Daxnerfree greensEFA Civilreconstructioninafghanistan

Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan
A Report for The Greens | European Free Alliance in the European Parliament by Michael Daxner and Jan H. Free
This report has been commissioned and funded by
The Greens | EFA in the European Parliament Paul Henri Spaak building Office PHS02C11 60, rue Wiertz 1047 Brussels, Belgium
http://www.greens-efa.org/
Citation: Daxner, Michael and Jan H. Free (2008). Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan. A Report for The Greens | European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Oldenburg (Germany): Working Group Cultures of Intervention, University of Oldenburg. The Greens | European Free Alliance in the European Parliament and the authors, 2008.
Contents
1 Summary................................................................................................ .................................................................................................................. Preface and Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 3 1.1 Preface ...............................................................................................................................................................3 1.2 Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................4 1.3 The Authors......................................................................................................................................................6 matters................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................... Why Afghanistan matters............................................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Internal reasons: The EU as a project of what? ....................................................................................7 2.2 External reasons: Proving the EUs ability to act.................................................................................8 2.3 External reasons: Re-adjusting the transatlantic relationship .......................................................9 2.4 What is wrong with Afghanistan ........................................................................................................... 10 2.5 Why now is a good time for Europe to re-engage in Afghanistan............................................ 11 2.6 Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................... 13 remarks..................................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................................ Introductory remarks..................................................................................................................................... 15 3.1 A brief intermediate summary of problems and questions ........................................................ 18 ................................................................ ...................................................... Decisive issues: What is crucial in Afghanistan ...................................................................................... 21 4.1 Afghan Ownership in a conflict of global dimension .................................................................... 21 4.2 How to learn to get the priorities straight ......................................................................................... 23 4.3 Trust in institutions..................................................................................................................................... 25 4.4 Corruption, first guilt, and returnees................................................................................................ 26 4.5 How to deal with religious leaders ....................................................................................................... 28 4.6 Modernisation.............................................................................................................................................. 30 4.7 Homeland Discourse.................................................................................................................................. 33 4.8 Soft and Hard Sectors ................................................................................................................................ 36 4.8.1 Education............................................................................................................................................. 36 4.8.2 Safety & Security ............................................................................................................................... 41 ................................................................................................................................ ................................................................................................................. Donor policies ................................................................................................................................................. 44 5.1 Visibility of European efforts in Afghanistan..................................................................................... 44 5.2 Multilateral and bilateral aid ................................................................................................................... 46 5.3 The global policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan ............................................................. 46 5.4 Bilateral Aid ................................................................................................................................................... 48 5.4.1 USA ........................................................................................................................................................ 49 5.4.2 United Kingdom................................................................................................................................ 52 5.4.3 European Commission ................................................................................................................... 54 5.4.4 India....................................................................................................................................................... 57 5.4.5 Canada.................................................................................................................................................. 58 5.4.6 Germany .............................................................................................................................................. 59 5.4.7 Japan..................................................................................................................................................... 62 5.4.8 Netherlands ........................................................................................................................................ 63 5.4.9 Norway ................................................................................................................................................. 64 5.4.10 Turkey ................................................................................................................................................... 65 5.4.11 Sweden................................................................................................................................................. 66 5.4.12 Italy ........................................................................................................................................................ 67 5.4.13 Denmark .............................................................................................................................................. 68 5.4.14 France ................................................................................................................................................... 69 5.4.15 Other Countries: Pakistan and Iran ............................................................................................ 70 5.5 Summary: policies of bilateral donors in Afghanistan................................................................... 72 5.6 General Recommendations Regarding ODA for Afghanistan .................................................... 73 Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................ ................................................................................................................................ Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................ 75 Bibliography..................................................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................................ Bibliography..................................................................................................................................................... 76
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Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan
Preface and Executive Summary

Afghanistan has become a metaphor for most Europeans, politicians as well as the general public. The country is present in the public discourse, though not as a real space with real human beings, but as an imaginary political unit where soldiers fight and die, where Taliban kill soldiers and aid workers, where a weak government excels in corruption and where progress is bought with immense tolls of human lives, material and credibility. Afghanistan has become the manifestation of a global policy, which is no longer drawing a clear line between foreign and domestic affairs, and, even more important, Afghanistan can be understood as the lead metaphor for the dominant post-national policies after 1989from the failed statestheory to the War on Terrorism (WoT). Every policy for Afghanistan has to deal with this discursive dual structure: it has to address the real Afghanistan as well as the metaphorical one. This report is focused on the meaning of Afghanistan for Europe and the crucial issues of civil reconstruction. It shall facilitate a far-reaching re-adjustment of European policy towards civil reconstruction in Afghanistan that will be able to generate tangible dividends for all parties involved. For that end, we have applied a rather broad problem-driven approach and tried to avoid the repetition of clichs and truisms that have already filled thousands of pages of reports and assessments, while Afghans become impatient, unruly and alienated from the new state of Afghanistan. We do not want to prove again that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means (alone); instead we want to discuss what problems should be addressed by a future European policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan. This is the moment to refer to our commission. This report is written by two scientists, but not for science or scholarly reference. It is assigned to the European Greens and shall support their line of developing a consistent political perspective for European policies towards Afghanistan and the region. The regional aspect has been too often marginalised or even completely left aside. After the recent events in Pakistan and the ongoing rift with Iran, but also in the light of the crisis in Caucasus, we can learn how close Afghanistan is to Europe proper, not much farther away than Kosovo and the Balkan wars were ten years ago. Our readers may be disappointed when finding that prominent green themes, such as women, environment, civil society, will not be directly addressed with priority. We are aware that these themes are important and will rightly remain on the agenda both of the Green Group and European polity. Your authors deal with the environment of such issues in order to present the bigger picture of Afghanistans social structure that is usually not part of the political discourse. If we want to learn about Afghanistan and about the prospect of European involvement there, our starting point should be the social conditions in Afghanistanwhich are largely shaped by the intervention and the interveners state-building experiment. On the basis of such an assessment, special priorities can be implemented easily later on.
1.1 Preface
We are adopting an eclectic approach, based mainly on micro-sociology, political ethnology and the experience which we have gathered or derived from our research and practice. We understand ourselves as partners and not as adversaries to those political scientists who dominate research in peace & conflict studies. This very special approach has gained a certain position in contemporary research under the name of sociology of intervention. Readers will find more about the approach and the context of the authors at our website www.uni-oldenburg.de/interventionskultur/.
1.2 Executive Summary

Building a state in Afghanistan requires more engagement in society building, because creating a new sovereign and democratic state under the rule of law and the market economy implies a complex re-organisation of a society torn apart by thirty years of war, poverty, deprivation and displacement. By focussing too much on institutional state building and security, the intervention is in danger of creating a state that is detached from the Afghans and without local buy-in of its governed population. Your authors start to analyse why Afghanistan matters to the European Union: effective delivery of aid and an uncompromising position towards human rights and against any violations of these rights (e.g., in context of the WoT) could convince the sceptical majority of European citizens that the EU as a political instance is a) able to act in most difficult environments, and b) is lead by principles that Europeans generally consider to be good (in a universal normative way)which could generate considerable spill-over effects with respect to public identification with the European political project. Next we identify key issues, on which the EU can demonstrate its readiness and willingness to display its policy: Local ownership, trust in institutions, dealing with religious and traditional leaders. Most important is the concentration on some soft sectors, such as education, higher education and a program to endogenously strengthen safety and security (with a special focus on police reform). Furthermore, we argue that the diverse phases of modernisation through which Afghanistan has gone in the 20th century should be taken more carefully into consideration by the interveners and humanitarians. Another neglected area is what we term homeland discourse: The interveners domestic politics shapeand sometimes even determinethe approach to re-building Afghanistans state and society, which leads to biased priorities and suboptimal strategies in Afghanistan. In our analysis of donor policies we have disentangled the global figures and pledges. We think that each of the bilateral policies of the major donors has pros and cons, and consequently, each national analysis is followed by some specific recommendations. The report recommends considering the following principles in future policy planning on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan: 1. On paper, the EU is well equipped for co-ordination tasks. Besides its abundant experience in bridging and harmonizing different legal systems and regulating the European common market, the European bilateral donors are already linked by the EUs own development bodies and EU-wide agreements (e.g., the EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy). Up to date, however, civil and military planning processes are kept far too separate: in volatile environments, military priorities prevail, and civil reconstruction is treated as secondary. But state building in Afghanistan cannot succeed with a security first mindset. After being let down by European donors in the 1990s, the majority of Afghans expect and demand a long-term European engagement. This implicates that a prolonged presence of European actors should not be questioned. Instead, the European citizens shall be instructed and educated much better than in the past about the aims and perspectives of the commitment to Afghanistan. This education shall include also a history of the many dimen-
2.
sions of the Thirty years war and the shortcomings of the international community during the 1990s. 3. The EU and the MS should increase their disbursements in Afghanistan in order to limit the USAs de-facto domination in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the EU should advocate a clear cut between American-led WoT and the international state building mission in Afghanistan. A certain degree of emancipation from US-American policy is a precondition for a distinctive European policy. European engagement in Afghanistan should be based upon an explicit and open discussion of the policies of Afghan actors. Europe should develop more trust and confidence in the ability of the Afghans to decide upon their own priorities (which in many cases are not security related). Moreover, European interveners should refrain from joining in into the corruption-discourse. Of course, Afghanistan has a tradition of corruption, but that does not release the interveners from their obligations to assist the Afghan population. In general, key actors in the Afghan theatre, such as the present Foreign Minister, a champion in advocating human rights, should be consulted more frequently by institutions of the EU. Foreign policy shall include Russia, Pakistan, India, China, and other neighbours and regional powers into a comprehensive concept. Iran is able to play a major peace-building role in Afghanistan, notwithstanding its conflicts with some western countries. Since Afghanistan is of very low strategic interest to any of the major international actors, the regional solution can contribute to a wider stabilisation concept that is not yet visible with any of the actors visions. Each member state and the European Union as a whole should be very clear about their strategies and deficits. A realistic assessment of the current Europeans efforts in Afghanistan should serve as a basis for a definition of a concerted and comprehensive European approach to civil reconstruction in Afghanistan and a discussion about the appropriate (political) tools for its implementation. For example: If we want more support for police, the ministers of the interior and the EC should decide upon a holistic concept not only for the training itself, but also for incentives to send more trainersthat is, inter alia, to design a system of significant social and career protection for the dispatched officers and experts. It is not sensible to call for a change of strategy and not to tackle the domestic barriers to such change. Most of the images of Afghanistan are outdated, as far as they are simple reproductions of a country before the war. At the risk of stating the obvious: Re-constructing Afghanistan cannot be understood as a re-creation of a former peaceful condition of social and political affairs. Instead, strong attempts to support local solutions and legal pluralism should be supported; the Constitution should be changed in a way that allows to include regional and local varieties and the peoples inclusion. The creation of a secular societal structure and a robust public space and the support of human rights organisations within this space should be given priority. Security and safety are important issues, but they should be seen instrumental to progress in the economic, cultural, and social stabilisation of the society, not vice versa. CIMIC guidelines shall be reconsidered and altered. With regard to police reform, the European involvement should meet quantitatively the average standard of previous large-scale state-building missions.
4.
5.
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7.
8.
There are two dangers for the European interveners: one is to give in too easily to the post-democratic temptation, that is to concentrate on the economic and military reconstruction and downplay human rights and the development of a reasonable interplay between institutions and civil society; the other is to disaggregate civil and military support and concentrate on popular though one-sided activities without understanding the importance to protect the achievements made so far. All this will cost more money, and it will need much better information of the citizens of the EU than before. Recently, some changes have occurred that may have an impact on the analysis. The Cabinet has been reshuffled by President Karzai. The highly effective Minister of Education, Atmar, has been nominated Minister of the Interior. Other shifts are less important, but this one is significant in two ways: it may suggest increased efficiency in the Interior Department, and it also may endanger the reforms which have begun under Minister Atmar in Education.
1.3 The Authors

The report has been entrusted to Michael Daxner, who has engaged Jan H. Free as a partner and co-author of this work. Both have been funding members of the network on the Culture of Interventions. Michael Daxner has gained some experience in the reconstruction of societies after interventions or in permanent crisis, such as Bolivia, Kosovo (with UNMIK), and Afghanistan. His theories are derived from the ethnopolitical theory of conflicts (Pierre Bourdieu) and from his own experience in society building in such areas. Main focus has been the Soft Sectors. He is presently professor at the Free University of Berlin and normally holds a chair in Sociology at the University of Oldenburg, Germany. Jan Free, MA, is a specialist in the theory of nation building and the emergence of nationalism in the process of society building. His doctoral thesis is directed towards the relationship between international employers of local workforce after interventions. He is also secretary of the research network Culture of Interventions.
2 Why Afghanistan matters

Without any doubt, European assistance is important for Afghanistan. Naturally, a country so devastated and impoverished as Afghanistan needs all the help it can get. But in a less evident way, Afghanistan is also important for Europe, for Europes performance in the Afghan theatre might be decisive in shaping the EUs future profile and stance in global politics. Or in other words: There is a good chance of tackling Europes multi-layered identity crisis in Afghanistan. At first glance, this claim appears to be an exaggeration, because Afghanistan is surely very remote from European realities. But there are several external and internal reasons why Afghanistan still matters for Europe and the EUthus, promoting an intrinsically civilian policy on reconstructing Afghanistan means promoting the EU as a inherently civil endeavour.
2.1 Internal reasons: The EU as a project of what?

