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,-

^^'/r}t^Ayte..

l-~,y(^4.l^A^t^^

^^ce^'kPa/n.

^A'SL

VZ. U/y^)

e.

iAJ,/yy/}y^

\\

i^'^^il

\t^^:xt

AEISTOTLE
AND THE EAELIER PEEIPATETICS
VOL.
I.

Wf

WORKS BY

DR.
:

E.

ZELLER.
History of

PRE-SOCEATIC SCHOOLS
Crown
8vo.
3()5.

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Philosophy from tlie Earliest Period to the time of Socrates. Translated from the German by Sarah F. Allkvxe. 2 vols.

SOCRATES
Translated

AND
from

THE
the

SOCRATIC
0. J.

SCHOOLS.
Rkichel, M.A.

German by

Crown

8vo. lOs. Gd.

PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

from the German by Sarah
P.

Translated
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STOICS, EPICUREANS,
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HISTORY OF ECLECTICISM IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

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OUTLINES

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

GREEK
F.

PHILOSOPHY.

Translated from the

Alleyne and Evelyn Abbott.

German by Sarah Crown 8vo. 105.6^'.

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ARISTOTLE
AND
I

THE BAELIEE PBEIPATETI0S

i

!
"

BEING A TBANSLATION FBOM

ZELLEB'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS

'

BY
B. F. C.

COSTELLOE,

M.A.

J.

H.

MUIEHEAD,
1

M.A.
'<

\^

IN TWO VOLUMES VOL.

I.

LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND

39

CO.

PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

1897

All

rights reserved

311
VI

TO

THE MASTER OF BALLIOL

TEAN8LAT0ES' NOTE
The
following translation embraces Part II. Div. II.

of the third edition of Dr.

'

Eduard

Zeller's

work on

The Philosophy of the Greeks

It is

in its Historical DevelopZeller's

ment.'

made with Dr.

sanction,

and

completes the series of volumes issued from time to

time

by

Messrs.

Longmans

as

translations

of

the

various sections of that exhaustive work.

is

Mr. Costelloe

chiefly

responsible for the translation of text and

to

notes

up

the

middle of Chapter VII., and

;

for

Chapter XIX. to the end

portion.

Mr. Muirhead

for the

middle

In most instances, however, both translators

In calling attention to the table
longer than might reasonably

have revised the sheets.

of Gorrige7ida, which
is

be expected in a work of this kind, the editors desire

to explain that,

owing

to an accident for

which the

translator

was not responsible, the sheets of that portion

which the greater part of them occur

of the text in

viii

TRANSLATORS' NOTE

were passed through the press before he had seen them

in proof.

In dealing with some parts of

Zeller's notes

a certain liberty has been taken with the

German

text

with a view to condensing the material where this could be done without impairing
believed to
its

value.

The

treatise is

be the only work accessible to English

is

readers which

a complete and accurate exposition of

the Aristotelian doctrine.

The student

will find

ample

guidance as to Dr. Zeller's plan in the Table of Contents,

which

is

in fact an index of subject matters

is

and the

arrangement adopted by Dr. Zeller

clear

so logical and

that

it

has

not been

considered necessary to

burden the translation with an exhaustive verbal index.

CONTENTS
OF

THE FIRST VOLUME

CHAPTER
Year of his

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

birth, his family and j^outh, 2. Entrance into the Platonic School, relation to Plato, development of his opinions, Sojourn in Atarneus, 18. 6. The Macedonian Court, 21. Return to Athens, teaching and research, 25. Coolness of

Alexander,
racter, 39.

31.

Flight

from

Athens and
II

death, 33.

Cha-

CHAPTER

Aristotle's writings
A. Consideration of the particular

Works seriatim

The Catalogues,

Letters and poems, 53. Dialogues and earlier writings, 55. Works on Logic, 64. Rhetoric, 72. Metaphysics, Natural Philosophy the Material Universe and Inorganic 75. Nature, 81. Organic Nature, 87. Ethics and Politics, 97. Theory and History of Art, 102.
48.
:

B. General Questions touching the Aristotelian Writings.

Different classes of Writings, 105.

Exoteric, 106.
lit

Scientific, 123.

CHAPTER
Fate of Aristotle's Works, 137.

history and order of the works op ARISTOTLE

Date and sequence of Works,
154.

ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER IV
STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE
Aristotle
165.

Their Difference, Dialectic, 171. Empiricism, 173. Formalism, 177. Division of his Philosophy: Theoretic, Practical, Poietic, and their subdivisions, 180. Logic, Metaphysics, Physics, Ethics, Theory of Fine Art, 188.
Aristotle's

and Plato,

IGl.

Their Agreement, 162.

Method:

CHAPTER V
LOGIC
Scope of Logic, 191. Nature and Origin of Knowledge, 194. Development of Knowledge, 196. Problem of the Science of Knowledge, 211.

Universal elements of Thought: the Concept, 212. Essence and Accident, Genus, Differentia, Species, 213. Identity and Difference, kinds of Opposition, 223. The Judgment, 229. Affirmation and Negation, 230. The Quantity of Judgments, 232. Modality, Conversion, 236. The Syllogism, 236. The Figures, 238. 233. Rules and Fallacies of Syllogism, 241. Proof: its problem and conditions, 243. Limits of Proof; Immediate Knowledge, 245. Axioms and Postulates, 248. The Principle of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, 251. Induction, Dialectic or Probable Proof, 252. Defects of Aristotelian Induction, 255. Definition, 265. Classification, 270. Sumvia Genera,
271.
^
.,

CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTORY
INQUIRIES

TOUCHING
PHYSICS

ARISTOTLe's

META-

The Categories what they are and how they are deduced, 274. The Categories in Detail, 281. Significance of the Theory of
:

the Categories, 288. First Philosophy as the Science of Being its Problem, 290. Its Possibility, 292. Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics, and tlieir treatment by Earlier Philosophers the chief problem of Metaphysics in Aristotle's time and his mode of presenting it, 295. Criticism of previous attempts at its solution: the Pre-Socratics, 297. The Sophists, Socrates, and the Minor Socratic Schools, 312. Plato, 313. The Ideas, 314. The Ideas as Numbers, 319. The Ultimate Principles of Things, the One and the original Material, 321. The value of Aristotle's criticisms on Plato, 326.
:

CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME

CHAPTER
METAPHYSICS
The Individual and the Universal,
substantial, 331.

xi

VII

continued

The Main Inquiry of Metaphysics

329.

The Individual alone

;

is

Difficulties in this view, 334.

Form and Matter

the Actual and the Possible deduction of the opposition of Matter and Form, 340. More accurate account of the opposition the Actual and the Possible, 345. Significance of this doctrine in Aristotle, 351. The Form in its three different aspects as Cause, 355. The operation of the Material Cause Passivity, Natural Necessity, Contingency, 358. Essential significance of Matter, 365. Matter and Form in relation to the principles of Individuality and Substantiality, 368. Relativity of Matter and Form, 378. Motion and the First Cause of Motion, 380. Mover and Moved, 383. Eternity of Motion, 387. Necessity of a Primum Mobile, 389. Its Nature, 393. The operation of God on the World, 402.
: : :

CHAPTER
A. The Idea of Nature

VIII

PHYSICS

and the most General Conditions of Natural Existence

Nature as the Cause of Motion, 417. Kinds of Motion, 422. Motion in Space, 423. The Infinite, 427. Space and Time, 432. Further discussion of Motion in Space, 437., Qualitative Change: Opposition to Mechanical Theory, 441.-$Qualitative Variety in Matter, 443. Qualitative Transform atioi?, 450. Mixture of Materials, 456. Final Causes in Nature, 459. The Resistance of Matter to Form, 465. Nature as a Progressive Series of Forms, 466.

CHAPTER IX
PHYSICS

continued

B. The Universe and the Elements

The Eternity of the World,

:

469.

The

Terrestrial

and the

Celestial

Universe the ^ther, 472. The Four Elements, 477. The Unity of the World, 485. The Shape of the Universe, 487. Structure of the Heavens Theory of the Spheres, 489. The Number
:

of the Spheres, 499. Retrogressive Spheres, 501. The circle of the Fixed Stars, 504. The Planetary Spheres, 505. Earth and Heaven, 506. Generation and Destruction in Terrestrial Elements, 508. Meteorology, 512. Inorganic Nature, 516.

Addenda and
Page

74, n. 2.

Co7'rigenda.
No. 78 gives the Rhetoric only

Zeller adds in a later note that Diog.

is not decisive. adds in a later note, that

2 books, but this

129,
1.

of these may be in great part explained by the supposition that Aristotle did not always write, but dictated his books. 178, n. 2, for Braniss 7'ead Brandis
22.

Zeller

many

188, n.

1, col. 1,
1.

1.

12, for

representation 7'ead opinion

203, n. 2,

4, insert
1, 1.
11.

199, n. 2

210, n. 2, col.
224, n. col. 1,

18, delete of

11, 12,/o/' a

and an read the same

232, 233, /or individual [juilgments] )-ead singular

235, n. col. 2,
1.

30, /or
1.

apodeictic read assertorial

7-ead these

249, n. 3, col, 2, 257, n.

288, n.
1,

5,

for there

1,

302, n. 3, 335, n. 1,

add a further reference to De Cwlo, i. 10 itiit. col. 2, 11. 18, 21, for equahty read identity col. 2, 1. 3,/or corresponds with read assimilates to
1.

itself

4,/o/- general
1.
1.

346, n. col. 2,

read universal 15 from bottom, after possibility insert

omit semicolon

comma

361, n. col. 1,
364,
1.

16,

8.

Zeller in a later note refers to the criticism of

1875, p. 425),

Toustrik {Ifermes, ix. and suggests that the word 'disturbance' miglit be replaced
17,/or Fr. 13 i^ead Fr. 12

by 'modification.'

390, n. 3, col. 1,
395, n. col.
1,
1. 1.

9,

after (the atSioi^)

add that

it

should be capable of ceasing to

l)e

400, n.

1, col. 2, 1. 11,

omit not
,

404,
1.

1.

33, after

23, /or object of

3, col. 1,
1.

405, n.

407, n. 2, col. 2, 412, n. col 1, 415,

1. 1.

1.

word read is thought read intelligible do read are 12, for 18, /or motion read moved

5,

after klvovv add, absoliitely

read Form related to them read not only bodies and for bodies and masses magnitudes but everything which possesses them or is related to them 427, n. 8, col. 2, 1. 8,/or masses read magnitudes 428, 1. 28, /or after read beliind 441, n. 2, col. 1, 1. 8,/or forcible read forced 454, 1. 11, /or extension read extrusion 459, n. 5, col. 1, 1. 17, for But read Again 479, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 1, after ought add in the converse case 1. 4, after does add not 481, n. 1, col. 2, 1. 24,/or oppositions read opposites. 497, n. 1, col. 2, 1. 3,/or one who stands ... in front of him read in front of the
16, /or forces
9,

417,

1.

propeller
504, 1.1, /or

who
One

stands in the line of the axis

reac?

The

510,

1.

2,

for has raised 7-ead surrounds

AEISTOTLE
AND THE

EAELIBE PEEIPATETIC8
d
The
lives

CHAPTER

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

and circumstances of the three great
philo-

sophers of Athens show a certain analogy to the character

and scope of their work.

this

As the
itself

Attic philosophy began

by searching the inner nature of man and went on from

beginning to extend
over the whole field of
limits,

existence, so

we

find that the life of its great masters

was

at first confined in

narrow

and gained, as
is

time went on, a wider range.

Socrates

not only a

pure Athenian
to pass

citizen,

but a citizen who

city.

feels

no desire
is also

beyond the borders of his

Plato

an

Athenian, but the love of knowledge takes him to foreign lands and he is connected by many personal
interests with other cities. his scientific training

Aristotle owes to Athens and his sphere of work but he

;

belongs by birth and origin to another part of Greece,

he spends his youth and a considerable part of his manhood out of Athens, chiefly in the rising Macedonian

kingdom
VOL.

stranger, not
I.

and even when he is in Athens, it is as a bound up with the political life of the
B

ARISTOTLE
city,

and not hindered by any pergonal

ties

from giving

to his philosophy that purely theoretic and impartial

character which became

its distinctive praise.^

falls,

The

birth of Aristotle

according to the most

probable reckoning, in the first year of the 99th Olympiad,^

1

The old accounts of

Ari-

stotle's life

now extant
v.

are (1)

Diogenes,
;

1-35 (far the most

Brandis, Aristotelia i. 1-188 Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, i. pp. 48-65 Grote's Arist. (1872), i. 1-37,
;
;

copious) (2) DiONYSius of Halicarnassus, Epist. ad Amvumim, 727 sq. (3) 'Apiffr. pios 1. 5, p. Koi (rvyypdixixara avrov, by the
;

and Grant's
1-29.

Ai-ist. (1877) pp. Stahr discusses (p. 5 sqq.) the lost works of ancient writers

which treated of

Aristotle's life.

Anonymus Menagii; (4) another sketcii of his life, known to us in {a) the Bios first three forms printed in the Aldine ed. of Arist.
:

cannot be sure, as to any of the sources mentioned, what their

basis or credibility may be. Rose's view that they one and all rest only on spurious texts and fanciful combinations (p. 115) is entirely unproved and Their value, howimprobable.
ever, beyond

We

Opp.

141)6-1)8

(which

is

there

ascribed to Pldloponus, elsewhere to Ammonias, but belongs to the as neither), here cited Pseudo-Ammoidus (o'^Amm.); (h) the Life published from the Codex Marcianusby Robbe in 1861 cited
,

doubt

differs

widely;

as Vita Marciana (or V. Marc.) (c) the Life cited as the Latin Ammoyiius, preserved in an ancient
;

we can only test each statement by its inherent probability, 2 According to Apollodorus
apvd
the

DioG.
basis

9 of

no
the

doubt on statement

which approaches translation, more closely to the Vita Marciana

than to
the

{ibid. 10,

DiONYS. and Ammon.) which may be accepted as the

safest fixed point as to the date of Aristotle's life, that he died in the archonship of Philocles (01. 114, 3), about sixty-three years old (JtSov rpiwv irov koI e^rjKovra, or more exactly, as in Dionys., rpia irphs to7s ^^rjKovTa Dionysius agrees, fiiwcras err)). but erroneously talks of Demo-

Pseudo-Ammonius
;

itself; (5) 'Htrux'ov MiA7?o-Iou ircpl Tov 'Apia-ToreXovs (6) SUIDAS, sub

All of these, voce 'ApicrroreATis. except (ih), are to be_ found in UuHLE, Arist. Oj)]). i. 1-79. Westermann's appendix to CoVitcs bet's Diogenes, and his Scriptorum (at p. 397) also con-

tain (3)
'Lib.

o-ives (4&)

and (4tf) Robbe, op. cit. and (4^). Rose {Arist.

;

Ord. 245), before the publication of (4&), ascribed the archetype of (4) to the younger Olym-

sthenes as three years younger than Aristotle, whereas he was born in the same year, or at most in the year before (in the beginning of 01. 99, 1, or end of 01. 98,
4); vide

piodorus
later

a guess which

may be

Stahr

i.

30.

Gellius'

called possible but not proven. Of

Arist.

commentaries, cf. Buhle, Opp. i. 80-104; Stahr,

statement (iV.^.xvii. 21, 25) that Aristotle was born in the seventh year after the freeing of Rome

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

B.C. 384.^

Stagira, the city of his birth,

in that district of Thrace called Chalcidice,^

was situated which was

at that date a thoroughly Hellenic country, with

many

flourishing cities,

possession of

all

whose people were no doubt in full Greek culture.^ His father Nicomachus
in 384 B.C., follows from the accounts as to his death above, and would also follow from our information as to his residence at Athens, if the figures are to be taken strictly (cf. p. 6, n. 3,

from the Gauls also agrees, since that event is referred to the year 364 A.U.C., or 390 B.C. So also the V. Marc. p. 3, and the Ammon. Latin, p. 12, assert that he was born under Diotrephes (01. 99, 1) and died sixty-three years old under Philocles. An otherwise

unknown

writer,

EUMELUS

(ap.

DiOG. 6), asserts, on the other hand, that Aristotle lived to be seventy but there is little reason
;

EosE (p. 116) in preferring this account, since his next words, tnuv hKovirov ire\evTT]a'eu, sufficiently show his lack of trustIn fact, as the worthiness. manner of Socrates' death is here transferred to Aristotle, so is his age also possibly by reason of the spurious Apologia ascribed
to follow
;

to

Aristotle

(v.

p.

35,

n.

3,

For if, at seventeen, he to Athens and was with Plato for twenty years, he must have been thirty-seven years old at Plato's death; so that, if we put his exact age at 36^ and bring down Plato's death to the middle of 347 B.C., his birth would still fall in the latter half of 384 B.C. It is, however, also possible that his stay in Athens did not cover the full twenty years ^ So called because most of its cities were colonies of Chalcis in Euboea. Stagira itself was originally colonised from Andros,
infra).

came

parallelism with the Platonic Apologia of Socrates. But apart from the probability of this explanation, Eumelus is completely displaced by the agreement of all the other testimony, including that of so careful a chronologist as ApoUodorus. A reliable tradition as to the age of their founder must have existed How in the Peripatetic School, could all our witnesses, except this one unknown and badlyinformed writer, have come to agree upon a false statement of it when the truth could have been easily ascertained ? ' That he was born in the first half of the Olympiad, or
infra')

and

its

but perhaps (cf. Djonys. w?5 supra) received a later contribution of second founders from Chalcis. In 348 B.C., it was, with thirtyone other cities of that district, sacked by Philip, but was after-

wards on Aristotle's intercession restored (v. p. 24, infra). Vide Stahr, 23, who discusses also the form of the name (^ra-y^ipos^ or ^Tor/^ipa. as a neuter plural). do not know whether Ari-

We

stotle's

family house (mentioned

his will, ap. DiOG. 14) was spared in the destruction of the town or was subsequently rebuilt. 3 Bernays (Z>iZ. Arint. ii. 55, ' 134) calls Aristotle a half

in

Greek,'

but

Grote

(i.

3)

and

B 2

ARISTOTLE
was the body-surgeon and friend of the Macedonian and it is natural to suppose that the King Amyntas long hereditary in the family must father's profession
^

have influenced the mental character and education of the son, and that this early connection with the Macedonian
Court prepared the way for the employment of Aristotle On neither of these in the same Court at a later time.
points, however,

have we any positive information.

We

may

also assume that

Nicomachus took

his family with

Grant (p. 2) rightly maintain against him that a Greek family in a Greek colony in which only Greek was spoken, could keep their nationality perfectly pure. Aristotle was not an Athenian,

and

though

philosopliical

Athens was his home, traces can

whose surroundings and training were so closely similar as those of Schelling and Hegel, or of Baur and Strauss. Vide DiOG. i. (quoting Hermippus), DiONYS., Ps. Amm., V. ^larc, Ammon. Latin., and SuiDAS. The family of Nicomachus,
'

yet be found in him of the fact that his poHtical sense had its training elsewhere but he was as truly a Hellene as Pythagoras,
;

Xenophanes, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, or the rest. The un-Greek element whicli
'
'

according to these authorities, traced its descent, as did so many medical families, to Asclepius. TzETZES, Cliil. X. 727, xii. 638, gives no ground for doubting The three recensions of the this.

Bernays
boldt
(in Werlie, v.

and
1

W.

von

Hum-

Pseudo-Ammonius repeat this same statement as to the family

;

his letter to Wolf, 25) find in Aristotle is doubtless to be connect ed not so much with the place of his birth as with the characteristics of his generation and his individual The full-born bent of mind. Athenian Socrates exhibits traits far more singular and seemingly

of Aristotle's mother,Phaistis, but for Diogenes tells erroneoiTsly us she was a Stagirite by birth, and Dionysius says that she was a descendant of one of the Chalcis. This colonists from connection might account for the mention of a country house and garden at Chalcis in the testaThe stateun-Greek as" compared with his ment (DiOG. 14). own people and time than Ari- ment in Suidas, suh voce NiKdjiiaXos, that a person of that name stotle, and if the typical writings of Aristotle appear un-Greek in had written six books of 'larpiKk comparison with Plato's, still, on and one book of ^vcriKo. refers, the one hand, this is not true of according to our text, not to the his Dialogues, and, on the other father of Aristotle (of. Buhle, 83, hand, equally great divergencies Stahr, 84), but to an ancestor are to be found between men of the same name; though no

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

him
to reside near the

5
tell

king/ but we cannot

how

old Aristotle then was, or

lasted,

how long

this state of things

what personal relations resulted from it. knowledge have we as to the early development of his mind, or the circumstances or method of his education.^ The sole piece of information we have as
or

Equally

little

to this section of his

life is

the remark of the Pseudo-

Ammonius ^
in later
life

that after the death of both his parents,"^ one

Proxenus of Atarneus ^ took over his education, so that

the grateful pupil did the like service for

Proxenus' son Mcanor, of

he was a

child,

and

to

whom he whom he gave

took charge while

his

own daughter
^

in marriage.

Notwithstanding the untrustworthy cha-

racter of our informant,^ the story seems to be true

doubt the story did refer originally to his father. The Anon. Menagii (with V. Marc. 1, and Ammo7i. Latin. 1) mentions a
brother and sister of Aristotle. For Diog. 1, following Hermippus, says expressly ffw^^io} [Ni/cc^jtiaxos] 'AixvvTq, TCf MuKeSSvcov
'
:

etc, cf. BUHLE, 1 sq. (lege Tpo((>rjs for (p-fifi-ns) 10 sq. Eobbe. * In his will (Diog. 16) Ari-

fia(TL\e7iaTpov Kal (piKov xp^f'O:

He

must therefore have taken up his residence in Pella and cannot

have
2

left his family in Stagira. Galen's statement (Anatom.

ii.

Administr.

1, vol.

ii.

280 K)

that the Asclepiad families practised their sons eK Traldwv in reading, writing, and avaT/xviv, does not help us much, as (apart from the question whether the information is fully credible) we do not know how old Aristotle was at his father's death. It is

mentions his mother and monument to be erected to her. Pliny (H. Nat. xxxv. 10, 106) mentions a picture of her which Aristotle had painted by Protogenes. There may have been many reasons why his father was not mentioned in the will. ^ Apparently a relative who had emigrated to Stagira, for his son Nicanor is called 2Ta7eipiT77s and oIkCios 'ApicrroTeKovs (Sext.
stotle

orders a

Math. i. 258). ^ What trust is in a writer who tells

to

be placed

us, inter alia,

that Aristotle was for three years a pupil of Socrates and that he

doubtful

human
^

or animal
all

p. 89, n.

whether Galen meant anatomy; cf. 1/^.

three recensions, p. 43

afterwards accompanied Alexander to India ? (Ps. Amnion, p. 44, 50, 48, V. Marc. 2, 5, Ammon.

Lat.U,12,U).
Aristotle in his will(DiOG. 12) directs that Nicanor is to marry
''

In

ARISTOTLE
but
it

throws no further light on that which necessarily

interests us most, the history of Aristotle's intellectual

growth.^

His entrance into the Platonic School ^ gives us our earliest reliable data on the subject. In his eighteenth
year Aristotle came to Athens
when she is grown charges him to take care of lier and her brothers, ws KalTraTrjp Sov Koi adeX^os he orders that the portraits of Nicanor, Proxenus, and Nicanor's motlier, which he had projected, should be completed, and that if Nicanor completed his journey successfully (r. infra), a votive offering he had promised should be set up in Stagira. These arrangements prove that Nicanor was adopted by Aristotle, and that Aristotle owed special gratitude to Nicanor's mother as well as to Proxenus, apparently similar to that he owed his own motlier, of whom a similar portrait is ordered. If we assume the truth of the story in the Pseudo-Ammonius it will most naturally explain the whole. Dionysius notes that Nicomachus was dead when
his (laughter
^

and entered the

circle of

up

lie

Nicanor's death (DioG. 13). This Nicanor is probably the same Nicanor of Htagira whom Alexander sent from Asia to Greece to announce his consent to the return of the exiles at the Olym-

pian games of 324 B.C.(DiNARCH. Adv. Dem.osth. 81, 103, Diodor.

xviii.8

cf the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhet. ad Alex, i, 1421, a, 38, and G ROTE, p. 14). And the vow in Aristotle's will probably relates to a journey to Alexander's headquarters where he had given an account of his mission and been detained on service in Asia. It is probably the same Nicanor who was governor of Cappadocia under Antipater (Arrian ajmd Phot.
;
.

made away

Cod. 92, p. 72, a, 6) and who was with, in B.C. 318, by Cassander, for whom he had done good service on sea and land

to Plato. It might appear that, as Aristotle died at sixty-three, the son of his foster-parents would be too old to marry a daughter not then grown up but this does not follow. If Aristotle was a child at his father's death, and Proxe;

Aristotle

came

(Diodor. xviii. 64 sq. 68, 72, 75). The dates agree exactly with
of Pythias, as see p. 20, n. 3, infra. know nothing of the age at which Aristotle came to Proxenus, nor of the manner or place of his education, for it was probably not at Atarneus see above, p. 5, n. 5. 2 A silly story in Ps. Amm. 44, V. Marc. 2, and Amman. Latin. 11 relates that he was sent by the Delphic Oracle. Apollodor. ap. DioG. 9

what we know

to

whom
^

We

nus a young man, the latter might have left a son twenty or twenty-five years younger than Aristotle, and some ten years younger than Theophrastus (then
at least forty-seven) whom Pythias was to marry in case of

''

irapafiaKiTiv

Se

IlKdrwvi,

KoX

Sia-

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

Plato's scholars, 1 to
Tpi\pai Trap'

which he continued to belong

not know, moreover, when
This

for

avr^

e^Kocriv err), eirra

Eume-

Koi

SeKa

4twv

avcTTavra.

testimony seems to be the basis of the statements of Dionysius

728) that he came to Athens in his eighteenth year, of Diogenes 6, that he came iTTTOKatSe/ceTrjs, and of the three recensions of the Ammonius Life that he came
(p.

lus lived, or from whom he got If, as is possihis information.

ble,
tetic,

iTTTO/caiSeKO

ira>v

yevSixevos.

We

have also the chronology of Dion} sius, who places his arrival
in the archonship of Polyzelos (366-7 B.C. 01. 103, 2), while the statement (F. Marc. 3, Ammon. Latin. 12) that he came in the archonship of Nausigenes (01. 103, 1) takes us to the middle of his seventeenth year instead Euseof the completion of it. bius in his ChroniGle knows that he arrived at seventeen, but places the event erroneously in 01. 104, 1. The statement of

he be Eumelus the Peripawhose riepl rris apxaias KcoficfiSias is quoted by a scholiast to iEschines' Timarch. (ed. Bekker, Abk. d. Berl. A had. 1836, Hist.-2}Ml. Kl.230, 39; cf. KosE, Arist. Lihr. Ord. 113), he would belong to the Alexandrine, or possibly even the post-AlexanIn no case, as drine period. above shown, can he merit our As to Epicurus and confidence.
Timffius vide p.
9, n. \, infra.

The

Eumelus (ajjud DiOG. 6) that he was thirty years old when he met Plato is combined by Grote (p.
3 sq.) with the accounts of Epicurus and Timaeus as to his dis-

Vita Maroiana finds it necessary to refute the story that Aristotle came to Plato in his fortieth year. The Latin Ammonius reproduces this in a still more absurd form, to which he adapts other parts of his story for he says that it was thought by many that Aristotle remained forty years with Plato. His translation xl annis immoratus est sub Platone probably means that the text of the
; '
'

archetype was
virh

pi ctt? 'ye'yovws iiv

fj.'

youth (cf. infra), but without deciding between the two accounts. We have already
solute

UXdroiVi, or

iroov tbv eV5t-

4rpifiv,

&c.

If the latter

be sup-

seen

how

little credit

attaches to

Eumelus' account of Aristotle's age and manner of death (p. 2, n. 2) but the two statements are connected and fall together, for,
;

posed, the mistake might well have arisen by the dropping out of &V in the translator's MS. Plato himself was probably at the moment absent on his
1

second

Sicilian

journey
p.

(vide

as Aristotle
in

composed an elegy

and the Dialogue named Eudemus

memory of a fellow-student, Eudemus of Cyprus (p. 11, n. 4, infra), who went to Sicily with
Dion in 357 B.C. and was killed there, it follows that Aristotle, if he were thirty when he came to
Athens, would have been born several years before 384. We do

Stahr (p. 43) suggests that the abovementioned statement that he was three years with Socrates and after his death followed Plato (P^. ^ww. 44,50, V. Marc. 2, Ammon.

Zeller, Plato,

32).

Lat. 11, 12, Olympiod. in Gorg. 42) arose from a misunderstanding of this circumstance. The archetype may have contained the

ARISTOTLE
twenty years until the master died.^ It would have been of the greatest value if we could have known in detail something of this long period of preparation,
in which the foundations of his extraordinary learning

and of
been

his distinctive philosophical system

laid.

must have Unhappily our informants pass over all the

important questions as to the movement and history of his mental development in absolute silence, and entertain us instead with all
life

manner

of evil tales as to his

and character.
first

One

of these writers had heard that

he

earned his bread as a quack-doctor.^

Another
being

alleges that he first squandered his patrimony, then in

his distress

went into military

service, afterwards,

unsuccessful, took to selling medicines, and finally took

refuge in Plato's school. ^

statement that Aristotle spent three years in Athens without hearing Plato, in attending other Socratic teachers, for whom the transcriber erroneously inserted the name of Socrate's himself. On a similar supposition, we might guess that the archetype said that in Plato's absence, Aristotle was with Xenocrates: or with Isocrates, whose name is often confused with Socrates. It seems more probable, however, that the origin of the error lay in the remark in a letter to Philip (whether genuine or spurious) mentioned in the Vita Marciana and the Latin Ammonium, to the effect that Aristotle

This gossip, however, was

'

Cf

p. 6, n. 3,
:

and Dionysius,
U\dTa}ui.

lit

suj)ra

a-va-radils

Xp6vov eiKoa-aerrj Sidrpixpe avp avr^. or as in A/nm., rovrq} cvveanv

err] tKocri.

Aristocl. ap. Eus.

:

Pnz?/^.

Lv. XV.
Ti/A.aiov

2, 1 TTcDs av ris airoSd^aiTO Tov Tavpo/LLCviTov \4yovTos iv Tols IffTopCais, ado^ov Ovpas avrhv larpeiov Kal ras rvxovaas (hiatus) d\p rrjs 7f\iKias /cAeicrat.

Timffius
^

The same is more fully cited from by Polyb. xii. 7, and

SUIDAS, sub
V. 'ApiffTOreATis.
:

oUv
ry

Aristocl. nt supra ira>s yap re, KaOdiTip prjalv 'EirlKovpos eV

rS>v
iTriTrjdevfidrwi/

irepl

iin-

made Plato's acquaintance in his twentieth year perhaps because Plato then returned from Sicily, perhaps because Aristotle had till then been of the school of

Isocrates,

arroXy, veov jxkv ovTa KaracpayeTv avrhv r)]v irarp^av oixriav, eireira 5e iirl rh (TTpareieaOai (Tvveucrdai, KUKUs 8e Trpdrrovra iv rOvrois iirl rh (papfxaKoiroiKuv iAOeiu, eTretra avaTreirrafidj/ov tov IlXdrcovos irepindrov iraffi, irapaXafi^Ty avrhv (leoe, according to Athen. -Trapa^aAcTv

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

rightly rejected even

by

Aristocles.^

Greater weight

attaches to the story of the breach between Plato and

his scholar

which is said to have occurred sometime before

the former died.

ourbj/, soil, eis

So early a writer as Eubulides the

:

rhv

irepliraTOv')

cf.

the

passage quoted in similar words, apud Athen. viii. 354, ajjud DiOG. x. 8, and less
closely a2?ud
1

same

^LIAN.

V.

H.

v. 9.

In the

first place, it is

with-

out any reliable authority. Even in antiquity no other testimony than Epicurus and Timseus is known, and except these two, none, as Athenasus expressly remarks, even of Aristotle's bitterest opponents mentioned these Timaeus's reckless slanstories. derousness, however, is well known, and he was embittered against Aristotle by his state-

credible writers who say that Aristotle devoted himself from his eighteenth year to his studies at Athens, but the other story is in itself most improbable. If Aristotle were no more than the (To<pi(Tr)]s dpaavs cv^ep-^s irpoir^T^s that Timaeus calls him, he might

perhaps have been

oy\iiixaQ)]s

also.

But when we know that apart from philosophical greatness, he was the foremost man of learning of his time, and was also famous as a writer for his graces of style, we must think it unparalleled and incredible that his
thirst
first

for learning

should have

ments (historically correct as they were) as to the low origin

of the Locrians (cf. PoLYB.xii. 7, Plut. Bio. 36, Nic. \ ; 10 DiODOR. V. 1). So also of Epicurus we know that there was hardly one of his philosophic predecessors or contemporaries
;

arisen at thirty after a wasted youth, and that he could then

have achieved attainments hardly

credible as the work of a long lifetime. All we know of Aristotle from his writings or otherwise impresses us with a sense of personal superiority incompatible with these tales of his youth not to speak of the argument that if he had squandered his
;

(not excepting Democritus and Nausiphanes, to whom he was under large obligations) whom he did not attack with calumnies

and depreciatory criticism (cf. DioG. X. 8, 13 Sext. Math. i. 3 sq. CiC. N. D. 1, 33, 93, 26, 73 Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. I. p. 946, n). Statements by such men, betraying as they do a tone of hatred, must be taken with great distrust and their agreement is no
;

property he could hardly have found means to live at Athens. Grote (cf. p. 6, n. 3, supra) does too much honour to Epicurus and Timseus when he treats their testimony as balancing the other. They are probably naked and
baseless
lies,

and therefore we

guarantee, for it is possible that Timseus copied Epicurus, or (as we may better think) that Epicurus copied him. Not only, however, have we against them the consensus of many far more

ought not even to infer from them with Stahr (p. 38 sq.) and

Bemays {Abh.
pMl.

d.

Brest.
i.

GesellscJiaft,

Hist.193), that

probably Aristotle practised medicine in Athens while he was natural studying philosophy.

10
dialectician

ARISTOTLE
accused
Aristotle

of

ingratitude

to

his

master.^

Others accuse him of annoying Plato by his

showy

dress, his overbearing

manner, and his jeering.^

Others relate that even in Plato's lifetime he attacked

his doctrines

and

set

sition to the Platonic,^

up a school of his own in oppoand even that on one occasion

he took advantage of the absence of Xenocrates to drive

the aged master from his accustomed place of resort in
the Academia.''

Many, even among the

-

ancients, re-

Neither Aristocles nor any of the trustworthy witnesses mention medical practice, and the two who do, refer to it in such a way as only to raise suspicion while Aristotle apparently reckons himself among tlie 'laymen,' jUt? rexvlrai, in medicine {Divin. 1,
;

^Elian,

F.//.iii. 19, describ-

ing Aristotle's style of dress in

detail.
^

DiOG. 2

a-jrecrrr]

Se

IWdTUPos
t'cuvov aireAaKV. 11.

eri

irepiouTOS' ooare

(prjalu

^lire^v 'Api(rroTe\T]s rj/nas

TLaKa9a'KeplTa7rcti\dpiayevpr]94vTa
TTju fiTfT^pa
iv. 9,

^and

so

tEliAN,
aj).

16;},
'

a. 6).

and Helladius
279,
p. 533,

Phot.

Aristocl. ap. Eus. Pr.

3
:

M\

XV.

2,

Koi TLvfiovXiSris 5e ttpoStj/car'

Aws
Tai

iv
. .

T^
.

avrov
. .

^Lfikicf xpevSe.

(pdcTKWV

TAeUTU>VTL

HAdrojvi /.I?; irapayeveadai. ret re ^L^Kia avTov SiacpOeTpai. Neither His of the charges is important. absence at the time of Plato's death, if that is true, may have had an easy explanation Plato, indeed, is said to have died quite unexpectedly (cf Zellee, Plato, The injury to Plato's p. 35). books, if it means a falsification of the text, is an obvious and absurd calumny. If, as is pos;
.

sible, it refers

ticism of Plato, this, as

see,

to Aristotle's criwe shall

Similarly b. Cur. Gr. Aff. v. 4G, p. 77, says Aristotle often attacked Plato while he was yet alive Philop. Anal. Post. 51 a, Soltol. in Arist. 228, p. 16, that he had especially opposed his and master's Ideal Theory Augustine, Civ. Dei. viii. 12, that he had established even then a numerous school. ' This occurrence is related by our sole authority (^LIAN, V. II. iii. 19, cf. iv. 9) in this way that when Plato was over eighty, and his memory was failing, Aristotle on one occasion,
CahI.

Theodohet,

Xenocrates

being

absent and

though it is keen and not always just, is no indication of any personal misunderstanding,
since to Aristotle
it meant only natural and impersonal polemics. Besides Aristocles, Diogenes (ii. also rejects Eubulides' 109) charges as a calumny.

^Ipeusippus ill, had gone with a band of his own pupils and started a debate with Plato, in which he drove the old man into a corner with such rude pertinacity that Plato withdrew himself from the halls of the Academy into his own garden, and it was

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

11

ferred to Aristotle the statement of Aristoxenus that

during Plato's Sicilian journey a school was erected

in

opposition to his

own

'

by

strangers.'

All these

data,

however,

are

very doubtful, and most of the

If the asser-

actual statements deserve no credence.^

tion of Aristoxenus were to be understood of Aristotle

it

could

not

possibly
first place,^

be

true,

for

chronological

reasons in the

but also because we possess

undoubted proofs that Aristotle belonged to Plato's

school long after the second Sicilian journey,
his master in the highest honour.'*
only when Xenocrates returned, three months afterwards, that he reproached Speusippus for his cowardice and forced Aristotle to restore to Plato the disputed
territory.

and held

Probably, however.

Aeistocl. apud Eus. Pr. Ev.

peats and extends. For Aristides the Latin Ammonius (11) substitutes Aristocles but the Greek Pseudo- Ammonius (p 44 sq.) limits itself to the remark oh yap Ti 0VTOS rod UXdroivos auTCfKoBo/j.'qa'ev avrc^ rh AvKeiou 6
; .
:

XV. 2, 2 ; Tts 5' Uv ireicrdeLT] to7s vtt' 'ApLffTO^cvov rod jxovffiKov Xeyofievois

'Ap., o&s
2

Tivs

viroXa/xfidvovcri.

Cf.

iv
TTj

r^

^(qj

rod HXdrajyos
Kol ry
aTro5r]fA.ia

refuted

Stahr, i. 46 sqq., not by Hermann, Plat.

from

iu

yap

irKoLvri

(pT]cr\v

iiravicTTaadai Ka)

avroiKoSo^vovs

fielv

avTCf Tivas

irepiirarov

Phil. p. 81, 125. ^ When Plato returned his last journey Aristotle

was
;

ovras. oXovrai ovv vioi ravra irepl

'ApiffroTcXovs A^yeiv ai/rhp, Apicrro|eVou Slo. iravrhs ev<p7]iui.ovpTos 'Api(TTOTeXTjv.

Among

the

euiot

was

Aelian (iv. 9), who in reference no doubt to the words of Aristoxenus, says of Aristotle avTcpKod6fi7}(rev avr^ [Plato] SiaSo also the Vita Marrpifiiiv.
ciana, 3
'Ap.
;

under 24 (cf. p. 2, n. 2, sujjra, and Zeller, Plato, p, 30 sq.) is it (apart from other questions) likely that he could so early head a school against a master who was then at the height of
his
this are (a) Aristotle published several Platonic essays (cf. infra and Zeller, Plato, p. 26). For many reasons (especially perhaps because of their notable departure from the method of teaching laid down by Plato, cf. Zell. Plato, p. 517 sq.) it is unlikely
*
:

fame 1 The proofs of

(Tx^^Vf'

ovk apa avT(^Ko^6fXT](riv &s 'Apiaro^euos

.
. .

irpuTOs
crreidrjs

i(rvKo<pdvTif](Te

koX

'Api;

vampov

rfKoAovOrjcrev

re-

f erringto

AEiSTiDES,i>e q^mtuorv. ii. 324 sq. (Dind.), who, however, does not refer to Aristotle by name any more than Aristoxenus, whose account he re-

that these fall between the second

and third

of

Plato's

Sicilian

12

ARISTOTLE
statement did not
refer
to

that

Aristotle

at

all.^

Elian's story as to driving Plato out of the Academy stands in contradiction with other and older ^ accounts

which show that Plato at that time had long removed his school from the open spaces of the Gymnasium of the

Academia
lieve of a

to his

own

gardens.

But besides,

it

ascribes

to Aristotle a kind of behaviour

which we could not be-

man of otherwise noble character except on the most conclusive proofs whereas here we have nothing but the testimony of a gossip-grubber, who is known to
:

repeat without discrimination things that are palpably untrue. Against the suggestion that Aristotle had by
journeys, Aristotle
(/y)

(cf.

infra)

The Eudemus of was written

their

genuineness

on

grounds

on the lines of Plato's Plicedo^ and Aristotle was probably still in the Platonic School when he wrote it, wliicli was long after
the third journey, since it is in memory of a friend who died

352 B.C.
Oorg.
16G,

(c)

in

Olympiodorus (m Jahn's Jahrh.

that are solved by our view of their application to the Ciiprian Eudemus and Plato, instead of to the Rhodian Eudemus and Aristotle himself. In the corrupt last line, Bernays {Rh. Mvs. N. F. xxxiii. 232) reads iiowd^. He refers dvSp^s, &c., to Socrates;

but this seems unlikely.

^ Aristocles {ut svjyrd) says expressly that Aristoxenus always spoke well of Aristotle, against which testimony, founded on a knowledge of his book, the hint to the contrary in Suidas 'AptorTo|. is of no weight. The word Trepiiraros was used of other schools besides Aristotle's cf Epicurus,
;
.

xiv. and 895, Bbrgk, Lyr. Gr., p. 504) has preserved some verses of Aristotle's Elegy on Eudemus, which

Supiylement}).

thus describe his relation to Plato iXdiiiv S' ds KX^ivhv KeKpOTTLrjs

SdireSou
evcre^ecos
(Teixuris

(pi\ir]s

IBpixraro

avdphs, tv ouS' alveXu roTcri KaKolffi

e^fiisf>s

[Plato]

fiSvos

t)

TrpwTos dvrjTcoy KareSei^ey

fiicp

ivapyws
olKeio)

and the where it is used of Speusippus, and 7, 9, of Heraclides. The nvas of

cited p. 8, n. 3, suj^ra,

Index Herculanensis,

6, 5,

re

Kal jx^Qo^oktl Xdyoov,

Aristoxenus

may

have referred

ws

Kal evSaificcu a/to yiverai aurjp. ov vvv S' eoTTt \afie7v obSevl ravra TTOrL
i.

ayados

re

to Heraclides himself; cf. ZelLER, Plato, p. 30, n. As to the Index Hercul. see ibid. p. 553.
2 In DiOG. ill. 5, 41 Zeller, Plato, p. 25, n.
;

cf

Buhle {Arist. 0pp.

55) doubts

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

his general behaviour incurred Plato's disapproval

13

and been kept at a distance by him,' we could bring many statements which imply that the relation between
had
so

the two philosophers was of an entirely different kind.^

We

may

allow no weight, therefore, to these accounts,

insulBficiently attested,
stories,

which in any case are

apparent.^

take no notice of sundry other

is

and we need whose inaccuracy

But we have beyond

this decisive reasons

which negative, not only Elian's story and the other similar tales, but the whole theory that there was before
Buhle, p. 87, sees a proof this in the fact that Plato does not mention Aristotle, to which circumstance even Stahr,
'

of

p.

58, attached some weight. But how could he name Aristotle

in

Socratie

dialogues

And

Kovs) and by David (ibid. 20, b, 16), that Aristotle was ashamed to mount the teacher's chair while Plato lived, and that this was the origin of the name ' Peripatetic' There is another theory (Philopon. 2it supra, 35, b, 2,

probably all Plato's works, except the Laws, were written before Aristotle
all.

David,
ibid.

25,

ibid. 24, a, 6, b, and the

Ammon.
Pseudo-

came

to

Athens at

Ammon. p. 47, V. Marc. 5, Amman. Latin. 14) that the name of Peripatetics belonged
originally to

vi.

27

['Ap.] vTrbXiKa.ToivosToaov'Tov
i]yd(T6r},

the Platonic school; that

Aristotle

when

T^s a7xiJ'oias
vir*
:

ws vovs

ttjs

and Xenocrates took

avTOv irpoaayopeveSiarpifiris ffdai and Ps. Ammo7i. 44, says Plato called Aristotle's house oIkos
avayvdocTTOv
cf. also Zeller, Plato, p. 559. To the same tradition belong the very doubtful story cited in Zeller, Plato, p. 26, n., and the account of the
:

altar dedicated

inscription

with a laudatory by Aristotle to Plato onhis death (Anim. 46, Philopon. i.q.v., Schol. in Amat. 11, b, 29), which arose, no doubt, out of a mistranslation of the Elegy to Eudemus, p. 11, n. 4, mipra. * Such is the idea mentioned by Philopo]ms(w?^ svpra, 11, b, 23 sqq., where in 1. 25, lege ^Apiarore-

over that school after Plato's death, or rather that of Speusippus, Aristotle's followers were called Peripatetics of the Lyceum and the others Peripatetics of the Academy and that, in the end, the one school were called Peripatetics only, and the other Academics. The origin of this theory is doubtless Antiochus, in whose name Varro in CiC. Acad. i. 4, 17 tells an exactly similar story which indicates that the whole is only an invention of that Eclecticism,developed by Antiochus, which denied that there was any essential difference between Plato and Aristotle.
; :

14 Plato's death

ARISTOTLE
any breach between him and his
rest in their antiquity

scholar.

Authorities which are beyond any comparison with

^lian and the

and

credibility,

remained with Plato twenty years, which plainly could not be true if, although he lived for
assert that Aristotle

that

time in Athens, he had separated himself from

Dionysius, indeed, expressly adds
this time
later

Plato before the end.

that in
all

he founded no school of his own.^

So even in
is

years

and in passages where he

Platonic
School,
it
^
;

contesting the

principles of the

Aristotle constantly reckons himself as belonging to

and he uses language as to the founder of that school

and his own personal relation to him such as plainly shows how little the sentiment of respect and affection
for his great

master had failed in his mind,'' even where

opposition was

their

philosophic

accentuated in the

So also we find that he was treated as a Platonist by contemporary opponents ;^ for Cephisodorus
sharpest way.
^

Vide
suina.

p.

6,

n.

3,

and
7,

p.

8,

n.

Ep. ad Amiii.
YlXdrcopi kuI
eTTTtt

i.

p.

738
'4us

(Tvvj]v

5ieTpi;|/e>'

seems to point to charges which his logical polemic against Plato had drawn down upon him, rh 8e KaOEth. N. 1. 4, init.
:

irwv

Koi

rpiaKOvra,
out'
ISiau

ovre
7re-

oAov fieAriou Xaws

SLaTroprjarai.

iiriffKeipacrOaL koI

(TXoAtjs
^

riyovfiepos

irus

\4yeTai,
(plhovs

Kaiirep

jToiriKws aipeaiv.

irpocravrovs rris roiavrrjs ^rjrrjcreajs

yivoix4vr]s

self
cf.

and the
Ka6'
ov<i

Aristotle often brackets himPlatonists together

:

^i^

rh
eJvai

&.v5pas
S'
ti.u

elcrayayelu

ra

eYSr;.

do^eie

Tpo-novs SeiKuvfjiev
kuto.
(jyafiev

on

Xaws

fieKTiov

Koi

5e7u

iirl

eari ra
icaO^

ei'Syj

t^v

viroXrjrpiv

a(aTr]pLa

ye

ttjs

aX7]9eias

Kal ra
(j)i\o-

ras Ideas, and the like, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 8, 11, 16, 23, 992, a, 11, 25, c. 8, 989, b, 18; iii. 2, 997, b, 3, c. 6, 1002, b, 14 cf. Alex, and Asclep. on 990, b, 8 and Alex, on 990, b, 16, 991, b, 3, 992, a, 10.
;

V eluai

olKe7a avaipelv,
crdcpovs

aWoos re
aix<po7v

Kal

ovras-

yap ovroiv

^iXoiv ocriov Trpon/jLau cL\-f)deiap. Cf. Zeller, Plato, p. 512; cf. also Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.\. p. 971, as to Aristotle's own view of his duty to a teacher.
^

tV

of

In a well-known passage the Ethics ^which ^itself

Numen. apud Eus.

Pr. Ev.

xiv. 6, 8.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

attacked the Platonic doctrine
'

16

the Isocratean, in a book directed against Aristotle,

Ideas.'

and particularly the and Theocritus of Chios accused Aristotle of

for

exchanging the Academy

Macedonia.^

Again,

it is

established that he stayed in

Athens until Plato's death,

years,

and immediately thereafter left the city for several presumably for no other reason than that then
for the first

time the

tie that

dissolved, because his relation to Plato

first

bound him to the city was was then for the

are told
;

time broken.

Finally,

we

that Xenocrates
it is

journeyed with him to Atarneus

and

probable

from the language in which Aristotle speaks of that

Academic's opinions
in later times.
^

that they continued to be friends

But in view of the known loyalty of Xenocrates and his unbounded reverence for Plato, it is
not to be supposed that he would maintain his relations

with Aristotle and keep him company on the

Atarneus,
if

visit to

the latter had separated from his master in

a disrespectful way, or had,

as

by any such rude conduct

^lian

ascribes to him, insulted the aged teacher not

long before his death.

It is of course altogether probable that so

inde-

pendent a mind as Aristotle's would not give up its own judgment even in face of a Plato; that as time
^

20, n. 3, infra
^AKa5r]iJ.ias

In the epigram noticed at p. dhero vaUiu avr^

:

Bop^opov 4u irpoxoais,
p.

B. being a river near Pella.

2

obviously alluding to him the cases cited, Zeller, Plato, p. 364, n. ; and notes on 585, and later passages), p.
is

he

(cf.

6 1 0), whom disbelieve.

3

By Steabo (xiii. 1, 57, we have no reason

whereas
in

Speusippus
cases.

is

named
pro-

to

parallel

This

Others have remarked that mentions Xenocrates, and that he avoids his name as if on purpose where
Aristotle almost never

bably indicates not ill-feeling, but rather a desire to avoid the appearance of personal conflict with one who was teaching beside him at Athens.

16

ARISTOTLE

went on he began to doubt the unconditional validity of the Platonic system and to lay the foundations of his

own and that he perhaps even many of the weak points of his
:

in these days laid bare

teacher with the same

uncompromising criticism which we find him using later If a certain difference between the two men had on.^ developed out of such relations, or if Plato had not been

more ready than many others since, to recognise in his scholar the man who was destined to cany forward and to correct his own work, it would be nothing wonderful.
Yet that any such difference actually arose cannot be proved, and cannot even be shown to be very probable ^
while

we have

patent facts to disprove the idea that

Aristotle brought on

intentional offence.

any open breach by ingratitude or The same facts make it very imIf he had

probable that Aristotle opened any philosophic school of

his

own during
so,

his first residence in Athens.

done

his

friendly relations

with Plato and the

Platonic circle

gone on, and it would be unintelligible that he should leave Athens

could hardly have
exactly at the
left
*

moment when

the death of his great rival

the field free for himself.^

'

On Even in the books Philosophy' {Arist. Fraym. 10, 11. p. 1475), apparently written
before
Plato's

death,

he

had

combated the Ideal openly Theory, and in the same treatise {Fragm. 17, 18) had maintained the eternity of the world.
2 have no right to ascribe to Plato and his circle of friends the later ideas of school-orthodoxy, in any such sense as to

We

suppose that the master could not tolerate the independence of such

a scholar as Aristotle. Besides, not to mention Heraclides and Eudoxus, Speusippus himself dropped the Ideal Theory, ^ The remark of the PseudoAmmonius that Chabrias and Timotheus prevented Aristotle from setting up a new school against Plato is absurd. Who could hinder him, if he chose ? Chabrias, moreover, died in 358 B.C. and Timotheus was banished from Athens for life in the followingyear,beingthenavery oldman.
;

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

If,

17

then, Aristotle was connected with Plato, as one of

his school,
it

follows that

from his eighteenth to his thirty-seventh year, we cannot well over-estimate the influence

of such a relation upon his course of thought. The effect of that education on Aristotle's philosophic system
discloses itself at every point.

The

grateful scholar has

himself 1 commemorated the moral greatness and lofty principles of the man whom the base have not even the
'

right to praise.'

But the reverence for the master would

obviously not prevent Aristotle from turning his attention at the same time to all other sources which might carrry him onward and help to satisfy
his insatiable
thirst for

knowledge.

We may safely

assume that he

did in fact employ his long years of preparation at Athens in busy acquirement of his marvellous learning, and also that he took a keen interest in
researches
in
it

natural
as

philosophy, though Plato

It

always treated
is

of secondary importance.

also possible

that even while

circle

he

may

he was still a member of Plato's himself have lectured,^ without thereby

with Plato or setting himself
as the leader of a

breaking

off his relations

comioeting school. hear, for instance, that Aristotle taught Ehetoric in opposition to Isocrates ; ^ but we know that the great

up against him

We
>

See the lines on

J. ffT^^-^'/iJrsfoteles,

p. 12 mpra. !\'\P-

'i^>

Cicero seems to be without exact information] versum.^jue^ll^l

Athens both Plato and

Aristotle.

enmi

turpe,

siU ait

esse tacere

cum/orere Isocratem
disoipuloi^vm
videret,

nohihtate

...vmtavitrejjentetotamformam jrrope d^sc^pl^nce su<e [which sounds as if Aristotle had even then a school of his own, though

Isoeratem pateretur dicere Ita ornavU et illustravit docirinam

illavi

omnem, rerumnue onaZ'

tionem
fucjit

cum orcvtiomi ea^'ercTa Uo.>ieco,mmxit. Neaue rZn I

VOL.

sajieJssim^ITeglT^^ "''

I.

18
orator's relations

ARISTOTLE

with Plato were no longer good and he attacked the philosophers.^ We have distinct that indications also which lead us to assign to this same
period the
writer
;

commencement

of Aristotle's activity as a

and the

fact that in the writings of this

time

he imitated his master, both in matter and form,^ shows clearly how completely he took on the impress of Plato's

and made the Platonic methods his own. In time, of course, and no doubt even before he left Athens, Aristotle acquired as a writer a more independent position and it is manifest that he had in reality outgrown the
spirit
;

position of one of Plato's pupils, long before that relation

came

visibly to an

end by the death of the master.

makes a covert attack on Aristotle, which confirms the story
; :

lipimm, qui hunc Alexandra filio Again, ihid. doctorem accierit. 19, 62, Arist. Isocratem ipsum
lacessivit,
. . .

and

ibid. 51, 172, qids

quis Arist. fuit ? porro Isocrati est adversatvs imIn Tusc. i. 4, 7, Cicero 2)eiu'ms ? assumes that Aristotle attacked Isocrates in his lifetime, which would be possible only in his first
acrio?'

residence at Athens, for when he returned in 335-4 B.C. Isocrates was many years dead. Cf QuiNEoque {Isocrate\ TiL. iii. 1, 14
.

Panath. 17 can hardly refer to Aristotle, because of the dates cf Spengel, Ahh. d. Bayer. Aliad. Cephisodorus, a pupil vi. 470 sq. of Isocrates, wrote a defence of his master against Aristotle, full of bitter abuse; v. Dionys. Be Isocr. c. 18, p. 577; Athen. ii. Aeistocl. 60, d, cf. iii. 122, b ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 24, Nu;

MEN.
xxiii.

ihid. xiv. 6, 8,

Themist. Or.

285,

c.

This friction did

:

jam

'scholis

jwnieridianis . seniore Arist. j)r(P^W'^'^^ artem oratoriam coepit, noto qiiidem lllo,
.

not prevent Aristotle from doing justice to his opponents in the

Rhetoric he quotes examples from

ut traditur, versu ex Philocteta frequenter usus : alffXP^v (Tiwirav

'laoKpdrriv [S'] eav\eyeiu.J)iog.{S)

no one so readily as Isocrates, and twice quotes Cephisodorus

{Rhet. iii. 10, 1411, a, 5, 23). Cf. as to the whole subject Stake, i, 68 sq., ii. 285 sq. * Spengel, 'Isokr. und Platon,' Ahh. d. Miinch. Ahad. vii. 731, and Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr. i. 416, ii. 459, n. 2 See for proof infra. Of the Aristotelian writings known to us the greater part of the Dialogues and some of the rhetorical

with

less probability, reads aevo-

KpaT7]v, so misplacing the story as of the time of the founding of the Lyceum. Cicero {Offic. i. 1, 4) speaks clearly of contests between Aristotle and Isocrates in his . life {de Arist. et Isocrate quorum uterque suo studio delec.

tatus contemsit alterum),and Isocrates- himself, Up. V. ad Alex. 3,

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

life.

19

That event opens a new chapter of Aristotle's So long as Plato led the Academy, Aristotle would not leave it. When Speusippus took his place,
Aristotle had nothing to keep

him
first

in

Athens; since

he does not seem to have at

contemplated the

foundation of a philosophical school of his own, for

which Athens would naturally have been the fittest place. Therefore he accepted, with Xenocrates, an invitation from Hermias, the lord of Atarneus and Assos,^ who had himself at one time belonged to Plato's school.

The prince was the intimate

went
to Mytilene.6

friend of both,^

and they

remained three years with him.^

safety, because

Thereafter Aristotle

This, Strabo says,

was

for his

own

Hermias had
;

fallen into the

power of

the Persians by treachery

Aristotle

it is

probable, however, that

had

left

before that event.^

DiONYS.
agree
Ej).

After the death

ad Amm.
i.

texts perhaps the ^vvayuy^ H^xpSiv seem to belong to the first Athenian period. ' This choice has caused surprise,

5,

who

but wrongly. It is possible that Plato had a greater personal

liking for Speusippus than for Aristotle, or expected from him

that Aristotle went to Hermias after Plato's death. The opposite would not follow from the charge cited from Eubulides on p. 10, n. 1, s%qjra, even if that were true. Strabo names

a more orthodox continuation of his teaching. Speusippus was a much older man, was Plato's

nephew, had been brought up by him, had followed him faithfully for a long period of years, and was also the legal heir of Plato's garden near the \.cademy. Besides, we do not Know whether Plato did himself bequeath the succession or not. BoECKH, Hermias,' ^JA. d. Berl. Aliad. 1853, Hist. Phil Kl,
'^

Assosasthe place where Aristotle lived during this period. Cf p. ] 7, n. 2, su2Jra. Aristotle s enemies {ajfud DiOG. 3, Anon. Menag., and Suidas,
.

'A/>.),

suggest that this friendship

one,

was an immoral
IS

but this

impossible;
^

Boeckh, iUd.

187.
sius, etc.,

Apollodorus, Strabo, Dionyut supra.

01.

108.

= 345-4

B.C.,

in

'

p. 133 sq.
3 Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, Apollodor. aj). DiOG.

p.
9,

610,

and

the archonship of Eubulus : see ApoUod. and Dionys. iUd. ' Boeckh, iUd. 142, refuting Strabo, has shown this to be probable, though not certain.
c 2

20
of

ARISTOTLE
Hermias the
pliilosopher married
^

Pythias,
;

who was
his last-

either the sister or niece of his friend

and of

ing affection for them both he

memorial.^
'

left

more than one

According to Aristocles
:

next note) citing a Letter to Antipater redueoiTos y^p 'Epfi^iuv

(see
dta Tr]v irphs
avT7]v,
e/ceij/oj/

{ajnid Demetr. of Magnesia DiOG. V. 3) daughter or niece.

Cf.BOECKH,?Z;<VZ. 140.

HarpocraEtym.
her an
call

evvoiav

eyrj/J-ev

TiON, Suid.
31.,

s.

v.

'Epfxias,

&\X(i}5

fxhu

(Tcocppova

Kal

arvxova-au fievToi ovffav, Tas KaraXafioixTas crvfjicpopas rhv Strabo (^ut supra) a5X(phv avrr\s. says Hermias married her to Aristotle in his lifetime, which is negatived by the Letter, if Aristocl. {ibid. 4, 8) genuine. says tliat Aristotle was accused in his lifetime of having flattered her brother to win Pythias, and
ayaOT]y

and Phot. Lex., adopted daughter.

^

Sm

also that Lyco, the Pythagorean, told a foolish story of Aristotle sacrificing to her after her death I>iog. (v. 4) caps as Demeter. the sacrifice this by placing immediately after his marriage. Lucian {Eun. c. 9) talks of sacricf. a like hint ficing to Hermias
;

Diog. (6) says he had a mon(whose inscription he Hermias at cites) erected to Delphi. A contemporary lampoon on this by Theocritus of Chios (a witty rhetorician of the Isocratean school and local leader of ant i- Macedonian politics) is noticed by DiOG. 11, ARISTOCL. at supra, and Plut. DeLxil. 10, p.

ument

603

;cf.

Muller, Hist.Gr.
p. 15, n. 1.

ii.

86,

and supra,

Aristotle

also dedicated

to

Hermias the

poem preserved in DiOG. 7, and Athen. xv. 695. As to Pythias,

the will directs that, as she wished, her remains should be laid beside his own as no other burial-place is named, she was probably first buried at Athens, and died, therefore, after 01. Ill, 2, but not very long before Aristotle's death, since the Pythias who was then not marriageable was her daughter (cf. Aristocl., Suidas and the Anon. Menag.). After her death Aristotle 'married' (eynixe) a certain Herpyllis of Stagira, who bore him a son Nicomachus and (Aristocl. cf Diog. 14) though their union was apparently irregular (v. Timseus ap. Schol. in Hes. "E. k. 'H. v. 375
; .

in

Athen. XV. 697 a. ^ The Anon. Menag.,

Suidas,

s. V. 'Ap. 'Ep^i'as, and Hesych. call her his daughter, the untrustworthy Aristippus (apud DiOG. 3) Both are dishis concubine. proved by the fact that Hermias was a eunuch (for the statements of Suid. Hesych. and Anon.

Menag.
cilable

as to this are irrecon-

with Demetr.

De Moo.

293). Aristocles ajj. Eus. xv. 2, 8 sq. cites a letter of Aristotle to Antipater, and a book by Apellicon of Teos relating to Hermias and Aristotle, and says that

Pythias
Strabo

was

the

sister

adopted daughter of
(xiii.

and Hermias.

DiOG.
Hist.

V. 1.

ap.
i.

Qr.

Muller, Fragm. Athen. xiii. 211

;

610) calls her niece,

589

c,

citing

Hermippus and call-

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

In the year 343 or 342
Aristotle accepted a call to the
B.C.

(Olymp. 109, 2)/

to

Macedonian Court ^

take charge of the education of the young Alexander,

then thirteen years

old,^

which before that had not

been in the best hands.'*

The

invitation probably found

him

have no reliable testimony as to the special reasons which led Philip to think of Ariin
Mytilene.'""'

We

stotle.^

Most unfortunately, we are almost

b, 47,

entirely

ing her a kraipa; SuiDAS and the Anon. Menag.), yet he must have treated her as his wife, and his will speaks of her with honour, provides for her, and begs his friends iTrifieXcTadai
.
.

ut sujjra. The Schol. in Arist. 28 says Aristotle was at Alexander's Court at Plato's death, but this is obviously wrong.
2 Cf. Geiee, Alexander Aonst. (Halle, 1856).
^

und

fjLuriadevTas
'6ri

ifiov,

kuI

'EpTrvAAiSos,
6.v5pa

Diog.

says fifteen,

which

(TTTOuSaia irepl ifie iyev^ro, toov

6,K\ci}v

Kol

iav

jSouATjrat

oversight, for Apollodorus cannot be wrong in such

must be an
(cf.

a date

Stahr,

p. 85).

(DiOG. 13). As to Aristotle's daughter we know from Sext. Math. (i. 258), the Anon. Menag. and Suidas s. v. 'Ap., that after Nicanor she had two husbands, Procles of Sparta, and Metrodorus the physician; by the former she had two sons who were scholars under Theophrastus, by the latter a son, Aristoteles, who was commended (being then probably young) by TheoSoOfi

*
i.

ViAJH. Aleoe.c.v.; Quintil.

1, 9.

5 Stahr (p. 84, 105, A. 2) is not averse to the view that Aristotle first went back from Mytilene to Athens, but none of our biographers know anything of it. On the contrary, Dionys., ut sn/pra, expressly says he went from Mytilene to Philip. Aristotle in a fragment of a letter

phrastus to his friends

will.

in his

Nicomachus was brought up by Theophrastus, but died in

youth
V.
(iJ.eipaKL(TKos)

Eloc. 29, 154, ew ^ikv ^A6r]v(av els 'S.to.yeipo ^KBov 5i^ Thv fiaffi\4a rhv fieyav e/c Se '^rayeipwu its 'Ad^,vas
ap.

Demetr. Be
:

says

iyitJ

in battle (Ari2,

stocl. ap.

Eus, XV.
s.

10

DiOG.

29

Suidas

v.

@6i)p.

and

NiKd/x,,

confirmed by the terms of Theophrastus' will, apud DiOG. v. 51). The six books of Ethics and the work on his father's Physics,
ascribed to him by Suidas, therefore very doubtful.
are

' This date is given by ApolLOD. ap. DiOG. 10, and Dionys.

Sm rhv xetyWiij/a rhv fieyav, but this jocular expression, even if the letter is genuine, proves nothing, as it is clearly meant, not as an exact historical statement, but as a rhetorical antithesis between the termini of his journeys, leaving out the intermediate points. * According to a well-known story, Philip had told Aristotle,

22

ARISTOTLE

without information as to the kind of education he gave the young and ambitious prince, and the influence he

had upon him.^

But we should be forced

to

assume that

before Alexander's birth, that he hoped he would make a great man of him(?r. the letter />. Gell.
is certainly Philip could not have written in these extravagant terms to a young man of

ix. 3),

but the letter

for

spurious,

not certain that any are trustworthy. Plutarch \Alex. c. 7 sq.) praises Alexander's thirst for knowledge, his delight in books and learned conversation, and his passion for the poets and
historians of his people.

He

as-

27,

who had

had no

chance

distinguish himself; and, to again, if he had destined him to be his son's instructor from
birth,

sumes that he was instructed by Aristotle, not only in ethics and

politics,

but in the deeper secrets of his system, basing this on the

he
to
2.

him
109,

would have brought Macedonia before 01. But the prince, who

was deeply interested in science and art, and no doubt well informed of what was going on in
notice of Aristotle after he had become one of the most distinguished of Plato's school, though little weight attaches to Cicero's statement to that effect {De Oral. iii. ;>5, 141). It is also possible tliat tlirough his father, Aristotle had relations with the Macedonian court, and he may himself, as Stahr (p. 33) suggests, have been acquainted in his youth with Philip, who was the youngest son of Amyntas and about his own age. There was a work, or perhaps a section of a larger work, On the Education of Alexander,' by the Macedonian historian
' '

well-known letter (ji. v. ap. Gell. 5, quoting Andronicus, and ap. SiMPL. Fliys. 2 b), in which Alexander chides Aristotle for
XX.

publishing
trines,

and

his aoroamatic docAristotle replies that

Athens,

may have taken

those

who had not heard them

not understand them. Plutarch also connects Alexander's fancy for medicine, which he sometimes tried personally on
his

would

friends,

with

Aristotle's

teaching. These are, however, more or less probable guesses,

and what appears most important

is least trustworthy, for the letters turn on the theory of an

acroamatic and esoteric teaching confined to a few, as to the incorrectness of which

^'.p. 112, inf. hear of two books which Aristotle addressed to his pupil,

We

Ilepl fiaaiKeias,

and

'Tirhp 'AiroiKwv,

d.q.v. p. 60, n. 1 inf. Plut.

(Alex. 8)

Marsyas (SuiD.

s.

v.

Mapo-.; cf.

says Aristotle revised the text of the 7Zm<^ for Alexander. As fellowpupils of Alexander are named Marsyas (Suid. Mapa.), CalHsthenes (Justin, xii. 6; cf. Plut.

MuLLER,
sq.).
it

Script. Alex. M. 40, and Geier, Alex. Hist. Script. 320

Onesicritus had treated of also in a chapter of his Me;

morabilia (Geier, iUd. 11 DiOG. vi. 84)o Yet the accounts we have of it are very scanty, and it is

Alex. 65; DiOG. v. 4 Arrian. but vide Geier, Alex. 10 Seript. 192 sq.), and perhaps Cassander (Plut. Alex. 74). At
;

iv.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

23

that influence was important and beneficial, even if we had less distinct testimony as to the respect of the great

pupil for his teacher, and as to the love of learning

which the philosopher imparted

to the king.^

Alexander

was not only the invincible conqueror, but also a farHe was ambitious seeing ruler, ripe beyond his years. establish the supremacy, not of Grecian arms only, to
but also of the Hellenic culture. He withstood for years the greatest temptations to overweening pride to

which any errors, he

man could
still

be exposed.
spirit, in

In spite of his later

all

stands far above

other world-con-

querors in nobility of

purity of morals, in love

of humanity, and in personal culture.

And

for all this

the world has in no small degree to thank the tutor

who

formed his apt intelligence by scientific training and fortified by sound principles his natural instinct for all
that was great and noble.^
Aristotle himself appears to

have made a kindly use of the influence which his position gave him, for we hear that he interceded with the king for individuals and even for whole cities.^
the same time Alexander

met

iyevovro
Opafifievos

rcKfiripiov.

6 /xevToi

irphs

Theodectes (Plut. Aleiv. 17), and probably also Theophrastus

(d. q. vide

<pi\o(To(piav

ifiireipvKiDs
ott'

koI
avrcp

crvvT-

apxris

Cv^os

^LIAN.

V.

H.

iv. 19).

but cf. 52. The V. 39, fabulous stories as to Alexander's youth, preserved by the pseudoCallisthenes, may be ignored. 1 'Apto-ToreATj Plut. Alex. 8 eavfidCo^v iv apxfi Koi ayaircou ovx rjTTov, CDS avrhs eAeye, rov irarphs, &s Sr eKer^/oi/ yuej/ ^ajv, 5i^ rovrov Se KoAws C^v, varepov Se vTroTrT6Tepov eax^v [v. infra], ovx ^o'tc iroiricrai Ti KaKbv, aXX' at (^iKo<ppo(Tvvai t5

DiOG.

ovk i^eppvr] rrjs ypvxvs, as his relation to Anaxarchus, Xenocrates, and the Indian phikoX irSdos

losophers Dandamis and Kalanus

showed (notwithstanding Themist. Or.

^

viii.

106, d.).

That he did not act in practice on Aristotelian principles (Plut. Virt. Alex. i. 6, p. 329;

(TcpoSphu iKeTvo Kal

exovaai

irphs

arepKTLKhu ovk avrhv a\KoTpi6Tii]ro5

DeOYSEN, p. 99, 2 Hellen. i. b, 12 sq.) proves nothing to the contrary. ' Fs. Amm. 46, V. Marc. 4, Jlww. Zif. 13,-^LIAN, F. ^.xii.54.
cf.

StAHE,
d.

GescJi.

24

ARISTOTLE
latter

Of the
had at

we

are told that Stagira (whose refounda^),

tion he procured from Philip

different times to

Eresus,^ and Athens,^

for his advocacy.

thank him

When Alexander, at the age of sixteen, was appointed

Regent by
his father,^ Aristotle's teaching It

must naturally

have come to an end.

cannot afterwards have been resumed in any regular way, for in the immediately
following years the precocious prince took a most active
1

So Plut. Alex.
33,
3,

c. 7, cf.

Adv.

Dio. Chkysost. Or.2p'n,Or.il,22^B.. On the other hand, DiOG. 4, Ps.

Col.
p.

1126,

and

Ammon.

47, V. Marc. 4, Ammon. H. Nat. vii. 29, ^LiAN. V. IF. iii. 17,xii. 54, 109, Valer. Max. v. 6, ascribe the re-

monument was erected to in consequence on the Acropolis. The story may be suspected of resting on a spurious letter; yet Diog. (6) also says ^-qdi 5e
that a

him

Latin. 13, Plin.

Sri irpefffi^vovTos avrov irphs ^ikiinroy virhp ^ Kdrivaioov a-xoKapxris iy^vTO ttjs
filois,

KoX "Epfxiinros eV to7s

storation of Stagira to Alexander. Plutarch, however, seems on the whole better informed, and is confirmed by the expressions of Aristotle and Theophrastus themselves cf. p. 25, n. 2, infra. Plut. {Adv. Col. 32, 9) and Diog-. (4) say that Aristotle also framed laws for the restored city, which is hardly credible. Dion (^r. 47) relates that he had to contend with great difficulties in the restoration, of which he complains in a letter, which may or may not be genuine. His work did not last long, for
;

iv
vtt'

^KKahriixia
St)

a-xo^rjs "EevoKpdTrjs

ikOSpTa

avrhv koI

deaadfievou

&\\(f TTiv (TxoKw

kK4(Tdai. irepi-

irarou rhv iu Au/ceioD- This cannot be true as stated, for at Speusippus' death, 339 B.C., Aristotle had long been Alexander's tutor, and at that date there could be Ho question of embassies to Macedonia. Stahr's theory (p. 67, 72) of an embassy in Aristotle's first residence at Athens is untenable.

The story may relate to the two years between the battle of Chgeronea and Philip's murder, when
already influential at the Macedonian Court, might by
Aristotle,

Dion (^ihid.) and Strabo (vii. f r. 35) describe Stagira as uninhabited that it succeeded for the time is
:

clearfromp.25,n.2,& p. 37,n. 3&4. ^ A doubtful story in Ps. Amm.

p.

47,

and

in

V.

Ma/rc.

and

Latin, represents Aristotle as saving Eresus from destruction by Alexander.

^ V. Marc. 4 and Ammon. Latin. (13) refer to the service that Aristotle did the Athenians in his letter to Philip, and add

Ammon.

his intercession have done some service to Athens which Hermippus could describe by some such term as irpea^eveiv. The favour Alexander showed to the Athenians may have been partly due to Aristotle's influence (Plut, Alex.
G.

13, 16, 28, 60).

\ 01. 110. 1, = 340 B.c.,theyearof Philip's campaign against Byzan-

tium. (DiOD.xvi.77; FLVT.Alex.9.)

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

part in his father's
decisive

25

campaigns

though that

circumstance does not exclude the possibility of some continuance of their intellectual pursuits in the intervals
of leisure.^

Aristotle seems at this time to have with-

drawn to the city of his birth. ^ At an earlier period he and his pupil had already left Pella.^ After Alexander ascended the throne, Aristotle must still have remained some time in the north. But with the beginning of the great war with Persia, the reasons that had bound him to Macedonia came to an end, and there was no longer anything to keep him away from that city, which
offered at once the

most congenial residence

'*

and the

best field for his teaching work.^

During this period Aristotle might or might not be called Alexander's tutor; which accounts

probably for the different stories as to the length of his tutorship, given by Dionys. as eight years (his whole residence in Macedonia), and by Justin (xii. 7) as five years, which is itself too long. 2 That the last period before his return to Athens was spent in Stagira, where his family house

seum, near Mieza. Stahr (104) takes this to be near Stagira, but Geier (Alexander und AHstot. 33) shows it to be S.W. of
Pella, in
*

Emathia.

The fragment quoted p. 21, n. 5, says it was the Thracian winter that drove him from Stabut this could scarcely be the chief reason. ^ The Ps.^ww^m. 47, says Aristotle was, after Speusippus' death, called to Athens by the Athenians, or, according to V. Marc. 5, by the Platonic school, the leadership of which he took over in common
gira,

was

(cf. p. 3, n, 2),

is

assumed

fragment quoted p. 21, n. 5, the genuineness of which is not beyond doubt. He must have treated Stagira as his home, since in his will (DiOG. 16) he
in the

with Xenocrates

(cf. p. 13, n. 3).

The three recensions of

this bio-

orders

offering for Nicomachus to be erected there. His second wife was of Stagira (v. p. 20, n. 3), and Theophrastus owned land in the city (Dioa. v.
52),

the votive

with which he shows himself

.

to be well acquainted. Cf Hist. Plant, iii. 11, 1 ; iv. 16, 3.

^ Plut. (^Z^a?. c. 7) says he and Alexander lived at the Nymph-

graphy, however, contain at this point a chaos of fables. The Ps. Amnion, says Aristotle taught after this call in the Lyceum, had afterwards to fly to Chalcis, went thence again to Macedonia, accompanied Alexander on his Indian expedition, collected in his travels his 255 forms of government, returned after Alexander's

26

ARISTOTLE

He returned to Athens^
for his

in

Olymp. 111.2

(b.c.

335-4)
left

thirteen years after Plato's death.

The time thus

years,^

work

in that city

was but twelve

but

what he accomplished in that short interval borders on Even if we may assume that he had the incredible.
already in great part completed the preparatory work
for his philosophy,

and that the researches in natural

philosophy and the historical collections which supplied

the materials for his theoretic labours had perhaps been

brought to some kind of conclusion before his return to

Athens,
treatises
it

seems certain that almost

last

all

his systematic
life.

belong entirely to this

period of his

death to his native town, and died there twenty-three years

after Plato,
(14, 17)
(5,

The Latin. Ammon. and the Vita Ma^rciana 8) send him with Alexander to

Persia collecting his 255 polities,

and returning home after the war, and after all this they make him start teaching in the Lyceum, ily to Chalcis and die there,
twenty-three years after Plato,

restored after the destruction of Thebes in the summer of 335, and that Alexander did not start on his march into Asia till the spring of 334, For the other view the calculation of Dionys, {see next note) may be quoted, but it is probable that this is

The

collection

of

polities
is

in

noticed also by Ammon, Categ. 5, b; David, Schol. in An. 24, a, 34 Ps.-PoEPH, ibid. 9, b, 26 Anon.
;

Alexander's campaigns

merely his own deduction from the years given by Apollod. 01. Ill, 2, for the arrival in Athens; 01. 114, 3, for his death; therefore, 01. 114, 2, for the
flight to Chalcis.
2

Dionys. ut supra

iaxo^a-

ad Porpk. apud Rose, Ar. xjseud. 393. To seek any grains of truth in this confusion would be lost
time.

^ev eV AvKeicf xpovov irdv SddeKa Tq} 5e TpiffKaiSeKOLTcp, fxera t)}v

Apollod. apud Diog, 10, and DiONYS, ut sup., both agree in

'

'AAe^duSpov reXevTTjv, iirl K(f)i(roSiapov &PXOPTOS, airdpas eh XaXKiSa v6<r(f reXevTa. As Alexander died June 323, and Aristotle in autumn
(cf. p. 37), this reckoning will be exact if Aristotle came to Athens in the autumn of 335 and left in the autumn of 323. It would also coincide if Aristotle went to Athens in spring 334 and to Chalcis in summer 322, which,

322

Ill, 2, but do not indicate whether Aristotle came in the first or second half of the year, i.e. end of 335 or spring of 334. For the latter it may be argued that the hostility of Athens to Alexander was only terminated 9,nd the Macedonian influence
01.

naming

however,
as
is

is

otherwise unlikely,
at p. 36, n.
1
,

shown

infra.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

Parallel with this comprehensive
as a writer
at last

27

and strenuous labour went on his work as a teacher, since he now began to compete with his great master on a

footing of equality as the founder of a

new

school.

The

open spaces of the Lyceum were the resort that he chose for his hearers.^ He was wont to converse with his

up and down in that gymnasium between the rows of trees and from this custom his
scholars as he walked
;

Peripatetics.' ^ For a more numerous audience, however, he would naturally

school derived the

name

of the

'

have to adopt a different form of teaching.^

' It was a gymnasium connected with a temple of Apollo Lykeios, and lay in one of the suburbs (cf. Suid. HarpocraTiON,and Schol. in Aristoph. Pac.

Therefore,

so limited, and they were called oi e/c (or ttTrb) rov irepiirdrov (or 01 iK tSov wepiiraTwu, StrABO, xiii. 1, 54), as the other schools were called ol airh rrjs 'A/coStj/uios, or
01 airh TTjs (Troas
iii.

V. 352.

(v.

ap. Diog. 2, etc.; Qi\(^. Acad.S..^, 17; Gell. N. A. XX. 5, 5; Diog. i. 17; Galen. IT. ijJiil. c. 3 Philop. in q. V. Schol. in Ar. ii. b, 23 (cf. in Categ. Schol. 35, a, 41 sq. Ammon. in q. v. Porph. 25, 6 David, in Categ. 23, b, 42 sq., and p.l3,n.3 supra) with David, Schol. in Ar. 20, b, 16; Simpl. in Categ. 1 fin. That this derivation is correct rather than the opposite view of Suidas (s. v.
2
; ;
;

Hermippus

181

Math.

vii.

Sext. Pyrrh. 331, 369

xi. 45, etc.).

^ Gell. ut supra, says that Aristotle gave two kinds of instruction the exoteric and the acroamatic. The former related to Khetoric, and the latter to
:

Philosophia remotior ( = Metaphysics) with Physics and Dia' '

The acroamatic instrucwhich was intended only for those who were tried and well prepared, occupied the mornlectic.

tion,

and 2/cpaTr?s) and Hesych., which derives the name from

'Ap.

ing;

the

exoteric
.

lectures,

to

the nepiTraros of the Lyceum as the meeting-place of the school is proved, first, by the form of the word, which can be derived only from the verb, and also by the fact that the word IleptTroTos in the earliest times was not confined to the Aristotelians (v.
p. 13, n. 3)
;

which the public was admitted, the afternoon (cf Quintil. iii. 1, pomeridianis scholis Ar. 14,
jjroieipere
Qivos,

artem oratoriamccepit).
ew-

The former was called the

:

though

later it

was

the latter the ^iiKivhs Trepliraros utroque enim tempio'e amhulans disserehat. It is impossible, however, to address a large audience therefore walking
;

28
as

ARISTOTLE
had already happened more or
less

with Plato, the

Socratic fashion of the dialogue had to give place to that

of a continuous lecture, whenever he was dealing either

with a large number of scholars or with subjects in which

there was something essentially
to be explained or

new in form and matter

to be carried

some inquiry
detail.^

through

with

scientific

accuracy of
difficulties

On

the other hand,

wherever these

did not arise, he did no doubt

retain the habit of philosophic dialogue with his friends

as

an alternative method. ^

In addition to his philowith which

sophical teaching he appears also to have revived his

earlier school of Rhetoric,^ in connection

there were exercises in oratory.'*

Diog. (3)
rect,
1

It is this,
10,

and not
:

is

doubtless more corSe

irAetoi/s

eTreiS^

iyeuoyro

Diog. iv, dAAa juV

ras
X^'^P^i-

speaking of Polemo
^Aeye

oi/Se KaQi^cou

irphs

^Stj KOI iKciOicrev.

d4(ris, (paal, irepnrarcoi/

Se eTre-

Such lectures ruust be meant when Aeistox. {Ilarm. elem. p.

says that Aristotle in his teaching indicated the objects and method of his inquiry before giving the development of individual points. It is, as will be seen, probable as to many of the Aristotelian writings that they were either made up from notes of lectures, or intended as preparatory notes for lectures and at the end of the Toy^ica Aristotle directly addresses his audience {Soph. El. 34 /w.). 2 This appears partly from the nature of the case, since Aristotle had among his hearers ripe and notable men like Theophrastus partly from the fact that at least in earlier years he used the form of dialogue even in his writings partly from the fashion of peripatetic teaching, which supposes conversation of.
30)
;
;

The continuous lecture on a definite theme is expressed by irphs deaiv Acyeiv a more cursory treatment by iTrix^ipeiu (cf.
:

following notes). ^ Diog. (3) is

not

a good

witness, since what he appears to state of Aristotle's later time seems to be taken from a source relating to the earlier period of contest with Isocrates (cf. p. 17, n. 3). It is probable, however, from Aristotle's Rlietorio itself that in the oral philosophic teaching rhetoric was not forgotten, and Gell., ut supra, speaks expressly of rhetorical

teaching in the Lyceum.

^

Diog. 3

koX irphs Q^criv crvv-

eyv/jLva^e

rovs ixaQyiras ajxa koX ^tjto-

piKws

the Oeffis being a general topic, not a particular question (cf. CiC. Top. 21, 79, Up. ad Att. ix. 4 QuiNTlL. iii. 5. 5. X. 5. 11 and Feei, Qucest.
eiraffKcou,
;

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

29

any popular lectures addressed to large audiences, that is referred to in tlie story that he received in the morning a small and select circle only and in the afternoon

everyone

freely.^

At

the same time

we must

also

think of the Aristotelian school as a society of friends

haviug on

many

sides a

common

life.

For friendship

its

founder, bred in the intimacy of Plato, always showed

by word and

act a tender

and beautiful enthusiasm

and

we hear

accordingly that, following the fashion of the

Academy, he was wont to gather his scholars about him at common meals and that he introduced a plan of definite regulations for these meetings and for the whole
of their

common

life.^

It is said that the aid

and appliances which Aristotle

were provided
rulers,
for

needed

for his far-reaching labours

him by

the favour of the two

Macedonian

and

especially

by the princely generosity of Alexander.^

Cic. Orat. 14, 46
adolescentes,
:

Prot.

150).

In hae Ar.

7wn ad
tenuiter

pMlosnpJiorum

morem

dissenmdi, sed ad copiam rhetorum in utramque partem, ut ornatins et uheritis did posset, Neither says whether exercuit. the earlier or the later school of rhetoric is meant: probably both;
cf.

which may refer, however, to the work mentioned p. 99, n. l,i^r; and Diog. (4) preserves a hint of his arrangement for the internal government of the school by offichanging every ten days. Cf Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i. 839, n, 1. ^ According to ^lian ( V. H. iv. 19), Philip gave him ample means to pursue his investigacers
tions, ttKovtov dj/ej/Se^, especially

Gell.

ihid.

i^corepiKo,

dice-

rJietoricas meditationes facultatemque argiitiarum cirAli'iimque rerum notitiam illas vero exotericonducehant

bantur, quce

ad

cas anditiones exercitiumque dicendi. ' Cf. p. 27, n. 3,

il)ld. 2

and Gell.

Athen. (i. 3, v, 186 b, cf. 186 e) says he wrote for their

common meals

v6aoi (rvixiroriKoi,

in Natural History Athen. (ix. 398) speaks of Alexander devoting 800 talents to that work ; and Plin. (H. Nat. viii. 16, 44) says Alex, placed under his orders all the hunters, fishers, and fowlers of the kingdom, and all overseers of the royal forests, ponds, and live stock, numbering many thousands. Pliuy'g story,
;

80

ARISTOTLE
stories of the ancient writers

However exaggerated the

on
this subject

we may

to be, and however wealthy suppose Aristotle himself to have been by fairly
it

may seem

inheritance/

is

yet clear that the vast scope of his

researches forces us to infer that he possessed advantages

which he probably could not have commanded but for such kingly assistance. The deep and wide acquaintance
with the writings of his people which his
disclose to

own works ^

us could
;

hardly be possible without the

and on this head we are expressly was the first who accumulated a great Such works, again, as the Politeiai and the library.^ collection of foreign laws could not be produced without laborious and no doubt costly investigations. The books
possession of books
told that he

on Natural History especially and the kindred treatises presuppose researches such as no one could have brought he had at his disposal or could set more than the resources of a private individual. It was therefore a happy circumstance that the man whose grasp of mind and rare powers of obto completion unless

in action something

however, is disproved (v. BranDis, p. 117 sq., and Humboldt, Xosm, ii. 191, 427) by the fact that with a few exceptions, such as elephants, Aristotle shows no

studies, implies that he

hampered by poverty.
worthlessness
n. 1
^

was not As to the

tales
of,

of

the

of

Epicurus and Timgeus,

p. 9,

and

3.

knowledge of things which would

be discovered in Alexander's expedition.

to

His will proves nothing as earlier years, but apart from the calumnies of his oppo'

his

Besides the extant works, we know of others concerning Khetoric, Poetry, and the History of Philosophy, ^ Strabo, xiii. 1, 54, p. 608 irpwTos wu 'la/xev avvayay^v fiifixia
:

nents, as to his pride and love of display, all we know of his way of life, his choice of residence, his marriage, and the means necessary for his extensive

koI SiSd^as rohs eV Alyvirrcf

fiaa-i-

Aeas

fii^Xioe^Kr)s
i.

avuTa^iv.
(iii.

Cf.

Athen.

3, a.

Gell.

says Aristotle paid lents for the works of Speusippus.

17, 3) three Attic ta-

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

servation

81

marked him as the ablest founder of empirical and of systematic learning, should have been so favoured by fortune that the needful equipment for his great calling was not denied him.
science

In the

last years of Aristotle's life the

good relations

between him and

philosopher

his great pupil

were disturbed.^

The
of the

may

well have taken offence at

many

things which Alexander did in the intoxication of success, at

many measures which he found

necessary for

the consolidation of his conquests, but which were re-

pugnant to the Hellenic traditions and to the self-respect of independent Greeks, and at the harsh and passionate excess into which the young conqueror was betrayed when he was surrounded by flatterers, embittered by personal opposition and made suspicious by treachery .^ There would be no lack of tale-bearers to carry gossip
true and false to the king, for the learned and philosophic

members

of his Court were plotting in their personal

jealousies^ to oust each other,

and even the courtiers and

generals doubtless sought to use the scientific proclivities

of the prince as points in the

game

of their ambitions.

As

the king's relations with Antipater grew more un-

friendly, it
also,

seems he was prejudiced against Aristotle"* because of the close relations between the philo-

sopher and the general.^

'

But the
^

severest blow to the

Cf. p. 23, n. 1, su^ra. The exchange of letters which is cited as a proof of their friend-

ship is unreliable, because we do not know how much is genuine. 2 Plutarch (cf. p. 23, n. 2, supra) says Aristotle was dissatisfied with Alexander's whole political idea of the fusion of the Greeks and Orientals,

For examples v. Plut. Alex, c. 52, 53, Areian, iv, 9-11. ^ Cf. Plut. Ihid. 74 (though that is after the death of Callisthenes)
;
;

as

to
;

Antipater,

cf.

Plut. Alex. 39, 49; Areian, vii'. 12 Cuet. x. 31 Diodoe. xvii

118.

This friendship is proved from the fact that Antipater 's

^

32

ARISTOTLE
came through the action

king's attachment to his tutor

of Callisthenes.^

The

stiff-necked opposition of that

philosopher to the

new
way

Oriental fashions of the Court

the bitter and reckless tone of his diatribes against

them

the pointed

in

which he vaunted

his inde-

pendence and drew upon himself the eyes of all the malcontents of the army the importance he assumed to
;

himself as Alexander's historian, and the arrogant airs

he gave himself accordingly, had long caused the king This made it to look on him with anger and mistrust.
the easier for his enemies to persuade the king of his

complicity in the conspiracy of the nobles which had

placed Alexander's
Callisthenes lost his

life

in
^

the

gravest danger, and

life

with the conspirators, though

he was doubtless innocent of their treacherous design.

In the heat of his anger the king's suspicions turned against Aristotle^ also, for he had brought up Oallison, Cassancler, was a pupil of Aristotle (PLUT.^te. 74), by the letters of Aristotle to Antipater (Aristocl. ajnid Eus. Pr. Ec. xv. DiOG. 27 Demetr. Eloc. 2, 9 225 Jj^LiAN, V. II. xiv. 1), and
;
;

writers,

and of modern 23, 2 Stahr, Arist. 1. 121 sq. Droysen, Gescfi. Alex. ii. 88 sq. Grote, Hist, of Greece, xii.
Qu.
vi.
; ;
;

290
^

sq., etc.
jj;^

jg

highly improbable he

especially

by the fact that Anti-

pater

is named as chief executor in Aristotle's will, (7j;^ DiOG. 11. The false story of his complicity based is in Alexander's death on this circumstance (?;. in-

was an accomplice, though w^e cannot say how far he was to blame for exciting by reckless talk his younger friends,
^ Alex, writes to Antipater (Pltjt. Alex. 55) ol fihv iraldes vTrh T(i/ MaKeSoucou KareAevaOrjaav top Se (ro(pLar7]v [Callisth.] y<i} KoAdaco Kal ruvs iifireij.\pai/Tas avrhv koX tovs inroSexoixfvovs tols TroAeci tovs ifxol iTn^ov\evovTas. Accord:

fro).

As to Callisthenes, see PluT. Alex. 53-55 Sto. rep. 20,

> ;

6.

p. 1043,

Qu. conv.

i.

6. p.

623

ArriAN,
18 sq.;

Curt. viii. Chares ajmd Athen. x.

iv,

10-14

ing to Chares

(ajj.

Plut.

ihid.),

434 d
Tusc.

Theopheast.
10, 21
;

ap.

ClC.

he had at

tirst

intended to try

ill.

Seneca, Not.

Callisthenes in Aristotle's pres-

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

sthenes as a kinsman and had afterwards

33

him

to the King,^ though, no doubt, he also

reckless

recommended warned the young man against imprudence.^ The suspicion

however led to nothing worse than a notable coolness

in his relations with Alexander.^

story to the effect

that Aristotle was

concerned with Antipater in the

alleged poisoning of Alexander was connected with the

death of Callisthenes,"* but the completely groundless

nature of the charge has long ago been proved.^

So

far

indeed was Aristotle from having any cause to desire

his

princely pupil's

death that that event in reality

brought serious dangers upon himself.

The statement of Dio. Chrys. {Or. 64, p. 338) that Alexence.

ander meant to kill Aristotle and Antipater is merely a rhetorical exaggeration. * Plut. iUd. Aerian, iv. 10, 1 DiOG. 4 SuiD, KaXKiae.
;

Arrian (vii. 27) and I. Pliny {H. Nat. xxx. 16) mention it, but, like Plutarch, treat it as an invention. Xiphilinus (Ixxvii. 7, p. 1293) says the Emperor Caracalla deprived the Peripatetics in Alexandria of

gonus

vii.

DiOG. ibid.; Valer. Max. 2 Plut. Alex. 54.

;

Plutarch says this expressly n. 1, supra), and the story in Diog. 10, that Alexander, to mortify his teacher, took
'

their privileges on account of the alleged guilt of Aristotle. ^ The disproof of the charge (cf.

(of. p. 23,

Stahr, Ar.
SEN,
rests,

i.

136

sq.

and Droy-

Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Xenocrates into favour, would

not prove the contrary even if it were more credible but it is unworthy of both Alexander and Aristotle, Plutarch, Hid., on the
;

contrary, sees in the king's kindness to Xenocrates, a consequence of Aristotle's teaching. Philoponus {a2md Arist. Meteor ol. ed. Ideler, i. 142) cites a reputed letter of Alexander to Aristotle from India, which proves nothing. * The earliest witness to this story is a certain Hagnothemis {apud Vjj^JT.Alex. 77) who is said to have heard it from King Anti-

i. 705 sq,) apart from its moral impossibility, on these grounds \a) Plut. ihid. shows expressly that the suspicion of poisoning first arose six years after Alexander's death, whenit afforded the passionate Olympias a welcome pretext to slake her hatred against Antipater's family, and to excite public opinion against Cassander who was said to have administered the poison (Z>) equal suspicion attaches to the testimony of Antigonus, which must belong to the time when he was at enmity with Cassander, though we do not know whether he made any charge against

Gescfi. d. Hellen.

VOL.

I.

34

ARISTOTLE

For the unexpected news of the sudden death of the dreaded conqueror called out in Athens a wild excitement against the Macedonian rule, which, as soon as the news was fully confirmed, broke into

open war. Athens put herself at the head of all who were willing to fight for the freedom of Greece, and before the Macedonian regent Antipater was fully prepared, he found himself beset by superior forces, which he only succeeded in mastering after a long and risky

From the first this struggle in the Lamian War.^ movement threatened, as was to be expected, the prominent members of the Macedonian party. Aristotle
Aristotle;
Aristotle,
is

(c)

it

is

significant

ander's

service,

and

intrusted
.

that the bitterest opponents of

to

whom

no calumny

amiss, such as Epicurus, Tima3us, Demochares, Lyco, etc., know nothing of the charge

with important missions (cf p. 5, the (It) finally, n. 7, supra) rumour of Alexander's poisoning
;

almost all who speak of (</) Alexander's poisoning preserve the

story (which was clearly connected with the first publication of the rumour and was well fitted to catch the popular fancy) that it was ac-

complished by water from the Nonacrian spring i.e. the Styx a proof that we are not dealing with history; {i^ the accounts Arrian and Plutarch give us from the court chronicles as to

the course of Alexander's illness do not in any way suggest poison (/) if Aristotle's motive was the fate of Callisthenes, that could hardly have caused in him a hatred that would lead six years later to murder, nor could he, after so long a time, have had

is refuted by the movement of Alexander's events afterwards. death was the signal for an outbreak in Greece, which in the Lamian war brought Antipater himself to great straits. Anyone acquainted with the politics of the day would clearly foresee such a result. If Antipater were not as much taken by surprise as everyone else was by the king's death, he would have made preparations either to stem or to head the rising. If he had been known as the author of that which the Greeks acclaimed as the beginning of freedom, they would not have begun their revolt by attacking him and if any part in it had been attributed to Aristotle, he would not have had to fly from Athens.
; 1

any fear as to
(_^)

his

own

safety

For

details, see
i.

Droysbn,
sq.

it is

own

probable that Aristotle's adopted son was in Alex-

Gesoh. d. Hellen.

59

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

may
not have played a political role
^

86

but, in any case, ; Alexander and his friendship with Antipater were so well known, his own name was so famous, and his personal enemies, no doubt, so many, that he could not escape attack. The charge brought
his relation as tutor to

against

him

of offences against the established religion

in itself baseless

enough

must
it

a pretext for wreaking political

geance.2

have been simply and personal venOhalcis

in

But

Aristotle found

best to retire before

the
*

rising

storm.^

He

escaped to

Eu-

According to Aristocl, ajj. Eus. Pr. Ev. XV. 2, 3, Demochares (doubtless Demosthenes' nephew, de quo cf. Cic. Brut. 83, 286: Be
iii.

a blind, although perhaps the Hierophant may have hated

the philosopher's liberalism. An honest charge of atheism in the Athens of that day was hardly possible, although the mass of the people could still be moved by it. Grote (18 sq.) shows how in this connection the Athenians would be impressed by the story that Aristotle had given heroic honours to an eunuch who was first a slave and then a tyrant. Grote also notices (p. 14) how mortifying the mission of Aristotle's adopted son was for Hellenic pride (v. p. 5, n. 7). The further suggestion of Grote (p. 37. cf.

23, 95 Seneca, De Ira, 2; Plut. Demosth. 30; Vit. Orat. viii. 53, p. 847, and SuiDAS) had alleged that letters of Aristotle's had been found

Orat.

ii.

23,

which were

hostile to Athens;

that he had betrayed Stagira to the Macedonians, and that after the destruction of Olynthus he had betrayed to Philip the richest citizens of that city. As the last two are impossible, the first is probably untrue, as Aristocles himself recognised.
^ The charge was brought by Demophilus on the instigation of the Hierophant Eurymedon,

Geant, p. 24) that the enmity of the school of Isocrates had to do

with the prosecution of Aristotle be true, but the fact that Demophilus was a son of Ephorus, and. that the latter, and perhaps

related

the deification of Hermias, and alleged as proofs the poem noticed (p. 20, n. 3), and the alleged sacrifice (p. 20, n. 1) cf. Athen. xv. 696 a, 697 a;
to
:

may

DioG.5 Anon. Menag., Suidas, and Hesych. Origen (<?. Cels.

;

65) suggests, out of his own fancy, nvh. 56yju.ara rrjs ^i\o(TO(pias avTov & iuSfiKxau cli/ai aaefirj oi
i.

'Aer}va7oi.

charge proves that

The weakness of the it was only

both, belonged to that school is not sufficient proof. have still less ground to accuse the Academic school of having any share in it. 3 His remarks that 'he would not give the Athenians a second chance of sinning against philosophy,' and that ' Athens was the

We

D 2

ARISTOTLE
boea,^

where he had a country house, to which he had sometimes retired before,^ and his enemies could only To Theophrastus ^ inflict on him unimportant insults.^
he gave over his teaching work at the Lyceum, as a But it was not given substitute during his absence.

place spoken of by
5'
e'Trl

Homer where
the

what we ad Amm.
Chalcis.

tind in
i.

Dionys. Lp.
that Aristotle

5,
3,

(rvK(f),

in allusion to

died in 01. 114,

It is

having

fled to

sycophants', are quoted by

iELiAN,
p.

iii.36;

DiOG.9 Origen,%# w^r;

Odyss.
p.

EusTATH.
1573
;

in

H
V.

120,

Ammon.

48

Marc.
last

8;

Amman. Latin.

17, the

not possible to assume (with Stahr, i. 147) an earlier emigration of Aristotle to Chalcis, on the authority of the statement of Heraclides that
Aristotle

them in a letter to Antipater. Favorinus, apud DiOG. 9, says the Homeric hne occurred in a written Apologia,
mentioned placing

was

living
8'

when Epicurus came

TcAeuTi^craj/Tos
lj.eT\de7v
(pcova.

in Chalcis to Athens, ^AXe^dvSpov

.
.

['E-TTiKoupov]

eis

KoAo-

which is known also to the Anoyi. Menaq. and to Athen. xv. 697 a, both of whom doubt its genuine-

For Aristotle's

flight

was

One does not see why ness. Aristotle, once in safetjs should write a useless defence. It was no doubt a rhetorical exercise in imitation of the Socratic Ajwlogia (cf

the fragment given by Athenseus with Plat. ApoL 26 d sq.). 1 Apollodor. ajmd DiOG. 10 is made to say that this was in 01. 114, 3, i.e. in the latter half This is improbof 322 B.C. able, for Strabo (x. 1, 11) and Heraclides ap. DiOG. x. 1 speak as if he lived a considerable time in Chalcis and besides it is more likely that the attack on Aristotle happened in the first uprising against the Macedonian party than that it was begun after Antipater's decisive victories in Thessaly, and that Aristotle fled in good time instead of waiting through the whole of the Lamian war. Probably, therefore, he left Athens late in the summer of 323, and Apollodorus only said
;

only to the danger that threatened him at Athens, which arose only on Alexander's unexpected death; and he cannot therefore have gone to Chalcis before the news reached Athens, Either in the middle of 323. Heraclides or Diogenes must be

due

inexact.
.

The Pseudo-Ammonius

(cf p. 25, n. 5 su^jra) and David lSc?ioL in Ar. 26 b. 26) assign im-

possible dates.
2

Cf.

Strabo,

x.

1,

11,

p.

448.
3 In a fragment of a letter to Antipater probably of this time

(ajj.

^LIAN,

V.

H.

xiv. 1,

cf.

p.

44, n. 4 infra)

mention
e^vTwv

Aristotle Ae\(po7s tS)v iu

KoX

makes
;|/7j^i(r-

(101.

What
ment,

whether a monuthis was proedria, or other honorary

S)V

cKpyprjixai

vvv.

privilege

we do not know.

If it

was given him by Athens,

it

may

be connected with the services

noticed p. 24, n. 3, su^pra. * DiOG. V. 36 and following lines, SuiD. s. v. eotpp.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

to

37

Aristotle

to

enjoy his retirement long.

is,

In the
B.c.^,

following year, that

in the

summer

of 322

he

which he had long suffered.^ two great contemporaries he survived Alexander by less than a year, and predeceased Demosthenes only by a short interval. His

succumbed
So
it

to a disease from

chanced that

of his

body

is

said to have been taken to Stagira.^

us,''

His

last

will is preserved to

and

it is

monument
it

of his

^ Apollod. ap. D10G..IO, V. Marc. 3, Ammon. Latin. 12, and Dion. Mp. ad Amm. i. 5, give

12, V. 15 init., ix. 4,

and because

1166 b, 11), does not fit the

circumstances, for in EubcEa he

01. 114, 3 as the year.

It

was

was in no danger. The tale (found

about the time of Demosthenes' only in JElias Cretensis, p. death (Apollod. ibid.'), but a 507 d) that he threw himself into the Euripus because he could not little earlier (Gell. N. A. xvii. As that date is given discover the causes of his visions, 21, 35). by Plut. (^Dem. 30) as the IGth and the variant of the same in of Pyanepsion 01. 114, 3 = Oct. 14, Justin, cohort. 36, Greg. Naz. Or. iv. 112, or Procop. Be Bello 322, Aristotle must have died between July and Sept. of that year. Goth. iv. 579, that his fruitless 2 That he died by illness is meditations on a vision wore him stated by Apollod. and Dionys. out with worry and fatigue, need ut supra; cf. Gell. xiii. 5, 1. no refutation, though Bayle (art. Aristotle, n. Z) thinks the latter a Censorin. {Bi. Nat. 14, 16) adds fitting end cf Stahr, i. 155. liwiw ferunt naturalem, stomacM 3 Related only by V. Marc. injirmita^tem crebrasque morhidi 4 and Ammon. Latin. 13, and corjyoris offensiones adeo virtute animi diu sustentasse, ut magis with the addition that an altar mirum sit ad annos sexaginia tres was built on his grave and the eumi vitam protulisse, quam ultra council meetings held there and The statement that a festival (^ApiffTOTeKeia) was Tion pertulisse. of Eumelus ap. DiOG. 6 (de quo instituted and a month named after him. The evidence is not V. p. 2, n. 2, p. 6, n. 3 supra) followed by the Anon. Menag. and good but as he was not only the Suidas, that he poisoned himself most illustrious citizen but also with hemlock, or (as Hesych, has the re-founder of Stagira (cf Dio. Or. 47, 224, who says that Aristotle it) that he was condemned to drink hemlock, is probably a con- alone had the fortune to be ttjs fusion with the death of Demo- irarpiSos o'lKKTr^s) the story is not sthenes or of Socrates. It cannot wholly improbable. * Apud DiOG. 11 sq be historic, because the best proevidence is against it, because it bably (cf V. 64) taken, like the wills of Theophrastus, Strato, is contrary to Aristotle's own and Lyco, from Aristo, a noted principles (^^. iV. ii. 11, 1116 a,
;
.

88
faithful

ARISTOTLE
attacliment and careful provision for
slaves.
all

who

were connected with him, including his

Peripatetic
'ApiffToov 6

Theo-

circ.

200-250

Kelos),

who
place.

(lege will be

mentioned in his

Herm-

ippus {circ. 200-220) cited the same record (v. Athen. xiii. 589 fl.)' which according to V. Ma7'c. 8, and Amnion. Latin. 17

was also quoted by Andronicns and Ptolemaius for the catalogues

of Aristotle's writings, de q. infra. V. Marc, says Aristotle left a SiaOrjKTi ^ (ppTai Trapd re 'Aj/.

dpOVLKCf Koi TlTOX^fiaicf

7rj/a/c[wv]

/JLeTO, \_Twv']

Twu avTOv

(rvyypafxfidr(i)v

{Amnion. Latin, 'cum voluminibus suorum tractatuum ;' cf. IIEITZ, Verl. Schr. d. Ar. 34). The external evidence for the the more will is therefore good because it is likely that the wills of Aristotle and his followers would be carefully preserved by the Peripatetic school (for which those of Theoph., Strato, and Lyco were a kind of foundation charter), and because Aristo was himself the immediate successor of Lyco. The document has also all internal signs of genuineness, and the objections which have been urged against it (cf. (tRANT, It is objected 26) prove little. that it mentions neither a house in Athens nor a library, both
;

others quoted, a regular disposition of his whole property. Grant thinks it unlikely that Pythias was not yet marriageable or that Nicomachus was a lad but this Why may not Ariis not so. stotle's wife Pythias, perhaps after the death of older children, have borne him a daughter ten years after their marriage ? or why might Aristotle not have by a second wife, for whose remarriage he provides, a son who would be a lad when his father Besides, we was sixty-three? know from other sources that the
;

education of Nicomachus was taken over by Theophrastus. The naming of Antipater arouses in Grant a suspicion that the
forger inserted

him
is

name

but

it

as a historic clearly natural

that Aristotle might appoint him in order to place the carrying out of his directions for the benefit of those depending on him under the protection of his

powerful friend.
that
first
is

And

this is all
is

meant when he
irdvrcav,

named

in the honorary position of

iwiTpoTTos

whereas
the

carrying

out

of

the business

A of which Aristotle possessed. never forger, however, would

have omitted the
;

latter,

which

was the thing of chief

for the school but it sible that Aristotle had already

interest is very pos-

made

arrangements

which did not require

about it, to be re-

peated in the extant will, that being rather a set of directions to friends than, like the three

provisions of the will is left to Theophrastus and the other eViObjection is taken to fieX-nrai. the provisions for four statues of animals which Aristotle is said to have vowed to Zeus Soter and Athene the Preserver, for Nicanor's safety (DiOG. 16), as being an imitation of the Socratic for Asclepios offering votive (Plat. Phcsd. 118, A). This, however, is far-fetched and the point is unimportant. Little as

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

phrastus
lie

89

named

as the chief of his school,^

and

to

him he

left

the best part of his inheritance, his books.

We are but poorly informed as to the personal traits of

Aristotle's character.

Excepting a few

details as to his

personal appearance,^ almost the only statements

possess are the attacks of his enemies.

we

Most of these

charges have already been shown to be worthless

as

such

those concerning

his

relations

with Plato, with

Hermias, with his two wives, and with Alexander, his

alleged misconduct in youth, and the political turpitude

of his later

years."^

What

remains of the stories told

Menag., Suid., Plut. Aud.
8,-p.26,and Adidat.
9, p.

Aristotle believed in vows or in the mythic personalities of Zeus

Poet. 53) reiers.

;

and

Athene, yet it is quite natural that he should erect a monument of his love for his adopted son in their common home, Stagira (to which the statues were to be sent), in a fashion which accorded with Greek custom. He himself in Etiiics iv, 5 reckons votive monuments and offerings among the forms in which the virtue of
lxya\o'!rpTreia
'

Pausanias (vi. 4, 5) mentions a statue said to be of Aristotle as to others, v. Stahr, i. 161 sq, and as to those exl ant, especially the lifesize sitting statue in the Palazzo

Spada

at

Rome,

v.

Schuster,

shows

itself.

Erhalt. Portr. d. griech. PMlos. Leipz. 1876, p. 16, where they are photographed. The sitting statue has a lean face, earnest and thoughtful, showing the lines of severe mental labour,

The pretty story as to the way in which he expressed his

choice
iV.

and with a
profile.

delicate,

clear-cut

is
xiii.

well
5,

A.

where

known (Gell. Eudemus

*
'

must be substituted for Menedemus '). It is quite credible, and not unlike Aristotle. 2 Steabo, xiii. 1, 54, p. 608 Plut. Sulla, c. 26 Athen. i. 3, a, with which cf. DiOG-. v. 52.
;

impresses us with its life-like truth to nature, and the workmanship is so excellent that it may well be an original work dating from the time of Aristotle
It

or his immediate successor. Directions are given in Theophrastus' will (DiOG. v. 51) that

the

Mou(re?oj/
:

begun by him should

eTreira
r))v 'Apia-roels
'6ffa

DiOGt. 2

calls

him

laxvo-

be finished

and fxiKpSfi/iiaros, and an abusive epigram in the Anthology (iii. 167, Jac), which deserves no weight, (TfxiKphs, (paXaKphs, and
(TKeX^s
nrpoydffTcop.

Te\ovs cIkSvu Tcdrivai KalraXoLira avaQ^fxara

vTTTJpx^v
1/

t5 Uphp
irpSTepov

bably

We
R,
(op.

pronouncing

hear of a lisp in to which the

word rpavXhs

DiOG.

2,

Anon.

T(^ t^PVy which proto be understood of a statue already erected. * Cf. p. 8 sq. 19, n. 4 ; 20, n. 1,2; 33, n. 4 ; 35, n. 1, 5,

is

40

ARISTOTLE
his

by

many enemies^
Nor do
of

has for the most part

the accounts

little

probability.^

we have
a

give us

any right to lay

seeking
sort

to Aristotle's charge either a self-

shrewdness,

or

jealous
first

and
these

little-minded

greed for fame.^

chiefly

The

of

charges

concerns

his

relations

with

the

Macedonian rulers. The second refers to the criticisms he allows himself to make in writing of his But it- cannot be cotemporaries and his forerunners.
proved that he ever sought the favour of Philip and
sujira.

tullian's

Another calumny is TerAr. familiarem suum Jlermiam tiirpiter loco excedere fecit {A2whget. 46), which in the context can only mean he betrayed him, a tale so senseless and wicked
that it required a Tertullian to invent it. The story of Philo of Byblos ap. SuiD. UaKaicp., as to immoral relations with the historian Palffiphatus of Abydos is equally baseless. Themist. Orat. xxiii. 285
>

Macedonian Court and flattered Alexander, and that at his death 75 (or even 300) dishes were found in his house or that
:

he was immoral in relation to Pythias and Herpyllis, and was also enamoured of Theodectes of Phaselis and again that he was so effeminate that he bathed in warm oil (doubtless for medical reasons, cf. DiOG. 16 and p. 37,
:

talks of
stotle's

a (XTparhs
{ap.
:

'6Xos

of Ari-

calumniators.

Aristocl.

By him, Eus. xv. 2) and

so miserly that afterwards or that in his youth he was too fashionable for a philosopher (which, as he was rich and brought
n. 2, supra'),

and
oil

he sold the

Diogenes
are

named

(11, 16) the following Epicurus, Timffius,

Eubulides, Alexinus, Cephisodorus, Lyco, Theocritus of Chios, Demochares, and Dicsearchus, within a generation of Aristotle. 2 Such as the accusations to be found in Aristocl. and DiOG., ut supra Sum. 'Apirrr. Athen. Plin. ff. A^. viii. 342, xiii. 566 XXXV. 16, 2; ^iLlAN, V. H. iii. Theodoret, Our. Gr. Aff. 19 xii. 51, p. 173; LuciAN, Dial. Mort. 13, 5, and Paras. 36; that Aristotle was a glutton, and for that reason went to the
;

and up at Court, is possible) that he was impudent and sneerIf there were any facts ing.
:

underlying these stories, we may conclude from the character of the narrators that they were in

any case

trivial and we can see in the passages of Lucian and Thcodoret and his quotation from Atticus how Aristotle's own statements as to wealth and pleasure were twisted to support these suspicions. 3 Even Stahr (i. 173 sq) pays too much attention to these
;

charges.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

Alexander by unworthy means,
of a Callisthenes.
^

41
to be
follies

and
to

it

was not
as

expected that he should applaud or imitate the

To impute

it

him

an

offence,
is

that he attached himself to the Macedonian party,

to

apply to him an erroneous and inapplicable standard.

By

and training he was a Greek. But while all him to the royal house to which he and his father owed so much, no one can say
birth
his personal ties attached

that the consideration of the general position of politics

ought necessarily to have turned him against their

policy.

So

satisfied

was Plato of the untenable character

Plato's follower could the less evade

of the existing political relations, that he had advocated

sweeping changes.

the same conviction, since he had a keener insight into

men and
ditions

things,

on which the

and had clearly detected the convitality of States and forms of

government depends.

With

his

practical

acumen he
;

could not put his trust in the Platonic ideal of a State

he was forced to seek the materials

construction from

for a political re-

among

the political relations as they

were and the powers already existing.

^

At

that day no

Stalir thinks it

flattery

when

Alexander

sounds like Aristotle writes to (Arist. Fragm. No.

611, apud iELiAN, V. 54) b Ovfjihs Koi 7) opyi]

iffovs
(1.

H.

xii.

ov irphs
irphs

angry with inferiors, and that he stood above all men, which was surely true of the conqueror of the Persian Empire. We cannot tell whether the letter is genuine.
Heitz {Verlor. Schr. d. Arist. 287) suggests that this fragment does not agree with that in Plut.
Arist. 13, p. 472 614, 1581, b) in which Aristotle is made to compare
;

^ffffovs

with Rutgers,
aXXb.
crol

Rose
Tohs
ovSels

and
'[(Tos,

Heitz)

KpeiTTOvas

yivcrai,
if

5e

but

this is genuine

{Tranqu. An.

Aristotle said no more than the truth, and he wrote, according to ^llan, in order to appease

Fragm.

Alexander's wrath against certain persons, for which purpose he tells him that one cannot be

himself with Alexander, but the letter is much the more doubtful of the two.

42

ARISTOTLE
conld be found except in the Macedonian

new foundation
kingdom,

for the

Greek States were no longer able at

life.

once tomaintain their independence against the foreigner

and to reform their inner

The whole course of

history so far had proved this so conclusively, that even

a Phocion was forced to say, in the unless the moral

Lamian War, that

were altered

conditions of Greece

there was nothing to be expected from an

armed

rising

against Macedon.^

Doubtless such a conviction would

come

far less readily to

a friend of the Macedonian kings,

an Athenian statesman than to who was a citizen

of a small city like Stagira, once destroyed

by Philip,

Can and then reorganised as a Macedonian town. we blame him if he accepted that view, and, with a
just appreciation

of the

political

situation,

attached

himself to that party which alone had a future, and

from which alone,

loss of

if

from any, Greece could

the

still

find

salvation from the dissension

and decay within, and the

power

to
if

face

enemy without
to

Can we
its basis

condemn him

he

felt

that the old independence of

the Greek cities must

come

an end, when

in the civic virtue of their citizens

was gone ? Can we object if he believed that in his pupil Alexander was fulfilled the condition under which he held that monarchy was natural and just ^ where one man stands

out so clearly beyond

their equality with
if

all

others in efficiency as to

he preferred to

him impossible ? see the hegemony

make Can we complain

'

of Hellas rather in

the hands of such a

man

than in those of the

great

king of Persia,
'

for

whose favour the Greek

2

cities
13
fin^

had

Plut. Phoc.

23.

pgiit^

iii,

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

48

been bidding against each other ever since the Peloponnesian War, and hoped that he would give the
Hellenes the only thing they lacked to become the
rulers of the world

political unity ?

As

for the

charge of jealousy of others' fame,

it

is

true that his philosophical polemics are often cutting and

colour,
rest

sometimes unfair. But they never take on any personal and it would be impossible to prove that they ever

as sharply,

on any other motive than the desire to make his point and establish it as completely as possible.
discoveries,

If he does sometimes give us the impression of insisting

on his own

we ought

to set off against this

the conscientiousness with which he seeks out every

seed of truth, even the remotest, in the work of his
predecessors
all
;

and remembering
is

this,

we

shall find that

that remains

but a very intelligible and very

pardonable self-appreciation.
Still

less

to pass over

minor matters ^

need we

attach any importance to the allegation that Aristotle

hoped soon to see philosophy completed.^ If he did, it would have been only the same self-deception of which many other thinkers have been guilty, including some who have not been, as he was, the teachers of mankind

> Polit. vii. 7, 1327 b, 29, reckoning the merits of the Greek race SiJirep iXevOepdv re
:

StoreAeT Kal fiiXricTTa iroXiTevSfjievov KoX Svudficvov &px^i-v iravTOiv

ixias

Tvyxdvop TroXireias. Like the tale told by Valer. Max, viii. 14, 3, as a proof of Aristotle's sitis in capessenda
2

standing of the Rliet. ad Alex. Rhet. Hi. d, 1^10 h, 2). qiq Tusc. iii. 28, 69 Aristoteles veteres philosopjios accnsans qui existimavissent pMlosopMam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos ant stultissimos ant gloriosissia. \ fin. {ci.
:

mos fuisse

sed se videre, quod

laude, which is plainly an idle invention based on a misunder-

paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane ahsolutamfore.

44
for tens

ARISTOTLE
of centuries.

In

fact,

the remark seems to

have occurred in an early'work of Aristotle's,^ and to have related not to his own system but to Plato's,

which professed to open out a prospect of an early completion of

all science.2

So
will,

far

as

Aristotle's

philosophical

writings,

the

scanty fragments of his letters, the provisions of his

us

and our incomplete accounts of his life afford any picture of his personality, we cannot but Nobility of principles, a just moral honour him.
sense, a

warm and

keen judgment, a susceptibility to all beauty, lively feeling for family life and friendship,
benefactors, affection for
relatives,

gratitude towards

benevolence to slaves and those in need,^ a loyal love for

his wife,

and a

lofty conception of

marriage

far tran-

scending the traditional theories of Greece

the traits that

such

are

we can

see.

They
it

all

carry us back to

that faculty of moral tact to which in his Ethics he

reduced

all virtue,

backed as

was in him by a wide

reflection.

knowledge

of

men and by

deep

We

are

bound
all

to suppose that the principles he asserts in his

Ethics were the guides of his

own

life,'^

the recoil from

manner
*

of one-sidedness
(piXo-

and excess, and the orderly

personally served

In the dialogue nepl

to

him should be

which it is rightly sold, and that several should be referred by Rose (Ar. Ft. No. 1) freed and even started in life, As to the latter, cf. his saying, and Heitz {Ar. Fr. p. 33). 2 As Bywater {Journ. of ap. DiOG. 17, ov rhv rp6irov, dAAa
(ro<pias,

In Philol. vii. G9) also says. Aristotle's extant works he often refers to the need of further investigation. ' As to the former, cf. his will, which provides inter alia that none of those who had

rhv

&vQp(joirov r{X4r)<ra.

Cf his expressions in the Letter to Antipater, ap. ^lian, V. H. xiv. 1 and ap. DiOG. 18. In the former fragment he says as to the withdrawal of former honours {de q. v. p. 36, n. 3,
.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

its roots in

45

appreciation of things which despises nothing that has

human

nature, but attributes an absolute

life.

value only to the spiritual and moral factors of

And
it,

if his character, so far as

of any little weaknesses which

we know it, may have

and in

spite

attached to

seems to us

lofty

and honourable,

still

more are

his powers

and

intellectual

achievements altogether

astounding.

Never have

so great a wealth of

know-

ledge, so careful powers of observation,

and so untiring
with a

a zeal for acquisition, been found in combination with

such keenness and power of

philosophic
insight
so

scientific thinking,

capable of piercing

into the

essence of things, with a width of view so fully capable

of at

once seeing the unity and coherence of

all its

all

know-

ledge, and embracing and subordinating

branches.

In poetic swing, in richness of fancy, in the insight of

genius, he cannot compete with Plato.

His powers lay

art.^

wholly on the side of knowledge, not of

us

That

fascinating witchery of speech with which Plato holds

is

hardly ever to be found in the extant works of the

Stagirite,

though many of those that are

all

lost are praised,

doubtless with justice, for their literary grace. ^

But
which

he outstrips his master in

those

qualities

mark the

full

manhood of

science
17

in width and
(/;.

solidity

supra) ovTws
jUTjSev fieKeiv
;

<T(p6Spa jx4\iiv virep

us /j-iire /xoi avrwu fi-fire jxoi in the latter, as to

exco,

sq)

and the fragments of

one who had reviled him behind hishack: airdura fie Kttl jj-affTiyovTco, The few poetic attempts we have show no great gift. On the other hand his wit was noted
the

(Demetr. De Eloc. 128), and apophthegms {ap. DiOG.

DeMETR. 29, 233) give proof of it. That it went with a tendency to banter and sauciness of speech (&Kaipos crrwfivXia), as ^lian (V. IT. iii. 19) tells us of him in his youth, is possible, though not proved by the existing testimony, ^ Be quo infra.
letters

46

ARISTOTLE

of research, in purity of scientific method, in ripeness

of judgment, in wary discrimination, in his compact

brevity and inimitable keenness of statement, and in

the definite use and comprehensive development of a

scientific

terminology.

He

cannot inspire us, lay hold

and the moral His energies, at all in the same way as Plato does. work is drier, more professional, more closely confined But to the field of cognition than Plato's had been.
of our hearts, weld in one the scientific

within these lines he has, so far as one

achieved success.

man

might,

For thousands of years he showed

For the Greeks he inaugurated
In every
field of

philosophy her way.

the age of learning.

knowledge then

open to him he enriched the sciences by original investigations,

and advanced them by new conceptions.

at their highest possible

Even

if

we put

measure the

help he derived from his forerunners, and the assistance

he obtained from scholars and friends, and perhaps also from trained
still

slaves,^

the range

of his achievements

runs so far beyond the

can scarcely understand

could accomplish
his restless soul
it
all,

common standard, that we how one man in a short life especially since we know that
wring from a weakly body the
Aristotle has

had

to

needful vitality for this gigantic work.^

fulfilled his historic

vocation and solved the philosophic

task

it

set him, as scarce

any other ever

did.

he was as a

man we know

unhappily too

little,

Of what but we

* Callisthenes of Babylon is said to have sent him information of astronomical observations there (Simpl. Be Coelo, Schol. 503, a, 26, following Porph.), but

the story is suspicious because of the addition that these observations went back 31,000 years,
^

Qf p 37^ ^

2,

and DiOG.

v.

16.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

have no reason to believe the attacks of his
to refuse to accord to

47
foes, or

him that favourable judgment

which his own Ethics with many subsidiary indications

must demand.

48

ARISTOTLE

CHAPTER

II

Aristotle's writings

K. Consideration
The

seriatim of the particular ivorks

the outset literary activity of Aristotle startles us at

its

both by

extent and

its

manysidedness.
his

The works
over
all

which we

have under

name

extend

branches of philosophy, and they exhibit a vast Yet wealth of wide observation and historical learning. add a great catalogues to these extant works the ancient

number of others, of which only the titles or slight fragments now remain. Two of these catalogues we have
:

21 sqq.), the first in two recensions, that by Diogenes (V. Anonymus Menagii' the other and that called the The first list contains, in in certain Arabic texts.^ Anonymus ^ ^ of which the Diogenes, 146 titles, most
'
: '
'

has preserved, leaving out^ a few

eight

'

and adding seven or

new

ones.

An appendix

adds forty-seven titles-

many of which,'^ however, are only repetitions or variants Pseudepigrapha. those already entered and ten
of
See both in the Arist. Fraoni. of Rose and Heitz (Ar. 0,Z V. 1463, Berlin ed., iv. b, lsq.,Parised.) According to the earlier

"^

48) he

who

was Hesychius of Miletus, lived about 500. ^ As to the possible grounds Heitz. omission cf oi this Verlor. Schr. Artst. ip. 15
^

text 111, but as completed

by

Rosefroman Ambrosian^S.
3

According to Rose's bable conTectu^re Ur, Mbr. Ord.

132. pro-

14byonetext,27bytheother. If our count - right there

are 9, ^.e. Nos. 147, 151, lo4, 155, 167, 171, 172, 174, 182, repeating

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

49

Both the sources agree in putting the total number of books at nearly 400.i The author of the first catalogue
cannot be (as Kose imagines
2)

identified with

Andro-

nicus of Khodes, the well-known editor and arranger of Aristotle's works,^ though it is not to be doubted that
that Peripatetic did compile a catalogue of Aristotle's
writings.^

For even
is

if

we could

set aside the fact that

Andronicus

said to have given the total

number

at

1,000 books,^ and the circumstance that the extant index includes Hhe liepl spfirjvsLas, which he rejected/

remains clear that we should look to find in Androthose writings above all that are included in our extant Corpus Aristotelicum, which is derived, speaking broadly, from his own. This is far
it

nicus's edition

from being true of the extant catalogues, for many important parts of the extant Corpus are either altogether absent or at least are not to be traced under
^^' 1^' o^^' \^h ^i H^' 39 and 11 of the main list. DiOG. 34, and the Anon, MENAG. at the beginning of his list. The titles mDiog. (reckoning the Letters as one book for each correspondent named and the UoKiTiiai as a single book) give 375 books those in the Anon, as completed by Rose, 391.
;

^^'

^^'

^^^^h ^id not at all correspond with his own work. A similar catalogue of the writings of Theophrastus is ascribed to him by the Scholia at the end of his Metaphijsics and at the beginning of the seventh book of the ^^6^. ^/
Plants.
^

David,

SgJwI. in At. 24
'

a
'

19.
*

iff

^'''^'''^1^' 8 sq. Ot. SELLER, Ph. d. Gt.

Pt.

in. a, 549,

3 (2nd edition).

1 his IS clear

from the above""^

This is the more remarkable because we gather from Dioa 34 that the catalogue was to include only works recognised as ^e6

;^c"//Tpw P''^^^^'' O^j/ZZa, 26) from the

(ct. p. 37, n. 4,

^^"*-

V.

Marc. 8
^^ ^' """^

supra) and David,

ott^^^'i\ Andronicus merely credible that adopted the catalogue of Hermippus

(v.

^*'

^^.-

nuine. Bernays(i>mZ.^.^,..l34) therefore supposes that the book was inserted in the cata^^" ^ Andronicus by a later

hand.
^

Heitz, Ar. Fr. 12)

Alex, in Anal, Pri

'

5'>
'

VOL.

50
their later

ARISTOTLE
names and
^

in their later form.^

list

The conleft
is

verse theory

that the

in Diogenes

was meant to
out of

contain

only those

writings which were

Andronicus's collection of the didactic works,

tived by the fact that the
sections of the Coriius,
list

nega-

contains
it

many important

and that

distinctly claims to

For be a complete review of the philosopher's works.^ it is equally impossible that it can owe similar reasons
its

origin to
'

Nicolaus of Damascus,^ or any other to

omits

our

Of the books contained in Corpus AristoteUcum Diogenes' list mentions only the
following: Nos. 141, The Cate(prics; 142, n. kp^t]vdas\ 49, 50, 'AmA. Uporepwu avaXvriKwv
;

important

parts

of

our

bfXTipc^v

102,
t

n.

Cy'wi/,

1)

books

(meaning no doubt the UUtory of AnimaU, he spurious tenth book of which is afterwards, No. 107,
128, called 'Tirep toD ^urj yevvav) 75, UoKitlkvs aKpodMrjxa-viKwv a 23, OlKovofiiKhs a ffiujs 8 books
;^

Corpus. The Anon. Menag. adds the Topics under that name (his No. 52) and the Metaphysics, to which he gives 20 books (if the text is right, de quo infra). The First Analytic is his 134, with 2 books, and the Mhics is 89,
'HOiKctiv k' (lege

dix adds
;

a'-K). His appen148, ^vaiKi] uKpSaais, 17]' 149, IT. y^via^ws koX {lege t] (pOopas 150, IT. /uLeredipcov, S' 155, 156, n. Ccf(}v n. C4^^ la-Topias i'
: ; ; ;

78,

Tex^ns

pr)TopiK^<f
:

/3'

119,

Kiv7]<Tws

UoL-nriKwu a the Topics,

and probably also under two dilferent

Also Nos. 90, infra. a j8' y' , and 45 (115),
;

(^(vcvv fiopiccv

names,
n. n.

of.

n. C^'wj' 174, n. TfOiKwv

2

(as 3 books); 157, n. (only 3 books) 158, yv4aoos (also 3 books) ;

;

'NiKOfiax^'ioji^-

(pvcreois

(which are a Kivhcr^ois probably parts of the Physics) y' and No. 39, n. (rroix^itav a fi' probably the two (meaning books n. yeve<TQ}s with our book
iii.

Of Bernays, Pial. Ar. 133, and Rose, ut supra cf on the Verlor. opposite side, Heitz,
:

Schr. p. 19.
^
'

2ui/e7pai|/c

5e

Tr&fnrXcKTTa
7)yT)(rdix7]v

fii^Kia

air^p

aKdXovOov

book iv. or Meteor.')', 70, eVeis iinx^ipw<^of TiKoi Ke' (no doubt a recension the ProUems) 36, n. rwv -rroaathe treaXoos XeyojjLevav (doubtless that tise, often cited by Ar. under name, which is now book v. of the
IJe
C(vlo,
;

viroypdxpai

5ia

r^v

irepl

rrdvTas

Xoyovs ravdphs aper^rjj/,' are the introductory words in DiOG. v. 21, but that does not mean that he would exclude the main philosophical treatises. The same is
clear from 34, where Aristotle's power of work is said to be proved
e/c

Metaphysics)', and 38, 'He^Kwi/ (only 5 books). Even assummg that all the suggested correspondences are correct, the list still

roov
*

Trpoyeypafx/x^voou

avyypafx-

fidroov,

numbering nearly 400. For his works on Aristotle

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

61

whom

the edition of Andronicus was already known.

>

must have been a scholar of the AlexanHermippus ^ and he must either not have had the means or not have taken the trouble to give us more than a list of the manuscripts which were to be found ^ in a library accessible to him,
Its compiler

drine period, most probably

presumably that of Alexandria.

be impossible
for

Otherwise

it

him

to have omitted important

would works

which can, as we
I

shall see,

be clearly proved to have

catalogue, therefore, only

been in use during the two centuries preceding the date

'of Andronicus.''

The

first

shows us what writings appeared under Aristotle's name

m the Library of
Of
writings, which

Alexandria.

far later date is the other catalogue of Aristotelian

two Arabic writers of the thirteenth century^ copied from a certain Ptolemy' probably a
^

Peripatetic of the second century a.d., mentioned also

by Greek
:

writers.^

His

list

seems to have reached the

Heitz, ibid. 49, Ar. Fr. 11). Through what channel it came to the knowledge of Diogenes, we do not know.
Brandis {Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. 81) has shown that this probably true of both the catalogues of Aristotle and Theophrastus given by Diogenes. * Diogenes himself elsewhere cites works of Aristotle which are not in his list (Beandis, iUd.; Heitz, 17), but this only proves that these references were taken from other sources than those from which he got the Cata^

cf Zellee, Ph. d. Or. Pt. iii. a. 556, 2nd ed., and Heitz, Verlor. 'Schr. 38.
.

So Heitz, 46 sq., followed by Geote, i. 48, Susemihl, Ar.

'

mclifk. 19, At. Pol. xliii,, Nietzsche, Rhein. Mus. xxiv. 181 sq. ' We are not expressly told that this scholar and Peripatetic, who wrote about 200 B.C., catalogued the works of Aristotle but it is hardly to be doubted, seeing that he wrote a biography of Aristotle in at least two books which Diogenes used (cf. DiOG. V. 1, 2, and
a. d.
;

b,
is

1,

Athbn.

xiii.

589, xv. 696),

and

logue.
^

that his 'Afaypacp^ rSov eocppdcrrov fiifi\ia)v is mentioned in the Scholia

cited,
p.

De
One

q.

V.

Rose, Ar.

0pp.,

p. 1469.

49,

n.

4,

supra

(cf.

of these Arabic writers

E 2

52

ARISTOTLE
For while
treatises,

Arabic copyists in an incomplete form.

Ptolemy put
Books, their

tlie

total of

Aristotle's

works at 1,000

lists

comprise only

so^e 100

Of the component parts of counting about 550 Books.^ their our extant Corpis only a few are wanting, and
absence

may be

partly accidental.^

Some

others are

(Ibn el Kifti, d. 12-18, aj), Kose, ibid.) says this Ptolemy was an

Strato(DiOG.v.58). The fact that the Ptolemy who compiled the

admirer of Aristotle, who wrote a book, Histories Ar. et Ifortis ejuset Scriptorum Ordo, addressed to Aa^las (or AHlas) the other
:

Catalogue came after Andronicus clear from the mention of is Andronicus at No. 90, and of Of the Apellicon at No. 86.
writers of that name knovirn to Rose (Ar. Lihr. Ord. 45) suggests as the same the Neoplatonist Ptolemasus, named by Jambl. ap. Stob. Eel. i. 904, and by
us.

(Ibn Abi Oseibia, d. 1269, ihid.') also speaks of his Liher ad Galas de vita Ar. et eximiajnetate testament I ejus et indiee scriptorvm ejus notorum. Both copy from him bio<i:rapliical details as well as the Catalogue, but

seem to know no more of him

than that he lived
'

in prorincia

Rum

'

(i.e.

the

Roman Empire),

and that he was a different person from the author of the AlWhat they say, howmofjest.
exactly with in Ar. 22, a, 10 (after Proclus, cf. 1. 23), says of a Ptolemy who reckoned the
ever,

corresponds

what David,

Scliol.

total of Aristotle's books (as did Andronicus, cf. p. 49, n. 5) at 1,000, avaypacp^v avTwu Troir}adixepos Kol rhv fiiov avrov kol ttjj/ SidOeaiv
:

and with the remark in J'.Marc.S, as to the same, that to his list of Aristotle's works he added his
to

David takes this Ptolemy be Ptolemajus Philadelphus, but this merely proves the ignowill.

rance of David, or the pupil who recorded his lectures; though we know that Ptolemasus Philadelphus himself was a collector of

Proclus In Tim. 7. Another was a contemporary of Longinus, but he is said (by Porph. V. Plot. 20) no scientific to have written works. The most probable identification would be with the Peripatetic Ptolemy, whose attack on a definition of grammar by Dionysius Thrax is quoted by Sext. Math. i. 60, and by the Schol. in Bekker's Aneed. ii. 730, and whose date therefore must lie somewhere between Dionysius and Sextus (70-220 B.C.). An exact reckoning is not possible without going into the variations of the numbering in the different texts. If the 171 Polities were counted separately, they would raise the total to about 720. 2 The most important omissions are the Ethics and the (Economics besides which there are the Rhetoric, ad Alex., the book upon Melissus, &c.; and the
' ;

works (Athen. i. 3, David, and Ammon. Schol. in Ar. 28, a, 13, 43), and was a pupil of
Aristotle's

tracts n, aKovffTuv, Ti. avatrvo'ns, n. ivvirviwv, IT. jxavTiKris ttjs eV

TOis virvois, n. yeorrjTOS Koi yf]pc}S,

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
named
Greek
twice over.

63

The

fact that this

Arabic catalogue

was taken from a Greek original

titles,

is

proved by the

often

hopelessly miswritten, which are

set against

most of the items.

such a character
for the
offer

It is obvious that catalogues of

and origin

no

sufficient security either

completeness of their reckoning or for the authenticity

of the writings they include.

Nothing but a

full

and

accurate inquiry into the merits of each case can enable

us to decide as to the claims of those texts or fragments

Aristotle's name. Such an inquiry cannot here be fully carried out but it will not be out of place to combine with a complete
;

which are handed down to us under

review of

all

the writings ascribed to Aristotle a concise

appreciation of the points to be considered in passing

judgment on their authenticity.^ To begin at the point where the old catalogues end, we may distinguish from the philosophical treatises those writings which dealt with personal matters the Their number is letters, poems, and occasional pieces. relatively small and if we exclude those whose genuine-

n.

'^TTvov

Koi iyp-nySpcreus,

and

IT.

Auetoritate, 1854,

and Ar. Pseud-

Xp<cfji.dTO}v,theU. KSfffjiov,!!.
Twj/,

apeTuu

Kal KUKiwv, n. Oavfiaffiuv aKova^id-

ejnffrajjhus, 1863, rejected too summarily all the lost and several

and the

*i'(rto7i'W;U(/c']fj.

But

as No. 40 includes the De Memoria et Somno, so it may be that others of the small scientific tracts are bracketed in the list under

one
*

title

As

to the

and number. works known only

or fragments,
cf.

by

titles

the

thorough inquiry of Heitz(Fe?'Zor.

Schrift.
d.

Ar.,

1865), refuting

Val. Rose,

De

Ar.

whose learned essays, Lihrorum Ordine et

The writings of the extant books. named in the ancient Catalogues will be cited in this chapter by Kose's numbers (p. 48, n. 1) ; of the Catalogues themselves, that of Diogenes will be cited as D.,that of the Anonymus Menagii as An., and the Ptolemy of the Arabic Ar. Fr. will be texts as Pt. used for the collection of the fragments by Rose in Ar. Oj)p. v. 1463 sq., Berlin ed.; and Fr. Hz.

54

ahistotle
is

ness

doubtful or which are certainly forged, there

is

very

little left.

few poems and poetic fragments/

and perhaps some part of the matter said to be cited from his Letters,'^ may stand. The so-called Apologia of Aristotle,^ and the Orations in praise of Plato and
Alexander,'^

must be

rhetorical inventions of later date.

extant Fragments seem to come from the editions of Artemon and
Andronicus. It is difficult to say if any are genuine, since some are certainly not. Not only Rose (Ar. Ps. 585, Ar. Libr. Ord. 113) but also Heitz (Verl Schr. 280, Fr. Hz. 321) considers all the letters That the six now exforged. tant (aj). Stahr, Ar. ii. 169, and Fr. Hz. 329) are so is clear, and Heitz holds that they could not even have been in Artemon's collection. * Cf Ar. p. 35, n. 3, su2)ra Fr. 601, p. 1578 Fr. Ilz. 320.
.

for that of Heitz in Ar. Opp. iv, b, 1 sq. of the Didot edition. " For these, with the notices relating to them, v. BERGHK,Zyr. Gr. 504 sq.,K0SE, Ar. Pseud. 598 sq., Ar. Fr. 621 sq., p. 1583, and

The most imFr. Hz. 333 sq. portant are those above cited
(p. 12, n. 4, p. 20, n.
3),

whose

genuineness we have no reason to doubt. D. 145 mentions %-k7i and iyKciofxia ^ i\ey7a, and An. 138 v/j-povs appear in An. Ajjj). 180.
;

2 The Letters of Aristotle, praised by Demetr. Floe. 230, SiMPL. Categ. 2 7, Scliol. in Ar. 27, a, 43, and others (cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 587, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 285, and Ar. Fr. 604-620, p. 1579, Fr. Hz. 321 sq.) as the high-

An
(v.

^Y.yKdofxiov

quoted by Olympiod.
166

YiXaTuvos is Gorg.

water mark of epistolary style, were collected in eight books by one Artemon, otherwise unknown

Jahrl. f. Philol., Suppl., xiv. 395, and.lr. Fr. 603, Fr. Hz. 319); but it is more than suspicious, since

no one used what would have been the best source

Demete. EloG. 223, (??. Schol. in Ar. 24, a, 26,

David, and Pt.

No. 87). Andronicus is said to have reckoned twenty books (Pt. No. 90, cf. Gell. XX. 5, 10), but perhaps it was only twenty letters, which is the number in An. 144 names letters D. 137. to Philip, letters to the Selybrians, four letters to Alexander Demetr. Eloc. 234, Ps. (cf. Amm. 47), nine to Antipater, and seven to others. The letters of

or to Diares (de quo

P/iys.

v. Simpl. 120),mentionedbyPHlLOP. Be An. K. 2, are not in D. All

of Platonic biography. A Panegyric on Alexander aj). Themist. Or. iii. 55 (Ar. Fr. 602, Fr. Hz. 319) is condemned by the Fr. a^). RuTiL. Lupus, De Fig. Sent. i. 18, if that belongs to it, Bernays' theory of another Alexander (Dial. Ar. 156) being very improbable. An 'EyKXTja-ia 'AKe^duSpov is named by An. (No. 193) as spurious. Books n. 'AAe|cij/5pou are ascribed by Eustath. ajj. Dionys. Per. V. 1140, and An. Apjj. 176, to Aristotle through some confusion between his name and Cf. Hbitz, Verl. Schr. Arrian's.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

65

second section of the writings

scientific

may

include those

which dealt with

questions,
all

but were yet

^

essentially distinct in

form from
^

the extant treatises,

namely, the Dialogues.

that
Aristotle,

We

have repeated proofs

said

in one class of his works, did

make
his
fact

use

of the form

of

dialogue.

It

is

that

Dialogues differed from

those

of Plato

in the

that the individuality of the persons

coe versing was

not carried through,^ and

that the author kept the

lead of the conversation in his

own

hands.'*
^

Of the
the three

known works
books
291,
*

of this kind, the Eudemus^

Oyi Fhilosoj^hy^

and the four books On Jusrer.

and Muller,
v.
.

Script,
d.

{de

Alex. pref.

Cf Bernays, Dialoge

Ar.

q. V. Bernays, 21, 148 etc., and Rhe'in. Mus. xvi. 286 sq.. Rose, Ar. Ps. 52 sq., Ar. Fr. 82-

(1863), Heitz, Verl. Schr. 141221, Rose, Ar. Pseud. 23 sq. 2 Cf. Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 19, 4, Basil. Ep. 185 (167) ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 24, Plut. Adv. Col. 14, 4, Dio Chrys. Or. 53, p. 274, Alex. ap. David, SgIioI. in Ar. 24, b,

48, p. 1479,
EijS7]fxos

Fr. Hz. 47)

is

called

(Themist. Be An. 197,

and

cf. quotations in Ar. Fr. 41), or nepl \l,vxvs (D. 13, An. 13, Plut. Pio 22), or EvS-nfjLos ^ v.

David, iUd. 24, b, 10 sq., 26, 35; Philop. ihld. 85, b, 41, and De An. E. 2 Peocl. ap. Philop. ^tern. M. 2, 2 (cf. Ar. Er. 10) and In Tim. 338 d;
33,
b,
;

(Plut. Cons, ad Apol. 27, 115, and Simpl. ap. Ar. Fr. learn from Plut. Pio 42). 22, and Cic. Pivin. 1, 25, 53, that it was dedicated to Aristotle's friend, Eudemus, who died in Sicily 352 B.C. (cf.p. lln. 4 supra),
rl/vxvs

p.

We

Ammon.

Cateff. 6,
;

(ap.

Stake,

and

it

was probably written soon

i.

Ar. ii. 255) Simpl. Phys. 2, b Priscian, Solut. Prooim. p. 553 b. 3 Basil. Ep. 135 (167) ap. Rose, Ar. Pseud. 24. Ar. Fr. 1474. Heitz, 146.

after (Krische, Forsch.

16).

Of the Fragmients ascribed to it by Rose, more probable places will be indicated infra for Fr. 36, 38, and
48. Aristotle himself seems, in

Pe

Ad Quint. Cic. ut supra. 5 does not refer to Dialogues. ' Aristotelius mos,' in Cic. Ad Earn. i. 9, 23, has a wider sense; and refers to the in ntramque partem disputare,' cf Pe Orat. iii. 21, 80 but see Heitz, 149. * This remarkable Dialoj^ue
*

Fr.

iii.

to refer to a discussion in the Eudemus, cf. Ar. Fr. 41 D. An. 3 (who by 3,

i.

An.

4, init.

oversight

gives
47, 95,

four

books),

'

Rose, Ar. Ps. 27, Ar. Fr. 1-21, p. 1474, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 179 sq., Fr. Hz. 30 sq., Bywatee, 'Aristotle's Dialogue

Bernays,

66
tice
^

ARISTOTLE
seem to have been the most important.

The first two

subjects,

are of particular interest, because they stand in such close

relation, not only

by their form but by their

to the

to be said for the conjecture that they were written in the period

work of

Plato, that there is

much

when

Aristotle

still

belonged to the circle of Plato's

fully passed over to his later

scholars,

and had not yet

independe//- position.^
on Philosophy,' Journ. of
vii.

There are certain other works

71-77,
p.

Philol.

1487,

Bernays,

48,

64 sq.

Priscian tells us the

work was a dialogue {Solut. Proceni. p. 553), and it is confirmed by the statement (Plut.
Adf.
Col. 14, 4, Procl. ap.

Philop.

^m. M. 2, 2; V. Ar. Fr. 10) that Aristotle had in his Dialogues attacked and renounced the IdeHl Theory; of. At. Fr. 11 from the second book n. (piXoa. arguing against the Ideal Numbers. These three books are referred to (besides D.) by Philodem. n. eva-eBdas, col. 22, and following him, by Cic. iV. I>. i. 1 8, H'6. The apparent reference in Arist. P%.s-. ii. 2, 194, a, 35 yap rd ov ej/eKa' etp-qrai 5' (Stx^s eV TOis irepl <piXo(ro<pias) is as Heitz says (^Verl. Schr. 180) Yary susbut on the other hand the reference will not apply either to the Book on the Good (which could not be
;

Rose, Ar. Ps. 87, Heitz, Verl. Schr. 169, Fr. Hz. 19. CiC. Pep. iii. 8, 12, mentions this as a comprehensive work in four books. According to Plut. Sto. rep. 15, 6, it was attacked by Chrysippus ('Ap. Trepi ^iKaioavviis
'
'

auriypd(pooi^)

and the attacks

of

picious, since Aristotle else cites his Dialogues

nowhere

called n. (pi\o(T., cf. p. 61, n. 1, infra), nor to Ifetaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 2, since as Aristotle left

that book unfinished he could not quote it in the Physics. Kose's rejection of the n. (piKoa. is followed by Susemihl, Genet. Fnt. d. plat. Phil. ii. 534 but the arguments are insufficient. D. 1, An. 1, Pt. 3, At. Fr.
;

Carneades mentioned by LacTANT. Fpit. 55 (ap. CiC. Pep. iii.) seem to have been also specially directed to this work. Dpjmetr. Floo. 28 cites a passage from it. We are not told that it was a Dialogue, but that is inferred from its position at the head of D. which begins (Bernays, p. 132) with the Dialogues arranged according to number of books. It is, however, true that in the midst of the Dialogues (as No. 12) the Protrepticus comes in, which probably was not a Dialogue. Neither probably were Nos. 17-19. It is a question, therefore, whether the Anon, has not here preserved the original order so that the Dialogues really include only the first thirteen numbers of An., together with the Sj/mposlon which was misplaced in that list by reason
:

of the textual error(?7.p. 58, n. 1). 2 This is specially true of the Eudemus. All the fragments of

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
whicli are supposed
to

67

have been dialogues, mainly

by reason of the place assigned them in the catalogues but some of them are only distantly connected with
this dialogue prove that it was built on the lines of the Phcsdo. They have in common not only their subject, the Immortality of the Soul, but also the artistic

and philosophic method

it is

in which treated. Like the PJiccdo (60 E), the JEudenms was intro-

duced {Fr. 32) by a revelation in a dream, the direct prototype of which is to be found in the other Dial, relating to the last days of Socrates {Crito, 44 A). As Plato concludes his work (108 D sq.) with an imaginative myth, so the Eudemus had also its mythic ornament (cf. Fr. 40, where the words of Silenus, ^aiixovos
etc., remind us also of 617 D, and Fr. 37, which must be taken in a mystical sense). As the Phcedo (69 c) refers to the doctrines of the Mysteries, so Fr. 30 of the Eudemus recognises the validity of the customary honours to the dead. But the most remarkable resemblance between the two Dialogues is in their philosophical contents. Aristotle in the Eudemus insisted .not only on Immortality, but also on Preexistence and Transmigration, defending in his own way the theory that the soul in its entrance into this life forgot the Ideas {Fr. 34, 35). As the Ph(sdo based the decisive argument for immortality on the relation of the soul to the idea of life (105 c sq.), so the Eudemus also called the soul ein6s n (Fr. 42). As Plato worked up to this argument by a detailed refuiiriirouov,

Rejj. X.

tation of the theory that the soul was the harmony of its body, here also Aristotle followed him (Fr, 41). Exactly on Plato's lines is likewise Fr. 36, where the misery of the soul tied to the body is imaged in a striking comparison ; and even if By water (Journ. of Phil. ii. 60) and Hirzel (Hermes, x. 94) are right in referring this Fr. to the Protrejjticus, still this also seems to have been on the same lines as the Eudemus (cf. p. 60, n. 1, infra). Aristotle took a more independent position against Plato in the books On Philosophy. It is true that the Frs. in which he defends the belief in the gods, the unity of God, and the rational nature of the stars (Fr. 14, 13,
16,

19, 20, 21,

ii.
ii.

and the Fr.

ap.

N.D. Brandis,
Cic.

49, 125, de q. v. b, 1, 84; Heitz,

228, refuting Kose, Ar. Ps. 285), read like Plato, and that Fr. 15 (de q. V. Bern AYS, 110, and Fr. Hz. 37) is evidently modelled on Bep. ii. 380 d. Nevertheless, Aristotle decisively declared himself in this work (Fr. 10, 11, cf. p. 55, n. 6) against the theory of the Ideas and Ideal Numbers, declared the world to be not only, as Plato said, unending, but also beginningless (v. Frs. 17, 18,

with which Bywater, 80, well compares Plut. Tranqu. An. 20, p. 477) and gave in Book T. (v. Bywater's reconstruction thereof from Philop. in Nieom. Isag Cic. Tusc. iii. 28, 69; Procl. in EuCL. p. 28 cf. Ar. Fr. 2-9) a
; ;

general theory of the develop-

58

ARISTOTLE
system,^

the philosophic
authenticity.^

and others are of doubtful

Blass, Rliein. Mus. xxx. 1875, There must be, how481).

of humanity to culture and philosophy, which, although it connects with Plato by the remark {a}). Thilop.) that the spiritual and divine principle, in

ment

(v.

p.

ever,

much

variation,

and

Blass'

view that certain passages are taken verbally from the n. (piXocr.
is

spite of its own light, appears to us dark 5ia 'Tr]v iTrLKeifx^vrjv

improbable.
'

rod adiixaros dxAuj/, and by the theory of periodic floods whereby humanity was thrown back into savagery (cf. Plato, Tim. 22 D, Laws, iii. 677 A, 681 e), indicates
clearly an independent view of history which goes beyond Plato not only in relation to tlie eternity of the World {Meteor, i. 14, 352 b, 16; Polit. vii. 9, 1329 b, 25; Metaph. xii. 8, 1074 a, 38; of. Bern AYS, TheopliT. il. d. Frommiglt. 42), but to the process of spiritual develojjinent {Metaph. i. 1, 981 b, 13, and 2, 982 b, 11 sq.). Aristotle's interest in scholarly inquiries appears in the passages of this work on the Magi, on

To this class belong the 3 bks. n. TTotTjTwj/ (D. 2, AN. 2,

Pt. 6; Bernays, 10 sq., 60, 139; Rose, Ar. Ps. 77; Ar. Fr. 5969, p. 1485; Heitz, V.S. 174 sq. Fr. Hz. 23). That this work was a
;

Orpheus, on the Seven Wise Men, and on the development of philosophy from their time to his own and his critical sense is shown in his discussion of the story of Orpheus in Fr. 9. Taking all this into consideration, the books On Pliilosopliy show, as compared with the Fudemus, a remarkable advance in independence of thought, leading to the suggestion that they were written later, perhaps at the end of Plato's life. Krische (Forsch. i. 265) sought to identify the 3 bks. n. ^i\o<r. with Metaph. i., xi., xii. but this is now untenable (cf. Heitz, 179,
;

and

infra, p. 76 sq.).

It is

more

probable that they were used for various passages of Metaph. i., xii., and for the bk. n. ovpavov

Dialogue is doubted by Muller, Fr. Hist. ii. 185 but it is proved not only by its place in the Catalogues, but also by an express statement in V. Marc. p. 2, and by the form of Fr. 61. It was probably used as a genuine work by Eratosthenes of Aristotle and Apollodorus, but we cannot be sure that their references {Fr. 60 ap. DiOG. viii. 51) may not point to another work, posAristotle, sibly the Politeiai. however, himself refers at the end of Poet. 15 to a discussion in the iKS^do/jLcyoi \6yoL, which it is most natural to apply to the n. iroL-qruv, as in the Rhetoric (which EosE, Ar. Ps. 79, suggests) there is no corresponding passage. The few references we have, which are mostly historical notes, show nothing that throws doubt on the genuineness of the work. Fr. 66 contains statements as to Homer, evidently from a tradition current in los, which (notwithstanding NiTZSCH, Hist. Horn. ii. 87, Muller, ut supra, and Rose, Ar. Ps. 79) do not prove the spuriousness of the book, since they might well have been introduced in the Dial, without being believed by the author.
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
With
the Dialogues

59

may

be

connected

another

set of writings,

which did not take that form, but were

Fr. miswriting; Ar. p. 1495; Ar. Ps. 119;
107 sq. Fr. Hz.

For thetitlen.TTotijTci);/ we find also

(Fr.QB, 66, 69 cf. Spengbl,^&A. d. Miinchn. Akad. ii. 213 Hitter, Ar. Poet. X. Heitz, V. S. 175) that of n. Troir)TiKrjs, which, unless it is a mere confusion, indicates that the work was not purely historical, but contained discussions on the Art of Poetry as well as information about the poets. After the Dialogues, which made several books, there follows in the lists the UoKiriKhs, which consisted, according to D. 4, of 2 books, according to An. 4, of one (Fr. 70, p. 1487 Rose, Ar. Ps. 80; Bernays, 153; Heitz, V.S. 189, Fr. Hz. 41) and thereafter the following, in one book each IT. ^rjTopiKrjs ^ TpvWos (D. 5, the addition of y is An. 5 obviously a false reading, though Pt. 2 b, ap. Ibn abi Oseibia has Be Arte Rituri iii.' Cf. Ar. Fr. 57 sq. p. 1485; Rose, Ar. Ps. 76 Bernays, 62, 157; Heitz, Fr. Hz. 41); the V.S. 189, ROSE, Ar. N-fipiveos (D. 6, An. 6 Fr. 53, p. 1484, Ar. Ps. 73; Bernays, 84; Heitz, V.S. 190, Fr. Hz. 42), doubtless the same as the Sid\oyos Kopivdios, of which Themist. Or. 33, p. 356 speaks the 2o(()i(TT^s (D. 7 An. 8 Pt. 2 Ar. Fr. 54-56, p. 1484 Ar. Ps. 75 Fr. Hz. 42), of which nothing remains except a few remarks on Empedocles, Zeno, and Protagoras the Mej/e^epos (D. 8, An. 10), of which there are no fragments the 'EpcoriKhs (D. 9 An. 12; Ar. Fr. 90-93, p. 1492; Ar. Ps. 105; Heitz, V.S. 191, Fr. Hz. 43); the Svfnrdffiov (D. 10; An. 19, where avWoyia-fMoy is a
; ;

44; cf. Heitz, V.S. 192, who rightly questions the application of Plut. JV. p. Suav. V. 13, 4 to this Dialogue) the n. ttXovtov
;

An. 7; Ar. Fr. 86-89, p. 1491; Ar. Ps. 101; Heitz, V. S. 195, Fr. Hz. 45) probably attacked by the early Epicurean,
(D. 11;

Metrodorus,
in
cf.

if

the proper reading

Virt. et Vit. ix.

Philodem. De

col. 22,

be (as seems probable

AMd,

Spengel, Ahli. d. Munclm. V. 449, and Heitz, I.e.') not

11.

n. iroXmlas, but

ttXovtov

the

Dial, is nowhere quoted and of the fragments

by name,
reckoned

'

as belonging to it Heitz rightly rejects Fr. 88 and the n. evxns (D. 14; An. 9; Ar. Fr. 44-46, Ar. Ps. 67 Fr. Hz. 56 p. 1483 Bernays, 122), to which we possess only one reference that can be identified with certainty, i.e. Fr. 46, which is too closely related to Plat. Rejj. vi. 508 e to permit its rejection, If we could say absolutely that the Dial. IT. evyevelas (D. 15; AN. 11; Pt. 5; Ar. Fr. 82-85, p. 1490; Ar. Ps. 96; Bernays,
;

'^

140; Heitz, V. S. 202; Fr. Hz. which was already questioned by Plut. Arist. 27, is not genuine, it would follow (as Heitz suggests) that the stoiy that Socrates was accused of bigamy misrests upon some in it This, however, understanding. seems hardly probable, because the story in question appears so frequently and so early in the Aristotelian School. As to the genuineness of the Dialogues
55),

60

ARISTOTLE
it

yet distinguished, as
treatises
(at

seems, from the strictly scientific

by

their popular style of treatment.

least

in part)

Aristotle's

work.*

These are same period of To that period must also belong

ascribable
to the
a couple of conversational remarks, which may therefore as properly be called irpoTpcirriKhs as Menexenns with its longer concould be versational preface
called
iiriTacpios

named

in the previous note, there are very few as to which we can

form an approximate judgment but there do not seem to be decisive grounds for rejecting any
of them.

(Thras.

ibid.

To the same period with the Eudemns belongs also the Pro

Ar. Phet. iii. 14, p. 1415, b, 30). If Cicero used it as a model for
his Ilortensivs (Scrij^t. Hist. Aiig. V. Sal. Gallieni, c. 2), it may still be questioned whether the dialogue form was part of the imi-

trejftims (D.

12

An. 14

Pt.

where

it is

probably transposed

with the n. (piXocr. and is therefore said to have three books.

Ar. Ft. 47-50, p. 1483 Fr. llz. According to Teles, circa 46). 250 B.C., it was addressed to the Cyprian prince Themiso, and was
;

known
Crates

to
(t.

Zeno and to his teacher Stob. i-^/wvi. 95,21).

]tOSE,ylr. Ps. G8 (with n,fortassc\ Bywater, Journ. of PMl. ii. 55,

and USENEii, Rhcin. Mus. xxviii. 372, suppose it to have been a Dial., and Beenays, IIG, gives no opinion but Heitz, V. S. 196, and HiRZEL, Hermes, x. 61, seem to be right in saying that it was a continuous essay. The reasons
;

are
G(jivo.

(1)
:

that
tip

Teles

says

'A/>.
e/jLi-

irpoTpeTTTiKhv

^ypa^pe irphs

a drama

and although a Dial, like may be dedicated to a

yet it cananyone, 'jrp6s (2) that all other
to
;

man,

Tiv\ irpoa"Yp6.(j)iv,

not be written
riva ypd(peip
irpoTpeTTTiKol
:

that we know were essays and not dialogues even the pseudo- Platonic Clitojjhon, which got an unsuitable second
title
aj?.

of

UpoTpcTTTiKhs (Thrasyll.
iii,

DiOG.

60), is

to this, for it is not

no exception a dialogue,

but a speech introduced only by

As Usener, ut sujfra, shows, Cicero also used it for the Somnium Sci^rionls, Rep. vi., and, mediately or immediately, Censorinus, D. Nat. 18, 11. Bywater, lit siipra^ has also shown (but cf. Hirzel) that Jamblicus used it for his own Protreyticus. Of a kindred nature apparently was the TI. TraiSetas (D. 19 AN. 10; Pt. 4; Ar.Fr. 51, p. 1484; Ar. Ps. 72; Heitz, V. S. 307, Fr. Hz. 61). As no fragments are preserved, we cannot tell whether the 11. rjSovTJs (D. 16, cf. 66; An. 15; Pt. 16; Heitz, V. S. 203; Fr. Hz. 59) was a The book dialogue or not. n. fia<n\ias (D. 18; An. 16; Pt. 7 Ar. Fr. 78, 79, probably also 81, p. 1489; Fr. Hz. 59), which was addressed to Alexander, and apparently referred to by Eratosthenes {op. Strabo, i. 4, 9, p. 66), was more probably an essay (v. Heitz, V. S. 204) than a dial. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 93,*' and On the other Beenays, 56). hand, the title *A\4^av5pos ^ vvfp (irepi) airoiKwv [-KtcDj/], if the text
tation.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
the treatise

61

On

the

Good}

It

was an account of the

little is

substance of Plato's lectures,^ and what

recorded

from or of

it

gives no reason to doubt

its

genuineness.^

be correct, rather suggests a dial. (D. 17 Ar. Fr. 80 Bernays, 56 Fr. Hz. 61. Heitz, V. S. 204, 207,
; ;

suggests
Kal
IT.

TTphs 'AAe|.

virlp airo'iKuv

fiaa-iXeias.

A
vir.

preferable
airoiKwu
a'.

conjecture would be,

IT.

fiaaiXeias a').

Other fragments

which Rose places among the Dials, will be referred to infra. The n. TayaBov consisted,
'

that he was not sure whether Aristotle's reference referred to the n. ray. or to a special work. If so, this makes rather for than against Alexander's knowledge of the n. Tuyddov. Simpl. Be An. 6, b, Philop. Be An. C. 2 (cf. Ar. Fr. p 1477 b, 35), Suid. 'Ayad. p. 35, b, believe that the

words

iv To7s irepl <pi\ocro<pLas Ae-

according to D. 20, of three books An. 20, one book; Pt. 8, five books: Alex, ad Metayli. iv. 2, 1003 b, 36, 1004 b, 34, 1005 a, 2 repeatedly quotes Book II., and the regular form of citation is eV Totj TT. Tay. Apart from the Catalogues, we never hear of this work except in the Aristotelian
notices Commentators, whose are collected and discussed by Brandis, *Perd. Ar. Libr. de IdeisetdeBono,' Gr.-rmn. Phil. ii. Krische, Forsch. i.263 b, 1, 84 Rose, Ar. Ps. 46, Ar. Fr. 22-26, p. 1477, and Heitz, V. S. 209, Fr. Hz. 79. Brandis {ihid.) has shown that none of them except Alexander possessed the work Heitz, p. 203, doubts this itself. even as to Alex., because he in one place (p. 206, 19) distinguishes the eK\oyi] rwv ivavrioov noticed Ar. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004 a, 2 {de q.
;

yofxivois in

b, 18, refer to this

Ar. Be An. i. 2, 404, work, whereas

refer

they

really

to

Platonic

writings

(cf. Zeller, II. a. 636, 4).

But

writers
this

this proves only that these knew the n. rayadov at

second hand.

Rose's view that

re-

work was a Dial, is futed by Heitz, V.S.2V1.

We

cannot tell whether Aristotle published in his lifetime his notes upon the lectures of Plato, or whether they became public after his death. If the cKAoy^ r.
ivavr., cited by himself, formed part of them, the former would of course be true. It is clear that the book was in use before the end of the third century B.C., and certainly before the time of Andronicus, because of the mention of it in Diog.'s list; cf. p. 48 sq. supra. 2 Referred to by Aristoxenus

infra) from the second book II. rayaQov, and in another place (p. 218, 10, 14) identifies them.

These passages seem, however, only to show that Alexander knew of no e/c\. t. iv. as a separate book, but saw in the second book n. Tay. a discussion to which, as far as the sense went, Aristotle might be referring, so

others, cf. Zeller, Plato, 26. (P7iy.9. 32, b, 104, b, Schol. 334, b, 25, 362, a, 8) mentions, besides Aristotle, Speusippus,

and

Simpl.

tiffius

Xenocrates, Heraclides and Hesas having published the Platonic lectures. 3 This is pro ved, against S USE

MIHL, Genet. Entw.

d. 2)lat. Pliil.

2, 533, in Zeller's Plato,

ad

loo.

62

ARISTOTLE
is

There

more doubt about the date of the work On

which Aristotle apparently refers to in the The and which Alexander possessed.^
'*

the Ideas,^

Metaphysics^^
JExtracts

from some of Plato's writings and the monographs on earlier and cotemporary philosophers^
Tliis work is named in D. and An. 45 (which give it one book only) n. ttjs Ideas or n. Ideas. We have references, however, by Alex. inMetaph. 564, b, 15 to the 1st book n. Idewv, in 573, a, 12 to the 2nd, and in 566,
1

54,

An. 85 Simpl. Be Tov; D. 94 Cwlfl, Schol. 491, b, 37 <rvvoxpiy^ Tifiaiov ypdcpeiv ovk iTTi.rofjL'^v TOV
; ; :

cf. Fr. Hz. 79. aw-n^iwae) ^ n. rcov Ilvdayopeiwv, D. 101 An. 88 no doubt the same as is named 'l^waycoy^ rSov TLvOayopelois
; :

b, 16 to

we may
b, 36).
a, 19,

the 4th (but in the last case well read A for A, with Rose, Ar. Ps. 191, Ar. Fr. 1509,

apea-KduTwu Schol. 492,

by SiMPL. De Ccelo, a, 26 and b, 41 sq.

;

Syrian, In

3Ietaj)h. 901,

942, b, 21 speaks of a work The eiSwj/ in two books. same is meant in Pt. 14 by the three books De imar/inihus, ntrum existant an own but the Arabic title \fari aiduln'' indicates that their Greek text read not 11. etSaJj/, but n. etSwAcov cf. RoSB, At. Ps.

n.

Tcoj/

UvdayopiKa {ihid. 505, a, 24, 35) UvOayopiKhsl-ov ?] (Theo. Arithm. SJ^tjs n. T7JS HvdayopiKwv 5) (Alex. Metaph. 560, b, 25), and n, TTjs TlvQayopiKris (pi\o(ro<plas
;

185; Ar. Fr. 180-184 p. 1508; Fr. Hz. 86 sq. we have I. 990 b, 8 sq. not only Alexander's statement that this passage refers to the work on Ideas, but it seems to be the natural inference from Aristotle's text itself that ho is re;

V. Pyth. 31). Probably separate title Uphs rohs UvOayopeiovs, D. 97, is only a part of the same work, as D. gives each of them one book only, Simpl. while Alexander and

(Jambl.

the

quote from book 2. The reference in DiOG. viii. 34, cf. 19, probably belongs to this treatise (whether we there read eV r^ ire pi
or tt. Kvdfxwp only, cf. Other notices of the Cobet). work are collected by Rose, Ar. Ps. 193, Ar. Fr. 185-200, p. 1510 find also three Fr. Hz. 68. books n. rrjs ''Apx^reiov [-tou ?1 (piAo(To(pias in D. 92, An. 83, Pt, cf. Ar. Ps. 211, and Fr. Hz. 9 Also Uphs 77, and cf. last note.
Kvaixcav,

ferring to some more detailed discussion of the Ideal Theoiy which is already known to his

We

this,

Kose {Ar. Ps. 186) doubts bat Alexander's own statements (cited in Ar. Fr. 183 Jin., 184 /?<-.) indicate as much. * Ta eK rujv vSfxcov UT^drwvos (D. 21, as 3 Bks., An. 23 as 2). Ta e/c rris iroXirdas a jS' (D. 22. PrOCL. Ar. Fr.^ 176, in Benip. 350 Ta eK Tov Tifiaiov Kal p. 1507). rwv ^Apx^TCLcov (alias Ka\ 'Apxv3

TO,

'AAKfialwvos,
e/c

D. 96, An. 87;

Ylpo^Xriixara
(?

A-n/JLOKpirov, 7 2) books, D. 124, An. 116 (cf. Ar. Ps. 213, Ar. Fr. 202 p. 1514, Fr. Hz. 77 ;) Uphs rh M\la<Tov, D.

ruv

95, 98,

ra Topyiov, D. ra "Seuocpdvovs, l-Kpdrovs in MSS.] D. 99 Dp. t^

;

An. 86 An. 89

lip.

Up.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
so far as these

63

were genuine

must,

however, have
first

been mostly compiled during Aristotle's

residence

in Athens, or at least before his return from Macedonia.

collection

of

Platonic Divisions

ascribed

to

him

was no doubt a forgery.^ Far above all these in historic importance stand the works which set out the peculiar system of the Master in Speaking broadly, it is these strict philosophical form. which have survived the first century A.D., and have alone
Z-i]vo}vos,

D. 100

otir treatise

De

Melisso, &c., to which, besides the lost section as to Zeno, another cited at second hand by Philop. Phys. B. 9 as Tip. r))V UapixeviSov dd^av seems to have belonged. know that this work was used by Simplicius (cf Zeller,i.474 sq.).

We

view of the character of our informants it is very possible that tliey presented ^s history what lie had only stated as a Pythagorean tradition. Similarly the meanings of the Pythagorean symbols {Fr. 190 sq.) and the contents of Fr. 188, which Isidor.
ajp.

There was also the Uepl

iirirov

ttjs STreuo--

Clement.

Strom,

vi.

641

Kal aevoKparovsl^cpLXocrocpias'],

9.3, An. 84. We cannot judge as to the genuineness of several, of which we have the titles only. It is

D.

not impossible that Aristotle

may

have

left,

among

extracts and philosophic

his papers, criticisms on various

attributes to Aristotle himself, are merely references to Pythagorean theories. The rest of the passages cited from this book as to the Pythagorean system give no reason to reject it. The apparent contradiction
{ap. Simpl. De Schol. 492, b, 39 sq.) and Coelo ii. 2, 285, b, 25 is quite reconcileable, without following Alexander in assuming a falsa lectio, for which, however, Fr. 195, ap. Simpl. iUd. 492, a, 18, gives some ground. 2 This is named in the existing lists only by Pt. 53, as Divisio Platonis^ (formerly mistranslated \jusjura7idum or tesCoelo,

falsely

between Fr. 200

Ar. Be

systems

written

down
and

in the course of his studies, that recensions of these were

It is also possible published. that similar collections may have

passed themselves off under his name. That the latter was the case with the tracts in our Corpses on the Eleatic School is proved in Zeller, Ph. d. Or. i. 465 sq. It is more difficult to decide as to the authenticity of the work on the Pythagoreans. If all the fables (see Zeller, Pli. d. Gr. i. 285) which appear in Ft. 186, were related as historic fact, the book could not be Aristotle's, but in

'

'

tamentum PV). It was, perhaps, the same as the Aristotelian 5mipeVets (v. p. 75, n. 2, infra) else-

where mentioned. A similar work, obviously a later recension of the Pseudo -Aristotelian text

64

ABISTOTLE

thereby transmitted to medioeval and modern times a

first-hand

Their preservation itself

the fact
first

knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy. is no doubt primarily due to that it was in them that that philosophy was
during the years of his teaching at Athens.
is

expounded in the systematic maturity in which he

set it forth

If

we take what

now

extant or otherwise

known

to us of this class of works, that

is

which

first

meets us

the important set of treatises which laid the founda:

tion for all later logic

the Categories ^^

the book on

used for the account given of Plato by DiOG. iii. 80, is printed by RoSK, Ar. Ps. 677-61)5 (and after him by J^r. Hz. 91), under the title, Aiaipdaeis 'ApiarordAovs, deq. V. ZeIjL., Pk.d. Gr. ii. a. ;)82.

think them the same. Andronicus was probably right {ap. Simpl. nt supra, Schol. 81, a, 27) in identifying the title of To Kph T. tSttccu with the spurious appendix of the so-called Post'

The

title

of this

work by
;

pr;^:idicamcnta

'

and

it

may have

common (and probably correct) account is KaTrjyopiai but we tind it also named as n. rcov KaTTjyopioov, KaTr^yopiai Sewa, n. T civ 5e/ca Karrfyopicov, U. rwv SeKa yevwv, n. Tuu yeycou rod ovtos, KaTTjyopiai ^toi tt. rwv SeKa yeviiccordTccu yevwv, n. rwu KaQoXov \6y(i)i>, Ylph Toou roiriKuu (or tottccu) Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 81, cf. ISIMPL. in Cat. 4, )8, and David, Sahol. in Ar. 80, a, 8. The title Ta irph twv roircav was known to Andronicus according to Simpl. ibid. 95 C, Schol. 81, a, 27, and to Boethius, In Prccd. iv. p. 191 (who obviously got his knowledge irom the same source as Simpl.,
the
:

been invented either, as he supposes, by the writer of that tract, or by some later editor who found the original name, Karrjyopiai, too limited for the treatise as
enlarged by the spurious addition. Aristotle himself refers to his theory of the Categories (Be i. ], 5, An. 402 a, 28, ^410 a, 14, Anal. Pri. i. 37, cf. the quotations, infra, p.

as

189, n. 2, q. v.) to his readers, and he this in other places also, which seems to indicate that he had dealt with it in a

known

assumes

published work. There

is

a more

Porphyry). Herminus, circa 160 A.D., preferred it to the ordinary name. David, however, (^Schol. 81, b, 25), D. 59, and An. 57 name a book called Ta 7rpi> Twj/ Tt^TTcoj/, besides the Karrjyopiai, which is D. 141, An. 132, Pt. 25 b and do not ajjpear to
i.e.
;

definite reference in Mh. JV. ii. 1 init. to Cateff. c. 8 (cf. TrenDELENB. IRsi. Beitr. i. 174). That in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217,

b 27, may possibly refer not to the Categ. but to some work of Eudemus, and those in Top. ix.,
(Soph.
5,
El.-) 4. 22.

