G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990 JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents. SARMIENTO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs. The facts are as follows: In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6 Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7 On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9 After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10 The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12 Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 fororacion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for 14 a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but their motion was denied. 15 Hence, this petition. The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs. The petition is meritorious.

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished: (1) By payment or performance; (2) By the loss of the thing due; (3) By the condonation or remission of the debt; (4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor; (5) By compensation; (6) By novation. (Emphasis ours.) There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it. Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made. Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states: Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs: 1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; 2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their legitimate children and decendants; 3. The widow or widower; 4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction; 5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287. Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.) Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. (Emphasis ours.) It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-ininterest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia

Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990 ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents. RESOLUTION PARAS, J.: The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss as amici curiaeduring the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane. The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows: It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. (pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo) Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)? The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not exist. Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions. Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)

Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimatechild who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation. (940a) Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied). Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. "The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12) "Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196). According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case. Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case. Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find support from other civilists. We quote: In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code

allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo) It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say: The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia defines parientesas "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo) According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. To recapitulate, We quote this: The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12). In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners. WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60941 February 28, 1985 CARMELITA E. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GREGORIO GALANG, and SOLEDAD PANGILINAN,respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: In the defunct Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Carmelita E. Reyes, the petitioner herein, filed Civil Case No. Q- 1 1976 for reconveyance of a parcel of land which was sold for unpaid taxes. The defendants were the following: 1. Quezon City, a chartered municipal corporation; 2. The City Treasurer of Quezon City; 3. Alicia P. Ledesma in whose favor a Certificate of Sale was first executed by the Quezon City Treasurer; 4. P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. in whose favor another Certificate of Sale was issued and in whose name a new transfer certificate of title was issued after that of Carmelita E. Reyes was cancelled; and 5. The spouses Gregorio A. Galang and Soledad Pangilinan who bought half of the land from P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. Reconveyance was sought on the ground that the sale of the land for unpaid taxes was void because of noncompliance with the legal requirements. The defense of Quezon City and its Treasurer, Alicia P. Ledesma and P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. is that all the requirements of the law concerning tax sale of delinquent real property had been complied with; and that of the spouses Gregorio and Soledad Galang is that they were purchasers in good faith, for value and without any notice of infirmity in the title of the purchaser at public auction from whom they derived their title. In its decision the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff as follows: a) The tax delinquency and tax sale proceedings, including the deeds of sale in consequence thereof between defendants Quezon City Treasurer and/or Alicia Ledesma and/or P. Ledesma & Co. Inc., over plaintiff's property registered under TCT No. 17498 of the Quezon City Register of Deeds, are null and void ab initio as being contrary to law and constitutional due process; b) The Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 113569 and 113570 of lung Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of P. Ledesma & Co., Inc., are also null and void as proceeding from acts completely void as afore-declared; c) The Deed of Sale dated April 12, 1967 between defendants P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. and spouses Gregorio Galang and Soledad Pangilinan, is likewise null and void ab initio; d) The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 116986 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of defendants spouses Gregorio Galang and Soledad Pangilinan is also null and void and ordered cancelled; e) Defendants spouses Gregorio Galang and Soledad Pangilinan are ordered to surrender TCT No. 116986 in their name for cancellation by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and accordingly directed to reconvey the land described in said TCT No. 116986 in in favor of the plaintiff, within 30 days after finality of this decision; f) Defendant P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. is directed to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City TCT No. 113570 for cancellation and also to reconvey the land therein described in favor of the plaintiff within 30 days after finality of this decision; g) Defendant P. Ledesma Co Inc. is directed to refund the sum of P 62,560.00 received from defendants spouses Gregorio Galang and Soledad Pangilinan as purchase price under the void deed of sale; h) Defendant Alicia S. Ledesma will be reimbursed the amount of P8,300.00 paid by her in connection with the tax sale with the Quezon City Government refunding to the extent of P6,872.45, the amount retained by it after taxes, penalties and costs from the bid price received by the City, and the balance of P1,427.55 from out of the deposit for taxes, penalties and costs made by plaintiff with

the Court upon filing of the action (G.R. No. 5894504 dated March 26, 1968), and the Quezon City Treasurer and/or the competent officials of the Quezon City Government are directed accordingly to effect this reimbursement of P8,300.00 unto Alicia S. Ledesma; and i) All the counterclaims by the defendants against plaintiff defendants P. Ledesma & Co., consequently are dismissed as also Inc.'s and Alicia S. Ledesma's cross-claim against defendants Quezon City and City Treasurer; no pronouncement as to costs. (Record on Appeal, pp- 105-107.) Defendants Gregorio A. Galang and Soledad Pangilinan appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals. The other defendants did not appeal. The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on April 29, 1982, rendered the following judgment: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one entered dismissing the complaint. (Rollo, p. 58.) A motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 15, 1982. (Id., p. 71.) The instant petition prays "that judgment be rendered declaring the appealed decision and order of the Court of Appeals null and void, as to allow affirmance in toto of the trial court's decision." (Id., p. 39.) The parties agreed on a stipulation of facts the substantive parts of which reads as follows: 2. The plaintiff was the duly registered owner of a parcel of land located at Makopa corner Banawe Street, Quezon City, containing an area of 855 square meters, more or less, which is more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17498 of the General Land Registration Office, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked Annex " A " and made an integral part hereof; 3. The aforesaid parcel of land was declared for action purpose under Tax Declaration No. 1575 of Quezon City, for the assessed value of P 15,400.00, a copy of which is hereto attached. marked Annex " B ", and made an integral part hereof; 4. On October 20, October 27 and November 1, 1964 there was published in the "Daily Mirror" a "NOTICE OF SALE OF DELINQUENT REAL PROPERTY, QUEZON CITY," among which delinquents is plaintiff Carmelita E. Reyes, for the taxes on the property in question; photostat copy of Notice is hereto attached as Annex "C", and the Affidavit of Publication of said Notices, executed by the General Adv. Mgr. of the Daily Mirror, as Annex "D"; 5. On December 4, 1964, the defendant Quezon City and then City Treasurer sold the aforesaid parcel of land of the plaintiff together with all advertised delinquent properties at a public auction sale for being delinquent in the payments of real estate taxes for the years 1956 to 1963, inclusive, in the total amount of P1,413.75; 6. The said parcel of land belonging to plaintiff was sold at public auction sale to the highest bidder thereof for the amount of P 6,300.00, from which was deducted the amount of P1,427.55 for the payment of the taxes, penalties and costs of sale, thereby leaving a balance of P4,872.45 now deposited with the defendant, City Treasurer of Quezon City; 7. A Certificate of Sale dated December 5, 1964, was executed by the City Treasurer of Quezon City, which is attached as Annex " E "; 8. On December 24, 1964, the Certificate of Sale of City Treasurer, Quezon City, to Alicia Ledesma, was inscribed in the Memo of Incumbrance, T.C.T. 17498 of plaintiff; copy of which is attached as Annex "P"; 9. On January 3, 1966, the City Treasurer, Quezon City, executed a Certificate of Sale of the property in question in favor of P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. and duly annotated in T.C.T. and a new title T.C.T. 10467t', Quezon City, was issued by the Register of Deeds on said property in the name of P. Ledesma & Co., Inc.; copy of said T.C.T. 104675 as Annex "G "; 10. On March l4, 1966, the Court of First Instance Branch V, of Quezon City, acting on the 'Petition for I of New Title as a consequence of Consolidation of ownership' filed by P. & Co., Inc. and docketed as G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 7681, an Order, granted said Petition, and ordering the cancellation of T.C.T. 17498, in the name of Carmelita Reyes, and to issue a new title in the of Petitioner P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. (Copy attached as Annex "H"); 11. On October 17, 1966, Court of First Instance, Branch V of Quezon City, acting on the 'PETITION TO CANCEL LEGAL ENCUMBRANCE' filed by P. Ledesma & Co., and docketed as GLRO No.