From the outset, the EU was envisioned as a project of peace and reconciliation. In that spirit, most of its bodies and institutions are based on consensus and unanimity. Over the years, the process of EU enlargement and the intensifying cooperation in every political and social area among member states (MS), the EU developed a huge apparatus that has proven to be rather badly prepared for todays global political landscape. A long process of internal reforms produced further diversification of the EUs institutional bodies, while European politicians are trying to increase the EUs operational capacity. Therefore, a stricter focus on issues of security was implemented; mainly as a reaction to civil wars in the EUs vicinity and the soaring international terrorism, but also as a measure to give the EU more active profile facing its counterparts. In the light of the first operational European battle-groups and several missions of the EU outside its boundaries, the securitization and militarization of the EU has become the centre of an intense debate among politicians and scholars, because despite the strong consensus that the EU has to be better prepared for playing a role in conflict prevention and resolution, the appropriate measures for that end are still controversial. Although no one contests that todays conflict operations need military and civil components, the EUs current emphasis of military elements is frequently called into question.1 Your authors understand the Union as peace-project rather than merely as a market, and expect as well as advise the Union to play an active role in the global policies on human security, human rights, democracy, and peaceful development. The accent on active means both: the quest for a strong and unified European Foreign Policy and the awareness of existing conflicts and disagreements with other players ambitions to define the field. Both components do not have to be mutually exclusive per se.2 How European actors perform in Afghanistan will be indicative for further activities of the EU. Afghanistan is generally understood as a cornerstone for modern warfare
1 2
See Gourly (2004) and Stewart (2008).
In the Afghan case, a strong disagreement with the WoT would not hinder the EU to cooperate broadly with the US on civil reconstruction and police training grounds. Playing an active role could also implicate that the unbalanced NATO commitment among the MS (member states) should not remain in the foreground, instead a highly harmonized and credible policy on human rights, principles of self determination and legal pluralism could be the basis of introducing European policy into the Afghan theatre.
as well as for reconstruction policies in any post-conflict society.3 Caught between being perceived as an inter-European civil project of peace and a full-blown global player, the EU is forced to find a way of merging both elements of its history and identity into a new form as long as it stays engaged in Afghanistan or in postconflict reconstruction in general. Although we prefer the EU to stay predominately civil in nature, we recognize that even a civilian organization cannot shy away from civil-military co-ordination in the age of New Wars4 and the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine.5 A strong, coherent, and plausible policy on civil reconstruction is therefore needed to counter the current fixation on security and prevalence of a military strategic culture.
2.2 External reasons: Proving the EUs ability to act

Since the negative referendums brought the EU-internal reform process to a grinding halt, the EU is more than ever concerned about its image in the Europe publics. As a remedy for this setback, several high ranking European politicians recommend to put more emphasis on the benefits of the EU for the citizens. Furthermore, the advantages of a reformed EU should somehow enter public awareness.6 Such an approach seems perfectly reasonable, since doing Europe without Europeans is hardly an option, and, for instance, polls indicate that the Irish No was generally due to a lack of information about the details and purposes of the matter of the referendum, the Lisbon Treaty.7 However, public awareness cannot be created at will, and consequentially there is a serious lack of concrete recommendations on how to improve communication between the EU and the citizens of its member states. On the other hand, the recent upgrading of the EUs military power has been characterized as some sort of nation building project for the EU, according to the traditional thesis that armies are a crucial part in the process of forming a collective identity.8 The underlying calculus is that a EU with an improved ability to act is more appealing to citizens and thus creating a European identity would be easier if the EU could be more operational.9 The implications in regard to Afghanistan are fairly clear: Because the events in Afghanistan are still one of the hot topics in international politics, the EU should use this attention to prove its ability to act and to present itself as an important coordinator of the international communities activities.10 To avoid any misunderstandings: We do not recommend (ab)using the Afghans. We would not recom3 4 5 6 7 8
See Biddle (2006) and Oliker et al. (2004). See Kaldor (2000), Kaldor & Salmon (2006). See Breau (2007), MacFarlane, Thielking, & Weiss (2004). See, for instance, Szamuely (2008, p. 118). See Phillips (2008). See S. Anderson & Seitz (2006).
9 We are, however, rather sceptical about the prospect of such a strategy. First, it is far from being established that Europeans want Europe to be a nation state of larger scale. Second, the nation building capacity of institutionalized military bodies is not uncontested (e.g., Krebs, 2004; Simonsen, 2007). And, third, any concrete nation building has to be preceded by some kind of collective belief in the existence of the respective nation and not vice versa (e.g., Free, 2007; Smith, 1999). Thus, creating a more nation state-like Europe is not necessarily the proper way to create more Europefriendly sentiments in the European public. 10
In the domain of internationally coordinated diplomacy, the EU already has proven its operational capacities; see for instance the European mediation in the recent Russian-Georgian conflict.
mend starting to engage in Afghanistan right now for the sake of better public relations. But the EU and European countries are already among the interveners, so we just emphasise that a resultant opportunity should not be wasted: At the moment, there are rather European countries in Afghanistan, but it is about time that Europe as a coherent actor starts to leave its mark on the Afghan state building project (or nation building or society building project).11 Right now, Afghanistan needs skills that are widely considered to be core competences of Europebut of Europe as a whole, not of individual member states.12 Therefore, the EU should re-focus on those required soft skills13 and prove to the world and to its citizens that Europe is more than the sum of its member states and that Europe can have a significant impact on peoples lives.
2.3 External reasons: Re-adjusting the transatlantic relationship

Since the end of the Cold War, Europes position and prospects in international politics have changed. Whereas before 1989 Europe was divided between the two superpowers, European countries are now no longer intrinsically bound to any nonEuropean superpower.14 This new degree of freedom became most visible in the quarrels about whether or not to intervene in Iraq. Not very surprisingly, this newfound strategic freedom did not translate into a European policy instantly, rather facilitating severe intra-European discord. However, the inability of the USA to integrate major European states into its coalition of the willing indicated a historical disjunction of European and US-American interests and approaches. So, although Europe and the USA are faced with rather similar threats, the transatlantic relationship is in a transitional phase.15 One of the prominent areas where European and US-American approaches collide is the matter of post-conflict reconstruction.16 As recent history has shown, only the Europeans can influence the USA directly in matters of international politics, especially when speaking in unison. One should not underestimate the impact a unified and coherent European stance can have on the USA. But the Afghan example illustrates how fragmented the Europeans are in practice. Take, for instance, the whole lead-nation approach, resulting only in overly self-centred, uncoordinated, and ineffective missions, but not in a dynamic rebuilding of Afghanistans society and state.17 The European lead-nations in Afghanistan have surely not increased the prestige of the EU or Europeneither in Afghanistan nor in the eyes of the European public. Nevertheless, the European nations are trusted by the Afghans and even considered as the best choice in alliance. It is not so important to analyse why this trust is so persistent, but to live up to it by good practice. Policy through disappointment is a very dangerous strategy. Although the Europeanscitizens and politicians alikebemoan the overall bilateral attitude of the USA and demand more American respect for European views
11 12 13 14 15 16
These terms are not synonyms but all the different instruments they denote have to be applied in Afghanistan. See Dobbins (2008) and Dobbins et al. (2008). Following the terminology of Nye (2004). See Calleo (2008). See Dobbins (2005).
For the more general transatlantic differences about how to tackle todays global security problems see Berenskoetter (2005).
17
See the chapters on the respective European lead-nations for references.
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and recommendations, the European activities in the domain of international politics are rather lukewarm affairs: national perspectives and priorities prevail. However, the European influence in international politics will increase in relation to the degree its policies prove to be doable and successful in current crises of global significance. Therefore, Afghanistan should be considered as welcomed opportunity to put Europe into action in the arena of highly complex and dirty international crises.
2.4 What is wrong with Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan seems to be rather bleak: Even seven years after the initial intervention the security situation is not satisfactory and institutions are rived by corruption. Of course, progress has been made in a number of areas (e.g., health or education), but no partial advancementshowever spectacular individually can turn the reconstruction of Afghanistan into a success story. So we do not want to repeat the customary offset here. Instead, we will point out the three general flaws in the design of the intervention in Afghanistan.18 Afghanistan is still a policy vacuuma fact that is regularly concealed by the strong rhetoric agreement on fundamentals. But despite shared goals, innumerable policy papers, reports, and bouffant statements of intent, a coherent, detailed, and applicable policy on how to proceed in Afghanistan and with its countless actors is still missing, making effective co-ordination nearly impossible. In the absence of an overarching framework, each organization or institutional body develops its own policy and approach, as the example of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) most apparently shows: Although all providers of PRTs agree on the purpose of those military-civilian teams, there is a profound controversy about how to achieve those goals, leaving every PRTs with a different approach to civil reconstruction and stabilization. Moreover, the lack of a policy that truly combines military and civilian approaches to state building, the military line of thought will always prevail in the fieldeven if individual commanders endorse a more civil approach, organizational patterns overpower singular prioritizations. Aid disbursements in Afghanistan are still too low. However reasonable all recent complaints about corruption are, the efforts of governmental donors do not match their strong rhetoric and wordy commitments. In Afghanistan, the disbursements by international donors amount to about $ 85 per citizen annuallya rather humble sum compared to the more than $ 800 that is being paid per citizen in Kosovo every year.19 In no other peace enforcement mission to date the rate of deployed personnel to inhabitants has been lower than in Afghanistan, where there is only one intervener per 1000 inhabitants.20 Although we do not want to imply that more is always better in every instance,21 it is simply not possible to achieve much in any field of activity without proper funding. Building a complete and complex
18 19
We will cover more specific deficits of current approaches to reconstruction in the following chapters.
See (Dobbins, 2008, p. 102). And, that is perhaps even more significant for the interveners engagement in Afghanistan, we do not want to imply that $ 800 per capita is a inadequately high level of spending. In Kosovo, for instance, this ratio was 20:1000 (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse, 2007, p. 39).
20 21
Especially in the field of development assistance and peace keeping operations, certain facets of resourcefulness seem to be rather an impediment to progress (M. B. Anderson, 1999; Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Easterly, 2006).
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state does not come cheap anywhere, especially not in a country that damaged and devastated like Afghanistan.22 Every intervention that has largely achieved its primary goals leads to a certain period of extreme good-will. This window of opportunity, sometimes dubbed the Golden Hour, should be used for laying the groundwork for further nation building measures, because there simply will not be a better opportunity than then, and early decisions cannot be easily revised later on. In Afghanistan however, the Golden Hour has been wasted.23 Military shortterm calculation prevailed, fostering bad government for the sake of stability, while aid and reconstruction was reduced to emergency relief and Quick Impact Projects (QUIPs).24 That put a bad omen on any posterior institution building and, in some cases, empowered local strong men who proved to be serious obstacles in subsequent reforms, just because they were deemed able to keep the locals sedate. As a consequence of the wasted Golden Hour, every further effort has to breast that legacy.
Obviously, the last point cannot be revised. So much the more we recommend tackling the first two flaws listed above. We understand our report as a contribution to developing the outlines of a comprehensive, coherent, and consensual policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we want to provide some basic data about the current involvement of national donors in Afghanistan that might be useful in debates as well as in policy planning and should serve as a baseline for further analyses.
2.5 Why now is a good time for Europe to re-engage in Afghanistan