166, b, 14. 178, a,

i.

no doubt refer to the passage

9, init.t

as to categories in Toj).

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which, however,
is itself

65

so brief

and undeveloped that it presupposes an early and better account.

Simpl. {Categ. 4 C> Schol. 30, b, 36) and David {Schol. 30, a, 24) say that Aristotle had also referred to this work in another place not now extant under the title of KaTqyopiai or Ae/ca Kar. We are told also that, fol-

lowing Aristotle's example, Eudemus, Theophrastus, and Phanias, wrote not only Analytica,' and works n. ep^rji/etas,' but
'

also Kar-nyoplai

(Ammon.

SoJiol.

28, a, 40, and in q. v. Porph. 15 m, David, Schol. 19, a, 84, 30, a, 5,

Anon.

ibid. 82, b, 32, 94, b, 14

but Brandis in the Rhein. 3his.

i.

1827, p. 270, rightly denies this as to Theophrastus, and doubts it as to Eudemus). The references in Simpl. Cat. 106, a, 107, a, sq., Schnl. 89, a, 37, 90, a, 12 do not prove that Strato referred to Ari-

On the other stotle's Categories. hand, the ancient critics never doubted the genuineness of the extant book, although they rejected a second recension {v. Simpl. Catcg. 4 f, Schol. 39, a, 36 Anon. ibid. 33, b, 30 Philop. ibid. 39, a, 19, 142, b, 38 Ammon.
;
; ;

saying that its compiler might be found 'in any master of a peripatetic school of the age following Chrysippus' (p. 207). Their critical positions, however, Prantl are not all tenable. Qibld.) takes exception to the number 10 but in the Toj). i. 9, the same ten Categories are given, and we know from Dexipp. lln Categ. 40, Schol. 48, a, 46) and Simpl. {ibid. 47, b, 40) that Aristotle named these ten in other works also. It is true that Aristotle generally uses a less number but that may only mean either that he here adduces all the ten because his object was logical completeness, or that he counted more Categories at an earlier time than he did later. He never assumed, as will be shown later, a fixed number of them. Again, it is objected that the KaTTjy. speaks of Sevrepai. ova-lat but we find as parallels to this not only irpSbrai ovalai (e.g.
; ; ;

vii. 7, 18, 1032, b, 2, 1038, b, 10), but also rp'nai ovaiai (ibid. vii. 2, 1028, b, 20, 1043, The words of KarTjy. a, 18, 28). cIkStws 29 b, 0. 5, 2,
:
. . .

Metaph.

fiSva

Tct

elfSTj

Koi

to,

y4ur}

Cat. 13, 17, and Boeth. In Freed. 113, all following Adrastus, a noted critic circa 100 A. D.; cf. Fr. Hz. 114). The only doubts suggested are by Schol. 33, a, 28 sq., and these apparently were not derived from Andronicus. The internal characteristics of the book, however, are in many ways open Spengel to criticisms, which {Miinchn. Gel. Anz. 1845, 41 sq.), Rose {Ar. Libr. Ord. 232 sq.), and Prantl {Oesch. d. Logih, i. 90, 5, 204 sq. 243) have used to combat its genuineness, the latter

SevT^pcu ovaiai Xeyovrai, are not to be translated < the term Seur. ova-, is used for genera and species and rightly so,' since it was not commonly so used before Aristotle, but rather, there is reason to treat as a second class of substances only genera and species.' Again, when it is remarked in Karvy. c. 7, 8, a, 31, 39, that, inspeaking, irpSs strictly cludes those things only which not merely stand in a definite relation to some other thing, but have their essence in such a reols rh clvai ravrSv icrri lation
*

VOL.

I.

66

AMISTOTLB
parts

the

and

kinds

of

propositions/

those

on

"' ^^^^^'^ ^^ ^^ t45 irp6s ri irm ex^ need to suspect here any trace
influence, since the exetf appears also in Ae. Toj}. vi. c. 4, 142, a, 29, vii. 3,247, c. 8, 164, b, 4; Phys. a, 2, b, 3, and Mh. ^'. i. 12, 1]01, of

Stoic
Ti

jrpos

TTws

It is trvie, however, b, 13. all the objections cannot easily be set aside. Nevertheless, the

that

treatise bears in general a decisively Aristotelian impress it is closely related to the Tojncs in tone and contents, and the external evidence is heavily in its
;

favour.
is

The

best

conclusion

seems to

be, not that the

whole

spurious, but that the seemingly un- Aristotelian elements are

the body of the work it is probable also that passages have been left out and others added but much of in this recension the inconsequence of exposition and language may as easily be due simply to the fact that the Categ. were the earliest of the logical writings, and were written probably many years earlier than the Analytics. This book, n. kpjx7]viias, w^as in ancient times rejected as not genuine by Andronicus (so Alex. Anal. pri. 52 a, and Sclwl. in Ar. 161 b, 40; Ammon. De Interpr. Boeth. 6 a, and Schol. 97 b, 13 Anon. iUd. 94 a, ihid. 97 a, 28
;

21

Philop. De An.

13,

4),

to* be explained by the assumption that the genuine body of the work extends to c. 9, 11, b, 7 only, but that what followed has dropped out of the recension

we

possess, and is replaced only by the short note, c. 9, 11, b, 8-14. The so-called 'Postprnadicamenta' (c. 10-15) were suspected as early as Andronicus

followed recently by Gumposch {Log. Schr. d. Ar., Leipz. 1839) and Hose (Ar. Ps. 232;. Brandis (.1/;^. d. Berl. Akad. 263 sq., cf. I)AVID, Schol. in Ar. 24 b, 5) takes it to be an incomplete sketch of the work, to which c.
14 (rejected as early as

Ammonius
;

and passed over by Porphyry

cf

(SiMPL. ut supra, Schol.

27;

Ammon.

Unci.

81,

81, a, b, 37),

and Brandis has now proved they

are added by another hand ('U. d. Reihenfolge d. Biicher d. Ar. Org.,' Ahlt. d. Berl. Aliad. Hist, phil. Kl. 1833, 267, and Gr.-r6m.

another compiled from Aristotelian fragmeats,as he suggests. The concluding para-

FMl.

ii.

b, 406).

It is

question whether

k was

graph, at c. 9, 11, b, 8-14, reads exactly as if it came in the place of further discussions which the editor cut out, justifying himself by the remark that there was nothing in them which did not appear in the earlier part. In

201 b Schol. 135 b) has probably been added by a later hand. The external evidence for the work is good enough. Not only do all three lists agree in naming it (D. 152, An. 133, Pt. 2), but we are told that Theophrastus referred to it in his essay IT. KaTacpdcreoos KOL aTTOcpdaeas (BlOG. v. 44; ALEX. A7ial. pri. 124, Scfwl. 183 b, 1 more explicitly, after Alexander, Boeth. iMd. 97, a, 38; Anon. cf. the Schol. in Ar. 94, b, 13 Schol. ap. Waitz, Ar. Org. i. 40,
Interpr.
;

Ammon. De

who, on De Interpr. 17, remarks irphs tovto (pT}(nv

:

b, b

16,

@6-

(ppaa-Tos,

etc.;

cf.

Ammon. De
It

l7iterpr. 73, a, 122, b).

seems

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
conclusions and scientific
also

67

method in general/ on the

no relation to the corresponding It should treatises of Aristotle.
be added that the work accords throughout with Aristotle's line of thought, but frequently enlarges in a didactic way on the most elementary points in a fashion which one would suppose Aristotle would not have found
necessary at the date at which

that

Eudemus

IT.

Ae'lecos

(Alex. Anal. pri.

Metapli. 63, 15;

6, b,

Anon.

Top. 38, Schol. in

24) may have been an imitation of this book (not, as Sclwl. 84, b, 15, wrongly suggests, of the Categories cf the quotation from Ammon. in preceding note). This last suggestion, however, is uncertain, and the notices as to Theophrastus are not absolutely clear, for the texts show that he did not name the n. hpii.t\v. at all. Alexander thought he saw, from the way in which Theophrastus dealt with the subject (thema) in his own book, reason to infer that he had

Ar. 146,

a,

Aristotle in mind but whether he was right in that inference or not, we cannot judge. The Schol. /;. Waitz has nothing to show that the reference there quoted from Theophrastus referred to a passage in this book, and was not
;

rather a general reference to the frequently recurring Aristotelian law of the excluded middle. On the other hand, it is singular that while the n. epfirjv. referred to is never cited or in any of Aristotle's books (cf. BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 102, a, 27), only the First it cites not Analytic (c. 10, 19, b, 31 Anal. 46, 51, 6, 36) and the To2ncs (c. 11, 20, 6, 26: Top. ix. 17, 175, b, 39), but also the n. ypvxvs (c. 1, 16, a, 8), and that for a proposition which neither the ancient opponents of Andronicus nor modern scholars have been able to find in it (cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 97, b, 49, whose suggestion, however, is not satisfactory). Its remarks on Khetoric
:

must have been written, if by him. The question, therefore, is not only whether it is by Aristotle or by another, but whether it may not, as Grant suggests (A 7'. 57), have been written out by one of his scholars from oj-al lectures in which the difficulties of beginners would naturally be kept in view. Syllogisms are dealt with by the 'Ava\vTiKa irpdnpa in two books, and scientific method by the'Aj/aA. ricrr^pa, also in two. The fact that D. 49 and An. 46 give nine books to the 'AvaA. irpdr, (though An. 134 repeats the title with two only) points probably only to a different division; but it is also possible that other tracts are included, for the Anon. ScJiol. in Ar. 33, b, 32 (cf. David, ibid. 30,
it
'

b,

4,

142, b, 38,

Philop. ibid. 39, a, 19, and Simpl. Categ. 4

says that Adrastus knew of forty books of Analytics, of which only the four which are extant were counted genuine. That these are genuine is proved beyond doubt, both by internal evidence,

and Poetry

(c.

4,

17, a, 5)

have

by Aristotle's own references, and by the fact that his earliest pupils wrote works modelled on them (cf p. 65, suj^ra, and BeanDis, Rhein. Mus. Niebuhr and Thus we know Br. i. 267),
.

f2

68

ARISTOTLE
dis-

and their proof by probability/ and on fallacies

of

an

Analytic

(Alex. Top.

70),

references to UpSr^pa ava\. of Theophrastus (Alex. Anal. pri. 39, b, 51, a,

b, 9, 131, b, Sclwl. 158, b, 8, 161, Scliol. 184, b, 36 Simpl. Dc Cado, Alexander, in his 509, a, 6).
;

by Eudemus and we have book i. of the

(cf.

other references ap. Bonitz, It is Ind. Arist. 102, a, 30 sq). therefore the original title, and has always remained in common use, notwithstanding that Aristotle cites certain passages of the First Analytic with the word iv rois irepl avWoyKr/xov (^Anal.
post.
i.

commentary, quotes from both on numerous points in which they developed or improved Aristotle's
'Aua\.
[ed.
Trpor.
(cf.

3,

11, 73, a, 14, 77, a, 33),

or that Alexander {Metaph. 437, 12, 488, 11, 718, 4) and Pt. 28
call

Tlicophr.

Ft.

the

Second

Analytic
(Z><?
;

airo-

Wimmer], p. 177 sq. 229; Eudcm. Fr. [ed. Spengel], p. 144 sq.). For the Second Analytic

the references are less copious but we know of passages Alexanof Theophrastus through der (Anon. Schol. in Ar. 240, b,
;

2, a,

242, aj). EusTRAT. ibid. ibid. 17), through Themist. Philop. 199, b, 46, and through an ibid. 205, a, 46, and through Anon. Schol. ibid. 248, a, 24, of

and

a remark of

Eudemus,

all

of

which seem
Analt/tio.

We

to refer to the Second know as to Theo-

Puis. De Libr. iv, fin., vol. viii. 765 Propr. vol. xix. 41) chooses to substitute, as he says, for the common titles, the names n. (rv\\oyi(TiJ.ov and n. a7ro5ei|ews nor have we any right to name them on internal grounds (with GuMPOSCH, Toy. Ar. 115) n. avKXoyKTixov and Me0o5iKa. Brandis justly remarks {Ue. d. Ar. Ory. 261 sq.; Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii. b, 1, 224, 275) that the First Analytic is far more carefully
SejKTJKrj,

or that Galen

and evenly worked out than the

can Aristotle Second (which hardly have considered as complete), and that the two books of the First Analytic do not appear to have been written together, but with an interval.
Aristotle dealt with this several books, no in doubt in connection with his still rhetorical teaching. have the Topica in eight books,
'

phrastus, not only from the form -n-porepa, of the title of the'Aj/a\. but also from express testimony Hippocr. (r DiOG.v.42; GALEN,
et

PI.

ii.

2,

vol.

v.

213,

and

Nat. i. 26) that he did it write a Second Analytic, and that, as is probable that in the text, he followed Aristotle. himself cites both Aristotle Anah/tics under that name Top. b, 32 viii. *11, 13, 162, a, 11, Ehet.i. SopJi. Fl. 2, 16.5, b, 8;

A LEX.

Qii.

subject

We

ii. 25,

1357, a, 29, b, 24, 12; Metaph. vii. b, 12 init. Fth. N. vi. 3, 1139, b, 26, 32 also Be Tnterpr. 10, 19, b, 25 31 31. Mor. ii. 6, 1201, Mil. Fud. i. 6, 1217, a, 17, ii. 6, 1222, b, 38, c. 10, 1227, a, 10
2,

1356, b, 1403,
;
;

9,

a, 5,

of which, however, the last, and perhaps the third and seventh also, seem to have been worked out long after the others (v. Brandis, Ue. d. Ar. Ory. 255

Gr.-rom. Phil.
its

ii.

b, 330).

The
cita-

genuineness of the work and of

name

is

established

by

tions in

Aristotle himself

{Be

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
proof.^

69

Besides these, whicli are the component parts

of our Organon,'

we have

also the

names of a great

Interj)r. 11, 20, b, 26; Anal. 2>r. i. 11, 24, b. 12; ii. 15, 17, 64, a, Rhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 37, 65, b, 16 28, c. 2, 1356, b, 11, 1358, a, 29
; ;

22, 1396, b, 4, c. 23, 1398, a, 28, 1399, a, 6, c. 25, 1402, a, 36,

ii.

c.

iii. 18, J419, a, 26, 1403, a, 32 For the art of proof hj 24).
;

term

probabilities Aristotle uses the Dialectic' (jTo/^. init., Rhet. init., etc.), and he refers to the Topics in a similar way as irpay'

fxaTeia

tt.

t^u

StaAe/cTiK^jj/ (^Anal.

It is probable, therefore, that by fte0o5t/cck (Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 19) he meant the Topics, which in the opening words announce as their object, fieOoSov vpe7u, etc., and in which viii. 2 i7iit.) (i. 12, 105, a, 16 the relative passage is to be found, rather than, as Heitz (p. 81 sq., Fr. Hz. 117) suggests, a lost work: cf. KOSE, Ar. Libr. Ord. 120; Vahlen,

pri.

i.

30, 46, a, 30).

Porphyry, appears to regard the as belonging, and the former as not belonging, to the In Hypomnematic writings. D. 81 we even find a second The theory entry of MeOoBiKhv a'. of Spengel (Ahh. d. Miinchn. Aliad. vi. 497) that our text of the Topics contains grave lacunce does not seem to be proved by the passages he quotes (Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 10; ii. 25, 1402. a, As to the former, which 34). refers to the Topics only for the
latter
'
'

difference between cvWoyia^hs and e7ra7co77; (cf. Brandis, 'Ue. d.

Khet. Ar.' ap. Philologus,

it

iv.

13),

is

As

to

by To2). i. 1, 12, the second, which does not

satisfied

apply to Top. viii. 10, 161, a, 9 sq., the words KaOdirep koL iv To7s roTTiKOLs, etc., need not be taken as referring to a particular passage, but may be taken as

Wien.

Aliatl. xxxviii.

99

Bonitz,

Ztschr. Oesterr. Gymn. 1866, It seems, also, that 11, 774. in several MSS. the Topics were

meaning of objections there are in Khetoric, as in Topics, many kinds,' i.e. in oratorical use as opposed to disputation, a remark
'

headed with the title M60o5/co, so that an idea arose that they were distinct works. This idea has been attributed to Dionys. {Ep. I. ad Amm. 6, p. 729, on Rhet. i. 2), but he speaks only of
auaXvTiKi) Ka\ fiedoSiK^ irpayfiareia,

and does not specially include the Topics in the latter. But D. 52
inserts MeeoSiKo. in eight books, and An. 49, the like title in-

that might well be made even if these distinctions were not taken in the earlier book. For similar uses of Sxrirep eV ToTs tottikoTs, etc., cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 101 b, 44 sq., 52 sq., and Vahlen, tit supra, 140 (where the phrase in Rhet. ii. 25 is explained as meaning Instances are here used in the same way as in Topics, and those of four kinds,' etc.).
'

cluding seven books, although both know the Topics as well. So Diog. (v. 29) distinguishes to Te TOiriKa Koi fiedodiKoi and Simpl.
;

or
21,

The n. ao^iffTiKoiv iKeyxcou, Alex. Schol. 296, a, 12, 29, and Boeth. in his transla(as

(Cat. 16

a,

Schol 47,

b, 40), after

have it) Soc^to-r. eAeyxoi. Waitz(^r. Org. ii. 528), followed by Bonitz (Bid. Ar. 102, a, 49),
tion

70

ARISTOTLE
of kindred writings
:

number
and

treatises

on Knowledge

Opinion,^

on Definition,^

on

Classification

by

Genera and Species,^ on Opposition and Difference,^ on Particular Kinds of Conceptions,^ on Expression in Speech,^ on Affirmation and Negation,^ on Syllogshows that Aristotle in the De Interpr. c. 11, 20, b, 26, and
Anal.jjri. ii. 17, 65, b, 16, refers to passages of this work (i.e. c. 17, 175, b, 39, c. 30, and c. 5, 167, b, 21), under the name eV
ToTs
ToiriKols
;

titles in Pt.: i.e.

.

No. 60,

'OpiffTiKa,

that he reckons

knowledge of fallacies as part of Dialectic (Soph. El. c. 9 fin., cf. Top. i. 1, 100, b, ch. 11 fin. 23) aiid that c. 34 is the epilogue not only for these but for Topics.' the whole science of
'
' ;
;

four books (cf DiOG. v. 50, for the same title inthelistof Theophrastus' works) 63, on the objects of Definition, two books 63 b, De Contradictione Befinitionum, 63 c, De Arte Definiendi 64, Il/jbs tovs dpKTiJLohs, two books (cf. the same from Theophr., DiOG. v. 45), translated De Tabula Definiendi. As to the collections of defini; ;

tions
^

'

and divisions, cf infra. n. iiZwv k:j.\ y^voiv, D. 31

.

IT.

Again, liowever, Aristotle seems cf. Rliet. i. 3, (in c. 2, 165 b, 8

;

etSoji/,

An.

28, otherwise

unknown.

11 cf. BRANDTS, (ri:rom. Phil. ii. b, 118) to distinguish the two, in a way, however, which proves, not that the two were not meant to form a whole, but that the treatise on fallacies was composed later than the The lists of rest of the TojAcs.

1359,

b,

^ As to the opposition of concepts there was a book 11, Twv avTiKiLfMevcav, doubtless the same as IT. ^vavriuv (D. 30, An.

32).

Simplicius, in his
(v.
;

comment-

ary on the Categ.

Ar. Fr. 115Fr. Hz. 119), 121, p. 1497, sq. gives us some further informa-

D. and An.
'Zo(p.

do not name the that reading in An. 125 is, as Rose shows, wrong), and yet give the MefloStKa only eight books, whereas Pt. 29, separates them from the Tojnes possibly, however, in (26 b) D. 27, n. ipia-TLKwu two books,
eX. (for
;

tion as to this book and its casuistical discussions. Rose (Ar. Ps. 130) refers it to the age of Theophrastus. Pt. 12 has n. Zia^opas, four books. ^ De Relato (IT. tov irpds rt), six books (Pt. 84).
^

De

Significatione,
is

its

Greek title

Pt. 78 given as ' Garam;

and An. 27, n. ipia-riKwu xSyuv two books, are the same as our
'

Itun^

i.e. rpafi/jLariKhv

or -wv.

As

n.

iTTLa-r-fjiJ.'qs,

(TTTjyUwv,

D. 40 IT. iiriD. 26, An. 25 n. S6^vs,

;
;

An. Ap2>. 162. The genuineness of the work is doubtful, because it is nowhere else referred to. 2 To this subject refer several

another related title, TI. to Xe^eus, cf infra. Pt. 54, Partitio Conditionmn quce statuuntur in race et ponnntur, four books, may also have been a grammatical
.

treatise.
^

Alex. Metaph.
cites

286, 23, 680,

eV

a,

26,

this

simply as

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
isms,^

71

and

on subjects belonging
Eristics.^

to

the

sphere

of

Topics and
T(f
IT.

Probably,

however, the most

KaTa(pd(T(i}s
it

probably, how-

should be (like the corresponding, or possibly identical, work of Theophrastus, named by

ever,

books of "Opoi irph rdv r6ir(ov that The the text of D. is wrong. An. gives instead two titles 51,
:

"Opwj/

DiOG.
1

V.

44) n. KaTa(poi(rew5 Kal

airo<paff^(i}S.

'%vXXoyi(TaS)V a' ^' (T>. 56,

An.
;

54); ^vWoyiffTiKhv Kolopoi (D, 57 An. 55 -kSov 'dpoov') ^vXhoyLafiol

:

Cnatural to refer the "Opoi to book 1, the first half of which (c. 1-11) consists in definitions and their explanation, and the seven Topica to books
fiifiXiov
is
;

52, Toitikcov

Here

it

a'

(D. 48).
-

2-8.

We conjecture,

therefore, in

this category belong in the first place the treatises placed next to the MeOooiKo. in the lists Ta irph rSiu roirav (D. 59, An. 57) "Opoi TTph Tuv roTTiKoiv, 7 books (D. 55) ToTTiKuv irphs tovs '6povs

To

view of the fact that both lists have the number seven, that in
D. also the "Opoi was originally distinct from the Topica, and that his text read "Opoi irph ruv ro:

iriKcav a'

ToiriKccv o'-f'.

D. 65 and
1,

a'

)8'

(D. 60, An. 59, Pt. 62 as

An. 62 name also

a'
)8'
;

'Y^irix^ip-nixdruv

three books

named Tabula definiadli'ibentuT

(Pt. 55, 39, B, 83,

B)

D.

tiomtm
Tojnca,

quae
i.e.

in
; '

Tlphs '6povs tottlkoou)

33, "TiTOfxvi][xara eirix^ipr]jxaTiKh, 3 B D. 70, An. 65, eVets

;

33

An.

De Defniendo

Topico
;

(i.e.

On

iirix^LpriiJ.aTiKal

/ce';

cf.

alsoTHEON,

Definition in Topics,' Pt. 61); 11. ipwrrja-eus n. IBicau (D. 32) Kol airoKpicrecos (D. 44, An. 44). Brandis, however, believes (ut supra) that these names indicate only particular parts of our Tojnea. He takes Ta irph rwv Tdiruv (elsewhere used for the cf. p. 64, n. 1) to be the Categ. first book, which in fact we know to have been so called by some (Anon. Schol. hi Ar. 252, a, 46) the "Opos tSov tSttcov [as Br. reads Tott. irphs it] to be books 2-8 TOVS opovs, books 6-7 n. ISlmv, book 5 and n. ipcor. k. airoKp. book 8, as to which we learn from Alex. Schol. 292, a, 14, that many named it so, and others again, with a reference to its first words, n, Ta|ecos K. airoKplffecas. These suggestions seem to commend except that it is themselves easier to suppose as to the seven
; ;
;

Progymn.

(Rhet. ed. Sp. il, 69), who ascribes to Aristotle and Theophrastus iroXXh
p.

165

W.

fiifiXia

diffewu iiriypacpdixeua,

de-

scribed by

Alex.

Toj). 16, ScJiol.

ets toi 254, b, 10, as containing avTiKclfieva St' evdd^wv iinx^ip7](nv. (Uphs dcffiv iirix^ip7v means *to develop the pro and con of a given proposition,' v. Ind. Ar. 282, b, 57, 283, a, 6: Oea-eis therefore are iirix^iprifxariKal themes for dialectic development or dialectical exercises with an introduction to the way of working them out.) The 'ETTtxeip Vara are no doubt identical with the

tV

AoyiKo. iirixeip. the

second book

of which is quoted by Schol. 227, a, 46, and the

Philop.
'Tirofivftfi.

iirix^ip. with that which is cited simply as "Tiro/xv-fiinarahy'D'ElxiFF.

Cat. 40, Schol. 48, a, 4, andSiMPL. Schol. 47, b, 39 following Por.

72

ARISTOTLE

ancient of these tracts were in reality productions of

the Peripatetic school at dates subsequent to Aristotle's

death.

Next

to the

Topics in order of subjects

^

come the
written

Rhetorical

Works.
at a

Some

of

these
;

were

before the Tojiics in order of time

others only after-

wards and

long interval.
or

Of the many books

origin

of Aristotelian

alleged Aristotelian

which

dealt with the theory of skilled speaking,^ or treated

phxay. Pt. g-ives three entries of

ancients

(cf.

Ar. Fr.
.

11 3, p.

1496

amusmata

'

or

'

if

umsmata
1

'

vTro/j.v'fi/j.ara), i.e.

No.

S2, IG

books

and

69, 2 82, b,

books

book.

PtOSE, Ar. Ps. 128; Fr. Hz. 116). It dealt probably (cf Soph. El. 4) with the fallacies Trapa t\\v Xi^iv.

The references in Athen. iv. 173, and xiv. C^r>i to "Ap. ^ Qeocppacrros
iv rots vTroixvi]ixa(n are not to a defined book so named, but are vao^ue and not to be i(1entified.

An. 196 names among the Pseudepigrapha a work Ile/Ji iJ.665ov.

"'

Cf.
a,

B/iet.
;

i,

init.

c.

2,

Wliat relation
in Pt. (No.

tlic ITporao-eis

71) = 3B[?2a] 80 = 31 [? 7] books) bear to the eVeis eTrix-

named
books,

and No.
say,

we cannot

but

we

also find

two entries in D. (46 and 47), and one in An. (38) of nporacreis a. The 'ETnx^ipr)iuLaTiKo\ xSyoi, cited by Aristotle in the opening of
c' 2.

25 Soj)Jt. El. 34, 184, a, 8. two extant Besides the works, this class includes primarily the Theodectean Ehetoric: i.e. D. 82 and An. 74, T4xvt]s ttjs QeoSeKTOu (rvvaycvy^ [? etVayoj'y^] The exin one or three books. tant Rhetoric alludes (iii. 9 fin.')
1356,
'^

to

an enumeration

eV rols 0eo5e/c-

reiois, wdiicli

Aristotle,
Rliet.

must mean a work of and proves, even if

n.
(cf.
first

/XJ/77/A.

work
the
itself

not a separate Them. 97, a, p. 241), but chapter of the work

is

(449,

b,

13

sq.,
;

450,

a,

iii. be spurious, the existence of this book in early times. The compiler of the Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1421, b, 1 makes Aristo-

30 sq., 450, b, 11 sq. cf. BONITZ, Tnd. Ar. 99, a, 38). Under the head of Topics fall also tlie 'Ej/<TT6.<ris, D. 35, An. 36, Pt. 55, b the YlpoTacT^is ipiariKol 5', D, 47, An. 44 Auceis ipiariKal S', D. 28, An. 29 and Aiaipeo-eis ffocpiariKOLi, S', D. 29, An. 31. As to the
;

tle

speak of rais

vir
;

i/xov

T^xvais

0eo5e/cT7? ypacpeiaais

and

ference also must be anterior to Andronicus. The words leave it doubtful whether the writer meant a Rhetoric dedicated to Theodectes, or one written by Aristotle but published

this reat least

'Epio-TtKol x6yoi, cf p. 68, n.

.

1 fin.

by Theodectes
I^ater
'

Ae'liv, named by tract Uapa SiMPL. SaJwl. 47, b, 40, was doubted, as he says, even by the

tV

in his own name. classical writers several

times attribute to the name Rhetoric of Theodectes' the

ARISTOTLE'S WitITINGS
of

73

the

history

of

rhetoric/
most im-

or

set

out rhetorical

atter meaning, in itself

probable

(of.

0eoSe/cTfjfoi rexvai.

Anon,
15,

in Ar. Fr. 125, p. 1499,

Ft. Hz.
10,

125

Quintilian,

ii.

gives this explanation with an ^ut creditum est': Valee. Max. viii. 14, 3 gives it more distinctly) or else they name Theodectes directly as the author (Cic. Orat. 51, 172, 57,
;

the TexJ'r?[s] a' of D. 79, An. 73 probably meant the extant Rhet. ad Alex. In D. 80 the MSS. vary between &X\t] r4xvr} and &XK7\ rexyoov crvuaycoyfi. If the former is right it would mean a second recension of our Rhetoric if the latter, a recension of the
Texvwj/ (Tvvaycoy^
:

in neither case

194

QuiNTiL.iv.
;

2,

63 and later
:

writers ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 141, Ar. Fr. 123 Fr. Hz 124 sq. compare the similar treatment of the title JS'icomachean Etldos by Cicero and others, de quo p. 97 or else they ascribe to Ariinf. stotle and Theodectes the opinions they find in this book (DiONYS. Comp. Verb. 2, p. 8, Be Vi Demos. 48, p. 1101 Quintil. i. Ar. Fr. 126). If it is 4. 18 genuine, which the Fr. at least give no reason to doubt, we should consider it certainly not as a work written Z>y Theodectes
;
; ;

would it imply separate works. Of the special tracts, the TpvWos has been mentioned p. 58, n. 1 supra probably An. Aj)^. 153,
:

n. priTopiKTis is merely a duplicate of it. In the title, n. Ae|ecos a' fi' (D. 87, An. 79, n. Ae|. KaOapas cf on a similar book by Eudemus, p. 698, n. 3) Brandis in the Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 1. 79 detects book 3 of our Rhetoric, whose
:

and published by

Aristotle after his death, but as a work of Aristotle dedicated to Theodectes, in

which view, since that orator did

not survive the date of Alexander's Eastern expedition, and
to Alexander through Aristotle (Plut. Alex, fioi.), it would have been composed during the years of Aristotle's residence in Macedonia. The name Texvat (in the Rhet. ad Alex.; cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 139) seems to indicate that it had more than one book, though the

first twelve chapters deal with that subject. This is the more probable that D. 78 gives the Rhetoric only two books, although An. 72 has three books. The others, i.e. D. 85, An. 77, n. fieyedovs a' (de quo cf. Rhet. i. 3, 1359, a, 16, ii. 18 sq. 1391, b, 31, 1393, a, 5) D. 88, An. 80, n. (TvjxfiovXias \_-ris] a (v. Ar. Fr. 136, p. 1501, Ar. Ps. 148, Fr. Hz. 126): An. App. 177, n. ^^ropos
;

had become known

An. App. 178, Texv-rj were doubtless all spurious, as was also the Murj/novikIv (D. 117, An. 109) which would be dealt with as an aid to
fl

ToKiTiKov

iyKcofiiaariKT),

Rhetoric.

Pt.

68, UapayyeXinaTa

plural

0eo8e/cTm {Rhet.

iii.

9)

would not necessarily do

so.

For

as the Uapayy. p-nropiKrjs attributed to Theophrastus by DiOG. v. 47, but was in any case not by Aristotle. An exposition of all the

seems to be the same

further details v. Rose, Ar. Ps. 135 sq., and Heitz, 85 sq. As to the remaining titles in our lists which relate to Rhetoric,

rhetorical theories (r4xvai) down to Aristotle's own time was given in the T^xvoiv (rwaycoy^ (D. 77, as two books: An. 71, and Pt.

74

ARISTOTLE

examples/ we have only one preserved to us,^ in wliich, however, we possess without doubt the most mature state-

ment of his
Alexander
24, as
yris a!

rhetorical doctrine.
is

The

EJietoric addressed to

now

universally admitted to be spurious.^

'EyKw/JLiov

one book), D. 89, ^waywand D. 80, "AA-Atj t^x^^v avvaywy^ (if tliat is the right reading) seem to be duplicates only. "We hear of it in CiC Be
)8',

x6yov

and ^EyKw^Lov

Invent,

ii.

2,

6,

Be

Orat.
:

ii.

38,

160, Brnt. 12, 48, etc.

180-135, p. Fr. JT~. 122.

Ar. Fr. 1500; Ar. Ps. 145;

v.

counted as pseudepiThe grapha in An. 190, 194. and apophvarious proverbs thegms quoted from Aristotle (Rose, Ar. Ps. 606 sq.; Fr. Hz. 337 sq.) are collected from difirXovrov, are

The same work or

an abstract of it seems to be meant by Deraetr. Magn. (jip. DiOG. ii. i04) by the title 'ETrtro^^
1

'EvOvfirjixara prjTopLKO.

a',

D.

84,

An. 7G

and

'Eudv/j.-niJ.dTwu

diaipeffds a

(D. 84; Ax. 88, mis-

ferent sources. 2 I.e. the three books of the The date of its comlihetorlc. position must be the last residence of Aristotle at Athens; cf. Brandis in Ar. Rhet.' Pkllol. That it has suffered interiv. 8. polations and transpositions {e.g. in book ii. c. 18-26 ought to pre'

written 'Eu6. KOI alpeafcou). To the same class belonged Ax. 127, but I. Uapoifxiwu, as npooi/xicov a' in D. 138. With these should be reckoned the XpeTat a collection of striking remarks, like Plu;

cede
vi.
'

c.

1-17) was
J-Z/A. d.

proved by

Spengel,
483,

iMunclin.Aliad.

followed by
Schr.'

Vahlen,

Z. Krit. Ar.

xxxviii. 92,121.

Akad. The genuineness

Wie7i.

tarch's Apophthegms, quoted by Stob. Floril. 5, 83, 7, 30, 31 29, 70, 90,43, 140,57, 12, 93, 38, 116, 47, 118, 29. But as a saying of Zeno the Stoic is quoted from it (57, credit 1 2), and as w^e can hardly Aristotle with such a collection of anecdotes, it must either be a forgery or else the work of a
,

book iii. has been qiiestioned bv Sauppe, Bionys. u. Ar., Gott. Rose, Ar. Ps. 137 1863, p. 32 Heitz, p. 85, 89 SCHAARn. SCiiMJDT, Samml.Plat. Schr. 108, whose view has been followed in Zeller, Plato, p. 55. 3 This work was known to
of
;

the
(v.
is

later writer of the same name, like the grammarian mentioned Rose believes aj?. DioG. V. 35. (Ar. Ps. 611) that 'hpiffror^^ovs is a misreading for 'Apiaruvos.

author of our earliest list D. 79, but its authenticity be thought of. not to

SpeNGEL Anaxim.
ix.
it,

(2^07.

Ars

99 cf. sq., excepting the

182, rex"Prolog, sq.) attributes

Rliet.
first

and

last

The same book seems to be what is meant in Stob. (38, 37, 45, 21) by the citation iK rwp koivuv
:

chapters,

to Aristotle's contemporary An aximenes of Lampsacus.

'ApiffTOTeXovs

diarpi^wv.

See

its

Fr.

aj).

Rose, Ar. Ps. 611, and

Fr, Hz. 335,The two orations.

This suggestion, however, is very questionable cf Rose, Ar. Lib. Ord. 100 Kampe, in the Philol. For, apart ix. 106 sq. 279 sq.
; . ;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Of the writings devoted
philosophic system, the
of Definitions
^

75

to the development of his

first

place
^

is

given to collections
as

and Divisions

regarded

aids

to

from the arbitrariness

of the separation of the part attributed to Anaximenes from the rest, the influence of the school of Aristotle betrays itself throughout, not only in the persistence of a method of didactic definitions

seems more probable) with the Platonic Aiaipeaeis, it cannot be

genuine. The quotation in Alex. Tojh 126, Schol. 274, a, 42, from
Aristotle, iv rrj roov ayaOiav Siaip4(Ti

(At. Fr.'llO, p. 1496

is satisfied

i<V.

Hz. 119),
2,

by M. Mar. i.

and divisions, but also in the tenor of particular passages. Cf., e.g., c. 2 init. (with Rhet. 1. 3) c. 3, 1424, a, 12-19 {Polit. vi. 4, 1318, b, 27-38) c. 5, 1427, a, 30 (^Eth. N. V. 10, 1135, b, 11 sqq., Rhet. i. 13, 1374, b, 6) c. 8, 1428, a, 19 sqq. {Rhet. ii. 25, 1402, b, 12 sqq.) c. 8, 1428, a, 25 {Anal, pr. ii. 27 init.); c. 9 init. (Rhet.i. 2, 1357, b, 28) c. 12 init. (Rhet. ii. 21, 1394, a, 22); and the dis; ; ; ;

1183, b, 20 sq., cf. Eth. N. i. 12, 1101, b, 11, but may have found its way from that source into the Aiaipeoreis also. Aristotle himself names an 'EK\oy^ roov evavTiatv, in Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, a, 1, where, after the remark that all oppositions finally go back to that of the %v or ov and its opposite,

he adds

reOewp'fja-da}

5' tj/jlIv
:

tinction of evOvfx.'niJ.a and yvcafxri in c. 11 sq., though differently put, is of Aristotelian origin (cf Rhet. ii, 21, 1394, a, 26) c. 17 (Rhet. i. c. 28 iriit. 15, 1376, b, 31 sq.) 29 init. (Rhet. iii. 9, 1410, a, 23). D. 64, An. 61, 'Opia/jLol, 13 "Opoi, 10 books, books Pt. 59 was certainly a later work of the School, analogous to the Platonic As to the other Defijiitiones. title. An. bl,''Opu)v ^i^Kiov a', cf. p. 71, n, 2, supra. 2 Besides the ' Platonic Divisions mentioned p. '63, n. 2, the lists name the following of this
.

ravra iv rfj K\oyf} rcov ivauriuv in the parallel passage, xi. 3, 1061. a, 15, it is only ea-Twcrav yap
avrai
33, TTOLVTa Se Kol

1004, b, avaySfieva (paiverai els rh ev Kal rh ttXtjOos elK^ipda} yap t) auaycoy^ r]fuv. To the same refers also x. 3, 1054, a, (TTi 5e Tov fifv uhs, &(nrep 29
:

re^ecopTj/xeVat

cf.

raWa

'

Kal

iu rf)

5iaip4(ri

rwv

ivavri(av

'

class: D. 42, AtotpeVets i{' [An. 41, n. Stotpeo-e&jj/l ; D. 43, An. 42,

AiaiperiKuv a [Kose leg. -Kbv, as in the duphcate title D. 62] Pt. 52 gives the Aiaip^treis (which might extend to any length according to the subjects chosen),
;

26 books. Whether the work was

different

from or

identical

(as

ravrh Kal '6ixoiov Kal X(Tov, etc. and the rainhv and '61X010V were themselves given in Metaph. iv. 2, 1003, b, 35, as examples of the e^Sr? rov cvhs treated of in the 'EK\oy^ r. iv. cf. also X. c. 4 ad Jin. But in 3Iet. xii, 7, 1072, b, 2 the words Siaipeais StjAo? refer, not to a T] treatise, but to the division of two kinds of ov 'iveKa given just before. Whether the reference to the 'EKhoy^ r. iv. indicates a separate treatise or a section of the work On the Good,' even Alexander did not know (cf, p. 61, n. 1); but since the subject
5iypd\paiHV, rh
;

76

ARISTOTLE
but none of these Most important, there^

correct appreciation of tlie subject

appear to have been genuine.

fore, is

the treatise

On

the First Pliilosojphy

a torso
genuine

bound up ^ with a number of which is other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, to form

now

arbitrarily

our
on

Metaiihysics.^
wliicli

Probably,
cites

however,

the

Aristotle

the

'Ek:Ao7^

with

seems to have been dealt in the second book IT,

it

rayaOov, Aristotle

is

probable

that
in

a younger contemporary of Andronicus, the title (which never appears before, and is permanent after that date) may safely be
referred to Andronicus himself, collection of Aristotle's writings alone explains it for it means, not as SiMPL. Phys. 1,

had only that book

view.

whose
;

This is the name by which the work was originally cited

'

De Motu Anim. G, 700, b, 8. That Aristotle himself so named it, is probable from Metaj)h. vi. 1,
V.

1020, a, 15, 24, 30, xi. 4, 1001, b, 19; Phys. i. 9, 192. a, 35, ii. 2 fn. De Coelo, i. 8, 277, b, 10 Gen. Corr. 1. 3, 318, a, 0; De An. i. for irpdoTr] (piKoa-ocpia 1, 403, b, 10 we also find (piXoaocpla alone {Metaph. xi. 3, 4, 1001, b, 5, 25), e^oKoyiK)) {Mctapli. vi. 1, 1020, a, 19, xi. 7, 1004, b, 3), t) irepl ra 6e7a (piXocrocpia {Part. An. i. 5, 045, a, 4), ao<pia (JSIetapli. i. 1, 2),

and

fxeOodos

Trepl

rrjs

apxri^

t^^

Trpc^TTjs (Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 7), as Aristotle's expression for the subject of the book and accordingly the book itself is also spoken of as a-ocpia, (piXocrocp'.a, eeoXoyia (ASCLEP. Schol. in At. 519, b, 19, 31). Cf BONITZ, v. 5, Arist. Metaph. ii. 3 sq. first find the name /xerd TO (pvaiKO. in Nicolaus of Damascus, who (ace. to the Schol. to Theoph. Metaph. p. 323, Brand.) wrote a Gewpia tu>u
;

and theNeoplatonist Herennius (ap. BONITZ, Ar. Metaph. ii. 5) supposed, the Supernatural, but .that which in the order of doctrinal development, and of the works as collected, followed after the books on the Natural Sciences (cf. Alex. Metaph. 127, 21; Asclep. Schol. 519, b, 19). It is named in the lists by An. Ill, An. App. 154, and Ft. 49. The latter has the usual Greek reckoning of thirteen books; the former which has at 111 k', at 154 leaves it uncertain whether the editions referred to were incomplete, the one having only A-K, and the other A-I, or whether K and I are corruptions of N,
t'
;

i.e.

A-'N.
^

The question of the arrangeof our Metaphydcs has been so far established by Bran-

ment

We

dis in

Akad. 1834, Hist.

'Ap.

^erd

to.

(l>v<riKd

afterwards

in Plut. Alex. 7, and since then constantly. As this Nicolaus was

63-87, 541 sq., and by Bonitz {Ar. Met. ii. 3-35), that it is sufficient to earlier for reader refer the theories to the comprehensive account given by Bonitz at p. 30.

Ar. Met.', Abh. d. Berl. Phil. Kl. p. Gr.-ram. Phil. ii. b. 1,

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

77

portions were brought into this connection immediately

The main body of the work, begun but not finished by Aristotle, is made up of books i., iii.
(B), iv., vi.-ix. In these, after the critical and historical introduction in book i., one and the same inquiry, that as to Being as such, is methodically carried on, although it is neither brought to a conclusion, nor in parts submitted to final revision. Book x. seems to have been intended for a somewhat further advanced section of the same inquiry (cf.
X.

passages of the Metapli.

{e.g. x. 4,

1056, a, 23, with which cf. v. 10, 1018, a, 25, and x. 6, 1054, b. 34, cf. V. 15, 1021, a. 25) and a discussion reserved in v. 7 ad Jin. for another place is to be found in ix. c. 7. The tract n. tov
;

TToaaxcas,

however, cannot have

originally
'

formed part of the work On the First Philosophy.'

earlier

It niust

2 init. with iii. 4, 1001, a, 4 sq., and x. 2, 1053, b, 16 with

vii. 13),

by

but as it is not brought Aristotle into any express

shown by the citaPhys. and in the and as an aid to the exact use and understanding of philosophic terms and as such it appears in D. 36, and in
is

as

have been written much

tions in the Gen. et Corr.

An. 37 with the special addition

X4y. ^ Twj/ Kara irpoaNevertheless, Ar. Met. vi. 2 imt.y alludes unmistakably to V. 7, 1017, a, 7, 22 sq., 31, in the words aAA' eVei ri Iv airXoos Xeyofxevov \4yeTai TroAAax&is, wv %v /xku ^v Th Kara avju^e^-qKhs, etc.,
T.
TTOff.

connection with book ix., it has almost the appearance of a

separate treatise.

n.

Biffiv.

Between these

connected books there is inserted, in book v., an inquiry into the different meanings of thirty philosophical conceptions

and terms, which stands in no connection with either the preceding or the following book. The Aristotelian authorship of this section is beyond doubt. Aristotle himself quotes it (in
Metaph.
vii.

init.,

x.

,1

cf.

Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 29, Phys. i. 8, 191, b 29), with the words eV rots ircpl rod Trocap^ws or
TT.

Tov

TToa.

Xeyerai (KaffTou.

The

view of Susemihl {Genet. Entiv.

d. Plat. Pliil. ii. 536) that these citations are not satisfied by our

indicates, by the the discussion had already come under the reader's notice. It appears, therefore, that Aristotle actually intended to incorporate our book v. or the contents of it in this part of his work, but never was able to finish the literary connection. As to book xi., the second half (c. 8, 1065, a, 26 sq.), is a compilation from the Physics, obviously not genuine. The first half exactly corresponds in content with

in a

way which
^v, that

word

book v., and that it is an unAristotelian tract which has taken the place of a genuine book with similar contents, is as decisively disproved as that of Rose {Ar. lAhr. Ord. 154) that the book is entirely unworthy of Aristotle. The book is alluded to in other

books
of the

iii.,

iv.,

and

vi.

and

is

therefore either an early sketch argument afterwards expanded in them, or else, as Kose {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 156) supposes, a later abstract of them. A point in favour of the latter view is the objectionable recurrence,

78

ARISTOTLE
the doctrine of changeable substances and their causes only in

seven times, of the particle ye which is otherwise unknown in Aristotle's writing (Eucken, De Ar. Die. Rat. i. 10; Ind. In view, Ar. 147, a, 44 sq.) however, of the arguments from tlie contents of the book themselves adduced in support of the other view by Bonitz (Ar. 3Iet. ii. 15, 451), this peculiarity is not decisive, especially as the general style of the book has Aristotle's
IX7]V,

narrow compass, and in a style condensed often to the point of This, with the fact obscurity.
that in these chapters the formula jJL^TOL ravra [a'C. AeKreovl on occurs twice (i.e. 3 init., and 1070, a. 4) indicates that it was not a book published by Aristotle, but a set of notes intended as a basis
wiiich many for lectures, in points were only hinted at in the the briefest way, with the knowledge that they would be made The plain by oral development. main theme of the lectures consisted of the points which in the second half of book xi. are treated with special care while the more general metaphysical inquiries which were to serve as an introduction or basis for them were only lightly sketched. The matter the lectures dealt with
;

characteristics, and as similar phenomena as to particles are

re found elsewhere. [Thus re occurs in Aristotle almost exclusively in the Ethics and Politics (Eucken, 16); 5e 76 almost exclusively in the Physics (ibid. 33),
.
.

in which also jx^vroi, Kairoi, and Toivvu are much commoner than in the other works (ibid. 35, 51) &pa recurs oftencr in the later
:

books of the Mctaph. than

earlier
(ibid.

in the

50):

and among

the ten books of tlie Ethics, there are many variants as between the three last and the sections i.-iv. or v.-vii., which again vary from one another in diction In this first half (ibid. 75 sq.). of book xi. five of the seven cases Besides, of 76 ix)]v occur in c. 2. 76 is so often inserted by the copyists that it is always possible some early scribe is partly reBook xii. appears as sponsible.]

was no doubt intended to be included in the work on the First Philosophy; and c. 6-10
as far as matter is concerned, exactly fitted to be the conclusion of it. C. 1-5, on the nothing hand, include other which is not contained in the The polemic of earlier books. Eose (Ar. Lihr. Ord. 160) against
are,

an independent treatise, which refers to none of the preceding books, but seems to allude to the
in c. 7,

which, as will be seen this book in the next note, is specially well fortified with external evidence has no value as against its

10 (esp. 267, b, 17 sq.) 1073, a, 5, and in c. 8, 1073, a, 32, to Phys. viii. 8 sq., and also to the De Ccelo ii. 3 sq. It is remarkable that while c. 6-10 develop in some detail the views of Aristotle as to the Godhead and other eternal Essences, c. 1-5 on the contrary give us

Phys.

viii.

Aristotelian authorship, but only as to its connection with our The relation of the Metaph. remaining two books to the rest but there is no is not clear; reason to hold with Rose (p, 157) that only xiv. is genuine. Aristotle must have originally meant to include them in the same book, for xiii. 2, 1076, a, 39, refers

ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
after Aristotle's death.^

79

Of

tlie

other writings

men-

tioned which would have stood in close relation with

to
b,

998, a, 7 sq., xiii. 2, 1076, to iii. 2, 997, b, 12 sq., xiii. 10, 1086, b, 14 to iii. 6. 1003, a, 6 sq., and in viii. i. 1062,
iii.

2,

Athon.
a,

Urbin.'] in the Introd. to

;

39,

where the name is Pasicrates and Asclep. Scliol. 520 a, 6, except that he has erroneously transferred the story from a to A). That it was inserted after the other books were collected is clear, not only from its designa-

22 he contemplates a treatment of Mathematics and the Ideas, which, as appears by xiii. init., was intended to serve as an introduction to Theology (cf, Brandis, 542, 413 a). On the other hand, in xiv. 1, the obvious reference to x. 1 is not noticed, and vii. and viii. are not referred
a,

to at all in
p. 26).

xiii.

and

xiv.

(Bonitz,

^ a|
W'

inconceivable that Aristotle would have repeated a considerable section almost word for word, as is the case with the present text of i. 6, 9, and xiii. But book i., as a whole, 4, 5. must, as well as book iii., which
It is

but from the way in which breaks the connection of the closely consecutive books A and B, for which reason man}^ of the ancients wished to make it a preface to the Physics, or at least to book i. of the MetapU. {Schol.
tion,
it

Syrian {ap. 3) mentions that some critics proposed to reject A. These, like Asclepius, probabl}^ confused it with o if not, Syrian was right in thinking their sug589,
b,
1

sq.)

Schol. 849,

a,

^
'.

cites it (iii. 2, 996, b, 8, cf. i. 2, 982, a, 16, b, 4, and 997, b, 3, cf. i. 6 sq.) be older than book xiii. It seems to me, therefore,

-r,

the most probable conjecture that the argument in i. 9, which is apparently more mature than
that in book xiii., w^as inserted on a second revision of book i., after Aristotle had decided to exclude books xiii. and xiv. from the scope of his main work on Metaphysics. Book ii. (a), a
collection of three small essays, written as an introduction to Physics rather than to Metaphysics (v. c. 3 ScJwl.), is certainly not by Aristotle. The majority of the

gestion laughable. * This seems probable (cf. Zeller, Ahh. d. Berl. Akad. 1877, Hist. Phil. Kl. 145) because of the circumstance that most of the genuine books of our Metajfhysics were in use at the date of the oldest peripatetic books or

fragments which

we

possess,

and

that they seem to have been gathered together in the same series of books with the rest at a very early date. Book i., as above stated, was not only the
for Theophrastus in book of his History of Physics, but has also left clear traces in what we know of Eudemus, and is the source of the point of view taken by the author of the treatise on Melissus, &c. Books iii. (B) and iv. are referred to by Eudemus,
i.

model

ancient commentators {oi irXelovs) attributed it to a nephew of

Eudemus, Pasicles of Khodes (Schol. ap. J r. Opp. 993, a, 29 the soSchol. in Ar. 589, a. 41 [Bekkek's called Philoponus
;

the fourth by Theophrastus also

book

vi.

by Theophrastus; book

80

ARISTOTLE

the Metaphysics, only a few can be considered to be

vii.

by Eudemns; book ix. by book xii. by Theophrastus, Eudemus, the writer of the Matjna Moralia, and the
Theophrastus
;

Mriapli., like

book

xii.,

which

writer of the n. ^4^^

Kivhcredos

book
the

by Eudemus book xiv. apparently by Tlieophrastus and

xiii.
;
;

rod n. tract cf. TTocraxaJs X^ySfievou, by Strato the following: (1) Metaj>h. 1, J)81, a, 12 sq., Eudem. Fr. 2, Speng. (2) i. 3, 988, b, 20,
fifth,

the

did not in fact belong to the main treatise, are in use as commonly and at as early a date as those parts which did, it must be conjectured that the whole was put together in the period immediately Aristotle's following death. This theory receives remarkable confirmation from the fact that already in the n. C^'wi/
KLV-fjo-ews

(c.

6,

700, b. 8),

which

Theopitr. Fr. 40; (3)

30,
1),

ihid.
5,

1.

EUD. Fr. 117;

18
;

De
i.

(4) Melissa,

i.

986,

Xeno]ih.

belongs undoubtedl}' to the third century B.C., book xii. itself is quoted by the title reserved by
Aristotle for his

etc., sec vol.

1.

21 sq.,
1.

ihid.

Theophr. Fr. 45 27, Theophr. Fr.

; ;

468, 484; (5) ihid. (6) 43,

;

main
eV

treatise
irepi

on
rrjs

Metaph.
TrpdoTTjs

i.e.

to7s
(cf.

(piKoaocpias
a,

BONITZ,
;

EUD. Fr. 11, S. 21, 7 (7) Theophr. Fr. 48 (8) i. 6, b, 32, EuD. Fr. 11, S. 22, 7,
44,

i,

6,

Ind. Ar. 100,

47

sq.

the sus-

987,
8p.

(9)
3,

i.

8,
;

989,

a,

30,

Theophr.

Fr. 46

(10) iii. 2, 990, b, 26, iv. 1005, a, 19, EuD. Fr. 4; (11) iii. y, 999, a, 6, Ftli. Fud. i. 8, 1218, a, 1; (12) iv. 2,1009, b, 12, 21, Theophr. Fr. 42; (13) iv. 6, 1011, a, 12, c. 7. 1012, a, 20,

picion thrown on the passage by Krtsche, Forseh. 267, 3. and Heitz, V. S. 182, is groundless). "We may assume, then, with some probability that immediately after Aristotle's death the finished sections of the work on First

Theophr. Fr. 12, 26 (14) v. 11 Strato apvd Simpl. Cafeg. Scliol.

;

Philosophy (i.e. books i., iii., iv., vi.-x.) were bound up with the other sketches and notes of a

in AHst. 90, a, (15) vi. 1, 1026, a, 13-16, Theophr. Fr. 12, 1 (16) vii. 1, 1028, a, 10, 20, EuD. Fr. 5 (17) ix. 9, 1051, b, 24, Theophr. Fr. 12, 25; (18) xii. 7 init., cf. c. 8, 1073, a, 22, DeMotn An. 6, 700, b, 7; (19) xii. 7. 1072, a, 20, Theophr. Fr. 12, 5; (20) xii. 7, 1072, b, 24, c. 9, 1074, b, 21, 33, Etli. Eud. vii. 12, 1245, b, 16, M. Mor. ii. 15, 1213, a, 1 (21) xii. 10, 1075, b, 34, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2; (22) xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28, Eth. Fud. i. 8, 1217, b, 22; (23) xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2. Since, our parts of therefore, the
;
;

12-46

by him (i.e. and xiv.), and that at the same time book v. was inserted between iv. and vi. but that book a, and the second half of xi., were first attached by Andronicus to this work, with which they were not connected either by origin or contents.
like character left
xi. first part, xii., xiii.,
;

Naturally,
taintj'-

we cannot with
by whom the

cerfirst

affirm

redaction was undertaken. But the statement of Alex. (ap. Metaph. 760, b, 11 sq.), that it was Eudemus, deserves all consideration while the different story told by Asclep. (Scliol. in Ar. 519, b, 38 sq.) is open to the
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

81

genuine, and these must have belonged to Aristotle's

earlier period.^

The works on Natural Philosophy form the

bulk of
series of
all

largest
first

Aristotle's productions.

We

have

important investigations which Aristotle himself connected together. They deal with the general

and conditions of the material universe, of the earth and the heavenly bodies, of the elements with
basis

their

properties

phenomena.

and relations, and of meteorological These are the Physics, ^ the two conRose, Ar. Ps. 615 Fr. Hz. 347) seem to have formed part. It is referred by Rose to* the hand of Aristocles of Rhodes, a contemporary of Strato but this seems unlikely cf. Heitz, V. S. 294. It cannot, however, have been a genuine work of Aristotle, and itseems tohave contained, not philosophical inquiries as to the Godhead, but collections and probably explanations of myths and
ajj.
; :
:

gravest doubts. Cf. further, p. 155 sqq. Besides the Books on Philosophy (p. 55, n. 5, and 57), on the Good, and on the Ideas (p. 61, n. 1, 62, n. 1), the Uepl evxvs was
'

probably genuine
tin,).

(v. p. 58, n.

1,

The three books n. rvxris (An, Aj)2). 152) and the MayiKhs were not. The latter is named bj' Diog. (i. 1. 8, ii. 45), and was also evidently used by Plin. {H. JV.
XXX. 1, 2) as Aristotle's, but it is reckoned by An. (191) among the Pseudepigrapha,and we know from Suidas ('Aj/Tto-e.) that it was attributed sometimes to the Socratic Antisthenes, sometimes to

the Antisthenes
patetic of
(le^e,

who was a
ci^'ca

Peri-

Ehodes

180 B,c,

religious usages. The n. hpxh^^ from its position in the list of D. 41, seems rather to have been a metaphysical or physical tract than a political one, but we know nothing of it. As to a 'Theology of Aristotle,' which originated in the Neoplatonic

by Bernhardy's happy con-

School
us
V.

and

is

preserved

to

jecture, 'VoSica for "PSScovl). On this book, vide Aj'. Fr 27-30, p.

in

1479

Fr. Hz.
;

an Arabic translation, DiETERCI, Alh. d. D.

GesellscU,

Heitz,

V. S.

morgeid.
117.
2

1877,

it to be a Dialogue. Of the QeoAoyovfieva, which was ascribed to Aristotle by Macrob, (Sat. i. 18), the Theogony mentioned by Schol, Eur. *Rhes. (28), and the reAeral spoken of by Schol. Laur. in Apoll. Rhod. iv. 973 (v. these and other quotations
'
'

294, 8 siders

Rose,

A r.

1,

Ps. 50,

who con-

^vctik}) a.Kp6a<ns in 8 books AN. 148, leg. r( for ii?'), as its own MSS and those of Simpl. Phys. init.. An. 148, Pt. 34, &c., name the treatise. Aristotle him-

(in

self

commonly
<pv(riKb.

calls

only the

first

books
(Phys.

viii.

1,

or tA irepl <(>vcr(i)s 251, a, 8, cf. iii. 1,

VOL.

I.

82

ARISTOTLE
On
the

nected works
viii.

Heavens and On Growth and

cluded book with which it
o-ecos.

3, 253, b, 7, cf. ii. 1, 192, b, 20, viii. 10, 267, b, 20, cf. iii. 4 ; Metaph. i. 3, 983, a, 33, c, 4, 985,

V.
is

with book

vi.,

so closely con-

nected, under the

name

II. kiv}]-

a, 12, c, 7, 988, a, 22, c, 10, xi. 1,

For though in the time of

(ajj.

1059,
i.

a,

34,
i.

Metai)li.

5,

xiii. 1,
i.).

Phys.

cf. Phys. ii. 3, 7; 986, b, 30, cf. i%.5. c, 9, 1086, a, 23, cf. The later books he

Adrastus

SiMPL.

16,

2,

many may have named

apx^v

i.-v.

a) n.

visually

calls
ix.

ra
8,

Trepl

Kipv.afus

\_(pv<TiKu>v'], as others named the whole, while vi.-viii. bore the title n. Kivriaecos under which

(Metaj)h.

1049, b,
;

36, cf.
i.

Phys.

viii., vi.

Be

Qt'lo
.

5, 7,

Andronicus (Simpl. 216, a) also cited them, yet it cannot be

272, a, 30, 275, b, 21, cf Phys. vi. 7, 238, a, 20, c, 2. 233, a, 31, viii. 10 Be Co'lo iii. 1, 299, a, 10, cf. Gen. et Phys. vi. 2, 233, b, 15
; ;

shown that
cited

this
v.

was

so in the

earliest period.

When

Theophr.

Corr.
viii.
;

i.

3,

318, a,
c, 6,

3,

cf.

Phys.

445, b, 19, cf, Anal. post. ii. 12,95, Pltys. vi. 1 But in Phys. viii. 5,^ 257, b, 10).
;

Be Sensu

as e/c tuv <pv(riKu>v he may easily have meant not only this whole treatise but and cf others also Qut supra Simpl. 216, a). When Damasus the biographer and follower of

book

a, 34 eV Tols KaOoKov -rrepl (pvaeoos refers to B. vi. 1, 4, MetajjJi. viii. in to B. v. 1 1, and (pvcriKo. Metaph. i. 8, 989, a, 24, xii. 8,
;

Eudemus

Simpl. 216, a, [aj?. where it is impossible to read Neoplatonist) the Bamascius

speaks of
eK

t^s

-n-epl

<|)U(rea)S

1073, 32, the phrase to tt. (pva^cas refers not merely to the whole of the Physlca, but also to other

Trpayfxareias rrjs *Ap.

works on Natural Science (cf. BoNiTZ and Schwegler arZZoc). For more general references see
4, Be Ccelo i. 6, 274, a, 21, TOLS irepl ras apx^s, B. iv. 12, vi. 1, Be Ca'lo iii. 4, 303, a, 23,

B,
eV

iii.

Trepl XP^^^ '^"^ KLvr}(rws, and see IND. Arist. 102, b, 18 sqq. D. 90, 45 (115) names a IT. (pvcrecos and a n. Kiv^a^ws, but the former with three books only,and the latter with one (cf. p. 50,n. 1).

b,

SiMPL.(P%s. 190, a, 216, a, 258, and 320, a) says that Aristotle and his kraipoi {i.e. Theophrastus and Eudemus) spoke of the first
5 books
<pv(riKoov

tuv nepl Kivfi' a-ews Tpia, it does not follow that he means vi., vii., viii., and not rather v., vi., viii. (cf. KoSE, Ar. Libr. Ord. 198 Brandis, ii. Indeed book vii. gave b, 782). even ancient critics the impression of a section not properly fitted into the general connection, and Simpl. {Phys. 242, a) tells us that Eudemus passed it over in his revision of the whole work. It need not on that account V e classed as spurious (with Eose, 199), but rather (with Brandis, ii. b, 893 sq.) as a collection of preliminary notes which do not belong to the Treatise on Physics. The text has taken on many in;

as ^vaiKa or n. apxa>v

and No doubt viii. as n. Kiwfjffeus. Porphyry, however, was right (av. SiMPL. 190, a) when he in-

and of books

vii.

terpolations and alterations from a paraphrase, known even in the time of Alexander and Simplicius (y. Simpl. 245, a, b, 253, b, and
cf.

Spengel, Ahh.

d,

MuncUn.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Decay
^

83

and the

Meteorology.'^

Connected with these

leading works (so far as they are not to be classed

as sections of

them under
sq.),

special names, or as spurious),

Akad.

iii.

313

but

the

Ar. Meteorol.

i.

415,
ii.

ii.

199 (nor

original text is to be found in the smaller edition of Bekker and in that of Prantl. The Aristotelian origin of B. vi. c, 9, 10 is rightly

from Cic. N. B.

15,

and Plut.

Plac. v. 20) infer that the n. ovpavov was originally more complete or existed in a recension
different
^

maintained by Brandis

(ii. b, 889) against Weisse. * The n. ovpavov in 4, and the n. 76j/eo-ecos KoL ^dopas in two books. The current division of these books, however, can hardly be derived from Aristotle, for books iii. and iv. of the IT. ovpavov are more nearly connected with the other treatise than are the earlier books. Aristotle recognises both by a short reference to their contents in the beginning of the Meteorol., and by citing

from ours. An. Apj). 150, MerecDpoAo-

yiKa

Pt. 37, IT. fMeredopcuv 5' ^ /t; TcwpoffKOTTid ; Pt. 76 do. with two
observed,

books only.

Be
.

7 in Meteorol. i. 3 rhv &V(a roirov iv Tols irepl rod iroi^lv Koi Tracxetj/ ^uapiffixevois to the Gen. et Corr. i. 10 (not Metew. iv.) Be Sensu C, 3, 440, b, 3, 12 (eV toTs Trepi jui^ecos) ; to the Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, Be An. ii. 11, 423, b, 29, Be Sensu, c, 4, 441, b, 12 (eV ro7sTrp\ ffToix^icav). A work n. ovpavov is ascribed by SiMF.(Be Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 468, a, 11, 498, b, 9, 42, 502, a, 43) also to Theophrastus, who is said to have followed the lines of Aristotle's book. With this exception the earliest witnesses to the existence of the work are Xenarchus and Nicolaus of Damascus (t>. Brandis, Gr.rbm. Phil ii. b, 952), but there is no doubt of the authenticity either of these books or of the
Ccelo
irepX
ii.
.
.
,

This work, as above places itself, in its opening chapter, in immediate connection with the works last discussed and its genuineness is beyond doubt. Aristotle himself does not name it (for Be Plant. ii. 2, 822, b, 32 is a spurious book), but he frequently recalls its doctrines; cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 102, b, 49. According to Alex. Meteor. 91 and Olympiod. ap. Idelee, Ar. Meteor, i. 137, 222, 286, Theophrastus in his fx.iTap(rioXoyLKa(T)iOG.v. 44) seems to have imitated it. Ideler {iMd. i. vii. sq.) shows that it was known to Aratus, Philochorus, Agathemerus, Polybius, and Posidonius. Eratosthenes, however,
;

ihid.

seems not to have known it cf. i. 462. Of the four books, the last seems from its contents not to have originally belonged
;

n. yep^aeus. From Stob. Eel. i. 486, 536 we cannot, with Idelee

to the saijie treatise. Alex. {Meteor. 126, a) and Ammon. (ap. Olympiod. in Idelee, Ar. Meteor, i. 133) prefer to connect it with the IT. yevca-em but it is not adapted to that work either. Since it has all the appearance of being Aristotelian, and is cited by Aristotle (Part. An. ii. 2, 649, a, 33 ; cf. Meteor,
;

o 2

84

ARISTOTLE

pliilosopliyJ are a variety of other treatises on natural

iv. 10,
.

743, a, 6 9, 384, a, an 33), it must be taken to be isolated section, which was not contemplated, in this form, when
ii.

Gen. An.
iv. 6,

6,

cf Mcieor.

383, b,

the Meteorology was begun (v. Meteor, i. 1 ad fin.'), but which in the end took the place of the further matter that remained to be dealt with at the end of book iii., which obviously does not itself bring the treatise to a As P.onitz (^Ind. Ar. 1)8, close.
b, 53) notices in criticising Heitz, this book (c. 8, 384, b, 33) cites

apxoov (ibid. 93), IT, KivrjtTcas (D. Pt. 17, 45, 115; An. 102, 1 B the same again as Auscid8 B and tatio 2)^iysica, at No. 84 perhaps also as n. apxvs at D. 41). In what relation the same work stands to the titles: 11. (pva^ws (D. 90 as three books, An. 81, as one); <PvaiKhv a' (D. 91); or n.
; ; ;

(pvaiKwi/ a'

(An. 82) is not clear. An. Ap2J. 170, Ft. 85 n. xP"''ou might also be only an extract including PJ/ys. iv. 10- 14, though it is preferable to think of it as a special treatise by some of the
:

3feteor.

iii. 077, 378, a, 15 (cf. on this subject Ideler,77>/yZ. ii. 347-

360

SrENGEL,

'

Ueb.

d.

Keihen-

folge d. naturwissensch. Schrif ten

d. Arist,,'

AhUandl.
;

d.

Munelm.

T.RANDIS, Gr.Aliad. V. 150 s(i. rom. Phil. ii. b, 1073, 1076; Rose, Arist. Lihr. Ord. 1J)7).
Tlie doubts alluded to by Olympiod. ihid. i. 131, as to book i. the reasons are unsupported given by Ideler (i. xii. sq.) for holding that two recensions of the Meteor, existed in antiquity
;

Aristotle himself Peripatetics. refers with the words iv ro7s ir. aroix^iuiv in the Be An. ii. 11, 423, b, 28, and the De Sensv, 4, 441, a, 12, to the Gen. et Corr. 2 sqq. Whether in D. 39, ii. An. 35, the title n. (rroix^icov 7' only refers to this work (possibly
in connection

with
50,
n.

De
1
;

(Joelo

iii.

or with 31etror. iv., cf. Fr. Pfz. 156), or whether it means a special collection of several Aristotelian tracts the elements, or relating to

and

iv., cf. p.

are not convincing.

The points which he supposed to have been found in another edition of this, are for the most part referable to other works, and where that is
not so (Sen. Qu. Nat. vii. 28, 1 our cf. Meteor, i. 7, 344, b, 18) informant m ay be in error. But it may is possible that these points have come from an edition that later had been expanded by a
;

there was a separate (which could not be considered genuine) must remain an open question. 80, again, as to the book n. tov Trdcrx^i-v ^ ireirovOevat (D. 25) Aristotle in Be An.

whether
treatise

ii. 5,

41 7, a, 1, and in Gen. Anirn. iv. 3, 768, b, 23 refers by the formula, iv to?s it. rod ttoi^Iv koI Trdax^Lv, to Gen. et Corr. i. 7 sq.,

hand or largely added to Brandts, p. 1075. The Physios have the^

;

cf
fol-

lowing titles n. apxS>v ^ (pixrews a' (An. 21), iv ro7s rr. tv dpx^" rrjs oAtjs (pvaca^s (ThEMIST. Pe rwv J.n. ii. 71, 76), iv to7s tt.
:

a leference doubted by Trendelenburg (De An. ibid.) and by Heitz (V. S. 80), but which it seems impossible, on comparison of the passages, to reject (cf. with Gen. An. p. 324, a, 30 with De An. 416, b, 35, and sq. 323, a, 10 sq. with De An. 417
; ;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Another
a, 1,

class of writings, less directly akin, are the

fj

Tovro 8e ttus Svvarhy

dp-f}Ka/xGv,

a5v-

varov,

etc.,

and

325,

title

ap.

Ar.

Oj)jj.

ii.

973,

n.
v.

b, 25, TTus Se eVSe'xeTOt tovto crvfiIt ^alvcLU, irdXiv \4ya>iji.eu, etc.).

itself, therefore, either to apply the title in DiOG. to this section only or to the whole of book i. If, however, a

cr-n/uLciuu),

for the Fr. of

;

which

suggests

Fr. 11%. Ar. Fr. 237 sq. 1521 157 Ar, Ps. 243 sq. The n. ttoTafMoou (Ps.-Plut. He Fluv. c. 25 ad fin. Heitz, V. S. 297 Fr. Hz. 349) seems to have been a
; ;

separate treatise
it

is meant, then seems more likely that it was

late compilation.
lier

Of much

ear-

analogous to the Gen.

et

Corr.

than that (as

d.

Trend.

Gesch.

Kategor., 130, supposes) it treated generally of the categories of Action and Passion. With Physics also was connected the tract De qua^stionibus hylicis, Pt. 50, and perhaps also Pt. 75, Be accidentlMis unirersiSy both without doubt spurious. So must be also An. A^jj^. 184, n. KdcTfxov

(according to Rose, either by Theophrastus or of his time) is An. App. 159 Pt. 22, n. ttJs rov 'NciKov avafidaews, de q.v. R0SE,^r. Ps. 239 sq. Ar. Fr, The Fq'. Hz. 211. p. 1520; date
;

treatises

De

H\t.mior%bus

and He
cannot

Siccitate, ap. Pt. 73, 74,

which cannot have been written by Aristotle, who so decisively combats the idea of a beginning of the world. The book n. kSctixov (which is not even known to our three lists) was
yevea-ecos,

genuine, as they are mentioned nowhere else. As to the n. xpco^oTcoi/, well founded objections have been raised by Prantl (/Ir. ii. d: FarVen, Miinch., 1849, cf. 107, 115, 142, etc.). p. 82 Alex, in Meteor. 98, b, and Olympiod. in Meteor. 36,a(/AlDELER, Ar. Meteor, i. 287 sq.) allege that

be

Aristotle wrote a

book

IT.

x^H-<^^t

written at the earliest 50-1 B.C. of. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. iii. a, 558. The so-called quotation from a

work n. /Ai|ecos, given by Minoides Mynas, in his edition of Gennadius against Pletho {Fr. Hz. 157), belongs perhaps to the Siaipiffeis spoken of p. 75, n. 2. Many of the books we hear of as related to the subject of tbe Meteor.

but neither seems to have known it. So Michael of Ephesus, He Vita et M. 175, b, remarks that Aristotle's n. ^vrav kuI x^^^^ was lost, so that it was necessary Arito rely on Theophrastus. stotle himself alludes in Meteor.
ii.

3,

359, b, 20,

to

some more

extended inquiry into the qualithings relating to the sense of taste and since in tbe late He Sensu, c. iv. ad fin.^ further inquiries on the same subject are projected as part of the work on Plants, it is a question whether we should refer the allusion in Meteor, ii. to a separate book n. xw^Vy and not consider it rather as a later interpolation referring to He Sensu"ties of
;

seem to A work
;

have
n.

been

spurious.

avefiooy

(ACHILL.

Tat. in Ar. c. 33, 158 A; Fr. Hz. 350 Rose, Ar. Ps. 622) was ascribed to Aristotle, probably by a confusion between him and Theophrastus {de q. v. DiOG. v.
42; Alex. Meteor. 101, b, 106, a, etc.) and so with the 'S.-nixila
;

X^i-P-<^vo}v

(D. 112, or

a2).

An.

99,

AMISTOTLE
mechanical,
optical,

mathematical,
tracts.^

and astronomical

nxidiDeAn. ii. 10. Aristotle contemplates at the end of Meteor, iii. a work on Metals, and the commen*^ators mention a jneTaWwv. TT. See fxovofiifiXos SiMPL. PInjs. 1, a; Be Ccelo,
c. 4,

ad Jin.).

The n.

aTSfKov rpafi/j-wu

(Ar. 0pp. ii. 968 sq.), which in our lists is only named by Pt. 10, and never cited by Aristotle himself, was also ascribed with much likelihood to Theophrastus

Damasc. Schol. in Ar. 408, b, 25 De 6'a?Zfl,ibid. 454, a, 22; Philop.

;

Phys. a, 1, m. (who, however, on the Meteorologia,\. 135 id., speaks as if he did not know such a
tract)
;

by Simpl. De Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 510, b,10, and Philop. Gen.et, Corr. 8 b, whereas Philop. ad Gen. et Corr. 37, a, and ad Phijs. ra. 8, treats it simply as by Arialso
Its genuineness is doubted by Rose (Ar.Libr. Ord.Wii). The reference in EuTOC. ad ArcMni. de Circ. Dlmens. prooim,.
stotle.

Olympiod.

in Meteor,

i.

Some, with more reason, attribute the book to Theophrastus (Pollux, Onomast. vii. 90, X. 149; cf. DioG. V.44; Theophr. Alex. Meteor. J)e Lapid. init.
183
id.
;

does not mean that Aristotle wrote a book on squaring the

the allusion is merel}'' to Soph. El. 11, 174, b, 14 or Phys. i. Without further 2, 185, a, 16. explanation Simpl. {Categ. 1
circle
;

126,

a,

ii.

161

Id.;

and
sq.,

see

KOSE, Arist. Pit. 254 sq. Ar. Fr. 242 sq.

;

i'V. JIz. 161).

261 >S. 1523; Against the idea

;

that Meteor,
8,

iv. iii. 7, 378, b, 5 384, b, 34, refers to the n. ^er. (on which see Heitz, p. 68), see

names

Aristotle's y^oofx^rpiKa re Koi

;

lxTi]xo.viKa fiifixia

but the extant

BONITZ, Ind. Ar.

98, b, 53.

We
aj).

know nothing
fodinis
Aral).

of the

De

metalli
Vers.

(Hadschi
160).

Khalfa,
tract

Wenrich, Be Auct. Gr.

The

on the

M7]xaviKa (in D. 123; AN. 114, called iJL-(]xaviKbv [-coi'], but more correctly ap. Pt, 18, Mtjx. t/jo)3A^ftaTa) are certainly not from the hand of Aristotle cf Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 192. D. 114,
;
.

IMagnet (n. ttjs Xidov, D. 125; An. 117; Rose, Ar. Ps. 242; P?'. H. 215) was probably spurious.

^OiTTiKbv

a'

[-av, sc. trpo^XrijxaToiv]

'Otttlko.

An.

103,
iyi

fiifiXia;

cf.
;

David
Anon.

That De lajndlhus, which was much used by the Arabs

(Hadschi Kh. loc. clt. 159 see Meyer, Nicol. Damaso. De iilan;

tis,

praef. p. xi.
sq.,

Ord. 181

Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ar. P.v. 255 sq.),

;

was certainly
53),
0'j<rlas

so.
a'

MaOf] fiariKhv

(D. 63

An.

n.

TTJs

eV

To7s

ixad7]jxa(nv

Categ Schol. 25, a, 36 Proleg. in Metapli. ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 377, and Fr. IIz. 215 'OTTTi/ca Trpo^A-fjiJ.., V. Marc. p. 2 and p. 8. It is clear from a reference in a Latin translation of Hero's KaTOTTTpiKo. (clrc. 230 B.C.) ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 378 Ar. Fr. 1534 Fr. Hz. 216, and from the Pseud. Ar. Prohlems, xvi. 1 ad fin.., that
; ; ;

(An. Apj?. 160), IT. fiovaSos (D. Ill; An. 100), n. fxcy^dovs (D. 85 An. 77, unless this was a Rhetorical tract; see p. 72, 2
;

such a book had currency under

Aristotle's
Its

name

at an early date,
is not,
it

genuineness

assured, though

is

however, very pro-

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

87

Next to the Physics and the related treatises come the numerous and important works dealing with life. Some of these are descriptive, others are inquiries. To the and the former class belong the History of Animals
*

bable that among Aristotle's genuine Problems there were some in Optics The Be Speculo, attributed by Arabic and Christian Middle-Age writers to Aristotle, appears to be only Euclid's KoTOTTTpi/ca (Rose, Ar. Ps. 376). An. 101, report an D. 113 'AarpovofxiKhu and Aristotle himself refers to such a work in 3Ieteor. i. 3, 339, b, 7 (^Stj yhp S)TTTai Sia Tuv acrrpoKoyiKuv deioprjfidrcov riiJuv), ibid. c. 8, 345, b, 1
;
;

titles

to be referred which are mentioned by Hadschi Khalfa

Be sideruvi arcanis. sideribus eorwnique arcanis, stellis lahentibus, and Mille verba de astrologia judiciaria. As to the accuracy of the other mathematical and related writ(p.

159-161)

Be Be

we can decide nothing. The attempt of Rose (Ar. Libr. Ord. 192) to prove that none of them does not can be Aristotle's
ings,

(^Kaddnep
Ccelo,
T7JS
irepl
ii.

Se'iKwrai
10,

eV

toTs

irepl

succeed. ' n. TO
IffTopias
i'.

aarpoXoylav
Tctlecos

deoop-fjixatriv),

and De
(Trepl
e/c

291, a, 29
avTcov
etc.

5e

ruv

AeaarpoXoyiav deoipeiTOci} 7eTat yap iKavcos) ; SiMPL. on the De Ccelo, Schol. 497, a, 8, appears to have the same in his mind. The existence of the book is accepted, of modern

scholars, by Bonitz (^Ind. Ar. 104, a, 17 sq.) and Prantl (ad n. ovp. p. 303) ; while Heitz (S. V.

(TI. ^4^v the 155 same is meant by D. 102 and An. 91, n. C^'^Vf nine books, and by Pt. 42). The Arabic writers count ten, fifteen, or nineteen books, and had no doubt expanded the extant text by various added tracts cf. Wenrich, Be Auct. Grcec. Vers. 148. Aristotle quotes it by various names Icropiai [-ta] t. to ^<^a (Part. Anim. iii. 14, 674, b, 16

^(fa iaropla
A2J2J-

An,

17) thinks it probable, though in Fr. Hz. 160 he refuses to decide. Blass {Rliein. Mus. xxx. 504) applies the references to writings by other hands. Ideler (Ar. Metayli. i. 415) assumes a varying recension of the Be Ccelo, which has no probability. It
p.
1

iv, 5,

680, a, 1 10, 689, a, 18

;

Jin. ; iv. iv. 13, 696, b, 14 ;

iv. 8

ad

Gen. An.
IffTopiai
IT.

i.

4, 717, a,
c.

33

i.

20,
;

728, b, 13; Resjnr.

ra>v C^oou

16, init.)

(Part. Anim. Gen. 660, b, 2 ii. 1, init. c. 17, Anim, i. 3, 716, b, 31 ; Respir. c. 12, 477, a, 6), tu^'iK)] Iffropia (Part.
;

does

not

seem

probable

this Astronomical or as Aristotle would have called it (v.

that

Anim.

iii.

5, Jin.),

iffropia ^vctik^
;

Heitz,

ibid.) Astrological

work

took the form of Problems, since Aristotle repeatedly speaks of Qi<i3pi]ixara. Not to it, but to late interpolated tracts, are the

(Part. Anim. ii. 3, 650, a, 31 Ingr. An. c. 1, Jin.), and simply la-Topiai or Iffropia (Be Resjnr. 1 6, Gen. Anim. i. 11, 719, 478, b, 1 a, 10; ii. 4, 740, a, 23; c. 7, 746, a, 14; iii. 1,750, b, 31; c. 2,753, b, 17 c. ^Jin. c. \Ofn. c. 11 Jin.
; ; ; ;

88
In

ARISTOTLE
Heitz, 224
sq.
;

its contents, however, it is rather a Comparative Anatomy and Physiology than a description of animals. As to the plan of it, cf. J. B. Meyer, Ar. Its genuineness TJiierk. 114 sq. is beyond question, though as to the tenth book, it must be taken to be, not merely with Spengel {Be Ar, Lihro Hist. Anim. Heidelb. 18-12), a retranslation of a Latin translation of a section written by Aristotle to follow book vii., but wholly- spurious with Sci.neider (iv, 262, i. xiii.), Kose {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 171), and Brandis (^Gr.-r'6m. Phil. ii. 6, 1257). Apart from any thing else the un-Aristotelian assumption of a female semen would prove

Fr. Hz. 172). So

Clemens, Pcedag. ii. 150, C (cf. Athen. vii. 315, e) seems to refer to the same lost work, and Apollonius {Mirahil. c. 27) mentions it, distinguishing it expressly from the extant Hist. An. (n. Cywj'). Parts of this lost work are probably indicated by the

names

IT.

drjpiwv
c.

Catasterismi,

41,

(Eratosth. and there-

from the Scholion in GermanICUS, Aratea Phoimm. v. 427,

Arat.
ed.

Buhle,

ii.

88); 'TTrep

Toiv iivOoXoyovfiivwv C^uiv (D. 106; An. 95); uTrep tQv (rvj'OiTwv (cf^^

(D.

105; An. 92); n. rwv <pw\v6vTa)v (Ptol. 23, ^/aj-i tv/ulin').

DiOG.

V.

44 attributes a

this

of
is

itself.

No doubt
as that
[Trepi]

tliis

treatise of that name, doubtless the same, to Theophrastus, from

book
fiT)

the

same

in

which come the Fragm. 176-178,

aj^ud Athen. ii. 63 105 d; vii. 314, b. To it also refers tlie notice in Plut. Qu. Conv. 8, 9, 3, which Rose, Ar. Fr. 38, refers to the
c.
iii.

D. 107, An. 90,

yepuav.

v-n^p

tov

Wimm.

to Alexander's reported assistance for the whole work, cf. p. 29 sq. snjrm and as to the sources used by Aristotle, cf. Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 206 sq. Besides this History of Animals, there were know^n to the ancients various similar works. Athenfeus, for example, uses one work different (as is clear from his own words) from our Jlist.A/i., xmder:
;

As

Dialogue Eudemus,' and Heitz, Fragm. Ar. 217, to the larpiKa. The citations from this and similar works, sometimes under the
'

name

of Aristotle, sometimes of

the names eV t^ it. Zcfwu, iv ro7s IT. Z. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 277, and Heitz, 224, unnecessarily read
ZwiKwv), iv
rq)
ir.

ZcoiKwv,

iv rcf
Z(fCt}v

iiriypa(poiJ.iv(f ZcfiKqi, iv

ry
TT.

tt.

^ {kuI]
at the
cites
IT.

'IxOvCOV, iv
tt.

T^

Z(i}'iKWV
;

Kal 'Ixdvcov, iv TCf

^l^Qvuv

but

same time he curiously

v.,

our Hist. An.

((pwv fxopiwv (see the

as v4ixtttov notes of
;

Schweighauser on the passages in question e.g. ii. 63, b iii. 88 c. vii. 281 sq., 286, b and the Index, and see Rose, Ar. Ps 276 sq.: Ar. Fr. Nr. 277 sq.;
; ; ;

Theophrastus, will be found in Rose, Ar. Ps. 276-372; Ar. Fr. 257-334, p. 1525 sq. Fr. Hz. 171 sq. Plin. (^H. Nat. viii. 16, 44) says Aristotle wrote about fifty, and Antigonus (Mlrab. c. 60 IQ6']) says about seventy books on Animals. Of all these it is clear that none but the first nine of our Hist. An. were genuine. The work which Athen. used (which is not Aristotle's style, to judge by the Fr.) seems to have been a compilation from them and other sources, belonging, in view of the passage quoted from Antigonus,to the third century B.C.
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Anatomical Descriptions.^
the three books O71 the
anthropological
'

89

The

latter class

begin with

Soul^'^

on which several other

tracts

follow.^
a. 30,

The
Be

further
i.

investi-

The

'Auaroixal (seven books,

Interpr.

16, a, 8,
11

Be
ad,

in D. 103, An. 93) are very often cited by Aristotle (of. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 104, a, 4, and Fr. Hz. 160), and it is not possible with Rose {Ar. Lihr. Orel. 188) to explain these references away.

Motu An. c. 6 init. and c. fin., and must therefore be

than these books.

earlier

We

know from H. An.

iv.
1,

i.

17, 497, a, 31,

525, a, 8,
ii.

Gen. An.

7,

vi. 11, 566, a, 15 746, a, 14 Part.

;
;

An. iv.

680, a, 1 and BeResjnr. 16, 478, a, 35, that the 'Auarofial

5,

were furnished with drawings, which were perhaps the principal point of the work. The Schol. on Ingr. An. 178, b (after Simpl. Be Am7/ia), can hardly have cited the work from his own knowledge. Apuleius (Be Mag. c. 36, 40) talks of a work of Aristotle,
n. ^(fwv auaTOfirjs, as universally

Ideler {Ar. Meteor, ii. S60) is not correct in saying that the reverse follows from the end of Meteor, i. 1. The words in the Ingr. An. c. 19 ad fin. which name this book as only projected and the n. ^4^v jxopicoi/ as in existence, are (with Brandis ii. 6, 1078) to be considered as a gloss only. Of its three books the first two seem in a more complete state than the third, Torstrik, in the preface to his edition of 1862, has shown that there are preserved traces of a second recension of book ii., and that confusing repetitions have crept into the present text of book iii.,

known

but it is seldom mentioned elsewhere, and Apuleius himself possibly meant the n. Ctfwv ixopicau. The extract from the work K\oy^ avaro/nuj/, D. 104, An. 94, Apollon. Mirah. c. 39 was certainly not by Aristotle. Heitz {Fr. 171) rightly rejects Rose's opinion {Ar. Ps. 276) that the avaroiJial were one work with the Cv'^Ka. An. 187
;

through a combination of two

recensions

made before the date of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the same appears to be true of book i. also. Singularly enough
;

D. and An. do not mention the work but Pt. 38 has it whereas D. 73 and An. 68 give eVety
; ;

IT. ypvxvs a'. also to be

The Eudemus ought

Ari:

stotle's
n. 2,
^

reckoned with psychology see

it

the

gives an auaro/j.}] avQpooirov among the P.^eudeingr. Aristotle did

accounts of
supra.

at pp. 55, n. 4, 56,

no human anatomy
iii.

3,

513,

a,

12,

i.

H. An. 16 init. and

(cf.

To this class belong the following extant treatises, which all

the Koivk adifxaros koL epya {Be An. iii. 10, 433, 20) : (1) n. aladrjcrecos koI alaOrtruv. Its proper name probably was n. alff9'f)(recio5 only (cf. Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i. 650, ii. 358) and it is cited by Aristotle in the n. C l^opiwu and the IT. Crelate to
\|/ux^s
;

see

'^

Lewes, Aristotle). The n. y\ivxfis is often

cited

by

Aristotle in the lesser treatises presently to be mentioned

(BONITZ,

J/Z. Ar. 102, b, 60 sq.), in the Gen. An. ii. 3, v. 1, 7, 736. a, 37, 779, b, 23, 786, b, 25, 288, b, 1, Part. An. iii. 10, 673,

and

90

ARISTOTLE
wide sense, as including
all the anthropological treatises which are introduced by 11. alad. 1 init., The as by a common preface. same explanation will account for the statement in Parf. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 19 that Aristode

y^vea^m (BONITZ, Ind. ArAQ^, a, 8 sq.), De Mcmor. c. 1, inlt.. Be Somno 2, 456, a, 2 (Be 3Iofu Anim. c. Wfin.), and announced as coming in the Meteor, i. B, 841, a, 14. TEENDELENBURG.Z'eylM. 118 (106) sq. (contra EoSE, .4r. <7r^. 219, 226; Brandis, iifc'r.
Gr.-rbm. Phil. ii. b, 2, 1191, 284 BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 99, b, 54, 100, b, 30, 40) believes that the n. alad. is mutilated, and that it is a separated section of it which is preserved as the e/c rov ircpl
;

would speak
Kal
TT.

ev t ro7s

ir.

al<Td'f](rws

oLKovarccv,
is

Ar. Opp.

ii.

800

sq.

It

of the causes and effects of sleep. The subject is to be found only Be Somno, 2, 8, 458, a, 18 sq, and no fitting place for its introduction can be found in our n. alaQ. Probably it did not occur in the
vTTvov
Sicapifffievois

certain that some of the references in later writings cannot be satisfactorily verified in our present text. According to the Gen. An. v. 2, 781, a, 20, and PaH. An. ii. 10, 65G, a, 27, it was

original text either and we are to understand the referetce as indicating by n. al<re. the general, and by IT. v-kvov the particular description of one and the same treatise (in which view re should
;

explained

eV 7o?s Trepl aladrjo-ews

that the canals of the organs of sense started from the heart but, on the contrary, in the only applicable passage of the extant treatise (c. 2, 438, b, 25) we are told that the organs of smell and sight are seated near the brain, out of which they are formed, but those of taste and touch in the heart. It is not until the Be Vita et M. c. 3, 469, a, 10 that he adds that the heart is the seat of perception for the other senses also (only not cpavepws as and here 1. 22 sq. for these) refers to the passage of the n. alad. just cited (for it is only there, and not in the Part. An. ii. 10, as cited Ind. Ar. 99, b, 5, that the different positions are assigned to the organs of sense). From these fact sit does not follow that a section dealing with this point is omitted in our text, but rather that the words eV to7s tt. alaO. in Gen. An. v, 2 and Part. An. ii. 10 are to be taken in a
;

perhaps be dropped). So finally in Gen. An. v. 7, 786, b, 23, 788, a, 84 there are allusions to investigations as to the voice eV rols These IT. Tpvxvs and ir. al(Tdi}(recos. are to be referred chiefly to Be
ii. 8, and secondarily to c. 1, 487, a, 3 sq., 446, b, 2 sq., and 12 sq. whereas the beginning of c. 4 of

An.

the Be An. itself tells us that it was beyond the plan of that treatise to give any detailed account of
voice and tone, such as we find TI. the extant fragment in
aKovcrrwu.
is

The last-named work never cited by Aristotle, and

contains no express references to any of his books. In fact its own broad and sketchy methods of exposition show it to be the work

not of the founder, but of a later

scholar of ;:he Peripatetic school,

probably however of one of

earliest generations.
yUTjs

its

Kal

avafjLvfiffeus,

(2) n. fivi}Pt. 40, is

quoted in the Be Motu An. c. 11, ad fin. and by the Commentators. The book of Mnemonics noticed

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
p. 72, n. 2 Jin. supra,

91

has nothing

ing

(3) n. virvov kuI iyprjySpareus cited Be Longit. V., Part. An., Gen. An., Motu An., and announced as in contemplation (Ind. Ar. 103, a, 16 sq) by Be An. iii. 9, 432, b, 11, Be Sensu, c. 1, 436, a, 12 sq. It is freit.

to

do with

Rose, Ar. lAhr. Ord., refers to Hist. An. iii. 3, 513, a, 21), and as the Essay on Life and Death is spoken of
(cf.

who wrongly

in the Be Longit. V. c. 6, 467, b, 6 as the conclusion of the inquiries concerning animals,

quently connected with (2) (but

clearly for external reasons only) as if they were one treatise, n.
fjLvfjIiirjs

KOL virpov

(Gell.

vi.

6,

Alex. Top.
copied

279, Schol 296, b, 1, SuiD. /avf^fiT], Alex. Be

Sensu, 125, b, Michael, in Arist Be Mem. 127, a, Ptol. 4). It is, however, clear from Arist. Bivin. in Somn. c. 2, Jin., that it was in fact bracketed with (4) n. 'TLvvirviav and (5) n. ttJs ro0' "'^irvov fiavTiKTJs. (4) is also in the Be

Somno,

2,

456, a, 27,

announced

as in preparation.
fiidrriTos /cot

(6) IT. fxaKpofipaxv^idrriTos, cited,

not by name, Part.

673,
a, 30,

An

iii.

10,

and by name Athen. viii. 353, a, Pt. 46, and perhaps also An. App. 141. (7) n. (wtis Kol QavoLTov: to which (8) n.
view so closely related that they form one whole {Be Vita et 31. c. 1
avairvorts, is in Aristotle's

Brandis (1192 sq.) suggests that only the first half of the so-called Parva Naturalia' (Nos. 1-5) was composed immediately after the Be Anima and that the rest of these (which in Ptolemy's catalogue stand at No. 46 sq. divided from the books on Sense, Sleep, and Memory by the books on Zoology) were not written until after the works on the Parts, the Movement, and the Generation of Animals, though projected earlier. And it is true that in the Be Generat. Anim. iv. 10, 777, b, 8, we hear that inquiries into the reason of the varying duration of life are projected, and these are not further dealt with in that work. But on the other hand the Part. An. iii. 6,
' ;

669. a, 4 refers to

Be

Respir.

c.

10, 16, and the same iv. 13, 696, b, 1, and 697, a, 22, to Be Respir.
c.

init. 467, b, 11,

Be

Respir.

c.

21,

a,

10, 13; and Gen. An. v. 2, 781, 20, as already observed, to Be

3,

486, b, 21).

tract, n. ve6Tr]Tos

There was a third /col yfipws, spoken

Vita et Morte,
(cf.

469, a, 10, sq.

of by Aristotle (467, b, 6, 10), to which our editors ascribe the lirst two chapters of the IT. (wijs Koi Oavdrov, but clearly without reason, for it seems more probable either that Aristotle never wrote the tract or that it was lost at a very early date (cf. Beandis, 1191, BoNiTZ, Ind. Ar. 103, a, 26 sq, Heitz, p. 58). Inasmuch

Ar. 103, a, 23, 34, sq., where the other references are more problematical). If Brandis
I7id.
is

right, these

references

must

have been added, as does sometimes happen, to works previously completed. As to the genuineness of the writings already named, it is guaranteed not only by internal evidence, but by the references referred to. Another

as the Be Vita et Morte, c. 3, 468, b, 31 (cf. Be Bespir. c. 7, 473, a, 27) mentions the Essay on the Parts of Animals as already exist-

projected tract,
(las

IT.

v6(Tov kuI vyi1,

(Be Sensu

c.

436, a, 17,

Long.
c.

Vit. c. 1, 464, b, 32,

Respir.
ii.

21, 480, b, 22, Pa^-t.

An.

7,

92

ARISTOTLE
On
on
the Parts of Animals,^

gations
essays

with the connected

the

the

Generation

and

Movement

of

653, a, 8), was probably never written (thougli Heitz, p. 58 and Fr.Ar. 169, thinks otherwise). It
is

unknown

to

Alexander,

J)e

Sensu, 94, and therefore it is likely that the Be Sanitate et Morho known by the Arabic writers (lladschi Khalf a />?/ Weneicii, Two books IT. 1 (;0) was a forgery. u\pews (Ax. Aj}p. 173) and one n. hardly (poouT]^ (ihid. 164) could

be

o-oiiuine (cf. p. 80, n.

1).

book n. TpofpriK seems to be referred to as existing in the J)e Som/io, c. 3, 456, h, 5 (the reference in Meteor, iv. 3, 381, b, 13 being too uncertain), and it is spoken of as a project in JJe An. ii. 4 Jin., Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b, 2, Pari. An. ii. 3, 650, b, 10, and c. 7, 653, b, 14, and c. 14, 674 a, 20, and iv. 4, 678, a, 19. The reference in Be J/otu An. 10,703, a, 10 (cf. Michael Kphes. ad lac. p. 156, a) is not to a IT. rpocpris, but to the n. TTv^vixaros for the words ris /J-ff oiv 7) actiTTjpia rov
:

Peripatetic cf. further ajj. EOSE, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 167, sq., and Brandis, p. 1 203, who both with Bonitz reject the book. n. C4^^ jxopiuu four books (in An, App. 157, three books) cited in the Be Gen. An.., Infjr. An., Motn An. (cf. Ind. Ar. 1()3, a, 55 sq), and the Be Vita et M. and Be Ilesjrlr. {de q. v. p. 91, supra) but the Be Somno, 3, 457, b, 28 might be referred to Be Sensu, 2,' 438, b, 28, though Be Somno, c. 2, 455, b, 34 may be better paralleled by Part. An. iii. 3, 665, a, 10 sq., than by Be Seinu, 2, 438, b, 25 sq. It is spoken of as projected in Meteor. Hist. An. ii. i. I, 339, a, 7, and
;
'

17, 507, a, 25.

The

tirst

book

is

(TvjxcpvTov TTvevixaros

e'lprjTai

iv 'aA-

a kind of introduction to the zoological works, including the treatises on the Soul, and the activities and conditions of life, and it cannot well have been originally meant for this place On the order of (cf. 8PENGEL, Aristotle's books on Natural Phi'

to the words rod ifj.(pvrov Trv^vixaros 5ia/j.ouri ; (n. TTj/eu. init.). (So BONITZ, Ind. uir. 100, a, 52 but Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 167 makes them refer to the n. ^(f. KLvr)(T. itself, and Heitz, Fr. Ar. 168 to the n. Tpo(t>ris.) The work is named in Pt. No. 20, where it is wrongly given three books. It dealt with food and other matters in an aphoristic style; and that it is later than Aristotle is clear from the fact that it recognised the distinction of veins and arteries, which was
AoLs clearly relate
Tis
7)
;

losophy,' Ahh. d. the iv. 159, and

cited).
-

Mdnch.
others

AMd.
there

n. ((fup yVae(>}s, five books An. App. 158, three books, Pt. No. 44, five books, ibid. No. 77, the same work in two books the errors are of no signi(in
;

It is often referred to ficance). by Aristotle, but only in the future (cf. Ind. Ar. 108, b, 8 sq.).

unknown

to him (cf. Ind. Ar. 109, b, 22, sq.). In any case it is

DiOG. omits it but its genuineness is beyond doubt. Book v., however, seems not to belong to it, but to be an appendix to the works on the Parts and Generation of Animals, just as the
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Animals/ complete
lost
*

93

his

zoological

system.

Later in

date, but earlier in their place in his teaching, were the

books

On Plants}
'

Other treatises touching this

{Psyck. d'Arist. 237) accepts it as genuine. Of the Indices, An. Ajjjj. No. 156, and Pt. No. 41, have the n. (cfcov Kivfiffeus, and Pt. No. 45, IT. Cv^^ -jropdas. 2 n. (pvTcov fi' (D. 108, An. 96, Pt. 48). Promised by Aristotle in Meteor, i. 1, 839, a, 7, Be Sensu c. 4, 442, b, 25, Long. Vitce, 6, 467, b, 4, De Vita 2, 468, a, 31, Part. An. ii. 10, 656, a, 3, Gen. An. i. 1, 716, a, 1, v. 3, 783, b, 20, and cited in H. An. v. 1, 589, a, 20, Gen. An. i. 23, 731, a, 29 (in the last, it is wrong to change the perfect tense into the future in the words of citation). Though both these references must have been inserted after the books were complete, it is possible that Aristotle may have inserted them. Alex. p. 183, on De Sensu, I.e., remarks that a book on Plants by Theophrastus was extant, but none by Aristotle.

Parva Naturalia are to the De For summaries of the Anima.

contents of the Part. An. and the Geiierat. Anim. see Meyer, Arist. Thierk. 128 sq,,and Lewes, Ar. c. 16 sq. The tract De Coitu (Hadschi Khalfa, aj). Wenrich, 159) was spurious: for it p. cannot be referred, as Wenrich
it, to the title n. fxi^ecos in Sensu, c. 3 (cf. p. 83, n. 1, supra). As to the book n. tov fir] yevv^v, v. p. 88, sujjra. n. Cv'^^ TTopeias, cited bj' that name in Part. An. iv. 11, 690, b, 15 and 692, a, 17, as the n. TTopeias Kal Kivijcrecas rwu C^cav in Part. An. iv. 13, 696, a, 12, and as 11. roHu C4^^ Kiv-f^ffews in the De Ca>lo, ii. 2, 284, b, 13, cf. Ingr. An. c. 4, 5, c. 2, 704, b, 18; yet it itself cites (c. 5, 706, b, 2) the Part. An. iv. 9, 684, a, 14,34, According as an earlier work. to its concluding words in c. 19 (which, as already suggested at p. 89, n. 2, may be spurious) it is later than the n. Cv^^ fiopicoy, to which also its introductory words seem to refer back; and yet it is frequently cited in that work, and at its close (PaH. An. 697, b, 29) there is no hint of an essay on Movement as still to come. Probably it was, in fact, composed while the larger work was in progress. The tract II.

refers

De

'

So

Michael Ephes, on

Vita et M. 175 b, Simplicius Philop. &c. {apud Rose, At. Ps. 261, Heitz, Pt. Ar. 163) say the contrary, but we need not suppose they spoke from personal knowledge of the IT. (pvroov. Quintil. (xii. 11, 22) proves nothing for, and Cic. (Fin. v. 4, 10) nothing against, their genuine-

Be

can hardly be Kiv7](Tcos ^^)<t>p authentic among other reasons, because it cites the n. irvev/xaTos Rose (Ar. (cf. p. 89, n. 3 Jin.). Lihr. Ord. 163 sq.) and Brandis (ii. b, 1, p. 1271, 482) declare it spurious Barthelemy St. Hilaire
; :

What Athen. (xiv. 652 a, 653 d, &c.) cites from them (Ar. Fr. 250-4) may as probably be taken from a false as from a genuine book. The two Aristoness.

telian references
it,

mentioned make

however, overwhelmingly probable that Aristotle did write two books on Plants, which were

94
still

ARISTOTLE
extant

in the time of though they were afterwards displaced by the more elaborate work of Theophrastus (so Heitz, Ar. Fr. 250, and Verl. Sclirift. 61, though Rose, Ar. Ps. 261, thinks the books by Theophrastus were ascribed to Aristotle). According to Anti-

Hermippus,

what Aristotle elsewhere says, or promises to discuss in his n,

Goxus
ap.

{Mirahil.

c.

169, cf. 129,

Ar. Fr. 253, Fr. Hz. 223) Callimachus as well as Theophrastus seems to have borrowed from these two books. So did the compiler of the <^vTiKa, as to which Pollux, x. 170 {ap. Ar. Fr. 252, Fr. Hz. 224) could not say whether they belonged to Theophrastus or to Aristotle, but which no doubt, like the ^wi'/ca

we know how conthe earlier Peripatetics adopted the teaching and the very words of Aristotle. On the other hand, the only passage cited verbally from Aristotle's books (Athen. xiv. 652 a, ap. Ar. Fr. 250) is not in those of Theophrastus, so far as we have them and the latter contain no direct reference to any of the Aristotelian writings a circumstance which would be incredible in a work so extensive which touched at so many points the
<pvrS)v
:

for

stantly

earlier Aristotelian treatises.

The

mentioned at p. 88, svpra, were compiled by a later disciple for

In like other similar collectors also used these books (cf. Rose and Heitz, ibid.) and they sometimes distinguish between the phrases used by Aristotle and by Theophrastus {Ar. Fr. 254, Fr. Hz. 225). The two extant books n. (pvTuu are emphatically un- Aristotelian. In the older Latin text they have passed already through the hands of two or three translators. Mej^er
lexicographical purposes.

manner,

Athemeus

and

very passage {Cavs. PI. vi. 4, 1) in which Jessen finds one main proof of his theory points to several later modifications of an Aristotelian doctrine which had arisen in the School after his death. Theophrastus, in contrast with Aristotle's view, speaks of male and female plants (cf. Cans. PI. i. 22, 1, Hist. iii. 9, 2, &c.). But a decisive argument is to be found in the fact that not only does the text of Theophrastus speak of Alexander and his Indian expedition in a way
4, 1, 5, 9, Cans. viii. 4, 5) which would be hardly possible in Aristotle's lifetime, but it also refers to what happened in the time of King Antigonus {Hist. iv. 8, 4) and the Archons Archippus, B.C. 321 or 318 {Hist. iv. 14, 11) and Nicodorus, B.C.

{Hist. iv.

(Pref. to NicoL. Dam. Be Planed. 1841) ascribes them in their original form to Nicolaus of
tis, ii.

Damascus, though possibly they are only an extract from his book,

worked over by a

later hand. Jessen's suggestion (Bhnn. Mvs. 1859, vol. xiv. 88) that Aristotle's genuine work is contained in the work of Theophrastus is in no way supported by the fact that the latter closely agrees with

314 {Cavs. i. 19, 5). It would likewise be clear on a full comparison that the diction and manner of statement in the Theophrastic books makes it impossible to attribute them to Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
field of

95

work, such as the Anthropology,^ the Physiogno-

mies,^ the
^

works on Medicine,-^ Agriculture,'' and Hunt(pvffecos,

n.

^Avdpd>irov

only

named

in

An.

Aj?jj.

183.

There

are a few items which seem to have belonged to this tract, apud KoSB, Ar. Ps. 379, Ar. Ft. 257264, p. 1525, Fr. Hz. 189 sq. 2 '^vGio'^voiyioviKa. (Bekker, 805), \-Kbv a' in D. 109, but -wa )8' in An extended recenAn. 97]. sion of this work is indicated by numerous references to the physiognomic theories not to be found in our text, which occur in a treatise on Physiognomy writ-

For the little that remains of it, see Rose, Ar. Ps. 384 sq., Ar. Fr. 335-341, p. 1534; Fr. Hz. 216, but on Fr. 362 cf. p. 88, supra. The genuineness of these writings, or at least of some of them, cannot be maintained. That Aristotle held that medical subjects should be treated in a technical way, and not from the point of view of natural science, is evident from his own declaration

which he makes,

p. 9, 1 fin. (cf.
;

ten probably by Apuleius {apud Rose, Anecd. Gr. 61 sq. cf Fr. Hz. 191, and R0SE,^r. Ps. 696 sq.). ^ D. mentions two books of ^larpiKoi the Anon, two books 11. larpiKrjs ibid, APP. 167, seven books n. larpiKTis: Pt. 70 five books of npo^\'f]iJi.aTa larpiKa (from which it appears that the larpiKci. in the list of Diog. were also problems, book i. of our extant Problems being made up of such medical questions and answ<3rs) Vita Marc. p. 2 R, UpofiX-fjixaTa iarpiKo. Pt. 71 IT. SiaiTrjs ibid. ibid. 92, one 74 b, Be Pulsu
; . :
:

Sensu, i. 1, 436, a, 17 Longit. V. 464, b, 32 Pe Pespir. c. 21, Part. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 8), iin. and such an indefinite statement as that of ^lian ( V. H. ix. 22) cannot prove the contrary. As to the composition IT, v6(tov koX vyidas see p. 91 fin. Galen (as Heitz ibid, justly remarks) can have known no composition of Aristotle on medical science, since he never mentions any such, although he quotes the
; ;

Pe

book
a^).

larpiKhs:

Wenrich,

Hadschi Khalfa p. 159, Pe San:

guinis Profusione Co el. Aurel. Celer. Pass. ii. 13, one book Pe Adjutoriis (perhaps a mistake in the name). Galen in Hippocr. Pe Nat. Horn. i. 1, vol. xv. 25 K, knows of an 'larpiK^ cwaywy^ in several books, bearing Aristotle's name, which was nevertheless recognised as being the work of his pupil, Meno; and this is possibly identical with the ^Zwaywy)] in two books named by Diog. 89 (as Wenrich, p. 158, suggests).

philosopher more than six hundred times. An. 189 mentions the TewpyiKa amongst the Pseudepigrapba. Pt. 72, on the other hand, gives 15 (or 10) books Pe Agricultura as genuine, and the statement in Geopon. iii. 3, 4 (Ar. Fr. 255 sq. p. 1525) on the manuring of almond-trees seems to have been taken from this, and not from the treatise on plants. Rose (Ar. Ps. 268 sq. Hz. Fr. 165 sq.) mentions other things which may perhaps have come
*

from
or

this source.

That Aristotle
is

did not write about agriculture

similar
i.

from PoUt.

subjects 11, 1258,

clear

a, 33, 39.

06

ARISTOTLE
spurious.

ing,^ are,without exception,

The
;

Problems'^
^

are no doubt based on Aristotelian materials

but our

extant collection under that

name can only be

described

as a set of gradually gathered

productions of the

Peripatetic

and unequally developed school, which must

have existed in
'

many
ol

other forms parallel to our own.''

of the 10th century. The character ascribed in the text to the collection of Problems may also explain the many varying statements as to its title and the number of books it included. In the ]M8S. they are sometimes called UpofiXr^/jLaTa, sometimes
'
'

In the Index
23,

Ptolemy,

No.

Hadsclu Khalfa gives I)e Anl(n. rwv (p(i}Xv6vT(t}v^ malium Cojdura, nee nan de
:

Loois, quihus
delit'jscunt,
'^

deversantur atque

i.

With regard to this treatise the exhaustive article by Prantl Ueb. d. Probl. d. Arist.' among the Ahh. d. Munch.
see
'

^vaiKo.

TTpo^Kri[xara,

and some-

Altad. vi. 341-377; KOSE, Arist. Ar. Ps. 215 Lihr. Ord. 199 sqq. HEITZ, Verl Schr. 103 sqq. s(iq., Fr. At. 191 sqq. ^ Aristotle in seven refers places to the Upo^X-nixara or
;
;

Upo^K-nixariKa (I'EANTL, iUd. 361 Ind. Ar. 103, b, 17 sqq.), sq. but only one of these quotations
;

addition Kar' elSos (Twayui'yris Q arranged in accordance with the matter'). Gellius generally says, Prohlemata (xix. 4), Proh. i^hyslca (xx. ITpo4, (juoting Prohl. xxx. 10) iyKVKXia fiX-n/jLUTa Apul. (JJe Mar/m, c. 51) has Prohlemata; Athen^eus and Apollonius {vid. Indices and Prantl, 390 sq.) althe
:

times with

to a certain extent the and the same extant Problems is true (PR. ibid. 367 sqq.) of the majority of the later references. Prantl, 'iZ/wZ. has abundantly proved this, and he has also shown {Miincli. Gel. Anz. 1858, No. 25) that among the 262 further problems which are given by Bassemaker in vol. iv. of the suits
'
; '
"'

ways npoi8AT7^aTo
(Sat.
vii.

(pvaLKa;

Macrob.

Didot edition of Aristotle, and some of which were at one time erroneously ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. USENER, Alex. Aphr. ProU., Lib.
iii.,

iv.,

Berl. 1859, p. ix. sqq.),

there

is

probably nothing written

by

The same is true of those which Rose {Ar. Ps. 666 sqq.) takes from a Latin MS.
Aristotle.

12) Physical qufsstiones. To collections of problems are also referable the titles ^vctikQv Xt]' Kara arcix^lov (D. 120, An. 110 asto the words k. crTotX;the explanation of which in Rose, Ar. Ps. 215, is not clear, they are to be understood of the arrangement of the different books in the alphabetical order of their headings) UpoffX-fi/xaTa (68 or 28 B, Pt. 65) 'ETTLTedea/xevwu irpofiX-nfxdTcvv fi' (D. 121, An. 112); 'EyKVKXiuv fi' (D. 122, An. 113, Upo^X7)iJt.aTa ijKvKX. 4 bks., Pt. 67) Physica Prohle-mata, Adsjiec(Ammon. Latin. tiva Prohl. (D. p. 58); "AraKTu 127, [a]5toTa/CTa)i/ i/8' An. 119). PrcB'
: ;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

97

Turning to Ethics and Politics, we have on the former subject three comprehensive works,' of which,
missa Qiioistionihus (Pt. &&, says the Greek title is hrhimatu hrua'

and then again

174
:

n.

7]6(iov

in the Appendix {-iKuv) N iKo/j.ax^iccj/

grawa,'' i.e. llpofi\t)ixdrct}v irpoypa(p^, or Upoavaypatpii) ^Zvixixik;

ruv QrjTiqfxdTbov o^' (AN. &Q with the additional clause <bs (f)7](riv EijKttipos 6 aKovar^is auTov^ David (ScJiol. in Ar. 24, b, 8) also speaks of 70 books n. (rvfiuiKTcou ^Tirtifidrwu, and the Vita Marc. p. 2, R of ^vaiKo, wpo^X'fjuaTa in 70 books 'E^rjyvfJL^va (or 'E^rtrao-inet/a) Kara y4pos iS' (D. 128, An. 121). With regard to the Upo^X-fifxara ixt]xaviKa,
:

(which seems to be an extract from the same work) Pt. 30 sq. the Great Ethics in two books, the Eudemian Ethics in eight. Aristotle himself quotes {Metaph. i. 1, 981, b, 25, and in six passages of the Politics) the ^QiKd, meaning doubtless the Nicomachean Ethics (cf. BenDiXEN in PMlologus x. 203,
vTroOijKas
;

86, n. 1, and The spurious composition n. TrpofiXrjfidTcov, to which beoTTTiKCL, larpiKa, cf. p.

95, n. 3.

sides D. 51 (and also An. 48, although the irepl is here wanting) Alex. To2}. 34, Schol. in Ar. 258, a, 16, also refers, seems to have contained a theory as to setting and answering problems. See Rose, Ar. Ps. 126, Fraffm. 109, p. 1496, Fr. Hz. 115. On the other hand, book XXX. of our Problems cannot well be meant (as Heitz, 122, believes) by the iyKvKXia, JEth. N. 1, 3, 1096, a, 3. Aristotle seems rather to indicate what he calls
in

Ind. Ar. 103, b, 46 101, b, 19 sqq.). Cic. {FlQi. V. 5, 12) believes that the Lihri de Morihus of Nicomaclras are ascribed to Aristotle, inasmuch as the son would write very much like his father. Diogenes also (viii. 88) quotes Eth. N. X. 2 with the words (^rjcl Se NiKofiaxos 6 'ApicTTOTeXovs. On the other hand Atticus {ajmd Bus, Pr. Ev. XV. 4, 6) gives all three Ethics with their present names as Aristotelian; likewise Simpl.
sq.
;

290

sqq.,

and

other places i^on^piKol \6yoi,

.

and De

CopIo, i. 9, 279, a, 30 Ha eyKVK\La <l>i\o<ro(pi\ixara. Cf BerNAYS, Dial, of Arist. 85, 93 sqq. 171 BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 105, a, 27
;

sqq.

More on this infra. 'UdiKa 'NiKOfidxeia 10 B., 'KOiKa Ev5iiij.ia 7 B., 'HdiKa /xeydha 2 B. Of our catalogues D. 38
^
;

only names 'UdiKwu e' al. S' (although DiOG. elsewhere {Vita, 21) cites the seventh book of the Ethics in connection with Eth. End. vii. 12, 1245, b, 20); An. 39 has 'WdiKuv K {e.g. the Eth. Nic.^ the last book of which is k),

in Cat. 1, C 43, e and Schol. Porphyr. Schol. in Ar. 9, b, 22, who says the Eudemian Ethics were addressed to Eudemus, the MeydXa NiKo/xdxia {31. Mor.) to Nicomachus the father, and the MiKpa NtKOjuaxta (Eth. JV.) to Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle. The same story is told by David, Schol. in A r. 25, a, 40. Eustrat. {in Eth. N. 141, a cf. Arist. Eth. End. vii. 4 init. c. 10, 1242, b, 2) speaks of the Eudemian Ethics as the work of Eudemus, that is to say, he repeats this statement after one of the earlier writers
;

whom

he used

(cf. p. 72, b),

and

not altogether unlearned on the other hand, on his own supposition, or

:

who was, it would seem,

VOL.

T.

98

ARISTOTLE
only

however,

one

the

Nicomachean

Ethics

is

of

directly Aristotelian authorship.^

following an equally worthless authority (1, b, m), he represents as dedicated to a certain Mh. Nicomachus, and Mh. Eud. to a certain Eudemus. A Scholion also which is attributed to ASPASIUS Qvid. Spengel' On the EthicalWritings under the name of Aristotle,' in the Ahh. d. Mil/ich. Akad. iii. 439-551, p. 520, of. Schol. in Ar. Eth.' Class. Journal, vol. xxix. 117) inu>t suppose Eudemus to be the author of the Eudemian Ethics, since on this supposition alone can he attribute the treatise on Pleasure to him, Eth. N. The Commentaries vii. 12 sqq. known to us (by Aspasius, Alexander, Porphyry, Eustratius) are concerned only with the NicoFor further machean Ethics. materials, cf. Spengel, iUd. 445

mass of smaller

that, after the corresponding sections of the Eudemian Eth. were

lost at

an early period, they were employed to fill up the blanks in the Eudemian Eth.; he is inclined to look upon the treatise on pleasure, Nic. vii. 12 sqq., which Aspasius also attributes to

Eudemus
Jin.'),

(see preceding note, as a fragment of the Eude-

mian Ethics

(p, 518 sqq.), but without wishing to exclude the possibility of its being a sketch intended by Aristotle for the Nicomachean Eth., and later on replaced by x. 1 sqq. In his Arist. Stud. i. 20 (against which Walter argues in Die Lehre v. d. inald.

Vermiuft, 88 sqq.) Me. vi. 13 is On also attributed to Eudemus.

the other hand Fischer (i><? Ethicis

sqq.

Schleiermacher (' On the Ethical Works of Aristotle,' for 1817, W. W. Z. Philos. iii. 306 sqq.) gave it as his opinion that, of the three ethical works, the so-called Great Ethics is the and the Nicomachean oldest, Ethics the latest, but the treatise of iSpengel already cited makes the opposite view clear, viz. that
'

Eudem. et Mcom. P)Onn, 1847), and with him also Fritzsche {Arist. Eth. Eud. 1851, Prolegg.
xxxiv.) refer orAj Nic. v. 1-14 to the Nicomachean, and Nic. v. 15, vi., vii., to the Eudemian Ethics. Grant {Ethics of Aristot. i. 49 sqq.) refers the whole of these three books to the Eudemian whilst Bendixen(PMZoZ{7^?/s, x.l99 sqq., 263 sqq.) on the contrary, for reasons worthy of note, defends the Aristotelian origin of the 12-15. including vii. whole, Brandis (6^r.-rom. Phil.ii. b, 1555 sq.), Prantl {D. dianoct. Tvgenden d. A?'. Miinch. 1852, p. 5 sqq.), and in the main also Ueberweg ( Gesch. d. Phil i. 177 sq. 5th ed.),

the genuine work of Aristotle is the Nicomachean Ethics, that the Eudemian Ethics is a supple-

mentary work by Eudemus, and that the Great Ethics is an extract taken directly from the EuBut the position of demian. which are the three books common to the Nicomachean and

and Rassow (Forsch.

iib.

d. niliom.

Eudemian Ethics
Eud.
iv.-vi.)
is

{Nic.
still

v.-vii.,

moot

Ethih, 26 sqq. cf. 15 sqq.) agree with the conclusions of Spengel the last-named with this modi-

Spengel (480 sqq.) bepoint. lieves that they belong originally to the Nicomachean Eth., but

support

much to Nic. v.-vii., though essentially Aristotelian,

fication,

which

has

it,

that

ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
tracts is also

99

genuine.

named/ but probably few of- them were Of the sociological writings only one the

has been submitted to the afterwork of another pen, and has perhaps, in consequence of a mutilation, been supplied from
the
'

and the

title

does not sound

Aristotelian. D. 61, An. 60 have also TiaQf] a'. Further (besides

Eudemian Ethics.

Such are (besides the Dialogues mentioned on p. 56, n. 1,

sq., n. SiKaioavvrjs, ^EpwriKhs, n. irAovTOv, n. vyfvias and H, TidovTjs), the following the small composition, still extant, n. apTU)v Kal KaKidv (^AHst. Oj)j). 1249-1251), which is the work of a half -Academic, half-Peripatetic Eclectic, hardly earlier than the first century before Christ Ilpordffeis IT. aperris (D. 34, An. 342) ;
:

59

the 'EpwTi/cbs mentioned on p. 59), 'EpwTiKa (An. Aj/jf- 181 Pt. 13, 3 B.) and 4 B. of &faeis ipwriKal (D. 71, An. 66 Pt. 56, 1 B.) are mentioned, both of them doubtless equally spurious. An. 162 reckons n. cw^poo-vj/Tjs among the Pseudepigrapha. IT. (t>i\ias a' (D. 24, An. 24, Pt. 25) is supposed not to be a copy from Fth. A', viii. ix., but a special treatise, which can hardly be genuine.
; ;

IT.
j8'

dperrjs

(AN. AjJjJ. 163); 11. SiKaiwv

(D. 76, An. 64 Pt. 11, 4 B.) ; n. Tov fieXriovos a' (D. 53, An. 50) ; n, cKOvaiov (-iuv) a' (D. 68, An. 58) IT. rod alperov Kal tov IT. atperov ffvfifiefirjKdTOS a' (D. 58
;

Still less can Aristotle have been the author of Seaeis (piXiKal (D. 72, An. 67). fi' Of the two writings n. ffv/x^idoffeus avSpds Kal yvvaiKds (AN. yl;;^;. 165)

and

Nofxovs (-oi) avSpos Kal ya/xe166), the former is mentioned by other writers several
rrjs (ibid.

Kal (TVfjLfiaivovros,

An.

56).

It is

not probable that Aristotle composed a treatise n. iiridvfxias In the beginning of the Be Sensu, he proposes future researches into the faculty of desire, but we do not hear that they were carried out what we find in Seneca (^De
: ;

(e.g. by Clemens, Olympioand David in the passages given by Rose, Ar. Ps. 180 sq., Ar. Fr. 178 sq., p. 1507). Rose (Be

times
dor.,

Ar. lAbr. Ord. 60 sqq.) has pointed

out two Latin translations of these (or the writing n. cru/u^Sjcotr., if both are not merely different titles of the same book) which profess to be the second book of the Economics see Ar. Psciid. 644 sqq. Fr. Hz. 153 sqq. Plutarch, Athen^us, and others quote from a writing n. jue^r/s, perhaps a dialogue cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 116 sqq., Ar. Fr. 98-106, p. 1493 sq. Fr. Hz. 64 sq. It was certainly not genuine it may have been identical with the writing of the same name by Theophrastus (Heitz, ibid.), only in that case Athenaeus, who,
T<i6ixoi
:

Ira,

i.

3. 9, 2, 17, 1, iii. 3,

l)may

more probably have been contained in the writing n. iraQu>v (or -ovs) opyrjs (D. 37, An. 30), the supposed remnants of which Eose (Ar. Is. 109 sqq., Ar. Fr. 94-97, No. 1492) and Heitz {Fr. 151 sq.) have put together. Whether it was a dialogue (Rose) or a treatise (Heitz) cannot with certainty be determined the latter seems the more probable opinion. Its genuineness is, to say the least, undemonstrable,
;

H2

100

ARISTOTLE
^

eight books of the Politics

it

is

preserved

but though
admirable

contains some
it is

of his most mature and

left,

work

unhappily

like the

Metapliysics,

un-

finished.2

genuine.^

The Of all the

(Economics
rest

cannot

be
lost

considered

we have
1

everything

in addition to these two, quotes a third by Chaniaeleon, must liave been indebted for his quotations to various writers, to whom it was known by different names ^anot very probable supposition. What is quoted from it is con-

Aristotle puts this work in the closest connection with the Ethics, by treating the latter as auxiliary to politics (Fth. JV. i. 1, 1094 a, 26 sqq., 1095, a,
c. 13, 1102, a, 5, 12 init.;met. i. 2, 1356, a, He expects from politics realisation of the principles down by Ethics (iUd. x. 10).

2, c. 2 init.

vii.

26).

cerned, partly with historical, partly with physiolo.oical discussions whether dnnikcnness was regarded also from a moral point
;

the
laid

But

we do not know. Nor do v/e know any more as to the contents

of view
(in the MSS., of D. 139, Nofios avaraTiKhs, of An. 130 No/nwu ava-TUTLKwu a',

he does not mean both to be merely two parts of one composition

a,

(cf.

PolU.

vii.

1,

of the

'kofxoi

(Tva(rtTiKo\

39, c. 13, 1332, a, 7, 21,

ii.

1323, b, 1, 1261,

for

the circumstance of the Platonic republic beingmentioned in it (Procl. in licvij). 350, Ar. Fr. 177, p. 1507) gives us no hence we cannot indication determine whether Ptose {Ar. Ps. 179) is right in supposing that there was a discussion in it on the arrangement of, and good behaviour at symposia, or Heitz (Ar. Fr. 807), 'in believing that
;

30, iii. 9, 1280, a, 18. c. 12, Even apart from 1282, b, 19). the citation Bhet. i. 8 fin., and the mention of it in the catalogue (D. 75, An. 70), its geniiineness can-

it

the n.

contained a collection of customs relating to them, (TvcTaiTLOov ^ (TVfXTroa-ioov (AN. App. 161) is identical with it not so, however, the three books
the title of which makes us think not so much of questions with regard to meals, as of questicns such as are proposed at a meal, like Plutarch's ^vnTroaiaKa irpoFor the UapayyeXfiaTa ^X-fjfxara.
cf.

p. 72, n. 2 fin.

not be doubted, however seldom it is named by ancient writers (see the remarks of Spengel, Ueb. d. Pohtik d. Arist.,' Ahh. d. Milnclin. AMd. v. 44 infra). 2 For further information, see the section on the political philosophy of Aristotle, ch. xiii., infra. 3 Of the second book (as to the beginning of which see EoSE, Arid. Lihr. Ord. 59 sq.) this has long been admitted, but Gottling {Arist. (Econ. p. vii. xvii.) considers the first to be a section of a genuine Aristotelian writing it seems more probable that it is the work of a later writer based on Polit. i. (See end of ch. xxi., infra.') D. 23, An. 17 name OIkovoJJLIK65 (or -ov) a'. Cf p. 99 supra on another pretended second book.
'
;
.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
except a few fragments.^
1 Thepolitical writings named, besides those quoted, are the following: (1) lioXmlai, a collection of facts with regard to 158 states (D. 145, An. 135, the text of which Bernays, Rh. Mus. vii. 289, with the approval of KosE, Aq'. Ps. 394, has evidently

101

Among them

the loss of

ness of the work, which Rose (^Ar. Lihr. Ord. 56 sq., At. Ps. 395 sq.) disputes, has no weighty arguments against it (as Heitz,

improved), which, according to the fragments and the statements

of Cic. Fl7b. V. 4, 11, and N. P. Su. V. 10, 4 (who

Plut. names

the work /crt'o-ets koI iroAtTetot) not only treated of the constitution, but also of the usages, customs, situation of the towns, the history of their foundation, their local traditions, &c. Pt. 81 gives the number of cities as 171 (or 191, according to the view
of Herbelot, Bibl. Ammon. V. Ar. 48 Ammon. Lat. p. 56,
Seliol.

Or. 971, a) gives 255: Ps.-Porphyr.

in Ar. 9, b, 26, and David, ihid. 24, a, 34, say 250, and Philop. ihid. 35, b, 19, about 250, but the increase does not seem to be founded on any later extension of the collection, but merely on clerical mistakes (cf KosE, Ar. Ps. 394). Simpl. ( 6fe^d^. 2, y. SchoL 27, a, 43) seems by the

246 sqq. shows) and even if the external evidence, of which that of TiM^us {a^md Polyb. xii. 5, 11) is the oldest producible, did not utterly exclude Rose's supposition that the work was published and circulated in his name soon after Aristotle's death, nevertheless the internal improbability of that theory would be much strengthened by it. The declarations of David, ihid., and the Schol. to Porphyry's Isagoge (vid. Rose, Ar. Ps. 399, Ar. Fr. 1535) favour the supposition that the different states in the Polities are taken in alphabetical order; and this explains why the Athenians (according to Fr. 378, where, however, the reading is uncertain) are treated in the 1st book, and the Ithacans in the 42nd {Fr. 466). The circumstance that the numerous fragments all contain merely isolated notes, without reference to a
p.
;

uniform complete treatise, will not (as Rose, Ar. Ps. 395
holds) serve as a proof of the spuriousness of the work; but, in conjunction with the fact tliat the Aristotelian writings nowhere refer to the work in question (for even Eth. N. x. 10, 1181, b, 17, refers to the Politics cf Heitz, 231 sq.), it supports the view (Heitz, 233 sq.) that the Polities was not a literary completed whole, but a collection by Aristotle, for his own use, of
;
.

words

eV Tttis yvqcrlais avTov ttoXi-

existence of spurious Polities; pvn' (158) instead of yvr](Tiais may be the true reading (Heitz, Ar. Fr. 219), though Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i., xii. 40 can hardly be right in substituting ^TTio-ToAats for
iroXireiais').

reiais to point to the

The

numerous

the large collection

.

fragments of are found

in MtJLLER, Fragm. Hist. ii. 102 sqq. (cf BoURNOT, in Philolog. iv. 2B6 sqq.) RoSE, Ar. Ps. 402 sqq. Ar. Fr. 34.3-560, p. 1535 sqq.; Fr. Hz. 218 sqq. The genuine;

which he had gathered by personal observation and inquiries, and partly from
facts partly

102

ARISTOTLE
government
in various

Aristotle's collection of forms of

cities, is

simply irreparable.^
Poetics
If this
^

Our
writings.

is

only a fragment
so,

but not even so

57; on
IT.

copies would only be circulated after A chapter out of the his death. UoKiTfla 'A6r]vaiu>u may have given rise to the title IT. twu So'Awvos a^ovwv (An. Apj). liO cf. MiJLLER, ibid., 109, 12). A similar collection was (2) the NSfxifia ^ap^apiKu, which are quoted under

be

UoKiTiKhs

cf. p.

^affiXeias
;

and 'TTrep airo'iKcou, p. 60, sub Jin. on n. f)T]Topos ^ -KoKiriKov, p. 72, n. 2, towards the end on n. apxh^t p. 81, n. 1, fin.; on a bunglingforgery of the Middle Ages, Se;

cretnm secretortim
rege
dk/nis),
cf.

(or, Aristotelis

ad Alexandruvi rcffemdemoribus

this title

11

by Appollon. 3lirabil. Varro, i. 1 vii. 70 An. App.

,

nnd Alex. 234

'

sq;

Geier, Arist. Rose, Arist.

18G

(yoixljxoiv

fiap^.

(Tvvayuyr])

',

Libr. Ord. 183 sq, Ar. Ps. 583 sq. Since this was written the

from

this title also the designations Nd/xoi a' iS' y' 5' (D. 140),
vofiifxwu 8'

Athenian noAtrem has been

'^

re-

(An. 131), seem to have

transcribed.
'

been wrongly

To
(An.

them the
(Atiien.
longed.
i.

vojxiixa

'Pwimaiuv

App. 185) and the

23, d)

v6^iixaTvppif]vS:v

probably be-

Among the few fragments

{apud MuLLER, ibid. 178 sqq.. Rose, Ar. Ps. 537 sqq., Ar. Fr.
561-568, p. 1570, Fr. IIz. 297 sq.), Nos. 562, 563 and 564 can only be attributed to Aristotle under the supposition that he did not give their contents in his own name,

covered. This writing, in our editions, is entitled IT. Trotr/Tt/cTjs. Aristot. himself mentions it in the Politics (viii. 7, 1341, b, 38), as a future work in the Rhetoric (i. II fin. iii. 1, 1404, a, 38, c. 2, 1404, b, 7, 28, 1405, a, 5, c. 18, 1419, b, 5, with which cf p. 74, n. 1), as already existing, with these words eV To7s Trepl nonjTiKrjs, or (1404, b, 28) eV T. TT. TToiriffeoos. The Indices
:

name
TiKTis

TIpayfiaTeias Te;^vrjs

iroit]-

but

as current.

(3)
NTjey)

traditions

somewhere
Ai/cajw/iara
Rifi'er.
'EAAtji/iScov

The
or Aik.

Twv

irdAeoji/
y

(Ammon.

Vocal).

Marc. p. 2, R) seem have dealt with quarrels between the Hellenic states and their settlement they are also
-TrdAewj/ ( V.

to

(D. 83), t4xvvs ttoitit. fi' (An. 75), Re arte iioetica secufidum. disciplifiayn Pythagorcs, Pt. Fr. (this addition is caused by the combination of two different titles: cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 194). Ps.-Alex. Soph. El. Schol. in Ar. 299, b, 44, has eV rqS ir. ttoitjt. likewise Herm. in PTicedr. Ill,
/8'
;

named more
(D. 129, An.
Apu/ids).
j3'
;

briefly

AiKaKo/xara

and AsT,

h t^

tt. it.

SiMPL. Cat.
ir. ir.
-ir.
;

120,

Harpocrat.
e(T IS TTo Kit iKal

is the right reading in D. 74) were in any case

(4) The @ (An. G9 the same

name IT.

Schol. 43, a, 13, 27: iv rep David, ibid. 25, b, 19, rh

ir.

on the other hand Ammon. Re

interpr. Schol. 99, a, 12, iu toTs IT. iroi.', BoETH. Re interpr. 290,

spurious.

The Anon.

the
los,

5 applies ttoXitikvs to the Grjd-

in libris quos
scripsit.

de

arte poetica

but that must be a mistake (see above, p. 59). On the

thorities

The more ancient auare acquainted with two

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

103

much

as this remains of Aristotle's other contributions

to the theory

and history of Art or of

his dissertations
left

on the

poets.^

Nor

is

there

much

of the other

come after chap. 18), which sufis mentioned only in the quotations ficiently prove that we only p' sgiven on p. 58, n. 1, with regard sess Aristotle's work in a mutito the writing IT. ttolt^tcov), the lated and hopelessly corrupt condition. We cannot here inquire more modern only with one except in so far as they copy how its present condition may be more ancient writers, as we must explained (Susemihl, ibid., p. 3 suppose was the case with Am- sq., gives an enumeration of the From ditferent, and in part widely dimonius and Boethius. this alone we might suppose that verging attempts at explanation). the writing in question originally It may be true, as Susemihl had a greater extension than it concludes, that the carelessness now has, but this becomes cert ain of the writing, the caprice of from the references to such the copyists, and the freaks of parts of it as are missing in our accident account for most of the recension, as for instance the mischief but we cannot make discussion on the Catharsis pro- these factors responsible for the mised in Polit. viii. 7, 1341, b, 38, interpolations, except in so far as which would naturally have come they may have rendered possible the introduction of some marin the section on Tragedy, and, as we learn from sure traces, ginal notes into the text. Of the Dialogue n. toivtwu actually did occur there (cf. Bernays, Grundz. d. Abh. d. y we have already spoken on p. Besides this An. 115 gives 58. Arist. lib. d. Wirkung d. Trag.' Abh. d. hist.-jyhil. Ges. in Breslau, KvkXov it. TTOirtrCov, likewise in 160 sqq., 197 sq. SusEMlHL, p. three books. This title may have 12; Vahlen, p. 81 sq. of his arisen, by duplication and coredition, and others) the exam- ruption, from that of the Diaination of Comedy, promised logue, or it may (according to Poet. c. 6 init., and quoted Heitz, 178) designate a work Rhet. i. 11 Jin., of which Bernays distinct from it but the kvkXov {Rh. Mtis. viii. 561 sqq.) has may also have sprung from the
books on Poetry (a third
;
'

'

'

pointed out valuable remnants in Cramer's Anecd. Paris., vol. i. app. (now in Susemihl, p. 208 sq., Vahlen, 76 sq.) and the discussion on Synonyms, which Simpl. men;

(yKvKXiov' (or -iav) which is found in No. 113. Allied to it, it would seem, are n. TpaycpSiwv a' (D. 136, An. 128) and Ku/j-ikoI (Erotian, Uxj?. Voc. Hi2)])ocr. s.
*

tions, Categ. Schol. 43, a, 13, 27.

v.

'Hpo/c\. v6(Tov).

Miiller

{Hist.

In other places also our text shows many greater or smaller

gaps, as also interpolations (as c. 12 and many smaller ones), and inversions (the most considerable that of chap. 15, which ought to

Gr. ii. 82), though not rightly, takes the AidaaKaAiai (D. 137 An. 129 Kose, Ar. Ps. 550 sq.. At. Fr. 575-587, p. 1572 sq. Heitz, 255, Fr. Hz. 302 sq.), seemingly a chronological cat a;
;
;

104

AMIStOTLE
us^

books named to

which dealt with subjects outside

^

the main lines of the Aristotelian system;

logue based on the existing- inscriptions of the tragedies performed in Athens as a part of the book on tragedies. Further, a series of writings relating to poets is named, wliich took the form of problems 'Airopvindrcav iroiriTiKwv a' (An. A pp. 145)

and among

Klriai TToi-qriKai (ihid. 1-iG,

where

ahiaL seems to indicate the form of treatment which is proper to the airoprifxara or irpo^KriixaTa, viz. that the hia. ri is sought, and 1he reply consists in giving tlie SrWi or the aiTia) ^ATropTj/ndTODV 'O/jltjpiKuu C (L>- 318; An. lOG C;
;

Hist. ii. 188 sqq.) cannot be maintained. More ancient seems to be the book n. fMova-iKrjs, which both DiOG. (116, 132) and An. (104, 124) give us in two places, and which is identical with the musical problems noticed by Labbeus, BiM. nova, 116 (see liRANDis, ii. b, 94) but it is no more genuine than the IT. KaXov (D. 69, An. 63, n. Kd\;

Xovs).

To these belong certain minor, mostly historical works, 'OAvfiinovlKai a' (D. 130, An. 122); Uv'

Heitz, 258 sq,, Fr. Ih. 129; Rose, Ar. Ps. 148 sq., Ar. Fr.
137-175, p. 1501 sq.) or, as the Vita Marc. p. 2. names it, 'O^.
(r]T7]iJ.aTa
;

Qlovikwv eXcyxoi a' (D. 134 and probably also An. 125); Uv9iov7Kai a (D. 131, An. 123, with the

strange
eV

title,

TlvdioviKas
;

fii^Xiov

'M.ivaixfJ-ov iv'iK-qaev)

IlvQiKus

Ylpofi\-r]pi.drwv

'OfXT]pi-

Ptol. 147 1)1 Ammon. V. Ar. 44 Amm. Lat. 54, probably a duplication ot: the aTvop7]ixara) 'A7ropi)iiiaTa 'Haiodou a' (An. App. 14i5)
I

Kuv
;

(An.

A2)2).

a (D. 133), possibly only a different title for the same writing N?/cat Aiovva-iaKoi a (D. 135, An.
126, 'NiKMU Aiou. aa-TiKwv Kcd
vaioiv
cf.
\r)-

a).

About these writings

'ATTOp,

'Apx'-^o'xou,

EvpiTiSovs,

XoipiAov y' (ibid. 144).

To these
(Ax. 107)

the

'ATToprnxaTa

Oela

seem
tise
roLs
:

also to belong. The treaEl 5e TTore "O/uiTjpos iiroir](Tiv

'HAiou fiovs ; (AN. Aj)p. 142), no doubt only one of the Homeric problems. -Of these writings the ones which are more likely to have an Aristotelian origin are the Querie\S on Homer but even these may have had later additions made to them. On the other hand the genuineness of the neVAos (An. 105 An. App. 169 Rose, Ar. Ps. 563 sqq., Ar. Fr. 594-600, p. 1574 sq. Fr. Hz. 309 sqq.; cf. Bergk, Lyr. Gr. 505 sqq. Muller, Fra'gm.
is

Hose, Ar. Ps. 545 sqq., Ar. Fr. 572-574, p. 187; Heitz, 254 sq., Fr. Hz. 300 sq. MiJLLER, J/ist. Gr. ii. 182 sq. Further n. vp7]iJidTcov (Clemens, Strom. i. 308, A, where, however, an Aristotelian work with this title which could not be genuine seems to be designated notes which may have come from the work are given by Muller, ihid.
; :

181

sq.).^

n. QavfjLaaluvaKovaixdTwv
(xii.

quoted by Athen.
oK/i.
d/c. c.

541

cf.

96) and, with the title

eV davfxaaioLs, perhaps also by AnTIGON. 3Iirabil. c. 25 (cf. av/n. aKova-fx. c. 30), a collection of strange phenomena,' the genuineness of which cannot be admitted. For further information on this
'

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
these also there
is

105
titles

no doubt that many spurious

have crept
B.

in.

General Questions touching the Aristotelian

Writings.

On
or

a general survey of the

works which are preserved

it is

known

to us as Aristotelian,

evident that they

different

apart from the letters and

kinds.

poems

were of two

The

component parts of our Corpus

Ari-

stotelicum

are without exception didactic treatises in

scientific form.^

And
are,

almost
as

all

of these which can

be called genuine

will

be seen, connected

together by express references in a

way

that

is

only to

be explained by the theory that they were addressed to

one

circle of readers as the

connected and mutually exIt is quite different in

planatory parts of one whole.

the case of the writings which were afterwards styled

'

hypomnematic

'

notes,

that

is

to

say,
;

made by

work see Westbrmann, Uapa^ol6ypa.<^oi, p, XXV. sqq., and espeRose, Ar. Libr. Ord. 54 Ar. Pseud. 279 sq., who refers the main body of the work, consisting of chaps. 1-114,
cially
sq.,

sq. Fragm. 219) is doubtful whether there was an

Schr. 163

Aristotelian

work on this

subject,

We

130-137, 115-129, 138-181, to the middle of the third century, An enlarged treatment of this, or a more extensive specimen of the same sort of work, is perhaps the no/jaSo|o, from the second book of which Plut. {Parall. Gr. et Rom. c. 29, p. 312) quotes something which is not found in our au/x. o-K. UapoLfxiai a' (D. 138; cf. An. 127), a collection of proverbs, the existence of which seems to be proved, inter alia, by Athen. ii. 60 d, although Heitz (Verl.

prove whether the references in Eustath. in Od. N 408 and Synes. Enc. CalvAt. c. 22 (^Ar. Fr. No. 454, No. 2) belong to this or to other works. In addition to these there

cannot

are two titles which are so indefinite that they furnish no safe clue to the contents of the writings to which they correspond: napo)3oA.al(D.126); "Araw:ra (to which irpofix-fi/xara or v-rrofivTjfxara

may
.

be supplied)

ifi'

(D.

127
*

cf p. 96, foot),

The' wonderful stories' are perhaps the only exceptions, but they are not Aristotelian.

106

ARISTOTLE

own use, and therefore not thrown by him into any such literary form and unity None of the as the works designed for publication.^ genuine is of this class,^ but extant works which are several of those which are lost seem to have belonged
Aristotle merely for his
to
it.^

From these two

classes of works, however, there

is to

be distinguished a third.

Cicero, Quintilian,

and

Dionysius of Halicarnassus praise Aristotle not only for scientific greatness, but equally for the grace and richness
of
his

exposition

the
'

golden stream of

his

speech.'''

This must have

referred to

works designed

^ Simpl. {in Caterj. Schol. in viroiJ.ur]fjLaTiKa oaa Ar. 24, a, 42)

:

irphs viru^vriCTiu

olKtiav Kol -KK^lova

:

avkfTa^^v 6 (piXocrocpos these writings cannot, however, be taken as iravrri cnrovSris &^ia, and hence we may not draw from tliem any proofs for the Aristotelian doctrine: 6 fiivroi 'AAe|avhpos TO. vTroixvr)/J.ariKa avfXTr^cpvpfidaavov
^liva
(prjalv

our Corpus were intended to serve as the basis for lectures, or were compiled from them, they would not on that account be merely
'

hypomnematical
=*

writings.'

p. 62, n. 4, 5,

mentioned on and perhaps also the whether the Polities (p. 101) riepl TayaQov is also one (as alE.g.,

those

elvai

Kol

fii]

Trphs

eVa
tliis

ready noted on seems doubtful.

^

p. 61, n.

2 fn.'),

(TKoirhv

ava(p4padai,

and

for

very reason the others are distinguished from them as awrayDavid (ScJtol. 24, a, 38) fxariKa.
:

vTro/xur]/j.aTiKa
fjLova

/jl^u

Xiyovrai iu

ois

air e-ypdcpv or av iTTiAoyuu Kal TTJs fcp^irovaris eKSoarecriv airayye\ias. Cf. Heitz, Verl. Schr. 24
TO.

K(pdKaia

Si'xa

TTpooi/jLiuu

Koi

Sq.
2

The Problems, which might

occur as an instance, cannot have been written down for his own use alone, since Aristotle often quotes them (see above, p. 96), thereby implying that they are known to
his readers. Other instances, such as the Melissus, etc., cannot be

Cic. Toj). 1,3: the works of Aristotle are not only recommended by their contents, sed (licendi quoque incredihili quadarn cum copia turn etiam suariBe Invent, ii. 2, 6 (on the tate. Aristotle has 2u^'o7co77? T^x^uv) left the old orators suaritate et hrevitate dicendi far behind. JJe Orat. i. 11, 49 si item Aristoteles, si Tkeoplirastus, si Carneades eloquentes et in dicendo snares atque ornatifuere. Be Fin. i. 5, 14 (on Epicurus) qicod ista PlaTheophrasti AHstotelis tonis
: :

orationis

ornamenta

neglexerit.

Acad.

ii.

38, 119: reniet

Jiimen
:

orationis
stoteles.

aurenm fundens Ari-

supposed genuine.

Even

if it

be

true that particular portions of

QuiNTiL. Inst. xi. 83 quid Aristotelem ? Quern dubito

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
by him
for publication.

107

It is not applicable to
;

any of

those which are

now

extant

and of

these, indeed, the

two Latin writers probably knew but a small part.^ We are driven to suppose, therefore, that it was to other works, lost to us, that they ascribed this kind of excelThe critic who judges of literary form by purely lence.
scientific criteria will find, it is true,

much

to praise in
dis-

our extant Aristotle.

crimination of
all

He

will

acknowledge the apt

his ideas, the inimitable

diction,

precision

and

compactness of his

and

his

masterly

handling of an established terminology.

qualities

But of the

which Cicero emphasises, or any graceful movement of a rich and rolling eloquence, he will find even
in the

most popular of the extant books but little trace

while in other parts the dry methods of treatment, the

rough brevity of statement, the involved construction of long sentences, often broken by anacolutha and
parentheses, stand
description.

in plain contradiction to Cicero's

ourselves,

We

can, however, gather for

even from the scanty fragments of the

lost books, that

some of these were written

sclentia
co2)ia

in a style far

more

rich

and

rerum an scrvptorum an eloqnendi snavitate

.
.

clarlorem putem. Dionys. Be Verb. Cop. 24 of the philosophers, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle are the best as to style, Be Cens. Vet. Sc7'i2)t. 4: irapa:

books. Of the others, however, Cicero used several of' the writings mentioned on p. 55 sqq., the books on Philosophy, the Eudemus, the Protrepticiis, perhaps also the noAirt/cSs, n. fiacriKclas and n. irXovrov; cf. Fin. ii. 13,

XTjTTTeW
IJ,ilJ.7)(Tiv

5e
rrjs

KoX

'ApifrrorfXr]

els

40

Acad.

ii.

re

irepl

t^v

(pfirtveiav

5eti/oT7jTos

/col

rrjs

aacprfveias

Koi

Tov

r}54os Koi iroKvfjLaOovs.

'

Except the Topics and Rhewe have no reason for supposing that any of them knew by personal reading the extant
toric,

125 Birifi. i. 25, 53 Fragm. Hort. aptid Augustine c. Jul. iv. 78 Fin. v. 4, 11 Ad Quint. Fr. iii.
15, 42, 16, 44,
; ;

JV. 38, 119 37, 96, 49,

;

B.

ii.

Ad
ii.

Att.

xii. 40, 2, xiii.

:

28, 2

Off. n. 1.

16, 56

and above,

p. 60,

108
ornate,

ARISTOTLE
and approached
of
far

more

closely to the literary

graces

the

Platonic

Dialogues, than any of

in

the

scientific

treatises
is

now contained

our

Corpus}

This difference

to be explained, not

merely by the
but also by the
the same
the

earlier date of the writings in question,

fact

that they were not intended to serve

purpose as the others,

audiences. 2

nor designed for

same

Aristotle himself occasionally refers to certain state-

ments of

his doctrine, published

use,

common

in terms

by him, or then in which seem to imply that a

(including these writings
in

portion of his writings

which the references

in

question occur) were not in

the same sense given to the public.^

what is pre12-14, 17 sq., 32, 30, 40, 48, 49, 71, 72 of the Fragments (Academy edition) from the J^itdcwus, Profrejjtieus, n. (j)i\oao(pias, U. 5iKaioavi>r]s, and above, p. 56, n. 2. - We shall discuss this immediately. ^ Poet. 15, 1154, b, 17: erprjrai
'

And

from his

On

this point see

may well doubt whether this gloss

is

served in

Nos.

allowable.

SedoijLeuoi

The predicate e/cwould certainly not be

there without a purpose, but is meant to distinguish the \6yoi K5eSo(iieVot from certain other

Se Trepl avroov eV to7s eKSedo/xevois

^oyois iKavws.
Koi
Trepl

Pe
TLs

oAAtj Se

ui fi. i. 4 init.: ho^a irapaSeSoTai

.
. .

\puxvs, TriOav^ /xhu 7roA,Ao?s

Adyovs wcTTrep S' evOvpas (for which Uernays, Pial. d. Ar. 15 sqq, erasing Xoyovs, reads: Sxrircp
euOvvas Se)
SeSco/cuia

Kal

rois iv

Koivcf yiyvofxivois \6yois' apjxoviav

yap Tiva avrijv x4yov(n, &c. In the first of these places, Bernays says (ihid. that 'pub13) lished' here means the same as 'already published' (the same explanation of the words is given by KosE, Ar. Ps. 79), yet one

Neither can we translate in such a way as to make ' the writings published by me a mere periphrasis for my writings partly because such a turn of phrase is not found in Aristotle. When he refers, without indicating a particular work, to something that has gone before, he is accustomed to say merely, iv &Wois, eV erepots or irpdrepov. Again the fact that he does not say utt' i/uLov iKSedofievoi shows that the emphasis falls on e/cSeSo^eVoj, as such, and that the
K6yoi.
iKS^SoficuoL
'

'

; '

\6yoi iKSeSo/neuoi are meant as an antithesis to fii) e/cSeSo/ueVot. Only we have no right to assume that things n^ iKdeSofievoi mean things published later. The anti-

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

109

commentators we further learn that one of the points

thesis to ' published is not later published,' but 'not published;'
'

'

and from the perfect iKSeSo/jLeuoi to read such as had already been
*

published at the time of the writing of the Poetics, and so were earlier than that work,' is shown to be impossible by the reflection of Ueberweg on this passage (Ainst. ah. d. BicMTi.^ p. 75) that every author puts himself, in regard to the reader, in the time at which his work will be in the reader's hands. Hence, if the Poetics were to be laid before the whole reading world, i.e. published, just like the x6yoi to which they referred, they would not be designated in contradistinction to the latter, by the predicate e'/cSeSofievoi, since each of them would
be, in relation

authors of the variant X^yoixivois instead of yiyvoix.') of conversations, such as would occur in educated circles, or (as Kose, Ar. Ps. 717, thinks) of expressions of opinion coming from the Platonic school for the evOvuas SeSw/cuta re;

fers to some criticism, known to the reader, of the supposition that

to their reader, equally a \6yos e/cSeSoyueVos, Eose wished to refer the K6yoi e'/cSeS., first to former passages in the Poetics (Ar. Libr. Ord. 130), and later (yl?*. Pseud. 79) to the Rhetoric, but he was subsequently (Ar. Ps. 714) right in withdrawing both, since the discussion for which the Poetics refer to the \6yoi iKSeS. is found neither in the Rhetoric nor in the Poetics (cf. Beenays, ibid. 138): and, even apart from this, the latter could never have been so indicated. Nor can we on the other hand (as KosB, Ar. Ps. 717, maintains) refer the expression to writings on Poetry by the Platonic school, for we clearly must confine it to Aristotelian writings: and in the second passage, De An. i. 4, the \6yoi iv Koivcf yiyvd/xevoi

the soul is the harmony of its bod}^ and cannot mean vague conversations of third persons (cf. also Bernays, ibid., 18 sq.). Neither can one refer them to oral statements made by Aristotle to his pupils (Philop. see following note), partly because Aristotle never elsewhere refers to such statements, and in a treatise which, though perhaps primarily intended as a textbook for his school, yet gives no indication anywhere of being meant only for his personal pupils, he could not well appeal to them partly because the Philosopher had really inserted the criticism referred to in one of his own writings (cf. fol:

lowing note). The latter fact indicates that it is wrong (as SiMPL. does see following note) to refer the \6yoi iv koiv^ yiyv. to the Platonic Phcedo, for which this expression would not be a sufficient indication, nor would
;

it

correspond (cf. Bernays, p. 20) with the manner in which it is in other places mentioned (cf.
Meteorol. ii. 2, 35.5, b, 32). Finally, though Ueberweg ( Gesch d. Phil. 1. 173, 5th ed.) understands by the \6yoi iv k. yiyv.

cannot be understood (as ToRSTmK,Arist. de An. 123 supposes, he being perhaps preceded by the

(extending the explanation of Philoponus) discussions which occurred in actual conversations, or in writings arranged in the

110
to

ARISTOTLE
so refers

was to be found in the T^udemus} We find other and more frequent references of his to the Exoteric Discourses as the place where he had Opinions, howdealt with such and such a subject.^ ever, differ as to the meaning of that name and the
which he
' '

form of dialogues, it seems clear that the latter could not be so named, and that there was here no reason for mentioning the dialogue form of such discussions. From the point of view of grammar, owing to the present tense of
yiyvoixivois (to

Ar. 124,
phrase
cius(in
iyKVKk.
is

'

writings in the

common

strain,' is

not so appropriate. The so explained by SimpliCcelo, Schol. 487, a, 3:

De

where he says that Aristotle uses

signify ra Kara apxqs rols iroWo7s irpoTideixeua, i.e. the t^corepiKo). We also see from Ar. Fr. 77, 1488, b, 36 sqq., and Fr. 15, 1476, b, 21, that the matter for which Aristotle refers to the iyKVKKia, was actually treated in two of his Dialogues. Cf. Bernays, ibid. 84 sqq., 93 sq., 110 sqq. It is shown by the passages quoted in Kose, Ar. Fr. 41, p. 1481 sq., and Heitz, Ar. Fr. 73, p. 51, from Philoponus, Simplicius, Themistius, and Olympiodorus (the common source for whom may have been Alexander), that Arist. in the Fudemvs, after following the Fhofdo, devoted a searching examination to the theory that the soul is the harmony of its body, the principal
(piK.

to

TTJj'

rd^iv

e'l

which BONITZ, Iiid.

46, rightly calls attention), they cannot be ex' the speeches subplained as

AHst. 105,

a,

mitted (i.e. which have been submitted) to publication,' for in that case it would have been It can only mean, as yvoiJ.4vois. Bernays translates it in his
Dial. d. Arlst. 20, 'the discourses existing in a state of publication, available for the use of all,' taking the eV Koivif here in the same sense as in the exprestV Koiv^ KaTariOeaOat, iv sions Koiv^ acpicvai (in medio rellnqnere, Metapli. i. 6, 987, b, 14). A similar meaning to that of the A0701 eV KOiv(f yiyvSixevoi seems to be attached to iyKVKXia or 4yKvof which (piko<TO(pi)ixaTa, K\ia mention is made in MJi. 1. 3, 1096,
:

heads of which examination are Hence the pasgiven by them.

sages in question must refer to this dialogue, although Philopo-

a,

(kuI

'iKavcos

Trepl fiev tovtuv akis' yap Kol iu toTs iyKVK\iois

elpTjTai irepl avrSov)

and De

Coelo,

i.

9, 279, a,

30

(/col

yap KaOdirep iv

nus (De An. E, 2) leaves us the choice between it and the &ypavpds robs eraipovs, Simplicius {De An. 14, with it the connects a) Pho'do. 2 All the passages are quote i below.
(poi

To7s iyKvKXioLs (t)iXocro(pr}ixa(n irepl TO, de7a iroWoLKis trpocpaiverai to7s

avvov(riai

and

x6yoi5 '6ti t6 6e7ov afieTdfiXrjTov hvayKalov ehai, &C.). 'EyKvK\ios can, just as well as 4v Koivip yiyv6/xeuos, mean in medio j^ositvs Bernays' rendering, Dial. d.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
relation

111

of these

'

Exoteric Discourses

'

to

our ex-

tant

Corpus.

always referred
works,
treatises

The ancients who mentioned them to them as a separate class of Aristotle's

from
the
technical
scientific

distinguished

by a
^

less

strict

method of treatment.^
as to details.

But
^

they

differ

among themselves

Cicero

and Strabo

speak of the exoteric works in general

The former, however, terms as popular statements.'' Dialogues,^ is unmistakeably thinking only of the
which we
also find described as
'

exoteric

'

in Plutarch.^

According

to Gellius,

the treatises which dealt with

late

The only exceptions are two Byzantine and altogether

untrustworthy interpreters of the

Ethics,

Eustratius (90, a) and the Pseudo-Andronicus (Helio-

the Aristotelian writings are divided into acroamatic and exoteric, oTa ra IcrropiKa koI ra SiaXoyiKo. Koi '6\(os rh /i^ &Kpas
OLKpi^eias

(ppovri^ovra.

dorus, circ. 1367, cf. p. 69, n. 1), the former of whom understands

De An.
ii.

E, 2 {ap.
:

PhiLOP. Stahe, AHst.

a-vyypdfjL. .

by

^^coreptKol x6'yoi.

the

common

fiara,

261) wv

ra
elai

i^MTepiKo.

koI oi SiaKoyoi

opinion, the latter, oral instruction.

aiTip Sto

TOVTO i^cvTepiKO. KCKXrjTai OTi ov irphs robs yvrjffiovs UKpoaras

5

about the Fin. V. 5, 12 highest good, Aristotle and Theophrastus have written duo genera lihrorum, ununi jyopulariter
"^ :

yeypa/xfieva.

scriptivni,

quod

i^iorepiKht' ajjjjel-

labant, altei'uvi limatius [d/cpijSe<rr4pci)s, in a more severe style], quod in conimentariis reliquerunt^ but in essentials they both agree.
3

XIII.

1, 54, p.

609

because

the

TheoPeripatetics, after phrastus, had not his works and those of Aristotle, ttAV oxiywv Koi yiiKKTTa ruv i^urepiKuv, they
liappened
^TjSei/

Ad Att. iv. 16, 2 quoin singulis libris [of the discourse on the State] ntor jjrowmiis, ut Aristoteles in lis qua; i^tarepiKovs vocat. In contradistinction to the Dialogues, the strictly scientific works are called (see preceding note) commentarii, continuous expositions, corresponding to the avTOTrpSa-Mira or aKpQariKo, of the Greek interpreCf.
:

nlo/ni

Ixetj/ (f)i\o(To(pe7v

ters (see p. 112, n.l,andll3, n. 2). Adv. Col. 14, 4, p. 1115 Aristotle everywhere attacks the Ideas: iv roTs i}0iKo7s virojULvii/iaaiv
:

irpayfiariKcos

[going deeply into

(synonymous with Cicero's commentarii

Sia\6y<t}V,
;

the subject, scientific]

*

aWh deaeis
2, b:

see preceding note), iv

5ia

Tols (pvaiKoTs,

tuv i^ayrepiKuv

Likewise Simpl. Phys.

112

ARISTOTLE
named
'

Ehetoric, Topics, and Politics were

exoteric,'

and those which related to Metaphysics, Physics, and

Dialectics as
'

acroatic,'

the reason being that the former,

for

Galen explained, were meant

everyone

the

latter only for the philosopher's scholars.^

Alexander,
is

in a letter which appears in

Andronicus/
is

supposed to
'

complain to his master of the publication of the

writings
;

acroatic

but inasmuch as Aristotle

expressly stated

to have published them, the notion that he objected to

their publication cannot have been in the

writer of that fragment.

At

a later time

mind of the we do find this

it

assumption also,'* and we find connected with

the further
'

theory that Aristotle purposely adopted in his

'

acroatic

'

N.

A.

XX.

5:

Aristotle's

lectures and writings were divided into two classes, the e^co'E|wTeTepiKo. and the aKpoariKa. piKacl'icchantuT (pur ad rltetoricas
nicditationcx fdcvltatemqve argvi'larum ciriliuniqve rcrnm, noaKpoariKa. ('onducchant, t'ltiam

shows that the distinction between the \6yoi aKpoariKol and i^wrepiKol must have been known
to the author of the letter.
''

Thus Plut.
S'

Alex.

c.

7:

^oiKe
7]QiKbv

'AXe^auSpos ov ix6vov rhu

KoX

iroXiTiKhv

irapaXafielv

aidem vocahantnr in qnihusj)hilosopliia rcmotior

svhtiUorqve ar/'ifahatur quccque ad natura; condisceptaii ones que temp latlones In the d'lalecticas peH'inehant. Lyceum the morning was devoted to the latter, the evening to the former (cf. p. 27, n. 8). Lihrosquoque S2(os, earuni omnium

Xoyou, aXXa Koi ru>v airopp'f}TU}v Koi fiapvTfpwv l^aOvT.] SiSaaKaXioiv, &s ol avSpes ISius aKpoajxar iKas Koi iTTOTTTiKas [as in mysteries] irpoffayopevovTS ovk i^ecpfpov els iroX-

CLEMENS, Strom. not only the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, but all schools have secret doctrines and secret writings Xeyovffi Se
Xovs,fxeTa(Tx^^^V.

575,

covimeoitarios, seorsiim dlvisit, ut alii exoteriei dicerentnr, 2)artim aoroatici. 2 De Suhst. Fao. Nat. vol, iv. 'ApiffroT^Xovs ^ Qeocppaffrov 758 ra p.\v ToTs iroXXois yeypacpOTcav,

rernm

KOi ol 'ApiCTTOTcXOVS TO. fikv eVojTepiKO. (Jvai

Twv (TvyypafiixoLTcav avrccv

Tas Se aKpodaeis to7s eraipois.

3

Cf.

Gell.
:

ibid.

Plut.
1.

Alex. 7; vide sui)ra, p. 22, n.

The wording

ovk opBoi)S iirol-na-as eKdovs rohs UKpoariKOVs ruv Xdyu^v,

TO 8e KOivd T Kal e^wrepiKa On the same theory, in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1, 1421, a, 26 sq., Aristotle is requested by Alexander to observe the strictest secrecy with regard to this work, while Aristotle, on his part, lays a reciprocal duty of silence on Alexan[-ov]

der.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

113

works a form of exposition which must make them uninany but his scholars while at the same time it is said that it was here only that he disclosed his
telligible to
; ^

views in their
the the
'

full logical

connection. ^

On

this theory

exoteric

'

writings were broadly distinguished from

by the fact that they were intended wider public, and that they were therefore put in a more popular form, did not cover the more difficult
'

acroatic,' just

for a

classes

of inquiry,

scientific

and substituted for a severe and method of proof one more accommodated to

general comprehension.^
This idea is expressed in the answer of Aristotle to Alex^

ander (see Gell. ibid.'), when he replies to the reproach of the latter with regard tothe aKpoariKol \6yoi XaQi oZv aurovs Kal e/cSeSo:

TiKws irphs So^au. He instances the Tonnes, the p-nropiKa and the e|wrepiKa. Kal yctp eV iKcivois ifMlcrra
'

fxeuovs Kal

fx)}

CKSeSoiiievovs

|uj/eToi

yap elffi fiSvots ro7s t]/xuv aKoixraaiv. See also Themist. Or. xxvi. 319, A sq., where it is said that Aristotle did not find the same discourses suitable for the masses as for the philosophers, and therefore withdrew the highest secrets of his teaching (the reAeo tepa, the fivffTiKhp) from the former by using obscure language. Simpl. jP%. 2, b, referring to the letters just mentioned, says eV rols
:

But the and the Rhetoric shows that this only refers to the basis of the opinions laid down in these writings, the argument from the universally
acknowledged (the
ej/5o|oi/),

rwv ijdiKuv Kal (pvaiKwu iuSd^ws Xiy^rai.^ example of the Tonnes

Kal
Trepl

irepl rSov

and

not to the teaching as such. The later writers, as a rule, express themselves in the same sense

thus Simpl. Phys. 164, a: e|&)repiKo. 54 iffTL to koivo. Kal 5t' euSd^wu irepaiySfieva aWa fi^ airoSeiKTiKO. (UTjSe aKpoafxariKa.

Ammon. and David,

ing note
;

As to see follow-

aKpoafiaTiKoh affdcpeiav eTreTTrjSeuo-e, &c. For the same view see Categ. Schol. 27, a, 38, David, Categ. Schol. 22, a, 20 27, a, 18 sq. In
;

the
c.

V. Auct. 26, calls Aristotle SittAoDs, 6.K\os ixhv 6 eKTOffOev (paiv6/xvos &\\05 Se
6 (PToadeu,
-

same sense LuciAN,

and cf. Philop. Phys. the other hand David, in Ar. 24, b, 33, changes ScJwh the statement of Alexander (which he quotes in order to rep. 4.

On

fiariKo'is TO,

fute it) into on eV fxhi/ to7s aKpoaSoKOvvra avrdp \eyei. Kal

:

exoteric

and

esoteric.
Tojj. 52,

TO

aXrjdrj,

iu 5e to7s Sia\oyiKo7s
xf/evSrj.

tA

Alexander remarks,

&A\ois SoKovuTa, TO
3

that Aristotle speaks at one time XoyiKws in order to unfold the truth as such, at another SmAe/c-

Besides the testimony already adduced, the statements found in the Neoplatonic com-

VOL.

I.

114

ARISTOTLE
The theory just mentioned can be traced
as far back

as Andronicus, perhaps even farther

'

but this does

It
is,

not put

its

correctness beyond question.

if it

however,

confirmed in the main, even

o:ie

requires correction in

point or another, by the utterances of Aristotle

'

himself as to the

Exoteric Discourses.'

It is true that
'

in a general sense he

may

describe as

exoteric

'

any

topic which does not belong to the inquiry immediately

mentators

go to establish this point. Thus the so-called Ammon. in Catcg. B,b sqq. (see also Stahr,
AristoteUa, ii. 255 sqq.), who, after some other divisions of the the Aristotelian writings, among syntagmatic ones distinguishes
'
'

avTOTrpocrcoTra

koL aKpoap-ariKO.

and

SiahoyiKa Kal i^wrepLKa. The former are written -rrphs yvrjaiovs b.Kpoaras, the latter irphs t)]V twv TToWwu a}(pf\(iav in the former own his Aristotle expresses
;

that David (24, b, 5) expressly appeals to Animonius (n. epfi-nveias) and to the commentary on theCatef/orics passing under Animonius' name (which, although in form it does not its present come from Ammonius, yet seems to have originated in one written by him), indicates that Ammonius was David's proximate authority

and though he (Ammonius)

cer-

opinion with a strictly scientific argument, in the latter ra 5oKovvra avTc^, aW' ov 5t' airoSeiKriKwv iirix^LprjixaTiov, Kcd oh oToi re eicriv ot iroWol iTraKo\ov9^7v. Simigreater length, larly, only at David, Schol. 24, a, 20 sqq., who likewise divides the avurayfjiaTLKa
into avToirpSacoTra or aKpoaixartKa and diaXoyiKa h. Koi i^coTepiKO. Acyovrai and considers the former to have been written irphs rovs
iiTLTrjSeLOvs
T-p

tainly made use of earlier writers (and principally Alexander, whom David at 24, b, 33 attacks, and from whom his quotation of the Aristotelian Eudenivs is probably taken, Uke that in Philop. Dc An. E, 2 sq. Ar. Fr. p. 1481,
;

No. 41),

we do not know has been added to On the other their testimony. hand we must trace the statestill

how much
ments

(piKoffocpia,

the
(pi.\o-

latter Trphs aveTrinqbeiovs Trphs

(Tocpiav,

and hence the former

\6y(av,

St'

avayKacFTiKoov
5ia TTidauMv.
'

the latter

Cf. p. 111, n. 4.

In proof of this statement we cannot attach so much importance to the passage just given from David as Heitz does The fact IVerl. Sehr. 25 sq.).

in Cicero, Strabo, and Ge\\.mB{vide sitpra, p. Ill, n. 2-6, 112, n. 1), to Tyrannic and Andronicus, and the letters mentioned on p. 112, n. 3 etc., prove that the latter was aware of the distinction between exoteric and acroatic writings, and of the suggestion that the last mentioned

were only intended to be understood by the pupils of the

philosopher.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
in liand,^ or

115

any discussion which does not go very deeply

It is also true that the title does not

into the subject.^

always

and

necessarily

denote a distinct

class

of

writings.^

Nevertheless there
it

are passages where

"*

we

have every reason to refer

1

to such a class

and that

Polit.
fxhv

i.

5,

rauTa
6,

Iffus

irrrl (TKe^ews.
;

aWk 1254, a, 33 i^MTepiKwrepas Similarly, ibid. ii.

; '

in the Rejmblio 1264, b, 39 Plato has only imperfectly treated of legislation, ra 5' aK\a ro7s f^ctidev \6yois TreirKrjpwKc rhv KoyovJ The term ' e^codev Koyoi covers in this case writings of the most In like speculative character. manner Eudemus Fr. 6 (Simpl. Phys. 18, b), where instead of the
'

at that time were everywhere in vogue even at social gatherings. That this does not fit other passages will be shown immediately;

as for the passage

in question,

such a rendering is forbidden by the strictly dialectical and genuinely Aristotelian style of the discussions from p. 217, b, 32 to
p. 218, a, 30.
^ Thus, besides the passae'e given in the preceding note from the PhysicSy the Eudemian Eth. ii. 1, 1218, b, 33, introduces the division of possessions into the external and the spiritual with the

e^ei

S' cLTToplav

....