7681 (Case No. 729). issued an Order granting said Petition and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the annotation in T.C.T. 104675, under Entry 21452, File T-15798 (Copy of said Order is hereto attached as Annex "I"); 12. On January l7, 1967, an entry was made by the Register of Deeds, Quezon City, for the subdivision of said property (T.C.T. No. 104675) into two parcels, and T.C.T. 113570 and T.C.T. 113569 of Quezon City were issued; photostat copy of said two (2) new T.C.T.s are hereto attached as Annex "J" and "J-1"; 13. On April l2, 1967, the defendant P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. sold unto the defendants Gregorio A. Galang and Soledad Pangilinan the one-half () T.C.T. 113569 of the above-mentioned parcels of land, containing an area of about 427.75 square meter which portion is now under the possession of the said defendants Gregorio A. Galang and Soledad Pangilinan under T.C.T. 116986 Quezon City, photostat copy of T.C.T. 116986 is hereto attached as Annex "K". (Rowed on Appeal, pp. 64-67.) On the basis of the foregoing facts plus those elicited during the trial, the court rendered the judgment aforequoted for the following reasons: l. The plaintiff never received any notice of delinquency, or any notice of tax sale, or any land of notice at all that her real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17498 of the Quezon City Register of Deeds was exposed to the risk of tax seizure and/or forfeiture; 2. The procedure conducted by the City Treasurer's Office of Quezon City demonstrate one continuing and mechanical pattern of 'paper' notification upon the plaintiff, without regard to whether or not the notices would actually reach the plaintiff thus notices of sale of delinquent real property, the notices of sold real estate in tax sale proceedings, the notices of the right to redeem property sold under tax sale, and the notice of failure to redeem property sold under tax sale (Exhibits "l-QC", "2-QC", "4-QC", "5-QC", "6-QC", "7-QC", 10-QC") all show that said requisite notices were each and all addressed to plaintiff at No. 142 Vito Cruz, Manila, and this procedure was obstinately pursued even with the actual knowledge that the plaintiff was not receiving any of said notices, since each and all these notices were invariably returned to sender (Exhibits "2-A", "2-B", "6-A", "6-B", "6-C". "10-A" and "10-B"); 3. The determination of the City Treasurer of Quezon City to pursue the futile procedure of notifying plaintiff at No. 142 Vito Cruz, Manila was insisted on, even with the awareness that plaintiff may be reached through the Philippine National Bank, which is recorded in the Quezon City Register of Deeds as mortgagee of plaintiff's property covered as aforesaid by TCT No. 17498 (see Annex "A" addendum to join stipulation of facts); 4. The above pattern of futile notification by the City Treasurer of Quezon City was never changed, even as that office was aware of the inexistence of the address No. 142 Vito Cruz, Manila, as early as November 26, 1965, when the City treasurer's Office found that the numbering of house addresses at Vito Cruz started with the number 500, with no house address below this number (Exhibit "8-QC"); 5. The tax sale on plaintiff's subject registered land on December 4, 1964, was made for only P 8,300.00, which is only a little over one-half of the assessed value of P 15,400.00 of the property at the time of sale (Annexes "B" and "E", addendum to joint stipulation of facts the gross disparity between the tax sale price and the assessed value of the property is a fact known actually by defendant tax sale purchaser and defendants Quezon City Treasurer (tsn, Feb. 17, 1977, pp. 10-14; see also Annex "B" addendum to joint stipulation of facts); 6. The minutes and/or record of the tax sale proceedings shows defendant Alicia Ledesma as the highest bidder (Exhibit "15A-QC ") and accordingly the certificate of sale records her as the purchaser (Annex "E ", addendum to joint stipulation of facts), but then when the final certificate of sale was executed by the City treasurer of Quezon City a year later the named purchaser was not any more highest bidder Alicia Ledesma but rather defendant corporation P. Ledesma & Co., Inc. (Exhibit "9-QC"); the attempt to explain away the interchange of Identities of the tax sale purchaser as a mere clerical error is belied by the voluminous records of the tax sale proceedings wherein Alicia Ledesma is entered and recorded as having participated as bidder and qualified as higher bidder in no less than ten (10) other tax sales from December 4 to December 11, 1964 (Exhibits L, M, N, 0, P, Q, R and S); as a matter of fact defendant Alicia S. Ledesma on the witness stand admitted to having been notified herself by the City Treasurer of Quezon City that she was declared the highest bidder for fifteen different real properties sold on delinquency tax sales during the period December 4 to 11, 1964 (Exhibit "T", in relation to tsn, Dec. 2, 1976, pp. 28-32; see also tsn, Feb. 17, 1977, pp, 27-43, pp. 45-50); 7. Finally, in a little over a year from December 31, 1965, the date of execution of the final deed of sale (Exh. "9-QC"), or on April 12, 1967 a half portion of plaintiff's subject property, without any

improvement having been introduced in the meantime, was sold for P 62,560.00 by defendant tax purchaser P. Ledesma & Co., Inc., unto defendants spouses Gregorio Galang and Soledad Pangilinan (see paragraph 9, answer of spouses Galang and Pangilinan dated May 23, 1968); in other words in this short span of one year real property purchased at the tax sale by the defendant Ledesma was sold at a profit of some 1,500%. 8. There are very revealing admissions by defendant Alicia S. Ledesma on the witness stand; that in another case for nullification of a tax sale of realty (Civil Case No. 10496, Benavides v. Quezon City Treasurer, et al.) she was again a defendant and she invoked the same defense that clerical error caused the execution of the sale in her favor instead of P. Ledesma & Co., Inc., the highest bidder per bidding records, and the tax sale was annulled as fraudulent; Gaudencio Maliwat, who was one of her witnesses in the instant case was made one of the party-defendants in said Civil Case No. 10496 (tsn, Dec. 2, 1976, pp. 36-42); these over a dozen coincidence of alleged clerical errors on a fact as material as the Identity of the highest bidder, repeated in all the tax sales to Alicia Ledesma involving 15 separate properties (Exhibit "T" in relation to tsn, Dec. 2, 1976, pp. 28-32; Feb. 17, 1977, pp. 27- 43, 45-50, see also Exhibits "L" to "S", inclusive), certainly do not establish 15 cases of honest mistakes; coupled these 15 'mistakes' in naming Alicia Ledesma as the highest bidder and tax purchaser and the number in which the notices were sent out to the plaintiff and the finding of fraud in the tax delinquency and sale proceedings comes easy; 9. The market value of plaintiff's property at the time of the tax sale in 1964 is fixed at P200.00 per square meter or a total market value of P171,000.00 for the entire area of 855.5 square meters; this market value placed on the property by plaintiff is unrebutted (tsn, June 20, 1974, pp. 16-17);-the gross disparity, therefore, between the tax sale price of P8,300.00 at which the property was auctioned off and the established market value of P171,100.00 is an extremely significant fact to be considered in the evaluation of the issue of regularity of the tax delinquency and sale proceedings. (Id., pp. 90-95.) Upon the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial court's decision and dismissing the complaint, rationalized thus: The question then that poses itself is was there no compliance with the requirements of the aforequoted provisions of the law? It is not denied that TCT 17498 which covers the property in question showed the address of the owner-plaintiff Carmelita E. Reyes as No. 142 Vito Cruz, Manila. The Tax Declaration No. 1575 of the property also showed the address of the owner as No. 142 Vito Cruz, Manila. As late as 1966, plaintiff's official address in the City Treasurer's Office was still 142 Vito Cruz, Manila. Then too, the property in question is located in Macopa corner Banawe, Quezon City with no number indicated. The evidence on record shows that the following steps were taken by the City Treasurer's Office before it conducted the questioned auction sale(a) A Delinquency Notice dated October 1, 1963 for the delinquent taxes and penalties of P 1,413.75 (1956-1963) on the property in question was sent to plaintiff at 142 Vito Cruz, Manila by ordinary mail (Exh. P-Q.C.). (b) A second notice dated August 7, 1964 informing plaintiff of the intended sale if delinquent taxes were not paid was sent to her at 142 Vito Cruz, Manila by Special Delivery (Exh. 2-Q.C. and 2-A-Q.C.). This letter was returned unclaimed. (c) A Notice dated November 11, 1964 stating that the real property in question has been advertised for sale in the Daily Mirror on October 20, 27 and November 3, 1964 was sent to plaintiff at 142 Vito Cruz, Manila Exh. 4-Q.C.). (d) Publication once a week for three consecutive weeks in tile Daily Mirror of the delinquent property stating the pertinent particulars was made. (Exhs. 3-Q.C. and 3A-Q.C.). (e) A Notice of Sale of Public Auction of Delinquent Property was posted at the main entrance of the Old City Hall where the sale was subsequently held and in all public conspicuous places in the district where the property is located. Posting was made on Macopa Street itself on October 21, 1964 and at the Mega Super Store (Exhs- 5Q.C., 5-A-Q.C., 5-B-Q.C.). (f) A form letter was sent to banks and lending institutions in Manila and suburbs all dated October 8, 1964 informing them of the impending sale (Exh. 22-Q.C.).

