypass turbofan engine R&D, and were confident that they could develop the technology and produce the engine with the desired specifications to Boeing by the 747s delivery date. Unfortunately, Performance, cost, and schedule cannot be specified independently. At least one of the three must depend on the others (Rechtin, 1991). With added weight came the need for more powerful engines and a substantial increase in development costs. As design parameters began to change, the trade-off between speed and altitude versus passenger capacity and range became a very realistic problem. Trippe, refusing to compromise, decided that Pratts engine, the JT9D, would need to produce more power than originally anticipated without an increase in engine weight, fuel consumption, and noise (Kuter, 1973). Pratt felt that they would be able to achieve this performance, but only over their normal development cycle of three to six years. Nevertheless, the increase in gross weight initially increased Pratts development costs by $350M, and this figure would rise to $750M by 1969 (March, 2008). Furthermore, due to the time constraints imposed on the design schedule, Pratt had a year less than what would have normally been required to develop a reliable JT9D engine
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(Irving, 1993). In a sense the technology, while promising, was before its time, and performance would suffer during testing and initial operations. Ultimately, Trippe realized that the technology that he wanted would not be available in the time required to get the 747 into operation. The solution that was proposed and finally accepted was to accept an engine with reduced performance. This engine would meet the thrust requirement at takeoff with the aid of water injection, and, when the technology was fully developed, these inferior engines would be replaced with the ones delivering the promised performance at a 50% replacement cost to Boeing (Kuter, 1973).
3.6 Safety, Redundancy, and Fault Tree Analysis

No point had been stressed more during the 747 design than that of safety. It was clear that the potential for failure in an aircraft carrying 400-500 people, while not completely avoidable, had to be kept extremely low. To reiterate a point made earlier, Boeing had to convince airlines and passengers that the 747 was safe, reliable, and efficient. It was clear that the 747 would be so large and heavy that it could not be flown manually (Norris, 1997). As a direct result of this, potential emergency situations, structural and system failures, and various other issues had to be addressed. Certainly, the following heuristic would be relevant in this analysis: In partitioning a system into subsystems, choose a configuration with minimal communications between the subsystems (Rechtin, 1991). This was achieved through redundancy and fault tree analysis6. Sutter introduced quadruple redundancy into several of the 747s elements, including control surfaces, hydraulic systems, fuel systems, and the landing gear (March, 2008). To further limit the dependency of the hydraulic systems on a single source, each was powered by one of the aircrafts four engines. Quadruple main landing gear meant that the weight of the plane would be distributed over a wider area, thus allowing the 747 to utilize existing runways without further reinforcement to them (Norris, 1997). Additionally, the landing gear was designed to tear away from the aircraft in the event of an accident or collision, thus preventing them from tearing into the fuel tanks and causing a fire. Besides the engines, the fuel system was isolated through a system of seals and compartmentalization (Irving, 1993). In addition to redundancy and isolation of failure mechanisms, the 747 featured inertial navigation, a state-of-the-art technology at the time. This navigation system would eliminate the need for ground-based aids, flying a pre-programmed route from takeoff to landing. Moreover, the tolerance of error in this system was no more than two miles in one hour (Irving, 1993). The 747 also featured an automatic flight control system that integrated many other computer functions, and almost every system in the aircraft featured a backup one.
6
Fault tree analysis is a method which allows the effects of a failure of a single part to be studied to determine its impact on other systems (Wikipedia entry for Boeing 747).
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While it may seem like overkill (as some at Boeing thought), this redundancy and isolation of components proved to be a life saver in many instances, even before the 747s introduction into service7. Sutter, as always, had been looking at the system in a larger context. There was no room for error, and with such a complex system all possible methods to ensure safety had to be incorporated into the design, even if it wasnt clear if, when, or under what scenarios the redundancy and fault control would be necessary. Complex systems, when fully assembled, can exhibit characteristics that did not exist when the elements were operating independently. This must be taken into consideration when defining the systems architecture and planning for the systems versatility and utility into the future. Predicting the future may be impossible, but ignoring it is irresponsible (Rechtin, 1991).
3.7 Another Comment on Ultraquality

Boeing strived to instill ultraquality into all aspects of the 747s design. Because of public and media concerns over the safety of such a large jet, it would undergo the most rigorous certification requirements of any aircraft to date at the time. Central to the certification process was the FAAs Federal Air Regulation 25, which established regulations for an airplanes handling qualities, ability to survive failures, and scenarios for emergency takeoffs and landings (Irving, 1993). Rechtin (1991) states that, You cannot achieve qualityunless you specify it. Boeing specified quality in their Design Objectives and Criteria handbook, which stated that, The airplane handling qualities shall be equal to or better than those of the current family of Boeing jet transports (Irving, 1993, p.255). Their objective in doing this was to ensure that any Boeing design would not only meet, but exceed the FAA requirements (Sutter, 2006). Additional points were given that stressed safety and weight control, where possible. In one part of this document, the criteria stated that if an element added to the system would result in an increase in weight cost of more than 150 dollars per pound, then it must be considered carefully, and if chosen, be accepted by a project engineer (Sutter, 2006). These established rules and guidelines ensured that every possible attempt had been made to develop a high quality, safe, and cost efficient system. With regard to fault tolerance, Boeings design philosophy was, No single failure modes, no uninspectable limited-lift parts (Sutter, 2006). This would prove to be valuable during the 747s testing and certification phase8.
Describe severed hydraulics issue in San Francisco
At one point, Russian KGB officers under the guise of potential 747 customers came to the Everett facility and attempted to purchase the Design Objectives and Criteria book. By the time they were forced out of Sutters office, their offer had reached $10M (Sutter, 2006)!
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3.8 Interior Layout and Passenger Comfort