'((Tws

5e ov irphs

rhv \6yov of Aristotle {Phys. i. 2, 6%^* 2* "^'''^ 185, b, 11) we read TovTo airoplau i^urepiKriv.
:

Phys. iv. 10, init. wpwTou Ka\ws ex^' SiaTroprjaaiirepl avrov \_Tov xpovov] Kal 5ta twv i^wrepiKwu \6yoov. The e|ajT. K6yoi here mean the discussion which follows immediately, and which is called exoteric (in the same way as Aristotle, in other places, puts the logical in opposition to the
'^

remark

8e

Kadair^p SiaipovfieOa kv rots i^coTpiKo7s \6yoL5. In

:

Kal

the

parallel passage, Eth. N. i. 8, 1098, b, 10, Aristotle says: he wishes to speak about happiness KoL e/c TWV X^yofiivuv ire pi aifTrjs, by which, according to the context, only the prevailing views

physical, rid. infra, p. 174, n. 2),

concerning meant. It
that the

happiness

can

be

is to these, therefore,

a it does not aim at and adequate notion of time (the ii Icnv b xpoj/os, 218, a,

because
strict

must

i^car. x6yoi of also refer.

Eudemus

only takes into consideration certain preliminary properThe question is not ties of it. but here of exoteric writings Prantl is none the less wrong (Arist. Physih, 501, 32) in maintaining that by the exoteric discourses we are to understand, not only in the present instance but everywhere, only those conversa31), but
;

true especially of 1323, a, 21 vo/j.iaavTus oZv LKavSos TToAAa \4ye(rdai Kol rwv iv To7s i^o^TepLKoTs XSyois irepl rrjs apicrTTjs C^rjs Kal vvv XPVareov avTo7s. That by this lie does not mean mere oral expressions of opinion in the conversations of daily life is clearly
is

This

Pollt. vii.

i,

shown by what immediately

fol:

tions

on interesting subjects which

lows. For Aristotle continues ws clAtjOms yhp irpSs ye /xiav Siaipeaiv

116
tlie

ARISTOTLE
writings referred to were of a more popular type
texts
is
i

than our extant Aristotelian

oi/Seh

made probable
;
:

ibid. 32 His avaKvTiKols Aeyofxei/ etc aii(pi(r^-nry](rii:V, from oaa &A\a irpoarhiopi^dixiQa iv Tois point may be stated thus And, on the other the arguments in the i^wrfpiKol avaXvTiKOLS. hand, the vvv xp^fTfov avTois is \6yoi, it will be univei sally recognised that the conditions of adverse to this explanation. That hai)piness include not only exter- is meant to designate what folnal and bodily good things but also lows as something extracted from and pre-eminently spiritual good the exoteric discourses but Arithings although it is true that in stotle would be far more likely to common life we are wont to content use such a formula if he was quotourselves with far too small a pro- ing something from a former work portion of such s])iritual good.' than if he was merely repeating This line of reasoning necessarily in writing what he had already implies that the i^wrepiKol \6yoL orally delivered. This latter, from the nature of the case, he must in qucstion,witli which the current opinion of society is said to be in have had occasion to do as often as a modern university teacher })artial agreement, are not the same as any form of expression does it. The fact, tlien, that he expressly mentions that he is of that current opinion (cf. BerKAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 40). Then, 'making an extract from the e|wTpiKo\ Koyoi,^ points, as in the again, the words irp6s ye fiiav ZiPe Cwlo, ii. 13, 295, a, 2, and aipeffLV ovSels au.(pL(T&r)TT]aeiev point Jlcti'or. iii. 2, 372, b, 10 (where to definite explanations, set down some of the writings which we in writing, not merely existing in the intangible medium of oral possess are quoted with the same conversation. It would be easier Xpr](TT4ov) to an existing written And an Aristotelian writto connect them with oral dis- work. courses of Aristotle himself (as ing must be meant, since that OXCKEN does in Staatd. d. Arid. which follows out of the i^corepWe cannot, however, iKoi \6yoi sounds perfectly Aristoi. 44-59). base this view on the present telian, and forms a whole with what Aristotle gives in his own Keyofiev (together with the Stopi:

'

C6iJiea, Pol. iii. G, 1278, b, 32), since Aristotle not only quotes the writings of others very frequently in this way, but not unfrequently even his own; cf. (/JOAtej/ Se Pol. vii. 13, 1332, a, 8
:

name
Lastly,

(jiiiels

Se

ipov/jLev,

1.

38).

something similar to that which is here quoted x6yoi is found in from the i^wr. some passages of the Ethics (i. 6 sqq. x. 6 sqq.), which Zeller,
although
in his second edition, brought into connection with this quonow concedes tation, yet he cf. to Bernays {ibid. 71 sq. Oncken, ihid. 43, 5; Vahlen, Arist. Aufs. ii. 6) that Aristotle
;

Koi iv To7s

251, a,
iii.

5);

1)

Pe
5'
;

Pliys. viii. 1, (pafieu 5^, etc. (PJii/s. Cado, i. 7, 275, b, 21

Tje LKo7s
;

Xoyos

61/

Tols

irepl

Kivrjcews

(iaTLu) Metaph. v. ?>0 fin.; \6yos Mil. vi. 3, Se TOVTOV iv erepois 1139, b, 26; utnrep /cot iv roh
;

would not by the designation

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
both by the express distinction that
i^oDTepiKol

117

is

drawn between
'

Xoyoi have mentioned

the Ethics, which in the Politics he repeatedly quotes as 7)BiKa, and puts in tlie closest connection

distinction ') of different kinds of dominion, but for the exact limitation of their difference
'

with them
Zeller's

{vid.
ed.).

p.

2nd

of Bernays' the127, n.
2,

ory (73 sqq.), that the first chapter of the seventh book of the Politics strikingly diverges from the usual style of his scientific works, and bears distinct traces of having been extracted from a dialogue

can scarcely be supposed after

Vahlen's forcible objections {Arist. Avfs. ii.)to be established; Zeller, however, feels bound to

(as Bernays, p. 38 asserts), cannot be inferred from the ^iopi^6/xeda, since this expression designates not only the exact distinction, the carefully- weighed logical antithesis,' but an]/ kind of distinction whatever. If we compare with it the perfectly analogous use of Xeyo/neu, diopi(6fxeda, &c., in the passages given above (p. 115), we shall be prepared to give the same meaning to the Siopi^ofieda here, and when
*

agree with Bernays that by the exoteric discourses in this passage is meant a written work of the philosopher's which is lost to us, and which Aristotle here seems to follow pretty closely, for which very reason he refers to it, and not to the Ethics, though the parallel passages in the latter were closely connected with it in meaning. Less convincing with regard to this, in spite of what Bernays says to the contrary (iii{. 38, 51 sqq.), appears to be Polit. iii. 6, 1278, b, 30 aWa iXT]v Koi rris apxHS tovs
'
'

we h-ave persuaded ourselves, from other passages, that Aristotle

names
TpiKol,
fit

certain writings \6yoi

e|&)-

the passage appears to this interpretation. (And there are certainly some among the lost Aristotelian writings iti which the distinction here

touched upon may have been given particularly the iroXiTiKhs

;

and
n. 1,
S'

n. fiaffiXeias

v.

supra, p. 58,
:

and

60, n.

1). The
4 init.

true of Eth.
eVrl
iroirjais
0/j.ev

vi.

like is erepou
TricTTev-

koI Trpa^is

\eyoijL4vovs rpdirovs [the Se(nroreia,

the oIkqvoixik)], and the ttoMtik)] apxh} ^dSiov 5i6A.etf koI yap 4vto7s

avrwy Kol to7s i^wrepiThe connection here unquestionably allows us to suppose that the words refer to
Se irepl
Ko?s \6yois.

i^corepLKoTs XSyois 5iopi^6/xc6a irepl

avTuv iroXXaKis. These words, looked at in themselves, might refer not only (as Oncken, ibid.,
suggests) to oral disquisitions, but also (by taking the 5topf^(^/ie0o as the collective we ') to conver'

discussions in Aristotelian writings of a character different from that of the scientific works which we possess, as for instance the Dialogue on the Poets or Gryllos but that it forbids any other supposition Bernays (p. 39, 57 sqq.)
;

sations not connected with the School or even with scientific philosophy. That Aristotle here * refers to the e|a>T. x6yoi, not for the existence' (more correctly

has not made out. If anybody wished to give to the passage, instead of the narrow meaning assumed by Bernays, the broader one, 'this has already been proved
in

my

othei* writings,' neither

the

118

ARISTOTLE
words
T^s
:

meaning of i^urepiKhs nor the context would stand in his way,

since the rendering of the former would be analogous to the examples quoted on p. 115, n. 1, and as regards the latter the question whether Aristotle here refers to scientific or popular
writings,
is

A76Tot Sc inpl avrris [sc.

eV Tols i^corpiKo7s

i\ivxns] Koi

x6yois apKovvTws ^via /col XP'')^'''^^^ avTols. diov TO fihv &\oyou avTrjs For ehai rh 5e \6yov exou. though it is by no means so incredible as Bernays, p. 36, believes, that the distinction be-

indifferent.

If,

on

the other hand, we wished to understand the e^wT. x6yoi of the

said by others \ey6ixiva what we could parallel the expres'

is

sion by an appeal to Eudemus Bernays, (see preceding note). referring to this, finds it impossible to believe that we are te draw the explanation of such a corner-stone of tlie Peripatetic system as the connection of ttoi-

tween the rational and the irrational in the soul may have made its way from the Platonic school into wider circles (Epicharmus, at a much later period, comes ver}'' near to it with his vovs dpa, &c.), and though it could scarcely be said to be an actual impossibility to interpret the words i^car.
\6yoi as referring to opinions current outside the school, yet the introductory words here too much resemble those given above from Polit. vii. 1, and the Xeyerai apKovvTws ^via Kai vvv XPV^^'''^'^^ avToh liere points too obviously to written discussions, for us to be able to refer this quotation

conversation of but if persons

:

from the common well educated so, he ought to iind it no less absurd to draw from the Very same source an
7}(Tiy

and

-rrpa^is,

exi)lanation of the centre of gravity of all Ethics, the notion of EvhaL/xovia. And yet we find in Mh. i. 8, init. incontestably
(TKeTTTeou
e/f

8);

irepi

auT^s

Koi

This may not mean that we are to seek the scicnHfie defimtion of happiness in the conversation of the educated but neither would this be affirmed in Eth. vi. 4 init. about that of -rroiriaLS and irpa^is, if we were to understand the f^ccT. x6yoi in this passage of the The appeal to uniXey6fi(va. versal conviction would be to establish a general distinction of

Twv Keyo/xevcov

irepl auTTjy.

mere X^ySfxeva. If it refers an Aristotelian work, this must be one of the lost writings most probably the Eudemus for the quotation does not
to to

'

'

agree with IT. i/^fx^s iii. 9, 432, a, 22 sqq., and this work would not be cited by such a reference, but, as always in other places, by eV Neither in Tols irepl xpvxvs.^ Metaph. xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28 (on the Ideas as such he will only
'

TToiriais

from

irpa^is
:

and
yap

this

is

Aristotle's

way

rep

aXrjde?

i.

iravra (TwdSei. ra virdpxovra (^Eth. Much more definitely may 8).

we

discern in Eth. i. 13, 1102, a, 26 an intention of appealing to some Aristotelian writings in the

speak aTTAws Koi '6aov v6iiov x-P^v TidpvXXriTai yap rcif iroXXa Kal virh ruv ^ct}TpiKa)V xSyuv") can we understand by the c^mt. x6yoi It oral discussions of others. must mean the work of Arialone stotle himself, since this could dispense him from a fuller criticism of the doctrine of Ideas and that we are to look for such work neither in the philo;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

119

the exoteric and the scientific treatises,^ and by the terms

that are used in describing the former.^
It is not to

be

sopher's doctrinal discussions nor in his strictly scientific writings is suggested not only by the designation 6|a>T. \6yoi, but also

solution, in the Dialogae on Philosophy, Y.^carepiKhs in Aristotle means (1) that which exists outside,
'^

by the Koi (koL vith r. i^. A.), by which the i^oT. \6yoi are distinguished from other not exoStill more clearly teric \6yoi. does this appear from Eudemus, when the latter, probably remembering this passage, in th. i. 8, 1217, b, 22 says likewise of the Ideas iireaKeTrrai Se Tro\\o7s irepj
:

the

external
ffoes

and

which
former

out,

(2) that refers to the

external.

The word has the meaning when for inis

stance a foreign province

called
ii.

an

i^MrepiK-i]

apxh (Polit.

10,

ai/rov rpdirois Koi iu to7s i^corepiKols

\6yois Kol iv
.

roils

Kara

<piXo(ro<piav.

Cf following note. This is indicated by the express statement in the passages quoted in the preceding note, especially from Polit. vii. 1, Eth. i. 13, Metaph. xiii. 1, that certain points have been suflBciently explained even in the exoteric disthat is, inasmuch as we courses should less expect such discusEudemus puts it sions in them. more definitely, by putting the i^wrcpiKol \6yoi (see preceding note, Jin.) in opposition to the Since the \6yoi Karci. <f)i\o<ro(j>lau.
' '
: '

1272, b, 19), or when hand and foot are styled i^wnpiKh fieprj (Gen. An. v. 6, 786, a, 26); to these uses cf the i^carepiKo. ayada, Pol. vii. 1, 1323, a, 25. In the second meaning the expression is used in the combination i^iorepiKoi irpd^eis (Pol. vii. 3, If now, in the 1325, b, 22, 29). phrase i^cor. \6yoi, we propose to give it thefirst meaning, we cannot, by exoteric discourses, in those passages where Aristotelian writings of a particular class or the inquiries contained in them are meant, understand such discourses as lie outside the discussion in which they are referred to as * other discourses' (like the i^wrepiKwrepa CTKer^is and the e^co.

are scientific inquiries, the former can only be popular discourses and, since (as we have seen) writings are meant by them, they can only be popuNow it might inlar writings. deed appear that the criticism of the doctrine of Ideas, to which
latter
;

dep \6yoi, p. 115, n. 1

and

3)

nor

yet (as Bernays thinks in I>ial. d. Ar. 92 sq.) such as do not enter into the essence of a thing, but are external to it (as p. 115, n. 2).

The

latter

suit, partly

meaning would not because this would

Mh. End.

and Metaph. xiii. refer, would of all 1, loc. clt. things have been least suited for popular writings; but we have already seen on p. 76, n. 3, 5G, n. 2 vied, that he opposed this
i.

8,

be a strange way of speaking of popular treatises,' partly because it would not fit those cases in which Aristotle again takes up in later works, as being suitable and adequate, what he had said in
'

doctrine, with

the greatest re-

the ^^(anpiKol \6yot (as in the passages of the Politics] Mhics^

120
inferred either from
selveSj or

ARISTOTLE
tlie

words s^corspiKol \6yoi, themfacts,

from the surrounding

that Aristotle's

Dialogues alone were meant.

There

may have been, and

in fact there appear to have been, other

works also which were adapted to the understanding of the general public.^

As
is

to the later theories, the idea that the

Master did
all

not intend his strictly scientific work for publication at

refuted by the contemporary record of the complaints

:

tliat

were made because he published them ^ and the idea that he designedly chose for them a style obscure

and unintelligible
visible

to the lay

mind

is

disproved by the
themselves.

characteristics of the

texts

truth
sider
all

is that,

except in cases where

them as mere sets of notes manner of trouble to aid the

by explanations and

The we ought to confor his own use, he takes

reader,

by the use of a
by methodical
If
it

strictly devised scientific

terminology, by clear definiillustrations,

tions,

processes of thought, and by warnings against possible

obscurities, ambiguities or misconceptions.

be true

nevertheless that there occur

^nd Metaphysics given on p. 115, Such writings could only

many

particular points of

n, 4).

be called exoteric, in this use of the word, in the sense that they were known and in use even outside the Aristotelian school. But it comes to very much the same thing- also if we start (as Zeller prefers to do), with the second meaning of i^corepiKhs, and understand the i^cor. xSyoi to signify such w^orks as were intended for outsiders or for the general public, the same, in fact, as are included in the terms xSyoi K:5eSofxevoi or 4v KOiv^ "yiyvoix^voi.

popular character was implied in the designation, but not directly expressed in the adjective e|coTepiKbs

as such.

When Eudemus

puts the Koyoi e|wT. in opposition to those Kara (piKoaocpiav (see preceding note), we might understand the latter to mean such as were intended to serve for scientific instruction but at the same time there is nothing against the translation both in those intended for the general public and in the scientific trea'
'

tises.'
'

That such writings were of amore

Cf. p. 60, n. 1. Cf. p. 22, n. 1, 112, n. 3,

ARISTOTLWS WRITINGS
difficulty,

121

the reasons are to be found anywhere rather

Besides,
it is

than in the writer's intention.

obvious

that any such theory attributes to the philosopher a

very childish sort of mystification, wholly destitute of

any reasonable motive.

It does seem, however, to be true that it

was only a

portion of his writings which Aristotle published, in the

sense of

making express provision for

their dissemination

to a wide circle of general readers.

Others which were

more

closely connected with his oral teaching

seem to

have been designed primarily for the use of his scholars

as classbooks.^
It

was in the case of the former only that

artistic

he took pains to cultivate that eloquence and

completeness and that popular style of exposition for

works were famous. The sole aim of the second set of texts was scientific investigation for its own sake, and they were therefore distinguished by a
which his exoteric
' '

and a less artistic dress. It seems that of by far the greater part, if not the whole, consisted of those writings which Aristotle wrote before the opening of the Peripatetic School at Athens, and of chiefly while he was still one of the Platonic circle all of which nothing remains but a few fragments.^ On
stricter logic

the former class

But without our having to suppose that they were forbidden

'

to

communicate them to
2
'

others.

In this sense', says Prof, Zeller, I had already expressed myself in the second edition, p. 98, as to the probable state of facts with regard to the distinc*

tion between exoteric and esoteric writings. On the other hand, I then believed that, in the Aristotelian passages which men-

tion the i^urepiKol Xoyoi, I could everywhere translate that phrase as meaning such discussions as do not belong to the sphere of the inquiry actually under investigation. (Thus also Schweglee, Gescli. d.griech. Phil. 194.) I have now rejected this opinion, and think that the general meaning of i^airepiKhs, to designate something external, or relating to the external, is mor

122

ARISTOTLE

such a theory there "may have been a great difference in

form between the 'exoteric' and the*' acroatic' texts,

appropriate. It follows that even in the combination i^wTepiKol a6yoi this expression will apply not only to such discussions as lie outside a specified subject (as p. 115, n. 1), or are concerned only with what is external to it (p. 115, n. 2), but also to such as are current outside a particular circle (p. 115, n. 3), or such as are intended for outsiders (p. 115, n. 4). According- as we begin from this or that passage in
Aristotle, and extend the meaning of the expression in that particular passage to all the other cases, we get this or that rendering of the e|wT. x6yoi. This is the explanation of the fact that even now there are the most diverse opinions on the matter. Of these, the farthest removed from the explanation which has prevailed since the time of Andronicus, which understands by tliis expression a particular class of Aristotelian writings, is the supposition of Madvig (Exc. vii. on CiC. Be Fin.), Prantl (Arist. Physik, p. 501, 32), Spengel (' Arist. Studien,' Ahlt. d. hayr. Akad. x. 181 sq.), Forchhamm'er

Aristotelian writings, or in the oral disputations of the school. These, in their view, may be called exoteric, either because they always have to deal with something foreign to the matter (cf. the e|a> and cco) \6yos, Anal. i. 10, 76, b, 24), or because they always treat the subject externally. Grote {Aristotle, 03 sqq.)

{Arist. nnd, die exoter. Reden^ cf. particularly pp. 15, 04), and SUSEMIHL {Philol. Anc. v. 074
sq.),

that only the conversations are designated by the e|coT. x6yoi. Rather nearer to it are Ravaisof non-philosophical circles

SON (JSIetaph. d' Arist. i. 209 sq.) and Thurot (Etudes sur Aristote, 209 sq.), who understand by them
such dialectic discussions (in contradistinction to the strictly scientific), as proceed by arguments TTphs SJ|oj/, occurring either in

agrees with them, except that, besides the Aristotelian Dialogues and some extracts from the acroamatic works, he thinks conversations outside the school are referred to. In like manner (though with the exclusion of conversations outside the school) Ueberweg {Gesch. d. Phil. i. 143, 5th ed.). Oncken {Staatsl. d. Arist. i. 43 sq.) refers the term to oral discussions, allied to the scientific lectures in which the e|a>T. \6yoi are mentioned, but of a different class from them. On the other hand Ritter ( Geseh. d. Pliil. iii. 21 sqq.) holds more closely to the statements of the ancient writers about the two classes of Aristotelian pupils and writings, in assuming (p. 29) that all the strictly scientific works were only written by Aristotle as a help to his lectures and were only published, at a later period, by himself or his pupils, and perhaps at first only for the latter whereas the remaining writings (which are lost to us), were designed for the use of cultured persons and might, together with any corresponding lee tures, be called exoteric. A like position is held, in the main, by Bernays {Dial. d. Arist.), who by the exoteric discourses under;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

123

less

and it may be very true that the matter of the former was advanced than the systematic doctrine of the Master, but it is entirely as we have it from his riper years
;

beside the

mark

to suggest that he sought in either the

one case or the other to conceal his opinions or to with-

draw them from the

these

reader's eye.

It is not only, however, the distinction noted

'

published

'

or 'exoteric' books

between and the others,

which points

to the conclusion that the extant, closely

reasoned writings of Aristotle were written primarily for

In the texts themwhich it is hard to reconcile with the idea that they were really puhlished,
his scholars, as classbooks only. selves there are

many

indications

in the full sense of the word, during Aristotle's lifetime.

In the
stance
stands
^

first

place there
is

is

the remarkable circum-

that a book which

such

cited in another nevertheless

tlie

Heitz
sqq.)>

( F(?7'Z.

lectures chiefly, Schr. d. A7'. 122

though agreeing with him

in substance, prefers to give the expression (with reference to Fhys. iv. 10 init.) the broader meaning, and to make it imply a point of view farther removed from true science. Bonitz (Bid. Arist. 104, b, 44 sqq. ZeitsGhriften fur ostr. Gymn. 18(56, 776 sq.) takes a similar view. Stahr
;

ii. 239 sqq., cf {Aristotelia^ especially 275 sq.), and Brandis (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 101 sqq.) express themselves less decidedly

philosophical writings, such as the Dialogues, partly a special manner of philosophising the latter broadly identifying the exoteric writings with the popular ones, but abstaining from further definition of them or *' exoteric of the expression discourses." Thomas (De Arist. e|cDT. xSyois') stands quite isolated with his strange whim of looking for Aristotle's exoteric discourses in the greater EtJiics. Space does
;

the

former believing that by

the exoteric writings are meant partly those in which something was treated merely in passing, partly and principally those which did not essentially belong to the systematic connection of

not permit me a more searching examination of these various suppositions the principles on which it would be based are contained in what has been said
;

above. Stahr, ibid., gives all the earlier references Which bear upon the question.' Ritter (iii. 29) and BranDis (ii. b, 113) have already
'

124
cites that other

ARISTOTLE
book
itself:

or that an earlier treatise

speaks of an inquiry as already completed, and yet a

later treatise says
it

is

in contemplation only.

These
All four

cases are not rare.

Analytics,^

The

Topics

is

frequently cited in the

'-^

and yet

cites the latter four times.

may
at

belong to a later-written portion of the Topics, but

any rate they cannot be later than the Analytics, in which these same books are cited as well as the earlier
ones.^

When

the FJiysics refers us back to discussions

exist only in the Metaphysics,
is

which, as
it

we know them,

might be said that the reference

^
;

to a section

which

existed as a separate treatise before the Metaphysics

was

compiled

but

it

cannot be doubted that the zoological

TOTriKo7s) to
4,

noted this and explained in a similar way.

'

the passage Tojk

ix.

167,
*

b, 21,
is

Cf.

p.

67,

n.

1.

BONITZ

follows

with which what also closely connected.

(Itid.

Arist.

102 sq.) jyives the

passages on which tlie followingexplanation is based, so far as they have not been expressly
cited here. 2 VIT. 8,
jxou opov^

Pliys. i. 8, 191, b, 2 Aristotle remarks, after a discussion on the possibility of comingfTs /xfv d}] rpSiros into existence
:

In

ovTOS, &\\os

5'

OTi ei/Se'xeTai
Svpa/XLV

Tavra

ma,

a,

24
/j.eu

eV

rtVcoj/

Ae-yejj/

Kara t^v
'

Kal TrjV

Se Se? Kara(rKevd^LU [sc.

SidpLffTaL
(cf.

avWoyiaiv kripois
ii.

aKpifiecn^pov
8' e/c

Anal. Post.

la), viii. 11, 162, a, 11: cpavephu

ra>u

avaXvTiKwp (Anal. Pr.

13, 162, b, 32: "^^^ alr^7rai 6

ii.

iuipyeiav tovto 5' iv &Woii SiwpiThis arai St' uKpifi^ias fj.aA\ov. reference is most probably to a passage in the 3Ietaphysic8 (for to refer it to one of the lost

2),

viii.

-rh

5'

eV

apxv

kpcoTwv,

Kar' a.\r}9iav jxlv iv ro7s avaKvriKo7s [Anal. Pr. ii. 16] dprirai, Kara
JiJL),

ho^av 5e vvv Ae/creoj/, ix. 2 (Sq/)h. Trepi jj-hv ovv tu>v 165, b, 8
:

writings is forbidden by the fact that Aristotle is not accustomed in other places to quote these latter, as he cites the dogmatic simple iv writings, -with the In the &\Kois cf p. 108, n. 3).
;

airoSeiKTiKcov [sc. (rvWoyio-fiiiiv^ iu

Tots avaXvTiKols
3

e'iprjrai.
ii.

A7ial. Pr.

15,

64, a,

36

6.W(av ipccrrffxaToov ffv\XoyictaffQai ddrepov ^ ws iv to7s TOTTLKols i\4xOv A-ajSeTi') refers to Toj). viii. and Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 65, b, 15 (oTrep ^'ipTjraf. Kcd iv TOty
(e<TTt 5e bi

however, it not only agrees with ix. 6 sqq., but also with V. 7, 1017, a, 35 sqq., i.e. the treatise ITepi rov iroa-axois, The .same is true of. p. 76, n. 3. of Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 29, as compared with Meta^h.
Meta^jh.,
V. 7.

AHISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
tract cited in the

125

Be

Goelo

was written

later

than that
:

work. 2
yet in

The Meteorology
its

refers to the
it

Be Sensu

and

own preamble

described itself as the close

of the series of investigations as to inorganic nature, after

which the works on Animals and Plants were to be taken

up.

The Natural History quotes the book on

is

Plants,

which
is

spoken of
still

in texts that are

"^

demonstrably later
treatise

as being

unwritten.

The same

on Plants
^(pwv

referred to in an

early section of the

Us pi

r/svsascos as already existing,

and in a
is

later

one as yet
Parts and
future."^

to come.^

The
;

lost

book on Food
it is

quoted in the
the

De Somno
There
is

in

the later works on

Generation of Animals,

promised as in the

a similar relation of cross reference between

these same tracts and one of the lesser physiological

if

Be Coelo, ii. 2, 284, b, 13 the world had a right and left side, it would also be obliged to have an above and below, a before

(iffirep

eijpTjTai

iv rfj decopia rfi Trepl

(pvTwv.

On

the other hand this

composition, as has been shown

on
in

p. 93, n.

and behind

SicoptCTat
irepl

^jl^v

ovv

irepl

1, is first promised works which on their part

rovTWV iv Tols

ras toov ^((xav Kivi](T^is (Jngr. An. 2, 704, b, 18, sqq., ihid. c, 4 sq.) Si^ t^ ttjs

^ucews oXk^Io. ttjs iKeivoov eJuai. - This is proved not only from MeteoTol. i. Ifin. but also because the History of Animals and n, Cv^v jxopioiv are quoted see Ind. Arist. 100, a, 55 sq.
;

quote in many places the History of Animals, De Vita et 31., Fart. An., and Gen. An. ' I. 23, 731, a. 29 a\\h Trepl
:

fxhv

(pvTU)v iv

kripois
fxtv

eTreV/ceTTTat.

III.

fi?i.

eoTTOj

TovTwv

T)ixiv

TiQ^wp'nixivou

5e ircpliv ToTs

3, 783, b, tovtoov (the falling of the leaves in winter) iv &\\ois rh aXriov \KT0v (cf i. Trepl fihv odv (pvTWv, 1, 716, a, 1 avra Kad^ avra x^P^^ eVttrKeTrTe'oj',

On

the other hand

v.

23

dAAa

Trepi

Jrepi Ttts ai(Tdr}(TLs deiKuvfxevois

(De

and

p. 93, n. 1).

Seiisu, 3) 5ib Ttt fxkv Aeyccfxcv, to7s 5' ws virdpxova'i xp7j(rcc/ie0a avrwu.
Still

Trepl
^

C. 3, 456, b, 6 erprjTa: 5e TOVTcov iv to7s Trepl Tpo(prjs.

:

more

clearly
3,

Meteor, ii. the lpr]Tai

Sensic, 4.
*

iv

in 359, b, 21, refer 6,Wois to De

1,

must we,

//.

/I.

V.

539,

a,

20:

Cf. p. 92, and on the chronological relation of the writings n. VTTVOV, n. (cpOOV flOploiV, n. ((^WV 7ei/eVecos, see BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist. 103, a, 16 sqq., 55 sqq.

126
texts, ^

ARISTOTLE
making it impossible to say which comes before The tract on the Parts of Animals is cited
it cites

the other.

once in that on the Motion of Animals, which

three times
itself.^

How

are

we

to treat this peculiarity ?

all

Are we

so to

pervert the formulae of reference in

these cases as to
if it

read what ostensibly refers to an earlier writing as

were only an indication of something intended in a

one
?

later

This would be negatived by the number of cases in

which the phenomenon recurs

itself a notable fact

and

also by the circumstance that in several cases the

assump-

tion of the later treatise as a thing already in existence is

too intimately interwoven with the tenor of the passage

to allow the change.^

The

like reasons stand equally

against the theory that these abnormal references crept

into the text after Aristotle's death.'*
'

But there

is

a far

n.

^oir^s /cal

0ai/aTou,

together
avatrvoris,

tJ> 8'

atriov iv to7s Trepl iropeias Kal

with the connected n.

of. p. 91 sq.
-

KiV7}(rews T(av {cfcov etpi]Tai.

3 Thus Tojj. vii. 3, 153, a, where two lines would have to be thrown out in order to remove the reference, and Metem'ol. iii. 2 fin. (p. 125, n. 3), where

An. 5, 700, a, 33 many animals have the front and hind parts near one another, olou
Ingr.
TO.

24,

re jxaKaKia

KoL to

crTpo/jL^wSr}

Tcov ocTTpaKoSepiuLoov. eXpr]rai 5e Trepl

rovrwv irpdrcpov

iv kr^pois [Part.

684, b, 10 sqq., 34, where is said of the jxaXaKid re Ka\ crTpofxfiwSrf twv oarpaKoSfp-

An.

iv. 9,

the same
ixu>v).

An.
tJjs

iv. 11,

the other hand, Part. 690, b, 14: t] 6' alria ai/Twu (of snakes) ctTToSias

On

eiprjTOi iv rols TrepI rrjs iropeias

tuv

^(fwv (c. 8, 708, a, 9 sqq.) Biupia-jueVots. Ibid. 692, a, 16: irepl 5e

TTJs
irepl

virdpxovai, Sos the XP'^I'^^H-^^"'plainly shows that the reference exposition. is not to a future Still more violent than the changes of text here contested is the resource {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 118 sq.) of giving to efpTjrot, when necessary, the meaning of ^tj^tj(rerat, and of denying the reference to the future in expressions like els iKe7vov rbv Kaiphv
airoKeiadca.

Twv

KUfMirvXcov Kdix\\/ws iv TO?S

rrepl

iropeias (c. 7, 707, b, 7, sqq.)

iiriffKciTTai
KOivfj

irporepov
irdvrwv.

With reference to the same passage, iv. 13, 696, a, 11

Besides the passages given preceding note, this the suggestion seems especially objectionable in De Ccelo, ii. 2 {vid.
*

in

ABISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
simpler explanation,
if it

127

be true that he did not at once

publish those books in which

we

find references to later

texts as already written, but used

them

for a

time only
his oral

among

his

scholars

and in connection with

lectures.

In such manuscripts addenda would be in-

troduced
later

and among them references to works written

would come in from time to time. If the author was never able to give to such a work any final revision for the purpose of publication, it might well happen that in one place a reference would stand in its originally correct form, as to a future work, though in another passage of the same or an earlier text a note might have been incorporated which spoke of the same work The same theory will explain the as already written. which we have every reason to fact that the Politics consider as a book never finished by Aristotle, and

published in its unfinished form after his death

in the Rhetoric, along with the Poetics,'^

is

cited
itself

which
^

is

spoken of by the
is

Politics in the future tense.

The

fact

that Aristotle had written a part of the Politics before

Poetics.

he wrote the Rhetoric and

call

Therefore he could
If he

the Poetics a future book in the Politics, and yet

quote a passage of the Politics in the Rhetoric.

supra, p. 125, n. 1)
8e Set Kal

since the

t^

ovpavif, kc.

corresponds with

the

(line 18) Siupia-Tai

fih odv (line 13). The whole passage from ^lupiarai to eijXoyov

ko7s irepl rovrwv'), the Poetics frequently, vid. supra p. 102, n. 1. ^ VIII. 7, 1341, b, 39: on the ' catharsis pvv fxkv airXois, irdKiv S'
'

iu

rols

irepl

iroirjTiK^s

ipovfi^v

avr^ (line 20), could be dispensed with, and it would all have to be taken as a postvirapx^iv eV

Aristotelian interpolation. Cf. infra, ch. xiii. 2 The Politics i. 8, 1366, a, 21 {StriKpifiwTai yhp iv to7s ttoKlti'

as Bernays {Ahh. d. hist. phil. Ges. in Breslau, p. 139) rightly supposes, probably refers to a lost section of our Poetics, and not to one of the Politics (Heitz, Verl. Schr.
(Ta.<p4(mpov,

which,

100

sq.).

128

ARISTOTLE
,

had published the Rhetoric he could not in it have referred as he did to the unpublished Politics.^ The closing words of the Tojncs ^ seem to indicate that Aristotle's treatises were meant primarily for his
scholars.

Addressing his readers, he bespeaks their

indulgence or their thanks for the theory he has unfolded to them,^ referring specially to those

who have

heard his lectures.

This does not imply that our Topics

are only the lecture notes of the Master, or the note-

book of one of his hearers. Such a view is negatived both by the wording of the passage,^ and by the fact
that
in later writings

he often refers to the Topics

himself'^ in

words which cannot be explained away as

relatinsr either to a lost

book of his own or

to another

author.

Such an address would be out of place in a work which was tendered to an unlimited circle of readers by formal publication, but it is entirely natural if the Topics was then issued only to Aristotle's scholars
It is more difficult to explain the strange fact that Hhef. iii. 1, 1404, b, 22 speaks of the actor Theodoras as if he were living- and acting, whilst still Polit. viii.' 17, 1336, b, 27 treats him as one belonging to the jiast.
'

iKavoos irapa ras

Tttse/c

hWas

TrpajfJ-areias

TrapaSocews rju^rjixevas, Aoiirhv hv efrj irdvTwv v/xuv 7) twv i]Kpoa~ jx^voiv epyou rd7s /xku irapaAeAet^/xeyois rrjs iJ.e66Sov
evpr}fMvois
^

avyyvcliiui.'qu

to7s

5'

Some
and

TroWrjv ^X^^^ X'^P^^MSS. read, instead of

But here the question arises, whether we possess, in the third book of FJu'toric, the work of Aristotle himself, or the work of
a later writer, who, in this passage, which seems to be in the genuine style of Aristotle, may have used one of his earlier works. Cf. p. 72, n. 2. - Soph. El. 33 Aristotle fin. had no predecessor for his theory Se <palvTai ei of demonstration
: ;

v/juv

v/iicov, rf/xiu

and

ri/jLuv

but

Aristotle could not possibly have

included

whom
*

himself among those he thanks, and to whom

he apologises.
distinguishes among readers the * i^Kpoafievoi from the rest only by striking out the ^ before rwv iiKpoafievcav could we get a simple address to listeners, but the MSS. all have

Which

the

'

it.
^

6ea(Tau.4voisviJUU

ex^tv

t]

/x4do5os

l7id. Arist. 102, a,

40 sqq.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
as a

129

auxiliary to them.^

memorial of the contents of his lectures or as an That this was true of some of his

books,

must be inferred from other passages

also.

The

synopsis of varying meanings of words, which

now forms

the

book of the Metaphysics, could never have been published by Aristotle in its present form as a
fifth

glossary without beginning or end. It can only have been placed in the hands of his scholars simply as an
aid to his

teaching.

Yet he often

refers to

it,

that even in texts earlier than the Metaphysics?

and The

same argument applies to the often-cited anatomical texts, ^ which must have been limited to a narrow circle because of the drawings which were an essential part of
them.
If
it

be true, however, that writings which

it

Aristotle cites were published only to his scholars,

follows that the

same must be true of those in which these citations occur for no one could in a published book refer to an unpublished one, or say that a subject not gone into was fully explained in an inaccessible
;

tract.

The same theory by which we explain the group of

peculiarities already noticed, will explain others also.

The

trick of carelessness in style which is so often remarked, the repetitions which surprise us in an exposition otherwise compact, the insertions which upset a

naturally well-ordered

explained most easily

if

movement of thought are all we suppose that the author

never put the finishing touches to the writings in question, and that various matters were at the time of the
As Stahr, iUd.t has supposed. 2 Cf. pp. 76, n. 8, 124, n. 4.

'

About

which

see

p.

89,

n. 1.

VOL.

I.

130

ARISTOTLE

posthumous publication added to the original text either from parallel copies or from the author's notes.^ This
theory becomes extremely probable

when, as in the

books On the

Soid,'^

we

find throughout considerable

sections clear traces of a double recension, without

any

reason to say that either recension

is

not Aristotle's.^

The same kind of argument would apply also to the rolitics and Metaphysics^ but as to these we have
independent grounds
unfinished,
for the belief that

they remained

and were only published

is if

after his death.'*

;

If this be so, a further inference

forced on us

for

we
as

must conclude that

publication only,

a certain book

was a posthumous
it

all which refer to show that they follow it in the to

in such a

way

series

cannot have

been issued in Aristotle's even if we could apply

life.

This line of argument,

it

with high probability to

nothing more than the Be Anima, would take us a long

way

for that

work

is

cited in

many

of the books on

natural philosophy.^

The scope and the modifications of this theory as to the way in which the Aristotelian books were produced,
can only be settled by a detailed examination of the indi'

A supposition which a number

:

Cf. p. 89, n. 2.

It

may be

of scholars have been led to adopt, with various particular modifications thus Bitter, iii, 29 (rid. Beansujjra, p. 121, n. 2 mid.) Dis, ii. b, 113 Ueberweg, GescJi. d. Phil. i. 174, eighth ed., SusEMIHL, Arist. Poet. p. 1 sq., BerNAYS, Arist. Politik, 212. It is also probable that Aristotle, instead of writing, usually dictated: which would account for many of the irregularities of style, such as the
; ;

otherwise with the repetitions and disarrangements of the connection in the Etidcs, especially
bks. 5-7. Cf. p. 97, n. 1. ^ As in Bk. vii, of the Physics,

on which Spengel has written in Ahh. d. Milnch. Ahad. iii. 2, 305 sqq. Cf Prantl, Arist. Phys. 337. * Cf p. 76, n. 3, and infra, Ch.
. .

xiii., init.
5

Ar. 102,

Vid. supra, p. 93, n. 2 b, 60 sqq.

Ind.

lengthy and involved anacolutha.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
vidual
texfcs.

131

But the

peculiarities above referred to,

'

the reference to a class of published or

exoteric

'

works,

the habit of citing later books in earlier ones, the tricks

of repetition and disorder which indicate the absence of

the author's final revision

all

these extend through

almost the whole of the extant Corpus.

from the

fact that,

From this and though the Topics and the De Anima

for

were apparently written only

Aristotle's

pupils,
it

yet they are frequently cited by later treatises,^

seems

very probable that the whole of our Corpus, so far as it is genuine, consists of books which were produced in connection with the teaching in the Lyceum, were intended at
first

for Aristotle's pupils only,

and were
only

made

generally accessible by formal publication

after the master's death.

Of the great majority of them

it may also be assumed, not only from their contents, but also from their express internal correlation that

Aristotle

is

already given his pupils by

it is

also

them working up in writing what he ha,d way of oral lectures,^ though likely that when they came to be published
in

by third parties explanations were added and whole passages interpolated from Aristotle's papers or his other lectures.^ A few of the texts may have served him
as aids in his teaching, without

being themselves matter

^

of lecturing.4

One
130.

of the books of the Metaphysics

in the Metajjhijsics

Cf. p. 129
.

and

and the

Dp,

on
to
3

Cf what has been remarked with regard 128 sq. p. the closing words of the
As,

Anima.
*

Like the composition Uepl

at p.

rod
77).

irocraxois (cf . p. 76, n. 3,

'lojnos.

from what has

been
130,

said on 7G and pp. seems to have been the

One is inclined to think the same of the 'Avarofiai. * The twelfth, cf. same note,
at p. 78.

case

132

ARISTOTLE
for a lecture course,

seems to have been a plan

not intended, in
to his pupils.
its

though

present shape, for communication

This, however, cannot well be true of

any great portion of the extant writings.

is

That theory

excluded in the

first

place

by the all-pervading

system of cross references, which both in number and in manner go far beyond anything that Aristotle
could have wanted for himself.^

Again
all

it is

negatived

by the
view

fact that,

in spite of

the defects already

literary point of

referred to, these

far

works are from a

more
if

carefully

worked up than they would

have been

they were merely sketches for the lecturer's

own

use.

Then again, the unusual recurrence of formula9

is

of introduction, transition and conclusion, shows that

the author
^

writing, not for himself, but for others.

(Soj)h. El. c. 2, fin.; Metaph. vii. 12, init., xiii. 10, 1080, b, 16 and cStrirep Sxnrep supra), X^yojxfv,
i\4yoiJ.u

Bk. xii. of the Metapliy&ws has in the first half none at all, and in the second, which is worked out much more fully (since the SeSej/crat, c. 7, 1073, a, 5, relates to c. 6, 1071, b, 20), a single reference (c. 8, 1073, a, 32
Se'Set/crai
S'

(Uth.

^^.

vi.

3,

1139, b,

26,
i.

Metaph.
1,

iv. 5,

1010,

a, 4,

Ehet.

ev

to?s

<j>v(riKo7s

irepl

supra), Kaddirep iir^Adofxev (Meta2)h. x. 2, init., xiii. 2, 1076, b, 39), Kaedir^p

1055,
a,

28 and

It is otherwise in most rovTwv). Still more of the other works. decisive, however, is the form of the references. No one uses for the expressions like himself <|)a/i.ei/ mentioned in p. 115, n. 4, or circumstantial formulas, like ck

ZiciXdixiQa

(Metaph.
iv

vii.

1,

init.),

&

dioipiffafjifv,

oh

SiupiffdiiieOa,
i.

ra

Zi(api(Tp.4va Tjfuv

(Metaph.
7,
2,

4,

985, a, 11,
9,

vi.

4), StjAoj/ T]tuv

4,/w., i. (Rhet. i.

1028, a, 1356, b,
Tjfiiv

1357,

a,

29),

rededopriTai

T6

rrjs

Icrropias

rrjs

irepl

ra ^^a
koX
Trp\

(pavephv

Kal

roov

avaTOjxSsv

v<mpov
yevea-ecos
a, 18),

Xex^'hc^TO'i'

"'

'''oh

(Part. An. iv. 10, 689, like (the Ind. Ar. 97, b, sqq. furnishes examples), or like those quoted on p. 115. 2 To this class belongs the conclusion of the Topics (see p. the vvy 5e Xeyco/xev 128, n. 2)

and the

avruv (Metaph. i. 3, cf. also those sen983, a, 33) tences in which what has been discussed before is summed up, and what is going to be treated is announced (e.g. Metaph. xiii. 9, 1086, a, 18 sqq., Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 10 sqq. So2)h. El. c. 33, 183, a, 33 sqq. Meteorol. init.). Oncken (Staatsl. d. Ar., i. 58) cites, from the Nicom. Ethics and
'iKavois

irepl

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Another unlikely theory^
transcripts in
is

133

that

which suggests

that the whole or a great part of our Corpus consists of

which

Aristotle's pupils

had

set

down the

contents of his lectures.

We

have seen that they are

the lecture

in all probability closely connected with

courses. 2

But whether they are a mere transcript of these, or a free working-up of the same matter, whether they were designed to repeat as correctly as might be
the words of the master, or to leave us a spiritual re-

production of his thoughts, whether in fine they were

written by his pupils or by himself,
question.
is

a very different

The note-theory may

rely

on the suggestion

that

it

would explain the carelessness of the methods of

Trepl
.

the P^Zt^i^s alone, thirty- two passages with such formulas. No one will believe that Aristotle would have had to write down ail such expressions in his lecture-book, like a man beginning- to teach, who is not sure of a single word. Oncken, ibid. 48 sqq. following ScALiGER. O. there remarks (62 sq.) that he thinks he has only made this supposition probable with regard to the Ethics and Politics, but his reasons would hold equally for the majority of our Aristotelian
'

rwv iroKiriKwv aKovaS/xevov.

;

writings.
2

Oncken,' in proof of
appeals,

this,

rightly

besides other passages (p. 59 sq.), to those passages of the Ethics in which an audience is spoken of Eth. i. 5tb rrjy TroAiTt/cTjs 1, 1095, a, 2, 11
:

(Eth. X. 10, 1079, b, 23, 27 vii. 5, 1147, b, 9, are not relevant here and Pol. vii. 1, 1323, b, 39 T4pas yap iariv ipyov crx''^^'^^ ' Tuvra, only means this beinquiry.') another longs to Oncken further proves that, in referring on any point to other works, only such expressions are used as are suited to a person who is sjjealdng, such as dp-qTai, KeKreov, &\\os \6yo5, Sec. but such language was certainly used in referring to writings (like the Problems and the i^corepiKol \6yoi, see above, p. 96, and p. 115, n. 4), and is often so used in our own days. He also refers to the title
; :
;

TToAtTt/c^
;

aKp6a<Tis

{ap.

DiOG.

v.

24) (pvcriK^ aKpSams is likewise universally used for the Physics

(vid. supr. p. 81, n. 2)
;

but since

ovK

ecTTt oIkio5

OLKpoaT^s 6 v4os
. . .

we do
titles

iTfpl [x\v

cLKpoarov

irecppoifiidaOoo

know with whom these originate, not much can be

not

Toa-avra.

Ibid.

c.

2,

1095, b, 4

inferred from them.

Sib Se? To7s edeffiy ^ix^ai KaAccs

rhv

134

ARISTOTLE
But on closer inquiry, this argument For it is not here a question of any as commonly arise in the redaction of

statement.^

comes

to nothing.

such defects

well-ordered lectures badly reported, through omissions

and repetitions and the erroneous piecing together of the broken argument. It is more a question of peculiarities of style not restrained by the writer, which are too characteristic and too constant in their character to
allow us to

make chance and the

for

errors of third persons

Such an origin might be thought possible if they appeared in some books and not in others. But as they in fact extend, though in varying
them.^
degrees, through the whole, they can only be ascribed
to Aristotle himself
'

answerable

The very
chief

style

and form of the

And

this

is

the

ground on which Oncken bases his opinion. The defects of our texts are most easily explained from tlie natural defects of a peripatetic monologue
'

(he says, p. 62), 'hastily copied and badly edited from the note-books of the audience.' 2 With these must be reckoned the formation of the sentences (searchingly inv^estigated by Bonitz, Arist. Stud. ii. 3 sqq.) especially the explanations, often of considerable length, which are parenthetically introduced, and the anacolutha consequent on this the frequent use or absence of certain
in
;

occurring so often in all Aristotelian writings, which are put at one time in simple form, at another (as in De An. i. 1, 403, b, 7 sqq.. Gen. et Corr. ii. 11,337, b, o, and in the passages explained by Bonitz, Arist. Stiid. ii. 16 sq., ibid. 6, 333, b, 30) in a
form, but are not answered. That such unanswered questions could not have occurred in a composition (Oncken, ihid. cannot allow 61), one how many, for instance, are found, only to mention one modern writer, in Lessing Neither can one admit the supposition {ibid. 59), that they were answered, in oral discourse, by the audience or the teacher. They seem to be, both in Aristotle and Lessing, a very natural diversion of an acute and lively Dialectic, which
disjunctive

particles (proofs of

which are

to

be found in EucKEN, Be Arist. Dicendi Ratione^ and in Bonitz's

f. d.

in the Ztschr. 1866, 804 sqq.), and similar points. The same is the true view as to the questions

notice of this

work

Mr. Gymn.

would have been more likely to be removed than retained by any

reporter.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

135

writings therefore afford a strong indication that not

only their contents but their language

is

Aristotle's
^)

own. from

A like conclusion
might allude

follows also (as

;

we

have seen

the series of cross references

to one or

for in a lecture a

man
could

two past

courses, but

hardly refer to a whole series of lectures widely distant

in date, as to which he could not assume that the details

were in the memory of his present audience.^

moreover that in

It

seems

many

cases, as in the

Natural Philo-

sophy, the matter of the various treatises goes too closely

into detail for the purposes of oral teaching.
lectures

Such

would have taxed the attention and memory of the most zealous hearer, and it is difficult to see how
they could have been transcribed so perfectly.^

Yet

these treatises stand on no different footing from the

rest.

We

learn that Theophrastus and

Eudemus

in their

Analytics followed

Aristotle, not only in

the general

plan, but in details,'*

followers adopted

and we can bring proof that these word for word several passages of the

extant Meta/pliysics.^
^

Eudemus adopted

the Ethics of

See pp. ]28, 131. Note, in relation to this point, how one and the same composition is frequently ref erred to in the most remote places, and how, on the other hand, the most widely differing texts are cited in the same treatise. Thus the Physics, De Calo, Gen.
'^

Anima, Be Sensu, Part. An.,

GeJi. An. the Metapliyncs quote the Analytics, Physics, Be Coclo, Ethics, the 4K\oy^ rSov ^vavriuiv inthe Rhetoric, the Tojncs,Analytics. Politics, Poetics, and the eoSe/creia are quoted, ^ The notion of formal dictation can hardly be suggested, but if it were, it would imply that our Aristotelian writings were the work of Aristotle him; ;

et

Corr., Meteor., Be Anima, Be Sensu, Part. An., are quoted in many passages of the Jf6;f<z/7%sics and in the Ethics the books on Generation and Corruptlonin the Meteorology, Metaphysics, Be
;

self
* *

and not

his pupils' notes. Cf. p. 67. Cf. p. 78, n. 1.

136
Aristotle,

ARISTOTLE
and
still

more the

Physics,^ often verbally,

into his

letters in

own corresponding texts. We actually possess which Eudemus consults Theophrastus as to

the text of a particular passage and receives his answer.^

These
fashion

facts clearly justify Brandis' remark.^ that the

in

which

Aristotle's

followers

clung to the

master's writings presupposes that they were dealing

with his actual words.

it

As

to the Tojncs in particular,

it is not a mere tranby another hand, but that on the contrary it bears to be and must have been the work of Aristotle

has been already proved that

script

(see p. 128).

If
stotle

it

be true that the philosophical works of Ariat his death

had not yet passed

beyond the

circle

of his personal hearers, this circumstance would

it

make

also intelligible that they might for a long time, even after his death, have been withheld from general publicity, or that they might even by an unlucky acci-

dent have been

lost

to the Peripatetic School.

And,

according to a curious and well-known story, such an accident was said to have occurred, involving, as was
supposed, the
Aristotle.
*

loss

for

two centuries of the texts of

See the section dealing with

xix.,

Phi/s. v.

2,

226,

b, 14,

and are
a,

Eudemus, etc., infra, Ch. and notes thereon.

'

found in Simpl. Phys. 216 Schol 404, b, 10,

^

These

have

reference

to

^r.-rom. Phil.

ii.

b, 114.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

137

CHAPTEK

III

HISTORY AND ORDER OF THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

Strabo and Plutarch say that the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus passed, at the death of the latter, to his heir, Neleus of Scepsis, and that they were
stowed away in a cellar by the heirs of Neleus, discovered only in the early part of the last century B.C.

by Apellico of Teos in a decayed condition, brought by him to Athens and thence by Sulla as spoils of war to Kome, where they were afterwards used and republished by Tyrannio and Andronicus..^
writers

From

this

story the

named argue

that

to

the Peripatetics

who

followed Theophrastus, not only the master's chief works,

but also his true philosophical system was unknown,

but they do not

tell

us whether this allegation

is

grounded on their own opinion, or on

The date of this edition must have fallen somewhere about the middle of the last century B.C. For as Tyrannio was in B.C. 71 taken prisoner in Amisus and released by Muraena (cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Or., pt. iii. a, 550, 1), he could hardly have settled in

definite evidence,

Ad

and Atticus (Cic. Ad Qu. Fr. ii. 5, His work at Att. iv. 4, 8).

Rome could not, therefore, have extended very far beyond the middle of the century, even though he perhaps lived on into
the last third of it. (He died according to Suid. s. v. ynpaihs, in the third year of an Olympiad the number of which has unbeen miswritten.) fortunately

Rome Rome

before Lucullus' return to (66 B.C.). We know that

he was even at the time of his capture a scholar of renown, that he was instructing in B.C.
67 the sons of Cicero, and had some intercourse with the latter

About Andronicus
Ph.
d. Gr., pt.
iii.

cf.

a,

549, 3,

Zeller, and

above, p. 49, n.

6.

138

ARISTOTLE
if so,

what the nature of the evidence might be.^ found in the tale a welcome explanation of incompleteness and irregularities of the existing the If in truth the case were exactly as Strabo Corpus.^ and Plutarch say, we should not only not wonder at the
and
Later
critics

existing defects, but

far

we should

rather have expected a

wider and more hopeless corruption than appears in For if it were true of the most important fact to exist.
'

Our

authorities

for

the

ro7s fjXv irdXai tois fiera

QeocppaffTO,

above narrative are, as we have remarked, Strabo (xiii. 1, 54, p.

608) and Phitarch (^tiUa, 26), for Suid 'XvWas only copies I'luThe latter, however, untarch. doubtedly gets his information

TOV OVK
u)TpLK(Jou,

XOV(riv
yur/Sej/

oAws

fii^Ala

irKriv oK'fyojv,

Koi fjaKicrra roov e|e;^et^ <pi\o(ro<piv

TTpay/xaTiicuis

dWa

O^aeis \r}Kvdi(iv'
d(p'

ro7s

5'

vaTepov,

Tuvra

irporiAdfv,

&fmvov

ov to $ifi\ia fJLev iKeivwu

The only thing from Strabo. which the latter does not give is the remark that Andronicus obtained copies of the Aristotelian works through Tyrannio, published them, and wrote the robs
vvu
(pepofjLepovs irivaKas.

(pi\oao(pe1v

Kal apiaroreXi^eiP, to. iroAAo duayKa^eadai. ixfuroi et/cora K^yeiv Sid rh irArjdos rcov

Plut.

may

have added this from what he knew from other sources, or also supposes in Arist. (as Stahr Strabo's historical ii. 23) from work (made use of immediately
afterguards
for an incident Sulla's residence at Athens).

in

But we can only suppose this to have been taken from Andronicus, if we limit the {to7s Peripatetics' 'younger S' va-repov, &c.) to those predecessors of Andronicus who were able to use the editions of Apellico and Tyrannio, and it is very questionable whether anyone could attribute to these
d/xapTLu>u.

We

have no right to suppose (Heitz, Yerl. Schr. 10) a source for his information about Apellico'sdiscoverj'- of books, independent of

men, who are qiiite unknown to us, an improvement of the Peripatetic doctrine, and a closer
insight into
Aristotle,

such

as

Hence our only stable witness for this item is Strabo. But we do not know to whom the latter was indebted for his information; the supposition that it was Andronicus is very unsafe. Strabo, after the statements as to the purchase of the AristoteStrabo.
lian books by Apellico, and as to his faulty editing of them, says avvi^T] Se toIs ck rSov TrepnrdTcov,
:

might with reason be ascribed to Andronicus. As little can we assume Tyrannio or Boethus
Grote ascribes it, Ari54) as Strabo's source of information, since the former
(to
stotle,
i.

whom

would have taken a different view of his own edition, and the latter of the younger Peripatetics. 2 Thus BuHLE, Allff. UncyM. Sect. i. vol. V. 278 sq., and lately Heitz; see next page, n. 2.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

139

works that the only source of our extant text was to be

found in these MSS., which rotted
for a

century and

more in the

cellar of Scepsis,

till

Apellico found

them

worm-eaten, ruined by damp, and tossed into a disordered heap

if it

be true that he, as Strabo says,

the

supplied unskilfully

missing portions,

and that

Tyrannio and Andronicus also had no further manuscripts they could collate who then could guarantee

that in any

number

of cases there would not have been

foreign matter, found

among

Neleus'

MSS., adopted
of his

into Aristotle's text, or connected parts

own

works separated, and other portions blunderingly bound together, or lacunae great and small filled up by the
editor's fancy ?

Modern

criticism has, however, raised doubts about

^

Strabo's story

which even

its

defenders cannot alto-

That Theophrastus bequeathed his library to Neleus is beyond doubt.^ That the MSS. of
1 After the isolated and disregarded voice of a learned Frenchman, about the beginning of the eighteenth century, had raised doubts as to this narration (see what Stahr fjives in Arist. ii. 163 sq. from the Journal des AS^-aj'ttw^of the year 1717, p. 655 sqq., as to the anonymous composition Les Amhiitcz de la Critique), Brandis (' Ueb. die

gether silence.2

cularity (Arisfotelia, il 1-166, cf.

294 sq.). Later scholars have mostly followed them, 2 Heitz, Verl. Schr. d. Ar. 9 sqq., 20, 29 sqq. Grote, Aristotle, i. 50 sqq. Grant, Ethics
; ;

Schicksale
llhein.

d.

arist.
v.

Biicher.'

Mus.

Niebuhr
, ;

and

Brandis, i. 236 sqq 259 sqq. cf. Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii. b, 66 sqq.) was the first to deal with it seriously, Kopp {Rhein. 3fus. iii. 93 sqq.)

of Ar. i. 5 sqq., Aristotle, 3 sqq. Certain errors in Strabo's and Plutarch's representation are indeed admitted by these scholars. but in the main it is said to be correct. It is impossible here to examine in detail the reasons given for this opinion, but the grounds for its rejection are fully dealt with in the text.

supplemented his criticism, and

has discussed the question with exhaustive partifinally

Stahr

DiOG. where

Theophrastus' will, apvd v. 52 cf. Athen. i. 3, it is added that Ptolemy Philadelphus bought the whole
^
;

140 Aristotle

ARISTOTLE
and Theophrastus belonging to that library
to

passed to tbe heirs of Neleus and were by them hidden

in a canal or cellar

escape a royal book-collector

in a desperate

and were afterwards found by Apellico condition, there is no need to doubt.^

which Strabo
relates as to the matter

All the facts

correct enough.

therefore be beyond question that Andronicus' edition of the Aristotelian text-books was

may

And

it

is

also

of epoch-making importance both for the study of the

system and

however, it be maintained that these writings were nowhere to be found outside the Scepsis cellar and were
for the preservation of the text.
If,

unknown

therefore to the Peripatetic School after the

death of Theophrastus, there are the strongest arguments

against any such theory.

In the

first place,

it

is

almost incredible that an

event so singularly notable as the discovery of the lost

masterpieces of Aristotle should never have been even
alluded to by any of those who, since that time, have

philosophers.

concerned themselves with Aristotle, as critics or as Cicero says not a word, though he had

abundant occasion,

for

he lived at

Rome

at the very

time when Tyrannio was working among the literary

booty of Sulla, and was, in
fact, in active
'

intercourse

with Tyrannio himself.

Alexander,

the Exegete,' says

nothing

nor does any one of the Greek critics

first

who used

the very works of Andronicus, either at

collection of Neleus and had it brought to Alexandria. For when Athenseus, or the epitomiser of his introduc'

or at second

Alexandria, this may easily be an inexact expression, just as the opposite it is inexact, in

tion, iUd., asserts that the rvTwle library of Neleus was taken to

way, when, in v 214, he makes Apellico possess not the works, but the library of Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
hand.

'

141

Andronicus himself seems to have ascribed to

Apellico's discovery so little importance that he based

neither the inquiry into the genuineness of a tract nor

the discussion of a various reading upon any reference

to the

MSS.

of Neleus.^

Later editors did not in any

way

feel

themselves bound
it

by

his

text,^

though

if

Strabo were right,

could be the only authentic one.

On

the other hand, the theory that by the loss of

the works of Aristotle, the followers of Theophrastus

strayed from the original teachings of their school and
lost

themselves in mere rhetorical developments,

facts.

is

an
as

obvious contradiction of the

It

may be

true that

the Peripatetics of the third century strayed

away

time went on from the study of natural philosophy and metaphysics, but this change took place not on the
death of Theophrastus, but at the earliest on the death
of his successor Strato.

So

far

was he from confining

himself to ethics and rhetoric, that he devoted himself,

on the contrary, with a one-sided preference to physics, though he by no means neglected logic and metaphysics.

He

frequently

contradicted

Aristotle;

but

that could not be

by ignorance of the Aristotelian system,

it

because he attacked

expressly.^

It does not appear

cf.

With regard to the first, the account given on p. 66, n.l. as to his doubts about the 'Ep;ur?i/etas n. with respect to the second point, cf. Dexipp. In Arist. Categ. p. 25, Speng. (Schol. in Ar. 42, a, 30) irpSiTov
:

likv

ovK iv Jkiraai rois avriypd^ois rh " 6 \6yos rris oixrias" irp6(TKeiTai, us Koi BorjOhs fjLvr]fio-

pute by means of Sulla's MSS. (or, if he had not access to the latter, at least by means of the copies of Tyrannio, which, according to Plutarch, he used). It seems, therefore, that these MSS. were not the only copies nor even the original ones of the

vivii KoX 'Av8p6uiKos it is not said that he has settled the dis-

works in question. Cf. Beandis, Rhein. Mus. i. 241. 2 Qf SiMPL. Ph]/s. 101, a. ' The proofs will be given,

'

142

ARISTOTLE
The theory that
Athens
is

that the scientific activity of the School came at once

to

an end, even

after Strato's death.^

the falling away of the later Peripatetics from Aristotle

was due
every
correlate

to the loss of his writings from

in

way
it

unnatural.

It is

to the parallel

much more reasonable to movement in the Academy,

at

which
Plato.

nevertheless

was

no

loss

for

texts

of

But who can

believe that the most important works

of the great philosopher were not extant at the date of

his successor's death

in
?

any other MSS. than those

or that not only in Aristotle's

which Neleus inherited

lifetime,

but also in the nine Olympiads between his

death and that of Theophrastus, not one of his

followers had ever been willing

many

and able to possess

himself of the most important sources of the Peripatetic teaching? Who can think that Eudemus, the most
loyal of the Aristotelian circle, or Strato, the shrewdest

of the Peripatetics, would have done without the Master's

books

or that Demetrius

of Phalerus did not include

them

in his zeal for collecting learned

works

or that

Ptolemy Philadelphus bought other books of Aristotle and Theophrastus for his Library of Alexandria, but
omitted to obtain copies of their essential texts ? The story also supposes that the possessors of the

stotle

manuscripts objected to such uses of them that Arikept his writings closely under lock and key, and
:

that Theophrastus, for no apparent reason, kept up this

in part, in the following piges. They will also be found in the section on Strato, infra, Ch. XX., and notes thereon.
See, at end of vol. ii., the section on the Pseudo-Aristotelian texts (infra, Ch. xxi.).
'

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
secrecy,

143

and
are

laid it as a

duty on

Ms

heirs.

All this
^

is

too absurd to need serious refutation.

We

not

left,

however, wholly to conjecture.

The materials are very scanty for the history of a time whose philosophic literature by an unhappy accident we have almost wholly lost but we can still prove, as
;

to a great part of Aristotle's books, that they were not unknown to the learned men of the two centuries that

elapsed between Theophrastus' death and the occupation

by Sulla. Whether Aristotle did or did not him^oii jpuUish his strictly scientific treatises, they were in any case destined to be the text-books of the School,
and to be used by its members. Even those numerous passages in which they refer one to the other offer us a palpable proof that, in the view of the writer, they were
not only to be read by his scholars, but closely studied and compared, and, by consequence, that copies were to be kept and multiplied. That this was done is clear, not only from the notices which

of Athens

we find of particular books, but from certain general considerations also. If it is true that the Peripatetics lost the genuine
Aristotelianism
disappeared,
it

when

the

library

of

Theophrastus

must be because the sources of that teaching were nowhere else to be found. But we hear
not only of Theophrastus but of
imitated Aristotle
^

Eudemus
titles

also,

that he

not only in the

but also in the

contents of his books; and how close was the imitation both in wording and in the line of thought, we can see
for ourselves

in the

MUcs

and Physics of Eudemus.^

2

'

For references see pp. 65

^^'

Cf.pJ48,n.4,andinthesec-

^^^

tion on Euderaus at Ch. xix., inf.

144

ARISTOTLE
this,

To do
texts
;

Eademus must have

if,

possessed Aristotle's

especially
at a
it is

as a reliable story tells us,^ he used

them

Again,

time when he was not living at Athens.^ beyond doubt that the Alexandrian Library

included a large

number

of Aristotle's works. ^

The

compilers of the Alexandrine Canon,

who

place Aristotle

among the model

chiefly in

writers of philosophy,

may have had

view the more careful style of his exoteric

^

writings

but in the foundation of that great collection

it is not possible that the scientific works of Aristotle can have been left out of account. If the Catalogue of

Diogenes ^ comes from the Alexandrine Library, it is proof positive that they were there but even if that
:

conjecture (in itself extremely probable) were erroneous,

the Catalogue
1

still

proves in any case that the compiler of

3 Besides what has been remarked on p. 142, we have the fact that Ptolemy Philadelphus busied himself zealously about Aristotelian books, paid high prices for them, and thus gave

Vide supra,

p. 130, n. 3.

Sckr. 13) indeed thinks that if the Aristotelian works had been universally known and published, it would be incomprehensible that Eudemus in his Physics (and
2

Heitz

( Verl.

Ethics) should have imitated the

words
It

of

Aristotle

so

exactly.

if that Eudemus had hesitated to do this with regard to published works, a plagiarism on unpublished ones must have seemed much more unlawful to hira. It is impossible, however, to re-

seems,

however,

occasion to the forgery of such texts (Ammon. Schol. in Arist. David, iUd., 1. 14 28, a, 43 And such SiMPL. Categ. 2, e). accounts as those noticed at p.
;

gard his conduct in this light at all, and he himself probably never so regarded it. His Ethics and Physics were never intended to be anything but elaborations of the Aristotelian works
universally known in the Peripatetic School, adapted to the needs of his own tuition.

64, n. 1 and 67, n. 1, about the two books of the Categories and the forty of the Analytics which Adrastus found in old libraries, must refer especially to the Alexandrian Library. But it is

not

to be supposed

that

the

latter obtained only substituted

works, and did not possess the genuine ones, by reference to which the forgeries were proved. * See Stake, ibid. 65 sq. on
this point.
"^

For which see

p. 48 sqq.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
it,

146

and earlier than Andronicus, had before him a great part of our extant Corpus Aristotelicum} Its probable author, Hermippus, was acquainted with the works of Theophrastus
(which according to Strabo and Plutarch were buried in Scepsis along with those of Aristotle), as is clear from
his catalogue of them, preserved, apparently,

who

lived later than Theophrastus

by Dio-

genes.2

That he at

all

events

disappearance of the Aristotelian

knew nothing of the writings, may probably

be inferred from the silence of Diogenes on that subject.^ Another strong evidence of the use of the Aristotelian books in the third century B.C. is to be found in the
Stoic teaching, which in its most systematic exposition by Chrysippus follows both in logic and in physics more closely on the Aristotelian than could be possible
if

the Aristotelian text-books were unknown.

indeed,

There some express evidence that Chrysippus had

is,

in

fact these texts in view.'*

P- ^^' - 1-

SI*

Cf.thescholionattheendof

the Metaphysics of Theophrastus TovTo rh fiifixiov 'AvBpoviKos fih

ovde yhp iv t^ waypatp^ ruv (dio<ppdaTov ^ifi\iwu. From the same list evidently is taken the scholion at the beginmng of the seventh book of the History of Plants {apud Usenee, Atml. Theophr. 2^) o<(>pd(TTov

Koi "Ep^tTTTTos ayvoovffiv

fiv^iav

ahrov '6\ws

TreTroLrjrai

originated with Hermippus, is the more probable since that writer is mentioned immediately before in v. 45. 3 For, on the one hand, it is not to be supposed that Hermippus in his copious work on
Aristotle (mentioned on p. 51, n. 2) would not have mentioned this circumstance, if he had been aware of it and, on the other hand, it
;

^epi <pvTa>v iffTopias t5

r;'.

"Epfxiinros

Sejepl (ppvyaviKHv Kol iroiwSuv, 'AvSpdvLKos Se irepl (pvTuv Iffropias.

DiOG. (ii. 55) names a book by Hermippus on Theophrastus, of which It probably formed a part,

very improbable that the author to whom Diogenes is indebted for his many quotations from Hermippus would have passed over this information. Diogenes, to whose
is

literary tastes

it

mended
upon
*

itself,

That the

must have recomwould have seized

lists in

Diog.

v.

46 sqq.,

it, if

at least in part

and

indirectly,

he found it. For even if we were not

VOL.

I.

146

ARISTOTLE
If the works of Aristotle were first unearthed

by

Apellico and first fully known through Tyrannio and Andronicus, how could it be said of Oritolaus that he

imitated the old masters of his school Aristotle, that ^ or how of Herillus the Stoic is, and Theophrastus ?
that he based himself upon them,^ or of Pana3tius that he was always quoting them?^ How could we have

mention of the constant tendency of Posidonius towards

Aristotle?'*

How

could Cicero's teacher,

Antiochus,

have explained the Aristotelian teaching as one with and the Academic, and attempted their complete amalgamation ? ^ or where could oppothorough-going nents such as Stilpo and Hermarchus have found the
^ So again, since material for their attacks on Aristotle ? letter in which AlexAndronicus gives us the alleged

ander complains to Aristotle about the publication of that date his doctrine,"^ it follows that long before of Aristotle, including some of those which writings

were afterwards reckoned

'

exoteric,'

must have

in fact

been public property.

Scanty as are the sources open to us, we can ourAndronicus, selves demonstrate -the public use before not only of many of the lost works, which, being
inclined to attach much importance to the polemic against one of the discourses mentioned on p 56 n 1 yet the expression in Plut Sto. Bep. 24, p. 1045, supIhid. iii. a, 514, 2. tUd. particulars, Fuller 535 sqq. Stilpo wrote, according to DiOG. ii. 120, an 'ApiaroreWs, Hermarchus (ibid. x. 25) -rrphs From the expres'AptcrTore'Arjv. sion of Colotes ajmd Plut. Adv. Col 14, 1, p. 1115, we can, however, conclude nothing.
^

poses

acquaintance

with

Ari-

stotle's dialectical writings. 1 Q^Q ^^^ V 5 14.

2

Ibid.
d.

V. 25,' 73.
;

Ibid iv 28, 79
Gr. pt.
iii.

cf.

Zbll.,

Ph.

a,

503, 3,

2nd

ed.

'

See pp. 22,

n. 1,

and

112, n.

3.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
exoteric or

147

hypomnematic/ are not here in point, but also of the majority of the scientific treatises themselves.
In the case of the Analytics we show this by the Catalogue of Diogenes and by the notices as to the use made of them by Theophrastus and Eudemus.^ For the Categories and the Uspl spfn^vslas, we have the Catalogue.3 As to the former, Andronicus found in his
the spurious Post-prsedicamenta added to them, and was acquainted with several recensions, having varying titles and different readings.^ It follows, there'

MS.

'

fore,

his

must have been long before day in the hands of transcribers.^ The Tojpics are
^

that the Categories

in the Catalogue of Diogenes,^ and Theophrastus

vide supra the four books, IT. p. 64, n. 2. StKoioo-vvTjs (p. 56, n. 1), taken into consideration by Chrysippus,
*

and

The

letters,

Demetrius (n, kpfi-qv.), probably also by Carneades the ProtrejMcus, which is known even to Crates, Zeno. and Teles (p. 60, n. 1), the Eudemus (p. 56, n. 2), which at any rate Cicero used the discourses on Philosophy
Teles,
;

60, d) was attacked by Cephisodorus; in short (as has been shown at p. 48 s^q.), all the compositions given in the Catalogue of Diogenes, not to mention the spurious but much-used composition n. evyeveias (p. 59, n. 2). The writings on ancient
ii.

philosophers,
sus, &c., are

among which

is in-

cluded our extant tract onMelis-

which, before him, Philodemus, and also Metrodorus, pupil of Epicurus, made use of the ipu>TiKbs, which, according to Athen. XV. 674, b, Aristoof Ceos knew; the dialogue n.7roti7Tc5j/(p.58, n. 1), which Eratosthenes and Apollodorus seem to have used the '0\vfnriov7Kai, which Eratosthenes (ajmd DiOG. viii. 51), quotes the DidascaUcs, which Didymus quotes in the Scholiasts to Aristoph. J?;. 1379 (cf. Heitz, Verl. ScJir. Z^^); the Uapoi/xlai, on account of which Aristotle (according to Athen.
;
; ;

(p. 55, n. 6) 58, n. 1 end),

and on Wealth

(p.

found a2?ud Diog No. 92-101 (see p. 62, n. 2, siwra). 2 See p. 67, n. 1. ^ See pp. 64, n. J, 66, n. 1. * See pp. 64 and 66,-p. 141, n.l.
*

The
the

same

would

follow

from

statement

Cateff., ScJwl. 79, a, 1),

(Simpl. that An-

dronicus followed pretty closely the Categories of Archytas, since the latter at any rate are imitations of the Aristotelian; Simplicius, however, bases what is here said merely on his false supposition of their genuineness.
^
^

Cf. p. 68, n. 1,

and

71, n. 2.

Of

Theophrastus

this

is

L 2

148
his follower Strabo
^

ARISTOTLE
had used them.

The

Rhetoric

is

imitated and referred to in writings which in

all likeli-

hood are themselves earlier than Andronicus;^ and the same is true of the Theodectine Rhetoric.^ The worked over by Theophrastus and Physics were

Eudemus, and the

that he
is

latter followed the text

so closely

actually cited in support of the correctness of

reading."^

various

One

of the

scholars of

Eude-

clear
p. 5,

from Alexander In Top. m. (of. 68. 72, 31), In Me-

same author In Categ. Schol. 92, b, 20 sq., with Themist. Phys. 54,
b, 55, a,

taph. 342, 30, 373, 2 (705, b, 30, See Simpl. Categ. 719, b, 27). Schol. in Ar. 89, a, 15. infra Toj)., Alex. Cf. (Schol. 281, b, 2). Among Strabo's writings is found apitd DiOG. v.
>

(Schol. 409, b,

a,6,b, 28),

and Brandis,
;

8, 411, Rliein.

Mus. i. 282 thereon about Eudemus, Simpl. P%s. 18, b(^risf.

Phys. 2, 185, b, 11);^ also 29, a b YJj^twxQs rep 'ApttrTOTeAet irdvra
i.
:

59, a,T6ir(cv irpooifiia.

-

KaraKoKovdwu
is

120, b,

where
iii.

it

The former in the Nhetoric

remarked on Phys.
:

8,

208,

n. 3),

ad Alex, (vide supra, p. 74, which Diogenes (No. 79) knows (cf. p. 72, n. 2) as well as cur Bhetorio (about which see the latter p. 72, n. 2, ad /in.) apud Demetrius, Be Elociitione quotations from our Rhetoric are found here, c. 38, 41 ( Rhet. iii.
; ;

KdKXiov yap, olfiai, rh " e|a) 18 rov i.(TTiws " ovTois aKoveiv, ws 6
b,
Eijd-nixos ivoTiffe

&c.

so 121,

rarov b ev
:

KaO-nye/JiSvos,
ricri
*'

apTiypdcpois']

avrl

rod

dh [sc. "
Koivij

"TrpwTTj. "
EijS-n/xos;

Kal ovro)

ypdcp^i

Kot

128,

Etjhrjixos 5e
;

rov:

TOLS 13,

TrapaKoXovOoov,

1409, a, 1); c. 11, 34 {Rhet. c. 81 iii. 9, 1409, a, 35, b, 16) (Rhet. iii. 11, init.y, to it ihid. c 34 refers, which is earlier than
8,
;

Eudemus
irapwv
;

writes,

the author Archedemus, who was probably the Stoic of that name, circa 140 B.C.
(as shown at p. 72, likewise given in Diogenes, and is named by the Rhetoric ad Alex. * get these facts, apart from other proof, from the exceedingly numerous references to for the Physics in Simplicius Theophrastus, instance, about cf. Simpl. Phys. 141, a and b, and 187, a, 201, b, and the
3

222, b, 18, iv rols E(;5. 201, b eavTov (pvaiKols irapacppd^wv ra rov Eude'Apia-ToreXovs; 216, a:
:

&C. 178, b in Phyx. iv. not Udpuv but

mus immediately connects with

what is found in Aristotle at the end of the fifth book, the be223, ginning of the sixth in Aristotle an eVl raSe rea peated in a diiferent context
;
:

Which
is

n.

2)

We

(Phys. vi. 3, 234, a, 1) gives an ambiguity in expression, and so

Eudemus puts "

iircKeiva "

instead
:

of the second eVl raSe; 242, a (beginning of the seventh book) Ei5. /uc'xpi rovSe SArjy (Tx^^^v irpayKe^aXaiois b.Ko\ovQi](Tas^ fiareias

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

149

mus
'

cited from

tlie

Physics of Aristotle the three books

on Movement.' It can also be proved that the same work was known to Strabo,^ and Posidonius the Stoic showed
less

no

acquaintance with

it.^

The De

Ccelo

cannot

be shown with certainty to have been known to any

writer older
It
is,

than

Andronicus except Theophrastus."*

continuation

however, very unlikely that this work disapits

peared after his time when

ysvsaseos
/cal

the
is

Hepl

(\>9opas

appears

in the Catalogue of
,

Diogenes,^ and

when the

Meteorology

which

is closely

connected with both the one and the other,

to have

known

been used by many writers of that period.^

it

Posidonius, for example, appropriated from

the theory

of the elements,^ and Strabo disputed its account of the

heaviness and lightness of bodies.^

The

(spurious)

and the Astronomy, are named in the list The Natural History was adapted not in Diogenes. only by Theophrastus,^^ but also by the Alexandrine That it was not writer Aristophanes of Byzantium.*^
Mechanics^
toCto
iv
Trap\dci}v

ws Trepirrhv
/col
'6

iirl

to

T^

re\evTai(f>
;

^i^Xitp Ke<j>d\aia

Simplicius remarks that it is based on Aristotle (Phys. ii. 2).

* ^

/iCTTjA^e

279, a:
(r^eS^i'

ye

Ei;5.

Vide supra,

p. S3, n. 1.

irapa<ppd(oi}U

Kal

avrhs to

That

is,
j8'

^ApiarroreXovs

ridricn

koI
;

ravra

(rroix^iwu a'

No. 39, y\ refers to

if

n.
it

ffwrSfxcos 294, b shows that the first motor must be immovable to which Eudemus adds rh irpwrtas Kivovv Kad' eKdffTTjv Kivqffiv. For

TO

Tfx-fiixaTa

Aristotle

further details see ch. xix. infra,

and
^

p. 136,

2.
:

Damasus

vide supra, p. 82.

about which see p. 50, n. 1 * Vide sujyra, p. 83, n. 1. ^ Simpl. De Ccelo, Schol. in Ar. 517, a, 31. SiMPL. iMd. 486, a, 5. * The former No. 123, the latter 113 vide supra, p. 86, n. 1. *" DiOG. v. 49 names as his
**

2 Cf. Simpl. Phys. 153, a (155, b), 154, b, 168, a, 187, a, sqq., 189, b (cf. Phys. iv. 10), 214, a.
3 In fragment the ajnid Simpl. Phys. 64, b of which
:

'ETriTo/iwi/ 'Apta-TOT6Aovs

n.

Z^Jwi/ r'.

" According to Hierocl. Hippiatr. Prtef. p. 4, this grammarian had written an 'EiriToyu^ of
it,

which Artemidor.
ii.

Oneiroe/y

oit.

14 calls

virofivfifiara

150

ARISTOTLE
the Alexandrine period
is

unknown during

also

shown

by the Catalogue of Diogenes (No. 102), and by the

existence of a popular compilation from
it

which was

much

in use.^

The Be Anima was

used, after Theo'

phrastus,^ by the author of the book on the

of Living Creatures,'
Ilspl
iTvsvfJLaros?

Movement who used also the spurious treatise As to the Problems,* it is more

than improbable that the working up of that book for the Peripatetic School began later than the time of
Andronicus.
seen,'^

The

Meiarpliyncs

was used, as we have

not only by Theophrastus and Eudemus, but after

them by Strabo and other Peripatetics. It was prothough some sections of ])ably published by Kudemus
;

it

do seem to have been

first

introduced by Andronicus

into the then extant Aristotelian treatise on the First

Philosophy.

Of the

EtJdcs,

it is

obvious that

it

could not

have existed only in Tlieophrastus's MS. so as to be lost with it, for if so it could not have been worked over
either

by Eudemus or
Moralia.

at a later date
Politics, if

by the author of
are to judge

Magna
the
list

The

we

by

of Diogenes, was to be found in the Library of

Alexandria,*" along with the first

(see Schneider in Demetrius edition i. xix ). also, Be Elomit. 97, 157 (cf. H. An. ii. 1, 497, b, 28 ix. 2. 32, 610, a, 27, 619, a, 16), or perhaps the earher writer used by him,
'ApicrroTekrjv

book of our Economics,

his

For the present purpose it is of no importance whether they are mediate or immediate witnesses for the use of Aristotle's work.
^ Upon which see ThemiSTOCLES in De An. 89, b, 91, a Philop. De An. C. 4. Cf. p. 89,

knows
'

this epitome.
l,^rf

Aboutwhichseep.87,n.

n.l, supra,
^ *

fin.

From this compilation also the many quotations from the

Cf. p. 89, n. 2 ad fin. As to which cf. p. 96.

Ar'\stote\\aiVL History of Animals in Antigonus' Mirabilia (c. 16, 22, 27-113, 115) are perhaps taken,

^ ^

See p. 79, n. Vide snpra,

1.

p.

100, n.

p. 100, n. 8,

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which
is also

151

by Philodemus.i It is obvious that before him the author of that book 2 had the Folitics knew it also is indicated by the notices that DicEearchus
cited

of his Tripoliticus.^
is

The use

source Cicero

not so well proven,'^ owed the parts of

political

it in the Magna Moralia we cannot tell to what and

of

it is

which he used

for his
it

own

works

but

it

not doubtful that

must have been accessible to learned persons after the death of Theophrastus. The same is true of the UoXiTStai, for the use of which in the Alexandrine
period
1

we have abundant
Vit. ix. ( Vol Here, ii.) 47, col. 27, 15, where

proofs.^

That the Poetics

Leg.
iii.

De

taken from the Aristotelian Politics,

col. 7, 38,
it is
2

citing Cic.
i.

iii.

6.,

ascribed to Theophrastus. Whom we have rather to

Bep.

25

(cf. Polit.

9,

1280,

6, 29, c,

seek in

Eudemus
:

or one of his

Peripatetic contemporaries than In Aristotle see ch. xxi. infra.^ s On which see infra, ch. xix.

ad fin. * Although happiness

i.

is

here,

4,

1184, b,

3.S

sqq., defined as

ivepyna Koi XP^o''^ '^'^^ aperrjs, this has certainly a greater resemblance to Polit. vii. 13, 1332, a, 7 (a passage to which Nickes, Be
Arist.
Polit. Zibr. 87 sq. calls attention) than to Mh. JV. i. 6, X. 6, 7, Und. ii. 1, since happiness is here certainly called ivcpyeia kot' apcT^v (or t^s ap6T77s),but the conjunction of the ivepyeia and

6, 1278, b, 8, 19, i. 2, 1253, a, 2) Rej). i. 26 (Pol. iii. c. 1, 1274, b, 36, c. 6, 1278, b, 8, i. 27 7, 1279, a, 25 sqq.); Rej). (Pol. iii. 9, 1280, a, 11, c. 10, 11, 1281, a, 28 sqq., b, 28, c. 16, 1287, Rej). i. 29 (Pol. iv. a, 8 sqq.) Susemihl (Arist. Pol. 8, 11). xliv. 81) also agrees with this. But since Cicero does not name Aristotle in the Rejntblic, and Leg. iii. 6 only refers to him in very indefinite expressions, he
;
;

Then the XpVffts is wanting. XP^o-is is also spoken of in IJnd.

1219, a, 12 sqq. 23, Mc. i. 9. 1098, b, 31, and thus it is quite possible that only these passages were in the mind of the author of the Great Ethics.
*

seems not to have drawn immediately on Aristotle, and the question arises where did he get this Aristotelian doctrine from ? Susemihl, p. xlv, thinks, from Tyrannic, but we might also pre:

sume Dicaearchus, whom Cicero was fond of using. 6 The oldest witness for this is Timaeus, ajmd PoLYB.xii. 5-11, and the latter author himself.
There is also, besides Diog. (Hermipjms) No.l45,the Scholiast
of Aristophanes, who (according to a good Alexandrine authority)

Zeller had already proved

in his 2nd ed., that in Cicero's political writings many things are

152

ARISTOTLE
is

was

also known to the Alexandrine grammaria,ns placed beyond doubt by recent research.^

We may sum up the case by saying that of the genuine portions of the extant Corpus, there are only the works on the Parts, Genesis, and Movement
Animals, and the minor anthropological tracts, as to which we cannot show either express proof or high probability for the assertion that they were in use after
the disappearance of Theophrastus's library from Athens. Even as to these we have no reason to doubt it only

of

we cannot positively prove it and that, when we remember the fragmentary character of our knowledge of
;

the philosophic literature of the period in question,

is

and Plutarch that the scientific writings of Aristotle were after the death of Theophrastus all but wholly withdrawn from access is therefore decisively negatived by the facts. A
belief of Strabo

nothing strange.

The

few of these writings may possibly have suffered the fate which they ascribe to the whole. One book or
lost to the School at Athens the library of Theophrastus, and may have been again published by Andronicus from the

another

may have been

lost

when they

damaged MSS.
reasons

of Sulla's
all

collection.

But that

this

happened to any or

of the important books

is for all

antecedently improbable.

There must have

of

quoted the noAiTe?ai very often; see Anst. Ft. ed. Rose, Nos. 352, 355^Sn'^I^'^^'^'^^^'^^^'^l-^^esq., 470 485, 498 sq., 525, 583. Iheir presence in the Alexandrian hbrary is clear from the Catalogue of Diog. (No. 83), and their having been used by Ari-

stophanes

Didymus from the

Byzantium and proofs which

de AHe Trag. Judic. Rel^ from the Introductions and Scholia to Sophocles and Euripides

Susemihl has collected at p. 20 sq., of his edition (following Trendelenburg, Granmiat. Grac.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

153

the long

been copies of the important text-books made during life of Theophrastus. He who cared so well

way, by providing for them gardens and houses and a museum and the means of maintaining it, could never have deprived them of his most precious and most indispensable possession his own and his master's texts if a sufficient substitute for them were not at hand. Any theory, therefore, as to an individual book of our collection, that its text rests solely on a MS. from Apellico's library, ought to rest entirely on the internal evidence of the book itself; for Strabo's and Plutarch's suggestion of a general
for his scholars in every other

disappearance of the texts could give

It is not, however, to

it

no support.

be denied that

many

of the

books show signs leading to the conclusion that in their present form other hands than the author's have been at work. We find corruptions of the text, lacunae in
the logical movement, displacement of whole sections,
additions that could be additions which

made only by
context,

later hands, other

are Aristotelian

but were originally

repetitions

style, and which yet can hardly be late interpolations.^ Strabo's story, however, does not serve for the explanation of these phenomena, for the reason, among others, that

designed for some other we should not expect in

which

so condensed a

such peculiarities are to be found equally in those texts

to
Cf. with regard to this, not mention other points, what has been said before as to the Gate'

yoi-ies

(p. 64, n. 1), n. epi^nveias (p. 66, n. 1), the Rheto^-ie (p. 72, n. 2), the 3fetaphysies (p. 76, n.
3),

(p. 81,

the seventh book of the Physics n. 2 ad fin.), the fourth

book of the Meteorology (p. 83, n. 2), the tenth book of the History of Animals (p. 87, n. 1), n. ^vxris (p. 89, n. 2), bk. v. Be Gen. An. (p.92,n. 2),theMJucs (p. 98, n.l), and thePoetics (p. 102, n. 2); and the remarks in ch. xiii. infra upon
the state of the Politics,

154

ARISTOTLE

which we can prove to have been current before ApelWe must explain them really as arising in part lico. from the circumstances under which these treatises
were written and
issued,^ in part

from the way they

were used

for

teaching purposes,^ in part from the

and the many accidents to was exposed. which If we pass to the discussion of the time and sequence in which the writings of Aristotle were produced, we
carelessness of transcribers

each transcript

must remember that

Aristotle
first

this is of far less

importance than
It is clear that

in the case of the writings of Plato.

commenced

his career as a writer during his

it is

residence at Athens,^ and

probable that he

continued his literary activity in Atarneus,

Mitylene

and Macedonia.
all to

The extant

writings, however,

seem

much
them

belong to the second Athenian period, although preparation may probably have been made for
before.

The proof

of this lies partly in certain

traces of the dates of their production, which control

not only those books in which they occur, but also all that are later ^ and partly in the common references
: 1
'^

How

Cf. p. 108 sqq. easily, by this

means,

explanations and repetitions may find their way into the text, and greater or smaller sections may come to be repeated, is perfectly plain, and is proved on a large scale by the parallel case of the Eudemian Physics and Ethics. 3 See p. 56 sqq. He left Athens in

345-4 and returned in 335-4. Thus Meteor, i. 7, 345, a, 1, mentions a comet which was visible whenNicomachus(01. 109, 4, B.C. 341) was Archon in Athens, its
B.C.
*

course and position being accurately described as from subseThe quent personal inquiry. Politics refer to tlie Holy War as an event in the past (v. 4, 1304, a, 10), and to the expedition of Phalascus to Crete, which took place at its conclusion about 01. 108, 3 (DiODORUS, xvi. 62), with a j/eoxTTi (ii. 10, /m.)> but the same book refers to the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336) in v. 10, 1311, b, 1, without the least indication
of its having been a very recent The Bhetoric in ii. 23, event.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which even the
earliest of

155

them contain

to

Athens and
If,

to the place itself

where Aristotle taught.^

^

then, the

view already indicated

as to the destination of these

texts for his scholars, their connection with his teaching,

and the character of their cross references be

1397, b, 31,

right, it

1399, b, 12,
;

refers

without doubt to past events of the years B.C. 338-336 in iii. 17, 1418, b, 27 it mentions Isocrates' Philippus (B.C. 315) ; of the Rhetoric also Brandis shows {Philologvs, iv. 10 sqq.) that the

son of the indefiniteness of that particle. Just as little does it follow from Anal. Pri. ii. 24, that Thebes was not yet destroyed at that time we might rather gather the contrary, with regard to this work, from Polit.
;

Attic orators quoted in it Poetics who were younger than Demosthenes, could

many

iii.
'

5,

1278,

a, 25.

and in the

Cf.

Brandis,

Gr.-r'6m. Phil.

ii.

b, 116.

We may give
:

here a

by no means belong to a time

prior to Aristotle's
first

departure

from Athens, and the same is true of the numerous works of Theodectes which are used both here and in the Poetics. In Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 1, xii. 8, 1073, b, 17, 32, Eudoxus and the still younger Callippus, and in Eth. N. vii. 14, 11.53, b, 5, x. 2, init., Speusippus and Eudoxus are spoken of as if they were no longer living, Eose (Arist. Lihr. Ord. 212 sqq.) has shown with regard to the History of Animals^ from viii. 9, ii. 5. init., and other passages, that it was only written (or at least completed), some
time after the battle of Arbela,

which the Macedonians saw elephants for the first time, and probably not before the Indian expedition. The fact that even nmch earlier events are introduced with a vvv as inMeteor. iii, 1, 371, a, 30, the burning of the temple of Ephesus (01, 106, 1,
in

instances, besides those already noted. Categ. 4, 2, ttou, oXov iv AvKelcp. a, 1, c, 9 fin. Anal. Pri. ii. 24 Athens and Thebes, as examples of neighbours. Likewise in Phys. iii. 3, 202, b, 13; iMd. iv. 11, 219, b, 20: rh eV AvKcicf) elvai. Meta2)h. V. 5, rh 30, 1015,^ a, 25, 1025, a, 25 irXevffai ety A^yivav, as an example of a commercial journey. Ibid. V. 2i, fi7i. the Athenian festivals Dionysia and Thargelia (Aristotle also uses the Attic months e.g. Hist. An. v. 11, &c. ; but it is not fair to attach any importance to this), R7iet. ii, 7, 1385, a, 28 ^ eV AvKelq) rhv <popfji.hu Sovs. Ibid. in. 2, 1404, b, 22, Polit. vii. 17, 1336, b, 27: the actor Theodorus. Very frequent mention is also made of Athens and the
: : :
:

few further

Athenians (Ind. Ar. 12, b, 34 sqq.). Again the observation on the corona borealis (Meteor, ii. 5,
362, b, 9) suits the latitude of Athens, as Ideler (i. 567), on this passage, shows. 2 P. 108 sqq. especially p. 123 sq. and p. 128 sq.
:

b, 19,

and in Polit. v. 10, 1312, Dion's expedition (01, 105, 4 sq.) proves nothing, by reaB.C. 356),

166
follows that all of

ARISTOTLE
them
raust

have been composed during

Equally decisive, on this

his final sojourn in Athens.

head,

is

the observation that throughout the whole of so

comprehensive a collection, there is hardly to be found a single notable alteration of teaching or terminology.
All
is

ripe

and ready. All

is

in exact correspondence. All

the important writings are woven closely together, not only by express cross reference, but also by their whole
character.

There are no scattered products of the We can only look upon them different periods of a life. as the ordered execution of a work planned when the
author, having

come

to a full understanding with himself,

had gathered together the philosophic fruit of a lifetime. Even the earlier works which he proposed to connect
with his later writing, he revised on a comprehensive Therefore, for our use of these texts, it is no plan.
great matter whether
a particular book

was written

sooner or later than any other.

The problem, however,

must be

dealt with nevertheless.

is

caused by the use of cross references already noticed.^ As such cases are, after all, only exceptions in the general run of the citations, the value
certain difficulty

of these as an indication of sequence

is

not so slight as

has been supposed. There

in

are, in fact,

but few instances

which our judgment as to the order of the writings is placed in doubt by the occurrence of references both ways. Of the extant books, so far as they are open to this classification, 2 the logical treatises, excepting the tract on
124 sqq. however, is always the case except with writings the genuineness of which can be
^

Cf. p.

This,

opposed on other grounds. Not only are none of these quoted in the genuine works, and only a single one in a spurious compo-

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Propositions,^
itself natural

167
It is in

may be

considered to come

first.

and accords with

Aristotle's methodical

plan of exposition, that he should preface the material

development of his system by the formal inquiries which were designed to establish the rules and conditions of
all

scientific thinking.

But

it is

also

made

evident by

his

own citations that

the Logic did precede the Natural

Philosophy, the Metaphysics^ the Ethics and Rhetoric.^

Of the
be the
cies,

logical tracts themselves, the Categories

first.

seems to

The

Topics, including the

book on Falla:

came next, and then the two Analytics

writings,

the treatise

refer to other writings.

but only very few of them On the other hand, there is not one among the works which we consider as genuine, which does not quote the others, or is not quoted by them, or, at least,
sition,

implied, whilst in most of them examples of all three connections To explain more fully: occur. I. Of the decidedly spurious works (a) the following are neither quoted nor do they quote n. kSct/xov, n. xpco/iicTa>/, others n, aKovarrwv, ^vffioyvwjxoviKii, H. <pvru>y (see p. 93), n. dav/xaaicov aKovfffidTwv, MTJxai/t/ca, n. arofiwu ypafxfji.wv, 'AvffjLoov Oeaeis, H. aepo(pdvovs &C., 'H0tKo fieyd\a, 11. aperwv Koi kukiuv, OiKovo/xiKd, 'PTjToptK); irphs 'A\4^avSpov. (b) n. TTVivfiaros quotes no other, but is quoted in the spurious treatise n. C(f(t}v Kivi\ffi(i}s. (c) On the contrary, the latter itself is never quoted. But it names some other writings as does also the Eiidemian Ethics, supposing that its quotations refer to Aristotelian works. II. Among the remaining
: : ;

the Categories is the only work which quotes no other, and neither is it directly quoted (but cf p.64). The n. ep/LL-nvcias. U. T. Kad' virvov fiauTiKTis and the Rlietoric quote others, but are not quoted n. C'^wj/ yevicreus has many quotations, but is only once cited, as a book planned for the future of the MetajjJiysics only bk, V. is quoted or used (cf pp. 76, n.3, and 79, n.l) in genuine works, bks, i,, xii., and xiii. in spurious ones and the 3Ietaph. itself quotes the Analytics, the Physics, Be Ccelo, and the Ethics.
.

On which
67,
n.

see p. 66, n. 1.
1,

Besides the arguments given

p.

on
in

p.

68,

n.

1,

we have
:

the

Anal. 10 fxaWov

decisive passage Post. ii. 12, 95, b,

Se

(pavepws

iu

rols

Ka66\ov irepl Kiu-fiffecos 5e7 A;^0^vat TTepl avTwv. Tlie Physics, however, is the earliest of the works on Natural Science. A negative line of proof also is found in the fact that in the Categories, the Analytics, and the Topics, none of the other writings are quoted.

158

ARISTOTLE
Later than the

on Propositions was added afterwards.^

Analytics but earlier than the Physics

may

be placed

the treatise which

Meta.i)liysics?

now forms

the

fifth

book of the
In

The Natural Philosophy came next.

first.

that section the Physics comes

It is projected in

the Analytics and the

Metaijhysics
;

is

referred to in the fifth

is

book of
presup-

but the latter

cited

or

works posed not only in but also in the majority of the other tracts concerning Natural Philosophy, while it on the other hand neither
ethical
cites

the metaphysical and

Ccjelo,^

nor presupposes any one of them.^ That the Be the treatise on Growth and Decay, and the
follow

Meteorology,
is

the

Physics
in

in

the order
Meteorology

given,
itself^

very

expressly

stated

the

Whether the Natural History

next
is

or the

De Anima came

not settled.

It is very possible that the former

it

work, extensive as but completed after

connect those lesser
-

it.^

was begun before the other the De Anima we must tracts which point back to it someis,

With

Seepp. 64,n. l,p. 67,n. l,p. and the treatise of Brandis quoted in the first-cited note, which (p. 256 sqq.), by a comparison of the Anahjtics with the Topics, establishes the earlier date of the latter. For, on the one hand, it is mentioned in the Physics and
68
sq.,
'^

Which we
(Jihein.
*

cannot,

like

Blass
'

Mus. xxx. 498, hypomnemati505), consider a cal writing, not merely because
of the references

made
also.

to

it,

but

on other grounds

Gen. et Corr. {vide supra, p. and, on the 1, p. 124, n. 4) other, it seems in c. 30 fin. to referto^vittZ. Posf.i. 6,75,a,18sqq., 28 sqq. though the latter point
76, n.
; ;

Be

^ Meteor, i. 1, whereon cf. further p. 83, n. 1, Ind. Arist. 98, a, 44 sqq., and the quotation of the tract n. (cfoov iropeias in the De Ccelo, ii. 2, given p.

125.
8 That the completion of the History of Animals should not be put too early is clear from what has been said on p. 154,

is

not certain. 3 Vide supra, p. 81 sqq., Ind. Arlst. 102, a, 53 sqq., 98, a, 27
sqq.

n.4.

ARISTOTLE S WRITINGS
times expressly
contents.
^

159

and always by the nature of their

of these were no doubt composed after

Some

or with the writings on the Parts, the Movement,

and
is

the

Genesis

of Animals.^
later

That group of
which followed

tracts

undoubtedly

than the Natural History, the De

treatises
it is

Anima, and the

upon

it.^

On

the other hand,

probably earlier than the

Mhics and

Politics, inasmuch as it can hardly be supposed that Aristotle would have broken in upon his

studies in Natural Philosophy

works lying in a wholly

be
less difficult to

different direction.

by undertaking extended It would

"^

suppose that the ethical writings as

This view
is

a whole came before the physical.^

not

excluded by any express internal references, excepting

the reference to the Physics in the Ethics.^

We

must,

nevertheless, decide in favour of the earlier construction of the Natural Philosophy texts, for a thinker

who

was
soul,^

so clearly convinced

as

Aristotle

was that the

student of ethics must have a knowledge of the

human

must be supposed
There

to

have put his inquiry into

in the Ethics

the soul before his researches into the moral activities

and

relations.

are, indeed,

very

unmistakable traces of his theory of the soul and of

the treatise thereon.^

Immediately

after

the Ethics

^ Thus n. oiV0rj(recos, n, iJirj/ou, n. ivvTTuiuv, n. avaTTuorjs {Ind.Ar.

102, b, 60 sqq.).

Vide siijyra^ p. 89 sqq. See pp. 89, n. 2, 89, n. 3,87, n. 1 Ind. Arist. 99, b, 30 sqq. * The further question of the relative order of the three writings named has been already
^
3
:

* Thus RoSE, ^lm#. Libr. Ord. 122 sqq. Eth. x. 3, 1174, b, 2. Cf. Phys. vi.-viii.
'^

Eth.

i.

13, 1102, a, 23.

i.

Though

Aristotle

in

Mh.

discussed on p. 91 sq.

26 sqq. refers, not to De An. iii. 9, 432, a, 22 sqq. ii. 3, but to the i^wrepiKol \6yoi, yet ii, 2 init. seems to presuppose
13, 1102, a,

160

ARISTOTLE
Politics}

comes the
ences, the

Judging by the internal

later

refer-

Rhetoric should be

than both, and

the
is

the

Poetics

should

be

later

than

Politics

but

before the Rhetoric.

This, however,

probably true

only of a part of the Politics

or

rather only of those

parts which Aristotle himself published, for his death

seems to have intervened before he had completed that

text as a whole. ^
2)Jiijsics,

So, again, in our so-called Meta-

Aristotle left incomplete,

probability a work which and with which several other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, have been amalgamated since.^
in
all
tlie

we have

the bulk of
ings.

theoretical writ-

But that there are not many more of such traces may perhaps be explained by the fact
that Aristotle did not wish to interfere with the practical aim of an ethical work {Eth. i. 1, 1095, a, 4, ii. 2, mit.) by any discussions which were not indis-

3 Cf. and with p. 76 sqq., regard to citations of the lleta-

pensable to
1102, a, 23.
1

its

purpose

cf.

i.

13,

See See

p. 100, n. 1.
p.

ch. xiii.
is it

And

127 supra, and i7ifra, if this supposition

go to make improbable that the Ethics, so closely allied with the Politics, should have been written before tlie works on natural science.
correct, it would also

physics, see p. 156, n. 2. Eose's supposition (Arist. Lihr. Ord. 135 sqq. 186 sq.) that the 3Ietaphysics preceded all the writings on natural science, or at any rate the zoological ones, makes the actual condition of that work an inexplicable puzzle. But there is also the fact that the Physics, as well as the Be Ccelo, are quoted in numerous passages of the Metaphysics {Ind. Ar. 101, a, 7 sqq.) as already existing, while the Metaphysics are referred to in Phys.i. 9, 192, a, 35, as merely in the future.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

161

CHAPTER IV
THE STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

As

Plato connects directly with Socrates, so Aristotle

philosophies as

with Plato.
earlier

Yet he made a comprehensive use of the well. He was better versed

earlier teachers in

than any of the

writings
favourite

the theories and

is

of his

forerunners,

and

it

with

him a
them
eager

method

to preface his

own
is

inquiries with a

retrospect of earlier opinions.

He

wont

to let

designate the problems to be dealt with.

He

is

to refute their errors, to resolve their doubts, to bring

out the truth which underlay their views.

influence of the pre-Socratic systems
far less

But the
is

upon

Aristotle

than
ciple,

it

apparent in the general structure of his system is in the treatment of special points. In prin-

Plato had refuted them all. Aristotle is not under the same necessity to distinguish his position accurately from theirs.^ He does not, at least in any
of the extant writings, devote

any space to such proby which Plato established the claims of philosophy and the true meaning of knowpaideutic efforts as those

Even in Metapli. i. 8 their principles are merelj^ criticised briefly from an Aristotelian point of view, and the Eleatics and
'

Heraclitus, about whom Plato busied himself so much, are passed over altogether,

VOL.

I.

1X32

ahistotle
against
'

]edo-e, as

the ordinary consciousness

'

on the

one hand, and the Sophists on the other. Aristotle presupposes throughout that general point of view which
characterised the Socratico-Pl atonic Philosophy of Ideas. His task is to work out, on these general lines, a more
perfect system of knowledge,
principles,

by a more exact definition by a stricter accuracy ot of the leading method, and by an extension and improvement of all
the scientific data? It is true that in his own writings the rare expressions of agreement with his teacher are almost lost sight of by comparison with his keen and
constant polemic
against Platonic
views.^

Yet

in

reality aud in the whole his agreement with Plato is far greater than his divergence,^ and his whole system

cannot truly be understood until we treat

it

as a develop-

ment and evolution of that of Plato and as the completion of that very Philosophy of Ideas which Socrates
founded and Plato carried on. In the first place, he agrees
for the

most part with

Plato in his general views as to the meaning and office To him, as to Plato, the object of of Philosophy itself.
AVe shall deal later on with this polemic, especially as it was directed against the doctrine of

stotle, as 14, n. 3,

we have shown on

p.

Ideas in Metajjh. Only a few &c.

i.

9, xiii., xiv.

not unfrequently includes himself in the first person along with the rest of the Platonic
school.

passages are

But

his

way
is

found in which Aristotle expressly declares his agreement with Plato, Besides the passages noted on

such a relation

the

of treating opposite

p
JV:

12,
i.

and

p.

U,
a,

n. 4, see
;

Eth.

2,

1095,

32

ii. 2,

1104, b,

iii. 4, 429, a, 27; 1265, a, 10. 2 Cf. also the valuable remarks of Strumpell, Gesch. d. Aritheor. Phil. d. Gr. 177.

li- De Pokt. ii.

An

6,

Whilst Plato to that of Plato. puts his own view, even where contradicts the original one it of Socrates, into the mouth of his teacher, Aristotle not unfrequently attacks his teacher the even where they agree main point, and only differ in opinion as to secondary matters.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Philosophy can be only Being as such,^
i.e.

163

Essence, or,

to speak more accurately, the universal Essence of that which is actual. 2 Philosophy treats solely of the

and basis of things,^ and in fact of their and most universal basis, or, in the last resort, of that which presupposes nothing.'* For the like reasons he ascribes to the philosopher in a certain sense a knowledge of everything, thinking,
causes

highest

of course, of the point of unity where

converges,^

all
'

knowledge
knowledge,'

As

Plato had distinguished

as the cognition of that

which

is

Eternal and Necessary,

Aoial. Post.
ifMircipias
.

ii.
.
.

19, 100, a, 6

init.,ii. 19, 100, a, 6,

i.

24, 85, b, 13

^K
Kal

5'

Texvvs o-pxh

ihv (xhv irepl yeueaiv, t4xvvs, iav 5e ircpl rh hy, 4Tri(TT^,fXT]s. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, b, 15 t(? ovTi ^ tv (rri Tivii, IfSto, Kal tovt'
iiriaT'fjiJ.'qs,
:

and Mh. JV. vi. 6 init., x. 10, 1180, b, 15. More infra, in cliapter v.
^

Anal. Post.
5e

i.

init.

iiri.
.

(TraaQai
'6rav
(TKeiv
5t'

oiSfied^

eKaarou

rr,v t' alriav olcafieda yiyvJ}-

((TtI

irepl

S}v

rov

(pi\o(r6<pov cTrt-

Ibid. 1005, a, 1005, b, 10. 2 Metajyh. iii. 2, 996, b, 14 sqq. rh clSevai 'dKaarov . t6t'
(TK4\^/a(rdai TaXrjdes.

Kal
init.

ixi)

2, c. 3,

IX"".

Th vpayfxd iariv . . ivdcxeadai rovr' &\\us Ibid. c. ] 4, 79, a, 23, ii. 11

.

ol6fi6a

virdpx^tv,

8toi/ uSoi/xeu ri
:

i<TTiv, &c. ; vii. 1, 1028, a, 36 etSeVot tot' oiSfxiQa Ka(TTOv juaAtoTo, orau rl icrriu 6 &v9puiros yvcfj/xev ^ rb
rrvp,

7, 1141, a, 17. a, 28, 982, a, 1, 982, a, 12, 982, b, 2 sqq., 2, vi. init. Cf. Schweglee, 1, Arist. Metaph. iii. 9.
c.
*

Eth. N. yi. Metaph. i. 1, 981,

Phys.
olSfxeda
rh.

i.

1,

184, a, 12

tJt6

fxaKkov ^ rh iroihv ^ t^ irotrhv ^ rh TToD, &c. c. 6, 1031, b, 20 t^ iiriaratrdai eKacrrov rovr6 iffri rh ri ^u dvai iiriffraffOai, and cf 1. 6 ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 5: the determination of the notion of
;
: .

yhp
%rav
Kol
init.

yivaxrKeiv

cKaffrov,

alria yuMpiaw/nev

ra irpwra
Kal

rhs

apxas

ras

irpcaras

fihy

the thing is indispensable, &vev yap rov KaB6\ov ovk earriu

iTTia-r'n/j.rjv

Xafielv;
iTTiarrtfiTj
:

c.

10,

1086,
;

Ibid. ii. 3 jMetaph. i. 2, 982, b, 9 56? yap ravrriv [that science which is to deserve the name co^to] rwv irpwruu d.px(ii}V Kal alriwv eJvai dwpririK'f]V rSre yhp c. 3 init.
fi^xpi

rwv

(xroixeiwu.

b,
lii.

33

rwv KaQ6\ov

(iBfvai
'Kp(l}r7]v
iii.

(pajxlv

eKacrrov,
oicojmfda

'6rav

r^u
;

6 Jin. KadoXov at ixiffrrnxai irdvrwv; iii. 4, 999, b, 26: t^

iiriffraa-Oai irws f<rrai, ct
fir)

airiav

yvwpi^etv

2, 996, b, 13, iv. 2,

1003, b, 16,

rt ^<rrai

iv. 3,
s

1005, b, 5 sqq.

^u enl irdvrwv

ibid, a, 28, b, 1

Metaph.

i.

2,

982, a, 8, 21,

xi.l,1059,b, 25.

Anal.Post.i.U

iv. 2,

1004, a, 35.

164

ARISTOTLE
'

from Fancy or

Opinion,' whose sphere

is

the contin-

To him, as to Plato, knowgent, so also Aristotle. ledge arises out of wonder, out of the bewilderment of To him, its the common consciousness with itself.^
object
is

exclusively that

which

is

universal and neceshioiuii,

sary; for the

It is

contingent cannot be

but only

an opinion, when we believe that a thing opined. might be otherwise it is knowledge, when we recogSo far nise the impossibility of its being otherwise.
;

from
it is

'

Opinion

'

and

'

Knowledge

'

being

all

the same,

rather true, as Aristotle holds, that it is utterly impossible to know and to opine about the same subject
at the

same

time.^

So,

again,

'

Knowledge

'

cannot

consist in Perception, for that tells us only of individual

things, not of the universal, only of facts, not of causes.'

In like manner Aristotle distinguishes 'Knowledge' from mere Experience by the test that the latter gives That,'' while the former gives us in any matter only a Why also ^ which is the very mark that Plato us a used to distinguish Knowledge from True Opinion.'
' '

'

'

'

'

'

'

Metaph. i. 2, 982, b, 12 5io yap rh OavixdC^iv ol S-vOpQiTroi Kol vvv

1
:

ala6i,(reus

iariv

itrlffTatrOai.

For

&c.

KoX rh irpwTov iip^avro <pi\o(ro(p^'iv, Ibid. 988, a, 12. Cf. Zellbr,

<^.

PA.
2

6^r.,pt.

Anal. Post.
c.

6 pn. tank.

div. l,p. 511, 4. cf iMcl c. i. 33 3Ie8, init. c. 30 sqq.

ii.
;
.

y\\.

15,

vi.

2,

1026, b, 2

Eth.N.Vi. 3, 1139, b, 18, sqq. To this line of thought c. 6 init. belongs the refutation of the principle,thatforeveryonethatistrue which seems true to him, which is dealt with in Meta2)li. iv. 5, 6, much as it is treated in Plato's T^^?Mw. ' Anal. ou5e St' Post. i. 31
:

perception has always to do with individuals (more on this subject rb 5 K^edXov koX iirl infra), alaQdv^ffQai, Sec. iratnu aZvvaTov Even though we could see that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that in an eclipse of the moon the earth stands between the sun and the moon, yet this would be no knowledge, so long as the universal reasons of these phenomena re-

mained unknown to
*

us.

Metaj?7i.

i.

1,

981, a, 28.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

165

Finally, Aristotle is at one with Plato also in this, that

both of them proclaim Philosophy to be the mistress of

all

other sciences, and Science in general to be the

highest and best that

man can

reach,

and the most

essential element of his happiness.*

Nevertheless,

it is

also true that the Aristotelian

notion of Philosophy does not completely coincide with

the Platonic.
content,
is

To

Plato, Philosophy, regarded as to its

a term

which includes
it

all

spiritual

and

moral perfection, and

regarded as to
sharply

comprehends therefore the

;

practical as well as the theoretic side

its

and

yet,
it

when
very

essence, he

distinguishes
of
it

from

every other form

human
off

activity.
strictly

Aristotle,

on the contrary, marks

life
;

more

from the practical side of

while,

on the other
xii. 7,
:

See Metaph.

i.

2, 982, b,

aficivwv
b,

S'
rj

oi/Sefxia

1072,

apxi'KcoTdrT] Se tcov iinffTTiixwu, Koi

fiaWou

apx^Kij rrjs virrjpfTOvarjs,

eVe/ceV ecTTt
5' iffrl

r]

'YV<api(ov<ra rivos

irpa-

Kr4ov eKaffrov
is

'

tovto

raya-

6hv iv cKdffrois.

But that science

dewpia rh i^Skttov Kal &pi<rTov. In Mli. jV. x. 7 theoria is the most essential ingredient of perfect happiness cf. e.ff. 1117, b, 30: 6t 5^ Oelov 6 vovs
:

24

'

which investigates the highest reasons and causes, since 'the highest *the good' and end are inchided among these.
one
'

Ibid.

1.

ovSeixiav

SjjXop odv, 24 avr^v ^rirovfi^u

:

ws

5t'

XP^'**''
(()afiv

kripav, aAA'

SIxTirep

^vSpwirds
(EvcKa
KotX

4\fv6epos

&

avTOv
ovTO)

Kal

fx.))

&KKov
fidvi)

i)v,

avTTj

fidutf

rhv ^vOpuirov, Kal d /cara TovTOv fiios d7os TTphs rhv avQp(i}Tnvov ov xph Se Kara rovs irapaifiiov vovvras avQp(ainva (ppovelv dudpuirov bvra ovSe 6vr}ra. rbv dvrjrhv, dAA' </)' (iffov ivSex^Tai adavari^eiv Kal iravra iroiilv irphs rh ^v Kark rh KpariCTOv ra>u iv avrcf . . tJ) oIk7ov (pvan Kpariffrov Kal eKaarcp rfj
TTpbs
'

i\vd4pa
Sib

ovcra

roiv

iiriartiixuv

^jSKfTdv iariv kKaartf

Bpd)TT(f

'

Kal t^J av'

yap avT^
avTTJs

ouTrjy eVc/ceV
t(,v

iariv
.

Kal SiKaiws

ovk

avdpwTrlvr]
.

vofjii^ono
oifre
elvai,

7]

KTrjais

oAA.'

t6 diiov (pdovephu
.
. .

ivS^x^Tai
"

5^ 6 Karb. rhv vovv ^los, [xaKiffTa ciircp TOVTO ^vOpwiros ovTos &pa Kal evSai/xoveffTaros C. 1178, b, 28: ey '6<rov 5^ 5to8,
;

o()r rrjs TOiavrrjs SAAtjj/

reivei

7]

Oewpia, Kal

t]

evZaijxovia.

Xph

vo/xi^eiv

Tnunayrepav
.

r]
. .

Kai6Tpai

BdOTdTT} Kal TiixiwrdrT] jxkv olv iracrai

yap avay-

Cf.
vii.
xii.,

c.

9,

1179,

15 fin.
infra.

Eth. End. See further in chapter

a,

22,

Taurrjy,

166

ARISTOTLE
it

hand, he brings
exclusively an

into

closer
is

relation

with the
is

experimental sciences.
affair
it

His view

that Philosophy

of the theoretic faculty.

He

dis-

tinguishes from
(Tr/oafts-),

very sharply the practical activities

(not, like Philosophy, in the activity itself),

which have their end in that which they produce and which
soul.'

belong not purely to thought but also to opinion and

the
'

unreasoning part of the

artistic

He

distinguishes

also the

creative

effort

(iroirja-Ls)

which

is

likewise directed to something outside

itself.^

With

Experience, on the other hand, he connects Philosophy more closely. Plato had banished all dealings with
the sphere of change and becoming out of the realm
of

'Knowledge'

into that of 'Opinion.'

Even

as to

the passage from the former to the latter, he had only the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass
to the pure treatment of Ideas.
Aristotle, as

we

shall

presently see, allows

relation to Thought.

to

Experience a more positive The latter, with him, proceeds

out of the former by an affirmative

movement

that,
little

namely, in which the data given in Experience are

brought together into a unity.

Furthermore, we find that Plato was but
^

interested in the descent from the treatment of the Idea

to the individual things of the world of appearance

the phenomena.

To him, the pure Ideas

Z)^ CteZo,
iii.

are the one

Besides the passage just given, see Eth. N. vi. 2, c. 5, 1140, a, 28, b, 25; x. 8, 1178, b, 20; vi. 1, 1025, b, 18 sqq. xi. 7 pe An. iii. 10, 433, a, 14; and
;

7,

306, a,

6.

The

same

is

Eth. i of Metapli.

repeated by Eudemus ^ fin., and by the author

ii. 1,

993, b, 20.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

essential object

167

of philosopliic knowledge.

Aristotle

concedes that scientific knowledge kas to do only with the universal essence of things yet he does not stop
;

at that point, for he regards it as the peculiar task of

Philosophy to deduce the Individual from the Universal Science has to begin with (as in a7ro8sfcft9, vide infra).
the Universal, the Indeterminate
to the Determinate.^
;

>
i

but

it

must pass on
think
little

It has to explain the data, the

phenomena.^

It

must

not,

therefore,

of

anything, however insignificant, for even there inexhaustible treasures of possible

for a

knowledge must

lie.^

It is

like reason

that Aristotle

makes

for scientific

thought itself rules less strict than Plato's.

1 MetapJi. xiii. 10, 1087, a, 10 rh 5e T^v i-rrKTT'fjiJL-nv elvai KaQoXov
:

He

takes
fieya
iffriv
'

(ru/ii8e)3T7K(JTO

(rv/x^dWeTai

fXfpos

irpds

rd etSeVai t6 ti
excu/U.ej'

TTuffav

e^ei fikv ra>v X-)(^d4vro}v, oh

.
.

fidXicrr''
[x)]v

airopiav
icrri
5'

iireihav

yap

airoSiSduai /carci

aXX^

T^v
T(i)V
Kttl

(pavrafflav irepl
fj

rwv

avfifiefiriKi'

fiev

ws aXrides rh
aX-qdes Koi
fJ.v

Xeyd/j-evou,
7]

ean

ws ovK
Sxnrep
S>v

yap

iTTKTriif/.'n,

irdvTOOv ^ rwu irK^icTTUv, t6t irepl TTJs ovfflas e|o;uej/ X4yeiv

rb

iiriffraa-dai,

Bnrhv,
'

rh

dvvdfxei
SvvafjLLS

rh Se ivepyeia
CDS
iiXr]

t]

fj.U

o'iv

[toC]

odaa Ka\ a6pi(rros Ka06Xov KaOSXov Ka\ aoplcrrov icrriv,

ivfpyeia
wpiafievT}

rod
ri

KaXKiffra' irdffTjs yap airo^ei^eMS apx^ TO ri icrriv, S)(rre Kaff oaovs rwv bpiffuQv iM^ (TviJL^a'vei ret (TvfiSrjAov on ^cfirjKora yvwpi^nv
. . .

S'

SiaXcKTiKcSs
'dnavTes
3

tp7\vrai

Ka\

Kevus
a,

Kal

wpifffieuov

Cf. C. 5, 409, b, 11 sq.

i.

rdSf ri odcra rovSe rivos. 2 Metaph. i. 9, 992, a, 24 (attacking the doctrine of Ideas)
:

Part. An.
irepl

5,

645,

5:
els

Xoiirhp
elirelv,

rrjs

(coXktjs

(pvffeois

jurjSei/
fi-fire
'

irapaXiirSvras
fx-ffre

SAws 8
roiv

(-nrova-ns

rrjs

ffo<pias irepl

Zvvaixiv

arifxSrepov

rim-

fldKaficv

(pavepuv rh aXriov, rovro /xev (ov6ev yap Xeyo/xev irepl

(irepou
fxevois

Kal yap iv rols /x^ Kexapia-ahruv irp6s r)]V atcrdficriv

T^s alrias '6dv 7] apxh "t^s jueraBe Cop.lo, iii. 7, 306, /3o\^s) &c. riXos Se ry\% ixkv iroif\riKT\s a, 16 iiri(Tr'f]/xr}s rh epyov, tt/s Se (pvffiKrjs rh <l>aiv6(Xvov ael Kvp'ws Kara Be An. i. 1, 402, a, IG oiffQ-nffiv. %oiK 5' oh ix6vov rd ri iari yvwvai XP'ho'^fJ'-OV elvai irpos rh OewpTjorat ras
:

Kara
ffa<ra

tV

Q^opiau
ro7s

(i/xws

Srifxiovpyf}-

<f>vais

aixT}xdvovs
SvvafJLevois

rjSovas
alr'tas
.

irope'xet

ras

yvupi^eiv Kal
hib Set
irepl

<t)vaei (piXo(r6(pois

tV
:

n^
'

Suo-xepaivetj/ iraiSiKoSs
arificorepuiv

r^v

roSv

(TKeypiv

ev iraffi

Cv^^ ^''"'' ydp ro7s (pvaiKols

evecrri ri dav/xaffrov, &C.

ii.

Be

Ccelo,

airias
Qvcriais
.

rS)v
,
,

(rv/xfie^-nKSrcov

raU
rk

12, 291, b, 25.

aAAa

Kal avdiraXiy

168

ARISTOTLE
'

the content of

Knowledge,' and of

scientific proof, to

include not only the Necessary, but also the Usual {to o)9 sttI to iroXv).^ He deems it a sign of philosophic
crudity that a

man

should

demand

the same logical

strictness of all kinds of investigation,^

it

when

in fact

^^

depends on the nature of the subject matter what amount of exactitude can be attained in each of the
sciences.3

Where

coercive proof

fails

him, he

is

content

Anal. Post. i. 80, iii. 12 Jin. Part. An. iii. 2, 663, b, 27. Metaph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 20, xi. 8, 1064, b, sqq. Eth. N. i. 1, 1094,
b, 19.

example
xiii. 3,

being

latter is thus expressed

adduced). The (Metaph.

:

1094, b, 11-27, 2, 1104, a, 1, vii. I fin. ix. 1, 1165, a, 12 {Polit. vii. 7 fin. is not in point here). It is chiefly as regards the ethical discussions that Aristotle here denies the claim they liave to a thorough accuracy, because the nature of the subject does not allow of any such result for in judging of men and the issues of human action, much rests on estimates which are correct only in the main and as a rule.' ^ According to Aiial. Post.i. 27, that science is more exact (aKpifiea-Tepa), which besides the Uti settles the diSn that which has to deal with purely scientific questions, not with their application to some given case (v /j.^ nad'
i.

Eth. N.
1098,

1,

c.

7,

a,

26,

ii.

S^ (that according to its notion ture, is earlier, or stands to the first principles
1078, a, 9)
Sffcp

tip irepl

TTpOTfpwp

Ty

\6ycf)

which, or nanearer
cf
.

p.

330 sqq.) kuI airXovarrepwv roarovT(f jxaWov exet ruKpifffs. From

naturally follows, that the philosophy, according to Aristotle, is capable of the greatest accuracy (cf. Metapli. i. 2, 982, a, 25 aKpi^ea-rarai Se rcSy
it

this

first

(Tri(rTT)fxv

at fioAKTra

tQv

irpdorup

(lai),
is

and that every other science

'

'

'

capable of so much the less according as it descends more and more to the world of sensible things (cf. iUd. 1078, a, 11 sq.) for in the latter noWii r] rod aopiarov (pixris ivvirdpx^i {Metaph. iv.

5, 1010, a, 3; further infra, in ch. vii. sec. 2). Therefore the natural sciences are necessarily less

viTOKiix4vov [d/cpt^Seo-TepaJ

t^s Ka0'
ap/io-

\moKiiix4vov, oiov
viKrjs),

apid/j.r}TiK^

and
of

lastly

that

which

accurate than those which are concerned with what is constant, like the first Philosophy, pure Mathematics, and the doctrine of souls

from a smaller assumptions (e.ff. Arithmetic as compared with Geometry), or in other words the
its results

deduces

number

which De An. i. 1 init. extols cLKpifieia); and those which have the transient as their object are less exact than Astronomy (il/e(of

the

more abstract
iK

Trpoadea-eus,
i.

Metajjh.

(^ i^ iXaTrSvuv rrjs as is also said in 2, 982, a, 26, the same

taph. 1078, a, 11 sqq.). Kampe (Erkenntnisstheorie d. Ar. 254) says, that in the scale of aKpi^eia

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

to put to postpone a

169

up with arguments possible and probable, and more definite decision until a further

analysis can be had.^ It is not, however, the essential problems of philosophy which Aristotle so treats, but always special questions of ethics or natural philosophy,
for

his dialectical procedure,

which Plato himself had relaxed the strictness of and put probability in the

place of scientific proof.

The

real difference

between
*

them
insists

is

only

this, that Aristotle

includes this kindred

branch of knowledge in Philosophy; whereas Plato on treating everything except the pure Science

of Ideas as merely matter of intellectual discourse, or

as a condescension of the philosopher to the pressure of
practical needs.^

Why,

asks Aristotle rightly, should

the

man who

thirsts after

knowledge not seek to learn

all ? ^

at least a little, even

where he cannot establish

all

Aristotle cannot be justly accused of having

promised the unity of

the science of lowest place rather, as has preceding note,
:

spiritual effort
rhv
\6yov,
4av
.

comby dividing
rb
5 ward v

nature takes the but this would been said in the be true of Ethics
ii.

els

and

Politics.

Cf EUCKEN, Meth. d. Arist. Forsch. 125 sq. See further on this subject in the next chapter.
avaydycofjiev.
^

De

CceU,

5,

287,

b,

28

^^^^

^i.

511, b, sq.
.

vii.

519,

sqq. c. 12 init. Gen. An. iii. 10, 7G0, b, 27, where to a discussion

on the reproduction of bees he adds the remark ov fx^v ilK-niTTai

:

e; Tim. 29, B,sq. and alib. Cf Zeller, PA. d. Gr., Pt. i pp. 490, 516, 536 sq.
c, sqq.; PI. 173,

TO,

(TvufiaiuovTa Uavois, a\\' idv

\r](J)dfj,

TTore

rore
iav

rfj

al<rdT}(Ti

Be Ccelo, \\.\2inU. weipareov \4yeiv t6 (paivdfJLevov, alSovs d|iov dvai vofii^ovTas ri]V Trpodv/jLiav

fia\\ov
ro7s
^

Tuv \6yo}U

iriarevreov, Kal

fiaWoy ^
to

dpdffovs (it

does not occur

\6yois^

bfioXoyovfieva

him that he himself might be

leiKviwcrnois
ix.

<paivoixevois.

H. An.

^1 fin. c. 42, 629, a, 22,27. Metapli. xii. 8, 1073, b, 10 sqq. 1074, a, 15. Meteor, i. 79, init. irepl ruv atpauuu rfj alaO-fiaci vofii^ofiev UavoSs aTroSeSer^^"' 'f'^
:

accused rather of an unphilosophicalmodesty), erTsStaT^<^iAo(ro<|)/as

Zi-^^v
irepl

kuI fiiKpas

ei/iropias

ayair^

av ras

fjifyla-Tas ex^^fiev airopias

Ct. ibid. 292, a,

U,

c.

5,287, h, 31

P^rt. An. l

5,

644, b, 31.

170
off the

AUISTOTLE
theoretic from the practical activities.^
is

That

distinction

undeniably justified to the

is

full

but the

note of unity

expressly preserved in Aristotle's treat-

ment by the

fact that while

he presents Ectopia as the

completion of the true

practical activity as

life, he also represents the an indispensable element therein,

human

'

an indispensable condition precedent of ethical knowledge.^ If it be true that this shutting back of Theory upon itself, this exclusion from the notion of Philosophy of all practical need and
as a moral upbringing is
' '

effort

(as

it

becomes apparent,
for the later

for

example, in the

Aristotelian sketch of the Divine Life) did in fact pre-

pare the

way

withdrawal of the Wise

Man

from practical usefulness, nevertheless we should not overlook the fact that even here Aristotle only followed
in the direction indicated before
'

by Plato

for Plato's
live
for

Philosopher

'

would

also,

if left

to himself,

'theory' alone,

and only take part in the

Least of
all

life

of the

Eepublic on compulsion.
with those
the

can one agree

who

criticise

Aristotle because he conceived

Philosophy, not from the point of view of an ideal humanly unattainable, but in a way that could be carried out in the actual world,^ or with those who
office of

attack

him by praising Plato

for distinguishing

between

the ideal of knowledge and the scientific attainment of If such a view of the relation of the ideal to men.'* actuality were in itself and in Aristotle's view well founded, it would only follow that he had sought, as
KiTTEE,<9^s.<Z.PA.iii.50sqq. Besides the passages to be cited infra, on the inquiry into the highest good/ cf Eth. N.
1

x. 10, 1179, b,

20 sqq.

i.

1,

1094,

b,

27 sqq.
*

'

Eittbr, iUd. and Ibid- ii. 222 sqq.

p.

56

sq.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

actual essence of things.

171

every philosopher should, not abstract ideals, but the

Even

this,

however,

is less-*

than the truth.

realised in
it

To

Aristotle the Idea does in truth

reach out beyond the phenomena

it

is

not entirely

is

not

any individual phenomenal thing, although Aristotle an unactual ideal even so.

recognised both sides with equal clearness.

thafc

He

sees
it

the goal of knowledge

is set

very high

cannot
best
it

be

reached by everyone

that

that

even by the

can only be imperfectly attained.^

call it

Yet he

is

never content to

wholly unattainable or to limit

the demands he makes upon Philosophy (as such) by the

weakness of humanity. Indeed, the whole course of this account must have already shown how complete
is

his

real

agreement with Plato on just

this very

point.

out in

In his philosophic method Aristotle likewise follows all essentials the lines which Socrates and Plato
out.

opened

His method

is

the dialectic method, which

its

indeed he himself carried to

highest perfection.

With

it he combines the observational method of the student and even though it be true that he does not of nature
;

succeed in getting a true equilibrium between the two,

yet the mere fact that he combined

them was one of

the highest services rendered to philosophy

among

the

Greeks.

Bv

that advance he

made

sfood the one-sided-

ness of the Philosophy of Ideas, so far

as that was

possible without a complete restatement of its principles.

As

Socrates and Plato always began by asking for the

Metaph.
;

i.

2,

7,

1072, b, 24

Eth. N.

982, b, 28, xii. vi. 7, 1141,

b,

2 sqq., x. 1178, b, 25
;

7,

cf.

1177, b, 30, iU^. yil 1,

c.

8,

172
'

ARISTOTLE
'

idea

of each thing they dealt with, and set this kind

all

of cognition as the basis of

other knowledge, so also

does Aristotle delight to begin with an inquiry into

the 'idea' of whatever his subject for the time being

may

be.^

As

Socrates and Plato

commonly

set out

on

such inquiries

with the simplest questions

life,

examples
beliefs,

taken from everyday

commonly accepted

arguments from uses of words and ways of speech so too is Aristotle wont to find his starting-point for the
definition of such ideas in prevalent opinions, in the

views of earlier philosophers,

subject and in the

expressions and names which are in

and particularly in the common use on the

Socrates sought

meaning

of words. ^

to correct the uncertainty of such beginnings

by means
Aristotle

of a

dialectical

comparison
all

of various
sides.

opinions and
in

experiences gathered from

this process is far

But
is

more complete and

directed with

more
view.

explicit

consciousness to

the scientific ends in

As

a rule, he

commences every important inquiry

with an accurate investigation as to the various points

of view from which the matter in hand can be treated,
as to the difiiculties and contradictions which arise from the different views that might be taken, and as to

the reasons which

make

for or against

each view
is

and

the task which he sets before the philosopher

simply

that of finding, by a more accurate definition of the

Thus, for instance, in Phys. iii. ], iv. 1 sqq. iv. 10 sq. the notions of Nature, Motion, Space and Time are investigated in De An. i. 1 sqq., ii. 1 sq. the notion of the Soul in Eth. N. ii. in 4 sq. the notion of Virtue
^

ii.

1,

Polit. iii, 1 sqq. the the State, and so on.

'^

notion of

It will be shown later what significance universal opinion and

the probable arguments deduced

it, had with Aristotle as a foundation for induction.

from

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle
is

173

ideas involved, the solution of the difficulties disclosed.^

thus working in truth wholly on the ground

lines of the Socratico-Platonic

and along the

dialectic.

method of
it

He

developed the Socratic Induction into a

conscious technical device, and he completed

by the
all

theory of the syllogism which he invented and by

the related logical inquiries.

has
left

In his own writings he us a most perfect example of a dialectical inof the subject. If

vestigation carried through with keen and strict fidelity

from

all sides

we

did not

know

it
-

before,

we should

recognise at once in Aristotle's philo-

sophic method the work of a scholar of Plato.

With

this dialectical process he combines at the

all

same time a mastery in of facts, and a passion

either.

that concerns the observation

for the physical explanation of

them, which are not to be found in Socrates nor in Plato

To

Aristotle the

most perfect

definition of

an

idea
'

is

that which exhibits the causes of the thing,^ for

this also
ii.

On
rd

more
:

definite
later.

aXriov

information will be given

2

Be An.
'6ri

fidvov

Set
.

oh yap 2 init. rdv bpicrriK^v

.

\6yov 5r]Aovv
atViaj/

ctAAa

koI

t^u
\6yoi
re-

t6 neaov, ev airaffi 5e rovro And after quoting some examples eV airaa-i yhp rovrois (pavcpdv icrrip oti to avro iffri rd ri iffri Koi Sia ri iariv, &c. Ihid. c.
Qtir^'hai.
:

ivvirapx^iv
ilaiv

Kal ificpalveadai.
oiov

vvp

5' wtTirep ffviiTTCpafffiaO'' ol

'6pa}v
'

rwv

ri

icrri

rpayu}Vi<Tix6s ;

rb taov

erepofi'f]Ki
'

opdoycoviou eJvai, laoirAevpov 6 Sh roiovros opos \6yos rov (rvixirepda[xaros 6 5e Keycav on earlv 6 rerpayuvKTfiSs fx.e(T7]s evpeais, rov Trpdyfiaros Keyei rd aXriov, Anal.
'

3 init. c. 8 init. ibid. i. 31, 88, a, 5 rd Se Ka96\ov rijxiov Sti StjAo? rd atriov. J/i^to^^/i. vi. 1, 1025, b, 17: dia r6 rrjs avrrjs etvai Siavoias r6 re ri lari ZriKov iroielv koX el effriu.
;
:

every inquiry deals vi^ith four points, the STi,the Si6ri, the t lo-rt, the ri iariv. These may, however, be reduced to the two questions el ecrri ixeaov and ri eari^ rb fiecov rb fxeu yap
ii.

1.

sq.

Ibid, vii, 17, 1041, a, 27 (pavepou roiuvv '6ri (rjrel rd aXriov rovro S' ecrrX rb ri i^v elvai, ws eiire7p \oyikcSs h tTr' evioou jxev eari rivos eVe/ca, eV eviuv 5e ri eKipria-e
:

'

irpurov.
elScSfiev

Cf
r)}v
.
.

Anal. Post.
airiav, alriai

ii.

init.:l'rTe\^eeiri(rra<rdaiol6neda'6rau

Se rirfieffov

rapes

ira<rai

avrai

Siot

rov

'

SeiKvvvrai.

174

ARISTOTLE
There-

philosophy ought to explain the phenomena.^

fore, in his

view

(as

we

shall see presently), it

ought to

take account not only of the idea and the final cause of a thing, but of the efficient and the material causes

Holding as decisively as we shall see he does that a thing is to be explained by its own causes, he could not well be content with a method which should Idea gives, and look only to the Universal which the neglect the immediate definiteness of the things themalso.
' '

selves. ^

This

is

the reason of that careful regard for

&v Tis
ovToi
olKeiois iriffTfixTfic \6yois^

Vid. snj?r. p. 167.

COS

In this sense Aristotle not unfreqiiently contrasts the logical consideration of a subject {i.e. that which is only concerned with what is universal in its concept), either with the analytical, which enters more deeply into the peculiarity of the given case, (and which he also calls ^k twv K^ijxivwv), or with the pliys'ical research which draws its result not from the concept of a phenomenon merely, but from its concrete conditions. The former, for instance, Anal. Post. i. 21 fn.,
-

Kal

ToiovToi

Tiv4s

ficiv

'

\oyiKws

Khv eK Tcoj/Se So|t6 T(f} rainh rovro avfi^aiv^iv. Gen. An. ii. 8, 747, b, 28 Ae^eoSe XoyiK)}v [oTr^Setltj/] 5ia toGto oti o(T(f KaQoXov jxaXKov TToppccTepw rwv
S' iirKTKOirovcri
:

oiKficov

icrrlv dpx(>}v.

And

after a

proof such as this has been brought forward, he adds (748, a, 7): oinos fxev ovv 6 \6yo5 Kad6\ov Xiav koX Kv6s. ol yap fi^ iK tu>v olKeiuv
apxoov \6yoi Keuoi, Sec. (similarly Zfe An. i. 1, 403, a, 2: 5ia\KTiKot)s Kal Kvws Mh. Micd. i. 8, 1217, b, 21 XoyiKws Kal Kevus). Hence in such cases he much prefers the physical treatment to the logical
;
:

c 23, 84,

a, 7, cf . c. 24, 8G, a, 22, c,

19, 30; Metajjh. vii. 4, 1029, b, 12, 1030, a, 25, c. 17, The latter, Phys. iii. 1041, a, 28. 5, 204, b, 4, 10 (cf. a, 34, Metaph. xi. 10, lOGG, b, 21), c. 3, 202, a, 21; De Ccelo, i. 7, 27o, b, 12; Metaph. xii. 1, 10G9, a, 27, xiv. 1, 1087, b, 20 (similarly (pvaiKxs and Kae6\ov, De Cwlo, i." 10 /in. c. 12, But here he takes 283, b, 17). the logical to be so much the more imperfect, the further re-

32, 88, a,

(e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 10: 1^01 5' 6.V ris Kal iK tovtwv, oaov
Siaipepovcriv
ol

(pvaiKws Kal \oyiKa>s

(TKOTTovvTes, &c., see

d.

Gr. ,-pt.i.

p. 869, 1),

Zelleb, Ph. whereas in

moved
Phys.

it

is

from the
:

metaphysical researches on Ideas (3Ietajjh. xiii. 5 Jin.) he thinks the AoyiKcorepoi \6yoi are the aKpi^4<TTpoi. See further, Waitz, Arist. BONITZ, Arist. Org.ii. 353 sq. Metaph. ii. 187; Ind. Arist. 432, b, concrete 5 seq. Rassow, Arist. de not. def.
; ;

definiteness
viii.

Cf. of the object. oh fiev oZv 8, 264, a, 7

doctr. 19 sq.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF APISTOTLE

facts

175

which has drawn down on him often enough the reproach of an unphilosophic empiricism.^ He was
not only one of the highest speculative thinkers

he

was also one of the most accurate and untiring observers, and one of the most erudite men of learning that the world knows. As in his general theory he conceived
of experience as the condition precedent of thought,

come
his

and of perception as the matter out of which thoughts forth, so in practice he did not fail to provide for

own system

a broad substructure of experiential

knowledge, and to base his philosophic dicta upon an

all-round appreciation of the data of fact.
in regard to

Especially

should

first

any theory of nature he insists that we know the phenomena and then look about

for their causes. ^

We

could not, of course, expect to

find in

him the sureness and accuracy of method which empirical science has in modern times attained. In Aristotle's day it was only in its infancy, and it suffered
from the complete lack of the proper aids to observation
'

and of the support of a developed mathematics.

Thus

We

SCHLEIERMACHER,

and appears to be in every way untenable

Gesch. d. Phil. p. 120, says of Aristotle: * cannot deny that there is a great want of speculative genius,' &c., and on p. 110

that

Aristotle's general

We

bent made him more suited for the collective comprehension of

empirical

and

historical

data,

he contrasts the older Academics with him, as being more speculative' but he sets out with aprinciple, according to which Aristotle must certainly come off badly: Never has one who first went through a great mass of empirical work become a true philosopher.'
'
;

than for the solving of metaphysical difficulties.'

- Thus Part. An. i. 1, 639, b, 7 sqq., 640, a, 14.; Hist. An. i. 7, 491, a, 9 sq. ; Meteor, iii. 2, 371, b, 21 Anal. Pr. i. 30, 46, a, 17 sqq. Aristotle appeals here (as in PaH.An. 639, b, 7) especiaUy to the progress of astronomy about which see infra, ch. ix.
;

'

Thus

also SrRUMPELL, Theoret. Phil. d. Gr. 156, who delivers

the judgment

which, however, can scarcely be reconciled with his own observations on pp. 184 sqq..

(middle).
d.x\.rist.

Cf.

Eucken, Methode
^c^.

Forsch.Yll

176

ARISTOTLE

also notice that in Aristotle the empirical effort is still

often crossed by the speculative and dialectic methods which he took over directly from Platonism.

too

Indeed, so far as natural science goes,

just to charge

it

would be more

him with
it

too

little

empiricism than too

would be far truer to say simply that he carried both methods as far as could be expected of The science of the Greeks began with specuhis day.
much.^

But

any and largely by the efforts of Aristotle himself. Therefore it was natural that the dialectical method of Socrates and Plato, with its logical dissections and connections of ideas, guided by
lation.

The empirical

sciences only attained to

late date,

sort of

development at a

current opinions and the indications of language, should

take precedence of any strict empirical rules.

Aristotle

stood in a close relation to the dialectical movement, and

brought
to

it

in theory
It

completion.

and practice, as we have just said, was not to be expected that the

art of empirical investigation should find in

him an

equally complete exponent, and therefore an accurate

discrimination between the two methods was as yet far
off.

That could only come after the

of the empirical sciences

fuller development and the direct investigation

of the theory of knowledge, which the

modern centuries
is

have brought to pass.

All the greater

his

the credit
scientific

due to Aristotle that

instinct led

wide and direct

him even

so soon to turn to the

methods

of

'

This charge has been

made

by Bacon, and, since the above was first wTitten, by Lewes {Aristotle^

a one-sidedness not uncommon with him, by Lange, Gesch. d, Mater. 1. 61 sqq.

91, 97)

and, through

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

observation and to connect

177

them

as

well as he then

could with the dialectical treatment of ideas.

That Aristotle's dialectic had to do with a far more extensive range of empirical data than Plato had to deal with is the reason why Aristotle's methods of exposition
are distinguishable at a glance from Plato's by that air of formal logic which they wear. Aristotle does not limit

himself to that unfolding of pure ideas which Plato expected of the philosopher,^ though his own attempts at it were in truth but rare and partial. The ideal processes
are for ever interrupted, in Aristotle, by references to experience, by examinations of ambiguous terms, by criticism of other views. The more extensive is the

the more eager

matter which he has to bring under the yoke of science is he to see that every step in his far-

reaching investigations should be assured on the one hand by a copious induction, and on the other by a careful observance of the rules of logic. His manner
of presenting his work seems often dry and tedious as compared with Plato's; for the texts we now possess
yield us but rare
for

which

his writings

examples of that richness and charm were praised no less than his

master's.

artistic finish,

make

miss wholly the dramatic life, the the fine mythical presentment which us love the Dialogues.^ But the Corpus Aristo-

We

telicum exhibits the peculiar qualities of a philosophic style in so high a degree that we ought not only
' For fuller information on the methodological principles of Aristotle and their application,see the next chapter and Etjcken,
;

(1872);

cf.

esoecially

pp. 29

Die Methode

sqq. 122 sqq. 152 sqq ^ g^e Zeller's Plato, ^ Cf. p. 106 sq.

passim

d. Arist.

Forschung
j^

VOL.

I.

178
not to call
'

ARISTOTLE
him a bad
'

writer,'

but ought rather to

set

him
is

in this respect far above his great forerunner.

He

accused of

formalism,' though where the discussion

grows more concrete, as in his physics or ethics, this but it will not be regarded as a blemish by falls away those who remember how needful even in Plato's view how much bewilderment this strict logical effort was
;

among

ideas

must have been cured by keen

distinctions

how many fallacies will have in the meanings of words the exact analysis of the syllogism. been avoided by Rather has Aristotle done the world immortal service
in that he established a fixed basis for all scientific

procedure,

and won
to us

for

whose value
If,

we only
to

thought thereby a security overlook because we have

it is

grown too used

again,
this point

to

it

remember that

great.

we endeavour

to appreciate, so far as at

we

can, the standpoint

and general view of

the universe which

find

two things.

we can On the one

call A'ristotelian,

we

shall

hand, no one can overlook

the basis he inherited from Socrates and Plato. Yet, on the other hand, there is an element of originality
so notable

and so sustained as to make us stigmatise the notion that Aristotle was a kind of dependent follower of Plato who did nothing but formally work

up and complete
utterly unjust.^

his

master's thought,

as

an error

>

Aristotle adheres not only to the Socratic proposition that Science has to do with the idea of things, but also to the further consequence which takes us into the

heart of Plato's system, that that which

*

is

truly actual
sq.

EiTTEE, iii. 28. Braniss, Gesch,

d. Phil.

see

Kant,

i.

179 sqq. 207

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

179

m
it,

a thing

is

only
all

its

essence as thought in the idea of

' '

is actual only in so far as it partakes of that ideal essentiality. Yet, whereas to Plato this Essential Being was a thing existing by

and that
'

else

'

which he relegated to a separate ideal world beyond the world of experience, his follower recognises
itself,

the truth that the Idea, as the essence of things, could** not stand separate from the things themselves. Therefore

he seeks to present the Idea, not as a Universal

common essence of things indwelling in the particular things themselves. In lieu of the negative relation to which the sundering
existing for itself apart, but as a

of ideas and

phenomena had

led with Plato,

he posits

rather the positive relation of each to the other and

mutual dependence. Therefore he calls the senelement the Matter, and the insensible essence the Form. He puts it that it is one and the same Being, I here developed into actuality, there undeveloped and
their
sible

So it comes that, for him, Matter must, by an inner necessity, strive upward to Form, and Form equally must present itself in Matter.
In this transformation of Plato's metaphysic,
to
it is

lying as a mere basis.

easy

recognise
is

the

realism

of the natural philosopher

whose aim
is

the explanation of the actual.

Just this

and ever recurrent charge against the Ideal Theory, that it leaves the world of phenomena, the things of Becoming and Change, unexplained. For his own part, he finds the very root-definitions of his
his strongest

metaphysic in his treatment of those processes wherein

is

the secret of

all

genesis and

all

change, whether by

nature or by

art.

N 2

180

ARISTOTLE
Yet
Aristotle, too,
is

philosophy in these directions

barred from completing his by just that dualism of

Plato. the philosophy of Ideas which he inherited from Matter together, Hard as he tries to bring Form and the last they always remain two principles, of
still

to

which he can neither deduce one from the other, nor Fully as they are worked out both from a third. range of finite things, still the highest through the left outside entity of all is nothing but the pure Spirit,
in man is the world, thinking in itself as the highest from without, and that Reason which enters into him

which never comes into any true unity with the indiviis at dual side of his being. In this way, Aristotle perfection and the ending of the Idealism of once the
Socrates and Plato
:

its

perfection, because

it

is

the

whole most thorough effort to carry it throughout the world of phenorealm of actuality and to explain the but menal things from the standpoint of the Idea
'

'

also its

ending, since in

it

there comes to light the im-

and the possibility of ever holding together the Idea real unity, after we have once Phenomenon in any
basis of the posited, in our definition of the ultimate

world, an original opposition between them, principles If we follow out the development of these
that purpose to in the Aristotelian system, and seek for we are take a general view of the divisions he adopted,

met

that, neither at once with the unfortunate difficulty

in his

writings nor in any trustworthy account of on that point his method, is any satisfactory information if ^e should trust the later Peripatetics to be found.i

own

Cf for what follows

.

Kitter,

iii.

57 sqq.

Bkandis,

ii.

b,

130

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

and the
divided

181

Neo-Platonic commentators,
all

Aristotle

had

philosophy into

Theoretic
office

and

Practical^

assigning to the former the

of perfecting the

cognitive part of the soul, and to the latter that of

perfecting the

appetitive.

In Theoretic Philosophy,
:

they say, he again distinguished three parts

or Metaphysics.
is

Physics,

Mathematics, and Theology, also called First Philosophy

Practical Philosophy likewise
:

fell,

it

said,

into three

Ethics, Economics,

and

Politics.^

There are not wanting indications in the Aristotelian

writings which serve to support this statement.
stotle often

Ari-

opposes to each other the theoretical and

the practical reason.^

quiries

He distinguishes between inwhich are directed to Cognition, and those

Accordingly

which are directed to Action.^

sqq.
;

we

find.

Teichmuliek,
ii.

Arist.

real

ForscJi.

9
v. d.

sqq.

Waltbe,

Die Lehre
sqq.
'

prakt. Vern. 537

Thus Ammon. in Qu. voc. 7, a, sqq. (who adds the fourfold division of Mathematics
Porpli.

into Geometry, Astronomy, Music, and Arithmetic), and after him

part as ah instrument of Philosophy), practical philosophy into Ethics and Politics, and Politics into the science of ibhe State and the science of the household. Alex. To2y. 17, gives as philosophical sciences, Physics, Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics but as to Logic cf below
:
.

David,
Pkys.

Scliol.

25,

a,
i.

1
e
;

init. Categ. Schol. in Ar. 36, a,

Simpl. Philop.
;

p. 187, n. 2.
2

Pe An.
i.

Anatol. in 462 H.; EUSTRAT. in Mh. N. init. Anon. Schol. in Arist. 9, a, 31. The division into theoretical and practical philosophy had already been given by Alex, i/i Anal. PH. init. and DiOG. v. 28.
.

Phys. init. Fabric Bihl. iii.

6,

10, 433, a, 14
6, cf.

432, b, 26, c. 1139, a, 13 vers. fin. Polit. vii.

iii.

9,

Fth.

vi. 2,
;

For further in1333, a, 24. formation see chap. xi. 3 iira^ rh i. 1, 1095, a, 5 r4\os [ttjs TToAtTt/cfjs] iffrlv oh ypSxTis
14,

ML

aWa
10,

irpa^is.

Likewise, ibid. x.

ing

Further, the latter, in part divergfrom the others, divides theoretical philosophy into Phy-

and Logic (which, however, he does not consider so much a

sics

1179, a, 35, ii. 2, init.: iirel oZv 7) irapovaa Trpayfxareia ov d^upias fveKd irrriv Sxrirep at &\\ai (ov yap iV flSw/aev Ti icrriv rj aperi) (TKiirrSluLcOa, ciAA.' /i/' ayaOol yevdficda, ^irel oi/Shv &i/ ^v 6<f>e\os ovttjs), &c.

182
at

ARISTOTLE
an early date in his School a division of Science
,

and practical.^ He himself, however, is accustomed to add a third the poietic science ^ because he distinguishes TroLrjais or production from irpa^Ls or action, both by its source and by its end,
into theoretic

'

saying that the former originates in the artistic faculty,

and that production has its work to be brought into being, but action has its end in the activity of the
the latter in the
will,^

end

outside itself in the

'

Metaph.
opBus
5'

ii.

(a), 1,
"^"^
'''^

993, b,
Koki'lffQai

speaks merely of an
of a
tik}),
<f>i\offO(pia)

eVto-T^yu?;

(not

19

ex**

TT/v (piKocrocpiav iTricniifxtiv ttjs olAtj0eias. dwpT]TiKT]s fifv yap (wherein, however, the whole of philosopliy is here inchided) tcAos dAr,eeia,

and irotrjthese passages would justify

irpaKTiK^
<piXo(ro(pia
iiria-T'fifxr]

our using the latter expression,

since
is

synonymous
the latter

with

when

TrpaKTiKTJs S' ipyov.

],

Etli.

End.
5'

i.

signifies not

merely knowledge in

1214,

a,
.

8:
.

ttoWSjv
TO, {x\v

ovtwv

avrSiu <tvuT;'j/et irphs rh yuwvai fx6vov, to. Se Koi TTCpl Ttts KTr}(rcLS Koi irfpl ras
6(t}pr]iJi6.TCt)v
.

irpd^ds rov irpdyfiaros.

'6(Ta /xev

ovv

xei <pi\o<To<piav jxovov OewpriTiK'fiv,

&C.
2

MetapU.
:

vi

1,

1025,
. .

b,
.

general, but science in the special sense of the term. And since in Metaph. vi. 1 {vid. inf. 183, n. 3) he gives three (pi\o(ro(plai OewpririKal, this undoubtedly supposes that there is a non-theoretical, i.e. a practical or poietic philosophy. But one cannot believe that by
is meant, not that science which treats of irpa^is and iroiTjais (Ethics, Politics, and the science of Art), but the faculty of

18 sq.

71

<Pv(Tik)]

iwiffTTj/xri

the latter

StjAoj/ (in oijT TrpaKTiK-f] eVrxj/ oijre

iroiTfTiKr]

irpaKTiK)]

.... Soare cl iraffa Sidvoia ^ TTOirjTiK}] ^ dewprjTiK^, t]

tis hv
efrj
;

(pvcriK^

OewprjTtKTj

c. 2,

the trpa^is and iroi-qaris itself, namely

^pSvrja-is

1026,

b,

(xi.

7)

ovdefxiS.

yap
[so.

and

rixvi)

(WALTER,

iTri(rTT}ixr)

i-mfxeXes

irepl

avrov

Lehre

v. d.

rov

(TvixfiffirjKOTOs]

oiire

irpaKTiK^

'^i\o(TO(pla

prald. Ve^rn.h^Q sq.). never has this meaning,

oijTc iroiriTiKfj

oUre 60Dpr}TiKf}. The same division of iiriffri^fxr] in Top. vi. 6, 145, a, 15; viii. 1, 157,
10.
c. 2,

and even

iiricrr-finri

cannot have

it

in this context. So again since cer-

a,

Further

cf.

EtJt.

N.

vi.

1139, a, 27, x. 8, 1718, difference theoretic science in De Coelo, iii. 7, 306, a, 16 Metaph. xii. 9, 1075, a, 1, cf. ix. 2, 1046, b, 2, and Bonitz on this passage. Though Aristotle here
3-5,

and on the between poietic and

b,

20,

tain branches are distinguished as practical and poietic from Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics, which are the theoretic
sciences, the former must likeAnd wise be really sciences.

what other place would be

for Ethics, &c.
3 ?

left

Metaph.

vi. 1,

1025, b, 22

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

actor. ^

183
to

The two

coincide,

however,

as opposed

t he the oretic activity in this, that

they have to do with

the determination of that which can be either one

or

way

another, whereas

Knowledge has

to

do with the
three

determination of that which cannot be any otherwise

than as
are

it

is.^

Aristotle

does also speak of

theoretic Sciences, the

first

concerning things which

the

movable and

corjporeal,

second referring

to

things unmoved though corporeal, the third dealing with

that

which

is

incorporeal

and unmoved

these being

Physics, Mathematics, and the First Philosophy,^ which

rSiV fxev

ovvTi

r)

yap iroiTjriKcov iv rcf) iroiapxh ^ ''oCs ^ r^xvn ^ Svya/xis

eV

X(i}pi(Tra S' iffois, oAA.'

ws eV
.
.

ri\ri.

7]

5e

TrpcoTTj

[sc.

^jA-OfTot^m]
.

Kal irept

ris, Twi' 8e trpaKTiKoov

ry

irpdr-

X<*>ptCTa Kal aKivrjra

(iffre Tp7s

TovTi T) Trpoaipecris. Hence L^th. vi. in the province of 5, 1140, b, 22 art it is better to err voluntarily in that of morals involuntarily. ' erepou S' EtJi. vi. 4 init.
: ; :

hv ejev
fxariKi),

(pi\o(To<p'ai decoprjTiKal, /jLadrj'

(pvaiK^, deoKoyiK'f].
1,

Simi;

iffrl Tro'njffis Koi irpa^is

b,

&Wo
'

C. 5, 1140, rh y4vos trpd^eus Kal

;

iroii^iffews

....
lo-Tt

rrjs fxev

yap
t}

iroi-fjcreoos

Tpov rh reXos, rrjs Se Trpo|ea)s ovk

tiv
'[r}

7^p
i.

aifT^

evirpa^ia

r4\os.
'

Ibid.
vi.
fikv

1 init.

Eth.

47ciffri]p.7]

1139, b, 18: 3, oZv ri iffriv iurevOfv

irdvTs

1096, a, 30, c, 6 init. De Ah.L I, 403, b, 7 sqq. About the name of the first philosophy, cf also p. 76, supra. As to Mathematics as the science of numbers and quantity, and the abstraction peculiar to it, whereby it does not consider a body according to its physical properties, but only from the point of view of magnitude in
larly xii.
.

<pavp6u

....
;

yap
:

viroAafi-

i^dvofxiv, h iiria-rd/Jifda

jx)] ivS^x^ffGai &W<i}s ^x^i-v c. 4 init. rov S' ^vSeXOfiepov &\\cas ^x^i^v ^ffri ri Kal Cf. C. 2, TTOiTfrhv Kal vpaKTou, &c. 1139, a, 2 sqq. Ue 6te/o,iii. 7, 306,
:

space, and, in determining number and quantity, disregards the of that in intrinsic condition which they occur, see Phys. ii. 2, Anal. Pout. i. 10, 193, b, 31 sqq. Anal. 76, b, 3, c. 13, 79 a, 7 Metaph. xi. Pri. i. 41, 49, b, 35
;

p 167, n. 2 Part. An. 640, a, 3 ^ yap apxh to7s fiev [the theorists] rh iv, toIs 5h [the technicists] rh ia-Sixevov. Metaph. vi. 1 (xi. 7) where among other things 1026, a, 13
vid.suj)r.
;

4,

c.

3,

i.

I,

a, 9, xiii. 2, 1077, a,
iii. 2,

1036, 9 to c. 3/w., 997, b, 20, iUd. 996, a, 29

106J, a, 28,
vii. 10,
iii.

'

Detached statements on Mathematics are found

IJin.

De An.

71 IJLfv

dW

yhp (pvaiK^
OVK
evia
irepl

rrepl ax(t>pi<J'Ta fJLcu

ctKiV/jra,

ttjs

Se jxaOtifia/x^v

TiKTis

aKivrjra

ov

in many places, e.g. Metaph. i. 2, 982, a, 26 De Coelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 15, c. 7, 306, a, 26; Be An. i. 1, Cf. Brandis, p. 135 402, b, 16.
;

184

ARISTOTLE

he names also Theology, and treats as the pinnacle of all knowledge.^

If,

however,

we attempt

to apply the

suggested

division to the contents of the Aristotelian books,^

sqq.

we

The contradiction which

iii.

knowledge
;

because

it

investi-

73 sq., finds in Aristotle, viz, that a sensible subtratum is first denied and afterwards attributed to Mathematics, and that its object is now designated as removed, now as not removed, from what is sensible, is partly solved by the distinction of the purely mathematical from the applied sciences, and partly and chiefly by the remark that Aristotle nowhere says that the object of Mathematics is a x'^P*(TThv, but only that it is considered as such, i.e. by abstracting from its sensible nature in Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 3, moreover, Astronomy according to the common reading is not called 'the truest philosophy,' but the oiKeioTctTTj, the most important of the mathematical sciences for the discussion in hand still Bonitz is right in reading t^s otKeioTctTTjs <pi\o(ro<pia Twv fxadrjuiariKuv iiTi<m}fxS}v.
; ;
:

RiTTER,

gates what is most difficult to be known because the science of the last reasons is the most accurate (o/cpijSeo-TaTr;) and gives the most perfect instruction as to causes because, more than any other, it pursues knowledge for its own sake and because, as the science of principles, and hence
;

also of final ends, it must govern all others. In Top. viii. 1, 157, a, 9, the following is given as an example of a division Uri eVt:

(TTTfiJ.'q iiriffT'fffi'rjs

fieffrepa

efvot

^fXriwv ^ T(j5 aKpi^ t^ fieKriSvcov.

'

Meta2)n.

vi.

1,

1026,

a,

21

(and almost the same in xi. 7, 1064, b, 1), after what is given in the preceding note tV tiihuto.:

TTjj/ [eVio-TT^/xTji/]

5e7 Trepl rh ri/niu)-

rarov yivos ehai.

in 1064, b, 5
e/cctcTTTj
:

(For, as is said fieKriwv Koi xe/pcoi'

Aristotle in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074, b, 29 sq. also supposes that the value of knowledge is proportioned to that of its object. The universal pre-eminence of the theoretical over the practical and poietic sciences does not, however, rest on this, nor on their greater exactness, for some of them (the zoological and psychological sciences) have no superiority over Ethics in either respect but primarily on the fact that knowledge is here an end in itself; cf. Metaph. i. 1, 981, b, 17 sqq. 982, a, I. * Thus Ravaisson (Essai siir
;

(TttjtSv.)

Keyerai Kara rh olKe7op 4itiat fjicv ovv dewprjriKai t(2v

&\X(t3V eViO'TTJyUCOf alpT(VTpai, aVTT}

Se Tcoi/ 6((i}pr]TiK(2v. He discusses at length in Metapli. i. 2, why the first philosophy especially deserves the name ao^ta because, as perceiving the most universal, it gives the most comprehensive
:

la Metaphysique d'Aristote, i. 244 sqq.). who wishes to subdivide theoretical philosophy into Theology, Mathematics and Physics, practical philosophy into

and

Ethics, Economics and Politics, poietic philosophy into Poetics, Rhetoric and Dialectics.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

run at once into manifold troubles.
stotle wrote, the
'

185

Of

all

that Arifall

only thing which would

is

under

poietic science

'

the Poetics

for

he himself rele-

gates the
that
it is

Rhetoric to

another section by indicating

a side-branch of Dialectics and Politics,^ and

Dialectics cannot

be disconnected from Analytics or

Logic. ^
If

we were

to conclude

from this

difficulty that

the

division into two groups

theoretic and

practical

was

preferable to the division into three, we should thereby be cutting ourselves loose from the statements of Aristotle himself.

It further appears that in the presenta-

tion of his system he took no account of the existence

The one mathematical work to which he gives a reference, and which can with certainty be taken to be genuine the tract on Astronomy belongs,
of Mathematics.

according
'

to
2,

the

classification
:

above

indicated,
;

to

/jJAt^f. i.

1356, a, 25

Sxtt^

(Tvfifialvei^T^v pTjTopiK^jp oiov trapa4>ues Tt TTJs Sia\KTiKris clvai koI ttjs

ifepl

TO

ia-Ti

ijdrj irpayfiardas, ^v SikuiSv irpoa-ayopevfw iroXiriK-fiv. c. 3,

:

1359, b, 8
Sxt
rris
irepl
TO.
T}^

(iirep

yap koX irpSrcpov

fxkv ck

purposes of Politics and since the character of a science depends on its purpose, he includes it in the practical section. Hence, although in itself an artistic science, and designated as such
Aristotle (e.g. MJiet. i. 1354, a, 11 sq. b, 21, J 355, a, 4, 33, b, 11, c. 2, 1356, b, 26 sqq. rhetorical theories are also called rexvai, cf. supra, 72, 2, 73, p. 1), still he does not seem to give Rhetoric an independent place in the system, as Brandis does (ii. b, 147), and still more decidedly Boring (Xnnstl. d. Arist. 78).
;

iip'r\K6Tis TvyxdvofjLev a\Tjehs iffriv,

by

p-qTOpiKT)

avyKurai

re

ava\vTiK7Js

iiri(TT'fiiuLr]s

Koi ttjs
rots

rh
fifv

ijdrj

TroXiriKrjs, SfjLo'a S' iffrl

T?)

Sia\KTiKf)

rh Sh
i.

<ro(pi(niKo'ts

\6yois. ^i^A.

1,

1094,
iro-

b,

6pfii/ Se Kal riis ivTi/jLordras

'rwv Svvdfifwv inrh ravTf\v

[r^v

AitjkV]

oijcras,

oTov

aTpari]yiKT)v,

oiKovofiiKTiv, ^TjropiK'fiV

xP^M-^^V^ ^^
irpaKriKcSv

ravrris Ta7s Koiirais rdiu

iiria-Trfnuv,

&c. These expressions seem to have a direct reference to the passage cited from the Mhetorie. Aristotle sees in it an application of Dialectics for the

So in Top. i. 1 init. c. 2, plainly designated as an auxiliary science to philosophy in general, and especially to the theoretical investigations,
'^

it

is

186
Physics.

ARISTOTLE
Of the
others, they are

either

of doubtful

authenticity or, in any case, the absence of any refer-

ences leaves us to suspect that these were not considered

an
'

essential

part of the connected

Physics^

exposition of his

system.^
second,'
^

The

again,

is

spoken of as the

not the third, philosophy

as

if

there were

no thought of Mathematics standing between it and and Aristotle himself refers First Philosophy the
' :
'

the

Mathematical

Axioms

to

the

'First

Philoso-

phy.'3

As
divide
later

regards Practical Philosophy, Aristotle does not

it

Economics and Politics ^ like the commentators'^ who were misled in that matter by
into Ethics,

the spurious Economics.

place
call
'
''

He

distinguishes in the

first

the

main Ethical Science

'

Politics

from the
Tactics,
writings
cf.

which
:

he desires to

auxiliary sciences of Econo-

mics, Military
'

and Rhetoric ^

and then in

Politics
'

'

he distinguishes that section which treats of

these
vii. 11,

About
Metaph.

p. 86, n. 1, siqna.
^

TTjs (pvffiKr^s
<}>ias.

KoX
iv.

1037, a, 14 devTfpas <pi\o(ro-

as the three parts of practical science this division must consequently belong to the oldest
;

Peripatetics.
^

With whom, besides KavaisRiTTER,

Eth.
i.

3
*

Metaph.

3 init. (xi. 4).

Aristotle in Eth. vi. 9, 1142, a, 9, besides <pp6vr](ns which relates to individual action, certainly names otKoj/o/t^oandTroA.tTeio also: but in 1141, b, 31 he has divided Politics [i.e. the science of the life in society with the exclusion of Ethics) into olKovouia, vonodea-ia, Tro\iTiK^, so that, according to this, Economics forms a part of Politics, Still more definitely Eudemus in Mfi. Eud. i. 13, combines the 8, 1218, b.
icoKitik)] koL olKovo/xiKrj Kol ^p6u7}(ns

302, also agrees. 1094, a, 18 sqq., vi. 9, 1141, b, 23 sqq. " Eth. i. 1, ibid., and 1095, a, 2, i. 2 i7iit. and Jin,., ii. 2, 1105, a, 12, vii. I2i7iit., cf. i. 13, 1102, a, 23. Hhet. i. 2, 3, vid. sujfr. p. 185,
son,
iii.

1,

n. 1.
Eth.i. 1, ]094,b, 2;Ehet.\. Also in the first 1356, a, 25. book of the Politics, Economics, as far as Aristotle has treated the subject, is taken to belong to the; science of the State.

2,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

the moral
action
treats of the State.
It is also important to
div^ision,

187

of the individual from that which

remember that
it

in the above

whether we take
for Logic.

to be twofold or threefold,

there

is

no place

The

later Peripatetics get

over this difficulty by the theory

controversy between
is

which
Stoics

is

a point of

them and the

that

Logic

not a part of Philosophy, but only an instrument

it.^

for

Aristotle himself never hints at this distinc-

tion,^

although he does, of course, treat Logic as a

Methodology.''

Nor

will the suggestion help us

much

for since Aristotle

scientific care, it

had worked out his Logic with such must have had some definite place in

his system.^

subdivision,

The only conclusion is that the scheme of which we deduce from the above-quoted
narrow
for

remarks of Aristotle, seems to be in part too wide and

in part too

the matter which his

books
built

contain.

A
'^

different subdivision of the system

,

might be

' Eth. i. 1 1094, b, 7. So also in the lengthy discussion, x. 10. DiOG. V. 28 Alex, in Pri.
;

philosophy, the point.

*

is

of course beside

Stipra, p. 91 sq.

Anal,
in

init., ScJtol.

141, a, 19, b, 25,

No more

trustworthy
(Z(?<7.

is

Ra252,

Top.

41,

m,

Ammon.

ajnid
;

vaisson's statement

ci^.

Waitz,' Arist. Org. i. 44 vied. SiMPL. Categ. 1, ^, Schol. 39, b, and Philop. in Categ. Schol. in Ar. 36, a, 6, 12, 37, b, 46. The same in Anal. Pri. ibid. 143, a, 3. Anon. ibid. 140, a, 45 sqq.

David, in Categ. Schol. 25, a, 1, where there are also further

fragmentary subdivisions of Logic and the logical writings. ' That in Toj). i. 18 /w., and
viii.

14, 163, b, 9, logical readiness as

bespeaks of an organ of

264 sq,), that Analytics is no special science, but the form of all science. It is much rather the ^?wwZe</^e of this form, which constitutes a particular branch just as much as Metaphysics, which is the knowledge of the universal grounds of all Being, Marbach, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 247, even thinks that here can be no doubt that the "Mathematics" which forms a part of philosophy is what is now called Logic'
' t

188

ARISTOTLE
otlier

on the

remark, that

all

propositions and problems

or
logical.^

are either ethical,

physical,

Under the

logical head, however, Aristotle here

comprehends both

formal Logic and the First Philosophy or Metaphysics,^

and this alone would prove that he could not here have meant to indicate a scheme for the presentation of his system, in which these two departments are kept so
obviously distinct.
If,

then,

find in his

we are forced to give up the attempt own isolated remarks any key to the plan
which
corresponds with
the

to

of

his

work
as

construction

itself,

nothing remains but to gather from the actual

work

we have

it,

the method of the work he designed.

Abstracting from those of his writings which are in-

tended only as preliminary essays, or devoted to historical materials or collections

concerning natural history,

criticism,

or taken

up with philosophic
investigations

we

distinguish

among
are

Aristotle's writings four

main masses.

These

his

of

Logic,

of Metaphysics, of
fifth

Natural History, and of Ethics.

Toj). i. 14, 104, b, 19: %(ni S' Txmcp TrfpiXafifTv rwv irpoTaaoiv

would be the
iidiKrjs

Ttt /JLev (pvffiKris

ra 5e

dewpias

o>s

fxaWov
2

iffTiv.