The evidence on record further shows that the following were the steps taken by the City Treasurer's Office after the auction sale(a) A Notice of Sold Real Estate dated December 15, 1964 was sent to plaintiff at 142 Vito Cruz, Manila stating that on December 4, 1964 the subject property was sold for P 8,300.00 and that the owner had one year within which to redeem. (Exhs. 6-Q.C. & 6-A-Q.C.). (b) A Notice dated October 20, 1965 was sent to plaintiff at 142 Vito Cruz, Manila by ordinary mail, reminding her that the right to redeem would expire on December 4, 1965 (Exh. 7 Q.C.). (c) A Notice was sent to banks and lending institutions in Manila and suburbs all dated July 14, 1965 about the properties sold at public auction on December 4, 1964 so that if mortgaged with them steps could be taken to redeem the property (Exh. 2Q.C.). It would appear therefore, that defendants Quezon City and City Treasurer's Office had done more than what the law requires of them in the sale of delinquent real property. For what the law required is only posting and publication. Personal notice to the delinquent taxpayer is not required. In the case at bar, however, the defendants Quezon City and City Treasurer's Office had even made earnest efforts to personally notify the plaintiff. If said letter notices did not reach the plaintiff, it is because of plaintiff's fault in not notifying City Treasurer's Office of her change of address. With the foregoing conclusion thus reached, it follows that the sale in favor of defendants-appellants, spouses Gregorio Galang and Soledad Pangilinan is likewise valid. (Rollo, pp. 55-58.) We do not fully share the simplistic perception of the Court of Appeals that the question posed is "was there no compliance with the requirements of the ... provisions of the law?" To be sure, if the answer to the question is that there was compliance as the Court of Appeals said, then it follows that the sale of one-half of the land to the spouses Gregorio and Soledad Galang is likewise valid. But even if there was no compliance it does not follow that the Galang spouses have no valid title. For, as they have asserted, they are purchasers in good faith and for value in the amount of P62,560.00 for one-half of the land which had no improvements whatsoever at the time they bought it. Even if We assume that the tax sale of the petitioner's property was attended with irregularities, an assumption which We are inclined to elevate to the status of a fact in the light of the reasons given by the trial court which We find to be more convincing, still the record is bereft of any evidence to show that the Galang spouses were a party to or had knowledge of the irregularities. Accordingly, pursuant to the doctrines laid down by this Court, the title of the Galang spouses cannot be assailed. (William H. Anderson & Co. vs. Garcia, 64 Phil. 506 [1937]; Reyes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil. 656 [1939]; PHHC vs. Mencias, L-24114, Aug. 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031; Pascua vs. Capuyoc, L-23197, May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA 78; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, March 27,1981,103 SCRA 467.) The Court of Appeals erred by reversing the appealed decision and entering one dismissing the complaint. With this kind of judgment the petitioner is left with nothing even as against those defendants who did not appeal and as to whom the judgment of the trial court had long been executory. In fact, the petitioner has projected the scenario in the prayer of her memorandum thus: WHEREFORE, upon an the foregoing, petitioner reiterates her main prayer in the Petition that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed and another one affirming the lower court be entered.In the event the Court finds no cogent basis for annulling the spouses' title, she at least prays that, the tax sale itself being voided or not (a matter no longer relevant to the Ledesma people, because of their non-appeal she be allowed to get back her interest in the portion of her property (still held by Ledesma & Co.) which has not yet passed into the hands of third persons who are innocent purchasers for value. Rollo, P. 142, emphasis supplied.) WHEREFORE, the petition is denied insofar as it seeks to nullify the title of the spouses Gregorio and Soledad Galang; and it is granted by preserving those portions of the trial court's judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the defendants who did not appeal therefrom. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39537 March 19, 1985 IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA and GENOVEVA RAMERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO DELGADO, PAULA DELGADO and MAXIMINA DELGADO, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to review the of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five dated October 7, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas Branch I, dated December 26, 1969 in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for reconveyance. On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Ramero or Irene Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and Paula Delgado over four parcels of land located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located in Pagbilao, Quezon, and another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff Maximina Delgado over three parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other falsifications succeed in registering in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado, sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and the funeral expenses of Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P 7,000.00 from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina Delgado they conveyed to her the three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed from plaintiffs common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel of land (pp. 1-14, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.). On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed an answer to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt of P 23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of Francisco Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.). On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim denying that the defendant Irene Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado, and hence has no right to claim from the estate of Francisco's mother, Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the defendant Irene Delgado no longer formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had previously disposed of them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.). On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.

On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to the counterclaim posed by defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of the defendant, in so far as it would have the effect of being an indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed (pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.). On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the counterclaim over the objections of the defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.). After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969 dismissing the action for reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the lawful owner of the eight parcels of land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with respect to their complaint and the defendants with respect to their counterclaim. The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision on October 7, 1974, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed. The deed of self-adjudication executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared null and void and set aside. The transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are hereby cancelled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are reinstated in the name of Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration executed by Irene Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas, with Tax Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs (pp. 58-59, rec.). The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene Delgado was the spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action (pp. 52-53, rec.). The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs; because in so doing it will be in effect a recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Francisco Delgado to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors of the deceased. As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that it was without merit, because if it were true, the plaintiffs could have demanded a receipt for such a big amount. The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco Delgado's mother, and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and funeral of Francisco Delgado which was advanced by the plaintiffs, need not be ruled upon because of the findings that Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 5758, rec.). On December 2, 1974, defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (pp. 2237, rec.). On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment on the petition for review filed by the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.). On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution by the First Division of the Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.). On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.). On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners (pp. 130134, rec.). On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents' comment (pp. 118-125, rec.). On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration (p. 142, rec.). In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the following arguments: 1. There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable Court must return to and even enhance the doctrine in Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in the reasoning of the currently prevailing doctrine, so that as arguendo and pro hac vice that Irene was not duly recognized or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is nevertheless entitled to successional rights

as sole heir of the late Francisco Delgado, considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado is undisputed and beyond question (p. 12, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). 2. Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under the Civil Code recognition of an 'other illegitimate' is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of rights, Irene Delgado was legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado, specially by his consent or advice to her marriage with Moises Villanueva contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the Court of Appeals (P. 39, Petitioner's Brief, p. 164, rec.). The petition is without merit. The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Clemea vs. Clemea, 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1969]; Paulino vs. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]). There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in the case of Zuzuarregui vs. Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein petitioners in their first assignment of errors. It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the recognition of illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly required to be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit from his or her alleged parent (p. 13, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also raised the argument that under Article 287 of the New Civil Code which reads: "Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this, code." The term "other illegitimate children" refers not only to those who are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous but also includes natural children who were not acknowledged or recognized (p. 18, Petitioner's Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other words, unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share of a natural child but the share of a spurious child so long as his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate children need only to prove his filiation to inherit and such does not place him in a more advantageous position than natural children, as they are placed in the same situation. WE do not find these arguments persuasive. Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children, declared in Clemea vs. Clemea, supra, that: The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. The motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition of natural children were stated by this Court in Serrano vs. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows: ... the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances where certain illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the large estates left by deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were natural children of such persons in order to get part of the property, and furthermore, they considered that it is nothing but just and right that alleged parents should have a personal opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons and others equally as well founded that Article 137 was enacted (p. 724). There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fag within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes vs. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Candles vs. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda vs. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1 [1905]).

As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was no sufficient legal recognition of petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado. It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1 "). Another certified copy of another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child (Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument. (Pareja vs. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167[1954]). Irene's certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition (Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra;People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Vudaurrazaga vs. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952]; Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of Macadangdang vs. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. Irene's secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo vs. De Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father. The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado It cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in the case of Lim vs. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein the Court said. According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, Public documents 'are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law.' Thus, 'there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.' "The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class. The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition... The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles vs. GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation. What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of birth, will statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemea vs. Clemea, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the. recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action shag be brought within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had

not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]). WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes alias Irene Delgado is not an heir of the late Francisco Delgado. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.

G.R. No. L-19281

June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitionerappellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees. Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees. BENGZON, C.J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon. On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate. On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon. On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2. After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... . From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child? The First Issue: It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable to this Court. Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled." The Second Issue: Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that: If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... . As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides: If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.

Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2. Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child." Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996. Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court. This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows: One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.) The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas intestate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate. A. Children. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles: ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants ... . ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate ... . ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901). In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996. B. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist. On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor). Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain and this we are not called upon to discuss but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

G.R. No. L-40003 October 28, 1986 SHIRLEY YAP, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Administratrix of the estate of MANING YAP, JAIME YAP, and TALINA BIANONG VDA. DE YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP, JASMIN YAP, and SAMUEL YAP,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the earlier decision of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Special Proceeding No. 1334 (R-61), declaring the petitioners as the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap entitled to inherit his estate and dismissing the opposition filed by the private respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision on appeal reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and, after a complete and correct inventory is returned by the administratrix, the entire estate of the deceased Maning Yap shall be divided into two equal parts, one-half (1/2) corresponding to the petitioner Talina Bianong and her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the other half corresponding to the oppositors Nancy J. Yap and her children Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, without pronouncement as to costs. Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on December 11, 1948. Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the Islam religion professed by both of them. Immediately, after the marriage, the couple lived in the house of the parents of Maning Yap at the poblacion of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Out of the marriage, four children were born; two of them died in infancy during the Japanese occupation, while the two others are petitioners Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap. While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on December 11, 1948 in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan Sarenas of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning Yap was not a married man. They had four children, namely respondents Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. On February 21, 1964, Maning Yap died in Piagapo, Lanao del Sur, in the crash of an airplane of the Philippine Air Lines. At the time of his death he, therefore, had two families living separately about 80 kilometers apart. On March 3, 1964, Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap filed Special Proceeding No. 1334 (Intestate Estate of Maning Yap) before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, seeking the issuance of letters of administration for the estate of Maning Yap. Among other things, the petition alleged that Maning Yap left personal and real properties all located at Malabang, Lanao del Sur, with an approximate value of P100,000.00. The petition was opposed by Nancy J. Yap and her minor children on the ground that she is the legitimate widow of Maning Yap and that Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, all minors, are their legitimate children. Talina Bianong was initially appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap. However, after a formal hearing and on recommendation of Talina, the lower court appointed Shirley Yap as regular administratrix of the intestate estate of Maning Yap. Various claims filed by the creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap were duly approved by the court and paid by the administratrix. Since there still existed a residue of the intestate estate consisting of real and personal properties and collectible debts after payments to creditors, the court set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of the late Maning Yap and his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate. After trial, the lower court rendered decision declaring Talina Bianong and her children as the legal heirs of Maning Yap. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring Talina Bianong, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap and entitled to inherit or succeed to his intestate with Talina Bianong, as his surviving spouse, and Shirleyt Yap and Jaime Yap, as his surviving legitimate children; (b) Adjudicating to Talina Bianong one-third (1/3) of the whole intestate estate of the late Maning Yap, as her share, pursuant to Art. 996 of the New Civil Code; to Shirley Yap, the other one-third

(1/3) as her share and to Jaime Yap the remaining one-third (1/3), also as his share, pursuant to Art. 980 in conjunction with Art. 996 of the new Civil Code. The opposition and claim of the opposition is hereby dismissed without costs. Upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her children, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals ruled that the estate of Maning Yap should be equally divided into two equal parts: onehalf (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her children and the other half (1/2) to Nancy Yap and her children. The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and Lao v. Dee Tim (45 Phil. 739). The facts in the cited case are similar to the case at bar in that Yap Siong in his lifetime contracted two marriages; first to Dee Tim on September 14, 1893 in China with whom he had three children and second to Maria Lao on June 24, 1903 with whom he had one child. Moreover, Maria Lao entered into the marriage believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man. Yap Siong died on September 1922 leaving properties which were claimed by the two families. In resolving the issue on how the properties of Yap Siong should be divided, this Court applied the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4), to wit: xxx xxx xxx ... [W]here two wome innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positive proved. (Articles 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553). A woman who is deceied by a man who respresents himself as single and who marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. ... The petitioners now contend that Maning Yap died in 1964 when the New Civil Code had already super ed the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that pursuant to Article 2263 of the New Civil Code, the distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in accordance with, the new codal provisions and not the Leyes Partidas, which is an old law no longer applicable, We agree. Article 2263, a transitional provision in the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 states: Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a) The Report of the Code Commission explains the rule, to wit: The decisive fact which gives origin to the right of the heirs, devisees and legatees is the death of the decedent. This is the basis of the foregoing rule. No heir, devisee or legatee has any vested right until the moment of such death (Civil Code, Padilla, Volume VII, 1975, p. 712). We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and by the Rules of Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 492; Canales v. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 9; and Morales, et al. v. Yaez, 98 Phil. 677), while the rights to the inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the New Civil Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68). There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force when the two marriages were celebrated to wit:

SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless; (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court. Bearing this in mind, how must the estate of Maning Yap be distributed? The records show that the real and personal properties under administration in the intestate estate proceedings of Maning Yap were acquired by Talina Bianong and the deceased Maning Yap during their marriage. Hence, these properties, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary are considered conjugal properties of Talina Bianong and Maning Yap (Article 142, New Civil Code). Considering that there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains during the lifetime of Maning Yap, such liquidation must be carried out in the intestate proceedings of Maning Yap, the deceased spouse as expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court (Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177). Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides: By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. and Article 185 thereof states: The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements. Pursuant to these provisions, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap approved by the lower court have been paid by the administratrix should be equally divided between Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The one-half share of Maning Yap would then comprise his intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs. (See also Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216) Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap's legal heirs are Talina Bianong, her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by Maning Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina Bianong, the first wife had not lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband. She is entitled to share in Maning Yap's estate upon his death (Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New Civil Code; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However, Nancy Yap's children by Maning Yap have the status of natural children by legal fiction and are considered compulsory heirs of the late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and 887, New Civil Code). Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage (Articles 142 and 185 New Civil Code), the other half being the share of Talina Bianong, should be distributed as follows: a. To the legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap-one-half (1/2) of the resulting net estate to be divided equally between them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil Code; b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianong one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate taken from the free portion or disposable half of the estate pursuant to Article 999 in relation. to Article 897 of the New Civil Code; and c. To the natural children by legal fiction --Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yapthe remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate to be shared equally between them pursuant to the first and third paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the instant PETITION is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The widow, Talina Bianong shall receive one half (1/2) of the whole intestate estate as her share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains. The other half, which is the net estate of the late Maning Yap, is distributed and adjudicated as stated above. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987 INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents. GANCAYCO, J.: In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4. This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975. These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales. Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition. In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow? Our answer to the first question is in the negative. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are: Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate

heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that: Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287; Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another. In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit: We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-inlaw, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied). By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code. The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.) Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales. On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-42257 June 14, 1976 ILDEFONSO LACHENAL, ELIAS LACHENAL, IRENEA L. SANTOS, FLORA L. SANCHEZ and NATIVIDAD D. LACHENAL, petitioners, vs. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I, and FLAVIANA L. LEONIO, respondents. AQUINO, J.: Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate estate is pending settlement in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (Special Proceeding No. 5836). His son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the properties included in the inventory of his estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII. On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding a motion to require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal-Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII and to return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair. Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the executor's motion. She countered with a motion to exclude the fishing boat from the decedent's estate. She claimed that she is the owner of the boat because she purchased it from her father in 1967. The executor opposed the motion for exclusion. The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 designated a commissioner to receive the evidence of the parties relative to the ownership of the motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had already finished the presentation of her evidence before the commissioner. The executor did not present his countervailing evidence. Instead, on July 8, 1975 he and the testator's other children named Flora, Elias and Irenea, and the children of a deceased child filed in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action against the Leonio spouses and the other three children of the testator named Crispula, Modesto and Esperanza, for the recovery of the motorboat Lachenal VII, allegedly valued at P150,000, together with back rentals and damages (Civil Case No. 3597). It was alleged in the complaint that Victorio Lachenal in 1964 leased the said motorboat to his son-in-law, Lope L. Leonio, for a monthly rental of P2,000 and that after Victorio's death, the executor of his estate demanded from Leonio the return of the boat and the payment of the back rentals. On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed in the probate court their own motion to exclude the said motorboat from the decedent's estate on the ground that the, probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to its ownership because that matter has to be resolved by the Caloocan court where Civil Case No. 3597 is pending. The probate court denied that motion. It held that it has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership because the heirs had agreed to present their evidence on that point before a commissioner. It invoked the rule that generally "questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, except when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased in which event it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question as to title to property and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. The reason is that questions of collation or of advancement are generally inevitably involved therein which are proper matters to be passed upon in the due course of administration. And it has also been held that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced." (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, page 473, citing Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Vda. de Manalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661; Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Dinglasan vs. Ang Chia, 88 Phil. 476; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). On January 5, 1976 the executor and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed these special civil actions of prohibition and certiorari against the probate court. The issue is whether the probate court should be allowed to continue the hearing on the ownership of the fishing boat or whether that question should be left to the determination of the Caloocan court where the subsequent separate action (now in the pre-trial stage) for the recovery of the motorboat is pending. We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L Leonio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. "The administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceeding" (De la Cruz vs. Camon, 63 O.G. 8704, 16 SCRA 886; De Paula vs. Escay, infra).

