EN BANC

[G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008]

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION,
LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ
AND MARIAN TIMBAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BR. 5 KALIBO, SHERIFF NELSON DELA
CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF THE RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
STATIONED IN BORACAY ISLAND, REPRESENTED BY THE PNP STATION COMMANDER,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18TH DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO
SANSON MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and
4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[1]
and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[2]) is the petition for certiorari and
for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners
against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5,
Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National
Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable
Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T.
Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private
respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the
"MCTC") a complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay
Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz
Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does
numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio
Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed
land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private
respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the
disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal
of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5] in the private
respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private
respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's
Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have

submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in
question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter
as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14
years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the
claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a
Deed of Sale (Annex `A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction
of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual
physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the
defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a
portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein
prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L.
Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of their confrontation, the parties
signed an Agreement (Annex `D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed
portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when
the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006,
the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other
John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises
along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex `E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot
in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs'
Certification (Annex `F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April
19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their
Certificate to File Action (Annex `G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that `prior to January 4, 2005, they were already
occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by
open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p.
25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter
fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report
and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual
physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted
therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the
possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession
must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on
April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex `D',
Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the
commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in
question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after
there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses,
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their

Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- `144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated `that on or about April 19, 2006, a
group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents.
These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused
to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April
18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers
the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached
as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built
and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to
the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in
question prior to April 19, 2006[6]."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of
Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance
conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ[7] - authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del
Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied
with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the
private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to
Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007[8].
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9] The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15)
days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to
allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition
for Review[11] (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory
Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12]
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008.
The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions
diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners
maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the
private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into
the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their

shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants
were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to
protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the
defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y
GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the
HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely
IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant
violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated
by the use of high-powered weapons.
[...]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue
because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are
influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and
the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested
by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses
in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.[13]"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible
entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case
in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the
assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be
originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where
the MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and
could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in
substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is
fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that
the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review
of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never
disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA
petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that
the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were
received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April
29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present

petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at
least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days[15] from receipt of
the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for
reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of
Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"[16] ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in
the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION
not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their
counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present
petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the
counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008
date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that
exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA
petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an
administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order
on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the
material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly
assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows.[17]
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of
willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum
shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA
- G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought
the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date
and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the
case moot and academic since the CA refused to
resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition
despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."[18]
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the
same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO
VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being
the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto;
(underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same
had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level
is replete with significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners'
act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this
date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent
to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into

action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had
already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition,
the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The
petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders
before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different
mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can
sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined
application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7;
Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may
have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a
forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed
interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order
has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and
deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may
also constitute direct contempt."[20]
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one
(1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary
Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as
petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty
or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as
opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the
property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the
property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictal are accion
publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion
reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the
petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction
may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed
value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible
entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present
petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation
of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ
and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the
issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."[22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and
to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These
allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id.,
petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the
private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.)
committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's
affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the
incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the
altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including
the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by
Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession
of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been
alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing
and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat
to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia
Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by
Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one
Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was
"accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible
entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly
complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after
examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and
based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with
incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled
upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much
later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on
interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as
the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of
terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the
petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry
the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the
RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators,
clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo
is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify
before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this
from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum

shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and
amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure,
when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the
use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of
amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari
process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the
present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the
institution of separate actions,[24] for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25] and for the
consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal
and civil action.[26] These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with
petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and
directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that
the right to life, liberty or security - the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a
pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence
of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of;
and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ ... ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may
release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence
employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with
copy of the same;

[ ... ]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police
[PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the
land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the
PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security.
The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under
the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts
made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of
drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas
data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., and Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,

- versus -

RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 180906

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind
secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The
constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the
rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 19[1] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both
questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)[2] filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23,
2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought
ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and
Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)[3] of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August
24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not
limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and
(2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed
under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect
on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein

respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule
and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court,
after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just
and equitable reliefs.[8]
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition
under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file
with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of
the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00
p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners
(herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF
are hereby REQUIRED:
1.
To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all
official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already on file herein;
2.
To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3.
To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a
list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of
respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express
and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein
respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14,
2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a
meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not
able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers
when he passed by the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and
army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his
mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him
on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of
his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and
face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but

three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.[12]