While increased cabin space was a big improvement over the cramped, narrow-tube configurations found in older jets such as the 707, Boeing felt that its size would be overwhelming to passengers. As a result, they solicited advice and suggestions from other airline experts and allowed them to review their work. John Borger, Pan Ams chief engineer, was also heavily involved in assessing the configuration and in choosing the amenities that would suit passengers best (Sutter, 2006). Rechtin (1991) points out that success is defined by the beholder. In this instance, the beholder was both the client (Pan Am) and the customer (the passengers of the 747). Therefore, to ensure success, the desires of both beholders were equally important. After all, if there was no one to fly on the jets, how could it succeed? Because of this, one of the test planes was partially dedicated to assessing passenger comfort (Kuter, 1973). As a result, assessing and maintaining passenger satisfaction has certainly contributed to the jets success. Sutter, in an interview with Tinseth (2006), recalls the following regarding Juan Trippes walkthrough of the mock-up of the chosen 747 configuration:
Juan Trippe walked into this plywood mockup of the cockpit, and he didn't care about that, but he turned around and looked at the space behind the cockpit, and I'll never forget it, because he turned to his chief engineer, John Borger and said, "What is this space going to be used for?" And Borger made a hell of a mistake, he said, "This could be a good crew rest area." And Juan Trippe just said, "This will be reserved for passengers!" And that's what turned the upper deck into a very profitable part of the airplane.
Two other issues had to be dealt with in relation to the interior. The first was that of evacuation. In order to meet FAA guidelines requiring evacuation in 90 seconds or less, twenty four doors would be required to be installed in the airplane. This would have proven to be a very complex problem to solve structurally, as each door would be a good candidate for weakness, fatigue, or possible failure. Furthermore, so many doors would take away revenue-generating seat space. Rechtin (1991) would argue that in this case it would benefit to simplify, as well as pause and reflect. Boeings chief cabin designer, Milt Heinemann, decided to do this and analyzed the records of 87 airplane evacuations under varying degrees of emergency over a 7 year period. Surprisingly, people didnt leave through the door closest to them, but rather the one that they had come through when entering the airplane (Irving, 1993). The simple solution, then, was to use fewer doors but make them bigger. The other issue that needed to be addressed was that of taxiing. Pilots, being in a cockpit situated higher above the around than any airplane before, would have a hard time judging height when taxiing and coming in on final approach. Therefore, Jack Waddell, who was the 747s test pilot, invented Waddells wagon, a device that would allow him to assess what it would truly look like operating the plane from this height (Irving, 1993). Using this device, he was able to practice taxiing and develop procedures and guidance for the pilots who would be flying the aircraft.
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Although the definition of modeling in engineering design has evolved into modeling in a computational sense today, modeling during the late 1960s could be extended to include the plywood cabins, Waddells wagon, and other physical devices that dominated the 747 design. Sutter (2006) states: Mock-ups, wagons, fabricated cabins, flight simulators: it was all groping for a sense of dimension, for an
understanding of the transformed scale of the flying experience (p. 272).
3.9 Sociopolitical and Economic Concerns

When the decision on where to build the assembly facility was being addressed, political pressure was being felt by Boeing. Building such a large facility would certainly bring economic advantages to those in the community where it would happen. Not only would it generate a real estate boom, but it would also open up the opportunity for construction firms to hire more workers, sparking the citys or towns economy. Besides Boeings home state of Washington, California was the other location being considered (Irving, 1993). Politically, this would have been more advantageous. Their representation in Washington was numerous and influential, and would likely result in lobbyists pushing for more funds to support the SST program, among others. Boeing ultimately chose to stay in Washington, partially out of loyalty to their home state, but also because it would be logistically advantageous. The town of Everett offered to build a highway interchange off of I-5 there, and the location was also in close proximity to a rail line, which would be crucial for receiving supplies and parts from subcontracted companies. From the standpoint of 747 design and operations, safety was a primary concern. As mentioned earlier, the jet would be carrying twice the number of passengers of any previous jetliner, and the jumbo size of the aircraft casted public doubts on its ability to fly or even operate around other aircraft on the ground. Furthermore, communities surrounding the airports were concerned about the noise and pollution that might result from such a large jet (Irving, 1993). In order to quell public concerns, a 747, which was only 78% completed at the time, was rolled out for the public and press on 30 September 1968 (Sutter, 2006). Furthermore, the jet was flown to the 28th Paris Air Show in 1969 in order to attract attention and expand the 747s client base. By the end of 1969, however, the country was in a recession and Boeing was suffering financially. Development costs were ballooning, 747s were sitting on Boeings assembly site without engines due to Pratts engine issues, banks were refusing to lend the company any more money, and Pan Am was threatening to take legal action against Boeing for failing to meet performance guarantees (Sutter, 2006). As a result, 60,000 workers were cut from Boeing, resulting in Seattles unemployment rate rising 17 percent. Sutter himself was told to cut 1000 engineers from the 747 program (which never happened). Furthermore, real estate sales fell by 40%, and the publics perception of Boeing had declined (Irving, 1993).
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At this point, it was clear that any more failure in the 747 program would mean bankruptcy for Boeing. Rechtin (1991) states that the cost of capital is a key consideration in systems design and manufacture, particularly for large complex systems with life cycles measured in decades (p. 253). By designing a new system that pushed the limits of technology and complexity without any government funding, Boeing took a huge risk in the 747 program. The threat of failure was always present, and Sutter and his team knew this. Success was imperative for survival.
4.0 Testing and Certification 4.1 Production Wraps Up