This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate action (Ongsingco vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 330, 334; Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals ,117 Phil. 835; Magallanes vs. Kayanan, L-31048, January 20, 1976; Recto vs. Dela Rosa, L42799, March 16, 1976). Where a party in a probate proceeding prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the court may provisionally pass upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action (Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Guinguing vs. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147; Junquera vs. Borromeo, L-18498, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 656; Borromeo vs. Canonoy, L-25010, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 667). The Court of First Instance is a court of general original jurisdiction invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases: civil cases, criminal cases, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and insolvency cases (Sec. 39, Judiciary Law; De Paula vs. Escay, 97 Phil. 617, 619; Manalo vs. Mariano, L-33850, January 22, 1976). Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a question of over the subject matter. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra, page 232; Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 rejurisdiction over the issue). Probate jurisdiction includes all matters relating to the settlement of estates and the probate of wills of persons (Sec. 599, Act 190), particularly the administration of the decedent's estate, the payment of his debts, questions as to collation or advancements to the heirs, the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and the partition and distribution of the estate (De La Cruz vs. Camon, supra). For the recovery or protection or the property rights of the decedent. an executor or administrator may bring or defend in the right of the decedent, actions for causes which survive. Actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the decedent's estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or administrator (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). In the instant case, the executor, by virtue of section 2 of Rule 87, filed a separate action in the Caloocan court for the recovery of the fishing boat and back rentals from the Leonio spouses. In the De la Cruz case, supra, it was held that rentals allegedly due to the decedent's estate may not be collected by the administrator by filing a motion in the testate proceeding. The said rentals do not constitute property in the administrator's hands and are not thus within the effective control of the probate court. The proper procedure in collecting such rentals is to file an independent action in the Court of First Instance so that the right of the estate thereto may be threshed out in a full-dress trial on the merits. The ruling in the De la Cruz case applies with stronger force to this case because here the executor seeks to recover not only the rentals but also the leased property itself, as to which the wife of the lessee had asserted adverse title. Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to property, which arises between the decedent's estate and other persons, should be adjucated in a separate action because such a question requires the presentation of appropriate pleadings (complaint, motion to dismiss, answer, counterclaim and reply). A resort to the modes of discovery may be necessary so that the issues may be clearly defined and the trial may be expedited. Those matters can be effectively accomplished in an ordinary action rather than in the testamentary or intestate proceeding (Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462). The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and counterclaims for money or property. Ultimately, execution has to be issued. The execution of a judgment is usually made by the Court of First Instance in an ordinary action and not in a special proceeding (See Magallanes vs. Kayanan, supra). In the instant case, in as much as the controversy over the fishing boat concerns members of the same family, the Caloocan court should endeavor before trial to persuade the litigants to agree upon some compromise (Arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code; Sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Rules of Court). WHEREFORE, the probate court's orders of September 17 and October 20, 1975, asserting its jurisdiction to decide the title to the fishing boat, Lachenal VII, are set aside. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26170

January 27, 1969

THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, plaintiff, vs. SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO, C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA and LUISA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, defendants. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Originally elevated to the Court of Appeals, this case was certified to this Supreme Court as one involving only questions of law. Proceedings were initiated on 10 June 1958, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, by the Government Service Insurance System (a non-stock corporation created by Commonwealth Act 186) by a complaint in interpleader (docketed as Civil Case No. 5037) for the determination of who, among the several defendants, is entitled to the retirement benefits, in the amount of P8,339.36, that fell due to a deceased member of the System, one Simeon Custodio. Defendant-cross-claimant-appellee Susana Custodio, a surviving sister of the decedent and the aunt of the other defendants, claims to be the sole beneficiary thereof; but her nephews and nieces contest her recognition as such and claim to be entitled to share in the proceeds by right of representation of their deceased fathers, who are three (3) brothers of the late Simeon. These nephews and nieces (defendants-cross-claimantsappellees in this case) are the following: Macario, C., Macario A., Luisa, David, Romualdo, Julian, Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed "Custodio". After responsive pleadings were filed, and the issues joined, a pre-trial was held but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. They, however, submitted a stipulation of facts, as follows: 1. That the late SIMEON CUSTODIO, who during his lifetime was a member of the Retirement Insurance Fund administered by plaintiff GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, died intestate at Tanay, Rizal, on February 16, 1957; 2. That said SIMEON CUSTODIO was survived by his only sister, SUSANA CUSTODIO and his nephews and nieces, namely ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO, C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and DAVID, all surnamed CUSTODIO; 3. That shortly after the death of SIMEON CUSTODIO, there was found among his personal belongings an undated and unsigned application form for Retirement accomplished by said SIMEON CUSTODIO wherein his sister, SUSANA CUSTODIO was named the beneficiary, although said application form was never submitted to the Government Service Insurance System. Photostat copy of said application for retirement is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this Stipulation of Facts;
1aw phil.t

4. That on July 7, 1957, at the residence of Leon K. Tongohan, son-in-law of Susana Custodio at Tanay, Rizal, SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, ADRIANO, and CELESTINA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, and JULIA TONGOHAN executed a document entitled "Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs' which provides, among other things that "(c) For any amount due the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, holder of GSIS policy No. 73557, our Aunt Susana Custodio as the decedent's only living sister, is hereby recognized by the aforementioned heirs as the sole and only beneficiary of the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, and giving unto our Aunt Susana Custodio the right to file, sign and receive whatever retirement pay under Republic Act 660, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 728 and 1123, and other amendments thereto". Copy of said Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs, which consist of four (4) pages, without, page 5, is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part of this Stipulation of Facts; 5. That on July 8, 1957 ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MOISES, MACARIO A., ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and MACARIO, C. all surnamed CUSTODIO, wrote a letter to the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System stating, among other things that they "inadvertently signed on July 7, 1957, without properly having understood, a document whereby it was made to appear therein that the aforementioned persons are waiving their claim on the benefits legally accruing to the aforementioned deceased". A duplicate copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part of this Stipulation." It will thus be noted from the stipulation of facts and its annexes that the deceased retiree, Simeon Custodio had one (1) sister, appellee Susana Custodio and three (3) brothers, namely, Vicente, Crispin and Jacinto, who had predeceased him; that the appellants are the children of these brothers; that two (2) among these children are both named "Macario" (Macario A. and Macario C.; that the children, Macario C., Luisa, and David Custodio did not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement; and that Macario C. is the only child of Crispin, while Luisa and David are two (2) of the six (6) children of Jacinto. From her opposition to the motion for reconsideration dated 20 April 1960, appellee Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the division of the estate where Macario C. Luisa and David would share per stirpes (Record on Appeal, pages 55-56).

In submitting their Stipulation of Facts for approval, the parties prayed the trial court "to resolve the questions of law raised in said stipulation of facts". On 2 January 1960, the trial court approved the Stipulation of Facts and required the interpleading defendants to submit their memoranda "within fifteen (15) days on a question of law", with the understanding that the case shall be considered submitted for decision on said issue after the filing of the memoranda or upon expiration of the period herein required". Without submitting other evidence, the defendants-claimants filed their respective memoranda, and, on 10 March 1960, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of appellee Susana Custodio, holding that her designation as beneficiary in the unsigned application form for retirement benefits, which was not filed with the Government Service Insurance System prior to the death of the employee, as required by regulations, was invalid; but that, nonetheless, she is entitled to the retirement benefit to the exclusion of the appellants nephews and nieces because the latter had recognized her as sole beneficiary in the deed of extrajudicial settlement executed on 7 July 1957, which is to be presumed regular in the absence of evidence of fraud or mistake attending its execution. Appellants nephews and nieces moved to reconsider, and on denial, they appealed to the Court of Appeals. Finding no question of fact involved in the case, but only questions of law, said appellate court certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. Appellants' first assignment of error is well-taken; that the intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio who did not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement, not be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio, as the only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence the case having been submitted for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that these non-signatory heirs had agreed, or accepted other benefits under the deed of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio did not oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and, actually, even prayed that said motion be granted (Record on Appeal, page 56), although the court denied it just the same. These three (3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with Article 1005 of the Civil Code. As Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario A., who signed the agreement) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits by representation the one-fourth () share pertaining to his father, while Luisa and David Custodio being two (2) of six (6) children of Jacinto, are each entitled to a sixth of one-fourth (1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass. The other assigned errors are: II. The trial court erred in not taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the preparation and signing of the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs', Annex "B" of the Stipulation of Facts, as circumstantial evidence of the fraud by means of which the signatures of appellants Romualdo, Julian, Macario A., Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed Custodio were secured, and in not holding that, consequently, said Annex "B" is null and void. III. The trial court erred in not holding that the appellants Romualdo, Julian, Macario A., Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed Custodio are also entitled to share as intestate heirs in the proceeds due Simeon Custodio from the Government Service Insurance System. Under these alleged errors, appellants contend that fraud or mistake rendered null and void the deed of extrajudicial settlement, such vice of consent being shown by the pretended badges of fraud, as follows: the fact that David Custodio was not made a party to the extrajudicial settlement nor mentioned in its recitals; the failure to secure the signatures not only of David but also of Luisa and Macario C. Custodio; the repudiation by the appellants of the extrajudicial settlement that they had signed just one day after its execution; the fact that Leon Tongohan, the son-in-law of Susana Custodia apparently had some intervention in the execution of the deed; and the adjudication in favor of Susana Custodio of an alleged unconscionable bulk of the estate. The Court of Appeals, in its resolution certifying the case to this Court, did not consider these assigned errors as ones properly of fact within its appellate jurisdiction on the following grounds: the covenanting parties, in asking for the approval of the trial court of their stipulation of facts, had prayed that the questions of law arising from the facts stipulated be resolved by the court; the parties did not submit any evidence; and fraud was not specifically alleged in the pleadings. We affirm the action taken by the Court of Appeals in certifying the appeal to us. Even if the five (5) circumstances stated by the appellant be held to be indicative of fraud or mistake, and infirming the deed of extrajudicial settlement, the stark fact is that the existence of fraud or mistake was not stipulated (Miranda vs. Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil. 526). Appellants' raising the issue of fraud or mistake without having specifically stipulated or pleaded the same, constitutes and unfair surprise upon their adversary, besides being in violation of the rule that fraud be specifically pleaded (Rule 9, Section 9, Rules of Court). Therefore, this plea of fraud or error is not allowable, being deemed waived by the lack of proper averment. At any rate, the circumstances now stressed by the heirs who have actually signed the deed of partition, and who have been allocated properties therein, fall short of evidencing fraud or mistake. The failure to secure the signatures of Luisa, David, and Macario Custodio could not have escaped their co-heirs, now appellants, and it is