As a rule, it is always easier to find arguments against involvement in Afghan politics than for it. This country has a history of being hostile towards any foreign influence and attempts to rationalize governmental structures: As early as in the 16th century, the Persians called Afghanistan Yaghestan, meaning land of the incorrigibly ungovernable.25 Even the mighty British Empire could not establish its rule over Afghanistan and suffered a legendary defeat in 1841, when, as the popular narrative has it, only a sole British soldier survived an Afghan ambush.26 Nearly 150 years later, the USSR was forced by local militias to withdraw from Afghanistan. Given that history, the question remains why donors should continue to envisage heavy and generally unpopular loads for an undefined period of time, when security is still problematic and the ability of the Afghan government to stabilize its state is still debateable. There are some rather obvious and fairly outworn reasons: Humanitarian argument: Afghanistan is without any doubt in need for humanitarian relief and development. In theory, the normative ethos of humanitarian universalism demands assisting the needy regardless the circumstances.
22 23
Rashid (2008, pp. 75, 171)
The main reasons for this failure have already been given: There was no policy that could be implemented and the few available resources were spent on rather arbitrary Quick Impact Projects with mainly unknown effect and poor sustainability (e.g., Oliker et al., 2004, p. 81).
24 25 26
See Chayes (2006) for a detailed account of the first years after the fall of the Taliban regime. See Chayes (2006, p. 68).
In fact, over one hundred soldiers survived the battle, but Dr. Brydonthe legendary sole survivormanaged to escape the tribal militias despite serious injuries of both horse and horseman (Ewans, 2002, p. 70).
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Political argument: State building is believed to be an essential part of countering terrorism. Regional argument: Stabilizing Afghanistan means stabilizing a region that some observers see on the verge of being engulfed in terrorism and armed conflict. Tactical argument: Staying in the Afghan state building-game is equal with staying a player in global politics. Pragmatic argument: The interveners should end what they have started, because otherwise the loss of prestige would be immense.
Of course, each of these arguments still holds true in 2008albeit to different degrees, but seem to have lost much of their credibility or are too abstract for the general public. In 2001, the support for intervening in Afghanistan was strong because of the threat of Al-Qaedaand not because of some concern about regional fractions or an overwhelming humanitarian impulse. Accordingly, most politicians referred to international terrorism as the main reason why action in Afghanistan was necessary. But already in 2002, Afghanistan stopped being an operational base from which an attack like 9/11 could have been executed.27 Therefore, the notion of defending our freedom at the Hindukush lost its persuasiveness, and support for the interveners mission in Afghanistan decreased rapidly when progress halted and casualties started to pile up. But besides the specific reasons for an intensified European involvement in Afghanistan given above, there are some additional and more general arguments for a sustained reconstruction mission in Afghanistandespite the popular reservations. We will focus on two points here that seem to be the most important.
When in a nation building mission things get more and more complicated, you are on the right track. What seems to be most paradoxical is indeed just
a consequence of the general goal of any state building effort: Creating a state and an institutional set-up in accordance with the Western model of statehood implicates increasing the functional differentiation of the intervened society.28 Applying market economies, rule of law, a separation of powers, and so forth leads always to a higher degree of social fragmentation and, consequentially, to some unrest that has to be channelled in institutions. Of course, this line of argument does not apply to insurgency and armed violence; thus, poor security cannot be exculpated by the Rumsfeldian notion that freedom is untidy. But it should be kept in mind that in state building missions, the curve of visible progress is rather flattening than rising towards the end. Therefore, the absence of tangible success is not necessarily a sign of failure and should not discourage the interveners.
Right now, a re-modelling of the global aid-system takes place. We do not

need to elaborate on the details of this reform process here, but one of its consequences should be highlighted: At the moment, actors in the field of
development assistance are not as tied to their tracks as they usually are.
Thus, a new convincing policy has better chances of being implemented on a large scale now than any other time. Add to this the wide-spread percep-
27 28
See Daxner, Free, Schler, & Thiele (2007) with further references. See Donini, Minear, Smillie, Baarda, & Welch (2005, esp. p. 54).
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tion that practices in Afghanistan need to change (e.g., more co-ordination on all levels, more coherence), and chances of a successful implementation of a sophisticated, inherently European policy on civil reconstruction are better than expected at first glance. Allowedly, the process towards more aid effectiveness does not cover the issue of civil-military coordination (CIMIC), perhaps the major problem in Afghanistan, so that the link between civil reconstruction in Afghanistan and aid effectiveness might appear to be rather weak. But the aid effectiveness process stresses enhanced co-ordination, alignment (local ownership), and harmonization among donors; goals that still need to be implemented in Afghanistan. Given that some of the best performers in terms of aid effectiveness are European countries (e.g., UK, Sweden, Denmark), the EU should use the impact of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a catalyser for a revision of the reconstruction policy in Afghanistan. Moreover, combining a strengthened engagement in civil reconstruction with the general process of the Paris Declaration has another advantage: If this combination proves to be successful, a translation of policy changes in Afghanistan into a rolemodel for civil reconstruction in general has a solid argumentative basis and is already entrenched in an internationally ratified and implemented institutional framework.29 Unmistakeably, all those introductory considerations do not implicate that the task in Afghanistan is easier to achieve then generally expected. Needless to say, the Afghan experiment30 is a tremendous one which bears great risks for every participant. But we want to stress that the general crisis of the intervention in Afghanistan is also a chance for the EU to show and prove true and ingenious leadership. If the EC can succeed in Afghanistan with its policies, the EU can succeed everywherea fact, that will not be overlooked by the European public.
2.6 Conclusion
Besides the obvious humanitarian reasons for continuing European engagement, Afghanistan offers a chance to demonstrate European leadership and capability to act in the area of global politics and to prove European citizens in a most tangible way that the EU and Europe is more than just a customs union. Of course, the European activities in Afghanistan have to be successful in order to create such positive effects. In most European capitals the impression seems to prevail that such successes cannot be achieved in Afghanistan, hence activities in Afghanistan are not priorities and kept rather low key.31 However, we hold that the major impediments to progress in Afghanistan are rather homemade: The interveners have no conclusive policy, they lack co-ordination, they are too militaryfocused, and they are understaffed in every department and chronically underfi-
Some reports on Afghanistan tend to ignore current changes in the global field of aid and development assistance. But since the activities of the interveners are part of that field too, it is rather unrewarding to focus only on Afghanistan. Without taking the bigger picture of international aid into consideration, recommendations are prone of being unrealistic or not fully implementable.
30
29
The state building mission in Afghanistan is experimental insofar as at the beginning of the intervention no participating agency had a detailed, fact-based plan about how the realize the rather general and therefore opaque objectives. Hence, state building in Afghanistan was an open-end mission: No one could exactly anticipate how it would proceed. Often, it seems that the main concern is preventing casualties among the own national ISAF-contingent rather than assisting the Afghans.
31
14
nanced compared to other state building mission in recent years.32 On the bright side, remedy is in hands reach, since it is up to Western decision makers to increase their engagement, to focus on a Europe-wide policy for civil reconstruction, and to use the EU respectively the EC for co-ordination as well as for implementation.33 The EU, on the other hand, has got to simplify and clear up its institutional structures on both sides, in Brussels as well as in Afghanistan. We recognize that without a general reform of the EU a thorough reform of the involved bodies is highly unlikely,34 but there are still enough opportunities for fine-tuning. Finally, it should be noted that the European public will not be convinced by the war on terror-argument anymore. Furthermore, voters will not condone enormous disbursements that are legitimated mainly by referring to international solidarity with the needy. By and large, Europeans are not that altruistic. It is a matter of common knowledge that we do not defend European freedom in Afghanistan at least not anymore. And the freedom of the Afghans is not that appealing to Europeans that substantial loss of life and money seems to be reasonable. But the legitimacy of European involvement in Afghanistan could be restored if Europe manages to distinguish itself as the lessons learned-agency of the global society: Europes concerted second wave of Afghanistan aid should aim at sorting out the mess left from an un-coordinated and astonishingly policy free intervention in Afghanistan in a distinctive European way.35
32 33
This statement holds not true for military activities in Afghanistan.
As long as the recent reforms of the EU are not implemented, the distinction between the EU and the EC is not a minor one.
34
How the current structures of the EU hinder an efficient implementation of European assistance in Afghanistan is worthy of a detailed investigation, that could serve as an illustrative argument why the Lisbon treaty is needed. Although, however, the recent reforms would not solve the problem of development aid being stuck between the pillars and between economic and political responsibility (Kurpas et al., 2007, pp. 123-138).
35
In a way, this second wave should be understood as chance to implement lessons learned from prior failures like the intervention in Kosovo was correction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15
3 Introductory remarks
To write recommendations about Europes position and role in the ongoing Afghanistan syndrome is to add one more text to a large amount of analyses and opinions and to a lesser amount of research. Each intervention produces a comets tail of second thoughts and analyses, especially, if the outcome of the intervention is not what it was meant to be. This is true for Afghanistan in particular, because for a long time (2002-2006), the quick impact intervention (2001) and the following operations against the Taliban were labelled the good war against the world-wide opinion that the intervention in Iraq created the prototypical bad war, hence increasing the pressure on the interveners to be successful in a good war. Now, that the security is deteriorating and toll among intervening military and civilians is rising, the notion is no longer on the validation of the war as good, but on its continuation with either the same or radically changed strategies. In order to minimize overlapping with other already written and read analyses, this report will be rather prescriptive than descriptivethe general facts are repeated in any substantial discussion and do not need to be put on paper here again. Furthermore, we do not follow one strict analytical narrative in our report, although our recommendations are, of course, based on an underlying approach. Nevertheless, we do not want to present our scientific theses here, but illuminate those parts of Afghanistans social fabric that we deem to be crucial for success in the state building process and relevant for any further policy planning. Your authors are not going to reconstruct the entire perception of the intervention to Afghanistan and the conflicts after this intervention. But in order to take a clear European perspective, it is necessary to have a closer look to some of the following aspects:
a. The conflict always has been a dual problem of national (=Afghan) and regional
(Central Asian) dimensions. Neither the public nor the overt rhetoric on the conflict has paid sufficient attention to this dualism36. For instance, there is a fatal and properly known link between the events in the Western Territories of Pakistan and the Afghan tribes on either side of the border, but neither the public nor the politicians of those countries that are engaged in Afghanistan have been overly aware of the connectedness of regional conflicts and developments in Afghanistan; only recently, after the demotion of President Musharraf, and while US forces transgress the national borders of Pakistan for their airraids, the attention has grown.
b. It is widely agreed upon the fact that there would not have been any military
intervention by the USA or NATO or any wider alliance without the effect of 9/11; and, in particular, without the recognition of the legitimate search of Osama bin Laden on Afghan ground. If this is correct, then the subsequent mandate of UNAMA, ISAF, and the international commitment to the Bonnprocess of state-building was not grounded in an urgent wish of the so-called international community to regime-change from the Taliban towards democracy, market-economy and a an influential civil society. In correspondence with
36
Much of the references used by your author so far had to revised and amended by the stupendous findings and comprehensive analysis in Ahmed Rashids new book (Rashid 2008). This magisterial account to the development of the conflict in the region shows the connection between the afghan question and the Pakistani and regional circumstances in a truly global perspective. This is also important for some of our later arguments on the Global Society approach which can be useful for the analysis and the recommendations.
16
this assumption, the nation-building procedures in Afghanistan followed an generic security-first counter-terrorism approach (s. failed state-thesis) in that they have been halfway co-opting and deconstructionist: Although most institutions were built from scratch since 2001 and replaced older institutions (deconstructionist approach), most of the personnel of Afghanistans politicians and bureaucrats remained and was integrated in the planning of the rebuilding of Afghanistan (co-opting approach).37 We will recommend corrections in either direction. But we shall not forget that, other than in dependent states, Afghanistan is sovereign, therefore the government of President Karzai must treat the interveners state building ambitions at least partly as exertion of influence by outsidersa fact that is often forgotten by the interveners within the haste of anti-terrorism measures and counter-insurgency but certainly not by the intervenees. Our basic assumption is that two complex wars are being fought simultaneously, one nation-building war,38 establishing a monopoly of power at a central level, according to the traditional ideas on what a nation-state has to be; and a global war against the Taliban, as part of a worldwide operation termed War on Terrorism.
c. The practical consequences for the need to build a state on the fundament of
new society in the making are considerably unclear: What we observe is a delayed process of society-buildinga delayed insofar as the formal institutions more closely resemble their Western role models than the informal, social organisation of the Afghan populationand we strongly recommend to support the Afghan people in their new construction of an society instead of providing a re-construction agenda. This is important insofar as despite many surviving traditions and diachronic developments, the old fundaments of the older commonwealth known by the name Afghanistan cannot sustain a modern state with an increasingly functionally divided society.39 In other words, one cannot have an authentic and traditionally differentiated state with peaceful conviviality among Pashtuns, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Hazara etc. while only having changed the socio-economy, the infrastructure and the political system into the features that liberal state-building will have.40 But that a full-blown western and liberal society will emerge as a by-products of a market-orientated economy will become apparent when we turn to donor specific policies later on.
d. The question for the EU will be whether its members will accept the construction thesis and link it to the post-intervention status of Afghanistan. This is decisive for the understanding of certain angles of our analysis of donor pledges and demands. Constructing a new society cum state is not an overly enigmatic process; for example, concerning root causes of conflicts: It helps to know about the origins of conflicts for sure, butrather than trying to end or solve
37 38
The concepts of co-option and deconstruction are explained in detail in Dobbins, Jones, Crane & DeGrasse (2007).
Many of the actions by Karzai and his cabinet are seemingly marginal, but function as a rather difficult way of arraigning allegiance by tribal leaders and other local forces, this includes changing micro-coalitions, ethnic and cultural compromises, even temporary giving in to corruption or drug trafficking, where it does not appear to be necessary. These are concessions to the state-building as well as to the common interest in defeating the Taliban. We think that the Taliban are considered rather a threat to the state-building and the consolidation of society than a part of world-wide terrorism, which does not mean much to most Afghans.
39
Functionally divided describes the fact that in modern times societies differentiate their elements among the lines of functionality rather than heritage or caste affiliation (Luhmann, 1997). See Bonacker (2008).
40
17
these conflictswe have to concentrate on the regulation of such conflicts that have emerged from the intervention and are spreading under the present circumstances. Because the interpretation of the root conflict(s) is quite different in the US, in Pakistan, in Russia, and, of course, in Afghanistan proper, the EU would be well advised to play its own opinion on these conflict(s) low key, to focus instead on their dealing with the present situation on-ground, and to develop a feasible pragmatic approach to European action in post-intervention societies. It has been detrimental for all attempts to help Afghanistan after 9/11 that the EU did not react more resolutely to the initial US complacency after the military victory and its unwillingness to assist a strong nation building.41 Each single incident or casualty of the European ISAF troops produces a national debate on whether to continue the commitment and the present way to send more troops and to enlarge the military activities as part of the WoT, or to change the strategy, or even to retreat from any military engagement. The military engagement in most public statements is treated as opposed to civil reconstruction and development aid. The complement is poorly understood, since the two wars are not perceived as such, but as one.
e. Was the golden Hour used for significant actions? The question is important
insofar as the attitude of donors and other players, e.g., allies in the ISAF and OEF context, more often than not is based on the impression that the decision makers of these countries get during the period called the golden hour42. Immediately after a victorious intervention which, by the majority, is understood as liberation rather than occupation, there is a period of time (of undefined duration, but never permanent and determined by a set of relatively well known conditions) of extreme good will.43 For the Europeans, the golden hour was a good justification to engage themselves not only rhetorically, but also practically in programs dedicated to both reconstruction and state building, and in being rather easily convinced in joining the post 9/11 coalition (ISAF rather than OEF). Of course, politicians knew that ISAF/OEF had no immediate aims in reconstruction, but they thought under the protection of the golden hour the risks were relatively little and the moral gains convincingly big.44 As a result, the common belief that the North is safe or the central state as the main foci in early nation building became part of a policy instead of a temporary phenomenon the fluidity of which one could have foreseen.
f.
European policy should not shy away from answering one question: Is the original and very strong solidarity factor towards the US after 9/11 exhausted? (There is no reason to go into morally justified or unjustified arguments. But the consequence from loosening the unconditional solidarity with the US is very clear: The humanitarian intervention (ISAF) and the alliance WoT/OEF have both lost one credible pillar of legitimacy. In other words: By now it is of no importance whatsoever whether Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar are found
41 The nation-building light paradigm has been significant for the early Bush policies as a contrast to Clinton years. For the concrete making of the US role see Rashid, 2008, p. 74f. 42 43
See Dobbins (2007), and Dobbins et al. (2007).
Among them some psychological conditions such as trauma, immediate relief, internal emptiness, also indifference and apathy against the environment; some sociological aspects such as reorganisation of family and development of hope (=belief in a future), and some political: expectations of political, economic, cultural freedom in the due course of liberation.
44
See Korski (2008), but cf. Sullivan (2008).
18
and convicted. The earlier motivation of counter-terrorism can be replaced or at least subsidised by a specifically European dimension in assisting civil reconstruction (cf. c.). This includes further strengthening the sovereignty of a state in search of the monopoly of power, notwithstanding the EU-wide criticism of the WoT. This is extremely important, because it would allow the EC a very decided position to not abstractly retreat from military activities but to ask for a continuation of changes in the US strategy as started in November 2007, which are showing some, but insufficient effect. Even a more WoT-sceptical view implies strengthening national security by efforts to establish and train national police forces (Police is more crucial to the state building process than military, and the Afghan National Army [ANA] is doing comparatively well compared to the Afghan National Police [ANP]). There is a new related problem emerging: the attacks on German soldiers in August 2008 in Kunduz have shifted the attention to military other than American, when it comes to justified or wrong allegations of attacks against civilians with significant reactions by the civil population. This is influencing the homeland discourse much stronger than attacks by ISAF forces against Taliban, with or without casualties among their own ranks, and or civilians. This concurs with the official rhetoric of most MS and the EC, but in MS this is a shaky position as soon as own troops are under fire or casualties and dead have to be mourned.
g. It is not unlikely that Afghanistan offered some European governments a good