By June 1968, production was mostly completed with the exception of the landing gear and engines. The extreme time constraints imposed on the 747 program meant that design and manufacturing were overlapping, and Trippe was pushing for the first 747s to be delivered to Pan Am in time for the holiday season of 1969-1970 (Kuter, 1973). However, Pratt and Whitney was still having issues in developing the JT9D high-bypass turbofan engine. Serious problems such as overheating, stalling, and surges were occurring, and Pratt didnt know why. Moreover, they didnt seem to be making much of an effort to do anything about it. Jack Waddell decided to change their lax attitude by taking Pratt representatives for a flight in their engine-powered 747. Soon after their frightening flight, Pratt made serious efforts to work out their development issues.
4.2 Flight Testing

The first test flight of the Boeing 747 occurred on 9 February 1969. Surprisingly, with the exception of a small structural failure in one of their flaps the flight went well. In order to test the airplanes response to hydraulic failure, Waddell shut down two of the hydraulic systems in flight. It wasnt until he shut down the second one that any detectable loss in smoothness occurred (Irving, 1993). Furthermore, an effect known as Dutch roll that had been a problem in most previous aircraft designs was not even present. Subsequent testing focused on testing the landing gear, flight characteristics at the extreme ends of flight (both high and low speed), and generating engineering data to aid pilots in their understanding of the airplanes handling characteristics (Sutter, 2006). It was clear during the testing stage that, for the most part, the quality that had been built into the system from the very beginning had resulted in great airplane far safer and smoother than any other at that point in time. Two major problems stood in the way of FAA certification though. The first was that of flutter. Flutter is a problem that arises when two parts of the airplane are vibrating at the same frequency. When this occurs, the vibrations feed off of each other,
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eventually growing in amplitude until the part fails9. Clearly, this was unacceptable for flight and would result in a catastrophe later on if it wasnt fixed. In the case of the 747, the wings and outboard engine nacelles were vibrating together (Sutter, 2006). A temporary solution was proposed by placing spent uranium ballasts in the outboard nacelles to change the frequency of vibration and eliminate the flutter. In doing so, testing was able to continue (the problem was eventually fixed by redesign of the parts). The other problem that remained was the engine problem. Under certain adjustments in thrust, the engines would experience violent surges or flameouts. Oftentimes, the engines would even overheat, triggering temperature sensors. If the 747 had any hope of passing FAA certification, the problem needed to be solved. After extensive testing, it was found that the fans were generating so much thrust that the forces were bending the engine casings, causing the turbine blades to come in contact with them. Consequently, this created aerodynamic disruption in the engine and caused the violent surges experienced during thrust adjustment (Sutter, 2006). This was known as ovalization, and it was a problem that neither Boeing nor Pratt had predicted would occur. Luckily, with certification approaching in weeks, Boeing was able to develop a supporting mechanism that prevented the engine casings from distorting, and Pratt was able to continue building engines for production. It is clear from the serious development problems that Pratt faced with the JT9D that the technology was premature. Pratt had been sure that they would be able to develop the engine on time, but unforeseen changes in performance requirements as a result of Pan Ams decision to add more weight to the airplane increased the complexity of the situation. While changes in performance can be cited as a cause of delayed engine development, Pratt also has to take some blame for the failure. They had a poorly managed company with no defined standards for quality in design, and this seeped through into their products. Sutter (2006) discusses how Pratts leader, Barney Schmickrath, didnt want to cost his company money by investing in a solution to the engine problem, and that he even knew about a potentially fatal problem in the engines fan shaft when run at full-rated power that would cause it to jam into the engines stator blades, causing it to arrest. This irresponsible and inferior quality management and engineering can be seen as a root cause for the engines delay in delivery. Meanwhile, Boeing had to deal with this situation in the best way that they could. Although the problem was out of their hands, Trippe was threatening to withhold payments and even pursue legal action against Boeing for the lengthy delays their and lack of ability to meet the agreed upon performance standards. Sutter handled the situation well, realizing that he had to focus on the situation from a wider perspective. While he couldnt control the performance issues Pratt was having, he could control how the rest of the aircraft design was coming along. This stark
As was the case of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge.
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contrast in leadership between Schmickrath and Sutter further illustrates why Boeing was able to succeed in the 747 project.
4.3 FAA Certification