unfair to lay blame therefor on Susana Custodio. The intervention of Leon Tongohan, her son-in-law, is without particular significance, since none of the signers was illiterate, nor was the deed notarized by him. As to the appellants' having repudiated their signatures, the same was a self-serving act, more indicative of a belated intention to squirm out of a disadvantageous transaction, after they entered it with open eyes, which is no ground for setting the same aside (Noble vs. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1). Certainly, it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument (cf. Mendezona vs. Phil. Sugar Estates, 41 Phil. 493; Bank of the Phil. Is. vs. Fidelity Surety Co., 51 Phil. 57). FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with the modification that Macario C. Custodio is declared entitled to a share of one-fourth (1/4), and Luisa Custodio and David Custodio to a share of one-twenty-fourth (1/24) each, of the retirement benefits. No costs.

G.R. No. L-22402

June 30, 1969

CLEMENTE ALVIAR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAREO ALVIAR, ET AL., defendants-appellants. CONCEPCION, C.J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, originally taken to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified by the latter to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law are involved therein, the facts having been stipulated by the parties. Clemente Alviar, the original plaintiff herein, and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime after the latter's death on January 30, 1901, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5) children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. On September 6, 1951, Belen Alviar died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half brothers and sisters, said Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor Alviar. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated in the Barrio of Sukol, Calamba, Laguna, with an area, respectively, of 17,199 and 6,422 square meters, more or less, otherwise known as lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan Psu-3720, and more particularly described in TCT No. 3033 of the Province of Laguna, and a residential lot in Pasay City, of about 237 square meters, otherwise known as Lot No. 223-D of subdivision plan Psd-18972, and more particularly described in TCT No. 1578 of the Province of Rizal. On June 28, 1955, these six (6) brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Calamba, Laguna, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the residential lot in Pasay City. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares. Moreover, Clemente Alviar secured TCT No. 15307 and 15308 to said Lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan Psu-3720 in Calamba, Laguna. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn, partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in said residential land. Over five (5) years later, or on September 4, 1962, Clemente Alviar commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters, Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to annul the deed of extrajudicial partition above referred to and the aforementioned TCT Nos. 8495 and 8496, covering the residential lot in Pasay City, as well as to recover the possession thereof and the title thereto, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiff's lack of education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the three (3) lots left by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted him as plaintiff in this case.
1aw phil.nt

The defendants having filled an answer denying specifically the allegations of the complaint regarding the irregularities allegedly attending the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition, both parties later filed a stipulation of facts on the relationship between them, the civil status of Belen Alviar, the properties constituting her estate, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition and the steps taken to carry out its provisions, and submitted the case for the determination of only one question, namely: "who are the parties entitled to participate in the inheritance of Belen Alviar, and in what proportion?" Plaintiffs maintained that since Clemente Alviar was a full brother of Belen Alviar, whereas the main defendants herein are merely her half brothers and sisters, Clemente is a relative of Belen nearer in degree than said defendants, who are more distant to her, so that they (defendants) are excluded by Clemente, and he is entitled to succeed to the entire estate of Belen. The trial court in effect overruled this pretense and rendered a decision holding that both parties "are entitled to inherit from Belen Alviar, ... plaintiffs to receive two-seventh (2/7)" of the residential lot in Pasay City, and "each of the defendants" Cesareo Fabiana, Luisa, Castor and Zenaida Alviar "one-seventh (1/7) thereof, with no pronouncement as to costs." The defendants moved for a reconsideration of this decision, upon the ground that the same should have ordered the redistribution, not only of the lot in Pasay City, but, also, of the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. This motion having been denied, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, as above pointed out, subsequently certified the case to the Supreme Court. The main issue raised by the parties in this case is whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by second marriage, and he excluded them in the succession to her estate. The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." 1 In relation to Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is,

therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004 and 1006 of our Civil Code, reading: ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the application of said Art. 1006. More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason why the same should be disturbed. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered absolving the defendants-appellants from the complaint, and dismissing the same, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978 TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees. AQUINO, J.: Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto." The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.) From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17). On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613). Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches. In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate? To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are: Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro. These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court). Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus. Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ... Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief). The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child". That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.

The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6). Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991). Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128). By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29). WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44077 September 30, 1978 ELIODORA C. VDA. DE CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE ARMY, respondent. GUERRERO, J.: This is a petition for mandamus filed to compel the response lent Commanding General of the Philippine Army to pay petitioner the full death compensation benefits awarded to her and her children in the decision dated October 5, 1971 by Acting Referee Claro Q. Riego de Dios of the Workmen's Compensation Unit Labor Regional Office No. 4, Manila, in WC Case No. R04-13114, entitled Eliodora C. Vda. de Corpuz, et al., vs. Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Army)". The facts of the case are simple and uncontroverted. Fro the service-connected death of T/Sgt. Cornelio Corpuz, the wife. petitioner herein. and her children were. awarded the amount of P6,000.00 plus burial expenses in the amount of P200.00. This ,award became final and executory and the Solicitor General indorsed the same to respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army for payment. However, instead of implementing the full award, the office of said respondent prepared General Voucher No. W-7023 in the amount of only P2.950.00, deducting from the total award the amounts of P3,000.00 representing the gratuity paid to petitioner under Republic Act No. 610, otherwise known as the Armed Forces Death Gratuity and Disability Pension Act of 1951 and P250-00 for burial expenses under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, or a total of P3,250.00 apparently on the ground that the benefits received under RA 610 was under Section 699 of the Revised Administratived Code with respect to the burial expense and the Workmen's Compensation Act are mutually exclusive. Notwithstanding the vehement protest of petitioner against said deductions, respondent refused to make full payment. Petitioner then sought the aid of the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, which rendered a decision on May 6, 1972, denominated as OP Decision No. 19, S. 1972, thru Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora. The decision noted therein that "the payment of gratuity to the claimant under Republic Act No. 610 was not brought to the attention of the hearing officer; hence it was not considered in the decision of this case which became final for failure of the Government to appeal the same within the prescribed period," 1 and ruled in the dispositive portion as follows:
Premises considered, this Office holds that the deduction in question is without legal justification. Accordingly, payment of the entire amount awarded as death compensation to the heirs of the late T/Sgt. Cornelio Corpuz is hereby authorized, subject to availability of funds and the usual auditing requirements. 2

Despite this definitive ruling, respondent Commanding General, thru Major Maraan Y. Calapis Army Adjutant, insisted in his 1st Indorsement dated July 5, 1972 that "the deduction from the award is in order and therefore the basic request of the claimants for full payment should be denied. 3 Respondent explained that the Philippine Army has a cause of action against claimants for reimbursement of the sum of P3,250.00 already given to them under RA 610 and Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code to avoid double compensation. On account of this firm posture adopted by said respondent, Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora reiterated that the deduction in question cannot be legally sustained in a decision dated March 9, 1973 denominated as OP Decision No. 168, S. of 1973. While agreeing that the Philippine Army has a cause of action against herein claimants for reimbursement of the amount of P3,250.00, the Secretary, however, said that the recovery thereof should be pursued through the proper legal remedy, not by way of deducting the same from the Workmen's Compensation Award. He further emphasized "that the instant claim was granted for the reason that, albeit the simultaneous payment of gratuity under the Workmen's Compensation Act and Republic Act No. 610 is not allowed, (his) Office or any office under the Executive Department is powerless to review or alter a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, much more after the same has become final and executory". 4 The dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision states:
For all the foregoing, this Office reiterates that the deduction in question cannot be legally sustained and hereby directs the payment of the entire amount awarded as death compensation to herein claimants, subject to availability of funds and the usual auditing requirements. 5