opportunity to demonstrate global responsibility and a close-to-US position without the need of readjusting the basically negative perception of the Iraq war. (cf. a.). While it was not so difficult for most governments to persuade their parliaments and political constituency that support of both military and civil reconstruction of Afghanistan is part of morally and pragmatically good policy, in most countries the public remained sceptic: the entanglement of ISAF and OEF, CIA operation, many civilian casualties by (mainly) US fire, allegations of torture etc. created an early anxiety of creating a second Iraq. Since foreign policy did not (and probably could not) explain why the Taliban resurged in the course of the reconstruction process, the logical but highly unpopular upgrading of the military aspects of the post-intervention time became the central focus of all Afghanistan discourse in Europe. The civil reconstruction, the different pace in diverse sectors of social and political development, in economy and in the settling of the returnee agenda have become functions of the one theme: the war against Taliban. At least on the level of discourse, Europe has become a hostage of the War on Terrorism (WoT). This deviates from the Afghan and regional problems and does no justice to the reality in the country. This kind of argument is part of what we call the homeland discoursea concept we will elaborate in following chapters: In a country that sends troops, pays for major reconstruction projects, has many DA workers in the field, and supports NGOS, there is permanent need of justifying its commitment and legitimising its political decisions. Normally, this is easier during the golden hour than later.
3.1 A brief intermediate summary of problems and questions

There are many more elements of European policy on Afghanistan. We shall reduce complexity by assuming that the US are, as a major player of all Afghan events, permanently and intensively present and, in a way, reduce the leeway of a sovereign European foreign policy;
19
the motives of the European commitment to Afghanistan and its own aspiration, both as a supra-national entity and a group of incoherent MS, are highly heterogeneous, therefore common interests and a common rationale should be identified as well as permanently diverging opinions in some MS; the difference between a specific Afghanistan policy and a broader regional policy is not very clear, as is the difference between support for state building in Afghanistan and the account to European interests, such as security, economy and the mere aspiration to play a role, i.e. to be recognized as sufficiently important in a part of global policy.
The shortcomings of this list are evident: in many details of the present reality in Afghanistan we can feel the absence of any relevant EU-policy during most of the war-period from 1978 until 2001. On the other side, and this will play an important role in the authors recommendations, there is a significant role of Europe in earlier periods of modernization, e.g. during the period of King Amanullah (r. 19171929?), notably of Germany, Turkey, and France. There is a certain idiosyncrasy between Afghans and British that has an impact;45 most important and highly tabooed are the rather diverse effects of the Soviet occupation and communist rule, e.g. on different development in rural or urban areas.46 In order to understand what is going on in the country, one has to consider the diachronic development of diverse sectors and gauge its impact on local life-worlds: Tribal structures, the rise of mullahs, the decay of rural areas, and the urban expansion, refugees and returnees, etc. should be seen under the overarching aspect of a yet incomplete, nascent society and a rather incomplete state-building in war-time. There was a Thirty-years War before the intervention (and your authors are choosing deliberately the analogy to the Great European war in the 17th century which left its traces for a very long period of time), and there is the bifocal war after the intervention, i.e. the state-building war against the insurgency and WoT on Afghan territory: The adversary is in both cases the Taliban, but within different discursive usages and not as a very concrete group. Taliban is the generic term for the real reason why we are entangled in a war, while we, the interveners, had the best intentions to fortify peace for people who deserve to live in peace. Your authors are aware of the fact that this argument bears an enormous moral charge: Considering the positions of the West, especially of the US and the former USSR, we have to take into consideration the conditions under which the Taliban could come into existence.47 They are subject and object at once, and we concur with Rashid (2008) that the Taliban of 2008 are different from the Taliban of the 1990s. But, as in many other conflicts, it is no use of dissecting the roots of the conflict(s) in a detail that would not meet the practice of everyday hostile encounters; and would also not be understood by the people on site, e.g., in the villages etc. We want to add one aspect, which is not yet maturated enough to give a clear recommendation. If we want to get an agreement with the Taliban, the definition of the moderate segment among the Taliban is critical to the implementation of such a wish. And many experts doubts whether we can differentiate between more
45
Even UKs Defence Secretary Des Brown recognized that insurgents were energized by the arrival of British forces in Helmand. Obviously, to fight the traditional enemy is still a strong incentive in Afghanistan (Suhrke, 2008a, pp. 225-226)
46 47
For an historic account of the Soviet occupation and its modernizations, see Ewans (2002) or Schetter (2004). See Coll (2005) and Rashid (2001).
20
and less moderate Taliban. However, should we want to be involved in talks with Taliban the sovereign Afghan state and its president in the lead then it would be inevitable to select those counterparts who are willing to respect the constitution and to participate in the reconstruction of the country under its umbrella, and then it would be inevitable to include them in the government, with a few ministries and real legitimate power; not as a token or appeasement policy. As we stated, we do not recommend this or deny any sympathy to this answer either, but if such a solution will be envisaged, it should be straight and robust.
21
4 Decisive issues: What is crucial in Afghanistan

We will now give you short synopses about issues that should be considered in every further European policy planning regarding Afghanistan. Measured against the performance on-site, country-specific knowledge has had only limited impact on the general policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan. Most donors seem to treat Afghanistan as an extension of their usual development programs without realizing or taking into account the peculiarities of the intervention in Afghanistan and its subsequent state building mission.
4.1 Afghan Ownership in a conflict of global dimension