Ka\
liihv

Tuv
yap

irpofi\r}ixa.Tuv

iJ-fprj rp'ia.

at

TidiKoi Trporda-cis (tcrlv, at 5e

XoyiKai
<TO(piav

....
Korr^

d/JLoiccs

5e Koi

ra

iro-

jSATj/xaro

....

oZv <piXoalroSv a.\i]Q(iav irepi

irphs fihv

irpayfiaTCvrfov, SiaXcKTiKcSs 5e irphs

So^ap.
It is of

no importance as

As an instance of logical propositions Toj). ubi auj). mentions the principle, which belongs equally to Methodology or Analytics and to Metaphysics (cf. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, a, 9 sqq., 1005, a, 2), that opposites fall
under the same science. Again, in the instances given on p. 174, n. 2, giqjra, \oyiKhs at one time stands for logical, at another foi metaphysical inquiries for the] latter also in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217,
;

against this, that, in dealing with the difference between knowledge and representation, Aristotle remarks in Anal. Post. i. 33 TO 8e \onrh iroSs Sel SiaveTfxai Jin.
:

iri

T Siavolas Koi vov koI

iirKTr-fifMrfS

Kal

t4xvvs Kal

(ppoviiffius koX aocpias

b, 16.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

out any part of

189

Philosophy of Art, except that Aristotle did not work

it

except the Poetics,

He

seems to
of

have forgotten to

deduce these various branches

work from the idea and problem of philosophy as a whole, or to reduce them to any simpler plan of diviOf these five, the section of Logic and Methodosion. logy ought to come first, not only in the time order of
the important texts, ^ but also in the order of exposition

for Aristotle

himself describes

it

as a propaideu-

tic for all

other inquiries.^

After the investigation of

'

scientific

method, the

'

First Philosophy

must come.
it

For, although the connected exposition of

belongs in

time to the close of Aristotle's work,^ nevertheless it contains the key to the philosophical understanding of
the Physics and the Ethics and
,

it

is

from

it

we must

obtain

all

the definitions, without which

we

could take

not a step in either of these sciences such as the

definitions of the

Four Causes, of Form and Matter, of

the different senses of Being, of Substance and Accident, of the

^

Mover and the Moved, &c.

lytics,'

The very

8(ra

See s?/^m, p. 156 seq. Metaph. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2: 8' iyx^tpovffi rwv \y6uTMV
-TTcpl

or 'One must be acquainted with what Analytics has

to
discuss.'

Inadmissible,

on

Tivh

rris aX-ndeias,
Si'

tv rp6irov

Sc? a7ro5ex6(r0ot,

aTTaiSevffiav

twv

avaKvTiKoSv tovto Spuffiv 6? yap vepl TovTwv ^Kiu irpocTTKrrafjLevovs, aWk fx^ oLKovovras ClTeTv. It is much the same for the ques-

the other hand, is Prantl's explanation {Gesch. d. Log. i. 137), which refers the tovtodp, not to the words with which it is immediately connected, but to the
d^idixaTa,

tion in hand, whether the rovruv is referred to avoKvTiKcSv, or more correctly to the investigations indicated in the words irepl rrjs from the dX-qOfias &c., since nature of the thing it comes to the same, whether he says, One
'

about which Aristotle has spoken above. As a consequence of this translation, Prantl thinks it monstrous that this passage should be used as a proof of the precedence of tlie
Analytics.
^

Vid. supr. p. 76

sqq.,

and

must be acquainted with Ana-

p. 160, n.

190

ARISTOTLE
of the
'

name
in

First Philosophy

'

expresses the fact that

all

the logical

order

it

precedes

other

material

investigations, as being concerned with the discussion

most universal of all presuppositions.^ The Physics follow on after the First Philosophy,' and the
of the
'

Ethics follow

the Physics,

because the latter

is

pre-

The Rhetoric must be taken The philosophy of Art, on the as belonging to Ethics.^ other hand, forms a section by itself, which is not brought into any definite connection with the rest. We can only treat it, therefore, as an appendix. To a like position we must relegate also Aristotle's occasional
supposed in the former.^
utterances as to Religion
in the true sense,
'

for a

Philosophy of Religion,

was not within his view.

tiktis),

Still

more plainly than by

irpwr-n <l)i\o(ro<pia is
:

Metaph.

vi. 1,

1026, a, 13,

the superlative
this

shown by the comparative

(pi\o(ro(pia'jvpoTfpa{(f)V(riKrjs, /j.a6r]ixa-

30, Gen. et Corr. i. 318, a, 5. Vid. supQ'a, p. 159. ^ See snj)ra, p. 185, n. 1.
'^

LOGIC

191

CHAPTER V
LOGIC

From

of old, Aristotle has been renowned as the founder

of Logic, and he has deserved his fame.

We

must

not,

however, overlook the fact that he treated Logic, not as

an independent science, but only from the point of view

of Methodology, as the
investigations.
'

technique
it,

'

of his philosophic
therefore,
full

In dealing with

he does

not contemplate by any means a

and uniform

account of the powers of thought as a whole, but rather

a simple inquiry into the forms and laws of scientific
proof.

Of the

first

half of his Logic

the Topicshe
single

admits this himself.^

section

Of the other and more important

the

Analytics

it it

follows partly from

references which assign to

the place of a Propaideutic

Topics

of Science,^ partly
aforesaid,

from the analogy of the

the

but more especially from the whole treatment

of the

subject.

Of the two Analytics

first is

logical

masterpieces of Aristotle, the

concerned with

Syllogisms, the second with the laws of Proof.^

in connection with these investigations,
'

Only and only in so

^xt^fJi-fV

Toj).

i.

1 init.

r/

/xev irp66(Tis
d<|)'

orav

b^ioius

Slxrirep

eVI

rrjs irpay/xareias fieOoSov evpe7u,

?is

^TjTopiKris Koi

laTpiKrjs Kal rcSv toi'

Svur)(r6iJ.0a

<rv\\oyi(ff6ai

ircpl

ovtcov Swoifxeuv
t/c

rovro

S' icrrl

rh

iravThs tov irporeOevTos TTpo^Kr,fxaros

i^ ivSS^CDV Kal avrol
fiTtOfv ipovfifv

twv ivdexofMevuv
"^

iroi^Lv

&

irpo-

K6yov virexofres

aipovfieda.

vircvavTiov.

Cf

c. 2.

Vid. supra, p. 189, n. 2.

C.

f^o^ify 5e

r(\4ws

tV fJi-fOohoy,

'

The common theme of both

192
far as

ARISTOTLE
may be
necessary thereto, did he stay to consider
It was not until a later he extended these hints into a

the theory of Propositions.^

period,^ (if at all) that

separate treatise in the Wspl ipfirjvsias. In the same way,

it is

from the consideration of the Syllogism that he

is

led to the logical treatment of Notions.

He

touches on

Definition in the Analytics ^^ merely as a matter con-

nected with Proof; and, in

fact,

the logical properties

of Notions as a whole are only taken up as incidental

to the Syllogism.^

The theory

of the Categories, on the

other

hand, belongs more to

it is

Metaphysics

than to

Logic, because

not deduced from the logical form

derived rather from

of the Notion as such, or from the process of thought

involved in

its

construction, but

is

the natural division of those real relations, to which the Categories, according to their content, are referred.^

The very name

is

of

'

Analytica
PH.
0.11:6-

'^

indicates that in the

is

thus designated in Anal.

:

that Aristotle

going by an

init.

irpwrov /nkv
7]

(lirc^u

ncpl ri Kal
irepl

analytical method,

rivos ecrrlv
Set|tJ/

crK\pis, '6ti

he proceeds from

and just as syllogisms to

KoX

ilTKTT'flfJLVS

aTToBciKTlKrjS.
ii.

propositions, so in like

manner

Likewise at end of Anal. Post.

19
Kol
Ko.\

init.

Trepl fxev

airodei^eoos, ri

ovv crvWoyKT/xov re iKarcpdv icTTi

he passes from propositions to notions. Both are merely considered as factors in the syllogism. ^ Some other writings on Concepts,

irws yiveTai, (pauephu, a/xa 5e koX

irepl iincrT'fjfXT]s aTroSeiKTiKrjs

Tavrhv

yap

iffriv.

which were mentioned on

AnMl.
i.

PH.

i.

1-3.

Anal.

Post.
'^

2, 72, b, 7.

Vid. supr. p. 66, n. 1. Anal. Post. ii. 3 sqq. and cf. especially c. 10. * The little that has to be mentioned with regard to this will be adduced later. The definition of the '6pos in AtmI. Pri. i.
3

supra, seem to have had a purely logical character; but probably not one of them was the work of Aristotle. Aristotle not only calls both the principal logical writings 'Ava\vTiKd (see p. 67, n. 1 ), but
p. 70,

(vid. supr. p. 189, n. 2,

n. I)

and p.

185,

1,

24, b, 16 alone shows ('6pov 5e kol\u is tv StoAverot r] irp6Ta(ris)

he uses the same designation for the science of which they

treat.

LOGIC
investigations which
Logic,' Aristotle

193
class

we should

under 'Formal
to

was

chiefly concerned

determine

the conditions of scientific procedure, and especially of scientific processes of proof.

method of forming ConPlato had added that of Division Aristotle was the discoverer of the theory of Proof This is to him so clearly the one important point, that he
ceptions
;
;

Socrates had revealed the

reIt

solves into

it

the whole

science of Methodology.

the later Peripatetics described Logic 2 as an 'instrument' of philosophy,^ and when accordingly the logical writings of Aristotle were
in

follows, then, that

when

the end published together under the name of the 'Organon,''' this was in no way contrary to the
'Ava\viv means to reduce a given thing to the parts of which
'

eVl

Th

TrpS>Tov

atriou, t

iv

rij

vp4crei eaxaroi^

composed, or to investigate the conditions through which it is brought about. In this sense
it is

iariv

\v6fiei/os eoiKe (-nreTv

yap fiovKal avaMeiy

6

rhy

elp'r]^4vov

ypafJ-fia.

Aristotle uses auaKvais and avaXiiiv regularly for the reduction of syllogisms to the three
figures, e.g.
^i

TpSirov Sxnrep Sid(pa'veraiS'T] fiev ('ffrriaisov

riKal,
'^"'K

iraaa ehaifiov\v<ns,oTov at /nadrj/xa7) Se fiovKcvais iraffa (-fiTTicns,

"'^^

Anal. Pri.

lo-Xf^Tov

iv

rrj

avahvaei
(Cf.

i.

32

init.

irpuTOv ehai

... Tovs yeyivnix4vovs [(Tv\Xoyi(rfiovs] avakvoifieu ets to irpoeip-q^iva (Tx-fifJ-ara, for which was written

eV tt} yeueaei.

Trendelenburg,
Arist. p. 47 sq.)
(TT-fifXT)

Mem.

Log.
eVt-

The waAvriK}}

immediately before
^ofiev
eipr]fieva crxrinaTa.

ttws
els

8'

audirpo-

TOVS <rv\\oyi(rfjLovs

ra

Cf.

BONITZ,

Ind. Arist. 48, b, 16. And since every investigation consists in tracing out the component parts and conditions of that with which it is concerned, avaXveiv together with Cnre'iv stands for investigate.' Thus Eth. N. iii. 5, 1112, b, 15: {^ovKeverai .... ov8eh irepl tov t4\ovs ) a\\^ OJ/J-evoi reXos ri, irws Kal dia t'ivoov
eo-Ttti

1359,b, 10) designates accordingly the art of scientific inquiry, or the introduction to it, which is scientific method-

(Ilhet.i.4:,

ology

and similarly to. avaXvTiKh. means 'that which deals with

;
:

of

scientific inquiry,' i.e. the theory it as in MetapTi. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2. 2 On this designation, proved to have existed since the time of

Cicero, cf. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 514, 27, 535. ^ Vid. supr. p. 187, n. 2.
* This name is not used by any of the Greek commentators

(TKOTTovai.
I.

ecus

tt.v

tKduaiv

VOL.

194

ARISTOTLE
own
'

Master's

being the

The further theory that Logic, as view.^ Organon of philosophy, could not be also a iDcirt of philosophy, 2 he would hardly have approved. In order rightly to comprehend this Science of Method, it will first be necessary for us to go more closely into Aristotle's views concerning the nature and
'

origin

of

Knowledge.

For

it

is

the

conception of
direction

Knowledge which determines the aim and the

of the procedure of Science
;

and the natural develop-

ment of Knowledge in the mind of man must point the way for its systematic development in Science also. All Knowledge relates to the Essence of Things

to

the

Universal

properties
all

which remain identical

Conversely, however,

with themselves in
Causes of
is
all

individual things, and to the

it

that

is

actual.^
is

true that the Universal

only to be

known through

till

the sixth century, as applied to the writings it only came to this use later (cf. Waitz, Arist. Org.ii. 293 sq.). On the other hand, the texts are, before that time, called by them opyaviKa, because they refer to the vpyavov (or bpyauiKhv cf. SiMPL. in jxipos^ (piKo(To<pias
; ;

and Ethics it has its own end in itself and its own object, or that it is meant to be a philosophically established presentment of the activity of human thought and nothing else (ibid. p. 138 sq,), is a supposition which can neither be proved from any definite statements of Aristotle, nor from the construction of his logical writings. The ' real-metaphysical side of the Aristotelian logic,'

Categ. 1, Schol. 36, a,

25^ a, 3.
' 1

Philop. in
7,

Cat.

15;

T>A^YlJi, ibid,

6^e5c/i. <Z.Xo^. i. 136, respect unreasonable, when he denounces the schoolmasters of later antiquity,' who, * infected with the folly of the Stoic philosophy,' wished at any price to represent Logic as the tool of knowledge. This is really

Prantl,
this

is in

'

however, need not on this account be disregarded. Even if it is regarded as the Science of Method, it may have its foundations in Metaphysics and even though it precede the latter, yet it may be;

come necessary,
^
"

the position and meaning which Aristotle gives it. The theory that in the same sense as Physics

in the end, to reduce it to metaphysical principles.

y^ff^^

gypj.^ p. igy, n. 2.

Fi^.s?^^?/-.

pp.163

sq.,

173 sq.

LOGIC

196

the Individuals, the Essence only through Appearances,

the Causes only through their Effects.

part from Aristotle's metaphysical

This follows in

propositions about

the relation of the individual to the universal, which will meet us hereafter ; for if it is individual existence
alone which can be
called originally actual
'

if

the
'

Universals exist, not independently as

in attachment to individual things as

Ideas
^

'

but only
it

properties

knowledge of Individuals must necessarily precede the scientific knowledge of

Universals.^ Quite as directly, to Aristotle, will the same conclusion follow from the nature of man's powers of knowledge. For while he unhesitatingly admits that

follows that the experiential

<.

the soul must bear within itself the ground-principle of its knowledge, he is equally positive that it is not
possible to attain

any

real

knowledge except by means

of course,

of experience.

All learning presupposes,

some present knowledge, to which it joins on.^ Out of this axiom there arises the doubt, which had given
the earlier thinkers so
bility of learning
^
^

<-

much

trouble,^ about the possieither, as it seems,

ri OecopeTp

> /

at

all.

For

we

Aristotle himself points out

a^ia (pavTaff/id

this connection of his doctrine of

rh y^p

perception with his metaphysics in I)e ATI. iii. 8,^432, a, 2 iirel dh ouSe irpayfxa ovd4v iffri irapa ra fj-eycdr}, us Sok7, to. afV^TjTa /cexcu:

(pavrdaixara (hair^p alad^/aaTd iari ' irK^iv &vcv vX-qs.

j^^^i p^^^_ ^ ^^^^ ^.^^ 5i5a(TKa\la Kal iraffa fxder}<ns diavor].

t:/c^

e'/c

TrpovirapxoixrTjs

ylverai

pia-fievov, eV ro7s etSecri to7s alaeriTois

TO.

voriTd jffTi (cf. c. 4, 430, a, 6 eV Se To7s exova-iy vkr]v Swd/xei %Ka<tt6v

iari

acpaipea-ei.

rwv voi]T(av) rd re eV A^ydfieva [abstract no-

yvdjaewsv^hiGh he immediately proceeds to prove as to the diff erent sciences, both as regards syllogistic and inductive proof.

The
30;
3

like in

Metaph.

i.

9,

tions] Kal o<ja tcSu aiaerjTcov e'lets /col Trddv. Kal Sid tovto oijre ix)j aiadavd/xevos ij.7]9(u ovOeu hv ixdQoi ov5e ^uj/etTj orav re ^ewpp, dvdyKT}

Mh.
and

992, b*
' '

vi. 8,

1139, b, 26.
a, 696,

ggg Zell., Ph. d. Gr.

pt.
ii.

pt.

i.

996,

02

196

ARISTOTLE
of that

must already be possessed

knowledge from which which is not in fact true all the rest is to be deduced in which case the said or else we have still to acquire it, knowaxiom does not hold for that which is the highest to all.i It was this difficulty that Plato sought ledge of of Anamnesis 'the latent recolavoid by his doctrine
'

But apart from all the lection of a prior knowledge. against the preother objections wbich he finds to lie
existence of the

unable to reconcile him unhimself with this theory, because it seems to without thinkable that we should have in its a hiowledge ^ not to speak of all the various absurdities Imowing it
soul,'^

Aristotle

is

to

which a

closer analysis of the notion of the existence

His lead.^ of the Ideas in the soul would obviously by means of solution lies rather in that conception answered so many of the questions of

which he has of metaphysics and natural philosophy in the notion Development 'in the distinction between the groundThe work of potentiality and the completed actuality.
'

soul,

he
its

says,

sense
I

must certainly bear within itself in some knowledge. For if even our Sense Perception
ii.

Anal. Post.

19, 99, b,

20

Toivvv,

on

out' ex^i-V oT6v re, oyr

e^iv

Every knowledge by argument supposes acquaintance with the

highest
&,a(Toi,
. .

ayvoovcri. Kal (jL-qSe/xiav exovffiv

iyy[vcrdai.
'^

principles

(the

apx^i
.

CL the section
Anal. Post.
i.

vld.lnf.y.
.

tc2j/ 5'

a^eVcov Tr,v
. .

tion of soul
3

and body,

as to the relainfra, ch. x.

cit.,

SLairopi)(TLV av tls yuwcTiv Koi TrSrepov ovk iuovcrai al ^ei5 [the

.

loo.

and

yvucTL-i

of the
'

apxa^ iyyivovrai

-ti

Metapli.

iuovaai XeK-fidaaiv. el /xev 87? exfM^" (Tvix^aivei yap aKpiavras, &TOTrov PcrTpas exovras yvaxreis airo^ei^ews Xaix&avop.ev n^ \avedviv. el de

exovres irporepou,

ttcos

&v yua3pi(oLfiev
.

Koi fiaudduoiixev eK fi^ TTpovTrapxovcnis yvtixrews aUvarov yap . (pauephv

.

992, b, 33. if ideas ^ To]}, ii.7, 113, a, 25 were in us they would have also Still Arito move with us, &c. himself would scarcely stotle have laid much stress on this merely dialectical line of attack.
9,
:

LOGIC
is

197

to be regarded, not as a passive reception of things

given, but rather as an activity for which such reception

is

the occasion,^ then the same must a fortiori be

all.

true of Thought, 2 which has no outward object at

Because our pure thought

the possibility of

is

not

different

from the

things thought,^ therefore there

lies in its

nature as such

knowing with an immediate knowledge those highest principles, which are presupposed by all derivative and mediate knowledge as its condition and starting-point/ So far, then, the soul may be de' De An. ii. 5, 417, b, 2 sqq. Aristotle here says that neither

b,

38

^ eV
iirl

ivicov

rj

eTriCT^^Tj

rh

irpayfia;
vArjs
iirl

fikv rcov TTOirjriKciv 6.vv

consciousness nor thought ought to be called a irdcrx^iv and an aWoiaxris, unless we distinguish two kinds of suffering and change r-fju re eVl ras (TrepriTiKas Sia64(reis /xcTafioX^v koI ttjv eVi ras ^i5 Kal rriv (pvffiv. Similarly in iii. 5, 429, b, 22 sqq., iii. 7, 431, a, 6. 2 Be An. ii. 417, b, 18 koX rh KOT ivepyeiav [al(rddve(r0ai] Se
: :

ovffia Kal rh ri ^v elvai, 7] 5e rcuv Oeo^pT^riKwv 6 x6yos r6 TTpayjxa Kal 7} v67]ais.

ii. 19, 100, b, 8 ovdhv iiTi(Tri\ixris aKpifiecrrepov &Wo yevos t) vovs, al 5'
*

Anal. Post.
.
. ,

eVei Se

ctpxcd rcov airodei^ecov yvoopi/xdorepai,

iirKTriifiT) S'
rooti

airaaa

/iierci,

\6yov

ecrri,

apxSov iTrKxr^ifxri (jl\v ovk Uv e^Tj, eVei S' ovZkv aKT}d4(rrpov eVSe'^erai
ivai
^iTiffri\ixii]s
.
. .

Aeyerai r^ decope7v Siacpepei tov fxlu ra. iroi'QTLKb. ttjs ivepyelas (^oc0ev, rh 6par6v etc. aXriov S' on rS)V KaO' eKaarov fj Kar^
dfiolufs

^ vovv, vovs Uv
ei

eiVj

Se, '6ti

rS}v apxoov
Trap'

iTTicrr'fjiiirjv

ovv /xridev &A\o y4vos exofiev

eirt (Tttjtoi/

a\7]0s, vovs hvetrj iTnari]fi7]s apx^].

ivepyeiau
iffTi rfi

ataQ-ncns,

7}

S'

i'KKrT'fjju.r)

Etll. vi. 6
oijr'
tt,v

ry]s

apxvs rev
eirj

r&v KaBoXov
avT^ orav
ovK
3

ravTa

5'

eV ai/rfj

Trios

CTTio-rij/iiT]

oijre

rex^V

eV

^vxf}. Sih yo7}(Tai fxkv eV ^ovX-qrai, ataddvcaBai S' avrc^' avayKoiou yap virdpalffQifiTov.

ovre

(ppdvrjo'is

....

XeiTr^rai vovv

X^iv rh

at 430, a, 2 (following the passage to be cited presently on p. 199, n. 2), he says 192, 3 Kal avrhs Se [o j/oCs] potjtos iariu SxTirep to. vorjrd. iirl fikv yap Twv &j/ev v\7]s rh avrS iari rh voovv Kal rh voovfxcvov t] yap iirtariifxr] t] Qfii}pr\riK)] Kal rh ovrocs iiriffrrirhv rh avrS ear IV. Ibid. iii. 7 init. rh S' avr6 ear IV t] Kar'' ivepyeiav iin(rrij/j.7]
:
:

De An. iii.

ehai rcov apxa>v. c. 7, 1141, a, 17, b, 2, c. 9, 1142, a, 25 (5 fikv yhp vovs rcov opcov, cov ovk ecrri \6yos.
:

c. 12,

1143, a, 35 (with
;

which

cf.

Teendblbnbueg, Histor. Beitr. ii. 375 sqq. Waltee, Die Lehre

V.

d.
:

])raM.
6

sqq.)

vovs

aficporepa

Vernunft, etc., 38 rcov iaxdrcov 4ir' Kal yap rcov irpdorcov '6prov

Kal rcov icTxdrcov vovs iari Kal oh X6yos, Kal S fxfv Kara ras aTroSd^eis
rcov aKivfircov '6pcov Kal Trpdorcov, 6 S' ej/ rals TrpaKriKa7s rod i^xdrov Kal iv5exoiJ.4vov etc. (More will be

T^

Trpdyfiari.

Metajj/i. xii. 7, 1074,

198
scribed as the
'

ARISTOTLE
place of the Ideas,'
'

and

it

may be

said

of the faculty of

Thought that
/j.^

it is

in itself all that is

said as to the latter, in ch. xi. and xii. infra.') This recognition of principles is an immediate knowledge (&fi^(rov), for the root principles of all argument cannot, in their turn, be proved (cf Anal. Post. i. 2, 3, 72, a, 7, b, 18 sqq. c, 22, 84, a, 30; ii. 9 i7iit.c. 10, 9-4, a, 9 ar\d3fetaj)h. iv. more 4, 1006, a, 6, 1011, a, 13 fully later). But on this very.

elvai
.

Kal
. .

to
fj

ctATjfles
(ixrirep

Kal

rh

\pev5os ;

ovdh rh a\r]des iwl rovruv rh avrh, ovrois ou5e rh clvai, ctW' ecrrt rh fjiev aXrjdh rh 5e \pevSos, rh fxev 6iye7v rd 5' ayvo^tv Kal (pdvai a\r}6hs
.

airarrjdrjvai yap irepl QLyydveiv rd ri iariv ovk iariv dAA.' t) Kara icrnv 'Sirep '6cra Stj avXfiefirjKos
fiT]
' .

eJvai ri Kal ivepyeia, Trepi

ecrriv aiTarT]Brivai
.

account it is always true. For error only consists in a false conjunction of perceptions, and hence arises only in the Proposition by reason of the conjunction of the Predicate with a Subject {Cater/.
4
fioi.
;

ravra ovk aAA' ^ vo^lv ^ fi-ff rh rd Se aKr]dhs rh voeiv avrd Se x|/eGSos OVK iariv, ouS' airdri], According to these aAA' ayvoia.

passages we should understand by the irpordaeis ^jxiffoi, which express the ultimate principles {An.
Post.
i. 2, 23, 33, 72, a, 7, 84, b, 39, 88, b, 36), only those propositions

De Interpr.
iii.

i.

16,

a,
;

12

immediate knowledge, on the other hand, is concerned with pure conceptions relating to no subject distinct from themselves, which we can only know or not know, but as to which we cannot be deceived De An. iii. 6 init. Twv aSiaipTCi}V vSrjcris iv 7] ixkv odu
8,

Dc An.

432, a, 11)

in

which the predicate is already contained in the subject, not those in which it attaches to a
subject different from itself or in other words, only analytical
:

prlo7'i

manner the
{iUd. ii. rod ri iariv

In like judgments. bpifffxhs rwv ajxiffoav 10, 94, a, 9) is a diffis

aj/a7rJ5et/CTOS,in

TOvTOis
iv

TTcpl

affirmed as to the existence or non-existence of a aA.770es, a-vvO^ais tls ^Stj vorjixdrwv conception, nor of its connection us v ovTwv and ibid, at the end Lastly, ecTTi 5' 7] fiev (pdcris tI Kara tlvos, with a stated subject. Socrirep t] Kardcpacris, Koi a\7}97]S ^ when the principle of contradic6 St vovs ov iras, aAA.' \|/eu5r?s Traaa tion (in Metaph. iv. 3 sq. 1005, 6 Tov tI iffri Kara rb tI riv lvai, b, 11, 1006, a, 3) is designated aXA' as the fiefiaiordrr] ap^V iraffwv Trepi aKr]9^s, Kal ov rl /cara rivos cocnrep rh dpav tov iBiov aXrjdhs, et %v Sia^tvcrBrivai. aSvvarov, here also 6 &v6pcairo5 rb XcvKhv ^ fiT], ovk only the fundamental principle of all analytical judgments is aXrfdes ael, oiirws ^X^'' '^^'^ &vev eVei Se in question the formal identity v\t]s. 3fetaph. ix. 10 itrX twv rh of every conception with itself. aKriBls ^ t|/6D5os . 1 Be An. iii. 4, 429, a, 27 koL Trpayfxdrwv icrrl rcf ffvyKelffdai ^ eS S^ ol \4yovre5 r^v ^vxh'' elvai TTt^r' iarlv fj ovk etrri SiripTJffdai roTTov etScSv (see on this Zeller's rh ahrjOes XeySfxevov ^ xl/evSos Trepi Sk S^ TO. aaivB^ra rl rh elvai. ^ Plato), irKi\v ^ri oUre SArj aAA'

oh

Se

h ovK Kot t5

effTL

rh Tpevdos
Koi

'

which

i/zeCSos

t(>

nothing

is

'

LOGIC
thinkable.^

199

This contained knowledge, however, can only become actual knowledge in the active exercise of
cognition.
ence,
it

It follows, therefore, that, prior to experi-

cannot be in the soul except in the way of a

possibility

and a basis

and

so,

according to him,

it is,

in virtue of the fact that the soul has the faculty of

forming
activity.^
vor}TiK^,

its

notions out of itself by

its

own

inherent

71

ovre
cfSr;.
iii.

evreAexeto
8 init.
:

aWh

Svvd/xei
^

rh

De An.
^vxns
TO.

vvv 5e
(TvyKe-

yet learned nothing, but possesses the capacity for learning something, but also when he knows

irepi

TO.

XexOepra

<pa\ai(a(TavTs
\l/vx^
8'
7]

f^Trca/iifv

irdKiv

on

rj

ovra

irdos

iffri irdvra.
rj

'yap al(rdr]Ta
7]

rh ovra rd

vo-qrh, effri
ircos,
.

iirKTT'fifn] fikv to.

a^a-drja-is
iii.

iirKrrTjTd

5'

aladrjrd.

(Cf

ii.

5/w.
2

7 init.)
:

De An.

airaOes

Nous
;

iii. 4, 429, a, 15 &pa Se? ehai [before the experiences the effect of

the voTjThv, it must be without vdOos cf. BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 72, a, 36 sqq.], Scktikov Se tov eWovs
Koi
SvvdfjLei

elSos]

dAAa

roiovrov [sc. olov rh /ni] tovto, Kal bjxoioos

something, but has not at a given moment this knowledge actually present to his mind. It was in the latter sense that Plato conceived of innate knowledge,whereas Aristotle conceived of it under the former analogy. This is the meaning of his comparison of the soul with the book that is not yet written on and it was a misapprehension when this comparison was understood in the sense of the later Sensation-theory of knowledge. (Cf. Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 342
:

ex^i'V, (iiCTT^p

ai(rdr]Td,

rh aiadrjTiKhv irphs rd ovtw rdv vovv irpds rd

.

sq.;

Trendelenbueg, on
485 sq.)

passage, p.

this Aristotle

vofjTd

6
. .

dpa KaAovuei/os
.

rrjs

^vxvs vovs.

ovQiv iariu evepyda

.
.

ru)V OVT03V trpXv voe7v

Kal v

5)j

etc. (vid. sujjr. p. 198, n.l). Ihid. b, 30 Swd/iei irds icrri rd vo7]rd 6
:

only wants to illustrate by it the difference between the Svydfiet and ivcpyeia.. He does not here go on to inform us in what way
potential
actual.

knowledge

becomes

vovs,
tt,v

aAA' epreXcx^ia ovSeu,

Se?
S'

irplv

vofj.

ovTcos

^o'lrep

iv

ypa/x/jLaTeici}

firjOev

inrdpx^i- ^vre-

Aexefos ycypa/x/xevov. Hirep av/xfiaipei

TOV vov. Here (b, 5) and in 417, a, 21 sqq. a still more accurate distinction is made between two meanings of the
4ir\
ii.

5,

dvvdfjLci

we can

call a

man Swdfiei

But, according to what has gone before (429, a, 15), it is not the alad-nrd but the vo-nrd by whose action the tablet of the VOVS, blank in itself, is written upon, so that we have to deal in fact with a theory far removed from the Sensationphilosophy.

iiTKTT'fjfji.uv

not only when he has as

200

ARISTOTLE
Tlirougliout his whole treatment of this question,

there runs a certain obscurity, the grounds of which

we

can of course indicate, but which

we cannot

altogether

remove without doing violence to the statements of the Master himself. On the one ha^nd, Aristotle contests the possibility of any innate knowledge, and insists that

On the other hand, he speaks of an immediate knowledge of those

all

our notions arise out of perception.^

truths on which

all

others depend,^ and allows that all

the knowledge which in the course of our lives

lay

in

our soul from

is

the

beginning in germ.^

we gain Of

course^ this last view

not to be taken to imply that

the soul, prior to

said

all

experience, carried in itself the

far as the content thereof is con-

knowledge in so
that the
it

cerned, or

function of such experience was

merely to cause
'

to be brought out into consciousness.'*

sq.

Cf. pp. 195 sq., p. 197, n. 4.

205

Cf. pp. 196, n. 1, 197, n. 2, 198, n. 1, and 199, n. 1.

* There is no necessity to interpret in that sense the passages given above. On the contrary, when he says in Be An. iii. 8 {sujjra, p. 199, n. 1) that the soul is in a certain sense everything,'
'

he immediately explains this phrase by adding (431, b, 28) audyKY] 5' ^ avTa ra e^Sr? ehai. avTO. jxlv yap St] ov oh yap 6 KiQos eV T^ ^vXVi o.KKa t6 eI5os uare rj Ka\ yap ^pvxh oocnrep t] xeip eVrtj/
:

than the thought that the soul is everything inasmuch as it is capable of having the forms (or images) of all things within itself. That it produces them out of itself is not stated. On the contrary, as the power of perception is called eldos alaOrjruu, because it receives into itself the forms of the al(rdr}Td, so the vovs may, in the same sense, be called elSos
t5wv, inasmuch as it is the faculty to receive the insensible forms and rdiros eldwv (p. 198, n. 1) may be taken in the same sense. The

-fj

'

T]

xetp opyavov iariv opyduoop, Ka\ 6 uovs eldos elBwv Kal r, a^aOrjcns

eWos at(T6r]ruu. Since the hand indeed forms and uses the tools, but still can only form them from some given material, this comparison does not carry us further

statement that universals are in the soul itself (in Be An. ii. 5, cited at p. 197,n. 2), occurs in a passage which has no reference to the growth of knowledge in itself, but where Aristotle is endeavouring to illustrate the progress from the power of perception to
'
'

LOGIC
For
It
this

201

innate ideas

would take us back again to the theory of which Aristotle so decidedly rejects.

pure

would be equally wrong, however, to make him a Empiricist, and attribute to him the view that
'

the Universal,

without any limitation, comes to the

If this were his view, he could not possibly have derived the highest concepts of all the 'prind^ia of all knowledge from that faculty of immediate cognition by which the Ilous is,

soul from the external world.' ^

according to him, distinguished from

all

other forms of

which by an ascent from individuals to universals, cannot be the data of any immediate kind of knowledge, but must be data of that kind of knowledge which is the most entirely mediate of all. Our cognitive
I'or it is plain that concepts

thinking activity .^

we can only come

at

faculties,

he

asserts, do, in fact,

-,

take this

way

to arrive

at these

prmdjpia

but he cannot have regarded the

thoughts in which these prindjoia come for us into consciousness as the mere precipitate of a progressively
refined experience, or the act

by which we present them

to ourselves as only the last of these successive geneactual perception by the relation of eVio-TTj/iTj^to the d^wptlv (p. 417, b, 5 6ecopovv yap ylyverai rh exov tV eTTiffT-fifi-np). Finally, in Anal, Post. ii. 19 (cited at p. 197, n. 4,,9wpro) Aristotle says it is impossible to believe that we should come to the knowledge of the highest principles, without possessing previous knowledge but he looks for that previous knowledge not in any ideas innate in the soul prior to all experience, but simply in the inductive process.
:

As Kampe {ErTienntnisstheorie d. Arist. p. 192) objects, not without reason, though his citation of Metaph. i. 9, 993, a, 7 sqq. is not in point.
'

2 gQ Kampe, ibid. but it is hard to reconcile with this exposition his attempt in the next following pages to reduce that true perception which is, for Aristotle, the basis of all knowledge to some kind of Intuitive Thought, essentially differing both from
;

Knowledge and Opinion.

3

Of, infra, ch. v.

ad pi.

Onthisseep.l97,n.4,sj^j7m.

202
ralisations

ARISTOTLE

upon a matter given in experience. Each of these generalisations consists in an induction,^ the result of which can only be expressed as a judgment and a conclusion, and which therefore is, like all
judgments, either
distinguished from
false

or true.

But,

on the other
is

hand, the activity of the Nous in knowledge

all

by him mediate cognition, and what we attain by it is not judgments but ideas not that which may be either false or true, but that which is always that which we may either have or not have, but true

as to which, if

we have

it,

we cannot be
is

deceived.^

So,

again, as

all

induction starts from perception, which

has relation to that which

Matter and

is

sensible,

compounded of Form and and as the quality of conbeing and not-being,

is

tingency, the

possibility of
all

inseparable from
tion alone

that

is

Matter, ^ therefore by inducattain to anything

we can never

which

is

For those ideas which rest entirely on experience can have no higher certainty than that on which they rest. But of the knowledge of the ^rincijpia^ Aristotle holds that it is of all knowledge the most certain,'' and he will allow nothing to rank among the jprincipia except what is necessarily
unconditionally necessary.
true.^
I
i

It follows, then, that the

immediate knowledge

referred to can only be an intuition

and

that

it

can
all

only be a spiritual intuition, as contrasted with

sensible

perception.

But the
itself.
*

spirit of

man
i.

has

not;

these ideas innate in

'

Therefore, the intuition by

72, a,
9.
^

About which seech. v.i^r.

.

Cf. p. 197, n. 4. ^ Cf infra in the second part of eh. vii., and the notes there on these points.

Anal. Post. 25 sqq. ;

2,

ii.

19,

71, b, 19, 100, b,

Anal. Post.

i.

6 init.

LOGIC
which
it

203

them cannot consist in any self-intuition making us conscious of the principia as of a truth already within us.^ It must be something whereby certain thoughts and ideas arise through an action of that which is thought upon the spirit thinking it, in some way analogous to that in
finds

or act of introspection,

which perception
is

arises

through an action of that which

perceived upon the percipient.

And

Aristotle does,

in fact, base himself on this very analogy

when he

says
is

that the Nous

is
;

related to the thinkable as sense

^

to

the perceivable
it
'

or that

it

touches

'

it

or that as perception in itself

knows the thinkable because must be

it

always true, so must thought be, in so far as

to ideas as such."^

relates

In

this

way we

get a theory which

is

for

the

moment
by the

intelligible

and

consistent.

But the further

questions remain

wholly unanswered

What

is

this,

which we get the principia of all mediate knowledge and the most universal of all ideas and axioms ? What kind of being belongs to it ? In
intuition of

what way does

it

act

upon our

spirit ?

Of what

sort

are these principia which

This was Zeller's his second edition.
^

we

so

attain ?

Do

all

of

view in
;

Be An.
.

iii.

4,

429, a, 15

see p.
3

Metaph. ix. 10, 1051, b, 24 (vid. supr. p. 197, n. 4): inperception of the aavvOera is rh fihv Qvyelv KoX (pdvai aXriQis ... rh 5' ayvoeTv /x^ Qiyyaveiv ; xii. 7, 1072, b, 20: avrhv 5e voe? & vovs [the divine vovs] Karh fji.erd\r)^iv tov vo7\Tov [by taking itself as a vo'r]T6v] voriros yhp yiyveTai Qiyydvuv Kal voccu. Eemembering,

doubtless, the first of these passages, Theophrastus also says in Fr. 12 (Metaj)h.) 25 'If we begin with observation we can, up to a certain point, explain things from their causes: oTav Se eir' avrci ra &Kpa ficTaBaivcD/jLev ovk4ri dvvd/neda, either because these have no causes, or because our
:

eye cannot see in a full light, tc^xo 5' eKeTvo a\T]d4(rTpov &s avr^ r^ v^
^

deoopia Biyovri koI oTou

*

a\pa/j.4vcf}.''
;

De An.

iii.

6 Jin.

cited

si^r. p. 197, n. 4.

204

ARISTOTLE
(as

them merely express the formal laws of thought

does the law of contradiction), or are there also metaphysical ideas which are so given, such as the ideas of

Being, of Cause, of

God ?

This might prove to be a

;

but it would take us very near to the Platonic teaching as to

the
intuition
'

natural conclusion from the theory of Aristotle

of

the
'

Ideas,

except

that,

since

for

Aristotle the

Forms

of things could not belong to

another world, the intuition of them would necessarily

be transferred also from the future to the present.

The

final

explanation of Aristotle's want of clearis,

ness on this subject

however, to be found in the fact

that he had only half emancipated himself, as

see,

we

shall

from Plato's tendency to hypostatise ideas.

for

The
all

'Forms' had
individual

him, as the 'Ideas' had for Plato, a

metaphysical existence of their own, as conditioning

things.

And

keenly as he followed the

it is

growth of ideas out of experience,

are farthest

none the

less

true that these ideas, especially at the point where they

perception,
logical

are

removed from experience and immediate metamorphosed in the end from a

human thought into an immediate presentment of a supersensible world, and the object,
product of
in that sense, of an intellectual intuition.

Plato conceived that the picture of the Ideas which

slumbers within us could only awake to any sensible

intuition

by

an

actual

recollection,

and

that

the

spiritual eye could only

accustom

itself to receive

the

light of the

Ideas by
is

a long course of preparation.

it

So

with

Aristotle

self-evident

that

at

the

beginning of our spiritual development we are at the

LOGIC
farthest possible distance from that
its

ii05

knowledge which is and that consequently our ascent to knowledge can only come by a gradual approximation to that goal, through a progressive deepening of our
goal
;

comprehension, advancing from particulars to universals,

from phenomena to the essence, from

effects to causes.

Knowledge, which we neither possess as a perfect gift of nature nor derive as a consequence from something higher than itself, must issue out of that which is
lower: that
is,

out of Perception.^
is

The development
is

in

time of our ideas

their logical order.

therefore exactly the inverse of

That which

absolutely

first

is

relatively to

us last;

and whereas by virtue of

greater certainty

its

nature the universal has

particular,

than the

and the principle than the deductions which depend upon it, yet individuals and things of sense have more of certainty for us.^ And in like manner we find/
Anal. Post. ii. 19, 100, a, ovr^ 5^ iuvTrdpxovffiv acpoopiffjueVat at e|eis(?i<:^.swy;r. 196, n. 1), out' ott' &XK(jt)v e^eup yivovrai yvuxTTiKocrepooy, aAA' aird alaO'fi

10

vii.

o-ecos.
i. 2, 71, h, 33: It p6iarl Kalyvci}pifjidiTepa5ix(>}s' ou yd,p ravTov trpSTepov rfj (pvaei Koi TTpds Tj/LLas TTpoTepov ou5e Yt-copijxwnpov Kal rjfiiu yuccpifidorepov \4yoi 5e irpos rjfxas (jlIv irpdrepa Kctl

Anal. Post.
S'

Tepa

ttjs yvwpifxwrepa rot iyyvrepov alad-fjcrecvs, ottAws 5e irpdrepa Kol yvctipifidiirepa rcL iroppdirepov ecTTt be iroppuiT(xrw jxev rcL KaOoAov fidXiara, iyyvrdrco 5e rci, KaO' eKacrTa. Phys. i. 1, 184, a, 16 Tre'^uKC Se
:

2, 982, 29 sqq. 1029, b, 4 sqq.; ix. 8, 1050, a, 4 Toj?. vi. 4, 141, b, 3, De An. ii. 2 iniL, iii. 7, 22 init. Eth. i. 2, 1095, b, 2. (Still more forcibly, referring rather, however, to PLATO, Pep. vii. init. than to Aristotle, is it expressed in MetapJi. ii. 1, 993, b, i).) The apparent contradiclion in PIli/s. i. 1 ecTt 5' rjfui/ Trpurou brjka koI (racprj rci avyKexv/iifua
i.
i.

5 fin.

Cf.

Metaph.

a,

23

v. 11, 1018, b,

4,

fxaWov
^jai

'

vcrrepou
rd.

5' e/c

tovtoov yivKal
ai

yvdopi^a

(rroix^^a

6/c

Tuv

yvcopi/xwrdpcav rjfuu
iirl

r]

65o's

Koi

(Tacpea-rfpoov

TCi (xacpeffTcpa

T77 (j)v<Ti

Kal yvwpifjLcaTepa

oi)

ydp

Tavrci 7]fuv re yvdipifxa koX ornXSts

apxcu SiaLpovffi ravra. Sid e/c ruv Ka96\ov iirl to. KaO' eKacrra 5e7 irpo'Uvai. rh ydp '6\ov Kara r7,v aiadficnv yuapi/jLcarepov, rh 5e KaO6Xov '6\ov rl eariv iroWh yap TrepiXafifidvei cos /xepr} rh Ka66\ov, is only a verbal ambiguity. For (as
'

206

ARISTOTLE

that the kind of proof which proceeds from the particular

than a deduction from the general.^ which actual knowledge is evolved from the rudimentary possibilities of knowledge is this. The first stage is always, as we have remarked, sensible
is

to us

more

clear

The way

in

perception.

Without this we can have no actual thought.^

The man who is deprived of one of the organs of sense must of necessity also lack all the corresponding knowledge, for the general

axioms of every kind of science

can only
rests

be discovered by induction, and induction

upon perception.^

Now

particular things are the

;

proper objects of perception ^ but inasmuch as a universal, although it may be as yet undistinguished,
is

contained in every particular, therefore perception

is also conversant mediately

with universals.^

Or, to
is,

speak more

accurately,

what the senses perceive

not

the individual substance of the particular as such, but

rather certain of
its

properties.

These again are re-

lated to the particular substance after the

universal, for they are not a
'

manner
'

of a

this

'

(johs) but a

such

Tkendblenburg on
An.
p. 338,

Arist.
iii.

De
J

fiev

and Eitter,

etc. remark) but the sensihle universal which is here dealt with the as yet_ in-

05, it is not the logical,

6 Sia
S'

ovv TrpSrepos Kal yi/copifKarepos Tov fi4crov avKXoyKTixhs, ijfuv ivapy4(TTcpos 6 Slo, rrjs iirayoDyrjs.

definite presentation of as when, for instance,

an

we

sent to ourselves a body before we clearly distinguish its themIn constituent parts.
selves,

object, repreas such,

2 De An. iii. 8, 432, a, 4 (vid. supr. p. 195, n. 1). De Sensu, c. 6, 445, b, 16 ouSe vo^'id vovs rh eKrhs
:

fi^ fier' ata-drjcreajs ovra.

3
*

An. Post. i. An. Post. i.

7}

18.

18, 81, b, 6

roJv

Kad' '^KUffTov

aXixdrja-is.

The same

however, the simple

;

ele-

ments are always prior to that which is made up of them Be Metaph. Ccelo, ii. 3, 286, b, 16
;

idea recurs frequently, e.g. An. Post. i. 2 (vid. supr. p. 205, n. 2), c. 31 (vide p. 207, n. 1), Phys. i. 5
Jin.,
^

Be An.
i.

xiii. 2,
1

1076, b, 18,
ii.

c. 3,

Anal. Pr.

1078, a, 9. 23 fin.: (pvcH

MetapTi.

1,

Be An.

417, b, 22, 27, 981, a, 15. iii. 8, as at p. 196, n. 1.

iii. 5,

LOGIC
;

207

{roLovhs) and although in perception they never come under our intuition in the form of a universal, but always as belonging to this or that thing, and in a
definite individual instance, yet still they are virtually

universals,

and out of our perception of them the

thought of the universal can be developed.^ Now the way in which it is developed is this. In sensible perception itself the several sensible properties,
fore also the relative universals,

and there-

which inhere in the indi-

vidual substance, are discriminated.^

tion
^

Out of such percep-

is

next developed by the help of

i.

memory

a general

An. Post.
eariu

31, init.

ouSe
et

5i'

alffd-ffo-eas

iiriffracrdai.

ykp

%(mv 7] aXffdrjiTis rod roiovSe TovSe T IV s [only the rSSe, however, is an individual subKoi

Koifi^

is said in the text will establish the agreement of these passages with the general doctrine of Aristotle, about which Heider

stance

ovdhv (Ttifiaiv^i tSov Koivrj KOTtiyopov^^vciv rdSe ri aWa toiSpSe; Metaph. vii. 13, 1039, a, 1 of which more infrd], aA.A' alaQdveadal ye avayKoiov rJSe rt k(iL tcov Ka\ vvv. rh Se KadSXov /col iirl iraffiv aSvuaTOv atcrOdveaOai. ov yap rc^Se ouSe vvv. ov yap hv ^v KadoXov iirel oZv at fihv O7ro56t|ets . KadShov, ravra 5' ovk ecrriv aladdv:

{Vergl. d. Aristotel. imd HegeVscJien DialeMiTi, i. 160, sqq.)

15 contradict it, as Kampe believes {ErTtenntnissth. d. Ar. It is there said that know85). ledge as Zvvaixis is tov KaddXov
a,

makes too much difficulty. does Metaph. xiii. 10, 1087,

sqq.

Nor

Kal aopicTOv, t] 5' ivepyeia upifffievrf Koi ODpifffievov rdSe ri odaa, rovS4

ecrdai,
Si'

<f)avephv

'6ri

ouS' iirlaraffdai

alffd^ffeus
a,

100,
KaB''

17:

eoTTiv. So in ii. 1 9, alcrddveTai jxkv rh S'

fKuaTov, ^

aXaQriffis
:

rov

KadoXov
ov
tion,

icrrlv, oJov

avOpdirov, aAA'
i. e.

KaWia

avdpccirov

Percep-

has, it is true, a definite individual Kallias for its immediate object; but what it gives us is the image of a man with these definite properties, and the circumstance of this man's being Kallias has no influence upon the content of our perception. Cf.

All that this states is that the capability of knowing extends to everything that is knowable, but that every actual perception is the perception of a definite object; and whether this object is an individual or a universal conception does not enter into the question. KadSXov here signifies the indefinite,' as to which cf xii. 4, 1070, a, 32 Gen. An. ii. 8, 748, a, 7 Mh. ii. 7, 1107, a, 29.
Tivos.
' ; ;

De An.

iii. 2,

Hence the
ii.

a'ia-dvais

426, b, 8 sqq. in An. Post.

19, 99, b, 35, cf.

a,
4,
c.

De An.

iii.

further
sqq.;

De An.

3,

ii.

12,

424, a, 21
5.

428,

and Ph7/s. i. 5,

189, a,

What

S{/vafiis

9 init., is called a avfKpvTos KpiriK-fj.

208

ARISTOTLE

representation, for that which has steadily recurred in

several perceptions
is

fixed

and retained by the mind.

Thus

arise in the first place experience,

and next, when

several experiences have condensed into general principles, art

and science

also, until at last

all
;

universal principles of
a scientific

and of these in
is

we reach the most like manner

same process

comprehension

only to be gained by a

farther methodical repetition of the

in

other words, by induction.

thus.

The

result

may

be put

Plato

sought to get at the Idea by turning

view, the

the mental eye awaij

which,

from the phenomenal world, on most that was to be seen was a reflection of the idea and not the idea itAristotle's theory of the ascent to knowledge rests self. it, on the contrary, rather upon a striving after the
in his

universal element in appearances as such.

In other

words, while both

diate data
still

demand

abstraction from the

imme-

on the underlying universal, the relation between the two elements is quite
reflection

and

different.
1

To Plato the

abstraction
Kal
re'xJ'Tj

from the given

Sia tt]s
ifnreipias

A7ial. Post. ii. 19, 100, a, 2 iK jxev oZv alcrOrjcreciis jiueTai uuxfxr},
uiO-irep

toIs

avdpcvTTOis

....

yiveTai Se

Texj/77,

k^yofxev,

e'/c

Se ^vi^ix-qs ivoKto)

oTav

e/c

iroWctiu Trjs efXTreiplas eufor}-

KaKis Tov avTuv

at

yivo/j.vr)S e/xTreipta.
/xurjixai

fiaTcov fiia

yap ttoWoI

apiOfjiw
fj

ojiioicov inr6\ri\pts.

Ka06\ov yevr]Tai irepl twv rb /xu yap ^x^iv

KaAA.ia KaixvovTi ttj/'SI To52 (rvi'ijVeyKe Kal

i/jLireipia fxia iffTiv. e/c 5' ifXTreipias

efc

vTToXriypLV oti

Travrhs 7}peiJ.i,aavTos tov KaOoXov iv T?7 4"^X??' '^^^ ^vhs 7rapaT(i TToAAa, h h.u eV airaaiv ev ivrj (Keivoif rh

T^j/

v6(Tov

^wKpaT^i Kal KaOeKaaTou ovtw TToAAots, i/LLireipias iffTiv Th 5' oti

jraai

cvTh, TfX^VS

apxh

Kal

e7rj(7T'i';|Ui?s,

toIs

TOLo7a-Se

war'

elSo^
tt/j/SI

eu

iku fxev
i.

-Trepi

yevecriv,

Tex^V^j

^^^

a<popL<T97ai,

Kdfxvovcn
. . .

tV

5e Trepl rh ov, eTTicTTTjjUTjs. Metajtli. yiyuerai 5' e/c ttjs 1, 980, b, 28 jUJ/7;|U7js ejximpia tols avQpwirois' at
:

yap rroXXal

ixv9\jxai

tov avTOv irpay-

fxaTOS fuas ^jxiveipias hvvaixiv attoTiKoixriv .... aiTofiaivii 5' iiTLffT'fjfJ.'q

v6(rou, crvfTiveyKev, Texvns. In the same passages is also found more to the like purpose. In Phys. vii. 3, 247, b, we have, /c yap TTjy KaTa juepos ifiweipias rrjv KaQoKov Kafjifidvouev TTi(TTi)(xT]v.

LOGIC
is

20d

the

first

thing,

and only on the presupposition

of such abstraction will he recognise the possibility of

coming to any knowledge of universal essence at all. To mind upon the common essence of the empirical data is the main point, and it is only as an inevitable consequence of this that abstracAristotle the direction of the
tion
like

from the particulars of sense comes

reason,
Aristotle
also

in.

For a

defends the truth of the

knowledge derived by sensation against the objectors he shows that, notwithstanding the contradictions and deceptions of the senses, a true perception is still
for

and that the actuality of what we perceive is beyond doubt, although its value is relative in a word,
possible,
:

that the doubts attaching to sensible perception^ are due

solely to

want of caution

in^

the use

we make
itself

of

it.^

He

even maintains that perception of

is in
first

never leads

us astray, and that it judgments that we are

1

our imaginations and our

exposed to error.
yap auaipeOeuros aXaQriais mev avaipeirai,
ffai/xa,

Metaph. iv. 5, 6, 1010, b, sqq., where, among other things (1010, b, 30 sqq.), it is stated that although we might say in a certain sense that without a perceiving being there would be no atVflijTck as such, still it is impossible to say that without the ou(rQif](ns the viroKelixei/a & Trotei t^v oh -yap ai<TQr]<Tiv could not exist
Cf.
h)]
r}

alffdTirhv
dcpfxhv,

5e

earrai,

oTov
Kal

yXvKi),

iriKphu

raWa oaa
2

icrrlv alo'drjrd.

To this refer Metaph. iv. 5, 1010, b, 3 sqq., 14 sqq.; xi. 6, 1062, b, 13 sqq. 3 De A71. iii. 3. 427, b, 11: ^
fxeu

yap

dtadrjais

ru>v
5'

ISiwu

del

a\r]97)s

Kal

iraaiv

vtrapx^i-

roTs

7' atcrdrjais at/ri]

eavrrjs iffriv,

C^ois, SiauoeTadai
^pevSais Kal ohSevl

eV5e;;^6Taj

Kal
Kal

eCTt ri koX ercpov Trapa Tr]U % avdyKT] irpOTepov e?j/ai rrjs aladija-ews' rh yap kiuovv rov Kiuovfievov TTporepSu iffri. Likewise Cat. c. 7, 7, b, 36 t^ yhp aiadr]Thu TrpoTepop rrjs alo'O'fja'eccs Sokc? eJvai. rh ixhy yap alcdrjThv dj/aipcdkv ffvuoAA.'
oX(tQt]<tiv,
:

virdpx^i'
:

/J.^

\6yos. Ibid. 428, a, 11 al jxhv [the al(rdi\(reis'\ aXr]9e7s aUl, al 5k (papraaiai yivovrai al ttK^iovs
li^euSeTs.

sqq.

ai/atpelrV aiadrjaiy,
aladr^rhv

r)

5e a^ffdrjcns rh
.
.
.

418, a, 11 1010, b, 7] aiadrjcris ^evS^s rov iSiov iarlv, oAA' t] (pavratria ov ravrhp
ii. 6,
;

Similarly

and in Metaxjh. iv.

5,

oh'S

oh
I.

awavaipil

^(^ov

rp

alad-f](rei.

VOL.

210

ARISTOTLE

He

sliows in fact that simple-minded confidence in

is

the truth of sensible perceptions which

every uncritical consciousness.
notion as the other Greeks of
into the part

natural to
his

This

is

in

case
little

the more easy to understand because he has as

making any

close inquiry

which a subjective
of our

activity plays in the

it

construction

experience, and refers

simply

to an operation of the objects

upon us whereby they

;

impress their images upon the soul

while, on the other

hand, the philosopher

observation,

who

attributed so high a value to

so wide a

and the naturalist who required

basis of empirical facts, could hardly

sufficient account of the attacks

be expected to take

which some of his preto

decessors
senses.2
'

had made upon Of course he does not seek

the trastworthiness of the

deny the delu-

See the account of Aristotle's theory of sensation, infra, ch. x.

ad fin.
-

It

has been shown at

p. 209,

n.l, how Aristotle, in Cat. 7, treats

that everything is always being moved, or that one thing is always moved and another never, -nphs airaura yap ravra Ikuvt] fiia Tricrris opw/xep yap evia orh /jlcv Kivo^fxeua
'

as given objectively even those sensible properties which Democritus had already shown to be merely subjective (Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 772, 1. 783, 2). Similarly in Phys. viii. 3, in combating the opinion (of Parmenides), irdvra 7ip/xe7u, he f ollow^s up the striking remark (254, a, 30) that such a view could not explain 5d|a and (pavTaffia as movements of

ore 5' rfpe/j-ovvTa. IMd. 258, a, 33, in opposing the doctrine iravr
r]pfxe7i^,

he

Sciji>,rovTOv ^rjrelu

X6yov

a(pvras rT]V alcrQ-qaiv, appcjcrria ris

iari Siavoias, and such speculations

seem to natural.

him abnormal and non-

All such questions as are are in our sound senses, &c., Aristotle considers altogether misleading

how we know whether we awake or asleep, whether we

the soul (it would have been more exact to say of the changing series of mental images') with the sweeping observation that to investigate such a view is Qn'^^lv x6yov &u fisXTiou exo/Jt-ev ^ Xoyou deTadai, and kukus Kpiveiv rh iriaThv Koi rhfii] TTLffrhu Koi apxhv Koi fx)) apxhv. The same objection holds, in his opinion against the theories
'

TTOLVTccv

elvai
oiiK

yap \6yov a^iovaiv ovtoi \6yov yap (rjTova-iv wv x6yos' airodei^ews yap ecTTt
.

apxn ovK
iv. 6,

airobei^ls i(TTi.
cf.

[Metajjh.

below, p. 247, u, 2). He thinks it a self-evident proposition that we can only decide upon the sensible properas upon the good ties of things ard the evil, the beautiful and the
1011, a, 8 sqq.

LOGIC

211

sions of sense, but he believes that our sensations, as

such,

are not to blame.

He

holds that each sense

represents to us always, or almost always, with truth the special colour, sound, etc., which it perceives, but
that illusion
first

arises in the referring of these pro-

perties to definite objects,

and in the discriminating

of that which that which

is

immediately given in perception from only got by abstraction therefrom.^

is

views, then, as to the nature or origin of knowledge, the arrangement of Aristotle's theory of
scientific

To these

knowledge

his Analytics

corresponds.
for in the

It is

the function of Science to explain the phenomena by

their principles,

versal Causes
ugly
'

which must be sought and Laws. The deduction,

5,

Uni1

therefore, of the

a normal state of the senses and the mind. In this sense Aristotle himself illustrates

in

De An.
rwv
fjLeu

iii.

3,

his principle in 428, b, 18 -^ aUe-^ffis

:

1010, b, 14. can only trust the deliverance of each sense with regard to its own particular objects, those of sight with regard to colour, &c. wv
:

We

iSiav a\7]di,s

icTTiv

fj

'6ti

\aX(TQi\(mav\

kKacrrt]

iv

rtf

aur^)
<pi](riv

oXiyKTrov exovaa rb xl/evSos. 5evrepov Se rod (TUyU^eySTjKeVot ToCra" Kal ivTuvda ^5i] ivSex^rai 5iai|/eu-

XpofCf wepl rh avro ouSeTrore a/xa ovrca Kal ovx ovtois

aAA' ouS' iv irdpcp xpov(f

irdOos
'r]jjL(\)i(Tfii,T7](T^v,

^x^'-^' irepl rh
irepl

yap \VKhu, ov tovto rb K^VKhv, fj &\\o Ti [whether the white thing is, e.g., a cloth or a wall], |/euS6Tat. (So also at the end of
SfcrOai'

OTi
i

fji^v

dXXa

rh

//eu5eTot,

Se

^ (TvfifiifirjKe rh irdOos. The same wine may taste to us at one

time sweet, at another not dAA' ov t6 ye y\vKv oT6v i<TTiv (irav ^,
:

C.

6.)

rpirov

Se
'iSia'

twv

kqivSov
5'

Kal

ovSeTTdoTTOTe fieTifiaAev,

eTTO/ieVcoi/

Toh
TO.

aviJ.^efir}K6(riu,

oh
olov

devi

irepl

oAA' dei dAr;avrov Kal eariv e| av-

virdpx^i
Kivriais

\4y(a

dyK-qs rh icrofxevov

Kal /j-eycOos,

&

(rv/x04fiT]Ke
^'Stj
a'(<T-

ToTs al(rdr]TO?s Tcepl & ixdhiara

eerrtv
B7](Tiv.

a-KaT7]0rivai

Karb.

r^v
Koivh

y\vKv roiovrov. Perception shows us primarily (as has been already said on pp. 206-7) only certain sets of

also

see De Sensu, c. i. 437, a, 8.) Sensu, iv. 442, b, 8 irepi (x(v TovTuv [the Koiva just mentioned] aTTUTUi'Tai, Trepi 5e ruu iSicov ouk airaTuvTai, olov o\pis nepl xP^^o-tos

(About these

De

Ihe subjects to which these qualities belong are not immediately and exclusively determined by perception nor are those other properties which are only inferred from what we perqualities.
;

kjX

olko)] Iff pi \^6(p(av.

Metai^Ti. iv.

ceive.

p 2

212

ARISTOTLE
and of effects from causes, word Bemonstration^ forms the task of Science
:

particular from the universal

or in one
for in

such deduction, according to Aristotle, consists

all

The premises, however, from which these deducmust start cannot be themselves deduced by Nor are they immediately given the same method. in any innate kind of knowledge. It is only by working upwards from phenomena that we can reach the principles only from particulars that we can that underlie them rise to universals. To do this scientifically is the business of Induction. Demonstration and Induction are accordingly the two component parts of the scientific process, Both, and the essential subjects of Methodology.
Proof.
tive proofs
:

however, presuppose the general elements of Thought,

and cannot be explained without a knowledge of them.

Aristotle, therefore, prefaces his theory of

Proof with

an examination of the Syllogism

into the nature of the

and in connection
Proposition, as
It

with this he finds himself compelled to go more closely

Judgment and the

work
(as

being the component parts of the Syllogism.

not
till

was and

a later period of his

we have

already ex-

plained) that he went on to treat

them

separately,

even then this part of

undeveloped.

liis

Logic remained distinctly

applies
still

The same remark

more
it is

strongly to his doctrine of Concepts.^

Nevertheless,

with these last that we must begin, in order to proceed

thereafter to the theory of judgments, and lastly to the

Syllogism

inasmuch
'

as certain

definite

views as to

concepts are always

presupposed by

Aristotle in his

discussion of Syllogistic Logic.

Cf pp. 192 sqq.
.

LOGIC
It

213

to

was the searcli for general concepts which gave philosophy under Socrates that new direction which
Plato

not only
essentials.

but

also

Aristotle

followed

in

all

As

a natural result of this,

we

find that

Aristotle,

generally

speaking,

takes for granted the

Socratico-Platonic theory of the nature of concepts and

the problem of abstract thought.^

But

as

we

shall find

him

in his metaphysics contradicting Plato's doctrine

of the independent reality of the Universal which we think in the Concept, so also in the matter of the logical handling of concepts he feels it necessary in

connection with this criticism to obtain more accurate and definite conclusions on many points.^ Plato had
required that in conceptual definition attention should

be restricted to the essential as opposed to the accidental

properties of things
;

and yet

at the

same time he had

exalted

all

general notions to an absolute independence

any further distinction between conceptions of property and substance.^ This distinction
as Ideas, without

Aristotle introduces, for to him, as

we

shall see, the indi-

vidual thing alone

is

Substance.

But he does not merely

separate the accidental from the essential.^

He
;

goes on
34 sqq,

Cf. pp. 162 sq.

and 172

sq.

cf.

Anal. Post.
i.

i.

4, 73, a,

For the following, besides

{Gesch.
cf.

Top.
7,
c.

5,

102, b, 4
c.

Prantl
sqq.),

and the

works,

Log. 1. 210 other general KUHN, De Notionis

d.
;

9
;

init.,

Metajph. v. 18, 1002, a, 24

6, b,

sqq., c. 30, 1025, a, 14, 28, c. 6

init.

Waitz,

in Categ.

16

Bvfinitione qual. Arist. constituerit, Halle, 1844 Rassow, Arist. de JVotionis Definitione Doctrina, Berl. 1843. * See Zell. P/i. d. Gr. pt. i.
p.

Anal. Post. 71, b, 10. According to these passages everything belongs to any object KaQ^ avro' which is, mediately or immediately, contained in the concept
'

518

sq.

584 sqq. * As to the distinction of the iTvfAfiefi-qKhs from the Kad' avrh
/Ji<?.

and all is /caro which does not follow from the concept. To be a biped belongs to any man ko0' avrh,
of that object;
o-w^iSeiSTj/fbs'
'

214
to

ARISTOTLE
a further subdivision of the latter head

make

by

dis-

tinguishing the Universal from the Genus, and both

from the Concept or conceptual Essence of things.^

Universal
objects in
is

A
by
is

everything that appertains

to

several

common, not merely by

If this

accident, but

virtue of their nature.^

common element

qualification of the essence derived from

some other

more general, then the Universal is a property-concept, and indicates an essential property.^ If it is of the
essence of the things in question, then the Universal

becomes a Genus.
for every

'^

If to the
a biped,
/cara
is

common

distinguishing
b, 11.)

man, as

sucli, is
is

To be educated
(rviJ.^^7}K6s.

to

him

wise Metapli. vii. 13, 1038, Cf. last note but one.

A
'o

(Tv/xfie^r^Khs

(T^^;. ibid.)

ifSsx^Tai virdpx^i-v
1X7]

bTojovv

kv\

of a true of all things which fall under the same conbut what is said k. (tvjxcept ^^7]k6s is only true in particular cases and therefore all universal determinations are Koff avr6. Metaph. v. 9, 1017, b, 35: rh yhp KaQoXov Kad' avra virdpx^^, to. Sh (XvjxBefiriKora ov KaO' avra ctAA' iirl
vTcdpx^i-v.
thin<j^ Ka9'

Tw auTO} Koi Hence, what is said

Koi

aJT^

is

^ Such an essential quality Aristotle calls a Kafl' aur^ u7rcpx'oi' a iraOos ko.Q'' avTh, or a (rvfi^iPr]Khs Kad' avrh, understanding- in the last case by a-vfifiefirtKhs (the term being used in a sense diff erent from that discussed

above) broadly that rivl, i.e. a quality cf 30 fin. c. 7, 1017, a,

;

h (rvfi^aiv^i

Metajili. v.
12,
iii,

1,

995, sqq.

rcou

Kad'

^KacTTa

airXcos

Xeyerai.

997, a, 25 iv. 1, iv. b, 5, 2, 1004, vi. 1, 1025, b, 12, vii. 4, 1029, b, 13; Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11,
b,

18,

25, c.

2,

Cf. note 2, below.

the (rvfM!3^r)Kds, part of eh. vii., infra. Thus Metapli. vii. 3 in\t. ohaia in common usage means many different things rh ri ijv elvai koX Kol rh KadSXov Koi rh yevos rirapTov rovrcov rh viroKeijuevov. 2 Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 26 Ka96Kov Se Xiyu} % Uv Karh iravrSs
'
:
:

For more about see the second

19, c. 4, 73, b, 5, c. 6, 75, a, 18, c. 42 Phi/s. i. 3, 186, b, 18, ii. 2, 193, b, 26, c. 3, 195, b, 13,
7, 75, a,
;

4, 203, b, 33; Be An. 1. 1, 402, b, 16 Bhet. i. 2, 1355, b, 30 Waitz, on Anal. Post. 71, b, 10
iii.
;

Tbendelenburg, Be An.
sq.
;

189
a,

BONITZ, on Metapli. 1025,

:

iarrl

Top. i. 5, 102, a, 31 y^vos 5' rh Kara irXeiSuwv Kal Zia<pcp6vrep e^Se/

T inrdpx'p Koi KaB' avrh ku) fi ahrS. (pavephv &pa on '6cra KaOSkov e|
avdyKrjS
virdpx^f-

twv

povfievov.

iv

4v r(f ri i<TTi Karrjyor^ ri cctti Se Karrf'6ffa

tois irpdyfiacnu
:

yope7crdai

ra roiavra X^yiaQo},
airodovvai

Part. All. i. 4, 644, a, 24 ra 5e Kad6\ov KOLvd TO. yap irXeioaiu vTrdpxovra KaOoXov Xeyo/xfV. (Like'

ipuTiqOcvTa rt iffri rh irpoKclfj.evov.^e.ff. in a man r( ecrri ; C^ov). Metaph. V. 28,

ap/xSTrci
:

LOGIC
qualities included in the notion of the

215

Genus are added

other marks which are again essential with reference to a certain part of the whole class, and by which such
part
is

distinguished from the rest of the same Genus,

is
If,

then we arrive at the Species, which, accordingly,

made up

of the

Genus and the

3,

specific differences}
21)
specific

1024, a, 36 sqq., where, among different meanings of yevos, the

a,

differences

following are given

rh

viroKeifie-

vov Tous Zia^opous, rh irp&rov ej/virdpxov & Aeyerai eV rtp ri iffri ov 5io0opai XeyouTai at ttoiSttj. , .

Ts (that these

two descriptions

apply to the same meaning of y4uo5 is shown by Bonitz on this passage). Ibid. x. 3, 1054, b, 30
XeyeTUi Se y4vos t &iJ.(pco ravrh Keyovrai Korh. r^v oxxriav ra Sid' rh yap <popa X. 8, 1057, b, 37 roiovTOv y4vos kuXcc, ^ djucpw ev ravrh \4yerai, fiij Kara (Tv^fie^it]Kh5 ixov Sia<popdt'. Top. vii. 2, 153, a, 17 Karriyop^lrai 5' 4v r^ rl iari
;
:

the second to properties, activities and conditions in fact, the avixfi^if]K6ra. To the first belongs the term man,' to the second the term grammar, 'and to the fourth the term Socrates.' But the uncertainty of the whole division immediately appears in the description of the third class, for if there are notions which are predicated both KaB' viroKeifieuov and

'

'

eV

viroKeifievcp

i.e.

which are at

r&

yevri
is

KaX

al

8ia<\>opal.

Every
;

consequently a Ka66kov, but not every Ka96\ov a yevos cf Metaph. iii. 3, 998, b, 17, 999, a, 21, xii. L, 1069, a, 27, &c., with
yivos
i.

once genera and properties (the example Aristotle gives is the concept of science,' which is in the soul as its inroKeifievov, and is also predicated of each of the particular sciences) then the genera and properties cannot be
'

distinct and co-ordinate classes of universals. undefined

How

9,

992, b, 12,

vii.

13,

1038, b,

was
'

16,

25

sq.

and

Bonitz

on

boundary between a genus and a property will be

the
' '
'

To the dis299 sqq. between genus and property is also partly referable the statement in Categ. c. 2, 1, a, 20 sqq. c. 5, that everything either
Metapli. tinction
(1) KaB^ vTroKifivov riuhs Xiyerai, 4v vTroKifjLvci} 5e oiidevi eamv, or (2)
iu
inroKeLfxei/ff} pi.iv icrri KaB''

seen also in his treatment of Substance (on which see the first part
of ch. Yii., infra). 1 eV Metajih. x. 7, 1057, b, 7 yhp rov yevovs Kol rS)v Sia<pop(av rh etSr] (for instance, the specific concepts ' black and * white are made up of the generic notion distinguishing Xp^iJ-a and the qualities SiaKpiriKhs and avyKpinKos white is the XP^f^"- StaKpiriKhv^ black is the xpw/ia <rvyKpiriK6v). Set yap rh Top. vi. 3, 140, a, 28 fxev yevos airh ruv dWuv x^piC^*)" [the generic concept distinguishes
: ' '

vnoKeLfie-

vov Se ovSevhs \4yerai, or (3) /ca0' v-noKCilxivov re Xeyerai Kal eV viroKijxivcp iffriv,

or (4) out' iu

inroKeifjLevcp

iffrlu oijre KaB' inroKeifx^vov Xiyerai.

Of

these divisions, the fourth comprises particular things the first refers to genera and (c. 5,
:

216
finally,

ARISTOTLE
an object
is

in this way, by the aggregate of its

distinctive marks, so defined that the definition as a

whole

is

applicable to no other object, then

we have

its

Concept}

The

object of the Concept

from

is

therefore the

(what belongs
every other],
Tivos
6,

to a genus

rr]v Se Siacpopav arr6

iv rc^ avTCf yivei. Ibid. vi. 143, b, 8,19. (Further instances of the manner of using Siacpopa are given by Waitz, Arist. Org.
i.

and that they express something substantial {Top. vii. 2, vid. mpr. and yet, looked at in p. 214, n. 4
'
'

themselves, they are not substances but qualities, for they express not a Tt, but a troiSv ri (Top.
iv. 2,
6,

279

BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 192,

a,

23.) These distinguishing marks

of species, Aristotle calls diacpupa dSoTTOLhs (Toj). vi. 6, 143, b, 7; JSth. X. 3, 1174, b, 5). From

122, b, 16, c. 6, 128, a, 26, vi. 144, a, 18,21 Pki/s.v. 2, 226, a,

;

27 Mctaph. v. 14 init.). The apparent contradiction between Ari;

other properties he distinguishes them by their being able to be predicated of a subject (kuO' v-koKei/xeuov \4yovTai), but not being in a subject (eV viroKeifxiucf ovk fieri) i.e. they do not subsist in a subject which would exist before themselves, or which might be conceived independently of them, but in one which bj/ them alone is this definite subject (Cat. 5, 3, cf. c. 2, 1, a, 24 sq ); a, 21 sq. they are not accidental but essential determinations (Afetaph. vii. 4, 1029, b, 14, 1030, a, 14 Toj). vi. 6, 144, a, 24 ovZ^'/ia yap SiacpopoL ruu Kara (rvfj.fil3T)Khs viTapx^v'T<>iv eVrl, Kaddirep ovSe rh oh yap iudex^rai r^u Siacpoyevos

stotle's different statements on the subject (brought out by Tren-

DELENBURG,Zrr^t Beitr. z. Phil. i. 56 sqq., and BoNiTZ,on Metaph. v. 14) may be solved in the manner indicated cf. Waitz, ut mpra.
;

Anal.

Vost.

ii.

13, 96, a, 24.

properties of things are also accidental to other things which fall under the same genus. Ta 5^ Toiavra ATjTrreoj/ [in the determination of concepts] fx^xpi TovTov, eoos Tocravra \r](p6f] irpoorov,
also to other things], airavra 5e /i^ eVi irXiov.
ravTr]u yap avdyKT) ovcriav clvai rod which will be further illustrated below. Ibid. 97, a,
Tvpdyixaros

Many

uv cKacTTov fj.\v [is accidental

ewl irXeTov virdp^ei

'

pav vTvdpx^LV Tivl Kai, [xt) virdpx^i-v) they belong to the concept of the which they are subject of affirmed, and hence everything that is implied in them is also true of the species and of the individuals to which they belong ( Cat. c. 5, 3, a, 21 sqq. b, 5). It can hence be said of them, that they
;

get the concept (x6yos of a given object by dividing the genus into its species, and then the species to which our object belongs into its sub-species, and thus proceeding
:

18

we

Trjs

ova-Las)

till

we arrive

at a

group wv ix-qKeTt.
that which
is

ia-rl

8ia(popa, i.e.

(together with the genus) form the substance {Metaph. vii. 12, 1038, b, 19 cf following note)
' '
:
.

indivisible into any farther sets of opposed species, to one or other of which the object in

question would belong (but about the actual tenableness of this

LOGIC

217

Substance, or more accurately the determinate Substance

or peculiar Essence of the things in question
theory, cf. BONITZ, Arist. Metaph. ii. 346, 1). So also MetaijTi. vii. 12, 1037, b, 29 ovQlv yhp ercpdu iffTiu iv r^ dpicr/j.^, irX^v t6 re irpS)TOV XeySfievov yevos /cal at diacpopai (or as it stands 1038, a,
:

^
;

and the
avQp<}iT(^

special use of
elvai, &CC.,

elj/ot

with a dative

annexed (for instance, rh

rh
cvl eJvai

opKr/uSs

(()opcov

ianv 6 A.070S). The

e/c

tcov Siais

genus

its species, the latter into their sub-species, and this

is

divided into

continued

ecas
1.

tip

eXdr]

ds rh

rb adiaipdrcf iffrlv elmi, Metaph. x. 1, 1052, b, 16 op ydp iffTt rh aol elvai rh fiovffiKcp ehai, ibid. vii. 4, 1029, b, 14, cf. Ind. Ar. 221, a, 34); and the phrase rh ri ?iv clvai. In the second of these expressions the dative must (according to Trendelenburg, Rh. Mus. 1828, 481
:

since in this series every subsequent differa8ia.<popa(ihid.

15);

and

SCHWEGLER,

Ar.

Metaph.

iv.

entia includes the preceding one the Siirovv includes the (e.g. xnr6irovv), therefore the intermediate terms which fall between

the genus and the lowest specific difference do not need to be repeated in the definition (cf. also Part. An. i. 2 init.). So it follows (Met. ibid. 1038, a, 28) '6ri T\evTaia Sia(popa 7} ovala rod 7]
:

371) be taken possessively, so that avOpuTTCf eJvai is equivalent to elvai rovro 8 iariv avOpdnrc}} = to be that which belongs to man and so rh apdpdoirq) elpai designates the manner of being that is peculiar to man = Man's
' ' ;

'

Being

'

whereas ^vOpwirov

elvai

only signifies the condition of one who is a man, or the actual

participation in human nature. For the proof of this explanation such passages as the following will serve rh eluai avr^ erepou, rh ^fjv ro7s Coiffi rb elvai iarriv (BONITZ, l7id. Ar. 221, a, 42, 54 sq., Arist. Stnd. iv. 377). The fact that the article is never put before the dative (for Aristotle does not say rh r(p avOpdoTrcfi ehai) does not stand in the way for the r^ in this case after rh would be very awkward as a matter of diction and moreover this very omission of the article makes it clearer that in the avOpdcircf} eluai we are dealing with that being which belongs t(^ man as such. The rl ^v elyai is also, as a rule, construed with the dative of the object (rh ri ^y elvai cf Ind. Ar. 764, a, iKd(rr(fi, Sec. 60 sq.) for it is (as Alex. says, in Schol. 256, b, 14 on To^. 24 m.)
:

irpdy/xaTos e<TTai Kal 6

dpicrfj-os

which, however, we have understand by the rekevTaia 5ia(poph, not only the last specific difference as such, but the specific concept as determined by it, which embraces the higher species and the genus. For the designation of that which is thought of in the concept, Aristotle makes use of various expressions. Besides oiiala
'

in to

and eJSos (of which we shall have more to say in dealing with the Metaphysics), we have to notice
in this connection his

way

of

marking out the idea which a word expresses by placing a 'direp

before it, as '6irp tv, or Sirep ev (Phys. 3, 186, a, 32 sqq.), for Being, as such,' or ' One, as such (cf BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist. 533, b, 86 sqq.); and also liis
:

'

'

'

'

218

ARISTOTLE
itself is

Concept

nothing else but the thought of

^j/

this

equivalent to 6 ti ^ctti rh civai avTw SrjA&Ji/ K6yos. But to this account must be added the explanation of the force of the peculiar imperfect, which is meant to designate that in things which does not belong to the moment, but which throughout the wliole course of their existence has represented their proper esse, i.e. the essential as distinguished from the contingent and transitory. (Cf.

elvai.

PTiys.

ii.

2,

194, a,

20

In TOV e^Sovs Koi rov tI 'fjv elvai. Phys. ii. 3, 194, b, 26 one of the rb eJSos Kal rh irapdfour causes is Seiyfxa' tovto S' iarlv 6 xSyos 6 TOV ri '^v elvai Koi to. tovtov yht\ this being what Aristotle, in Me:

tapli.

i.

3,

983, a, 27, calls

?iv

tV ovo'iav

but immediately afterwards Thv \6yov also. In fact,

Kol Th
t'i

ehai,

Plato,

Tl/eo't.

150,

the Heracliteans maintain ws rh irav Kivqcris ^u Koi &\Xo oi5f v, examples apitd other and SCHWEGLER, ut sKjjra, 373 sq.). Hence rd rl ^v ehai auOpuircf properly means, that which in a man was his proper esse,' the true being of man, that belonging to him which is also called the TrpcoTTj ovffia '(Slos kKacrrco {Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 10;
:

'

all these expressions are constantly interchanged by him. Compare, for example, the Be An. ii. 1, 412, b, 10, where ovcrla t] Kara rhu x6yov is explained by rb ri ^u ehai; Metaph. vi. 1, 1025, b, 28: Th Ti ?iv eivai KoX Thv \6yov vii. 5, rh ri ^v eJuai Koi 6 1 030, b, 26 opi(rix6s (similarly Part. An. i. 1,
; :

'

'

vii. 7, vid.

inf.

vii. 5 fin.')

But

this is simply his Ideal 13eing, that of which we think, when we abstract from what is contingent to the phenomenal man before

and from the material element on which that contingency rests

us,
cf.
ej'

Phys. ii. 2,ut supra) 1107, a, 6 KaTo. fieu ova'iav KoX rhv x6yov rhv t'i ^p The ti ^v elvat eJvai XiyovTa. stands to the simple tl <tti. as the particular and definite to the universal and indefinite. Whilst only designates the tI ^v luai form or peculiar being of a ; thing, the question, rl ia-Tiv may be answered by giving either the matter only or that which
()42, a, 25, cf
]'Jt](. ii.
.

6,

tV

'

'

'

vii. 4, 1029, b, 19 ^pa ixT] iuearai X6ya) avrd, AeyoPTL avTO. ovtos 6 X6yos tov tI ijv dvai iKoia-rcf}. So ch. 7, 1032, b, 14 \4yco 5' ovffiav avv vKr]s rb t( Ibid. xii. 9, 107o, a, 1 ?iu elvai. eTrl /iej/ rcou iroiriTiKoiv dvev vXrjs ovaia Koi rh Tt ^v efj/at [sc. rh 7] And ch. 8, 1074, a, irpayixd i(rrC\. 35 rh Se ri -fjv ehai ovk Ix^' vXt]v TO irpuTOV evreXcx^tayap. The t/ ?iu eJvai, therefore, goes with the eldos. Metaxjh. vii. 7, 1032, b, 1 iihos Se K4yu) rh ri ^v eJvai kKaffTOV KoX T^v TTpcaTrjv ovffiav. Ibid. ch. 10, e?5os 5e Ae^w rb ti 1035, b, 32
:

Metaph.

(^

includes both matter and form, or even by giving merely a property; and even when it is answered by giving; the ideal form, the answer need not embrace the whole concept of the thing, but may be confined to the genus, or the specific difference (the proof of this is given by
Arist. Metaph. iv. The ti ?iv eJvai is, 375 sqq.). consequently, a definite species of the ri ia-Ti (hence Pe An. iii. tov tl icTTi Kara rh 6, 430, b, 28
:

ScHWEGLEB,

Tl ?iv elvai

= Being on
*
;

tial side

')

and thus,

its essenas very com-

LOGIC
Essence.^

219

And this is arrived at by the process of making the Universal of the Genus determinate bymeans of the aggregate of distinguishing marks.^ But

in Aristotle, the used in the narrower meaning of the rl ^u

latter

monly happens

may

be

ehai, whereas the other phrase never has the looser sense of the Tt ((TTi, so as to designate merely the matter of the thing or a mere property, or a generic universal without the specific differ-

Top. vii. 5, 154, a, 31 \6yos 6 rh ri ^v clvai (T'nfiaiuwv. Metajy/i. v. 8, 1017, b, 21 rh ri ^v eJvai ov 6 x6yos opifffxhs, Kot TovTO ovtria Aeyeroi kKaffTov. So also vii. 4, 1030, a, 6, cf. a, Ifi, b, 4, and ch. 5, 1030, also Part. An. i. 1, 642, b, 26 a, 25. Hence Aristotle also
94, a,
6pi<x^6s effri
:

n.)

ences. The like relation exists between elvai with the dative and the accusative: rh elvai with
XevKcp elvai designates the idea of

what is white rh XcvKhv elvai, the Cf. property of being white. SCHWEGLER, loo. cit. p. 370 Phys.
:

iii. 5,

204, a, 23, et alibi.

ri

Aristotle
for-

undoubtedly introduced the

mula rh

^v

eJuai.

Stilpo really used it (see Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 223, 3), he probably took it from Aristotle. Again, Antisthenes could hardly have used the mere ri -^v to designate the concept at least, this does not follow from the references in Zell. ibid. p. 252, n. 1. The following writers treat at length of the rl ^v clvai and the allied phrases Trendelenburg (who was the first to examine this subject thoroughly), Rhein. Mus. v. NiebnTir und Brandis, ii. (1828), 457 sqq. Be Anima, 192 sqq., 471 sqq. Hist.
:

Even if Zeller,

designates the concept (in the subjective meaning) by the expressions 6 \6yos 6 dpl^wu r^v ovffiav {Part. An. iv. 5, 678, a, 34), b x6yos 6 tI iffri Xiycov {MetapJi. V. 13, 1020, a, 18) and similar phrases. (AJ70S or \6yos ttjs oixrlaSj in relation to the objective meaning of \6yos, stands for the form or the Being of things e.g. Gen. An. i. 1, 715,
:
:

a, 5,
2,

Be An. 8 414, a, 9, &c.

;

i.
;

1,

403, b, 2
cf.

ii.

ing note.) By case '6pos is synonymous with

6pi(TiJ.hs, e.g.

precedthe nature of the

i.

and

in Top.

init.

%cti
eJuai

5'

'6pos

ix.\v

\6yos
;

6 rh tl

^v

a-nfiaivcov.

So ch.
ii.

4,

101

b, 21,

and
i.

oh. 7,103, a, 25

Anal. Post.
; ;

3,

Beitr. i. 34 sqq.; Schwegler, ut supra, 369 sqq. (who cites other authors); Hertling, Mat. n. Form. b. Arist. 47 sq. Anal. Post. ii. 3, 90, b,^30, Spifffihs ixkv yhp rov ri 91, a, 1
:

fcrri

Kol ovaias
opiajxhs

bpifffxhs ri i(rri drjXoT.

init.

6 fjikv oZv Ibid. ii. 10 \eyerai elvai

.

Meta/ph. ch. 13, 1039, a, vii. 5, 1031, a, 8 19 ; viii. 3, 1043, b, 28 ch. 6, 1045, a, 26; Poet, ch.6,1449, b,23. But the same word, in a further sense, signifies either of the two terms of a proposition (subject and predicate), and is therefore the standing expression for the three Anal. terms of the syllogism '6pov Se koAw Pri. i. 1, 24, b, 16 6ts %v SiaXverai tj irpSraais, etc., ch. 4, 25, b, 32, ch. 10, 30, b, 31, ch. 34, 48, a, 2 Anal. Post. i. 10, 76,
:

72, b, 23

10, 97, b, 26

\6yos rov ri

4(rri.

(Thesameibid.

35 et sup7'a. 2 Cf. pp. 215, n. 1, 216, n. 1. Aristotle expresses the relation

b,

220

ARISTOTLE

the essence of things, according to Aristotle, consists It is therefore only with the only in their form.^

form that the Concept

is

concerned, and no concept of

sensible objects as such can be presented to the mind.^

For although a

definite relation of

Form

to

Matter does
also to

belong to the peculiar Essence

between these two elements, by designating the genus as the matter and the specific difl'erence and as the form of the concept by this he explains how in the concept the two are one. The genus is that, in other words,
;

and therefore

odv (sc. ovcrlai) ovtoo [in the sense of the avvoXov^ K^yovrai, tovtwv
fieu eari (pdopd
'

Kol

yap

yeuecris

ruv 8e \6yov ovk eanv ovtoos ooarc ovSe yap yeveats (ou (pdeipeaOai yap yiyveraL rh olKia elvai aWa rh 5ia tovto 5e koI Tr;Se rrj oi/cta)
'
.
.

which, in

becomes
concept
fxevou),

the substratum

indefinite, first definite in the specific

itself
(inroKei-

rwu

ovcriSov

rwv

alcrOrjTwp ru)v Ka9'

eKacTTtt

ovO' bpiafxhs ovt'' airodei^is

ix'^vcriv

eariv, Kal
Tu>v

on
'

vX-qv

rjs

r]

(pvais

whose properties are the matter, and whose form is made up of the distinguishing marks. But the substratum never actually
without properties, nor the matter without form, and therefore neither does the genus exist outside the species, but only in them looked at in itself, it only
exists
;

ToioLVTr]
1X7]

oSffT'

ivdex^crOaL Ka\ elvai 5tb (pOapra iravra ra KaO'

eKaara avrwu.

el ovv H] t' aTrJSei^is avayKaicov Kal 6 opia-jxhs eViKal ovk eVSexerat, arriixoviKbs, Sxnrep ouS' iTtiaT'i]p.7)v ore jxev iiriore S' &yvoiav elvai, aWct ar'i]fj.'t]v So|a rh roLOvr6v iariv {vid. SUpra

p. 163),
bpiafibv,

ovrois

ou5'

airS^ei^iv

ou5'

contains the aniversal presupposition, the possibility of that which exists in reality in the lowest species Metaph. viii. 6, v. 6, lOlfi, a, cf. ch. 2, 1043, a, 19 25 ch. 28, 1024, b, 3 vii. 12, 1038, cf. ch. 3, x. 8, 1058, a, 23 a, 25 1054, b, 27; Phys. ii.S) fin.; Gen. et
;
:
:

5o|a iarl rov evSeXo/Jievov &WUS e~)(^iv, SrjAov (in ovk tt.v ein avroov ovre aTToSei^is. As soon as we perceive it no longer, we

aWa

do not know whether it is now the same as we think it to be. (Cf

Anal. PH. Top. V. 3, 131, b, 21 And in ch. 10, ii.21,67, a, 39.) 1035, b, 34 rov \6yov /j-epr] ret. rod
;
:

Corr. i. 7, 324, b, G {Part.AnA. 3, 643, a, 24, does not come inhere). Cf. p. 217, n. 1. More fully treated in the account of Aristotle's Metaphysics, infra, ch. vii.
'

p. 219, n. 1, and Metaph. vii. 11, 1036, b, 28 tov yap

2

See

eWovs }x6vov ecrrlv, 6 Se x6yos icrrl rod KaOoXov rh yap KvKAcf eluai Kal kvk\os Kal ^vx'^ ^^vai Kal ^vx^ rov 5e (Tvv6Kov ijdr), oJov ravrd kvkXov rovdl, rwv KaOeKacrrd nvos

KaQoKov Koi rod etSous 6 SpiafiSs. So ch. 15 init. by Substance is meant sometimes the A^7os alone, sometimes the K6yos crvv rf} v\t) crvvei'daai fieu \7ilJ,/x4vos (the aivoXov').
:

^ alaOrirov ^ vovrov (X4yw 5e vof]rovs fJi\v oJov rovs /naOrj^ariKou^, alaOrjrohs Se oTov rovs x-^^ovs Koi
|i;AiVous but even the rails former have a vXrj, only it is a iJ\t j/oTjTrj, 1036, a, 9 sqq.), rovrav Se

LOGIC
the Concept of any object,^ yet
sense
itself,
it

221
is

not

this object of

but only

this

determinate mode of sensible

existence, only tlie universal form of the object,

which

can be defined. ^
as such

It follows as a consequence of this

that the conception does not relate to individual objects

but this applies also to all IndividKnowledge, in fact, aims always at a Universal,'^ and the words of which a definition is made Each concept up are themselves general terms.-^
of sense
^
;

uals in general.

ovK
<reajs

ecTTiv

bpifffjibs

aX\a
e/c

fiera voj]-

alard^crews
5'

yvcapi^ovrai,
ttjs

aireAdduTas [-ra]

eVreAe-

xetas oi) drjAov irSrepov rrore eialv ^ OVK elalv, aA-A' dei Xiyovrai Kal 5' t] yvwpi^ovraL t<S Kad6\ov \6ycf 0A7J ^yvucTTos Kad' auT-fju, ^ As in the concept of the house (Metajjh. vii. 15, see preceding note), the soul, the axe (Be An. i. 403, b, 2 ii. 1, 412, b, II), of the (TifjLhv (MetapJi. vii. 5, &c.), in fact in all concepts of material and natural things. Cf

although the Phys. ii. 9 fin. material causes are subservient to the ideal or final causes, still in explaining natural phenomena we must give both Kacos 5e Koi iu T<j5 \6y(}} iarl rh avayKoiov [i.e. because the physical or material causes belong to the concepts of ihingH']. dpiaa/jLevcp yap Th pyov Tov
:

numberless things cannot be defined without giving their matter, this seems, at first sight, a contradiction. In the passage referred to (lletaph. vii. 10) Aristotle seeks to escape this contradiction by saying that in such cases, not this individual object, formed by the combination of a specific concept .with this definite matter, is defined, but only its form it is not this circle, but the circle, or the ki!>k\^ ehai, not this soul, but the But the soul, the ^vxv elvai. difficulty is, indeed, by no means
;

removed in this way. If, for instance, the soul is the Entelechy of an organic body {Be
' '

irp'uiv,
5'

on

Biaipecris

roiadi

avrr]

the ri ?iv eJuai r^ {Metaph. ibid. 1035, b, 1 6), then a matter constituted in a stated way belongs to the concept of the soul.

An.

ii.

1),

roiwSe

adifxari.

OVK (TTai, et 1X7) e'let odovras oh, 6t fxr] ffLO-qTOiovaOL ovToi povs. eaTL yap Kal eV rev Kdycf evia Cf 3Iefi6pia oos v\r] Tov Xoyov.
.

Metaph.
Vid.

vii. 15,

1039, b, 27,

as at p. 220, n.
* ^

2,

mpra.
p. 163, n. 2.

mpra,

taph.

vii. 10,

1035, a,

1,

b, 14,

and

ch. 11, 1037, a, 29. 2 If on the one

hand we deny that matter belongs to the concept of a thing, and on the other are obliged to admit that

Metaph. ibid. 1040, a, 8: not only are sensible things incapable of definition, but also ideas rwv yap Kad' eKaarov r] i5ea,
:

us
5'

<pacrl,

Kal x^P^<^''"h-

avayKoiov

5'

e^ ovofidroov dvai rhv

ov iroirjaei 6

K6yov ouo/na dpi^S/xevos, uyuwaTov

222

ARISTOTLE

embraces several individuals, or at least can embrace and even if we descend to the lowest species several
;

we

are

still

always met by universal determinations

these, the individual
entities are dis-

only.

Within

tinguished no longer by anything relating to species,

but only by accidental marks of difference. ^

yap
earai.

Between

ra
'

5e

Keifxcva
virapx^i-v
elf

Koiva
Koi
bpi-

iracTLV.

avdyKT] apa
olnv

6,Wa} Tuvra

Tts

(Te

aaiTO, ((^ov epe? lax^^^^ ^ \VKhv ^ erepov ri h koI aWcp inrdp^CL.

'

but below this there only remain individuals which are no longer distinguished (see specifically Metaph. x. 9, 1058, a, 34 sqq.
and5?/j!>rtt,p. 216, n.

l),andarein

Loc.

cit.

1.

14, Aristotle pro:

a sense

'6jxoia

poses the objection

TQVTU}
vi?dpx^i-v

ix7}Qfv

kxXv^iv
juovct}

97, a, 37, b,

{Anal. Post. ii. 13, these, however, 7)

;

Xo^plsjxkv irduTaTvoWoils^'d^a Sc

(which

is

really

the case in the determination of concepts, r/VZ. mpra, p. 21G, n. 1), and lie gives among other answers this (cfT Bon ITZ, on this passage) even though an object at 1. 27
'
:

continue to form a multiplicity, and, in fact, an indefinite multiplicity, and for this reason cannot be the object of science and of the concept 3Ietaph. iii, 4, iriit. (Ire yap jxt] eari ri irapd ra Kad(.Kacfra, rd he KadeKaara direipa, rccv
; :

be the only one in its species, like ihe sun and the moon, still its concept could only contain such things oaa. eV iikXov eVSe'xera/,
olov

8'

direipwv
;

iruis

evBexerai
ii.

Xafielv

iTnarr]/j.r]v

cf

sqq.;

2\)j?.

ii.

A7ial. Post.

i.

994, b, 20 109, b, 14; 2, 24, 86, a, 3 sqq.

2,

idu

erepos
6cc.'

yeurjrai

tolovto^,

SrjXou OTL yjXlos (xrai

Aoyos,

Cwh,

i.

Koivos dpa 6 Similarly, in De supposing 9, 278, a, 8

:

and ibid. c. 19-21, the proof that argument cannot be continued to inlinity either upwards or downwards. In this Aristotle exactly follows Plato see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. Aristotledept.i.p 524,3,587,1. signates singulars by the phrases rd Ka9' eKaara (or k. eKaarov), rh dpLdficv ev{Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 34
:

there were only one circle, oiidev fiTTOv dWo eo-rat t^ kvkXo) eluuL koI TwSi T^J kvkXw, koL to jiifu eldos, rh
5"

dSos

eV

rfj

vArj
:

Kal

twu

kuO'

(Kaarov. Ibid, b, 5 there is only one world, but still the ovpav(f ilvai and the r^^Se t^ ovpav^ dvai.

Waitz on
;

are

different things. Metapli. vii. 10 (r?VZ. mpr. p. 220, n. 2) 6 Kityos earl rod KadoXov.
:

two

s^ipra ; see this passage), to rtva, 6 Tts dvQpoiKos, &c. {Categ. ibid. Anal. Post. i. 24, 85, a, 1, 4, b

Categ.

c. 2, 1, b, 6, et

Anal. Post.
5'
\

ii.

iarl

iras

13, S7, b, 26: alel The opos KaOoAuv.

determination of concepts may be continued till all specitic diiferences are exhausted, and the reXkvra'a Siacpopa is reached ;

vii. 13, 1038, b, 33), {Categ. c. 5, 3, b, 10; Metaph. ix. 7, 1049, a, 27 ct supra ; see Waitz on this passage of the Categories^, also rd dro/na (e.g.

34; Metaph.
r6be
ri

Categ.

c. 2, 1,
iii. 1,

b, 6, c. 5, 3, a,

35;

Metaph.

995, b, 29. It is true

LOGIC
this accidental difference

223
specific differences lie

and the

those attributes which belong exclusively to the

memFroalso

bers of a certain species, without, however, being directly-

included in their Concept

j^erties (Xhio)}

and Aristotle

calls these

But

in a wider sense this

name

is

used by him to include specific differences on the one

side

What

and accidental qualities on the other.^ falls under one Concept must be,

so far as
fall

this is the case, identical.^

that the lowest species, which do not divide into sub-species the aSid(popa, vid. m})ra, p. 216, are given the same name n. 1 but in that case, whenever this meaning does not appear from the context itself, he uses, not merely ra drofxa, but Sro/io eWr] and similar expressions (cf.

What
topical

does not

under

iii. 3, 999, a, 12, v. 10, 1018, b, 6, vii. 8 fin., x. 8, 9, 1058, a, 17, b, 10, xi. 1, 1059, b, 35) or ra eo-xaro, because in descending from the most universal

Metaph.

5th book, which deals with the treatment of the ^5ia (c. 1) he distinguishes the tdiov Kaff avrh from the Wlov irphs erepov, the oei ^Biov from the ttotc IfStoj/. He himself, however, remarks (129, a, 32) of the Uiov irphs cTepop, and it is true in any case of the irore XSiop, that it belongs to the (rvfxfiefir]K6Ta. On the other hand, he gives as examples of the X5. Kad^ avrh and del essential marks such as C^ov addparop,
^(fop dpr]rhp, rh e'/c ^l/vxvs Kal aca/j-aTos ffvyKei/xepop (128, b, 19, 35, Cf. preceding note, 129, a, 2). ^ Aristotle does not say so in these words, but it is shown by his discussions on the various meanings of ravrhp. In Top. i. 7 (cf. viii. 1, 151, b, 29 152, b, 31) three of these are distinguished yepei ravrhp is what belongs to one genus, elfSet ravrhp what belongs to one species (cf. Metaph. x. 8, 1058, a, 18), and apiQyi.^ ravrhp, Sip opS/nara irXeica rh Se irpay/xa eV. This last kind of identity may be expressed in various ways
.

thej come last (Metaph. xi. 1, Mh. JV. vi. 12, 1143, 1059, b, 26 a, 29, 33 Be An. iii. 10, 433, a,
; ;

451, a, 26). In Toj). i. 4, 101, b, 17, he distinguishes y4vos, Wiov, and and as soon as he (Tvfji.fifir]K6s has divided the Uiov again into opos and iSiou in the narrower sense, he defines the latter, c. 5, 102, a, 17: 'tdiov S' iffrlv f> fx^ StjAo? luLev rh ri ^v eJuai, fiSpq) 5' U7ra/5%et Kal apTiKaTrjyopeTTai rov vpdyfxaros [is related to it ^as an interchangeable concept], otov tSiou avdpduTTov rh ypafifxariKrjs elvai
;

16

De Mem.

c. 2,

Kvpidirara
dp6/j.ari

/mep
opt}}

Kal

trpwrois

'6rap

5e/CTt/cJj/,
2

&c.
{loc. cit.)

rh ravrhp airo^ody,
Xwiricf

Already

he distin-

KaOdirep

lixdriop

Kal

^<^op

guishes the TTore ^ irp65 ri tSiov from the cnrKcos 'loioy, and in the

ire^hp Sivovp apOpwircf},

orap

Toj

Sevrcpop 8' (5j^, Kaddirep rh iTriarrrjfJLTis

224

ARISTOTLE
is

one concept
whicli

different.^

Complete Identity, however,

implies unity of matter also, for individuals between

there
is

no difference of a species are yet

different numerically, because in each of them the same

Conconcept presents itself in a different matter.^ highest degree gives us ceptual distinction in the
Contrary
Opposition;

whereas simple

difference pro-

duces Contradictory Opposition.

TLo) are such as, within the
as possible asunder.^
beKTLKhv

For Contraries (havlie

same Genus,

as far
fact, is

Contrary opposition, in
10, 1018, a, 38 sqq. 1024, b, 9.
^

Tpirov S' avOpwTTCf}, tov avjx^^fi7]K6TOs, diov rh KaQ'i]fx^vov ^ Th ixovaiKbv 'S.wKpd.Tei. There is a somewhat different Aridivision in 3Ietaj)h. v. 9.
.
.
.

and

ch. 28,

Hrau

aiTo

stotle

there disting-uishes, first, the Tavra Kara (Tvix^fir]Khs and ravra KaO' aura then the ravrhv
;

See preceding note and p. 222, That the individual differences of things must be based on Matter will be further shown later on, in the second part of
n. 2.

ch. vii. infra.

'^

i8ei

and

apidtxS,

both of which
ii.

Aristotle states this defini-

are afiirmed partly of that which has a Matter, partly of that which has an Essence (fulleratx. 3,1054, a, 32 that is identical in number which both in Matter and in Form As a general explanais one). tion he gives us a formula which to the one is easily reducible cited above v rahr6rr)s eySr-ns irXeiovuiv tov elvaL r) ris icTTLV lirav xp^/'''"' ^^ TrAeiocrtv (as in avro avTcpravTou). Since, however (according to ch. 10, 1018, a, 85), Unity and Being can be used in different senses, the meaning of the ravrhu, '^repov, kc. must vary accordinolv. Meiaph. v. 9^ 1018, a, ^9: erepa 5e Keyerai uv fj to. f^Sr) TTAf/w ^ v vXv ^ o \6yos rrjs
: :

'/)

c. 6, 6, a, 17; Etli.N. 1108, b, 33, as one already in use (bpi^ovTaC) but in Metapli. X. 4 iii'd., he puts it forw^ard in his own name, and he there establishes the proposition that opposites must belong to the same genus, by observing expressly TO. ixkv yap yivn SiacpepovTa ovK e^ei 65hv els &\X7)\a,

tion, Cateff.
8,

dAA.' aTre^ei
{e.g.

ttAcov Kal acrv/xfiKrjTa

a sound and a colour are not opposed to one another, because they cannot at all be compared, they are aavyi.^Ki]TOi). Yet, on the other hand, we read in MetapTi. v. 10, 1018, a, 25 ivavrla
:

>

\yTai

TO.

re

fi^

Svvara

a/xa

t&j

awTw

irape7yai rCov ^ia(pep6vT(i>v kuto.

TO,

yvos, Kal
Toou iv
(TTOP

irXilcrTov 5ia((>epoj/Ta

ovaias' /col '6\us avrLKd/nevcas rcf On e!'5et ravTcp Keyerai to eTepou. and yev^i eVepoj/, cf. ibid. x. 8, v.

T^ avT^
(that

yeuei, Kal
Toiv

ra

TrAel-

^ia<p4povTa

deKTiKcfi

the

TavT(f ivavria are

iv

LOGIC
nothing but specific difference made absolute.^
tradictory opposition,

226

Con-

on the other hand,

is

the relation

accidental to one and the same

deKTiKhv is contirmed by Metaph. X. 4, 1055, a, 2y De Somn. No. 1, 453, b, 27), KoX ra irX^iffTov Sia(p4;

belong to different genera, like sound and colour, belong also to

different

sciences:

cf.

too.

cit.

1055,

a,

31. Further, from the

the ivavriov

povTa Twv
Kal

Oirh

ttjv

avrV

Suva/xiu,

same
2,

definition of

wv 7] diacpopa /jLeyiaTi] ^ ottAws ^ Kara yevos f/ Kar' elSos. rh 5' ^AAa evayria Xey^rai ra ixkv r(f to. roiavra ex^iv, ra Se TCf Scktiko. iJyai Twv ToiovTcou, &c. (and the like in
X. 4, 1056, a, 35), and Categ. c. 11^7?.. also has: avdyKr] Sk Trdvra T^ ivavria ij iv r^ avrcp yepei

{ibid. 1055, a, 19, cf.

Be

Ccelo,

i.

269, a, 10, 14, and Fhys. i. 6, 189, a, 13) Aristotle deduced the principle that to each thing

dvai [like black

and white],

ij

iv Tols ivavriois yiveaiv [like just

and
[like

unjust],

^ avra yivt] etvai

cites

good and evil]. 8impl, something similar (/m Categ.

84,
a,

Sohol.

6;

At. Ft.
n.

117)

from the

treatise

at/riKeifxe-

vwv, about which cf. p. 70, n 4. The more mature and correct siatement is that which is given in Metaph. x. {e.g. good and evil

could not be contraries it they did not fall under the same generic concept, that of moral behaviour) and, in fact, Aristotle himself (at 1055, a, 23 sqq.) resolves the earlier statements by bringing them into line with the idea of the eVaj/T oj/ as there defined. It is only in reference to that definition of the iuavTiov that we can understand
;

there can only be one contrary. Between contraries there may lie an indefinite number of intermediate grades, which are compounded of these contraries (as colours out of light and dark), yuch intermediate grades are not found, however, between every pair of contraries, but only between those pairs of which one or other predicate does not necessarily belong to the subject concerned, and in which there is a gradual transition from one to the other. {Metaph.y..!; Categ. c.lQ, 11, b, 38 sqq., 12, b, 2b sqq. cf. SiMPL. Categ. Schol.inAr.M, a, 15
sqq.,28 sqq.) What Aristotle hadin his mind in this doctrine of the ivavriov is the scale of changes in the natural sciences ; for every

change
v.

is

condition to the opposite

3,
c. 5,
;

a transition from one Phys.

;

Aristotle's

important axiom {Me-

226, b, 2, 6, i. 4, 187, a, 31, 188, a, 31 sqq. Ge/i. et Cott. i. 7, 323, b, 29. To the above definition of the el'Sc-t ivavriov

taph. iii. 2, 996, a, 10; iv. 2, 1004, a, 9, 1005, a, 3 ; xi. 3, 1061, a, 18 ; An. Fri. i. 36, 48, b, 5 Ue An. iii. 3, 427, b, 5, et alibi; see BoNiTZ and Schweglbe on Metajjh. iii. 2, loo. ait.), rwv ivavriwu fxia iiTKTT'fifi'n. That is the same science which deals with the same things things which
;
;

corresponds that of the ivavriov Kara rdirov in MeteoT. ii. 6, 363, a, 30, and Phys. v. 3, 226, b, 32. The correct way of formulating oppositions was dealt with in the
p.

treatise n. avriKeifxivuiv {vid. supra 70, n. 4, and Simpl. loc. cit. 83, b, 39 sqq.; At. Ft. 116).
'

The

biatpopa reKeios of

Me-

VOL.

I.

226

ARISTOTLE
to

between such concepts as stand

relation of

one another in the

Yes

to No,* of affirmation to negation,

and

between which, therefore, no third or middle term can object one lie,' and of which as applied to every given opposition, to This kind of or other must be true.=* put it differently, arises when everything which is not
contained in
a certain concept
i.e.

is

collected into one

negative expression,'*

where the aggregate of all is divided between two concepts possible determinations by the test of identity with or difference from some
given
determinant.

Between contrary and contradictory opposition Aristotle places that oi frivation and the jiossession,^ though he is not able quite to establish between this and the other two kinds of difference*^
X. 4, 1055, a, 10 sqq., 22 Since this opposition only occurs between abstract concepts and not between concrete things,
tapJi.
sqci.

here: see
^

CaUg.

Catef/. c. 10, 12, b, 10. c. 10, 11, h, 16 sqq.,

13, a, 37 sqq.; 1057, a, 33.

and

Metcqyh.

x.

tlie

tained
(^('.(j.

tract n. auriKei^ievwv mainthat onl}^ the concepts

(pp6vn(ns

and

acppoavvT])

were

" An opofxa or prifxa aopicnov vid. infra, p. 232, n. 2. "^ "'^'' " "E|is and arepT^ais, e.g. ' see;

to

called airXcis iuavria, not the beings to which these concepts apply (such as the (pp6vi/xos and
le

ing

'

and

'

bHnd.'

For what

fol-

tlie icppwv).

SiMPL.

loc. clt. 83, b,

24 sqq.,
'

cf.

PlATO, Phcedo, 103

B.

Aristotle's
'

standing formula

lows, cf. Trend bLENBUEG, Bist. Beiir. i. 103 sqq. 6 In Metaph. v. 22 Tand, referring to this, X. 4, 1055, b, 3) Aristolle distinguishes three mean-

for this kind of opposition is therefore, ws Kardcpacris kuI dnS-

ings of the

o-repTjo-ts

(1)

fti'

m^ %xV
Khu
fi^

Ti roov Tr(pvK6Twv ex^o'Gai,

In a jv^wg.^..... ^.. c. judgment the like opposition is called durlcbaffLS (vid. n. 6, &c., infra)
.,ovu.. (pa(nsavTLKt(jeaL.'

avrh ^v TrecpvKhs ^x^iv, oTov

-rrecpvichs

(jyvrhu

oinixdTwv (rTeprj(Teaihey<iTai.(2)Uv ^x^iv, ^ ahrh ^ rh yeuos,

and in PJiys. v. 3, 227, a, 8 and Metaph. iv. 7 init., v. 10 init.,

the opposition of concepts included under the same word.
2

(3) hu irecpvKhs koI 8t6 ^nlj kv ^x^iv fi^ Ixfjexr?.

7re(|)u-

the
^

is

Metaijh.

iv. 7, xi. 6,

1063. b,
cf.

meaning would privation be synonymous with 'negation (for blind' = not-seeing ), and
first
'
' '

19

Pliys. loc. cit.,

and

what

we could
/cara

affirm of the opposites

1

will be 'said presently about contradictory judgment. The kind of opposition is the same there as

Ka\ %i,iv that which are told by Catey. c. 10, 3, b, 20 sqq. (that is to say, by the
o-repyjo-tj/

we

LOGIC
opposition.

237

Notions

of relation are adduced as the

is

author of the Post-proedicamentd) can not be affirmed of them, namely that everything is either one or the other (either * seeing or * blind ') in such a case, therefore, the relation between a-Tepr](Tis and ^is would be reduced to that of a.vTi(pa<ns, In the other two senses of ffripriffis this is not the case, for in them the (TTeprjffis itself, as is admitted in Metajyh.
'
' ;

a middle term
6>^Lv

'6Tav

yap

ijSr)

ire^vKhs ^ orpiv ^x^tv, rdre ^

rv^Khv

ixov

^ri%(rf'.xi.

It is,

how-

be observed that (1) so long as the thing in question is not Tre(f)VKh5 o^piu ex^iv, it is not
ever, to

iv. 12,

1019, b, 3 sqq., expresses

is

something positive, and

'

a kind

of |ts ; and thus, if we take * privation in this sense, the opposition of the '4^is comes under the definition of the kvavriov. The distinction of the two in the Post-prcedicamenta ( Categ. c. 10, 12, b, 26 sqq.) is founded on the following argument of

SeKTiKhv 6\pea)s either, and therefore the instance adduced is not to the point and (2), on the other hand, there is much that is intermediate between * possession' and 'privation,' for there are all the degrees of partial possession there are not only
;
:

'

seeing

'

things

and

blind

'

things,

which have no middle term between them (as straight and crooked '), one or other must necessarily apply to
those
'

evavria,

'half blind.' A further distinction of the ivavria from the opposites Kara (rreprjaiv Koi e^iv is said to lie in the fact {Categ.c. 10, 13, a, 18), that in the former the transition from one to the other is

but

also

things

'

'

everything capable of the distinction {e.g. every nuniber must be either odd or even ) when, on the other hand, there is a
'
'

mutual (white can become black and black white), but in the latter only one-sided, from possession to privation, and not conversely. But this is likewise incorrect
:

not

only

can

things

which see become blind or the

rich poor, but blind things

middle term between two ivavria, such a conclusion never follows Everything (we cannot say, which is capable of colour must be either white or black ') but
* ;

may

become seeing and the poor rich and even if this is not possible in every actual case, the same is just as true of the ivavria themselves

in the case of

a-Teprja-is

and

e^is,

neither one nor the other of these we cannot say results will arise that to everything capable of the distinction one or other of such opposites must apply,' for there may be some time at which neither of the two will apply to
;

man

neither can every sick get well, nor every black thing become white. For the logical relation of concepts, such a distinction would in any case be of no importance. Lastly, in
;

Metaph.
is

x. 4, 1055, b, 3, 7, 14, it

it

T^

y^p
;

fi-fjiru

irecpvKhs

oxpiv

said that the ffreprja-is is a kind of avricpaffis, namely the avri<pa<ns

iv r(S
5e/cTt/c(ju,

ovre oxpiv ^X^^ neither can we reckon this class of opposites with those between which there

IXff

oiire TV(p\hv

and the

ivavTi6rr]s

\4yeTai

but

a kind of
xi. 6,

(rrepria-is

1063,

according to

(thus also in b, 17); so that, this, these three

Q2

228

ARISTOTLE

Of all these subjects of a fourth sort of opposition.^ opposition the general proposition holds good, kinds of
that
'

opposites

fall

within one and the same science.'

n.
avriKeifievav

concepts would form a kind of gradation from the higher to the r>at tliis also can only be lower. said when the concept of arepricns as is not accurately determined soon as this is done, the relation
;

also
;

treated of
Seliol.
;

(Trep-ncris

and

^is

Stmpl.

Ar. Fr. 119. We shall have to discuss hereafter the metaphysical signiin Ar. SG,
b, 41, 87, a, 2

fication of
'

o-TepTjffis

and

its rela-

of crep7]ais

and

e|is

falls either

under
r-ns.

avric^acns or

under havriS:

To the

latter result Anal.

ean Post. i. 4, 73, b, 21 points yap rh ivavriov t) arepr^ais ^ avri(paais eV rui avrw yevi, olov &pTLOV
Th
IJ.7]

TTepiTThv eV

apidjj.OLS

for, to

be an

ivavriov, the o-repTjo-is

must

express a positive concept, and this not merely indirectly, like the avTKpacns from which it is here distinguished. The same is true of passages like Metapli. vii. 7, 1033, a, 7 sqq., where the sick person who is elsewhere the ivavriov of the healthy person is given as his ar^prja-is &s fi^v ibid. xii. 4, 1070, b, 11

tion to the vAt]. Cat. c. 10, 11, b, 17, 24 sqq.; Top. ii. 2, 109, b, 17, c. 8, 113, b, 15, 114, a, 13, V. 6, 135, b, 17; Metaph. x. 4, 1055, a, 38, c. 3, 1054, a, 23. Instances of such relative concepts are (see Cat., loc. cit., and c. 7; Metapli. v. 15): double and half in fact, the manifold and its part, the virepixof and vTrepx6iJ.^vov the active and

the passive the measurable and the measure; the knowable and
;

knowledge. Though in Metaph. v. 10, two further forms of opposition are named, yet Bonitz, on
this passage,

and Waitz,

Ai'ist.

eJSos [airia rcHv crwixdrcov'] rh Q^pixbv Ka\ &\\ov rp6-Kov rh ^pvxphv i) (Tr^p
r](ns,

for cold forms a contrary opposition to w^arm, and if it is an dSos, it cannot be merely a negation and hence, though it is given as a negation with other analogous concepts (e.r/. Be Cede, ii. 3, 286, a, 25), yet Aristotle himself in other passages admits
;

Org. i. 308, have demonstrated that these latter come under the four already given. Conversely, Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 7 only mentions

two
'^

{avriipacis

and

ivavriorris^.

See n. on p. 225, and as to the extension of the above principle to all avriKeifjLeva, cf Metaph. iv. 2,
.

that, in

certain

cases,

it

is

natural property, and not merely a defect (JPart. An. ii. 2, 649, a, 18), and that it has the power of
acting (^Gen.
24),
et Corr.
ii.

Top. 1. 14, 105, b, 83, 9 ii. 2, 109, b, 17, viii. 1, 155, b, The founda30, c. 13, 163, a, 2. tion of this proposition lies mainly in the fact that, of opposites,

1004,

a,

2,

329, b,
Cf.

which cannot possibly be

of

true
sqq.,

a mere

<rr4p-f](ns.

Trendelenburg,
theor.

Joe.

cit.

107

and Strumpbll, Gesch. d. Fhil. 27 sq. The tract

one cannot be known without This has different the other. causes in different cases in contradictory opposition, it arises from the negative concept Non-A immediately presupposing and containing the positive one A; in correlative concepts it arises
:

Logic
But concepts taken by themselves cannot,
nor
false.

so far,

produce Discourse of any kind; they are neither true

Definite
expression, and
first

therewith

truth

and falsehood likewise, are

sition.^

found in the Propo-

The coupling of the Noun or Name- word with the Verb or Time- word, of the Subject with the
Predicate,^ presents us with a

unit
if this
is

of discourse (or
discourse takes

spoken thought, Xoyos)

the form of Assertion,
in
it,

and

if

anything

affirmed or denied

we

get,

as distinguished from other

words,'* the Proposition
''

thought expressed in

modes of or Judg-

ment ment

(a7r6<j)av(TLS'y

for

which Aristotle

regards the

simple Categorical Judgment as the

is trve,

type.'^

judgis

when

the thought whose inner process

Ai'ist.
is

from their mutually presupposing one another; in contrary opposition, and in (rrep-nffis and e'|is
(so far as that applies here) it arises because the knowledge of the opposed specific differences presupposes that of the common

Org.

i.

352). Interrogation

under the concept of Trp6raais, but it is distinguished as irp6ra(ns SiaXeKTiK^ from irp.
put
in that the latter is darcpov fiopiov rrjs avri(pd(Tws, and the former, on the
airodeiKTiK-^,
AT]\pi.s

genus,
Vid. sujjra, p. 202, &c. Interj)r. c. 4, c. 5, 17, a,
'
;

De
17

Metaph.
d.
2

vi.

4;

of.

Zeller, Ph.

Gr. pt.

As

i., p. 527, 5; p. 628, 1. to ovofxa and prifxa (the

other hand, ip(t)T7}(ns avn^daews. Similar definitions of irpdraa-is will be found in De Interpr. ii. 20, b, 23, and Anal. Post. i. 2, cf. Soph. El. 6, 169, a, 72, a, 8
;

8, 14.
s

latter of which, however, includes

llpoTaais

on the expression

both copula and predicate), see

cf.

Biese, Phil.

De

Interpr.

c.

1, 16, a,

13, c. 2,

2;

Waitz,
>

10, 19, b, 11 ; Poet. c. 20, ; Rliet. iii. 2, 1404, b, 26. This is also Platonic ; see
3, c.

BONITZ,

d. Arist. i. 128, Arist. Org. i. 368 Ind. Ar. 651, a, 33 sqq,

c.

1457, a, 10, 14
d.

De Interpr. Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24,

'
7] 7)

4,

17, a, 1

a, 16.
c. 5,

Zell. Ph.
^

Gr.

pt.

pp. 557,

De
e/c

Interpr.
icrrip

n. 5, 532, n, 2.

jxkv

airXri

17, a, 20 aird^avais
.

Interpr. c. 4 ; and Rhet., ut supra. * Such as wish, request, &c.

Be

Se

TOVTcov crvyKifi4vT}
fiev
airXri
irepl
oiis

ecr
(poju)]
fi

S^

71

aTrStpavcis

(TTIjxavTiK)]

rod virdpx^^v ri

In Anal. Pr.
Top.
i.

i.

1,

24,

a,

22

fi^ virdpx^i'V,

ol )(_p6voi. diijprjvTai.

10,

104, a,

8 (cf.

Waitz,

S30
signified

ARISTOTLE
by the spoken words,^ regards tliat as conjoined
is

or divided which
it is

so conjoined or divided in actuality

false in the opposite case.^

The most fundamental

between judgments is therefore that of Every affirmation stands affirmative and negative.^ opposed to a negation which forms with it an exclusive
distinction

(contradictory)

opposition

(ai/Ttc^ctcrtp),

in

such wise

that one or the other of

third
is possible.'*

them must be

true and no

On

the other hand, certain affirm-

ative propositions are related to certain negatives (as,

for instance, universal affirmatives to the
'

corresponding
rh
fxev r\

On

the definition of speech

^opiov

S' auTi(f)d(Toos

Kard
2.

ratu eV rrj ^vxf) Ta0nixdraov, see De Interpr. c. 1, 16, fi, i?, c. 2 init. c. 4, 17, a, 1

as

(rvfxfioAov

rivos Kardcpaais, rh 5e rt atrd rivos

aw6(paaLS.

Cf. p. 226, n. 1

and

We shall have more to say later on

about the law of contradiction and the excluded middle. According to De Interpr. c. 9, an
exception to the rule stated above is found in such disjunctive propositions as refer to a future result which is contingent or depends on free will. As is here remarked, we can assert nothing at all about them beforehand, neither that they will happen, nor that they will not happen of them (Gen. et Corr.ii. 11, 337, b, 3) only '6ri [xeWei, but not '6ti ea-Tai, is true for the latter excludes the possibility of the event being otherwise. Hence of them only the disjunctive proposition is true, that they will either happen or will not happen.' Of the two they categorical propositions, they will not will happen and happen,' neither is true of them. The latter assertion is remarkable, for we should rather say, that one of the two assertions is true, but we only find out
;
' '

fioph.

El. c. 1, 165, a, 6; De Sensu, c. 1, 437, a, 14 liJict. iii. The events in the 1, 1404, a, 20. soul which words express are, according to these passages, the same in all men their designation in speech, on the other hand, is (like written signs) a matter of convention, and thus differs in different persons. - Metapli. vi. 4., ix. 1 init. ^ De Interi)r. c. 5 init. icTi 5e ^^ TTpuTos \6yos airocpavriKhs
; ;
:

Kardcpaffis elra aTrocpaffis

'

oi 5'

&Woi
1,

irdyres

crvvSeafxcfi
;

eh.

Further,
i.

ibid. c. 5, 6
;

24, Anal. Post. i. 25, 86, b, 33. a, 16 The irpoTaais Kara(pariK^ is also

A7ud. Pr.

called KaTTjyopiK^, the airocpaTiKT] Anal. Pr. i. 2, also (TTepriTiKi). c. 4, 26, a, 18, 31, c. 6, 28, a, 20, b, 6, 15, 0.13, 82, b, 1.
*

'

'

De

Inter^r.

c. 6, c. 7,
i.

17, b,

16

72, a, 11 aTr6<pav(Tis Se avTi(pd(r(cs dirorepovovv fjidpiov. avricpacTis Se avTid(Tis

;

Anal. Post.

2,

ris

ovK

^ari

fiera^h

Kad^

avr^v.

Log Id
universal negatives) in the

231

way

of contrary opposition,
case.^

which does not exclude a third possible

But

in truth

we must not expect

a perfectly clear

exposition of these relations

from Aristotle.

As he
dis-

was not yet able

to distinguish the Copula expressly

from the Predicate,^ he was naturally unable to

cover the true status of the Negative.
states that negation concerns the

He nowhere
it

Copula alone, that

which by the
stotle

result.

But Arias

true those assertions which assert actuality and since this, in the
;

only

regards

given case, is itself undetermined, no definite proposition can, with When truth, be then affirmed. it is equally possible that something will happen, and that it will not happen, the assertion that it will happen is neither true nor false it only becomes one or other, according as a corresponding or a contradictory
;

according to later terminology, are opposed as subcontraries, are, in A7mI Pr. ii. 8, 59, b, 10, reckoned among the ivavricas avriKcl/jievai. Aristotle, however, re(c. 15 init.) that this is only according to the words, not as to the thing itself.' 2 Vid. supr. p. 229, n. 2. In De Interpr. c. 10, 19, b, 19, a case is certainly before his mind, otolv
'

marks

Cf. Simpl. state of fact arises. Categ. 103, /3 Bas. according to the teaching of the Peripatetic
:

school only the disjunctive proposition is true, * A will either be or not be but which part of this disjunction will be true, and
' ;

rh effri rplrov TrpocrKarrjyoprjrai, as in the proposition ean S'lKaios &v6pci}Tros. This, however, does not relate to the separation of the copula from the predicate, but only to the fact that, in existential propositions (Ttiv &vdp(i}iros, OVK iCTLV S., &c,, the
:

subject

which

false,

&\r)irTOP

lvai

rfj

means which

can be expanded by an added adjective, itself may be put either

of
:

(pvaei Koi da-rarov.

Hence
,

all

that
ovk

class of assertions

fjS-n

fj-ev

Toia ^ roia. It is from the Megareans that Aristotle took the Aporia subject-matter of the which he discusses in the passage cited: cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.

'

pt.

i.

p. 220, 1.

De

Interpr.

c. 7,

17, b,

20:

cf.

what has been said

at pp.

The 224-5, about the ivavTioTrjs. particular aflarmative and particular negative propositions which,

affirmatively (Si/catos &.), or negatively (^ov SiKaios &.) ecrrt Sik. ft. means 'there is a just man,' which is different from &v9po}iros SiKaios i(TTi, 'man is just.' Aristotle nowhere says that every proposition, or even that the existential proposition logically considered, consists of three parts and the treatise n, eptirjveias even shows a preference for selecting examples from those existential propositions which fall into two parts only.
;

232

ARtSTOTL^

has to do only with the connection of the subject to

the predicate, and does not in fact deny the subject or
the predicate
itself.^

The omission caused him

is

to

treat propositions with a negative subject or predicate

as a special class,for

whereas there
to

in fact

no ground
of

doing

so.^

Aristotle

proceeds

consider

the

Quantity

Judgments, distinguishing between those which relate

many objects at once and those which relate to one, and then subdividing the former into universals and
to

particulars.

He

has therefore a general division into

particular,
^

judgments universal,
'

and
_Pqj.

individual.''

But

In Anal. Pr. i. 46 init. c. 3, 25, b, 19, he shows that there is a distinction between ^^ eli/ot To51

which consists the form of the judgment the

^hiit in

inasmuch as propositions of the last kind have the form of ailirmative proposi)U7/

and dvai and cJuai

/xr)

tovto,

fjL^

eJuai

KevKhu

definite conjunction of the subject with the predicate remains

\fvKhu,

tions but he does not detect the real reason of this either here or in De Interpr. c. 12 (to which
;

the same, whether the subject and predicate be positive or negative concepts. And Aristotle liimself admits (Anal. Pr. i. 3,
25, b,
19,
cf.
c.

13, 32, a,

31),

Beandis,
2

p. 165, refers).

that expressions such as: eVSeX^TaL /j.r]dul vTzdpx^t.v, ea-riv ovk

ayadhv, have a o-p^rjyua KaracpaTiKou. * Still, this is only the case in De Interpr. c. 7. Universal

b,

Interpr. c. 3, 16, a, 30, 12, he says: ovK-&v9pwiros is

ovo/xa,

De

and ovx-vyiaivei no but he wants to call the former ouo/j.a adpiarov, and the
pv/ia;

no

latter ^7j/xa aSpicrrou

10,

and

in

c.

along with the propositions eariv &udpwTros, ovk e. &., &c., he introduces also the corresponding ones concepts
OVK
ovK-&u9p.,
&vdp.,

judgments, which are also called eVI rwv KadoKov airocpaivopTai KadoAov, and particulars, which are also called eV yuepet or Kara /mepos {Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 17,
c.

2,

25,

a,

4,

10, 20, Sec), are

made up
:

of negative
ovK-&vdpcoiros,
ov-^'iKaios

also designated as those

eVl

which

Io-tij/

ruv KaB6\ov

fiev

fffTiu

OVK-&.,

icTTiv

aTTOcpaiuovTai, i.e.

Ka66\ov 5e in both the subfii]

OVK

effriv

ov-SIk.

ovk-

ject is a KadoKov, t
ir^cpvKe

eir\

TrXfiSvcav

Theophrastus called &c. these propositions e/c fxeraB4crws (Ammon. De Interpr. 128, b, 129, a., and Philop. Scliol. in Ar. 121, a), or Kara ixerddeaiv (ALEX.
:

KarTjyopelo'dai,
is

but in the

Analyt. 134,

a.).

affirmed of whole extension, in the other not so. The Analytics, on the other hand, does not mention individual

one the predicate

subject
in

the

its

LOGIC
he
adds what he
is

233
'indefinite

calls

the

judgments,'
a

and thus
distinction

led to bring in,

really has

here

as elsewhere,

which

nothing to do with the

logical form of thought-connection at all, but solely with the grammatical form of the expression.^

Aristotle also devotes

much

attention to the Modality

this

of Judgments,
subject
in

on account of the importance of

with the Syllogism.

connection

He

dis-

tinguishes between judgments which assert actuality,

necessity,

and

possibility,^
is

but this division does not

coincide with that which

now

in use
for

Apodeictic,
/classification
/

and Problematic

of Assertory,
in
his

Aristotle

does not regard subjective

degrees
things.

of

certainty,
'

but the objective nature of

By

possible

'

only what

he does not mean what may perhaps exist, but may exist but does not exist necessarily, and

therefore rriay or

may

not
;

exist

indifferently.^

The

judgments (see following note) and although it is true that they are without meaning for the main object of that treatise, which is the doctrine of the
syllogism, yet we should expect that, if Aristotle at the time he wrote it had already had his attention called to this form of judgment, he would have expressly stated why he passed it
over.

examples which are there given Tuv ivaurioop eJvai r^u avr))V iiri<rT-i]fji.T\v ,

belong, logically considered, to

the class of universal propositions others which might be adduced, such as ((TTLV &v6p(airos biKaios, are particular. Aristotle himself makes no further use in the Analytics of the irpOTaa-eis abiSpiaroi. Theophrastus designated under this name the particular negative (Alex, Analyt. 21, b), or perhaps
as

r^v

r]5oui]v

fx)]

eluai

aya66v,

We may infer, if

the com-

position n. kpfx-nveias be really his, that the peculiar notes of indivi-

dual judgments must have struck himafter he had written Analytics. ^ In the De Interpr. he adds nothing as to indefinite judgments. In Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 16 (cf 0. 2, 25, a, 4, c. 4, 26, b, 3, etc.) he says 'jrp6Ta(ns ^ Kad6\ov ^ eV /xepei fj adi6pi(Tros but the
.

Ammon. Be InterjJT. 73, a, states, particular propositions in

i. 2 init. iracra rod virdpx^LV ^ rod avdyKTjs U7rap%etj/ ^ rov ivdex^-

general.
2

Anal. Pr.
'/)

TrpSraa-is 4crTiv
e'l

trOai virdpx^iv.
3

Anal. Pr.
8'

\eyw

i. 13, 32, a, 18 iuSex^ffdai Kal rh ivdex^fJ-f-

234
corollaries

ARISTOTLE

which he deduced from his definitions were partly confuted by critics as old as Theophrastus and Eudemus.^ To what is called the Eelation of Judg'

vov, ov
S'

fxi]

virdpx^i'V-,
;

^Uvarov

uuTOS avayKULOv, reOevTOS ovSev earai bia tout' effrai &pa ro eV1. 28
:

which may equally happen or not happen (Anal. Pr. i. 13, 32, Hence he maintains b, 4 sqq.).
in Anal. Pr.
1.

ovk ayajKoiov Ka \rh fxi) Mefajfh. avayKoiov ivBex^H-^vou. eari Se dwarhu ix. 3, 1047, a, 24
Sexd^ei/oj/
:

13, 32, a, 29 (cf.

Be

Ccelo,

from the

12, 282, a, 4), that ^vSex^crOai virdpx^^v the

i.

TOVTO, $ iav virdp^r) 7] eVepyeia, ou AeysTUL 6xel^' rr]v Swafiiv, ovOcv Likewise C. 4, eo-Tai dSvvarou. 1047, b, 9, c. 8, 1050, b, 8 TrRaa
:

eVSexeo'^at l^h virdpx^i-v also invari-

hvvajXLS a/xa ttjs

.

avTicpdcrecos icrriv

kjl).

elj/at

rh dpa Svvarov 4hai iuSex^rai rh avrh dpa Koi /urj eJpai

hvpaTov Koi clvaL Koi

1)

fxrj

e'ivai

ix.

yap Kara to dvvaadai \eyeTai, ravrdv iari Swarhv rdvavria i.e. what can be healthy
i?lit.
:

'dcra

can also be ill, what can rest can also move, he who can build can
also destroy. Aristotle
'

ably follows, and from the iravrl eVSexeo-0at the ivdex^ffdai /xv^evl and fx)] iravrl (i.e. the possibility in question of the predicate occurring to none, or not to all, for Prantl, Gesch. d. Lof/. i. 267, explains the words wrongly) for since the possible is nothing necessary, the contrary of all that is (merely) possible may happen. And for the same reason
;

'

possibility,'

contrary is preceding note, and Be Interjjr. BoKe7 5e rh avrh c. 12, 21, b, 12 irav dvvaa-daL Kal ehai Ka\ fii] eluai yap rh Svuarhv refiveaOai v) )8a5/(,6ij/
:
'

a says that in the possibility of the also contained (see

Aristotle refuses {ihid. c. 17, 36, b, 35) to allow, in possible propositions, the simple conversion of the universal negative judgFor, since the negative ment. judgment, it is possible that no B is A,' according to him, init is cludes the affirmative, possible that every B is A,' so the
' *

Kal

ix)]

^adi(eiv Kal
&c.),

/xt]

riuveaQai.

determining the concept by taking that meaning of ^vva/xis according to which it designates a power of doing or
dvvarov,

simple conversion of the former would include the simple conversion of a universal affirmative

suffering {3retaph. ix. 1, 1046, a, and it 12 init.) V. sqq., i) matters not that this possibility
;
^

of the

contrary is not always equally great, and that the ^vSexoixevov or Svvarhp (for these two expressions are really synonymous) at one time designates
rule,

judgment; and universal affirmative judgments cannot be converted simply. Theophrastus and Eudemus denied these assertions, because they understood by 'possible,' everything that can happen, and lost hold of the state-

ment that it must also at the same time be able not to happen and thus they included some
things necessary in the possible (ALEX. Anal. Pr. 51, b, m, 64, b,
72,
a,

something which happens as a though not without excepanother something at tions,

b,

m,

73,

a).

Aristotle

LOGIC
'

235

ments Aristotle pays as little attention as to the Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms. Only in what he
himself admits {Anal. Pr. i. 3, 25, a, 37; Be Interpr. c. 13, 22, b, 29 cf MetapJi. vs.. 2 init. c. 5, 1048, a, 4, c. 8, 1050, b, 30 sqq.) with regard to the forces of nature (Swti/tety) which only act in one direction, that the necessary also may he called a possible (Sworbj/), and that, allowing this, universal negative possible-propositions can be converted simply, and that we may conclude from necessity to possibility but he also adds that this is not true as to his own concept of the possible. Two further points of
;
.

there was a perfect possiblesyllogism (Alex. loc. cit. 66, b). Both sides are right, according to their concepts of the possible. If we understand by * possible ' everything that can be, including also the necessary, the syllogisms are quite correct and simple ' Every B is A, every C can be B, therefore every C can be A ' No B is A, every C can be B, therefore it is possible that no C is A.' If, on the other hand, we take possible to mean only that of which the contrary is likewise
'

'

'

possible,

we cannot make such

'

which Alexander wrote a work (Alex. Anal. 40, b, 83, a), arose between Aristotle and his pupils upon the question
dispute,

on

about the mood of conclusions in syllogisms, the premisses of which are in different moods. Aristotle says that where one premiss is a possible- and the other an actual -proposition, a perfect syllogism can only be had in the case where the major proposition is a possible-proposition if, however, it is the minor, we get, first of all, an imperfect syllogism, i.e. one in which the conclusion is only obtained by a deductio ad ahsiirdum and not immediately from the given premisses, and secondly, in the case of a negative syllogism (more correctly in all cases), the possibility in the conclusion must be taken in the improper sense (i.e.
:

syllogisms, because in this supposition the minor, every C can be B,' includes the negative proposition, 'every C can be not-B.' And also, as Theophrastus and Eudemus merely adhered to the principle that the modality of the conclusion is conformed to the weaker premiss (ALEX.z&i*^.), they asserted, on the same principle,
is

that

when one premiss

and
the other conclusion is
Schol.

assertorial apodeictic, the

apodeictic (Alex. ihid. 40, a, 42,

b,

and from him Philop.

not as confined to that which both can and cannot be) (^Anal. Pr. i. 15). Theophrastus and Eudemus, on the contrary, were of opinion that even in this case

in Arist. 158, b, 18, 159, a, 6), whilst, according to Aristotle (Atial. Pr. i. 9 sqq.) it is apodeictic when the major is so. In this case also, according to the meaning which we attach to the modality of propositions, both assertions may be made. If the propositions 'B must be A,' 'B cannot be A,' are supposed to express that between B and A there is (or is not) not a contingent, but a necessary connection, it follows that between every-

L>36

AntSTOTLB
^

says of contradictory opposition

do we find the kernel of

On the the late doctrine of disjunctive judgments. other hand, he is copious in his treatment of the Conversion of Propositions,^ laying
rules,^

down the well-known

but he

treats it solely in connection with his

theory of the Syllogism.

This theory

of the Syllogism was expounded by

Aristotle at full length,

and

it

may

truly be called his

most original
duce the

discovery.''

As he was

the

first

to intro-

name

of the Syllogism

into

the scientific

vocabulary,^ so he was also the

first to

connections and

all

advances in

remark that all our thought depend

upon the
'

syllogistic
'

combination of judgments.

Syllogism

is

a chain of thoughts, in which, from certain

matters assumed, and by virtue of these alone, there issues

of necessity

some further matter

different

from

them.'''

thing contained in B and A, by the same necessity, tliere is, or

is

think connected or not connected with B.

*

not, a connection (if all living

Vld.

S7ij}r.

p. 230.
i.

beings, by reason of a necessity of nature, are mortal, the same every kind of is also true of living beings, e.g. of men), as Aristotle, loo. cit. 30, a, 21 sqq. shows quite clearly. If, on the other hand, these propositions are meant to state that we are obliged to think A connected or not connected with B, the proposition, C must (or cannot) be A can only be deduced from proposition 'B must (or the cannot) be A,' when we are obliged to consider C implied in B. If, however, we only know as a fact (assertorially) that C is B, then we only know as a fact, likewise, that C is or is not that which we are obliged to
'

Anal. Pr. 32, a, 29 sqq.

-'

2,

3, cf. c. 13,

c.

17,

36,

b,

15

sqq.
'

ii. 1,

53, a, 3 sqq.

Simple conversion of uni-

versal negative and particular affirmative judgments, particular conversion (later so-called conversio ])er accidens) of universal affirmative, and no conversion at all of particular negative judgfor the conversio per ments contrapositionem was not as yet

known
*

to him.

As he himself says. Soph. El.

d.

c.

34, 183, b, 34, 184, b, 1. 5 Cf. Gesch. Peantl,

i.

Log.

264.

Anal. Pr. 1. 24. b, ^18^ avWoyicrixhs Se ecrri x6yos iv ^ reOevTcav rivwv erepdu ri rwv K6t-

LOGIC
The

2.r/

principle that this process in its simplest form in-

more than two assumptions, or more accurately two judgments, from which a third is derived, and that therefore no syllogistic conclusion can have more than two premisses, is nowhere expressly proved by Aristotle
volves no
in the beginning of his treatise, though he refers to
later.i
it,

Now

the deduction of a third judgment from two

given judgments can only arise out of some bringing

into connection of the concepts,

which in these given

This
is

judgments were
ble,

as yet unconnected.^

impossi-

except a mediation be effected between them by another concept connected with both of them.^ Every
syllogism
cepts,
is

must

therefore necessarily contain three con-

no more and no less,'* and of these the intermediate

first

connected in the one premiss with the

and in

the other with the third, in such a

the connection between the
iihwv ravra
a, 1.)

way

as to bring out

first
^

and third in the con-

e|

audyKTjs

avfifiaivei

r^
i.

principle

which

Aristotle

elvai.

(Likewise
'

Tojj.
1,

1,

100, a, 25, cf. Soj?h. El. c.

5ia

165,
'

does not state in this form, but which follows immediately from
his definition of Judgment, if we apply it to the case before us.

Ae'7cy Se r^ ravTa eli/ai rh ravra (rvfifiaiveiu, rh Se * 5ia ravra (Tvfxfiaiv^iv rh fiTjdeuhs e^coOev
'

opov irpocrSelv trphs rh yeueadai rh auayKa7ov.

1

Ajial.

Pr.

i.

25, 42, a, 32.

irpo-

Cf Anal. Pr. i. 23, b, 30 but especially 41, a, 2. Anal. Pr. i. G.25,init. Ibid. 42,b,l sqq. on the number of con^
.

sqq.,
*

As regards terminology, the premisses are generally called

rda-eis

{Metaph.
rod

v. 2,

1013, b, 20:

virodeaeis

avixTc^pafffxaros')',
JSf.

the
vi.

minor proposition in Eth.

12, 1143, b, 3, vii, 5, 1147, b, ^ Irepo (or TeAeura/o) irpdracris

9=

the conclusion invariably = o-y/tirfpaa-ixa. In Anal. Pr. ii. 1, 53, a, 17 sqq., however, avfnrpa(Tfjt.a stands for the subject of the conelusion.

cepts in whole series of syllogisms, Of the three concepts of a syllogism {opoi, vid. siqyr. p. 219, n.l), that which occurs in both premisses is called (ji4(ros ; that which comprehends the latter is called thehigherorgreaterduei^oj/orTrpoJto/ ^/cpoj/) that which is comprehended by it, the lower or lesser (e\arrou &Kpou oi effxarov), Anal. Pr. i. 4,25,b, 35, 32, 26, a, 21,c.38
;

init.,

and Anal. Pr.

ii.

23, 68, b.

238
elusion.
all

ARISTOTLE
But
this result

may come

in three ways.

As

judgments

consist in the connecting of a subject

(for Aristotle leaves hypothetical

with a predicate
disjunctive

judgments out of his

and and as reckoning),

the connecting of two judgments into a conclusion, or, in other words, the deduction of the conclusion from the
premisses, rests

upon the

relation of the intermediate

concept or middle term to the other two, it follows that the mode of the connecting ('the form of the syllogism') will be determined by the way in which the

middle term

is

related to the others.

:

Now

there are
either

only three ways possible

the middle term

may

be related as subject to the higher

and as predicate to

the lower concept, or as predicate to both, or as subject Aristotle does not take any direct notice of to both.2
a fourth possible case, in which
it is
;

the subject of the

lower and predicate of the higher

greatly blame him, for
;

but we need not

this fourth

arrangement can
Zogik, 103, p. 276

33 sq. or the major concept is called briefly 6.Kpov, and the minor
Tpirov.

Ueberweg's

Anal. Pt. i. 23, 41, a, 13, at the end of the section on the
1

syllogistic figures, Aristotle, after

having treated of the necessity and significance of the Middle concept as a connecting-link between Major and Minor, continues
irphs

ovv avdyKiq fxevri Xafielv 5' ivSex^rai Koi rh T tov B (^ yap rh A tov T
:

&iJ.(pcti

KOLvhv, tovto

2 The position of the propositions has, as we know, no influence on the form of the syllogism. The precedence of the major, customary since then, seemed more natural to Aristotle than to us. In laying down a syllogism, he begins not, as we are accustomed to do, with the subject, but with the predicate of the major: A

Karr]yope(TavTas,
(poiv,

&ix(pa}

rh F nar'' ajxKara rod T), ravra S'

fj

T^ r

eVrl

TO. etprj/ieVa

(XX'^l^^^'ra,

<pavphv

gri TrduTU (rvWoyKrfihv avdyKT} yiv(r9ai 5ta rovrwv rivhs t&p axV' Cf. 0. 82, 47, a, 40 sqq., fxdrccv.

vwdpx^i Travrl r^ B, B virdpx^t iravrX so that, even in his form of expression, there is a constant descent from the greater to the middle concept, and from that
:

to the lesser. he. cit. p. 276.

Cf.

Uebbbweg,

and the searching discussion in

LOGIC

239

never occur in a single and rigorous chain of reasoning.

We

obtain,

then,

three

Figures

(o-'xrjixaTa)

which together sum up the categorical syllogism.

so-called fourth figure of later logic
^

The

is

ignored, and

neither the hypothetical nor the disjunctive syllogisms

are treated of as special forms in any way.^
If

we ask what syllogisms

are possible in these three

figures, it is to

be observed that every syllogism must

contain a universal, and must also contain an affirmative

proposition
^
;

that the conclusion can only be universal

are so;;^

when both the premisses

and that

in every

syllogism at least one of the premisses must resemble

The proof of this cannot be well given here. Cf. Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr. and consult iii. a, 738, 2ncl ed. especially Pea.ntl, Gfiscli. d. Log.
'
^

i.

570
3

sq.

coincide, for an unproved supposition may be expressed in a categorical proposition, and conversely a hypothetical proposition may be fully demonstrable. The same statement, can, in fact,

Whether

this

is

a failing
d.

or, as

Prantl

{Geseh.

Leg.

i.

without changing its meaning, be expressed both categorically

295) thinks, an advantage of Aristotelian logic, it is not necessary here to inquire but when that learned writer, as well as Biese (Phil.d.Arist. i. 155), endeavours to find that Aristotelian account of hypothetical syllogisms, which others miss, in the remarks on supposition-syllogisms (avWoyiffixol e'l vTToOccrews) at Anal. Pr. i. 23, 40, b, 25, 41, a, 21 sqq. c. 29,
;

and hypothetically. Our modern distinction of categorical and

hypothetical propositions regards exclusively the form of the judgment, not the scientific certainty of the proposition. * Anal. Pr. i. 24 init. en re
:

iv

airavTi

[sc.

(rvWoyia-fiq}']
'dpccr eJvai

Set

KarrjyopiKSv riva tu>u

is

koI

45, b, 22, c. 44, he confounds two different things. Aristotle means by a * hypothetical syllogism

that which begins with an unproved supposition (cf. Waitz, on Anal. 40, b, 25). We understand by it that of which the major is a hypothetical judg-

ment. And the two classes do not by any means necessarily

rh Ka66kov virapx^^v. The former not further proved, as Aristotle supposes it to be clear from his preceding explanation of the syllogistic tigures. By way of proving the second, he proceeds &pv yap rod Kad6\ov ^ ovk earai (rvWoyia-fihs, ^ oh -rrpos rb Keiimevov, fl rh e| apxvs alriiacrai which will be exiDlained in detail in what follows infra. ' Los. Git. 41. b, 23.

240

ARISTOTLE
its

the conclusion, both as to

modality.'
rules

quality

and

also as to its

Yet Aristotle has nowhere deduced these

method.

on general principles from the nature of the

syllogistic

They

are merely generalisations

from his observation of the various forms of syllogism

themselves.

This analysis, however, he carries out with

very great care.

He

is

not satisfied with proving the

figures,^

well-known moods

for the three

but he also

investigates minutely the influence which the modality

of the premisses in pure and in mixed syllogisms

exercise

must upon the conclusion and upon the whole

syllogistic process.^
first

He

regards the syllogisms of the

hgure alone as

perfect,' because,

according to his

view, they alone immediately reveal the necessity of the

syllogistic sequence.

Both the others yield

'

imperfect

syllogisms,
first.

and require to be completed through the Their demonstrative value rests upon and is
either apagogically or

proved by the fact that they can be reduced to the

first figure,

by conversion.'* These
reductio

syllogistic forms are of course

employed in the
hypothetical
'

ad

impossibilG^ as well

as

in

'

arguments

generally.'^
1

Loc.

cit.

1.

27.

7, 29, a, 30, b, 1 sqq., c. 23^, of.

c.

For the

tirst

figure (to use

1,

the Scholastic designations) the Taoods: Harbara, Darii, Celare/U, Ferio (Anal. Pr. i. 4); for the second: Cesare, Camestres, Fesfor the tino, Baroco (ibid. c. 5) third Darapti, Felapton, Disaviis, Datisi, Bocardo, Fresison
;
:

reXeiou fihv odu ko\w avWoyiafihu rhv iJ,r]Sevhs &\Xov

24, b, 22
:

irpoaSed/xevov
Trpbs

irapa

ra

^l\riix4va

rb ^ai'^i/at t8 ai/07/cotoj', areA^ Se rhv irpoffSe6fxevou ^ ivhs ^ ttXhSvoov, & ^(Tti fi^j/ ai'ayKa7a Sta tSjv viroKei/xevwu opwv oh ^^v
t\'t]irrai

Sia irpordarewv.

It is

not

(c. 6).

necessary here to
;
.

defend Arisqq.
;

Anal. Pr. i. c. 8-23 cf the discussion in n. 1 to p. 234, s?{^rfl^. < See the sections cited, espe=*

stotle's view,
* Ibid. c. 23, 41, a, 21 cf supra, p. 238, n. 1.
.

ciallyc. 4:Jin.,c. 6fi7i.,c. 6Jin.,c.

LOGIC
With

24]

equal fulness does Aristotle set forth rules for the proper treatment of these forms in scientific

first

and the errors to be avoided. He shows in the instance what kind of propositions are more difficult to prove but more easy to confute, and vice
use,

versa}

Next he provides

rules for the discovery of the

fitting premisses,

having regard to the quality and

^

quantity of the conclusion to be proved,^ and in doing

so he takes occasion to censure

in passing the Platonic

method of

head he treats minutely of the rules and methods which must be observed in
division."*

On

this

order to reduce the materials of proof so discovered to

the exact syllogistic form.^

Furthermore he discusses
the syllogisms giving true
;

the capacity of syllogisms in relation to the compre-

hension of their contents

conclusions from false premisses

'

the circulus in argu-

27-29, here also (c. 29) with express application to apagogic and supposition2

lUd. lUd.

c. 26.
c.

the Platonic method is blamed because (contrary to the rule given at p. 216, n. 1) it multiplies unnecessarily the intermediate
introduces the same thing under different genera, gives negative qualities, divides from all kinds of opposite points of view, &c. Cf. Meyer, Arist. Thierliunde, 71 sqq. * See Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i.
divisions,

syllogisms.

To seek to define concepts by means of continuous divisions,

^

he says

we have then

81), is of no use to suppose the chief point that is to be proved.

(c.

it is a question of the concept of man as a ^^ou Qv^rhv, then, he says, from the propositions All living beings are either mortal or immortal man is a living being,' it would only follow that man is either mortal or immortal that he is a ^^ov 6vT\rhv is a mere postulate. Hence
' ;
:

When

623 sqq.
* ^
''

Log.

cit. c.

32-46.
ii. 1.

Anal. Pr.

Ibid. c. 2 init. (cf. Top. viii. 11 sq., 162, a, 9, b, 18) 4^ aK-nduv fihv ovv ovK ItTTt \pev5os cuWoyicr:

Aristotle says of division, that it is oTov aadey^s [not valid] <rv\\oyi(Tfi6s. Similarly in Anal. Po8t.ii.5. Alsoin Part. An. i. 2 sq.,

4k \pevSwv S' 7rA?V ov Si6ti dAA' Uti OVK effTLu K \pv$a>v

acrdai,

ecrrti/
'

aArj^es,

rod yap Sioti

avWoyiarfjLds

(because false premisses give the ground itself, the 5i6ti, falsely
cf.svjjra,-p.nS,n.2).

Under what

VOL.

I.

242

ARISTOTLE
;
'

endo

the

'

conversion
;

'

of the syllogism

the Redudio

ad

absurdum

syllogisms

which

result

from

the

conversion of premisses into their opposites/ together with the various syllogistic fallacies and the means of

meeting them.^ Lastly he inquires into those kinds of proof which do not arise by demonstration, in the strict
sense of the word,^ and establishes the

method of arguat
this
;

ment

peculiar
is

to

each."^

We

cannot

point

possible in the conditions this different figures, is discussed in c.

2-4.
*

To

kvkK(x)

koX

e|

dW^Awv

Induction, c. 23 example, c. 24 (cf. Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 9 lihet. i. 2, 1356, b, 2, 1357, b, 25, ii. 20); d7ra7W7^ (reduction
of one problem to another more easy to solve), c. 25 objection
;

This consists in the SfLKwadai. conclusion of a syllogism (which, liowever, must of course be shown to be true from other sources) being used in conjunction wath the converse of oiie premiss to prove the other. For the cases

the syllogism 26 from the probable (ehhs) or cer(evaracris), c.

;

tain
c.

marks
calls
is
'

((TTj/xem),

stotle
27.

the

'

which AriEnthymeme,'

where

this is possible, see loe. cit. Against 'the vicious 5-7. c. in argument, see Anal. circle
'

these

The most important of Induction,' which we

shall discuss later on. It consists in the major proposition being-

Post.
2

i.

3, 72, b, 25.

The destruction of one premiss by the other in conjunction

wdth the contradictory or contrary
of the conclusion
'^

loc.cit. c.

8-10.

6 5ia Tov

The Beductio ad ahsnrdum, aSwdrov crvKKoyicTfJios, c.

proved by the minor and the conclusion. PJ.g., we may prove apodictically All animals which have little gall are long-lived man, the horse &c. have little gall, and are therefore long-lived but the inductive proof will go thus
'
;

'

ll-14,cf.ro/;.viii. 2,157, b, 34, c. 12, l(5'^,h,b,2ind Anal. Post. i. 26, where it is remarked that direct proof is of greater scientific value.
*

lived

Man, the horse &c., are longman &c. have little gall therefore animals which have
'
;

little gall

are long-lived.'

This,

Loc.

cit. c.

XV.

The

^^etitio 2)'>'incipii (t^ er

apxri alrelaOaL), c. 16, cf. 2'ojJ. \ni. 13; the /j-V trapa tovto (rvfi^alveiv

t6

^evSos,
c.

c.

17

the

irpuTov

\pev5os,

18, cf.

Toj).

viii,

10

rules
tion
;

for

disputation
;

from this, c. 19, sq. by too hasty suppositions, c. 21 on proving certain suppositions by the transposition of the
propositions in a syllogism,
c. 22.

deduced on decep-

'

however, only applies when the minor concept (' animals which have little gall ') has an equal extension with the middle concept (' man &c.'), and when the minor proposition (' man &c. have little gall ') can be simply transposed so that in its place 'the animals which have little gall are man &c.' can be put (loc. cit. c. 23). ' See for a fuller discussion of these points, Prantl, p. 299-

LOGIC
follow

243

him

into

these
to

researches,

although

we un-

doubtedly owe
syllogistic

much

them

in the application of the

method, and though they prove most clearly

with which the great logician worked out
detail.

the
its

care

many-sided

The

syllogistic

system forms the foundation upon

Scientific

which Aristotle built the theory of which he

)

Proof,

set out in the

second Aymkjtics.
is

All proof
It is

is syllogistic,

but not every syllogism

proof

only the Scientific Syllogism which deserves this name.^

Science consists in the cognition of causes, and the
cause of a phenomenon
arises.^
is

that from which

it

of necessity

and apprehension by means of proof are only possible when something is explained from its original causes.^ Nothing can be the subject of proof except that which is necessary. Proof is a
Proof, therefore,

conclusion from necessary premisses.'^

That which

is

ordinarily (though not without exception) true can be

321. In the selection and sequence of the different sections no strict order is observed, although related subjects are put together. On the division of the Prior Analytics as a whole, see BeANDIS, p. 204 sq., 219 sq. Anal. Post. i. 2, 71, b, 18

alria iarl, koI

p.)]

eVSe'xeo'^ot tovt''

&A\as ex^"'- Further references in support of this, sujjra,ip. 163, n. 3. ^ Ibid. et roivw 71, b, 19
:

iffrl

rh

iiri(TTa(rdai

otov

edefiev,
iiri-

avdyKr]
(rriiix-QV
/col

koI

t^v airoSeiKTiK^v

e| aXriduv t' ehai KalirpcaTOiv a/xeacou [about this below] koI

airddei^iv

Se

Aeyco

firKXTTifioviKov.

And

(rvWoyKr/xhu after giving

yvcopi/JLcorepccv
(TVfj.-Kepa.(TfJLaTos'

koI

Trporepcav

ovtoo

rov yap ecovrai

.

the requisites for such an argument, he adds: o-vWoyKTixhs fieu

kuI at apxal oIkuui. rov deiKw/nepov. Ibid, line 29 :alfTta re. .delehai
[sc.

yap
8'

(ffrai koL

&vcv tovtoov, aTrdSei^is

ov yap
c.
TroirfO'ei

ovK lo-rat
2

iiri-

deduced]

that from which a proof is (in t6t iiria-TdfieOa

.
.

a'T'fjfirjv.

'6rav ttjv alriav etScDjuey.

cit.

Log.

2 init.

eTriVro. .

adai Se
5t'

olS/xcd'

'irav ri\v t'

%KaaTOV airXoos . alriav olwfuda yvdoCKeiv

ecrriv,

* Ibid. 5' 4 init. c. iirel aSvuaTOv d\\(i)s exetv ov iarlv

:

iirKrrTJfxr]

airKcos,

avayKa'iov

h.v

e^r;

%v rh irpayfid

on

iKeiuov

rh

iiriTrrjThi/

rh Kara rvjv

a-rroSeiK-

244

ARISTOTLE

included under matters of proof only in a limited sense.^ On the other hand, the contingent cannot be proved

cannot even be
sary truth
is

known

scientifically. ^

And

since neces-

that only which proceeds from the essence

subject, while everything else is

and the idea of the

contingent, so
it

may

be said that

all

proof relates to

and
is

is

istics

founded exclusively upon the essential characterof things, and that the concept of each thing
its

at

once

starting-point and goal.^

The purer and

which any more perfect the the concej^tual form of Proof secures to us concerning nature and the causes of an object, the higher is the kind of knowledge which it warrants and so, other
information,
therefore,
;

things being equal, a universal proof ranks above a particular, a positive proof above a negative, a direct

above an apagogic, one which enables us to know the cause above that w^hich merely instructs us in the fact/
TTpdyfiacriv
.

(pavephu

on

%v exo^ej/ to? ex^tv airdhei^iv e$ avajKaiccv &pa (rv\\oyi<Tfx6s iariv

i(Tr\v
7}

roiovTcav rivuv Uv eCt) 6 onrodeLKriKhs airav yap rj ovrois au\Koyi<xfji.6s

Cf note 3 infra. Metaph. xi. 8, 1065, a, 4: rod ael fxhu yap traaa iiria-TViiJ.'n
airdSei^is.
1
.

ovTos
iariv.
Tccv

cos

iirl

rh

ttoAv,

rh

5e

(Tu/ijSejSTj/f^y

eu

ovSerepc}}
i.
:

tovtccu

Anal. Post.
Si'
4irl

a-vWoyirrixhs ^

30 ttSs yap avayKaiwv % 5ia

Trporacrewi'

^ Karcc (rv/j.$e^T]Khs, rh Se (ru/x^e^rjKSra ovk avayKala. Ibid. eVel 5' e| avdyK7}s at the end xjirapx^i- Tepl eKaarov yeuos oca KaO* avra virdpx^t ^at 77 cKaarov, <pavephv OTi irepl rwv Kad' avra virapx^VTWV
virapx^i:

al

4-iri(rrr}/j.oviKal

awodei^eis Kal

e/c

us

rh iroXv

rwv roiovruv
(rvix^e^f}K6Ta

elclu.

rh

/j-ev

yap
&(rr^

Koi

et fxev

al irporaffeis

avayKoiai,
el 5'

ovk
ovd'

avayKala,
ei

Koi rb

(rvfXTrepa(T/ji.a

avayKoiov,

OVK avdyKt] rh
SiOTt

ffvixiripafffxa

elhivai
eXu],
fx)^

roiovrou.

rh ttoXv, koI rh (Tv/xTrcpaafxa Cf. p 168, n. 1. 2 AimL Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18, cf c. 8, c. 33, &c. vid. c. 30 supra, p. 164, n. 2. 3 Ibid. c. 6 init. ei odv iffrlu airoSeiKTiKT] iinariiniri e| avay7} Kaioiv 6.p')(^uv (& "y^P etTiffrarai ov

ws

iirl

virdpx^iy

del

Kad'

avrh

Sh,

olov

oi

did crrj/xelav

(TvKKoyiaixoi.

rh ydp Kad^ avrh ov

ovdc SiSrt.

Ka& avrh

iirKXr'fjo'erai,

Svvarhv &\\W5 ^x^iv) t^ Se ko0' rols hvayKoia virdpxovTa avrh

rh Se SiSri eiriaraaOai ecrri rh Sth rov alrlov iirlffracrOai. Si" avrh &pa Set Kal rh jxecrov r^ rpircp koX rh Cf. irpchrov r(p fieacf uTrapxetv. p. 213, n. 5 supra. * Anal. Post. i. 14, c. 24-27.

LOGIC
If

245

we take demonstration

as a whole,
it

building up of a scientific system,

is

and consider the an axiom that

the knowledge of the universal must precede that of

the particular.^

The same

considerations lead

up from
deeply

another point of view to a principle which

rooted in Aristotle's whole
:

ie

way of thinking that nothing can be demonstrated except from its own peculiar
principles,

and that

it

is

inadmissible to borrow proofs

from without.
question,

Demonstration, he thinks, should start

characteristics
of

from the essential

the

object

in

and any properties which belong

it,

to another

genus can only accidentally attach to

they form no part of
its

seeing that

concept.^

All demonstration,
Its

consequently, hinges on the concept of the thing.

problem consists in determining, not only the properties

which attach to any object by virtue of the conception

of
it.

it,

but also the media by which they are attached to

Its function is to

deduce the particular from the

their causes.
'

universal,

phenomena from
'

Is this process of mediation

unending, or has

it

a necessary limit ?

Aristotle takes the latter alternative,

from three points of view.

Phys. vcrepa yap 7]
'

iii.

1,

irepl

200, b, 24 twv IBlwv Oeupia

:

5ei|ts, ej/Se'x era* to ovtci. wv 5e rh y4vos erepov, Siairep

tj/ctjs

clvai

apid/xr]-

rrjs irepl rcov

2

koivwv

iffriu.
:

ovk Anal. Post. i. 7 init. &pa ecrriv i^ ciWov yeuovs fierd^avra

Setlot, o'tou
TiKr?.

rh yetafxerpiKbv

apiQixt]-

koI yecofierpias, ovk ecrri apiOfnjriK^v awSSei^ip ((papfiSffai iwl ra toTs fieyeOecri (ru/uySejSTj/cJTa . &(rr^ ^ airhMs avdyKT} rh avrh ehai
. .

tV

Sel^eaiv,

Tpia yap icrri ra iv raTs ottoev fxkv rh airoBeiKuifievov

'
'

yevos ^
SrjXov
'

iry,

ei

fieWei

rj

airSSei^is

fierafiaiveiv.
e'/c

rh

rovro S' icrrl rh (Tvixirpa(rfjt.a virdpxou yevei rivl KaB'' avr6. %v 5e raa^id/xara' a^idl>iJ.araS^ io'rlv i^uv rpirov rh [sc. oi airodei^eis etVtV]. yeuos rh vTroKeifievov, ov ra irddr} Kul

aSvvaTOu, yap rod avrov yivovs

&\\(as
S' '6ri

avdyKt) ra &Kpa Kal ra fi^ffa ilvai. el yap fi-^ Kad' avra, av/x^e^T^KSra
ecrrai.

5ia
.
. .

rovro

5e7^ai

&\Xr)

iiricrr'fjfJ.T)

ovk ecrri rh erepas,

ra

Kad' avrh <rvix^fiT]K6ra StjAoT i^

S>v
iJ.v

r)

aW'

f)

'6ffa

ovrcos e;^et rrphs

&WTj\a
;

aTfdSei^is.

oZv

r}

air6-

&(Tr' elvai

Odrepou

virh

Odrepov

C.

246

ARISTOTLE

from the particular to the general from the subject, beyond which there is nothing of which it can be predicated to continually higher predirise

We

may

and we may, on the other hand, descend from from that predicate which is the most universal point the subject of no other predicate down to the parBut in any case we must arrive eventually ticular.
cates
:

at a point

where

this progression ceases, otherwise

we

could never reach an effectual demonstration or definiThe argument excludes also the third hypothesis, tion.^
that there

may

exist

an

infinite

number
is

of intermediate
definite preinfinite, it

terms between a
dicate.2

definite subject

and a

If the

list

of middle terms

not

follows that there are things of which there cannot be a demonstration or derived knowledge.^ For wherever the

middle terms cease, immediate knowledge must necesTo demonstrate sarily take the place of demonstration.
evGrytliinrj
is

not possible.

If

we attempt
to

it

we

are

either

brought round

again

that progression ad
all

infinitum
bility of

already mentioned, which annuls

possi-

knowledge and Proof, or which

is

else to

'

arguing in

circle,'

equally incapable of producing a

solid demonstration.'^
9 init.
Ser^at
:

There remains, therefore, but one

supposes a limit to the number of concepts above as well as below. ^ Ch. 22, 84, a, 30; and so ifeta2JJi. iii. 2,

(pavephu

'6ti.

ovK

eariv

eKaffrou airodAA' ^ e/c rwv

return e/cao-Tou apxc^J^, &c. to this later on. ^ For he says at 83, b, 6,84, ra &Treipa ovk eari 5te|eA0eTj/ a, 3 voovvTa. Cf note 4 infra. 2 I old. ch. 19-22. The details of this treatment, in parts not
:
.

We

997, a, 7

irepi

iravruv

very clear, cannot well be repeated here. We have already

^seen at p. 222, n, 2,

that Aristotle

yap aSvparovaTroSei^ivehai' avdyKti yap e/c rivcou elj/at Koi irepi n /col rivdv tV airJSetljj/. * After Aristotle {Anal. Post. 1. 2) has shown that the proof -power of syllogisms is conditional on the scientific knowledge of the premisses, he continues, in ch. 3
:

LOGIC
conclusion, that in the last resort demonstration
start

247

must

from propositions which, by reason of their immediate certainty, neither admit nor stand in need of
proof. 1
'

These 'principles' of
conclude from
this,

all

proofs must possess

it

Many

that

refute

by reference to
a circle
1).
'

his

no knowledge at

all is possible

others, that everything can be proved.' But he confutes both Of the former he assertions.

earlier exposition of * reasoning in

on the subject
(de

quo
'

V.

swpra, p. 242, n.

says
elvai

ol

/xev

yap

virodefievoi

fx.^

Anal. Post.^ c. 2, 71, b, audyK-q Koi r^v a-TvoSeiKriK^v

ffr'fuj.rjv
e'l

20

eiri-

SXcos

iiriaraaOai,

ovroi

(Is

aX-qQwv

t'

elvai

KoX

ws ovk Uv iTTiffrafxevovs ra vcTTepa 5ta ra TTpSrepa, wv /u.-^ effri it pur a, opdcos \eyovres, aSwarov yap ra 6.ireipa
&iripov a^iovffLV
avdyecrdai,

trpcvruu Kal afieauv Kal yvcopi/JLODrepcav Kal irporepwv Kal airioou rov
(Txmfiepdffiiaros.
dj/airoSei/cTcoj/,
fx))
.
.
.

e/c

irptarwv

8'

8ri ovk itnar-iiaerai

avatr6-

Si\6e7v. et re '{aravrai Ka\ elcrlu apxo-h ravras ayvdocrrovs eluai airo5ei|ec6s

ex<v air65ei^iv avrSiv [because

if

otherwise
SeiKTot

they were not

76

/xi]

ovcn]s

aiiruv,

oirep
el

(pafflv elvai

rh iiriaTaffOai ix6vov

know
Karb.

could, likewise, only them by proof]; rh yhp

we

8e
e'/c

yu.^

etTTi

ra irpwra

elBfuai, ovSe

ra

eiTiffraaBai

uu

airdSei^is

eari

fx^

rovrcav eluai iiriffraadai air\a>s ov5e Kvpicos, a\y e| viroOtcreoDS, t

that what is deduced would not be known if the principles (apxal) are not known, and that if mee/cetya

iariu.

He admits

ex^iv dTrJrjixeXs 5et|fi/ ear IV. C. 3, 72, b, 18 Se <pap.ev ovre iraaav eiriar^ix-qv
(rvfifie^-qKhs,
:

rh

airoSeiKriK^v elvai, afxeawv avairSdeiKrov.

fidvov
e-KKXr^ix-qv
eiriffr-t^fx-ns

aXXa r^v rwv

.

Kal

ov

aXXa
.

Kal

apxhv
^ rovs

'

diate knowledge, by way of proof, is the only knowledge, then there can be no knowledge of opx^> Yet he himself in the same treatise denies this very thing at p. cf. Metaph. iv. 4, 1006, 72, b, 18 tffri yap airaideva'ia rb fi^ a, 6
;
:

elvai rivd (pafiev,

Upovs yvwpiQifxev.
n. 6,

Cf supra,ip. 197,

and 210, n. 2, 179, n. 4, and On the other hand, 210, n. 2 fin.

yiyvdoffKeiv, rivcov
Sei^iv Ka\

Set

0jTe7v air6-

rivwv oh Sc?" '6\(as fiev yap airdvroov aSvvarov airdSei^iv ehai. els hreipov yap Uv fiaSiCot, uiffre /i7j5' ovrws elvai d7r(}5ei|t/. As to the second of the above propositions, Aristotle states it at p. 72, b, 16, in other words

the circumstance that a thing is always so is no reason for rejecting proof by causes, for even the eternal may have its causes on which it is conditional see Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, b, 17 sqq.
;

'Apx"^ "PX"^

airoSei^ews, dpx"^
a,

(TvXXoyi(rriKal, a. d/xeaoi, irpord<reis

dfieffoi,

Anal. Post. 72,

8'

7,^ 14,

C.

10

init. (A.e7cw

apxas ev
eari

eKda-rcp
[x^

yevei ravras, &s

;

on

ev-

trdvruiv

elvai
'

airS^ei^iv

ovhev
KVKXcf}

KwXveiv
yiveffOai

euSexecrdat

yap
11.

r^v

air68ei^iv

Koi

i^

oAA^Acoi/ and then at

of the

25 sqq.
to

same page he goes on

Sex^rai Se7^ai) ii. 19, 99, b, 21, cf. Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, p. 197, n. 4 b, 29 sqq.; Metaph. v. 1, 1013, a, 14, iii. 1, 2, 995, b, 28, 996, b, 27, iv. 3, and also cf, Ind,
;

248

ARISTOTLE

them.^

even a higher certainty than anything deduced from Consequently, the soul must contain a faculty
of im'mediate

any mediate cognition.

f

knowledge higher and more sure than And, in fact, Aristotle finds in
pure reason
it

the A^os

the

^just

such a faculty; and

itself,

he maintains that
case
it

never deceives

that in every

it
B,

either has its object or has

false or illusive way.^
it

it not^

but never has

in

Yet
ledge.

the possibility nor

must be admitted that he has neither proved tlie infallibility of any such knowThis immediate certainty, he says, is of two

There are three elements in every process of demonstration that which is proved, the principles
kinds.
:

from which
prove^.

it

is

proved,^ and the object of which

of these
is

it

is

The

first
it

is

not matter of immediate

knowledge,
that

for

deduced from the other two.

These, again, are themselves distinguished in this way,

the

axioms are

common

to

different

fields

of

knowledge, but the postulates relating to the special

Arist. Ill, b, 58 sqq. In Anal. Post. i. 2, 72, a, 14, Aristotle proposes to call the unproved premiss of a syllogism Qfffis, if it refers to a particular fact, a^'Kajxa if it expresses a universal presupposition of all proof.

also used in a wider sense, see Anal Post. i. 7, 75, a, 41, c. 10, 76, b, 14, and Metaj)h. iii. 2, 997,
a, 5, 12.

AlT7)ixa is

from

virddea-is

in

distinguished Anal. Post. i.

2,

10, 76, b,

23 sqq. Aoial. Post.

cf. p.

i.