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were
all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also
recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While
he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo
Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before
being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of
captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie
Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who
entered his house and abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old.
Another one of his abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years
old.[14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to
sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the
person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van stopped several times until they finally
arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the
doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes.
After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to
be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New Peoples
Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned
where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had
helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who
beat him up would salute them, call them sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds
when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the
blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of
the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather
shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents abduction.[16] While
these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the
soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents.
During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.[17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping
and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of
wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some
parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could
hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room.
Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill
him.[18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk,
then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them
came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the
window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he
used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and
an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where
he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He reached the
highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and

caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was
Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They
poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she
wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was
returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were
treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when
respondents guards got drunk.[21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room
enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did
everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He
counted that eighteen people[22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother
Reynaldo and himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay.
They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the
bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
DTU.[24]
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and
eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they
replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains
in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and
gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them
the results of respondents urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through
the master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in
the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen.
Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.[25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and
several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario
and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men.[26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on
board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan
for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were
brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit.
Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in
the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then
asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond
responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.
[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa
akin?

Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat
sundin nyo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga
rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang
at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa
gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise.
At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that abducted
them - brought them to their parents house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo
stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers,
Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymonds
parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they continued to join human
rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back
to Sapang.[29]
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking
with the four masters who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When Gen.
Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood
outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to
take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at
Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are
on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.[31] During
his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.[32]
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan.
The medicine, named Alive, was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a
box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were
getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they
felt heavy upon waking up.[33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang.
Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a
military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata,
one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and
civilians.[34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the
24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren
went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was
removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.[35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the
barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many
soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In
one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a
student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided
that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go
home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to
do the laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two
other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the
room with Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called master or
commander by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the
adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten
up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were

threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.[37]

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that
they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their renewed life.
Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to
instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila.
Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September
2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and
holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry
Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.[38]
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were
transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in
the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed
with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up
and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in
the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.[39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other
soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They
were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man
doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the
NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.[40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog,
Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived,
only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son
right before Raymonds eyes.[41]
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to
Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired
army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do
errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.[42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo,
and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what
he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na
inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming
makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga
bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy sinunog. Masansang
ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong
sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo
habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa
labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa
kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila
iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga
bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan
nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila
sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin
daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan.
Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga
sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang
sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si
Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay
magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.
[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to
raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for
which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a
small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were
instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they
stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and
they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor
how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived
nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some
more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of
them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the
head of the guards. Respondents house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was
no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts
had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When
none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the
highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for
Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as
they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from
their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded
with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was
detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely
beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With
a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no
longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang,

Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in
the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the
name Rodel and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in
San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was
also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In
these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan,
but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed
by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, Welcome to Camp
Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action
Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture
was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the
respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent
with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on
August 15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and the results thereof were reduced into
writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul
Protocol in conducting the examination.[47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and torture. In
compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of
Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly
abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This
is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents
before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the
7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ On July
4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon,
Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic)
Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at
Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to
establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated
June 27, 2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers,
although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and
ordered them to release the latter.[48]
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner)
Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and
was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations,
neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and
agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8.

In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I

have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d)
of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance Likewise, in a Memorandum
Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of
Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo
is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and
(6)

to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.[49]

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of
the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have
caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to
Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A
Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by
the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished
Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition
for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan
and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish
the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those
responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the
commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.[50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC)
PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan,
Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion
detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan

and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay,
Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the
Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were
informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such
beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain
Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.[51]
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj.
Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons
implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return
and would be subsequently submitted.[52]
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U.
Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay,
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora,
Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.[53] The 24th Infantry Battalion
is part of the 7th Infantry Division.[54]
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th
Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,[55] through his Assistant Chief of Staff,[56] to
investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit,
namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka
Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy
Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative
liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was
initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General
saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned
about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.[58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute
sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation
started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.[60] The investigating officer,
Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that
day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there
other witnesses summoned and investigated[61] as according to Jimenez, the directive to him
was only to investigate the six persons.[62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.[63] The six persons were
not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.[64] During the entire time that
he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not
propound a single question to the six persons.[65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their
statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30,