With only the engine problem remaining the 747 was ready for FAA certification. From the outset, the certification process was designed to be the most rigorous of any jetliner put into service. The complexity in the aircrafts design, especially in the airframe, meant that the aerodynamic tests would be of particular importance. FAA certification of any commercial aircraft entails several key tests. In one such test, known as minimum unstuck, the plane is loaded to maximum takeoff weight and must take off under the power of one engine. The purpose of such a test is to determine what the minimum runway length needed for takeoff is. The triple-slotted flaps allowed the airplane to takeoff using much less runway than would have been needed under a double-slot configuration. Another test that was performed was the rejected takeoff test, which involves bringing the airplane up to decision speed (V1) and then applying maximum breaking. The purpose of such a test is to measure minimum runway length needed to abort a takeoff. Moreover, the aircraft must sit on the ground unassisted for 5 minutes to simulate the time it would likely take for emergency crews to arrive. Once again, the 747s design ensured that this test would succeed. Although the tires were under immense stress, the 747 was fitted with fuse plugs to release the tire pressure and prevent an explosion after they caught fire (Sutter, 2006). Additional tests under varying power, thrust, normal and failure conditions, and aerodynamic forces were also performed. In the end, the 747 pulled through. Pratts engines were able to hold up with Boeings modification to eliminate ovalization, and the aircraft was fully FAA certified and cleared for delivery in a record 10 months on 30 December 1969 (March, 2008). For a system to meet its acceptance criteria to the satisfaction of all parties, it must be architected, designed, and built to do sono more and no less (Rechtin, 1991). The 747 passed testing and certification with relative ease, despite the engine and flutter issues. However, from an architectural perspective success is not defined by the passing of a series of tests, it is defined by the client. Upon delivery, the client must be satisfied that the product which they are receiving meets the specifications and standards laid out during the conceptual phase and contract signing. At the time of delivery of the first 747 to Pan Am, $2M in progress payments was being withheld by Pan Am for each plane that they had ordered. The progress payments would be made when the 747 was brought up to the agreed upon performance guarantees, as set forth in the contract (Irving, 1993). Furthermore, true system acceptance is marked by a shift in ownership, responsibility and liability from the builder to the client (McKendree, 2009, Lecture 08). Until the 747s were brought up to the agreed upon specifications the system was not truly accepted.
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5.0 Operations and 747 Variants

The probability of failure is proportional to the weight of brass in the immediate vicinity (Rechtin, 1991).
5.1 Initial Operations

Upon delivery of the first 747 to Pan Am on 31 December 1969, the airline scheduled the first flight to take place on 12 January 1970 on a transatlantic route from JFK Airport in New York City to Londons Heathrow Airport. This would be a proving flight, and as such, would not be carrying ordinary passengers. Instead, on board were Pan Am employees and invited guests (Davies, 2009). This would be an important flight because Pan Am had invested hundreds of millions of dollars as well as temporarily sacrificed agreed upon performance in order to get the 747 delivered on time. Although the 747 arrived in London with no mechanical issues, the initial departure from JFK was delayed by three hours due to a problem with the hydraulic system of one of the Pratt engines. It seemed that the engine problem was threatening to cause delays even before the first revenue-generating flight. Moreover, the engine problems persisted in London when the 747 was scheduled to give a press flight, delaying the departure for this flight by two hours, and the flight back to JFK by 23 hours (Davies, 2009). Chances for recovery from a single failure, even with complex consequences, are fairly good (Rechtin, 1991). The issue was that, while the engine problem had been satisfactorily addressed and modifications designed to eliminate engine failure, these modifications would take time to implement. Pan Am did not want to wait, and decided to accept the faulty engines in the interim while withholding partial payments to Boeing. Apparently, neither Pan Am nor Boeing felt that the problem was serious enough to delay operations. Logically, it seems that attempting to put these aircraft into service before the problem was resolved would mean lengthy delays, increased costs, passenger dissatisfaction, or even a catastrophe in flight. Perhaps this was a risk both companies were willing to take. Rechtins recovery of failure would occur very soon, as by April 1970, Pratt had shipped the modified engines to Boeing for installation on the 747s. These were delivered promptly to Pan Am, despite Japan Airlines expecting their first round of 747s as well (Kuter, 1973). Throughout the entire design and initial operation of the 747, Pan Am repeatedly reminded Boeing that they had made their progress payments and honored their part of the contract, and it was expected Boeing would do the same by delivering the aircraft that provided the agreed upon performance laid out in this contract as soon as possible. Boeing could not risk losing such a valuable client, despite the risk of losing others for not delivering their aircraft on time. This was a tough tradeoff, but Pan Am was the most influential airline in the United States at the time, and if the 747 was to succeed theyd need as much exposure as possible. It was crucial for Boeing not to get into a zero-sum game with the outside world (Rechtin, 1991).
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While Boeing was able to avoid getting into a zero-sum situation, they suffered considerable losses during initial operations. In completing modifications to all of Pan Ams 747s they had absorbed 75% of the cost (Kuter, 1973), and it took the company almost eight years to get out of the red and begin bringing in profits (Irving, 1993). In the meantime, they had to continue production, delivery, modifications to engines, and bear other development costs.
5.1.1 Public Perception, Logistics, and Socioeconomic Factors