72, a, 25

Again,

contains an affirmation as to the existence or non-existence of an object, it is a virSdeffis if otherwise, a dpicrfiSs. &eais is used in a broader meaning in Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 05, b, 13,
if

64(ns

sqq.
2

247, n.

1.

Vide

supra,

p.

197

sqq.,

where Aristotle's view of this 'immediate knowledge is explained.

'

and Anal. Post. i. 3, 73, a narrower one in Top. i. (For further 11, 104, b, 19, 35. references see Ind. Ar. 327, b, 18 sqq.) For a^iufia, which is
a.

66, a, 2, in 9
;

7 (as cited supra, p. 245, n. S),andibid. ch. 10, 76, b, 10 TTciffa yap airoBeiKriK^ iiri(rT-fifir] Trepl rpia iarlu, '6<ra re ehai riderai (ravToi S' ecrri rh yevos ov
i.
:

Anal. Post.

Tuv

Kad' avra. iraOrifidTwv eVrl dew-

prjTiK^),

Koi

Ttt

Aeyofieva

Koivb,

LOGIC

249

matter are peculiar to the particular science.* It is only upon postulates which are proper to a particular

department that he allows a binding demonstration to be founded. 2 But these postulates are just as litfcle
capable as the universal axioms of being deduced from

They must be supplied to us by our knowledge of that particular object to which they
a higher law.^
relate.''

They are

therefore matter of observation

of
effTi

experience.^
a^tci/xaTa e|

How
. . .

such an experience could come to

(following on the passage cited
rovro,
sujjra, p. 245, n. 3,) (pavephv koI
ecrovrai
:

wv

irpcarcav airodeiKwa-i,

Kal rpirov ra irdOr}

iffTi, Trepl
'6

rpia ravTU
2,

et
'6ri

Se (payephu

re Se'iKwai Kal & SeiKwai

ovk

Koi 4^

u>u.

Metaph.
e/c

iii,

997, a,

ras kKaa-rov

avdyKT] yhp

rivoov elvai Kal

Mas apxas avo87^ai yhp [for there would be]

irepi Tc Kal

rivuv

t)]v airdSei^iy.

In

ch. 6
*

he gives yhos
Anal. Post.
i.

viroKi[X^vov

tj

iK^tvai airavruv apxal Kal iiriar-iifXT] iKeivcav Kvpia irdvTcov. Cf. ch. 10,
*

irddv, d^Kafiara in

another order.

cited p. 248, n. 3 supra.

l,cit. sujyr. p. 245,n.3,andi^i^. c. 10, 76, a, 37: effrt 5' wv xP^^'Tot eV Ta7s airoSeiKTiKOLs iiriffT-fjibLais ra jxkv X^ia
e/cacrrrjs iirKTT-fjfnjs

Anal. Pr.
Sh Kaff
5ih

X^iat

i. 30, 46, 'a, 17 eKaaT-qv [eVto-T^yurjj/]

ai

irMtaTai
eKaffrou
/xhu

[^apx^l

roov

yicr/xaiv].

ras
S'

fxev

avKKoapxas rds
irapa-

iSia fihv diov

atrh Xffoiv
C.

ra 5e Koivd ypafifj.}jv ehai roiavSl

, .

irepl

i/jLireipias

i(TTl

Sovvai. Aeyco
yi,K)]V

olov ri)v affrpoXorrjs affrpoAoX-qcpOevTav yap

Kal rh vdu, Koiva

Se oTov rb Xcra

i/xireipiav

32

init.

Uv dcpcKri ras
:

on tcra ra Komd.
S'

yiKris

eViCTirj/xTjs.

auras opxas

airduTcav eJvai Tccv (rvWoyLff/xcav dSv-

varov, and after this has been proved at length he says at the end at yhp apxal dirral, e| wv re
:

Kal irepl
at

'6

at fxev olv e| oov Koival,

iKavus ruv (paivonevcov ovrws eupedrjcrav at affTpoKoyiKol airoSei^eis. So in Hist. An. i. 7 init. we have first to describe the peculiar properties of animals, and then to discuss their causes ovtm yap
:
:

5e

irepl

'iSiat,

olov

apidfihs,
airo-

Kara
odov,
irepl

(pvaiv iffrl iroielffQai

virapxovarrjs

r^v

fj-eO-

fieyedos.

More about the

ttjs iarropias rrjs

SeiKTLKal apxal or the Koival SS^ai e|

&udiravTesSeiKvvovaivwillheiound
in the passages cited at p. 247, n. 2. 2 Vid. S2i2)r. p. 245, n. 3 Gen. An. li. 8, 748, a, 7 ovtos fxev ovv d Xoyos KaOoXov xiav Kal Kevus. oi yap fi^ eK roSv olKeicoi/ apxS>u x6yoi Ket/ol, aXXii. BoKovaiv ehai ruu irpayixdroiv OVK ovres. Cf. p. 174, n. 2,
; :

supra.
'

a/v re yap Kal e| wv eJvai Set tt;?/ airSSei^iu, e/c tovtwv yiverai (papepSv. ^ Cf. preceding note, and the remark in Eth. vi. 9, 1142, a, 11 sqq., that young people can make advances in the knowledge of Mathematics, but not in Natural History or the wisdom of life, '6ti ra /xhv [Mathematics] 8i' afai

eKawrov

irepl

Anal, Post.

i.

9,

76, a, 16

pecrecis

icrriv

[is

an

abstract

250
pass,

ARISTOTLE

he does not further inquire. Sense-perception he treats as a simple datum, whose elements he does not
try to analyse.

He

even includes cases which are to

us merely judgments

upon given
certainties.^

materials,

among what
im-

he

calls

immediate

It is therefore

possible to give a clear and sufficient account of the

faculties

to which, according to him,

we

are indebted

for the immediate truths in question.

To enumerate the
various sciences
is

special presuppositions of all the

also obviously impossible.

is

Even

general view of the universal axioms

science], rwv
pias.
1

not to be found

S' ai

apxcd e|

iixirei-

It is said in Bt/i.

b,

153,

that

iii. 5, 1112, practical reflection

(fiovXevais) is
Ka9' Ka(Tra,
TreVeTrTai

concerned with to
olov

et apros tovto aicrflrjo-ews ws Set yap ravra. Ibid. vi. 9, lli2, a, 23 sqq., Aristotle explains that, contradiction to eiricrTijfjL'n, in
-/)

ferred to an ala-d-nffis in like man(See also the discussion of ner. So in <pp6v7](Tis in ch. xii. infra.) Eth. iii. 12, 1143, b, 5, referring to the same class of propositions tovtwv ovv e;^' Se? he says
:

ataOrjo'iv, avrrj S' icrrl vovs.

Now,

although (as

is

Jin.) a(<rd-nais is as in Polit. i. 2, 1253, a, 17, in

indicated in c. 9 here to be taken

*

(pp6uT)arLS

is,

like

uovs,
;

an im-

mediate knowledge but whilst the latter is concerned with the ecTTi x6yos (the uu ovK '6poLf
'

highest principles,' which in this case are practical principles), is a knowledge toG (pp6v7](ns
eVxctTOu,
01)

OVK

effTiv

iin(Tri]ixT\

the wider signification of consciousness,' still it always means immediate knowledge,' as an distinguished from an iiria-T-fifir]. Kampe {Erhenntnissl. d. Ar. 220 sq.) finds in the above passages, a proof that Book VI. of the Nicomacliean Ethics originally
'

[the sensible properties of things] dAA' o'la al(T6av6fida, on rb iu toTs fxaOr^fioTiKols ecrxaTOv rpiyauov (i.e. the last thing obtained in analysing a figure is a triangle). Here, therefore, the judgment ' This is explained as a is a triangle matter of a1(TQT]ais (and so also in Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 20) and the minor premisses of practical syllogisms, such as * This deed is just,' 'This is useful,' &c., are redAA.' a((rQ7}<ns,

ovx V

''wf i^icou

'

belonged to the Eudemian but Polit. i. 2, shows how unfounded As little does is this conclusion. it follow from Eth. vi. 3, 1139, b, 33 where the et jxkv yap irws iriffrevr), &c., does not mean 'we have knowledge when we have any conviction,' but knowledge consists in a definite Hnd of conviction based on known prin;

'

ciples.'
2

For proof of

this,

see ch.

xii.

infra.

LOGIC
in Aristotle.
all

251

He

merely seeks to determine which of

can involve no possible
of Contradiction.'^ error.

principles is the most incontestable, obvious, and

it

unconditional,^ so that

This he finds in the

Law

No

one

can seriously doubt

principle

this principle,

though many may

it is

pretend to do so; but just because

of
all,

the highest

it

admits of

no demonstration

it

cannot, that

is

to say, be

deduced from any higher law.

It is certainly possible to defend it against objections of

every kind, by showing either that they rest upon

misunderstandings, or that they themselves presuppose

the axiom in question and destroy themselves in attack-

ing
'

it.^

He has, however,
iv.

carefully
:

guarded against any

Kal ravrr) rrj

Metaph.

3,

1005, b,
'

(Trpoa5i(i}pi(rd(o 5' rjfuu

^ffiaioTdrr} 5'
Siaipevffdrjvai

apx^ iraauv

Tvepl

^v

irpordcr^i
iffrl

aZvvaTov

yvcopLixwrdrh)v

rrjv

yctp

avaryKolov elvai
fj.^

roiavTTjv (Trepi yap &

atraroovTai

yvwp'iQovffiv

irdvTes^

ical

avvrrddeTOv.

^u yap avayKalov
^vvteuTa
uTrdOeffis.

ex^'** "^^^ Stiovv

ivavria 5' 5d|a S6^ri 7} rrjs apTKpda^ws, fpavephv '6ti aSvvaTOv d/xa viroXafifidviiv rhv avrhv elpai Kal /xij eivai rh avrd afxa yap ttv e^o: rds ivavrias 5d|as d 5tei)/ua'/AeVos Trepl roirov.

ra

elcoddra'),

'

Tuv

ovtwv,

tovto
:

ovx

2 Line 19 (xi. 5 mit.) rh yap avrh ufia virapx^iv re Kol fxij virdpX^iv a^vvarov r^ aur^ Koi Kara rh avr6 Kal Hffa SAAo TrpoffStopicraifxed^
'

Ibid. c. 6, 1011, b, 15: eVel 5' aSvvarov t^v avT[<pa<nv dhTjdeveadai a/xa KaTo. rov avrov [for which at line 20 he substitutes afxa Karacpdvai Kal
airo<pdvai aKi]Qu)s], (pavephv

on

ou5e Tavavria djxa virdpx^i-v iv-

tiv,

efTTOJ Trpoff^LOipifffxiva ttphs

\oyi-

Se'xeTai
djx(^(t),

r^

auTcfJ

dW'

fj

irij

Kas Svffx^p^tas.
fiefiaioTdrr] tcou

aiirrj Si] iraffwv iffri

^ ddrepov

jxkv

irij

Odrepov 5e

apx^v. The axiom opposites cannot belong to .>^** the same thing in the same respect, is only a form of this. And the further principle that no one can really ascribe such opposites at once to anything is so closely connected that sometimes the latter is proved from the former, at other times the former from the latter; cf. Anal. Post., ut et Se (j.)) ip54x^rai supra, line 26 a/na vTrdpx^iv rv avrto ravavria

airXcos.
3 In this sense Aristotle in Metajjh. iv. 4 sq. confutes the

that

'

'

'

statement (which, however, he only ascribes to certain of the older schools as being in his view an inference from their tenets Gr. part i. cf. Zellee, Ph. d. 600 sq., 910, 4), that an object can both be and not be the same thing at the same time,' by proving that in every statement the principle of non-contradic;

'

252
sophistical

ARISTOTLE
misuse of
it

to

deny the connection

of

different properties in

one subject, or the possibility of

becoming and of change, by that detailed exposition of it in which he shows that it is not absolutely impossible that contradictions should be predicated of the same
subject,

but only that they should be so predicated

similar arguments to these with which he esta-

together and in the same relation.^

By

blished the

Law

of Contradiction, he lays
^

down

that of

an incontestable Axiom. tlie But he does not expressly deduce the one from the
Excluded Middle
as
other.

Though

Aristotle maintains so decidedly that every

kind of knowledge brought about by demonstration is doubly conditioned by an immediate and undemonstrable conviction of the mind, yet he is far from repre-

senting this conviction as itself incapable of scientific

verification.

The

starting-point of

all

demonstration

is

undemonstrahle

it is

incapable of being deduced from

any other principle as from its cause. Yet it can be shown from the given facts to be the condition which underlies them, and which their existence presuption

i7iit., c.

In c. 5 1007, b, 22, xi. 6 init.), he reduces to the same principle the dictum (de quo V. Zellee, Ph. d. Gr. part i. 982, 1, 988, 2) that that is true for each one which appears so to him ; and to this, amongst other
is

presupposed.
c.

(paivofjLeuov,

the

dictum
Trp6s ri.

would

6 (of.

4,

make
'

everything a

See preceding note, OwSe fiera^v avricpdaias ivSe^^'''

x^"^"'
^

ovliv

cf p. 230, supra.
.

'

'

arguments coinciding broadly with the Platonic Thecctetus he

Metaph. iv. 7 in applying has argument, Aristotle his reasons those adopted here which are borrowed from the con;

especially opposes the objection (1011, a, 17 sqq. b, 4) that since

every

(paivS/uLeTov

must be a nvl

sideration of Change in Nature, evidently wishing to prove his theory not only as a logical, but also as a metaphysical principle.

LOGIC
poses.

253

So in the place of Demonstration, conies in There are thus two lines of scientific thinking which require to be distinguished the one
Induction.^
:

which leads up to principles, the other which leads down from principles ^ the movement from the universal to the particular, from that which is in itself the more certain to that which is so for us and the reverse

movement from the individual, as that which is best known to us, to the universal, which is in its own nature the more sure. In the former direction goes
syllogism

and

scientific

demonstration

in the latter

goes induction.^
all

And by
to be.

one or other of these ways

knowledge comes
.

That which by virtue of

exoj/ras aiffdrjanv
y^iUy

its

' Cf with what follows the references on p. 242, n. 6 supra. The name * iirayta-yh] refers either to the adduciTig of particular instances, from which a universal proposition or concept is abstracted(TRENDELENBUEG,JE'^<^?;^. Log. Arist. 84 Heyder, Vergl. d. arist. und hegel. Dialehtik, p. 212 sq.), or to the introduction to these instances of the person to be instructed (Waitz, Arist. Org. a. 300). In favour of the latter explanation there are certain passages, in which ' iirdyeiv has as its object the person knowing as 2'op. viii. 1, 156, a, 4 iirdyovra ficv airh ruv KadcKaaroy iirl ra KaOSXov, but especially A?ial. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 19 OTi fiev yap irav rpiywvov e^et Sutrti/ opQats "iffas, vpopSei, '6ti 5e rdSe rpiywvSv iffriv, a/na iirayofxevos irplv 8' 'iraxdwa^ ^ iyvcipiffev .
'
:

^Swarov. * 'Eirdhowever, also means to

'

prove by induction,' as in iirdy^iv rb KaQdKov, Top. i. 18, 108, b, 10

Soj^h. El. 15, 174, a, 34.

'

1095, a, 30 i. 491, 2 and see p. 205, n. 2 supra. ^ Besides Induction, Heyder ( Vergl. d. arist. und hegel. Dial. 232 sq.) finds in Aristotle (Phys. i. 1, 184, a, 21 sqq.) indications of another process, by which we should proceed from the universal of sensible perception to the concept, as the more particular and definite just as in induction we go from the particular in perception to the universal of the conBut he himself rightly cept. observes that this is only an induction reversed (though this case is not usually made very
-

cf.
;

Eth. N. i. Zellee, Ph.

2,

d. Gr. pt.

AajSeTv

(TvA\oyi(Tixhv,

rpdirov

fidp

Tiva

tffcos

c. 18,

81, b, 5

(pareov iTria-Taffdai, See; liraxOvvai 5e ^t?

:

prominent by Aristotle). When a universal is brought out as that which is common to many individual cases, it is thereby

254

ARISTOTLE

nature admits of no demonstration must be established have already remarked that this by induction.^

We

undemonstrable element of thought need not necessarily be abstracted from experience, but that Aristotle
rather regards the universal axioms as apprehended by

the
sees

spontaneous activity of the reason.^

that
this

But

as he

activity

of reason

is

only

gradually

developed in the individual under the guidance of experience, so he believes there are no other means of
scientifically verifying its

content and deliverance but

by a comprehensive induction.^ Many difficulties are For inductive reasoning is founded, involved in this.
separated from the complex in which it presents itself to perand this is all that ception Aristotle has in his mind in the passagecited; cf. p.205sq. mj)ra. Anal. Pri. ii. 23, 68, b, 13 airaura yap TricrTevofxep ^ 5ta cruAAo;

tion of the whole will be gathered from what is said in the text.) Similarly Anal. Post. i. 1 init. Anal. Post. i. 18: fj-auddt/ojuiev ^
iirayooy-^
fj

d7ro5et|ei.
e/c

cctti

5'
t]

tj

'

jxkv a7roSei|is

rcbv KaBoXov,
'

S'

yLa/iiov

?)

Si'

eTraycoyris.

Ibid, at line
;

iirayojyr] 4k twv Kara fxepos Tov Se rd KaOoAov O^oopriaai

iiraycoyrjs.

dSui/a/jlt]

Si'
:

35

vld. supr. p. 206, n. 1 twp apx(*>v 7, i098, b, 3

; :

Eth.i.
al fxkv

IMd.
OTt

ii.

19, 100, b, 3
TO.

S'

Sf;Aov

S^

7}ixLV

irpccra

^nayuyri OewpovvTai, al S' alffOrjcreL, irpoe'/c &c. vi* 3, 1139, b, 26 yLycocKOfxevcov Se -rraaa diSaaKaXia
; :
' .

iirayayfi
i.

yvupi^nv avayKalov.
rh
.

Top.

12:

etTTi Se

{xey

[e?5os

X6ywv
tj

SiaAe/fTiKwj']
XoyKTfjLos
.
.

e'7ra7w777,

rh Se ci^ASe
airh
to,

7]

fxhv

yap
t]

Si'

671-070)7775,
Sr?

r]

Se

itrayccyr]

(TvAXoyLajLLCf.

/xeu

eiraywyr)
6

tS}v

KadeKaffTou
.
.
.

inl
7)

KaQoKov
Kal

apxv icTi

Kal
e'/c

rod KaQoXov,
tu>u KaQoKov.

Se

(podos

ecTTi 5'

p.\v iiraybiyr)

auWoyL(r/j.us

eiVii'

indav(i)Tf:pou

Kal

aacpearepov

&pa apxal e| wv 6 (rvWoyiafihs, wv iiraywyr) ovK eCTi (TvWoyiafMos (Trendelenbueg, Hist. &pa. Beitr. ii. 366 sq., and Brandis, ii, b, 2, 1443, would like to cut out

Kara
Kal

rrju

aXffQiqffiv

yvoopiixwrepov

To7<i

TToXAols KOivhv, 6 Se truA-

Aoyiff/jhs

Tovs

Hid.
a,

the last two words, on the gTOund that all unproved knowledge does not rest on induction; but the form of statement is not more universal than in the other parts of this passage, and the explana-

35
'^

^laariKcoTfpou Kal irphs kvTiKoyiKovs ivapyecrrepov. Bhet. 1. 2, 1356, c. 8 init. and cf snpra, p. 205 sq.
;
.

See

p.

197 sqq., and 246 sq.

S7c2)ra.
3 See also the citation infra (in note 1 on p. 256) from To^f.
i.

2.

LOOIC
as

255

we have shown,^ upon such

minor premiss.
It

a mutual relation of

concepts as will admit of the conversion of the universal

affirmative

assumes that the minor

and the middle of the syllogism have the same extenIn other words, no cogent induction is possible, unless a predicate can be shown to be common to all the
sion.

individuals of that genus of which

it is

to be predicated.

Such an exhaustive acquaintance with every individual It would seem, therefore, that case is impossible.^ every induction is imperfect, and that every assumption which bases itself upon induction must remain uncertain.

To meet

this difficulty,

it

was requisite
for the

to

introduce an abbreviation of the inductive method, and

to find

something which would make up

im-

possibility of complete observation of every individual

instance.

This Aristotle finds in Dialectic or Probable

Demonstration,'* the theory of which he lays

down
he

in

the Topics.

The value of

dialectic consists,

says,

not only in the fact that

it is

an intellectual

discipline,
:

nor that

it

teaches argumentation as a

fine art

it is

also of essential service in scientific research,

inasmuch

as
*

it

teaches us to explore and estimate the different

all the cases which liad occurred of a particular kind, still we could never know that the future would not bring other experiences differing from them. The supposition itself is by the nature of the case impossible, and even more clearly unprovable, * On this narrower meaning of the ' dialectical in Aristotle, see WAITZ, Arist. Org. ii. 435 sqq. cf following note.

P. 242, n. 6. Cf. Anal. Pr.

knew

ii.

24

fin.

\jh 7rapd5et7ywa] Siacpepei rrjs ivaywyris, '6ti t] fxkv e| aircivTcov ratv aTOjxwv rh uKpou iSeiKuvev wTropx^"'

T^

(UeV^

.,

rh bk

ovK e|

Ihid. c. 23, Set Se voiiv rh T [the 68, b, 27 lowest concept in the inductive syllogism] t^ e| airavrcov rcou yap rj KaB^Kaarov (rvyKeiiJ.evov
airdvrojv
delKvvffiv.
:

'

e7ra7co77j 5ta iravTUV.

^

Even

if

we supposed we

266

AUISTOTLE
It

aspects under which an object can be contemplated.

is

specially useful in establishing the scientific prin;

for as these cannot be deduced by demonstration from anything more certain than themselves, there is

ciples

nothing

left for

probability.^

us but to get at them from the side of Such an attempt must start from the

prevailing tenets of humanity.

at
least

What

all

the world, or
it,

the

experienced and intelligent part of

since

believes, is

always worthy of consideration,

it

carries with it a

presumption that

it

rests

upon a

real

experience.^
'

Tojy.

i.

'H

p-ev

rr\s

TTpayfJ-anias,
7]s

fxeOodov

npoQ^ais evpuv,
irpo-

65hu exei. Aristotle (Tojh viii, 11, 162, a, 15) calls the dialectical

a0'
Ttepl

bvi/r](T6fji.eda

avKAoyi^ecrdai.
koL

iravrhs
e|

tov irpoTeQevTOs
6v5o|a)j/,
jX'qQ'kv

fiKr\ixaTos

avroX
8e

Koyov

virexovres
.
.

ipovfxeu

vTvepauTiov.

SiaAeKTLKhs

avWoyicriJLos 6 e 4uS6^ccv
^oimevos
.
. .

avWoyi-

ev5o^a Se ra doKovvra
^)

KacTLV

'/)

rols irAeiaTOis
t)

to7s (ro(pois,

Ka\ rovTOis

TOLS

iraaiu ^ tols TrAeiarois Kol jJidXiaTa yuwpifj.ois

i.

syllogism iTnxeipr)iJ.a. Thurot, sur Ao'lst. 201 sqq., compares the dili'erent statements of Aristotle on the office and use of Dialectics; but he has laid rather too much stress upon the partial inaccuracy of Aristotle's language. Cf. on the Tojncs also p. <)8, n. 1, supra.
J'Jtudes
2 Birm. in S. c. 1 init.: irepl Se rrjs fiauriKijs rrjs eV ro7s viruois

eudo^oLS.

Ibid.
y]

((Ttl St] irpos

rpia
irphs

[XP''7(T'i/ios
yv/Jij/ aalai',

irpayfxaTela],

yLuofxeurjs

ovre

Karacppovriaai

irphs

ras euTv^eis, Trphs

.

TCLS
.

Kara (piXoaotpiav iTriaT-fifxas irphs Se ras Kara (piXoaoipiav

'dri

iin(Tri]jxas,

dwd/xevoi

irphs

ajx(p6repaZiaTTopTi<raipaov ev kKacrrois

KaTO\p6fX9a ra\r]ds re koI rh \pvdos. ir I 8e irphs ra irpura r wv ire pi

e

Koicrrrjv
fxev

iir Lffr'}]yL7]v

ap^ci^v.
apx(*>v

6/c

yap ruv oiKeiwv rcov Kara

nL(rr-r]fJiriv

tV

irporeQela-av

o.'^vvarov elirelv rt irep\ avrcov, eVetS/j

irpwrai at apx".^ airdvroov elal, Sia 5e Tocv irepi eKacra ivoo^a^v avdyKy]
irepX
t)

rh /nhu yap iroWovs viroXa/xfidveiy e'xeij/ ri (Trj/jLeiwSes rh ivvirvia irapfX^rai iriariv us e^ efiireipias Aey6/xvov, &c. Bth. i. 8 init. vi. 12, 1143, b, 11; Bhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 15 (cf.the beginning of ch. xiv. infra). For the same reason, Mh. vii. 14, 1153, b, 27 appeals to Hesiod ("E, K. T)fx. 763) (pv/JLT] S' oij ri ye irdjxirav air6\\vrai, ^v riva Xaol iroWol and Synes. Calv. Enc. c. 22 (^Ar. Fr. No. 2) quotes as
ireiarOTJuai.

pdSiov

ovre
i)

irdvras

avrcov SieAdelu.

rovro

5'

ifStoj/

Aristotelian
iraXaias
yueVrjs
elcri

'6ri

[sc. at irapoifxiaC]

/xaXiara

o'lKelov rrjs diaKeKriKrjs

(piXocrocpias

ev

rats

iariv
ras

c^eraariKT]

yap oZaa
fj-eddSuu

irphs

fieyiffrais avdpccirui/ <pdopa7s ottoAo-

airaauiy

Tf

apxo.s

iyKaraXeififxara irepiffwOevra

LOGIC
Such a foundation may appear unstable
;

267

and the

sense of this forced on Aristotle the need (which had like-

wise driven Socrates to form his dialectic) of supplying

its deficiencies

by combining the

different points

of

view which cross one another in popular opinion, and by balancing them one with the other. From this he
got his habit of prefacing his dogmatic dissertation^

with ^kiroplai of enumerating the different sides from which the subject may be touched of testing conclusions by mutual comparison and by established standards
;

and,

finally,

of

raising

difficulties

by

this

testing

process and obtaining a ground for a scientific exposition from their solution.^

These

dialectical

elucida-

tions prepare the

way

for positive scientific conclusions

by clearing up the questions which are in issue;, by grouping the inductive results under a certain number of general aspects, and by making them explain each other and so combining them into an aggrer
gate result.

From them, our thought

.

is

led

on into the

koHL Se^iSrrjra. Cf also Eth. End. 1264, a, 1 i.6mi^., and, as to the belief in the aldiip,De Coelo, 270,h, Id, Metajfh.

hik ffvvrofxiav

Ka\ irpcorov Siairop'fia'avTas oiiruSeiKT

Polit.

ii.

5,

vvvai
irepl

ix6.Ki.ffTa jxkv

irdvra
el

ret

evSo^a
fi^,

ravra ra
koX

irddr],

Se

rcb

xn.S,aiid Meteor. 3Sd,hy27.

With

this is connected Aristotle's preference for proverbial sayings and * gnomes,' about which cf p. 104,
.

ihv yhp \in)Tai re ra dvffx^pv koI KaraXeiinirai to. evSo^a, dedeiyfievov Uv elTj
irKitffra

Kvpidorara'

n. 1

(on the
'

Ilapot/xtat).
iii.

iKavws. Cf. De Coelo, i. 10 init. Anal. Post. ii. 3 init., and WaitZ on this passage also Phyg. iv. 10
;

Metaph.
cviroprjffai

Unit.:
Ka\S)s-

effrt Se

init.,

To7s

fiovKofievois rrpoijpt)

yov rh

Sio-TTopTjo-at

yhp

iiffTfpov eifiropia \vffis

twv
5'

TrpArepov

airopovfxfvuv
JV. vii.

iffrl,

\veip

ayvoovvTas rhu
1
fin.
:

Seff/xSv,

ovk tffTiv &c. Eth.

rwv

&\\(i>v,
I.

S\ Soavcp iir\ TiOfPTtts tA <paiv6fjt.eva

Sc\

Meteorol. i.lS init., DeAn.i. 2 init., Zongit.Vit. c. l, ^Qi,h^2lf &c. InTb/;. viii.11,162, a, 17, the airSpriiJ.a is defined as ffvWoyiaixhs 5ia\KTiKhs a.vTKpdffeccs. These Aristotelian Apories served the Scholastics as a model for their disjmtatio jjro et contra.
' '

VOL.

258

ARISTOTLE
which brings us

explicit problems, the true solution of

to philosophic knowledge.^
It is true that neither this theory nor the actual

practice of Aristotle can satisfy the stricter require-

ments of modern

science.

his procedure in the working from the observed facts of the laws and definitions out of Science, or in the establishment of natural pheno-

Whether we consider

mena

themselves,

we must admit
Of

that

it

shows serious
all

omissions and defects.

says that instances
it

Induction, for example, he

consists in

the collection, from

the

of a given class, of a proposition which expresses as a universal law that which was true of all

these particular cases.^ In truth, Induction consists in inferring such a proposition from all the cases hnown to
us

and in considering the principle on which the inductive method rests, the main point is to inquire how we are justified in concluding from all the cases hiown
;

to us,

a law for

all like cases.

Aristotle can hardly be

blamed

for not raising exactly this question, since

none

of his successors succeeded in stating it clearly until Stuart Mill wrote his Logic and even he could find no answer but an inadequate and self- contradictory theory.
;

But

it

was an inevitable result of

Aristotle's position

that his theory of Induction does not help us over the real difficulty, which is to ascertain how the correctness

of an inductive proof can be assumed in spite of the fact tbat the range of experiences on which it rests is

not complete.

The
2,

fact is that Aristotle, as

:

we have
and

Metaph.

iv.

1004, b, 25

Cf. svpra, p. 242, n. 6,

lo-Tt 5e

v 5ia\eKriKh

ireipaffTiK^ irepl

p. 255.

&v f]

<pi\oa-o<pla yvoxTTiK-fj.

LOGIC
already indicated, has tried to
fill

259

up the gap by the

In the latter his

invention of the
dialectical

'

proof from probability,' and by the

treatment of the diroplai.

acuteness and his scientific width of view are conspicuous

throughout.

But

it

cannot make up for a satisfactory

facts, if

and methodical comparison of observed

only for

the reason that the theories discussed are not themselves

based on pure observation, but on the svBo^ov

views, that
is,

on which guesses, inferences and fancies have, or at least may have, become mixed up with Even where Aristotle is dealing actual experience. with actual observation, he falls, in many respects, far short of the standard which we are accustomed to set
in
to the scientific observer.

As

to

the conditions of a

trustworthy observation, or the methods to be applied

for establishing the correctness of one's

own

observations

or

controlling

the accuracy of information given by

others,

we have
is

only here and there a chance remark.

As he
tive

too little conscious of the part which a subjecin

all

mental activity plays

his

perception,^

so

it

was natural that

vation.

method should not adequately

provide for the subjective control of the errors of obser-

In his own work there

criticise.

is,

on

this side of

it,

much

to

It

is

true

that he

has brought together,

especially in the zoological writings,

an extraordinary
have been
partly

volume of statements of fact, the overwhelming majority

of which (so far as they can
'
"^

now be
by
this

verified
or

^)

Cf. p. 210 and tw/Va, ch. X. For this is not always posis
is

that name,

sible, partly

because it uncertain which animal

often

because not all the animals mentioned by Aristotle are sufficiently

meant

known

to us.
s

260

ARISTOTLE
Most of
;

found to be correct.

these,

of course, are

patent enough to any observer

but there are also

many

cases among them where careful investigation would be The methods of experiment he did not required.^
altoo-ether neglect.^
'

His

historical studies excite our

All the

Part. 33 sqq. (cf. Lewes, AHst. 394), that he had made experiments on the development of the embryo in the egg, since he there remarks that we often find in eggs, even on the third day, the heart and the

Thus we see from

4,

more odd is

it

that Lewes

An.

iii.

665,

a,

liver as

isolated points.

So in

Gen. An. ii. 6, he makes remarks on the order of appearance of the different parts of the body from which, as even Lewes ( 475) admits, we see that Aristotle studied embryonic development. A statement, long considered fabulous, about the appearance of a placenta in a kind of shark {H. An. vi. 10, 565, b, 1) has been confirmed (by Joh. MuLLER, Ahh. d. Berl. All. 1840, PJiys. math. Kl. 187, cf. Lewes, loc.cit. 205) the same.is the case (cf. Lewes, 206-208) with Aristotle's statements about the embryo of the ink-fish ( Gen. An. iii. 8, 758, a, 21) about fishes which build a nest {H. An. viii. 30, 607, b, 19) about the eyes of
; ;

should complain of Aristotle's failure to mention the freshness of the sea breeze, the play of the waves, &c. This is to blame Aristotle for not having the bad taste to drop from the realism of a zoological description into the style of a feuilleton, or the impertinence to explain to people who had the sea daily before their eyes the things they had

known all their lives. 2 EuCKEN, Meth.

Forsch.,
p.

d.

Arist.

163 sqq., gives instances from Meteor, ii. 3, 359, a, 12, 358, b, 34 {H. An. viii. 2,
590, a,
a,

22)
ii.

H. An.
iii.

vi.

30 {Gen. An.
iii.

1,

2, 560, 752, a, 4) ;

2, 413, b, 16; Be H. An. 471, a, 31 vi. 37, 580, b, sqq. (if this was really an experiment, and not rather a chance observation). Then again there are others in-

Be An.

Respir.

troduced with a

Xiyovffiv,

Gen.

An.
later

iv,

1,

765, a, 21 (which is

on disputed by himself),

the mole (^De An.

iii.

1,

425, a,

10, H. An. i. 9, 491, b, 28 sqq.), and about a gland which a certain

Hist. An. ii. 17, 508, b, 4 (though in Gen. An. iv. 6, 774, b, 31 the same is stated in his own

and

kind of stag has under the tail {E. An. ii. 15, 506, a, 23, cf. W. Eapp in Mailer's Archiv. f. Anat. 1839, 363 sq.). With regard to his
description of the cephalopods, Lewes remarks ( 340 sq.) that it could only spring from a great familiarity with their forms, and we see in it the unmistakeable traces of personal knowledge.

name).

Some

ments are

of these experiof such a questionable

kind, that we may well doubt whether Aristotle himself conducted them and, on the whole, he appeals to experiments so seldom that we cannot avoid seeing how little he, or Greek
;

science in their value.

general,

re

LOGIC
To

261

high admiration by their extent and their accuracy.^

received accounts he so far takes a critical attitude
is

that he

careful to correct

many

false views,^ to direct

attention to
authorities,^

the

untrustworthiness of
lacks adequate

some of

his

and

to attack even universally

accepted

myths.''
tion,

Where he
is

he

willing to reserve his

means of observajudgment ^ where there

;

might be a tendency to close an inquiry too precipitately, he gives us warning that we should first weigh
all

the objections suggested by the matter in hand

before

we

decide.^

In a word, he shows himself not

^

only an untiring inquirer whose thirst

for the

know-

ledge of

all

things great and small was never satisfied.

' Besides the numberless items of information from the History of the Greek States, of Philosophy, of Poetry, and of Khetoric, which the extant works contain, we

4t/rTvx'fjKaiJ.ev.

But, on the other

refer here to what is quoted from the Politics and other lost works; de quo vide p. 101, n. 1; 73,n. 1; 62, n. 5; 58, n. 1; 103, n.l, and 104, n. 1. ^ Thus in the cases named by

may

to us

{loc. cit. 124), Gen. An. 755, b, 7 sqq., 756, a, 2 ch. 6, 756, b, 13 sqq., 757, a, 2 sqq. iv. 1, 765, a, 16 sqq., 21 sqq.; H. An. viii. 24, 605, a, 2 sq. ' As in Hist. An. viii. 28, 606, a, 8, ii. 1. 601, a, 25, where certain statements of Ctesias are called in question as untrustworthy in Gen. An. iii. 5, 756, a, 33, where he says that fishermen frequently overlook the occurrence in question: ovQih yhp avTwv ovOev rrjpel roiovrov rod yvwvai x^P^v. So in Hist. An. ix. 41, 628, b, 8 ; axn6itrri 5' ofjirw
iii. 5,
;

EUCKEN

37, 618, a, 18, 620, b, 23, he appeals to eyewitness. * As in doubting the genuineness of the poems of Orpheus, and the existence of their supposed author; as to which see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. vol. i. 50. ^ Cf. supra, p. 169, n. 1. I)e Ccelo, i. 13, 294, b, 6: dAA' ioiKuffi fJt-^xpi Tivhs ^TjreTv, oAA.' ov fi^xP'' '"'^P ^^ Swarhv ttjs
c.

hand, in

29,

70^ 7jfx7v tovto trivrh irpayfia iroifiadai r^v (ijTTjcrip aWa irphs rhv ravapria \4yovTa' koI yap avrhs iv avr^ (rjre'i fiexpi Tep tiv ov firiKeri %XV avriXeyeiv avrhs avr^ iih 8c7 rhv fieWovra Kahws Qr]r-{]aiiv ivarariKhv flvai Sia ruv oIk^iuv ivarda-coov rep y4vei, rovro 5' iarlv kK rod irdcras ndewprjKevai ras Siaairopias

jra<rt

Tjdcs, /x^

TTphs

'

(popds.
''

Th

(pi\o(ro(j>ias

Si^yv:

vide

supra, p. 169, n. 8.

262

ARISTOTLE

but also an observer of care and common sense. Nevertheless, we find that glaringly incorrect statements are
not rare in Aristotle, and occur sometimes in cases
where, even with the simple methods to which he was
limited, the correction

of the error should have been

more commonly do we find that he draws from insufficient and incomplete data conclusions much too rash and sweeping, or that he forces his facts to conform to some general theory which
easy enough.^
still

And

has

inductions he

In his basis. and by basing them on various popular assumptions he leaves them without any sure foundation. He shows himself but little
itself

no adequate
is

experiential

often far too rash,

Cf.

EucKEN,

loc.
:

clt.

155

Such cases are that Arigives the male sex more teeth than the female (Hist. An. on the conii. 3, 501, b, 19
sqq. stotle
;

149 sqq., 154 sqq., 315, 332, 347, 350, 352, 386 sq., 398, 400, When, however, it is 411, 486. said that Aristotle in the Part.

jectured cause of this error see Lewes, Arist. 332, A. 19); that the human male has three sutures in the skull, and the

female only one running around

it (ibid. i. 8,

An. iii. 6, 669, a, 19, asserted that only man has a pulsation of the heart (so Lewes, 399, c, where According to this pashe adds sage one might think that Aristotle never held a bird in his
: '

491, b, 2)

that

man

hand
is

has only eight ribs on each side (ibid. I. 15, 493, b, 14) a supposition, as it would seem, universall}^ held at that time, and explained by supposing that it was founded, not on anatomical
observations of human corpses, but on observations of living bodies cf j). 89, n. 1 that the lines in the hand indicate longer or shorter span of life (ibid. 493, b, 32 sq.) that the hinder part of the skull is empty (H. An. i. 8, Part. An. ii. 10, 656, 491, a, 34 b, 12; Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b,
;
. ;

and Eucken, 155, 2), this an inaccurate accusation. Ari; '

stotle distinguishes, in

De Respir.
or

20, 479,

b,

17,

the

(T<pvyixhs

always going on, heart-beat from the irri^rjcris ttjs Kop5ias = the strong throb of the heart in passion. And even the latter he does not confine to men, for he says in the tract referred to that it sometimes becomes so strong that animals die of it. All that is said in the passage cited is iv avdpa>Trc() re yap (TvfjLfiaivei ix6vov ws elire 7v i.e. the passion-throb occurs almost exclusively in
:

35).

Further examples in Lewes,

Man.

LOGIC
skilled in the art of analysing the

263

phenomena methodiand of unravel-

cally into their real factors, of following out each fact

to its causes

and the laws of

its action,

ling the conditions of the causal nexus.

He

has not

mastered

even

in the degree which with the scanty

the best technical skill of Greece was possible to him methods of establishing and analysing facts, of checking observations and theories, or of applying experi-

ment

to science.

He

does not, in a word, come up to

is

the standard to which in our day a student of nature

expected to attain.
rather would
it

There

is

nothing strange in this

if it

be strange

were otherwise.

If Aristotle were without the faults

we

note in his

theory and practice, he would not only be far more in advance of his own time than in fact he was he would have belonged to another and much later period of

human thought.
titude, correlation

Before science could attain to that cer-

and exactness of procedure by which

it

we

excel the ancients,

was necessary in

all

ranges of

scientific

collected

and and

historical inquiry that the facts should

all

be

laws of

manner of experiments made, that the particular classes of phenomena should be

sought out and gradually universalised, that hypotheses

should be proposed for the elucidation of various series

and these again continually checked and To this end no genera 1 revised by the facts themselves. disquisitions on methodology, but only scientific work Until the experimental sciences had itself could assist. passed far beyond the position at which they stood in Aristotle's time, it was not possible that either the methodology or the methods of experimental knowledge
of facts,

264

ARISTOTLE
advance beyond the form in which he In the then state of science it was

should really
stated

them.

already a great thing that observed facts should be

collected in such vast masses

was not

and with such care. It to be expected that they should also be with

the like care tested, or that his personal observations should be exactly discriminated from information otherwise
received,

and the value of the

of the
assertions

latter critically

which we find absurd, were probably taken by Aristotle from others in all good faith, and were not doubted by him, merely because the knowledge of nature which he possessed gave him no reason to think them impossible. When

appraised.

Many

we

are surprised

often

built hypotheses

by the rashness with which the Greeks or theories upon facts whose

think

first sight, we do not stop to utterly they were ignorant of all our aids to accurate observation, and how greatly this poverty of

falsity is

obvious to us at

how

tools

ment.

must have hindered every sort of helpful experiTo fix time without a watch, to compare degrees

of heat without a thermometer, to observe the heavens without a telescope and the weather without a baro-

meter these and the like were the tasks which the natural philosophers of Greece had to set themselves.

no basis for accuracy as to facts, the attend the classification of phenomena, the discovery of natural laws, and the correction of
there
is

Where

difficulties that

hypothesis by experience are so vastly increased, that we cannot wonder if scientific inquiry rises but slowly and
insecurely above the levels of prescientific fancy.
service

The

which Aristotle nevertheless did

for

the world in

LOGIC

265

the collection of data, and the acuteness with which he

strove
to

explain the facts he knew, cannot but be

if

appreciated

we

try to judge

him by any standards

that conform to the knowledge and the opportunities

of his day.

To enter

into the details of Aristotle's Topics, or to

examine his refutation of the Sophistic fallacies, are equally beyond our present scope. No wider view of
his scientific principles is to be got from them, but only

an application of them to a
Science properly so called.^
place to

field

beyond the limits of

this is the proper

But

touch upon his researches into

Definition,

which we find partly in the

in

^Qcondi Analytics, partly

the

Topics.'^
all

As

the Concept forms

research, so

the starting

point of

scientific

we may say conwith the Conit

versely that a complete acquaintance

cept

which

is

Definition
is

is

the goal toward which

strives.

Knowledge

indeed nothing but insight into

is

the grounds of things, and in the concept this insight summed up. The what is the same as the ' why.'
' '

apprehend the concept of the thing as soon as we apprehend its causes.^ So far, Definition has the same problem as Demonstration. In both we try to discover the means by which the object has been brought to be what it is.'* Nevertheless, they do not, with Aristotle,
entirely coincide.
'

We

In the

first

place, it is clear that

d. arist. u. hegel.

Brandis, pp. 288-345 gives a sketch of both. 2 Besides the general works

Heyder, Vergl
BialeUih,
p.

247

sqq.,

and

Kampe,
195 sqq.

Erkenntnissth. d. Arist.

De

on Aristotelian Logic, see Kuhn, notionis definitione, etc., and

;

Arist. de notionis definitione (cf. supra, p. 212, n. 2)

Kassow,

Vid. supra, p. 163, n. 2,

and

p. 173, n. 2.
*

Vid. supra, p. 173, n. 2.

266

AUlSTOTtn

everything which admits of demonstration does not

equally admit of definition
;

for negatives, particulars,

all

and propositions predicating properties, can

monstrated, whereas definition
affirmative,
is

be de-

always universal and

not concerned with mere properties but with the substantial essence only.^ The converse not everything that can be defined is no less true

and

is

admits

of demonstration,

as

may

be

seen at
start

once

from the fact that

undemonstrable

demonstrations
Indeed,

must
it

from

definitions.^

seems to be

true in general, that the contents of a definition are undemonstrable by syllogisms for demonstration fre:

supposes a knowledge of the essence of the object, while The one points this is precisely what definition seeks.

out that a property belongs as predicate to a certain subject; the other does not concern itself with individual properties, but with the essence
inquires for a
'

itself.
'

The one
'

that^'

the other for a

is,

what

and

in order to specify what anything

that it
is.^

we must

first

know

Here, however,

we must draw

a distinction.

The fact is that a definition cannot be derived through a single syllogism. We cannot take that which is asserted
predicate in the definition of an object and use it as the of a middle term in our major premiss, in order to attach
it

again in the conclusion to the object which was to be defined for if, in such a process, we are dealing with not merely one or other of the properties, but with the whole concept of the object, then it must
: >

Anal

Post.

ii. 3.

8t:

?)

^(rn to'Sc kut^ rovSe

ibicl.

fl

Ibid. 90, b, 18 sqq. (cf. Another supra, p. 246 sqq.)kindred reason is there given
2

ovk

lo-rtv.
*

Anal. Post,
;
.

90,

b,

28

sqq.
*

also.

cf c. 7, 92, b, 12. ^bid. c. 7. 92, b, 4.

LOGIC
the one

267

follow that both major and minor premisses would be

alike definitions

of the middle term and the

other of the minor.

A proper definition, however, cannot

be

be applied to any other object except the one to

defined.^

Consequently, in every definition, the subject

and the predicate must be equal in comprehension and

extension, so that the universal affirmative proposition

which expresses the

convertible.

definition,
it

Therefore

follows that,

must always be simply by such a process

real definition,

as we have described,

we should only be demonstrating the

same by the same,^ and should get, not a

but a verbal explanation.^
Plato's

method of arriving at the idea by means of for the division presupposes the division is no better The same objection also applies to the concept.'* method^ of assuming a definition and proving its for validity a ^posteriori by reference to individuals how can we feel certain that the hypothesis which we assumed, does really express the idea of the object, and not merely a numiber of particular marks ? ^ If, lastly,
;

we endeavoured
'

to bring definition within the province

have to argue: 'the concept of that which is itself the cause of life consists in its being a selfmoving number the concept of the soul consists in its being itself the cause of life,' &c.
;

Vid. sum'a, p. 216 sqq. 2 Anal. Post. ii. 4. As an illustration he uses the definition of the soul as * a self-moving number.' If we wished to establish this by means of the sj'^llog-

ism

* everything that is itself the cause of life is a self-moving number; the soul is itself the cause of life, &c,* this would be
:

^ Anal. Post. ii. c. 7, 92, b, 5, 26 sqq, cf. c. 10 init. i. 1, 71, a, 11; Top. i. 5 init.; Metaph. vii.
;

4,

1030, a, 14.
* ^

insufficient, for

in this

way we

F/<^. sw^^r, p.

could only prove that the soul is a self-moving number, and not that its whole essence, its concept, is contained in this definition. In order to show this, we should

Which one

241, n. 3. of the philoso-

phers of that time (we

know

not
also

who) had likewise made, " Anal. Post. ii. c. 6, and Waitz.

268

ARISTOTLE
we should be met with the
never brings us to a
*

of the epagogic process,

difficulty that induction

what/

but always to a

'

that.'

But although

definition can

neither be obtained

by demonstration nor by induction,

it

so long as they are separately used, yet Aristotle thinks

it

possible to reach

by a union of the two.

instance

When
and we

experience in the

first

has taught us that

certain characteristics appertain to an object,

begin to search for their causes, or for the conception

which links them to their subject, we are so establishing by demonstration the essence of the thing
if
;

and
it.

we continue

this process until the object is defined

in all its aspects,^

we

at last obtain the concept of

Although
us to find
to

syllogistic demonstration, therefore,

may be
said

insufficient to constitute a perfect definition, yet it helps

it,''

and in

this sense definition

may be

be under another form a demonstration of the

This process
is

essence.^

admissible in every case but

is not dependent on and the conception of

that of things the being of which

any causes outside themselves

'

Loc. cit.

c. 7,

92, a, 37

Indue-

owS' d7r<J56t|ts, hriKov fiivroi hih <rv\\oyi<rixov koI 5t' airoSci^ews

oirr^ &t/ev
'

shows that something in general is of such and such a kind, by proving that it is so in all particular instances but this is equivalent to proving merely a
tion
;

&(rT^

airo^ei^eus

ten yvwvai

rh

ti

4<ttiv

ov

ianv

aXriov &\\o, otk*

earriv

tariv airSSet^is avrov. * Ibid. c. 10, 94, a, 11:

&.pa

UrieffTivfjovK e(rriv,nottheTiia'Ti.
*

Spia/xhs

eTs

fxhv

\6yos rod rl

'

Ibid. c. 8, 93, a, 14 sqq. It is necessary at this point

iarip avatrSSeiKTos, fh Sh crvWoyi<rfibs

out the too short hints of Aristotle's statement by reference to the argument cited at p. 216, n. 1 suprUf from A?ial. Post. ii.
to
fill

rov ri 4<tti, vrdcni Sia<ppwv i^s otoSc/Iccds, rpiros 5e rrjs rov rl

icmv

airoSel^ews

(rvfjiVfpaffiJ.a

the

13.
*

Anal. Post.

ii.

8 Jin.

ffv\-

Koyifffihs fikv

rov ri

itrriv ov ylverai

fuller explanation of which is given above. That definitions of the latter kind do not suffice, Aristotle tells us in De An. ii. 2 ; vid. supra, p. 173, n. 2..

LOGIC

269

these can only be postulated as immediately certain, or

elucidated by induction.^

From
to the

these researches into the nature and condi-

tions of Definition

we

obtain some important rules as

practice
it
^

method by which in

is

arrived at.

Since the essential nature of

an object

can only be
causes, Defi-

defined genetically by the indication of

nition

its

must embrace those distinctive characteristics by which the object is actually made to be what it is. It must, by Aristotle's rule, be got at by means of that which is prior and more known; nor must these
principles be such as are prior in our knowledge, but

such as are prior and more known in themselves.

is

It

allowable to prefer the former only in the case of

scholars

who

are incompetent to understand the latter

elucir

but in such a case they get nothing which really

dates the
[follows
i

essence of the object.'

This rule, indeed,

for the

from the axiom that Definition consists of the

specific
9
Sri

genus and the

'

differences:
yL6vov rh
fivai

genus

is

Altai. Post.
fifv

ii.

C.

fffn 8e

rl

ruv
ovK
rl

'4rp6v

aXriov,

iffriv. S)ffT SrjKou

icrri
tt,

rwv 5' Koi twv

apxal

irphs

iffri yvwvai xp^o-tjuov rh deupijffai ras aWias

. .
.

rcov (TvfifieffijKdTcov to?? oifciais

ra

jxiv

Afieffa

Koi

aWcL

flffiv,

Kal flvai Kal ri iffriv into-

Kal avdiraXiv ret ffvuficPrjKdra ffvu^aWfrai [xeya fi4pos irphs rh

'.

iroiriffai.

^ IkWov rpdirov (pavepk preceding note and Anal. Post. ibid. 94, a, 9 6 5e ruv aficffwv dpifffihs diffis iffrl rod rl
QiffOai 5er

Cf.

iffriv avairodeiKTos.

6,1048,
Kiydv,
^TjTeTi/,

a,

Metaph. 35: SrjXov 5' 67rl

ov
Se7 Ka\
Travrhs

ix.

rh rt iffriv for a definition only correct when it explains all the ffvfi^efirjKora (i.e. the ko0* avrh ffv/xficfiriKdra, the essential properties w^. p. 214, n. 3 sw^ra)
elSevai
is
;

rS>v
'6pov

kaOiKaffra

rfj

iiraywy^ h fiovXSfieOa

Kal

dAAo

rh
p.

avdXoyov
253.

ffvvopav;

and above,

To

Induction also belongs the process which is described in De An. i. 1, 402, b, 16: toiKc S' oi/

of an object. On immediate knowledge, cf. p. 246 sqq., 197 sqq. ^ Qf course with the exception of the &/iffa just mentioned, i.e. that which is conditional on no principle other

than
'

itself.

Top.vi.4:;ct^.205,n.2supra.

270
prior

ARISTOTLE
and more certain than
Inversely
its

contents,

and

tlie

differentiae are prior to the species

off.^

which they mark

result:
for
if

we

obtain

the

same

Definition consists in specifying the aggregate deter-

mining
the

characteristics

in its essential nature,

differentiae,

by which the object is conditioned it must include the genus and

are

for

these

simply the
in their

scientific

expression of those causes which in their coincidence

produce the object.^

But

these,

turn,

are

definitely related to one another in

riority

an order of supe-

The genus is narrowed by the then the species so first of the differentiating marks produced is further narrowed by the second, and so on. It is not, therefore, a matter of indifference in what
and
inferiority.
;

order

the

separate properties shall follow in any de-

finition.3

definition,

in

fact,

implies

not

mere
the

enumeration
completeness''

of

the essential marks,'*

but also

Bearing this

and the proper sequence of them.^ in mind, it will be found that in the

descent from universals to particulars the practice of

'

Loc.cit.\^].,h,2^;cLsvpra,

p. 215, n. 1, 216, n. 1.
2 This follows from the passages cited svpra, p. 173, n. 2, compared with pp. 215, n. 1,244, By reason of this conn. 3.

can occur in the definition; of. p. 217 sqq., Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96,
b, 1 sqq., i. 23, 84, a, 13., Top. 6 and other passages Waitz Categ. 2, a, 20.
;

vi.

on

Mt has been already remarked

246, that the number of intermediate grades must be a Qi.dAso Anal. Post. limited one.

nection Topics vi. 5 sq., immediately after the remarks on the

irpSrcpa
Kal
yvcapiixdrnpa,

on

p.

gives

rules for the correct determination of the definition by y^vos

ii.

12, 95, b, 13 sqq.

"

Anal. Post.

ii.

13. 97, a,

23

and
.

Sta^opot.

s Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, b, 30; cf 97, a, 23 sqq. * Tci eV Tcj} rl ecrri KarriyopIt ov/xeva, at rov y4vovs Sia<popai.

Se rb KaraffK^vdC^iv '6pou 5i^ ruv Siaipfo-ewu rpi&v Sel aroxaC^freai, fov \afie7u to. Kar-nyopovfxeua 4v
is

r^ ri eVrt, Koi ravra rd^ai rl wpSirov ^ d^vrepov^ Koi Srt ravra

irdvTd.

is

obvious that only such things

LOGIC
progressive division
is

271

our surest method, while a correis

spondingly gradual building up of concepts

equally

proper to the upward process towards the universal.^

And

thus Plato's method, though Aristotle could not

it

accept

as a satisfactory process for deducing definitions,

was yet recognised and further worked out by him as a means to their discovery.'^ Supposing, then, that we have defined and surveyed the whole field of the knowledge of concepts on this
method, we shall obtain a system of ideas such as Plato
looked
for,^

carrying us in an unbroken line from the

all

Summa
down

Genera through
the lowest

the intermediate

members
scientific

to

species.

And

since

deduction must

consist in the specification of causes,

specific difference in the

and since each

implies the

introduction
creates

of a

new

cause,

upward scale and every

it

added

cause

a corresponding differentia,

results that our logical structure

must exactly

corre-

spond with the actual sequence and concatenation of causes. Plato never undertook actually to set forth that
derivation of everything knowable out of unity, which

he saw ahead as the end and goal of science.

' Aristotle includes both, without further separating them, in the concept of Division. For this he gives full rules in Anal,

Aristotle

Post.

25;
i.

ii. 96, b, 15-97, b, 13, Toj).\i. 5, 6; Part. Anim.

the object to be divided; and lastly (to which Plato devoted less attention), that it should not proceed by means of deduced or contingent differences, but by the essential ones. Cf. preceding
note.
^ Two further rules, contained especially in the sixth book of the Topics where he enumerates at length the mistakes made in defining are omitted here,

Like Plato (Zeller, Gr. pt. i. p. 524 sq.). he also considers that the most important thing is that the dishould be continuous, vision should omit no intermediate grade, and should totally exhaust
2, 3.

Ph.

d.

See Zell.

ibid. p. 525, 588.

272

ARISTOTLE

considers such a demonstration to be quite impracticable.

The highest genera, according

to him, are

no more

capable of being derived from any one higher principle

than are the special postulates of each science.^ They are connected, not by any complete community of
nature, but only

by a kind of analogy,^ and the reason

tion in Metaph. x. 1, in which the unity of analogy does not occur) the unity of number, of species, of genus, and of analogy. Each of these unities includes in the subsequent unities (i.e. it that which in number is one is but not also one in species, &c.) Hence the unity of vice versa. Analogy can OQCur even in those things which belong to no common genus (cf. Part. An. i. to (xkv yap exovc* 5, 645, b, 26 rh KOivhv /cot' auaXoyiav, to 5e It /coTo 7eVos, TO kot' (ISos). occurs in everything 6<ra ex^* ^^ &\\o TTphs &\\o. It consists in
:

sqq., &c.

Anal. Post. i. 32, 88, a, 31 vid. supra p. 246. sqq.

;

Aristotle says, in Metapli. xii. 4, 1070, b, 1 (irapa 7ap t^v ova-iav koL rdtWa TO KaTt)yopovfiiva ovd4u ecrri Koiv6u), that the categories especially can be deduced neither from

one another nor from a higher common genus v. 28, 1024, b, 9 (where the same is said of
:

Form and Matter)

b, 8
;

xi.

9,

1065,
;

Phys.
a, 19,

iii. 1,

200, b, 34
;

De
4,

An.

i.

5, *410, a,

13

Uth. N.
;

i.

1096,

23 sqq,

cf.

TRENDE-

LENBURG, Hist. Beitr. i. 149 sq. The concepts, which one would
be most inclined to consider the Being and highest genera, One,' are no y^vn Metaph. iii. viii. 6, 1045, b, 5 3, 998, b, 22
'
'

identity of relation (tVJTrjs \6y(av),

and hence supposes at least four members (Mh. JV. v. 6, 1131, a,

ws rovro iv Its formula is TovT(f ^ irpds TovTO, T({5' eV r^Se ^ irpds t6S (Meta2)h. ix. 6, 1048, b,
31).
:

X. 2, 1053, b, 21

xi.

1,
;

1059, b,

1070, b. 7 Eth. N. ibid. Anal. Post. ii. 7, 92, b, 14 Top. iv. 1, 121, a, 16, c. 6, 127,

27

sq.
;

xii. 4,

7
is

cf.

Poet. 21, 1457, b, 16).

It

a,

26 sqq. Cf. Trendelenburg, loo. cit. 67 Bonitz and Schweg;

found not only in quantitative

such
as

identity,

arithmetical
iV.

LER on Metaph.
on
p.

iii.

(more

and geometrical (Uth.

v.

7,

276 infra^. Therefore the principle ' that eventually everything is contained in a single highest concept as in a common
genus,' which Strumpell, Gesch. d. theor. Phil. d. Gr. p. 193, gives as an assertion of Aristotle, is not really Aristotelian. 2 In Metaph. v. 6, 1016, b, 31, four kinds of Unity are distinguished (somewhat different is the other fourfold enumera-

1131, b, 12, 1132, a, 1), but also in qualitative identity, such as similarity (Gen. et Corr. ii. 6, 333, a, 26 sqq.), or in identity of operation (cf. Part. An. i. 5, 645, T^ avdhoyou r^v atn^v %xov b, 9 Svpa/jLiv, ibid. i. 4, 644, b, 11; ii. 6, 652, a, 3), and in fact in all categories (Metaph. xiv. 6, 1093, Besides those in the b, 18). passages just mentioned, other instances are given in Be Part.
:

LOGIC
why
the sciences are not
all

273
is

one,

just because each

class of actual existences has its

own
If

peculiar sort of
it

knowledge which applies to

it.^

be true that
is

among
first

the sciences

we
*

find one

which
'

principles
it

the

a science of
.

First Philosophy

we must not
any single
shall find it

expect

to develop its subject-matter out of

principle of being.

On

the contrary,

we

necessary, before proceeding to

any further researches,

the most general points

that

we should

inquire into

all

of view from which the world of actual existence can

be considered,
This
is

or,

in other words, enumerate the highest

generic concepts themselves.

it is

with which the doctrine of the Categories

concerned, and these form accordingly the true con-

necting link, in Aristotle's philosophic system, between

Logic and Metaphysics.

Anim., Anal.

PH.

i.

46, 51, b, 22,

Tpa
'6ff(ou
/xirj0'

8'

4iri(TT'fifji.r]

icrrlv
6/c

ere'/jay,

and Bhet.
cannot
ciples),

That which be deduced from any

iii.

6 fin.

at apxal

eVepot
TO,

e/c

rwu avr&v rwv ereptav. Metaph.

fiij'j^
:

other thing (the highest prinmust be explained by analogy, as, for example, the concepts of Matter, of Form, &c. cf Me;
.

iii.

2,

997, a, 21

-K^pl

oZv rd avr6
Kad' eVri

yivos
T7JS

avfifiefirfKSTa

avrk
QeuIbid.

avTTis [eTTio-T^jwr/s]

priffai e/c tS)V

avTwv

8o^a>v.

taph, ix. 6 (vid. sup. p. 269, n. 1); xii. 4, 1070, b, 16 sqq,, and Phys. i. 7,191, a, 7. Thisisthe account given by Trendelenbueg in \)Ss,Hist. Beitr. i. 151 sqq. Analogy is of special importance to Aristotle in his study of Natural History; see thereon infra, and cf, Meyer, Arist. Thierkundcy 334 sqq. ' Ayial. Post. i. 28 init. fila 8' iricrr'f)fMr} 4crTlv . 7} iuds y^vovs
' :
.

1003, b, 19: ottovtos Se 2, yevovs Kal aX(TQT](ris jxia hds Kal iiriar-fjixy. Ibid. 1004, a, 3:
iv.

Toaavra

fi^pr}

(f)i\o<ro<plas
. .
.

e<rrlv

ocranrep at oixriai

vdvs y4vr\
TovTois.

^x^^''''^

"^^

vndpx^i y^p ^v Kal rd 6u

Sid Kal ai iiricTTrinai aKoKovd-fjcrovai

The relation between and the concept of the First Philosophy will be examined
this

infra.

VOL.

I.

274

AUISTOTLE

CHAPTER YI
INTRODUCTORY INQUIRIES TOUCHING ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS
1
.

The Categories
fall,

All

the objects of our thought

according to Ari:

stotle,

under one or other of the following ten concepts

Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Where,

Situation, Possession, Action, Passion.

When,

These highest concepts

the

Categories

neither

mean

which would be utterly foreign to his Realism, nor are they merely concerned with logical relations. What they exTrendelenburg, Gesch. Katcgoriecnlehre {Hist. Beitr. i. 1846), pp. 1-195, 209-217; BONITZ on Aristotle's Catego'

to

him merely

subjective forms of thought,

C.

init.

ruv

Kara

ix-ql^jxiav

d.

o-u/iTrAo/cV X^yoix^vwv '4Ka(rrov ijroi otxriav (Tr]iJ.ahei ^ iroahv ^ iroibv ^

irpos

/)

irov

v)

irorh

-fj

/ceTo-^ot

^
i.

ries, Aristotel. Sttid. vi.

H.

(first

published in the SitzvngsheHclit der Wiener Akad., Hist.pMlol. ATZ. 1853, B. X. 591 sqq.); PrANTL, Gesch. d. Log. i. 182 SCHUPPE, Die sqq., 90 sq. arist. Kategorieen. (^Gymn. progr,
;

^x^iv v) ttoi^Iv 9 i/iit. fxcTa

:

i)

irdcrx^iv.

To^).

to'ivvv

ravra Se?

twv KaTTjyopiwv, virapxava-iu at ^7]de7(rai Trrapes [opos, yhos, Uiov, av/j-fiefinSiopia-aadaiTayfj/r]

iv

oh

eari Se ravra rhu apiOfihu d^Ka, ri ion, iroahv, iroiov, npos ri,
k6s].
irov,

essay

1S66) cf. BrentANO's der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nacli Ar., published in 1862. 2 Categ. c. 2 init. r(hv \eyoKara avfj-irXoK^v jueVwi/ rk juej/ \4y(rai, ra S' &uv av/jLvKoKris.
Gleifvitz,
;

irore,

Keladai,

ex^iu,

iroie7y,

Vo7i

iraax^iv.
^ Aristotle uses various expressions to designate them (cf. Trendelenburg, loc. cit. at p. 6 sqq., and BONITZ, ^vt stipra^ at p. 23 sqq., and in the Ind. AHst.

METAPHYSICS
press
all
is

276

rather the different forms of the Actual.^

Not

forms of the Actual, however, are categories or divi;

sions of categories

different formal points of

but only those which represent the view under which the Actual

may be treated.
378, a, 5 sqq.).
rh.
7ej/r7
i.

Therefore he does not reckon

calls them ovtos, cf.

among the

He
tov

(^scilicet,
1,

De An.

402, a, 22), to. irpwra 9, 1034, b, 7), also SjatpcVets {Top. iv. 1, 120, b, 36, 121, a, 6), and irrcixreis (J^Ietaph. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, with which cf. Etlh. End. i. 8, 1217, b, 29), t^ Koivh. TTpcora {Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, b, 20, and Metajfh. vii. 9,

Metaph.

vii.

whereas the predicate, as such, can only occur in the proposition. Hence it is needless to ask the question (over which Schuppb, loc. cit. 21 sq., gives himself unnecessary trouble) in what sense Substance,' which is notapredicate-concept (inde infra, ch. vii. init.), can belong to the scheme of the categories. Any concept becomes a predicate by being asserted of something, and this may occur even with concepts expressing substance (cf Metaph, vii. 3, 1029, a, 23, to /xev yhp
*
.

1034, b, 9)

but most frequently

or
(ttjs kottj-

Karriyopiai, KaT'i]yop-i)fxaTa, y4vT]

(Tx^^aTa rSiv KaTijyopiSiv

yoplas).

BONITZ

(with

whom

Beitr. zur Logik, ii. 1 sqq. agrees) rightly explains the last expression by simply transand lating KaTt]yopia * assertion consequently yfvii\ or ax^H-o-To. r. Kar. = the chief genera or fundamental forms of assertion,' = the various senses in which an object
' ; ' '

LUTHE,

&\\a
8e

Trjs ovorias
ii\rjs).

Karriyopenai aVrrj

TTJS

For instance, in

the

proposition, ' this man is Socrates,' Socrates is predicate. From this logical function, which

meaning modes

The same can be spoken of.' is conveyed also by the

shorter Kor-qyopiai = the various
'

of assertion,' or Karriyopiai rov 6vros (Pht/s. iii. 1, 200, b, 28 Metajih. iv. 28, 1024, b, 13, ix. 1, 1045, b, 28, xiv. 6, 1 093, b, 19, &c.); the latter phrase implying that every such assertion is concerned with being. The meaning of predicate,' which Karn]yopia often has in other places, and which
;

'

Brentano Qog. cit. 105 sq.) and ScHUPPE give it here, does not
suit the Aristotelian categories, designate the for the latter different senses of the to koto
pmihifxiav

may take on in a 2Jf"oposition, it by no means follows that such an idea, when regarded out of this special relation and with reference solely to the content of the idea itself, is to be regarded as signifying anything dependent, or in the nature of a property or avfjifiifiriKSs. Strumpell is mistaken in saying (Gesch. d tlieor. Phil. h. d. GriecJien, p. 211) that the categories treat of the various ways of predicating or the distinctions to be drawn in the ways of combining concepts, though in other respects he correctly apprehends the merely formal character of the
a substance-concept

categories.
^

avfi-irXoK^v

KeySfxeua,

Mttaph.

V.

7,

1017,

a,

22

T 2

276

AniSTOTLE

categories eitlier tliose concepts whicli are so universal as to be predicable of things of the most different kinds,

and

to have a different

meaning according

to the rela-

tion in

which they are used (such as the concepts of Being and of Unity ^), or any of those more definite expressions which concern the concrete condition of
ouTO 5e dual Xey^Tai offairep ra o-xVt t^s kottjyopias' 6(rax(ii>s yap Xeyerai, roaouTaxcos rb eluai (TTjfxaiyei (cf. Mh. JV. i. 4, 1096, a, 23). Hence the categories are called KaTrjyoplai Tov ovTos (see preceding
Ka6'
ffrj/xaiuei

tity,

and a fourth as to place cf. following note. These two concepts (which
; '

KaTO,

ovTusv,

navTuv fiaKitna \4yerai rwv according to Metaph. iii.

;

3,998, b, 22 sqq.; x. 2, 1053, b> 16 sqq. viii. 16, 1045, b, 6, cf. That of which they re- supra, p. 272, n. 1), are no y4v7)y note). present the various meanings is but predicates which may be the tv {Metaj?7i. vi. 2 init. ix. 1, applied to all that is possible. De An. i. 5, 410, a, That they cannot be genera, 1045, b, 32 13 Irt 5t iroWax^s Aey OfjLeuov rov Aristotle proves in Metaph. iii. 3, by observing that a genus can ouTOSf ar}fxa(vi yap rh fxeu rdSe ti, &c.); cf. I7id. Arist. 378, a, 13 never be predicated of the mark Logical relations of con- which stands to it as a specific sqq. cepts, on the other hand (such as difference, but that Being and Unity must be predicable of 'opos, yhos, X^iov, crvfJifiefirjKhs), are not expressed in separate cate- every mark which can be added but run indifferently- to the Sy and the ovaia.^ Both the gories, through them all. In answer to concepts are used in various the question ri ian; for instance, meanings. MetajjJi. v. 7, gives you may get according to cir- four senses of Being,' while ix. 10 (cf. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, where cumstances an ovaia, a iroahv, &c. As little are the the Kara (rvfjL^efirjKhs Keydfievov "bv see Top. i. 9. categories concerned with the is omitted) gives three, one of opposition of true and false, these being that /coto to ffxh^-o-'^owhich has reference, not to the rSiv KaT'i)yopiu>v, which suggests nature of things, but to our rela- that a different kind of Being cortion to them {3Ietaj)h. vi. 4, 1027, b, responds to each category, and Being 29). Yet Aristotle sometimes does therefore implies that make, after all, an ontological cannot as such coincide with any The same is application of the categories, as single category. rh %v 4v iravrl when, for example, he deduces true of Unity the different kinds of change y4vi dffri ris (pvffis, Koi ovOevhs from the circumstance that one tovt6 y avrh r] (pixris, rb Iv ( = there is nothing whose essence kind is concerned with things as to their substance, another as to consists in Unity as such '). It their quality, a third as to quan- likewise occurs in all categories,
;
:

'

'

'

'

'

METAPHYSICS
any
object

m^
ethical
properties.*;

and

its

physical or

Equally does he exclude from the number of categories

those general metaphysical conceptions which serve to

explain concrete peculiarities and processes,

such as

the

conceptions of the Actual

and the

Possible, of

Form and
object, of

Matter, and of the four kinds of Cause. ^

The

but adds to the concept of the

be put in the category of Action

which it is predicated, no new mark and Aristotle concludes from this, '6ri ravTha-Tjiiiaivei
;

and Passion {Top.

iv. 1,

120, b,

ircos

rh ej/ Ka\ rh Iv (Metaph. x. 2, 1054, a, 9 sqq.), the rh eu koI rb tv ravrhv Koi fiia (pvcris r^ a/coAaA\' ou% ais ovQeiv aW'fjXois
.
. .

26; Pliys. v. 2, 225, b, 13, iii. 1, 201, a, 23; Be An. iii. 2, 426, a, 2 Teendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 135 sqq.), and in this sense it is
;

even used in MetapJi.

b, 22, to illustrate

viii. 4,

1029,

how

the cate-

kvL 2,

\6ycf)

dr}\oi>iJ.va (3Ieta.j)7i.

iv.

1003, b,

22),
3,

and that both

a,

have the same extension (avn(rrpi(p^i, xi.

gories other than Substance have a substratum, yet it does not itself become a category. Still

1061,
b,
*

15

sq., cf.

vii.

5,

1030,

10, c. 16, 1040,

b,

16).

Upon

Unity,'

cf.

also
'

Metaph.

X. 1 sqq.

ticular * unity treated of), and the references at and see also p. 272, n. 2 supra Heetling, Be Arist. notione unius, Berl. 1864, As to the hv, see particularly Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden. * For this reason such a concept as Movement (or Change) is not put among the categories
; ;

(where in paris of measure

would it be a category if we were to accept the belief of the later Peripatetics (which is not established by Metaph. v. 13, Simpl. Categ. 78, 5, 1020, a, 26 29 Bas.) that it belonged to
less
;

the category of the iroa-hv, or as others preferred (Simpl. ibid. 35, So also, 5, 38) to the irpos ti. when Eudemus (Bth. Bud. 1217, b, 26) gives Motion (in place of Action and Passion) among the categories, it is not Aristotelian. Other Peripatetics, notably Theo-

it is

rather, according to Aristotle,

a physical concept which, through the different categories, receives its further determination as substantial change, qualitative or quantitative change, or movement in space (Phys. v. 1 Jin.,
2 init., ibid. 226, a, 23, iii. 1, 200, b, 32 Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31 Be Ccelo, iv, 3, 310, a, 23 3Ietaph. xii. 2, 1069, b, 9 more about this infra). He allows that, looked at in itself, it may
c.
;

phrastus, said more correctly, that it * runs through many categories (Simpl. ibid. 35, 5, 38 Phys. 94, a). In the same way the G ood is to be found in various categories (Bth. N. 1. 4, 1096, a. 19, 23). ^ None of these concepts is reckoned among the categories or comprised under any one of them. On the contrary, whea Aristotle is the considering various meanings of Being,' he mentions the distinction of Suj/'

'

'

278

ARISTOTLE
is

purpose of 'categories'

not to describe things by their

actual qualities, nor yet to set forth the general con-

ceptions which are needful for this purpose.

They

are

confined to pointing out the different sides which

may

be kept in view in any such description.

intention,

In Aristotle's
not real con-

they are meant to give

us,

framework into which all real conceptions are to be set, whether they are confined to one division of the framework or extend to several.'
ceptions, but only the

and ivreK^x^la, with the distinction of truth and falsity, as matters to be superadded to the distinctions expressed by the categories (Metajjh. v. 7, 1017, a, 7, 22, 31, 35, vi. 2 init., ix. 10 init.y c. 1, 1045, b, 32, xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26 Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 22, cf. Trendelenburg, Gesch. der Categorise )ileJire, ut supra., p. 157 sqq. BoNlTZ, nt supra, p. 19
<{/AJ
; ;

but themselves running through the various categories

sq.),

indifferently {Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26 Metaph. ix. 10 init. rb Se Kara dvvafiiv Kol iycpyeiavTOvrajv). Aristotle does not tell us why
;
:

they cannot be reckoned among the categories but the reason seems to be that indicated above, viz, that these ideas do not merely
;

relate, like those of substance, quality, &c., to the formal cha-

racter and the formal differences of that which falls under them, but designate definite real relations of actual being. Thus also Brandis, ii. b, 394 sqq. On the other hand Trendelenburg, ibid. 1G2 sq. explains the absence of Possibility and Actuality from the categories by saying that the latter are ' separated predicates,' whilst
'

'

'

the former is no real predicate.' It seems, however, that precisely the opposite is the case. The categories are not themselves directly taken as predicates, but only as designating the place of certain predicates in the scale whereas the distinction of Possible and Actual is based on real and definite facts, the contrast between the different conditions of development in individual things, and the opposition in the universe as a whole between the corporeal and the spiritual. The one kind of distinction is only an abstract, metaphysical expression of the other. But it is not possible entirely to agree with Bonitz when he says on p. 18, 21, that the categories are only meant to render possible a survey of what is contained in the empirical data,' and hence that * such concepts are excluded as extend beyond the comprehension of empirical data, to any kind of explanation of them.' For the concept of Motion is given by experience just as much as that of Action and Passion, and the concept of Substance is as valuable for explaining the data as that of form and matter, or of
'

'

'

METAPHYSICS
Of the completeness

279

of this framework, Aristotle is

tells

convinced/ but he nowhere

actuality

us

how he came

to set

does

it

and possibility. Nor seem possible to say with

Bebntano (loc. cit. p. 82 sq.),that the categories are 'real concepts,'

if

8, 10, a, 35 sqq. Metaph. v. 20), he refers back with the words KoX ToAAo 5' ws Bi-^prirai irpSrepov. Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 24: irSrepov

by this we are to understand such concepts as designate the common object-matter of a series of experiences, such as are the concepts of weight, extension, thought, &c. For those very
categories which are most frequently and universally applied substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, and passion

rJSe ri Koi ohcria ^ iroihv ^

Kai
ris

trocrhv

SAAt]

ruv

Siaip0ei(Twv

Karffyopicou.
(rTjfxaivei

Ibid.

c. 5,

410, a, 14:

TTocrhv

yap rh fihv rJSe ri xb fie ^ iroihv ^ Kai riva &X\7]v tS>v diaipcdeicrwv Karriyopicov. Anal. PH. i. 37 rh S' vtrdpx^^v rSSe
:

T(^5e

bffaxSis

at
xii.

TO(TavTax(t>s XrjirTeov KaTr\yopiai hn^p'f)vrai.

1
,
:

designate merely formal relations, and hence are adapted to cover and apply to a content of the most diverse character and though this is not so absolutely true of others such as irov, ttotc, or Ke7(r6ai that peculiarity only proves that Aristotle was not able strictly to carry out through them all the point of view with which he started his categoryscheme as a whole. Bkentano himself, at p. 131 sq., admits that the distinction of the categories is not a real distinction.' Prantl, GescJi. d. Log. i. 204 sqq., denies that Aristotle adopted any absolutely fixed number of categories but it is clear, not only from the enumerations given at p. 274, n. 2 and p. 282, n. 3, but also from many other expressions, that he did. Thus we have in Soph. El. c. 22, init. iirelirep
;

1069, a, 20 nrpwrov rh iroihv, elra rh TTOffSv; vi. 2, 1026, a, 36: ra T7JS Karrjyopias, oTov rh o'x^fJ'-o-'TO. jxkv r\, rh Se iroihv, rh 8e iroahv, rh Se iroS, rh Se ttotc, /col elf ri &XXo (rr]fxaivi rhv rpSvov rovrov ; vii. 4, koI yap rh ri iariv 1030, a, 18 eva fiev rp6irov (njiuaivei r^v ovaiav Kai rh r65e ri, &\\ov Se (Kacrrov
7}

Metaph.

ohcria,

elra

rcov Karr^yopovfievuiv,

iroahv, iroihv
;

Kai '6aa
a,

33

&AAa roiavra xii. 4, 1070, it is a question of, irSnpov

'

erepai ^ at avral apxai aroix^la rSov ovffiSiV Kai rSiv irpos ri, Kol Kad^
eKoiarriv 5e roov Karrjyopiuv dfioicus.

Likewise in Meta^yJi.

vii. 9,

1034,

b, 9, xiv. 2, 1089, a, 7; Phys. iii. 1, 209, b, 26, after mentioning

some of the
to

categories,

he refers

at the rest with a mere &\\ai Karriyopiai,^ as to something well known, and in Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 12, a, 21, the impossi-

bility of

an
is

ruv Karrtyopicov namely, the ten enumerated in

exo/xev Ttt y4v7]

argument

infinitely extended proved by the asser-

Top. i. 9, to which at c. 4, 166, b, 14, after mentioning rl (rabrh),

TToihv,
TTOcrhv,

iroiovv,

irdffxov, Sto-

(really only a kind of voihy, the diddeais see Categ. c.

Kd/xevov
:

tion that the number of categories is limited to those there named. The completeness of Aristotle's list of categories is also supposed by the proof referred to the end of p. 276, n. 2, that at

280

ARISTOTLE
; ^

out these categories and no others

categories themselves there
is

and among the

of
are
^

so little indication

any fixed principles

for their evolution

sion

that

we

there are only three kinds of motion (in the narrower sense),
qualitative, quantitative, and local (Phys. v. 1 sq.), inasmuch

as those referred to in Categ. c. 7 trov and irore are re;

as that theorem is proved by the process of exclusion. Motion,' Aristotle argues, does not occur in the categories of substance, &c. therefore only those three categories remain.' ' Even in the lost writings no
' '
:

presented by the adverbs of place and time; the last four categories are to be looked for in the
verb, for 7roi6?v and irdo-xeii' translate into a general concept the force of the active and passive voices, as K^lffdai renders one side of the intransitive, and ^x^iv the special force of the Greek perfect. But, in the first place, as

way. On the contrary, he does not distinguish the parts of speech on any such method as 2 ToTRENDELENBUEG(in his that which Trendelenburg's dissertation Be Arist. Categoriis theory of the categories would [Berl. 18.'i8] and the Elementa presuppose, for he nowhere exLogioes Arutotelicce, p. 54) be- pressly distinguishes the adverbe, longs the credit of having first he treats the adjective (as priiia) endeavoured to find one. But along with the verb, and in fact even his repeated explanation in the only parts of speech which Hist. Beitr. i. 23 sqq., 194 sq. has he names (apart from the article not persuaded us that he has and conjunction) are the ovona really succeeded in doing so. It and the ^^/io. It is therefore seems rather that the objections not probable that grammatical which RiTTER, iii. 80, and still forms to which, as 'parts of more exhaustively^ Bonitz, loc. speech' he paid no attention, cit. 35 sqq., have brought against should nevertheless have guided his opinion, are well justified. him in distinguishing the classes Trendelenburg (and after him of concepts. And, again, the BlESE, Phil. d. Arist. i. 54 sq.) two series do not in fact correbelieves that in setting out these spond to any such extent as we ten genera Aristotle was proxi- should have expected if Trendemately influenced by gramma- lenburg's supposition were tical distinctions. He suggests correct. For 'quantity' and that oifo-ia corresponds to the quality may just as well be exsubstantive, voahv and voihp to pressed by substantives (e.g. \evthe adjective with irpos corKSrrjs, eep/iorrjs, &c., Categ. c. 8, respond such forms of expres- 9, a, 29) or verbs (AcAeuKwrot,
:

occurred; otherwise the early commentators would have appealed to it. Whereas, on the contrary, Simpl. SchM. in Ar. 79, a, 44, says '6\us ovSaiaov irepl
Tttftcos

such have

demonstration

seems

to

Bonitz, p. 41 sqq., fully proves, Aristotle himself nowhere gives any indication of his having arrived at his categories in this

rrjs

tcov

'^^vSsv

oiiBefiiau

alriau 6 'Apto-ToreATjs air(pr}vaTO.

'

'

'

'

METAPHYSICS
by putting together the main points
true that a certain logical

^81

reduced to supposing that he obtained them empirically,

of

view from which

It is

the data of experience can be practically treated.

progress
is

to

be found

among them. Next Thing.

We

begin with the Substantial

the

in order to this, he deals with Quali-

action &c.) as by adjectives and passion as well by substantives (irpa|js, v6lQo^, Sec.) as by time not only by adverbs verbs but also by adjectives (x^iChs,
;

'

'

'

very many subSVTpa7os, &c.) stantives designate no substance {Categ. c. 5, 4, a, 14, 21); and a corresponding for relation
; '

form cannot be found. Beentano, loc. cit. p.

grammatical
148 sqq., also seeks to defend the Aristotelian categories against the charge of having no scientific derivation and suggests another He believes that in scheme. arranging them Aristotle first dis'substance' from tinguished
and, among the distinguished the absolute from the relative and that he went on to divide the former into (1) inherences (material =
'accidents,'
latter,
;

there are two facts first, that Aristotle in speaking of the categories, never indicates such a deduction, and next, that none can be found into which they naturally fit. Even in Brentano's ingenious scheme, this is not the case. If the ten categories had come about in the way he suggests, they would have been enumerated by Aristotle in a corresponding order. Instead of that, the irpos ti, which, according to Brentano, should come last, stands in the middle in every enumeration (see p.274, n. 1 and p. 282, n. 3), andits regular place (the only exception
:

being Phys. v. 1) is immediately after the inherences' After it, again, the affections do not follow (as they should according to Brentano's order), but the

'

TToahv, and formal = ttoiSv) (2) ajfections (iroteTi/ and irdo-xttJ', to which, at one time, Aristotle added
;

external circumstances.^ Nor is the distinction of inherences and

'

(3) external circumstances and irore, and, for a time, K7(r0ai). The question is not, however, whether it is possible to bring the ten categories into some logical scheme (for that
X^"')
;

affections Mi^^t Aristotelian. So far as a logical disposition of the

(iroO

could be done with any series, unless it were merely put together at haphazard), but whether Aristotle aiTived at them by means of a logical deduction. And against any such supposition

categories ex post facto is concerned, Zeller gives on p. 288 infra, that which he prefers, although he does not believe that Aristotle arrived at his list of categories by any method in which he had in his mind beforehand either that or any other logical scheme into which they were to fit.

282
ties:
first

ARISTOTLE
(in the

iroaov and ttoiov), those

qualities

which belong to a thing in itself, and then (in the irpos Ti), those which belong to a thing in its relation to
other things.
conditions
of

From
list

these he passes to the external

sensible

existence

Space

and

Time.
This

And

he ends the

with the concepts which express

strict sense

changes and the conditions thereby produced.

cannot be called a deduction in the
;

for that,

according to Aristotelian principles, was not possible

in the case of the highest general conceptions at
all.^

In

fact,

the order of the

It

categories
is

is

not

always
ar-

the same. 2

even seems that ten

somewhat

bitrarily fixed as their

number.

Aristotle himself so

far recognises this, that in his later writings

he passes
in

over

the categories

of Possession

and

Situation,

places where he apparently intends to give a complete

It is possible that it may have been the example of the Pythagoreans,^ and the predilection

enumeration .3

Vide supra, pp. 246 and 272. Examples will be found in what follows, and also at p. 279, n. 1. The most striking thing
*
'^

^ iroahv ^ Trp6s ^ Trotiraaxov ^ irov ^ ttotc, Htup tv kuO^ cvhs Kar-nyoprjOf}. Ibid, b, 15 ray4vr] rSiv KaT-qyopiwv ir^wepavTai' ^
'6ti

iroibv

ovv

t)

that in Cat. c. 7, contrary to the otherwise constant rule, and even to the order given in c. 4, irp6s precedes iroi6v. No satisfactory reason can be found for this, but it would be rash to conclude anything from it against the genuineness of the work, since a later writer would probably be less
is

with regard to this

^ yap

fcoibv

^ troahv ^
fj

ttoiovu ^ ttoo-xoj'
ova-ia to

ttov

which the

'irp6s ri ^ ^ irore (the latter are op-

posed as a-vfifiefirjKdTa has been already mentioned). P7i]/s. v. 1

Ji?).
:

et

odv at Karrfyopiai Si-ppTjvrai

ova-ia koI troiSTrin

r^
koI

irork koI

t^ Trp6s
^

Ka\ rep irov Ka\ ti Kal r^ iroa-^

t^

iroieTv

irdarxeiv,

avdyKi)

rpcTs eJvai

Kiv-fjffeis (of.

p. 279, n. 1

permit a divergence from the order given than would

likely

to

Aristotle
'

himself,
i.

for

whom

it

was not firmly established.

Anal. Post.
^ h>
T(j3

MetajjJi. v. 8, 1017, a, 24: Jin.). rwv Karriyopovfievwv to. ficv ri ia-ri crrnxaivei, rh 5e iroihp, tA Se iroahv, to Se iTp6s n, rd Se nov rd Se Trore.
*

22, 83, a, 21

See Zell. Ph.

d.

Gr.

pt. 1,

S>(TTf

ri i(TTiv [^KarrjyopelraQ

325.

METAPHYSICS
for a

283

them by the seem to Aristotle natural that he should find a round number of cateBut we cannot well suppose any further congories. nection between his doctrine and the Pythagorean ^
decirnal

system inherited from

it

Platonists,^

which made

at first

nor

is

the conjecture^

much more

probable, that he

borrowed his categories from the school of Plato.'* It is true that almost all of them appear in Plato's writings ;
^

but we cannot attribute any great weight to this

arises,

coincidence, for the reason that in Plato they are merely

used as occasion
at a full

without any attempt to arrive

all

enumeration of

the categories in one scheme.

Among
*

the categories themselves,

much

the most
;

Zellek, ihid. p. 857 sqq. As Petersen supposed in Philos. Chrysipp. Fundamental

2

p. 12.
3

KOSE, ATist. Lihr. Ord. 238

In the
first

sqq.
place, there is of the ten categories among the Platonists and it is not likely that information about so notable a point would neither have been transmitted through their writings nor
*

no trace whatever

certainly not Platonic in fact it one chief point of dispute between Aristotle and his master that the latter conceded to ideas of quality the position of substances and made the iroihv an might rather suppose ohaia. (as Ueberweg does in his Logik, 47, at p. 100) that Aristotle was led to his theory of Categories in his recoil against the theory of Ideas, and, in particular, by the reflection that the Ideas only
is

We

through Chrysippus and other scholars of the Alexandrian period to

the

and through them

later Peripatetics, And to us.

again, the theory of the categories is so closely connected with the other opinions of Aristotle that it is not likely to have

things under the form of substantiality, whereas things in the actual world exhibit many different forms of existence. But as this explanation

represented

sprung up on other ground. Take, for example, merely the fundamental statements as to the ova' a and its relation to prowhich the whole perties, on in division of the categories These are Aristotle is basec^.

presupposes the distinction of substance from properties, &c., too much importance must not be attached to the theory. 5 See Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 205 sqq.; BONITZ, vt supra, p. 56. Prantl, Oesch. d. Log. i. 78 sqq., and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. p. 589,
itself

S84

ARISTOTLE
is

important

that of Substance, which

may

here be

fitly

treated at once in detail.

is

Substance, in the strict sense,

individual Substance.
is

That which can be

set out in

parts

a Quantum.^
is

If these parts are divided, then

if

the

Quantum
;

a discrete Quantum, a multitude;

it is

they are interdependent, then

a quantity
^

a constant Quantum,
(Oeo-is),

if
is

they are in a definite position

extensive
;

the quantity
(rd^Ls)

if

they are only in an order

it

without position,

then

is

non-extensive.^

The undivided,
is

or the unity by
is

distinguished,

means of which quantity the measure of it. This is the disit is

tinguishing

mark
"*

of quantity, that

measurable and
to a divisible

has a measure.

As Quantitas belongs
:

Metaph. v. 13 init. iroahv XcyeraiTh diaiperhvels ivvirdpxovTa,

'

wv cKarepov f) fKaffrov eV ri Kai r6S ri ir4(pvKv clvai. The eVuirdpxovra, however, are, the constituent parts as distinguished from the logical elements of the concept. Thus, e.ff., in 3fetaj)7i. iii. 1, 995, b, 27, c, 3 init. he inquires whether the yevrj or the iwirdpXovra are the highest principles ;
ibid.
is
viii. 17 Jin. the (ttoix^Iov defined as that ds 6 ^laipelrai [sc. rX] ivvirdpxov [Acc] ws fj\7)v. Similarly in viii. 2, 1043, a, 19, cf. Gen. An. i.21,729,b. 3 wsivirndpXov KoX ixSpiov hv evdvs tov yivofievov (Ttafxaros fiiyvvfifvov rrj vXr}. Ibid. c. 18, 724, a, 24 Ua s 4^ vA-qs
: :

ber and time are also iroah, we must not suppose that these parts are merely material ones and in Metaph. v. 13, the roSe t* must be understood not of individual substance, but in a wider
'
'

sense,
2

as

signifying

anything

numerically distinct
TToahv Ka9' avrh

(apiO/j.^ /).

Meta2)h. v. 13 (where also

and Kara

(rv/jL^efij]-

k6s is spoken of).

Cat. 6 init.
ibid.

Trendelenburg,
treats

p.

82,

further of discrete and continuous quantities, with special reference to Cat. 6, Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 10 sqq. and Metaph.
loc. cit.
*

Cat.

sqq.

c. 6 init.y ibid. 5, a, 15 Aristotle does not here ex-

ylyveffdai

rivos

to yiyv6p.iva X^yo^^v, e/c ivvirdpxovros iariv.

press

the

opposition

of

....

that

Cat. c. 2, 1, a, 24, c, 5, 3, a, 32, &c. (Ind. Arist. 257, a, 39 sqq.) The iroahv is consequently that which is m^de up of parts, like a body, and not of logical elements, like a concept. But since num-

which has and that which has not extension in any general form, but merely by means of examples
(of

the
;

former

line,

body
*

of the latter
X.
1,

time, num1052, b, 15

surface,

ber, word).

Metaph.

METAPHYSICS

285

and substantial whole, so Qaalitas expresses the differences whereby the conceptual whole is divided; for
under Qualitas, in the
stotle

stricter sense of the word,^

Ari-

understands nothing else but the distinguishing

mark, or further determination wherein a given Universal particularises itself.

As

the two chief divisions

of qualities, he notes those which express an essential

distinction,
activity.^

and those which express a movement or

Elsewhere he names four determinations of
the most important,^ but these again
TrdOr]

quality as
sqq.

fall

Cat. c. 6, 4, b, 32. This follows immediately from the above definition ot Troff6v: that which can be divided into parts can also be built up of parts and
;

rwv

Kivovfi^uuv y

Kivov/xeva

Kal al ru)v Kivqffiwv hia^opal.

To

be measured by them.

Further

the first class belong, among other things, the qualitative distinctions of numbers to the
;

marks of

iroahv (Cat. c. 6, 5, b, 11 sqq.) are that nothing is opposed to it, and that it is what it is and neither more nor less, and that the concept of equality and inequality belongs peculiarly to
it.
'

second, aper^j and KUKia. With regard to the Sia<popd see supra, p. Therefore Quality ex215, n. 1. presses a determination of form, for that is true of the 8ia<t>oph Meta^yh. viii. 2, 1043, a, 19 %oiKe yap 6 fihv Sid rwv Sia<pop(ov \6yos Tov eWovs Kal ttjs ivepyelas elroi, 6
;
:

The generic concepts

ova-iai)

(devre-

5' /c

tcDj/

fuwapx^VTuv

ttjs

v\r}s

pai

are sometimes also called iroihp, or more correctly irot^ ovffla (Cat. c. 5, 3, b, 13 cf. Metaph. vii. 1, 1039, a, 1); and sometimes the <Tvfxfiefi7fK6Ta are
;

fiaWov.
3

TTotoTTjTos

The four cWtj Cat. c. 8. (bcsidcs which, we are

:

comprised under the same term

(Aruil. Post.
2
i.

22, 83, a, 36).

In Cat. c. 8 the concept of irott^rrjs is not explained except by reference partly to forms of speech and partly to examples. In 3Ieta2)h. v. 14, 1020, b, 13, however, there is an enumeration
of its different meanings thus: (Tx^^^y 5r; KOT& 5vo TpSirovs \4yoir' &v rh iroihv, Koi tovtwv eva rhv
KvpitifTOTov
rj

irpctTT? fitv

yap
.

iroiSTris
.

T^s

ovcrlas

5ia<popd

to Se

10, a, 25, others might occur) are the following (1) 6|s and Bid6<ns, which are distinguished inasmuch as f^is expresses a lasting state, while Siddetris is used sometimes for every state whatsoever, and sometimes for a transitory one (cf. Metajjh. v. 19, 20; BONITZ and Schwegleb on this passage Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 95 sqq. Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 303 sqq.) Instances of e|t$ are eVia-T^/iot and dperai] of mere Siddea-ts^ health and sickness. (2) "Oc*

told,

286

ARISTOTLE

under the same heads.^

He

treats as the peculiar

mark

of Qualitas, the opposition of the like and the

unlike. 2

But
^

in dividing off this category from others

Aristotle finds himself in difficulties.^

To the category
;

of Relativity

belongs that of which the peculiar essence

^

consists in a definite relation to something else

this sense Relativity
KaTo, Svva/jLiu (pvcriK^v

and in

is

the category which

would

expresses
(i.e.

aSwafilav fl Aeyerat (a class which, however, cannot be strictly distinguished from the e|ejs and Siadea-as see Trendelenburg, ibid. 98 sqq.
;

ation of the bodily parts

KitffQai),

BURG

(as TRENDELENrightly perceives, Hist.

More about the

Svua/xis

later).

(3) The passive qualities, 7ra07jTt/cai also called irddos in irotdrrjTes, the meaning of iroidrtjs Kaff %v aWoiova-Oai eVSexerai (3fetaj)h. v.
21),
irde-q

Beitr. i. 101 sq.) equally apply to many other things which Aristotle includes under Quality whilst, on the other hand, the impossibility of a constant definition of the categories is seen from the fact that a generic
^irto-TTj/tr;) may (e.g. concept belong to the Trp6s n, when a corresponding specific concept (ypafXfiariK^) belongs to the iroihy

and distinguished from the

(which
fall

under the category of Trao-xei"), by their duration. Aristotle,ho wever, understands by them not only the qualities which are produced by a irddos (such as white and black colour) but also those which produce a irdeos or an aWoiwais on our senses cf. De An. ii. 5 init. (4) Figure
:

{Cat.
b, 18

c. 8, 11, a,
;

20; Top.iv. 124,

whereas in Metaph. v. 15, 1021, b, 3, larpiKYi is counted under irpds ri, that it may follow
generic concept, iirKTrrjixrj). * That the category of RelaCat. c. 7, precedes tivity, in that of Quality (vide supra) is contrary to the natural relation of both, as is clear, not only in all other enumerations and in the express explanation in Meta2)h. xiv. 1, 1088, a, 22, but indirectly also (in Cat. c. 7 itself) from the fact that the o/xoiov and laov and quantitative (qualitative equality) is in 6, b, 21 counted as irp6s Ti cf. Top. i. 17 Trenits
; ;

(o-^^iiia Kal iJLopcpr]).

* For the first two and a part of the third express 'activities and movements the rest, 'essen; '

tial properties.'
2 Cat. c. 8, n, a, 15; on the other hand (ibid. 10, b, 12, 2G), the eVoj'TJOTTjs and the /xaWov kuI rjTTou ( = ditf erence of degree') do not belong to all quantities. The notion of Similarity, cf Tojj. i. 17
'
. ;

iVetajjh. v. 9, 1018, a,

15, x. 3, 1054, a, 3, and ijifra, p. 287, n. 2. ' For, on the one hand, the re-

delenburg,
5

ibid. p. 117.
c.

Thus
rh vpSs

Cat.

in Cat. c. 8, 10, a, 16, that the concepts of rarity and denseness, roughness and smoothness, designate no quality, but a sit^^-

mark

^(rrt

ri ols

7, 8, a, 31 rh elvai ravrdu
: :

iari

T^

irpds rl irws exeti'

where

the earlier verbal explanations are expressly declared (at the

METAPHYSICS
the least
reality.'
,2
^

287

Aristotle distinguishes three kinds

of Relativity
this,

which are again reduced to two.^

is

In

however, he

not consistent throughout,'^ nor has

he been able to find any sure marks of this category,^

or
to avoid confusing it in

many ways with

others.^

beginning of the chapter) to be Cf Top. vi. 4, 142, insufficient.

.

a, 26, c. 8, 146, b, 3.
'

Metaph.

ut

supra

rb Se

dently from the fact that it is measured or thought, and only becomes a relative in so far as that which measures and thinks enters
into relation with it). The like also in Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 34, 1057, a, 7. * Another division is found in Top. vi. 4, 125, a, 33 sqq. * The various peculiarities of the Relative which are mentioned in Cat. c. 7 are all found, as is there remarked, only in a part of that class e.g. the ivapndTrjs (6, b, 15, cf. Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 35, c. 7, 1057, a, 37, and also
:

Trpos Tt TTc^yTwr

[for

which Alex.

read iraawv] Hikioto. (pvais ris ^ Karriyopiwv iffri, Koi ovffia ruv
2
vcTTepa Tov irotoG Koi iroffov, &c. b, : rh 5e irp6s ri oijTC Svudfiei ovffla
;

oijT ivepydc^.

Mh.

iV.

i.

1096,

yap rovr' ^oikc Koi (TVfjL^efirjKSTi rod ovros. 2 Metaph. v. 15 the irpds ti appears in the following forms
a,

21

Ttapa<pv6j8i

(1) Ka6' apidfjihv Kal apidfiov irdOrj (and in other related forms) to this head belong the ^aov, 'dfioiov^ ravrhv in SO far as these are concerned with relations to a given
; : toutci ficv yap wv /xia t] ovffia, Hixoia 8' S>v rj TroicJrrjs fiia, iffa

Teendelenbukg,

123 sqq.), the

unity

S>v rh TToahv eV (the latter also

jxaKXov Kal ?ittov, the property of correlatives to be simultaneous ( Cat. 7, b, 15), which is not found in the relative of the second class (the iTria-TrjThu, &c., see note 3,

in Gen. et Corr.

ii.

6,

333, a, 29)
Kal

(2)

KOTtt

Svvafiiv

TTOtrjTi/cV

iradr}riKr]V,

like

the

dep/xavriKhv

supra). But it is a universal mark of every relative, to have a corresponding correlative (rh irphs
avTi(rrp4(povTa KeyeorOai, Cat. 6, b, 27 sqq.), which, in the main,
tallies

and the OepfiavrSv; (3) in the sense which comprises such expressions as fiCTprirhv,
Stoj/orjToV.
iiriffT'nThp,

The

first

two kinds
:

at first (c. 7

come also in Ph]/s. iii.

'

1, 200, b, 28. 3fefaph. ibid. 1021, a, 26 In the first two of the cases is called t<^ adduced the trpds oTrep eVrli' &Wov Acyeardai avrd h

with the statement made itiit.) and afterwards repeated (8, a, 33), that the irpos Tt is oaa avrd amp iarlv kr^puv
elyai

Aeyerot ^ oirwaovv

dWws

irphs

iarlv (double is

that

which

dfpfxavTiKdu).

dnr\daiov, dep/xavrov In the third case

rjixiffeos

warms

statement differing merely by being less exact. Individual substances {irpwrai oifffiai) cannot be relative but
erepov, the latter
;

avrd \4ycadai it is Tcp &\\o (what can be measured or thought

-irpbs

generic concepts (Sevrepai ovartai) may be. Cat. 8, a, 13 sqq.

Thus in
e'|iJ,

Cat. c. 7, 6, b, 2,
atadrjffiSy
iiri-

has

its

proper essence indepen-

the

Siddeais,

288

ARISTOTLE
categories are dealt with so briefly in

The remaining

Aristotle mentions

the treatise on the Oa/e^ories and, indeed, wherever them ^that an extended account of

them cannot be given here.^ The essential meaning of the theory

of

the cate-

gories lies in the fact that it indicates to

us

how

to

distinguish the different meanings of concepts and the Thus, different corresponding relations of the actual.
in the first place, the original or substance of each thing
is derivative.^ is

and unchangeable essence

distinguished from
all

that

Among

things which are derivative, a

the qualities, the activi-

division is again
ties,

made between

and the external circumstances.

Of the

qualities,

one class belong to things in themselves, and in this case they express sometimes a quantitative and sometimes
a
qualitative

determination

that

is

to

say,

they
^
;

have relation either to the substratum or to the

eiffis are referred to TTp6s of which, however, the first four belong also to Quality, the Position; noi^'iv and to last irio-veti', according to Metaj?h. v.
o-T^/tTj,

form

Ti,

has gone before. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, treats Action and Passion more at length, but that passage deals with the physical meaning of these terms, and we shall have to mention it later on. "Elts is discussed etymologically in Metaph. v. 15, and in Cat. c. 15 (in the FostproBdicamenta). ^ cf. note 4 on next page.
' As Trendelenburg, p. 103, rightly remarks, the Quale is related to the Form, the Quantum to the Matter vide siq^ra, 284, n. 1 and 4, p. 285, n. 2, cf. p. 219, n. 2. Thus similarity also, which, according to Aristotle, consists in qualitative equahty (see p. 286, n. 3, 287, n. 2), is deanother place, as in fined, equality of Form (Metaph. x. 3, Bfxoia Se ihv /xi] ravt^ 1054, b, 3
;
:

16, 1020, b, 28, 1021, a, 21, are relative concepts; the parts of a whole (^irrtUXiov, K<pa\i}, &c.) are also said to be relative (Cat.

6, b, 36 sqq., cf., however, 24 sqq.). Also Matter (Phys. and if so, why not ii 2 194, b, 8) Form as well ? In the abrupt ending of the
7, 8, a,
; '

genuine Categories, c. 9 (as to which, see the latter part of n. 1 to p. 64, S2ipra) it is merely said of
the category of iroterj/ and Trelo-xetv, that it is susceptible of opposition

and of More and Less.

As to

the other categories, there is nothing but a reference to what

METAPHYSICS

289

another class belong to things only in relation to other

things

that

is

to say, they are relative.^

With regard
is

to activities, the

most far-reaching opposition

;

that of

Action and Passion

on the other hand, the categories

of Possession and Situation, as has been already re-

marked,^ have only a precarious rank, and are afterwards

dropped by Aristotle himself sah

silentio.

Finally, as

regards external circumstances, these are taken on the

one hand in terms of Space, and on the other in terms

of Time, in the categories of the

Where and
;

the

When.

however, both of these ought to have been ranged under the Category of Relation and perhaps it was this kinship which led Aristotle to place them as a
strictness,

In

rule next in order after that category.^

gories, however, lead

All the catebase.''

back to Substance as their

airXws Svra .... Karh rb elSos ravTo. ^), in Metajjh. iv. 5, 1010, a, 23 sqq. iroa-hv and iroihv are

irapa

r^v

ovffiav
rrjs

iravra yap Kad^

oixrlas

viroKeifjLfvov

Xeyerai

transposed with iroahv and

elSos,

in MetajjJi. xi. G, 1063, a, 27, TToihv is taken as (pvais d}pi(Tix4uy], TToahv (like Matter, vide infra) as aSpiaros. * All concepts of relation refer to something which is con-

and

ditioned; substances are not Ti vide supra. ^ Vide snpra, p. 282.

:

irpos

ception
^

this is not without exclear from p. 282, n. 3. * Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11 TTOfTO yap ravra [iroihu, &c.]
'

That
is

(but what is asserted wa^' viroKeilx4vov is a Gvp.^cfiy}Kbs in the further sense Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 8 Metaph. v. 30 fin. &c) c. Ka\ yap Troffhv Kal 7, 190, a, 34 Koihv Ka\ irphs Tpou Kal Trore /cot wov yivTai vTroKei/jLeuov rivos hia rb ix6vr)v r}ju ovaiav fjLTjOevbs Kar' &\\ou \4yadai viroKei/xevov to 5' ^A.A.o TrdvTa Kara rrjs ovcrias iii. 4, 203, b, 32:' Metaph. vii. 1, 1028, a, 13, Ihid. 1. 32 irdvTMV rj ovffia irpooTOv
:

Kal Koytf Kal ypdcrei Kal

XP^^V

(cf.

the whole chapter);

c. 4,

1029, b,
:

Kara rcov ovcriup KaTvyopclrai (about avfi^e^riKhs in this meaning see p. 275 sqq.). Similarly 1. 19, iMd. a, 25, c, 4,
(rv/xfi4fir)Ke

Kol

23, c. 13, 1038, b, 27, ix. 1 i7iit. xi. 1, 1059, a., 29, xiv. 1, 1088, b, 4

vtmpov yap

[ttjs outrtos]

traaai at

73, b, 5.

Ph'i/s.

i.

1,

185, a, 31

ovOiv yap tuv

aWwv xwp'O'Td^'

iart

Karrtyopiai. Gen. ef Corr. i. 3, 317, b, 8. Hence in all the enumerations ovcria goes first. Cf. also infra, ch. vii. init.

VOL.

I.

*U

290

ARISTOTLE
inquiry, therefore, into Substance, or

An

Being as such,

must

be the starting-point in the investigation of the

Actual.
2.

Tlie

Fird

PJdlosoj^hi/ as the Science of Being.

As Science in general has for its task the investigation of the grounds of things,^ so the highest Science must be that which refers to the last and most universal
of the grounds of things.

For

this gives us the

else

most

comprehensive knowledge, everything

being com-

prehended under the most universal.

It gives us the

knowledge which
universal

is

most
are
It

difficult to attain, as the

most

principles

the

furthest

removed from

sense experience.
since
it

gives us the surest knowledge,

has to do with the most simple concepts and

It gives us the

principles.

most instructive knowledge,

all

because

it

points
is

out the highest grounds, and

instruction

a setting forth of the grounds of things.

It gives us that

knowledge which
it is

is

most truly an end

all

to itself, in that

concerned with the highest object

of knowledge.

It gives us that
it

which dominates

other knowledge, for

all

establishes that

end to which
is

knowledge
'

serves.^
p.

But any knowledge which

For
cite
is
-

to

Vide supra,

this

we

may
is

163 sqq. especially

Metapli.

i,

2,

where the above

(982, b, 7)
iiri
:

thus

summed up
iiriffrrj/jLTiv

Mctaph. i. 1, where, with reference to prevaihng views as to

wisclom, it that 6 fjLeu

airoLVT^v olv

twv dprm^vwv
TrlirTsi

t)]v

avrrjv

rh (y]Tov-

shown

(981, b, 30)
diroiavovv

jx^vov uvofxa\jTo(pia\-

deTyapravT'nv

/xTripos tojv

twv
sqq.

ixdvTOiv a1<TQT](nv eJuai 5ok7 crocpdirepos, 6 Sf TexftTTjs rwv i/xireipajv,

dewprjTiK'fjv.

itpuiTwv a.px('>v kx\ alricov elvai Cf. iii. 2, 996, b, 8

Mh.
a,
elvai.

TV. vi. 7.

Metapli.

vi. 1,

X^ipoTex^ov
Oeccp-qTiKoi

apx^f^KTwv, al 5e rcov iroi7iriKa>v fiaWov.

Se
jxlv

1026,
yivos
rSiv

21

t'^v

Ti^fjirdrTiv

[eirio-TT^urj?/]

Set irepl

rh rifxidoTarov

Hence
riva'i
(TT'fip.T],

'6ti

nZv

t)

cro(pla -rrepi
iiri-

al fihv ovv dfcaprjTiKal

aiT'.as

Koi

apxds eariv

Srj\ov.

avTT] 5e

dWcau iiTKTT'qixoov aiperdjTCpai, twv de:>:pr]TLKuv.

METAPHYSICS
set forth

291

the ultimate grounds of things must clearly

all

include

actuality, for these ultimate grounds are simply those which explain Being as suchj Other sciences, such as Physics and Mathematics, may limit

themselves to

a particular sphere, the

conception of

which they take no further. The science of the ultimate grounds of things must go through the whole world of things, and must take them back, not to finite principles,
but to their etern^L^auses, and, in the
that which
is

last resort,

to

proceeds
world. 2
'

all

unmoved and incorporeal, from which movement and formation in tho corporeal
is

This science
iv.
1
:

the First Philosophy, which

a'jTa virdpxovTa

Metaph.
Tiy
^f;

(ttiv

4iri-

t^ yivei
.

irepl o elaiv
?)

(TTXfir]

TOVT(j}

Of cope? rd Ou ^ ou Ka.1 to virapxovTa Kad' aur6. aunj S'

aTToSetKuvovcriu

^ ayayKaidrepov
.

fia\aKu>Tepoy.
el i(TTiu

d^ioius

5e oil'

iarlu oudefxia ruv iv fiepei KeyoIXIV03V T] avT-i] oifdefMiayaprdiV&Wcov

'

irpayfiaTevovTai ovSev

kxBoKov irepl tov outos /jup.is avrov ti airorefiotoutou fieyai d(t.'podm rd iirel Se tus apxas (Tvfji^e^riKOi Kal TCLs aKpordras otVias ^7]rov/j.V, SrjXov CDS (pvcredos rivos avTas avajKalov elvai Kad' avT^v. 5ti Kai 7)ijuv TOV ovTos f] hv ras irpdoras uiTias \rjTrTeov. Cf note 2 and
iiricTKotrei
i]

irepl h Keyovffi 5to Th TTis avT7]s eJvai Siavoias t6 t ti

jXT)

i<TTi

Th yevos

ou,

akKa

Trepl

siij/ra, ch. iv.

-

passim. See the previous note, and see also Metaph. vi. i at apxal Kal TO a^TlO ^'TJTCtTOt Ta>V OVTWU,
:

So with Physics and Mathematics, ihe former being concerned with that which is moved and in which the Form is not separated from the Matter, the latter being at the best concerned with that which is abstracted from Matter and Movement, but which does not exist of itself as immaterial and unmoved (cf. p.
it

effri SrjKoj/ iroielv Kal el ecrnv.

is

SrjAou 5e

on

f)

oi/ra.

Every science

has to do wiih certain principles and canses. oAAo iracrat avrai

&c.] irepl eV yivos Tre piypaxl/d/xepai itcpl TovTov TTpayixarevourai, oAA' ovxl irepl ofTos airXus ovSh ^ ov, ouSt' tov ri iariv ovdeva \6yov iroiovvTaf a\\' (K TOVTOV at jxep al(TQi](Tei
[laTpiK^], jj-aOrffiariK^,

183, n, 3) el 5e tI ecniv a'ihiov Kal aKLvrjTov Kal x^'P'O't^j/, (pavephv oti decoprjTiKrjs Th yvcovai. ov [xevTOi
:

(pvcnK?is

ye

ovde ixaOrjixaTiKTjs,

aXKa

irpoTepas

a/j.(po7v.

Ti Kal

The object
x'^'Pi'^rh koI

of this science

is

the

aKivTjTa avdyKT} Se irlvTa fxev to. aXTia a'iSia elvai, fiaK'ffTa Se tovto

iroi-i](ra(Tai

\afiovffai

avTO StjAoj/, ai 5' virodeaiu Th t'i iaTiv outco to Kad"

TouTO yap aXTia to7s (pavepols tw Qeiujv. In them, if anywhere, to delov must be sought with them stands or falls the possibility of
;

202 Aristotle also

ARISTOTLE

tigate all actuality

names Theology/ and its task is to invesand the ultimate grounds thereof, as being ultimate, are necessarily also the most which, universal, and concern, not any part of the actual, but
the whole.
It is true that the possibility of

such a science

is

open to much question. How can one and the same science treat of causes which are of different kinds, and

which do not act collectively together

other hand,
if

And, on the
each r/enus

we were

to refer the causes of

to a special science,

how
is

could any one of these sciences

described above
it

claim to be that which

since in this
it

case the qualities claimed for

would rather be divided

?
^

up among the
its

special

sciences

Again,
is

is

question whether the First Philosophy

to

draw

into

scope the

principles
at

of scientific
all

procedure,
definite

or

whether these belong

to

any

science,
it

inasmuch
relate.^

as all sciences

make

use of them and

is

impossible to assign any definite object to which they

Or, again,
is it

to be a single science, or
all classes

more

than one, which will deal with

If there

of the actual ?

are

whether they are

of

more than one, the next question is, all of the same kind or no, and which
If there be only one,
all

them
it

is

the First Philosophy.

then

would seem that that one must include

:

if there is a First Philosophy nothing else besides natural substances, Physics is the first science ; tl 8' l(ni ris ovala aK'vrjTos,

ovra p ui/. Metajjh.

'

loc. cit. et alih.

vid.
c.

mpra.
-

Metaph.
Ibid.
;

iii.

1,

995, b, 4,

auTTj TTpoTtpa KoX <t)iKo<TQ(pia irpJiri]

init.
^

Kol KadoXoi) ouTws nepl Tov iiuTos

decoprjcrai Koi ri
t)

oTi irpujT-n
'bv

'

fccu
e^rj

ravrrjs

ii,v

b,

26

ct.

c. 1, 995, b, 6, c. 2, 996, sujjra,ch. \.j?ass7m.

iari Koi ra vvdpx-

METAPHYSICS
objects of knowledge,

293
ot

and thereby the multiplicity

Finally

the special sciences would disappear.'

we may

ask whether this single science

is

to relate only to sub-

stances or to their qualities also.

The

first

alternative

to say

it would be then impossible what kind of science had to do with the qualities of Being. The latter seems untenable, because sub-

seems inadmissible, because

stances

cannot be

known by

the

same method

of

demonstration as qualities.^
Aristotle

answers these questions by

remarking

that not only that which falls under the same conception,

but also that which relates to the same object, belongs

to

one and the same science.^

This, he says,
is itself

is

the case

as regards Being. or
is

Only that which

are

Substance,

somehow

related to substance, can be

named Being.

All

those conceptions which

in question denote

either that
ties
all

which

is

Substantial, or else qualities, activi-

lead

and circumstances of Substance, and in the end they up to certain elementary pairs of opposites, and
fall

opposites

under the same

it is

science."*

For these
diflSculty

reasons he concludes that

one and the same science

which has to deal with

'

all

Being as such.^ The

2,

Metaph. ibid. 995, b, 10, c. 997, a, 15. C. 1, 995, b, 18, C. 2, 997, a,

'^

ov '^ap fi6vov

Metaph. iv. 2, 1003, b, 12: twv kuO' tv \'}o;xV(i}v

eVto-TrjiUTjs i<TTleeu'p?](rai /mas,

aWh
-I

25.

Among

the

a-vfifiefirjKOTa ra'is

Kal roov irphs jxiav Xiyojxivwv (pvaiv.

ova-iais must be counted also the concepts of ralrhv, erepov, o/jloiov,

in 995, 1003, b, 34 sqq. 1004, a, 1(5 sqq. The furtl er Apories of the third book, which are concerned not only with the concept of the First Philosophy but also with its contents, will be mentioned later on.
b,

ivavTiov, Sec.

enumerated

JMd. 1. 19, 1004, a, 24, cf. note and as to the difference between Kad' v and nphs ev, see lUetaph.
%ii. 4,
^

20;

cf. iv. 2,

On

1040, a, 34 sqq. this point see

:

p.

221,

supra,.
* Mttapli. iv. 2 rb Se ov Keyerai fih iroXKaxus. a\ha irpls (v Koi /n av riva (ftvaiv (for which

later

airav irpls ixiav

apxhy) kaI

294

ARISTOTLE
must needs resume in itself the content is removed in Aristotle's mind by
in

that this science

of
all

other sciences,

the distinction he draws between the different senses of

Being.

As Philosophy

general

has to do

with

Essential Being, so there will be as

many
from

sections of
^

Philosophy as there are kinds of Essential Being.

As
in

Being determinate
general, so
science
is

is

distinguished

Being

the First Philosophy as the

universal
It

distinguished

from the special

It abstracts

sciences.

deals with the particular also, not in its particularity,

but as a form of Being.

ties

from the peculiariitself

it

whereby a particular thing distinguishes

from

others, in order to

have regard to that only in

which

appertains to
itself

all Being.^ The objection that Substance must needs be treated in other ways than that

ovx

d/jLwvviuLccs

o-j(rlo.i

... TO, ivra \iyeTai, to.

.

jxiv "yap oti

S'

25, b, 27 sqq.

oti irddr)

Metaj)h. iv.

2,

1004,
a,

a,

2,

ovaias,
(pOopal

ra
t)

8'

on

oShs

(Is

ovaiau,

7)
-7)

&c.
-

(TTepriaeis ^ TrotOTTjres ^ yevur]TiKa ovaias, r) rSsv irphs T^v ovffiav heyojj.4vuy, ^ tovtuiv Tivhs aiTO(\>a(r(is ovaias Sih Kal to fxT] hv ehai fir] ov (pafj.4v. The consideration of One also belong-s to this science, for the ev and the ov are (ilnd. 1003, b, 22) TavThu Ka\
iroi7]TiKa
ir)

Mctaph.

iv. 2,

1004,

9 sqq.

Since the concepts of the One and the Many, of Identity and
Distinction, &c., relate to one and the same object, therefore one and the same science must deal with them; 1004, b, 5:
eirel
fl

ovv tov kvos

fj

ev Kal tov ovtos

jx'a

(pvais

Tw
aiTiov,

aKO\ov6e7u,

wairep
^'''

apxh
X'jyq}

Kal

aAA' ovx ^^
.

dr}Xovfxva
TO,

8f/Aoi/

ovu

TavTa Kad^ avTd iaTi irddri, aAA' ovx o.pi6inol ^ ypajxfial ^ irvp. drjAou us (Keivris ttjs i'in(TTi,fi'qs Kal
ov
TL eo-Tt yj'Mpiaai Kal to, av/j.fiefi'qKdT

OTI

Kal

ovTO.

jULias

dewprjaai

ovTa.
trpdjTOv

iravTaxov
T]

Se

iTnaTTifiT]
St'

aWa
h,v

^prrjTot Kal
7]

Kvpiws tov Kal 4^ ou to, h \4yovTai. t

avTo7s. As the mathematical and physical properties of things form a special province, ovrw koI
ovTi p hv ecTTt Tivh "(Sia, Kal toGt' eVrt nepl wv tov (piKoaoipov iTriaKf^aadai Ta\r}dis. Ibid. 1005, a, 8. This is further illustrated in xi. 3, 1061, a, 28 sqq.
ToJ

ovv toCt' icTTlv

Sioi

ovaia,

twv
.

oixriwy

Tos apxo.s Kal tols otV/as 5ih Kal tov exejc Thp (piX6ao(poj/. ouTOS 'Sea ttSr) Oewprjaai fxias iffTiv cVto-Tirj/Arjs Tq5 y4vei to. re e^Sij tuv eldccv. Further, 1004, a, 9 sqq.
.

METAPHYSICS
which proceeds by deducing its
essential attributes

296

would

not trouble Aristotle,^ since the same thing would be true of the fundamental coaceptions of any science whatever.

To

the question whether the First Philosophy

would

also deal with the general principles of scientific

procedure, Aristotle answers in the affirmative, inas-

much
In

as these principles themselves relate to

Being in

general rather than to any particular class of Being.

fact,

he proceeds immediately to a detailed investiits relation to

gation of the law of Contradiction and the Excluded

Middle, which by reason of

Methodology

has been already discussed at however, these inquiries

p.

251.

By

Aristotle,

^.Ain the present connection

his First Philo-

treated ontologically, as giving knowledge of the actual,

for

which reason he includes them in

sophy.^
3.

The Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics and their Treatment 'by earlier Philosophers.
Aristotle had left

The forerunners of
problems in the

him a

series of

way

of metaphysical inquiry for which

he found

it

necessary to obtain a

new

solution.

The

most important of these, to the answering of which the fundamental ideas of his system are immediately
directed,
1..

were the following

all,

First of

how

are wqjfo think of the actual ?

Is there

nothing but corporeal existence, as the prethat,

Socratic natural philosophy

beside
'

and above
It is

Or is there, assumed ? somfthing uncorporeal, as

nowhere expressly answered in the Metaphysics.

iv. 3.

MetapJt.
1.

vol..

* u 4

296

ARISTOTLE
?

Anaxagoras, the Megarians and Plato said

only, or is form to be distinguished

Are the

altimate grounds of things of the nature of matter

from matter as a

peculiar and a higher principle

2.

Connected with this

essential

is

the question of the rela-

tion of the Individual to the Universal.

What

is

that
Is
it

which

is

and

in the last resort actual ?

is

the individual things or the universal ideas, or

there

perhaps in truth only one universal Being

The first ? was the common view which hnd latel}^ come out, bluntly enough, in the Nominalism of Antisthenes the second was the theory of Plato the third that of Parmenides
;

and of Eucleides
3.

after him^'V^

Seeing that unity of being and manifold existence

two

how can we hold these Can the One be at the same time a manifold, including in itself a number of parts Can the Many come together in an and qualities ?
are both given in experience,
tosfether in thougrht ?

actual

unity

These questions also were variously

be
reconciled,

answered.

Parmenides and Zeno had denied that the

could

two

ideas

and had therefore

while
the

declared the manifold to

be a delusion,

Sophists used the assumption of the manifold for their

theory of argument, as Antisthenes for his theory of

knowledge.^

The Physicists of the Atomic and Empedoclean schools lijjftited the relation between the Many and the One to that of an external and mechanical The Pythagoreans found in juxtaposition of parts..

number, and Plato, with keener philosophic insight, in his Ideas, a means of combining a multitude of different
'

See ZELLEfi, Ph.

d.

Gr. pt.

1,

pp. 985 etc.

METAPHYSICS
corresponding
itself,

297

determinations of being in an inner unity, while the

relation

in sensible

things

explained

according to Plato, by impact.

4.

Equally different were the views held as to the

passing of the one into another

of

that
How

is,

as to the theory

Change and Becoming.

to be or cease to be ?

can being become

not-being, or not-being being

come

? How can anything How is movement possible,

or change ?

Such were the questions that Parmenides and Zeno had asked in doubt, and the Megarians and the Sophists had repeated their questionings. The like
drove Empedocles and Anaxagoras, Leucthings by the combinations and
Plato himself so

difficulties

ippus and Democritus to explain the coming to be and

ceasing to be of
all

separations of unchangeable matter.

far

agreed with them that he confined change to the

it

sphere of appearances, and excepted from

all

that

was truly

actual.

Aristotle has all these

questions

clearly in view.
^

To the

first

two problems related most

of the diroplai,

with which he opens his great work on Metaphysics,

after the introductory discussions of the first book.

Are
there

sensible things the

only essential being, or

?

is

besides
is it

them some other

'^

Is the

'

other

'

of one kind, or

manifold like the Ideas and mathematical entities

of Plato ?
is

The limitation of Being to sensible things contradicted by the series of arguments on which Plato
:

had already based his Ideal Theory

'

such
iii.

as,

that the
34 sqq. 1060, b,

just mentioned,

With the exception of those which are con-

Metaph.
1,

2, 997, a,
c. 2,

(xi.

1059, a, 38,
2.

cerncd with the office of the First Philosophy in general.

23),

iii. 6, viii,

298
particular things

ABISrOTLE
of sense, passing

and
^

indistinct as

they are, can be no object of knowledge

and that

all

the world of sense, as passing, presupposes an eternal as formed, presupas moved, presupposes an unmoved These Platonic assumptions, poses a forming cause.-

however, as
of
^

we

presently find, are beset by

all

manner

difficulties.

The problem returns

in the form of the

question
to be

whether the ultimate grounds of things are

for in their genera, or in their constituent

sought

parts

the

latter

being the basis of their

material

conditions, the other the basis of their formal determinations."*

be adduced.

For either view plausible arguments may On the one hand there is the analogy of

corporeal things, whose constituent parts

we name when

we have

to

explain their

character.

On

the other

hand there are the conditions of knowledge, which we attain to by a process of determination through concepts

And as in the assignment of genera and species. between these again there arises immediately the question, whether the highest genera or the lowest species
ought to be treated as the true
'principia.

The former
would be

would be universal, including

all

individual existence as

an ultimate principle should do.

individual in
'

The

latter

determinate conceptions, and out of such only could the

its

peculiarity of character be obtained.^

b, 21).
" ^

iv. 5,

vii. 15, 1039, b, 27; 1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 3, cf. i. G, 987, a, 84; xiii. 9, 1086, a, 37,

Metaph.

Vide supra, ch.

v.

Metaph.

iii.

998, b, 14 sqq.

b, 8.
2
^

Ibid.

999, b, 3 sqq. Metaph. iii. 3 Trc^repoi/ Set

iii.

4,

T^

7eVrj aTOix'^'ia KoX

apx^s

uTroAa^u-

^dveiv ^ jxaXKov 6| oov ivvTrapX'^v'''^v iarh '^KacTov irpuTov (xi, 1, 1059,

Among the (xi. 1, 1059, b, 34). varied and often intricate forms of Aristotle's dialectic, it is only possible to state here the leading line of reasoning.

METAPHYSICS
On
tlie

299

like considerations rests the other difficulty, to

^

which Aristotle rightly gives special prominence

question whether
tual, or
it is

the

only individual things that are ac-

whether the universal of the genera be actual also. ^

unlimited and of that which
is

The former theory seems untenable because the sphere

of individual existences
is is

unlimited no knowledge
is

possible,

and since

all

knowledge in any case

open to
of a
all

of universals.
lie

The
or

latter is

the objections which

against the theory

universal

existing independently,

the Ideal

Theory of Plato.^
particular

An

application of this question to a

case

is

contained in the

further inquiry,

whether the conceptions of the One and of Being denote

anything substantial or are only predicates for some
subject

of

a
at

different
all
(e.g.

nature.

Those who
as in

accept

universals
stantial,

Number)
the
first

any way sub;

must

affirm
is

proposition

but the

opposite opinion

not only supported by the analogy

of the whole world of concrete things, but also

by the argument that you cannot treat the One as substance

without denying, as did Parmenides, the existence of
'

Metaph.
18
10(50,

iii.

4 init.

c.

6 fn.
init.,
first
llie

Mctaph.
ovv fXT\94v ovOev au
oiffQ-nra,

iii.

4,

999, b, 1

et jxkv

(cf. vii.

sq.), xiii. 6,

xL 2

ian
etr]

irapa

ra KaO^

e/cacrro,

ibid.
TToo-oii'

b,

19.

In the
is

vorjThv

aWa

iravra

passage this Apory

Qiwpriffai;

called

xo^^TcoTaTr? Kal oj/ayKatoTaTrj similarly in xiii. 10, 1086, a, 10; and we shall find later on, that its importance and difficulty vest not merely on the opposition of Aristotle to Plato, but also on the intrinsic contradiction involved in the foundations of his own system. 2 That this Apory coincides with that adduced on p. 298, in Aristotle himself asserts

and hence he here again adduces the reasons, which were

there mentioned.
^

Metaph.

iii.

4, c.

6,

1008,

a,

161, 4. expression for the

5, cf. p.

Only another above is the

et'Set

question
,p'n.),
/
'^

(iii.

4,

999, b, 24, xi. 2

Tt>

whether the apxal are

apiO/xcp
e/
:

or rh

yap

apid/j-ff

eu

KaO^KaiTTov K^y^iv
c. 6,

5ia<ppei

ohekv (999, b, 33 cf. 30).

1002, b,

300

ARISTOTLE
To the same head belongs the Numbers and Figures are Substances

the Many, as such.'

question whether

or no, and to this also opposite answers are possible.

For as the qualities of bodies are mere predicates from

which we distinguish the

substrata,

bodii3s

themselves as their

and as these bodies presuppose, as their elements, the surface, the line, the point, and unity, it would seem that surface and unity must be as subwhile on the other hand these have stantial as body is
;

not any existence for themselves but only in corporeal

things,

and they do not come

to be

and cease

to be, as

Substances do.^ Yet another difficulty which leads back

to the relation of the individual to the Universal
,
'

is this.

The

jirincipia

must on the one hand,

as

it

seems, be of
:

a potential character, since possibility precedes actuality

on the other hand, they must be actual, since otherwise

Being would be merely

indeed, do actually exist

accidental.^
:

Individual things,

whereas the universal concept,

only potentially.

except in so far as

it

has found for itself a place in

^individual
if

entities, exists

And

finally,

there be besides the corporeal, an uncorporeal, and

beside the changing, an eternal, the final question

must

be whether both
not.

ot these
it

have the same principia^ or

If
3

If

we say Yes,

seems impossible to explain the

difference
*

between them.
iii.

we say No, then we must

Metaph.
1,

4,

1001, a,
c.

sqq., and, referring to this, x. 2,

xi
2

1059, b, 27,
iii.

2,

1060,

a, 36.

of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines, ' Ihid. iii. 6, 1002, b, 32 cf. BONITZ and Schwegler on this

5 (cf. xi. 2, 1060, p. 1002, b, 32 viii. 5 \n\t. c. 3, 1043, b, 15). shall meet with further objections to this view in the criticism

Metapli.

passage.
*

b, 12 sqq.,

and on

As Plato supposed, in

full

We

accordance with Aristotle's view, Cf Zeller, P/i. <?. (rr. pt. i. p. 628 sq. 805 sq.
.

METAPHYSICS

301

decide whether the principia of the changeable are themselves changeable or unchangeable. If they be changing, then we must go back to deeper principia,

with which the same dilemma will recur.

unchangeable, then
another the

If they be
it

we have

to explain

how
The

can be

that out of the unchanging, in one case the changeable,

in

unchangeable,

arises.^

like dif-

ficulty, in truth, applies to all

the different classes of

it

Being.

How,
fall

for

example,

is

possible that things

under wholly different categories, such as those of Substance and Relation, can lead back to principles that are one and the same ? ^

which

The other questions

stated above

those relating to

the unity of the manifold, and the possibility of change were clearly present to Aristotle's mind, and he sought
in the first principles of his Metaphysics to find a solu-

tion for them. unity, concerns

The combination of the manifold into him chiefly as leading up to the inquiry

how the genus and the

ception
;

differentia can be one in conthough he recognises that the same question may be raised in all cases where things of a different
3

nature are combined.^

'

Aristotle's answer, in all such

a,

Metaph.
Ibid.

iii.

4,

1000,

sqq. (xi. 2, 1060, a, 27).

4. Aristotle 1070, b, 17) that the linal grounds of things are only analogically the same for xii.
2

1014, a, 5, and settled in the manner stated in the text by viii

6.
<

answers

{ibid.

Thus with regard to numviii.

bers (^Metaph.
c.

3,

1044,

a,

2,

^11 This question also occurs in Anal. Pod. ii. 6, 1)2, a, 29. In Beliyterpr. c. 5, 17, a, 13, it is

and to the relation between soul and body (c. G, 1045, b, 11 De An. ii. 1, 412, b,
6
init.'),
;

6 sqq.)

but also in

many

cases:
b,

cf.

Mvtaph.
b

viii.

propped, discussed more fully in Metaph. vii. 12, again touched upon in viii. 3, 1043, b, 4 sqq..

12:

KofiToi

avrhs

other 6, 1045, \6yos iirl

itdvTu>v,

&c.

302
cases

ARISTOTLE
as will be seen, is in its essence

one and the

It is based upon the relation of the possible and the actual of Matter and Form.* The problems of Becoming and Change are of still greater importance If a thing comes to be, for the Aristotelian system.

same.

does

it

arise out of

being or out of not-being

it

If a

become something, or nothing ? thino- ceases to be, does Does change mean the becoming of opposite out of The one opposite, or of the same out of the same ? seems to be impossible because nothing can come out

of nothing, nor can anything return to nothing, nor take on it the qualities of its opposite {e.g. warmth the
qualities

of cold).

The other
it is

alternative

is

equally

impossible, because

absurd that anything should at

a definite time
^;imilar case
is

come
the

to be that

which

it

already

is.^

analogous problem whether those

things which act upon each other are likes or opposites.^

In

all

these questions, difficulties are brought to light

which are soluble only by a careful inquiry into the

first
1

principles of philosophy.
,

where Cf. Phys. i. 2 Jin Lycophron and others "are blamed for running into difficulties by the inference that one must at the same time be many: lixrirep
re Kal ovK iuSex^fi^vov ravrhv TToAAa eivai, /utj ravTiKeiiieva 5e ev Koi 5vvdfii Koi lo-Ti yap rh

this question coincides with the other, as to Change, since that

which acts corresponds with that which suffers: &<tt avajKri

rh irda-xoy elsrh iroiovv /xira^dWetv (Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 9). Hence it is true that, on the one hand, things which are not opone posed cannot act upon another: o-jk e^iarTicn yap &K\r}\a ttjs (/)u(r6&;s oaa fi-fir' ivavrla fii,T'
i^ ivavricav earl (ibid. p.>323, b,

cj/TeAeYeia.
Cf. Phys. i. 6, 189, a, 22, c. 190, b, 30, c. 8 init. iUd. 191, h 10 sqq., Gen. et Corr. \. 3 init. ibid. 317, b, 20 sqq. Metajjh. xii.

Y
'

^^
6,

i.

c.

See Gen et Corr. i. 7; Phys. 189, a, 22, c. 7, 190, b, 29, To Aristotle 8 191, a, 34.
3

but on the other hand. 28) neither can absolute opposites v-jt' a\Ki]\ov yap irda-x^tu ravavria h.UvaTov (Phys. i. 7, 190, b, 33).
;

METAPHYSICS
The contributions which
stotle.^

303

his forerunners

had made

towards their solution, did not in any way satisfy Ari-

He

takes exception to most of the pre-Socratic

philosophies

primarily
it

because of their materialism,

which made
first

impossible for them to reach out to the

;

principles of the incorporeal

and he further

objects that they practically took no account of ideal

and

final causes.^

The

earlier Ionic school is criticised

by him because

of the difficulties which beset every one of their presuppositions,'' because of their

tendency to overlook the

moving

and because of the superficial way in which they erected an arbitrarily chosen element into
cause,^

the universal
qualities

basis of things, whereas the sensible and changes of bodies are conditioned by the

opposition of different elements.^

The same

criticism holds for Heraclitus, in so far as

he agrees with the Ionic school in assigning a material element as the basis.''' To his peculiar doctrine as to
the flux of
all

things and the meeting of opposites,

Aristotle has other objections.

He

thinks

that

the

doctrine of the flux

is

on the one hand not accurately

it

thought out, while on the other hand

For what follows cf. StrumPELL, GescJi. d. theor. Phil. d. Gr. 157-184; Brandis, ii. b, 2, Aristotle's criticism p. 589 sqq.
'

overlooks the
iii. 5,

See

De

Caelo,

Metaph.
;

of earlier philosophers is here dealt wii h only in so far as it concerns their fundamental doctrines. MetaiJh. i. 8 init. cf. iv. 5, 1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 1. ^ Metaph. i. 7, 988, a, 34 sqq. b, 28, Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 32 sqq., Gen. An. v. 1, 778, b, 7.
'*

988, b, 29 sqq. l/^to^7i. i. 8, 988, b, 26 6^ew. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 24 * Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, De Coelo, iii. 5, 304, b, 11, cf. 8
i.

8,

ibid.

i. 3,270, a, 14; Phys. 1.7, 190, a, 13 sqq. iii. 5, 205, a, 4. ' Aristotle, indeed, generally

puts

him along with Thales, Anaximenes, &c. see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 585, 1.
;

304
fact that every

ARISTOTLE
change presupposes a substratum
;

that

under alterations of matter, the form maintains itself that it is not all kinds of change which could go on and that from the changeableness of ad infi,nitvjm
;

earthly things

to the universe as a

of

draw any conclusion as The theory of the unity opposites he dismisses by the argument that Herato

we ought not
whole J

clitus is in conflict

with the

Law

of Contradiction/'^

The

objections to Empedocles cover various points

of detail regarding his natural philosophy which cannot

be gone into here, but they reach also to the funda-

mentals of his system.

His assumptions as

to

the

immutability of the original matter are held to involve

the impossibility of qualitative change, of the passage of the elements into one another as seen in experience, and of their combination into unity in the derivative forms
of matter, and also of the doctrines, upheld

by EmpeSphere.'
^

docles himself, as to the quantitative identity of the

elements

and their co-existence

in

'

the

Aristotle also objects that the derivation of these ele-

ments

is

not shown, and that they are not carried back

being,''

to the original divisions of material

which are
remarks

only incompletely presented in the definite kinds of

matter

known

to us as

fire,

water,

&c.'^
is

He

that the opposition of heavy and light

'

not explained

Metaph.

iv.

5,

1010,
d.

a,

15
i.

bqq.; PZ/ys. viii. 3, 253, b, 9 sqq.

-

See Zellee,
sq.,

Pit.

Gr.

600
^

and

483,
i.

1.

989, a, 22-SO; 329, b, 1, c. 7, 334, a, 18, 26, c. 6 init. ihld. i. 1, 3 4, b, 10, 3 5, a, 3, c. 8, 325, b, 16. In De Cwlo, iii. 7 init he
H,

Metaph.
et

Gen.

Corr.

ii.

1,

gives a detailed refutation of the atomistic reduction (by Empedocles) of aWoiooais to eKKpiaris. * The opposites 'warm and cold,' &c., on which Aristotle bases his own theory of the ele-

ments. ^ Gen.
ii.

3,

et Corr. 330, b, 21.

i.

8,

325, b, 19,

METAPHYSICS

305

at all,' and that in the theory of the pores and effluxes an explanation of the mutual influence of bodies is put forward which would logically lead to absolute

Atomism.^
from
since
first

The two 'causes

of motion

'

in the

Empe-

doclean system he considers not to be properly deduced

principles nor to be sufficiently distinguished,
also divides, and Hate not and he remarks that since no laws of their working are laid down, an inordinate
;

Love not only unites but

^

only divides but also unites

scope

is left,

in the fashioning of the world, to Chance.^

He

holds the assumption of alternating states of the

world to be arbitrary and untenable,'^ and the theory of the composition of the soul out of the elements to be beset
with
difficulties of all kinds.^

Finally, Aristotle believes

that the philosophy of Empedocles would lead in the end

to a sensationalism which

would make all truth uncertain.'^

The
kind.

criticisms on the

Aristotle

plausible basis.
positions,

Atomic theory are of a similar admits that the theory has a very If we start from the Eleatic presupdesire nevertheless to save the ideas

and

if

we

and of movement, then an Atomic theory is the most convenient way of escape. So if we think it an impossibility to suppose bodies to be actually
of the manifold
divisible
cicl

infinitum^ the only alternative

in the assumption of indivisible

seems to lie atoms as their ultimate

i.

Dc

Ccelo, iv. 2, 309, a, 19.

Part. An.
cf.
viii. 1,
*

1,

640, a, 19

Phys.

Gen.

et

Corr.
d.

i.

8;
i.

252, a,

4.

Zellek, Ph.
3.
3

Gr. part
d.
iii.

6J5,

De
Gr. pt.
8,
i.

See Zeller, Ph. 698, 2, and Metaph.

a, 25.
*

iii.

p/^^^. viii. 1,251, b, 28 sqq. i. 10, 280, a, 1 Metanli. 1 4, 1000, b, 12.

Coelo,
;

986,
b,

De An.
;

i.

5,

409, b, 23-410,

27
'

Gen.

et

Corr.

ii.

6,

333, b, 2
1)
;

sqq. (cf.

Zeller, iUd. 703,

I.

cf.

Metaph. iii. 4, 1000, b, 3. Metaph. iv. 5. 1009, b, 12; Zeller, ihid. 727, 1.

VOL.

306
constituents.^

ARISTOTLE
Aristotle, however, neither admits these

Eleatic presuppositions, nor does he concede that the

division of bodies can ever reach its limit,^ or that the
definite things into being could be treated

coming of

as a combination of

minima^ or their passing out of

existence as a resolution into atoms. ^

Rather does he

hold that indivisible bodies are impossible, since every

fixed quantity can be divided into fixed quantities,

which

again must be

divisible.^

He

says that atoms which are

neither qualitatively distinguished nor capable of acting

on each other could not explain the different qualities

and the interaction of bodies or the passage of the elements into one another or the processes of becoming

and

The theory that the atoms are infinite in change.-^ number and kind is also rejected, because the phenomena can be explained without this hypothesis, since all
differences of quality or of form are reducible to cer-

tain fundamental types,

and since the situation and

movement of the elements in nature are also limited by number; and it is Aristotle's view that a limited number of original entities is always to be preferred to
an infinity of them, because the limited is better than the limitless.*'' The assumption of empty space, so far
i. 8, 324, b, 85 316, a, 13 sqq.; cf. Zellbr, Hid. 764 sqq. 2 Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 317, a, 1 But Aristotle expresses sqq. himself more exactly on this point, though without explicit reference to the Atomic theory,
>

Gen. et Corr.
2,

Phijs. vi. 1

De

Ccelo,

iii.

4,

sqq.

c.

303, a, 20.
*

Gen.
c. 9,

sqq.
4,

et Corr. i. 327, a, 14
;

8,

325, b, 34
Coelo,
iii.

De

in Phys.
3

iii.

6 sq.

Gen.

et

Corr.

i.

2,

317, a,

iUd. c. 7, e. 8, 306, 303, a, 24 shall have more a, 22 sqq. to say on this subject later, " Be C(eIo,m. 4, 303, a, 17 sqq. 29 sqq. b, 4 cf. Phi/s. i. 4 Jitt. viii. 6, 259, a, 8.
;

We
;

17 sqq.

METAPHYSICS
from being necessary
the characteristic
^

307
as

to explain

phenomena such

those of movement, would rather be inconsistent with

ferences of weight, for in a

movement of bodies and the difvacuum nothing could have

any particular place towards which it would tend, and everything would necessarily move with equal quickness.2 He finds that movement and its different kinds are, in the Atomic Philosophy, simply presupposed, and not deduced from first principles.^ He objects that the
school completely overlooks the

teleology of nature,

and that instead of giving us any principles on which phenomena rest, it refers us to an unsolved necessity,
or to the assertion that in fact things have always been
as they
are.''

There are further polemical passages,

:

which can only here be mentioned in passing against the theory of an infinite number of co-existent worlds ^
;

against Democritus' explanation of sense-perception

against
his

^
;

doctrine

concerning

the

soul,^

and

his

acceptance of sensory appearance as truth.

The natural philosophy of Anaxagoras

is

so closely

connected with the physics of the Atomists and

Phjs.

Empe-

'

iv.

7-9,

cf. c. G.

More
i.

on this
-

later.

^ See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. 788 sqq., and Gen. An. v. 8 vers.

Pliys. iv. 8, 214, b,

Coelo,
i.

Be
300,

33 sqq.
b,

ii.

8.

28 sqq. 275, b, 29, 277, a, 13, 294, b. 30, iii. 2, With regard to the
7,

fin.,

where

Aristotle's criticism of

the mechanical explanation

of

theory of Weight held by

critus, see further

Demo-

De Cado, iv, 2, influence of Aristotle's attack upon the changes

G
;

very similar to Plato's criticism in the Phcedo of that proposed by Anaxagoras.

is
^

nature by Democritus,

as to the

I)e Catlo,

i.

see

Zeller,

ibid. 797, 2.
**

which Epicurus made in the atomic theory, see Zeller, Ph.

d.

De Sensu, c. 4, 442, a, 29. De An. i. 3, 40G, b,'l5, cf!

a, 8.

c,

Gr. pt.
^

iii.

a, 378.
xii. 6,

2,

403, b. 29, 405,

Mefaph.

1071, b, 31.

Zeller, ii2U

822.

X 2

308
docles that
objections.
it

ARISTOTLE
is

open
infinite

for the

The

number

most part to the same of his primary bodies is

not only needless, inasmuch as a small

equally well, but
it is

also

number would do mistaken inasmuch as it would

make all knowledge of things impossible. Again, since the primary differences of kinds of matter are limited in
number,
so

must be the primary bodies

natural

also.

Since

all

bodies have a

magnitude,

their

constituent

parts (the so-called ofMotofispi}) cannot be of indefinite

size;

and since

all

bodies are limited, there cannot be

logically obliged to

in each thing, as

Anaxagoras was

hold, constituents belonging to the infinitely various

kinds of matter.^ Further, if primary matter is to be looked for in the simplest bodies, few of the o^ioiojxepi] could be considered as primary matter. ^ Anaxagoras
recognises the existence of change in things, but the doctrine of the unchangeability of their constituent parts
is

The continuity of bodies is negated by the infinite number of their constituents,"^ in spite of Anaxagoras's weak attack upon the
theory of em.pty
is

inconsistent with that admission.

space.''

Aristotle finds that

Anaxagoras
was
^
;

as little able to account for differences of weight as

Empedocles.'"^

The

original

mingling of
it,

all

kinds of

matter, as Anaxagoras states

Phys.
7 sqq

would be unthinkable
viii.

'

i.

4,

187, b,

Calo^ iii. 4. For a furtlier remark as to tlie infinite in space, see Plujs. iii. 5, 205, b, 1.
I)e
''

the latter part of ch. * Phys. iv. 6, 213,

^
*^

infra.

a, 22.

De

Co;lo, iv. 2, 309, a, 19.

De

Ccelo,

iii.

4, 302, b, 14.
;

Gen. et Corr. i. 1 Pkys. 20o, a, 19. Further objections of a similar kind, but not especially directed against Anaxagoras, will be dealt with in
^

Besides the physical objections which are raised against it in Metapk. i. 8, Gen. et Cori\ i.
10,

iii. 4,

327, b,

19, Aristotle asserts

both of this statement and of the corresponding one (that, at all times, everything is in evey-

META PHYSICS
but
if it

COO

were more correctly stated

'

it

would lead

to the

substitution of

matter

'

(conceived of as one and with-

out qualities) for the infinite variety of primary bodies

him and

which Anaxagoras assumed.^ The theory, common to others, of a beginning of movement among
Aristotle freely

matter, after infinitely continued rest, would contradict

the regularity of the order of nature.^

recognises the advance

made when Anaxagoras formuinasmuch

as,

lated the doctrine of universal mind, but he considers

it

to

be
it

still

unsatisfactory,

on the one
mis-

hand,

did not bear fruit in the explanation of nature,

it

and, on the other hand, as applied even to man,

conceived the distinction between the spirit and the

soul.^

With regard
little
first

to the Eleatics

(among whom he takes

account of Xenophanes and Melissus),'' Aristotle's

point
is

that their philosophy contains no basis for

any explanation of phenomena/'

of

Their primary axioms

;

he takes to be vitiated by grave obscurities

'

they talk

the unity of being

'

without keeping distinct the

;

different

meanings of unity
limit in

and thus they

its

attribute to

being such qualities as negate in turn

unity
(e.g.

unconditional

Melissus).

Parmenides, and limitlessness in They do not understand that every proposi-

tion involves the duality of subject

tiling),

and predicate, of
185, a,
10,
i.

that it destroys the principle of contradiction. See Zeller, Ph. d. Or. pt. i. 911. Metapli. i. 8, 930, a, 30. 2 Phys. viii. 1, 252, a, 10 sqq. See Zeller, iUd. 887, 4, 893, 2; Be All. i. 2, 404, b, J, 405, a, 13. * Metaph. \. 5, 986, b, 26
'
=*

P/n/ft. i.

2,

3 init.,
;

and De Cado, ii. 13, 2i)4, a, 21 on the other hand Paimenides is

always treated with respect. ^ Mctaph. i. 5, 986, b, 10 sqq,;
Phus.
iii.'l,
i. 2. 184, b, 25 De Ccrh, 298, b, 14; Geii. ct Corr. i. a, 17 of. Sext. Math. x. 325,
; ;

8,

46.

310

ARISTOTLE

that thing and quality, so that we cannot even Fay between Being as Being is without distinguishing
'
'

substance and the Being

we

attribute to

it

as

quality

which
^

latter,

if

there

were only one Being, would

necessarily be something other than Being, i.e. notThe Eleatics assert the unity of Being and being.

deny not-being, whereas in

fact
'

'

Being

'

is

only a com'

mon predicate of all things, and Not-being is perfectly thinkable as the negation of some definite kind of being
(e.g.

not large, &c.).^

Being, and yet at

They attack the the same time describe

all
'

divisibility of
it

as extended

Becoming,' and therefore in space.^ of things, on the ground that every the multiplicity or process of becoming must start either from Behig

They deny

from Not-being, and both hypotheses are untenable. They overlook a third possibility, which not only

makes Becoming conceivable, but is the sole expresthat sion of any actual process of becoming namely, becomes what it is, nob out of absolute Notanything being, but out of that which is relatively not-being.'' Aristotle holds that Zeno's polemic against move-

ment
as

rests

upon

similar

misconceptions,

inasmuch

he treated space and time not as fixed but as discrete quantities, and argued on the assumption
This is the essential point of the complicated dialectical discussion in Phys. i. 2, 105, a, On the second 20-c. 3 vers. Jin. half of these discussions (c. 3), Plato, Parm. 142, b sq., cf. B sqq.; and see 244, JSt)/jh.
'

Metaj)h.
ift^rf.
i.

iii.

4,

1001, b, 7; cf.

Zeller,

541.
8, cf.

Phys.

Metaph. xiv

Zbller,
''

ibid. p.
i.

562
sq.

sq.
a,

Phys.

3,

187,

3;

cf.

Zellee, iUd. 563

1009, a, 26 sqq. (The point will ch. be treated more in detail On the other hand, viii. infra.) the Eleatic hypothesis is ansvvered in Ge7i. et Corr. i. 8, 325, a, 13 merelj^ by a reference to the opposed facts of experience.
2,

METAPHYSICS
of an infinite

311

that they consisted

number of

actual

subdivisions, whereas in fact they merely include potenStill tially in themselves all possible subdivisions.^ less importance does he attach to the arguments used

by Melissus to prove that Being

less.^

is

limitless

and motionis

How
we

can

it

be supposed that 'All

One,'

unless
things,

are prepared to ignore all the differences of

and to represent even contradictory opposites Here also Aristotle finds as one and the same ? ^ unproved assumptions as to the principles of things, and
an absolute
philosophy.
failure to solve the weightiest questions of

among the Pythawho attempted a philosophy of nature, although goreans, their principles made movement and change, which are They the basis of all natural processes, inconceivable.'*
Neither does he find a sohition

proposed to explain the corporeal by referring

it

to

Yet how can that which is extended in space be derivable from numbers, or how can weight arise out How, in of that which is neither light nor heavy ? ^
number.
fine,

can the qualities of things be so derived at

is

all ?

What

the meaning of saying that in the formation of

size,

the world, the One, as corporeal

was

'

the centre
^
'

which drew unto

>

itself

portions of the limitless ?

cf.

Zeller,
'^

PIujs. vi. 9, c. 2, 233, a, 21 Ihid. 545 sqq.

Phys. i.S
Phys.
i.

init.',

cf.

Zeller,

ihid. 554, 3.

19 sqq. 989, b, 29 sqq. 5 MetajjJi. i. 8, 990, a, 1 2 sqq. iii. 4, 1001, b, 17, xiii. 8, 1083, b, 8 sqq. xiv. 3, 1090, a, 30; De
^

2, 185, b,
i.

Metajjh.

8,

3Ietaph. xiv. 5, 1092, b, 15. Ti e passage refers to Platonics and Pythagoreans together. Other remarks, which refer immediately to Plato and his school, but also apply to the Pythagoreans, need

not be here cited,

'

Metaph.

xiii. 6,

1080. b, IG,

Cailo,

iii. 1

Jin.

xiv. 3, 1091, a, 13; cf. ihid. 381 sq. 349, 4.

Zelleb,

312

ARISTOTLE

Again, where things different in character are explained by one and the same number, are we to distinguish

between different classes of numbers by reason of the

differences of the things they signify, or are

we

to

deny

the variety of these things by reason of the likeness of

the numbers that denote them

universal conceptions such as the

be of the nature of substance

How, again, can One and the Infinite Finally, if we pro^

ceed to inquire as to the way in which the Pythagoreans

applied their theory of numbers,
superficiality
is

we come upon singular The theory of number itself very incompletely worked out,"* and there are numerand
caj)rice.^

ous untenable positions in their theory of physics which

Aristotle

marks with

censure.''

Not only the

earlier schools of

Natural Philosophy, but

also the later systems called, in Aristotle's view, for fun-

damental reconsideration.
nection there

Only one of the

later schools

can be specially dealt with here, because in this conis

no account

to be taken of the Sophists.

they taught was to Aristotle's mind only a mock wisdom, which dealt in the contingent, the unessential,

What

and the

unreal.^

His task in regard to them was, not

(cf.

Metaph. i. 8, 990, a, 18 Zeller, ibid. 862, 1), vii.

1036, b, 17
'-'

Metajjh.

i.

5,

986, a, 6, 987,

11.

a, 19.

cf. xiv. 6,

1093,

a, 1, 10.

With regard to Being and

the One, this view is explained (against Plato and the Pythagoreans) in Metaph. iii. 4, 1001, a, 9, 27 cf. X. 2; and it is there especially remarked that the assertion of the substantiality of the One would destroy the plurality of things. As to the &ireipov of. Phys. iii. 5, and also
c. 4,

See Zeller, ihid. 367, 2. 8uch as the Antichthon (Zeller, ihid. 383, 4 \ the harmony of the spheres {De Cwlo, ii. 9), a theory about time {Pliyg.
*

'

'

218, a, 33, cf. Zelle, 406, 3 sq.), and certain views as to the soul (^De An. i. 2, iOi, a, 16, c. 'H Jin. cf. Afial. Post.
iv.

10,

ihid.

ii.

11, 94, b, 32).

*

See Zeller, ihid. 968.

203, a,

1.

METAPHYSICS
to
establish

813

any metaphysical propositions, but to combat the scepticism which brought all manner of truth into question, and to prove the untenable nature of their sophisms.^ The services rendered by Socrates to philosophy are by no means minimised by Aristotle, although at the same time he emphasises the limitation
of Socrates' achievement to the sphere of ethics,

and

observes that in this connection Socrates did not establish

any metaphysical

basis.^

Of the

lesser Socratic

schools Aristotle criticised only the Megarians, for their

and the and the Cynics, in regard to their theory of knowledge and ethics.''
actual,^

assertions about the relation of the possible

The attention which Aristotle pays, however, Plato and the Platonic school is as thoroughgoing
his treatment of the other Socratics is slight.

to

as

His own

system grew directly out of that of Plato.

He was com-

pelled, therefore,^ to distinguish his views from those of

Plato exhaustively, and to set out the arguments which

led

him

to

go beyond the Platonic school.

Aletaph.
iv.

Thus

it is

The former in

proving that
destroj^ all

it

would not only

5, cf. c. 4, 1007, b, 20, x. 1, 105:^, a, 35, xi. 6 init. ; the latter in the

motion and change,

possession of skill or
;

but also
:

all

treatise
^

on the

fallacies.

Cf.

Zeller,

the passages cited, ihid. at pp. 94, 2, and

power one who does not now hear would be deaf one who is not actually building would be
no architect. The former are spoken of in Metaph, v. 29, 1024, b, 32, viii. 3, 1043, b, 23 (cf. Zeller, Hid. 252 sq.), and in Eth. Nic. x. I,
*

1143 Ihat even the Ethics of Socrates are one-sided, is shown by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. iii. 7,
1113, b, 14 sq. sqq. 1117, a, 9, 17 sqq.
=

c.

11, 1116, b, 3

vi.

13,

1114, b,

3 (cf. Zeller, ihid. 220, 1). Aristotle here confutes the Megarian principle, that the merely possible is actual, by
ix.

Metaph.

1 172, a, 27 sqq. Aristotle attacks the exaggerations of the moral doctrine of the Cynics,

Supra, pp.

14,

56

sq.,

162,

&c.

314
in

ARISTOTLE
no
spirit

of jealousy or detraction

that

Aristotle

comes back again and again to discuss the Platonic doctrines, and to set out their defects from all points of
view with untiring patience for such a criticism of his master was unavoidable if he was to defend his own philosophic individuality, and his right to found a new
;

fame of his predecessor and the His main criprestige of the flourishing Academy.
school, against the ticism, leaving out of account incidental objections, is

directed against three leading points

first,

against the
later

Ideal
'

Theory,

as

such;

secondly,

against the
; '

and, thirdly, Pythagorising statement of the Theory concerning the ultiagainst the principles laid down

mate basis of things. Matter and the One.^ The Ideal Theory of Plato rested upon
tion that
it is

his convic-

only the universal essence of things that

can be an object of knowledge.

shared by
Aristotle. ^

This conviction was

So likewise did Aristotle accept

without criticism Plato's doctrine as to the mutability of all sensible things (which for Plato was the second
buttress of the

Ideal

Theory), and the necessity to

this the conclusion that it

pass beyond these to something stable and essential.^

But when Plato draws from

is

only the Universal, as such, which can be actual, and

it

must exist for itself as something substantial (beyond phenomena, Aristotle parts company with him. This, therefore, is the central point about which revolves
that

the whole Aristotelian attack on Plato's Metaphysics. For Aristotle holds as to this assumption that it is
'

Cf Zellee, Platon. Studien,

.

p.

197 sqq.

Vide supra, pp. 163, 300, &c. Vide supra, p. 300 sqq.

METAPHYSICS
devoid of
all scientific

315
it

basis in itself ; that

leads in its

results to difficulties
soluble,

and contradictions absolutely in-

phenomena,

and that instead of explaining the world of it makes them impossible.

is

He

holds that the hypothesis of the Ideas

;

not
is

established

of the Platonic arguments for

is

it,

there

not one that

not open to decisive objections.^

ends that Plato sought thereby to attain are

The and must

be attainable otherwise.
Ideas
is,

indeed, exactly the

it is

The content of each of these same as the corresponding'

thing of which

said to be

the Idea

;
'

for in the

conception of the ideal man^ of

man

as such, exactly the

same marks are included as in the conception of man in the ordinary sense, there being no difference between the two beyond the addition of the word ideal (to
'
'

avTo).'^

In this view, the Ideas appear as nothing more

than a needless reduplication of the world of things,

and the introduction of the Ideas to explain things

to Aristotle as if a

is

man who

could not count in small

numbers should attempt

is

to count in large ones.^

But

even apart from the failure of proof, the Ideal Theory

in his view in itself untenable; for Substance cannot
Cf.
Ik^lvoi qvQ\v 'dWo ino'.ow^ 5/ avdpwirovs aihiovs, ovB' ovrui ra itSr}
7a/)

sqq.

Metapli. i. 9, 990, b, 8 1079, a, 3fefaj)h. iii. 2, 997, b, 5 TToWaxfi S' ext^J'TOjy SuaKoXiav, ovOevhs 7)TT0;/ 6.TOirov rh (pdvai fiku flval Tivas ^vcreis irapa ras eV ry ovpavw, ravTas Se ras avTas (pdyai Tois aladriTols it\t]v Uti to /x^v diSta rd Se (pQaprd ' avrh yap dv*

xiii. 4,

aA\' f] alad-nra ai'Sm. Similarly Metapli. vii. 16, 1040, b, 32: itoiovffiv odu [ras i^eas] ras avrhs toj eJ'Set to7s (pQaproti, aWodi'Qpunrov
Kal

avTo'imrov,

irpoffTiQ^vTts

rots

al<Td-r]Tois

Qpuirov (paaiv elvaiKoX "trnov Ka\ vyieiav,

t5 p7j/.ia rh ahrh. Ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 10 cf, Eth. N. 1. 4, 1096, a, 34, Eud. 1. 8, 1218, a,
10.
^

&\Ao

S'

obSev, TrapaTrXi^aiov

TTOLovvrcs
(pdaKoua-iu

TOis

deovs

yuei/

dvai

Metaph.

i.

9 init.

xiii.

4,

dp0pJi}Troeide7s

Se

ovre

1078, b, 32,

316

ARISTOTLE
it is

be separate from that whereof

the Substance, nor

Genus from that

essence)
it

to

which

(as

forming part of the

fact,

belongs.^

This proposition, in

sum-

marises the whole difference

Aristotelian systems.

between the Platonic and

Aristotle holds, however, that

were waived, the Platonist would only pass out of one difficulty into another. It would appear, for
even
if this

instance, that in reason there could only be Ideas ot

that which was substantial

and the Platonic school

accordingly ascribed Ideas only to natural things.

Yet
is

when once
divided

it is

admitted that the Universal Essence

individual things,
it

among

must
all

follow that

Ideas should be ascribed also to privative and relative

conceptions and to
artificial

products of

kinds

;^

and

even among the Ideas themselves, the most of them

must have Ideas over them

relation of copies, so that
it

to

which they stand

in the

would be true of

them that
it

the same thing would be at the same time type and

copy.^
fall

Thus

also for every thing

inasmuch as
make up

must

under a

series of genera, superior

and subordinate
a conit

in form

there

must be

severed Ideas;'' or again, the

various general marks which together

cept must be themselves so

many

Substances, and

would follow that one Idea would be made out of man}^

Ideas, or one Substance out of
Metaph.

many
;

real Substances,

Z6^mv Uu
oiiffiav

i. 991, b, 1 9, aSvvoTov, cJvai x^P^^ ''"'''' Koi ou rj ovaia; xiii. 9, 1085,

:

24, 85, b, 18

cf.
2.
i.

Zeller, Ph.

d.

^^' P^'
^

i-

^^7,

Metaph.

9, 991, a, 29, xiii.

a, 23, cf. vii. 6, 1031, a, 31, c. 14,

1039, b, 15.
2

Metaph.

i,

9,

22, 991, b, 6, xiii.

c. 8,

1084, a, 27

990, b, 11 sqq. 4, 1079, a, 19, Anal. Post, i.

In the first of these passages we should read oTov rd y^vos, us ylvos, (.i^uv (sc.
5,

1079, b, 34.

irapiUiyixa ^CTai).
*

Metai)h.

i.

9,

991, a, 26.

METAPHYSICS
and these sometimes of opposite kinds.
the Idea
is
^

317

Or

again,

if

to be Substance,
;

it

cannot at the same time

not the unity of
of which

be a general concept

for it is

many
it

individual thino^s, but an individual itself amono^ other

individuals.^

Conversely, the things

is

predicated could not be true subjects."*

this

Of Ideas of
it

kind any defiuition would be as impossible as

individuals,'^
is

is

of other

and since the Idea,

it

like

the

individual,

numerically one,

follows that one or

other of the contradictory predicates by which

divide the genus

we subit,

must always be predicable of

be
itself

in

which case

it

clearlv cannot

the genus also.^

Aristotle considers the assertion that the Ideas contain the essence of things to be inconsistent with the

view that they are at the same time incorporeal. He represents Plato as speaking sometimes of a matteir of
'

the Ideas

'

(that being inconsistent with the notion that

^),

they are not in space

that in the case of

and as holding at other times

all

natural objects matter and the

process of becoming belongs to the essence

tion of them, in

and concep-

which case the conception of them

Similarly, he argues

cannot exist by

itself separately.^

that the ethical conceptions cannot be separated from

p. 515, svpra,
^

'

JSIetapli. vii.
c.

13.

1031), a, 3,
b,

from
vii.

Cate(j. c. 2.

c.

14; cf.
'=

8,

1033,

19,
a, 23.

i.

9,

Mctaph.

15, 1040, a,

8-

i^Dl, a, 25), xiii. 9,

1085

27.
Top. vi. 6, 143, b, 23. Length in itself must be eithe]* hnXarls or irXdros cxoi/, and then the genus must be at once a species also.
''

Metaph.

vii. 16,

xiii. 9, 1080, 1040, a, 2G sqq. cf.

a, 32,
iii. (?,

1003, a, 5. Metapli. 9, ut sujjra.

'^

i.

9,

992, b,

9, xiii.

P^fPlujs.

iv.

1,

209, b, 33

cf

Metaph.

vii. 6,

103!,b, 15

cf.

Zell. iUd. 556

"

sq.,

628

sq.
.sqq.

passpge,

LONITZ and Schwegler on this and the citation at

ii.

2,

193 b, 35

318
their objects.

ARISTOTLE

There can be no 'Idea of the Good' standing by itself, for the conception of the Good appears under all possible categories, and determines itself differently according to the different circumstances
;

aad as

there are different sciences that deal with the Good, so there are different kinds of good,
in fact, an ascending scale

among which

there

is,

a fact w^iich of itself ex-

cludes the possibility of a

common Idea existing by itself.'

:

further objection

is

that the theory of Ideas logically

for if

carried out would be a process ad infinitum

an

Idea is always to be posited in every case where more things than one meet in a common definition, the common essence of the Idea and its phenomenon must

always come in as a third term different from either of

them. 2

Even
'

if

the Ideal Theory were better founded and

and After, and can consequently be included
in a relation of Before
in

Eth. N. i. 4 {End. i. 8) cf preceding notes. As to the principle

;
.

that what

is irporepov

and var^pov

no

common

generic concept,

cannot be reduced to a comnion

generic concept, see Pollt. iii. 1 (Zell., ihld, 571 J 275, a, 34 sqq. On the same principle in yq.). Eth. Nie. loc. cit. Aristotle remarks in criticising the 'Idea of the Good,' that the upholders of the doctrine of Ideas themselves say that there is no Idea of that which stands in the relation of Before and After; but this is actually the case with the Good, for it is found in all the categories e. (J., a substantial good is the Divinity and Reason, a good is Virtue, a qualitative quantitive good is Measure, a relative good is the Useful, &c. Thus these different Goods stand
:

and therefore

in no idea, but (109G, b, 25 sqq.) only in a rela(Vide supra, p. tion of analogy. 276 sqq.) Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 2, vii. 13, 1039, a, cf. vii. 6, 2, 1031, b, 28. Aristotle expresses this objection here by saying that the doctrine of
'-'

Ideas leads to the rpiros &vdpwTros. Cf. Zell., Plat. Stud. p. 257, and Ph. d. Or. pt. i. p. 623, 5. He finds the parallel of the rp'.ros (which, however, is &i/dpunro5 equally true of the ideas themselves, cf. Sojjh. El,
c.

22, 178, b,

36) in the change of the universal into an individual of the

same name.

METAPHYSICS
less

319

untenable, Aristotle would

fulfil

still

say that

it

could

byis

no means

the task of a true Philosophy, which

to exhibit the basis

and principles of the world of

appearances.

As

the Ideas are not in things, they

cannot make up the essence of things, and they cannot

contribute anything to the being of things.'

Even the

relation of the one to the other cannot be stated clearly,

for Plato's

participation are always unintelligible metaphors. ^

some kind of copying and The principle of motive power, without which no process of becoming and no explanation of nature is conceivable, is wholly wanting.^ So also is the principle of final Even in regard to the theory of Knowledge, cause.'* the Ideas cannot render us that service which Plato
references to

own

expected from them, for

if

they are outside of things,

then they are not truly the essence of things, and therefore the

knowledge of the Idea leads

itself,^

to

no sure con-

clusion as to the thing

And

how, on the other

hand, could

we
All

arrive, asks Aristotle, at

any know-

ledge of the Ideal, since innate Ideas are not to be

assumed
creased

? ^

these difficulties

will

be vastly inhis school in

so interposing

if

we

are to follow Plato

translating the Ideas into

MetapTi.

and Numbers, and

335, b, 7 sqq. 1217, b, 23.

i.

9,

991, a, 12 (xiii.

cf.

Etli.

End,

i.

8,

5,

9, 99 i, a, 20, 992, 1079, b. 24), i. 6, 987, b, 13, viii. 6, 1045, b. 7, xii. 10, 1075, b, 34. 3 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 8. 19 sqq. b, 3 sqq. (xiii. 5) 992, a, 24 sqq. b, 7, c. 7, 988, b, 3, vii. 8, 1033, b, 26, xii. (], 1071, b, 14, c. 10, 1075, b, 16, 27 Gen. et Corr. ii. 9,
i.

mit.\ 2 Metaph.
28

a,

(xiii. 5,

* Metaph. i. 7, 988, b, 6, c. 9, 992, a, 29 (where, instead of lib, li o should be read). " Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 12 (xiii. 5, 10 r9, b, 15), vii. 6, 1031, a, 30 sqq. cf. Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a,

32:

ret

'yap

et57?

x'PfTw

r^p^ri-

fffiaTO.

re yap tVrt, ice' Vide supra, p. 202, &c.

320

ARISTOTLE

between the Ideas and the things of sense the whole The difficulties which would science of Mathematics.
thus arise were set out by Aristotle with a painstaking

thoroughness most tiresome to the modern mind, though

in his day to cut off
school, led
it

may

possibly have been needful in order

for the

all

ways of escape

Pythagorising

by such men as Xenocrates and Speusippus.

He
of of

how we are to think to ourselves the causality numbers,' or how they can contribute to the existence He shows how capricious and contrathings.^
asks
is

dictory

the application of these numbers to natural

objects.^

He

points out the difference

in

character
are
quali-

between conceptual determinations, which

tative,
tative,

and numerical determinations, which are quantiremarking that two numbers make up one number, but two Ideas do not make one Idea, and that

among

the numbers which

make up numbers no

quali-

tative differences can be posited,

whereas there must

be units qualitatively different if there were Ideal With minute and careful thoroughness,^ Numbers.''
he controverts the various suggestions as to the relations of mathematics to the Ideal Numbers which were

thrown out by Plato and his school and the devices they
resorted, to in order to maintain a conceivable difference

Metapli.
,

i.

9, *.>91,

b, 9,

with

a,pi6ixo7s rivSsv {viroK^iixivusv).

- Metaph. xiv. 6 iuit., ihid 1093, b, 21 cf. c. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq * Loc. cit. from 1092, b, 29 cf, the commentaries on this passage
;

the answer:

if

things are likewise

numbers, one does not see of what

use the ideal numbers are to them if, on the other hand, things are only arranged according to number, the same would be true of the ideas of them, which would not be numbers, but \6foi. eV

Cf.

568
^

sq. 854,

Zell. Ph. d. Gr. 867 sq. 884.

cit.
i.

pt.

i.

Loc.
2.

9,

991, b, 21 sqq.

992, a,

METAPHYSICS

321

them.^

between the Numbers and the units which compose But in this, as in other branches of the argument, his main point is always that there is a fundamental contradiction between the notion of a unit of
fact of differences of kind.

number and the

It is not,

of course, necessary here to recapitulate those of his

objections to Ideal

Numbers which apply

also to the

Ideal Theory in general. ^

But it is to be noticed that, in Aristotle's view, if once w^e assumed tbe existence of Ideas and Ideal Numbers, the ordinary mathematical numbers would lose their status, for they could only have the same component parts and therefore the same
nature as the Ideal
of

Numbers
be

themselves.^

The

position

ideal they

for qua must go by ideal numbers, and qua mathematical they must go by mathematical number ^ and from the way in which the theory of magnitudes is
;

magnitudes would

equally dubious;

deduced, he considers that the further dilemma arises

that either
it

must be
and a

possible for a surface to exist

without

line,

solid

without surface, or else

all

three must be one and the same.-^

Finally, as concerns the ultimate principles of things,
in

which Plato and the Platonists had sought to

Ideas,^'

find

the ultimate basis and constituents of their

Numbers

and

Aristotle asserts that

it

is

impossible to

know
'

the

constituent parts of

all

being, since that

;

23,

Mttaph. xiii. 6-8. As in Metaph. xiii. 9, 1085, a, and in xiv. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq.