2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66]
When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation
report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.[67]
He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.[68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their
evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who
were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil
court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula
Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
B) states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the
concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat.
He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan
about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he
was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and
that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and
CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said
victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit C) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged
abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that
on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed
nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on
other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject
CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated
him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit O)
states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of
CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware
about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the
CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN: Rolando
Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy.
Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident
when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated
him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando
Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on
the abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit E)
states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he
knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he
was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed
only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were
being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why
they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family
particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando
Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who
killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit F)
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a
farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are
active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any
participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident
when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated
because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit G)
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the
Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their
barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are
active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and
he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter.
He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the
abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal
to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of
linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that
transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the
killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will
not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge.
As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first
place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGUs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.

V.

CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of
abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this
investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or
criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from
the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.[69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts assessment of the
foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND
GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING

RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S)
AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS;
AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,
RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED
AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST
OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial
Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit
was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides of the political
and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system[72] participated in
mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the
Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which

made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime.[74] As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[75] On the
other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection in Spanish.
[77] In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred
great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many
Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for
his native state, Yucatan,[79] which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation
of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.[80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.[81] If, after
hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he
orders the official, or the officials superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary
measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus
combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce
the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using
this power to make law for the entire nation.[82]
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving
into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.[83] It became, in the
words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos self-attributed
task of conveying to the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity,
her own painful history conceived.[84] What began as a protection against acts or omissions of
public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo
libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo
contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the
judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo
for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants rights derived from the agrarian reform process.[85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military
juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut
of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.[86] Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to
some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.[87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of
amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second

paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for
the judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the
amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is
comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
[88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its
roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through
remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas
corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required
to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common
law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human
rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and
threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner;
it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability
for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.
In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order[92] to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from
depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,[93]
prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and
other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and
Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October
24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more
effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The
Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners first
argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and
credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and selfserving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners
cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the
degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they
escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents
were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the
following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.[96]
(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel.[97] May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan
kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang kapitbahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na
nakatira sa malapit na lugar.[100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond
Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners
(herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the
six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their
attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and
residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure
that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who
drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the
petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were
looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best,
merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused
on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to
the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but
even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU

auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated

Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he
was aware of the petitioners captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command.
In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he
(Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted
them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners
during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction
of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division
(Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr.,
member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could not, indeed,
be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which
the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision
of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which
the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also
attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners,
one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and
conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for
at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with
Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house
inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D,
rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario
and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners parents,
where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not
to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again
see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo,
pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata
and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required
Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other
occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel
like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the
abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.[101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymonds affidavit
and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony
and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left
by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate respondents accounts of
the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the
facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt.
Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit,[104] firms up respondents story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant
Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this
case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions
findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral,
made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her
recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.[107] She was also examined by a medical doctor whose
findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her
cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.
[108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal
will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their
credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or
landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no
quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit
that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in
every sense of the word[109] as their movements continue to be restricted for fear that people
they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still
at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to
life, liberty and security.[110] (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat
of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point out that this right is often
associated with liberty; it is also seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against
torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly
mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free from
torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places[112] fall under the
general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that
the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the
State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a
liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v.
Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue
restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report under
unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty[115] or being put under
monitoring and surveillance.[116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to
life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including the extensions of his/her
person houses, papers, and effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits
the states power over a persons home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself.[117] The purpose of this provision was enunciated by
the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security
of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to
the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his
privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the
best causes and reasons.[119] (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] guarantees essentially the right to be
alive[121] - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of
person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a
right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a
powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence.[122]
In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of
life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[123]
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed
as the highest aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate
that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right.[124] It is the right to security of person as the word security itself
means freedom from fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to

the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;
threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or
past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the
right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with
violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right
to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.[127]
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones
body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in
the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably,
in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to
the bodily integrity or security of a person.[129]
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When
employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate
incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as
the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in
the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not
even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was
made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.
[130] In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had
physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other
hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found
baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time
when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security
and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx

xxx

xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural
obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis
supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a
statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to
security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions
is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and
security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right
to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article
III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.[133] As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez
Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed
by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the
truth by the government.[135]
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has
been interpreted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases
involving Article 9[137] of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction
with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person
can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a
deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v.
Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in
Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of
paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest
and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did
indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security
of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant.
Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in
article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security
only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have
undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a
matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just
because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an
obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of
article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained
persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139]
(emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and

prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his

movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the
Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,[141] involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state;
Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the complainants husband who was a
supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving the murder of the
complainants partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation
of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,[144] involving an assassination attempt on the chairman
of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to
security not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive
duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.[145] The ECHR interpreted the right
to security of person under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the
leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case, the claimants son
had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The familys requests for
information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested
that this was a violation of her sons right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive
and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of
Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that
individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this
reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into
an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.[147]
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now
determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty
and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. In Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with
gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call
from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has
come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were
released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled
that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in
a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw
pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga
sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.[148]
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in
detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they
have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and
torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and

protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat
vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.[149] Precisely
because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be
expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written
threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of
amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the
failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of
petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and onesided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU
and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the
investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not
propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did
not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family
or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum
Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of
Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a
competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of
the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification
of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location
and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a
competent court.[150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that
he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on
this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the
purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to
respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been
furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a
writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that
there is a violation of respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated
by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and
protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of

M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports,
records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and
civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order
sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that
the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the
production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there
exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than
the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his
unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only
mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the
relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present
case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule
should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the
unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of
the people such as respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or
things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part,
viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books
of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,[153] the respondent judge, under
authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among
others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the
issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court
struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot
be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results
of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo
has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the
present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as
the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary
in the resolution of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily
compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and

even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators
behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by
avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these
military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation
and action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in
securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical
interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are
snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is
a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA,
Petitioners,

versus

NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 182795

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,*
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,**
NACHURA, ***
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 5, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the
following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and
embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and
Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only
solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules the RULE
ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO.[1]
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of
filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and
spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these
so-called syndicates clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the squatting
syndicates - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be
the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges. If unabated
would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this
Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer
for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to
answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the
hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme

Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the Private
Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.[2]
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the
second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore,
Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be
treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible
issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable
Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the
powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own
previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of
merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.[3]
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this
case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the
remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still
have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to
life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in
the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been
threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless
there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only
if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
SECTION 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued
and the petition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and
security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions
of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not
covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, LT. GEN. VICTOR
S. IBRADO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A. VILLANUEVA,
Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
Petitioners,

- versus -

CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA MEDINA,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 186640
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 11, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On December 28, 2007, respondent Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this Court a petition
docketed as G.R. No. 180839 for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and
Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Gen. Esperon), the then Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
On January 2, 2008, the Court[1] resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon
to make a verified return of the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who was
ordered to hear and decide the case which was eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010
WR/A.
Cleofas amended her petition[2] on January 14, 2008 to include herein co-respondent Marciana
Medina (Marciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers[3]
including Lt. Ali Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt. Gil Villalobos[4] (Sgt. Villalobos) as therein
additional respondents.
In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on September
17, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were
catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around
1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18, 2006, Nicolas wives Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez,
who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by;
that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and
Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as
bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials.
Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on
September 19, 2006 to the Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Accompanied
by officials of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),[5] they also tried to
search for Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the 71st Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo
Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail.
Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina
Galang (Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside
Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on
September 21, 2006, whom Josephine later identified as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after
respondents had shown her their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that she saw
the victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006,[6] this time at the Camp of the
Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, where she had
occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on December 21,
2006 before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which endorsed[7] the same to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on
account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo,
the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain
military camps,[8] the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition
of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[9]
Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the Writ,[10] verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt. Sumangil, Sgt.
Villalobos, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as Commander of the Armys 7th
Infantry Division, and Lt. Col. Victor Bayani (Lt. Col. Bayani) as Camp Commander of Camp
Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in Tarlac City, was filed with the appellate court on January 24,
2008. Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano), Commanding General of the Army, filed a Return

of the Writ upon his return from an official trip abroad.