While safety became less of a concern as the reliability issues of the JT9D engine diminished10, the economic recession in the United States took hold of peoples doubts. Many felt that the 747 was too big and that the cost of operation would be too inefficient. The reality of the situation was quite different. Size had little impact on sales, as many airlines chose to purchase the 747 in order to compete with Pan Am. Others just wanted to have a 747 in their fleet because of its perceived attraction and prestige (Sutter, 2006). Peak production reached 7 per month in 1970 (March, 2008). Moreover, per seat operating costs on the 747 were 30% lower than on any previous jet. One issue that arose during initial operations was that of multiplexing. In considering passenger comfort and taking into account the long flights that they would be enduring, entertainment was a critical component that needed to be integrated into the cabins design. In order to cut down on the weight the additional wiring would bring, multiplexing was used instead, wherein one wire shares the signal between several different sources. Unfortunately, this technology was new at the time, and failure of the multiplexing equipment was common during flight. This was just one problem that irked passengers, and other factors such as departure delays, engine problems, lost baggage, and delays due to inadequately trained personnel all contributed to a decrease in passenger satisfaction. In relation to choosing the 747 as their favorite plane to travel on, public agreement fell to 71% in the winter of 1970-71. As improvements were made in terminal and crew operations and as engines became more reliable, agreement rose to 89% in the summer of 1971 (Kuter, 1973). In relation to the heuristic, Success is defined by the beholder (Rechtin, 1991), the beholders here were the passengers. Therefore, early on in the 747s operation the passengers determined the relative success or failure of the jet. The 747, while a complex system itself, became part of a larger system upon implementation the operational system and the users influence on that system. Boeing and Pan Am realized this, and airport operations were observed carefully. Certainly, baggage handling was a big concern because it would affect how long passengers had to wait between deplaning and leaving the airport. The problem was that many of Pan Ams bases were unprepared to handle the changes that would come with accommodating an aircraft of the 747s size. Kuter (1973) makes an important observation with regard to this airport
10
Sutter (2006) points out that it took ten years before he was truly satisfied with the performance of the JT9D engine. By then, Rolls Royce and GE had competitive engines to widen client options.
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construction and modifications to airport facilities is controlled by municipal, state, and government authorities, and these authorities rarely fund changes at airports until their necessity is visible. As a result, Pan Ams airports were faced with inadequate resources to handle the 747, which resulted in the aforementioned logistical issues. In a sense, the product and the process did not match (Rechtin, 1991). The larger system (the airport) was not given the resources to allow successful operation of the smaller system (the 747). Since the smaller system will always lie within the larger one, and since the larger system did not receive adequate resources initially, it can be concluded that airport operations were bound to fail until the proper changes were made. How would one design this into the system architecture of the 747? Exogenous factors certainly need to be considered, as well as the system in a larger context, but oftentimes there is no way to avoid a potential issue or misfit. The best one can do is minimize the impact that these misfits will have on the system. One way in which Pan Am did this was by studying the mistakes and problems that occurred during the first 30 days of operations, and took measures to reduce these problems for future operations. What else could have been done though? Perhaps Boeing could have defined a standard protocol for airport operation and handling of the 747 (not sure if they did). The problem here is that the architect would then need to take into consideration the differences in each airport, such as the number of terminals, available support personnel, or amount of airport traffic. As is the case with any complex system, it can never be optimum to all parties concerned, nor all functions optimized (Rechtin, 1991).
5.2 The 747 Freighter and Other Variants

5.2.1 Sales Increase
Given the fact that Trippe demanded that Boeing not deliver the 747 to any other airline for half a year so that his company could lock in the 747 market, it appeared that the jets success would depend primarily on how Pan Ams initial operations went. Operations, for the most part, did run smoothly, and not only were initial airline orders being filled, but new orders were coming in as well from other airlines. Some figures put the increase in sales in some perspective peak production was reached in 1970 at 7 per month, the one millionth passenger was transported on 16 July 1970, just six months after the 747s introduction to service, and the one hundredth 747 was delivered on 26 February 1971, a little over one year after introduction (March, 2008). The remainder of this paper will briefly discuss the variants that were introduced over the years, and the needs of the client that brought about those variants, from an architecting perspective.
5.2.2 The 747 Variants