3,

1090, a, 25-b, 5, they are used against Speusippns. * Mt'taph. i. 9, 991, b, 27 xiv, 3, 1090, b, 32 sqq.
c. 3,
;

* Mitaph. i. 9, 992, b, 13 xiv. 109O, b, 20. Ihid. i, 9, 992, a, 10 xiii. 9 1085, a, 7, 81.

Cf. Zellek,P/!. d. 028 sq., 805.

"

Gr

pt

VOL.

1.

322

ARISTOTLE

knowledge cannot be derived from any prior knowledge.^ He doubts whether all being can have the same constituent parts,2 or whether out of the combination of the same elements, at one time a number and at another

He remarks that such time a magnitude could arise/^ ascribed to substances, and constituent parts can only be only to those substances which have some admixture of
materiality.''

Hi^ further demonstrates that such con-

stituent parts could neither be thought as individual

nor as universal

not as individual, because they would be cognisable and could not be the connot then not as stituents of more things or Ideas than one they would not be of the universal, because in that case
:

nature of

substance.''^

In another connection, he takes

exception to the variance of the Platonic suggestions as to the 'material element,'^ and rejects altogether the

assumption of Speusippus that there are more than one

original but different principiaJ

closer inquiry into

the two
'

Platonic ultimate principles, 'the One,'

and

the Great and Little,' leads Aristotle to declare that

they are both misconceived. be a thing existing by

substance.

He

asks

how

the

One can
is

itself,

when no

universal

The notion
;

of unity
^

expresses
xiii. 10,

only a

Mttaph. i. 9, 992, b, 24 against which, indeed, his own distinction of demonstrative and inductive knowledge might be used. 2 This is suggested, without

Metaj)U.
a. 4.

1086, b, 19,

1087,

MetapU. xiv.
1089, b,

1,
1 1
;

1087, b,
cf.

4,

12,

2(>, c. 2,

Zeller,

mention of Plato, in Metaph. xii. 4, 1070, a, 33 sqq. cf. what was adduce'd on pp. 300-301, supra.
;

Gr. pt. i. p. 628, 3. it the remark in Meta/pli. xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13 sqq. is true, that Nature is not lviaoli^lt]s ^airy
T'h. d.
'

Of

3
*

Metapli. iii. 4, 1001, b, 17 sqq. xiv. 2 Ibid. i. 9, 992, b, 18

;

fioxOvpa rpaycfdia, and in xii. the ovk ayadhv TroXvKOipavii].

10/w.

ther

cf.

Zeller,

ibid.

p.

Fur851 sq.

'inn.

and the passages there adduced.

METAPHYSICS

323

quality or, more exactly, a determination of measure. This, however, presupposes something measured,., and even that is not necessarily anything substantial, but

may

any of the most

also be a magnitude, or a quality, or a relation, or different kinds of things, and, accord'

'

ing as it is one or the other of these, the One will be variously determined, as predicated of one or other of the similar kinds of subjects.^ Whoever seeks to deny this
the One as the only SubEleatics a position which, apart from other objections, would make Number itself impossible.2 Again, if with Plato we are to say that the
'
'

will

be driven to explain

stance, as did the

One

is

the same as the Good, then there will arise other

intolerable difficulties,^ not worse, however, than those which would be raised if, with Speusippus, we attempt to

distinguish the

One from the Good as

for
'

a special principle

the Great and Little,' this conception indicates nothing but bare qualities, or rather, bare relations and these, indeed, of such a kind as
itself.4

by

As

could least of

all be taken for anything in the nature of substance, since they manifestly require a substratum.

How

can substances, he asks again, consist of that is not substantial, and how can constituent parts be at the same time predicates ? ^ Or if we are to take

which

thisfirst,

second principle to be more closely related to the as not-being is to being, such a theory would be
Plato believed that he could only
of Parmenides by assuming a prin1087, b.

altogether perverse.

escape the
'

monism
X. 2
;

Metaph.

xiv.

1,

36

33,
'

and

sqq., b, 13,
*

xi. 2,

1060, a,

36;

cf.

20 sqq Metaph. 1091, b,

' .

.wy^?'^, p.

312, n.2,and p. 272,11.2. in. 4, 1001, a, 29. 3Ietaph. xiv. 4, 1091, a, 29,

16, 22
. ,

init.

Metaph.

1,

^ 3fetaph. i. 9, 992 b 1088, a, 15 sqq.

'

1
'

'

xiv

Y2

324
ciple of not-being.

ARISTOTLE
This assumption
is

not necessary

for the purpose, since

Being

itself is

not of one kind

only

^
;

and

it

would

also fail of the purpose, since the

manifold character of Being cannot be explained by the

simple opposition of Being and not-Being. ^
to Aristotle, Plato has not sufficiently defined

According

Being and
'

not-Being, and in his deduction of

'

the manifold

from

them he has been thinking

for if the
'

of substance only,
^c.,'"^

and not

either of qualities, magnitudes,

Clreat

or of

movement

and Little* produced movement, then

must the Ideas whose matter it is be likewise moved.'* The main defect of the Platonic view lies in the position that opposition as such
ciple of all things.
still it is

is

the

first

and original prin-

If

all

does arise out of an opposition,

is

not out of mere opposition as such, which

negation, but out of relative opposition Qut of the sub-

stratum to which negation attaches.

Ever)' thing

which
it

comes

to

be,

presupposes a matter out of which

is

comes, and this matter

not simply a kind of Not-

Being, but a kind of Being

which

?'x

not as yet that

which
this

it

is'

(thont to

hecome.

The nature

of matter in

regard was misunderstood by Plato.

He had
as the

in

view merely the opposition of matter as against the

formative principle, and so he thinks of
it

Bad

and the Not-Being, and overlooks the other

side of the

question namely, that it is the positive substratum of By this all formative action and of all becoming.-^
MctapJi. xiv. 2, 1088, b, 35 sqq. cf. p. 223, supra. Ihid. 1089, a, 12. ' Ihld. 1. 15, 31 sqq.
1
^

Metaph.
;

xiv.
;

init.

c.

4,
a,

1091, b, 30 sqq. 32 .^qq. Phys A.

xii. 10, 9, cf.

1075,

Zeller,

Ph.

d.

Gr. pt.

i.

p. Gl-1.

'

Ibid.

i.

9,

992, b.

7.

Ml^TAPllYSlCS

.325

oversight he involves himself in this contradiction, that

matter tends to

its

own

annihilation,

that the evil

it

tends to the good and must of necessity assume

itself.^

into

Further contradictions arise in the considerations that the Great and Little (as was above remarked
of the
'

Unlimited of the Pythagoreans) must be a thing

'

whereas at the same time as a determination of number and magnitude it

itself,

existing for

a substance

cannot possibly be

so,

and that the same principle would

If,

of necessity have to be given in actuality as unlimited,

which

is

a position in fact unthinkable.^

finally,

we

ask the Platonists in what

way

the numbers can be

deduced from their ultimate principles, distinct statements are entirely wanting. We ask if they arise by a
mixture, or by a composition, or by a generation, and
is no answer.^ We are nob told how out of the One and the Many could be produced those units of which numbers are composed,'^ or whether number be

there

itself limited or unlimited.''

the
the

first

There is no deduction of uneven number or of any of the rest except

first ten.^

We
by
its

are not

unities arise out of

which

is

shown from whence those made up the indefinite

is

duality which,

combination with the One,

:

to

and we are not shown how the duality of the Great and Little can, with the aid of the One, bring forth any numbers which could
^
'

generate the remaining units

Phys.\.^,Vd2,?i,lQ.;Meta2)h.
P/ti/s. iii. 6,

xiv. 4, 1092, a, 1.
-

sqq.

Metaph. xiii. 9, 1085, b, 12 an a'-gument immediately

c. 4,
^

203, a,

204, a, 8-34, cf. sqq.

Metaph. xiv.
;

sqq.

xiii. 9,

5, 1092, a, 21 1085, b, 4 sqq.; cf. c.

directed against Speusippus. s jfji^ io85, b, 23, c. 8, 1083, b, 3(> sqq. xii. 8, 1073, a, 18. Zeller, ibid. p. 591, 3.
;

7, 1082, a, 20.

][Jetaj)h.

i.

9,

991, b, 31.

326

ARISTOTLE
tlie

not arise by

doubling of the One.^

Tbere are a

multitude of similar objections to be found in Aristotle,

but these will be more than

sufficient.

These criticisms of the Platonic theory are not all of equal value. Not a few of them, at least in the form
in

which Aristotle directly states them, rest undeniably

Plato.^

upon a misunderstanding of
cannot
Ije

Nevertheless,

it

gainsaid that Aristotle has noted the

weak

points of Plato's theory with a keen insight, and has

conclusively exposed
its defects.

Not only has he comand dilemmas of the

pletely exhibited the obscurities

theory of Ideal Numbers, but he has also refuted once

for all the Ideal

Theory and the assertions of Plato as

to the original basis of things.

Among
all

which he uses in

his attack, there are

the arguments two which stand

out as decisive, and to which

or innnediately return
:

the others mediately

all

jirst^

that

universal concepts

(such as those of the One, of Being, of the Great and

Little, of the

Unlimited, and in fact

all

the concepts

involved in the Ideas) are in no sense substantial, and

that they denote only certain qualities and relations,

and at the most only the genera and species of things, and not the things themselves second^ that the Ideas are
;

devoid of motive power, and not only cannot explain,

but would actually make impossible the changes of

phenomena, the coming to be and ceasing to be of things, change and movement, with all the natural
properties of things that rest thereon.^
'

In the direction

Metaph.
Cf.

xiv, 3, 1091, a, 9.

Zellee, Platon. Stud,

257 sqq.
^

on the importance which he himself attached to this objection cf., for example, Metaph. i. 9,
;

Aristotle frequently insists

991,

a,

Trivrwv

5t

(xdMara

METAPHYSICS
of Aristotle's polemical energy to these points,

327

we may

recognise in

him the

spirit of the

Natural Philosopher

reaching out towards clear definitions of the actual

world and towards an explanation of

of abstraction
are

facts.

His powers
is

not inferior to Plato's, and he

skill.

superior to

him

in dialectic

But he

is

determined

to give currency to

such conceptions only as verify

themselves by experience, in that they either combine

into unity a series of
their

common
is

cause.

phenomena, or take them back to To the logical Idealism of Plato

there

wedded

in Aristotle the Realism of the student

of Nature.

So

far the

attempt has been to state the objections

It is

Aristotle urged against his predecessors.

time to

turn to his

own answers

to those questions the solution

of which he failed to find in them.

SiairoprjCreiev

&v

ris, ri

nore

(TvfxfidK-

Kal ixTa(popas Keyeiv Tron]TiKas

IBeas airofiXiiTov
a,

ri

Aerot

rk

e^dr]

to7s

aiSiots

rwv
Kal

ydp iari rd ipya^6/xevov vpds ras

;

al(r9r]Ta>v

^
'

rots

yr/vofi^voLS

and

so ihid. 992,

(f)0ipoixvois

ovT
].

yap
:

KLvrt(Tws

24

oAws Sh
fxlv

^r}Tov<Tr]s rrjs (ptKo-

avTols;

ovT )U6To/3wA7js and at

avToou

ovSe/xicis icTTiv a'lTia

cro<pias ir^pi rCov

(pavepcov rd a'iriov

20

t^ 5e \4yeiv
/cat

rovro
Xiyojx^v

e^aKa/j.^v

TrapaSeiyiiiara
e'xetj/

avra

eluai

/iT-

irepl ttjs alrias

(ovSkv yap odev 7] apx^

r&Wa

KivoKoy^lv iari

rrjs /iera^oATjs),

kc.

328

ARISTOTLE

CHAPTER

Yir.

CONTINUATION.
Tiue
Tii:<:he

M dn

I/iqairi/

of Metapliysics.

are tlires

discussed.

main questions which now fall to be In so far as the First Philosophy has to do
it

with Actuality in general, with Being as such,

follows

that the question of the original essence of the actual,

which

is

the inquiry into the conception of Substance,

all

must precede
in a true

other investigations.

To

this question

Plato in his Ideal Theory had answered that that which

and original sense

is

actual was to be souo-ht

for only in the

classes,

common

essence of things or in their

Aristotle, as has

which are expressed by general conceptions. been seeii, was nob content with the
but for that very reason he attributed the more
It

answer

inq^ortance to the relation between the individual and

the universal.

was
felt

in the inaccurate

statement of

this relation that he found the

fundamental error of

Plato's view,

and he

that

it

ception of

the

same

relation

was from the true conthat any revision of,

start. The first question for Philosophy, therefore, must be an inquiry into the conception of substance,' which is an inquiry into the relation of
'

Platonism must

the

individual

to

the

universal.

Aristotle defines that relation in such a

^

But inasmuch as way as to throw

See

p.

290 sqq. supra.

METAVIIYSICS
essential actuality

329
individual,
it

to

the

side

of the

follows that the Form, or the sl^os^ which Plato

had

made

identical with the universal,

becomes detached

from the universal in Aristotle and takes on an altered

meaning.
which'

To him Form

is

essence determinate and

developed into
is

full actuality:

undetermined

univ^ersality,

the possibility of Being, not yet determined

this wa}^ or that, is considered as

Matter in opposition
accord-

to

Form.

The
fine,

relation of

Form and Matter

ingly furnishes the second

Forui, in
is
;

main object of Metaphysics. essentially related to Matter, and

the fact

Matter to Form

arid this relation consists in

.

that Matter becomes definite through

is

Form This process

way movement and
In the following

Movement.
first

All movement, however, presupposes a

first

cause of movement, and in this

the

motor constitute the third pair of concepts

is

with which Metaphysics

concerned.

pages Aristotle's theory

three heads.
(1)

will

be set forth under these

The Indiciclual and

the Ihiiversal.

Plato had taken as the essential element in things

'

the universal as

it

is

thought in conception,' and had

ascribed Being, in its fullest and original sense, to that

only.
It

bination

of

was by a limitation of this Being, by a comBeing with Not-Being, that individual

These, therefore, had, outside and

entities could arise.

above them, as something other than themselves, the

universal
essences,

which were the Ideas.

Aristotle

denies this, for he finds the fundamental error of the Ideal

Theory in

this seijaration of the conceptual essence

from

330

ARISTOTLE
itself.'

the thing

universal

is

that which belongs to

many

common,^ or, more accurately, that which belongs to them by reason of their nature, and It follows that all therefore, necessarily and always.^
things
in

universal concepts denote only certain of the properties

of things
subjects.

or,

in other words, are predicates

and not

Even wlien a number of condjined to make the conception

thereby

these properties are

of a genus,
to
all

we

get

something which belongs

the

things

pertaining to the genus in question, but by no means

a universal subsisting beside
Plato's
su

them
is

as

distinct.

For

%v nrapa

ra iroWa
If,

substituted Aristotle's
is

thino- subsistino'
is

Kara ttoWmp.^ bv

then, the universal

not anyIt

itself, it

cannot be Substance.
is

true that the

'

name

of Substance''
iravTaxov

used in various
(pa/ihv
elvai.
ret

Seep.31G,n.l,s?(/;;vi'.
5),

Metaph.

lOSG, b, 2: tovto S' [the iKivriae doctrine of Ideas] fxev 'S.'jOKpa.T'ris 5ia rovs bpicrfJLOvs, ov jxriv ix(*>pio-e ye roov Kad' fKacTTOv Kol TOVTO opdccs iv6i)(Tei> OV ^wp^a'as apev fi\v yap tov Ka96\ou ovk ea-Tiu iTn(TTT]ixt\v \a^e7v, rb Sc- x^P' i(^eiu oiTLO'y tcou crvfx^aivovTUV ^vaX^P^^ "ffJt Tas Ideas iaTiv Cf. c. 4, 1078, b, ao sq. Meta2>h. vii. 13, 1038, b, 11 TO 5e Ka96\ou Koivov tovto yap Aeyerai KaOoKov o TxKeioanv virapx^i-v
xiii.
. .

Ndaph.

V. 9,

KaOoAov 1017,

b,

35

Ka'ioKov Kad' avTO. virdpx^'-

yhp See also

BoxiTZ, Ind. Arist. 356,

Kampe,
160
'

b, 4 sqq. Erkcnntnissth. d. Arisi.

sq.

Anal. Post. i. 11 init.: eUv oZv eluai /) eV rt irapa to, avdyKT}, u airddei^is TToAAa OVK fCTTar eivai jxivToi %v KaTO, TroXAciv
/jeu

a\ri6es (lire7u avdyKt].

De An.

iii,

-'

8 (see p. 195, n. ], supra). ' Aristotle's oixr'a is of course

34 outco yap \iyo;j.ev to KadeKaaTov rb apidfjiCf} eu, KaOoKouSeTO eirlTovTwv. Be Interj)r. 7, 17, a, 39 Part.
iricpvKiv
;

iii.

4,

9i;9,

b,

644, a 27, and s?/^r. Anal. Post. \. 4, 73, b, 26 KadoAov 5e \4ya) t> kv KaTO. iravTds re vTrdpxv koI KaQ'' abrh Koi rj avTO.

An.

i.

4,

(pavephu

ixpa

oti

oaa Ka96\ov
ciel

e|

avdyKfiS
c.

imdpx^i87, b,

to7s -npayixaffiv Ka\

31,

32: rh yhp

and elsewhere translated substance.' It is strange to find this translation attacked (by Strumpell, Gescli.d.theor. cf. (Jr. 213 sq. Phil. h. d. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 555, ground that Aristotle 1) on the nowhere understands by oWio. the unknown, constant, and real substratum of variable attributes.' It cannot, however, be expected that we should cease to use for
here

by

'

'

METAPHYSICS
senses,^

831

but

it

applies originally only to that which can

neither be stated as a definition of the essence of any-

thing

else,

derivative.2

nor can depend upon anything else as a In other words, Substance is that which is

only subject and never predicate.^

is

Or

again. Substance

Being

in its original sense, the source from

which

These conditions Aristotle all other being is draw^n.'* The universal, as he finds fulfilled only in individuals. proved against Plato, does not subsist for itself. Every
universal, even the genus, has its existence only in the

individuals of which

it

is

predicated.
It

It is

always in
'this

something other
individual alone

than

itself.

denotes not

thing,' but only a stated condition of things.

is

The

that which

belongs to itself only,

which
is

not borne up by some other, which is what it by reason of itself, and not upon the basis of some
is
fidXiffra

an Aristotelian term the word which the custom of 1,500 years has consecrated to it, simply because Herbart connects the same word with another sense. On the different meanings
1

yap

So/cet

eJmi ohaia rh
.

vvu fxev ovy tvttcp e'lprjrai ri ttot iarlv rj ovala, otl to firj Kaff viroKeifitvov a\Aa Ka0' ov ra &\\a. Cf. Anal.
viroKe'/xeuou

irpxrov

PH.
*

i.

27, 43, a, 25
6.

Longit.
:

V. 3,

of

s^e p. 374 sc[.,ifi/ra. ovcria 84 imiv v Cat. c, 5 KuplooTaTOL T KOI TTpwTccs Koi fidAio'Ta
over' a,
:

465, b,

X^yojXivt],

Tivhs
tIs

% jUT^re KaQ' K4yiTai firir' eV

viroKeifjLeuov

viroKeifxhcfi
f)

rivi icrriv, oTov 6

tTTTTOS.

rU

avOpooiros

Cf. further

TreNDEL-

rb hv jVetaj)h. vii. 1 init. \4yTai TToAA-axiis [in the different (pauepov ori. rovrwv categories] irpwrov *ov rb t'l iffTiv, oirep (rr]fxa\vei ra S' &\Aa Aeyerat tt]v oixriav oura t(j5 toD ovtws uvtos ra fxiv
. .
.
.

Hist. Beitr. i. 53 sqq. Aristotle himself elsewhere MetapU.Y. 8, 1017, so defines it. airavra 5e TaOra xiy^Tai b, 13
^
:

ENBURG,

iroaoT-qras
Sec.
. . .

di/ai,
iixrre

ra Se

Tro'oTTjras,

to irpwTcas ov koI ov

t\ ov

itself

ovfflaoTiovKad'vTroKeifxivovA^yeTai,

aWa
ia-ri

1028, b,
cKeTz/o

Kara tovtwv rh 36 Ka9' ov ra

:

to.
8'

&KXa

vii. 3,

nothing else than to nothing else; cf. Anal. Post. i. 4, and the remarks which follow] dA\'

[what

is

and applies

vTroK'ixiv6v

'hv

aXXa

Kfyerai,

airXws v ovaria 1030, a, 22 rh ri

:

h.v

eiTj

c.

7,

iffriv airkoSs rf)

Se avrh

/UTjKreTt

hi6 TtpSirov TTcpl

Kar' &\\ov. tovtov diopiffreov

ovffia

virdpx^i-

See further on

p. 289.

332
otlier

AmSTOTLl^
being.
^

Only in a derivative sense can the

:

genera be called substances

as

in so far, that

is

to say,

they

set

forth the
;

common
^

essence

of a

certain

number
'

of substances
:

and they claim a kind of

TovTo irdyTuy airia ravra 1008, a, 8 oudey yap rwv Koiyy ToSe ri a-rj/xalyiL, aWa TonV5e, 7] S' oiiaia roSeri. Soj>h.
di.a
;

Cat. c. 5, 2, a, iJi ra 5' akKa ira/Ta /jroiKad' unroKeia^ycov \4yTa.L

T(2y TTpirwy ovaiwy
a-iTOAS
v)

Kai

iii.

G,

eV vTroKnixiva's

foriy

fj.}}

ovaxv

ovy
rjSy
i.

Txy
?;},

tvojotccv

ov(TL-jiy

aSvywoy
calls

HaAcoj/ ri

^IvoLi.

Anal. Post.

4,

a,

Kl.G. 22, 178^ b, 37 (cf. ibid. 179, 8) TO yap dvOp'joiros Kal airav t6
:

b, 5,

where Aristotle

/ca9"

Koiyjy OV To'Se
T7

that o ^u.)/ /ca9' vnoKntxivoj KsyeraL aWov riyos, oToy rh ^a^i(oy erfpjy tl oy ^a^'^ov iau Kal kevKoy, S' ojcr'a, KM oaa ro'Se ri, ojx 7] krepoy ri uyra effrly birsp eVx-V Ta fjLey 5^ /j.^ Ka9^ viroKeia^yov

aWh

Trp6s Tl

77

TTws

(Tr}:j.alyi.

dAAa TOioySe tl tQv toiovtwv tl (This holds even of

ri,
rj

the sensible qualities of things;

see p. 20(), .supra.) Gen. An'^\\. 767, b, 33 t6 Ka9eKa(rToy TOVTO yap 7] ovj-ia. All other categories indicate mere accidents ((rvfijBefirjKJTa) of substance cf. p. 28'J Kujfra. Aristotle finds it therefore quite natural {Mefnph. vii. 16, 1010, b, 26 sq.) that the ideas should be made into a x'^P'fToj' if they are taken for substances. The error of the doctrine of ideas consisted only in regarding the universal as
.",
: ;

[sc. Aeyi/xej/a]

a9"

ana

Ae'yw,

ra

vKOKeiu4yov (ru'x^e^rjKjTa. Mctaph.\\.i. 1, J02S, a,27: that

be

Ka9'

which supports
said
to be
.

t]
.

qualities is obcria kciX rh Ka9'

all
/x(:y

eicaoToy

rcoy

yh.p

aWvv

KaTriyopyjixiray o-ji)y X'-^P'-'^t^v, a"jrr] 5e fx6vr] c. 8, 102!), a, 27: TO xaipio-Toj/ Kal to rods ri vndpx^iv
;

5oKu
a,
] [)

fidKia-TaTrj o-jaia
:

c.

1,

lU/JO,
;

rb roSe ri c. 10, 10:')o, b, 28 KaldKov S' ojk ecrriy oiiaia c. 12, lOvJI, a, 27: r] oua'.a hy tl Kal roSe ri arj^uaiyei cos (/)a;.teV; c. 13, 1038, b, 10:
oxxriav kxl
: ;

such a substantial idea. (HektLING, Mat. und Form, 44, 1, has misunderstood this statement.) Cat. c. 5, 2, a, 15 SevTepaL
:

TvpwTT]

ovcria

'ihios

eKxaru)
Te
5);

??

oyx

5e obcriaL \4yoyTai eV ols ei'Seo'iv at irpwToos ojalai Aeyoyitej/at virdpxovai,

virdpxd- ah\(v,Td 5e Kad JKov Koiyov.

Tavra re
yfi'T]
.

/cal
.

rd twv elSuy tovtoov

o re

Ibid.

1.

JU

e/f

TO-'jTjiy

oTov

&y0p(O7ros Kal

6ioopoi'(ri,

(payepoy

on

o-j9fy

tcov
/cat

KadoAov viTapx6vTwv ova'a iarl,

OTi

obQtv

(TrjiiayeL

rctr

KJiyrj

KaTrfyopovixeyaiy roSe ti, dAAa Toi6y5e c. 16, 1040, b, 23 Koiudy fxy}9ev ovar a obSeyl yap uirdpx^i V
; :

further on. Otherwise the expression SevTepa ovala does not occur in Aristotle. As, however, he elsewhere uses
((foy.

TO

And

so

O'jala

aW

irpMTTi ovtria for substance in the primary sense,' and rp'.Tr] ova-la
'

rj

avrfj re Kal

r^ exoyri
:

for

'third

class of substances,'

airrV oj iarly ova'a. Ibid. fin. T<2y KaOoAou Xeyo/JLivwv obdev oixria xii. 5 init. eVei 5' eVri ra t.uv x^'P'
:

no objection can be taken, as we have already remarked (in n. 1

to p. 64).

i<rrh, TO, 5c

ov

;(OJ/3(rro, ovffiai

eKeTva.

MJETAPHYSICS
substantial character with the

333

more right the nearer

that

they approach to individual

degree than the genus.^
ception

substances, so

the

species deserves to be called substantial

in a higher

According to the strict conof substance, however, that term cannot be

at
all,

applied to them

because they are predicated

'

it is true of them, as of every universal, that they are not a This,' but a Such not substantive, but adjective and that they express,
'

of individuals,^ and because

'

not substance, but a condition of substance.^

further marks of substance which Aristotle gives us, likewise refer, in so far as they are really characteristic of that conception, to individual substances only.4
^

The

The

so-called

secondary substance of

Cat. c. 5,2, b, 7sq. Aristotle, indeed, Stems to say the opposite in 3Ietaph Yiil 1, 1042, a, 13: en aWws [(ru^^o/j/et] rd y^uos

only of individual substance has been shown. A second (Cat 5 3,a, 6 sq.,and p. 381, n. 2\?/m)
is t^ fi^ eV J7roet^eVa; ^hai lUit this characteristic belongs also to the class, and not to it alone

fxaXXou Twv ei5<bu [oiaiay eiVat] Kal TO KaddXov t<2v KaBUatrra but
;

he does not intend to express his

own view in these ^^ords; cf. vii 13; BoNiTZandScHWEGLER

*''

but likewise (Cat c 5 8 a 21 &c.) to the specific 'difference. since this is likewise
contained in the conception of the thing to which it applies; ^^i^e (according to Aristotle, *^'^-) only that is eV ^TTo^e.^.V.; which does not belong to the conception of that of which it is predicated, but which is a quality in a substance quite init e.a. in the sentence 'the body is white' KfvKov is eV viroKeifievcp on the other hand, in the sentence man is two-legged,' S.Vow is not 4v VTroKifi4v<f}. A further peculiarity of substance is (Cat c. 5, 3, b, 24) r6 f,r}dh avrals iuavr'ou ehai. And yet Aristotle himself remarks thkt the 'same
:

o/, ^ 'Cat.

c.

o,

2, a,
,

19

sq., b,
,.

^3^1

.
{),

u, D,

o^^f^''l''"t^'^P'l^t

Ti

^5^;^iU:7rao-a5eot;(no5o:iTc8e iTv^uLueiu. Of. nrptiTai ohaiai

this
5e
tifv

holds unconditionally:

iirl

SfuTf'pij/ ovaiup cpaiv^rai ojxoMs T(f> (Txif^ari t^s -n-pocTvyopias ToSe ri a-qfiah^iy ov
to;;/
.
.

dependent of

fi'iv

aKrjdfs ye,
o-ij^aij/er

Tt

ov

dAAa /xaKAou iroiov yhp kv eVri t6

^
irpxTT) ova'.a,

vTTOKii^Kvov

o5o-7rep

'

aAAa

kuto.

ttoWuu

avdpwTvos

A7eTa: Kal t6 (^ov. Ihe tirst characteristic of suDstance was rd ^^ Kad' v-noK^iti^vov Kiy^fxeai.

That

this

is

true

334

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle cannot be treated as exactly identical with

quality, but neither can it properly

be considered subits qualities

stance.

It denotes

substance on the side of

only.

For

it

is

the combination of the essential proclass of substances.^

perties of a definite
witli
it,

In contrast

it

is

the

individual

substances alone

which
original

are of tliat self-sufficient

and independently subsisting

of substance, in
its

nature to which the

sense, belougs.

name
is

This view, however,

If
is
all

not without

its difficulties.
it

knowledge

is

concerned with the actual, ^ then

only the actual, in the highest and truly original

object of knowledge.
reality,"* it
is

sense of the word, which can furnish the original and

ultimate

If

knowledge
the
first

is

the

recognition of

must

relate, in

place,

to real Being, whicli

this substance is
is

the substance of things.^

it

If

individual substance,
ble.

follows that,

of quantity and And ceptions.

the case with determinations many other conthe same reply

if

The statement, moreover, contains a questionable identitication of substance with matter,

to which we shall have again to refer. Cat. c. 5, 8, b, 18 (after the passage quoted in n. .3 on p. 833) ovk atrXws Se ttoiou tl arjixalvei, uxrnep rh \^vk6v. ouSeu yap &\\o a-nfiayci t^ XevKhu dAA' y) iroiov. rh 5e elSos koI rh yeyos -rrepl ovaiav t6 woiov acpopiC^i-- iroiav yap riva ova'iav
'
: :

may be made

(^ihid.

1.

:}3)
is

it

be said that substance

sus-

ceptible of no diiference of degree, no greater or less. For while, perhaps, we might say that one is more or less of a man than another, yet we could in no sense say that he is more or less 'two-legged.' If,

'

finally {ihid.

4,

a,

10, b, 3, 17),

(rvfiaiuei.

Cf.

Simpl.

A'at.

2f>,

take as the most distinctive quality of substance t^ ravrbu

we

Bas.,

who
Ibid,

explains

iroid

ns

ovaria

by

ttoiJttjs ovcriwSris.
-

tv apid/uLif hv TcSu ivaviiwv ehai hcKTiKov, to Kara t^v eavTrjs ^erajSoAV 6e/CTi/cV rdSv ivavricau
Ka\

See p. 162.

^
*

and

p. 219, n. 1.
4,

MetajJll. vii.

1030, b, 4

holds only of individual substance, since to classes the conceptions of numerical unity and change are inapplica(Ivai,

this

iK^tvo Se (j>avep6u
a-n-Aws Sptar/xos koI

on

6 irpdyruis Ka\

ovcnuv ianv.
n. 1.

rb ri ^u ^Ivai roiv See also p, 219,

METAPHYSICS
in the last resort, all

335
of the individual,

knowledge

is

and that individual things furnish, not only the startingpoint, but the whole essential content and object of
knowledge.
This conclusion,

however, Aristotle de-

cisively rejects.

He

is

convinced that Science relates,

not to the individual, but to the universal, and even

w^hen
it

descends furthest to particulars,

it

addresses

itself all

the while, not to the individual things, as such,

but to general conceptions only.^

in his system cannot be
is

This contradicti(m
it

met by the observation ^ that

only in the realm of natural being that the individual

is first,
first-

whereas in the realm of

Aristotle himself

spirits the universal is

knows nothing of any such

any kind of limitation,
individual es-

distinction.

He

says, without

that knowledge

is

directed to the universal only, and,

it

equally without qualification, that

is

sence only which

is

substantial

and he chooses the

both propositions
alike.^

examples with which he

illustrates

from the natural and the spiritual world

Even

God

is

individual Substance.

The

fact that
:

Substance

and Form run together proves nothing for, as will be seen, there recurs in the working out of the conception of Form the same difficulty which now engages us
with regard to Substance.
Aristotle

himself
,"*

recognised the

full

weight of

the difficulty
'

and he seems to indicate another w^ay

^

Pp. 162 sqq., and 220 sqq. siqna. CiAn Anal. Post. \. 24, 85, ihe argument that the a, 20 sq general method proof is better than the particular; and ihid. rd Se ri iari rwy c. 14, 79, a, 28 Kae6\ov eo-TiV. BlE3^,Phil.d.Arist.i. 56 sq.
,
:

cf ^jth regard to the

_

first,

'^

1086, b, 33 sq., Anal. Post. i. 31 1)81, a, 7 i. 1, in regard to the second, Cat. c. 5, Metapli. vii. ]0, 3, b, 14 sq. ; 1035, b, 27, c. 16, 1040, b, 21, xii. 5, 1071, a, 2. * Metajjh. in. icrn S' 4 Ifiit.

Metapli.

xiii. 10,
;

83G

ARISTOTLE
^

of escape in the remark

in
jiofise,

tliat

Knowledge, considered
is

is

indeterminate and

directed to the uni-

but that in actual practice, on the contrary, it is always directed to something determinate. This, howThe knowledge of the ever, does not take us very far.
versal,

particular arises only

positions

The

certitude of that

by the application of universal proknowledge depends on

therefore, as Aristotk^
its

their certitude.

Such knowledge,

expressly recognises,- has not for

object the indivi-

known by
otlier

dual as such, but, on the contrary, the individual is On the it only in the form of universality.^

hand,

if

the individual be that which

it

is

original

actuality, then

ought to be precisely,

(put individual,

the proper object of knowledge, and

it

tlie

knowledge of

the universal ought to depend upon In fact, it would be the individual certainty.
as Aristotle taught,^ the universal
its

for its truth

and

and not, which should be in

the more certain.^
p. 220,

own nature the

better

known and
^

exofiep-n reTovTccpaiTop'a Koi TTaawu XaXe-rrcaTaTr] Kal ava'y KaLordrr} deooprjaai, irepl ris 6 Xoyos i(paTr]Ke

See especially

&c.,

svpra.
^ Tc^ huOoXov \6ya}, as Aristotle expresses it, Metapll. vii. 10 (see pp. 220 sqq., svpra). * See p. 205, n. 2, Siqyra. ^ Rassow'S solution (J.m^f)^. de Kotiords Definltione Boctrina, p. 57) is equally unsatisfactory. He appeals to Metapli. vii. 10, 1085, b, 28 (where, moreover, after the words us KadoXov, which stand in opposition to the following KaQ" e/cao-Tov, we have simply

vvv
Toov

yap fx)] eari ri irapa ra KaOcKarrTa, ra 8e KaOiKcara aTretpa,

elre
5'

aireipuiv irws eVSe'xerai Xafi^iv

;

i-KiaT-'riixriv

c.

.A';?.:

et

ix\v

ovv

KaOoAov
[viz. ovK

at apx^i,

ravra

(Tvjxfia'vei

ovOeu yap iaovTUL ovaiaL rctiv Koivwv ToSe ti (rrj/iaiVet, aXKa TotoVSe, h 8' ova'ia toI^ ti, as he says before,] et 5e ii)] KaOoAov, aAA.' US ra KaOeKaara, ovk tffovrai im(TTT]Tai

KaOoKov yap

at itn(Trr\yiai

iravruv. CI.

Metaph.
also
xiii.

^\. 2, \OQ>0,h,

19, xiii. 10, a 14.

'

vii.

18,

1039,

Metaph.

10

see p. 1G7,

an iliriiu) and c. 4, atd tries to solve the contradiction by remarking that in definition and in science generto supply 1029, b, 19,
ally the individual is regarded

n. 1 supra.

METAPHYSICS
If,

337

genus had than the species, but that, on the contrary, for us the species had more than the genus we should thereby place ourselves in opposition
in itself

conceding

this,

we were

to say that the

more of the

essential

to the definite statements of Aristotle,

insists that
all

who continually Substance, in the strict sense of the

-

word,

US as such.
it

not that it appears to only one case which would make possible to escape the difficulty that is, if there were
is

individual Substance

There

is

a principle which, being individual, could be at the same time truly universal, for this could be at the same
time, as substantial, a basis of actuality, and, as uni-

Such a principle seems to be found in the keystone of Aristotle's entire system namely, in his theory of Pure Thought, or of God. To him the Divine, as thinking Essence, is Subject as the End, Mover and Form of the world, it is also a true
versal, a basis of truth.
;

The conception of it has existence in -one Essence, not merely contingently, ^ but by reason of its own nature whereas, in all finite things,
universal.

individual

the universal presents

itself, in

itself,

or at least might present

number

of individuals.^
to seek

From

this stand-

point

it

would be possible

a solution of the

difficulties

suggested, by saying that in God, as the

sujjra.
xii. 10, 1074 a 33 iroWh [everything of which several examples are contained in the same classl Savu eh yhp A6yos Kal 6 airhs ^x^i

not as individual, but from the universal side of its being. That
]ust the reason why it would require to be otherwise if the individual were the substantial.
IS

Metaph.

Ua

hpiOfK?

Beandis, ii. b, 568, whose answer to this question is not al

ttoAAcDj/,

oiou itvOpdirov,

together clear. As perhaps that of the sun or of the moon see p. 222, n. 2,
;

:ZccKpdT7,s

ds- rb Se ri 7,y duai o^k ^2. iix-nv rh ttowtok ivreXeyeia ydo a

54
/

r-

VOL.

I^

338

ARISTOTLE

ultimate principle, absolute certitude for thought coincides with absolute actuality of being, but that, in all

derivative forms of being, the greater actuality falls to

the share of the individual and the greater cognisability

to tlie share of the universal.
ever,

That

this solution,

how-

would
is

be in accordance with all Aristotle's preAristotle himself does not

misses

not yet proven.

distinction.

draw the
that
all

He

says without any qualification

in the cognition

knowledge consists

of the

universal,
alone.

and that substantiality pertains to individuals h^ven if we were to limit the first of these
its

propositions to the world of sense,'

incompatibility
Aristotle's

with the second would not disappear.

is

view

not that
/'V3

knowledge
are
It

is

directed

to

the universal

because

incapable
is,

of perfectly

knowing the
iii

individual as such.

on the contrary, that

^pite

of the fact that the individual things of sense are better known to us, the universal must furnish the sole object
of

knowledge in the strict sense, because it is in itself more original and more cognisable because it alone
possesses that immutability which anything that
is

to

be the object of knowledge must

conclusion
is

afford.^

The

further

inevitable, that, in comparison with the

it

individual things of sense,

must possess a higher

shall

degree

of actuality also.

And we

also

find^

the individual can only arise through the combination

1

AsG. V. HERTLiNGdoes,il[/.^.
h.

terial world.

H^e

it is

the only

Arist. 43, f., remarking- that the form of universality is not in all spheres the indispensable condition of knowledge,
u.

Form

resource

in face of the partial unknowableness of all material things,

"^

we have

but only where we are dealing with the knowledge of the ma-

See pp. 205 and 220, supra. Infra, p. 368.

METAPHYSICS
of

339

"reality

Matter. But one cannot understand how can belong in a higher degree and a more primary sense to that which is a combination of Form

Form with

and Matter, of Actual and Possible, than

is

to that

which
i.e,

pure Form as

it

is
is

known

in universal concepts,

to the Actual
Possibility.'

which
It

limited by no element of

mere

only remains, then, to recognise in

this poiat, not

merely a lacuna*, but a deep contradiction in the philosophy of Aristotle.^ He has set aside the
Platonic attempt to hypostatise the universal concepts,

but he leaves standing

tions,

its

two main

pillars,

the assump-

namely/that

it is

only the universal that can be

the object of knowledge and fliat the truth of

know-

ledge keeps pace with the actuality of

its

object.^

How

was

it

possible to hold these

two positions together in

thought without involving contradictions ? We need not expect, threfore, to avoid contradictions in working out the further developments of his
theory,

questions which the

by which Aristotle sought a solution of the Ideal theory and the doctrines connected therewith had left unanswered.
presents it pure, Since Kittee, iii. 130, called attention to this difficulty it has beeH further discussed by Hey'-^

* Even Heetling fails to make this intelligible, when he goes on to say in the passage just quoted

that that only ledge which

is

is

worth in things.

object of knowof permanent This in the

sphere of sense is never the whole thing, but is entangled with all that is accidental and that has its source in matter. He thus suggests the question how the thing in which the permanent worth is mixed with the accidental can be anything more substantial than the form which

cf Arist. und liecjel. Dial. 180, 183 sq., and Zeller's first edition, p. 405 sq., which was
;
.

dee

followed by Bonitz, Arist, Metaph. ii. 569. Schwegler' Arist. Metaph. iii. 133. Cf. also

Strumpell,
sq.
3
.

GescJi d. Phil. 251

d.

Cf Zeller, Ph.
sq.

Gr. pt.

541

"

^40

AUISTOTLE
Form and Matter:
the Actaal

{I)

and

the Tossihle.
lie

We

must now go back

tl:e

to Plato.

In the Ideas

had distinguished

non-sensible essence of things

from their sensible appearance. Aristotle refused to think of the former as a universal subsisting for itself Yet he does not wish to abandon outside of things.
the distinction, and the grounds on which he bases it are the same as those of Plato namely, that the nonsensible

Form can alone be an

is

object of knowledge,

and

that

it

alone

permanent amid the change of appearit

ances.
different

He

says, as Plato said, that as perception is

is

from knowledge,

equally clear that the

object of

knowledge must be something other than All that is sensible is passing and sensible things. 'contingent which may be one way or cliangeful it is a may be another. What knowledge requires, on the
;
'

contrary,
itself,

an object as unchangeable and necessary as which can as little change into its opposite as
is

knowledge can into ignorance.

can have neither a concept
noi*

Of

sensible things
it is

a proof;

the

we Form
:

alone with which knowledge has to do.^

is

Form, indeed,
all

also the indispensable condition of

Becoming

since everything that becomes, comes to be something

from being something else. Becoming, then, consists in this, that some matter takes on a definite Form. This Form must therefore be posited before each case
1

Metaph.

y'n.

11,
^uev

15 (see p.
of.
il/id.

eVtg-TTj^uT?

ohdevos,

ei

fi-h

ris

chai
^ti

220, supra), with iii 4, 999, b, 1: et

which

Aeyet t^v atcdncnv

S'

eTriffrvfivv-

iariTapara
et?j

ovv tir^Qh kx9' e/catTra, ohOkv hv

ou5'
5,

iv.

aKivoTOv; 1010, a, 25: Kara rh dSos

ai^iov
ov5'

ovdh

vorjrhu o-KKt. Ttivra aia9r,TX kcu

arravra. yiyvaaKO/xsv.

METAPHYSICS
of

341

Becoming

as tlie

aim and end thereof; and even

supposing that in any particular case the Form could

itself originate in

the process of Becoming, yet in any

case

such

supposition
it

could

not

be

carried

ad

infinitum^ for if

could,

true instance of actual

we should never arrive at a Becoming. The fact of Becomit

ing, in other words, is inexplicable unless

be true

that before anything

came to be there was a Form ^ which itself had not come to be. For the same reason there must also be Matter as the correlative of Form. The relation of these two
^

should not be defined, as Plato defined

*

it,

merely as one

Ei5os,/lop</>^,

Ao7os(see

p. 211),

n, 'i,snjjraj, ovaia (infra, p. 275), rh ri ^v ehai (see p. 217, n. 1,

S'{ij)ra).

Mttapli. iii. 4, 990, b, 5 fxriv e/f 76 a'i^iov oitOfv lariv, ouSe yeveaif ehai hvvariv avdyKr] yap elvai ri rh yiyuo/nevov Kol c'l ou ylyvcrai Kal tOvtoov rh %cr-)(^arov ayivvriTov etir^p 'iararai re koX Ik
-'

aWa

'

rovTo iv 6.\\cf}. The form, again, could only come from another form, and so on ad inji/iitum, since all coming to be is the embodiment of form in matter. (paycphv &pa oti ovde rd elSos ov yiyvcrai oh^e r6 ri ^j/ Hvai oTi TO fxlu ws dSos ^ o'jffia Keyofievou oi) yiyucrai, rj he aivodos TavTT}V \eyo/j.4t/t] yiyperai, 7) Kara
.
.

fii]

ovros yevfcrdai adiivarov 5' e^Trep r/ v\r] iarl Sioi rh ay4vv7]TOs elvai, iroAu ert /nciWou
.

Kai

on
;

eV Travrl

t^

yevoix4vc()

vAtj

T(

^IKoyov
iKeiuT]

elvci

t^v

ohaiav
[o,7crta
ei

iroTe

yiyverai.
v\t]

as that

which
TOVTO
e<TTai

becomes]
iXT)TC

yap
54

/x-fje

rh jxlv ToSe rh Se ToJe c. 9, 1034, b, 7 oy fi6vov 54 TTcpl rris overtax 6 \6yos Sr]ko7 rh fi^ yiyv(r6ai rh elSos, a\\^ irepl Taurcou Sfio'cos riav irpccrav Kowhs 6
cpeari, Kal
:

ean

iffTai

iKeipT],
el

ovQkv

Ao')os, oTop TTocrov iroiov,

&c.

It is

rh Trapdirav,

tovto

aSuvaTOU, avayKf] ri ehai Trapi rh avvoXov t)iv jj.op^7]u Ka\ t6 eJdos vii. 8 init. eVei Se inr6 rivSs re yiyverai to yiyvo^ivov Kal e/c
;

not the ball, nor is it the brass, that comes to be, but the brass ball, not TTOihp but iroihp ^v\op
;

xii.

ov yiyperai ovre r) uArj 3 inst. ovre rh dSos, Aeyw 5e ra ^axara,

:

Tiuos

[e.f/.

out of brass]
.

koI h

Trap

wairep . le.r/. a ball] oj^eThviroKeififvov ^01(770^ x^^'^^^'j ojTU)s ovdh TijV acpalpav el fx^] Kara
yiyverai.
.

(ru/u.^e^r)Kcs

\4yco

S'

on

r6v

Xa^Kdv (TTpoyyvXov
t6
arpo-yyvKov v) Trou7v, oAA' eVepdj/

rroielv

icrrlv ov
(T(pa'tpav

imo TiPtjS rod irpcvrov KLvovpTOs h Se, 7] uAt/ els h 54, rh eibos. fis &TTeipop ovp elcTip, el /x^ ixopop xo^Khs yiyperai crrpoyyvKos, dAAa Kal rh crrpoyyvXop ^ 6 _j^aA/cJs
rl Kal

yap yuera^SaAAe:
ri.
vcp'

Kal

ei's

ov

fx\p,

tV
ti,

apdyKT] 54 arripai.
viii. 3,

I hid.

olou rd eidos

1043, b,

1(5, c. r.,

070, a, 1 5 1044, b, 22.

1

342

ARISTOTLE
all

of opposition, in the sense that

fall

true Being would

exclusively to the share of Form, and that there

for

would remain

Matter only the sphere of Not-Being.

Here again
Becoming.^

arises the old question of the possibility of

It

could come to be, since

might seem that out of Being nothing it is already and out of Not:

Being nothing
finds
it

also,

for

ex nildln

niliil fit.

Aristotle

possible to avoid this diflllculty only

by

saj^ing

that

all

which comes

to be

starts
is

in

the process of

Becoming out
and

of that which
/'.s'

only in a relative sense

That from which anything comes to be cannot be absolutely Not-Being, but at the same time it cannot be that which it is only on its
in a relative sense
not.

way

to become.

There remains, therefore, as the only

it is

possible alternative, that

possibility,

that which

it

is

to be in

but not as yet in actuality.

If, for

example,
but as
educa-

an uneducated

man becomes

an educated man, he does

so out of the condition of a

truly out of the condition of a

tion.

man not educated, man capable of

In

fact, it is

not the uneducated, as such, that

it

becomes educated, but

subject,

is

the uneducated Tiian

the

that

is,

which has a predisposition towards

is

education, but in actuality

not yet educated.

All Becoming
actuality.

is

a passing over of possibility into

Becoming, in general, therefore, presupposes

a substratum
w^hicli
'
.

whose essence

it is

to be pure possibility,

has not in any relation become actualit3^2

say

All

Cf pp. 302, 309 sqq. This relation is tnily developed in P7/?/s.i, G-10, from which
2

\4yovTs ^ avyKeiueva [the former,

the following are extracts c. 7 <pauu yap yipecrOai i^ &K\ov &\\o i^ eTi'pov eVepoj/ ^ ra airkci f^al
: :

the man becomes cul'the uncultured bethe latter, if I comes cultured say 'the ^ncultured man becomes a cultured man ']. toov Se yivofjiif I
'

tured,'

or

'

METAPHYSICS
becomes that whicli
it

343
its

comes to be out of

opposite-

What becomes warm must before have been cold. He who becomes a man of knowledge must before have been
without knowledge.^
Opposites as such, however, canVOV Kal T7JS
5v6, viz.

ivociv d)S

TO awXa \eyo/xev yipeadai,

vTrofievou Xeyo/nev yiveadai,
vTro/xevou.

fiopcpTJs

CCTTt

Se Td Se

rh rh

fiev
S'

viroKeififvov dpid/x^ /xev

ej/,

e'lSei

ovx

fikv

yap

yivonevos &v6pQ)Tros ical etrri, rh Se /at? fiovanchv Kol Th d/movcrou ovre airXws

&udpc}iros viro/xfvei fxovaiKhs

ovT (TvuTiOe/xcvov
fievMV 3e TOvTwv yiyvojxivcav tovto
Tis
Trifi\e\pp,

vTrofxevei.

dicapKT-

i^ airavTuv

rwv

ecrt Xafielp idi/ &(nrp Kiyojxev, ori

Se? ri ael KoX TOVTO

viroK(:7(T6ai
el

Td yivSfxevov,
.
.

Koi

api9/j.y

aXK'
iivai.

ei'Set

ye ovx eV
avdpccircj}

raiirov rd
Koi

iariv %v, ou 70^ Kol to d/xovacij

.

TO

/!/

virofjLeuei,

rb

5'

^'TOyUtVei Td fjLev fi^ dvTiKdfievov virofxevei (6 yap dvQpunros virolj.euei) Td fxovcriKdv Se /col t6 djxovaov

ovx

(1) matter as such and (2) the negation of form ((XTeprjffis) as property (<ru/x)8e)8TjK3s) of matter. It is just this distinction, c. 8 goes on, which solves the difficulty previous philosophers felt in dealing with the possibility of becoming which they ended by totally denying oijTe yap to ou y'uecrdai {elvai ')dp ^'Stj) e/c re fi^ tvTos ovheu &v yeveaOai rj/j.e7s Se Kal avToi t^aixfv yiyueaOai fxlv ovSkv cnrXus e'/c fx^ ovTos, '6fi(t3S ixivTOL yiyveaOtti Ik
.

fi^
/c

OUTOS,

olov

KaTCL

(TVlJLfie^V,K6s

'

yap
fx)]

TTjs

ovx vTrofievei. Ibid. 190, a, 81 in the case of all else that becomes the ov(ria is the substratum of the change oti Sh kuI ai ovalai Ka\ ocra aAAa airXws uuTa | vtro:

avTd
it is

eVrt KaQ'' ov, ovK ivvirdpxovTos yiyve(TTepi]aeu3S,

thing becomes what not from its negative which in and for itself does not exist
Tai Ti [i.e. a
:

man,

for example,
.

Kei/xevov Tivhs yiuTai, iiriffKoirovvTi

yivoiT'

tiv

(pavepov.

This he goes on

he is uncultured]
ovTOs, &XXos

becomes what not cultured from being. ,

efs fxfv Sij Tpd-rros

to prove by the examples of plants, animals, products of art and chemical changes(aAAo/a)0"e<s),and then proceeds &(tt SrjAou e/c twv
:

S'

OTi ifSex^Tai TavTO.

Xdyeiv
b,

ivfpyeiav.

Kara t^p Gen.

SvyajLuv et Corr.

Kal
i.

t^j'

15

Tpoirov jxfv
dei.

3,317, Tiva Ik fi^ ovtoi

elp7)ix4vu}V,

OTi

Th

yiv6/j.(uou

dirav

dirXoos yiviTai, Tpoirou Se

dXXov

i^

Kal iffTl ix4v Ti yiv6[JLevov, eVxi 5e rt & tovto yivQTai, Kal novTO 5itt6v )) yap rb viroKeiat
i<TTl,

(TVvQeTOV

Td yap Svydfxei Ou evTeXexeia Se jj.^ ov dv ay kt) irpoinrdpxeiv

ovTOs
Cf. Metaph. 2 (an exposition in complete agreement with that of the Physics); ibid. c. 4, 1070, b, 11, 18, c. 5, 1071, b, 8, iv. 5, 1009, a, 30 and p. 841, n. 2, svpra. See infra, and Phys. ii. 5, 205, a, 6.

Xcyd/xevou dfxcpoTfpws.
xii.

fxevou

^ Th auTiKeiiueuov. Xeyw Se dj/Ti/ceTff^jtt fxhp Th &/nov(rov, viroKu(r6ai Se Tdv cLvdpwTrov, Kal t)}v fxkv
d(rxvi^o(Tvpr]u

Kal

tt]v

djuopcpiau

t)

tV
Td

CLTa^iav to dvTiKe'iixevov,
i)

tov Se
. . .

XaXKou

^ t6v xP^*^^^ (pavfpdv ovv OTt yiypeTaiirciv iK re tov vTroKfifxeX'i(jOv

Tdv

'

vTTOKeifievou.

844

ATIISTOTLE

not change into their opposites, nor even act upon their
opposites.

Cold does not become warmth

;

ignorance

does not become knowledge

the latter begin.

but the former cease when

is

Becoming

not the passing over of

one property into the opposite property, but the-passage

out of one condition into the opposite condition, by the

interchange of one property with another.

follows that
all

Thus it Becoming presupposes some Being on

the basis of which such an interchange takes place, and

which underlies

as their suljject the changing properties and conditions, and maintains itself in them. Tliis substratum certainly is in a sense the opposite of that
it

which
is

is

to become, but
It

it

is

so not in itself,

but

derivatively.
it

has not as yet those properties which

to

receive,
;

and

in

place of

them

it

has their

opposites
to that
tion,

and
is

in so far it

stands in a negative relation

it.

which

to

come out of
its

This negative relaessence, but only

it.^

however, concerns not

own

the determinations of quality which attach to

'

As

Cf. besides

the

above nn.

aiid p. 32:J sq., Phy^. i. G, 189, a, 20 for the explanation of ])lie:

hZvvarov. AVe obtain three principles (apx0 {^hid. 191, a, 12)

nomena

eno\igh to assume two principles standingto one another in the relation of opposites, aTropTjtreie yap av tis ttws
it

is

not

7)

7]

iruKvoTrjs
irc(j)vK(v
v)

r)]v jxauor^iTa ttoi^Iv

auT-r]

Ti

t/V TrvKforriTa.
oiroiaovv ivav:

ofjLo'ccs

Sh Ka\ aXXr]

TLOT'os,

kc

eari

/jLu

c. 7, 190, b, 29 ws 5vo \kt(op ehci

;

5ih
rets

doxa?, to-Tt S' dbs Tpe?s. Koi ^ari fxhv ris Xtyoi rh ws ravavr'a, oiou /xovaiKou Kcl rh a^iovaov v) to Oep/jLoi/ Koi Td \i/vxpov T^ I'pjxoafxlvov KaX utt' rh apap/xo(TTOV eari 5' ws ov

-/)

aW'fjAMV

yap

iraffx^^v

ravavria

besides viroK^ifxeuou and \6yos ef-pecial account of (rrepTiais, otherwise only two. A thing-'s opposite is its principle in so far as its matter is infected with areprjcris or the contrar}' of the form it is going to receive something other than its opposite is its principle in so far as the matter in itself is as capable of the one determination as of the other c. 9, 192, a, 1() Plato errs in identifyingthe material simply with the non-existent, uvtos yap rivos Oeiov Kal ayaOov Kal icperod, t6 fxeu ivavriov avTo} (pa/xev dvai,
if

we take

METAPHYSICS
it is

34.5

a presupposition of
itself

cannot ever

all Becoming, this substratum have had a commencement; and since

everything which perishes resolves

itself finally into the

also.^

same substratum,
ningless basis of

it is

imperishable

This begin-

Becoming ^ is Matter;'^ and so we have Matter alongside of Form as a second term.'' The notion and the relation of these two principles is more accurately determined in the doctrine that Form is the Actual and Matter the Possible."^ Both
TO
'0 irc<puKev i(t>'rTOa.i Koi opdyeaBai avTov tear a t)]v kavrov (pvaiv. TO?s 5e (Tv/x^aivei rd ivairiov ope-

PJnjs. ilnd.

1.

31

Xeyai yap

vXriv TO irpcaTOv viroKeifxevov eKaffrc}),

ou yiperai ti
(xv/xfiefirjKos.
:

yeadai rrjs kavrov (pdopas. Ka'.roi ovT avrh kavTOv oiov re etpieaOai rb fiSos 5la rh fxr] eluat eVSeey, oijTC TO evavTLou. (pOapTiKa yap a\\i]\av TO, ivavria. aAAa toCt' ecTTii/ 7] v\r], uxrirfp au ei S^Av 'dppevos Kai alcrxP^v KaXov (see Phys. iv. 9, p. 825, n. 1, svjrra). 217, a, 22 i(TT\v vArj fi'a rwv ivav:

Kara
4

ivvirdpxovTOS ^)) Gen. et Corr. i,

1/A77

fill.

to-Ti

Se

/j-aAia-ra

jxkv

Kai Kupiccs rd viroKeifievov yeviaeus Kai (pdopas ScKTiKdi', rpoirou Se tivx Kai

rd

Ta7s
i.

aWais

ytieTajSoAaTs
:

3fetaj>k.

3,

983, a, 29
Cf.

erepxv 5e
i/'Atjj/-

[aiT av (pa/nev eJvai^

tV

koI

rd

viroKi/j.evov.
*

foregoing nn. Cf. the foregoing and the

Tiwv, Qepfxov Kai i\tvxpov

Ka\

tSov

aWccv
Kol

Toov

(pvffLKccu

iuavTido'eoou,

4k

Svyd/xei

ovtos
t]

ipepyfia ov
[sc.

yiverai,

Ka\

oh

x^^P'f^T'h H-^i'
vXt), T(^ S'

n. As arfprjais constitutes of itself no independent principle, but merely belongs to matter as such, i.e. to matter as still form-

next

Tuv

ivavTiccaeu'v']

fhai

less, it is

assigned a place beside

krepov.
' See p. 341, n. 2, siqyra. Phys. i.9, 102, a, 28: ^(peaprov KaXdy'ev

form and matter only in a very few passages and with a certain
reservation see P/irs. i. 7 (p. 344, n. 1); Mctoph. xi'i. 2, 106VS b, 32, c. 4, 1070, b, 10, 18, c. 5, 1071, a, (5, 16.
;

vriTov avdyKT] avrriv elvai.

eire

yap
eiTe

iyiyvero, viroKeiaOai ri Se? irpcorov,

T()
e'l

ol'

iwndpxovros

(pOeipeTai, eis

tovto acp'^erai (ffxa-

TOV.
-

To

VTCOKtlfXevOU,

342, n. 2,

and

0'e7i.

TO SeKTlKdu,]). besides followir g notes

Corr.
2,
i.

10, 328, b,
S'

ddrepw iJLcv d^KTiKov Gdrepou

elSos.

414, a, 1): ix.op<p\ koX ellto^ Tj KoX Xoyoi Kai oiov ivtpyeia Tov SeKTiKov. Ibid. 1. 13 oifTTe Ao'7os Tis av ill] \j] if'i'X'''] ''"^ ^'i^os, ahk" ovx vXt] Kai to liroKe'^uevov.
ii.
:

Be

All.

ii. 1, 412, a, 6 yeios ev ri twv ovtcov t^v ovalav, TttUTTjs 5e t^ fxlv as v\t]v, % KaO' a'.Th juev ovk iari rode rt, eTfpov Se fjLOp(pi]v Kai elSos, Kad' t/Stj Xeyerai ToSe tl Kai Tp'nov t5 e/c Tovrwv. (Tti S' tj jxlv vXt]
^
:

De An.

\(.')0jxv

Svvafiis, Tt) 5'

c. 2,

ddos ivreXex^ia.
;
:

So

414, a, 14 sq. Coi. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, a, 32 ds fxev ovv uAtj ToTs yf.vvr]To7s icrriv c'hiov rh Svva-

10

ARISTOTLE

conceptions liave been obtained entirely out of the consideration of

rhv
eivai

the
elvai.

distinction
^Ii'tapli.
to,

between the two poles

Ka\

fir]

vii. 7,

1032,
"ifj

a,

20: airaura 8e
rj

yiyv6/j.eva
vXrjV.

(pvcTfi

rexvrj

e^^'

SvvaThv yap Koi eli^ai Koi /x^ elpai iKacTTOv ahruv, rovro S" [that wliicli can be or not })e] i(Tr\v iv viii. e/cao-TO) vXi] c. 15 (/'. sxpra) vK-qu 5e Keyco ^ /xr} 1, 1042, a, 27 rode Ti oZffa eVepye'ct 5uj/a,iiei eVrl ivel 8' T5t ri: c. 2, 1012,' b, 9 ixlu ws viroKeLiaevr] kcu ws uAtj 7]
; ; :
:

olxria d/jLoXoyeTrai, avrt]

Svvdiu.^1.

S"

eVxij/

rj r;

Ihid.
1.
;

\0V.\,

a,

12
Koi

iufpyeia oAAtj
X'Syos
;

&AXr}s
/u-hv

uArjs

Kal

20
1.

ipepyeias
[^oviTia

rod 27 ^
:

ei'Soy?

r?is

yap ws
iJ.op(pT}

v\7]

iarlu^
c.
)>

r]

5'
:

ws
.

on

(Ufpyeia;

i//'i/.
.
.

rrjv ivepyeiay
rrjs evepyeias
:

Kal rrju /xopcprjv KOI rod cfSou?

(I 5'
;

of the icTxdrv vXr], he must make the same reply to the question as to the iixri eKaarov, the matter If of these determinate things. the earth cannot be said to be avdpooTTos, neither can it Si/i/a,uet be called according to Afetaph. the viii. 4, 1044, a, 35, b, 1 sq., matter of man'; and what the same passage calls ZwdjueL oIkIu, 1049, b, 8 sq. designates uAtj. On the other hand, irpdoTr) uAtj is So far, theresimpl}" Suj/ct/iei ov. fore, as there remains any distinction beUvcen the two pairs of conceptions, it c ncerns not so much their actual content as the point of view from which we regard it. In the antithesis
'

1045, a, 23 vXr) rh Se rh jx\v Bwdfiei rh Se ijLOpcpf]. Kal ivfrpyeia ix. 8, 1050, a, 15 7/ vk-q earrl Svvdixei, on eA9o( tiv els ru orav Se y ipepyeia ?), rore elSos
c.

G,

of

form and matter we

distin-

iarlu

rh

fieu

guish between different elements, in that of ivepyeia and Swdfiei between different states or con-

'

iv

r(f

eibei

h.

ro ilhos Cvfpyeid iffriv vkri Kal 7] ouala [roov <pQa.prooi'~\ xii. 5, Swa/JLLS ovaa, ojk ivepyeia euepyeia jxtv yap ro 1071, a, 8 1. 18 dvud;ueL Se 7/ vXr] elSos irdurau Sr/ irpwrai apxat t^ iv^p^'^ia Svudixei. irpwrov, ro efSet, Kal aWo
ovcr'a
. , .

Kal

Th6 former ditions of things. refers to the relation of substance to attribute; the latter, to the relation of the earlier to the later condition, of the incom-

'.

<>

But plete to the complete. since the very essence of matter consists in possibility of form in actuality, we can conceive no case in which more than a
grammatical change
in order that we the latter for the And vice sions.

Such passages could

easily

be

multiplied to prove that tJ ^wd,ui OP corresponds precisely to vXr], rd ivepyela ov to elSos. Even the statement (BoNiTZ, Arist. Metapli. ii. 398) that v\-r\ refers raiher to trpwrt], duvdui hv rather to iaxdrt] vArj (see p. 348, n. 1, infra), does not seem correct. If to Ihe question irSre
Svvd/xei
iffrlv

may

necessary substitute former expresis

verm we may

in

most cases substitute matter and form for the possible and
the actual. The only difficulty that can possibly arise is in the case where we are speaking, not
of two things- related to one another as the possible to the actual, but of one and the same

{Mctaph.

%Kacrrov ; Aristotle ix. 7) replies by means

METAPHYSICS
between which
all

347
^

Change and Becoming moves.

all
first

If

we

abstract in any given case from

is

that a given

object

about for the

time to become, we shall

is

have a definite Matter which

in

want of a

definite

Form, and
ing
it.

is

consequently as yet only capable of receiv-

If

a product of

we abstract entirely from anything which is Becoming that is to say, if we think to

ourselves a kind of object which has not as yet

become
is

anything, then

we

shall

have pure Matter without any

This will be that which
everything

determination by Form.
nothing,

but
or

can become

the
of

Subject,
all

namely,
thinkable

substratum to which no one of

belongs,

the

predicates

but

which
all

precisely

on that

account
it

is is

equally

receptive
is

them

all.

In other words,

that which
:

in Possibility

and nothing in Actuality

thing as
b,
ii.

it is

purely potential Being,^

it

passes from possibility

ii.

to actuality, cf. Phys.

8,

8,

19o,

5,

1,

viii. 4, 255, a, 88; Be An. Ge7i. An. ii. 417, a, 21 sq. but even here it 735, a, 9
;
;

seemed to presuppose it, is clear from the statement that nothing to which 'becoming' is inapplicable can be said to have a
also

matter
b,

Metapli.

viii.

5,

1041,

can

always

be

shown that a
and

27:

oi-Se Traj/rds {JAtj eVrlj/ ctAA'

i<TTi Kol

thing is Svud/jei only in so far as it has the i/Atj in itself. Although,

therefore,
dwd/xei
ivepye'a

oa-cou yet^ecris

aWrjXa.

Knv
vX-q.
-

have, logicall}' considered, a wider range than uAtj and clSos (since, while the latter express only a relation of two subjects to one another, the former express also a relation of one subject, to itself), metaphysically there is no distinction between them, That Aristotle's conception of matter and with it the distinctionbetweenmatter and form thus originated in the attempt to explain becoming,' which
' '

fXTa^o\^ els ocra 5' &vev rod jj.Ta^d\eariv /ult], ovk eari tovtcdu Cf. vii. 7 (previous n.)
-1)

Td

Suva/^ei

liu.

A somewhat

different meaning attaches to Swa/xis when it indicates power or facultj'- in the sense of the

apxh /uera^SATjTtK//, whether we speak of a faculty for doing or for suffering, a rational or an
irrational power (cf. Mctajfh. ix. 1-6, v. 12) Aristotle, however,
;

again mixes up both signitica(cf. BoNlTZ on Metaph. 379 sq., and p.. 234, n. 1, sujjra\
tions

348

ARISTOTLE
If conversely
it

without any kind of actual existence.^

we
that

take
is

an object and abstract from

merely

everj^thing

to completion, if
as
fully

its way we think of the end of its growth attained, we obtain the pure and com-

rudimentary and only

on

plete

realisation

of

its

conception, to which
is

nothing

formless,

no matter that

still

unformed, auy longer

attaches.

The Form,
its

or intelligible essence of a thing,

perfect realisation,

corresponds with

and Form
is

in

general with Actuality.-

Just as a statue

contained

only potentially in the unwrought material, and comes

into

actual

existence

only through the

Form which

the artist communicates to the material. Aristotle under-

Fioni
Zvvau.is

this
it

second

we have
a

cation of

iViGaning: of Aristotle's applito the naaterial in

man
4,

is

ra

Karaixyji'ia.

Mctaph.

v.

which
resides,

determinate

power

as in Pent. An. ii. 1, ()4(), ;i, 14 sq., where moist and dry, warm and cold substances, (icn. An. i. 18, 725, b, 14, where certain liquids, 3IeteorA\. 3, 359,
b,

12,

where
5,

salts

and

alkalis,

J)e
fxeis.

Sensii,

fragrant
'

444, a, 1, where scents are called ^wa-

1015, a, 7, c. 24 imt., viii. 6, 1045, b, 17. c. 4, 1044, a, 15, 34, b. 1, ix. 7, 1049, a, 24. Some verbal confusion is caused b}^ the fact that the expression TTpwTT) vkri is applied equally to nuitter which is absolutely, and to matter which is only relativelj', first (to the oAws wpdoTr] and to the Trpds avrd itpurr] v\r}) see Mctaph. v. 4, viii. 4, 1041,
;

a, 18,

23; Phya.

ii.

1,

19.3, a,

28,

This pure matter, which, however {seei}ifra),\s never present as

such, Aristotle calls TrpwTT] vKy. Its opposite in this sense is uAtj eVxttTrj (tSios, oiKeia kKaarov), or the matter which unites itself, immediately, without requiring further preparation, with a deter-

and
Cf.
^

cf.

Mdaph.

BONITZ,
'Ej/f'pyeia

1014, b, 28. h\d. Arist., 786,

v. 4,

b, 10.

or eVrcAexeia

(in

the concrete rh it^epyeia ov, rh eVTcA6;(;eta ov), expressions which properly differ as activity or
act ualisation
differs

from com-

minate form.
material as
,

UpdoTT] uAtj is

the

mentary differences

precedes all elethe ia-xarr} v\r{, e.g of the statue is the stcne or brass; the tVxaTTj v\r\ of
it
;

pleteness or actuality^ but which are commonly used by Aristotle

without distinction. p. 379 sq.

Cf. in/ia,

META PHYSICS
ceptibilityindeterminate,
capable, indeed, of

849

stands by Potentiality in general Being as mere sus-

undeveloped self-existence,
definite reality,

becoming a

but not

yet

made

into one.

By

Actuality, on the other hand,

he means the same being considered as a developed totality or Being which has wrought out all that it

When accordingly he Matter with potential, being, he means to say that the former is the totality of the qualities which the latter does not possess but
contains
into
full

existence.

identifies

Form with

actual.

is

capable of acquiring.^

Matter as such, the so-called

without form or definite character, being just that which precedes all Becoming and all formation;
TTpcoTT] vXrjj'^ is

the

centre

of
;

indifference to

all

opposites and defi-

nite qualities

the substratum which as yet possesses

thinffs.^

none of the qualities that make the Form of

1

jVetc(j?/i.
8'
7]

i'aTi

1048, a, 30 ivepyeia rh virapx^^v t5

ix.
G,
:

avdpiavra x"-^k^^JS t) Trphs KKiv7]v ^v\ov 7} irphs twv 6.KK00V

ojy

yap

irphs

vpayixa
duvdaei. iu
TCf)

fir]

ojtus

Socrirep

\eyo/xeu
oToy

Ti

T(i}y

ix<ivToov jxopcp^u
irplv

7]

v\r} Kzl

\iyo/xV 5e

Svudfxei

Th ap.op(pou exet
flOpCpT]!/,

Xa,3e7v
ITphs

t^v

'Epurju Kxl eV rfj b\r} T/ju rjfi'a-eiay, on cKpaipede'r] &j/, Kal

i-rricrT'fijxovj.

^v\y

OJTOtS

aVT7]

OVaijiV

kA
Tj

rhv
iirl

fx)]

CLV

Svudrhs

diwpTjcrai.
8'

Qewpovvra, rh S' iuep-

iii.

exei Kal Th t JSe ti Kal Th uv. Ibid. 1, 201, a, 29.

'^

7eia.
rfj

SriKou

tcov

KaOeKuara
dAAot

See p. 848, n. su'/ra Mctapli vii 3, 1029, a, 20

1 ,

iirayooyrj

^ovAo/xeOa hiyeiv.
^ir}Ti7i/,

A/yoj
/j-iiTi

8' v\7]v

^ KaO^

a\jT))u fxiire tI
jULijOkv

Kxl o) deT iravrhs opou

on ws rh TO oiK)ho;xiKhu, Ka\ T'b iyprjyopos irpbs rh K%dv5 )u, ical rh bpiav trphs rh [ivov [xku o\piv Se t^ai', Kal TO cLTroKzKpijXivov iic rrjs uAtjs irphs T7]v vKr\v, kxX to arreip')a(rp.4vov wphs Th auipyaffTOV. tj.vTrjs Se TTJs Siacpopas BaTtpov jxopiov eoTCi} 7} ip^pyeia affixpia-fi^vr], OuTepcfi 5e Th 5uvaT6v c. 8, 1050, a, 21 ^5' vnoKeiPJnjs. i, 7, 191, a, 7
Kt\ Th

avdhoyov crvvopau,

Kj^ofjiovv Trphs

Aeyfrat oTs liipiTTai TO uv; c. 11, 1037, a, jx^Ta txkv yap t^s uAtjs o-jk 27 lanu [A070S], aSpiffTov yap; ix. 7, el 5e' ti ian irpiiTou, 1049, a, 24
:
:

iroahu fir,T

&\\o

t)

ix7]kIti

vivov [of

^AAou Ae'yerat iKiisuch and such a nature],

/cot'
;

TovTo
n.
5,

irpta T7) vKt]

viii.

see p. 315,
:

jueiTj

(pvais iirLCTTrjTi]

Kar avaho-jiav.

supra, iv. 4, 1007, b, 28 Th yap huud/x^i hv Kxl fi^ eVreAsX^ia Th aSpiaTSu iaTi. Phys i. 7 see above, n. 1, and iv. 2, 209, b, 9 passing from this it becomes
;
:

350

ARISTOTLE
it is

Considered in this aspect,

also unlimited or infinite,

not in the spatial sense (for Aristotle, as

we

shall see,

does not admit the existence of infinity in space), but

in the wider sense according to

which the

infinite is that

which, as fixed and circumscribed by no determinate

Form, has reached no conclusion or completion.^ And since what is wholly indeterminate cannot be known.
Matter, as such,
that

by analogy by supposing a substratum for things of sense in general which is related to them in much the same way as a special material To Form, on is to the things that are made out of it.'^
is

unknowable.

It is only

we can gain any conception

of

it,

the other hand,

all

we

attribute all the qualities of things,

defniiteness,

limitation,

and
.
. .

intelligibility.

Form
'

^f^puxo^J^^v^n'

viro

tov iUous
, .
.

[the

form]

(fat
?}

a-pKr/.trVoi'

cVrt 8e

IQlOVTOlf

V\l]

KO).

TO
1),

oApiffTOU.

Jlr C.rln,
Hot
elj^at

\\\.

S, HO;!,

17: aeiSes

a-iofxpoy

ih jxaKinra yap au

Oh

tnroKdf.ceuoi'
o'utu) dvi'aiTO

pud/J.i((T6ai,

Kaddirsp iv

rw

Tif-uxw

Tthiiov b' o-j5f:i> jlLT] exov t4\os ov yap Kivov TO 8e TfAos 7r^.7s Au'w ffvudiTTnu iarl t^ anauTi Kai oAoi) rd aiTfipou ecTTi yap v) amipoi' Trjs tou /.aytdovs reAe ott]to bvpdixei oAoi', ros uArj kuI eVTeAe^ea 5' ov Kal ov -Trepte'xei
. . .

yeypuTrrai, Tt iravdex^s. By aweipou Aristotle under'

dAAa TTpiexeTai, fi dyvwaTov fj aireipju

e;^6i
7]

Uireipoi'
'

Sid Kal

i5os

yap ovk
5e Kal

stands, first of all, the unlimited in space, and in this sense he examines the conception in Phi/s. iii. But finding that in ac4 sq. tuality there is no such infinite space, he finally identifies the un-

vXrj

aroirov

Kal

ahvuaTOv,

to

dyvoxrrov

t6

a6pia-Tou nepiex^ti' tal opi^eiu; c. 7, (pauepov ort oos uAtj to 207, b, i)5
:

limited wilh the aopiarov or uAtj. the notion Cf. ih'ul. c. 6, 207, a, 1 commonly entertained of infinity is wholly false, ov yap ov fxrjSeu e^co, aAA' ou dei ri e|co eVxi, tout'
:

6.irsipou fihv ovv iaTLv iarlu ov kxto, iroahu Xafx^avovcnu aei ri AajSetj/ tffriv l|w. ou Se fxriSeu e^o), tout' iarl TeKciou Koi o\ov(De

aTreipoV

a'lTiov, Kal oti t^ uvai avTta (TTpr]ais, to Se Kad' avTo vwoKeiixei'oy rh ffvuex^^ '^<** aiaOrjTou. iv. 2, see previous note. Phys. iii. 0; see previous note ibid. i. 7, JSIetaph. ix. 6 see p. 349, n. 1, supra, Metapli. vii. 10, 1036, a, 8 ^5' uAtj it-yvaitnos Kad^ avT^v. Cf. also p. 220, n. 2, supra for parallels from Plato, cf. ZklLEii, Ph. d. Gr, pt. i. p. 621, 2.

airetpou

iariv

ywev

'^

Ca;lo,u. 4, 286, b, 19, repeated)

METAPHYSICS

351

and Matter, therefore, require nothing further to medi-. ate between them in order to produce a whole, but are
immediately
Matter in
united:

Form
;

is

the

definiteness

of

itself indefinite

Matter receives into

itself

directly the lacking definiteness of

Form.

When

the

Potential passes into the Actual, these elements do not

stand opposed to one another as two separate things, but one and the same thing looked at as Matter is the Potentiality of that of which the Actuality is its

Form.'

But

just as

we may not regard Form and Matter

in

their mutual relation as two heterogeneous substances,

so neither

may we

regard either of them in any case as

a single substance, so as to imply that one Matter and one Form constitute the fundamental elements which in
various combinations produce the aggregate of things.
Aristotle

recognises, indeed, in
is

the

Divine

Spirit

being which

pure

Form

without Matter.
all

Yet he
Forms,

does not treat this as the intelligible idea of

the universal, spiritual substance of
all

things, but as

an individual being, beside which

beings exist as so

all

other individual

many

substances.

In like manner

Aristotle recognises a fundamental matter, which, while in the elements and generally in all particular kinds of

matter
itself

it

assumes different forms and

all

qualities, yet is in

one and the same in

viii.
(5,

bodies.

Yet this primitive

'

3retaph.

1045, b, 17

to the question how the elements of a conception or of a number can be one, Aristotle answers that they are related to one another as matter and form (see p. 220, n. 2, sifj}ra): ea-n S' iiairep

e^pTjTat koI tj iffx^rv v^V [ot p. 348, n. l] Kal v ^lopcp^ ravrh kuI eu [So rh fihu Swd/xei to 8e ivepyeia. Bonitz reads, but^ Bekker has ev yap ti ravTo kuI Svvdfxei to eV.] 'iKaaTou ical rb 5vudf.ii Koi rb
:

^vepy^ia eV ttms iaTiv.

362

ARISTOTLE
is

matter

one of the elements.

never present except in the definite form of Nor can it be otherwise, since
^

pure, indeterminate Matter

is mere Potentiality without any Actuality whatsoever. This original corporeal Matter,

moreover, does not exhaust the conception, and Aristotle goes on to speak also of an incorporeal Matter which he
finds, for

figures.

To

example, in conceptions and in mathematical this belongs whatever, without being itself

cori)oreal, stands to

something

else in the

as corporeal

Matter stands to Form.^

same relation Hence we see

that not only does each of these conceptions denote a single existence or definite class of things, but they are
used, though undoubtedly obtained in the first instance by abstraction from corporeal things,^ wheresoever a
relation subsists analogous to that

which they originally

express.^

Thus

in

analysing conceptions into their

'

Phys.

iii.

5,

204, b, 82

ovk

vorir-i].

Ibid.
tj
.

c.

10,

Ha-Ti
Ttt

roiovrov

au^a

alffdTjrhv irapa

i/Atj

5'

;^ej/
.
.

alaBr}Tii
vot]tt]

103G, a, 9 iariv rj Se
:

otherwise the four elements must needs resolve themselves into this, which is not the case. Ge7i. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 8. Ibid. 1. 24 Tj^els 5e (pafiev fxhu ehai riva vX-qv
ffToix^la KaXovix^va,
:

j/otjt^

5e

r)

iv

toIs

alcrd-nrois

oTov

vwdpxovaa /nij ij alaQrird ra fiadrj/jLariKd. ^ This is evident from the

;

examples which Aristotle uses in

illustration
n.
cf.

Tuv

pp. 341, n. 2, 342,

(ju^fxaTcav
oil

rwv

aladT^Tcov,

aAAa
rd
5,

TavTTiv

x^'^o'o'tV, a-^A' ael ^er'

pauTLeio-ec^s. e| ^s KaXovfieva (TT0ix^7a. 320, b, 12 sq.

'^

yiverai

Ibid,

i,

2,and 345 n.5,,sz/^A Of matter he remarks also in Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 320, a, 2, that we are to understand by it [xdMcna koL Kvpiws rh viroKeifxeuov yeueaeocs Kal (pdopas Sktik6v.
^

Metaph.
Se TTjs
Kal

viii. 6,

1045, a, 33
r]

Metapli.
S'

xii.

ra

5'

oXtio.

lo-Tt

y'Arjs

aia-erjTi),

J ddrov Xoyov rh
;

^uef vo-qr)]

5'

Kal at dpxal

&\Xa dXXaiu eariu

ws,

fj-euvXr)

tan
/cot'

rh

ivepyeid iffrip vii. 11, 1036, b, 35 ^(TTUi yap vXr) ivicov Kal fir] aladr)Ta)V Kal iravTos yap vXt] ris icTTiv t fi-f] iffri ri riv dvai Kal eldos
S'
:

KadoXov Xeyrj ris Kal dvaXoyiav, ravrd irdvrcov

h.v

&s

oTov Xacos robv

alaQ-qTccv

aoifxdroov

avrh

Kad'^ aiirh
rj

aAAa r65e
t)

tj

eari yap

vX-q

/xhu al(Tdr)r)]

rj

Se

ws fih elSos rh eep/mhu Kal &XXov rpdirov rh \pvxphu rj (rreprjais, vXtj 8e rh Swdfiei ravra irpurou Kad' avro irdvToou Sc ovtcc fifv cltreTv
'
.

METAPHYSICS

353

two elements, Aristotle attributes to the genus the same significance as Matter, while he identifies the
specific

difference with the Form.^

Similarly in the
zoology, in

scheme of the universe,

in physiology, in

psychology, the upper and the lower spheres and elements,^ the soul and the body,^the male and the female,'*

the Active and the Passive Reason,^ stand to one another

same relation as the Form and the Matter. The same is true, it need hardly be remarked, of Potentiality and Actuality. These also express a definite relation which may subsist between all possible kinds of objects, and which can best be explained by analogy.^ Aristotle
in the

applies

them

in precisely the

same way as Matter and

Form.

He

uses them, for instance, to elucidate the con-

nection between the genus and the specific differences,

show the possibility of several properties belonging to one and the same thing. By them he explains the relation between the passive and the active
to
'^

and in general

ovKiCTTiv, ru> auaXoyov Se, wffirip it ris UTTOL oTi apxa' el(ri rpe7s, rh

d5os Koi
'iKaiTTov

7/

(TTep-nai'i

Kal

t}

vKt].

dAA.'

TovTwv

'^Tipov irepl

eKaarov
:

yeuos iariu;
5'

en c. 5, 1071, a, 3 rpoTTov T(p avdhnyov apxo-ial avToi, olov iucpyeia Kal Sui^a/jLis.

uWou

aWa

/col

&\\(cs.

ravra &\\a re &\\ois Kal L. 24 B.\\a 5e EWcov

:

Gen. et CorrA.'i^,^\%, 335, a, IS. ^ jjg j^,^ [[ |^ 412^ b^ 9 s;q q. 2, 414, a, 13 sq. and often. * Gen. An. i. 2 i/tit., ii. 1,732, a, 3, ii. 4, 738, b, 20, and often. AEetapll. i. 6, 988, a, 5, V. 28, 1024, a, 34.
)]12, a, 12,
ii.

b, H2,

8,

^ ^

Be An.

ili. 5.
;

aiTia Kal <TToix^7a, uxnrep iXexBr], TU)v fir) iu ravT^ yeuei, xP^h"-^"^^^^
y\/6(pwv, ovaiSov, Trocr6Tr]TOS,

irX^v

r^

avihoyop' Kal toov eV tolvt^ y4veL erepa, ovk e^Set, aW' OTi tSov KaO^ (KacTTOv &Wo f} re cr^ vXrj Kal rd Kivrjaav Kal rh eldos Kal t) i/xh, rep KadSxov Se xSycp ravTo..
*

Metapli. ix. 6 seep. 349, n. 1, Sl/pra. Ibid. I04:8,h, 6 Adyerai S' ivepycia ovirdvra dfxoiws, oAA' v) rd avaXoyov, 6>s rovro iv tovtc(> ^ irpbs tovto, rd S' eV TwSe fj irpbs ToSe to, /mev yap ws Kivrjcns irphs Svvafj.iv, ra
:

'

5' 00s ovcria irpSs

riva v\r]v.

Cf

xii,

5,

1071, a, 3, cited p. 362, n. 4.

''

See

Be

p. 219, n. 2, supra. C(elo,iv. 3,4, 310, b, 14,

I.

Be An.

ili. 5.

VOL.

A A

354

ARISTOTLE
It follows that one

understanding.^

and the same thing

as Actuality in the

may be viewed in one Form as Potentiality

:

aspect as Matter, in another as

in the
first,

second.

The elements,
all

for instance,

material of

other bodies, are

which contain the Forms of the primitive

Matter; the brass which supplies the material for a statue

has
its

own

peculiar
is

Form

as a specific metal.

While the

soul in general

in
is

its

viewed as the Form of the body, yet even own highest and most immaterial part a distinction

made between two elements which are related to one another as Form and Matter.^ Indeed, we shall find that
everything except the
'

eternal immaterial substances

tlie

contains some element of Matter,^ while on

other

hand, as we already know,'* Matter never actually presents itself to us except as endowed with Form.

We
less

may therefore
lies at

distinguish several stages-^ in the

development of Matter into

Matter

Form. The
all

first

purely form:

the foundation of

things

but

it is

also true that everything has its

own peculiar and

ultimate

Matter. Between these two

lie all

the material formations

through which the original Matter has to pass before it becomes the particular Matter with which the Form of the thing immediately unites itself.^ The same holds
true of the hvvafiLs?
*

We
and
320,

ascribe potential

knowledge

b,

Metaph.\n\. 6, 1045, a, 23, 16. rhysA.2fin.\ see p. 219,

supra.
-

n. 2, p. 351, n. 1, p. 301, n. 3
4,

Cf. (ran. et Corr.

;

ii.

1,

Y^.^i.%,n.\,e.g.Metaj)?i.\\i\A,\OU, a, 20: yiyvovrai 8e irXdovs v\ai rod ai/rov, orav daripov t] crepa v, oTov tp^ey/na e'/c Xnrapov koX yKvKeos, d rd Kmaphv e'/c Tov y\vK4os, fK Se

Phys. iii. 1, 201, De An. p. 375 sq., 440.

a,

32
'
*

a,

29;

x^^^s TCfauaAv^adai
v\-t)v ttjv

elsTrjVTrpdljTriv

x^^Wa,

Cf. p. 352, n. 2.

See
Cf.

p. 352, n. 1, 5?/^r,

and

'

compare
*

p. 348, n. 1.

Be
quoted

See p. 351, n. 1. Phys. viii. 4, 255, An. ii. 5, 417, a, 21 sq.

33;

the

passages

METAPHYSICS
not only to the

355
is

man

of learning

when he

conceived as

not actually engaged in scientific activity, but also to

the learner,

and even

to

man

in general.

But the

sense in each case varies, and

we have

to distinguish

between the degrees of proximity to ivspysta} Nothing

which it had at first the by degrees and in the universe at large there are an infinite number of intermediate stages between mere Potentiality or the first Matter, and complete Actualij^y, which is pure Form or God. Now in the phenomenal world, Form presents itself
attains the realisation of that

mere capacity

to be, except

under the aspect of a threefold principle of causality, while Matter contains the ground of all impressibility

and of all incompleteness, of natural necessity and chance.

Aristotle
is

in the habit of

enumerating four kinds

however, on closer

of Cause
efficient

the

material, the conceptual or formal, the

final.^

and the

These,

Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, a, 9: iyyvrfpo) 5e Koi iroppcoTepa) ajrh auTov ivSix^rai elvai Sv/uLcifxei, wcrirep
'

KadevSwv
ovvTos.
2

y^ca/nerpris

tov iyprjyop-

dros iroppuTipw koI outos tov dewp-

I, 1013, a, 17: iraiTwv ovv KOivhv tcDp" apxoou rh irpurov clyaL odeu ^ ^(Ttiv t) yiyvsrai ^ yiyvaxTKirai tovtuu 5e ai fihu ivvirapxovaai elaiv al 5e eKTOs.
fihi/

MetapJi.Y.

Anal. Post.

i.

2, 72, a, 6

Tojj. iv.

Apxai.

On

the meaning of

1,

121, b, 9.
^
:

this expression see

Mctaph. v. 1, with the comments of SchWEG-

/i^e^

LEE andBONITZ, and also xi.l^'/i.,

Gen.
i.

et Corr.

i.

7,

324, a, 27, Phys.

5, 188, a, 27, viii. 1 Jin.,

Gen. An.

P/ajs. ii. 3, 194, b, 23 eVo ovv rpSnov ainov \4yeTai rb 6| o5 ylverai ivvirapxovTos, olov &\\ov x'^^'^^^ '^ov ai/Spiwros, &c. Se t^ ei5os koi to irapdS eiyfia tovto

v.7,788,a,14;also7*o<?Z^. c. 7,1450, b,27; Waitz, ^7'i,v^. Orr/ i.457 sq., the Ind. Arist. under apxh, and p. 247, n, 2, sujfra. 'Apxv indicates the lirst in every series, and in this sense it is used for all kinds of causes, but more especially of
first

\6yos 6 toD ti ^v eluai koi to, tojtou yeVrj [i.e. the classes above it] ... tTi od^v rj apxh ttjs
v tt^ccttj t) rf/s i]pefir](Tea}s ... eTi ws rh reAos tovto 5' iarl Th ol %v^Ka ( = Metaph. v. 2) 195, a, 15 one class of causes is ws t5 ^| ol olItio., and of these to [lIv ws tI viroKeiixevov, to. Sc &s tJ>

5' 4(tt\v 6

fxeTal^oAris

causes,

i.e.

such as are dehigher.

Cf,

ducible

from no

AX

356

ARISTOTLE
two
first

inspection, are found to be resolvable into the

mentioned.

The concept of a thing

But
it

is

not different
actualise a

from

its

end, since to realise an end

is

is to

concept.

likewise possible to identify the

it

concept with the efficient cause, whether

thinf>' in motion from within as its soul, or

sets the

whether the

motion comes from without. Even in the latter case it produces motion, is the conception of the thing which Only man can alike in works of nature and of art.

Only the conception of health can determine In like tbe physician to labour in producing health.^
beget man.
Ti i]v

hai
7]

ueeu

next we liavc causes ^pxh T'?? ix^rafioKris v)

;

rivos the

end

is

in

the

one

(Trdaeccs

Kol

Kivr,(Tcos

lastly

rh
'i^

Mctapk. i. T(\os Kul rayaOov. ra 5" atria KtyeraL Terpax^s, iilit. wv fi'av jJikv alriav (pa/xlv ehai rrjv irepav ovaiav Koi rh ri i)V eluai Se T7V ^\r]u Kal rh viroKiifxe/xov,
:
.

case to heal the sicl-, and in the other to estal)lish health). Phys. ii. 7, 198, a, 24 eu ipX^rai Se ra rp'a els rh

rpirw
ravrr],

Se oOeu
Se

7]

apyj] tt/s Kivr,(Ttws^

rerdprTjv

avriKei/JLeuriv
'iveica

aWlav

Kal rayadov. 1044, a, a2, Anal. Pod. ii. 1 1 init., IJe Somno, 2, 455, b, 14, Gen. An. i. 1 init ,\. 1, 778,

rh ov

Ihid.

viii.

4,

ncWaKLS rh fih yap ri Iffri Kal rh ov euKa eV iffri [cf. 198, b, 3], TO S' o9eu 7] Kivqcris irpcvrou rep ct,vdpcctros yap el'Sei ravrh rovrois Cf. i. 7, 190, b, avOpooTTou yevva. l)e An. ii. 4, 415, b, 7: 17 sq. tan Se r] ^vx^ '''^^ (wvros (Tu^iaros

'

b,

7,

and elsewhere

of.

Ind.

alria Kal apX'h- ravra Se iToKKax<>>s Aeyeiai. o/xoiws S' t] ^vxh Kara rovs hiwpi.(Tfxevovs rpoTTOvs rpels alria
Kal

Arist. 22, b, 29. On the different terms used for the four causes, ihid. and Waitz, Arist. Org. ii. 407; on what follows, Hitter, iii. 106 sqq. The further modilications of the doctrine of the four

Kal yap iide;/ 7} Kivnais ai/ri], ou eVe/ca, Kal ws 7] ovcria rS>v

ili^vX<^v
fully.

(Tcofx-drccv

i|/inj/rj

airia,

which he goes on to prove more

Metaph. xii. 5, 1071, a, iravrwu Srj rrpwrai apxai ro iuepyfia irpiaroy, rd eifSej, Kal &\Xo
18
:

causes in Phys. ii. 3, 195, a, 2G sq. (of. Mctapli. V. 2, 101 3, b, 2S), are unimportant, as is also the distinction of the ov eVexo into person and thing, on which cf. Be An. ii. 4, 415, b, 2 rh 5' ov eVewo SiTT^J', rh ii.\v ov rh Se ^. See also
:

5u'AiJ.ei.

Elsewhere now one

and now another

causes
:

xii. 7,

2, 194, a, 35, and Metajjh. 1072, b, 2 (where we must read IcTt yap rivl rh ov 'ducKu Kal

Fhys.

ii.

of these three identified with the So Metaph. viii. 4, 1044, third. taws Se ravra (i.e. eldos and b, 1 Gen. An. 1. rekos) &ix<p(c rd avrd. yap alriat vir6Kivrai init. 1 rerrupes,r6 re ov cVexa w5 reXos,
is
:

Kal 6 \6yos rTJs oitaias

ravra

fikv

METAPHYSICS
manner we
shall in the highest cause,

357

find the pure

which is God, Form, the ultimate end of the world and

the source of

its

Aristotle in his
oZv
'6dev
ii.

movement united in one. Nor does physics distinguish more than two kinds
a'.irep
7)

ios

eV Tt

(fxeSi^r vTroXafielv 5e?,

eV rols aiSiois re Ka\ irpcarois

'

Tp'.rov Se Kol
T]

riraprov

t)

uAtj koL

iikv
'

yap

iffTiv

us

uAtj,

t]

5'

us
ti

1,

is

apxh '^^^ Kit/'fjcrfcos. Ibid. 732, a 3, where the female called the uAtj, the male the
Kivovcra
irpdoTT],

fiopcpT]

5e? 5e Kal

tV

tp'ittjv

ahia

\6yos
c.

virdpx^i

Kol
;

rd

elSos,

and

6,

where, as in i. 1, the formal and the final cause are identified, and only three principles are enumerated: the r4\os or ou eueKu, the apx^ kivtjtlk^ koI
742, a, 28

see p.341,n. l,fin. Meta2)h.\\\.linit.: iravTa to. yiyvofiepa vtt6 re rivos yiyuerai Kal eK tivos Kal ri. Of the ixp' ou it is said f urtlier on Kal ixp^ ov, 7) Kara rh eJSos Xeyo/xevr]
irpoffvTrdpx^i-v.

Metaph.

xii. 3,

(pvcris

7)

oyitoetSrjs [sc. rcf

yiyvofxevcp]

avT7] 5' eV

and the XP^^'-I-'-^^ ^ Xpvrai rh rekos. Part. An. i. 1, rrjs 641, a, 25 (l)vcrea}s Sixmos Xeyo/jLfuris kuI oijffTjs ttjs ixhv us v\7]s TTJs S' US ouaias [which =
yevvriTtKi]
:

&v9puTros yap &vQpuTTov yeuua, and further, 1032, b, 1 1 ooare (TVjx^aivn. rpSirov riva e| vyidas vyieiuv yiueadai, Kal

aW(f.

tV
7]

r^v olKiav e'l o'lKias, r^v exovcrau uAtjv

iarri

ttjs
t]

&vev vXrjs
iarpiKT]

yap

Kal

oiko^o/xik^ rh eldos ttjs

ttjs
oIk'ixs

?5os]

Kal

%<TTIV

aVTt]

Koi

U)S

7]

vyieias

Kal

Xiyu
-fju

S'

Kivovaa Kal ws rh t4Kos. Phi/s. ii. koI iirel t] (pvais 8, 199, a, 30 StTT')/ T) fxku WS uAtJ 7] 5' 0)5 (JiOpip)], reKos 5' avrr] avrr} &j/ etrj r/ ahia -q ou eVe/ca. Jbid. c. 9, 200, a, 14 rh 5' ou eVe/ca iv Tqs \6'Y(f}. Li. 34 rh reAos rh ou cueKa Kal 7/ apxh airh rov opiajxov Kal rov hdyov. The artist's method is nature's also: eVei 71 olKia TOi'i/Se, raSe Set yiyveadai ourws Kal el &vdpci}7ros ToSl, TttSi. Part. An. i. 14: (paiverai 5e 1, 639, b, 7rpd}T7} [aWla^ %v \cyo/jLV 'iveKa Tivos \6yos yap obros. De An. i. T<) eiZo%, eve/ca 1, 403, b, 6 TUivli. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 5: us [Xfv OAtj tout' iariv aXriov Tols 7ej/7jTO?s, us 5e tJ ov eVe/cei/ fiopcj)^ 7] Kal rh elSos tovtq 5' effrlv 6 \6yos 6 ttjs eKdaTov oucrlas, and previously : dalv ovv [at Tf/s o-pX"^ yeviaeus~\ Ka) rhu
:

ovaiav Svew h\7]s rh

(Cf. Gen.
7]

ri

elvai.

All.

ii.

4, 740,

b, 28

5e r^xvr] fiopcp^

ruv yivojxivuv
i.

iv

'dXAcf.
7}

Part. An.

1,

610, a, 31

5e rix^'O Xdyos rov tpyov 6 duev rrjs v\7]s iffriv ; so in Gen. et

Corr.

ii.

9,

335, b, 33, 35,

fx.op(p-h

corresponds to Te'xfTj; the art, however, is elsewhere treated as the true efficient cause, the artist only as a secondary cause e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 34.)
;

Metapli.
Kivovu
di/dpctiirois

xii.

4 fin.
/jihi/

(irel

5e

rh

iv

ro7s

<pv(riKo7s

(read
iv

avOpurccf),

approved

by

ScHWEGLER and BoNiTz)

5e rols dirh Siavoias

duOpuTTOS,

rh eldos ^ rh evavriov, rpowov riva

rpia aXria h.v eifTj, wSi 5e rirrapa. vyieia yap ttus t} larpiKT], Kal oiKias elSos 7] oIkoSo/jllk^, Kal &vdpuiros dvdpuirov yevva ry yap c. 3 fi'n.
;
:

larpiKT]
iffriv.

rexvri 6 \6yos rrjs vyidas

apiO^hv Xaai Kal

t^ yivu

at

avral

Speaking of health again,

358

ARISTOTLE
final,^ in

of Cause, necessary and

the operation of Matter

and that of Form or concept. ^ This is the only distinction, therefore, which we must regard as fundamental that between formal, efficient and final causes For though the is merely a secondary subdivision.
;

three are not always combined in the individual,^ yet

in themselves
is

and

in their essence they are one,

and

it

only in the

separate."*

phenomena of sense that they are found The created universe has several causes

the eternal has only one

the
is
7,

essential concept itself.^

Again, as the

Form

at once the efficient

and

the final force, so Matter as formless and indeterminate*'

it is

said in
15,

Cicn.

et

Curr.

i.

ii24, b,
it

that as the ov

eVe/ca

is
'

not

K0L'r]TiK6v.

this, see pp. 841), &c. stipra.

For a fuller discussion on At this point, it will be enough to refer the reader to l^art. An. i. 1. Cf.
p, 642, a, aZrai, r6 0'

the otlier, but in a different sense physical exercise, r.ff., may be the efficient cause of health, health the final cause of exercise. This is the meaning of ttoWolkis
;

in P/u/s.
*

ii. 7 (p. 356, n. 1). Cf. J/etaj)Ji. ix. 8, 1049, b,

5vo alriai rh i^ oLvayKTis. The opposition is indicated in 1, 17 in the words a.px'n

I
:

dalv

6.pa

ov

eVewa

Koi

17: rqj Se XP^'^V Trpcrepov [sc. iv4pt^ rqS efSet rh yia Svfdueccs^ ^5e

yap

T]

(pvais
cf,

/maWou

ttjs wAtjs,

with

further the passages quoted in the foregoing note from J*/n/s. ii. 8, and Part. Afi. i. 1.
1,

which

avTh ij/epyovv irpdTfpov [^i.e. every potentiality presupposes a similar actuality], apLdfji^ 5' oj for, as this is explained, the seed indeed precedes the plant which springs

For although in Gen. An. 778, a, 34, the moving cause

-

v. is

from it, but this seed itself comes from another plant, so that it is still the plant that produces the
plant.
^5iov

classed along with the necessary and eflicient, yet as Ritter, appealing to Pltys. ii. 9, 200, remarks, the rightly a, 80, moving cause is not here considered by itself, but only as united with matter. Cf. also eV yap rrj vXrj rh Hid. 1. 14 avayKOLOV, rh 5' ov iveKa iv T(p KSyqi. ^ So that, as is remarked Phijs. ii. 3, 195, a, 8, of tw^o things each may be the cause of
:

Ibid. vii. 9, 1034, b, 16 ovaias '6ti avdyKrj Trpovirdpx^tv krepav ova'iav eVreAe^e/a odaav ^ Trote?, oTov Cv^''^ ^* ylyverai Cv*^^5 Gen. Ah. ii. 6, 742, b, 33: apxv 5' iv fikv To7s oLKivfiTois rh ri
rris
.
.

icrriv,

iv

irAeious,

Se ro7s yivofiivois ^Stj rp6irov 5' &\\ov Kot ov

nacrai
^

rhv

avr6v
r,

'

wv
srijjra.

fi'ia

rhv

apiOfihu, (iOev

Kivrjais iariv.

See

p.

318 sq.

METAPHYSICS
is at

359

once the passive subject of

all

all

impressions and the

cause of

blind operations unregulated by any purpose.

all

Matter alone can receive impressions, for

process of determination,

irddos

is

and nothing is susceptible of such a process but that which is not yet determined
is,

nothing, that

but the indeterminate and therefore

other words,

nothing but Matter, which can exhibit every activity and every quality,
in
for the simple

determinable

quality

itself, it has no But though Matter is wholly devoid of any such active and positive force,

reason that, taken in

force.^

or

operative

Aristotle nevertheless attributes to

to the
plastic

it

every obstruction

energy exercised by Form.

?

To what

other source, indeed, could this be traced

since

And

so,

that

Form always works with a purpose, it is in Matter we must seek the ground of all phenomena that
and antagonistic
to be explained
to

are independent of this final purpose

it,

the principle of blind natural necessity and chance.

first

The

of these obstructive forces

is

by

Nature's need of certain materials and the consequent de-

pendence of her creatures upon the same.

material element
is

Though
yet

this
it is

in

no sense

efficient cause,

an indispensable condition of the realisation of Nature's

ends.

Though
:

it is

not necessary in

itself, it is

so con-

ditionally
'

for if a certain particular

i.

being has to be prorb

Kiucla-Oai,

Geii. et Corr.

7,

324, b, 4
e^et

to

Trio'xe'J' etrri koX

rh

^cra fxep
p.op<p)]v,

ovv

jxt]

eV vKri

t)]V

Se kivui^ koX ttouIv CT^pas dwdfiews.

Tavra fiev awadT} twv ttoii)oaa S' iv vArj, iraOTjTiKoi. tV fifv yap v\7jt' XeyofjLev S/jLoicas cds (lirelv Tr]v avT^v ilvai twv auTiKeiTiKuiu,
fxevccv diroTcpovovv, cSo-Trep

Of Matter as moved and Form as mover we shall have more to say

immediately. How exclusively passivity was limited by Aristotle to Matter, appears especially iu
his anthropology.

y4po5

ov.

ibid.

1.

18

t/S'uAtj
:

ri

v\r} iraOrjri-

kSv

ii.

9,

335, b, 29 t^s fxhyap vK-qs

360

ARISTOTLE

duced certain particular materials must be ready to hand.^ For the same reason, the extent to which Nature
'

riato

had already sharply

diaspKTjj.ei'wv

ivTo7s Kara (piXoffo^iav

distiiig-iiished

the aXria from tlie avva'nia, the efficient causes (8t' aJv 7171/6x01 Tt) from the indispensable conditions {av^v ww ov
;

yiyuerai)

cf.

JJir.

1.

(512

sqq.

[the necessity imposed by the conception and that of compulsion]. ecTTt S' ev yc to7s exovai yhiffiv 7] rpiTTi. X^yojxiv yap t)]v Tpo(l)))u avayna^ov ti KaT ov5eTpoi/
TovTcav
Toov
rpoircov, dAA.'

adopts this disHis whole view of nature turns on the opposition between design and natural neAristotle tinction.

also

on ovx

cessity, between what is required by the conception or form of a thinii: and what proceeds from

rovro 5' iarlp wa-iTip e| uTrofleVews. Gen. An. i. 4, 717, a, 15 ttuv rj (pvcris 5id rb avayKa7ov Troie? 7) 5id ro 7) fifXnov ii. 6, 748, b, 16: irdpTa
oiou T &vev Tavrrjs eJvai.
: ;

the nature of its material: the former is the 5i' h, the latter the oZ ovK aueu the former is independent and unconditioned, the latter is for a purpose and conditionally necessar}'. To these two there is added a tliird kind oi^ necessit}^ viz. compulsion, which, liowever, does not further concern us here (unon this as distinguished from the necessity of the conce]jtion, cf. P/ti/s. viii. 4,
;

5e ravra, Kaddirep etiro/xev (748, a, 86), Ae/creoj/ y'lveaOai rfj jjlIv e'l

avdyKris, ttj

5'

%VQKd Tivos

iv.

a/xcpOTcpas tcls

ovk 6| avdyK7\s dAA' 5t' 8, 776, b, 82 alrias, eueKd re rod

:

jSeATiVrou koI e^ avdyKrjs. Phys. ii. 2 init. rh S' e| avdyKris irSrepov

:

e'l

vTToQtffiws vTrdpx^i ^ Kal air\a>s ;

usually we look for the necessity in the nature of the material parts dAA' ofiws ovk dvev yuev rovrcov yeyovev, 01 fxevroi 5 i d ravra
;

Tr\))u

ws

5t'

v\7)v

dfxoius

Se Kal

254, b, 18; An.

Pc;,s^.

ii.'u, 94, b,

1015, a, 2(5 sqq.,vi. 2, 1026, b, 27, xi. 8, 1004, b, 88) Cf. Mctaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, rh yap kva-yKOLOv roaauraxoos, 11 TO fx-ev I3:a otl vapa ryjv opjjLrjV, to Se ov OVK civv rh ev, rh Se /x^ eV5eXo/i6j/oy aWws dAA' airAcos. Part. An. i. 1, (i8'.), b, 21: rh 5' e| audyv.
5,
:

87;

Metaph.

aWois iraaiv, eV oaois rh rov eVrij/, ovk dvev fikv rcav avayKalav exovrcov rrjv (pvaiv, ov /xivroL 76 Sid ravra dAA' 1) ws vXtjv e| vTToOecreoos St/ rh avayKa7ov, dAA' ovx ^^ rfXos iv yap rrj v\t) rh avayKa7ov, rh S' ov eveKa iv rqj koyq}. L. 80 (j)avephv S^ on rh avayKa7ov iv ro7s (pv(nKo7s rh ws
iv ro7s
'4vKd
.
.

'

iir)s

ov

iraaiu

virapx^i
aiBiois,

to7s

kuto,
5'

iiKr)

\y6fjLvov

Kal

ai Kivr,a^is

ai

(pvcriu o/noLccs

....

virapx^t 5e t6

ravrr\s.
So/fg? 5e
aTr?\a>s

Pe An.
ncriv
r)

ii. 4:,

416,
-rrvphs

a,

9:
rrfs

fxiv

awAuis

To7s

rd
1

i^

rov
.

<pv(Tis

viro9(aojs Kal to7s iu 76 j/6 ere iraaiv. Jhid. 642, a, 1 etVJv apa Sto aWai avrai, t6 0' ov evKa Kal rd e^ auiyKrjs iroWa yap yiverai on
:

alria

tt/s
.
.

rpocprjs

Kal

av^^<TQ}s hai
fiev
TTcos

rh 5e crvvair lov ianv, ov firjv air\us ye

:

av ris aTropr}<Tie TToiau Xeyovffiv avdyK7)v at keyuvres e'l audyKrjs' tuu /idpyap Svo rpdiruv ovSerepov olov re virdpx^iv, rww
'lacos

avdyK-q.

8'

et Corr.

Gen. 7) ^vxriii. 9, 335, b, 24 sq. it is not the matter which is the proit is
;

dinov,

aWafiaWov

ducing cause, for

sive

and moved

merely pasthe Kvpiwrepa

METAPHYSICS

361

can realise lier end the mode and the perfection in which the Form manifests itself are conditioned by the character of these materials that is, by their capacity for receiving and exhibiting the Form Just in proportioD as

this capacity is wanting, will the formations be imperfect

and degenerate from their true patterns and the proper we shall have productions which serve no end at all, but are developed incideutpurposes of nature, or perhaps
ally as the result of
sity, in

some natural coherence and neces-

the course of the realisation of Nature's purposes.^

production of anything and that which is necessary to it as the instrument of its activity: the former must precede in origin the thing which it aims at producing the latter must follow it. Cf. on the whole subject Waitz, Arist. Org. ii. 409 sq. Part. An. iv_. 2, 677, a, 15 KaTaxpVTai fxev ovv fviore r] (pvais
;

and the fiop<pii. The physical is the mere tool of the

alria is ri ^u elyai

causative conception heat does not any more of itself effect production than the saw saws of itself. Part. An. iii. 2, G63, b, 22 iras
;
:

8e T7JS

avaryKaias (pixreais exova-rfs

rj

To7s vTrdpxovffiv e| audyKr]S

kuto,

tov /coxaSimilarly Aristotle distinguishes {Anal. Post. ii. 11, 94, b, 27) '^v^ko. tivos and e| avdyKtis and enumerates {Metai)h. V, 5) the commoner applications oi kvayKcuov: to that oS &vev ovk eyS^x^rai (fjy, &c. ws avvairiov, to that which is fiiaiou and to that
(pvffis

rhu \6yov

eueKo.

Kexprirai, x4yup.v.

els rh wcpiXifiov tois TrfpiTTcafiaaiu, ov fiijv Sia TOVTO Se? ^rjreTv iravra evcKa TLVOS, aXXd rivcav vvroiv TOiovTcav erepa e'| avdyKTis (rvfi^aivei

which is oLvayKoiov in the proper sense rh airXuvv ( = arrXSos avayKoiov) viz. the /i^ hZex^ijx^pov &\Xws
6X641/.

Quite in conformity with

the statement of

Eudemus ajmd Sim PL. P/12/s. 63, a, that matter and aim are the two
this
is

Tavra iroXXd. So according to Gen. An. v. 1, 778, a, 30, only that has an end to serve which appears universally in all nature's productions or in certain classes of them ; individual varieties on the other hand have none the eye has an end to serve the fact that it is blue has none ibid,
dia
: ;
:

c.

8 Jin.,

mention

is

made

of

causes of motion. Within the sphere of conditional necessity there is again (Gen. An. ii. 6, 742, a, 19 sq.; where, however, 1. 22, we must read, not ov IVe/ca but with Cod. PS. and Wimmer rovTov u.) a twofold distinction made between that which as efficient cause conditions the

yiveaOai (rv/xfiaivei fx^ VKd TOV aXX' e| avdyKrjs Koi 810, T^u alriav t^i/ KivrjTiK-fji/. According to Metajj/i. viii. 4, 1044, b, 12, the eclipses of the moon appear to serve no end vei 6
;

phenomena oaa

rhv (rtrov ah^-tiar), aXX' e| avdyKr]s rh yap avax^fv \|/yX^')''"* ^^^ ^"^ T^ ^vx&^v vSccp
Zei/s
^TTOJs

ovx

362

ARISTOTLE
shall hereafter

We

have occasion to observe how deeply

whole theory of Nature,

this view is rooted in Aristotle's

and how many phenomena he accounts for by the resistance of Matter to Form. Again the same property of Matter is also the source of all contingency in
Nature.^
first

By

'

the contingent,'
to

Aristotle,

who was

the

carefully

examine
all

this

conception,^ under-

stands in general

that can equally well belong or

:

not belong to a thing

in its
being,"*

that which

is

neither contained
its

essence nor supported by the necessity of

and which accordingly

That
'

is

neither necessary nor

existence

normal.^
yevifxcvop
viOfQai

we must assume the

'

of

KareXOuu to S' av^drovTov yivoixivov rhv <t7tov

ofxoicas 5e

Whether

also of all

freedom

(rvfj-fiaivei.

Koi ^X

rcf)

airoWvTai 6 alros eV Trj a\(f, ov TOVTov eveica vei ottojs air6\7]Tai, aWarovTO avfi fie fir] Ki^(Phys. ii. individual organs 8, 198, b, 18) of animals are without purpose the bile is a Tripirrufia Kal ovx eueKOL Tivos {Part. An. ibid. 1. 13), the stag has no use for its antlers
; :

choice in man, from which alone contingent effects really spring (to it alone at least these are referred in De Interpr. c. D, 18, b, 81, 19, a, 7), Aristotle does not tell us. In Phys. i. 5, 1 96, b, 17, sq., he expressly excludes frQ^ purpose, as such, from the domain of rixvof
':^vfxfiifir]Khs in the narrower sense, rb airh Tvxfis. ^ As he says himself, Phys. ii. 4. * An. Post. i. 4, 73, a, 34, b, 10 Aristotle calls KaS" aiira, oaa koI virdpx^i^ Te fv rcf tI iffriv oaois Twv cvvirapx^vrcov avrois avra iv Ty Koycp ivvirdpxovcri ry ti iari
'^
:

G6B, a, 6, 664, a, 7). The same is true of all superfluous materials which are unemployed such materials are &xpvo"roi' or even rwv Trapa (pvaiv Ti (Gen. An. i. 18, 725, a, 1, 4) we must therefore decide even in reference to one and the same material whether it serves a purpose or not lymph {lx<^p), eg., which consists partly of half-assimilated and partly of corrupted blood, is in the former aspect a'lfxaros X"P*'' ^^ ^he latter e| avdyKTis (Part. An. ii. 4 Jin.). Necessity of this latter kind, as is indicated in the passage quoted above from PJiys. ii. 8, coincides
{ibid.
iii.

2,

5r]\ovvTi
Si'

Sea 5e
;

firfderepoos

iirdpx^i, (rvfififiTiK6Ta
/iiev

further, t^

avrh virdpxov kKdcTT(f Kad^ fi}] 5i avrd (rv/j.fiefir]K6s. Top. i. 5, 102, b, 4 avfifi^firiKos Se iffriv ... & eySe'xeTat virdpx^iv
avrh, rd 5e
:

6r(f}0vv

evl
;

/col
.

T(f

avTCf
1
,

KoL

[xij

virdpx^iv
fievov
^

cf p. 234, n.
Svi/ardv,

on ivS^x^-

and

p. 218, n. 4,

p. 214, n. 3,
firiKos

on avfificfirjKos. Metaph. v. 30, init. ffvixfie:

with contingency.

AeyeTai

ft

virdpx^i

fji-fv

Ttv*

METAPHYSICS

363

such a principle, and not ascribe everything to the

operation of necessity, Aristotle proves in the
first

place

by the witness of universal experience,^ and in particular by the fact of the Freedom of the Will.^ But he finds
the true rationale of
finite existence
all

contingency in the fact that

all

contains the potentiality of being and

not-being, and that Matter as the indeterminate renders

opposite determinations possible.^
It follows

from

this

property of Matter that

dently of the
final

many

things happen indepen-

action of eflScient causes.

The

latter

have always a definite object in view, but they frequently

fail

of

its

perfect accomplishment

'^^

owing

to the inde-

terminate nature of the Matter which they use, while

at other times,

owing

to the

incidentally produce results

ally

same disturbing cause, they which they did not originevent

is

design.^

contingent or accidental
e|

Koi aKTjdes elirelv ov fievTOi out'

avdyKr}s otr' eVl

t^ ttoKv.

The
vi.

same
1026

definition is given
b, 31 sqq. (xi. 8).
;

2,
ii.

oXws eariv eV ro7s /j.^ ael ivfpyovai rd Svvarov (hai, koI fx^ d/xoius. Metaph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 13: &(tt
t}

Phys.

uAtj

(XTai
iirl
;

alrla,

fj

iubexofx^vr]

5 init. Be Cwlo, i. 12, 283, a, 32: rh fifv yap avrcfiaTSv icTTi Kal rh aird Tvxv^ Trapa ro ctel Kai rh a>s
iirl
ii.

irapa t5 ws

rh

-ttoXu

&\\u}s, rod

8,

rh iro\v ^ou t)yiv6ixvov. Phys. might not the 138, b, 34

:

appearance of design in nature be explained by supposing that of her chance productions only
those survive which are fitted to Uve ? No ravra [xhv yap Kal iraura ra (pvaei fj ael ovtu yiverai ^ cos iirl rh troXh, roov 8' airh rvxvs Kal TOV avTO/xdrov ovdev. So Ue
:

(see p. 345, n. 5, svjjra), v. 30, 1025, a, 2i: ovSe S^ aXriov copicrixivov ovdev tov a-i;^)8e)37?/coTos, aWa rh tvx^u, tovto S' aSpiarou. Cf. n. 5 infra. See pp. 3G0 sqq. s^qjra,
(rv/i/SejSTj/cf^Tos

vii. 7

'

An. iv. 10, 778, a, 4: fiovXerai fikv oZv 7} (pvais to7s rovroou [t&v ^.arpoov'] api9/xo7s apidGen.
ras yeueaeis Kal tcls reXfVTas, ovk aKpifio7 5e did re t)]v ttjs i/Arjs anpiffTiav KaldiaTh yiveaQaiiroKXas apX"^> '' "^^^ yevea-eis ras Kara. <pvaiv koX to? <p6opas i/jLTrobi^ovaai noWaKis aKnai rwv irapa (pvaiv ffvfjLirnrrdvToiv elaly. See further p. 341 sqq.
ytieTj/

Ccclo,
'

ii.

8,

289, b, 26.
b, 31,

Phys. ibid. 196, b, 13. Be Interpr. c.^, 18,

19, a, 7.
^ Be Interpr. c. 9, 19, a, 9 there must be contingency, '6ri
:

See

u.

3,

sniira.

Phys.

ii.

364

ARISTOTLE

caused by the diversion of free or compulsory purposeful

action to results alien from
its

purpose through the in-

fluence of external circumstances.^

Now,

since these

disturbing circumstances are always found in the nature

of the material

means by which ends

in
Aristotle's

are realised, and

in the system of nature to

which these means belong,

sense of the

Contingency,

word,

may

be defined as the disturbance by intermediate causes

of an activity directed to a purpose. ^

But

activity in

obedience to a purpose

is

that by which the essence

is

or cpnception of an object

realised.^

That which
;

does not proceed from

5, 196, b,
fiev 'iviKa
eo'Ti
5'

it

is

unessential

and there-

17 rajv Se yivofxivoov to. rov ylyverai, raS' ov eveKo. tov oca re a-nh
: .

called Tiixv, otherwise avTOfxaTou, so that the latter is the wider conception. Both, however, stand
ecpially

Siavo'as
(pv(T(ios.

ii.v

.irpaxdeir]
5r)

Kol
airh
/xlv

oaa anh

opposed to purposed aciireiBi]

TO,

ToiavTa orav Kara

tion
5,

uxTT
7]

aopiara ra ovtus

avixfieP-)]Khs (pafXiv flvai

,

ysvrjTai,
.
.

tvxV^

atria, Koi

rvxv

o-^pi'f^TOV (^Phljs. ii.

rh

a'jTo aXriov
(TvfxfiefirjKhs

oi>pi(Tjj.4i/ov,

ovv /ca9' rh 5e /cara

OLTreipa

yap &j/ T(f hi cru/xfia'T]. It is chance, for instance, if one conies to a place for another purpose and is rewarded in a way he had not
aupiarov

197, a, 20). Akin to this, but unimportant for our present investigation, is the coincidence in time of two
'

circumstances betw^een which no causal relation of any kind exists, e.g.

a walk and an eclipse of

thought of
sure
;

he (Metaj)h. v. 30) digs a hole and finds a trea;

or

if

desires to sail to is carried to another or, generally, if from action directed to a definite end
l:ie

one

or if place
;

and

SQjTiething else results, by reason of the intervention of external

circumstances, than that which was intended (orau fi^ rov

(Tvfi^dvTos eveKa

yhrjTai, ov

e|cD

Phys. ii. 6, 197, b, 19). If the action is one of voluntary choice (irpoaipeTou) such a chance (according to the passage just quoted from Phys. ii.) must be
TO
a'lTiov,

the moon. Such a coincidence (which is the purest and simplest case of contingency) Aristotle calls a-vfiTTUfxa, Div'm, jk S. i. 462, b, 26 sqq. 2 See p. 856 sqq. sujjra. Metaph. vi. 2, 1026, b, 18 Sxrirep yap ovSfxaTi jxdvov rh trvfjifiefi7]K6s ion. 5tb nXoLTCov rpSirov Tiva oil KUKois T^v o'o^io'TiKTju irepl rh fir} Ou fra^ev. elal yap ol ruu (rotpiffrdv Xoyoi irepl rh ffvfifiefir]Khs us clveTv (patuerat IJ.d\iara Trdvroov. L. 21 yap rh avfiPcPrjKhs iyyvs ri rov (xi)
^

OVTOS,

METAPHYSICS
fore Aristotle says that the contingent borders

3G6

non-existent.^

on the After what has been already said about

it

the nature of Knowledge,

scarcely needs, therefore, to

be explicitly stated that such a principle as Contingency can be no object of Science.

While

it is

obvious from what has just been said

it is something far more might have been expected from the first

about the nature of Matter, that

'primordial than

definition given of its concept, this

becomes
'
'

still

clearer

from other considerations.

From Matter

Aristotle is
is

not contented with deducing merely what one

apt to

consider as accidental and unessential, but also certain

properties of things which essentially belong to the conception of them and contribute to determining their generic character. The distinction, for example, between

male and female

is said to be merely one of material ^ and yet procreation, which depends upon it,^ occupies a most important place in the scheme of the philosopher.'*
;

' Anal. Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18, C. Mctaph. ihid. 1 02G, 30, 33 init. b, 2, 1027, a, 19 (xi. 8). 2 MctajjJt. vii. 5, 1030, b, 21 sex
,

hih

rh avrb
iv. 3,

(Tireptxa

OrjKv

v)

&ppij/

'yiyv^raL -naQov ri nddos.

Cf. Uen.
ii.

An.
'

767, b, 8 sqq.,

3,

is

reckoned one of the essential

ix,iir\hu\eB,i\\eKaQ' a-jTavTTapxovTa;

and p. 353, n. 4, mj)ra. Be An. ii. 4, 415, a, 2G, and ol her passages. That this is in737, a, 27,
in

but

X. 9 iiiit. it is asked Zia ri yvv)^ avZphs ovk eiSet Sia(p4pi ... ou5e QfQv e?]\u Kal &ppiv 'irepoif t^ ei'Se/, KairoL Kad' avrh tov ((fov

compatible with the statement Metaph. x. 9, was rightly

remarked

by Engel,

Ueb.

d.

ical ovx ws Aeukottjs a\X' y Cv^^v, Kal rh 07i\v Ka.1 rh appev vTrdpx^i ; iin(] the answer is that a distinction in

aurrj

7;

Siacpopa

Koi

fieXavia,

kind rests on ivavTioTrjTes iu rcf ^6y(f alone, not on those eV rfj fi^rj. rh Se Sipp^w Kal 6rj\v tov Cv^^
oiKe7a u(u irdOr], aAA' ov
oixTiau,

kot^ r^y
crw/xart.

Bcdeut. d. vKf] Arist., llheiii. 3Ius. N.F. vii. 410. * It is even stated, Gen. An. i. 2, 710, a, 17, b, 8, that the sexual distinction, depending as it does on dilference of function, is /faro rhu Xdyov and is one oh Kara rh rvx^v fiopiou ov5h Kara ttjp rv^ovaav SvvafJLiv.

dAA' eV ry vKrj Kal t^

366

ARISTOTLE
we
sliall

Similarly

liave occasion to observe that the

which Aristotle always represents as even in their physical nature different in kind from human beings, are yet at the same time to be regarded
lower animals,
as imperfect

formations

which have been prevented

Furthermore,

(owing, w^e must suppose, to the properties of Matter)

from developing into the form of man.

is to

it

Matter that

w^e

must

refer the mutability

; ^

and cor-

ruptibility of earthly things

and the same must be

o(Ta
S'

from tlie follows This general consideration that all Change and Becoming presupposes a material (sec jj.342,n.2 sq. suj^ra) which, as Suvdufi ov contains the possibility alike of being and not-being ( Gen. et
'

6.K\riXa.

PdWeiv
v\7i
jx^v
Tj
;

ecTTiv

/ur/,

&vev tov fx^raovk eari rovrcav

:

oea vii. 10, 1035, a, 25 ovv (TvviiXriixixiva rh elSos Kal ravra fxku iarlu i/Atj
. .

(pdiiperai
/jt.^

els

ravra

oaa Se

Cor?',

ii.

Metaph.

vii.

7,

and

avvei\r]Trrai rfj vArj, aA\' ai/eu ravra 5' ov (pdeiperai ^ uAtjs

. . .

other passages. Cf. p. 345, n. 5), as Aristotle himself distinctly Cf. MctajJh. vii. 15 (see says. p.' 220, n. 2, supra), ix. 8, 1050,
b,

oXcos ^ oijTOL ovToo 76 (similarly it

eCTt

5'

ovdiv Svudfxd

dtSioj/.

[Or as this
4,

203, b,

expressed P/tys. iii. 30 eVSe'xeo-^ai yap t)

is
:

eluai cvSev Siaipepii iu to7s ciiStois.]

forms, of immaterial ou5' i<rri 1070, a, 15 yivecris Ka\ (pOopa rovrcav, aAA' dWov rp6irov etal Kal ovk clcrlv olKia re rj dvev vkrjs Kal vyieia Kal irav rh Kara rexvr\v not the form as such, as we must understand
is

said
3,

xii.

\6yos 8e oSe. rf/s avTKpda^ws

-KCKra

diiua/JLLs

aua

iffriv

[the possi-

being invohes the bility of possibility of not being, &c.] Th apa Swarhu (hai ivbex^Tui Koiflvai Kal p.)] eT'at(cf.p. 234, n. 1),
.

only its union with 1. 22, but this or that material has a beginning and end); xii. 1, 1069,
b, 3
2,
:

^8'

alaOrjrr] ovcria fMerafiKrjTT)

:

10G9, b, 24
:

irdvra

5' i/'At/i/

t})

S'

iv^ex^lJ-^vov

(xri

Hvai

(peapro'j (similarly, xiv.

2, init.).

The motion, therefore, of every perishable thing is combined with effort, for only thus is the possibility of the opposite sta*e (the hvva;xis t7]s avr i<bd(Ttci}S, 11. 25,
.30

oaa ^jTajBiAAet. Longit. v. S> p-'h ear IV evavriov Kal oiroi a^vvarov av ei'rj (pdaprjvaL fxr} eariv But we may not infer from this the indestructibility of any material thing: advvarou yap r(p v\t]v
b, 7
TrdfTri fxeu

ex^t 3, 465,

exovri/XT] virxpxeiv ttws rh evavTiov. yap evelvai rh Oep/xhu ^

ei/dv

sqq.)

overcome

vKt] Ka\ hvpaixis ovaa,

^ yap ovala ovk eufpyeia,

rh

eudex^Tai,

irau

8'

elvai

alria tovtov; viii. 4, 1044, b,

27

ovd iravrhs v\r) icTTlv oAA'

yiyeffis
iffri

otrcoj/

aBvuarov ^ depfihu J) evdv rj KevKov Kexo^pKr/xeva etrrai yap ra irdOT} [' for in this case these qualities

Ka\

/nera/SoA./;

its

would

be

independent

exist-

MBTAPHYStCS
said of all badness
ences
'].

367

and imperfection,^ although the perafxa

ovv,

orav

^ rh

noir]TiKhv koI rh iraOrjTiKhu, aei t^ jjiev TTOiei rb 5e 7roo';\;6t, adiiuarov

u)] /n^TafidWeiu. De Ccnlo, i. 12, nothing that is with283, a, 29
:

possibility of opposites, since its conception has for ever been realised in it and will always continue to be realised. Evil

out beginning can have an end, and nothing that is without end can have had a beginning, since this could only be if it were its nature at one time to be, at another not to be. t&v Se
TOIOVTWV T] aVTT} SvyafjLis ttjs avTKpdcreus Kal rj SXt] alria rov
eluai Kol
'

fi-ff.

tV

ix. 9, 1051, a, 15 ; Aristotle seems, indeed, to assert the very opposite of this avdyK-r) 8e Koi itrl Twv KUKccv rh Te\os Kal iuepyeiav eJvai x^^P^^ '''VS Suua/iiecas t5 70^ Suvduepou ravTO &!J.(pci) ravavTia. Srjkou &pa on ovic eVri rh Ka/cbj/ Trapa to irpdyfiara vaT^pou yap ttj (pvffei rh Kanhv rrjs
:

Metaph.

and imperfection, on the other hand, consist in nothing else than a discrepancy between the concept of a thing and its actual state. While, therefore, on the one hand, the Svud/j-ci hv cannot be itself evil, yet is it, on the other hand, the ultimate cause and condition of it. Accordingly Aristotle himself speaks {Phys. i. 9, 192, a, 15) of
the KaxoTTOihv of the i/Ar;. He it is not evil in itself and in its essence, but only

admits that

'

in a secondary sense, and in so far as, being without form, it lacks also the qualitj^ of goodness
(cf. p. 324, n. 6, and p. 344, n. 1). But it is precisely upon this want and this indeterminateness that

'

Suvd/j.e(i}s.

But

this only

means

that since every dvuafiis contains the possibility of opposite deter-

minations (see
to

p. 234, n. 1, S7ij)ra)

merely Swdfxei hv we cannot attribute one of two mutually exclusive qualities, such as good and bad, as the Platonists had done in explaining matter as evil (cf. I)k\ i.
is

what

642, 6, 721, 737). Nevertheless, the ultimate cause of evil can only reside in the Swdfifi ov, in other words, in matter and this is indicated by Aristotle himself when, in the passage just quoted, he proceeds ovk &pa ov5' iv To7i e| apxv^ kolI to7s aiSiois oiidiv iariu ovtc Kanhv ovTe a/j.dpTTifia ovT 5i(f)6ap/xfi/ou Kal yap rj
:

the possibility of its turning out bad as well as good depends. Eternal reality excludes evil, since it has either no matter at all, or one which, as perfectly definite and formed, is incapable of opposite determinations while mutability and change, on the other hand, are sure indications of evil and imperfection, (On this subject cf also Eth. JV. vii. 15, 1154, b, 28 fiera^oXi] Se irdvTcov yXvKVTarov, Kara rhv ttoit^t^u, Sia TTov-qpiav rivd. uxrirep yap dvOpcoTros
:

evfXiTdfioXos 6 TTovripu^, Kal

7]

rj

(pixns

Seo/jLeuT]
oi55'

ixera^oXris
iirieiKTis.)

ou

yap

5i(X(p6opa
is

There no imperfection in the eternal,

ia-riu. it

rwv KaKwu

since
7i(f
,

exists continually eVep-

and therefore excludes the

SO we shall find that Aristotle traces all imperfect forms of natural existence to the resistance which the matter offers to the form and by a parity of reasoning he would have been forced to refer the
aK\rj
:

And

368
feet

ARISTOTLE

and imperishable heavenly bodies are no less formed In Matter alone we must seek of a definite material.^ for the cause of change and motion, which result from
an innate striving of Matter after Form.^
finally, is

Matter,
all

the source of individual existence, in

those

things at least

which are formed of the union of Matter

certainly

and Form.

Aristotle

did not treat

of the

principle of Individualisation with the universality and

definiteness that

we could have wished and thereby he bequeathed to his followers in the Middle Ages a rich op:

portunity for scientific controversy.

We shall find herehe recognises

the rational part ot

after that, in addition to corporeal beings,

in the Deity, the spheral spirits

and man, incorporeal beings free from any taint of Matter, which we must nevertheless regard as being also individual existences.^ Yet when the Form becomes actual in
anv material,
it is

the latter alone which explains

why the

source oE moral evil to the body, which in his general scheme is alone passive and changeable,

none of the qualities on which rest the mutual opposition of

the elements and their transformation into one another (cf. The question is, p. ;-}58 sqq.). how it can be Si">, if it is really matter and if all matter is a Syi/ct^ei ov and all Suz/a;u.is contains the possibility of opposite states.
this, more infra. The solution which the Schoolmen in their doctrine of
-

had he
vague.

not, as

we

shall see liere-

after, left this question

wholly

"' Aristotle himself has not overlooked this objection. He meets it {MctapU. viii. 4,1044, b, eVi Se twv 6) with the remark (pvcriKciy jiifv aiSiwv 5e ovaiuv &\\os
:

On

\6yos. "laws 'yap evia ovk exet vhrjv, (pvaiKoX koX ^1 o-j ToiavTt]i' (as the
'y^vvrirai ovciai)

aXXa

fx6vov

Kara

Similarly xii, 2, 1069, b, 24. The ether, for instance, of which the heavens and the heavenly bodies consist, is said to have no ei'avTiwo-is and therefore to be subject to no It has chano-e in its substance.
T6irov KivoTiv.

angels devised, to the effect that these pure spirits, as specitically different from every other and itself the only member of the species, is therefore at once specifically and numerically single, is nowhere suggested by

each of

Aristotle.

METAPHYSICS

369

Form is never present in it except under certain limiting conditions and with certain definite properties, which are not contained in the Form as such that is, in the pure

Concept of the thing.

The Form

or Concept

is

always a

Universal,' denoting not a thing but a kind,^ of being thought, but not of existing,

and capable

by itself apart from Between the Individuals into which the m^/nce species resolve themselves no difference of kind or Form any longer exists,'* and consequently they must be distinguished from one another by their Matter.^ Aristotle is
things.^

unable to apply this principle unwaveringly

See p. 219, n. 4, and p. 221, supra and upon ii'^os as the object of the conception see notes on pp. 216 and 341, &c., and cf. p.
;

<5

through-

<Tvv^i\i)fXfi4v(p TTJ vKrj ov iroiova-iv. Sih avQpwTTQv XevKdrrfs ov iroiu ou5e

fxeXauia

us
tj

v\t]

yap

6 6.v6p(i}iros,

ov

TTotu

Se

Sia<})opay
i/Atj-

173, n. 2. 2 3Ietaph. viii. 8, 1033, b, 21

difference]

[a specific ovk avdpccrrov

yap

the form

not something apart from definite material things, aAAa t^ toi6v^( arj/jLaluti, rdde Kal
is
oipifffxivov

etd-r] ^iolv ol ayOpoDnoi Sia tovto, Kairoi '^Tcpai al (TapKes Kal ra ocrra e| uv o5e Kal oSe a^Xa rh avvoKov

ovK

f(TTiv,

aWa

iroiel Kal

yei/va

K tovSc roidvSe.

is itself

the distinctive
:

But this mark of

universaliiy; see pp. 'S3'd,Scc.supra. ^ Phys. ii. 1, 11)3, b, 4 ^ P-op<ph Koi rb eidos, ov xajpitrrbv ou ctAA' ^ Kara rhv \6yov. Metaph. viii. 1, 1042, a, 2G sqq. v. infra, n. G.
;

Seeuotesatpp.216, 221,&c.

supra.

(Uei S' ovx '^repou, on iv T(f Koycp ohK eariu ivavriooais. There are certainly passages in Aristotle in which that which constitutes the difference between individuals of the same species seems to be included in the conception of their clSos thus it cannot be overlooked that the conception, ^.^., of man, which according to the passage just
**

'irepov fxh',

Metapk. vii. 8fi?i. (cf. c. 10, the form unites with the matter, rh 5' airav ^'St? rh
^

1035, b, 27 sqq.)
elSos

Toiovde

iv Ta?o-Se rais aap^l

'

Kal oTTols KaXKias Kal ^ooKpdrTis Kal CTepou fihv Sia r^qv v\r]v, ercpa

quoted is an injima species, does nat exclude certain individual differences which have a reference, not to the matter alone, but also to the form of the individual

members
form).

of

it

{e.g.

their bodily

yap, ravTh 5e to5 eJfSet H-rofiov yap rh etSos; x. 9, 10o8, a, 37 i^rel^

No clear distinction, how-

i(Tri

rh fih \6yos rh

fiep iv Tqi

ttSei

\6ya) flfflu voiovai Siacpopav, Hcrai

I.

ooai evavTi6Tr}T(s
S' i/Arj,

ever, is anywhere drawn between this individual form, and the

5' cV

t^

universal form or class conception which expresses the common

VOL.

B B

370

ARISTOTLE
;

out

but
of

it is

clear that his system leaves

Callias

no room

for

essence things;

several individual the contrary, the former always resolves itself Metaph. finally into the latter. koli. xii. 5, 1071, a, 27, it is said Tu>v eV Tahrf^ et'Set eVepa [sc. to. fiSej, aW' (TroLxeld eVriv], ovk OTL ruiv KaOcKaarou 6,\\o, Vj re a)] rh elSos v\7} Koi rh Kivr\<Tav Koi Kal 7] e/j.^, r(^ Ka66\ov Se Xdycp While, however, accordravrd.

or Socrates.
:

The only
lies

on

ground of individuality
the matter
v\r]
(veffTi,

in

tV iravrl t<^ yevofifvcfi

Kol iffTi
fiiv

fore
(1.

is]

T^

[and thererJSe rh Se T<J5e

1,

18).

Exactly the same

viii.

of Metapli.
(etrrt 5'
/meu
T]
T]

is true 1042, a, 26

ovaiaTh
.
. .

viroKfi/xevov,
5' 6

^Woos

vXt]

&\\ws

\6yos Koi

ing to this passage everyone has

an

elSos of his

own

different

from

that of everyone else, still the one does not differ from the other in kind. They will differ from one anot her, therefore, only in so far as they belong to different subjects or in otlier words, in tlieir actual embodiment, not in their characfer apiO/xcf, not e'lSei. Metaph.
:

rdSc ri hv ry \6y(f) rpirov 5e rb iK rovTCov, ov y^vecns fiSvov Ka\ <p6opd i(TTi Koi x'^P^^'''^^ air\u>s), and of the similar statement, Metaph. v. 8 (see p. 3 72, n. 2, i7ifra). The form is a rJSe in so far as it expresses a definite kind of being (man, but it becomes the beast, kc.) form of a definite individual thing in being united with a Considered material. definite
fxopcpr],

XcopjcTToV

icrri.

vii.8 (cf. p.:]72,n.8),1029, a,

is

1, it

apart from this

universal,

said: the name oixria seems fo belong in the first place to the toiovtov 5e vTTOKeiueuov trpwrov Tp6i:ov yueV riva 7] i/'Atj Acyerai, &\^ov Se rp6irQV t] fxopcp)), Tpirov Se Since, then, by rh e/c TovTuv. viroKLiJLvov ov substancc the individual thing as the subject of all its predicates is elsewhere understood (cf pp. 332 sqq., 300, kc), we should naturally refer /xopcpr) here to the form of the individual thing qua individual. But from the further explanation, c. 8, it
'
.

and
as

it is

conclude,

union it is a not true to Hertling does

5(5),

that Phys.

appears that this

/J-opcph

iv

rep

aiaQ-nrw (1033, b, 5), this ws Mos ^ ovaia AcySixevov, is only the un-

realised form which first makes this definite thing into a thing which is defined in this or that way (T(55e into a roidvSe, 1. 23) in the actual thing, i.e. in the

from the fact 210, b, 29 sq., seems to reckon the eWos as well as the vXt] a constituent element of the thing, that it is the cons-til utive principle of individual This is true rather of being.' the material in which the form Even De is first individualised. An. ii. 1, 412, a, 6 leads to no other conclusion. It is there said Xeyofieu 5^ y4vos 'dv ri rSov tvrwv t)]V ovaiav, ravTijs 5e t5 fieu ws vXr}U, h KaO' avrh fifu ovk ^ari T({5e Tt, eTipov Se ij.op<p^v Kol eJdos, Kad' ^v ^5t7 \4yTai rJSe tj, /col rpirov rh eK rovrcov. The thing is called this definite thing, i.e. a thing of

(Form

If.

Mat.
iv.

3,

'

matter, but vi^hich on the other hand itself stands related to individual things as man is to

this kind, because its material has received this form so the r6^e means here also, not the individual, but the specific peculiarity.
;

Still

less

in such passages as

METAPHYSICS
individual
Metaph.

871

Forms of
1071,
a,

sensible things.^
20 {apxh

Every Individual

xii. 5,

yap rh Kad' eKacTov ruv Kad' sKacrrop &>6pa}Tros yap avOpdoTrov Kad6\ov
'

ak\' ecTTiv ovSels, aA.Aa Il-qXehs

'Ax'^^ecos, &c.)

itisCasHERTLiNG-

sajs at p. 57), stated 'in plain words that the form, like all first
principles, must be individual.' Peleus, however, is not the mere form of an individual but a real

individual thing, since it gives to the individual its peculiar nature, and is thus distinguished from the essence {rh t\ ^v elvai), which is always, at least in sensible things, a universal. He admit?, however, that these two conceptions, which in certain passages Aristotle undoubtedly recognises as distinct, are as a rule

individual and he has become so by the union of the form man with this particular human body.
;

Moreover,
5,

"(Siou elSos

(Metaph.

xii.

1071, a, 14) refers, not to the individual form of this or that man, but to the form man in general. So also the remark (Be An. i. 3, 407, b, 23) that any soul may not enter any body, since all have their Xhiov eI5os Ka\ fxop<p)]v, must be taken to refer to bodies and souls of different kinds, and to mean that the soul of a man may not wander into the body of a beast. And when Gen. An. iv. 1, 7G6, a, GG sqq. explains the origin of the female sex on the ground that the male principle cannot transform the material into its Xhiov ^Ihos, it is not dealing with the. individual type, but with the form of the male sex. It does not alter the case here that difference of sex according to Metaph. x. 9 (see p. 365, n. 2, stqjra) resides not in the ovaia ( = elSos) of the Cv"^ but only in the i/Ai7 and the craj^a for even although it be true that to Aristotle this diffeience concerns, not the essence of man or animal as such, but only the form of the
:

used interchangeably by h im. It seems more correct to say, on the contrary, that it was Aristotle's conscious intention to identify the two, and to treat the form as well as the essence as a universal.
If in

we

find individual expressions

him which 'do not wholly har-

monise with this view, this is an inconsistency which the actual facts of the case forced upon
him. It is not the expression of the view with which he started and which was only afterwards obscured. That the essence of each thing lies in its form is to

an incontrovertible poand is stated by him with the greatest definiteness. The

Aristotle
sition,

hody, yet it is not on that account a mere question of individuality. Hertling (Form ti. Mat. 48 sq.) believes that the form in Aristotle mu.'^t necessarily be an
'

opposite he never stated in express words; it can only be deduced from casual expressions to which we cannot certainly prove that Aristotle himself consciously attached this significance. As a matter of fact the boundary line between the essential marks which constitute the class conception, and the unessential which constitute mere individual difference, is very impalpable. In every attempt to define it and to explain certain differences among th'ngs as class differences, others as individual varieties within the same class,

we

shall come upon cases in which a certain indefiniteness is

BB

372

ARISTOTLE

therefore implies a material element,^ and everything

that has a body

is

an Individual.^
'

Aristotle uses the

two terms
ently.^
sible to

'

object of sense
is

and

'

individual
all this,

'

indiffer-

If Matter

the cause of
it is

it is

imposcontri-

suppose that

distinguished from
:

Form only
it

by privation and non-existence

bute something of
its

rather

must

own

to

Form.

Matter, viewed in this light, must be rated at even

inovitable.

That Aristotle ex-

of multiplicity,

Kahoi
ot /itv
.

o-vfifiaivfi

perienced this difficulty is undeniable but it does not therefore follow that he did not make the attempt, and that he intended from those eihr] which coincide with class conceptions to distinguish a second kind of d^f] which represent, not what is common to the class, but what is peculiar The truth is to the individual. that there is no place in his scheme for such individual forms. For since according to the wellknown view that the form has neither origin nor end (see p. 342 and this must hold also of the form which as ro'Se ri is in an individual existence see preceding note) the individual forms of
:

y
5'

ivavTicos

yap
.

e/c

Trjs

uAtjs ttoAAo TTQiovaiv

(paiviTai
:

K ixias v\r)s fx'a rpdire^a

which,

however, Plato did not deny, since it is just because the same material gives only one specimen, that material things constitute a plurality even when there is no distinction of kind between them as Aristotle also holds. ^ Cf. 3Ietaj)7t.. iii. 4 Ceiled p. 342, n. supra) where he says if there were nothing but individual things, there would be nothing but sensible existence xii, 3, ovaiai Se rpfis, 1070, a, 9 fxiv

>';

vAtj TiiSe Tt ovffa

7)

r^

(paiveadai
ert rpirr]

Se (pvcris (here

=
'

eldos) rSSe ri.

7)

els

V)

Kai
7]

e'^ty

ris

ck

sensible things, if there are such, must be in actual fact separable from the things whose form they are but this in Aristotle's view is wholly inadmissible. 1 mtaph. vii. 11, 1037, a, 1:
;

TovToou,
i.

Kad^

(Kaffra.

De

Ccnlo^
:

9,

227, b,

.30 sq. (cf. p.

219, n.)

Form as such
and

is

something

differ-

yap uArj ti's iariu t fi-i] ehai Kol eJSos avTo Ka6' Ibid. xii. 8, avrh aXXa r6Be ti. This only cited p. 339, n. sujjra. has there refers, however, as been already remarked, to the individual rcembers of an injzma
KoX TrauTos

iari ri

-^ju

ent from form in the material if, for instance, there existed only one single circle, tlie circle would still continue to be something different from this circle. The one would be the iUos, the other clhos V rfj vXri /col rHv Ka6'
cKaarov.
eirel

alaOrjrds roov KaO' eKacrrov hv

ovv iffriv 6 ovpavSs iXr]. rh

airav

yap

alcr9T]Thv

eV

t^

vKri

sjtecies.

See Plato
2

e.g.

Meta2)h.

1.

6,

988, a,

makes matter the source

'Individual reality' and eihos iv rfj v\r) here signify the same thing.
virripx^v.

METAPHYSICS

373

a higher value,

when we

recollect that Aristotle allowed

to

substantiality in its full sense

the Individual alone,

If the Individual alone

as

is

Substance,

and

if

we have
the

just

seen,

is

always

universal,

Form, and if
is

therefore

Matter

then

true ground of individual existence

we cannot

escape the consequence that

and that
of

Matter supplies the ground also of substantial being, it is not pure Form, but the composite result

Form and Matter which alone is Substance. Indeed, since we have defined Substance as the substratum
'

(uTTOKStfisvov)

and have
it

also recognised in

Matter the

substratum of

all

Being,^ this would seem to give Matter

alone should be regarded as the
things.

the right to claim that

primitive Substance of
for Aristotle to

all

Yet

it is

impossible

admit

this.
;

Full and original reality

Form alone Matter, on the contrary, is no more than the bare Potentiality of that whereof the Actuality is Form. Not only, therefore, is it impossible that
belongs to

Matter can be substantial, but from

Moreover,
Aristotle

its

union with Form

there can be produced nothing higher than pure

Form

there

are

innumerable passages in which

expressly identifies

Form with

Substance.'*

He
to

declares that in all primitive

is

and absolute existences,

the intelligible essence

not different from the thing

it

which
'

it

belongs,^ so that

constitutes the Substance

2 '
*

See pp. 331 sqq. See pp. 300, 333, and notes. See pp. 344 sq. Kg., Motaph. i. 3, 983, a,
iii.

27;

4,

1080,
(eiSos

b,^ 5,

6e

999, b, 12 sqq.; vii. 4, c. 7, 1032, b, 1, 14 Ki-yu r6 ri ^v fhai

S'

fKaarov
. .

Kal

A7a;

Trpdirr]v ovalav ovaiau av^v v\r]s to

tV

c. 10, 1035, b, 32, c. 1037, a, 29, c. 17, lOil, b, 8 viii. 1, 1042, a, 17, c. 3, 1043, b, 10 sqq.; ix. 8, 1050, a, .5; Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 6 Meteor. iv. 2, 379, b, 2G, c. 12, 390, a, 5; Part. An. i. 1, 641, a, 25; Gen. An. i }, 7li, a, 5. Cf, p. 214, n. * Metajjh. vii. G in answer to
1
1
,

rl ^v ehai),

374

ARISTOTLE
Further, he will not suffer anything else

of the thing.

to be considered absolutely real except absolutely

im-

material Form, or pure spirit.

It is not a sufficient so-

lution to recall the different senses in which the term

Substance (ovald)
in the full

is

used,^ since it is not here a question

merely of the use of language but of the claim to actuality

and

strict sense of

the word.

The question
to a

is

whether we are

to assign

it

to individual things as such,

i.e.

or only to their intelligible essence,

is

Form which

unaffected by change in the individual thing and

remains for ever

culty,

or

Here we detect a diffirather a contradiction, which threatens to

self-identical.
it

shake the very foundations of the system.

Aristotle did not succeed in evading
altogether.

In

his Metaphj^sics

he asks the question where we ought

to look for the substance of things

in the Form, or in
Whole produced by
would not be known

the Matter, or

in

the composite

the question (1031, a, 15) irorfpou ravriu iariv t) krepov to ri ^u flvai J) (Kaarov ; it is said that the}^ are different only in the cas9 in which a conception belongs to a thing Kara avfifie^riKhs

exist, things

(rwu
5'

mere predicate), whereas on the other hand when the concep(as

tion expresses the essence of the thing itself they are one and the same. Kg. the conception of whiteness is different from the on the other KfvKhs Hudpcoiros hand the hi ehai is not different irom the fu, the ayaOcp dvai from the ayaOhv, nor again (c. 10, 1036, a, 1, of. viii. 3, 1043, b, 2) the kvkKos, fhai from the KvK\cf>
;

ovK ecrrai ^irKTrrifxy}, to OVK carai ovra 1031, b, 3). Tliis holds of all o<Ta fxr) /car' &\\o Xeyerai, aWa Kaff avra Koi irpioTa. rwv 1031, b, 13, cf. 1032, a, 5 trpdoTcov KoL Kad' avra Xeyo/xevwu rh eKaarcf elj/at Kal cKaaToy rb avro Kal eV 4<TTi c. 11, 1037, a, 33 sqq.
fxhv
:
;

'

Cf. the following notes

V. 8,

and

1017, b, 23 (rv/xfidivei Sr; Kara Svo rpoirovs t)]V ovffiav \4ye(rdai, t6 6' vrroKeififVOV

Metapk.

<E<Txo.Tov,

fjir}KTi

Kar^

6,\\ov

hv r65e ri hv Kal [where, however, as X<*>pi<tt6v f? 8CHWEGLER and BONITZ rightly remark upon this passage, we
\4yTai,
Kal h

the ^vxfi efvat from the ^vx'hOtherwise (not to mention other

reasons) conceptions would not

Xoopiffri^v to

can only understand the xSytp be meant on which

; ;

cf. viii. 1

see p. 369, n. 6, sujyra]

METAPHYSICS
the combination of
both.^

375
his

Bat

answer

is

far

from satisfactory.

He

admits

that Matter

cannot

properly be termed Substance,^ yet, on the other hand,

he does not venture to deprive

since
it is

it

altogether of this

title,

the substratum of

all

Being, the permanent

amid change.^
Matter
the
is

Nor

is

it

sufficient to

maintain that

substantial in a different sense from

Form,

latter
;

being
for

actually,

the

former

only poten-

tially so
TOiovrov Se

how can we
rj

conceive of a Substance
5'

kKaffrov

fiop(ph

Kal

on
eV

iarlv ovaia Kal

t]

vKt] hr\\ov.

rb

f/5os.
'
.
:

irdaais

yap rats avriKei/xevais

VII. 3 init. (cf at p. 370) use ' substance in various ways as equivalent to the Ti ^v ehai, tlie KaQoKov, the yevos, By the last, the viroKei/xevov. again, we may understand either the v\rj or the iJ-op<p^ or the comOf posite product of both. these, however, the Ka96\ov, and with it the y4yos (on the relation of which to the k3.66\ov, see p. 213 sq.), are quietly set aside, 13 (cf. p. 333, sujjra) and c. since the fiopcj)^ coincides with the Ti ^v fhai there only remain the three above-mentioned sigCf. 0. 13 nifications of oiia-la. init, viii. 1, 1012, a, 26 sqq.

/xerafioXaTs iffri ti rh viroK^ifx^vov

we may

'

ralsfjerafioXais. Cf.p.344.
7,
:

IMdAx.

1049, a, 34 the substratum of the rode ri is v\r] Kal ovala vKiK-i]', et ovv iarl rh vii. 10, 1035, a, 1 fiev xiXr] rh 5' elSos rh 5' e'/c rovrwv, Kal ovaia tj tc vArj Kal rh elSos Kal rh fK rovrxv. Fhys. i. 9, 192, a, 3 (cf. pp. 342 sqq. and notes)
: :

Tjfxus

/xeu

yap

v\r]u

Kal

ar(pi](Tiv

fieu o'JK

rp6v (pafieu eluai, Kal rovrwv rh ov elvai Kara avfxfiefirjKhs,

v\7]v,
r}]u

rr}v

5e

areprtaiv
5e

Kad^

avr^v, Kal rrju

7ra)9,

fikv iyyi/s Kal oi/aiav

rijv

vXrfU,

rr)V
ii.

ffrfpr](riv

oudaficis.

Be An

(see p. 669,
:

n, 6, supra).

ifnd. 0. 2

Be An.
;

369, n.
a,
2

6,

sujjra)

(see p. Ind. Arist. 545,

ii.

23 sq.
Metapli.
vii.

after adducing in support of the view that the

1029, a, 27, several reasons

3,

Metapli, viii. 1, 1012, a, 26 ovaia rh viroKei/jicvov, &W(i)S 6.K\ws 5' b Xoyos jxlv 7] vKt], . rpirov Sc rh ex Kal v fiopcp^, rovruv c. 2 init. cVel 5' r] fi\v ws vTroKeifj-iPT] Kal &S vXrj ovala
*

%ari

5'

6fxo\oyi7rai, outtj 5' iffrlv

7}

Svpdfiei,

substance = the matter, he goes aZvvarov Se koI yap rh on

:

\onrhp
fin. ris
7]
:

tV

^s ivcpyciav
ris
5r/

ovcriav

ruv

'

alcrdrirwv

etVetj/

iffriv.

Ibid.
'

Xo^p^fTrhv

SoKfl

Kal rh T(^5e ri virdpx^^v fidAKTra ttj ovala, 8ih rh flSos Kal rh 6^ afifpoLv ovaia hoJ^mv Uv fhai fiaWov rrjs i/Arjs. Cf. further, p. 345 sqq.

<pavfphv

iK rwv elpTJixevoy
Kal ttws
5'

7}

aladrjrr] ovffia iffrl

fxkv

yap ws

v\7],
7)

7)

ws

fiop<p^,
r)

'6ri

eVepyeia

Se

rpir7]

CK

Meta^yh.

viii. 1,

1042, a, 32

rovrwv; xiv. 1, 1088, b, 1 (against the Platonic doctrine of an abso-

376

ARISTOTLE
:

which is merely potential that is, an absolute existence which does not yet actually exist ? If we grant that Form
the proper Substance of things, actual existence in the highest sense, and that as such it is opposed not ouly to Matter but also to the composite product of
is

Matter and Form,' yet Aristotle has done nothing at all to

show how
is

this is possible, considering that

Form

in itself

always a Universal, that the Individual is always burdened with Matter, and that Substance is originally individual Substance. In like manner he fails to tell
the essence and substance of things which cannot be conceived apart from a definite material composition 2 or again how Matter devoid. of quality and determination can produce the individual
;

us

how mere Form can be

doterminateness of particular existences which are not related to each other as so many impressions of a die but are differentiated from one another qualitatively by
definite properties.

Finally,

it

is

not easy to see

why

and extinction should pertain to things that are the joint product of Form and Matter, and 3^et nqt to Form
birth
lutoly great and small) avdyK-q re iKaarov v\r]v eluai rh Sui-duei TOLOvrov, uxrre /col ovaias t^ Se irpos Tt oijTe Svvdaei ovaia ovre
:

ehai fiaWov

rrjs

vKrjS.

r^y

fikv

roivvy e| afi({>o7y ovaiay, \4yco Se r7}V iK re rrjs v\r]s Kal rrjs ixopcprfs, a(per4oy vcrrepa yap Kal 5^ At;,
'

ivepyela.
viii. 3 init. iyiore XavOdv^L trSrepov crrjfialpei rh tvo/xa (TwOfTov ovff'av ^ T^ju ivepy^iav T
'
:

Mctaph.

Kal

T^v

fiop(pr]v,

oTov

t}

oIk'u irdTepuv

rov koivov oti (TKeiraa-fxa e/c \lQwv cJjSI Kei/jLevu>v, ?) TTJs epepyeias Kal rod e^Sovs on arKfiraafia vii. 3, 1029, a, 5: et
(TTlfMelov

irXivOcoy Kal

Tt>

?5os

T?is

vAris

irpoTcpov

Kal

frequently distinguishes between conceptions of pure form and of form inherent in a definite material the standing example of the latter is the (ri/jihy as distinguished from the ko7\ov so also axe, saw, house, statue, and even soul. Cf. Pkys. ii. 1, 194, a, 12, ii. 9 Jin. Be An. i. 1, 403,
2
;

Aristotle

fxaWov

Kal rod ef afKpolv xpSrcpov fffrai line 29 rh eldos xal rh ef a/x^olv ovcrla SS^eiev &j/
iy,
; :

b, 2,
vii.

ii.

1,

412, b, 11.
10, 1035,
a,

Mcfaj)h.
1 sqq. b,

5,

c.

74, c. 11, 1037, a, 29.

METAPHYSICS
or Matter separately. ^

377

For even if we can suppose that Matter as such had no beginning, it is hard to imagine
that the

Forms

of created things were uncreated, if they

neither exist independently as Ideas nor are originally

inherent in Matter. All these difficulties exhibit the same

conclusion that

Substance.

we discerned in dealing with the notion of The fact is that Aristotle combiues in his Mefails to

taphysics two different points of view, which he

harmonise.

On

the one side he adheres to the Socraticois

Platonic principle that the true essence of things

to

be found in their Concept, and this

is

always Universal.

On

the other side he acknowledges that this Universal has no existence apart from the Individual, which he
therefore declares to be the Substance.

He

cannot

explain

how

these two positions

may

coexist in one

and hence the above-mentioned contraAt one time the Form, at another the Individual which is the product of the union of Form and Matter, appears to be the Actual. Matter causes
philosophy,
dictions arise.

mere Potentiality. It is represented at the same time as indefinite Universality and as the ground of individual determinateness. So the un*

results incompatible with

Metaph.

vii.

15 cited at p.

ovaiav Xiyoi^v.

audyKT} Sh Tavrrju

4, sujjra, and the passage ffomc.lOcitedatp. 366,n. l;i^r<^.

219, n.
viii, 1,

1042, a, 29

TpiToi/ 5e

rb

e/c

^ aidiou dvai ^ (pdapTTjv kvev rod (peeipea-eai Kal y^yovivai &vfv rov yiyueaOai rh elSos ovSeU
. .

TovTwu

[form
:

and matter],
;

oZ

y4ue<Tis fiovov Kal ^0opa. iffri

iffTi

c. 3,

1043, b, 10 ou5e 5r/ 6 avdpwiros t6 ((^ov Kal diTTovu, aWd ri

.

ovSh yej/^a, aWa Troiilrai T(i5e yiyvirai hi r6 ck tovtcou c. 5 init. iirel S' evia &yeu yevicr^ws Kal (pdopas ea-ri Kal ovk
noiel
;
:

Qii^ (Ivai h irapa ravrd ^(Ttlv, d ravd' uK-n ovaia' h i^aip7] ovpTcs rrjv vArju \4yov7iu. et odv rovT alTiov rov ehai Kal oixrias [so BoNiTZJ, TovTO avrijv tiv t)]v
.
.

iariv, olov ai dTiyixal, eKirsp flalu, Kal oAojs to. e^idv Kal al /nopcpal, oh

yap rh XVKhu yiyverai, dWa rh ^v\ov KivKuv. Cf. pp. 341 sqq., and notes there.

878

AUtSTOTLB
we cease to wonder that Aristotle's

certainty goes on, until

doctrine of Matter and Form, Particular and Universal,

received the most various interpretations and supported

the most contradictory assertions not only

among

the

Greek Peripatetics but

and to a far greater extent among the logicians of the Middle Ages.
also

Yet the doctrine is of

vital

importance to the System.

Aristotle finds the best solution of the difficulties which

perplexed earlier philosophers in his distinction between

Form and Matter, Potential and Actual. By means of this distinction he explain show Unity can also be Multiplicity; how the Genus and Differences form one Concept; how the many Individuals constitute one Species how Soul and Body make one Being.^ It is this alone which enables
;

him

to solve the
all

problem of Becoming, over which Plato

as well as tinction of

others

had stumbled.

Indeed, the disespecially, as

which we are speaking serves

has been seen, for the elucidation

of this

problem.

Form and Matter being

tion
;

related to each other as Actual

and Potential, they are in a position of essential correlathe notion of the Potential implies the possibility
of
its

becoming Actual
it

the notion of the Actual implies

that
that

is

the Actuality of the Potential.

Everything
;

is

to

versely everything that

or other

become actual must be potential and conis potential must at some time
actual, since

become

what

is

never to be actual
Aristotle

cannot be called potential.^

'

Nor does

mean

Cf.

pp.219,
5.

n, 2, 351, n. 1,
ii.

and

369, n.

De An.

1,

412,

b, 6, c. 2, 4 14, a, 19 sqq. 2 Aristotle, indeed (^Metaph.

ix. 3)

controverts the Megarian

assertion that a thing is potential only so long as it is actual but he forbids us also to say {ihid. c. 4 init.') '6ti Swarov fiev roU ovk %<rTai 5e, since this could only
;

METAPHYSICS

379

by Potentiality any mere logical or formal but also real Potentiality. Matter is in itself or in its capacity that whereof the Actuality is Fo^^m and consequently
;

Matter of

itself implies

Form, requires Form, owns a

it)
it

natural inclination or longing (as Aristotle expresses

for
it,

is

provoked by

to
is

move and develop

itself.^

On
is

the other hand

Form

that which gives complete;

ness to Matter

by

realising its potential capacities

it

the

Energy or Entelechy of Matter.^

(pvaiy Koi 6pfi})u, is

But the

be said of that which by its very nature could not be but this could not be potential, and he therefore denies (as was pointed outatp. 366,n. l)that in things of eternal duration there can be any potentiality without actuality. * Cf. the passage, Phys. 1, 9, quoted p. 344, n. 1. Matter is said by nature icpUaQai. koX
:

from

distinguished compulsion, audyKr] "jrapa t)]v 6pij.^v, and the falling of a stone quoted as an example of the former (similarly Metaph. v. 5, 1015, a 2f3, b, 1, c. 23, 1023, a, 17 sq., xii. 7, 1072, b, 12 cf.
;

Hektling, Mat.

u.

Form,

91).

6p4ya6ai
Kol i(peTov,

tov

deiov

Kal

ayadov

and this is the principle upon which we must explain the movement of the world by God and of the body by the soul.
Cf such expressions as Metaph.
.

Nevertheless we cannot but recognise in the use of these expressions the psychological analogy from which the terminology is borrowed, reminding us as it does of the earlier hylozoism.
2 Aristotle as a rule makes no distinction between these two terms (see Trendelenburg, Be An. 296 sq. SCHWEGLiiR, Arist.
;

xii.

7,
;

1072, b, 3
ibid,
a,

Kivel
:

ws

ipdo-

(icjov

26

rh

hp^Krhv

KoX rh voTjrbp klv^I

oi)

Kivovjx^vov.

The longing referred

to is

cjnscious desire, but a natural impulse, and is frequent ly referred to by Aristotle as the cause of the natural movements of bodies. Thus {Phys. ii. 1, 192, b, 18) we are told a work
:

no mere

Metaph. iv. 221 sq., 173 BONITZ, Ind. Arist. 253,

sqq., also p. 348, n. supra),

sq.

b,

35
if

and

he seems to do so in individual
passages, yet is the distinction of each from the other so loosely defined that in different passages the same is assigned to both. Thus motion is usually called the entelecheia of matter, the soul the entelecheia of the body (cf. Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26, 201, a, 10, 17, 28, 30, b, 4 viii. 1, 251,
;

of art ovdffi'au
fioKrjs efKpvTov,

Spfiiju

e;^et

jx^ra-

whereas the proCf. Metajfh.

duct of nature has.

V. 23,

1023,

a, 8,

where Kara r^v

;

avTov (pvariu and Kara T^fv abrov ipuhv are parallel phrases Anal.
Post.
ii.

11,

94,

b,

37,

where
rijv

a, 9

Be An.

inner necessity,

dvay/crj

Kara

27, b, 5, 9,

412, a, 10, 21, 28, 413, a, 5 sqq., c. 4,

ii. i.

380

ARISTOTLE

Entelechy of Matter or the actualisation of Potentiality

is

Motion.^

The

correlation

therefore

of
its

Form and

Matter leads us to consider Motion and

Causes.

(3) Motion

and

the first

Cause of Motion.

Aristotle has himself explained

what he meant by
other words,
it

the definition

we have

guoted.

^Motionis the Entelechy

of that which exists potentially

yet Metaph. ix. 415, b, 4 sqq.) 6, 8 (1048, b, 6 sqq., cf. 1. 1, lOnO, a, ;>0 sqq.) motion is defined as energetic, and yet again (ibid. c. G, 1048, b, 18 sqq.) it is said to differ from energy as the incomplete from the complete, so that only such activity as contains
;

in

is

yeiaTov TcrtXeo-fxepov (ci. n. 1 atp 383 infra). But eVreAexem is used

also in this sense, e.ff. De An. ii. 6, 417, a, 28, and the same ex-

its

own end
life,

in

itself, e.g. sight,

happiness, is called energeia, while on the other hand that which is subord inate to an end outside itself and ceases with its attainment, e.ff. building, walking, &c., is called motion. (On these two kinds of activities, ?;. also c. 8, 1050, a, 23 sqq.) Metaph. ix. 8, 1047, a, 30 again seems to appropriate eVreAexeta to the state of completion, eVe'pyeia to the activity directed to its attainment, or to motion (Sok7 yap
iy(pyeia fxtxKiffTa 7} Kiuriais eJpaij, so c. 8, 1050, a, 22. Also Be ii. 5, 417, b, 4, 7, 10, 418, a, 4, ivT^K^x^ia stands for the completed state. (That Metapli. xi, 9, 1065, b, 16, 33, repeatedly uses ivepyeia where Phj/s. iii. 1 has eVreAexeja, is of no importance, on account of the spuriousness of the former passage.) Elsewhere motion is called iv^pyeia areA^s, eV. rod a.T(\ovs, and as such is dis-

thought,

and An.

pression occurs Mcta]-)li. xii. 8, 1074, a, 35, c. 5, 1071, a, 36, as applied to the pure, immaterial form, viz. God. Phys. iii. 3 init. the action of the moving cause is ev4pyia, called the change effected in that which is moved eVreAexeict, a use which seems quite proper, as the latter and not the former is brought to completion by motion yet in the passage that follows eVreAexetais used of both, and in Metaph. ix. 8, 1030, a, 30 sqq. it is said, with reference to the two kinds of activities distinguished above in the case of those whose end is outside of themselves, the energeia is in that which is moved in the case of the others, in that which acts. It is therefore impossible to point to any fixity in the language used to express the distinction between these two terms. Phi/s. iii. 1, 201, a, 10, b, 4: Tov Swdfici ovros ivreX^x^ia ^ 7] roiovTOv, Kivrjais icrriv tj rod Svvarov, y Suvarhv, eVreAcxeto
;

(pavfphv

'6ri
:

Klvrjffls

iariv

c.

2,

tinguished from the

a-rrXMs ivtp-

202, b, 7

Kivrjffis

cVreAexeja rod

METAPHYSICS

381

the process by which that which existed previously only

in capacity is brought to reality, the determination of

Matter by Form, the transition from Potentiality to

Actuality.'

The movement of

building, for example,

which a house can be made, into an actual house. But motion is the entelechy of potential existence only qua potential and
not in any other relation.
for instance, out of

consists in fashioning the materials of

The movement of the

is cast,

brass,

which a statue

cern it in so far as it is brass for qua brass it remains unaltered and has always had a certain sort of actuality but only in so far as it contains the potentiality of being

does not con-

made
KivrjTov

into a statue.^

This distinction, however, can,

,

it

f)

kivi]t6u

viii. 1,

25

a, 9

4>a/iej/ Stj

tV

Kivr\(nv eluai cVreAe-

Plujs. iii. 1, 201, therefore Metaph.

a, 9, sqq. xi. 9,

(and

X^tav Tov

1065, b,

KH/7JT0V p Kiyr)T6y. So Metaph. xi. 9, 1065, 'b, 16, 33 see preceding note. That only this transition and
;

sqq.).
(

Brentano's explanation

t'

the condition attained

by

of it, only the process of actualisation, not the actuality, is

means

Vun der mannigf. Bedeutung des Seienden nach Arist. p. 68), according to which motion is the actuality which transforms a
potential being into 'this potential being,' or which constitutes or forms a potential as potential,' is without support either in Aiistotle's use of terms or in actual fact. For, in the first place, the entelechy of the ^wdix^i tv is not that by which the Sw. hi> first comes into being ; and, in the
'

meant by the expression entelecheia or energeia is obvious not less from the nature of the case itself than from ihe repeated description of motion as an uncompleted energy or entelechy
(see pp. 383, n. 1, 379, n. 2). The same distinction elsewhere occurs.

Pleasure,
is

e.g., is

said not to be a

second bronze

movement, because a movement

at each moment incomplete, whereas pleasure is complete. The former is the pursuit, the latter

place, when, e.g., the which is potentially a statue is formed into the statue,
its KLVT](Tis

does not consist in

^vvafx^i

its
i.e.

becoming

kudpihs,

the attainment, of the end, a result of the completed activity. Eth. N. X. 3, 4, vii. 13, 1153, a, 12. * In this way the previously

bron7e, Aristotle, however, has stated the meaning of his definition unambiguously in the

quoted

definition is

explained.

passage immediately following, so has the author of Metaph. xi. 9.

and

382
is

ARISTOTLE
clear,

be

only applied to
for

tlie

case of

special or
is

particular

movement;
own.

sucli

movement

always

carried on in material tliat lias already an actuality of

some

sort of its

general notion of

If, on the otlier hand, we take the movement, it may be defined as the

process

by which Potentiality is actualised, the development of ^fatter by Form, since the material (pia material is mere Potentiality which has not yet in any
respect arrived at Actuality.
all

This definition includes

all

Alteration of every kind,

It

coming into being and

destruction.

does not, however, apply to absolute

origination and annihilation, for this would necessitate

the birth or destruction of matter, which

is

never assaid,

sumed by that wheu he

Aristotle.^

It follows

from what we have

refuses to regard

becoming and decaying

as

forms of motion, maintaining that though every motion ^ this distinction is chano-e, all change is not motion

must be accepted

as a relative one

which does not

h^

of the general idea of motion; and so Aristotle himserf

on other occasions^ employs motion and change as synonymous terms. The doctrine, however, of the different
kinds of motion belongs to Physics.
is intermediate between and actual being it is Potentiality struggling into Actuality, and Actuality not yet freed from Poten;

We

have seen that motion

potential

tiality

in

other

words, imperfect Actuality.