In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the
proper remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
since the petitions ultimate objective was the production of the bodies of the victims, as they
were allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military personnel;[11] that the petition failed to
indicate the matters required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from
being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative; that respondents failed to
present the affidavits of some other competent persons which would clearly validate their claim
that the military violated the victims right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them;
and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military
officers with respect to their duties; or allege that respondents took any action by filing a formal
complaint or visiting the military camps adverted to in order to verify Josephines claim that she
saw the victims on two different occasions inside the camps, or that they took efforts to follow up
on the PNP Capas Stations further action on their complaint.[12]
Denying he violated the victims right to life, liberty and security, Gen. Esperon specifically
asserted that, in compliance with the Defense Secretarys directive in relation to cases of Writ of
Amparo against the AFP, he issued directives to the Nolcom Commander and the Armys
Commanding General to investigate and establish the circumstances surrounding reported
disappearances of victims insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the military units
was concerned; and undertook to bring any military personnel involved, when warranted by the
evidence, to the bar of justice.[13]
Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the whereabouts of the
victims, stating that it was not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility,[14] and
that he was away on official business at the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.[15]
Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp Commander only on September 1, 2007
and thus had no personal knowledge about the victims alleged disappearance or abduction on
September 18, 2006; that he was informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were
detained in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities; and that in compliance with Gen.
Esperons directive, their command was conducting further investigation to verify the allegations
in the petition.[16]
Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September 24, 2006, on
which date civilians were not allowed to enter except on official missions or when duly authorized
to conduct transactions inside the camp. He thus concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to
have seen the two victims inside the Camp of the Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Batallion
inside Hacienda Luisita on September 24, 2006 or at any time thereafter. He instead recounted
that on September 24, 2006, he spoke for the first and only time, but only at the gate of the camp,
with a person who identified herself as Antonina Galang, who informed him about the
disappearance of the victims since September 18, 2006. Warning him that these men were
members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), she advised him not to entertain any queries or
complaints relative to their alleged disappearance.[17]
Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangils disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or
meeting anyone named Josephine Victoria, or about the latter having entered the camps kitchen
to drink water.
Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately
inquired on the actions taken on the case. He averred that he had never participated directly or
indirectly; or consented, permitted or sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He
declared that it had always been his policy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law,
and to bring those who violated the law before the court of justice.

In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers
posited that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military
camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of the nature of a search warrant, such that the
requisites for the issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their issuance. They went on to
argue that such request relied solely on bare, self-serving and vague allegations contained in
Josephines affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she saw Nicolas and Heherson on
board an army truck near the Nolcom gate and, days later, inside the kitchen of the 71st Infantry
Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while logging outside said camp, Josephine had
stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places where she allegedly saw Nicolas and
Heherson.[18]
On whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly connected with the
disappearance of the victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed
Decision of September 17, 2008,[19] Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt.
Col. Bayani for lack of evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows:
All said, this Court is convinced that petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established
any direct or indirect link between respondents individual military officers and the disappearances
of Nicolas and Heherson. Neither did the concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully
their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of justice.
The concerned Philippine Army units (such as the Northern Command and the 7th Infantry
Division, which had jurisdiction over the place of disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, should
exert extraordinary diligence to follow all possible leads to solve the disappearances of Nicolas
and Heherson. The Philippine Army should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the
protector of the people and the State.
RELIEFS
While as We stated hereinbefore that We could not find any link between respondents individual
military officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that
the two men are still missing. Hence, We find it equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the
interest of human rights and justice as follows:
1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any
military camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City,
within reasonable working hours of any day except when the military camp is on red alert status.
2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine
Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay
to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas
and Heherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written
report to this Court within three (3) months from notice.
SO ORDERED.[20] (underscoring supplied)
The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Motion), arguing in the main that
since respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the
appellate court should not have granted those reliefs.[21]
The appellate court denied the Motion by the assailed Resolution of March 3, 2009.[22]
Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen. Alexander Yano,[23] Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado,[24] and
Maj. Gen. Ralph Villanueva[25] (petitioners) filed the present petition for review of the appellate