Complex systems will develop and evolve within an overall architecture much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate forms than if there are not (Rechtin, 1991, applied in a larger context than the original system design)
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Figure 2 summarizes the key performance specifications of the 747 variants. All numbers are taken from (March, 2008). Once the general operations of the system are implemented, the architects job is not done. Key to maintaining system success is adaptation. Given that Boeings, Pan Ams and Pratts success depended on the success of the jet, assessing client needs and desires were crucial. One variant that developed out of assessing the needs of Japan was the 100SR. Japan was seeing an increase in travel between their islands in the 1970s, and they needed an aircraft that could accommodate this increase (Sutter, 2006). However, the 747 was designed for long range travel and would prove to be little use to JAL under its existing configuration. Yet, they needed an aircraft capable of carrying more passengers than the normal 747. It seemed like a complex problem, and with the 747 being the first of its kind, no one really knew what the consequences of modification would be (Sutter, 2006). Can the 747 be redesigned for short-range travel? What effect would repeated pressurization due to increased number of flights have on the structural integrity of the aircraft? Here, as would be the case for many of the 747s future variants, the quality and versatility built in to the design from the very beginning would pay off. It turned out that only minor changes to the landing gear and internal structure needed to be made, and no significant cost in weight or operation was observed. Sutter (2006) argues that the freedom of travel created by the 747s operation in Japan contributed to their economic growth during this period. It should be noted that no freighter versions were produced with the 747-100 variant. The first freighter appeared in 1972 as the 747-200F (March, 2008). Initially, the 8-foot restriction on cargo containers limited its attractiveness to customers. While Trippe had anticipated the need for cargo carriers, time had changed the requirements of what customers had wanted. By installing a side door on the fuselage to allow side-loading of cargo, Boeing was able to increase sales significantly (March, 2008). However, sociopolitical factors would have a direct impact on the introduction of the 200 Combi(nation). Sabena, which was Belgiums national airline, had placed orders for 747 freighters. Congo, which had been under rule of Belgium, was providing the country with significant trade and travel. However, after Congo declared their independence from Belgium this trade ceased. As a result, Sabena was left with an order of 747 freighters with little use for them. It was at this time that Boeing introduced the 200C, which would allow the transport of both passengers and cargo. The 200C was eventually modified into the 200M which allowed for the simultaneous transport of both passengers and cargo, and it was this model that saw significant sales from both major airlines and airlines in smaller nations. As was mentioned earlier, the prestige and size of the 747 had attracted many of these smaller nations into purchasing a 747, even if they had little use for one (Sutter, 2006). The 200M was the best option for them economically.
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Figure 2: Selected Performance Specifications for the 747 Variants (Source of data: The Boeing 747 Story by Peter March)
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Additionally, modifications were made to the passenger model, including an increase in MTOW, payload, and range. More importantly, the 200 variant marked the point at which Rolls Royce and GE engines became competitive with Pratt and Whitneys. Eventually, Pratts engines would be seen in fewer and fewer 747s. The 747 continued to prove its versatility with the introduction of the 747SP. This model was designed to fill the gap between the 707 and the full 747 (March, 2008). Furthermore, Pan Am desired for the plane to have the range to make a non-stop flight from New York to Tokyo (Sutter, 2006). Although this would necessarily increase fuel loads, the changes needed to be made for this jet were surprisingly small the only major change was reduction in fuselage size. The simplify heuristic proved to be valuable in this instance. In order to prevent the need to develop an engine with higher thrust to account for the higher fuel loads, Boeing simply cut off 48 from the fuselage. Rechtin (1991) advises, In new missions and markets, expect the unexpected. This proved to be true with the 747SP. While only 45 orders were placed, it opened up the market to more countries who had long routes to serve, but didnt want to initially commit to the full capacity 747 (Sutter, 2006). From an architecting perspective, Sutter (2006) alludes to the importance of constantly assessing clients needs and seeking ways to improve on the systems architecture when he says,
In manufacturing, youll do better in the long run if you look beyond an individual models sales to see what it does for your overall product line (p. 223).
Operational success depended on exposing the 747 to as many clients as possible, and if necessary, modifying the original architecture to fit a particular clients needs. This is the key reason the 747 succeeded in the long run. Watch out for the intermediate systems. They may be traps instead of useful system niches (Rechtin, 1991). The above heuristic was certainly true in the case of the 747-300 variant. It was designed with the intent of carrying up to 660 passengers, but its lack of range under those conditions resulted in many airlines choosing a 450 seat configuration. Coupled with an economic recession, the aircraft saw few sales and featured marginal improvement over the 200 series (March, 2008). It is clear that additional research should have went into the proposed design changes. Had Boeing inquired as to what the airlines had wanted, and sought out whether there was a market for the 300 variant, perhaps they would have saved time and money by opting out of its introduction. It should be noted that the 300 variant was the first to utilize a full double-deck configuration, and replaced the spiral staircase was replaced with a square one (Sutter, 2006). By far, the variant with the most changes and which has been the most successful to this day is the 747-400. Its success can be attributed to several factors, including close client consultation, upgraded technology, and lighter materials which resulted in better performance. The need for redesign was evident, as other major companies such as McDonnell-Douglas and Airbus were
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developing long-range airliners with more powerful engines (March, 2008). After consulting major airlines, it was determined that the entire flight deck would be redesigned, implementing the latest digital avionics. The introduction of electronic instrument display also eliminated the need for a flight engineer, thus reducing the cockpit crew from three to two. Weight reduction was achieved through alloy wings and carbon brakes. Expansion in wingspan and addition of fuel capacity resulted in higher altitude and longer range. The 400 has seen several sub derivatives, including the 400D for domestic flights in Japan, the 400ER for US-Australia routes, and the 400ERF freighter for Air France (March, 2008). Moreover, the 747 has been configured for various military uses and is most widely known as the aircraft that transports the shuttle from alternate landing sites back to Florida. It even saw failed attempts to be utilized as a fire-fighting and oil transport aircraft, the former which failed to gain FAA certification and the latter which failed due to environmental opposition. Reflecting on these variants, it seems that the ones that succeeded were introduced when there was a market need, necessary technology upgrade, or special utility. The ones that did not succeed failed due to falling into the niche trap, public opposition, or lack of certification. Regardless of which failed, which succeeded, or what the associated cause was, Sutter makes one point very clear:
From the beginning the 747 was intended to be versatile. That is why she adjusted to new technologies and our customers requirements over the decades. This flexibility contributed towards the planes success and makes it legendary (Attributed to Sutter, in (March, 2008), p. 78).
6.0 The Future of the 747