Potentiality

It

is

distinguished

from mere

by being
sense

an

Entelechy, and from an Energy in

its strictest
is

by

the fact that in Energy the activity which

See pp. 341 sqq. svpra. Phys. V. 1, 225, a, 20, 34, and passim see infra.

directed

iii. 1, 201, a, 9 2 initAv. lO/fin. viii. 7, 261, a, 9, and 2)assim.

'

E.g. Pliys.

sqq.

c.

METAPHYSICS
to

383

lias also attained its object thought, for both a process of search and also a mental possession of the object of thought whereas motion ceases in the attainment of the object, and is therefore

an object
is

instance,

only an unaccomplished

effort. *

Hence each

particular

motion

is

opposite

a transition from one state of being into an from that which a thing ceases to be into
it

there

has to become. Where there is no opposite, no change.^ Consequently all motion implies two principles that which moves, and that which is moved, an actual and a potential being.
is also

that which

it it

Mere Potentiality is unable lacks Energy and so likewise

:

to produce motion, for

is

pure Actuality, since

contains nothing imperfect and undeveloped.

Motion

can only be conceived as the operation of the Actual or

' Phiis. iii. 2, 201, b, 27: rov 8e hoKilv adpicrrov clvai t}ju Kivrffiv aXriov on oVt? els Svyajxiv rSov

eveKa 77 Kiur^ffis, ovk eari ravra ^ ov reXeia ye ov yap reXos, dAA' eKeiuT) evvirdpx^i rh tcAo? Kal
uiv

irpa^is

oPTwv ovT e/s evfpyeiau tan de7i/ai avT^u anXctiS' ovtc yap rd Svvarhv voahv ilvai KiyeTrai | avdjK'qs
otre rh ivepyeia iroahr,
Se' aXriov
5' '6ri
7}

7]

irpa^is

ov yap
owS'

a}xa

fiaBi('ei

Kal
ajxa

fiefidSiKev,

o'lKoSojuLel

Kal

re K'vqcris

fi/epyfia fxiv ris elvai Sok7,

areX^s

areAes rh dvvarhv, ov iarlv rj ij/epyeia. It is therefore neither a (rreprjcris, nor a

Sui/o/its. nor an ivepyeia aTrArj (80 Mctapli. xi. 9, 1066, a, 17.) VIII. KivCnai rh KivrjrSv 5, 257, b, G TQvro S' 4(rrl Suvd/xi Kivovficpoy ovK ivrcXex^ia rh Be Svpa/xei eis evreXex^iav j^abi^ei. eari 5' 7}

:
'

&c. ecvpaKe Se Kal opx rh avrh Kal voe? Kal vev67]Kev ri)v /xev ovv roiavrrjv evepyeiav Xeyw, eKeivtiv 5e K^urjaiv. Cf. c. 8, 1050, a, 23 sqq. and p. 379, n. 2, supra; De An. ii. 6, 417, a, 16: Kal yap ecrriv 7] Kivqais evepyeid ris
o''KoB6/j.T]Kv,

areXijs fxevroi
7}

yap
7)

Kivriais
S'

"tiv,

iii. ; 7, 431, a, 6: rov areXovs evepyeia airXws evepyeia erepa 7) rov

rereXea-fxei/ov

Kiv7](Tis

rh
5e

8e

evreXex^ia. kiptjtov aTe\^,s Kivovv ^Srj evepyeia iffr'v.

:

225, a, 10
a,

Meiaiih. ix.

Twv

6, 1048, b, 17 eirel irpdlewv wv earl irepas

1, 224, b. 26 sqq. Metapli. viii. 1, 1042, 32, 2, 1069, a, 13: eU evavrictxreis hy elev ras KaQeKaarov

PItys. V.
;

xii.

rtXos aAAa rcov Trepl rh riXuSy oiov rov icrxvaiueiv r] irrxvaaia, avra Be 'drav laxvaivtj ourws i(TT)piuKivf]aei,fi^ inrdpxovra
ovSep-la

fxera^oXai avdyKT) Si] fierafidXXeiu r^u vX7]V Svva/j.eu7]v &iLL<pco eirel 5e dirrhv rd hv, fieraBdXXei trau eK rov dvyafxei ovros els rd evepyeia ov. Cf. p. 342 sqq.
at

384

ARISTOTLE
the
Potential or Matter
:

Form upon

even in that

which moves
the soul
as

itself

we always

find the motive force

separate from what

is different

it

moves, just as in living creatures

itself,

from the body, and in the soul

we

shall see below, the active part is different

from

the passive.^ While Becoming, therefore, is impossible without matter or potential being, some Actuality is not
less indispensable as

an antecedent and motive cause.

where an individual has developed itself from mere Potentiality to Actuality, and consequently

Even

in cases

the former principle precedes the latter in

it,

yet another

individual must have come before it in actual existence. The organic individual is produced from seed, but the
Phys. iii.2(p. 38P,,n.l),viii. 257, b,'8 Metapli. ix. 8 esp. 1050, Phy^. vii. 1 a-KCLV b, 8 sqq. xii. 3 v-k6 riVQS avdyKT} Kivovfiivov T()
'

Metaph.
?l

ix. 1,

1010,

a,

28]

aAV

5,

K-exwpio"Tat, ravrri rd fxev TTfcpvKe

iroitiv

TO

8e

Trdcrx^^^-

Nothing

even in the case of Kive^adai that which apparently is selfmoved, the material which is moved cannot be at the same time the movino: cause, since if a part of it is at rest the w^hole
:

single, therefore, is selfmoved, ctW' avdjKr] dirjpriaOai Td Kivovv iu kKacrrcf irpds rb Kivovfiipov
is

that

oiov

e'lrl

rcJov

ai^'vx^'^

opcoficv,

orav

Kivrj ri

T(V /x\pvx(^i^

avra
ttu

aWa

av/x^aivei
Kive'tcrQai
.

Kal

ravra
:

vir6 tlvos asi

5'

yepoiTO

(pauephu
;

but also be at rest neither can rest and movement

of
it

must

in the

self- moved

be dependent

The true exelse. planation is to be found in the above account, and Phys. iii. 2 (ren et Corr. ii. 9 neither form in itself nor matter in itself explains becoming; ttjs filv yap t^ Tracxf'" ^^^t^ ^aX t^ {/Atjs KiveiffQai, T^ 5e TTOiflv Kol KiveTv
on anylhing
:

257, b, 2 advvarov 5)] rh avrh aiirS kivovv irdvTr] KLv^lv aWh avru ^epoiro yap av oXov Kal (pepoi rrjv ahr^v (popav, ev hv kol aTO,uov tQi ei'Sft, &c., Tt bicapiarai on Kivcirai rd KivrfTov, &c. (see p. '68'^, n. 1). Therefore, we certainly hear nothing in Aristotle of any Identity of Mover and Moved (Biese, Phil. d. Arist. 1. 402, 7, 481)
c. 5,
'

Siaipovcri TCLS alrias

'

'

kripas
p,

Svvd/xews.

See

further,

:U1 sqq. 2 See preceding note and Phys. it is impossible iii. 4, 255, a, 12 that a (Tvux^^ ^al avfx.cpv'ks should be self -moved ^ yap %v Ka\
:

nor does the existence of something which at the same time moves and is moved {Phys. iii. 2, 202, a, 8 and above) in any way prove it, i the above explanations are true.

ffvvfX^^

M^

"^?7 ravTT) airaOes [cf.

MBTAPHYSICS
seed
is

38$

not antecedent to the hen.^

contributed by another individual the e^g is Conversely, where an actual

meets with a potential being, and no obstruction from without intervenes, then the corresponding motion is net-essarily produced.^ The object in which this process
takes place
it

is

the thing

is

effected is the

moved or Matter that by which motive power or Form. Motion

;

therefore, is the

common function of
:

both, though

it

takes

\
'

Metaph.

ix.

oel

e/c TOX)

Svud/jLei

1049, b, 24 liuTos yiyverai rh

8,

6Vep7etot ov VTrh ivcpyciq, ovtos, oTov

oTav ws UuauTai [under the conditions which limit their activity and pas.

KaKelvas

dvdyKrj,

&vdpcoTros

e'l

/jLOvcriKOv, del
:

audpcanov, jjLOvciKhs virh klvovvtos tivos irpdorov.

ovcTia,

1050, b, 3 (pavephu (in irpSrepou rrj euepyeia Suj/a/tiews koI uiairep

efTTOyuei/, Toil

sivity] Tb'/roirjTiKhvKal ThiradTfTLKhv rh fih iroielvTh Se 7ra(rXf t^^ ^Keivas 5' ovk di/dyKrj avTai fxev yap [the irrational] iraa-ai fxia kvhs
irX7i(xia(w(Ti,
'

xpovov aelTrpoXa/ufiduei

TToirjTtKij,

(Ke7vai 5e

to);/

ivaiTiuv^

ivpyeia kripa irph krepas e'tts rrjs Tov dei Kiuovvros vpdiroos. xii. 3, (cited in note to p. 356, supra)
;

xii. 5,

1071, b, 22 sqq.

c.

6,']

072,
.
. .

a, 9
(I

Trporepov ivepyna Swd/ULCcas

del

8e fxeWei y4vcns Koi (pOopa eluai,

eJuai

ivepyovv &Wa}S ii. 1, 734, b, '6(Ta. (pvcrei yiverat ^ rex^V vtt^ 21 iuepyeia uvros yiverai eK rod Svpdjiiei roiovrov. Phys. iii. 2 fin. fldos Se del o'taerai ri rh klvovu, ... &
aet

aWo
:

Kal &\\a}s.

Gen. An.

that necessity forced this powder of -choice to be exercised on both alternatives, opposite effects must be produced at one and the same time). For even in the case of the latter, so soon as the choice has been made, the result necessarily follows oiroTepov yap tv
if
:

waTe

dfia iroi^aei TavavTia (so

6peyr)Tai
T(S

Kvpiws,

tovto

Troirjaei,

OTavwsSvvaTai
irad-nTiKui

inrdpxr} Kal irXTjaid^fi

icrrai

apxh foi
Kivfi,

u'ltiov rrjs Kiifrjaeu-s,

orav
TTOS

oiov o ivTeXexeia dvOpw-

e'/C TOV hvudjXei UVTOS duOpwrou. Ibid. c. 7 viii. 9, 265, a, 22 Metaph. vii. 7, c. 9 >/*., ix. ^fin., xii. 7, 1072, b, 30 sqq. Be An. ii. 4 init. iii. 7 init. cf. also p. 355-6, mpra. Phys. viii. 4, 255, a, 34 sqq. [Only an apparent exception to

TTOiei

av9pu)irov

(1048, a, 11); but the wall must decide on the one side or the other, if the condition of action is to be present for to produce opposite effects at the same time is impossible, ov ydp
:

ovTOJs e^et
eo-Ti

avTuu

tV
7}

Svuafxii/ ov5'

TOV

d/j-a iroielv

SvuaijLis (1.

22).

Finally,
effect

it

follows also' that the

'*

introduced by Metaph. ix. 6, where it is said (1047, b, 35) we must distinguish "between
'his is

irrational

and rational forces;

necessarily' produced when the active and passive principles are in the condition ws SvuavTai TToielv koI irdax^iv and the general reasons of this have already been stated at p. 378-9.
is
;

VOL.

I,

C C

386

AMISTOTLJ^
:

opposite directions in each

the motive power excites

the latent activity in the thing

moved, while the thing

moved

realises it for itself.^

Aristotle conceives of the

operation of the motive principle upon the thing moved them.^ as conditioned by continuous contact between
>

Pliys.

iii.

3,

where

this is

discussed at length. V. 1. 224, b, Kivnais ovk eV t) 4, ihid. 1. 25 Tw ("ihei a\\' eV Tq3 KivovfM^V(f KoX vii. 3: the KLvr^TO} kot' ivfpy^iav. dAAoicDO-ts takes i)lace only in the
:

Here the motion of throwing. of the thrown seems to continue after contact with the thrower But this Aristotle has ceased. cannot admit to be the case. He
therefore
10,

assumes
;

{Phys.

viii.

material thing.
426, a, 2
'
:

De^
r]

An.
tw

iii.

2,

ci 5' i<Triv

Kivriais Koi
ttoiov/col

TTOiTjo-is

KoX rb iraQos iv
r/

2GG, b, 27 sqq., 267, b, 11, De Insomn. cf. iv. 8, 215, a, 14 2, 459, a, 29 sqq.) that along

yap rov

iroirjTiKov

KivnTLKOv ivfpyeia iv t<^ Trao'xoJ'Tt iyyiperai. dih ovk avayKT] rh kivovv

KLVilaQai ...
iv
To3
7/

with the thing thrown the thrower moves also the medium through

which

iroirjais

koX

t]

Trddrjais

Traaxo!'''''

o.\?C

ovk iu
p.

rw

it moves {e.g. the air or water) and that the motion of the thing w^hich is moved is com-

-noLodvri.
2

See further
'2,
:

358-9.

Cf. p. 378-y.

3 v Kivnais iuPhifS. iii. Jin. TeAe'xeta rov Kiurjrov f] kiv7]t6v (rv,u-

municated to it from this, when it has passed from the thrower. But since this motion continues after that of the thrower has
ceased, while (according to his presupposition) the motion of the medium must cease simultaneously with that of the thrower, he adopts the curious solution that the medium can still pro-

)3atJ/ei

5e

tovto

0i|et

iiioff oLfxa

Koi irdcrx^i.
:

b, 24, vii. 2, init. a/xa TCf kivov^^vc}) eVri* Kivovv Xeyw 8e rh d/xa, on ovdfu iffTiv
. .
.

rov Kiv-qriKOv, vii. 1, 242, rh 5e Trpwrov

avrSiv ixTa^v- tovto yap Kouhv iirl kivovvt6s iravThs Kivovjxevov koi

eVrii/ which is then shown to be true of all kinds of motion. Ibid. 1 viii. 2, 255, a, 34, c. 1, 251, b, sqq.; Gd)t. et Corr.i. 0, 322, b, 21, Gen. Jn.n. 1, 734, c. y, 327, a, 1 Kive7v re yap n^ cfKTdiKVOu a, 3 dhvpaTov Metajjh. ix. 5. Cf. n. 1 supra, and p. 387, n. 3. That this contact of the moving force with
;
:

duce motion even when it has itself ceased to be moved ohx afxa
:

iravTai kivovv koI Kivovufvov

dWa

Kivwv TraucTjToi Kivwv, kivovv Se eTi iaTiv (267, a, 5;. The law of inertia, according to which motion persists
Kivovfxevov
/xev

d/xa

OTav

that which

moved, is conceived of by Aristotle as not merely a momentary one giving the tirst impulse only, but as lasting during the whole continuance of the
is

until it is met by an opposing force, was not, therefore, known the natural motion to him. of the elements, which carries each of these to its proper place,

How

can spring from contact with a moving force, it would be hard

to say.
sqq..

obvious especially from his account of the motion

motion,

is

By what is said of these, however (Pkys. viii. 4, 254, b, 33

Be
Cwlo,
iv.

3 Jin.),

it

METAPHYSICS
Indeed, this appears to

387

him

so necessary that he asserts

it

yV even

of what

is
:

absolutely incorporeal that

acts only

V through
touching

contact
it
^

even thought apprehends

latter,

its

object
to

the

by
the

however,
to

is

related
^

thinking subject as

Form

Matter

and

in like

manner God,
in

as the first cause of motion, is said, as

we

shall shortly see, to

be in contact with the world.^ But

what sense such expressions can be used of immaterial

things, Aristotle has not further explained.

It follows

I
eternal as
it

from this that Motion

is

as

Form and
sents,'*

Matter, whose essential correlation

it

repreend.-^

and that

has neither beginning nor

had a beginning, the movens and the motum must either have existed before this beginning or not.
For
if it

If they did not exist, they

and
first

so a

must have come into being, movement would have taken place before the motion. If they did exist, we cannot suppose that
rest,

they were at
to move.

since

it

was of

their very nature

But

if it

be granted that they did move,

some active force must have operated to endow them

not proved even that they are

moved by anything
'

else at all.

which touches is not touched byanything which touches it again]

Cf. p. 203, n. 3.
Metaj)7t.. xii.
iii.

...
lOTl, b, 19, 429, b, 22,

(ixTTe

'[

kiv^I aKivrirov ov,

9, 4,

29: JDe An. 29 sqq.

'*

Gefi.et Corr. i.G, 322, h, 21: nothing can affect another without being in contact with it, and in the case of things which at the same time move and are moved, this contact must be mutual (323. a, 20 sqq.); ecrt 5'
ftjs

ainoiTo rod kivtitov, iKeivou Se ouSeV <pafx,hv yap iviore rhp KvirovvTa drrreardai rj/nwy, ctAA' ovk avrol iKduov. That this,
iK^lvo /xev
&</

however, is no more than a play upon words is obvious, See p. 341, n. 2, 345, n. 1.
'

ivioTe (pajxiv to k vovv aTrr^adai

S' ciK ro/xe-

fi6uov Tov Kivov/jLPov, xh

With what follows, cf. SiET&^CK.,Die Lehre d.Ar.v.d.Ewig^ keit d. Welt (^Untersuch z. PJnl. d. GriecJien Halle, 1873, pp 137 189).
^

vov (x^

avTeardai airTO/xdvov [that

CC

388

ARISTOTLE
tlie

with

property of motion, and tlius

we should

in this
It is

case also arrive at a

movement

before motion.

motion equally impossible to conceive of of a movement is always conditioned by The cessation movement which puts an end to the first. As
as destructible.

another
in

former argument we were forced to admit a the first, so here we process of change antecedent to Motion is to the last.^ cannot escape one subsequent the world was end; therefore without beginning or
the
perish.'^ never created and it will never although Motion from this point of view is in*\ Yet, its limitathere is another aspect in which it has
finite,
'

tion.
it

follows

principle, Since every motion presupposes a motive motion in general involves that file idea of
first

the assumption of a

moved by anything

else.

motive force which is not Without this assumption we

of moving causes, should be involved in an infinite series motion, because which could never produce actual us to a first cause and without they would never bring ehai kuI Kivwiv, ^iVep 6 The above account contains on h.v6.yK7] '"' ";'5'^^'^\. With essence of the discussion in XP''^^^ '^"^"^ the pasThat motion must reference apparently to this PJnis viii 1
1

be eternal is also asserted in 3Ictank xii. G, 1071, b. 6: hW' i,Larov KivvTiP ^ -y^viaBai ^ <peapwar ae\'yapf,u. Further, if Time is without beginning and

sage, Metaph. xii. 6 proceeds oi/Se XP^^ov ov ^ap oUvryo -npdr^pov /cal '^ar.pov .Iva^^ fir) ovros xP^^ov. Ka\ v Kiuv<r^s upa ouro, avuexvs
:

iixrirepKaco^popos?)

^ yaprhavrh

end (on this see infra, p. 406, also, since .^c.) motion must be so Time, as we shall find, cannot be conceived of apart from motion.
Cf PJu/s
viii. 1,

K.u^<r.<is

-.dOos.

The same

ianu

b xpovos

et S^ 251, b, 12 KivU^cos aple^lhs ^

:

li.V^is r's, .r^ep aa xPor'os eVrl., apdyKV Kal KipvcTiP aidiou ehai,^nd after proving the infinity of time

in both directions he goes on at 1. 26 : aWa fx^v (ty^ XP^"^^^ (pavephy

inference follows from the state ment (PJnjs. vi. 6 2o6, b, 32 sqq iMetaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 3) that every change and process presupposes a previous one In this form viz the question as to the eternity of the world, the present subject will Ch. IX. infra. recur
"^

METAPHYSICS
that,

389

none of the succeeding causes could operate.

This conclusion cannot be avoided by presuming that

the object

moved produces
is

its

own

motion, since
vi^hat

it is

necessary for the motive force already to be

object

the

become and hence the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same relation be both moved and moving. We are forced, therefore, to admit a primum mobile. That principle, again, might be either something moved and therefore something The first of these self-moving, or something unmoved.
to
:

moved

cases,

however, resolves

itself into

the

second,

for

even in a self-impelling substance the motive force

must of necessity be different from what it moves. Consequently there must be an Unmoved Substance, which is the cause of all motion.^ Or as this is elsewhere more briefly demonstrated since all motion must start from a motive principle, a motion which has no beginning presupposes a motive principle which is as eternal as the motion itself, and which, as the presupposition of all motion, must be itself unmoved.^ Thus, then, we obtain three elements that which merely is moved and never causes motion, = Matter that which both causes motion and is itself moved, = Nature that which causes motion without itself being moved, = God."* Our previous pages will have shown that this position

'

Cf. p. 384, supra.

rrdwra
vii.
1

(jydapToi.

aW'a^vvarov
'

Kivn-

Phys.

viii.

5,

cf

and

criv

v)

agreed that neither efficient nor formal nor even final causes permit of a regresms ad injinitum. Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 4
ii.

(a), 2,

where

it is

^v.

ael yeu<rdai ^ (pBaprjuai c. 7, 1072, a, 21 : eo-rt

Kivrjcriv

ykp
ael
.
.

n
.

Kivovfxevoy

&irav(TTou

ean
^

Toivvv

koL % kivu.
5, 25G, b, 20 1072, a, 24 (as
;

Phys.

viii.

='

Metaph.

xii.

7,

avajKY]
aKiurjTou.

eJuai

riva
et

a'iSiov

ouaiau

emended by BONITZ) De An. iii.

10, 433, b, 13.

a" re yap ovcriai irpoorai

Koi
Tracrai (pdapral,

TWf ovTuv,

390
is

ARISTOTLE
not

an isolated one in Aristotle's pliilosophy. Actuality in the highest sense is synonymous with Pure Form devoid of Matter the Absolute Subject which as

perfect

Form

is at

the Universe.^

once the motive force and the end of The gradations of existence, ascending

from the

first

formless Matter, reach their

consummaformed the In the same

tion in God.

And

this

thesis

actually

starting-point for a demonstration of the existence of

God

in Aristotle's treatise on Philosophy.^

work he deduced the

ciples

belief in the gods from

two prin-

from

reflection

upon

self-revealing traces of the

divine nature in the presentiments of the soul and from

the contemplation of the heavens.^

A well-known fragwhat stress he laid upon the witness of ment shows beauty and order in the universe to the existence of Nor are these arguments without their justifiGod.'*
Cf. pp. ?>55, kc, and the passages quoted, pp. 395 sqq., on God as highest form, pure energy and supreme end. Mdaph. xii. (Ttiv ^picrrov del 7, 1072, a, 35 [in every sphere of being] kvaXoyov ro irpwrov. - SiMPL. De Ccelo, 130, ScUol. in At. 487, a, 6 {Ar. Fr. 15):
'

toIs virvois
niaffixovs

yivo^hovs
ras
eV

Tavr'r]s ^vBov-

koX

yap,

<P'n(T\v,

ry

naurelas.^ orav virvovv Kad' eourV

J)

rovrov ev toTs irepl which see Ch. II. snpra) " KaBoKov yap iv oh eo-ri ri
Aeyet 5e
Trepl

yevnrai t] ^vxh, t^tc r^v IlZiov airoKa^ovaa (pixriv irpofxavriv^rai re koI irpoayopevei ra jx^Wovra. roiavTT} Se eVrt Koi ev t^ Kara Thv edvarou xP'C'^^* '^^^ ffwfidTOJv. So Homer represents Patroclus and Hector as prophesying at

^i\o(ro(ptas(as to

death,

e'/c

tovtwv

ovv,

(f)'n(r\v,

vire-

Koi ctptfieXriov, iv rovTois iaTi arov. 67rel ovv iu toTs oiaiu iarlv

uvOpwiroi ehai ri Behv rh KaB' kavrhv [-J)] ^oiKbs rrj ^vxv k^ irdvTuv iirKTrrnxoviK^jTaTOV.
uor^ffav ol
8)/

aWa

&\Ko &X\ov
^

fieXriov, cariv

apa ri

/col

Koi airb

ruv
ficB'

fierewpcov

BeaffdifiXiov

6.pi<TT0V, '6irep err? &/

rh

eeloj/."

/xevoi

yap

T]^4pav ^ fxev

Fr. 13, b, 8exT. Math.

ix.

irepiiroXovvra,

20

'Apto-TOre'ATjs 5e ciTrb dvolv dpxaiv evvoiau Bewu eAeye yeyovevai eu to7s dvBpwirois, dir6 re rwv ircpX r^u xpvx^v (Tv/xfiaivSvTuv KOI airb rSiv
:

rev rSiV
iuS/JLiaav

vvKrwp 5h r^v cvraKdXXccv aar^puv Kivrjcriv,

Kiu-ljcrews

elval

roiavTTjs
curiov.
*

riva Behv rhu '^fjs euTo|ia Koi

i^r.

fjLCTedpuiv.

dXX' avh

fihu

rS}v irepl

In the brilliant

14 (prob.
in

TTjv

^vxhf'

<Tv}xfiaiv6vr(i)v 5td

rovs iv

also

from the

11.

(piXo(ro<pias

METAPHYSICS
cation in
his

i391

system, although there are, no doubt,

certain points of

them which must be interpreted

in

the light of a less rigid logic, or perhaps referred to an

earlier

form of his teaching more akin to Platonism.

states of feeling are only

Presentiments which exhibit themselves in prophetic

dreams and inspired

an obscure
the divine

manifestation of the force which under the form of the

Active Understanding unites the

intelligence.^

human and

The beauty
its parts,

of the world, the harmonious

connection of

the purpose observable in their

arrangement, the splendour of

inviolable

the

stars,

and

the

order of their motions, point not only to

astral spirits (in

whom we
far

shall

have hereafter to recog-

nise the guiding forces of the heavenly spheres), but

also to a

Being placed

above them, from

whom

alone

the simple movement of the universe and the harmony

between the whole and

ClC.
iV.

all

the parts proceed. ^

Oonse-

D.

ii. .37,

95,

which

re-

cum autem
turn

terras

nox opacasset,

the beginning, of Plato's picture of the dwellers in si the cave {RejJ. vii. init.") essent, qui sub terra semper habitavissent accepissent
at
:

minds us

'

coelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum luminum varietatem lunaeque

turn crescentis

eorumque
ratos

tum omnium

senescentis et ortus
:

autem fama

et auditione, esse et vim Deorum deinde aliquo tempore, patefactis terrae faucibus, ex illis abditis sedibus evaderein haec loca, quae nos incolimus, atqueexire potuissent cum repente terram et maria coelumque vidissent, nu-

quoddam numen

bium raagnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent adspexissentque

solem

ejusque

tum

occasus atque inomni feternitate immutabilesque cursus haec cum viderent profecto et esse Deos et haec tanta opera Deorum esse arbitrarentur.' According to CiC. ^V. D. ii. 49, 12.5, Aristotle seems to have pointed to the instinct of animals as a teleological argument for the being of God. ^ For the fuller discussion of
this see infra.
^

magnitudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem

efficeret toto coelo luce diffusa;

Besides the passage from i?e

6^?^, i. 9 quoted -w/r^, in n. 6 at p. 395, cf, Metaiih. xii. 7, 1072, a,

892

ARIS7VTLE

quently the arguments whicli Aristotle puts forward,

in

the passages indicated, to prove the existence of

God, though based, like those of Socrates and Plato,^

upon teleological principles as well as the identification which he elsewhere establishes between the force of nature working to fixed ends and God^ are not a mere

adaptation of his views to unscientific notions, but are

in

harmony with the

spirit of his

whole system.

The
If,

35 sqq., where God is described as the upiaTov or ov ev^Ku, and as thus the eflicient cause of motion in the world; but especially c. 10, where the question is discussed TTorepxs ex^^ '? "^^^ o\ov (pvais rh ayadup icai Tt &piaTOv, nonpoi'
:

wpciro} ovdiv (1075, b, 21, 24).

like

Speusippus,

we accept a

whole series of primary principles

we

Kex(^pi-(riJ-^vov Tt KoX
/)

avrh Kad' avrh,

tlxrirfp

T-V Ta^LV,

v)

aucporepws,

GTpdT^vjjLa. In the case of an array the good resides as well in the general as in the order of the whole in the former, however, in a still more prhiiary sense than in the latter. The universe is com:

destroy the unity of all being (see the passage, Div. I. p. 854, 1); Ttt 5e ovra ov fiovXeraL iroXiTeveadai kukms. " ovk ayadhv ttoXvKoipavii] efs Koipauos Icttco." Cf. xiv. 3, 1090, b, 19, where he is again attacking Speusippus ovk
:

eoiKC S'
6/c

7}

(pvats e7reja-o5iw57]S

oiaa

rwv

(paivofxevooy,

wairep /jlox^VP^

IDared to

an army
ttws,

TCTaKrai
ouTcos
Tvphs

iravra 5e (tvvaAA' ovx oixoioos, Koi

:

TTAwTCC Kol TTTflVa Kol CpVTO.

KOlI

OVX
tl.

ex^^ ocare

/jltj

eTvai

Barepw

OoLTepou fXTjOev,

a\K' iari

irphs fiev

yap ev awavra (rvi/reraKrai, except that each creature is more fully subject to this order just in proi^ortion to the nobility of its nature, even as in a household the freeborn are subjected to a stricter discipline than the TOLavTT] yap kKaarov apxT] slaves.
avTOov
("is
7]

(pvais iariu.

Xcyco

5'

oTou

ye rh diaKpiOrjvai ixvdyKr] airaatv i\de7v, Kol aAAo ovras iarlu wu Koivcavel airavra els rh o\ou. All other systems are founded of necessity upon the opposite principle Aristotle's is the only exception, ov ydp iariv ivavriov rS
:

rpaycpSia. We have the same point of view in I&. 16, preserved us only by an unknown to scholiast, where Aristotle says given several apxaK they must be either ordered or disordered. But the latter is impossible, since from disorder no natural order, no K 'ifffxos. could have arisen ei Se Terayjuevai ^ e| kavTUV iraxQil' aav t) virh e^ccOev Tivhs alrlas ; but even in the former case exovcri ri Koivhv rh avvdiTTOv avras KaKelvo rj The comparison of the a.px'horder of the world with that of an army is further developed in Sext. Math. ix. 26 sq., which perhaps follows Aristotle Ilepl
:

<piXo(TO(pias.

See Div. i. p. 143 sq. 786 (Zeller's Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 281

sqq. 485).
T]

<pv(Tis

ovZhv fidrrju iroiovaiv.

METAPHYSICS
unity of the world and
its

393

adaptation to fixed ends can

only be explained by the unity of the Supreme Cause.

It
is

not without good reason,

also,

that Aristotle

in his

most important

treatises

connected the proof

his theory of

of the reality of the

Supreme Being with

motion
is

which the Changeable seen most directly to lean upon an Unchangeable, as

:

for this is the point at

itself

the condition of

all

change.

The further
being eternal,
it
it

characteristics of the

Supreme Being

may be determined from what

Motion must be continuous (crvvsxv^), and so must be one and the same throughout. But such a
is

has gone before.

single motion

the product of a single mobile and a

is

single motum.
is as

Hence the primum mobile

itself.^

single and

eternal as motion

In the next place what

is

has been said about the continuity and uniformity of

motion implies that this motive principle

absolutely
itself

unmoved;

since

that

which

is

moved, being
it

subject to change, cannot impart

an unbroken and
is

uniform movement,^ and

essence of the
of change.^

consequently

of

the

primum

mobile to exclude the possibility \

It is

unchangeable and absolutely necesnecessity

is

sary
'

and

this unconditional
6,

the law by

)(

Phys.

viii.

259,

a,

13

MetajjJi. xii. 8, 1073, a, 23 sqq.,

where in connection with

Trpc^TTj otStos

the

^ In Fr. 15 (preserved to us by Simpl. Do Ccelo, 130, 45, K., Soliol. in Ar. 487, a, 6), from

the

KoX fila Kivr}(Tis, that of fixed stars, it is shown how

single single

motion

presupposes
cause.
Cf.

a
p.

moving

391, n. 2. On the constancy and unity of motion we shall have more to say in the next chapter. - Phys. viii. 6, 259, b, 22, c. 10, 267, a, 24 sqq.

the treatise n. (l)i\ocro<pias, the immutability of God is proved on the ground that the KpdTicrrov can neither suffer change from anything else nor feel in itself the need of any such change, (It must be granted to BeeNAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 113, and Heitz, Ar. Fragm. p. 37, that

394
whicli the universe

ARISTOTLE
is

held together.^
it

It

is

further
is

involved in this that

the other hand
destructible
in
"^

is

incorporeal.

Only that
;

indestructible which cannot possibly cease to be

all

that

is

merely potential

is

on by nature

only that can operate as priwAim mohile

is

which there

no element of unrealised
is

possibility.^

But

the Potential

necessarily material.
is

A Being that

-contains in itself nothing that

merely potential must

this amplificalion also belongs to

The the Aristotelian fragment. passage in Plato's Republic, ii. 880, D sqq., as Simpl. remarked, served as the original of it.) The same reason is assigned also in the De Ca-lo, i. 9 (see p. 395, n. fi) for the immutability of God, and in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074, b, 2(), for the doctrine that God must always think the same ex. p. 397, n. 2. thing
;

Twv (pdapruv, eai 5' ovOhv 5vvd/xei aiSiov. This he then goes on to That which is merely prove. potential can both be and not be.
i

T^

1072, b, 7: eVet S' eo-Ti ri kivovv avrh oLKiyriTOU bv, ivepyfia ov, zovto ovk ej/Sexerat
^^

Metaph.

xii.

7,

a\K(t)s exe'J' ovSa/xws

e'l

avdyKr]S

upa eVrtv vv ' Kal rj avdyKr) KaXoos [i.e. in so far as it is necessary it, is good, since, as is immediately explained, its necessity is neither external nor merely relative, but absolute fir] iv^ex^y-^vov &\\ws,

^ TovTo avrd [relatively to that], 'o \yTai eVSexec^at |U7j elvai [the former, if I say, * it is possible the latter, if I for A not to be say, it is possible for A not to be in this place, or not to be so great, or not to have this quality '] airXais Se rh Kar^ ovcriav [but that whose is absolutely perishable substance can cease to be]. ovOiv &pa Toov a(p0dpT(i}V airXus Swdfiei ovSt ruu e| iorlv hv airKccs
airXus,
'/)

5'

ev^ex^lJ-^vov jx)] (Jvai (pOaprhv,

'

'

audyKiqs ovtuiv.
if
3 Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 there were a KivtyriKhv which did not realise itself in action there would be no eternal unineVSe'xeTot yap terrupted motion T^ Svvafiiu ^xov fjL^] ivcpyf7v. But this would be equally true, et
:

aW'

airXws

avayKa7ov']

e/c

TotauTTjs

&pa
rj

apxvs

^pTTjrai

ovpavds Kal
-

(pvm^.

After showing that the iuepyeia precedes the Swafxis in all the three respects of hoycfi, Xpov(f and ohcria Aristotle goes on,
Afrtaph.
ix. 8,

r] 5' ovaia avTrjs Sivafiis' ob yap earrai Kivrjcris ai'^ios eV5eX^Tai yap rh Svvdfid ov fxh eluai. Se?

ivepyficreL

'

1050, b, 6 (follow-

ing immediately on the passage

quoted at

p. 385, n. 1) : aXXa fi^v Koi KvpicoTcpcos [actuality has a

higher reality than the Siva/xis]. T filv yap aidia trpirepa ry ovcria

dpa elvai apx^v TOiavTr]v rjy rj ovffia ivepyeia. The leading thought of this proof (iuSex^o^Oai ') fJvai ouSev SiO(i)ep6i iv ro2s aiSiois) Aristotle states also Phys. iii. 4, 203, b, 30, and he shows in Metaph. ix. 4 that it is inadmissible to say,

METAPHYSICS
be immaterial and therefore incorporeal.^
incorporeal can be unchangeable
;

395

Only the
subject to

on the other hand,

is

everything which has a material side

motion and change,^ and can

all

alter its state."^

Moreover
is

bodies have magnitude, and magnitude

always

limited.
finite

But the limited cannot possibly produce an inactivity like eternal motion, for its power is just

as surely limited as that of the infinite is illimitable.''

It follows that the

primum

incorporeal,

indivisible

motionless, passionless,

mobile must be absolutely and unconditioned by space, changeless in a word, it must

:

be absolute Reality and pure Energy.'^

on
dvvarhv
fxev rohl,
it

ovk

etTTot 5e,

immediately follows that we can never say of anything which by its very nature
cease to be, that it will never and consequently cease to be it cannot be of the nature of that which never ceases to be (the a'iSiov).
ca7i
;

from which

^ Plujs. viii. 10, 266, a, 10 sqq. 267, b, 17. Metapli. xii. 1 jitu " Metaph. xii. 7 (see p 394, n.
;

1,

supra)y
i.

c.

8,

1074,
:

a,

35
n.

cf.

preceding and following

Ccelo,
9,

De
eanv

279, a, 16
on.

e|&>

Se rov

ovpavov
oijre

SedeiKTai

ovt'

ivSe-xcrai

(pavephv

&pa

on

yeueaOai aufxa. ovt tSttos ovre

((TtIu

'

Cf. p.
f),

847

sq.

and Mefaph.
ert
eJua.i

Kevhv oOVe

;(;p(5j/os

e^oodev

'

xii.

ravras
vXtjs.

1071, b, 20: Set ras ovaias

aiSiovs

toIwv
auev ye koI

diSTrep out' iv roirq} ra/ce? iricpvKcv,

yap

SeT, et irep

ovT xp^^o^ avra iroie? yqpdcTKeiv. ouS' ecrrlu ovSevhs ovSe/j-ia jxera^oX))
Toov vTTfp
<popav,

aWo
-

Tt cuSiov. ivepyeia &pa.

T^v

e^coTOTCtf

TTayix4v(av

After what has been said above, this does not require any further proof. All change is a
transition from possibility to actuality, which is only precluded where there is no matter, and therefore no Zwdixei ov. Cf. (besides p. 359 sqq.) the proof in
Phijs. vi. 4, that

aAA' avaXXolwTa Kal airad?) T7]v api(rT7]v exovTU ^w Kal r^u avrapKeaTarr^v SiarcXeT rhv airavra

alwva. After some remarks upon the expression ali^Vy Aristotle proceeds rh rov iravrhs ovpavov riXos KaX rh rhu irdvTa xP^^^v Kal Tryi' aireipiav Trepte'^oy riXos a'lwu
:

everything which

4(Tnv, airh rov del elvai i\7](pw5 rrjt

iTvuivvjxiav,

changes must be divisible.

We

ddduaTos Kal

dcTos.

06 ev
dfxavIt,

shall thus find also that the soul is in essence unmoved. 3 PJiys. viii. 6, 259, b, 18. Cf. preceding n. and p. 366, n. 1. * See p. 394, n. 3, and MetapTi. vii. 7, 1032, a, 20, c. 10, 1035, a, 25.

Kal
p'lis,

ro7s

dWois

i^^prrjTai,
S'

To7s fiev aKpifieaTepov ro7s

rh eJval re Kal Cv^'

is

thus seen that the highest Deity

(rh delov irav rh irpZrov Kal aKpS-

rarov)

must

be

unchangeable.

396

ARISTOTLE
By
a converse
process,
it

follows that, since

all

multiplicity partakes of matter, the

primum

mobile and
of
all

that

which
rjv

it

moves are
is

single.^

The cause

motion, or God,
(to rt

therefore Pure Being, absolute

Form

elvat to TTpcoTov), incorporeal Substance

or,

in other words, is

Thought.

Nothing but pure

for

self-

centred thought
soul has

is free

from materiality,

even the

an essential relation to the body, and in all substances form is involved with matter. Again, perfect activity exists in thought alone. Neither
corporeal

constructive
is

(TroirjTifcr))

nor practical
is

(irpaKTi/cr)) activity

perfect, since the

end of both

external to them-

selves, and therefore they require material to work But the Supreme Being has no end beyond with. 2
itself,

because

it is

the ultimate end of everything.^ It

is

ovT yap

aWo

Kp^lrrSv icrriu o ri
.

[nom.]

KLU-fjaei

oijT

Ix*'

and tliat we must do so is obvious from the fact that the subject of
this explanation is expressly said to be that which is e|w rod ovpavov, the incorvireprrjv i^uTaToo (popav poreal, immovable, all-embracing, the 6e7ov irpwTov Kal aKpSrarov, the cause of all being and life. Metajjh. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31

(pavKov oudev, out' 6//5ees tu>v avTov KaXwp ovSevos iffTLV. (Cf. p. 398, n. 3.) Asto whether this account, indeed, was to be taken as refer-

ring to the primal mover or the primally moved (the outmost sphere) the old commentators according held divided views Alexander to SiMPL. i7i loc, as well as his Peripatetic predecessors, gave the preference to the second, the younger (Neoplatonic) expositors to the first explanation. Alexander's view seems to be supported by the words
:

on

5e efs ovpauhs, <pav(p6v

ovpai'ol
Sxrirep

'

el

yap

irXdovs
apiOfj.^

di/dpcoiroi,

rj irepl ^Kaarov apxh, ctW' oca 76 iroWai e^s yap api6/x(f TToWa, vXrjv e^ft rh 5e \6yos Kal 6 avrhs iroWwv ri ^v elvai ovk e^et vKrjv rh irpcoTOP

effraL elfSei /xia

Se

'

'

'

eVreA-exeto yap.
Cf. p. 400, n. 1. Ccelo, ii. 12, 292, b, 4: T(p S' uis &pia-ra ^xovri oitdeu Set TTpd^ecas eari yap avrh nh ov eVe/co,
'-

Kot

6.iravcrrou

5^

Klvr^triv

Kiuelrai

v\6y(os, unless

we

alter KivelTui

De

with some of the MSS. used by

however

into KLve7; it is easy, to supply 6 ovpavos "as the subject, even although God is spoken of in what precedes,

Simpl.

'

7]

5e TTpa^is del iaTiv iv Svcrlv, orav Kal ov eVe/co ^ Kol rh rovrov eycKa.

METAPHYSICS
true that in analysing

397

Thought we separate Potentiality

faculty of thinking

from Actuality

the

from actual

Thought

(Oscopla).

But

this distinction does not apply

to the Deity, for his substance contains

no undeveloped

potentiality
finite

and even in the case of man, it is only his nature which renders him incapable of uninter;

rupted thought.

The nature of the Deity

consists of

unceasing sleepless contemplation and absolutely perfect activity,^

an activity that cannot alter, since to a perfect being alteration would involve a loss of perfection.2

God, therefore,

is

the absolute activity of \>^

thought, and, as such,

He

constitutes absolute reality

all life.^

and

vitality

and

is

the source of

What, then, are the contents or subject-matter of this Thought ? All thinking derives its value from the object of thought but the Divine Thought cannot be dependent for its validity on anything beyond itself, nor can it relate to anything except the best. But the best is
;
*

rcp

liJth. JV. X. 8, 1078, b, 20 S^ QoivTL rod TrpdrTeiv acpaipov-

man

(d avOpunipos vovs 6

twv

arvv-

fxivov, Ti Se

luaWov tov

Troi7u, ri

AeiTrerot irKijv dioipia ; Sxrre 7] rod deov ivepyeia, ixaKapi6Tr]Ti hia(pipovffa,

deii}p'r]TLKi]
7]

at isolated moments when it contemplates perfection, not in broken fragments but in its en64tci}]/)

tirety:
t)

ovruis 5' exe<

avr)) aurijs

ttv

eXr].

koX

tuv

v6t](Tis
"

ihv airauTa
xii.

aloova.
:

avdpcairivwv 5^

ravrri ffvyy^v^cr-

TaTT]
b,

v^aifxoviK(ara.TT].
;

Metaph.
c. 9,

xii. 7, cf. p. 398, n. 5

:

1074,

28 we cannot think of the divine thought either as resting or as in a state of mere potentiality,

for

et

fxr)

vSvffis

[actual
tyvafiis,

9, 1074, b, 2o rh 6ei6TaTov koI ri/xiwraTov voe? Kal oh fxcra^dWei ^is x^^P^^ 7P V fi(Ta^o\}] koI Klu-qais ns ^'Stj t^ tolovtov. Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 28 (pa/xev Se [5^] rhv dehv ehai ^<^ou

Metaph.

SrjKou roivvv

on

=*

thought] iariv, v\oyov iviiTovov

dAAa
iivai

atSiou &pi(TTOV, oxttc ^wi] Kal aiccv

to avvex^s alrcf rris voi](Tu>s. Ihid. 1075, b, 7 (following BoNiTz's text) pure reason is indivisible as is therefore the discursive thought of
:

avuex^^ '^"^ a'iSios virdpx^i t<^ decf rovro yap 6 deos. Be Ccelo, ii. 8, 286, a, 9 deov 5' ivepyeia aOavaffia tovto 5' ia-rl fcw^ atSios.
:

398

ARISTOTLE
itself.^

nothing but

Consequently God contemplates

is

Himself, and his thought

the thought of thought.^ In

must necessarily be the case with Pure Spirit, thought and its object are identithe cal.^ This unalterable repose of thought upon itself indivisible unity of the thinking subject and the object of
the thought of God, therefore, as

thou"-ht
'

constitutes the absolute blessedness of

alrictiv

God.'^

less, of course, can affected by any emotion from without. Hence the statement {Etk. N. viii. 0, 1158, b, 35, ] 159, a, 4, or more deli iiitely End. vii. 3, 12, 1238, b, 27, 1214, b, 7, 1245, b, 14, and from this treatise M. Mot: ii. 11, 1208, b, 27), that God does not love but is only loved, and that between Him and man there is too wide a separation to peru\it of mutual

Still

[?],

avTh

eavTO

yivuxTKei

God be

Kal 4uepyeia cVtI Kal xcDpiO'TOJ'.

^

taj)h. xii. 9
7]

See preceding note and Jlf(paiuiraL 5' dei &\Aov

: .

^ eTr' iviwu t] rh Trpayfia ; eVt /xev rSiv T\oi7]TiK(iov avev v\7]S 7) ovaia Kal to
iinarr 7)1X7],
.
.

iin(rr7]iJ.ri

ri ^v elvai, eVl 5e rcou deccpririKccu

6 Xoyos TO Trpayjxa koX t) v67](ti9. ovx CTepou ovv ovtos tov voovfievou Kal TOV vov, oaa /xi] vK7\v ex^i to

avTh

e(TTai,
fiia.

Kal
c.

7]

voriais
iii.
:

tov
4 pn.

voovixivov
-

De An.
7 mit.')

Metapli.

xii.

9,

efre

70^
'

fxridev

j/oeT,

ti

1074, b, 17: tiv ejfrj to

tiv et

(cf. c. 5

and

eVi /xev
icXTi

yap TMv &vev uArjs Th avrd

voovv Kal TO VOOV]XCVOV.

Th

(Te/xyhv,

dAA.'

exet wcrn-ep

Kadevdooi'

Kvpiov,
i'lT]

tovtov 5' aAAo ovK av 7] apiarr] ovaia 5ta "yap tov uoelv rh rifiiou
e'lre voel,
. . .
.

avTw virapx^i- ^t' Se %repov If yap avThs avrhv 7)

.
.

ti voel
ri.
.
.
.

Korspov ovv SLa(t)pei ri 7) ovdkv t5 vos7u rh Ka\hu t) rh tvxov ; }) Kal aroirou rh biavoe7aOaL irepl iuicci' (as at p. 397, S/jAoj/ roivvv if further, at 1. 29, n. 2); vovs were the mere power of thinking, SriKov, on aAAo ri Ssv e'lr] rh Ti/XLWTepov ^ 6 vovs, rh voovfxivov KoX yap rh voeiv Kal r] uoTjffis virdp^ei war^ el Kal rh xiipicTTOv voovvti ovk ti.v ei'r; rh (pevarhv tovto, apKTTOu 7) voTjcris avrov &pa voel,
.
.

1075, b, 7: exov v\7]v, &c., see p. 397, n. 1, supra. ^ This view is set forth in the passage immediately following that quoted p. 394, n. 1 5tauMetajjJi.
xii.

9:

adiaipeTov irav

Th

fii]

ycay))

S'

icTTlv
o'ia

[sc.

t^

irpdlncf)

KivovvTi]
7}iJuv.

0VTU3
ixkv
7)

iifuv
TjSoi/^

7] dpiCTTj fiiKphv xpovov yap dei iKelv6 iffTiv yap oBvvaTov. eVel Kal
'

ivepyeia

[so

BONITZ,

'

KpaTiarov, Kal effnv c. 7 (see voi](T(i)s voricris. 7} uSiqais Be A71. iii. 6, 430, b, 24 n. 4). Se rivi fJ-T] ioTiu iiavriov rwv t
tiVep eo-Tt
tJ)
:

following Alexander, rightly instead of t] tjS. iv4py.'] tovtov koI Std toOto [i.e. because not God's activity alone, but activity in general, is pleasant, for in this passage, as often in this book, lucidity is sacrificed to an excessive brevity of style] iypifyopa-is
atcrdTjffis v67)(ns

^iSkttov
t]

^AxiSes Se
l\ vdrjais
tj

Kal

jxviiixai

Sid TauTa.

METAPHYSICS
These
Divine
propositions of
Aristotle
first

.399

concerning the

Spirit

contain

the

attempt to find a

scientific basis for

Theism.

as

self-conscious

intelligence

Here first the idea of God was logically deduced

from the principles of a philosophical system instead ox being borrowed from religious notions. And on the
very threshold
solution of

we

are confronted with the difficulty the

is
:

which

the final problem of

all

systems of

theistic speculation

how

are

we

to define the idea of

God
from

so that while maintaining his essential difference

all finite reality,

we may

yet preserve

his per-

sonality,

and

vice versa ?
;

Aristotle represents

God

as

self-conscious Spirit

on the other hand, he deprives and creation, but the direction

Him

of

body and

senses, and, not content with this,

declares not only action

of the will itself towards an object, to be incompatible

Ko.Q''

outV fov

KaB' avrh apiarov

passage

ixaXiara rod /jLakKxra [pure thought has for its object that virhich is absolutely best, and all
Koi
71

the more

the purer it is]. aurhv Sh voe7 6 vovs Kara fxerdAri^piv Tov voTjTov vorirhs yap yiypeTOi Qvyyavtav Koi vouv^ Hxm ravrhv vovs Koi voy]T6v. TO yap SeKTi/cbv
fitly

is quite general, referring neither to the divine nor to the human reason exclusively ; 1. 24, however, continues et ovv ovrcos e5 ex*> ^^ rjfieTs ttotc, o dehs ael,
:

OavfJiaarTSv

'

et

Se
6;^ei

jxaKKov
Se
w5i,

ert koX
'

Qavixaciwrepov.
^a>)/

Tov

uor}Tov

Kal

ttJs

ovcrias
Sicrr'

vovs,

5e' ye virdpx^'^- V y^P vov ivepyeia (o)^, e'/ce?i/os 5e t] ev^pyeia ivipyeia Se t/ KaQ^ oi/tV eKclvov ^corj

iuepyd
{^evepyiiv
[i.e.

Se

e^ajj'.

eKUVo

apiarr] Kal aiSios. tpafxkv S^,

.,

as

and exeiv] fxaXKop toutov more than the mere recep-

at p. 397, n.
^W<-. x. 8,
vii. 15,
1

3, sujjra.

Further cf
n. 1; iJ/*^.

citedatp. 397,
:

tivity] t SoKe7 6 povs delov e'xetr, Kal 7) dicopia rh t^Sio-tov koI dpicrrov

eXrovT] (pixris 154, b, 25 airArj eXr], del r} avri] irpa^is ijSioTT]

(and therefore actual knowledge, and not the mere capacity of knowing, is the best and most
blessed state. On this meaning of deupla vid. BONITZ, Tnd. Ar. From 1. 18 328, a, 50 sqq.)
{t)

earai

Sib 6 6ehs ael n'lav Kal airXriv

;

xa^P* ''75<'V

and
^ecfJ
.

Fulit.
,

vii.

1,

&s cvdaifiwu fxev iari Kal /xaKapios, Si' ovOhv Se

:

1323, b, 23

t^

tuv

i^coTfpiKcov

ayaQuv aXXa
tc^
ttoios

Si'

Se

vdrjcris

t]

kuO'

aiirijv)

this

avrhv avrhs Kal r^v (pvcriv.

tis

ehai

400

ARISTOTLE

with divine perfection/ and confines his thought within

iroi-qcris nor (on the difference between them cf. p. 182 sq.) can be attributed to God is definitely stated by Aristotle in many passages The e.g. Eth. x. 8, 1178, b, 7 sq.
1

That neither

7rpa|ts

position that perfect bliss consists in thought alone, he there proves

by showing that everyone considers the gods blessed

and that
:

the

question

ctAAa ras ras i\fvdpiovs ; ai 5e (Tuxppoves ti &z/ (hu ; All these being inconceivable (5ie|lovai Se TTOLVTa (paivoLT^ av to. irepl TUs 7rpa|ets fiiKpa. Koi avd^ia deuv),
,'

Se -Ko'ias TrSrepa ras SiKtxias

7rpd|ts then is aTTOueTfiai XP^^" avrols ;

.

avSpelovs
. . .

fj

he concludes
:

t^>

8/j

C^vn,

&ic.

(as at p. 397, n. 1). Be Ccelo ii. 12, 292, a, 22 eoi/re -yap rui p.\v ^picna xouTi viTapx^<-v rh ev &uv irpd^ecos, 5' iyyvrara [the heavenly rcf

not recognise any such limitawhich, moreover, would be wholly inconsistent with his other views (for since, according to the passage quoted p. 394, n. 1 properties must be all God's absolutely necessary, none can belong to Him which He does not require for his perfection and blessedness, and which therefore He could not dispense with without prejudice to these). On the contrary, he says without any reservation {Eth. x. 8 see p. 397. n. 1, S7ij)ra), that neither iroielv nor irpdrreiv can be attributed to God that perfection in action (practical virtue) can only find a place in human intercourse and among beings who are subject to human passions (EiJi. x. 8, 1178, a,9,b,5, vii. 1, 11 45, a, 25); that every action is a means to an end
tion,
;
;

bodies of the outer sphere] Sia Ibid, b, 4, cited oAiyrjs /cat fxias.
p. 39(), n. 3, suj)rd
G,
:

(ren. et Corr.

i.

since every Ttoikiv 323, a, 12 involves a corresponding iracxeiv, we cannot ascribe a -KOifiv to every movens, but only to such as must itself be moved in order

different from itself, and therefore that it cannot be attributed to God, for whom there is no end not yet attained (JDe Coelo, as

quoted above).

Nor

is

it

any

that it may in turn move Kiviiv, therefore, is a more comprehen;

than Trotetv. conception These details are much too explicit to permit the assertion (Beentaxo, Psychol, d. Arht. 247 sq.) that Aristotle desires to deny to Deity only such actions
sive

objection to this view that Aristotle elsewhere {Eth. vii. 15, see p. 398, n. 5 fin. Polit. vii. 3, 1325, b, 28) speaks of God's -rrpa^is, since the word here used in the wider sense in which it occurs in Eth. vi. 2, 5, 1139, b. 3, 1140, b, 6 (where it is said that irpaf^is differs from
;

action universal must be ascribed to God on any view) as result from a felt need, and that therefore, while denying that irpdmiv contributes anything to the blessedness of God, he does not deny that it belongs to Him generally. Aristotle does
(irpdTTiv
' ;

'

having its end in itself, being the t4\os) and includes every form of activity, activity of pure the even thought. No other meaning will suit the words, Eth. vii. 15, oel v and in a similar avT^ irpa^is
TToiriais

in

cvirpa^la

sense Pol., as above, 1. 16 sqq., distinguishes irpd^eis irphs kr^povs, Tas rS}V aTTofiaivSvTav X'*P"' 7'7''oin a word, fxivas Cf Tov wpdrreiv

METAPirVSICS
the limits of an isolated self-contemplation.
irpd^iis

401

But

this

e^coTepiKoij

actions which
called

elsewhere
irpa^is

are

simply

in the narrower sense of the word from tus avT0Te\e7s, Koi ras auTuv eueKa deupias Kal Siavoijaeis, and attributes only the latter to God, in opposing- the view that the practical life is superior to the theoretic (rxo^fj yap tiv d dfhs exoi kuAws koi ttus 6 i^coTcpiKot k6tixos, oTs ovk elalu irpd^eis TTapa ras oiKeias ras avruu. Still less is it a pertinent objection that in using popular language Aristotle ascribes iroieTu to God, as in Be Caelo, i. 4 Jin.
;

out further specification of its nature. But if action does not belong to God, neither can will, for as will (irpoaipeais) is dpxh irpd^ecos and originates in turn in a desire on the one hand and the conception of an end on the other, it always presupposes an

7]eiK)) e^ts

(Mk. vi.

2,

1139, a, 31)

impossible to reconcile with Aristotle's conception of God. Furthermore,

it is

and these ideas

De An. iii. 10, 433, a, 23, is defined as rational desire ; but desire cannot in any sense be
jSouArjo-ts,

(d dehs

Kal

r]

(pvais

oiiShv

fidrrfv
ii.

voiova-iv).

Gen. et

Corr.

10,

ascribed by Aristotle to God nor can we admit the assertion of Brentano, p. 246, that because

336, b, 31

{arvucirK-fjpwcre

rh oXov

ivTcAexv iroiiicras r))v @ehs here means the yeveffiv). which governs divine force nature, whose relation to the first cause of motion is left, as we shall see, wholly undefined nor can we draw any conclusion from this use as to Aristotle's view of God as the absolute supradehs,
;

&

he ascribes to Him 7}hov^, he must also have ascribed to Him something corresponding to desire in us. It is only of sensuous KvTn} and T]^ov^ that Aristotle says {De An. ii. 2, 413, b, 23) that it involves iiridvfiia he expressly adds that he is not here speaking
;

reason, any more than from the frequent use of d^ol as in Eth. X. 8, quoted above, and
viii. 14, 1162, a, 4, x. 9, 1170, a, 24, we may argue that Aristotle was a poly heist. UoieTi/ also in these passages seems to
I

mundane

and ibid. iii. 7, 431, a, declares dpcKriKhv and (()fvKTiKov to be identical with
of
:

Nous
he

10

atae-nriKhv,

and remarks

iii. 9,

10,

iUd.

to be

be used quite generally and not limited any more than

iroiT]TiKhv,

3Ietaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 12 (to which Beentano appeals, but which is nowhere directly applied to God b}'- Aristotle) to
thtj

432, b, 27, 433, a, 14, cf. Mh. vi. a, 2, 1139, 35, that the vods OeafprfTiKhs (therefore also the divine) does not deal with the (j)VKrhv and ZiwKrhv by which desire is always conditioned. It is evident that those passages in which Aristotle uses the common conceptions of God as generally

admitted premisses from which conclusions may be drawn -9..7.

Top. iv. 5, 126, a, 34 Eth. x. 9, 1179, a, 24, or, indeed, such quotations as Eth. vi. 2, 1139, b, 9, Bhet. ii. 23, 1398, a, 15 prove nothing. Such statements as that God in making Himself the'
; '

p.

narrower sense discussed it bears merely the 182 general signification of creation or production, as in the phrase
;

vovs

iroiTjTiKhs,

and merely

indi-

cates causality

in general with-

VOL.

I.

D D

402
solution
'

ARISTOTLE
is

wholly unsatisfactory.

On

the one hand,

personal existence implies activity of will no less than of thought.

is

On

the other hand, thought qua personal

always in transition from possibility to actuality

in

other words, in a state of development

and

is

deter-

mined
these

as

much by

the variety of

its

objects as

changes

of intellectual states.

Aristotle

by by destroying

conditions

and confining the function of the

self- contemplation,
life

Divine Keason to a monotonous

not quickened into

by any change or development,

merges the notion of personality in a mere abstraction. The diflficiilties which perplex us when we come to consider the operation of (lod upon the world are not
object of desire for his own sake universe and the desires the whole order of nature (Brext, 247), receive no support whatsoever from Aristotle. Such a conception, on t lie contrary, is wholly irreconcilable with his idea of God, for all desire is an effort after something not yet attained,
'

xii.

10 (see p.

.S91, n. 2.

supra) offers
Aristotle

no support to
is

either.

here inquiring in what way the world contains the good. The only answer which he gives, however, to this question is contained in the words Koi yap iv rij rd^ei
rh fd Kol 6 a-Tparrjyhs, Kal fiaWov ovTOS oi) yap ovros Sia Ti]v rd^iv
'

in a (pvais tov dpicrrov reTvxnKv:a (3fetapk. xii. 8, 1074, a, 19)

and

dAA.' iKeivr]

diarovTou

iffriv.

If

we

any such
1

effort is inconceivable.

On

this point also Aristotle

apply this to the idea of God and the world it certainly follows that the perfection of the universe resides in the first place in God as the first cause of motion, and secondly in the universal order that owes its origin to it. On the other hand, t he comparison of the world to an army gives no clue to the method in which the order of the universe proceeds

has expressed
for doubt.

himself

with* a

definiteness that leaves

no room Neither the view of

St. 246 sq.), IJRENT. {Psych, d. that in knowing- Himself, God knows the whole creation as well, nor Schneider's modification of it {Be Caum p'nali AHst. 79 sq. cf. also Kym, Mefaphya. UnterK. 252, 256), to the effect that God knows the intelligible world as the totality of the forms that are contained in his thought, finds

AH

from God (for this was not the question under discussion). As we evidently cannot conclude from it
that

any

justification

in

Aristotle's

God sketches plans, issues commands to his subordinates, &c. (though this way of represepting God's government of the

>vntings.

The passage ^^etaph.

METAPHYSICS
less

403

weighty.

Aristotle describes

God, as we have
also more and the ground of

seen, not only as the priimim mobile, but

generally as the highest principle

the collective cosmos. ^

attributing to

While we
belief in

are not justified in

him

Providence which
yet see that he

extends

its

care to individuals,^

we may

acknowledges the world to be the work of Reason,'^ that

universe is common enough), TrSrepov al avral tuv (pdaproov KaX neither does it follow that God T&v o.<pQdprcav apx a i elaiv. On the produces the order of the world other hand we read in Metaph. xi. by a process of thought which 7, 1064, a, 34 sqq. if there be has for its object the world itself an ovaia xupiffr^ Kal aKiwqTos, or its individual parts. That point ivravd^ tiv e??; irov Kal rh deTov, Kal can only be decided by a refer- avTT] hv UT] TrpwTT] Kal KvpiwraTf] ence to declarations elsewhere apx-f]. - Metaph. xii. made by Aristotle. Still further 7, 10; see p. 394, at variance with the spirit of the n. 1, and p. 391, n. 2, supra. Be above comparison is the state- Cwlo, i. 9; seep. .395, n. 6. ^ On this subject cf. ment of Kym, p. 246 sq.,that the p. 422, n. good or God does not merely exist 1 see Ch. XVI. infra. How little outside the world as an individual the passages referred to are to be being, but is immanent in it as taken literally is obvious from ' God order and design. and the fact that the gods (0eol) are 'the good 'are not, however, to always spoken of in them in the Aristotle convertible terms (cf. plural. But if we have thus first to translate them into language e.ff. Eth. i. 4, 1096, a, 2.S, Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 3, b, 35 sqq.), and the possible to the philosopher in general is quite different from order to discover his true meanthe order of the army. Cf further ing, it is a question whether we have not to mnke as great a dep. 413 sq. Metapk. xi. 2, 1060, a 27, duction from their literal content cannot, indeed, be quoted in sup- as in the parallel cases which will port of this statement for the be discussed infra, at the end words etVrep e(TTi ris ova(a Kal dpxv of the section in Ch. IX. on the roiavrt) t^v <pvaiv o'lav vvv Q^Tovfi^v, Universe. * Kai avrrj /xla irdvTccv Kal t] ovtt] tS)v Anaxagoras is praised aidioiv re Kal (pOapTuv, not only, as {Metaph. i. 3, 984, b, 15, cf. may be seen from the context Phys. viii. 5, 256, b, 24) for and from the parallel passage iii. having made vovs anios rov Koa/jLov Kal Trjs Tct^ecos Trdaif)s, and it is re4, 1000, a, 5 sqq., leave it in doubt whether there be such an marked Phys. ii. 6, 198, a, 9, that apxh or not, but they do not avrdfiarov and tvxv always pre speak of God as an individual suppose a vovs and a <pv<ns. being. The words in iii. 4, are
:

'

D d2

404

ARISTOTLE

he recognises,^ in the adaptations of nature, traces of the operation of God, and that he finds in human Reason an
indwelling element of Divinity.^

But if we attempt to bring t*hese convictions into harmony with his theology as above discussed, we are met by many questions to^
which
it is

noi]easy to find
firsl?

an answer.
if

In the
vj

place,

it is

obvious that

God

exercises

neither creative nor practical activity in relation to any-

thing

else,

He

cannot be the lyrimum mohile.

Here,

however, we

are met by the notion to which

:

already alluded
exercises a

that

we have moving itself, Form, without

'

power of attraction over Matter, causing it God moves the world in this to move in its direption. way: the object of desire and the object of thought But these cause motion without moving themselves.
two motive forces are ultimately the same (the absolute object of thought is the absolutely desirable or pure
good)
;

for the object

of desire

is
is

apparent beauty,
real

while the original object of will

desire
object)
is

beauty

but
the
set

conditioned by our notion (of the value of the

vice versa.

and not

Thought, therefore,

is
is

starting-point or principle.
in motion

Thought, however,
of thought;

by the object
series
is

but only one

of the
1

two

absolutely intelligible,^
ly point out,

and in

Cf. p. 421,

and
S),

p.

4G0 sq.
ii.
I>,

Eth.
b,

ix. 7,

1177, a, IH, b,
;

.SO,
7;]fi

117'.), a,

2G;
:

Gen. An.

27, 7;{7, a, 10

4,

4U8,' b,

29

JJsAn.i. Part. An. ii. 10,

686, a, 28, 373. kripa (TvaToix'a Kad" ai}ri]v. By this It epa (rufrTOtx'a we are to understand, as the more recent conimentators right^'ij%,

a, 7, iv. 10,

NoTjr^ 56

7}

and as is obvious the series of being and good. The expression refers to tt^e Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine of the universally prevalent antithesis of being and notbeing, perfection and imperfecfrom
1.

3o,

tion,

(fcc,

which Aristotle had

discussed at length in the 'ExAoy^ tuv "EvauricDu (see p. 61, n, 1,

METAPHYSICS
this
tual.'

40o
as

Being stands
^
'

first,

defined

simple and ac-

and communicates motion to the rest.' 2 God, therefore, is the primimi mobile only in so far as He is the absolute end of the world,^ the Governor, as it were, whose will all obey, but who never sets his own hand to the work.^ And He fulfils
that which*
is

Tlie final cause operates like a loved object,

moved by

it

by being absolute Form. As Form in general moves Matter by inviting it to pass from
this function
^

potentiality into actuality, the operation of

the world must be of the same

supra) and often alludes to else-

sort.''

God upon Without doubt

where

1004, a, 1, ix. 2, 1046, b, 2,xiv. 6, 1093, b, 12, i. 5, 986, a, 28; Phys iii. 2, 20U b, 25, i. 9, 192, a, 14; Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 319, a, 14. Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, a, 26 see BoNiTZ and Schwegler. 2 lUil. 1072, b, 3 Kiv^l 5e <ws ipd>lj.pov, Kivovjxcvov (better Cod.
;

cf.

Metaph.

iv.

2,

if

would certainly be strange, for God is the first mover He must

be the
are the
xii. 6,
i
.

first

operator, since the

KivrjTiKhv aXriov

and the iroir]riKhv same (Be An. iii. 5 init.;

,
;

'

Gen. An. i. 21 729, b, 1 3 Metaph. 1071, b, 12; Gen. et Corr.

7,

324, b,

tan
apxh

Se t^ iroirjTiKhv
Trjs Kiwfjcreus)
iroi-ncris

aXriov ws oOcvtj
is

and only a certain kind of

denied of
1).

ET
^

Kivov/x4}'Cf>)

5e

raAAa

KiV7.

God
it is

(see

p.

400,

also do the movers of the celestial spheres (to be discussed infra, Ch. IX. in the section on the Spheres) these cause motion, according to Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 23, ws t4Xos ovtrai <popas. * Cf Metajih. xii. 10 init. and
;
.

As

n.

But

quite another

thing to say that according to Aristotle God operates upon the world not directly but indirectly, not by Himself exercising activity upon it, but as perfect being by eliciting its activity by
his

fin.
*

mere existence He is
;

efficient

The

subject,

however,

is

here only treated generally: the question is not whether God moves the world but how He

moves

it,

and

it is

therefore

ir-

relevant

when Brentano,

ibid.

235 sqq., contests the assertion that God 'is not the first operative principle, but only the final cause, of being that according to Aristotle no operation at all belongs to Him. This assertion
' ;

in virtue of his final cause. Nor is it sufficient to discredit this s'atement to adduce passages in which God is described in general as the moving or efficient principle of the world. No one doubts that this
is so.
it

cause being

only

'

'

To prove our view wrong, would be necessary to produce passages in which direct action upon the world is attributed to Him it would be further neces;

406
this

ARISTOTLE
doctrine

system.
the

harmonises admirably with the whole It gives us, in fact, the proper coping-stone of
ultimate

Metaphysics, by clearly exhibiting the

efficient,

unity of formal,

and

final causes,

and their
moreover,

relation to the material cause.

We

find in

it,

the ultimate principle of union between the Metaphysics and the Physics the point at which the investigations

into the nature of the

Unmoved and
issue.

the

Moved meet
to

and find a common

It

enables Aristotle

trace to absolutely immaterial and unmoved Being the ultimate source of all movement and change, and to

make God

the

central,

controlling

principle

of the

universe without involving

*^>

Him

in its machinery

on

the one hand or disturbing the uniformity of natural law bv personal interference with it on the other. It further furnishes him with the means of reconciling the eternity of the world with its dependence upon a divine

supernatural Being.

If the existence or the order or

the motion of the universe be referred to definite acts of Deity, we are forced to assume that the world had a

beginning, since every single act and that which is produced by it has a beginning in time.^ On the other

hand, a system which

is

gravitating towards a fixed

its

and

definite point,
is

and which owes

motion to the
it

attraction w^hich

thus exercised upon

(and Ari-

such a system), can be conceived of stotle's But the with or without beginning. indifferently as

Cosmos

is

sary to show how any such statement can be reconciled with those

Aristotelian conception of the nature of God as an absolutely

passages v/hich explicitly deny

unchangeable Being who

only object of His
'

any such action of finally to harmonise

Him
it

and

own
1.

is the thought,

with the

Cf. p. 412, n.

METAPHYSICS

407

more important the above doctrine is for Aristotle, the more obviously does it reveal the weak side of his
theory.

The notion

of the motiim naturally desiring the

is

mobile, the Corporeal seeking the Divine,

as to be almost unintelligible to us.^

so obscure
if,

Further,
perfection,

as
is

As Theophrastus easily discerned, IV. 12 (3fetajjh.), 8 ei e<pe(ris, S)] SA\cos re Koi rod
'
:

for

his

own
this

it

not meant that the matter in

which

desire is produced
;

apicrrov, /j.era
at/
i7j

i/zuxrjs,

cfirpvx

Tci

PROCLUS,

m
:

Kivovfieva.

Similarly

Tim. 82,
Arist.
dt}

(of.

ScHRADER,

Volunt.

Doctr. Brandenb. 1847, p. 15, A, 42) asks et 70/j Ipa. b Koff/xos, &s (prjcn Kal 'Aptaror4\r]s, rov vov
Kal Kivelrai
irphs

avrhv, irSdev e;^et

ravrrjv
'

tV ecpecriv ; We are not, of course, there-

fore justified in denying that Aristotle held this notion in the face of his own plain and re-

peated statements and the interpretations of them in this sense by the most faithful of his disciples all the less as it is hard indeed (as the discussion in Theophrastus, Fr. 12, 5, clearly proves) to say in what other way motion can, on Aristotle's principles, be conceived of as proceeding from the absolutely unmoved. Brentano (as above, 239 sq.) thinks, indeed, that there is nothing so totally in contradiction to the Aristotelian doctrine as the view that ' matter is the efficient principle because it moves of itself to meet God, who is its end.' As little, he says, can 'the end produce anything of itself
;

causes the motion as little can it mean that the end produces it by itself alone, apart from any efficient principle. The fact is that the efficient cause is not here regarded as different from the final. Though we should perhaps in such a case conceive of two independent causes at work, the attractive force and the thing that permits itself to be attracted, Aristotle represents the relationship otherwise. He ascribes to the mover a ^vvaixis iroi-qriK)}, to the motion merely a
(Meta])h. v. 15, 1, 1046, a, 16 sqq.). It is impossible, therefore, for him to attribute to that which owes its motion to something else, any independent efficiency of its own. On the contrary, the efficient and the final cause, as has been shown at p. 356 sq., he conceives of as in essence one.
ZvvafJLis

iradririK^

1021, a,

15,

ix.

without an

efficient

principle.'

But nobody has asserted either the one or the other. When
it

is

said

that

God
the

causes
desire

motion by causing

Their apparent severance under certain circuTustances is only a phenomenon of the sensible world, where form realises itself in matter, and therefore (cf. pp. 368 sq.) in a plurality of individuals. In the intelligible world, however, efficient and final cause are always one and the same, and accordingly it is impossible to speak of an end producing anything apart from a principle

408

ahistotle
motum must be
in contact' with

Aristotle supposes, the

the

mohile,

it

follows that the Universe

must be

in

contact with the

explicitly states.^

primum

mohile, as, indeed, Aristotle

It is true that

he endeavours to
contact

exclude
idea
;

the notion of contiguity in space from this

for

he often employs the expression

'

when the context

clearly proves that he does not allude

to juxtaposition in

space, but only to an immediate

connection between tw^o things.^

that the

Moreover, he asserts

"

motum

is

in contact with the iirimmn mohile,

but not

vice versa.
is

But even though we overlook the

here involved, w^e find the notion
not think of ascribing any such quality to matter, and we should hesitate scarcely less to attribute to plants and animals a longing after the divine as Aristotle does in Le An. ii. 4, 415, a, 26 sqq. (see Ch. X. pt. 2, infra). Even the doctrine of a plant and animal soul would scarcely justify sucli a view in our eyes, as from such a soul thethonght of God is necesBut just as sarily excluded. Aristotle here attributes to nonrational existence an unconscious yearning after t^ Q^tov, so the conception of a world animate throughout, so natural to the Greek and j^et resting ultimately on an untenable anthropological analogy, enables him to view the astral spheres, which he holds to be of a far higher nature than any earthly existence (see Ch.IX. on the Universe), in the samelight. Cf. supo'a, p. 386. 2 Gni. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, 20. 3 Cf. snjjra, p. 203, n. 3. * Gen. et Corr. ibid. see p. 387, n. 3, svjn'a.
'
'

contradiction that

to the of efficiency.- Similar action of God Himself is that of the spheral spirits, which produce motion in their respective spheres as being themselves the end of the motion cf p. 405, n. 3. It is still more strange that Brentano
;
.

goes beyond the view which he combats, in saying, p. 240, that according to Mcfaph. xii. 7, 1072. a, 26: 'God moves as known:' for since matter, as he himself adds, cannot know God. it would follow from this that God does not move matter at all. The assertion, however, rests upon a misunderstanding. Aristotle says (cf p. 404) rh opeKrhv Koi rh vorjThv Kive? oi) Kivovmvov vovs Se vnh rov votjtov KipeTrai KJi/e? 8e ws epcufifuov. As
. :

voTjrhv

God moves

onl}^

Nous

(to

which, however, motion can be ascribed only in an improper sense cf. Ch. XI. at the commencement and at the enddnfra); the world, on the other hand. He moves as 4p(i>/jLvov by means of the up^^is which He causes. "VVe, indeerl, should
;

'

METAPHYSICS
of existence in space forced

409
still

upon us

more remarkin setting the

ably by the further assertion that

God

world in motion starts from

in space/

its

circumference.
is

For since

generally the primordial motion

taken to be motion

and of the original motions in space none is continuous and uniform except circular motion,^ the operation of the first mover upon the world must consist in the production of circular motion.^ According to Aristotle, this might be effected either
absolutely

from the centre or the circumference of the world, for both of these places are ap;^at, and command the whole movement. He prefers the latter, however, because it

moves faster than the and that which is nearest to the cause of motion ought to move at the quickest rate.'* In defending
is

clear that the circumference

centre,

he might hope to evade the objection that he places God in a particular locality by his peculiar theory of space, which excluded from the notion everything that lay beyond the limits of the world. It is
this position
'"^

obvious, however, that

we cannot

accept this defence.

is confined to the unvarying exercise of uniform self-contemplation, so, in his relation to the world, He has no other func-

Again

as the Deity, relatively to Himself,

tion but that of monotonously causing circular motion.

To explain the
'

rich variety of finite existence with the

9
;

Phys.
^,

viii.

7,

see p. 421

^^^

- Ilnd. c. 8sq. De Coelo,\. 2; J/e%^7/. xii. G,_1071, b, 10.

;
*

Phya.

viii.

6 fin.,
;

c.

Metapli. xii.

6/;^

c.

8,

^ fin. 1073, a,
;

2^

s<l%

P%.

viii. 10,

267, b, 6

279, a, 16 sqq. (see p. supra). Hence the assertion (Sext. Matli. x. 23; HypoUjp. iii. 218) that God is to Aristotle t^ Trtpas rov ohpavov ^ Cf. De Ccelo, i. 9 (cited as above, at p. 395, n. 6) and p. 432, / r
i.

Cwlo,

9,

395,

n.

6,

i?^

n. 5.

410
infinite diversities

ARISTOTLE
and subdivisions of its motion, by simple and uniform activity, would be im-

means of this
possible.

Aristotle himself admits as much with reference to the heavenly bodies; and accordingly he adds to the first mover a number of subordinate but equally

eternal substances,

whose business

it

is

to cause the

special motions of the planets.^

The same

provision

must, however, be
of
all

made

to account

for special

motion

As

the First Cause of motion

it

kinds and for every separate property of things. cannot have produced
exercises one general function in

them, seeing that

the world and nothing more,

we

are driven to assume

some
its

special cause for them.^

Only
is

it

will not

do to

point merely to something which

equally general in

operation

for

example, to the inclination of the

orbit

of the sun and planets, from which Aristotle ^ deduces the phenomena of growth and destruction. The special character of everything must be ascribed
to its

own

particular nature
:

and Form.^

Here a new
and
?

question rises

what position do these particular Forms,

forces

which operate as creative

in finite things

constitute their peculiar essence, occupy with respect to

the highest form, the primordial motive force, or

God

Or what
as they

are

we

to say of those beings which, belonging

do to the supernatural world, are unaffected by

ixeKX^i yiv^ffis koX (pOopa ehai,
Set elvai ivepyovv
^

3Ieta2)h.

xii.

8,

For
-

fuller

explanation
xii.
6,

1073, a, 26. see Ch,

&K\o

AWcos

/col

dWus.

IX. infra.

mtaph.

1072,

a,

to secure the uniformity of the motion of the world (TreptcJSy 1. 10 is prob. corrupt), Sel -ri aei
/icVetj/

Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, a, see the section of Ch. IX. infra, which deals with the earthly world.
23
;

wo-auTOJs

ivepyovv.

el

5e

* Cf., besides p. 350 sq., the passages quoted iy?//-, p. 432, n. 5.

METAPHYSICS
the changes of birth

411

spheres with the spirits that

and destruction the heavenly move and animate them,

?^

and the immortal part of the human soul

peculiar nature of these beings ?

What
and

explanation does Aristotle offer us of the existence

We

cannot suppose
such a

them

to be God's creatures

^
;

for not only does

notion obtain no support from his system and writings,^

That these three classes of being are uncreated and indestructible not only follows from the eternity of the world and its motion, but is also expressly stated by Aristotle cf. p. 474 sq. and Ch. IX. infra.
'
;

indeed (Metaph. v. 1, 1013, a, 16, 20 sq.), is used in as many senses

as'o^Ttoj/, and includes especially the conception of final cause. Since it is God who, as the most perfect being in the universe, gives unity of aim to the whole, and who causes the all-governing motion of the first sphere, He is also the irpct-Trj koI KupiwTa.T'n dpxh, on Him the whole order of the universe may be said to depend

As Beentano holds them

to

be, Psych, d. Arist. 198, 234 sqq. BuLLiNGER goes even further,

Erhabenheit uber alien BiMlismus etc. (1878), p. 2 sq. According to his view, Aristotle supposed not only the whole world, but even the material of which it is made, to originate in a divine act of creation. Thus the
JDes Arlst.
'

395, n. 6), and justified in applying " eTs Koipavos ea-Tw " (p. 391, n.
(p. 394, n. 1,

and

to

Him we are

material out of which God creates the world would, according to Aristotle, be nothing else than the power and might eternally actual in God, whereby the world is actualised,' &c. (p. 15).
'

'

It will be sufficiently evident from the account already given in the text that speculations are here attributed to Aristotle which are as foreign to the range of his thought as they are in conflict

with his definite declarations. ^ That God is called irpuTrj dpxh (see p. 403, supra), proves nothing for this may mean, not only that He has produced everythino-, but also that He is the
;

The commander, however, is not therefore the creator of his subordinates. And as little does it follow from Mctaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 3 (see p. 385, n. 1 supra)\.\\2X the creative activity of God precedes all being in time; for the ael Kivovv irpcoToo^ does not (as Ps. Alex, in loo. certainly thought) refer to God as the first cause of motion in the universe. On the contrary (as is obvious from the explanation upon p. 1049, b, 17 sqq. which the Sxrirep (tirofiei/ recalls), the reference is here to the fact that every individual thing presupposes as the condition of its production another similar already existing thing, and this likewise another, ecuj rov
2).
del KivovvTos irpcoTcos
:

and

condition of the eternal activity of the world

order
:

i.e.

dpxh,

come

to the first

member

until we of the

412

ARISTOTLE
it

but

would involve us in the contradiction of sup-

posing the uncreated to be at the same time created,

that which has been declared to be eternal to have had
a beginning in time.^
in

The same question

arises with

series

question
tirst

given the

which has impulse to the

whole
in
Kivovy);

series, t\ie j)7'imn in niovens

each

and

case (not the TrpcoTov this is the reason why

the
p.

ael Kiu. irp. is

repeated from

1049, b, 26, where (as Phys. viii. 10, 267, a, 1, 3) this is unAridoubtedly its meaning. stotle was precluded from holding any theory of creation by his view of the eternity of the world. Such a theorj^ moreover,
is incompatible, not only with the assertion that to God belongs neither irpdrTtiv nor ttoic'iv (see p. 400, n. 1), but also with the principle ex nihilo niliil ft (P/n/s. i. 4, 187, a, 84, c. 7, 190, a, H;'Gen. An. ii. 1, 733, b, 24; Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 6, vii. 7, 1032, a, 13, 20, b, 30, c. 8 init., ix. S, 1049, b, 28, xi. 6, 1062, b,

of every subsequent theism this is impossible. One who conceives of God as the substance of the world, and of finite things as mere manifestations of the divine force immanent in them, may, and even must, in consequence, declare that the one is as eternal as the other. One, on the other hand, who treats God as a personal being outside the

from which we have not the smallest right to make an exception in fa\our of the Deity, as
24),

world, distinguishing other beings from Him as so many independent substances, would involve himself in a palpable contradiction were he to hold that the latter are eternally created by the former. Creation as an act proceeding from a personal will must necessarily be in time, and an individual being in order to produce other beings must necessarily exist before them. For only causcc im7nane7ites\m\e

does. p. 240, indeed, believes that the eternity in time of immaterial substances as little dispenses with the necessity of an efficient principle for them as the eternity of motion dispenses with the necessity of a mover in other words, he endeavours to reconcile the eternity of the world with the theory of its creation by means of the conception of an eternal creative activity in God. But upon the principles of the Aristotelian as
' ;

Brentano, 249, Brentano,

contemporaneous effects ; causes frariHeuntes always precede their effects : the father precedes the
son, the artist the work of art, the creator the creature. Such a contradiction we should be justified in attributing to Aristotle, only if we could show that he held alike to the eternity of the world and to a creative activity of God. The opposite, however, is the case. Aristotle holds, indeed, quite definitely the doctrine of the eternity of the world, but

of a creative activity in

God we

not only find no word in his writings, but he expressly de-

METAPHYSICS
respect to the

413

Forms of sensible things, and to the order of nature which results from their union with Matter they also are uncreated.^ It is equally impossible upon
Aristotle's

as the result of

showing to explain the adaptations of nature any personal interference on the part of
finally,

God.2

If,

the

ancient

Greek view of
is in

the

universe as interpenetrated by divine forces

open

disagreement with Aristotle's dualistic theism,^ this does not, where the question is one of his scientific
views, justify us in setting aside or explaining

away

his

own

and well-considered statements, on the ground that he has neglected to bring them into harmony with views that were pressed upon him from
definite

another side.

Brandis adopts another method of solving the above

difficulties.

He

believes that Aristotle regarded the

thoughts of God, whose selfdevelopment produces alteration in individual things, and the harmony of whose transmutations is guaranteed

Forms

as the

eternal

by the fundamental unity which underlies them.^

Clares that Him at all.

But,

no

iroiitv

belongs to

Cf. also infra, Ch.

XI. near the end.

in reference to the forms p. 341, n. 2; in reference to the universe as a whole, p. 887.
is

As

shown

Such interference is expressly denied of God (see p. :i68, n. 1), nor on the theory that the world is eternal can we
*

we must supply certain important conceptions, and goes on * Indeed, that all existences must be traced back to, referred ultimately to, living thoughts of God, and that these must be treated as the simple substrata
physics,
:

upon which concrete existences and their mutations ultimately

rest,

understand when it could have taken place cf. p. 412. Cf. infra, p. 420 sq.
;

hardly requires to be expressly stated, and is indicated

by the question {3fetaph.

see p. 298, n.
:

xii.

9,

Qr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 575, where he says that in order to

2, supra) If nothing attained by the thought of the divine spirit, wherein consists its

is

fully understand Aristotle's

meta-

worth?

We

may, moreover,

as-

414

ARISTOTLE

in the first place, this statement can apply only to the Forms as such, and leaves the existence of the eternal

substances
plained.

(the

spheral

spirits,

&c.)

wholly unex-

In the second place, it is untenable even It finds no support in with respect to the Forms. own utterances,^ and in more than one point Aristotle's
it

contradicts what he indisputably taught.

The

object

definite of Divine Thought, according to Aristotle's than God Himself: not only statement, cannot be other

are finite existences,

as these particular things,

ex-

forms, which cluded, but even the specific concepts or their internal essence, must remain remote constitute
different from Him, since they are always something stand far below that which alone from Himself, and

and perfect can be matter of his thought viz. divine Aristotle anticipating to the eternal thought of God
:

sumethat

Leibnitz's doctrine of monadsmore or less consciously intended qualito refer the changes in the exties or essence of individual

That dynamic activities which have gone out from God, and therefore also finite being which is animated by these,

and

p.

577

n.

'

istences to the self-development which of the divine thought on Ihey rest, and the obstructions and disturbances in this self-

development to its connection with matter or potentiality; and the

iTarmonious variations in the developments of different individual

existences by an anticipation of the conception of a harmonia pra'staMUtn., to the unity and perfection of the ultimate reality, the unconditioned spirit of God,

is their common substratum.' Cf further his p. 578, where the central point of the Aristotethe lian theology is sought for in doctrine that all determination dy in the world is referable to ITamic IcTivities, and these again

which

should seek to return to Him, is bo also quite comprehensible, iJ/^^. iii. a, 113 sq Even J/c%^^. xn. 9 contains nothing to support Brandis s view (cf. also Kym, iMetaph^ Aristotle there Urders. 258). asks how we are to conceive of the thought of the divine spirit if nothing is thought of by him (not: if 'nothing is attained by his thought ') his power of thought must be as worthless as that exif something ercised in sleep
' ;

'

other than Himself is thought of, then is the worth of his thought to be measured by the worthiness But this does not of its object ? mean that the Divine thoughts constitute the essence of things.

METAPHYSICS

415

Conversely, the Forms of things cannot be being.' thoughts of the Deity, since, according to Aristotle, the

Form

is

the substance of the thing, and Substance can

neither

be predicated of nor belong

to

anything.^

Thoughts cannot be substances, since they exist in the

soul as their substratum.^

Again,

we

find

no analogy

in Aristotle for the notion of a self-development of the

divine thoughts

indeed,

it

is is

the proposition

that there

directly contradicted by no change in the thought

of God, no transition from one thing to another. Finally,

while Brandis maintains that

all

things strive towards

Deity, because the active forces which emanate from

Him

struggle to return to

Him

again, Aristotle himlike

all

self rather ascribes

this striving,

motion, to
it-

Matter, which desires to complement and complete

self

by means of the

forces.^

Nor

is
it

it

the least im-

portant objection to this view that

clashes with the

whole character of Aristotle's system.

For supposing

the thoughts of Deity to be the supporters of concrete

existences and of their mutations, the relation of finite
reality to

God would be one

of

immanence

the Deity

would by virtue of his thoughts be inherent in things, and the latter would have in God the permanent ground
of
their

shifting

properties.
v/e

Instead of Aristotle's
at
is it

dualistic theism,

should arrive

system

of

dynamic pantheism.^

But not only

p. S97,
*

impossible to
4y^.5?/;;r.

See

p. 398, n. 1,
sq.,

and
p.

stratum; seep. 214,n.

*

n. 2,
,

svpra. gee p. 330

'Eiria-T-fifif)

and

373

sq.

mpra.
'

and
is

P. 397, n. 2, supra. Cf. p. 404 sq., p. 344, n. 1, p. 379, n. J, and on the

the very

ex-

ample which Aristotle mentions

doctrine that motion resides in the motum and therefore in the

material, 386, n. 1. Thig is made
*

still

more

41G

AIIISTOTLE

discover such a system in the works of the Philosopher,

but even his school were unacquainted with anything

of the sort, until the influence of Stoic opinions intro-

duced that fusion of things diverse and fundamentally distinct which meets us in the spurious book upon the World and still more in Neoplatonism. Aristotle leaves
it

quite uncertain
particular
his

how we

are to define the relation of

the

From

and individual Forms to the Deity. utterances upon the subject we can only say

that he placed

them

side

by

side,

without explaining

satisfactorily the existence and the special motions of

finite

things by the operation of the Deity, or even They are given attempting such an explanation.
factors, just as

Matter

is

a given factor which he does

It is true not attempt to deduce from Form or Deity. unity of his system, the ovk a'yaBov iroXvtliat the
KotpaviT], is thus

rendered more than doubtful.^

This brings us to the conclusion of the Metaphysics. God being defined as the First Cause of Motion, phi-

losophy passes from the

other words, to Nature.

Unmoved to

the

Moved or,

in

obvious by-KYM; cf. ibid. p. 242 2i6sq.,256,258sq.,andp.402,n.l, According to Kym, tin. supra. God is said to be, not only the creative conception, but also the material cause of the world, the indwelling purpose and the productive force that is immanent This, however, is a mere in it. assertion, and is not proved to be Aristotle's own opinion by any
detailed investigation into his declarations on the subject. ' Cf THBQPfJB. Fr, X2 (^Me.

taj)7i.),

Kdyov
TrXeiw

rh 5h fi^rh radr' 7 SeTrai irKelovos TrepI

:

i^d-q

rrjs

icpeaeus,

iroia

/col

rivwv,

eVetS^

ra kvkXikcl [the heavenly

at <\>opal^ rpSirou

spheres] Kal
virevapnai

nva

rh av-hwrov [? we should have expected dyadhv ov

/col

&pi<jTov'] Kal

ov xf^piv acpaves.

e^re

yap ev rh kivovu, dronov rh fxrj irdura r^v out^j/ [sc. <f>opav Kivel-^ elre KaO' eKaarou erepov, a'i (rdat'] dpxoX TrAeioyy,^ SjTTe [?] rh t' avficpupou avrS>v ets tp^^^iv iovrwv

r^v

apiffrTjv ovSafius <pavep6v.

PhI'sics

417

CHAPTER
PHYSICS
A.

VIII

The Idea of Nature and the most General Conditions of Natural Existence

has to deal, as
corporeal

First Philosophy, according to the view of Aristotle, we have seen, with unmoved and inreality
:

though,

in

treating

of

this

its

proper subject,

we were

in fact obliged to include

some

notice of the opposite principle.

is

Natural Philosophy occupied with the aggregate of corporeal existence which is subject to Motion.' All natural substances
;

are bodies, or united to bodies

and under the name

of natural existence
everything, in
to them.

we

include bodies and masses

fact, which possesses them or is related Hence the whole domain of corporeal existence belongs to Natural Science.^ But regards form only
ifc

in its connection with matter,^

'

and the

soul in its con:

Cf. p. 183, n. 3.

De

Coelo,

i.

init.
7]

Tr^p't

(pvaews

iin(TTi}fir]

ax^^hv

irXdar-n

1, 298, b, 27 eVel 5^ ruv tpia^i ^cyo/nevuv to yueV ea-Tiv ovaiai ra 5' cpya koX irddv rovrwv [by ovaiai,

(paiv^Tai irepi re crcvfiara Kai fiey^eri Kalra rovrwv elvai nddr] kuI 7 as
KLu-nafis,
ba-ai

cTt

Se

irepl

ras apxds,
dcriv

however, he here means both simple and composite bodies] (pavephv on r^v irKeiaTTiP avfifiaivei
Trjs
irepl

rrjs

Toiaxmjs
<picrL

oixrias

(p{)aus

iaropias
iraaai
a-wjuaTa

avveaTciyrwv ra fxeu i(TTi acafxara /col fieyeOr] [as the human body], to 5' exei (rSifia Kal fiey^dos [as man], t^ 5' apxal rwu
fXOi'roiu

Tuv yap

nepl
at

(Tco^uctTwj/

duai
ovaiai

yhp

<pv(TiKal

7)

^ fiera

elaip [as
I.

the soul]

iii.

(rw/xdrcou yiyvourai Kal fieycduiK iVfitajjh. vi. 1, 1025, b, 26 sq. (xi. 7) and elsewhere ; see infra.
=*

wsm.

VOL. vuLi.

Eg'

418

ARISTOTLE
It

nection with the body.^

must, however, be remem-

bered that material existence pertains to Nature and to

Natural Philosophy only in so far as Mathematical motion and repose.

natural bodies
;

it

is

subject to

bodies are

not

indeed,

Mathematics may be

distin-

guished from Physics by the fact that the former deals with immovable, the latter with movable, substances.^

Furthermore, movable existence can only be regarded as natural when it contains within itself the principle
*
'

of

motion

and

this is the point of difference

between

natural things and the productions of art.^

tinction, on the other hand,

The

dis-

which

is

drawn between

rational

and

irrational forces,

on the ground that the

former

may

act in either of

latter only in one,

two opposite directions, the and that the former, therefore, are free,

the latter necessary

is

only a subdivision within the

since in all substance

realm of Nature.^

Yet

Form and
:

Matter are distinguishable,

we are met by

this question

Does the
'

essential reality of nature consist in the

102G,
ttjs

Form

Metapli.

vi.

1,

a,

nepl
iffTiv.

^vxn^
oa-n

^vlas
fJ.^
i.

Qiupriaai

rod
vhr]s
7.

Phyi^. ii. 1, 192, b, 13: ra nev yap ^vaei ovra irdvra (paiverai
""

(pvaiKOv,

avv
1,

Be
Phrjs.

All.
2,

403, b,
:

^xoura iv eawroTs dpxV Ktvficrews kol a-Taaeus, ra /xev Kara rSirov, to.
8e
/car'

FuTt'.An. 11,64:1,
-

ii.

mathematician

a, 21, '62. the 193, b, 31 as well as the

av^V(riv Ka\
'

(pQiaiv, to.

5e

KaT
exet

aWoioiaiv
etc.
. .

kX'vk)

8e

koX
dpfi^v

IfxaTiou,

.^ovSefiiav
ifKpvrou,
_

physicist is occupied with the form of bodies, aAA' ovx v (pvaiovSe Kov (rdfiaTos ir4pas '^Kaarou ra (Tu/i/Se/SrjKOTa SewpeT ^ roiovrois

[sc.
Sih

(pvaiKols^

ovai
'

av/jL^efi-nKev.

as he proceeds in the rest of the chapter further to explain. ^ 3IetajjJl. xii. 3, 1070, a, 7 v fih oi r^xv-t] apxh eV &A?^cfi [similarly ix.
/nerafioKris
:

Kal x^p'^C^''
Kiviiaectis

X'"/"'^'^"
.
.
.

7P \V
.

rh ^\v iari yap irepiTrhv earai Koi to apTiov,

voi](rti.

etc.

ixvev

Kiu-ncrews,
oLudpooiros

<rap^

Se Kal

10^^' b' ^] ^ ^^ ^^'^'^ "PX^ ^^ avr^. Metajih- ix, 2 init. c. 5, c. De Interjjr. 8, 1050, a, 30 sqq.

"*

oarovv Ka\

ovKeri.

Cf

C. 13,

22, b, 39.

what follows and

183, n. 3, sv2)ra.

PHYSICS
or in the Matter ?

419

In support of the second alternative might be asserted that everything requires some material in order to be what it is.^ Yet Aristotle is
it

forced to maintain the

first alternative.

things invariably resides in the

Form

Form and purpose

is. 2

that a natural object

final

The essence of only by its becomes what it

it is
;

The true causes are the

If,

causes

the material

causes are only the indispensable conditions of natural

existence.^
therefore,

neral definition of Nature,

in
it

is

material, so

we wish to determine the gewe must not consider what much as the moving and informing

Nature is the cause of motion and rest in everything which possesses these conditions of being originally
force.''

thing

and not merely in some derivative fashion. A natural is one that has such a motive force within itself.'' But Aristotle does not help us greatly in defining
*

193, a, 9-30. 1, 1014, b, 26. Phys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28 sqq. c. Metaph. as above, 2, 194, a, 12. 1. 35 sqq. Part. An. i. 1, 640, b, 28, 641, a, 29, b, 23 sqq. For a fuller discussion of this point see i/i/ra and p. 357-8. * Part. An. :7 i. 640, b, 28
ii.

Phys.

v.

4:

Jin.

t]

irpdirri
7;

<pv(ns koX Kvpius

ovcria
rj

Metapli.
-

V. 4,

\cyoiJ.4v7]

iarlv

rwv

ixovraev apxhv Kiv-fia-ews iv avrols ^ avrd. vi. 1, 1025, b, 19 [xi. 7, 1064, a, 15, 30] ir^pl yap rfji^ roiavrrjv icrrlt/ ovaiav \Ji <pvaiK)f\
:

'^

4v

77

77

apxv

rrjs

Kivi\<Tews

koX

')fa.pKaraT^vp.op(p))v<p'u(TisKvpia}T4pa

641, a, 30: the scientific investigator has to deal with the soul still more than with the body, oarcp /xaWov t] v\r] Si'
rrjs vXiKTJs (l)v(r(as.

iKeivTju (piKTis iarlv

*

fj

dvdira\iv.

Phys.

oUffrfs rrjs

ii. 1, 192, b, 20: us (pvaews apxvs rivhs /col

airias rod KiuetaQai koX -^pefxeTu iv

(rrdaeus iv avrfj (or 1. 26: ircpl toiovtov hv ean Swarhv KiveTadai). It is indifferent whether nature is described as the substratum of motion merely, or of rest as well, since, according to Aristotle, rest {^p^fiia, <TTd(ris) belongs as an attribute only to those things to which motion belongs, or at least can belong, and is merely (rreprfais

vwapx^i irpdoruis KaO' avrh /col fiTj Kara avixfie^rtKos. 1. 32: <i)V(ns fifv o5j/ i(TTLTO pr]div (pvcTiv 8e e;^ei oaa ToixvTrjv Hx^t apxW' Metaph.

Phys. iii. 2, 202, a. 3, 226, b, 12, c. 6 iidt., vi. 3, 234, a, 32 c. 8 239, a, 13, viii. 1, 251, a, 2^.
Kivfjo-eus.

2,

E 2

420

ARISTOTLE
^

the character of this

force

'

with accuracy

On

the

one

side

lie

considers

Nature as a Single Being,

attributing to

her a

life

which permeates the world

throughout,^ and a definite design which determines

and

unifies all its parts.

He

talks of the aims

which
In a

she attempts to realise in her creations, although the

properties of matter often thwart her purpose.

except by the

word, he uses expressions that can scarcely be explained analogy of the human soul and the

Platonic anima mundi^^ although he distinctly argues

against this idea as conceived by Plato. Though he remarks that the designs of Nature are not determined by deliberation like those of an artist,^ and though in general we cannot attribute to him any real and intentional personification of Nature, yet

the

analogy re-

mains.^

On

the other side, however, he undoubtedly

regards

living

beings as individual
life

substances.
to

He

ascribes an individual principle of

them, and he

never indicates, or sets himself to discover, how this Nor principle is related to the single force of Nature.
does he teach us
causality."^

how Nature
insisting
it

is

related to the divine

When

of divinity, he denies
'

to

upon the exact significance any but rational beings ^

;

See the end of this chapter. Proofs of this are innu;

merable it will suttice to refer to the discussion of design in nature which follows in the text. As will be shown in its
proper place. ^ By analogy is meant, not identity, but similarity. Cf. with what follows BeanDlS, iii. a. 113 sqq.
' '
'"

^ovov fxercx^i' [^b twv v) yap avOpdiruv ycuos^ tov Oeiov ruv r]/juu yvupificap ^(fOiV ^ fidXiara irdvrcov. man stands iv. 10, 686, a, 27 upright Sia rh rrju (picriv aitrov Kal T^v ovalav eli/at delav epyoi/ 5e tov rh voe7v Kal <ppovilu. deioTOLTOv Eth. N. X. 7, 1177, a, 13 sqq. (cf vovs is the divine in p. 1 65, n. 1) man, and therefore the highest activity is the theoretic.
a, 7
: :

As

in Part.

An.

ii.

10, 656,

PHYSICS
and from
this point of
is

421

view he will not allow that Nature

as a whole

divine, but only

demonic*

Yet there

are

other passages in which he seems to follow the popular

theology of the Greeks, who recognised and revered an immediate exhibition of divine force in natural phenomena. Nature and God are so used synonymously,^'

and a share
view
as
is

in

divinity

is

conceded to

all

natural

existences, however trivial.^

Indeed, this vacillation of

deeply rooted in Aristotle's philosophy.

is

So

far

God

the

first

cause of motion,

all

motions in the

universe must proceed from

Him

natural forces can

only be an emanation of his force, and natural causes a

manifestation of his causality.

On

the other hand,

if

we

confine the functions

of the

primum movens

to

setting the outer sphere of heaven in motion, these

conclusions

are impossible.
to

If even in the heavenly

sphere

we have

Mover a series still more necessary in order to explain the much greater variety of movements in the realm of nature to assume a train of independent substances endowed with motive power of their own. How the harmony of these movements or their conjunction in an orderly
system
'

assume in addition to the Supreme of subordinate and eternal beings, it is

is effected, it is

hard to say.
:
:

It

cannot be by the

Dhin. p.

S. c. 2, 463, b, 12

since beasts also dream,

;

dreams

cannot be divine they may, however, be demoniacal r) yap <pv(ns

;

Etli. N. x. 10, 1179, 4xei rh -irav. rh /xev oduTrjs (ptxrctas [the b, 21 moral disposition] Sid nvas 9ias alrias rois us aK-ndcos evrv.

Saifxovia,
'^

Be

a\\' ov Oeia. Cado, i. ^ fin.: 6 Oehs Kal

X^*'""'

viroipx^i.

The

dflai

alriai

correspond here to the Platonic

Oeia
/xoTpa,

rj

(pvffis

ovSeu fxarriv noiova-iv.

Gen.

as to

et Corr. ii. 10, 386, b, 27 sqq. (see r\ext chapter, infra). Polit. vii. i,

LER's Plato and

svjjra.

which see Zelcf. p. 402 sqq.

1153, b, 32:

rovro ^32: edas y'ap ^vvajxius epyop, ^ris Kal t6S avu1326,
a,

Mh. N.

vii. 14,

iravra yap (pvaei ex^i ti Quov.

422

ARISTOTLE

natural operation of the priWtm movens upon the world.

Aristotle's philosophy, moreover, excludes the conception

of God's immediate interference in the course of the

universe; and

it

would be

illegitimate

to

attribute

to Aristotle the popular belief in Providence,

on the

strength of a passing allusion to

it

in his writings.^

Consequently

it

remains in obscurity whether we are to

regard Nature as a single force or as an assemblage of

forces, as

something independent or as an emanation

;

from the divine activity

or,

on the other hand, whether

we ought to combine these two points of view, and, if so, how we ought to do it. But meantime we may
permit Aristotle further to unfold his view of Nature.
'J'lie

most important idea with which we have

is

to

deal in the Philosophy of Nature

that of Motion.

In

our earlier researches

general bearing
;

we had

therefore

to examine this idea in its what now remains is that we

should

analysis of physical
special sense.

supplement our previous conclusions with an motion in its stricter and more

Motion was defined generally on

actualisation of

p.

380

sq.

as

the

what

exists potentially.

By

analysing

the different sorts of Motion

we

arrive at the special

definition of its physical character.

Aristotle distin(J)i\q3V

'

Eth.K.x.

9,

1179,3,22:

troiuv us
fiivovs

ruu

5e

Kara vovv iuepycov Kal rovrou

Koi

opOws

depaircvccv koi SiaKelfxcvos apiarra Kal

60((>iXe(rraTos eoiKcu elvuL
et

trpdrrovras.
(ro(f>(fi

on

avTols iTrififXovre koI KaXws Se iravra ravra rai

yap

fidXicrO^ virdpx^i,

ovk SStjAov.

Tis

ewLU^Kcia rCov auOpunrivoov inrh deuv yivirai, lixmep SoKe7, Kal etVj &j/

60<pi\4(TraTOS

&pa.
is

It is obvious

that

Aristotle

here arguing
;

evXoyov xatp^"'
Kal
ciTj

'""^

ovToi/s

t^ apiffTcp
aya-rraiuTas

ry
6

(Tvyyet/e(rrdr(p (rovro S' &i/

from popular conceptions he himself ascribes to God no external operation.

sujjra. Cf. pp.

povs)

Kal

Tovs

389sqq.

lndXiffra

rovro Kal rinwvras avrev-

PHYSICS

423

giiishes three kinds: quantitative motion, or increase

and decrease; qualitative motion, or alteration; and motion in space, or locomotion to which may be added as a fourth kind, birth and destruction.^ Now all these

kinds of movement
third

may

be ultimately resolved into the

For,
if

kind Motion in Space. them more closely, we find that

we examine

increase or growth, to

begin with, consists in the addition of fresh material to matter which has already received a certain form the
:

increment
that which

is
it

potentially but not actually identical with

augments, and assumes

its

form

in other

a,

Phys. V. 1, 225, a, c. 2, 226, 23 (Metajjh. xi. 11, 12), cf.

stance (birth and destruction) is not admitted to be motion (simicf Simpl. c. 5, 229, a, 30 Phys. 201, b, who extends the statement to the Peripatetic school in general, remarking, however, that Theophrastus, among others, did not keep strictly to elsewhere this use of language)
larly
;
.

Mefapk. viii. 1, 1042, a, 32, xii. 2 mit.,P/iy8.Yiil 7, 260, a, 26, 261, Gen. et a, 32 sqq., vii. 2 init. De An. i. Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31 Long. v. 3, 465, b, 3, 406, a, 12, .^0; De Ccelo, iv. 3, 310, a, 25. Aristotle here Cat. c. 14 init. three generally distinguishes
; ;

kinds

change {fieTafioXi}) from being to being, from being to not-being, and from
of transition

not-being to being. Tlie first is motion in the stricter sense, the second destruction, the third
orif/ination.

Aristotle treats this also as a form of motion, and uses * motion' as synonymous with ' change.' See p. 382, n.'i,svpTa. Phys.\ii. 2,243, a, 21 (cf. Pe An. i. 3, 406, a, 4) distinguishes two kinds of loco:

that which is selfmotion he then originated and that which is The divides into the kinds mentioned caused by something else.

Motion

in the text
KOTCt Trddos

(Kiuriffis

Kara

fieycdos,

and Kara

roirov,
7,

as he

calls

them Phys.

viii.

260, b,

26), and, taking birth

tion rates
T)

and destrucagain together, thus enume:

four kinds of fieTafioXi] Kara rh ri (yeveffis Kal (pQopa), -q Kara, rh iroffdv {aij^riais /col (pOiais), Karb. 7] Kara rh iroihu (ctAAotaxrts), 7] rh TToO {(popa). That these are the only categories under which motion caa be thought, is shown Phys. V. 2, where change of sub-

four kinds the StVrjo-Js, third and fourth of which, however, may be resolved into the Cf. viii. 10, 267, b, 9 first two. Pe An. iii. 10, 433, b, 25 sqq. Ingr. An. c. 2, 704, b, 22 i3fot. An. c. 10, 703, a, 19); the
latter
e\^is,

again

is

of

&(ris,

6xV(ris,

statement mRhet.i.

5,

1361, b,

16, is less exact. "Cicns is either in the stricter sense, or io-is

nrK-nyi]
;

An.

ii.

8,

3{eteor. iv. 9, 386, a, 33 ; Pe 419, b, 13,andcf. Pr(>&^.

424

ARISTOTLE

words, such increase is an augmentation of matter, the form remaining constant. Similarly decrease is the diminution of matter without change of form.i
tive

Quantitative alteration, therefore, implies both qualitamovement and locomotion. 2 But the second of
is

these two

prior to the first

for

every transformation

results from the coincidence of

something which proit is

duces
active

it

with something in which

^

produced, of an

and a passive element

is

This coincidence, then,

for (although the not necessarily true) the patient must always be touched by the agent, and contact cannot be effected

can only take place by local contact,

converse

without locomotion.''

Even the
tion,
is

last species of

change, birth and destruc-

eventually founded upon

movement

in space.

If

one

were to assume
existence,

an absolute beginning
could

or
not,

end of

such a transmutation

indeed, be called a movement, since in such a case the substratum of the movement would itself

begin

or end.

But

birth

and annihilation

in this absolute

sense

are really impossible.^

Everything starts from

xxiv. 9,936, b, 38. IdeleE,^W#. Meteor, ii. 509. P tae the full discussion in Gen. et Corr. i. 5.
-'

Phys.
lloiuv

viii. 7,

'

2G0, a, 29, b. 13.

tlie

physical sense

IS

synonymous
^

aWoiovv,
aOai.
(TLs

to Aristotle with Trdax^Lv with aWoiov:

Of. Ph7/s. in. ^ fin.

kWoiw-

fi^v

yhp
7]

aWomThv,
pificoTpov

rod aWoiwTov, f, ivT\4xia tri Se yuco7]

rovro 5' oh ^ Kivr^ais vdOos Kaff Strou iWoLovrai ixdvov. On a further meanin'>* of 7rote?y see in n. 1 to p. 400 * Phys. viii. 7, 260, b, 1 sqq where it is further remarked that all qualitative changes are ultimately resolvable into rarefaction and condensation, which involve change of place. Geoi. et Cm-r. i. 6, 322, b, 21 sqq. c. 9, 327, a,
iriffxovTinrddos -

Tov Swdfiei TTOiririKov

f,

1, of, p.
^

386.

Kol Tra9r)TiKou

toiovtou.

i. 6, 322, b, 9, 323, a, 17: ov yap ol6v re irav rh Kivovv ttoicTv, finep rh iroiovy o.vTiB'{]<TofXv t^

6om

Gen.

et

et Corr. i. 3, amonoarguments, shows thai matter would in the end be all used up, if destruction were to
Ge7i.

other

PHYSICS
sort,

425
i

being of some

and
Its

is

resolved into being again,

It is only a particular object, as such, that begins

ends
its

its

existence

beginning

is

the
else.^

end,

aod and

end the beginning, of something

in so
far as generation

Consethe
sur-

quently,
different

and destruction are

affects
it

from change, this difference only

individual object.

The individual changes when

vives as a whole, although its qualities alter, but it is generated or destroyed when it, as a whole, begins or

ceases to exist.^ If on the contrary we regard the universe and not the individual, then generation and destruction coincide partly with composition and division, partly with the transmutation of materials.^ Now both of these processes are occasioned by movement in
space.'^

cause

all

Everything that comes into being has its becoming implies a being by which it is
'
'
' '

mean
-^j

actual annihilation (318, ,

...

a,

^^^' ^' ^'' yeveais ehai irpc^TT] Twv Kiuvcrea,u 5LhTovro,'6Tiyueaeai Set t5 TTpay^ia irpuTov. rh S' >'
S6^i

,,v

T'i 7 hv

^"^',

7]

in the irddv, birth and destruction by change in the viroKeifxevop, whether in respect of its form (\6yos) or its matter c 4, 819
;

fpbs fi^v 6T0V0VV tS>v yivotxh^v ovTws exei, erepou hvayKoTiov wpdT^pdy TiKiv.Tfrdai Twu yiuofi4yu,p ov avTb Kal fi-q yiySfievov, Kal rovrov erepou irpSr^pou. Cf. 38 1-7.

aW

p.

Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, a, 23 5ia rh r^v rouSe (pdopav &KKov ^Ivai y4vjaiv. /ca2 r^V rov^^ y^p^triv &A.\ov Hvai (f>dopau diravarov amy'
:

10: kWoiucris /n^u iariv, 'drav rov iwoKeifidvov, alaOr}. rov Hvtos, fierafidWv iu to7s a{>rov TrdO^ffiu .... Uap' S' '6\ov ^erafidWr, fii] hirofx^vovros alaB-nrov rivos oos viroKeifieuov rov avrov y4u<rLS ijSn rh toiovtov, rod 'si
h,
{,Trofx4vovTos

<peopd.

319, a, 20,
P'
3
'

^^-^"^o^V. o?n " ^^^? .T^"

11.

IMd.
Cf.

10,
,^

336, b, 24.

fan yap

i. 2, SU, a, 20: yevetris air\rj Ka\ <bdoph ov (TvyKpmec Kal SiaKpia-^i, Urav

(ren.et Corr.

dW

b 31 where he argues that geis effected by definil e becoming transmuted and determined in certain ways by the agency of efficient forces destruction, on the other hand by the conquest of the passive
sqq.,

Cf. Meteor, iv. 1, 378,

neration materials

matter
form.
^

over

the

MeTa^a\A77

determining^
260,

/c

rovS^

els

roSe o\ov.

'AKKoiacris is

produced by change

Cf. P/ii/s.

viii. 7,

b 8

426

ABISTOTLE
Since this, as

produced.
tion,

we saw

in tbe case of altera-

cannot operate without movement in space, such

Again, if movement must precede all generation.^ movement in space precedes generation, it must of necessity precede growth, change, decrease, tion
;

and destruc-

since these processes can only be carried on in that

which has previously been generated.^ Therefore this species of motion is the first in the order of causality, as
well as in the order of time and in the logical order also.^

Notwithstanding what has just been

is far

said, Aristotle

from explaining natural phenomena by the merely

mechanical principle of motion in space, as the Atomists

had done.
his

Even purely physical occurrences cannot, in satisfactorily accounted for by this method, seeing that many of them are only to be conceived as modes of qualitative alteration, or the
opinion, be

transmutation of

materials.''

Physics do not by any

Final Causes

means exhaust the conception of Nature.

TrdvTuiv TU3V KO.B-qfxa.Tuv apx'h tukttvkuciXTis Se uwffis Kol fidvoocris
.
.

Kol

jjLOLvcoais

avyKpiais Kal SiaKpLcris,

dent of these conceptions, and none of them are applicable to the heavens (260, b, 19 sqq. Gen. et
Corr.
ii.

KaO^ &s yivecris Kal (pOopd Aeyerat (XvyKpivofieva Se Kal rccv ovaiSiv.
ZiaKpivSjxeva
lj.eTa^6.A\iv.
^

10

init.).
is

So

also

move-

dvayKH]

Kara
a,

roirov
1

Fliys. ibid.
et Corr.
ii.

261,

sqq.

Gen.

10

init.

- Pkys. ibid, b, 7. It is here further pointed out in proof of the priority of movement in space,'
'

the only one of these conceptions which has to do with the eternal, and is of infinite duration (260, b, 29, 261, a, 27 Aristotle also argues that sqq.). because it is the last in time in rein space

ment

that, while it is presupposed by the others, it does not presup-

pose them. Without the movement of the heavens, neither o;eneration nor destruction, neither growth nor material change, could take place. Movement itself, on the other hand, is indepen-

spect to individual existences, it must be the first in nature (260, b, 30, 261, a, 13) and he holds that it causes the least change in the nature of the thing moved, and is the motion which the self -moving produces in preference to every other (261, a, 20). Ibid. 260, b, 15 sqq. ^ Seep. 304,n.3,andp.306,n.o.
;

PHYSICS
rise

427

above the material causes which subserve them

for in the

and these are not provided

Democritus.^
Lastly,
if it

philosophy of a
is

be true that 'becoming'

transition from potentiality to actuality, or a process of

development, and that the importance of Aristotle's natural philosophy consists, to a great extent, in having
first

made

this

notion
it

of development possible
it is

and

consciously given

the foremost place,

clear that

Aristotle could not favour opinions

^
'

which started with

alter-

an express denial of any becoming or qualitative

ation,

and

left

us nothing but a

movement in space

of un-

alterable materials. Therefore qualitative alteration must

be added to locomotion, even in the domain of matter, as a

second source of natural occurrences
:

but over against

both, Aristotle sets the teleology of nature, which uses as

means to its end all that is corporeal and determined by natural necessity. Next to Motion in Space, and not without direct relation to it, come investigations by which Aristotle further illustrates the idea of motion in his Physics and these include discussions upon the Infinite, Space, Time, the Unity and Continuity of Mot ion, ^ &c. The Infinite ^ had played an important part in pre* See p. 307, n. 4, and cf. p. 359, sq. supra. - He describes those conceptions, indeed, generally, iii. 1, 200, b, 15 sqq. c. 4 init., as belonging to the discussion upon motion, and deals with the first three in bks. iii. and iv. before the section upon the kinds of motion but the way in which he treats

them shows that he

chiefly of locomotion.

is

thinking

^ The discussion of this conception Aristotle introduces mPhys. iii. 1, 200, b, 15, with the words Zok^I h'' t] Kivr](Tis ^Ivairwv (rw^x^^i rh S' &Treipov SfKpaiverai irpwrov ii/ t&5 (ruvexe?; c. 4 mif. he remarks that natural science deals with masses, motion, and time, each of which is either finite or infinite, On what follows see Zeller, P//. d. Or. pt. i. 186.
:

428

ARISTOTLE
Plato and the Pythagoreans

Aristotelian pliilosophy.

went
to

so far as to

make
:

it

an element of

all

things, and
this

therefore a substance.

Aristotle begins
'

by proving

be impossible

'

infinity

does not belong to the

order of substances but of qualities.'

that an 'infinite magnitude'
is is

Then he shows
For suplimited by
is

inconceivable.

pose

it

to be a body,
;

body

that which

superficies

or if

it

be a number, numbers are capable

is

of being counted, and that which can be counted

infinite.^

not

Lastly,

and more
the

especially,

an

infinite

body

could neither be composite nor simple.

It could not

be

composite,

since,

elements being limited in

number, an infinite body could not be made up of them unless one of them were infinite in magnitude, and such an element would leave no room for the rest.^

And

to think of
first

it

as

simple

is

equally

impossible.

In the

place, as far as this world is concerned,

no

bodies exist except the four elementary ones, nor can

there be any out of which alone everything could come,

since
if
all

becoming moves between two opposites

it is

and
its
;

there be several primitive bodies,

infinite.'*
it

quite impossible

that one should be

Again, every body has

natural place, in which

abides,

and

to

which

it

tends

and this law determines the difference in weight between bodies every body without exception must exist
;

in a definite space, in a locality; but in the infinite

there is no definite locality, no distinction of up and down, centre and circumference, before and after, right and left.-^ Moreover, whereas it is manifest that bodies
'

Phys.

n. 2,
-

and

iii. 6, 204, a ; see p. 312, p. 325, n. 2, supra. Phys. ibid. 204, b, 4.

i.

7 init.
*

Ibid. 204:,h, 11, cf.

Be

Ctelo,

iv.

Phys. ibid. 204, b, 22. Ibid. 205, a, 8 to end of chap., 8, 215, a, 8. De Ccelo, i. 6

PHYSICS
either

429

move

in a circle like the celestial spheres or in

straight lines

up and down

like the elemental bodies,

infinity admits of neither of these

movements.
is

The

former

is

impossible, because circles are by their nature

circumscribed, and circular

movement

a centre, whereas in the infinite there

latter,

is

rotation round no centre the

; ^

end.2

because lineal motion has a starting point and Indeed, infinity could not move at all, since it
' '

would take

infinite

time to traverse the smallest con-

ceivable space.^

Finally, Aristotle uses an

argument
formless

conclusive with Greeks,

who could not imagine

is

being shape

the infinite, as such,

call that infinite
is

incomplete and without

is

we

the magnitude of which

indeterminable, which

never finished and complete,

which cannot be limited in such a way as not to leave some portion of it outside."* The infinite first becomes a whole and complete when it is enclosed by means of form. But the world cannot be conceived except as complete and a whole.^ It is therefore impossible that
imt.
sqq.
c. 7,

274, b, 8, 29, 276, b, 6

^o>

Aristotle's
firiSev

words

In c. 6, 273, a, 21 sqq., the same conclusion is reached by showing that infinite bodies mui-t be infinitely heavy or light, but
infinitely heavy or an infinitely light body is an impossibility, since it must either exhibit infinite speed or be absolutely immovable. As is shown, at unnecessary length, De Coelo, i. o, 271, b, 2ri sqq. 272, b, 17 sqq. c. 7, 275, b,
'

yap ov

e^cc,

ov are aAA' ov aei

:

eVrl,

tout'

aireipSv

iariv,

an

where, however, the antithesis is merely verbal, ov jwrjSej/ e|a) meaning that beyond which nothing exists,' ov aei n e|a>, on the other hand, M hat of which a part always remains beyond.'
'

12.
'^

De

Coelo,

i.

6 init.
a,

Also
21

c. 7,

275, b, 15 sqq.
^

IMd.

c.

6, 272,
a, 36.

sqq.

Phy.

vi. 7,

238,

6 see at p. ^^Q,sup. 715, b, 14 ^ Se (pvais ((xvyei rh direipov rh /xev yap &iripov oTeAes, tj 5e (fivais ael ^T/ret rehos The objection {Phys. iii. 4, 203, b, 22 sqq.) that infinite space presupposes also an infinite body, he afterwards sets asidc(iv. 5,212, a,31, b,8, 16 sqq.;
^

Pliys.

iii.

Gen. An.

i.

430

ARISTOTLE

the infinite, as such, should really exist as an inter-

minable magnitude.^

Yet we cannot entirely do without it. Time, and is measured by time, are without beginning or end. Magnitudes are capable of* infinite
motion, which
division,
cf.

number
i.

of

infinite

increase.^

Hence we

see p. 395, n. siqjj'o) by his peculiar definition of space as the boundary between the enclosing- and the enclosed. The boundary of the world itself is, therefore, according to his beyond it iew, not in space there is no space either void or
Ccelo,
9,
'
;

De

ther it be spatial size, or time, or motion, can consist of what is

indivisible. Continuous magnitude can only be constituted (according to Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 10) by such elements as have a common boundary, and, moreover, lie outside one another indivisible magnitudes, on the other hand, must either lie wholly outside one another, in which case they would have no point of contact, or must wholly coincide (Phys. vi. 1 init., cf. Gen. et Corr.

occupied. Phys. iii. b Jin. on iuepyeia ovk effri (TUfxa

' :

fxkv

ovv
1(5

&ireLpou,

(ptxv^pbv

e/c

TdUTOJv.

c.

(5,

206, a,

T^ 8e/ie')e9os oTi war' ivepyeiav ovk

^(TTLv &Tripov, i1pif]Tai
;

ibid, b, 24.
:

Phys.
IdTiv

iii.

6,

itiit.

otl

5'

el

fxi]

uireipov

ctTTAis,

iroWa

ahvvaTa (Tv/j-fiaiueL, brjXou. rod re yap xP^^"^ ecTTat tis apx^l Kal Tf AewTT?, kclI ra fxey^dr] ov Smipera
/cat apiO/j-ds ovk earai Aristotle proves in particular: (1) the eternity of time, and with it the eternity of motion which is measured by time. Besides the passages quoted p. 388, n. l,seeP////.viii. 1, 251, b, lOsqq. and cf. 3Ictaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 7. He argues that as every present is the middle point between the past and the future, and every moment is a present, it is wholly impossible to conceive of any moment of time which has not a before and after, and therefore of any which could be a first or a last moment, a beginning or an end of time. (2) He proves the infinite divisibility of

els

ixeyedr],

dneipos.

817, a, 2 sqq., I)e Cceloy iii. 306, b, 22). The assumption of indivisible bodily surfaces or lines is not only incompatible with the fundamental principles of mathematics (Be Ccelo, iii. 1, 298, b, 33 sqq, c. 5, 303, a, 20, c. cf. the treatise n. 7, 306, a, 26
i. 2,

8,

uto/jluv

ypafi/uLwu),

but

it

would

magnitudes, by showing that nothing which is continuous, whe-

likewise make the most universal of all physical phenomena, viz. motion, impossible, for, magnitude and time being alike indivisible,it is impossible to traverse one part before another. Inrespect, therefore, of each of the indivisible elements and accordingly also of the whole which is constituted by them motion could only be predicated as a thing of the past, never as a thing of the present (Phys. vi. 1, 231, b, 18 sqq. cf c. 2, 233, a, 10 sqq. c. 9, 239, b, 8, 31), and all difference of velocity must also in like manner vanish (ihid. c. 2, 233, b, 15 sqq.)

PHYSICS

431

must conclude tliat the infinite exists in one sense and not in another or in other words, that it has
:

a potential but not an

sibility of

actual

existence.
is is

The
;

divi-

magnitudes in space

indefinite

yet

we

an infinitely small particle. The multiplication of numbers has no limit yet there is no infinitely great number.^ In a word,
therefore argue that there

may not

the infinite can never be represented in actuality.

It is

always potential, and in

opposite directions
division,

its

two manifestations takes

being capable of infinite
:

extension

but not of infinite augmentation

number, on

the other hand, of infinite augmentation, but not of

infinite division, since the unit is

the smallest number.^

Real infinity is only possible in incorporeal substance

Again, all change is excluded in things indivisible, for change involves division between an earlier and a later condition {Phys. vi. 4 'mit.). In particular, when we come to the indivisible elementary bodies and surfaces of Democritus and Plato, we shall find these beset by a whole series of new difficulties in addition to the above. (3) Lastly, as there is no highest number, number is capable of infinite multiplication. This, however, has never been disputed, and therefore requires
&ireipov. Only we must not suppose that this potentiality can

TO

ever
Tt
. .

become
ov
dAA.'
7,

actual,
Xafifidvciu

&(rr6

rh

direipoy
.

Set

ws roSe

del eV yeveaei fj (pdopa, 207, b, 11 (on the infinity of number) Ibcrre Swdfi^i

&c.

c.

fx4v

iffriv,

ivepyeia

5' oti

'

ctAA.'

dei

virepfidW^i rh Aafi^auSfjievov iravrhs wpifffiivov irk-fiOovs. dAA' ov xcwpttrrhs 6 apidfihs ovros tt)s SixoTOfiias, obSh ij.4pi 7] aireipla yiverai,

dWa

ciffirep

Koi 6 xpovos Kal 6 dpiQjxhs rov

no proof. Phys.
'

iii.

6,

206,

a,

12 sqq.
rh

TTws fi\v ecrri [rh &ireipov'], ircas S'

oij.

Keyerai

5^

rh

elj/ot

fxev

It is shown also, Gen. et Xpovov. Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 14 sqq., with respect to infinite divisibility, that ic never can be actually realised in fact and therefore exists only potentially. It is just because it
is

merely

'

4v

Swd/xei.

that

the

6.ireLpov

ecTTL fj.hu irpoo'deaei

ecrt 8e
'6ti /j.kv

Infinite

is

reckoned

among

Kol a(j)aip4(Ti. rh 5e iJ,4ye6os

Kar'

iu4pyeiau

ovk

%(Ttiv
'

^ir^ipov,

ftprjrai,
XctA.6irbj/

diaipecei

ypafj-fids

oh yap ras aTd/xous AeiTrerat ovv Sufo/tet efj/ot

S' iffriv

aveXuv

material causes (see p. 350, n. 1, supra). Phys. iii. 7. Time, however, even Aristotle holds to be infinite
'^

in both directions.

432
as

AiasTOTL^
infinity of force.

an

This
is

also,

however,

is

manifested

only in a series which

never exhausted, and in the

Space,

endless motion of the world.'

In proceeding to the notion of

remark, in the
it

we may

first pl^ce,

that Aristotle did not regard

as the boundary-line or shape of individual bodies

for in this case bodies

until their space,

would not move in a space, but

sively enter the

tified

and same

several bodies could not successpace.

No more
is

can

it

be idenalso
is it

with

the

matter of bodies,

since

this
:

inseparable from the body which

in space
is

nor is

that which circumscribes, but that which

scribed.

circumit

In the third place, we

may

not regard

as

the distance between the boundaries of bodies, since

this distance

changes with the bodies, whereas space

remains always the same, whatever

within
it.2

may

exist

and move

Space may more properly be defined as the limit of the surrounding body in respect to that which
it

surrounds.^

The place

of each particular body*

is

therefore formed by the (internal) limits of that which

surrounds
world.
*
'^

it,

and space

in general

by the

limits of the

See notes to p. 395, supra. Phys. iv. 1-4, cf. esp. 211, b, 5 sqq., 209, b, 21 sqq. ^ To irepas rod iripi^xovros adofiaros, or, more accurately, to ToG irepiexouTos irepas aKivrirov
2

It is strange that space should here be called as in c. 4, 212, a, 20 (cf. n. 3, supra) rod ohpavov ri rb
(Txo.Tov KaX aTTTOficvov rod Kivqrov
(xdiixaros irepas T]pfiovv for we are told (v. below and p. 377) that the vault of heaven moves continually in a circle. Aristotle
;

trpwrov.

Cf

De

Coelo,- iv.

3,

310,

b, 7.
'

"iSios tJttos,
iv.

Phys.
irpSjTos

init.,

T6iros Koiv6s.

as it is called as opposed to It is also called 6

rdiros 4v

iarlv cKacrrov

ibid. c. 4, 211, a, 28.

5

Phys.

iv. 5,

212, a, 31, b, 18.

(c. 4, 212, a, 18 212, a, 31 sqq., viii. 9, 265, b, 1 sqq.) that just as in the case of a ball which spins round its own axis without otherwise moving- the circumference is as

means, however
sqq.
c.

5,

PHYSICS
Aristotle obtains the notion of

438

Time by a similar Time cannot exist without motion, since it is only by the movement of thoughts that we perceive it.
process.^

Yet

it is

not motion, since motion

itself is
is

inseparable
in one case

from the object moved, and therefore

faster, in

another slower
its

whereas time
is

is

universally
fast.

the same, and

movement
it.

always equally

It

follows that time stands in a special relation to motion,

but

is

different

from

It is the

of motion in respect to

what
the
' '

is earlier

measure or the number and later.^ The

unit of this

number

is

now.'

Time

is

occasioned

by the movement of the

continuous, in so far as
sent
'

now.'

It is this that

makes

time at once a continuous and a discrete magnitude

is the same in the prewas in the past discrete, in so far as its being is different in each moment.^ These notions of Time and Space involve the infinity of the former and the finitude of the latter and
'

now

moment

as

it

we

already

know
the

Aristotle's
them."^
the

further reasons for this

distinction
stationary
circular
its

between

In like manner his concep11, of. p. 220, a, T6 5^ 6 xp^vos rep vvv KoX Sfpp7)Tai Kara rh vvv 219, b, 9 Clxrircp 7) Kivncris aei 6.Wi] kol aWrj, Kal 6 xp^^os 6 5' cifia nas xP^vos 6 avros rh yap vvv rh avrh 8 ttot' i)v rh S' elvuL avrcp erepov. Ibid. c 13, init. rh 5e vvv icrri awextia Xpdvov ffwex^i yap rhv xp^fov rhv irape\66vra Kal ea6/j.evov, Kal
iv. c.

as

centre,

motion affecting merely pans, since only those change

position,

(Tvi/X'f)!f

their

the highest heavens move only in a certain respect, and are in space only Kara (Tvfifie^rjKds, and in so far as their ] tarts move and are in space (^Be
so
( 'o'lo,

'

V, 5,

which passage Bban-

Dis, ii. b, 748, w^rongly suspects). In a like sense it is said (212, a, 18) that the river is stationary, and that only the individual

oKoDS

TTcpas

XP^^*^^
-p

icTTiv
fj

'

Siaipe? Se
ael erepov

Swdfief koI
rh vvv,
.

/xev toiovto,

dh avvSe?, del rb

waves move.
'

Phys.

iv. 10, 11.

avr6 ravrd

'ApidfjLQs

Kiwria-ews

Kara
1 1 Jjn.
;

to

npSrepov Koi varepov, c. Ccelo, i. 9, 279, a, 14.

Be

eari Se ravrh Kal Kara rj Siaipcais Kal r] V(0(tis, t6 8' elvai ov ravrd. * Cf. p. 428 sqq., and 387, supra. Aristotle, however, here
.
.

VOL.

I.

434

ARISTOTLE
If

tion of Space implies the impossibility of a vacuum.

Space

is

the limit of the enclosing body in relation to

the enclosed,

space where there

we cannot but conclude that there is no empty space would be is no body

:

an enclosure that encloses nothing.

Aristotle tries on

this point, with minute and patient arguments, to con-

fute the widely-received assumption of a vacuum, which, owing mainly to the teaching of the Atomists, had become part of the current Natural Philosophy. The reasons with which they had supported it appear

him inconclusive. Movement does not need to be explained by such an hypothesis, since we can imagine that
to

another body quits the space which the object in motion

enters.

Condensation

may

be referred to

th-e

exit of
;

air or other

matter from the bodies in question

rare-

faction to its entrance into them.

The expansion which

water, for example, experiences

(that
is,

when passing

into air

into steam)

may

be explained by the alteration

:

of materials, which necessitates another degree of rarity

or the

phenomena

of gravity by the tendency of the

^

The vacuum elements to reach their natural place. would rather put a stop to the possibility of motion.
Since emptiness yields equally on all sides, one cannot imagine anything capable of determining a body to
follow
afford

one direction

rather than another.

localities.

It

would
special
it

no distinction of natural
it.

No

motion could take place in

distinguishes, as Plato had done (Tm. 37, D, 38, b), between the endless time in which mutable existence moves, and eternity (aiwv) or the timeless being of

On

the other hand,

the

immutable.
3.

Phys.
i.

iv,

12,

221. b.
;

De
iv.

Coelo,

9,

279, b,

11-28 see Phys.

1

p. 895, n. 6,
7,

mpra

sqq. 214, a, 24 s(

c.

8 mit,

c.

PRYSICS
would be equally impossible, on
infinite
tlie

436

hypothesis
for

of
in

vacuity,

to
if

assign bodies

any reason
of the

rest

Nature

Again,

fall

or rise with a rapidity

proportioned to the rarity

medium through which they are moving, everything would have to fall or rise with infinite rapidity through the infinite rarity
of the void. greater masses

On
fall

the other hand,

if,

ceteris paribus,

or rise quicker than smaller ones

because they more easily overcome the withstanding medium, then in the void, where there is no resistance to

overcome, the smallest would move as quickly as the

greatest.

Lastly,

how

are

we

to

conceive that an

empty space exists beyond the space occupied by bodies, since, if a body entered that space, there would then be two spaces, an empty and a fall, the one within the other? And what is the use of such a void space, since every body has its own extension ? Besides, by
*

maintaining that there

empty space or any space at all beyond the world, one would end in the contradiction of asserting that a body could be where no body can.^ If empty Space is impossible, empty Time, filled with no movement, is equally inconceivable, since Time is
is

nothing but the number of motion.^ Aristotle, in fact, maintains the eternity of motion as having neither be'

Phys.iv.S; ct Be Coph,

iv.

In estimating- the force of these arguments we must, of course, take accoimt of the state of scientific knowledge at the time, and of the presuppositions which were shared by Aristotle and the Atomists alike. See
2.

Kevhv ovSh xP<^j/os eVrlj/ e|o. TOV iO) ovpavov- iv airavTi yap tSttcp SwatoV v-ndp^ai trcDyuo- Keuhu S' (hal
(paaiv

iv

ju^

iwircipx^i
.

(xooixa,
.

nwarhv
de

p. 442, infra.
&fxa

5e

J^^

5rj\ov

P'^\ on

^-

^'

ovSh tottos ovSh

P^'

a,

11

5' iat\ yeviaOai r|co rod ovpavov SeS^iKrai on ovt' ^anv oUr' ivdix^rai yeviaOai (ru:ixa. P/njs. \m. 1. 251, b, 10: t^ irpSrepov Kal varepov irws iffrai xP^vov fx)] ivros; ^ 6 xp^vos fx^
.
-^

ova-qs

Kiv^crecos ;

et

S-fj

ianv
2

FF

430

ARISTOTLE

ginning nor end.^ On this point he suggests the remarkwhether there could be Time without a able question
:

soul ?
is

And he answers it by saying that Time in its essence

implicit in motion, but that in reality it cannot be without the soul, because number does not exist without a calculator, and reason is the only calculator.^ But we

should

make

a mistake

if

we sought

to discover in this

remark any
philosophy.

inclination to the idealist theory of

so vast a.n

which has obtained

Its

importance in

Time modern

apparent bias towards Idealism pro-

ceeds from Aristotle's not conceiving the ideas of Time and Space in as pure and abstract a sense as is familiar
to us.

Although he does not go so far as Plato, who identified Space with extended substance, and Time
stars,-^

with the motion of the

yet he never attempts to

make an
Xpovos

accurate distinction between Space and

apiO/xhs
v)

Time

Kiv'cr^ois
ael

Kiuria-'s

Tis, e^Trep

xpoJ'os eVrii/. audyKf]

Koi KLur}(nv a'ibLou

2o

avayKt)
fjL^v

aWa
i.

Ibid. 1. elvai.. ^hai ael xP'^^^'^dye xpo""". ^avephv on

.
.

avdyKfi
9.

elvai

Kal

Kiv^cnv,

direp

xpovos irddos ti
279,
a,
is

Kivfjcreajs.
:

De
8'

Coflo,

of its existence; v. Toesteik in Wi. Miis. xii. 1857, p. 101 sqq.], oiov el evSexerai Kivrjcnv elvai avev Aristotle is not quite \\ivx^sconsistent in his answers to the question, what faculty of the soul it is that perceives time. Accord-

world there
apid/xhs

outside the 14 no time, for xP^vos

ing to the above passage and

A II. iii.

10, 483, b, 6 sqq.,

Da we must

KLvhae'jos

KiurjaLS

&Uv
Cf. p.

(pvffiKov aa>ixaT0S ovk eariv.

395, n.
'

B,

supra.
a.

See p. 887. mpra. Phys. iv. 14, 22:'),

el

10 sqq.

esp.l. 25:
apie/xelu
r)

Se

jUTjSei'

^ux^

'aXXo irecpvKev "^ ^"XVS^ fovs,

suppose That it is the reason, and that the sense of lime is limited In the Be to rational beings. Mem. i. 450, a, 9-23, on the other hand, he assigns it 'to the wpwrou aia-e-nTiKhu, and attributes memory, which involves the perception of
time (ihid. 419, b, 28), to many of the lower animals (ibid, and Hist. An. i. c. 2, 453. a, 7 sqq.
1,

advuaTOU eh'ai XP^^^^ "^^xh^ f^h oijavs, a\\' r) tovto o irore uv iariv 6 xp<^'os [apart from the soul time, as such, cannot exist, but only that which constitutes the essence of time, the reality that
lies

488, b, 25).
3

See Zell. Ph.

2.

d.

Gt. Abth.

i.

pp. 613, 684,

beneath

it

as the substratum

PHYSIOS

4a7

as universal forms of sense, and the existence in which have seen that he cannot they are manifested.

We

conceive of space without physical locality, higher and lower, gravity and levity.^ He limits existence in space,
in
its

strictest sense, to that

which
itself,

is

surrounded by

another body different from position that there is no space beyond the world, and
that the world as a whole
single parts.^
ia not in space, but only its In the same way the homogeneous parts

arguing from this

of a coherent body, as parts of the whole, are only

space; they are not actually so until separated from the whole.^ It is the same with Time. Time, being the number of motion, presupposes an
potentially in

object

moved on

the one hand, and on the other a

counting subject.

He

remarks expressly, however, that

when Time

is called

the

number

of motion,

we must not

understand by the word number that by which one counts, but what is counted.'^ Number, that is, must be taken Far from not in its subjective but its objective sense. considering Time as a mere form of our perception, he
regards
it

rather as something

pertaining to motion,

and, indeed, to the body moved.

Outside the world,

where

bodies cease,

Time

also ceases to exist.^

In the further discussion of Motion which is found in Aristotle's Physics, our attention is chiefly drawn to
the points which bear

more directly upon his doctrine of the primum movens and the structure of the universe. He
P. 428, supra. says, therefore, Phys. iv. the movements of 1, 208, b, 8 simple bodies (fire, earth, &c.)
'

He

show

ov fx6vov

'6ti ea-ri

ri 6 rdiros,

real significance). ^ j^gg p. 429, n. 5, supra. * Phys. iv. 5, 212, b, 4. * PAys. iv. 11, 219, b, 6. * De Ccelo, i. see p. 435, 9
;

dA.A' oTi Ko.\

exet rivh dvyaij.iv (a

n. 3, svf>ra,

and

p. 3&!", n. 6.

438

ARISTOTLE

defines the meaning of coexistence in space, of contact, of intermediate space, of succession, of continuity, S>lc} He distinguishes the different relations in which the unity of motion can be spoken of,^ finding the absolute

that

unity of motion in continuous or unbroken movement is, in such as belongs to one and the same object

same relation at one and the same time.^ He asks what constitutes uniformity of motion and its opposite in what cases two movements, or movement and repose, may be said to be opposed to each other
in the
'^

how

far the natural or

unnatural character of a moveAfter

all

ment has
divisible

to be considered in either instance.-^

proving further that

continuous

magnitudes are
this
it

ad

infi^dttDn,''

that time

and space in
is

respect correspond, and that in reality

only with

P/ujs^ y.?>:

a^ia

fxev

ovv

Ae-yerat tcwt duai Kara tottoi/, oaa eV epl Tdtrcf iarl irpwrcv, x^p'^s Se

aTreaQai Se wv ra fxera^v oe els irecpvKe Trpwrou acpiKvMai rh fxerafidWou jpe^^s 5e ov fxera Tr}u dpx^u
o(Ta eV ere>(^,

of Bekker's smaller edition. ^ P/ajs. v. 4, 227, b, 21 awAws 5e yum Kyrjais rj rfj ovaia fxia Koi t<2 apiQfx^, the latter is the case when
:

<

a-Kpa'dixa,

t)

/xouoy SuTos

firiShv ixera^v

eVr
. .

not only the thing moved and the kind of its motfon {aWoiwais, (popa, k.c., together with their special varieties) but also the

Tu>u eV lavTCf yevei kou

[join with
.

time

is

the same, 228,

fxiav
.

a,

20

t-^u

TauT^j]

oil

4(pe^r\s

iariv.

re aTr\S>s

[^k\v'I](T iv~]
.

dvdyKr) koI
et

fX^l^^vov
cessive] t

8e

[immediately suc-

auvexv
fiia.
* ^
*"

^^i^ai

koI

(Tw^xhs,

....
KoX

tv 4(p^ris ov d-wT-nrai Xiyu) S' elvai avv^x^s

Ibid, b, 15 sqq.

[continuous], orav ravrh yevrirai %v rh iKarepov irepas ois diTToi/rai. In the <rvvex^s, therefore, there must be unity as well as contact. On acp^ of. Ge/t. et
323, a, 3. v. 4 init. motion is either yiv^i or Met or avKws juia. For other senses in which motion is said to be one,' see ibid. 228, b, 11 sqq. Of. vii. 1, 4, pp. 125, 139,
i.

Fhys.
Ibid.

V. o, 6.
vi. 1 sq.

2, sicjjra.

The

see p. 430, n. indivisible unit of

;

space and time (the pointand the moment) is therefore (as is shown

Corr.
-

6,

Phys.

'

De An. iii. 6, 430, b. 17 sqq.) never found existing actually and independently as a xpto-T^v, but only as contained potentially in the divisible, and not ever known except as a negation.

PHYSICS
finite spaces traversed in a finite

439

time that motion has

spaces are only said to be whereas which the time of motion traversed in the same sense of the establishes the he
to do
infinite

in

is

infinite

indivisibility

present moment, and concludes that in this unit neither

bility of

motion nor rest are possible.^ He discusses the divisimotion and of the body moved, ^ remarking that
alteration

every

attains

completion in an indivisible
its

moment, but that the moment of

beginning

is

never

capable of being accurately determined/ He shows that it is equally impossible to measure a merely finite space
in infinite time or an infinite space in finite time,

and

consequently that an infinite magnitude cannot move

any distance

at all in a finite time.'^

These conclusions

supply him with the means of refuting Zeno's argu-

ments against motion,^ and enable him to prove that the indivisible can neither move nor change in any way.'^
Finally,

he prepares the way

for

investigating the

movement

of the universe and its cause,

by asking^

whether there can be a single movement of infinite duration. After establishing the eternity of motion and
*
'^

Pky.
Ihid.

vi. 2,
c.

233, a, 13 sqq.

3,
:

and again

c. 8,

where he adds in the transition from motion to rest, the motion

long as the transition while, therefore, a thing is coming to rest, it is moving still, 3 Ihid. c. 4 (cf. also p. 430, n. 2). Motion according to this passage is divisible in a double sense first in respect of the time occupied, and secondly in respect of the object moved. * Ihid. c. 5, 6. We see from SiMPL. Phys. 230, a, m. 231, b,
lasts as
;

lasts

m. and Themist. Phys. 55, a, m., that difficulties had already suggested themselves to Theophrastus and Eudemus in connection with this view, ^ Phys. vi. 7 ; of. p. 429, n. 3, supra. Aristotle shows, P%s.viii. 9, 265, b, 10, that his predecessors also treated motion in space as the most primary,

Phys.

vi. 9, cf.

c.

2,

21, viii. 8, 263, a, 4,

and

233, a, p.^Sll,

supra. ^ Phys. viii. 10. At the end of this chapter.

**

440

ARISTOTLE
primum movens^ he
it

the necessity of a
if

gives this answer

^
:

there

is

a continuous and single

movement without
in space, for

beginning or end,

must be movement
other,'-^
:

not only does this precede every

is

but every other

a transition betw^een opposites

first

case the

^ and where this is the motion ceases at a certain point, at which

a new movement may begin in another direction, but one and the same cannot continue without a break.

The same argument proves that only

answers
all

circular motion

the necessary requirements.

If all

move-

ment

in

space must be either in a straight line, or

circular, or mixed,-"* a

endless duration
could.

mixed movement could only be of and continuous if both the others

in
a

Movement
points

straight

line

cannot

have
''

this character, since every finite rectilinear

movement

has terminal

at

which
it

it

ceases,

and though

betw^een these terminal points

may be

infinitely often

repeated,
stitute

yet these repeated

movements do not conCircular motion

is,

one continuous motion.

therefore, the only kind of

movement which, continuing

one and the same in unbroken sequence, can be without beginning and end.^ It unites the repose of the universe with unceasing motion, since
it

enables

it

to

move

'

Phys.

viii.

1-6; see p. 387

7
;

'

lUd.

261, a, 31 sqq.

sq. supra.
^

Among mixed
we must
all

forms of mothis division

Phys.

viii.

see p. 423 sq.

tion
**

in

supra.

reckon
;

Generation from not-being to being destruction from being to not-being increase from less to greater decrease from greater to less alteration from one state to another, e.g. from water to steam.
^
;

An

curves except the circle. intinite one is impossible,

'

not only in itself (see p. 430, n. 2, supra) but also because the world is not infinite, ^ All this is explained at length, Phys. viii. 8, 261, a, 27263. b, 3, 264, a, 7 sqq. c. 9 hdt.

PHYSICS
without changing
sure for
all its

441
^

place as a whole.
is

It is the

mea-

other movement. It alone

^

entirely uniform

whereas in rectilinear
this eternal rotation is

movement

rapidity increases in

proportion to the distance from the starting-point.^

How

of the

primum movens

"*

brought about by the operation we have already shown.

Important though movement in space is, as the most primitive kind of change on which all others are dependent, Aristotle cannot agree with the mechanical
theory of physics in merging
one, and iu

forms of change in this assuming only the combination and-separation,

all

while rejecting the transmutation, of materials.

questions arise upon this point.
distinction

Three

Is there a qualitative
?

between

sorts of

matter

Is there a quali-

tative alteration of materials ?

Is there such a

com-

bination of materials as to cause the change of their

'

PItys.

viii.

9,

265, b,

cf.

p. 398, 4.
-

Those, namely, which Aris-

totle treats as the natural

motions

other words, the downward motion of heavy, and the upward motion of
light bodies.
3

of elementary

bodies: in

With forcible move-

is the case. Phys. viii. 9, 265, b, 8 sqq. ^ The seventh book of the Physics is passed over in the above account, because it was not originally a part of the work (see p. 8 1, n. 2, svpra). Its contents are as follows. After it has been explained in c. 1 that every movement must have its source in a

ments the opposite

privium movens, and in c. 2 (see p.386,n. 3, and p. 423, n.\,adfin.)

that the latter must move along with the motion, c. 3 goes on to show that dWoiwais concerns only

the sensible qualities of things; c. 4 inquires in what case two movements are commensurable, and c. 5 finally proves that the same force moves half the mass in t he same time twice as far, in half the time the same distance as the whole likewise that the same mass is moved, by the same force, in the same time, the same distance, in half the time half the distance, while half the mass is moved by half the force the same distance on the other hand, it does not follow that twice the mass is moved by the same force half as far as half the mass, or the same mass by half the force half as far as by the whole force for the force may not perhaps be able to move it at all. The same is true of the other kinds of change.
;
;

442
qualities ?

AltlSTOTLE
The Atomists answered all three of these and Empedocles at least the

questions, Anaxagoras

second and the third, in the negative. Aristotle feels himself obliged to answer all affirmatively, combating the mechanical theory of his predecessors, and seeking
the solution of their difficulties in the peculiar tenets of

That he wholly succeeded in this attempt the natural science of our day will certainly refuse to admit, and will even be frequently inclined, with Bacon,^ to take the part of Democritus against him. Yet-this is just a case in which we have to guard
his

own

system.

against a too hasty criticism of a

of the first places

man who

occupies one

among

the scientific investigators as

In order to form well as the philosophers of antiquity. an impartial judgment of Aristotle in his contest with the mechanical theory of physics, and to appreciate his own views, we must never forget that we have not here to do wdth the atomistic philosophy of our days, but
with that of Democritus, which differed from
co'lo.
it

Mo

Aristotle, like his opponents, possessed nothing

but the scantiest rudiments of the methods and processes of observation which we have to so boundless

an extent at our command.

He had

to

define the

elementary physical conceptions of an age whose observations did not extend beyond the reach of the naked
eye,

and whose experiments were confined to a few

simple and for the most part very unreliable empirical

processes.
^

Of

all

our

mathematical,
ences
{Arist.

optical,
ThierTtuiid^,

and
419

Cf. KUNO FiscHEE, Fran: Bacon, 262 sqq. (Eng. tr.).

-

sq.) to Aristotle's

method

in test-

Cf. also

sq.,

1220

sq.,

Beandis, ii. b, 121.3 and Meyer's refer-

ing heat.

PHYSICS
physical instruments,
lie

443

possessed only the rule and

compasses, together with the most imperfect substitutes

for some few others. Chemical analysis, correct measurements and weights, and a thorough application of mathematics to physics, were unknown. The attractive

force of matter, the law of gravitation, electrical phe-

nomena, the conditions of chemical combination, pressure of air and its effects, the nature of light, heat,
combustion, &c.

in

short, all the facts

on which the
based, were
It

physical theories of

modern
if

science are

would have under such circumstances Aristotle had developed views in natural philosophy of which we could have availed ourselves without alterabeen more than a miracle,
tion at the present time.
to
It is the business of a history

wholly, or almost wholly, undiscovered.

show how he explained phenomena consistently with the position of knowledge in his own day.'

None of the ancient systems presents so pure a form of mechanical physics as the atomic, to which the theory of the elements adopted by Plato from Philolaus is
closely allied.

and consider
only original
this view, not

differences of shape

Both deny qualitative variety in matter, and magnitude as the and real distinction. Aristotle opposes

merely because it maintains the existence of infinitely small bodies or superficies, but also because

In both rejudgment, the weaknesses of the Platonic theory are most striking.^ It contradicts
spects, according to his

it

denies specific difference in matter.

mathematics, because
superficies,
'

it

regards bodies as composed of

logically to the

which brings us
262
sq.
2

assumption
.

Cf. supra, p.

Qf^

Zellee, Platon. Stud.

270

sq.

444

ARISTOTLE
^

of indivisible lines

nay, further, to the resolution of

magnitudes

into points.^

Again

it

destroys the divisi-

bility of bodies.^*

Moreover, the figures of the elements

assumed by Plato do not fill the space within the world, and yet he allows no vacuum.-* Lastly, it is impossible
to
difficulties

form any coherent bodies out of them/'' Nor are the which beset this theory from the point of
less

view of physics

important.
of

which have weight consist none V6 And how, according to

:

surfaces

For how can bodies which have

this hypothesis, could

the specific gravity or levity of the single elements be Fire would have to become heavier and produced?

ascend more slowly in proportion to

air

its

bulk;

much

would be heavier than a

shows that
all

little

water.^

Again, while
respect to
diffi-

experience

the elements are mutually

transmutable, Plato only admits this with

the three just mentioned;^
culties
arise

even in their case

from the circumstance that superfluous

are not balls or pyramids.
'

'

Plato, indeed,
cf.

es actually
;

tion
2

and Xenocraadopted this assumpZell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i.

IMd.
d.

Ph.
'>

Gr.

ad fin. 868. Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 6, 300, Cf. Gen. et a, 7, c. 7, 306, a, 23. since the Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 21
pp. 807, 2

IMd.

8 iuit.; cf. i. 679, 3. 306, b, 22 sqq.

c.

Zell.

pt.

De

b,

Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 25 sqq. 31 sqq. (where, however, we

De

irpdoT-r)

uAtj

of the Timcens is not

a superficies, elementary matter cannot be resolved into superficies.

must read to a-w/bLararwu iTrnrebwv, the gen. iniire^icv being governed by 7rA^06t) cf the corresponding objection to the Pythagoreans, p.
; .

311, n. 5, 6 supra.
Ccelo,
:

305, b, 31, 306, a, 26 primary atoms of the elements cannot be divisible (nor are they according to Plato and
3
iii.

De

7,

'

De

c. 5,

312, b, 20 sqq.

Ca;lo, iv. 2, 308, b, 3 sqq. It has al-

Democritus) seeing that when fire or water is divided, each part is again fire or water whereas the parts of a ball or pyramid

how we are to interpret these objections in the mouth of Aristotle. s De Ccelo, iii. 7, 306, a, 1 sqq. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 676, 1, 2.
ready been shown

PHYSICS
triangles are left over/

445
it is

and that

as easy to think of

a superimposition of surfaces

as of the

composition

assumed by
fact that the for instance

Plato.^

Furthermore, the theory of un-

changeable type forms of the elements contradicts the

shape of simple bodies

is

water

and

earth,

determined by the surrounding space.^

place, how are we to comprehend the and movements of the elements by these hypotheses of Plato? Democritus supposed that fire was formed of globes, on account of its mobility and

In the

last

qualities

disruptive force

Plato thought

it

was made of pyramids,

but that the earth was

made

of cubes, on account of its

comparative immobility.
are hard to

move

in their

Yet both of these elements own locality, and easy to move

Aristotle
is

in a strange one, since they strive to escape from the

latter

and not from the former/*

therefore

forced to regard Plato's theory of the elements as in

every respect mistaken.^

The Atomic theory of Democritus and Leucippus is treated by him with more respect ^ but he holds that
;
^

Ibid.
sq.

1.

20

cf.

Plato, Tim.

ball does not

change that with

56

D
3 *

which
Casio, iii. 1, 299, b, 23.
c. 8,

Be

Jbid.

306, b,

9.

Ibid. 306, b, 29 sqq., where it is further objected that balls and pyramids are easily moved only in a circle, whereas tire has an upward movement. Again, if corners that give to it is its fire its heat-producing power, all elementary, bodies must likewise produce heat as well as everything that has mathematical i-hape, for they all have corners. Fire changes things which it a pyramid or a seizes into fire
;

into contact into balls or pyramids. Pire separates only dissimilars, whereas it unites similars. Further, if heat be united to a particular shape, so also must cold, ^ Pkoclus at a later date defended it in a separate treatise against his attacks Simpl., Schol. in Ar. 515, a, 4. ^ Cf. the discussion in Gen.et Corr. i. 2, 3 5, b, 30 sqq., the chief sentences of which are cited in
it
; i

comes

Zell. Ph.
Coelo,
iii.

d.

Gr. pt.

i.

771, 4 also,
;

on the Platonic theory,

7,

cf.

De

306, a, 6 sqq.

446
it

ARISTOTLE
fiir

also is

from having proved that everything

may

be deduced from a primitive matter of absolutely

homo-

geneous quality. In the first place, it is open to all the objections which beset the hypothesis of indivisible
bodies.^

Next, as in the case of Plato,

it

is

clear that

the materials could not adjust their shape to the space

in which they find themselves, if

we

attribute a distinct

elementary figure to them.^

already
^

In the next place, we

Aristotle
is

know
;

the reasons

why

not inclined

to admit an infinite variety of difference of shape

tlie

among

atoms

and

if

the elementary atoms are to be dissize,

tinguished only by their

one element could not be

developed from another.^ If all the atoms are homogeneous, one does not see how they are separate, and why they do not join when brouglit into contact with

one another.
materials,

If they are

we should have to seek

composed of heterogeneous the cause of phenomena

in this circumstance,

and not in the difference of shape,

and then they would influence one another while in con1

See, besides p. 306, the state-

ments quoted p. 430. n. 2, all of which are more or less directly Here aimed at the atomists. also, we must continually remind
oiirselves of the state of science

It is certainly hard to a cohesive body could be constituted of such atoms. The

collision.

see

how

means which Democritus adopted

for securing this

end by attribut-

at the time, and of the peculiar character of the theory which When, for Aristotle attacked. instance, he shows that atoms could not coherein a solid body, he is not speaking of the atoms of modern physics, which attract and repel one another, are held in

ing corners and hooks to atoms, by which they may hang on to one another (Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 796, 2, 798, 4), could not but appear to Aristotle, as they Cic. appeared (according to Acad. ii. 38, 121) to his follower
Strato, fantastic and absurd, See p. 445, n. 3, mpra.
^
"

equilibrium, &c., in many different

Seep. 331

sq.
4,

ways, but of the atoms of Democritus, which act upon one another only mechanically by pressure or

De

CopIo,

iii.

303, a 24 sqq.

Cf. p. 306, n. 6.

riirsics
tact,

447

which

is

what the Atomists deny.'

In the same

way

a reciprocal influence would exist between

if certain qualities

them

like

warmth,
;

for instance

were

coupled with a certain shape

it

is,

however, equally

impossible to imagine the atoms without qualities and

to

suppose them
is

endowed with

definite

properties.

Again, there

no reason why there should be only small and invisible atoms and not also large ones.^ Lastly, if

moved by another power, they experience an influence, and their apathy is destroyed if they
the atoms are
:

move themselves,
and
different

the motive force

is

is

either inside

from what

moved
"*

are not indivisible

in one

in which case

them
they

or opposite properties are united

and the same

object.

Again, Aristotle believed that Democritus was quite

as unable as Plato to explain the physical qualities of

things.

The one makes

fire spherical,

the other pyra-

midal in form, but both are equally w^ong.-^

stotle,

Ari-

however, derives his most conclusive argument against the homogeneity of matter from the very phe-

nomenon by which modern support it the phenomenon

science

is

accustomed to
Democritus,

of gravity.
all

like Aristotle,

was ignorant that

bodies mutually

attract each

other, that within the terrestrial

all

atmo-

sphere they

gravitate to the centre of the earth, that

is

the inequality in the rate of their descent

'

caused by

(ren. et

Corr.

i.

8,

326, a,

<

lUd.

326, b,

2.

29 sqq., to which, however, it might be replied that they refuse to unite because they are not liquid but solid bodies.

In the passage quoted

p.

445, n. 4, supra, Aristotle attacks

lUd.

326, a, 1-24. Ibid, at line 24.

both views alike and on the same grounds. Cf. also Gen. et Corr ^f / ^

j,

8,

326, a, 8.

4t8

ARISTOTLE
air,

the resistance of the

and that the pressure of the

fire,

atmosphere occasions the ascent of

vapour, &c.

Democritus believed that

all

the atoms
fall

fall

downwards

in the void, but that the greater

less,

quicker than the

deducing from this hypothesis the concussion of the

atoms and the pressure by which the lesser are driven upwards. For the same reason, he held that the weight
of composite bodies, supposing their circumference equal,

corresponds to their magnitude after subtraction of the

empty

interstices.^
is

Aristotle demonstrates
:

that this

no above or beneath in infinite space, and consequently no natural tendenc}downwards all bodies must fall with equal rapidity in
hypothesis
false

there

is

the void,^ nor can the void within bodies

lighter than they really
are.

acquainted with the actual

make them But being equally unphenomena which have to be

explained, Aristotle repudiates the only true point in the

system of Democritus, in order to avoid the consequences

which he saw to be implied in the Atomic hypothesis,

but the truth of which Democritus was as far from recognising as he was.
to be facts,
tive,
it

On

the strength of what he assumed

he opposes a theory which, originally speculaas

could only be supported by a verification of the facts

had assumed, such

was wholly beyond the reach of

ancient science.

It is true, as he says, that in a

;

vacuum
but this

everything must sink with equal rapidity

'

Cf.
sq.,

Zell.
791
sq.

Ph.

d.

Gr.

i.

779

P?iys. iv. 8, 214, b, 28 sqq. JJe Ccelo, iv. 2, 308, a 34-309, a, 18 see p. 428, n. 5, supra.
;

real advance upon the atomic theory, but only as a means of making his own arbitrary assumption of deviations in the atoms comprehensible. Seep. 307, n. 4,
sujjra.

Epicurus, indeed, had

this, not,

re-

cognised

however, as a

PHYSICS
appears to him so inconceivable that he considers
sufficient

449
it

ground

for rejecting the hypothesis of

if all
all

empty

space.

He goes on to say that

bodies be composed

of the same matter, they

must

be heavy, and there

would be nothing that was in

of its

itself light

and by virtue
or are
it

own nature

disposed to

rise,

but only some things

that remain behind in the

downward movement
else.
size,

driven upwards by something

Although

may

be that of two bodies of equal

be the heavier,
tire

the denser might

nevertheless a

great mass of air or

of earth
sible,^

would necessarily be heavier than a small quantity or water. This, however, he thinks impos-

and he says

it

is

manifest

when we

consider

that certain bodies always tend upwards, rising quicker

in proportion to the increase of bulk

phenomenon
If gravity

which seems to Aristotle quite inexplicable on the hypothesis of absolute

homogeneity in matter.

be determined by bulk, then a greater mass of rarer ma-

would be heavier than a small one of denser, and accordingly would move downwards. If, on the contrary, it is said that the more vacuum a body contains the lighter
terial
Cf./*Ays. iv. 8, 216,a, 13: 6pajfi^uyap rh fxei^co f>oirr]V exovra fi fidpovs ^ KovipOTTjTos, icLV ToAAtt d/jLolus
'

ravrov
vKrfV,

avinfiaiveiv to7s fiiav iroiovaiv

Koi

ixi\Q'

airXois

elvai ixt]Q(v

eXV '^'^^^ (TX'hho.ffi, dccTTOv (pepofJLfvaTO

^aou x<^p^ov,Kal KaraXoyopovexovai TO ix^ydOr] irphs &A\ri\a. uxrre Kal Sta Tov Ktvov. aW' aSvvaTov. 8ia riva yap alTiav ohrQi]<TkTai QarTov iv /xev yap toIs irK^peffiu e| avdyKTjs
'

Kovtpov firire (pi:p6ixivov &uq}, oAA' ^ varrepi^ov t) iKdAifiofieuov, Kal iroWa

QaTTov yap Ziaip^t

yuet^of
.

Tjj

Iffx^'i

rh

IffOTaxri

&pa irdvT

eo-rai

oKiycou [small atoms] 5e jx^yaKuv fiapvrepa tlvai. et tovto icrrai, (TvixfiriffiTai iruKhv a4pa koX iro\v irvp vSaros eJuai tovto 5 fiapvrcpa Kal yijs 6\iyris. eVriV aSwarov. Cf. previous D. Ibid. C. 5, 312, b, 20 sqq, (where,
/xiKpa

[in

a vacuum].
-

dAA' ahvvaTov.
:

however, in
ihv
Se Suo,
troiovvTa,

1.

32

we must read
irws eo-rat

[as

De Coilo, iv. 2, 310, a, 7 t(^ Prantl rightly reads, instead

piiav
TToielv
(putriv

to.

/iTa|i/

of rb] 56

twv

&c., as Prantl does in his translation, though not in his

Ty

ix^yedci SiacpipouTOi'V

apayKa7oi'

text).

VOL.

I.

G G

450
it is, it

Aristotle
may be answered
that a great mass of deuser and

heavier substance includes more

vacuum than

a small

one of the rarer sort. Finally, if the weight of every body corresponded to the proportion between its bulk and
the empty interstices, ever so great a

lump

of gold or

lead might sink no faster, and ever so great a bulk of fire rise no faster, than the smallest quantity of the same
stuff.

He

concludes that

we

are driven to assume the

existence of certain bodies heavy or light in themselves, which move respectively towards the centre or the cir-

cumference of the world

wt^

^ ;

and

this is possible only

when

conceive of them as distinguished from each other the qualities of the matter composing them and not by merely by the figure or magnitude of the elementary
ingredients.^
are the materials of the world different in

Not only
(jnality,

but they are also subject to qualitative transUnless we admit this, we must explain formation.
tlie

apparent transmutation of

matter

either

(with

Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Atomists) by a simple extrusion of existing materials, or (with Plato) by a

change in the figures of the elements. ^ We have already seen ' how far Aristotle is from agreeing with the latter

On the other hand, solution as maintained by Plato. were we to imagine that one and the same corporeal substance, like wax, assumed first one and then another elementary form, and that this metamorphosis was in
Aristotle here follows Plato's view; see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 678 sq. Strato, on the ocher hand, returned to that of Democritus
'

b,

Cf.

27 sqq. c. 5, 312, b, 20 sqq. the section concerning the

.

see infra, Ch.

'

XX.
308, a, 21 sqq. 309,

Elements, infra. ^ Cf De Cceh, P. 4i4 sqq.

'

iii.

7.

Be

Ciclo,

PHYSICS

451

fact the transmutation of materials, the indivisibility

of these elementary substances would follow,^ and this he finds to be at direct variance with the nature of
corporeity.2

As

to the theory of

Empedocles and the

Atomists,

it is

clear that, according to them, those sub-

stances into which others seem to be transformed existed previously in a state of interminglement with the latter,

and are merely extruded from them.

that this conception
is,

Aristotle thinks

in the first place, at variance

with the testimony of our senses.^

Experience shows

us a metamorphosis of materials in which the elementary properties of substances alter. One substance
passes into another, or a third
is

formed of several.

When water

freezes or ice melts, the

phenomenon is not,

he says, occasioned by a mere alteration in the position and order of the parts, nor has a mere separation or combination of materials taken place, but, while the substance remains the same, certain of its qualities have

changed.^

Again, when water

is

made from

air,

a body

comes into existence heavier than

portions of the
air.
7,

air,

yet not, he thinks, as

a consequence of the separation and compression of certain

Conversely,

when

air is
all

produced

Be
that

Cu'lo,

iii.

305, b, 28
is

that underlies

the elements

sqq., 306, a, 30.

The meaning

we may suppose

the ele-

alike (as was actually done by Philolaus, of. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i. 376 sq.). By thus conceiving of the atoms of the elements as

ments formed of atoms of a definite shape earth of cubical, fire of quadrilateral, atoms without adopting Plato's view of the constitution of these bodies, and that the conversion of one element into another may be explained, not as its resolution inlo its primal surfaces and the coiubinatlon of these into a new form, but as a transformation of the material

divisible, however, we should involve ourselves in the difficulty already mentioned, p. 444, n. 3.
^

See p. 430, n. 2, ?f7^m. Gen. et Corr. i. 1, 314, b,

iii. 7, 305, b, 1. 989, a, 22 sqq. Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, a, 14
i,

10 sqq.

l)e Cmlo,
8,

Metapli,
sqq.

452

ARISTOTLE

by evaporation from water, the former occupies so large

a space in comparison with the latter that the vessel.
thesis that
it

even bursts

How
it

is

this to be explained

on the hypo-

had previously existed in the water withIf a body grows or dwindles, out change or difference ? it is not merely that new parts are added to it, but all
'

its

parts increase or diminish in size

and this involves

When
bones and

a general change in the material. ^

flesh are

formed from

food, they are not taken ready

made from what we

eat, like bricks

from a wall or water

from a cask, but the food passes into a wqw material.^ Moreover, it is clear that the elements themselves come
into existence

and perish
are

fire is

kindled and goes out

water
atmin.

is

precipitated from the air and passes into steam

How'

we

to conceive of such

formation

and dissolution? which they begin and end,

'Jliere

must be

definite points at

as in the case of all

to suppose

Becom-

ing, else

we should be driven
two
directions.

an

infinite pro-

<n*ession in

Yet these terminal points

cannot consist of indivisible bodies

indivisible (or atoms) as
'

whether absolutely
seen,'*

we have already

or such

as above, 305, b, view of gravity precludes the admission that the greater weight of water as comC'atlo,

Be

to explain steam as a kind of air

o sqq.

Aristotle's

which emanates from water nor

;

could atomists generally regard it as other than a complex of

pared with steam

is

due merely

to its greater density. The atomists of that time could not pos-

atoms emanating froni water in which they had previously been imprisoned. As against such theoriesAristotle'sobjectionsarevalid. Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, a, 22. ^ Ibid. ii. 7, 334, a, 18, 26; cf. Be Ca;lo, iii. 7, 305, b, 1. Cf. p.

sibly explain the expansion of fluids into steam as the result of increased repulsion in the atoms at least the atoms of Democritus are certainly incapable of internal
;

457
iii,

sq.
*

Empedocles and Anaxchange. agoras (with whom Aristotle, ibid, 1. 16 sqq., first deals) were obliged

In the passage from i)<;6?^,

6,

cited at pp. 306, n. 446, n. 4.

4,

and

PHYSICS

453

as are divisible by nature but are never actually divided

for

why

should the smaller resist division, when larger

?

bodies of similar substance do not do so

No more

can

the elements be produced from incorporeal substance,^ or

from a body different from themselves

for if the latter

were not one of the elements,

it

could have no gravity or

natural locality, and hence would be a mathematical and

not a physical body, and would not exist in space.

Hence

we

are driven to suppose that the elements are developed

from one another.^ But this process can only be conceived

as one of transformation.

For

if

there were not a trans-

formation of the elements, but only a putting forth of

something which they already contained complete within

themselves, one substance could not be entirely dissolved
into another, but an insoluble remnant would be left and so any complete transmutation of substances, such Coarse as is given in experience, would be impossible.^
:

and

fine materials could

never be completely converted

into each other."*

Lastly,

how

are

we

to

imagine the

reciprocal influence of substances on one another, unless

they are capable of qualitative change?

Empedocles and Democritus made bodies enter each other by means But not only can this hypothesis be disof pores.'
'
1

length, in the sqq.

=

As is proved at superfluous and with some obscurity,

example, consists of a different

material or different atoms from water, steam might be extruded from water, but water could not be wholly resolved into steam.
^

De

CoelOy

iii. 7,

305, a, IG

Be

CopIo,

iii.

6.

This objection is first brought against Anaxagoras in the Pliys. i.4,I87,b, 22 sqq. in2)e 6Wo,iii, 7, 305, b, 20 sqq. it is used against all who explain material change as an extrusion in the latter case with justice, since if steam, for
:

De

Cwlo,

iii.

4,

803, a

24,

where the words viroX^iy^ei yap ael, &c., must mean 'since the larger atoms would fail to obtain
release,' so that in water, for ex-

ample, a residuum would be left whichcouldnotbe turned into air.