Although the interveners activities in Afghanistan should primarily be aimed at improving the lives of the Afghans, the recent crisis in the Caucasian region has shown how intertwined all elements of regional policy are. Just a few examples that illustrate the global context of any dimension in the European commitment to Afghanistan: The EU must consider its relations to Russia not only in regard to the balance of power in Eastern Europe, but also in Central Asia. Only by using the logistic facilities (esp. air bases) in the Central Asian republics, Western forces were able to intervene in Afghanistanand the ex-USSR republics permissions always relate to Russian politics. Bottom-line: Russia is crucial for the supply of troops in Afghanistan, albeit in an indirect way, and could easily diminish the impact of any European foreign policy in Central Asia. The ongoing Kashmir crisis shapes the domestic politics of Pakistan and should not excluded from any consideration. From this point of view, the position of India concerning Afghanistan can be better understood. As long as the Iran nuclear fight is not settled, Iran cannot enter the Afghan theatre in a constructive and peace-supporting way. However, the role Iran has been playing in consolidating economy and stability in western Afghanistan cannot be excluded from European considerations.
A focus on the agenda in and for Afghanistan must add some other dimensions. Many Afghans are anxious that their country could be forgotten by the world community or in particular by Europe. They are afraid that Afghanistan is only a token in a new Great Game between global power players. This fear is not an exaggeration, despite the keen interest of political leaders in a successful development of the military and civilian reconstruction. More than one analyst has observed how little interest the fate of the Afghan people produces in the public opinion of countries whose troops are in Afghanistan or whose development aid and political support for the country is significant; this suggests that engagements in Afghanistan might not be motivated intrinsically (i.e., not by the poor conditions in Afghanistan) and could be ended rather abruptly if they cannot be displayed as profitable for the donor country somehow. We hold that the EU should be second to no one else in following a triple humanitarian perspective, which, in the end, will serve European interests in global politics as well as Afghan interests in a prosperous and peaceful living. In our chapter about donor policies and the prior general assessment on assisting Afghanistan in building a state and a new society, we give a quite positive impression of the EC policy. In repeating some unquestioned principles we want to go deeper into the social
22
and cultural texture of these policies, in order to refresh the main justification for a complex military-based humanitarian intervention: its humanitarian purpose. 1) In a local perspective, the EU should act in compliance with the needs of the Afghan people and adjust its own, legitimate interests to this aim. 2) In a regional perspective, the EU should add to the peaceful development in the region, with Afghanistan as a natural (i.e., geographic) and political centre. 3) In a global perspective, the EU should increase its power as a key player in global policy through strengthening its humanitarian agenda; especially strengthening the civilian component in CIMIC and subsequent instruments for conflict prevention and resolution. Afghanistan could be the role model for such an interconnectedness of these different levels of policy. But for that, the current practice of muddling through must end. On paper, the EU is better suited than any other actor to perform such a path breaking role and provide the international community with an encompassing and applicable strategy for reconstruction of war-torn societies and failing states. The ranking of the perspectives is not arbitrary. Therefore, we will concentrate on the first, the local perspective, because without progress in Afghanistan, any regional or broader policy must fail, given the strong rhetoric of the interveners after 9/11.48 However, the humanitarian aspect can be included into policies on the first and third perspective as well. Nobody would seriously deny that a strong motivation for the intervention is to help the Afghan people, e.g., by liberating them from the effects of war and oppression, by opening new horizons for a peaceful life, by introducing strong and effective institutions etc. But we observe two disquieting facts: Most of these motives echo our own projections into the needs of the Afghan people or are echoed by Afghan leaders on the system level, especially by political peers or negotiators, and are not based on the empirical expression of needs and demands by the people themselves.49 The discourse on needs is not as evidence-based as it appears. Very often, the needs of the nascent Afghan state are instantly and unconsciously conflated with the needs of the Afghan populationby Afghan politicians as well as by the interveners. The classical misinterpretation to exemplify this assumption is the security first suggestion: Nobody would dare to deny that security is a precondition for most other activities. But security is not the priority; the activities (work, ploughing the field, selling fruit, sending children to school, filtering water etc.) are the priorities for any individual Afghan. This example explains why we, the interveners, seem to be never content with the polls that rank security much lower than our politicians and the common sense in the interveners countries tend to do. This is not simply a phenomenon of post-colonial discourse. The consequence from a reversed strategy would be to support Afghans in creating such objects and properties that are worthwhile of being protected in their eyesan assessment that might be based on a totally different risk-assessment than ours. Locals tend to subordinate security measures to local needs, what appears to be wrong according
In international politics, it still matters what has been said officially. No one should underestimate the long lasting, inter-generational memories and its consequences in Afghanistan and Central Asia in general (see C. Johnson & Leslie, 2002). The interveners have announced Afghanistan as a centrepiece of their counter-terrorism policy and will be judged by Asian and Arabian publics by their performance there.
49
48
See, for instance, Barnett and Zrcher (2007) and Pouligny (2005).
23
to our military or security doctrines. (In the case of PRTs we can prove that this consideration may have an actual, however locally limited relevance).50 For the European approach, learning about the local needs would imply also to acquire faster and more comprehensively research and findings about the highly diversified local structures and opinions on priorities and needs51 and to read the polls and other empirical data with Afghan eyes. This implicates a change in policy, because it instigates mechanisms and instruments to effectively receive and implement what the Afghan eyes see and want. The creation of such mechanisms and instruments can be part of a policy which will focus even more on the support of higher education and social research.52 To sum up: It is about time to take the notion of Afghan ownership more seriously. Currently, Afghan ownership is mainly understood as participation of the central government or their local institutions and often neglects the local population (partly due to time pressure and/or implementation problems) who is the addressee of every donor mission or reconstruction effort. Furthermore, true Afghan ownership often entails meagre effectiveness (due to prolonged planning phases and local needs that may required solutions that are not part of the current best practice catalogue) which is often not approved by the donors headquarters.53
4.2 How to learn to get the priorities straight

As stated earlier, the priorities of the Afghans are not necessarily identical or congruent with those of the donors and other major players. There are different angles and strategic approaches which prepare for rather incompatible priorities in support and implementation, in particular when they exceed the basic needs like food and shelter. We think that most of the direct support action and reconstruction work is well intended and much of it worthwhile of being continued. (This is one of the bases of our optimism). However, when adopting a closer look into the contents and substance of the support that can be given from the outside (donors and directing powers) and the activities which should be assisted in the society, we find quite a few idiosyncrasies and approaches in need of correction.54 The short-comings of current policies become apparent when applying a view that is society-oriented (instead of system- or state-oriented); based upon a theory of post-intervention and post-war circumstances; critical of a pure, emphatic civil-society philosophy.
50
The example of a bridge, built by a PRT (Bamyan, 2006) in best intention, but under security aspects: a local person told us that the bridge is fine and is being used, but the villagers would have wanted and needed the bridge elsewhere. In its given location the bridge was perceived as part of the interveners infrastructure and not as a contribution to Afghanowned reconstruction. See the exemplary study of Koehler and Zrcher (2007a). Conference Herat 2007; Daxner: The Right to Modernisation, p.2, 10
51 52 53
See Carbone (2008) for a detailed account about how increased aid effectiveness brings about decreased local ownership. This is not only a observation in Afghanistan: Humanitarian NGOs and GOs are always at their best when faced with an real catastrophe where only emergency relief is required, but in general less effective when forced to operate in a politicized environment (e.g., Terry, 2002; Weiss, 2007).
54
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We want to make sure that we do not favour Realpolitik (or neo-realistic peacebuilding theories within the liberal state-building paradigm), but shall combine a well-grounded pragmatism with the sociological humanism that is represented in observations and analyses like those from Bourdieu.55 And we do not want this to be marginalized as the philosophy of a policy that has to stand in the background, whenever political decisions are being made. The lack of over-arching ethical and need-oriented discourse is one of the major reasons for failing practice in societies of intervention; or, as Bourdieu points out critically, the absence of the interveners self-reflexion in making their policy.56 To learn about priorities, empirical methods and a theory of objectivation of individual and subjective perceptions are necessary, but the diverse current approaches to post-conflict situations often operate with incongruent instruments or schemes that are too tightly bound to the policies of their contractors and very seldom applicable to local perspectives too. In other words, there is no grand unifying theory about how to learn about the minds and needs of people affected by interventions (intervened) without excluding the critical view of the interveners motives and scopes. Our own approach can be located at the interface between political ethnology and sociology, deliberately leaving out the great visions on the systems level, such as treaties, global alliances, international law etc. But this restriction does not mean that we want to avoid reference to these fields, but they are not the ground from which our discourse is being constructed. For the aspect of society-building, a focus on the day-to-day perceptions and subjective realities (often slightly inappropriate termed life-world) is relevant: This is the sphere, where traditions, person-to-person conflict regulation, individual and micro-sociological values, hopes, anxieties, fears and the circumstances under which they appear, are relevant. In the light of the absence of a comprehensive and convincing theoretical framework, the EU should encourage research in order to explore the anthropological and social bases of large-scale interventions. Concerning the priorities of civil reconstruction in Afghanistan, there are quite numerous polls and other opinion research which we consider valid for interpretation. If we combine everything we know from these studies and from our own research and communication on site, three dimensions of reconstruction priorities can be discerned: For the ordinary people, priorities are employment, clean water, basic health care and sanitation, education, energy. Security plays an important role to stabilise and protect the achievements made in each of these priority sectors, but it is not a priority task unto itself.57 For the elites and the collusive segment of interveners and intervened, security (first) is the condition sine qua non for any development and reconstruction. We consider this a misleading and wrong policy; but the approach following the
55 56
See Bourdieu (1976; 1993).
See Bourdieu (2003). We think that these essays on ethnological field work and on the objectivations, i.a. through analyses from photography, are the best introduction into the attitude of advising by laying the focus on both, the interveners and the intervened. One striking example where Algerian experience can be transferred to Afghanistan is that the people through the war have emancipated from an attitude of submission to western care; in our case through the unifying moment of resisting the Soviet occupation (Bourdieu, 1960). For instance: In an recent representative poll issued by the three important broadcasters ARD, ABC, and BBC the most frequently reason given by Afghan for the slow progress in Afghanistan was the bad economic situation (51%), while only a third blamed the lack of security (33%). Two thirds of all interviewees rated their local security situation as generally good (Charney Research & Afghan Institute for Social and Public Opinion Reseach, 2007).
57
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real needs first and the security option as a consequence from successful reconstruction bears the risk of becoming unpopular and difficult to defend at any security-related negative event. Who is ready to bear the responsibility? Who is held liable for a singular security gap? For most Afghan people the new institutions of a liberal, market-oriented democratic state are acceptable or even preferred, but the individuals in the leading positions of those institutions are neither trusted nor available nor visible enough. The consequence for institution building is clear, less clear is the strategy to train the democrats who are willing and appear to be capable to serve in democratic institutions. What is needed is a certain basic republicanism, i.e. the willingness to serve the public case and to become trained for an agenda beyond the legitimate interests of family, clan and tribe. People seem to prefer legal pluralism in many affairs that are related to both the systems level and their life-world; this linkage could promote identification with the nascent Afghan state and promote an identity that is centred rather on inclusive institutions than on exclusive ethnicism or images of collective, primordial bonds of fate and family.58 People need a public space: one of the most important conditions for the development of a free society is public space, and not only inside the secure walls of exclusive or elitist gated communities. Despite some progress with regard to free media and press, Afghanistan lacks the fundamental multitude and variety of cultural and public forums which are necessary to let values, taste and morals compete. (Conservative arguments that these needs echo only western attitudes and are directed against tradition, are simply wrong: given the history of modernisation in Afghanistan and the urban development (even under Soviet occupation), a good part of tradition serves as an instrument to keep outlived micro-social orders alive. The old order was certainly conservative and restrictive, but allowed all people, especially in rural areas, to maintain their attitudes and rules within a stable division between public and private spheres. By escape, exile, fighting, return and further displacement, this has been irreversibly destroyed for many Afghans. As far as we know the problem of public space for the
millions of internally displaced persons living in the slums of the big cities has never been touched.
4.3 Trust in institutions

Some other needs can only be derived from the circumstances under which the reconstruction takes place. In the Asia Foundation polls, the discrepancy between (wanted) trust into institutions and real distrust in concrete persons (politicians) and parties is stunning.59 Much of the distrust in institutions can be explained by traditional corruption, the notorious susceptibility of administration to bribery and patronage, the submission under superiors etc. The rather instinctive, unreflective bending to authoritieselders, fathers, mullahs, landlords etchas survived de-
Center for Policy and Human Development: Afghanistan Human development Report 2007. Kabul: esp. the contribution of Ali Wardak (chapter 5), which provoked high level controversies. For example, in Asia Foundation poll Afghanistan in 2007 79% of all interviewees agreed to the statement the politicians seek power for their own benefits and dont care about helping people (pp. 49, 59), while 80% believed their provincial government does a good or somewhat good job, but only 56% said the same about their municipal authority. And even more striking: nearly 50 per cent would not allow meeting of any political party in their area (pp. 74-75).
59
58
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spite many of the traditional reasons and the texture of the previous society do no longer exist. This phenomenon is being used and abused by the strongmen and traditionalists in order to prevent emancipation. But a responsible bureaucracy (in the sense of Max Weber) should do more than excise these deficiencies. Administration should be effective, efficient, reliable and sustainableand also be ostentatiously visible as such. While much progress in institution building has been done, confidence building and the peoples participation in a transparent administrative system should be supported by more firmly and coherently (up to date, there is no conclusive approach to this problem discernable). As for the training of public service and institutional proficiency, continuing education, preferably lead by Afghans, is advised; good practice can be offered exemplary from experience in other areas of intervention. The most controversial aspect is police. While the polls give a surprisingly positive account to trust in the ANP, all references by actors on the ground and foreign analysts regret the slow transition of police from a notoriously disreputable institution into a real police. Under the aspect of European responsibilities much of the criticism is certainly justified. But there might be other aspects that would show local police in a more favourable light, e.g., the familiarity with the local social environment. The more we insist that terrorists belong mainly to the agenda of police the more the role of ANP for the domestic politics becomes critical. Even if we agree that in an environment such as Afghanistan the proper delineation between military and police is not altogether sensible, there must be a strategy for the police in which direction it will have to act.60 Another example is the need for legitimacy of local power and rules. Schetter, Glasner, and Karokhail (2007) have shown the big differences among groups from the same tribal or ethnic background, when it comes to the legitimacy of their autonomous domain vis--vis the central government.61 It is necessary not only to respect these differences, but to include them into custom-tailored local programs.
4.4 Corruption, first guilt, and returnees