The 747s versatility continues even to this day, 40 years after its introduction. Recently, there has been much publicity in relation the 747-8, Boeings latest variant. The 747-8 promises to be quitter and more economical than any other 747 in operation, both past and present. Central to the 747-8s innovative design is the use of composite materials, which, coupled with General Electrics GEnx engines, promises to improve fuel consumption by 16% (March, 2008). Additional intercontinental range and freighter variants are also planned. Because of these major changes, Sutter believes that the 747-8 will share the same success as the 747-400:
I think the 747-8 is going to be just as popular as the 747-400the impression that the 747-8 is an interim airplane should be really discounted. It's a first-line airplane that's going to last 15-20 years (Attributed to Sutter from (Boeing, 2009)).
And after that?

the market always changes. The airlines want more. There are more needed. So I think that in 15 or 20 years you might see an even larger, more capable 747 being built (Sutter, from (Boeing, 2009)).
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To apply a heuristic from (Rechtin, 1991), the key lesson for the architect, then, is to never stop talking about the system. The architect needs constantly keep an eye out for what is going on in the market. What are the customers current needs? How will this new proposed model be used? Will it fail to find a niche like the 747-300, or does the client or the market need something that warrants significant redesign, thus making it a success like the 747-400? In short, the architect needs to assess the needs of the client and search for ways of improving the design to meet those needs.
7.0 Conclusion: Success and a Sense of Timing

Wealth is knowledge and knowing how, where, when, and why to use it (Rechtin, 1991). Beyond the revolutionary changes the 747 has brought to efficient, long range, safe and comfortable travel, it also brings lessons on how to make a system succeed even under extreme circumstances. It brings lessons on how a vision, when pursued with persistence, charisma, and optimism, can overcome limiting circumstances such as schedule and funding constraints. This vision began within Boeing at the start of the jet age, and has continued to persist to this day through their foundational principle that the company should build a family of jetliners that would cover the spectrum of the existing markets and perhaps open up new ones (Sutter, 2006). Key to the 747s success was its architect, Joe Sutter. Chosen to be the project leader only because Boeings top engineers were working on the SST, he admits that he was in the right place the right time (Sutter, 2006). However, Sutter wasnt the only one in the right place at the right time, and due credit has to be given to Trippe. Irving (1993) states that Pan Ams standards for being the best airline in the business ensured that extremely high quality would be built into the system. Trippe also had a keen sense of knowledge which led him to realize that a high capacity, long range jet would be needed very soon. He provided Boeing with a financial reason to build the airplane, and he persisted even through the slips in schedule and performance. Perhaps what makes this client-builder relationship so unique was the sense of awareness that both leaders had in relation to the planes utility and future success, and their determination to see it succeed. Irving (1993) also states that,
Douglasdecided to satisfy a market that was there; Boeing decidedto create a market a market that could only be defined by the airplane itself (p. 229).
Sustained creativity is necessary for survival of an industrial system in todays world. (Creativity requires) having grand visions that extend beyond ones life.
-Both quotations attributed to Behrokh Khoshnevis, SAE 549 Lecture on 17 Nov 2009
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In creating the 747 market, both leaders had the creativity to realize that change was inevitable, and that in order to succeed in satisfying future customer demands, an aircraft that would revolutionize long distance air travel was necessary. Morover, in order to ensure its success long into the future its design had to be of the highest quality. It had to be versatile enough to survive changes in technology, utility, and market need. Although no one could have imagined at the time of 747 creation that the concept of SST would fail to takeoff, they knew that, at least through cargo transport, it would have utility for years to come. Now, forty years later new derivatives continue to be conceived and built. It would not be unreasonable to expect the 747 to stay in service for another forty years. Whatever occurs, one thing is certain the 747, built on a solid architecture and lead by a quality architect, was successful, and as Rechtin (1991) points out, Theres nothing like being the first success.
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Reference List Works Cited