454

ARISTOTLE
divisible,

pensed with, since bodies only require to be

and need not be actually divided in order to experience reciprocal influences but it really serves no purpose, for,
;

two bodies cannot affect each other by contact, those parts of them which interpenetrate by means of pores
if

will not

do so

either.^

Therefore while the mechanical

theory of nature confined itself to a

movement

of the

elementary ingredients in space, Aristotle maintained

their

qualitative

alteration.

Where
the

the former

had
real

explained apparent metamorphosis as a mere process of

extension,
Aristotle

assumed

operation

of

changes under certain conditions.

impulse

His predecessors

re-

stricted the reciprocal operation of bodies to pressure

:

and

he extended

it

to the internal nature of bodies,

whereby they transform

It
is

their primitive qualities.

precisely this process

which he understands

by

The movement, are contained in the correlation of potentiality and actuality. AVhen two things meet, of which one is actually what the other is potentially, then, so far as
'

action

and passion

'

in their stricter sense.^

all

conditions of such transformation, as of

this is the case, the latter

is

patient, the former agent

*'

and a change
'

is

produced in the one, which proceeds from

rai fxovou,
ijlov

et Corr. i. 8, 326, b, 6327, a, 7 sqq. Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, if the 12 movens is likewise partly ntotuni, parti}- i/nmobiJe, this must be true also of the aorent Kid yap rh kivovu iroifTv ri (pacri Koi TO TTOiovv KivcTu. ov fx}ju aWa dia<pfpfi ye Kal Se7 Siopi^eiv ov yap oi6v re irav rh Kivovv toluv,

Gen.

o'tou

28,

C. 9,

oAAa rb kiuuv
Ihicl. c.

rh KevKhu koI rh Oepiirl TrAeoj/ rov

riva Se rpSirov

rroielt/ ItTTiv.
^

9 init.
ovcri

yevyav Koi iroifiv \a^6vTs Ka\ iricrx^iv, \4yu/xev upxhv t)]V iroWaKis elprj/xevrjv. et yap i(TTi rh /ahv Swd/j-ei rd 5' ivTvwapx^t to7s
roiovrov, 'K4(pvKev ov rfj fiev Trao'xeij', ctAAa irivrr) Ka0' oaov iffrX roiovrov, jfrrou Se Kal fiaWov rj roiovrov fxaWdv iari Kal
\f:X^'a.
5'

rfj

ov

e'lirep

rh

iroiovv

avri.Qi\<Toixev
8'

T(j3

irdarxovri.

rovro

oh

if

Kivr\(ns

vdOos.

Trddos 5e Kad" oiTov

aWoiov-

rirrov.

PHYSICS

455

Action and passion, like all movement, the other.^ presuppose on the one hand the distinction of a movens

and a motum^ on the other their direct or indirect

contact.

Where one
it

or other of these conditions fails,

is

no passion and no alteration

are present,
is

possible

where both

inevitable.^

Again, this consequence

depends upon the agent being partly similar and partly opposed to the patient since of things which belong
;

to wholly different genera, as a figure

and a colour, for example, neither can produce any change in the other and the same is true of such things as are completely similar, since change is always a passage from one condition into an opposite, and that which does not
stand in any opposition to another thing cannot produce
in
it

an opposite condition.
generically

Hence the agent and the

similar,

patient must be
different
;

but specifically

and

so the old

moot point

as to

whether likes

or unlikes influence each other is decided

by the law
patient are
"^

that neither the one nor the other do so absolutely, but

both in certain relations.^

The agent and

opposed within the limits

in the agent's

of the same genus

and

the change consists in the removal of this opposition,

making the patient

like itself.^

Hence

p. 386, n. 1,

been already shown, that all motion has its seat in the motum, not in the movens.
'

It has

n. 3, sujjra. Gen. et
'"

CorrAhid.^2^,
^5rj

a,

Sih

nal

eijKoyov
kuI

depixaivuv
Kal

to

t6 re irvp ^pvxpov \l/vxeip,

Ibid. 327, a, 1 c. 8, 326, b, 1. Longit. Vit. 3, 465, b, 15. Cf. p. 378 sq. iupra. ^ Gen. et tbrr. i. 7, 323, b, 15324, a, 14, with which cf the quotations on p. 340 sqq. * Like all 4vavria. Hee p. 224,
,

oXus to

ttoititikov dfioiovu eavrtp

to irda-xov t6 Te yap iroiovv Kal rb irdaxov cuavria iarl, Kal t] y^veffis Tovvavriov. ctiaT^ avdyKt] to eis irdexov cis rb iroiovv fieTafidw^iv ovroi yap (arai etV Tovvavriou v
yiveais.

456

ARISTOTLE
is
'

the patient

in the position of the

determinate
so far as
it

form

'

is

matter,' to which a communicated by the agent. In

'
^

has not yet received this form or has another

form,

it

is

opposed to the agent

it, it is

inasmuch as

it

must
upon

be capable of receiving

similar in kind.

If the

agent

is also

a patient, so that the two mutually act

each other, both must be of the same material, and in this respect belong to the same genus.But this
condition does not universally apply to agents
:

for as

the jirimidn movens

is

is

without passivity,

unmoved, so the first active power and therefore without matter

is

whereas, on the contrary, the lowest force that acts

immediately upon another

is

material,

and

its

operation

conditioned by

irdOos

on

its

own
it

part.'"^

The
is

reason

why

all

parts of the patient are affected by this

active influence

and by the alteration

its

occasions,

to

be found in the nature of corporeity.

tial,
is

Body, as potendivisible at all

subject in
/

whole extent to the transition

to actuality,

e.

to change,
offers

and being

points,

nowhere
force."*

an absolute resistance to the

of materials

active

The question about the mixture

is

must

be judged from the same points of view.

a combination of
^

mixture^

two or more
n. 2,
'^

materials,^' in

which

relation obviously identical with that which he expresses in the passage quoted p. 454, n. 3, under the form of potentiality and actuality. 2 Ihid. 324, b, 6 t^v fiev yap
:

upra. For the above, see Gen. ct Corr. ihid. from 324, a, 15 to the end of the chapter ; and cf. c, 10,
328, a, 17.
*

Gen. et Corr.

i.

v\r)v \4yoixev dixoiojs

us

clireTv

tV

P- 454, n. 8,
a, 6 sqq.
^
i.

supra).

9 init. (see Ibid. 327,

et

avrijv elvai

ruv

avTiKi(x4vu)V oTrore-

Tlie y4vos stands to the elSos generally in the relation of matter; see p. 219,

povovv, S>airp ycvos ov.

According to Gen.

Corr.

10.

Aristotle shows, ihid. 327, b,

PHYSICS
neither the one
is

457

merged

in the other/ nor both exist

is

together unchanged, but a third

itself 6fioio/JLSps9.'^

formed which
it

is

In other words,

consists neither

in the absorption of one sort of matter into another, nor

in a merely mechanical junction or interminglement of

both,^

but in

chemical combination.

When

two

materials are mixed, neither of

preserving

its original

them remains the same, They are not merely qualities.

particles,'*

blended in invisibly minute

wholly passed
into

but both have

new

material,

wherein

they

remain only potentially, inasmuch as they can be again Such a relation, however, only extracted from it.^
13 sqq. 828, a, 19 sqq., that only the union of substances(xf>'o''"a), not that of qualities or of the form with the matter or of the immaterial efficient cause with its passive object, can be called a mixture (/xi^is). To us this seems superfluous but according to Metajjh. i, 9, 991, a, 14 (cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 890, n. 4, and ibid. i. 881 sqq.) he had some occasion to make this reservation. That the substances, moreover, which are mixed can only be of a material nature is self-evident for the incorporeal
;
:

-Ibid.
S'

328,

a,

10:

(pa/nev

ftirep

Se? fiefiTxOai

n, rb
:

fiix-

Oh ofioio/jLcphs elj/at [or as it is i^ei rov previously expressed avTov \6yov t^ oXcp to fiopiou'] koI Sia-ir^p t)v uSotos t^ ixipos iidwp, On the ovtw kcu rov Kpadevros. dfioio/xepei see the end of Ch. IX. w/m, and cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i.

879, n. 2. ^ ^vvdeais,
a,

{ibid. 328,

as distinguished 5 sqq. cf. Metaph.

is atradis

xiv. 5, 1092, a, 24, 26) from [xi^is In Metaph. vii. 2, or Kpaais. 1042, b, 16 o-uvSeo-ts is further distinguished as the class notion under which Kpaais comes.

As happens in the case of burning {Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, b, 10), where it is not a mixture that takes place, but the production of fire and the destruction of wood, or, in other words, the change of wood into fire. The same is true of nutrition, and generally of all cases in
'

As Anaxagoras, the Atomists and, later, Epicurus supposed. ^ iir^. 327, b, 22 eVeU' ^(ttI ret iikv Swdfiei to S' evepyeia ruu uuruv, ivBex^rai ra jxix^^vra elvai
:

ttws

koI

h^}

elvai,

ivepyeia

ixev

which one material is transformed

into another (ibid.
1.

13, 328, a,

23

sqq.).

This

is

not a case of

fM^is

but

aWoioiXTis.

yeyovSros e| ^n cKaripov airep fiaav irp\v /xixSvpai koI ovk airo\a)\6Ta .... aw^srai yap t] SvvafMis avruv, just because they and can be again separated sqq. In later usage com1. 31
kripov avruv,
;

uvtos tov 5' SwdfisL

458

AltlSTOTLE

occurs

when

the materials brought together are mutu-

ally capaple of acting

and being acted on

^ ;

and when,
in

moreover, the forces of both stand in a certain equilibrium, so that one of

them does not get merged

;

the other and

in a

its qualities

absorbed like a drop of wine

hundred gallons of water

and

lastly

when they
at as

are easily divisible, so as to act

upon each other

many

points as possible, like fluids.^

affect

Where
other

these conin

ditions meet, materials

each

such

manner that both, while combining, change at the This combination, attended by the same moment.
simultaneous transmutation of the materials combined,
is

mixture.'^

Aristotle

is

not content with substituting the theory

of qualitative differences and transformations in matter

for that of the

mechanical physicists.
is far

He

goes further,

and shows that he

from being
is

satisfied

with that

physical view of things which

confined to material

causes and their laws.

Material causes are only inter-

mediate

merely
Dc

the means and indispensable condi-

tions of

phenomena.

Above them stand

final

causes

plete mixture of
Tvavrr)
fiiJ.7x6aL,

tliis

kind

(^to

rraOrjTiKo.

re

v-rr'

dAATjAcoj/ Koi evopi-

Scnsu, c. 3, 440, b, 11), as distinguished from a mere compound of smallest parts was called rj 5t' o\ov Kpacris. This is the case when their material is of the same kind but their qualities are of an opposite character ibid. 328, a, 19 sqq. cf, p. 454, stfj^ra. 31 ^ Ibid. 328, a, 18 towards the end of the c, where the above is thus expressed mixture takes place iTre'nrep cVrlr evia roiavra ola
"
;

ffra

Ka\

ivSiaipeTa

[according to
ibid.

what

Aristotle

says,

328,

b, these

two coincide with one

.

another]

ravra yap

oijr

i(j)9dp6ai

avdyKri fiefxiyfxfva ovr' %ri ravra ottAws (hai, ohre avvdecriv elvai rijv
fu^iv avruv, otjre irphs r^v atffd'naiv

jiarent mixture]
jxkv h
h.u

[the previously mentioned apdAA' co-t: ixlkt6v

iv6pi<TTou iv iradr]TiKdv

koI voir)TiKbv koI roiovrcp /j.ikt6v.

^

Ibid. 328, b, 22

ri

Se

fii^is

twv ixiktwv aWoiwdcvTWV

eVwcts.

PHYSICS

450

above material necessity, the design of the universe above the physical explanations of nature, theteleological.

Our researches up
If Nature
is

to this point have already led to

its

the conclusion that everything in nature has

End.

the inner cause of motion, every motion

its

has

its

goal by which

measure and direction are

determined.^

If the essence of things consists in their

is

form, the form

not to be distinguished from their

End.^

If everything which

moves must of necessity be

follows that the ultimate in that

moved by something else, it cause of movement resides

universe as
its

which moves the

in general

Final Cause,^ and

movement
^

can only be conceived as the action of form upon

matter, in which the former
so
is

the

object of desire,' and

strives.''

the goal towards which the latter

Ari-

stotle

cannot conceive of regulated and orderly events

except under the analogy of

human

action

directed

towards an end.
of

Hence while combating the theory an anima mundi in the form in which it had been

held by Plato, he adopts himself a similar view.^

'

He

See p. 1)41, n. 2, supra. See p. 356 sqq., p. 418, and

li^ee

consists of circular motion, or of

any motion at

all.

It

would be

p. 462, n. 2.
^ *

p. 404,

and

See p. 383, and

p. 396, n. 3. p. 379, n. 1.

sqq.;
;

De An. i. 3, 406, b, De Coclo, ii. 1, 284, a,

25 27

inconsistent with its perfect happiness that it should be intermixed with the body of the world and, burdened with the
latter, should have uninterraittently to produce, like an Ixion with his wheel, a motion which

sqq. Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 37. Aristotle rejects this theory in

the first place because he cannot regard the soul as in any sense a motum and therefore not even as kavrh Kivovv (see the beginning of Qh.^. infra). He further objects that Plato conceives of the soul of the world as something extended in space. But it would be impossible to suppose that its thought

had no affinity with its nature and which therefore involved exertion. Nor, indeed, is it shown

how

it produces it, Lastly, the soul cannot be opx^ as asserted in the Phcf-drus, if, according to the Tinucus, it comes into exist.

ence only with the world,

460
refers not only the

ARISTOTLE
movement
of the outermost sphere,

which communicates

itself to all others,

but also that of

as the

the stars, like Plato, to the action of spirits, which are

related to the spheres
soul
is

moved by them

human

to the

body J

He

even treats the forces of

nature in general, to a certain extent, from the same point of view in the eternity of motion he recognises
:

tlie

immortal

life

of nature,^

and he even ascribes a

sort

of animation to the elements.^

also, as

Every
is

vital activity is

we

shall

see,"*

an activity guided by a purpose,

related to the soul as

for

everything in living beings

the incorporeal unity of the corporeal existence. Hence

it

follows that

by regarding nature
is

as a living whole,

Cf. p. 373 sq. and see the section in the next cliapter concerning the Spheres. Aristotle is so
'

due, not to

iheprimum movens,

far justified from liis own point of view in treating both the world

as a whole, and its individual parts as animated with life, as he does also Be Ccclo, ii. 12 followed bv Eudemus {Fr. 76 b, Simpl.

Albut to particular motors. though the whole world is thus animated, yet Aristotle refuses to call it with Plato i^fov, because its life springs from no single principle of motion. 2 Plii/s. viii. 1 U6Tepov init.
:

5e

yeyouf irore

Kiv7\(ns

ovk nixra

Phys. 283 m. Lchie (I. At. r.

Siebeck, D. d. Lehen d. Univercf.

irpSrepov, Koi (pOeipeTUi ttolKlv

SJa'Te

outus

Kiveladai /xrjShv,

-/)

oijT

iyevero

avvi, in Flclite's ZtscJir f. Phil. Ix. 3 1 ). God is a part of the universe

ovT (pdeiperai, ctAA' ael ^v Kal del

((TTtti,

Koi tout' adduarov Kal dirav^ojtj

in the
is

which reason a part of the man and of the

same sense

in

(XTOV vTrdpx^^ To7s oixriv, olov

tis

is the relation of the spheral spirits to their spheres. Each of these spirits, however, animates only the sphere which it moves and the jirimum worens only the irpSoTos ovpavos. While the movement of the latter, indeed, extends to all the other spheres, yet in their case it is

same nature

ovaa To7s (pvcrei (XvucaTwcn iraaiv. In these words Aristotle seems to have in mind the passage from
Ileraclitus,

quoted Zell. Ph.

iii.

d.

Qr.
3

i.

586, 2.
5' iv yrj

Gen. An.

yiuerai

11, 762, a, 18: koi ev irypcp ra ^wa

Kal TO, (pvTO. Sia ro iv yfj ficv

vSwp

virdpx^iv, iv

S'

vSari irvevfia, iv 5e

something communicated from without like the motion of the driver on a carriage their own proper motion, on the other hand,
;

rovTcp iravrl d^ppidrrira ypvxtKqv, uxrre Tp6-Kov riva irdvra ^/zu^^s flvai

At the commencement of Chap. X. infra.

PHYSICS

461

and deducing its movement from the incorporeal forms which govern all material change and shape, Aristotle is driven, as was Plato on similar grounds,' to adopt of God and necessity a teleological theory of nature.^
nature, he says, do nothing without a purpose
;

nature

always

strives, as far as
;

circumstances permit, to realise

superfluous, profitless, or incom-

perfection

nothing
;

is

plete in her

of her productions

we may

say with truth,

that there
is

and

far

more truly than of those of

^

art,

nothing accidental in them, but that everything has

its

own purpose
creations

it

is,

indeed, this very prominence of

design in nature which constitutes the beauty of her

and the charm with which even the

investigation.^
G42

least of

them repay
'

The essence of Nature,

/iidrrjv fxrjdiv ixr^r^

as

See Zell. Ph. d, Gr.

i.

aTroAeiVet ri TaJv

sqq.

With what follows, cf ElTTee's exhaustive treatment of the whole subject, iii. 213 sqq. 265 sqq. 3 De Ccelo, i. 4 fn. 6 B^hs kuI
'

7}

<pV(TlS

OvSeV

^ICLTTIV

1T010V(TIV.
:

\\.

ohK 8, 289, b, 26, 290, a, 31 iCTTiv iv Tols (pvaei rh ws irvx^v

avayKaiwv ttX^v iv rois irTjpwfxaari KoX rois are\f (Tiu. Gen. et Corr. iv airaaiv del ii. 10, 336, b, 27 rov P^Xriovos opiycadai (pafiev r^v <pi(nv. Be Vita et M. c. 4, 469, r^v tpvcriv dpcofxev iv iraffiv a, 28 cK ra>v Svvarciv iroiovaav rh KciWi(TTov. Gen. A n. ii. 6, 744, b, 36
: :
:

ovQkv
T/ff/r.

TTOif'i

TTfpiepyov ouSe /ndrrjv

c. 4,

r]

.... ovOfV MS ^Tvx^ TToieT T] <l)vais. 291, b, 13: r) 5e (pvcris ovdev aXdyws ouSe /naTTju Troie?. c. 5, 288, ael Troie? twv eV5ea, 2 17 (f)v(ris
c. 11,
:

(pvffis.

Likewise

739, b,

19.

An.

c. 2, 704, b,

15

v <pv<ns
/c

ouOev

iroieT ixdrtiv

dW'
'

dei

rwv

'S6;^ojueVajj' T77

ovaia

Trepl

eKaarov

XOfiivwv rh fifXTiarop. Pol'it. i. 8, 1256, b, 20: et olv v (pixris jurjfler artAts rroiti firirt fiT^Te IxdTrjv. Part. A/t. i. 1, 639, b, 19: fxaWov 5' icrrl rh ov (veKa Kol

rh Ka?^hv eV rots

rrjs (pixrcajs epyuis

eV ro7s rrjs rexvy]s. iv. 10, 687,

ii.

Si6-irp ei yivos ^(f>ov rh dpicrrov ^iXriov w5i, ovrus koX ex^t koto (pvffiv. Even in the most insignilicant products of nature we may perceive the effort after perfection cf foil. n. and Eth. N. x. Xffws Se Koi iv ro7s 2, 1173, a, 4
;
.

a, 15 (cf.

14)

ri

(puais eV
uiiShv

rwu

(pav\ois

icrri

ri

(pvaiKhv

dyadov
:

VSxo/A6'a,''
c.

iroiel
:

rh

fieAriarov,
r}

12,

694, a, 15
rrcplep^ov.

(pvais
iii.

iroiii

De An.
(pvcris

9,

432,

b,

21

/x^re

iroid

KpeTrrov fj Kad' outo, h ip'irai rov o'lKflov dyaOov. vii. 14, 1153, b, 38 irdvra ydp <pvaii e^et Tt 0(:'lov. PaH. An. i. 5, 645, a, 15
'

402

ARISTOTLE

he shows,

is Form, but the form of everything is determined by the function for which it is designed.^ All Becoming has its goal, and the terminal point of all motion is also its end or object.'- This pursuit of fixed designs in nature is demonstrated to our experience by the order and coherence of the universe and the regularity with which certain effects are produced by certain It is impossible to ascribe to chance what means.

happens always or even usually.^ He lays especial stress upon the motions of the heavenly bodies, the
birth

of living creatures

from seed, the instinct of

animals, the- evidences of design in the structure of

animals and plants, and also upon

human

action, inas-

hib

Se't

/j-rj

SivfrxepatVei;/ irai^iKws ttjv

(Tvuexovs TTjs Kiwrjcrews

Tl

otj(Tr]S ^cttl

irepl

Tuiv

ari/JLUTepuv

(cfccv

(iri-

eV iraai yap to7s (pvaiKoTs (rKe\piv. As HeracliueaTL Ti Oav/xacTTdv.

tus bade tlie strnngers welcome to the bakery wliere they found

him, saying
also,
iTp\

tliat

God was
ry)u

tliere

ovTco

Kal

npos

(T]Ti](nv

Se?

jXT)

iKaarov rwu Cv^^ irpocrUvai SvauTTOvixeuoy ws iv airaaiu

(puaiKov koI kuAov.

TCAOS Ti)s KIVT](X(:WS, TOVTO ^(TXO-Tov Ka\ TO ob kvKa. c. S, 199, a, 8 eV oaois Te'Aos eVrt ti, tovtov eveKa KpaTTiTai Th irpoTCpov Kal rh ^(pe^ris, kc. I hid. 1. 30, see p. 350, supra. Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 23 iravTaxo^ Se \4yoix^v To5e ToCSe ez/EKo, OTTov tiv <paivii]Tai t4Aos ti
:
:

irphs

r)

KLvrjffis

irepaiuei iJ.r]Bephs

(ivTos Tivhs

to

flJ.iro5i(opTOS,

(ixTTe

eJuai

(paucphv
St]

yap
iv

jx)]

rvxovTws aKTC
Ti)s
'

eVe/ca tivos

OTt
b,

Toils

(pv(rOi)s

jxaKiaTa
t)

ov

5'

(pyois eVrl Kal eVewia avv<rTr)Keu

rrju

edTl KaKovjXiv

TL

TOIOVTOV,
Pliys.
7]

t
ii.

Kal

(pvcTLv.
T]

1,

193,
oos

12

(pvais

AeyoyueVrj

y^youe r^hovs

rod

X^pO'V d\r](pev. (Cf. c. 1, in previous n.) Cf also Meteor, iv. VI, BOO, airavTa 5' iar\v wpia/xdva a, 10
1
:

Ka\ov cited

Tw

epyq)

'

ra

/jl^v

yap

dvvd/uLeua

rd avruv epyov aXrjdws ((TtIv Ka<JTa, olov 6 ocpdaXfids [sc. aArjOws 6(p9aXiJ.ds itTTiv^ el opa, Td 8c fi^ Svvdixivov dfiwuvficos, olov 6 redvews
TToteTi/

^ 6 XiOivos.
2

(pvais

Pkys. ii. 2, 194, a, 28 j v 5e up yap t4Aos Kal ov eVe/co

apa 415, wff'n-ep yap 6 vovs 'iviKa tov b, 16 TTOte?, Thv avTov TpSirou Kal r] (pvcris. ^ Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 34, 199, b. 15, 23 Part. Ari. iii. 2, 663, b, Gen. An. i. 19, 727, b, 29, cf 28 Dc Ccelo, ii. 8, 289, b, p. 302, n. 5 26 ovH ecTTiu iv to7s (pvaei Th cos eTvx^v, ou5e tJ) iravTaxov Kal ira(Tiv vndpxov TO otTTo tvxV^'
.
.

ylveais [see Mctaph. v. 4 b^os iffTiv els (pvaiv

.

init.^
f]

lxnp(pT)

(pxxxLs.

Be

Ail.

ii.

4,

PHYSICS
much, that
is

403

to say, as all art is

pletion of nature,

an imitation or comand the design of the one therefore

other.
^

implies that of the

If

we cannot deny the

evidences of design throughout the world of mortal

things, he argues that
far greater

we must admit the same in a measure with regard to the universe at

large,

is more strict, and the regularity more unbroken. Whence, indeed, could the laws which govern the former have sprung except from the latter ?^

where the order

Consequently the discovery of

first

final

causes forms the

It

and most important problem of natural science. must direct its attention, not to the individual, but
which the individual subserves not to the But if it is suggested that, in
:

to the whole

matter but to the form.^

* Phi/8. ii. 8, 198, b, 32-199, h, 26, cf. viii. 1, 252, a, 11

aWa

(x^v ovd4u

Kara
Trao-t

ye draKTOv rwv (jyvaei /cat <pv<nv 7] yhp (pvais alria

Tci^eajs.
;

Part. An.
ii.

i.

b,

12-30
;

De Cwh,

8,

1, 641, 289, b,
;

diro rvxvs koI rod avro/j-drovroiovrov (Tva-TTJvai, eV ^ otto rvxvs Koi ara^ias ou5' driovv (paiveTai. Cf also Zell, Ph. d. Gr. i. 650, 579, 1. PJiys. ii. 9, 200, a, 32 (after
=*

Gen. An. iii. 10, 760, a, 31 25 Metapli. xii. 10, xiv. 3; see p.
391, D. 2, suj)ra.

the passage quoted p. 360, n. 1) /col kfi^u fih r^ (pvatKCfj Aeicreai ai

airiai,

naWou

5e

tj

rivos

eveKa

\Pavt. An.
7}

i.

1,

641, b, 12:
iravra.

aXriov

yhp rovro

rrjs vXrjs [inas-

(pv(Tis

J/e/ca

rov

iroie7

(palujrat yap, wcirep eV ru7s Te^J'o(TTors

iffrXv

7)

rexvr),

ovtws

iv

ahrols

roh

apxh

tal

irpdyixaa-iv &\\r] ris alria roia^rrj, ^v exo/xeu

Kaddirep [as well as] rb depiubu Kal ^pyxpov 4k rod iravros. Slo /xaWov eiKos rov ovpavov yeycurjaOaL virb
roiavr'ns
airias,
et

y4yove,

Kal

elvai 5td roiavrr]u alriav

fiaWou ^

rd ^ya TO dvrjrd
<j>aiueraL

'

rb yovu rerayovpaviois
r)

fievov Kal rb wpia-fXiuoviroKv /uLaKXov

eV
5'

ro7s

irepl

V/xas,

rb

&\\ot' &\Xws Kal ws

ol 5e rS)u fiev (cfJMv %Ka(rrou <pv(rei (paalv

irepl
elj/ot

ervx^

ra Burira /xaWov.
rbv
S'

Kal yevfffdai,

ovpavov

much as Nature chooses her materials with a view to the thing thpt is to be produced] oAA' ovx avrr] rov reAouy. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 29 it is not sufficient to give the material causes of a thing. Matter is merely the motmn, the movens in the province both of nature and art is something quite different the Kvpiwrepa alria is the form. Materialistic physics, instead of giving us the real causes, can tell us only of implements of production as if one in answer to the question ' Who saws the wood ? were to reply,
:

'

464

ARISTOTLE

order to pursue definite ends, Nature must be capable of conscious deliberation, Aristotle considers this un-

reasonable

Even

Art,

lie

remarks, does not

reflect,
it is

but works in the

artist unconsciously.^

Moreover,

just this which, as

we already know, forms to Aristotle's the distinction between Art and Nature, that the mind productions of the former have their motive principle
outside themselves, and those of the latter within.^ thus arrive for the first time at the important conception

We

of

immanent

design,

point

so

essential

to

Aristotle's

imr to his view, as the

a fixed end.

system that we might define Nature, accordrealm of internal activity toward

'The

saw.'

the passages quoted

Cf. p. 360, n. 1, and p. 303, n. 3,

aud
d.

p. 307, n. 4,

and Zell. Ph.

ej/e(TTi T^ fVcKa rov, Kal eV (pvaei. Aristotle has here in view the ai't that has become a llxed habit

Gr. pt. i. 7.^8, 1, 3, 81)3, 2, on the neglect of final causes in ancient physics. Part. An. i.
(paivcrai Se irpuTH] 039, b, 14 [sc. alria] %v X^yofifv iveKci tiuos
1,
:

and second nature in the artist. Such art he conceives of, hownot as belonging to the but as inherent in 'Art' itself, seeing that the creative principle resides, not in the artist, but in the artistic conception which operates in him, and w^hich Aristotle therefore identifies with the T^xv-f] itself cf. the passages quoted from Mctaph. vii. 7, Gen. An. ii. 4, Part. An. i. 1, in n. 1, p. 356, and Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, oo-o yap fir) exet r))v avrrjv a, 34
ever,
artist,
; :

\6yos yap ovtos, apxh 8' 6 \6yos ev re ro7s Kara rexvriv ofio'ctis
Kal eV

rols

(pvcrei

avufffr-nKoaiu.

Ibid. c. 5, G4o, a, 30: in the investigation of the animal ovganism tlie question is, not of the

individual parts or the matter, but of the oAtj ixop(f>^, of the a-vvdecris and the oAtj ovaia. Pkt/x.n. 8, 11)9, b, 26: arooUaOaL '4vcKd rov TTOV 5e TO jUTj yivtaOat, iay |U?; Uwari to kivouv

v\r)v,

TTotel
'

cnraOri

ouTa,
iroiovara

oiov

rj

larpiKt]

avTT)

yap

vy'ieiau

ov^fv
-

TTcttrx^* ^''^^

'"''^^

vyia^o/iituou.

^ov\V(rdiJ.yov [ = idu /xtj ^ouAeuTjrai TO Kivovu, for the poirt is

missed by Doring, who, in his Kuni^tl. d. Arist. 68, puts a false emphasis on tluiai], Kairoi Kal rj T^xvV ov fiovMveTai Kal yap et ivriv iv r^ ^vXcf 7] vavwqyiKr], Sfxolws h.v
*

See p. 418, n. 3, ,wpra. In this sense Nature, as the internal in living operative principle
things, is also expressly opposed to the human understanding,

which operates upon them /row

without (Ovpadev vovs)
A7i.
ii.
;

cf.

Gen.

(pvcrei

i-noUi

^<n'' ei

iv ry

rix^y

6,

744, b, 21.

PHYSICS
But

465

this action in obedience to purpose cannot obtain

:

along with the free operation of form, we have the necessary element of matter
for,

a complete mastery in nature

which cannot be entirely overcome by form.

We have alBoth

ready shown (p. 359 sqq.) that Aristotle finds in matter the

groundwork of chance and blind natural necessity.

in fact, ultimately coincide, since chance
is

precisely that

which does not happen as the fulfiment of some design, but is produced by the way, in consequence of the
operation of intervening causes which are indispensable
to the attainment of a further end.

This characteristic

of natural existence renders

it

impossible to assign a pur-

pose for everything in the world.

Nature, indeed, works

realisation of her

towards

definite

ends, but, in the

plans, she produces

many

things parenthetically, by the

; ^

way, from mere necessity

far as possible to

yet she

still

endeavours as

make

use of such chance products,

em-

ploying her superfluities for purposes of her own, and,

like a

good housewife, taking care that nothing be

lost.^

It follows that natural science, in like mann<r, cannot

always proceed with the same rigour, but must take into account the disturbances introduced into the
designs of nature by necessity and chance, admitting

exceptions

to

rules,

and feeling

satisfied

when her

generalisations hold in the majority of instances.^

'

See p. 361, n. G/m. An. ii.

1,
(5,

supra. 744, b, 16

and nutrition of animal orgarisms Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, a, 3/

;

SxTirep olKOpSfios

ayadbs, koI t) (f>v<ris ov9ev anofidWeiv e^udev ^| y Io-tj

ri

troiTJcrai

xPW'r^v.

He

points

especially to uses to which siiperfluous materials (Trepmwfxara, on which see Gen. An. i. 18, 724, b, 23 sqq.) are put in the formation

iii. 2, 663, b, 31. Cf. also p. 361, n. 1, and Part. An. iv. 5, 679, a, 29, where be says of the juice of the cuttle-fish ri Se (pvais o/'
:

sqq.,

nj? Toiovrcp irfpirrdifiaTi KaraxpyiTai irphs fio-fjdeiav Kal aaoTTfpiav ahrwy.

*

PaQ't.

An.iii.

2,

663, b, 27,

VOL.

I.

HH

4GCj

ARISTOTLE
It is

from this resistance offered by matter to form

all

that Aristotle derives

irregular natural

phenomena

(rspara), such as abortions and the like.

He

regards

them
result

as the stoppage of nature in the midst of an

^

and failure of the Such phenowhich she originally intended.'^ mena arise from form not being completely master over
unfulfilled design, as a mutilation

matter.^

Moreover,

we may

note that he even con-

siders it a kind of abortion or failure of the ends of nature when children do not resemble their parents, and especially their father,^ when a good man begets

a bad son and rice

cf.

versa,''

Avhen the nature of the body

ecTtJ'

Metapli.

ii.

n. \, 2, supra.

H /?"/?. and p. 168, Hitter's statement

evia
fvcKci

Kara

t^x^V

^^ ^'^

'''"

bpBws

rov, iv Se toTs a/xap-

(see his p. 212) that the doctrine of Nature rests according to Aristotle rather on opinion than on science, seems to be due to a mistranslation of Anal. Post. i.
33, 89, a, 5, where t] <pv<ns ri TOiavr-n (i.e. to evBex^l^^^ov KOi

purai

ravofx^vois eVewa fx^v rivos iirix^ia.XK'' aTTorvyxo-vcrai, 6/j.o'cos

&/ ex''* '^-^

repara
3

^^ '''^'^ (pvcriKols Koi ra eKeivov rov ajxaprr^iara

eVe/ca tow.

fren.

An.

iv.

4,

770, b, 9

f'ari
ri,

yap ro repas rwv irapa (pvaiu

5'

&\Xa}s

ex^Jj',

as

context)
roiavTT]
'

and

is

is clear from the taken as = ^ cpvais

irapa tpvffiv
iirl

oh iracrav ciAAo
irepl

r^v ws
irapa

ro ttoKv

yap r^v

Nature

is

so also

del Kal r7]U i^ avdyKris ovOhv ytverai

<i>v(nv (a proposition which was afterwards applied by theologians to the miracles, and in become has application this

(i.e. d)8e)8aios).

Gen. ^M.iv. 3,759, b, 10 sqq. Aristotle is here speaking of abortions which want essential parts of the human body as well as

those which have more than the proper number, and applies the above explanation to both t\os yap ru>v fiev Kiu^ffeoov (form-giving
:

famous, although ally known that

it is
it

not gener-

comes from

Even a repas, thereArihtotle). fore, is in a certain sense Kara

(pvaiv,
ri]U

orav
T]

fx^

Kpari](Tri

r^u Kara

motion) Kvofx4vwv,
KpaTovfxeurjs,

rr\s

5' vKiis

ov

ii\i)U

Kara ro

eTbos ^ixris.

ficvei
S'

to

Kad6\ov
. . .

Cf. previous n.
jjL^

fia\i(TTa

'

rovTO

(TtI (oJov

Cf. TO Te'pas avaTrrjpia rls icrriv. also 767, b, 13: to 5e repas ovk eueKoi rov KoiX avayKa'ov irpos r^v T^v rod T\ovs alriav, aWa Kara
aviiiPefirjKos
^

avayKa7ov.
ii.

* Gen. An. ii. 3, 767, b, .5: h ioiKws ro7s yovevaiv ^'5rj rpoirov rivh. repas iarlv. * Polit. i. 6, 1255,^ b, 1 yap, &(Tirep e| avQpuirov a^iovcri iK dijplwv yiveadai &vdp(t}irov Ka\
:

Phys.

8,

199, b, 1

et

5)/

9r)piov,

ovrw Ka\

e| ayadSov

ayadov

'

PHrSICS

467

does not correspond to that of the soul.' Indeed, he looks on all the female sex as imperfect and mutilated
in comparison with the male, because the informing force of the man was insufficient to overcome the matter

taken from the

Again the brutes

woman in the act of procreation.^ are dwarfish as compared with human

members
of their body are
;

beings, because the upper

not properly proportioned to the lower ^ they are the imperfect attempts of nature to make men a form of development analogous to that of children." Moreover,

among the animals we may discern a further malformation in the case of single tribes the mole, for instance ^
or, to speak more accurately, we may distinguish between more perfect and less perfect animals such as have blood are more perfect than such as have none the tame than the wild;^ those which possess but one
:

centre of organic

with several.^

life than those which are provided In like manner, vegetables, as compared
e
^

V 5^ <l>{,(ris^ $oi\eraL fxh rodro iroLUv iroXKaKis, ov fi4uToi Uvarai.

1 oht.^l. 5, 1254, b, 27 ^oiK,raLfx,vovvr,^vcriSKa\rb.<T<i,f,ara Siatpepopra rroi^iv ra ru^v iXevO^ptcu

:

Gen. An. ii. 1, 732, a, 16 PoUt. i. 5, 1254, b, 10- tI

Kac

rcou Sov\a,u,

avf^fialue^

8h

^o\\aKis rovuaurjdu. Lt. znjra the section in Ch.

X. on 8ex
on. JU

ID

Animals

^xh ^/u^pa [^ya] rciu ayp'mv ^eAx/o; rV <i>iciv. Aristotle admits, however, himself, Part. An i ;) 643, b, 3, that the division of animals into tame and wild is a false one, as all tame animals are found also in a wild condition,

^''''^' '^- 1^'.^^^' b, 2, Trai/ra 7ap eo-Ti ra (.cfa uaud,5r}

^\

raAXa^apa
IZ, b.hj, a, 8.

Tou&uepcc^ou.

Cf.

c.

Children also, for

ravc^5;
^^''''- c-

Thegreaterperfectionoftameanimals is therefore something that is acquired so far as it is%i<T.i,

;

it

the

same reason, are

'

consists in a

mere capacitv
iv.

Part. Aoi.

5,

682, a

il> h/jjass2m. 2 p. and

^'
ii.
1

^^'

^^

-t\r''-b

^^^' ^' ^^

^Z^Lf.f'^^^^"''}''''^'^^''''' from that of a beast. Btst. An. IV. 8, 533, a, 2.

indeed, desires to give to such creatures only one central organ, ^^*' ^ei"g enable to do this she '' ^^^^^^ ^ ^i^^ tt^^ several In the Problems (x. 45) the writer goes so far as to say that

HH

4C8

ARISTOTLE
Tliey display design but

with animals, are incomplete.^

in a less
see,

developed form

^
;

and they

too, as

we

shall

have an animate existence, although only in the

its

lowest stage of

development and in
Aristotle
life,

its

most rudi-

mentary

outline.

even goes further and

least possible, in

recognises a degree of

though the

what appears
whole
of
is

to be

inorganic'^

Thus Nature

as a

the gradual conquest of

Form

over Matter

continual progi'ession towards

life.

more

perfect development

That which

is

absolutely
since all

temporal origin

is last,

first, or Form, in its Becoming is a move-

ment out
wliich

of Matter into
first

Form, and
the

tlie

beginning (that
thought)
is

comes

in

order

of

also

in every case the end.*

It follows that

complex existorganic to

ences must be posterior to simple ones

tlie

the

inorganic.''

Aristotle, however, does not carry this

eartlily existence.

thought beyond the sphere of

applies
it

He
first

chiefly to organic nature, in

which he

had the insight

of existence.

to discover a continuous progress from

inanimate to animate, from imperfect to perfect forms

nature produces wild plants and animals in greater quantity than tame ones, because it is easier to make what is imperfect than what is perfect, and because nature, like art, is only able to create the better after long pracThis, however, is an extice. aggeration of the Aristotelian doctrine of nature's weakness. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 7, 757, b, 19,24. 2 Phys. ii. 8, 199, b, 9 kuI iy
'
:

Ch. IL.infra, at the end of pt. i. ^ Part. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 25

ra vcrrepa

ToTv

(pvTo7s

^veari rh

cveKo. rov,

ijTTOV Se ^L^pdpdiTai. ^ See p. 460, n. 3,

supra

and

yeveaei irpSrepa (pvaiv icrrl, koI -rrpwrov rh rfj yevecrei TeKevTa7op rcf /lev olv XP^^V trpoT^pav r^u vXrjv avayKa7ov dvai kol yev<Tiv, rcji Xoyqs 5e t^/j/ kKaarov fxop<pi]v. Metapli. ix. 8, oiraj/ eir' apx^f /SaSi^'ei J 050, a, 7 rh yiyv6fiivov koI t4\os apx^ yap rh ov eucKa, rod reXovs 5' eVewa ?; ycueffis. Seealso-p. 205, n. 2, supra. ^ Part. An. 646, b, 4. Meteor. oel Se, fiaWov iv. 12, 389, b, 29 Srjkop [ti eKa<TTOu} iirl rwv xxrrcpwv koX '6\oos '6(ra olov opyaua K2) fveKd
rfj
. .

tV

tV

PHrsiCi^

469

CHAPTER IX
CONTINUATION
B.

The Universe and

the

Elements
inquiries into

TuKNiNG now from these more general

nature to the consideration of the actual constitution of the world, Aristotle comes upon a question which had
occupied a leading place in previous metaphysical discussions

the question, namely, of creation.

live a definite

His pre-

decessors had without exception assigned to the world

in

which we

beginning in time

some,

such as Anaxagoras,
holding that this world

Plato,
is

and the Pythagoreans,^

;

the only one

others that the

world we see

is

only one

among an
is

infinite series of

other worlds both past and present.^

first

Aristotle eternal

to

declare

that

our world

was the and unis

sq.

begotten.^
itself
rov.

This conviction seems to have early forced

upon him/

Although
d.

in his system
Gr. pt.
'-

it

not

Wehaveaclearerideaof the true nature of man than of flesh, bones, &c., and a better idea of the nature of the latter than of the elements. T^ 7^^ ov fi/Ka ^Kia-Ta ivravda StjAov oirov irMlcTTov t^s uAtjs wo-Trep yap ei ra e(Txo.Ta

i.

H78 sqq. 410

;

The atomic school held the existence of both Anaximander, Anaximenes, Diogenes, and Empast.

Xricpdeiri,

t]

/xhv vKr] ovdhv

&\\o

Trap'
v)

pedocles placed the series in the On Heraclitus cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 586, 2 ad Jin. 629, 1 ad Jin. .and on Xenophanes,
iind. 498,
^
'^

outV, V

5'

ovaia

ovOh &\\o

Jin.

\6yos, rh 5e nera^v avaKoyov rcf iyyvs ehai '^Kaarou, iirelKalrovruu oTiovu i(TTiv eucKdrov.
'

As he says himself
i.

in the

De
Fr.

Ca-lo,
*

10, 279, b, 12.

ii.

Cic. Acad.
18), quotes

38, 119 (Ar.

On

the latter

cf.

Zell. Ph.

probably from

470

AklSTOTtS

placed in direct connection with the doctrine of the

eternity of motion/ yet
it

follows, equally with

it,

from

the consideration that the operation of creative force in

the world must be as eternal and unchangeable as that

force itself,

and that therefore the universe which

it,

is

produced by
change,"''

however the individual parts may cannot as a whole have had a beginning in

time.

Aristotle, indeed,

nowhere expressly

states this

result in the

works that have come down

it.^

to us, although

he approaches very near to

tlie
5()

He contents himself,

in

treatise n.

(\)i\oao<pia<;

(sec p.

sq. Hn])ra), at

any rate from

and we should have

a TTpoTfpa
/xTa)8oA.^

either in one or both of them, to suppose

ttjs

one of the dialogues, as Aristotle's Neqne enim ortum esse view

' :

TrpuTrjS.

unquam mundum, quod

nulla

fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita esse eum undiqueaptuni ut nulla vis tantos queat niotus iiiutationemque moliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum cxistere

Similarly we should have to conclude that as a preliminary to the transition from creation to destruction of the world or vice versa a change must take place in the creative force or in the material upon which it works.
If both remain unchanged their mutual relation must also remain unchanged, and therefore also the resultant effect. But

ut hie ornatus uncjuam dilapsus occidat.' (Cf. Plato, Tim. 84, :b, 8o Ps. 68, E, and elsewhere.) Phit-o, uFAcrii. M. ii. 189 {Ar. Fr. 17), where it is declared to be Sfctrr? a0eo'T7js to regard the bparos B^hs as no better than any human product. The See p. 387, supra. latter is even quite compatible with the doctrine of the birth and destruction of the world.
'

On

this, cf. p. 468, n, 3.

Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 20 sqq. where, in opposing the view that motion had ever a beginning, he says had the movens and the mobile existed without producing any motion, the transition from rest to motion could only have been effected by a previous change
^
:

according to Aristotle, God is eternal, and unchangeable matter, on the other hand (setting aside the doctrine of the immutability of the material of which the heavens are made), we know can only suffer change through the operation of the moving cause. If, therefore, the latter is unchangeable, its relation to the matter and the universe which is its product must This is the be unchangeable. argument indicated by Cicero in the passage quoted above,

where Aristotle declares

it

to

be inconceivable that so perfect a product as the world could

PHYSICS
his investigations into the origin of the world,

471

with

and refuting the doctrine The docthat the world has a beginning but no end.^
proving that motion
however,
the
it

is eternal,

trine,

is

clearly involved in his metaphysics.

is

For

if

primum movens

unchangeable, the

effect

which
same.

produces upon the world must always be the

It

cannot at one time act as a creative, at another

as a destructive, force.

The same conclusion

follows also

from Aristotle's
stars are

scientific doctrine of the

immutability

of the material of which the heavenly spheres and the

made.

Not

only, therefore, does the doctrine

of a beginning and end of the world in the sense of an

absolute birth
have

and destruction
novo
it

find

no place in Ari-

had

a
;

beginrjing

consllio

inito

whence

may

be concluded that the creative force must have produced the best from all eternity in virtue of its own unchangeable perfection.
' Aristotle devotes De Cwlo, 10-12, to the proof that the heavens are without beginning and end, confining himself, however, almost exclusively to the attack on the Platonic view, that,

ticular moment ? or why should that which has been from all eternity cease at this particular moment to exist? (283, a, 11) It is its own nature which constitutes a thing without beginning or end, and this in such a case excludes the possibility of not-

i.

they will endure for ever, ihey yet had a beginning in time. His chief argument against it is that beginning and endlessness, end and beginninglessness, are mutually exclusive. That which exists for an endless period can neither begin nor cease to be in either case there must be a time in which it is not (see c, 12, 281, b, 18 sqq. where, however, it is proved in too formal a way). Why, moreover, should that which has not existed for all eternity begin to be at this pjir;

w bile

being the nature of that which has had a beginning and is liable to perish must, on the other hand, include it. The latter, therefore, cannot last for ever any more than the former can begin or end (1. 29 sqq. cf. p. 366, n. \,fn. and the passage quoted, ibid.
; ;

ilt.

from Metaph.

ix.

8).

The

views, on the other hand, of those who hold that the world has both beginning and end are

here only lightly touched upon.

The atomic view Aristotle considered that he had disposed of by his doctrine of the unity of
the world, while in reference to the view of Heraclitus and Empedocles he contents himself

with remarking

(c.

10,

280, a,

472
stotle's system,

ARISTOTLE
but even such a fundamental change in
as
is

the constitution of the world

Heraclitus and Empedocles
is

presupposed by

wholly inconsistent both

with his cosmology and his metaphysics.

for Aristotle is not of

but only of

its

The question any origin of the world in time, actual character and constitution.
is

The universe

divided, according to Aristotle, into

two halves of opposite character

the other celestial.

the one
is
:

terrestrial,

and

This opposition

at once revealed

by the testimony of our senses and Aristotle can hardly have come to it in any other way. The unalterable nature of the stars
larity of their

and the changeless reguin his opinion, so strong

movements form,
recognise
to
different

a contrast

to terrestrial corruptibility

and change, that

different

we

are forced to

two

essentially

realms,

subject

laws.

])ortant this opposition

strives to
lie

seems to him to
its

The more imbe, the more he

in

demonstrate

necessity.

All natural bodies,

space.

argues, are

capable of
is

movement

But

movement compound
from the

in space

either rectilineal or circular or a

of both.

The
it

third of these being derived

first

two,

follows that the latter alone are

rectilineal

simple and original

the centre
to

motion proceeding from

or
vice

the

circumference,

versa,

and

circular motion revolving

round the centre.

If these
certain

are the

tirst

natural motions, there

must be

bodies which by reason of their nature are the subjects

of such
1 1

movement, and which are consequently the

cf.

sqq.

Zell.

P/i. d.

Gr.

pt.

ad Jin.) that it attributes to the world a mere change of form and not a veritable birth
i.

629,

and destruction, That it was the observation of this which led Aristotle in
'

the

first

instance to

make

his

PHYSICS
most primitive and ancient bodies.

473

Those, on the movement, must be formed by combination from them, and receive their
contrary, which exhibit a composite
particular
bias

derates in their composition.

from the constituent which preponThat which is natural is

is

always earlier than that which

violent.

opposed to nature and

It follows that circular,

and

also rectilineal,

movement must be
other, the

naturally fitted for some body or

more

so that rotation is the only

unbroken and
is

interminable movement, and nothing that

to nature fulfils these conditions.

contrary

Accordingly there

must

exist

two

sorts of simple bodies

the

one origin-

ally destined for rectilineal, the other for circular,

move:

ment.^
it is

Rectilineal

movement has

opposite directions

either

upwards or downwards, passing from centre

Consequently, the bodies
natures, destined
is,

to circumference, or vice versa.

which exhibit
for the

it

must be of opposite
:

one or the other kind of motion that

they must

be either light or heavy.

Circular motion, on the other

hand, exhibits no such contiaries. It starts from any point

towards any point in the circumference.

which
it

is

naturally qualified for

It

it

So the body must likewise be withlight, since

out contrariety.
does not rise or

can neither be heavy nor

fall,

and in

fact it

cannot exhibit any

kind of rectilineal motion.

It is

even impossible to comthe other must^ be

municate either upward or downward motion to it by force,

since if the one were unnatural to
distinction between two realms of being is obvious from his whole treatment of the subject, Of. also p. 366, n. 1. ' De Cailo, i. 2, 268, b, 14 sqq. - According to the principle
it

already laid down (c. 2, 269, a, 10, 14) as the basis of the discussion (see p. 224, n. 3), %v hi ivavrlov, which, when thus universally expressed, is certainly

open

to dispute.

474
its

ARISTOTLE
natural motion.^
is

The body that is destined

for circular

motion
change.

also without beginning or ending, subject to

neither increase nor diminution, neither impression nor

His argument for this is that everything that comes into being springs from its opposite, and everything that perishes is resolved into the same ^ all in'-^

crease

and decrease depend upon addition or subtraction of the matter out of which a thing has grown, and therefore that which, being without beginning, possesses no
such matter, cannot increase or decrease
finally,
;

all

bodies,

which

alter, either increase or decrease,

is

and where

there

is

no such process neither

there any alteration.^

JW;. c. a, 269, b, lS-270,a, nor can the positioD ySm fx^ yap iv^ex^rai t^v aXKov Kai Irepou
12
;

\sc. KU'Tjaii/ KiuelcrdaL] (c.

2,209,

a,

7) be accepted except provisionally as of universal validity. As is shown in the sequel, it is The inapplicable to the aether. position upon which the latter

TUerhinde, 393) in casting a doubt upon Aristotle's clearly expressed meaning, mereIv on the ground of the actual clitliculties that beset the theory,
(Aristot.
-

He

a, 13. b,

says, Be Cwh. i. 3, 270, ayeuriTou kuI acpdaprou

:

koI auav^hs kol

kuI out'

avaWoiuTov,

u'iSiou

av^r]aiv '4xov oy're (pdiaiv,

conclusion rests, (viz. that movement in a circle has no opposite). indeed, endeavours Aristotle, (c. 4) further to establish by

aAA' ayrjparov koL dvaWoiajrov Kal airaOes. Cf. Mctaph. viii. 4, 1014, b, 7, xii. 1, 2, 10G9, a, 30, b, 25. On this point, cf. also p.
'^

But he cannot prove that the motion may not

special proofs.

341
'

sq.

Be

Cudo,

i.

3, 270, a,

13-35.

be crooked or oblique for if we have two opposite motions on the same or on parallel lines
;

The immutability of the body

which has no opposite might have been proved more simply and conclusively from the proposition (p. 341, andp. 353 sq. above) that all change means transition from one state into its opposite, and that a thing can only be operated upon by its opposite,
Aristotle, however, does not here adopt this method, as his investigation into the conception of change and affection was not published until later in his

which deviate in opposite

tions,
it

direc-

does

not

make the

shghtest difference whether the lines are straight or circular, Moreover, the courses of the fixed stars and of the planets are actually in opposite directions why may these bodies
;

not,

then,

consist

of

different

substance ? We are not warranted, however, with Meyer

ffitherial

PHYSICS

475

This position draws further support from experience. For he contends that if the spaces of the heavens, as well
as the intermediate space

between heaven and earth,

were

full

of air or

fire,

then the bulk of these elements,

considering the magnitude of the stars and their distance from each other, would be so hugely disproportioned to that of the remaining elements that the latter could not
preserve their equilibrium, but would be swallowed up

by them.

proper proportion between the elements

the celestial space

can therefore only be maintained on the hypothesis that is filled with a body different from the

matter of the elements.^

this

We
all

are also led to believe that

body

is

superior to

change, by the fact that

antiquity, so far as tradition reaches, furnishes us with

no evidence of the
heaven or

least alteration in the fabric of the

its parts.^

Finally, the unthinking belief of

this conviction,

humanity harmonises with

generations.^

belief deserves respect as the inheritance of

and such a unnumbered

its

All nations have placed the residence of

the gods in heaven, because they were convinced of

' '

immortal and divine nature. The name a3ther may be traced to the same source, for Aristotle, like Plato,-"'
derives
it

from dsl

dslv^

from the
De
o\)

restless rotation of

treatise tion.
'

on birth and destruc-

^
^

Ovlo,
Se?
b,

i.

3,

270, b, 11.
5ls oAA' ras avras

yap aira^ ov5k

vojui^eiu
els

Such a proportion involves that there is as much air and as much fire as will be produced by the transformation of all water into air and all air into fire on
the basis of the existing quantitative extent of these bodies. 2 3feteor. i. 3, 339, b, 13-340,
a, 18.

airfipdKis
o.<\>iKV7(TQai

U^as
19.

^;uay.

JDc

Ccelo,

270,

339, b, 27,
is

given words, and JMetaph. xii. 8 ad fin. See infra, the section of Ch. I'X. on the Heavens, and Ch. XII. pt. 2.
5

See Meteor. where the same reason in almost the same

Plato, Crat.

410, b.

476

ARISTOTLE
The conclu-

the celestial globes, and not from aWeiv}

sion
is

that the nather

matter.''^

elementary
1

must be distinguished from all Without opposition and without

Arist. 30 sq.) that all uArj of the stars is the potentiality they possess of motion and change in space, and that in this sense we might even attribute vk-rj to vovs (Heetling, ibid. 23). Aristotle certainly says, Metaph. viii. 4, 1044, b, 7 in the case of yivvqTou oixriai, we have to deal both with their matter and form
7iissth.

De

Codo,
i.

i.

3,

Meteor,

3,

389,

270, b, 4-25 b, 19 sqq.

d.

that

is

meant by the

and

Be

following these 3Itmdo, c. 2, 392,

.

passages
a, 5.

bu

the name * aether,' cf Zell. Ph. il. Gr. i. 897, 4 ad fin. - Althongh it is called irpurov (TToix^7ou, De Cwlo, iii. 1, 298, b, c. 3, 6; Meteor, i. 1, 338, b, 21 339, b, 1(5, 340, b, II, rh twv 6.(Trp(iiv aToix^lov; Gen. An. iii. it is yet expressly 3, 737, a, 1
;

it

is

otherwise with
Sf
'

(pva-iKol fxiv

(listiiigiiislicd
ri\)ni tlie
ii.

in tlieso ])assages

a'ihioL
oiiic

ovcriai.

'

frrajy

70^ evia

3, l',M\,

four (nuix^7a. Gen. An. I), 29, it is called irt^pov

e^f

vAr]u,

7)

01;

roia.vTi]v

aWa

/jioi'op

icara r^irui'

kli'-)]t%u.'

Matti-r,

adj^ia ical Otiorepoy

twv
i.

KaXov/neuooi'
3,

(TToix^iwv

340, b, 7 (ef, p. 488, n. 3, infra), erepov a-wfia iTvpos T Kal &cpos and De Orlo, i. 2, 2G9, a, 30: ovaia crco/naTos aWf] irapa tus ivravQa (rvardcrfis diiorepa Kal Trporepa tovtoop airdv;

Meteor,

however, is denied of the heavenly bodies only in the sense in which it belongs to temporal
things.

Aristotle

means that
uAtj

if

we understand by
which
a
thing
is

that

of

made,
Kal

the

vTTOKiifxevou

yepeareus

<p6opas

ruiv
If,

cf. ih'id. c.

;>

(following n.).

therefore,

we understand by

o-ToixeTa

only such simple bodies

as stand to one another in the relation of opposites, and pass into one another, we cannot reckon the rether among these.

SeKTiKov (as it is defined, Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 320, a, 2), the unseated and eternal has no uAtj in this sense but if w^c take it in the more general sense of the substratum of change, the Swd/xei hv,
;

Only when we extend the meaning of the word to embrace all

simple bodies can we call it a aroix^lov. On the other hand, it is, to say the least of it, inaccurate and misleading to say that according to Aristotle the celestial spheres have no ma'

it has v\ri, inasmuch as it is capable of movement in space. 'I'hat this is all that Aristotle means is obvious from the parallel passages, xii. 2, 1069, b, 24 Trdura 5' v\riv ^X^' '^^'^ fiera^dWei
r
.
. .

Kal Tcop aiSiuu

irSdip

'6iTa

jx^ yevP7]Ta

KLpr]ra Se <popa, ctAA' oh yfpprjT^p,

aWa
oh

izoi

viii. 1,

1042, b. 5

terial

substratum

'

(EfiENTANO,
;

PsyeJiol. d. Arist. 198

Heetling,
'

yap apdyK-q, e? ri S\7]p TdiriKrjp. TotTO Kal ypp-qT^p

(pddprrjP exeij/
;

ex^i/cat

Mat. und Form, 22), that the aather consists of a material which is'no material, of an immaterial
material
'

(Kampe,

Erliennt-

050, b, 20 ouS' e*" Ti KiPOv/j.pop aidiop, ohK effri Kara hvpafiip kipov/j.pop aAA' ^ iroSiP TTot [only in respect of
c.

8,

PHYSICS
mutation,
it

477

stands above the strife of the elements:

it

these belong to the terrestrial,

of
it

to the celestial, world

;

are formed the heavenly spheres and stars the god-like in the realm of matter.^

it

is

The
circular

four elements are different in

all

respects.

If

movement

is

peculiar to the a3ther, their

move-

But, as we have remarked, rectimotion follows two opposite directions, upand down, toward the circumference and toward the centre. That
is rectilineal.

ment

lineal

which tends naturally downwards is heavy that which rises is light. Accordingly the elements exhibit the opposites of heavy and light.^ This opposition cannot,
;

he holds, be reduced to quantitative differences of magnitude, of mathematical figure, or density it is original

;

and

qualitative.

The

peculiarities of the elementary

materials we cannot explain either, with Plato and Democritus, by the mathematical qualities of atoms, or, with

the elder physicists, by the rarefaction and condensation

locality

can it be said to move merely Zwdii^i and not ivepyda, inasmuch as it is not yet in the place to which ^it is moving]
rovTov
ffOai']

denied of them in as it is denied of immaterial Nous, or that it be attributed to the latter in

likt}

is

same sense

the the

can
the
i

5'

[l.p.

Tov irSdey

iroi kiucT-

same sense

vK-nv

ov9h KuXvei
:

uwapx^iv.
3,

It

is

Be Ca;lo, i. 9, 278, a, 10 sqq. Aristotle expressly says 6 ovpavhs as a universal conception is different from oSe 6 ovpav6s the
;

as to the former. called OeTos, Meteor

; :

339, b, 25 also, similarlv, Be Ca-lo, i. 3, 270, b, 1], 20 ^ wpdrtj ouo-/o tmv acoudruv, rh vpurov

former
latter
less
viii. 4,

is
rfj

flSos
v\r)

Kal

noptp^,

the
Still

fj./xiyfi4vov.

can we infer from Metapli.

that the celestial globes are incorporeal beings (like the ther, they are frequently called diia (Tcifiara, &c. see Ind. Ar. 742, a, 43-60) ; we cannot, therefore, suppose for a moment that
:

riov irapa yijy Kal irvp Ibid. ii. 1, 284 a, 4 Later philosophers, such as Cicero's Epicurean (iV. De. i, 13 33, cf. Krische, Forseh., 'sOG sqq.) and the pseudo- Justin Cohort, c. 5, 36, identify on this ground God and the tether
(riafia,

'4rep6v

Kal a4pa Kal vSwp.

g^e

p.

473

sq.

478
of one and the

ARISTOTLE
same primitive material.
point

We

have
first

already proved this

hypothesis.^

with regard to the

But those who deduce the differences of matter from a condensation and rarefaction of some one original element are, besides other arguments, met by
the objection that they do not explain the distinction

between light and heavy substance.

They
it

confine

the difference between the elements to a mere relation

of magnitudes, and accordingly represent
as

some-

thing merely

relative.'^

sition of rectilineal

To Aristotle's mind, the oppomovements and natural localities at

once demands a qualitative difference between the elements.

Rectilineal motion being just as primitive as
circular motion, there

must be certain bodies which are

it.-"^

especially designed for

Again, since

it

includes

two tendencies, upward and downward, we must in the first place assume two bodies, of which one naturally
sinks, the other rises, the

one tending to the centre, the

other to the circumference of the world.

place,

In the second

we must imagine an

intermediate element, or

rather

a pair of elements, the one approximating to

the former, and the other to the latter.

bodies, the first

Of

these four

two are earth and

Earth
;

fire,

the other two

water and

air.

is

absolutely heavy and entirely

absolutely light and entirely
straight to the
;

devoid of lightness

fire is

devoid of heaviness.
centre,

The one moves

all

and therefore sinks below

other bodies

the

other moves straight to the circumference, and therefore

See p. 443 sqq. Aristotle discusses this view Ccelo, iii. 5, cf. iv. 5, 312, b,

'

20

Metapli. i. 8, 988, b, 29 sqq. ggg p_ 473^

Be

PHYSICS
rises

479
air,

above

all

other bodies.

Water and

on the

other hand, are only relatively heavy, and therefore also

relatively light.

Water
;

is

heavier than air and

fire,

but lighter than earth than water and earth.

air heavier

than

fire,

but lighter
sink of

Under no
;

possible circumstances,
fire

unless compelled by forcible movement, does

itself into the place of air

nor, again, does earth rise

into that of water.

sink into the lower regions

them is withdrawn.^
earth

Air and water, on the contrary, when the matter which fills Earth is everywhere heavy; water,
;

air, everywhere except in and water ^ fire, nowhere.^ Therefore of two bodies the one which holds the more air may be heavier
;

everywhere except in earth

in air but lighter in water

weight of wood,

for instance,

than the other a hundredthan a pound of lead.''

We
'

may

arrive at these four elements even

more
All

definitely

by

another

process

of

reasoning.^

without, however, explaining a

circumstance which has so important a bearing upon his
theory.
- That even air has weight is obvious from the fact that a bladder full of air is heavier than

Properly, indeed, they ought to rise into the higher Aristotle; admits himself. Be Ccelo, iv. 5, H12, b, sqq., that this does happen unless external force be applied,
;

world cannot consist of sether alone, fox it must have an immovable cen're. There must therefore be a body whose nature it is to rest at the centre and move
it, and therefore also one an opposite nature. We thus have earth and fire, which in turn require water and air as

towards

of

'

intermediate elements,
follows, see Gen. The true author of this theory of the elements is said to be Hippocrates (according to Idblbr, ^riz^. J/z-^^or. ii. 389, who appeals to Galen, i>e ^/^w'. sec. Hipiiocr. i. 9, 0pp. ed. Kiihn i. 481 sq.). This, however, is uncertain for several reasons. In the first place, neither of the works here referred to, n. <f>v<nos avOpdoirov and n. aapKuv, can be
et Corn.
ii.
'"

For what

2, 3.

an empty one
3

ibid. c. 4, 311, b, 9.

Aristotle,

in

the

passage
in this

just

referred

to, finds

explanation of the difference between absolute and

specific gravity.
*

theory

an

Be

Ccelo, iv. 3-5.

The same

ideas occur, in a somewhat different application, ii. 3, 286, a, 12 sqq. It is there said that the

480

ARISTOTLE

bodies capable of being perceived by the senses are prehensible but all qualities perceptible by the sense of
;

touch, with the exception of gravity and levity,^ are

reducible

to

four

warmth,
The

cold,

dryness, moisture.^

Aristotle regards the first

active,

two of these properties as the others as passive.'"' Now, by joining these

Cf. Zell. P/i. d. Gr. 519 sq. 897.
i.

attributed to Hippocrates.

205, 241,

former is without doubt the work, or an extract from a work,

the of Polvbus, his son-in-law post-Aristotelian of is latter
:

have not here to do with these, as they do not indicate a particular kind of action and

We
;

origin, cf.

cxlvii., civ.

KtJHN, Hipyocr. 0pp. I. Littre, (IJuvrea (V 315 sqq. iJSl. i. llippoeraie, A gain, while tlie treatise n, (pvaios
;

avOpwirov

recognises (c,

init.)

Empedocles's four elements and even makes heat and cold, dryness and moisture the constituent elements of every living thing (c. 3), it yet does not bring these

passion the elements, on the other hand, stand to one another in that particular relation of action and passion {ihid. 329, b, 20), which the treatise on birth and destruction chiefly discusses. e^p^ilv Ibid. 329, b, 24 Kol ^vxp^v KoX vyphu Koi ^r]phu to
-'

/j.(u

two positions together as Aristotle does, or deduce each of the four elements from the various
combinations of those four pronor, indeed, perties into pairs does Galen (see supra) claim this for it. The treatise n. aapKwv, on the other hand, refers (at i. 425, k) to the Aristotelian account of the elements, but this merely proves that it is later than Aristotle. That heat and cold, dryness and moisture, were regarded as the elements of things in the medical schools of his time, is corroborated by Plato, St/m. 186, d. The early physicists 187, D. regarded the conflict of heat and cold as the primary principle of
;

iradriTiKa

ra 5e t^ yap iari rh (TvyKplvov to. dfxoyevT] [from which it follows that fire separates heterogeneous elements], x^/vxpou

r^

iToir)TiKa

dvai

K^yerai

'

d^pfxhv

ra T

5e jh (Tvvdyov KoX avyKplvov o/xoims (Tvyyfvr} Ka\ ra /x^ 6ix6<pvKa,

vyphu 8e rh aopiffrov
evopiarov
ttv,

olKcicp

opcp

^r}phv

5k rh a6pi(Trov

jjiiv olKeicf) '6pcf},

5v(r6pi(rrov 5e.

(Cf.

The 3Ieteor. iv. 4, 381, b, b, 29.) qualities Xeirrhv, iraxh, yXi^xpov,

Kpavpou, /xaKaKhv, ffKKripov are reduced to these primarj'^ qualities
diepdv
;

and

fie$pyfivov

form two
in its of
5e

kinds of moisture, narrower sense and

dryness. ^ Meteor,
iv.

^-npdv

ireir-nybs

init.

eirel

rerrapa
.
.

SicapiaTai
.

aXria rS)v aroi-

evolution and frequently united with it that of dryness and moisture, without, however, as yet expressly combining these four as the primary properties of things.

S}U ra /j.hv 5vo ironjriKa, X^ioi3V, rd dep/xov Kal rd ^vxp^v, to Se Svo TradriTiKa, rd ^r]p6v Kal rd vyp6v t\

Se

TTiffris

(fiaiuerai

rovrwv eK rrjs iiraywyrjs. yhp iv vaaiv rj fiep

PHYSICS
four properties in pairs,

481

we

obtain, after eliminating

two impossible combinations, four that are possible, in which one active and one passive property are always united, and thus four simple bodies or elements are
exhibited
or air;
2

i warm and
cold

dry, or fire warm and moist, and moist, or water; cold and dry, or
;

earth. 3 These are the four sorts of matter of which all composite bodies consist, which are excreted from all.
6epix6rr}s

Kal

^f/vxp^r-ns

opl^ovffai

Kttl crvfi<pvov(rai

Kal ix^rafidXXova-at

ra

ofioyevrj Kal

ra

/j.^

SfioyeyTj, Kal

vypaivovcrai
(TKXripvuovffai

Kal

^rjpaivovtrai

koI

Kal fiaXdrrova-ai,

ra
Kal

Se

|r/pa

Kal

vypa

Spi^S/nej/a

tSAAo ra
Cf.
c. c.

elprffiepa iraQr) irdcrxovTa.

4 init. c. 5, 382, a, 27 sqq. 10, 388, a, 21, c. 11, 389, a, 29. ^ In his descriptioTi of these

four primary substances and their

is

stituent parts of any kind (cVuttdpxovra), and thus even the component parts of a conception or a demonstration, as well as the form as constituent part of the thing, but in a more special sense the iwirdpxop us uAtjj/ (BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist. 702, a, 18 sqq-) stands for the ultimate material constituents of bodies themselves, that els % SiaipeTrai ra
ffcafxara effxara,

fundamental attributes Aristotle not quite consistent. Thus

Gen. et Corr.
c. 3,

iKuva 5e

fnjKer'' els

&Wa
3,

efSei

ii. 2, 329, b, 7, 13, 330, a, 30, 33, and Meteor, i. 2, 339, a, 13, he calls the latter (heat, cold,&c.) both arroix^la and apxal, the bodies of which they are attributes, ottAS adifxaTa, Ind. Ariit. 76, b, 15 sqq. Again, they are frequently called (noix^7a with the addition ra KaAovfxcva [Phys. i. 4, 187, a, 26, iii. 5, 304, b, 33. Gen. ct Corr. ii. 1, 328, b, 31, 329, a, 26. Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 5. Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, b, 29. Metaph. i. 4, 985, a, 34 t^ ws eV
:

1014,

a,

Sia^epoura [^Metaph. v. 32 cf. i. 3, 983, b, 8],

;

els h

raKKa

(rdfiara

SiaipeTrai,

ev-

virdpxov Svvdfiei fj evepyeia, avrd S' ear IV aSialperov els erepa r^ eXZet (^De 6teZ<>, iii. 3, 303, a, 15). So

Gen.
i.

et

Corr.
ii.

1 init.
;

ii. 7 init. Meteor. (ruu aTOX^ioiv rwv ercojULa;

355, b, 1, iv. 1 init. 3 init. c. 5 init., and innumerable other places. The original oppositions, moreover,
2,

TiKwu)

Be

Coelo,

iii.

which succeed primary substance

as the second principle of existence (as the elements are the third, Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 32),are called aXria tuv aroix^iwvy Meteor, iv. 1 init. - 'Ofor arixls yap i, ct^p,' Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b, 4. ' Gen. et Corr. ii. 3. Meteor.
iv. 1 init.

^\r}s

elSci

\ey6jLLva

ffTOix^^a'],

Fart. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 13 even ra Ka\ov/j,va vt6 rivoov aroix^^oi., SO that we clearly see that he is merely following in this the usage of others. On the other hand, aroix^lov which in its most general sense indicates con-

YOTi,

I,

II

482

ARISTOTLE
all

and into which

are resolved. ^

Their

own

primitive

and indecomposable nature is proved by the fact that though they can, by transmutation, pass into each otlier, they never excrete any other body from themEvery composite body in the terrestrial kingselves. ^ dom contains all of them.^ Yet they are never revealed For example, to our experience in perfect purity.^
elemental

which
as ice

is

must not be confounded with a flame, produced by an intensification of its warmth,

fire

is

by an

intensification of the cold natural to

fire
is

water.

Elemental

caloric,

or

warm and dry

is

evaporation;-^
'

flame, on
3.

the contrary,
v.

no constant
ttTi^ls
elcriv,
.

I)e CVelo,

iii.

Metaph.

Oepfior-nros,

uxnrep Kal KpixrraWos

3,

see p. 481, n. l,and elsewhere. 2 De OrJo, iii. 3, 302, a, 19 sqq. 3 As is more fully proved,
et Corr.
ii.

ipvxp^rrjros
\l/vxpi^T'nTOS

t]

yci.p

koI
7]

1]

(eais virepfioAai
7]

rwes

/lej/

5h Oep/jLorriros
irii^LS

Gen.

8.

Gen.
ia-Ti

ovK

'^KacTTOV

et Corr. \i.^,'m,h,2\: Se rh -rrvp Koi 6 arjp Kol Tuv clpr]jj.4vwu a.n\ovVy

Kpva-raWos iari \^vx,pov, Kal rh irvp

6

(I ovv vypov

icrrai

C^(Tis
f/c

^qpov

dep/jLOv.

5ih Kal oiidhu

oUr

KpvrrrdWov yiyverai ovt'

e/c

irvpSs.

aWa

IjliktSv

fifu eariv, oi

to S" an\a t o lavr a jxhroi ravra [raOra],

OjULOLOU,

The same remark

fire.

is

made about

Oiov et Tl TO} TTVpl

TTUpoeiSfS,

ov TTVp, Kol r-h TCf aepi aepoetSe's Cf. ofJLoiws 8e KOLirl rSov aKXwv. Meteor, ii. 4, 359, b, 32, where,

340, b, 21, c. 4, 341, b, 22; cf. 1. 13: irpwrov (ikv yap vTch r))v iyKvKXiou (popdu itrri

Meteor,

i.

3,

referring to the distinction between wet and dry vapour, which f o-Ti is discussed below, he says S' ovTi rh vyphv &vv tov ^rfpov ofjTC rh |i?pbj/ &vev tov vypov, aWa irdvTa ravra Xeysrai Kara r^v Ibid. ii. 5, 362, a, 9 vTrepoxhv. dry vapours are only produced where moisture is present. Ibid. iv. ACCOXUing uu -I /t^o. XV. i,i^ii, According to Phys. iv. 7, 21 8. O, a 32 air is intermingled with water; whereas, in i^e -Se/is?/, c. 5,
:
:

rh depfxhu Kol ^vphv, t Xeyofifu irvp auwuv/jLou yap rh koivov, &c. What is called fire is a kind of inflammable material (uTre/cKau/io) which,
'
'

like

smoke, can be kindled by a

motion.
Heraclitus

little

had

with heat in fire identified general (see Zell. Ph. d: Gr. distinction the 588 sq.) i. between fire and the heat of
;

fire

443 a'
*

4, this is

controverted;

cf.

Meyer,
25

Arist. Thierkunde, 404 sq. Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b,

TO

Si=

irDp

^(xrlv

virepfioX^

appears in his school (Plato, Aristotle had a special reason for emphasismg this distinction, as is indicated by the above passage from the Meteorology. For it was impossible that between the aerial and the celestial sphere there should
Crat. 413, c). ^, ^^. ^- ~, -V.
.

PHYSICS
material, but a

483

phenomenon occasioned by the transmuand dry substance (air and earth). Again, while each of the elements exhibits two essential properties, one of which in each case is its proper and
tation

of moist

distinctive characteristic

the dryness of

earth, the cold

of water, the
fire.2

warmth of Since, finally, each element includes a passive and an active quality,*^ it follows that all act upon and
' '

moisture

or fluidity of air, the

by one another, that they mingle and are transformed into one another a process, indeed, which would not otherwise be conceivable.^ Each element
are acted on

may

pass into

all

the

rest,

for everything goes

to

from

be a region of fire, as he was forced to hold there was, if fire included only visible flame.
'

be the primary quality of water, moisture of air, he yet tells us here Key^rai Se riav (rroix^iuv
:

Meteor,

ii.

2,

355, a, 9

-^

vypov Kal ^T]pov fjLTa^a\\6vTwv yiyvcTai Kal oh rpe^erai [with which that which is improperly called rpotp^, Long. nt. 3, 463, b, 24, Vita et M. c. 5, 470, a, 2, does not conflict] ov yap 7] aWi} olffa Sia/mevei ovOeva xp^vov ws elireTj/. Ibid. c. 3, 357, b, 31 Kaddvep rh tuv peouTcov vBdrcou Kal rb rrjs <p\oyhs
Sia
(Tvi/exovs
:

/tec

yap (p\h^

/j.hv 777, vypov Se ridefieOa 5e vypov awfia tiSwp, ^ripov 5e yijif (iv. 4, 5, 382,

iSialrara ^r}pov
.
. .

iiSup

a, 3, b, 3) and since dryness and moisture are regarded as the

;

pevfia.
:

Vita, et

M.

c. 5,
ii.

Gen. et Corr.

3 ov fi^v ottAcDs ye rerrapa bvra [to (rroix^la^ kvhs eKaarou

iari,
yrj

aW
[xiv

3,

470, a, 2. 331, a,

passive or material qualities (see p. 480, siqjra), earth and water are held to be the matter of all bodies. Fire, on the other hand, represents in a special sense the element of form {Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 335, a, 9 sqq.), for here, as elsewhere, the containing element stands to the contained in the relation of form to matter
Coelo, iv. 4, 312, a, 11) Similarly, more reality is attributed to heat than to cold, inasmuch as the former is a positive, the latter a negative, attribute ; the one is classed as being, the other as not-being {Gen. et borr i. 3, 318, b, 14).

^rjpov

/xaWov

\l/vxpov,

vSccp

5e
5'

\f/vxpov

^ fjLaWop

{Be

^ vypov, a^p
depuov,
TTvp

vypov jxaWov ^ ^aWov ^ Irjpou. Mtteor. iv. 4, 382, a, 3. In the latter passage Aristotle says, among other things, that earth and water alone are inhabited by living beings (on which vide below), because they alone are uAr; rSov acafiaTuiv. For although cold is held by Aristotle
Se
depjuov

See pp. 479 sq. mjJi^a. Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 329, b, 22, c. 7, and elsewhere see pp.' 450 sq. su2)ra.
^
*
;

484

ARISTOTLE
;

opposite to opposite

but the elements are

all

opposed

to each other just in the same way as their distinctive properties (warmth, cold, dryness, and moisture) are

opposed.

The more complete

and the slower
is

this opposition

is,

the

more

difficult

the process of transition

from one to the other; the less complete, the easier. Therefore, when two elements exhibit respectively a
both their essential properties, the process is difficult than when they have one property in common and conflict only in respect of the In the latter case the alteration of one property other.
conflict of

slower and more

in one of

them occasions
;

a complete transmutation into

the other

while in the former case we only gain one intermestep by such a change for only the element between the two that are opposed is produced, and diate
requires a second transmutation before the metamorphosis is complete. For instance, by removing the
it

we obtain air but it is only when the humidity common to water and air has been removed If the humidity of water disthat we obtain fire.
cold of water,
;

appears, earth

produced; but in order to generate to earth and water must be fire, the coldness follows that the elements which withdrawn. Hence it
is

common

metamorphosed are wholly opposed to one another are by an indirect process those which are but partially
;

opposed are transformed

directly.

Fire passes directly

directly into into air or earth, indirectly into water ; air indirectly into earth; water directly fire or water,

into air or earth,

indirectly into fire

indirectly into
'

earth directly

into water or

fire,

air.^
4.

Thus

all

the

Gen. et Corr.

ii.

PHYSICS

485

elements, as Heraclitus and Plato had already demonstrated/

form together one complete whole, a

self-

contained circle of generation and destruction,^ the parts

of which are incessantly undergoing transformation, but
steadfastly maintaining the law of their metamorphosis,

preserving the same forms and proportions in the midst

of the ceaseless transmutation of their matter.^

These propositions concerning the nature of the

elementary bodies are enough to prove that there
only one world.
is

For

if

each body has

its

its

natural place,
it,

and

if its

very essence consists in

having

then

all

bodies, unless hindered

by

force,

must move

to these

their natural localities

earth
it

to the centre, aether to

circumference, and the other elements to the inter-

mediate spaces.

Hence

is

impossible

that

there
air,

should be more than one region of earth, water,

fire,

and consequently that there should be another world besides the one in which we live. We cannot suppose that a body is forcibly retained in a locality beyond the world, since such a locality must be

and

sether,

'

Cf.

ZeLL.
ibid.
ii.

pa.
680.

d.

Gr.

i.

619,
'^

and

&aT

Ge7i.et Corr. ibid. dSl.h, 2: (pavephv on KVKKcp re earai r)

:

tovto koI inGavhv, ws a^vvarov fxri rhu avrhv eJuai irepl iravruiv tovtojv \6yov, Koi ^ia<p4peiv TaxvTrJTi /cot
^paSurriTi rris /aerafioAris eVi irdvraiv re Koi (pOopau clvai Koi yeveffiu, v^iv

y4v(Tis TOts ottAoTs ffdixaai, &c.

is
^ Meteor, ii. it 3, 357, b, 27 asked, irorepov Kal rj QaXarra

ravr-qv ix4vtoi reray/j-evcas iraaiv avro7s. 358,

av/j-fia'-

b,

29

dei Sia/iieuet. roov avTobv ovffa fiopiwi/ apidix^, ^ r^ efSet Kal T<p iroa-^ rSsv jx^puv, fjL^ra^aWSvToiv dei Kaddirep a^p Kal rh ttSti/jlov vScop Kal rh irvp. ael yap dWo Kal aWo yiverai tovtcov '^Kaarov, rh S' elSos

ovre del ra avra fiepr] dia/xevei, ovre yy^s ovre daXdrrrfs, dAAd fiSvoy 6 Kal yap Ka\ Trepl yrjs iras uyKOS. rh fikv yap ojxoiws Set vTro\afie7u av4px^Tai rh 5e iraKiv ffvyKarafiaivei Kal rovs rSirovs avuficra

rov
rh

TrKi]6ovs

KaOdirep rh
rris

eKdarov rovrwv fx4vi, rwv peovruv vddrcov Kal

(pavephu
Sr?

(pKoyhs pev/xa.

fidWei rd t' fTriiroXd^oura Kal to Kariovra iraKiv. Cf. also Tt^hL. Ph. d. Gr. i. 2, 576, 620.

486

ARISTOTLE
;

the natural place of some other body

and

if all

bodies

in this one world have their place, there can be

no body

and consequently no space, since space is is or can be.^ The same conclusion is arrived at also from another side. Several worlds would presuppose several first causes of motion, which would be specifically similar, and consequently
outside
it,

only that in which a body

has no matter

But the primum movens and complete in itself. It follows that the world which derives its continuous and eternal motion from the first cause must be so too.^
only different in their matter.
:

it is

single

If,

however, we are told that the concept of the world,

like all concepts,

must manifest
us

itself in several indivi-

duals, Aristotle bids

this argument would be only conclusive if there were an extra-mundane matter in which this concept could incorporate itself,

answer that

but since our world embraces the whole of matter,

of necessity single
in
its

it is

kind, although

we ought

always to distinguish between its concept and the phenomenal manifestation of the same which is present
to our senses.^

If there are not several worlds

now

in

more can there be such in the future, or have been at any past period. This world of ours is one, and single, and complete.'*
existence, no

Be Cwlo, i. 8, 21 sqq. 279, a, 11.

'

c.

9,

278, b,

out'

This metaphysical proof, held in prospect Be (Joelo, i. 8, 277, b, 9, is given Metapli. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31 sqq. of. also p. 388 sq., and on matter as the source of multiplicity, p. 368 sq. Be Cwlo, i. 9 cf. p. 222.
^
;
=

nXclovs ovpavol oijT iyevovro ivSex^Tai yev4(r6ai TrAejous aAA.' efs Kal fiovos koI reAeios ovros ovpavSs ianv. lUd. i. 1 fin. particular bodies are infinite in
uffl

number
Toijvo/xa

t)) Se vav ov ravra fi6pia ; reAeioj/ avayKolov elvai koi Koiddirep

<rr)ij.aivi, Trdyrt),
oij.

koI

jx)]

ry

/xh

tj? 5'

'

Ibid. 279,

a,

Sxrr'

ovt vvv

PHYSICS

487

Furthermore, the shape of the universe is determined by the nature of the five simple bodies. Since
circular

motion

is

motion to the
distinction,

rest,

proper to one of them, and rectilinear we obtain in the first place the

touched upon above, between the two chief regions of the world that in which circular motion

and that in which the opposite movements up and down hold sway i.e. that which is full of sether, and In both of that which contains the four elements.
rules,
:

them the materials

the other.

lie

in spherical layers one above

For since similar materials uniformly strive

to reach their natural localities,

which in turn are deter-

mined by
it

their distance

from the centre of the world,

follows that the materials of each sort are conglobated

in spheres
centre.

which are at all points equidistant from the In the middle of the whole lies the earth

solid sphere,^ but in extent a relatively small portion of Its fixture in this locality proceeds partly the world.2
>

Besides the argument quoted

in the text, Aristotle proves the rotundity of the earth {De Ccelo, ii. 14, 297, a, 6 sqq.) from the form of its shadow on the moon

during an eclipse, from the different stars visible in the north and the south, and the fact (already touched on 296, b, 18) that falling bodies do not move in parallel lines but only at similar angles towards the earth. With regaid
to the last,

" In proof of this statement Aristotle, Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 6, 340, a, 6, refers generally to the affrpoKoyiKk 6wp-f]ixara, BeCoslo; as above. 297, b, 30 sqq., he adduces the fact that when we

short distance north south, some of the stars or visible over the horizon seem to change their positions. He_ rtJ"

move even a

marks here that mathematicians

reckon the circumference of the earth at 400,000 stadia (50,000 about double, therefore, miles the true measurement), and that as compared with the size of the celestial bodies this is a comparatively small figure. The hypothesis (so important in later times for Columbus's discovery)
:

there
it

is

doubt whether

had

for been ascer-

room

tained by accurate observation and experiment, or whether it was not, an inference from the theory that all bodies which have weight gravitate towards the
(jentre.

488

AklSTOTLJE
its
:

from the nature of

us of the
fact.3

material,^
'^

and partly from

its

position in the universe

observation, moreover, assures

surface of the earth

The hollows on the

are filled with water,

spherical. 4

Around spheres first of air, then of

what we
call air is

the upper surface of which is the water and the earth are hollow
fire.

Aristotle, however,
last,

not unfrequently identifies the two

remarking that composed partly of moist and partly of dry vapour, the latter produced from earth, the former from water and the moisture of the earth the
:

drier kinds
that

mount upwards, the more humid, from

their

Indian and Atlantic Oceans are all one sea, he further

the
thinks worthy of respect. Do An. iii. 8, 428, b, 3, Meteor, i. 8, Mo, b, 2, he tells us that the sun is larger than the earth.
'

presupposes a fixed centre, which Aristotle conceives of as corporeal see p. 480, su^jva. ^ Thus, heavy bodies when thrown upwards in a straight line return to their starting-point
;

DeCcelo,\\. 14,

where Aristotle

opposes the view that the earth moves, both in the form in which it was held by Philolaus (Zell. Ph. (I. Gr. i. 388), and in the form p:iven to it by Hicetas, Ecphantus, Heraclides (ihid. i. 459, ii 1, 8^7 sq.), and attributed also to
Plato (ihid. ii. 1, 682, 2). His chief reason is (296, a, 27, b, 6, 25) that circular motion is contrary to the elemental nature of the earth, in virtue of which its proper motion is rectilinear and toward the centre. For the

{ibid. 296, b, 25 sqq.). Moreover, astronomical phenomena find a satisfactory explanation on the hypothesis that the earth rests (297, a, 2), while on the opposite hypothesis irregularities must result; for instance, the stars could not always rise and

set at the same points (296, a, ;]4 sqq.). The motion referred to in Anal. Post. ii. 1, 89, b, 30, is
' '

the earthquake. * The proof of this, De Coelo, ii. 4, 287, b, 1 sqq., is as follows

same reason all other motions must be denied of it. For since
its

as water always accumulates in the deepest parts, and the nearer the centre the deeper any part is,
w^ater must continue to flow towards the centre until all the deep places are filled up, i.e.

natural motion

is

toward the

centre, and all bodies rest when they arrive at the place toward

which they naturally gravitate, until its surface is at all points motion away from the centre equidistant from the centre. The cannot belong to any part of it proper place for water is the and the whole must be at rest. space occupied by the sea, Meteor. - The rotation of the world ii. 2, 355, a, 35, b, 15, 356, a, 33.

PHYSICS

489

greater gravity, sink downward ; so the former fill the upper, the latter the lower, region of the atmosphere.^

The spherical form of the lower world involves that of the celestial region which surrounds the former and touches it at all points. 2 But considered in themselves,
the heavens could scarcely be supposed to have another shape,^ since the sphere is the first and most perfect

and therefore the one appropriate to the first Moreover, it is only this figure which can revolve within the space which it encloses,^ and external to the heavens there is no space. Lastly, the motion of the heavens, being the measure of all movefigure,

body.

ment, must be the most rapid but the most rapid is that which has the shortest journey, and a circle is the
;

shortest road from the

same point

to the

same

point.^

' Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 19 sqq. 341, a, 2, c. 4, 341, b, 6-22; cf.i. 7, 344, b, 8, c. 8, 345, b, 32 ii. 2, 354, b, 4 sqq.; De Ccelo, ii. 4, a, 30 287, on the difiference be; ;

which are described by the spinning of a smooth body, and of which, therefore, each section
which cuts the axis at right angles forms a circle whose centre is on the line of the axis.
Simplicius gets out of the difficulty by remarking that, while in the case of other shapes there is only one axis that will serve the purpose, in a sphere you may take any you please an explanation with which we may
;

tween dry and moist vapours {avaevfiiacris, or Kairvbs and arfxls),

also Meteor, ii. 4, 359, b, 28, 360, a, 31, iii. 6. 378, a, 18. 2 De Calo, ii. 4, 287, a, 30 sqq. As there can be no space
V.

is void (see pp. 432 sq.), it follows that the celestial and the fiery spheres are at all points in contact with one another. ' For what follows see De

which

Coelo,
*

ii.

4.

lUd.

287, a, 11. This state-

ment is certainly strange, for as Alex, apud Simpl. in loco,

Schol. 493, b, 22, observed at an date, a whole series of figures share this attribute

rest content on so trifling a point. ^ Or as Simplicius, in loco, explains it: of all lines which return to the point from which they started, and thus inclose a space, the circle is the shortest just as of all surfaces of equal extent that which is circular, of
all

early

bodies

of

equal

bulk that

with the sphere,

viz.

all

those

which is globular, has the smallest circumference. Kven with this

490

ARISTOTLE
finer

The

and more uniform

indeed, in

its

matter

is,

the more

perfectly spherical will be the shape of the celestial

world

as,

the most perfect body matter

'^^

and as the argumust ments by which the spherical shape of heaven is proved
be perfectly adapted to its form,
re(iuire.
Still

we cannot regard

the

matter of the

heavens as uniformly homogeneous.

stotle's

Nature, in Ari-

opinion, reconciles all opposites by a gradual

process,

and the purity of the

diminishes
as
it

aether,

which composes
the
terrestrial

heaven,

approaches

atmosphere.^

heavens, Aristotle
explanation

In proceeding to investigate the disposition of the All the is guided by observation.'*

the argument is a It is obvious that Aristotle accepts the globular form of the earth on the direct evidence of the senses, and merely adds these other proofs as supplementary evidence.

lame one.

Kampe is wrong dAiKpives, Sec. the in supposing that it is air as the matter of the fiery region and not the fether that is
here spoken of. The &v( M^Xf" aeX-f-iurjs does not mean the region below the moon, but the upper regions reaching down as far as the moon, and lying between it and the starry heavens. Moreover,
accfia

>

Unci. 287, b,
iffriu

'6rL /j-ev

olv

acpaipoeidrjs

6 Kocrixos SriXov

(K Tovrwv, Kal on kot' aKpifinav (VTopvos 0VTW5 waTC fxrjdhu /UTjre TTapanKriaiws exftv X^ipoK/j-riTov jxry 6.KK0 ixr]dfv Twv irap^ r]u7u eV
ocpdaAfjiols (paivofifucov,

'drepov a4pos

cannot

no

terres-

trial

body being so completely adapted for an exactly symmetrical form.

According to the above argument, the smallest elevation

'^

or depression in the outer surface of the celestial globe would presuppose a void space outside of it. 3 Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 6 rh
:

possibh^ mean the air, but, as 10 immediately says, the 1. irpocTOP aroix^^ov kvkKc^ (pepofxevov must not, or the aether. however, conceive of a mixture of elementary substances which cannot extend to the region of circular motion, but merely of of differences in the degree density.

We

^ According to Eudemus (in SiMPL. Ife Ccelo, Sohol. in Arist.

(x\v

yhp

&v<i}

Kal

fJ-^XP''

<T^X'i]VT]S

498, a, 45) Plato had thus stated the problem of astronomy rlvwv
:

Tpov eJuai aSoiia <pafxiv irvpds re Kal aepos, ov fxrjv ctAA.' eV avr^ ye rh fxiv KaOapuTipou dvai to 5' tjttuu

inroTeOeKTuv ofiaAccv
Viav Kivrftrecov
Kiur](Tiis
SiarrcoB'p

Kal rerayfie-

ra vepl rhs

TcovtrAavu/fiepwv (paiuSfieya,

PHYSICS

491

heavenly bodies seem daily to move from east to west,

but seven of them

and from
its

move

besides in longer periods of

(paivofieva airoBdcreiv,

this time forth Greek astronomy held to the view that

Kaff iKaarov a<paipas

Twv
fiia

irXaviafievoov

erepas

function consisted in discovering hypotheses which would explain the phenomena as satisfactorily as (on their somewhat hardy assumption) the motion of the stars is explained by the theory of uniform motions. The highest criterion of the truth of a theory is rh adiC^adai ra (paivS/xcva. To take only a few instances cf. the quotations from and about Heraclides, in Zell. Ph. d. Gt. i. 881, 1, and in BoCKH, D. Tiosm. Syst. d. Platon, 134 sqq. Aristotle's statements about Callippus, Metaph. xii. Tp S' 7)\iov Ka\ 8, 1073, b, 35
:

fieu

... to oZu Tr\rj6os tuv (Xtpaipwv eoTco Toaovrov rh 'yap avayKoiov

ixdrrovas
. .

eTi/o;,

&c.

a(peia6a>

ro7s Icrxvporepois Kiyeiv.

ii.

Be
Ka\

Coslo,

5^ Tovrwv

(ilTeTv yikv

12, 292, a, 14: -nepl KaKS>s ^'x^t

tV

f'^i

irXelov avveaiv, Kaitrip

fiiKpas

ixovras a<popfi6.s, Sec. ; C. 5, the desire to explain 287, b, 28 everything is a mark either of great zeal or great folly. The extent, however, to which the attempt is open to blame depends upon the motive which inspires it, and the strength of a man's conviction of the truth of
:

his views

iroTcpov avdpcairlvus ^

T^} (re\r]V7]s

5vo qiero
acpaipas,

en
;

rrpocrde-

Teas
il

eJpai

ra

(t)aiv6[xeua

KapTepix<>}Tepov, Tals fikv oZv aKpi^((Tripais avdyKais orav ris iiri-

fjLiWei Tis airoScaaciu

ments and Geminus, in Simpl. Phijs. 64, b, and what the latter says of
the old following

the statequotations from

astronomers

partly
Sosi-

roTc X"P"' ^x^^v Sfi To7s evpvvv 5e rh <paiv6iJt.Pov (irjreov. Cf. also Part. An. i. 5, 644, b,31, where it is said that the study of the heavens possesses an infinite
TVXXI,
IffKovffi,

Eudemus and

charm,
rdfieda
:

ei

Kal

Kara
.

fiiKphv i<pair-

genes, Pe Coelo, Schol. in Arist. 472, a, 42, 498, a, 43, 499, a, 7, 500, a, 25, 501, b, 28, 502, b, 5 sqq. 503, a, 23, 504, b, 32 sqq. Aristotle adopts the same criterion. He asserts only those positions which are warranted by the facts where the latter are inadequately known, or do not speak with sufficient plainness, he makes no pretence of absolute certainty, but is content with probability. Thus Meta2)h. xii. 8, 1073, b, 38, 1074, a, 14, afterdeclaring(1073, a, 11) that the investigation is not yet concluded, he says avayKoiov Se et /ueAAoi/cri cruvTeddaai iraaai. ra
; :

and on the necessity of

c. 1,

observation, cf ibid.
Trepl

639, b, 7:

TTorepov, KaBdirep ol /jLadrjixaTiKol

Ti]v dcTTpoAoyiav

to

Sciicvvovffiv,

ouTco

Se?

Kal

ihv

(pvaiKov
to.

(paivofxeva -rrpioTov to, irepl

Qe(t}p'f](ravTa

ra ^ya
irepl

KaX

ra

fx^pi]

rh

eKaarov, eveiff ovtco Keyeiv rb 5ia ri Kal ras alrtas, ^ &\\as irus. (That Aristotle would decide for the former method is obvious.) Aristotle himself was a most careful observer of known facts see p. 46, n. 1, supra. ' Aristotle speaks, of course, only of the stars known to the ancients, and visible to the naked eye.
;

492

ARISTOTLE
i.e.

very unequal lengths in the opposite direction,

from west to
could

east,

move
in
its

freely in space

around the earth. That these bodies was a thought beyond the

reach of ancient astronomers.

fixed

They fancied each

star

and therefore were obliged to imagine at least as many celestial spheres as they saw Aristars differing in their movements and periods.^
sphere,
stotle does

not get beyond this view.

The

stars,

he

says,^ as well as the

whole heaven, appear to move

this

and since the earth

explained by a real
stars, or of
'

is fixed,

phenomenon must be
of the heaven or the

movement

both

It is not conceivable that both should

Many of the older philosophers held that the stars were carried round by the air or the rotation of the world. Besides
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who
held that the stars were nebulous masses, this view was shared by Anaxagoras, Democritus, and perhaps even xinaximenes ; Empedocles held that it was true of the planets but not of the fixed
stars,

dawned upon them. seemed, moreover, to be demanded by the nature of the stellar motions themselves, which, if tliey were one and the same every day round the earth, were more naturally explained by a
yet having
It

which were

set

immovably

in the arch of heaven (see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 226 sq. 500, 622, 715, 799, 898, 3). Anaximander seems to have been the first to start the theory of spheres {Ihid.

206 sq.) which was subsequently adopted by thePythagoreans(ii>/<^. 384, 1, 449) and by Parmenides {iUd. 528). Plato adopted it from the Pj-thagoreans (^ihid. i, 685), and was followed by Eudoxus and Callippus, the leading astronomers of Aristotle's time (see p. 497 sq., infra). It seemed forced upon them by the difficulty they had in conceiving of a free motion of the stars, tlie
idea of universal gravitation not

motion of the whole sphere of the fixed stars than by a number of separate motions. A like hypothesis seemed to afford the best explanation of the movements of the planets, including tlie sun and moon their proper motion being the result of the rotation of their spheres, which takes place, however, in a direction opposite to that of the fixed stars, while their daily course was to be explained on the ground that the rotation of the stellar regions included them also. 2 Be Ccelo, ii. 8. This argument is stated with some fullness, because it shows the important fact that Aristotle already presupposes the existence of different stellar spheres.
single
;

PHYSICS
move independently,
for

493
case

in this

how

could

we

explain the exact correspondence between the rate at which the stars move and that of their spheres ? We

cannot refer an invariably regular phenomenon to an

accidental coincidence.

the hypothesis that the stars

are fixed.

In this case
to

The same may be said about move while their spheres also the rate of the astral moveno
real connection

ment would have

circle,

correspond to the size of their

is

although there

between the

two.

Hence we

are driven to suppose that the spheres

move, but the stars are fixed and carried round by

them.^

This hypothesis satisfactorily explains why,

a

among concentric circles, the larger move at

rate.
stars,

more rapid

It is further seen to

be necessary because the

from their spherical shape,^ in order to get into

motion, must either roll or spin.

ever,

Mere
;

rolling,

how-

would not carry them on their way ^ and the fact that the moon always shows us the same side proves that
they do not spin.
Moreover, their shape
is

the least

adapted to progressive movement, since they are devoid of locomotive organs^'' obviously because nature has not
intended them for any such movement.^
' Tovs fih kvkXovs Kive7adaL To Se &(rTpa ^^uepeTv [i.e. they have no motion of their own within

their

own

spheres, but
koI
is

move
toTs

organs of locomotion, the corresponding shape, viz. rotundity, ^ Moreover, Aristotle adds, it is only the sun which appears
to roll at its rising

with
2

them]
That this

eVSeSe^ueVa

and setting

KvK\oi5

<f>epe(reai,

289, b, 32. their form is de-

this, like the twinkling light of the fixed stars, is merely an

and

monstrated,iJ*<^.c.ll,bothbythe shape of the moon in its different phases, and by the teleological argument that since nature does nothing in vain she must have given the stars, which require no

optical delusion, * Cf also Zell. Ph. d. Gr i. 681, 1. * In his refutation of the doctrine of the harmony of the spheres (c. 9 /w.), which we
.

494

ARISTOTLE

Now

in order to explain the motion of the heavenly

it

bodies upon this hypothesis,

was assumed that every

sphere revolved on
rate.

its

own

axis at a perfectly uniform

Accordingly, so far as the movements of the

separate stars varied from a perfect circle, or progressed

at unequal rates, they were regarded as composite

movements capable of being analysed into pure and uniform

rotations.

Therefore, t^ach star refpiired as

tlie

many

spheres

as were found necessary for

resolution of its ap-

parent movement into pure circular revolutions.

stotle

Ari-

was bound

to accept these various hypotheses,

since even he never doubted that the heavenly spheres and the matter which composed them performed such

revolutions only as our eyesight seems to witness to

moreover, he was obliged to suppose that the spheres contained within the universal globe, in which there

kind of movement.'

was no vacuum whatever, had no room for any other He went further, and connected
may omit,
Aristotle gives another reason, viz. that infinite confusion would result if the movements of the stars were free.
'

is

crease and decrease of velocity possible only, he asserts, in a

;

movement which has beginning, middle, nd end it is impossible

in circular motion, which is alike v/ithout beginning and end.

Cf what has already been

.

said upon the movement of the heavens, p. 489, and on the circular movement of the primeval body, p. 473. It was a universal

presupposition among ancient astronomers, traceable to Plato (seep. 490, n, supra, and the references to Eudoxus and Callippus, p. 500 sq. ivfra), that the movement of the spheres must be perfectly uniform. Aristotle endeavours to establish its truth in the first instance in connection with the irpcoros ovpavhs, the sphere of the fixed stars. In-

Unequal motion presupposes change either in motum or viovens, or both, but this is impossible with regard to the heavens. For it is obvious to
the senses that the parts of the (highest) heavens are uniform in their movements, while with regard to the heavens as a whole the same conclusion is forced upon us when we consider that unequal motion is only possible where force is either added or withdrawn, and that every with-

PHYSICS
his peculiar theory of motion with these views.

495

All

motion depends upon the contact of a mobile with a motive body, and this law must apply to the motion of
the spheres, since one movens in the same matter can

only produce one kind of motion,^

and since every

motion ultimately proceeds from an unmoved cause, and every motion which has no beginning from an eternal
cause of movement,^ we must imagine as many eternal and unmoved substances for the production of the

for the

movement of the spheres as there are spheres required phenomena to be accounted for.^ The heavenly
;

bodies are no dead masses, but living beings

drawal of force (aSuj/a/tta) is an unnatural condition inapplicable
All these reato the heavens, &c. sons hold equally of the spheres of the planets considered individually and apart from the influence of their spheres upon one another Arias of the first heaven. stotle, at 288, a, 14 of the passage quoted above, confines himself The moveto the latter only. ments of the lower spheres are compounded of those of the true account The higher. of the motions of the planets (attributing to them acceleration and retardation of velocity) is declared to be iravTiXSis &\pyov Koi irXdcTfiari '6iJ.oiou, 289, a, 4, Phjs. viii. 6, 259, a, 18 (v. above p. 293, n. 1): fiia S' [^ /ciVrjo-ts] 1 u<|)' cv6s re rod kivovvtos Ktd evhs Tov kivovjx4vov.
'

there

vdrepov filav ovaiav ^ jr\elovs, Koi irSffas ; and answers, 1073, a, 26: eTrel Se rh Kivovfievov avdyKf] vTTo rivos KivctaQai, Koi rh
c.

stotle 6er4ov

asks,
t)]v

roiavT7)v

Kiuovv aKipTfTOv klvai Ka0' avrh, Koi rijv cuStov Kivricnv inrh d'iTTpicTov

Slov KivelffQai KoL

airXrju
irpdoTTiv

tV

a*'*"''

^<^'

^vhs,

dpwfjLev 5e irapd t)]v

tov iravrhs r^v

(pafxcv

(popau

^v Kiviiv

r^v

ovaiav Koi aKivrfTOu, &KXas (popds oijo'as ras tcov irXaviirav aihiovs avdyKT] Kal tovtoov
. .
.

Kd(TTr}v

tS)v

(popwv

utt'

CLKiviirov

T6 KiuelaOai Kaff avrh Kal aiSiov oixrias. ^ re yap roov dcrpuv (puais d'lSios ovcria ris od<ra, koI t5 kivovv aid tov Kal irporepov rod Kivov/uifvov, Kal rh TTporepov ovcrias ovaiav dvayKoiov
elvai. (pavephv rolvvv 8ri roaavras re ovcrias dvayKaTov elvair-ffv recpvcriv

aiBiovs

Kal

dKivi^rovs

KaB'

avrds

Kal SLvev

fieyedovs.

BeENTANO'S

Cf. p.

way

in

388 sq., and on the which motion is produced

by the unmoved mover, p. 404. 3 After showing the necessity of an eternal incorporeal cause
of motion, Metaph.
xii.

view that these eternal beings were created by God has already been discussed at p. 412, supQ'a.
*

De^ Ccelo,
:

ii,

b, 1 )

aW'

Tifiels

7,

Ari-

avruv

fxdvov

12, 292, a, 18 (cf. ws irepl (Tujx&tuv Kal fiovdSuv rd^tv

496

ARISTOTLE
as

must be

many
of a

'

souls,' to preside

over their motions, as

there are spheres.

therefore,

The

fabric of the heavens consists,

system of concentric hollow balls or

spheres, so placed within each other as to leave no

empty

interspace.^

The centre of

this

system
;

is

called

the bottom, the circumference the top

the outer spheres are uppermost, the inner are nethermost,

so

and

and each
is

locality in space is higher or lower according

as it has a greater or less distance from the centre. ^

It

only indirectly, and relatively to the motion of the

are united severally to spiritual beings which stand in the same relation to them as the human soul does to the body which it

Siavoovfxeda

'

5e7 S' els /xeTex^uTcov

irpd^^cos

inroXafifidveiu

Kal

(wrjs.

true that avrwv seems to refer to the stars, not to their spheres, and that we are at liberty to picture with Kampe {Eriienntnissth. d. Arist. 39 sq.) each individual star as
It
is

moves without being

(see
ii.

itself
b
5'

moved
Ccdo, ovpavhs

wfra,

vol.
a,

ii.,

init.^.

Be

2,

285,
Kal
b,

29:
;

cfxrpvxos

e^et KLvr}<Teus apx^v.

animated by a
so, for if

spirit

but

the

passage does not compel us to do the spheres are animate the stars which are part of them must share their life and action. Elsewhere, however, Metaph. xii. 8 (see p. 501 sq. ivfra, and cf. previous note), he expressly says that there cannot be more eternal unmoved beings than
there are spheres, and this is only what we should have expected from him, since it is only from the movement of the stars that he infers, in the way indicated in the preceding note, the existence of such beings. Moreover, it is only the spheres, and not the stars, which are said by him to be moved. It is only these, then, that have * souls of their own, or, to speak more strictly, it is only these which
'

cf. Part. An. i. 641, b, 15 sqq. As, however, the mover of the highest sphere lies outside the world and is un-

So 284,
1,

32

moved, Plato's conception of the

'

world-soul

'

(which, indeed, Ari-

stotle expressly rejects, see p.459, n. 5) is as inapplicable to it in its relation to its sphere as it is to the other spheral spirits in their relation to theirs. ' Aristotle denies that there is

any void (see p 433, sq. supra), and accordingly conceives not
'
'

only of the astral spheres but of the others, even the lowest, as in immediate contact with one another. Meteor. 1. 3, 340, b, 10 sqq. 341, a, 2 sqq. ; Be Coelo,
all
ii.

4,
2

287,
.

a,

5 sqq.
;

Cf pp. 473 and 478, supra Phys. iii. 5, 205, b, 30 sqq. Be

;

Coelo,

i.

6 init.

ii.

4,

287,

a,

8,

and elsewhere,

PHYSICS
spheres, that the terms above

497

and beneath are applied opposite points in the circumference, and consequently that we come to speak of right and left, front and back, in the world. In this case, reckoning from
to

the sphere of the fixed stars, we call the southern half of the globe the upper, reckoning from the planetary sphere, the northern.^
'

Each sphere has

its

own

peculiar

See De Cmlo, ii. 2 (cf. Phys. passage just referred to) and the lucid explanation in Bockh, P. liosm. Syst. d. Platon, p. 112 sqq. The differences here spoken of apply only to motion, and therefore properly only to that which
; to (285, a, 23) TO oQiv 7] KiuTjais, the right hand rh d</)' ov, the front to icp' o ri Kiurjais. (Cf. Inyr. An. c. 4, 705, b, 13 sqq.) If we apply this to the world, that is tlie right side of the irpwros ovpavos from which its motion proceeds in other

is

living

and

self -moved
is

such the upjjer

motion will be that which carries the point in the periphery which has received the push past one who stands in the line of the axis in front of him in other words, that which proceeds from the right in a forward direction and thence to the left. This, however, will be the case with the motion of the sphere cf the fixed stars only if the head of one standing inside of it be upon the south pole with that of the spheres of the planets
:

which move from west to ea^t, on the other hand, only on the words, the east. This motion opposite supposition. According is conceived of (285, b, 19), as it to Aristotle, therefore, our anwas by Plato (see Zell. Ph. d. tipodes are in the upper hemiGr. i. 684, 1), as proceeding in a sphere, which he also calls circle towards the right, as when (obviously from a different point in a circle of men anything (as, of view than that just indicated) for instance, the cup or the talk the right side of the world we at table, Plato, Symj). 177, d, in the lower hemisphere and on 214, B, c, 222, E, 223, c) is passed the left side. On the other hand, along by each to his neighbour reckoning from the courses of on the right. The irpuros ovpavos the planets, ours is the upper is therefore represented (285, a, and right-hand, theirs the lower 31 sqq.) as standing inside the and left-hand, side. He points circle of the heavens in the line out, indeed, that we cannot proof its axis, touching one of the perly speak of a right and a left poles with its head, the other at all in connection with the with its feet, and as giving the world as a whole (284, b, 6-18
;

ball

at some point upon its equator the push with its right

e7r6i57;

Se rivis elffiv

o'i

(pacriv eivai

Tt 5e|iOj/ Koi
. . .

apicmphv rov ovpavov

Se? trpoadimiv T<f rod

hand which sets it spinning. The natural direction of such

VOL.
I.

e^Trep

iravrhs (rd/xari

ravras ras dpxds

K K

498

ARISTOTLE
communicated by the presiding incorporeal
but in
all

motion,

being

cases the motion

is
;

uniform, without

beginning or ending, round an axis

but the direction

and the rapidity of this rotation vary in the several At the same time the spheres are connected spheres.
witli

each other in such a

way

that the inner, or lower,

are carried round by the outer, just as if the axis of each

sphere were inserted at

its

poles into the next above.'

Consequently, the problem arises

.
.

how we

are,

under the

el

51 Sel Koi T(f ovpavcfi TrpocrTt

rwu toiovtmv). Nevertheless, Fhys. iii. 5, 205, b, 33, he sa>'S that the distinctions above and below, before and

dimiv

behind, right and

iv

left, exist ov

fxovov TTphs r]ixas Ka\ 64(ri,

dWa

Kol

b,

Jngr. An. 5, TOG, T(f o\cp he finds it natural that motion should proceed from the upper front and right side, t] [dv yap dpxv Tifiiov, rh S' ^I'co rod

avT^
11,

A similar connection oi" the surrounding the inner with spheres Plato had conceived of as existing between the spheres of the planets and of the fixed stars, when in Tim. 36, C, 39, A (cf Fh. d. Gr. i. G83), he represents the axis of the former as inserted in the latter, and accordingly attributes to the planets a spiral the of motion compounded
'

tov uinaOev Kal TO Se^LOU tov dpKTTepOV TljXlWTtpov (t.houiih it might; bo said with equal truth, ws 5jd to tcls
KOLTw Kal rh
irpocrBiv

One motions of both circles. would suppose from Arikt. Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 18, 25,
fSiMPL.
I'.KS,

Be

Cirlo, Sohol. in Arist.

b,
1

3(1,

that

Eudoxus and

dpx^-s

eV

TovTois

iJvai

TavTO.

nuiwTioa rwv duTLKn/j-ivwi' /.Lopiwu irrtiv). So in BcCdlo, iii. 5, o the question why the heavens move from east to west and not in the contrary direction, he gives the answer that since nature orders everything in the most perfect ])ossible way, and forward motion is superior to backward, the heavens have ret^eivcd that motion which, according to the
t

(pus also conceived of the stars collectively as carried round by (he sphere of the lixed stars, and the planets collectively by a sphere moving in the line of the It is clear, however, ecliptic. from the further explanations of Simplicius and from Aristotle's
( 'alii

enumeration of the spheres(which

differed only in
of Callippus addition of the o-(pa7pai aveXiTTOvcrai) that this was not the case. Plato's proof that the spheres of the planets are carried round by the sphere of the fixed stars appeared to them Only those spheres fantastic. they conceived of as connected with one another which belonged

from that
the

description of right and left in is to be regarded as a forward one. The allusion, Meteor. ii. 5, 362, a, 32 sqq., to the north pole as the upper, the south pole as the lower, is an unimportant use of ordinary language.
c. 2,

PHYSICS

499

specified circumstances, to determine both the number of the spheres and also the direction and rapidity of

their rotation, so as to explain the motions of the stars revealed to us by observation.^

For

this

of Cnidos,

purpose Eudoxus, the famous astronomer who may be regarded as the first founder of

observation,^

a complete theory of the spheres based upon accurate sketched out a system of twenty-seven

spheres, twenty-six of which belong to the planets. Considering the simple nature of its motion, he thought one sphere enough for the heaven of the fixed stars, and in this sphere the whole assemblage of the stars was
fastened.

On

the other hand, he assigned four spheres

upper planets, and three apiece to the sun and moon, which, in agreement with Plato, he placed lowest in the planetary scale. The first sphere
of each planet was intended to explain
tion
in
it

to each of the five

its

daily revolu-

since
to the

with the heaven of the fixed stars, accomplished every day a rotation from east to
planet.
Aristotle,

concert

same

on

the contrary, extended Plato's doctrine to the relation of all the upper spheres to those that are contamed within them, as is clear from his hypothesis of retrogressive spheres (see iTifra).
(Cf. also De Coelo, ii. 12, 293, a, TToAAa (T^ixara. Kivov(Tiv at irpb 5
:

immediale contact with one anp. 496, n.l,7//;m), each can communicate its motion to the one next below it. This relation need not apply with equal strict
other (see
ness to the elementary spheres as to the heavenly, seeing that they do not, like the latter, consist of

r^s reKfVTa'as
exovcr-qs

Kal^rrjs^

ei/

&crTpov

iv iro\\a?s
ff<pa7pa

yap

crcpaipais

Tf\vra7a

4v5e5efj.4uv

IMd.G.lO.) Hejustiview on the ground that the upper spheres stand to the lower as the form to the matter,
^pTai.
ties this

a body whose nature it is to move in a circle. Aristotle, however, supposes in Meteor i 3, 341, a, 1, ii. 4, 361, a, 30 sqq' that the winds circle round the earth, being carried round by the
rotation of the world, Cf. p. 490, n. 4 si/pra

De
a,

Ccelo, iv. 3, 4, 310, b, 14, 312,

;

Eudemus and Sosigenes

'

supra, p. 325, n. 2) and that, asall spheresare incloseand

V.
;

12

Simpl.

Be Coelo,

in

Sohol. in

Ar

498

a, 45, b, 47, cf.

svpra, p. 451, n. 2

K K 2

500
west.

ARISTOTLE
The second, which was fastened
into
its
it,

revolved

in the opposite direction, completing

course in the

space of time required by each planet (in the sun's

case oG5^ days) to traverse the zodiac in the plane of

the

ecliptic.

The

others, likewise carried

round by the
to explain

surrounding spheres, but differing from them in direction and the period of rotation, were

meant

the variations which are observable between the apparent

motion of the
spheres.
star itself.^

stars

and that produced by the two

^

first

The lowest sphere

Callippus
for the

of each planet supports the

added seven other spheres

this,

two apiece

sun and moon, and one apiece for

theory,^ without

Mercury, Venus, and Mars.'' Aristotle approves of

as being the
Hiul

more probable

remarking
of

IDEIJJK on Euilt^xus, Philo.wjfh.Abk.d.Berl. Ahad. 1830, p. 67 i^. For a fuller account oi" tlie
'

nomer was a pupil

(or

Eudoxus

theories of Eudoxus and Callippus, see besides the scanty allusion in Aristotle (^Metaplh. xii. 8, 1073, b, 17; SiMPL. ibid. 498, b, 5-500, a, 15, who depends partly upon the work of Eudoxus n. Taxwj/, partly upon the account of Sosigenes, but has not altogether avoided falling into mistakes, and Theo. Astronom. p. 276 sqq. ed, Martin, in whom, however, his editor (p. 55 sq.) points out serious errors. In explanation, cf.lDELER, ibid. 7osqq.

Krische, ForscJiuiigen, p. 288 sq., are followed by Bonitz, Anst. Metaph. ii. 507 sq., and
w4io

Schwegler,
;

Arist. JMetaph. iv.

274 sq. PbaNTL, 'Apiar. w. ovp. 303 sqq. 2 According to Simpl. ibid.
498, b, 28, 500,
a, 23,

perhaps only of his pupil Polemarchus) who on the death of the latter betook himself to Aristotle at Athens, Simplicius kjiows of no work by him, but gives some account, taken from Eudemus's History of Astronomy, of the reasons which led him to dissent from Eudoxus. Arist. ibid. 1073, b, 32 SlMPL. ibid. 600, a, 15 sqq.; Theo, ibid. 278 sq. Ideler, Krische, 294 sq. 81 sq. * It is obvious from the passage quoted p.490, n. 4,supra, that he did not attribute complete certainty to it. According to Simpl. 503, a, 3, he even brought forward several objections to it in the Problems. The passage, however, does not occur in this treatise as we have it, which makes it all the more difficult to decide upon its genuineness.
=*

this astro-

PHYSICS
that his

501

own

doctrine of the connection of the spheres

first

in one coherent whole renders the

sphere assigned
superfluous.^
rectification

by Eudoxus and Callippus to each planet At the same time he judges an important
coherence of the heavenly system.
carries

of the theory to be needful, on account of this very

For

if

each sphere

round in

its

course

all

those which are contained

in

it,

the motions of the lower planets must be greatly

disturbed by those of their superiors, and the whole

assumed spheral system would be altered communication of movement from the spheres of one planet to
result of the

unless precautions be taken to neutralise the

those

of another.

accordingly, inserts

To meet this difficulty Aristotle, some other spheres between the

lowest of each planet and the highest of that which comes next beneath, meaning them to obviate the action of the first upon the second. But the premises of the whole theory require that these fresh spheres

should move at the same rate as those which they are destined to neutralise, but in an exactly opposite
direction;
2

and again that there should be

as

many

'

For, as Simplicius also re-

marks, 503, a, 38 sqq. (where, however, 1. 41, we must read crwcnroKadiaruffav), a special sphere is not required to explain the daily rotation of the planets from
east to west, since, in consequence of this connection the motion of the spheres of the fixed stars communicates itself to all that are contained in it. 2 For if two concentric spheres, whose axes lie in the same line, and of which the inner

one is fixed to the outer by the poles of its axis, spin round the common axis with relatively equal velocities in the opposite directions, each point of the inner sphere is at each moment precisely in the position in which it would be if both spheres were at rest. The

two motions have

completely

neutralised one another in their effect upon the inner sphere and all that depends upon it, as Sosigenes, in Simpl. ibid. 500, b, 39, truly explains.

602

ABISTOTLE
^

retrogressive or retarding spheres

as the

movements

they are used to obviate.

In other words, the collective motions peculiar to each planet have to be considered none of these may be communicated to another planet,
:

whereas the daily revolution from east to west excited

in each planet

by

its first

sphere does not require to be

neutralised.^

It is only the

moon which

requires no

retrogressive sphere beneath the one which carries her,

since there
interru])t.
is

no planet below the moon that she could

consequentl}?-,

Aristotle,

adds twenty-two

retrogressive spheres to the thirty-three of Callippus,

three apiece for Saturn and Jupiter, four apiece for

'

1(pa7pai

aveXiTTOvaai

(sup-

ply ras

ru)V viroKaru) (l)pou.(U(i}V &<T-

of individual constellations); cf. ibid. 502, a, 40.

" This supposition is as erroneous as the view, discussed p. 501, snjjra, that the theory of a special sphere for each of the planets with daily rotation from east to west is compatible with Aristotle's system of the spheres. For since, according to his view, the sphere of the fixed stars in its revolution carries round with it all that is contained in it, each further sphere which revolved in the same direction and at the same velocity would only add one more to the number of the daily rotations of the spheres contained in it, unless this result were obviated by a special arrangement

Tpwu

(r<f>aipas,

not
ib.

as

Sosigenes

does, SiMPL,
i.e.

502, a, 43, ras tu>v

vvpdv(i) Kivfjcreis,

1071, a, 2-12'*, 'spheres which serve to turn

to

those beneath them backwards,'

to

communicate
to

them a motion

of the next above them, and in this way to keep them in the same position

opposite

that

relatively to

the fixed stars as they would ha^e held had the planetary spheres above them produced no effect upon them at all ("ras dv\iTTOvaas Kcd els rh avrh a.iroKaOi(TTa.(Tas rfj Oeaei t^v
irpcirriv

a'(pa7pav

rerayixevov

del rod utto/cotco &(rTpov"); Mefaijli.

ihid. 1074, a, 1

sqq

Theophrastus

called these spheres avrava^epov<rai, because they carry those that are beneath them back,

of

retrogressive

spheres.

Ari-

and
less

&va(TrpoL,

because not only

are star498, b, 41, where, however, the retrogressive spheres appear to be conall of

some, but

them

(SiMPL

ibid.

has obviously overlooked this. If he had remarked it, he would not have neutralised the action of the primeval spheres of each planet which run parallel with the heaven of fixed stars, but would have abolished them
stotle

founded with the

starless spheres

altogether.

PHYSICS
Mars, A^enus, Mercury, and the
fifty-five or,
if

503

sun

giving in

all

we add
entities

in the sphere of fixed stars,

fifty-six

spheres, together with as

many

eternal incor-

poreal

unmoved
to

from

whom

the motions of the

spheres proceed.^

not

fail

conceiv^ed,

The progress of observation could show that the theory of spheres, even as thus was inadequate to explain the phenomena
earl}^

accordingly, as

as the middle of the third century

before Christ, Apollonius of Perga advanced his theory of

'

epicycles

'

triumphantly against

it.^

Yet even the ant-

agonists of Aristotle's system admitted that his theory

of retrogressive spheres
rectify
'

was an ingenious attempt to and supplement the hypothesis of Eudoxas.^

ibid.
cf.
;

Metaph.
;

Simpl.
;

Krische, 500, a, 34 sqq. iMd. 206 sqq. Ideler, ibid. 82

ibid.

BoNiTZ and Schwegler on the

passage in the Metajjhysics. There Aristotle expressly says, 1. 17 sqq., that more spheres are not required, for, since every motion exists for the sake of
that which

moved, there can be no motion and therefore no sphere in the heavens which is
is

not there for the sake of a

6t

star.

Sf (XT]Zfxlav oiSv t' eJyai (pophv fx^j (Twreipovcrav Trpos 'darpov <popav^ Ti 5e iraaav ^ixriv koI iraffav ouaiav diradrj Kol Kad' avr^v rov
dpiffTov
Sei
vofxl^eiv,

TTvxVKv7av r4\ovs elvai ovSs/j.ia Uv etr) irapa

(pixris

ravras
&c.],

erepa

[sc.

dirad'^s

dudyKT] rdv dpidfidv elvai rSiv ovaiuv. eire ydp fl<riv eVepot Kivoiev tiv cus reAos

dWa

rovTOV

groundless the traditional reading is obviously meaningless.) Here also we can see that his theory is founded upon observation. In 1. 12 he remarks that if we were to leave the sun and the moon out of our reckoning, the number of the (planetary) spheres would be 47 but the difficulty is so obvious that Sosigenes conjectured this to be a slip for 49 (Simpl. ibid. 502, a, 11 sqq.). Krische, with whom and seemingly also Bonitz Schwegler agree, refers the remark to the eight retrogressive spheres under Mercury and the sun but it is not easy to see Low the (T<pa7pai avfK'movaai belonging to the sun and the moon could have been left out.
;

ibid.

Upon which cf esp, Ideler, 83 sq., Lubbert, On the

.

o{i<rai

(popas.

(Instead of tcAo us,

;

Greek Theory of the Moon's Orbit,'

RUein.
3

however, in 1. 20, we must clearly read with B< nitz t e'Aos BrbnTANO's objection to this emendation, Psychol, d. Ar. 344 sq., is

Mm.

xii.

(1857), 120 sq.

Of the Peripatetic Sosigenes

Zell. Ph. Simpl. says,

(as to whom, see d. Gr. i. 696, 701)

604

ARISTOTLE
One
circle of fixed stars,
it,

or the

'

first

heaven,' as

Aristotle called
celestial world.

is

the most perfect portion of this

Stationed next to Deity, the best and

it

most perfect

object,

accomplishes
it

its

purpose by a

single motion.

In

its

single sphere

carries
Its

an innumotion
is

merable multitude of heavenly bodies.^

better side

pure, unalterable, uniform rotation,^ starting from the

and following the better

direction,
it it

from

right to

right.'^

Moving without
it

trouble,

requires

no Atlas

to support
40
:

nor any

sail to

carry

round by

ihid. 500, a,

ravra toIvvv tov

'hpi(TTor4\ovs crvvToixtas ovtuis koX (Tacpcos flprfKoTos, 6 'Siucriyeurjs iy-

t^v ayxii'oiav avrov &.G. SiMPL. proceeds, 502, b, 5 sqq., to give the arguments which he brought against Aristotle's theory.
Koofiidcras
1

few motions, the next above that and the next again reach higher attainments, the former by the aid of many, the latter by the
aid of few, motions. Finally the highest heavens a,ttain the highest with one single motion. In answer to the second question, Aristotle remarks that the first sphere far excels the others in
vital

asks
of

De how

Ca'h),
it

ii.

12,

Aristotle

is

that the

number

motions belonging to each planet does not increase with

and original energy

Set

{voriffai

from the prlmum inovens, but the three middle planets have one motion more than the two above and below
their distance

yap

t^s

C'^^js

koX ttjs

apx^s

eKacTTris

iroW^v inrepox^v

eluai ttjs

7r/?coT7js TTphs

ras &Wa5, 292, a, 28)

them and, further, why the

;

first

sphere contains so many stars while the converse is the case with the others, several spheres being assigned to each star. In reply to the former question (292, a, 22) he says that whereas the Most Perfect needs no action (see p. 396, n. 2, 3, and
p. 397, n. 1), of all

but that the nearer each is to first the more are the bodies which it carries, seeing that the lower spheres are carried round by the upper. Aristotle himself seems, from the way in which he introduces them, 291, b, 24, 292,
a, 14 (cf. p. 169, n. 3, and p. 490, n. 4) to place no great reliance

neath

Him

that is beone thing attains its

end by a few actions, another requires many, others still make no effort to attain their end at all, but content themselves with a distant approach to perfection.

upon these explanations. The problem, however, appears to him too important to be altogether passed over. There are questions which he approaches with a species of religious awe, but which nevertheless lie very near
his heart.
-

The earth does not move

that which
lies

at
it

all,

nearest to

has

See See

p. 494, n.

supra.

p. 497, n. 1, supra.

PHYSICS
force. ^

605
all

Its

motion embraces

and generates

all

Unbegotten and indestructible, affected by no earthly distress, comprehending in itself all time and space, it rejoices in the most complete existence that has been allowed to any bodily thing. ^ Less
motion.
perfect
is

the region of the planetary spheres.

Instead

of one sphere bearing countless heavenly bodies,

we

here perceive a multiplicity of spheres, several of which

are required to

bear one star on

left side

its

course.

Their
a pure

motion proceeds from the

of the world, and

itself, it is

though, considering each sphere by

and uniform

rotation, yet the general result is not so,

round by the upper, and as a consequence motions composite and deviating

since the lower spheres are carried
'

See

p. 459, n. 5.
Coelo,
ii.

iffnv eTs Kcu aiSios [d ttos ovpavhs Aristotle, however, has principally view the itpwros ovpavhs, which, in in i. 9, 278, b, 11, is called by preference simply ovpavSsI dpxhv ovk %-)(^u)v rod fxiv KOI TeAeuT^i/
1 init.
:
:

De

ancients were right when they assigned the heavens, as alone indestructible, to the gods, for it
is

&<pdapTos Kal
irdarjs

ayeyrjTos,

$ti

5'

airaO^s

Oui^Trjs

Sutrx^peias

iarlv, irphs 5e rovrois dirovos Sid

rb

/xrj56/Ams

irpoaSelffdai

Piaias

iravrhs alcovos,

exw^

Se koI TrepiexoifV

iv avrcp

rhv

&,iripov

xpjyoj'

KuXvovTa Karex^i (t>4p(rdai irefpvKSra avrhv SAAws yap rh roiovrov iiriirovqv, irav
avdyKijs,

SiSirep KaXws e;^et ffv/uLireideiv eavrhv rovs dpxaiovs Kal [xaXiffra irarpiovs TfiJLoiu a\7}d?s eJpai xSyovs, us %<ttiv

Hacfirep &i/ aiSicorepov

ri,

Kal

SiaI. 9,

dea-ecos rrjs dpia-rr]s &iJ.oipou.

addvardu ri Kal 6e7ov tSou ixovTwv

fieu

els Kal fxopos 279, a, 10 TeAetos ovros ovpavSs icrriv.

:

Kal

The

ix^vraiv Se roiavTTjv Sxrre firjdeu ehai irepas avTrjs,

Kiv7)(riv

aWa

fxaWoy ravTTjv twv &K\(tiv irepas. t6 re yap irepas rwv Treptex'^j/Tcoj/

eVrl, Kal aiirt]
rj

KVK\o(popia reAeios

tos areAers Kal rhs ixovtras irepas Kal iravKav, avr^ /Av ovSe/xiav oUt apx^v exovcra otfre reAeuT^j/, aAA' &iTav(Tros ovcra rhu 6,iripov xP'^'^oj/, rciv S' &\\<i)v
Trepte'xet

oZaa

rS>v fikv alria ttjs

Sfxo/ifVTj
t)]v

apxv^ t^v Se

passage which follows (quoted p. 395, n. 6), refers partly to the same subject, even although the description contained in it refers primarily to God and not to the heavens. All that was said of the aether, p. 473 sq., is equally applicable to the irpuros ovpavhs, which, according to the account p. 490, n. 3, is formed of the purest aether.

iravKav.

The

606

ARISTOTLE
circle are
is

from the

produced.'

Moreover the rate

is

of

these motions

affected

by the

relation of the lower to

the upper spheres,^ which in itself

a further proof

of their less complete self-sufficingness.

Nevertheless,
of the

these spheres belong to the most divine part

visible universe, to that
bility

removed from mutaand impression from without, and which partakes

is

which

of perfection.-^

As

the aether

elements, so

tlie stars

is superior to the four without exception occupy a posi-

tion of superiority to the earth.

They form

tlie celestial

world, in comparison with which the terrestrial seems

but an unimportant and transient portion of the whole.^

p. 494 sqq. mipra. Cwlo, ii. 10: the velocity of the planets (by which, however, Aristotle, as Plato, Tint. ;}9, A sq., Rep. x. 617, A, Laws, vii. 822, A sq., here means, not their absolute velocity, but merely the time of their revolutions, and accordingly calls those swifter which take a shorter time on the other hand, see c. 7, 289, b, 15 sqq., Meteor. 1. 3, 341, a, 21 sqq.) is in inverse ratio to their distance from the earth. The further each is the longer it takes to complete a revolution, inasmuch as the motion of the stellar heavens from east to west has a stronger counteractive influence upon that of the planets from west to east the nearer it is to it. As Aristotle expressly appeals to mathematical proofs for the truth of the latter proposition, we must understand it to mean that of concentric circles or spheres which revolve round their axes in the same time, the outer ones move swifter than the inner,
'
.

Cf

and that therefore the velocity of

their motion (in the present case that of the daily motion round the earth) constantly decreases towards the centre. ^ Cf pp. 474 and 505, n 2, supra, and Phys. ii. 4, 196, a, 33 to^
. :

De

ovpavhv KoL

to,

deiSrara robv

(paivo/j.e-

vuv. Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 17 (see p. 503, n. \, supra). The stars are therefore called 0e?o auixaTa,

Metaph.
12,

ibid.
b,

1.

30,

De

Ccelo,

ii.

likewise the heavens, ihid. 3, 286, a, 11. * Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 18: t6 yovv TeTayfjL^vov /col rh wpiff292,

32;

fi4vov TToAu

fiaWov
Trepi

(pa'v^Tai iv ro79
S'

ovpaulois

'/)

v/xas to

^A\ot'

&W(i}S Koi ws ervx^ Trepl ra QvqTo. fiaXXov. Metapli. iv, 5, 1010, a,

28

6 yap irepl rjfxas rov aladrjTov Toiros 4u <pdopd Ka\ yeveaei 5iaTeXe7
:

fidvos

&u

'

aAA.'

eiirelp fiopiov

ovtos tov iravrds

oifdev
icrriv.

ws

By

thus dividing the universe into a

and a celestial part, Aristotle intends to distinguish

terrestrial

between the sublunary world, the materials of which are

pirrsics
Aristotle,
like

507

Plato,

thought the stars were bodies

spirits,

animated by rational
fore

and ascribed
^

to

these

beings a nature far more godlike than man's.

of knowledge which

There-

he attributes a priceless value to the smallest iota we can boast to have acquired about them. 2 In this view we can trace the consequences of a metaphysic which deduced
ultimately
all
it

motion
is

from incorporeal essences; but

it

also

possible to recognise in

a reflection of those

modes of

supplied by the four elements, and in which birth, death, and qualitative change take place, and the world of the heavenly spheres,which consists of astherial matter and which, while exhibit-

doctrine, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 34, 991, b, 13, iii. 6, 1002, b, 15, 17, 22, 467.
1 Eth. vi. 7, 1141, a, 34: avOpdirov iroXv OeiSrepa r^v (pvffiv, oTou (pavepdorard ye e| wv 6 Kda/xos

ing
tion

motion
of
Ccelo,

in

space,

admits

neither growth nor transforma-

any
i.

Be

kind. 2, 269,

Similarly,
a, 30, b,

14

it4^vk4

Tis

oifcria

ffdjxaros

&XXr)

Traps rhs ivravOa avcndccis, OcioTfpa Kal irporepa rovrccv aTrdurcou

avv(rrriKj/. De Ccelo, i. 2 see preceding note. ^ Part. An. i. 5 init. the beings in the world are either unbegotten and imperishable, or begotten and perishable o-u^/Se;
:

j8T7/ce

5e

irepi

fjiXv

iKeivas

Ti/xlas
xnr-

....

etTTt Tt
irep]

Trapa
i]ij.as

ra

<rd>/xaTa

ra

otjaas Kot Oeias

. .

ikdrrovs
.

rjfuv

Sevpo Kol
fffiivou

Tepov K^xcopie;^o'

rtxrovrq}

rifiicoTepav
a<l>aT7)K

rijv

ipvcTLV

'6<T(firep
;

tuv

ivravQa ir\e7ov c. 8, 276, a, 28 sqq. b, 3, ii. 12, 292, b, 1, where twv &(Trp(av and ipravOa are opposed Meteor, ii. 3, 358, a, 2,5 tout' del yivecrdai Kara, riva rd^iy, us eVSeX^rai fxeT^x^iv ra ivravOa rd^ccos. In ordinary language evravOa and iKe? indicate respectively the upper and the under world (e.ff.
;
:

ire pi Sh rwv <p6apdpx^tv Oewpias rcov (pvToov re koI ^(fuv eviropov/jLfv fxaWou Trphs rijv yvSxriv 5td to avuTpoipQv. ex^' ^' ^ndrepa X'^P^^rwu fih yap el koI Kara i^uKphv

e<paTrT6fie6a,

'6fxa)S

Sia

t^v

rifitorriTa
Trap' Tjfuv

Tov yvwpi^eiv ^hiov ^ ra

arraura,
clxTirep

Kal ra>u ipwfxevwv rh

fiiKphu fiSpiov KariSelu iariv i) iroWa erepa Kal fxeydha 5t' aKpifieias Idelv t^ Se 5fd rh fiaWou Kal wXeiu yuwpl^eiv
iflSidv

rvxhv Kal

Soph. Ajaw, 1372

i.

Plato,

Efij?.

330, D, V. 451, b; AjjoL 40, E, 41, B sq., and elsewhere), in Plato also the sensible and ideal

avrciv Xafxfidvei ri]v rrjs iiriarriiixris uTrepoxV, ^Tt 5e 5ih rh Tr\7\(Tiairepa Tjficou elvai Kal rrjs (pvaeus o'lKeiSrepa

avriKaraXXdrrerai ri

irphs r)]v irepl

world C^heat. 176, A,

Phrsdr.

ra dela
CoelOy
ii.

(piXocrotplav.

250, A), as also in Aristotle,

where

Cf. also Pe 12 {suj)ra, p. 169, n. 3).

he

is

describing

the

Platonic

608

ARISTOTLE

thought which lay at the root of the natural religion of the Greeks, and which stamped themselves in similar
notions upon the philosophy of Plato.^
self,

Aristotle

him-

indeed,

is

perfectly conscious

of this connection

between his theories and the ancient faith of his nation. The relation between the terrestrial world and the celestial spheres gives rise to the motions and change of
earthly things. The laws that govern the earth are necessarily different from those of heaven,^ because of

the difference

of materials,

if

for

no other reason.

The nature of the elements

forces

them

to

move

in

opposite directions and to exhibit opposite qualities, to act and be acted upon, to pass into and to inter-

mingle with one

is

another.'' But since everything that moved must be moved by something else, it follows

that the reciprocal interaction of the elements receives

^
-

Zell. Ph. d. Or. See p. 505, n.

p.
8,
e

i.

p.
2,

68G

sq.

svpra,

and
xii.

475, supra. 1074, a, 38:

Metaph.
TrapaSe'So-

Kal ravras ras 5o|oy eKeivuu olou Xei-^ava irepKreaSxrOai fJ-expi- Tov vvv. 7] jiiev ovv irdrpios 5o|a Kal 7] irapa roov Trpurwv iirl
(pOeipoinevcoj/

vaXaicov
(laiv

irapa tcou apxaiu^v Kal irujULiv jxvQov ax^f^ari Kara-

roaovroy
^

rifuu (pavepa (xdvov.

Both Christian and heathen

XcXfi/m/uLeua ro7s vcrrepov oti deoi

ovroi [the
TTfpie'xet
Ttt

re starry heavens]
'Skrju

opponents {e.g. the Platonist Atticus, see Euseb. Prcpp. Ev.

XV.
5,

Koi

<pv<riu.

Se

rh 6e7ov t^v \onra /xvdiKoos

rijv
ircidcis

6;

Athenaq.
;

Svpplic.

c.

^Stj

irpoarriKrai

irphs

rcou

rroXAuv /cat wphs t)}v els rovs vo/llovs Kal rh (TvjuLcpepov xp^^^i-v avOpunroeL^els re yap rovrovs Kal rwv &\\wv C4'wv o/xoiovs riffl Xeyovai, Kal rovrois erepa aKoXovda Kal
'

Clemens, Strom, v. Euseb. ihid. 5, 1 Chalcid. in Tim. c. 248 and elsewhere; cf. Keische, Forsch.
22, s, 88 p D; 591,

irapaTrAy^o'ia

rois

elpri/meuois

'

wj/

et ris xt^P'Vas avrh Xdfioi fiSvov rh irptorov '6ri deovs wovro ras irpdras

ovaias elvai deicos tiv etprja-dai vojxia-eiev Kal Kara rh eiKhs iroWaKis evp7)fxevf]s eh rh Svvarhu eKdirrr/s
Kal

have distorted this to that the Divine Providence reaches only as far as the moon and does not extend to the earth. How far this representation agrees with the true Aristotelian doctrine may be gathered from what has been already said, at pp. 403,410, and 421.
347,
1)

mean

rex^ns Kal

<piKo(ro<pias Kal-KaXiv

See pp. 453

sq.

477

sq. sup.

PHYSICS
an impulse from without.

509

The immediate sources of Their movement occasions the changes of warmth and cold, which in the opinion of Aristotle, are the most generally active forces in the elementary bodies. ^ Although the stars and their spheres are neither warm nor cold,^ yet, by their movement, they generate light and heat in the
these motions are the heavenly bodies.^

stratum of air that

all

nearest to them as, indeed, moving bodies warm and even set fire to surrounding substances by friction. This is partilies
;

swiftly

cularly true of the place in which the sun

since
'

is

fastened,

it

is

neither so far off as the fixed

i.

stars,-*

nor yet

Meteor,
5'

2,

339, a,

21

ef audyKT]s truu^xv^ irws ovTos [6 vepl rriv yriv Koaixosl^ rats

cfTTt
6,vu)

burn, and the lead of arrows and bullets to melt (on this widely spread error of the ancients, cf.
it

(popais,

lixm

irciaav

avrov

rijv

dvua/xiv
oicTTe

Kv^epua<rdai
(xkv

iKilQiv.

lDELEK,.lm^. 3Ieteor. i. 359 sq.); must therefore heat the air that
surrounds them, raina
avTct iKQepfxalverai ^4pffdai,
Kivr]<Tei

....
avTov

rOsv

TTvp

(rufx^aivovTwv irepl KaX yrjv koI to.

avyy^ur} tovtois ods iv v\r]s eifSet rd>u yiyvofievwu airia xph vofii^eip, rh 8' 0VTU5 aXTiov ws oOev 7] ttjs .
.
.

/xeu ovv 5ia to eV de'pt ts 5id T7ji> TrKrjy^iv rfj ylyverai irvp' tu)V 5e &v(i}

eKaffrou iv

r^
fi^

ff<paipa,

(pip^rai, Sxtt^

Kivifa-ews

apx^ r^v twv

;

del kiuouc. 3,

avra

ixkv

iKirvpovadai,

rov

S'

fifvwv airiaTiov Svi/afiiv a, ]4.

'^

340,

aepos virh rr]v rov kvkXikov (XdofiaTOs (r(j)a7pau uvros audyKTj (pepofievrts
iKeivrjs

See
It

p.

480, n.

3, sujjra.

ijcdepixaiviaQai,

impossible that they should be, seeing that the jether, of which they consist, admits none of the opposites which constitute the qualities of the elements. Some further reasons against the view that they are of a fiery nature are given, Meteor.
^

is

IxaKurra
Se/xduos.

6 i\ios

koX ravry TeTvxVKev ei/Se-

nXrjcnd^ouTds re avrov Kal a.vi(Txovros KoX virep tj/jlols uvros yiyverai rj depfidrrjs. That

Sih

S^

i.

fiit.
*
:

DeCoelo, ii. 7, 289, a, 19 the do not consist of fire, t) 5e Ocp/xorrjs ott' avruu koX rh </)cos yiverai 'ttap(K'rpi^oix4vov rod aepos
stars
virh

the sun has this effect is explained, Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 19, in the course of an exposition which agrees with the passage just quoted, in terms similar to the above. See further Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 10, i. 7, 344, a, 8. The whole account, however, would suggest many diflaculties even to

TTJs

iKeiuuv

(popas.

Motion

causes wood, stone, and iron to

an Aristotelian. For how can light and heat proceed from a

510
so slow of

ARISTOTLE
motion as the moon.
fire

ment frequently causes the

Again the solar movewhich has raised the

air, to burst and rush violently downward.^ If the motion of the sun were uniformly the same in relation to the earth it would produce a simple and unvarying

effect either of

generation or of destruction.

inclination of the sun's path

makes

it

unequal.

But the The

sun

is

different parts of the earth,

sometimes nearer and sometimes further from the and the alternation of birth
is

and death

a result of this circumstance.^

witli the

Whether

one connects the former

proximity and the

latter with the remoteness of the sun, the one with the approach of warmer and the other with that of colder

seasons of the year,^ or whether one regards generation

as the consequence of a proportionate mixture of heat

and
!sing-le

cold,

and destruction as produced by a preponbody

like
this,

celestial
it

Sel Se ttX^'ovs ehai ras Kivfjo-eis Kal

the motion of the whole sphere that produces them? AVe sliould require in tliat case to siipjjose that the sun stands out oi its sphere like a jironioiilorv. Or how does it ;i,ii,ree witli tlie account here given that the lire and air region is separated from the solar sphere by the lunar ? Meteor, i. 8, 341 a, 28. Gen. et Corr. ii. 10 eVel t\ Kara r^v (^opau Kiwqcrls SeSeiKrai OTi aiSios, dvdyKri rovrwu out wu Kal yeveaiv elvai arwexSos >; yap (popa TToi-fj(TL T^v yiveffiv eVSeAexcDs 5ia
is
'
'^
:

when

iuaur ias,
ruiy

tj

rij (popa

tt] auwjULa\tla.-

yap ivavTiwv rauavTia a'lTia. Sio koI oux v irfxarr] (papa alria ^arX YeveVewy koX (pdupas, aAA' r] Kara rhu Xo^ou kvkKov eV rav-rr) yap Kalrh (Tvvf:X^^ ^(Ttl Ka\ rh Kiyi^iodai
Kivriff^is . rris fxhv olv avvtx^*"^ ^ '''^^ oXov (popa alria, rov 54 TrpoaUvai koI airUvai ?/ ^yKKiais avfxfiaivii yap ore fxlv iroppoo yiveo-dai ore S' iyyvs. aviaov 5e tow SLaarr^/jLaTos uvtos auw/xaXos earai
.

5uo

rj

Kiurjais

wctt' el Tcp irpoffieuai Kal

'

rh irpoadyeiv Kal dirdyeiv rh yevvrjTiKov. But as both birth and death are eternal, <pavepov on fiids fieu ofjo-rjs tt)s (popas ovk eV5eXerot yivea-dai dfjitpw Sia rh evavTia elvai rh yap avrh Kal axravrois ^xov del rd avrd irecpvKe iroie?!/. Siffre iJTOi yeveffis del earai fj (pdopd.
, .

'

iyyvs elvai yevvS., rqi dirievai raitrhv tovto /cai irSppu) yiyecrdai (pOeipei Kal el r^ iroWdKis Trpocrievai yevva, Kal ry iroWdKis direK0e7v (pdelpei raiu yap evavricov rdpavria atria, Cf. Meteor, i. 9, 346, b, 20, ii. 2, 354, b, 26. ^ As is done in the preceding note and in the passages quoted, p. 512, n. 1 , infra.

PHYSICS
derance of one over the other/
same.
still

611

the facts are the

The double movement

their

of the heavens occasions

the interaction of the elements upon one another, and,

by causing
flying to

mutual metamorphosis, prevents their

the different localities which, if prevented by no controlling influence, they would severally occupy.

The

materials of the world are thus continually conducted in a never-ceasing stream of reciprocal trans-

mutation downwards from above and upwards from

below. 2

The endlessness of

this process

communicates

a sort of infinity to perishable things.

The substances

which are further removed from the highest cause having

no right
thus
'

to indestructible existence, the Deity has en-

dowed them with perpetual becoming

'

left

instead, and has no gap or discontinuity in the universe.^

'

the

Gen. An. iv. 10, 777, b, 16: generation, evolution, and

the life of animals have their natural periods, which are determined by the revolution of the sun and the moon, as we might expect: koX yap 9epix6T'i)Tis Ka\
y\iv\(:is

a'lTiov yap tovtov iarlv rj &A\r]\a uerdfiaa-is el yap eKaarov e/xepev ev rfj avTov x^P'"els

awjxara.

Kal
i]Sr]

/j.^

iJ.erefia\\ei/ viro
Siea-TrjKea-av.

tov

irXrjaioi^,

tcu

H^xpi

(rviJ.iJ.eT plus

rivhs

oZv did T7V <j)opdu did 5e TO ixerafiaAKeiv ovk eVSe'xtTcti ixeveiv ovdeu avrwv iv uvSefiia xw/>a
Terayfxevr].

fieTafiaAAei SnrArjy ovrrav

ras yeveaeis, fxera 5e ravra Tos (pdopds. rovTOov S' exovai rh Tr4pas Koi rrjs apxyjs Koi rijs reAeuT^s at TovTwv Kivr}(reis tS>v aarposv. The changes in the temperature
iroiovari

Here also it is only by variations of temperature that

the sun effects the constant transmutation of the elements, as is placed beyond a doubt by the arguments in the Metem'ology which are discussed below. Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 20 Tovro S' eiiAoyus (rv/j.fiefir]Kev eirel yap ev diraaiv del rod fie\riovos opeyeaOai (pafiev r^v (pvaiv, fieAriov
=

of the air depend upon the sun and moon those in the water upon air and wind. Whatever is or comes into being in them must adjust itself to their state. (Then follows the passage quoted p.
;

363, n. 4.)

5e rh eJvai
et

Gen.
7
J
:

Corr.
e/c

ii.

aixa 5e StjAoj'

10, 337, a, rovrcav '6 rives

crco/ua-

5'

t) t^ fii] eJvai, rovro dSvvarov ev airaffiv vndpx^tv Sid

.

rh

irSppo} TTJs

dpxvs

dcpiarraaOai, rqi

awopovcriu, Sia ri

kKacnov roov

\enrojj.evcf)

rpoircp

(TweirAripoxre

rh

ro3v els t))v olKeiav (pepofievov eV T(^ dneipcf} XP^^V o'' 5tf(rTa(rt rh.

x^pw

'6\ov

6e(is
iroi-fiaas

evreXexv

evSe\.)

(better ri]v yeyeffiy oVrw

512

ARISTOTLE
is

Accordingly a higher order

mirrored in the law of this

mutation

for as the

heavenly bodies approach the earth

it

and move away from

at fixed

and equal

intervals,

nature has ordained that birth and death should occur

coincidently with these periods of the heavens
is circular,
;
'

and

as the

movement

the opposite motions of the

elements in the terrestrial world also accomplish their

kind of
all

circle,

inasmuch as each of them passes into

itself.^

the others, and finally returns upon

Aristotle's Meteorology is occupied with the

pheno-

mena produced by

the motion, reciprocal action and

mixture of the elements.^

He

first

describes those

which belong to the

fiery circle;
;

next^ those of the

''

lower portion of the iitinosphere

yap au ^aAarra
[in this
in
TT/s

and
and

finally
the

those
of

irvvbipoiro to i'ivai

,sujr/'a),

on

circle

way no
hih.

nature]

be left rh iyyvrara dvai

,a:ap

will

generation,
2'.]

P/i//s. iv.

14, 22;), b,

sqq.
^

ovaias rh yiueadai del Kal tt]u yfvtcriu. Ibid. c. II fin. perishable things complete the circle of their being apie/j.cp not (Uei. Cf. also Zell. Ph. cl. Gr. i. p. 512. Ibid, at 836, b, 9 eV X(T(f Xpovcf Kal 7] (pdopa kol t] yeveais rj Kara (pvaiv. 5ih Kal ol ^pouoi Kal ol
:
'

The object of the

c.
1
:

treatise is
offa
a-v/j.-

set forth thus, in

Palvei Kara (pvaiv /xhu, araKToripav jxivrOl T7?S TOU TrpwTOv (TTOix^iou

Twv
. . .

aco/uidToov, irepl

rbu ytiTvivvTa

fidXiara tottov t^ cpopa ruv &(npwv, o(Ta T OeirifXiv hv a4pos dvai KOiva TrdBt] Kal vhaTos, en 5e yf/s
ocro
ei'577

fiioi

kKacrruiv apiO/xhu

fx^^c'^

'^'*'

Kol

/ueprj

Kal

irddt]

tSsv

rovTcp Biopi^ovrai iravToif yap iffri rd^Ls Kal TTcis fiios Kal xpovos /j-erpelrai Trpi65cf,Tr\^v ov r^ avrt^ irdures.

fiepcov.

With these investigations

ought to be connected the discussion of organic being Qibid.

Experience, moreover, is in hardpw/xeu this theory yap (in irpoffiouTOS jxkv rov /;Atoy

and
'
'>

iv.

mony with
yeviffis

12/m.). 3IeUor. i. 3-8. Ibid. i. 9 iii.

TTJ

6.

icrriv,
tffcf

aTriouTos 5e ^6i<ris,

TOTTos

64(Ti

Kal eV

XP^'^V ^Karepov.

It is

fxera

tovtov
:

[i.e.

fxiv hivrepos after the fiery

true that in many cases death takes place quicker. The reason of this, however, is to be found in the disproportionatenessof the materials. 2 Ibid. 337, a, 1, c, 11, 338, b,
3,
1

and again
Kal &epo5,
''

circle], irpwros 5e irepl rrji/ yrjv ; tottos Koivhs vbaros re

i.

9 init.
iii.

Ibid.

6,

378, a, 15 sqq.

according to Belcher's reckoning, or iii. 7 according to that of

sqq.

cf. c.

(see p. 484,

IDELER.

PHYSICS

513

which are exhibited within the sphere of the earth. The latter part of his treatise does not seem to have been finished. Aristotle appears, instead of continuing
the work, to have composed the separate essay which now forms the fourth book of the Meteorology and

which

offers a

proper point of transition to the science

its

of animate existence in

discussion of topics which

we should
chemistry.

refer to the province of inorganic

1

and organic
various

In the

first

of

these

sections

phenomena, such as meteors and aerolites,^ together with the Comets and the Galaxy, are explained to be
collected masses of dry
fire

and inflammable vapours set on by the motion of the stars.^ Comets are bodies of
vapour in a state of slow combustion, moving
Similar in kind is the vaporous material being excreted and by the movement of the whole heaven.*
its

this

freely or in the train of a star.^

Milky Way,
inflamed

In the lower portion of the atmosphere are observable all circumstances connected with the formation of the

Under the influence of solar warmth the moisture on the surface of the earth evaporates. The rising mists cool themselves in the higher regions of the air, imparting a portion of their heat to the fiery
clouds.
'

See
.

p. 83, n. 2, sujpra.
i.

were thought

to forecast.

'
3

^{eUor.

On

4, 5.

n. 4, 479, n. 4, 490, n. 3, and 509, n. 4. "J^'i^.c. 6-7, especially .344, a, 16 sqq. and c. 8, 345, b, 32 sqq. In
^

Cf pp. 482,

of the nature of comets which he here gives, Aristotle endeavours (344, b, 18 sqq.) to explain those

harmony with the account

meteorological

phenomena

{e.g.

storm and drought) which they

Meteor, i. 396 Ideler points out that Aristotle's account of comets held its ground among the most distinguished astronomers until the time of Newton ^ jj^^ ^ g^ ^^^ 34g^ ^^ g where the attempt is made to explain in detail, on the basis of this supposition, the form and appearance of the Milky Way.

VOL.

I.

L L

514

ARISTOTLE

sphere, and losing the rest in contact with the chillness

Then they condense, change from air to water,^ and fall again to earth. In this manner there is formed a stream of air and water, moving up and down in a circle when the sun is near, the column of air, or warm exhalation, rises when it retreats, the stream of water flows downwards.*^ Aristotle makes use of this phenomenon to explain the clouds and
of the upper atmosphere.^
:

snow and hail,"^ and goes on to connect with it the nature and origin of rivers ^ and of the sea." The former are produced in part by the products of the atmosphere and in part by a transmutation The sea, though of vapour into water within the earth.
mists,^ dew, rime, rain,

no

less

eternal than the

world,

is

always yielding a

portion of its waters in the

form of vapour, which

returns to

it

through the rivers after having been again

Its
salt

transformed into water in the atmosphere and dis-

charged in this form.

ness in combustion
in the earth, a
for

and

bitter

taste

is

occasioned by earthy particles which obtain their bitter:

when dry vapours

are generated

change ensues from earth to fire

in other

words, combustion. These vapour, then, carry the result of this combustion aloft with them, which mingles with
the water of the rain and the streams, and being by reason
of
its

weight unaffected by evaporation,

of this 340, a, 26.
is

it

remains

'

The reason
i.

given,

iMd.
'^

c. 8,

Air, which is a compound moisture and heat, when it cools down, is transformed into moisture and cold, i.e. water see

of

Ihid. at 346, b, 32. Ihid. c. 10-12. J^m?. c. 13, 349,b, 2-c. 14yif/i., where he gives a survey of the most noted rivers and their sources. The matter of c. 14 will
*

p. 484, supra.
3

be further touched upon ivfra.

'

Ihid.

i.

c. 9.

Ihid.

ii.

c.

1-3.

PHYSICS
behind in the
sea.

515

Dry evaporation

causes wind, as moist

Both are mingled in the lower atmosphere, but the dry exhalations rise aloft and are carried round by the rotation of the upper regions. This excretion of the warmer matter causes the remaining moisture to cool and be condensed into rain
evaporation rain.

and

this refrigeration

being communicated to the

strata, causes

warm

vapours of the upper

them to rush towards

the earth in the shape of wind.^ Consequently, the alternations of wind and rain depend upon the fluctuations of

moist and dry vapours continually changing place with

one another.^
terior

Masses of vapour penetrating the inearth as

of the

winds produce earthquakes.^

are

Similar in their origin

thunder and lightning,

whirlwinds and simooms,"* while halos round the sun

and moon, rainbows, parhelia, and light-streaks in the

clouds
^

may

be explained by the reflection of light in

moist exhalations and water.

In the earth

itself stones

are produced from dry exhalations, together with all

other minerals which are incapable of fusion

damp

vapours, on the other hand, by hardening, before passing

into water,

become metals.^ At the end of the third book of the Meteorology

Somtio,
^

Ibid. i. c. 13, 349, a, 12 sqq., 4-6, especially c. 4, where the subject is further developed. Cf also IDELEK, i. 541 sqq. Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 1 Prohl. xxvi. 26. 2 Upon this oj/TJTrepia-Toats, a

3,

457, b,

2.

ii.

conception which plays a great part in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, as it did in Plato's before, and in the Stoics' after, him, see
also Meteor,
i.

Meteor. ii.T,^. An enumeration of the various hypotheses advanced by the ancients to explain earthquakes is given by Ideler, in loco, 582 sqq. * Ibid. ii. 9, and iii. 1. * These phenomena are dealt with in Meteor, iii., chapters 2-6. ^ Meteor, iii. 6, 7, 378, a, 15
sqq.

12, 348, b, 2

De

516

ARISTOTLE

Aristotle promises to give a fuller description of these

bodies.

But the fourth book, which

is

not properly
start.

connected with the others,^ makes a new

the
four

Taking

elementary characteristics, and

cold as active, dryness

regarding

warmth and
and then the

and

moisttire as

passive, principles, ^ Aristotle first considers the former

latter,

in

their

several manifestations.

From warmth and

when
tion

cold he derives generation on the

:

one hand and corruption on the other ^

generation,

these principles, being combined in due propor-

and acting on the material substratum of a being,

its

obtain complete ascendency over

ruption,

substance

^
;

cor-

when the warmth

is

peculiar to the moist ele-

withdrawn by some external heat, and consequently form and distinctness are destroyed.''
ments of a being

Among phenomena

of a similar description, but not

involving generation or destruction,

may be reckoned
Of the two
(pvaiu <p6opa els

digestion, ripening, boiling, roasting, &c.^

Cf, p. 513, supra. See p. 480, n. '.i, supra.

iraffa

yap

7]

Kara
ttjj

Tovff oSos icTTiv.

L. 16
eV

a7i'>\iis

5'

Meteor,
7]

iv.
ol)V

1,

378,

b, 28:
7]

eVrt (pQopa
olKeias Kal
utt'

eKacTTC}}

vyp<^

irpwTOV jxkv
yevecris Kal
Tcoj/
7}

KaOoXov

aTrArj

Kara (pvaiv

6ep/j.6r7]ros
'

(pvaiKJ] jx^raRoKr) tov-

aWorpias

depfidrTjros

auTTj 5'

TOiV dvpd/j.civ icTTiv ^pyou Kal

avTiKeijxivr) (pdopa
*

Kara

(pvcriv.

%(TTi 5' 7} olttXti 31 KoX ((>vaiK7] yeueais fxerafioAT] vttS rovTwu roov Swdfieaf, orav e;^a>o'i AoyOV, 6K TTIS VTT0Klfliv7)S vK7]S

Ihid.

1.

earlu 7) rov irepiexoyros. Corruption may also be described as the joint effect of ^pvxp^rTis o'lKeia, and 6ep/j.6r7]s aXXorpia. Moisture, however, is (ace. to 1. 8 sqq.) a

eKaarr) (pvcrei
at
elprjfxevai

avrai

S'

[wAtj] elalu

yewwai
5

Se

Swdixeis iradrjTiKa'. rh depiJ-hv Kal ^vxp^f

:

Kparovvra
Kparfj,
a.7Ti\iia

rrjs v\7]s.

Ibid. 379, a, 2

orav 5e

/x^

necessary means, all generation being the result of the action of moisture (which is evopiarov see p. 480, n. 2, S2q?ra) upon dryness in obedience to the efficient force of nature destruction begins orai/
; ;

Kara

fxepos

jiieu

fxdoKvffis Kal

ylverai, rij
fidXicTTa

5'

airXfj yepecrei
c^i/zts.

Kparfj rod opi^ovros did rh Trepi4xov.

"

rh opi^fiepov
'<^i^i.s,

ivavTiov

Koivov

irerpis, iriiravffis,

6im]<Ti$

PHYSICS
passive principles moisture
in its nature the
therefore,

517
is

and dryness, the former

;

more

easily determinable

moisture,

must needs determine the

;

characteristics of

dryness and not vice versa

neither of the two, however,

can exist without the other, but both (and therefore also the two elements, whose fundamental qualities they
are)

must

subsist together in all bodies.'

This comsoft.^

bination produces

the opposition of hard and

its
is

Every body, again, which has must be stiff, and all stiffness
Consequently,

own

definite

form

a form of dryness."^

we

are next led to treat of the nature

and

kinds of drying, melting, and stiffening, together with

the materials subject to these processes.^

Homogene-

ous bodies are formed of earth and water by the influence of

warmth and

cold/'

Aristotle proceeds at once

water in a
^

as effects of heat,
/xdoXvais,

a7re\|/m, wjucJttjs,

vessel.
c. c.

cold.
*

as effects of Cf. Meteor, iv. 2 sq, IMd. c. 4 elal 5' al jxkv

crrdTevcris
:
.

Ibiff. c. 5 init.

dpxa^ Tcov crw/ictTcoj/ al TradrjTiKal vyphv KoX ^rjp6v iirel 5' eVri rh fxkv vypdv evdpKTTOv, rh Se ^rjpdv Zv(T6pi<TTov [see p. 480, n. 2,su2)ra],
.
.

oixol6i' ri T(f

u\l/Cf)

Kol to7s r]5vcr/xa(n

'

5-7. 8 init. c. 10, 388, a, 20 sqq. On the nature of homogeneity, cf. Part I, 879, 2. Homogeneous bodies (ofioio/nepri) are defined in general as those composed of one kind of material,
'

Ibid. Ibid.

&\Arj\a irdcrxovcip' rb yap TCf ^vpcfi aXriov rod Spi^eaOai Ka\ 8ia rovTo e| afxcpoTv icnl rh upifffxepou (TWfia. Xey^Tai 5e tS)V
Trphs

vyphv
.

(TToix^lcov

Idiairara ^r]pov ixku

yri,

whether that material be simple and elementary or compound, in the narrower sense as those composed of the latter. Opposed to the homogeneous is the heterogeneous (di/ofJLOiofjLepes), or that which is composed of different held materials mechanically
together, as is the case especially with organic bodies. See, besides the passages referred to above, Meteor, iv. 10, 388, a, 13. c. 12 init. De An. i. 5, 411, a, 16-21, where besides b, 24 sqq cf.
; ,

vypov de vScop [see p. 483, n.

5ih

2, stip.'].

ravra

diravra

ra

upiff/xeva

ivravQa [added because the statement does not apply to aetherial regions] ovk &vev yrjs Kal
(Tca/xara

SSaros.
^
.

Ibid. 382, a, 8 sqq. c. 5 init. rh wptcTfievoy ffStixa oiKeicf} Upcf)

(cf p. 480, n. 2), as distinguished

from that which has its form imposed on it from without, as

dfxoiofjLfp^s

we

have

6fioii5-^s,

which

is

further expanded into rh

518

ARISTOTLE
and composition/ passing to

to describe their qualities

the detailed discussion of living beings with the remark

that homogeneous bodies serve as the matter of hetero-

geneous ones, and that the designs of nature are more

clearly exhibited in the latter
fact,

than in the former.^

In

however, everything which

we

find scattered over

the later writings about the objects of sense-perception,

light, colour, sound, smell, &c.,

belongs to that portion of

physics which

is

treated of in the Meteorology.,

We cannot

therefore here do
o\ov rots
ii.

more than
Part. An.

refer to these suggestions,^

fMopiois ^/toeiSe's,

655, b, 21, where d/xoioaeprj is explained by (rwwvvfia rois 6\ois TO. fiep-n cf. the Jjid. Arist. under the word. According to Philop. Aristotle distinguished in his
9,
;

Be Sensu, c. 8, 418, b, 3 sqq. 439, a, 18 sqq. transparency is a

; :

between elementary homogeneous and organic bodies. In a quotation from this dialogue occur the words {Ar. Fr. 1482,
Eudeinns
davfia, 10, cf p. 482, supra) fxerpia eVrt rSiv (TTOix^icov 7] v6(T0S
.

Twu bjxoiofxcpwv 7} dcrdeveia Tuv opyaviKuiv rh ai(Txos they are perhaps, however, only inserted by the reporter by way of ex. .

property (koiv^ (pixris Koi of many bodies with whose other properties it is inseparably united (ov x^P^^'^'h)That which gives actuality to this property (J} rovrov ii/fpyeia Tov Sia^avovs p 5ia((>aves 17 ej/reAe'xem rod 5ia(pavov5, 418, b, 9, 419, a, 10) and as it were colour to the transparent object is light, whicli again is caused by fire or
Siva/uiis)

common

aether (virh irvphs^ roiovrov oTov rh

&V0} (tS/xo),

and may therefore be

irvphs

planation. Ibid. c. 8-11. Caps. 8 and 9 treat especially of stiffening by heat and cold; of melting by heat and moisture of softening, bending, extending; of breaking, bruising, splitting, &c. caps. 10 and 11 treat of the constituent elements of homogeneous bodies and the properties by which they
; ;

may be known.

For a fuller account of Aristotle's treatment

of the latter subject see Meyer, Arist. TJderhmde, 416 sqq. 477. ' Ibid. c. 12. 5 Aristotle gives the following account of Light, De An. ii. 7,

^ toiovtov rivhs At the same time he controverts (De An. 418, b, 20; Be Se7mi, c. 6, 446, a, 25 sqq ) the view of Empedocles that light is motion passing from heaven to earth, on the ground of the immense distance at which we see it. Light, to Aristotle, is the effect of motion (see 468 sq. sujjra), but is not jjer se a motion, but rather a definite state which is produced in a body as a whole in consequence of a qualitative change {aXKoiuais) such as freezing (De Sensu, c. 6, It is asserted at 446, b, 27 sqq.) the same time that vision is the defined as
irapovffia

iu rep 5ia(pave7.

PHYSICS
as
it

519

will

be

now

necessary to pass at once, in the next

volume, to Aristotle's observations and conclusions as

to Organic Nature.
result of a

motion which passes from an object to the eye through the trans]parent medium (Be An.
ii.

7,
c.

29,

419, a, 9, 13, 12, 435, a, 5

iii.
;

1,

424, b,

Be

Se7isv, 2,

438, b, 3). That, he says, which

presence causes light, by absence darkness, is also that which on the border of transparent things produces Colour. For colour resides only on the
its its

by

surface of bodies, and belongs, therefore, only to those which have definite limits as light is said to be ^v aopicrTq} rep SLa(pave7 (Be Sensu, c. 3, 439, a, 26), so colour is defined (ibid. 439, b, 11) as rh rod diacpavovs iv (rdofxari o)pi(riJ.ev(p irepas. White and black correspond on the surface of bodies to light and darkness (439, b, 16), and from these two primary colours come all the others, not merely by the mechanical confusion of their atomic elements, nor by the shining of
:

points of view in the most exhaustive manner, pp. 86-159, as also Baumkee, Arist. Lehre V. d. Siniiesvermoffevi (1S77 ),ip. 21 sqq. S o u n d is said to be motion caused by the concussion of hard bodies and transmitting itself through the medium of the air. It was to describe this idea of the sound-medium that Theophrastus and other Peripatetics invented the word Sirjx", formed upon the analogy of Sta^aj/rjs, just as in like manner they invented Sioa/xos to describe the medium by which smell is transmitted. Phi LOP. Be An. L, 4 cf. ibid. M, 8, o. 10, o. Those notes are

high which make a forcible impression on the ear in a brief time, i.e. quick notes those on the other hand are deep which take a longer time to produce a weak impression, i.e. slow ones (Be An. ii. 8, 419, b, 4-420, b, 5). Bodies which are fastened into others and carried round by them as the stars are, produce no sound
;

one through the other, but also by a real process of mixture, such as is described at p. 420. If they are mixed in simple numerical proportion, we have pure colours if otherwise, impure. Inclusive of black and white, Aristotle enumerates in all seven primary colours (ibid. 439, b, 18 to the end
of the chapter,
also c. 6, 445, b, 20 sqq.,and c. 4, 442, a, 19 sqq. Cf, Be An. ii. 7 init. ibid. 419, a, 1 sqq. Meteor, iii. 4, 378, b, 32 sqq., i. 5, 342, b, 4). The treatise upon colour starts from somewhat different premisses vide Prantl, who treats Aristotle's doctrine of colour from different
; ; ;

by their motion (Be

291, a, 9 sqq.)

held to be caused by dry materials which are dissolved in moisture, i.e. in

is

Smell

Casio,

ii.

9,

water or
a, 1, b, 4
;

air (e7xuAtos

|7j/j(^t7js,

443,

note that the earlier and

ocr/n^

provisional description of
KttTTi/wSrjs

and

avaBvixiaaiSy

Be

as Sensu,

2, 438, b, 24, is rejected, ibid. c. 5,

443, a, 21).

This

is

how they
(Be
;

become objects
Sensu,
;

to the sense

c. 5,

Be An. ii. 6 cf. Baumker, 28 sq.) In the same way Taste is the effect of
the union of dry or earthy material

442, b, 27-443, b, 16 9, 421, a, 26 sqq., 422, a,

520

ARISTOTLE
the law discovered by the Pythagoreans which declared that the harmony and discord of sounds depended upon certain numerical relations is considered also to apply, not only to colours, but to tastes (xu^oO- T)e Sensu, 4, 442, a, 19 sqq. c. 7, 448, a, 15. Aristotle compares seven principal tastes to the seven primary colours. Fm'ther investigations into the nature of x*^/"**^ ^^ reserves (Be Sensu, c. 4 fin.^ for the (pv(Tio\oyia irepl rwv (pvTciv. Upon the treatise attributed to him ir. x'"f^^^-> ^ee p. 84, n. 1. The sense of Touch has for its object all those general qualities of bodies (Be An. ii. 11, 422, b, 25, 423, b, 26), which are ultimately resolvable into terms of the elementary oppositions referred to on p. 479, supra, and do not, therefore, call for further
special notice here.

with moisture, which, however, in this case is not that of water and air, as in the case of smell, but of water alone. The object of the

again

sense of taste is x^f^^'X^f^^^ is defined as rh yiyvd^ifivov virh Tov elprjfievov ^-qpov [viz. rod
'

Tpocpiimov |rjpoO] irdOos eV to? vypcf,

yevaeus ttjs Kara ^vva^iv rrjs ivipy^iav [i.e. ets aWoLcoTLKhv which causes our sense or faculty of taste actually to feel a sensation, 441, b, 19], TOV Tpo<piixov
^rjpov irdOos

(TTepri<ns {ihid.l. 24).

a mixture of white and black, so all tastes

As

all colours are

(Xiiraphv

Spi/J-h and and 6|u) are a mixture of sweet and bitter if these elements are mingled in a

and

aKj-ivphv,

avffTTjphu, (TTpucpvhv

certain proportion we have pleasant tastes otherwise, unpleasant Be An. ii. ones (Be Sensu, c. 4
;

10,

Baumk. 32

sq.).

In this

way

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