This is the place to bring forth a recommendation which should be discussed in detail because it is deeply intertwined with issues of legitimacy and trust. There is a growing sense of Afghans that the western donors and partners blame them collectively for structures that impede or hamper the process of reconstruction, what in turn might result in a loss of legitimacy for every individual politician or office bearer. For those rather unspecific accusations, a high ranking Afghan official coined the term second guilt of Afghans62 and described its as follows: Their first guilt was fighting among each other after the victory over the Soviets and being unable to create a stable commonwealth and state on their own. The second guilt is being ungrateful towards the generous donors and political allies, advisors and consultants by being inefficient in implementing all the help and assistance of-
60 61
For a most accurate overview on the issue see Rashid (2008, pp. 203ff).
See also Schetter (2006). The observation that local tribal leaders represent a highly developed sense of independence and autonomy has been impressively stated by Tom Koenigs (SRSG UNAMA until December 2007) in many of his explanations to political leaders and expert audiences. This is an attitude which should not be broken by a central government but could be made best use of in creating decentralised structures and legal pluralism.
62
Thesis presented by Sayed Hosayn Anwar, the governor of Herat, at the AICHR/AUAF Conference on Conflict resolution, November 2007. At the same conference, the civilian representative of NATO repeated exactly the accusations which had caused the governors irritation.
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fered. In particular, corruption, laziness, nepotism, tribalism is among the most frequent accusations brought against Afghan authorities; in a diplomatic language this was also a message for President Karzai at the Paris meeting 2008.63 Because of a few facts which are unpleasant but should be taken into account, the interveners critic falls on fairly deaf ears. Consider for example the issue of nepotism: Especially in the early years after the intervention, the interveners (esp. the USA) conducted a lot of activities that would give the model for attitudes they are now criticising. In the war against the Taliban the opportunity for an easy win had always won against morals.64 Why should Afghans feel guilty, when their level of efficiency and regular work is impeded by circumstances that are to a large extent formed and controlled by their numerous advisors? With regard to efficiency, Afghans, especially highly trained returnees, know their job as well as western consultants but have the advantage to know the local circumstances pretty well and are not open to pragmatic solutioneven if they diverge from the customary good practice-routines. We know of many examples, when experts from foreign GOs or NGOs advise activities which either had been advised by local experts much earlier or simply miss the point. (One example has been international experts advice to create water distribution cooperatives, when local tradition have known about such institutions for centuries and could not revive them only because of the destruction of the hardware and drainage systems. Instead of simply rebuilding the traditional systems (which would have required not much resources), the interveners experts initiated a prolonged process of fact finding and planning. Needless to say that they arrived at an efficient and capable solution, but in the meantime, the highly paid experts got a bitter and sarcastic review by Afghans who urgently waited for any help that would have allowed them to cultivate their land again. The best known example is Ismael Chans criticism of sanitation projects that cost more than 10 times as much as local projects for toilets, which were obviously considered to be too backward compared to the offered international solutionsalbeit serving the same purpose.)65 This complex is not exclusively typical for Afghanistan, but only in a few societies of intervention the original root conflict has amounted to such a tremendous first guilt of a long lasting civil war and violence among many factions and alliances. Very often returnees suffer from the allegations of the second guilt without even being part of the civil wars and other conflicts that constitute the first guilt. This aspect requires a special attention by all external program designers and advisers. The EC has very early undertaken to support all kinds of refugee protection and returnee integration, from which programs we can derive many useful details.66 The other side of the medal is also important and requires as much attention: Many of the returnees have been away from Afghanistan for such a long time, and they have become estranged from their homeland. Some of them have romanticised the inner image of their country and want to return to a good time that has never existed; others have become condescending and want to modernise their compatriots in a most one-sided way. But between these extremes, there is also a third group, which is larger: They try to accommodate to the new situation and fail, as well as their local counterparts fail to work with them. Here, the habitus-theories apply, according to which habitus changes more slowly than reality.
63 64 65 66
See Cooper (2008). For a detailed account of the highly ambivalent actions of high level US-Americans in late 2001, see Chayes (2006). See Rout (2008) for a general review of Afghanistans irrigation systems and its possible reconstruction. The EC Budget line B7-667 comprised much support for IOM and UNHCR projects after 2001 (CSES London 2007).
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For both sides of the problem, we recommend a new research program including expatriates and re-migrants that left the country after a period of disappointment. It
is imperative for further planning to finally gauge the returnee-factor by more than just arbitrary collections of anecdotes from the field.
4.5 How to deal with religious leaders

A last element on the issue of needs is tackled with utmost care. We dare a political recommendation which is not daring in itself, but can create many misunderstandings. As advocates of a secular state,67 we think that there is a needand not only a politically and culturally motivated wish to reduce the power of the mullahs and to re-establish more power of the tribal elders and leaders. Each major political change in the last 40 years has reduced the power of the tribal elders and strengthened the power of the religious leaders.68 While the first effect was often intended, especially by the Soviets, by the Taliban and by the US interveners, the second was a mainly unwanted or unpredicted effect from the first (with the exception of the Taliban who explicitly want strong mullahs as local authorities over the hearts and minds). Of course, it would need a synchronic and diachronic analysis to find out who has been or is a real tribal elder and locally respected leader, and who is simply a warlord or strongman. But we hold that in general the thesis of declining tribal power is correct, albeit exceptions are granted on both sides. One could argue that it is natural that the mullahs attain much power because of the deeply conservative religious texture of society. But if that were true, then religion should have played an even bigger role in previous times, and then, the influence of mullahs was evidently lesser. One explanation for the rise of the mullahs is the rift between urban and rural areas: while the latter remained in their traditional pattern, secularism had gained some ground in the cities, and religion became a natural ally of the traditionalist and often reactionary dissent. Another explanation is the increasing bondage of the Taliban under the command of Al Qaida, 69 and in this context a specific kind of religion is instrumental and not fundamental to the life-world. 70 The third explanation is micro-social: When the power of the local elders had been reduced, people looked to another local authority to seek guidance and advice, and the mullahs were palpable. There are more possible explanations, and most are compatible with each
67 A secular state does not mean an adversity against religious practices; it is a condition for tolerance towards religious denominations and between them, and agnostics. We would not advocate a laicist state in Afghanistan. But theocratic elements in a state to be, which has adopted a constitution which is well balanced among its elements of religious tradition and universal human rights, should not be supported by a superficial respect for traditions and attitudes which are directly contradicting the human rights laid down in the constitution. 68 69
See Spanta (2004). See Rashid (2001, 2008).
70 This is an additional argument for the characterisation of Taliban as traditionalists, different from the generic fundamentalist (Giradet, Walter, & Norchi, 2003, pp. 44-52). This position is rather complex, because it is obvious that for the conservative fundamentalists of all religions tradition also plays a role. The difference is that Taliban traditionalism (in the beginning, and based on Deobandi madrassa education and other sources which came also from religion) overemphasised religious observance and interpreted it in a way that was strangulating the faith-base by sheer obedience. Today, we must speak of a second generation of Taliban who do not even pretend a spiritual basis but act directly political, and often as underlings of Al Quaida commands. Not all of the Taliban measures (p. 51) are applied by the fundamentalists, who can be best compared to their likes in all societies as using religion to keep up a certain social structure and texture. There is one other element that is being used by the Taliban, i.e., the Pashtun component of their traditions which should demonstrate the Pashtuns their loss of influence on the whole of the state. It is most important that we do not define the Taliban according to our classification of terrorists and insurgents, but see them in context.
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other. But it is clear that the religious component in both legislation and everyday life has grown, even under President Karzai,71 and the pressure on courts and administration has become stronger in many cases, though not everywhere.72 The right to secularism within some limitations is a mid-term aim of crucial importance, not least for the relation between the sexes, business partners and the individuals competing for lifestyle and values. In many cases, the new constitution, which we consider premature and unbalanced for many reasons, is being interpreted in a rather orthodox and faith-based manner. Again, this is no argument against the recognition of a deeply religious conservative society; but it is an appeal to the external partners in society- and nation-building to also respect the openings towards a more balanced pluralism. The Europeans have a chance to propagate this more credibly than other faith-based policies on the ground. Since there is certain openness of many Afghans towards this pluralistic position, not least among returnees from their liberal western exiles, this is a chance for the Europeans to occupy a special field of credible and comprehensive activities, where they can combine this approach with the creation of more public space. It would overexpand this section of the report to go into the details; but generally speaking, many people fear an undue influence of western civilisation on their traditional life-worlds,73 but do not oppose the opportunities which are being offered by the presence of a more western or modern competition in lifestyle and habits. There is progress, however full of backlashes. On the one side, court rules such as the death sentence against a journalist are not being executed and the new Supreme Court make large steps away from the opinionated and narrow interpretation of the law and Sharia by the former Justice Shinwary,74 who had advised women not to work for international organisations or not to travel without the company of husband, brother or father. Much progress is indeed pushed by external influence, often insistent without being dominant. But the problem is that both people and government are frequently unaware that the state itself has committed itself to human rights conventions. A good example is the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which was ratified without much awareness by either government or the people. If international actors point at such duties from a legal or political commitment, it is no wonder that it is often interpreted to be interfering in a colonial or hegemonic way. This resentment often manifests itself in support for religious hard-liners, because this resistance to the interveners agenda is generally considered to be more legitimate (see the whole issue of respect for other cultures) than purely political opposition. Through creatingand respectinga more vibrant and accessible public space, thus giving the people more pronounced opportunities to express their concerns, religious hard-liners will be weakened more substantially than be blaming public religious figures in general.
See, for example, the re-instatement of the Talibans Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, renamed as the Ministry for Haj and Religious Affairs, now Ministry of Haj and Endowments. For a general overview of religious actors in Afghanistan, see Borchgrevink (2007).
72 73 74
71
See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2007) for a summary of religious affairs in Afghanistan. See Koehler & Zrcher (2007a).
The detrimental influence of the extremist leader Sayyaf on the US Ambassador Kalilzad until 2006 was one of the reasons why the Supreme Court could act against all reformist attempts (see Rashid, 2008, p. 215).
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4.6 Modernisation
We are not giving an ultimate definition of modernisation. Instead, we will give a few examples, where modernisation hits sensitive aspects of society-building, before we come to a conclusion and present recommendations on this segment of reconstruction. The interveners of 2001 have got to be aware of prior modernizations and its remnants in order to plan and implement the construction of a solid state and a peaceful society in Afghanistan in the most promising and sustainable way. Due to the complexity of the issue of modernization we will start with the recommendation in this chapter and only then elaborate on them. Consequences from the impact of modernization in Afghanistan are recommendations on
Judicial reform: It is imperative to in corporate traditional and informal rule