But this second directive failed to above respondent t release the balance of the award prompting petitioner to file instant petition for mandamus. For respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army to insist on deducting from a final and executory award under the Workmen's Compensation Act the sums paid to petitioner under Republic Act No. 610 and Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code is, indeed, an unlawful act of excluding petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right to which the latter is entitled under the law. A final and executory award entities petitioner to its enforcement according to its letter. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the officer charged with its implementation as the latter's duty on the matter constitutes only a ministerial act that does not call for the exercise of discretion. The adamant refusal of respondent to enforce the award completely is also an unlawful neglect to perform an act

which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office. Consequently, mandamus is a proper remedy. Clearly, there is no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law than the issuance of this writ especially in this case where petitioner had sought the help of the office of the Chief Executive of the land which consistently ruled in her favor but failed to convince respondent to effect the full payment of the award. A case on all fours with the present case is that of Antonio Falcon vs. Ismael Mathay, Sr., etc., L-30303, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 765, where this Court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for to compel the Auditor General to pass in audit and approve for payment a final award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the Republic of the Philippines. In disposing of the case, this Court ruled: The denial of the coed deduction by the Workmen's Compensation Commission having become final, the respondent Auditor General has no alternative but to approve the payment of the Commission's award. For him to insist on reducing the compensation payable thereunder by insisting that the indemnity paid under Republic Act No. 610 should be subtracted from it amounts to review by him of the Commission('s) final award, and no such review is authorized by law or jurisprudence. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are exclusively appealable to the Supreme Court, yet, even the latter is powerless to alter the award that have become final, so long as they are made within the Commission's jurisdiction, which is not questioned in this case. Respondent, thru the Solicitor General, views this petition for mandamus as a mode for the issuance of "an extraordinary judicial writ to coerce a double payment of benefits, a payment not allowed and, in fact, excluded by the very statutes upon which entitlement is based." 6 Then, he concludes "that mandamus is not only improper but it also should not be used to amend the law, reverse existing court decisions, and create an unfair advantage for one beneficiary not enjoyed by countless others, ..." 7 The provisions of the statutes referred to above are Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and Section 9 of the Republic Act No. 610, as amended, herein quoted as follows:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kins against the employer under the Civil Code and other law, because of said injury. 8 (emphasis supplied) Sec. 9. Repeal or modification of laws. Except as hereinafter provided, any gratuity or pension revived under the pro. visions of this Act shall be in addition to any retirement pay payable under existing laws. Provided, That no person who has received the death or disability benefits under Republic Act Numbered Five Hundred seventy-three shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act No payment shall hereafter be made to the beneficiaries of deceased officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine Constabulary under the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Thirty or any other law granting similar benefits to officers and employees generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government. ... 9

In support of his stand, respondent cites the case of Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Erlinda L Doyon No. L-30320, March 29,1972; 44 SCRA 191, where this Court ruled: It will thus be seen that Republic Act No. 610 bars payment under other laws; so does the Workmen's Compensation Act. Hence, if one is paid under Republic Act No. 610, he may not again be paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act, unless as in the case at bar, what was received under the first law is less than what can be received under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in which event, considering that both laws are social legislations designed to provide a system whereby dependents are awarded benefits to prevent them from being destitute and a charge upon society, the difference in amount may still be ordered paid by the Workmen's Compensation Commission in a proper case brought to it. We find this line of reasoning of respondent completely devoid of merit as it conveniently evades the material fact brought to light by petitioner that the award has become final and executory. The finality of the award not having been denied or disputed, the case is closed against respondent in view of the ruling in Falcon vs. Mathay (supra), a case squarely in point. By reason also of the finality of the award, the doctrine enunciated in. Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Doyon (supra) is not applicable. An excerpt from the factual backdrop of the said case is pertinent, and We quote: Both the Philippine Air Force and the Office of the Solicitor General wrote the Commission that they were not controverting the widow's claim, the death of Cpl. Doyon being in their opinion compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. They request however, that the sum of P3,000.00 already paid under Republic Act No 610 be deduct from whatever award would be given

to the widow; that there be no adjudication for burial expenses, payment thereof having already been made. While the payment, therefore, of gratuity under Republic Act No. 610 and the burial expense benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code were properly and timely raised in the aforesaid case of Doyon, such facts were not brought to the attention of the hearing officer in the instant case thereby resulting iii the rendition of an award which became final and executory as the Solicitor General did not interpose an appeal. Moreover, barely two months after the promulgation of the decision in Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation and Doyon the validity of the doctrine therein laid was put in issue in the case of Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Constabulary) vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Flora A. Vda de Sanchez, No. L-34352, May 31, 1972; 45 SCRA 358 where this Court took note of the "well-reasoned observation" of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in its decision holding tht the amount received by the claimants under R.A. No. 610 should not be charged against the compensation due under Act No. 3428, as amended, to wit: ... The death benefits given under R.A. 610 is given in recognition of the Added risks peculiar to Armed Forces personnel as our guardian of our national security; while the benefits granted under Act No. 3428, as amended, as part substitute for lost earnings of the workmen who are victims of work-connected accidents, siickness or death. In other words, while the origin of the employer's obligation emanated from only one reason, namely, the employee's injury, illness or death, the former law is given as a gratuity in appreciaiton of said employee's past services, while the latter law is a social legislation which has for its purpose the amelioration of service connected injuries or illnesses of the victims and their dependent sin case of death so that they will not become a social outcast. While this Court ruled in the aforesaid Anchez case that the P3,000.00 previously received by respondentsclaimants under Republic Act 610 should be deducted from the total award made to them under the Compensation Law, it did so "if only from the standpoint of adhering to precedent" 10 and on the consideration "that , unlike previous laws of similar nature, Republic Act 610 does not appear to be expressly intended to grant the benefits therein provided for 'in recognition of the added risks peculiar to Armed Forces personnel as our guardian of our national security' and all such though implies." 11 Petitioner herein now prays for a re-examinaiton of the aforeseaid doctrine claiming tht there is no express provision in the law relative to the exclusiveness of R.A. 610 vis-a-vis the VWC and neither is there any provisin in the Workmen's Compensation Act that expressly benefits under R.A. 610 and Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code. She further asserts that while it is true that R.A. makes no express mention aobut its concept and purpose as a gratuity benefit, the legislative intent prompting the passage of R, A. 610 in 1951 was to give higher benefits to military men "in recognition of or commensurate with the hazards attendant to military service." This particular intent, she states, can be deduced from the explanatory note to House Bill No. 1516, the parent bill of R.A. 610. And from the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 252, parent Bill of R.A. 5859 which amended R. A. 610 by increasing the gratuity from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00, it can allegedly be seen that the purpose of such amendment is based on the increased cost of living, medical care and attention and not on The basis of merely equalizing said benefit with that granted in the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. However, inasmuch as this is a suit for mandamus, We find Chat this is not the proper time for the re-examination of the present doctrine. The right of petitioner to the enforcement of the whole award under the Workmen's Compensation Act is clear, well- defined and certain as the said award has become final and executory and it is elementary that once a judgment has become final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution. 12 Any opinion expressed by this Court upon the validity of the doctrine wished to be reexamined would, therefore, be not necessary to the Decision of this case and would merely constitute an obiter dictum. 13 Moreover, a discussion thereof would, in effect, put in issue the validity of the final and executory award of Acting Referee Claro Q. Riego de Dios something which may not be done in a suit for mandamus as the validity of a final judgment cannot be assailed collaterally unless the ground of attack is lack of jurisdiction or irregularity in their entry apparent on the face of the record or because it is vitiated by fraud. 14 WHEREFORE, the writ of mandamus prayed for is hereby granted ordering respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army to pay petitioner the sum of P3,250.00 unlawfully deducted from her award of P6,200.00 under the Workmen's Compensation Act. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25889 January 17, 1973 HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, JAIME E. LAICO and LUZ LOS BANOSLAICO,petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE CHIVI and ANGELINA CHIVI as representative of the deceased MARTA B. CHIVI, respondents-appellees. Ernesto J. Seva for petitioners-appellants. MAKALINTAL, J.: Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35677-R, dated 31 August 1965. The facts as found, by the Court of Appeals are as follows: On 1 January 1955 the spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land to Marta B. Chivi, representing to her that the land was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law and assuring her that although the land was covered by a pre-war free patent application, the application had not been approved and no patent had been issued. The Sierras made that assurance because Chivi was not willing to buy the land if it was covered by a patent, since it would then be subject to repurchase. They agreed that the purchase price of P10,800.00 was not to be fully paid until the vendors could have the land registered under Act 496. At the instance of the Sierras, Chivi filed an application for registration of the land in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. While the application was pending Chivi, on 24 May 1958, sold her rights and interests in the land to the herein petitioners-spouses Jaime Laico and Luz Los Banos for P25,647.00, with the stipulation that should Chivi fail to secure and transfer title to the Laicos she would return to them twice the amount of the aforesaid purchase price. To induce the Laicos to buy Chivis rights and interests, the Sierras showed them a petition withdrawing their free patent application. The Laicos thereupon continued with the registration proceeding in substitution of Chivi, who signed a deed of transfer of her rights. In December, 1959 the Laicos discovered, and in January, 1960 Chivi learned, that a free patent title had been previously issued to Isidro Sierra as early as 26 February 1932. The Laicos went to see the Sierras, who agree to execute, as they did execute on January 17, 1960, another deed of sale in favor of the Laicos. The Laicos then withdrew their application for registration and filed instead a petition for the reconstitution of the title issued to Isidro Sierra. On 14 June 1960, however, the Sierras filed a complaint against Marta B. Chivi, assisted by her husband, and the Laicos in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6184, praying that they (plaintiffs) be allowed to repurchase the land under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The Chivis and the Laicos filed their answers to the complaint and counter-claimed for damages by reason of the alleged bad faith, misrepresentation and fraudulent acts of the Sierras, as herein before recounted. The Laicos filed a cross-claim against the Chivis for collection of twice the amount of the price paid under their sales contract for the latter's failure to deliver title to the Laicos, alleging that "the defendants Chivi are/or will be liable on these warranties and condition should the plaintiffs finally obtain favorable judgment in their favor" (sic). On 12 March 1964 the Sierras and the Laicos entered into a compromise to amicably settle Civil Case No. 6184 as between themselves, stipulating therein, among other things, that the Laicos were now the absolute owners of the land and that the Sierras would withdraw their objection to the reconstitution of the patent title and that said title would be transferred in the name of the Laicos, who would pay P10,000.00 to the Sierras; that the Sierras would ask for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6184 insofar as the Laicos were concerned and would convert their action in the case from one for repurchase to one for collection of the balance of the sales price and of damages against the Chivis; that the Laicos would pursue their cross-claim against the Chivis and in the event they obtained a favorable judgment thereon they would pay to the Sierras one-half (1/2) of any amount awarded to them in excess of the purchase price of P25,647.00. The compromise, which was executed without the knowledge of or notice to the Chivis, was approved by the trial court on 12 March 1964. On the same date the court, joint motion of the Sierras and the Laicos, dismissed witness prejudice the complaint in Civil Case No. 6184 insofar as the Laicos were concerned as well as the counter-claim of the Laicos against the Sierras. Chivi was not notified of the dismissal. The court set the case for pre-trial on 14 July 1964. Despite notice to the Sierras and the Chivis, only cross-claimant Jaime Laico and his counsel appeared, whereupon the court declared the Chivis in default and allowed Laico to present evidence on the cross-claim before the deputy clerk of court. Counsel for the Chivis filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, explaining why he failed to appear at the pre-trial, but the motion was denied. On 5 February 1965 the court rendered judgment for the Laicos, sentencing the cross-defendants to pay them a total amount of P15,000.00, plus costs, and on 1 April 1965 issued a writ of execution. Pursuant to the writ the sheriff levied upon the properties of the Chivis and issued a notice that the properties would be sold at public auction on 14 April 1965.