Irving, Clive. (1993). Wide-body: The triumph of the 747. New York, NY: William Morrow & Company, Inc. Khoshnevis, Behrokh. (2009, November 17). Guest lecture on creativity, SAE 549. Los Angeles, CA. Kuter, Laurence S. (1973). The great gamble. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. March, Peter R. (2008). The Boeing 747 story. Stroud, UK: The History Press. Marx, W., Mavris, D., & Schrage, D. (1994). Knowledge-based manufacturing and structural design for a high speed civil transport. 1st Industry/Academy Symposium on Research for Future Supersonic and Hypersonic Vehicles, McKendree, Thomas. (2009, October 13). Lecture 08, SAE 549. Los Angeles, CA. Norris, Guy. (1997). Boeing 747: Design and development since 1969 (jetliner history). Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing Company. Rechtin, Eberhardt. (1991). Systems architecting: Creating and building complex systems. New Jersey: Prentice Hall PTR. Sutter, Joe. (2006). 747: Creating the worlds first jumbo jet and other adventures from a life in aviation. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Tinseth, Randy. (2006). Father still knows best. Retrieved 29 October 2009, from: http://boeingblogs.com/randy/archives/2006/08/father_still_knows_best.html
Other useful references obtained during research

Air Accident Investigation Board. (n.d.). AAIB report on the accident to Boeing 747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988. Accessed 19 October 2009, from: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/dft_avsafety_pdf_503158.pdf Beaverstock, C. S., Maheri, A., Richardson, T. S., Lowenberg, M. H., & Isikveren, A. T. (2009). Methods for conceptual flight control system design. 47th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting Including the New Horizons Forum and Aerospace Exposition (Disc 1), Boeing. (n.d.). 747 timeline. Accessed 24 October 2009, from: http://www.boeing747.com/747_timeline.php
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Boeing. (n.d.). Boeing 747 model summary through October 2009. Accessed on 29 October 2009, from: http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/displaystandardreport.cfm?cboCurrentModel=747& optReportType=AllModels&cboAllModel=747&ViewReportF=View+Report. Boeing. (n.d.). History: 747 commercial transport. Boeing. Retrieved 12 October 2009, from: http://www.boeing.com/history/boeing/747.html Boeing 747. (2009, November 29). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved 14 November 2009, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_747 Gilliland, B. (2008). Test flying the world's fastest airplane. 2008 IEEE Aerospace Conference, , 97-8,. Glancey, Jonathan. (2009, February 16). Classics of everyday design no. 59: Boeing 747. Accessed on 03 November 2009, from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2009/feb/16/classic-design-boeing-747 Ingells, Douglas J. (1970). 747: Story of the Boeing super jet. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers. List of Boeing 747 operators. (2009, November 21). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved on 17 November 2009, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Boeing_747_operators. Lu, R. F. (2002). Manufacturing process modeling of Boeing 747 moving line concepts. Proceedings of the 2002 Winter Simulation Conference (Cat.no.02CH37393), 1 Maier, Mark W., & Rechtin, Eberhardt. (2000). The art of systems architecting, second ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Rahmani, S. (1992). Rapid prototyping via automatic software code generation from formal specifications: A case study. 1992 IEEE Aerospace Applications Conference Digest (Cat.no.92TH0401-0), , 95-105,. Rumerman, Judy. (n.d.). Boeings post-war aviation activities. U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission. Accessed on 17 November 2009, from: http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Aerospace/Boeing_postwar_comm/Aero20.htm. Straub, H. H. (1991). Boeing 747-400 upper rudder control system with triple tandem valve. SAE Special Publications, n 885, p 31-40, Sep 1991, Advanced Aerospace Hydraulic Systems and Components
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A Revolutionary Gamble - Architecting The Boeing 747 Jumbo Jet

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A Revolutionary Gamble - Architecting The Boeing 747 Jumbo Jet

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA VITERBI SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING

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2.2 Early Requirements Definitions

2.2.3 Balancing Market Demands with Client Intentions

3.0 Design of the 747 3.1 A Note on Quality in Design

3.2 Manufacturing and Logistics

3.3 Wing Design

3.4 Weight Problem

3.5 Struggle for Engine Performance

3.6 Safety, Redundancy, and Fault Tree Analysis

3.7 Another Comment on Ultraquality

Describe severed hydraulics issue in San Francisco

3.8 Interior Layout and Passenger Comfort

3.9 Sociopolitical and Economic Concerns

4.0 Testing and Certification 4.1 Production Wraps Up

4.2 Flight Testing

As was the case of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge.

4.3 FAA Certification

5.0 Operations and 747 Variants

5.1 Initial Operations

5.1.1 Public Perception, Logistics, and Socioeconomic Factors

5.2 The 747 Freighter and Other Variants

5.2.2 The 747 Variants

6.0 The Future of the 747

And after that?

7.0 Conclusion: Success and a Sense of Timing

Reference List Works Cited

Other useful references obtained during research

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