of law into the future judicial system of Afghanistan. In the very long run, these forms of justice may lose their authority but now and in the next 20 years, any legal system has to recognize and co-operate with traditional approaches to conflict mediation, even if they run contrary to western formal standards. In order to maximize the share of formal justice in dispute settlement, Afghanistan needs an institutional framework for legal pluralism.
Education: There is a tendency in every society of intervention to conservatism in the cultural ministries. Often, in nascent states, education is used to foster a certain vision of national identity which often includes a somewhat idealistic view on the rural population and the so-called traditional way of live.75 In Afghanistan, a slight traditional roll-back has already happened76 and should be understood as a reminder to pay more attention to educational issues that are more concerned with curricula then re-building of schools (more on education in chapter 4.8.1).
The interveners attitude towards tribal structures: Concerning modernizations, tribal leadership has always played an important role in Afghanistan: Many attempts to modernize the country had been incomplete because of the resistance of the rural population. However, the assumption that tribal leader are generally opposed to progress is wrong, but they insist on having their say about which elements should be emphasised.77 Even today, after a shattering civil war, Afghanistans tribe are still a force that should be reckoned with, and therefore a change of the interveners attitude towards tribal leader is recommended. The interveners should try to establish a working relationship between a new generation of tribal leaders, the Government of Afghanistan,78 and the interveners themselves in order to a) facilitate a community driven process of modernization and b) to reduce the
75
Of course, traditionalism and modernisation go hand in hand. Only when things begin to change drastically in one lifetime, the good old days can become the groundwork for a political ideology (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Lasch, 1991). See Daxner et al. (2007, pp. 74-76). See Suhrke (2007).
76 77 78
The Government of Afghanistan is notoriously hostile towards any tribal institution because it fears that the acceptance of any tribal legitimacy would diminish the legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. It may be appropriate to make the Government of Afghanistan familiar with the principle of subsidiarity; Europe should use its knowledge about organizing multiple layers of authority within one bigger institutional framework in this context.
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power of mullahs (which is different from just reducing the power of religion).
Mixed record of modernization: We must not forget that the last previous
common enemies of the Afghans, the Communists and Soviets, were also considered western in ideology and attitudes. On top of this, the decline of the tribal authority and the rise of the warlords are often considered to be a consequence of modernization. The interveners should be more aware of the impression they give when playing the modernization card: given the mixed record of modernizations in Afghanistan, just presenting the intervention as a vehicle of universal progress and general amelioration is simply not enough.
We hold that regarding society rather than the state, the major elements of modernisation are the freedom to expression and communication, to movement and the acquisition of rights, foremost the right to have and to define rights at all. (Of course, today this cannot be discussed without including the minimum status of human rights, which was not the case in earlier stages of modernisation). But then, participation in economic growth and in the competition for appropriate lifestyles and the respect and recognition of individuals and personalities notwithstanding a role for collective and community habits. One should not underestimate how waves of modernisation affected the Afghan people in the past and today. Afghanistan has a history of being one of the poorest countries of earth at least since the 18th century. In more recent past, Afghanistans poverty was aggravated by forced isolation in the late 19th century, then by incomplete leaps towards modern structures, and finally by a terrible and long period of war. Diachronic development is the characteristic of the cultural and social history of the people; the political history, however, looks relatively stable until the 1970s at least as long as we just look at the rulers, e.g. King Zahir Shah, whose rule began 1933 and lasted forty years. But the real rifts and ruptures occurred along other lines, for example, town vs. countryside, Pashtuns vs. other ethnic groups,79 different tribes within an ethnicity against each other, western educated vs. locally trained persons, and so forth. In the last 200 years, Afghanistan has consistently been subject to modernizing interventions that aimed at these fault lines and at reducing poverty.80 It has been mentioned several times that the war itself pushed modernisation on many levels, with and without conscious reflection of its effects on the individuals and their social life. This must not be misinterpreted as a militaristic anthropology of the war as mother of all inventions and change. However, war changes in a very cruel way much of the environment in which life-worlds had developed over the times. The co-ordinates of time and space become rapidly altered; telecommunication, weapon technology and the rupture of traditional division of labour and the routines of earning a living change the cycles of day, year, and seasons were changed by the modern guerrilla warfare that enfolded in Afghanistan. Each war brings modernization, not always to the right people, not always in the right way; but it invariably does. Resistance against modernization that is brought
79
Whitney Azoy, an eminent anthropologist, stresses the ethnic factor for present Afghanistan more than others and predicts a revival of fights between Pashtuns and the other groups as long as the relative minority position of Pashtun elites is not reverted towards a bigger role. Azoy was director of the AIA in Kabul until 2007 See Suhrke (2007) for the most illustrative introduction into this complex.
80
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from the wrong side may have some good reasons. Hence it is not sufficient to denounce insurgents as enemies of Afghanistan and enemies of progress. We suggest that a more precise characterisation of the major adversary groups ideology (and their adherents) is needed. Too many analyses generate their own lexigraphy of actors while it is still nebulous who is exactly spoken of in frequently used slogans like We must talk to the moderate Taliban. More important than whether moderate Taliban exist is the divide between political denominations and simply criminal labelling, e.g. in the case of abductions. If the moderate branch of Taliban networks can be identified, and the legitimate afghan leaderships want to include them, with or without international support, then it is evident that the integration should be comprehensive: Taliban then should get positions in government and executive. (There is always a danger to privilege a newly integrated group, or to refuse to draw exact red lines, which should not be transgressed, especially where human rights and security are involved, but this is a tactical caveat, not a principal one.) The ability to draw the correct distinctions in this regard is a critical premise for one major strategic argument which appears in most decisions: the assumption that by effective and efficient relief from the worst economic struggles, hearts and minds of the Afghan people would be won, whereupon our mission will soon be accomplished and we can hand over more power and responsibility.81 In the end, this argument rests on the belief of the pacifying powers of tangible progressa belief that equally was present in the Soviets policy in Afghanistan.82 Still, it remains to be proven that modernization and economic progress alone are sufficient for the emergence of a peaceful and solid Afghan society. However, by adopting a modernization-orientated policy, the interveners are part of a long lasting and conflictridden history of modernization in Afghanistan, in which each attempt has been met with fierce resistance.83 In regard to the ideology of the insurgents, we hold that the quasi automatic link between Islamist and radicalism/extremism is only partially justified, and that the relationship between fundamentalist ideologies and the willingness to compromise on modernisation in general and on co-operation in institution building and reconstruction is not negative per se. However, the characterisation as traditionalist for the first generation of Taliban is a valid complement to the general genealogy of this group, and this has a far reaching implication: they do not care for the improvement of the material living conditions of the people, they would seek isolation from effects of globalization and a complete submission of the people under their moral and political rigidity. Today, when the second generation of Taliban has even less interest in stabilising the socio-cultural conditions for the people than before, their aim is clearly directed in destabilising and disrupting any progress rather than ever hoping to regain the government. Butand this is of utmost importancenot ever resistance against the state building mission in Afghanistan is motivated by a Taliban-related traditionalist ideology. For our argument it is not important to create hierarchies of insurgents or terrorists; instead, we seek to understand why different groups, apart from their ethnic, cultural, and economic texture and their recent positioning in the struggle for
81 82
As Jackson and Gordon (2007) show, this reasoning is of a typical military kind.
By pointing out certain parallelism in policy we, of course, do not put the interveners of 2001 on the same level of the USSR invaders.
83
See Suhrke (2007).
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power, behave differently and adopt different attitudes towards the interveners and the global policy. These attitudes are important for every peaceful or simply political attempt to negotiate and bargain certain issues. Even more important in the context of modernization are the changes in authority, when commanders replace older hierarchies. On the other hand, the influence of the military socialisation has an impact of the community. Commanders, instead of tribal elders, became pivotal in local conflict resolutioncertainly not a change to the better. In the beginning of their regime, the Taliban pretended to play a similar role and got some appreciation for it. It should be registered that today, most people do not accept this role of the Taliban without personal intimidation, and this is a major difference between home-grown guerrilla structures and the insurgents pretension. However, this change of leadership in the Afghan society has got to be recognized as a part of the Afghans legacy of forced modernization and not as a natural, progressive change from tribalism towards a more civil kind of authority or even as an act of emancipation from an outlived theocracy.84 For the EU and all MS, it is important reflect the effect of the cultural and social reality of Western societies and states on the experience and perspectives of returnees from European countries.85 Lifestyle and other aspirations, imported from the exile, are not always modern in the sense of an emancipative modernisation, but they are often considered as western and secular. On the other side, the very young political generation, also students, who have never been to the west, sometimes adopt a totally unrealistic nostalgia towards a past they do not know (under the King, before the Soviets came etc., i.e., in times, when their parents were just born, they would not refer to the reforms under King Amanullah).86 Given the liberal state paradigm of nation-building, one task would be to convince these new conservatives of the benefits of market economy and representative democracy, of democracy in general. But for that we have to go beyond the neo-liberal paradigm, because there is more to Western values than just freedom and accumulation of wealth. But then the education towards republicanismas opposed to an opaque localism with, nor real separation of private and publicand democracy must be even more intensive and sustainable.
4.7 Homeland Discourse

This section of our report has a special relevance to the European Union, the MS and other Europeans, although, in variations, it can be also directed towards any country that has troops, GOs, NGOs or other persons in Afghanistan. Many examples in this chapter are taken from Germany, because each country has its particular variety of homeland discourse, and we know the German situation best. But you will find it easy to transfer the issue into your respective home country. The EU, so far, is no such home country, but we can relate the paradigms of the homeland discourse to Europe as a political and cultural unit (cf. our reference to the nation building of Europe in the introduction).
Some segments of the interveners have shown a distinctive inclination towards commanders and Mudjahedin, mostly based on a kind of global military camaraderie (see, e.g., Maloney, 2007, pp. 195-216): Power that is based on military force is instinctively regarded as a more western variety of social capital (of course, this bias is not only discernable in the actions of army officers). Some of these experiences were indeed considered in the projects funded by the EC, however more has to be done in the future (e.g., the programs under the EC Budget line B7-667 in 2007).
86 85
84
Research and discussions conducted by your authors in the course of investigations in Afghanistan 2003-7.
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Homeland discourse is the combination of all discursive elements that make public opinions about an event or a situation (Afghanistan is not a single static topic). It is part of our research and practical work to deconstruct the discursive practices and to reveal subtexts that (may) have a stark influence on decisions taken on a nations commitment to the events in Afghanistan. Sometimes, Afghanistan means the real Afghanistan, sometimes this is a cipher for any foreign country, a strange country, or the Oriental World, or a place where we have a mission or from where we should better keep our hands off, etc. Pictures, metaphors, standing quotations etc. add to this complex situation, and many politicians, even with best intentions, do not always realise to what extent they are determined by this discourse at times. The term homeland is deliberately chosen, because after 9/11 it has become more distinguished and routinely used than before, and brings along a certain context. We strongly recommend the EU should intensify research on homeland discourses and consider strategies to inform the public and the political decision makers in ways which are less susceptible to distortion by the discourse, or in other words: The EU should use its mitigating role to facilitate a way of speaking about Afghanistan that is more focused on Afghanistan than on the meaning of the mission in Afghanistan in the respective countries which contribute to this mission. However, it is seldom possible to directly influence the discourse, and we do not recommend trying to spin the public opinion excessively: Any approach that treats the homeland discourse as a matter of governmental PR will fail, because its subject (in our case: Afghanistan) is than reduced to an issue whose medial and discursive image needs to be tweaked according to domestic preferences. Obviously, this approach does no justice to Afghans and is inherently, though often without intention, condescending and post-colonial.
Although national policies on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan are predetermined by domestic politics in interveners countries or attitudes among the interveners electorates, a policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan should not be a political issue, but primarily a response to Afghan needs on ground. Of course, reasons to intervene in a certain region are always political (due to an oversupply of occasions to intervene, the few intervention that take place are initiated by political reasons), but the following activities do not have to be political as wellespecially since official justifications for interventions usually rely heavily on humanitarian reasons, which are generally understood as super-political. Public opinion will often applaud a triviality: The war against the insurgents or Tali-
ban cannot be won with military means (alone), therefore more civilian reconstruction is needed; and for this the strategy towards Afghanistan must be changed.87
The purpose of this paper is not to go into the psychology of wartime journalism or a media critique, but the public opinion has attained qualities which are decisive for the making and explaining political decisions, e.g. on the further deployment of more troops or on combining civilian and military activities. In our research on the Society and Culture of Intervention, the so called homeland discourse plays an important role, and we want to explain its basics here not in order to display scholarship but because we observe differences between the homeland discourse in European countries, in the United States, andneedless to say in
We do deliberately not give one direct quotation, because this sentence is reproduced in hundreds of variations since the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, i.e., since 2006.
87
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principlein Afghanistan that shape and influence those actors disagreements among each other, which are evidently important in further policy planning. The other reason is that there is no unified strategy among the EU MS with regard to future commitments and policies in regard to Afghanistan, and this may contribute, even involuntarily, to an acceleration of the process of marginalising the people of Afghanistan and their problems because the real Afghanistan and the Afghanistan of the homeland discourse are uncoupling more and more. Only in the last few weeks, the importance of the homeland discourse has become recognised officially in Germany. After three civilians were killed by German ISAF, the German MoD acknowledged the Talibans keen observation of the German public debate in the run-up to the debate over the renewal of the mandate for the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan in October, and linked the latest incidents to a Taliban strategy of influencing both the German Parliament and the public.88 Our research team had predicted exactly this behaviour at the occasion of the so-called Totenkopfaffre (skull-affair) in 2007.89 Furthermore, a debate about whether or not Germany is involved in a war in Afghanistan (or rather in a stabilisation operation) has enfolded90a debate that depicts how far apart the realities of Afghanistan are detached from the German discourse about Afghanistan.91 One element of a critical account to the homeland discourse is the deconstruction of some running slogans which impregnate the public opinion. We first list two examples in order to exemplify what we aim at: It has become part of the US strategy, also for US military, to win the hearts and minds of Afghans. A former German Minister of Defence said that the Liberty of Germany is being defended at the Hindukush. (The translation would allow another connotation. The German Freedom is being defended ). The familiarity of the first slogan almost hides the immediate response: What shall the Americans do with Afghans hearts and minds? (Of course, there is also a subtext of friendship, alliance, future dependency, etc.). Isnt it more important that President Karzai and his legitimate government gain the hearts and minds of his compatriots, and shouldnt ISAF and other interveners do everything to attain this? But this is exactly what is being regularly undercut, for example, at donor meetings like Paris 2008, when the government is blamed for insufficient support of the interveners efforts to build a state. Instead of winning hearts and minds, many political peers develop a complex of secondary guilt, as the Governor of Herat said in 2007.92 We do not think that a code of conduct or simple training of interveners can change attitudes in the long run and in due time, nevertheless, attempts to establish such a code and improvement in training are advised. More important is to give the Afghan a better chance to communicate their problems with our behaviour. We lay the second guilt on Afghans because we (subconsciously) measure the effects of any development or event according to our standards and expect the Afghans to deduce their conclusions in the same way. The problems are not the facts, but their perception and interpretation.
88 89
Germanys Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, in a radio interview with Deutschlandradio, September 03, 2008.
Using the example of the corruption-discourse, Goodhand (2008, pp. 412-413) notes how mindfully the Taliban utilize the interveners discourses for their own ends.
90
See, for example, the daily press review of the (http://www.dradio.de/presseschau/20080828070000/, [Sep 11, 2008].
Deutschlandfunk
for
Aug
25,
2008
91 92
To make it unmistakable clear: Of course there is a war going on in Afghanistan. See Daxner (2007).
36
On the Ministers regularly cited and recited phrase about German liberty: He wanted to create a line of associations that starts with 9/11 to show that terrorism is going global. Global terrorism target any country, thus also Germany. The Taliban are part of the global terrorism. We fight there for our liberty (and freedom), while supporting the Afghans. But is this really the subtext that reaches the public? People read this line in a more simple way: We fight there for ourselves and not primarily for Afghans. Adding to this, the Ministers slogan entails the identifying of Taliban and Al-Queda; a popular figure of thought that still pervades and, therefore, hampers public debate about Afghanistan. Both interpretations are dangerous, because they weaken the legitimacy of the mandate and, more indirectly, the ongoing civil reconstruction. In many cases, such rhetoric is being used and abused to enhance certain views on the conflict and the commitment of the intervening partner. These views can be right or wrong, but in most cases they form a public opinion based on little more than these slogans and thus de-legitimising parliaments or government deciding on continuation or termination of the countrys part in the intervention. The double bind is evident: Either government does not bend to the public opinion, then it is losing legitimacy in the interior; or it does give in to such opinions and their fixated interpretation, then the position of the country (its army, its development aid etc.) are becoming less calculable and reliable, diminishing the legitimacy of the respective country and its efforts in the eyes of the intervened people.
4.8 Soft and Hard Sectors