courts assailed issuances, faulting it for

. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR
PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. . . . [AND] . . . DIRECTING
PETITIONERS TO:
(A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO, NORTH LUZON
COMMAND, PHILIPPINE ARMY, SAN MIGUEL, TARLAC CITY AND ANY MILITARY CAMP OF
THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION LOCATED IN AQUA FARM, HACIENDA LUISITA, TARLAC CITY;
AND.
(B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES, FILE CHARGES AGAINST THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT
WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM NOTICE.[26] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on
the basis of the credibility of Josephine as a witness. It arrived at the following findings:
To prove that these two military officers took or have custody of Nicolas and Heherson, petitioners
presented Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang, a niece of petitioner
Cleofas Sanchez neighbor, who allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson inside Camp Servillano
Aquino on September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a certain Major Henry Galang, who is
allegedly living inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw Nicolas and Heherson at
Aqua Farm at Hacienda Luisita, where the camp of Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Battalion
is located and where Heherson was seen sweeping the floor and Nicolas was seen cooking,
having wounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a gunshot wound; that on
November 1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt. Sumangil to give her a cellfone which Tech.
Sgt. Villalobos handed to her for her to know where Nicolas and Heherson will be brought; that
they [sic] saw the two outside getting some woods under the watchful eye of a soldier when
Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being slow and thereafter, she did not see the two anymore.
While Josephine Galang Victorias story of how she saw the subject two missing persons (Nicolas
and Heherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her credibility as a witness had been
successfully destroyed by the following witnesses presented by the respondents.
1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that she knows a certain
woman named Josephine Galang Victoria who introduces herself as Antonina Galang, niece
through the cousin of his wife and a long-time resident of Cut-Cut II since birth until she lived with
her partner Philip Victoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or siblings house; that he
knows the reputation of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her truthfulness
and integrity, known to fool others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be
trusted even if she is under oath before God and the State.
2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang Mansalay testified that she is a resident of Cut-Cut II
since birth in 1964 and she knows Josephine Galang Victoria because she is her niece being the
daughter of her older brother; that she even took care of Antonina as a child but her general
reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, known to fool others, a liar and
invent [sic] stories for reason of money.

3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of Cut-cut II and Antonina Galang is a
niece and attested the same negative reputations against Antonina.
It appears that said negative testimonies of Josephine Galang Victorias relatives were never
successfully rebutted by her and the Court gives credence to them. No ill motive [sic] were
established against the said witnesses to testify against Antonina Galang.
Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she was in Camp Servillano Aquino when she first saw
Nicolas and Heherson riding in an army truck because she was visiting her uncle, Major Henry
Galang, allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of Antonina Galang was put to
doubt. TSG Edgard Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Major Galang was
no longer residing there in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of TSG Reyes only
bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on Antonina Galangs penchant to invent stories
or tell a lie.
In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims of Antonina Galang that the two
missing person [sic] she saw first in Camp Servillano Aquino and later, in Aqua Farm, were
Nicolas and Heherson. Notably, Antonina Galang never did see the faces of the two but were
known to her through photographs. Certainly, there may be a difference between photographs
and the faces in person.
To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestation that
they saw Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those armed men who passed their place in
the early morning of September 18, 2006.[27] (underscoring supplied)
NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate courts
September 17, 2008 Decision.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot
assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do
is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the
purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of
the court a quo or raised in the appellants assignment of errors or arguments.[28]
This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to
avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the
parties, and aid the court in making its determinations. A party who fails to acquire complete relief
from a decision of the court has various remedies to correct an omission by the court. He may
move for a correction or clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through ordinary
appeal. There is thus no basis for the Court to skip the rule and excuse herein respondents for
failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties contentions that
have remained disputed.[29]
What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether
the grant of the RELIEFS[30]
by the appellate court after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof necessary to
prove either partys claim, viz:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claim by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. - The Court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to
have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving
amparo petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that
standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the
appellate courts decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review.
Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary
diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in
safeguarding every citizens constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[31]
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not
relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or
inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move
and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs.
In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the
courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and
preserve all relevant evidence, viz:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the
court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may
order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of
keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that
may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing,
may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit
entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by
affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit
of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and
the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of
its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing,
may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or
electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to
produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order
the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The
reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners
could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.
Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs
granted by the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify the
appellate courts judgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding
thereto an order for the production of logbooks and reports.[32]
At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise
of praying for affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted
to a party who did not appeal.[33]
If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court was merely
interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court, but they did not.
They could have opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it
being a prohibited pleading[34] under the Amparo Rule, but they did not.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 17, 2008 Decision and March
3, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs
are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,

MELISSA C. ROXAS,
Petitioner,

-versus-

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR.

GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA
CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 189155
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
September 7, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 26 August
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced
jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data
Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection
order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to
the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to
Petitioners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently
related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order
and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although
there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of
the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless,
ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting
those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner
and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and
coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.[3]
We begin with the petitioners allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.[4] While in the United States,
petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.[5] During the
course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in
April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac[6] in conducting an initial health
survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.[7]
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, IPOD,[8] wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and
medicines.[9]
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus
Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.[10] At around 1:30
in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud

sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.[11]
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.[12] The armed men were all in
civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their
faces.[13]
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied
her hands.[14] At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc,
already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout
her name.[15] Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the
vanbruising her arms, legs and knees.[16] Once inside the van, but before she can be
blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her.[17]
The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.[18] Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were
ordered to alight.[19] After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound
of its metal doors.[20] From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes
taking off and landing and some construction bustle.[21] She inferred that she was taken to the
military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.[22]
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.[23] The thrust of
the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of
returning to the fold.[24] The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing
and suffocating the petitioner.[25]
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.[26] Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath,
during which she became acquainted with a woman named Rose who bathed her.[27] There
were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.
[28]
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of
her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as Dex, James and RC.[29] RC even
told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group, and that
she was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.[30]
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon
City.[31] Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a
SIM[32] card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,[33] a plastic bag
containing biscuits and books,[34] the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.[35]
Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something
untoward will happen to her and her family.[36]
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone
given to her.[37] Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the
safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.[38] Petitioner
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy
as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC.[39]

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or
even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of
detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents
be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but
not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es
prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the
records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa
Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to
petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk,
IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.[40]
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.[41] The
Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return.[42]
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs[43] on
behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as stage managed.[44]
In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr.
Paolo, as contained in the Special Report[45] of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report,
Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions
instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.[46] From this statement, the public
respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house,
nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they
were supposedly abducted.[47] This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if
ever there was any abduction it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the
consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.[48]
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate[49] of the petitioner, as actually belying her
claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted
that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that
could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in
her wrists and knee caps.[50]
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of
petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein.
Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a
charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time,
bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents.[51]
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents
insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds:
(a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her
immunity from suit,[52] and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the
absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least
authorized, the commission of such atrocities.[53]
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the
truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.[54] In both the police and military arms of the
government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:

Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the
afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz
Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay
Kapanikian.[55] Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.[56]
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner
Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his house.
[57] Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, and
was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.[58]
Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with
an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.[59]
At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to
the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van
and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.[60]
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report[61] that
was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt.
Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional
Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.[62] Follow-up investigations were, at the same
time, pursued.[63]
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional
Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN
(Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner,
Carabeo and Jandoc.[64]
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the
victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and,
ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.[65] Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons
with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by
petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing investigations.[66]
Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner
for inquiries were left unheeded.[67]
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports[68] that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the
abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of
her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.[69]
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know
about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this
Court directing him and the other respondents to file their return.[70] Immediately thereafter, he
issued a Memorandum Directive[71] addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter,
among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military
involvement in the abduction.[72]
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado,
the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message[73] addressed to public respondent

Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army,
relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.[74]
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent
Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen.
Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to
set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at
the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner.[75] In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen.
Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct
the investigation.[76]
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report[77]
detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners allegations as
opinionated and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and
torture.[78]
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,[79] the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the
petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5)
straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed
the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling
the truth.[80]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that
the abduction of the petitioner was stage managed, as it is merely based on an unfounded
speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time
they were forcibly taken.[81] The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of
the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the
very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she
was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.[82]
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the
security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of RC to contact and monitor her, even
after she was released.[83] This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more
compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are
still at large.[84] Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of
amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as
continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the
abduction.[85]
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy
of the petitioner, noting the existence of records of investigations that concerns the petitioner as
a suspected member of the CPP-NPA.[86] The appellate court derived the existence of such
records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list
representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show
the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the
photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the
organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as
well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only
constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her
already volatile security.[87] To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any
records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently
related to her abduction and torture.[88]