In due time the Chivis filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul: (1) the order of the trial court authorizing the Laicos to adduce evidence ex parte on their cross-claim against Marta B. Chivi; (2) the decision rendered on said cross-claim; and (3) the order directing the issuance of a writ of execution, the levy on execution and the notice of execution sale of the properties of Chivi prayed further that the therein respondents be prohibited from conducting any further proceedings in said Civil Case No. 6184 on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction in the premises. Upon giving due course to the petition the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the therein respondents from proceedings with the execution and with the sale at public auction set for 14 April 1965, until further order. On 31 August 1965 the Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring null and void all the proceedings on the crossclaim of the spouses Laico against Chivi, as well as the orders, decisions, writs and processes issued in connection therewith, and restraining the therein respondent Judge and sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 6184. The Laicos moved for reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, Marta B. Chivi died was substituted by Angelina Chivi. In an order dated 16 March 1966, the motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari brought by the Laicos. The principal issue in this case is: Could the cross-claim in this particular action stand after the complaint in the same action was dismissed with prejudice? In the resolution of this issue the following considerations are pertinent: (1) A cross-claim, as defined in Section 7 of Rule 6 is "any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein." (2) The cross-claim of the Laicos against the Chivis was for the recovery of the sum of P51,294.00, upon the allegations that according to the contract of sale between them, "should the defendants Chivi fail to transfer the title to the land in question to the VENDEE (defendant Laico) then the former shall return to the latter (the aforesaid sum) which is double the amount of the purchase price received by the defendants Chivi;" and that "the defendants Chivi are/or will be liable on these warranties and conditions should the plaintiffs (Sierras) finally obtain favorable judgment in their favor" (sic). (3) When Marta B. Chivi sold her "rights and interests" to the land in question to the Laicos on 24 May 1958 the latter knew that Chivi had yet no registered title, and in fact substituted her in the registration proceeding which she had initiated. (4) In their counterclaim for damages against the Sierras in Civil Case No. 6184, the Laicos alleged that the "plaintiffs, in fraudulently misrepresenting to the defendants Chivi, as well as to the defendants Laico, that the land in question is unregistered and is not covered by a patent, thereby inducing the latter to purchase the land in question, which they would not have done had they known that the land is covered by a patent, should be adjudged to pay ..." (5) The warranty undertaken by Marta B. Chivi, judging by its terms and by the surrounding circumstances was in respect of the transfer of ownership not of the registered title to the Laicos. The action filed by the Sierras was not for recovery of such ownership but for the exercise of their alleged right of repurchase under the Public Land Act on the ground that the land they had sold was covered by a patent title. In other words, the filing of the action did not militate against the warranty to transfer title, for the very fact that the plaintiffs wished to enforce their alleged right of repurchase was predicated on the assumption that the title, that is, ownership, had been effectively transferred first to Chivi an subsequently by the latter to the Laicos. (6) In any event, even viewing the situation in the light most favorable to the Laicos, their cross-claim on Chivi's warranty to deliver title to them was so inextricably linked with and so utterly dependent upon the success of the complaint of the Sierras for the repurchase of the land that when the complaint was dismissed the cross-claim could not possibly survive. For as the cross-claimants themselves alleged, the cross-defendants would be liable on the warranty "should the plaintiffs finally obtain favorable judgment in their favor" (sic). The warranty became functus oficio after the Sierras, who turned out after all to have a free patent title to the land issued way back in 1932, agreed to transfer and did transfer said title to the Laicos first by the deed of sale executed directly in their favor by the Sierras on January 17, 1960, and again in the amicable settlement of the case between them. The fact that the Laicos paid P10,000.00 to the Sierras in that amicable settlement created no liability on the part of the Chivis: first, because the latter neither knew nor consented to such settlement; second, because the Laicos had already acquired the land directly, from the Sierras by virtue of the aforesaid sale of January 17, 1960; and third because the said sum of P10,000.00 was not the subject of the cross-claim against them. Apropos is the following statement of the legal principle:
A cross-bill strictly speaking is one brought by a defendant in an equity suit against ... other defendants in the same suit, touching the matters in question in the original bill. It is considered as an auxiliary suit dependent upon the original bill, and can be sustained only on matters growing out of the original bill.

There is a well-defined distinction between a cross-bill merely defensive in character, and one seeking affirmative relief. The dismissal of the original bill carries with it a purely defensive cross-bill but not one seeking affirmative relief. 1

The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the complaint and could prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under the principle above enunciated, it could not be the subject of independent adjudication once it lost the nexus upon which its life depended. Under the circumstances above set forth the dismissal of the cross-claim should have followed the dismissal of the complaint as a matter of course, without further proceeding; and in setting the said cross-claim for pre-trial and receiving evidence thereon and then rendering judgment against the cross-defendants the court committed such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari. Concerning the argument that the respondents here were guilty of laches because they filed their petition forcertiorari after the lapse of over 9 months from the time judgment of the Court of First Instance was rendered, respondent Court of Appeals ruled in our opinion correctly as follows: xxx xxx xxx To the contention that the petitioners' action is barred laches, we are bound to disagree. The judgment by default was rendered on February 5, 1965. It is not known when the petitioners received copy of this judgment, but the fact is that on April 13, or after the lapse of only 2 months and 7 days from rendition of the judgment, the petition for certiorari was filed with this Court. Principally, the petition assails the decision and the writ of execution thereof which was issued on April 1. Assuming that the decision complained of was actually received by the petitioners on the date it was rendered, the intervening period to the filing of the petition is only 2 months and 7 days, which is shorter than the shortest period of 2 months and 26 days cited in the respondents' ex-parte motion for reconsideration in support of their theory of laches. And a mere 12 days intervened between the issuance of the writ of execution and the filing of the petition for certiorari. xxx xxx xxx Parenthetically, this Court would like to state that Judge Guillermo Torres should not have been made to appear as active party-petitioner in this case, his participation having become functus oficio after the rendered judgment, and therefore his role being purely nominal in this petition. In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.