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military
or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner.[89] The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own
statements, the petitioner merely believed that the military was behind her abduction.[90] Thus,
the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and
torture of petitioner.[91] The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.[92]
Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied.[93]
Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate.[94]
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents
from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.[95] Corollary to this, petitioner also finds
fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal
belongings.[96]
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these
were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient
evidence to prove government involvement.[97]
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command
responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as
respondents in her amparo petition.[98] Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement
holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return
of her belongings.[99]
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition.[100]
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,[101] which was the first to examine command responsibility
in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.
Rubrico notes that:[102]
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws
of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest
terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."[103] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The
Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,[104] foreshadowing
the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators[105] (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring

supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it
is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.[106] While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ
does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.[107] The rationale
underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the
landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:[108]
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[109](Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on
the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,[110] the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and
accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to
wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading
the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her
assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.[111]
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who
were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.[112]
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya

conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she
was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard
while thereat.[113]
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry
sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that
insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial
evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence
of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence
based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote
and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,[114] the
cartographic sketches[115] of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the
mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the
greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for
the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in
such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police
personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the
police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was
detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not
inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only
because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she
was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel
time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.[116] With nothing else but obscure observations to
support it, petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations.
Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp
Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed
with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the
failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and
torture.[117] We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the
reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of
her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public

respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of
the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.[118]
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact
that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric
of property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.[119] Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule,[120] which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection
of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.[121]
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the
military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would
be equivalent to sanctioning a fishing expedition, which was never intended by the Amparo Rule
in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.[122] Contrary to the explicit position[123]
espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a fishing expedition for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.[124] A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While
the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the
supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as
was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a
prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp
cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to
the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the
petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.
Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review
this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error
infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion[125] of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on
the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governments Order of

Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal
charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of
Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in said video, there were
records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to
privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or
another, to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and
dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made
available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being
violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of
this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without
evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be
protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.[126] The writ operates to protect
a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.[127] This, in the case at bench, the
petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence
on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that
would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately
provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence,
clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even
shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the
public respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners alleged ties with
the CPP-NPA, appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be
ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being
kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege
of the writ of habeas data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute
any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that
can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction
and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to
its Constitutional mandate to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,[128]
must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and
torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This awkward situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in
an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by
law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main
source of the evidentiary difficulties faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.[129]
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the
respondent who is a public official or employee to prove that no less than extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance
of duty.[130] Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the
satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their
investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of
evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not
fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on
the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said
reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same
time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to
ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the
victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly
outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the
petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of
her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in
their investigative efforts.[131] While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner
would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes
that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to
explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads.[132] Indeed, while
the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as
adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable
investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of
diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to
explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the

victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in
any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least,
of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches
included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the
direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on
the abduction and torture of the petitioner.[133] But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches
remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation
under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write
finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy
because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real
perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift
the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner
upon the CHR.[134] We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the
trust and confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation in the
hearings already conducted by the commission.[135] Certainly, it would be reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very
least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the
abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also
deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner,
also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows
1.)
Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm
of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts;
and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
2.)
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to
the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its
personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable
regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.)
Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of
this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.)
Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her
stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent
reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of
Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court

of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under
this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
1.)
AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal
belongings;
2.)
AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention
areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.)
REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to
any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.)

MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting
further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue
to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches
submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not
limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.
c.
Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor,
to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of
the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part
of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and
its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the
petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.
5.)
REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following
purposes:
a.

To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public
respondents; and on the basis of this determination
c.
To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation
of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation
either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not
responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against

those found responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer
for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
MANILA
ELECTRIC
COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA,
Petitioners,

versus

ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 184769
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

October 5, 2010
x - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds
of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ
where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous
letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave,
which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO
MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.[1]
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.[2]
By Memorandum[3] dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that
there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which
could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President
and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested
for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel
from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on
job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts
on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged
accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even
serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled,
it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful
or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management
apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a
sitting duck so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its

expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale
for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action
would be a punitive one.[4] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending
resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition[5] for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued
failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a
violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.
Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return
containing the following:
a)
a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of
such data and the purpose for its collection;
b)
the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information;
and
c)

the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order[6] of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file
their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted
respondents application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter
alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[7]
By Decision[8] of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas
data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to
ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners
refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[9] contending that
1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the
case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its
employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.[10]

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,
petitioners argue that although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is
essentially questioning the
transfer of her place of work by her employer[11] and the terms and conditions of her
employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management
prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003[12] expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or
injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the
writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person,
family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing
her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age
of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
[13]
Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15] that the writs
of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.[16]
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution.[17] It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns
is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on
the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful
or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.[18] And she even suspects that her transfer to
another place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could be a punitive move.
Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the
Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.