We have learned from the earlier interventions, e.g., in the Balkans, that the Soft Sectors, for a number of reasons, are given less attention by the interveners, and in many cases by the local authorities, than the so called Hard Sectors.93 Two main elements of the Soft Sector are education and public health. Other areas are public administration, media and judiciary, but also the environment. Typical Hard Sector areas are energy, transportation, infrastructure, but also security.
4.8.1 Education
Education is in general a part of the success story of the post-intervention era in Afghanistan. In 2003, hardly 3 million students attended primary and secondary education, in 2008 the number is approx. 6 million, 2 million of them are girls.94 It is difficult to grasp the relevance of this progress if the country is not known as very large, mountainous, with many remote valleys, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and the sharp antagonism of general education and the destructive policies of the insurgents. Our explanation of this progress will be concentrated on three strategic aspects in the Ministry of Educations policy: the intensive integration of top-level advisers into the line of ministerial decision making; the delegation of responsibility to protect schools and teachers/students to the local communities (cf. our account to local and tribal leaders);
93 94
For an exemplary approach see Daxner (2003). See Campbell & Shapiro (2008, p. 26).
37
the attempt to establish state-owned Madrassas as counterweight to the richer private ones, often paid for by religious extremists.
The unsolved problems are still overwhelming: Remote areas still have no access to school or other education facilities; teachers are reluctant to spend a couple of years in a hostile environment unless they are given substantial hope for an improved life in better, more urban catchment areas after their return. There is still a strong tendency among conservative and traditional local powers to restrain education, especially for girls and young women. Teacher training is still a mess, since the frictions between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education have not been resolved during recent years.95 There are not enough dormitories for female secondary students, making studying at higher education facilities nearly impossible for female student from rural areas. Vocational and professional secondary education is far behind the minimum standard.
We recommend the EC or a consortium of MS should develop a distance learning program that is aimed to reach both parents and their children: If the illiteracy of the parents is being tackled, the inclination to support schooling of the children will grow. This can also be an indirect strategy to strengthen the power of the local governments and elders and to create a certain distance to the mullahs, who, in many cases, are also illiterate. Such a vocational program combined with a re-direction of agro-centric qualification for rural areas might have even short-time impact.96 Higher Education is the key to most soft sector developments and certainly the hinge between the socio-cultural and the political aspects of society building. This could have also been a success-story, but progress has been slowed down and even reverted into a backlash by many facts. Since the field is well researched and we know quite a lot of the problems, your author shall concentrate on a few items with perspectives of particular interest. Higher Education has been probably the only sector where the Golden Hour had been well used in the beginning, under Minister Fayez. After 2002, he tried to modernise the system and get it connected with the international community of higher learning. There were good opportunities for such ambitious policy, because the
95 The Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for the training of teachers, while the Ministry of Education is responsible for the schools. It is not difficult to imagine effects of synergy here. 96
This needs explanation: The rural areas, especially where people make a life from a run down agriculture and/or from growing poppy seed, cannot and shall not brought back to their original status (i.e., to a situation when there were no big landowners, and the soil fed the villagers etc.). Return into remote areas can only be stimulated, if ever, if people get other perspectives than tilling the hard soil in same way their ancestors did. This means the introduction of qualifications which are useful in such an area though not being directly needed for farming. (Economic structures shall be built together with a socio-cultural change). This is a very brief outlook on a very complex problem. The impact of such an action might be immediate, but probably will it take much negotiation with local leaders and their clientele until such plans can be realised. However, we think that is one promising line: creating a modernised structure of settlements might be feasible, where agriculture can be modernised while the village development is based on diversified qualifications which develop a new division of labour and can, at the same time, produce new social cohesion. Furthermore, there is an interface with the civilian aspect of PRTs .
38
country has among its returnees a very high number of excellent experts in many fields and because there is a history of cosmopolitan urban academia that has not been entirely forgotten. Unfortunately, the early progress has been reverted into a stagnation and backlash due to the unwillingness to promulgate the legislation prepared by Fayez in 2003/4, and to problems which will cause much political trouble in the near future:
Students demands for participation and for improvement of their social

and cultural integration into the institutions are widely neglected. The dangers are that dormitories and campuses continue to become hotbeds for agitation and indoctrination by extremist groups. A specific social space for students should be created, which is likely to give them a role as future democratic elites. We consider the neo-conservative attitude and the backward cultural orientation among many young students a real danger for the sustainability of the modernisation program of the ruling government; (This is a security threat that has been constantly underestimated by analysts and well received by those who have a civil reconstruction impetus only).
The social problems (admission procedures, food, transportation, recruitment from poor backgrounds etc.) are aggravated by trigger issues like tuition fees, post-graduate studies, and the quality requirements for new appointments, etc. We recommend a fast integration of the Afghan institutions into the discourse of European Higher Education: most universities and scholars tend towards a European rather than Asian or American higher education reform, despite the fact that USAID has outpaced other donors, notably Germany in volume and efficiency at reforming the institutions. There are elements of basic higher education policies which cannot be delayed, e.g., whether and how local governments (provinces etc.) should contribute to their institutions and what say they should have in decision making. Both refugees of several layers of displacement and privileged students from urban and local upper classes and upper middle classes have a tradition of getting their degrees either in foreign countries will well developed higher education systems or at institutions in the neighbouring countries Iran and Pakistan, where some of the better universities produce very good graduates. It should become a major political task to create incentives for freshmen to enrol in Afghanistan.
For this it will be necessary: to increase the number of places in the institutions drastically (In 2003, there were 34.000 students in 18 institutions; in 2008, the number has not surmounted 80.000; there are some more students in teacher training institutions under the Ministry of Education, but the most conservative estimate of the immediate demand in admissions is 100.000 admissions per year!). We recommend the EU to step up coordinated assistance, either in separate programs or via the World Bank Trust Fund in order to improve equipment and capacity, and the social support for domestic students; and to support accredited private higher education which, as a complement to public higher education, will be more flexible to satisfy the immense demand for admission, especially by women.
39
to support the Afghan Association of Universities to act as reference point to international contacts and also act as substitute for the Rectors Conference that had been launched in 2004 and was abandoned by the government after Minister Fayez replacement in 2005. The EUA could act as a bridge-head for these contacts. By agreements with European higher education the exchange of students and faculty, and degrees could be facilitated, also under the Convention of Lisbon 1997. Such an approach would also strengthen the attempts to get good legislation and a promotion of academic freedom and institutional autonomy.97 In order to attract domestic students to Afghan higher education, it is also important to create a research base, which will not only stimulate modern curricula, but shall also offer a new academic job market which does not exist effectively by now. This will offer perspectives for a young and well qualified generation that in particular would not be ready to return home from foreign institutions without such opportunities. One very special program is recommended in the field of social research: since the country does not have a robust research base in Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, Anthropology and Psychiatry, it is difficult to realize the plan of creating real afghan ownership in these areas;98 that would imply to have the Afghans posing the questions and not just answering the questions provided by the interveners. Community Colleges (CC) are the key institution of higher education. A program, ambitiously launched under Minister Fayez, is advancing too slowly. With the European experience in both short cycle tertiary education and professional post-secondary education, there could be a comprehensive program that would supply each province with one CC at least, sponsored and implemented by partner-MS. Research in higher education and not the invitation to copying European models seems to be the right way. There could be also a regional solution, including all neighbours of Afghanistan, with synergy effects to be likely.
The US is the de-facto lead nation of all levels of post 9/11 intervention to Afghanistan, and it is one of the leading players in the civilian reconstruction of the higher education and health sectors, mainly operated by USAID. Other important players in that field are the World Bank, Germany, Japan and, on different levels, Iran, India and Pakistan. The international support for Afghan higher education is under-funded, poorly co-ordinated, without too much respect for Afghan needs, lacking co-ordinated and harmonized mid-term and long-term aims.
Consequently, many good approaches remain isolated and far from synergetic. The danger of irreparable loss of connection with the international higher education community is as imminent as another wave of migration of highly educated experts who have returned to their country.
97
See Fayez (2008) with a survey that linked the problems of the country to the development of higher education in the wider region (neighbouring countries). See Daxner et al. (2007) for a detailed elaboration on this thought.
98
40
One most sensitive aspect the reform of higher education is the permanent and ongoing confrontation of returnees and those, who have never left the institutions or survived the war and dictatorship in the country. The prestige of their host institutions is one of the big assets of returnees, and they are able to use their connections and networks. But, as we know from other interventions, the resident groups, with a certain privilege by simply having been in the system, tend to be stronger and keep the returnees at arms length. This has immediate effects on both the ability to reform curricula and structures, and to appoint academic staff according to the needs of a modernising system. The resident groups are also a stark barrier for any attempt to democratise the system and to include students into the decision making processes). Direct intervention from the international community of higher learning is difficult, especially as this is also a cultural sensitive field. But cutting the ties with the international community would create a next generation of less well educated and expert faculty99 or a remigration of returnees to their host countries. (This is also, to a lesser extent, true for highly qualified experts in non-academic sectors). We recommend the EC launches a combined research and implementation program together with the Afghan institutions (e.g., AAU) and , even more important, that the migrant communities in the MS take special care of this problem. Within the Afghan responsibilities will be priorities on early retirement programs for residents, especially if they can neither be retained nor show intentions to compete with the returnees; the other problem, to shield academia from increasing pressure from Sharia faculty and religious intervention, is even more delicate, but is directly related to the international inclusion of afghan academia. Another aspect of modernisation the higher education system has also to do with the imported technological shock-wave. How to make sensible use of the modern IT-devices and electronic media? In the main institutions, i.e., the universities in the five big cities, there are already enough computers and IT centres. It is erroneous to believe that development aid for improving equipment should start (and end) with abundance in electronic devices. Elements of a secondary illiteracy show everywhere, as we have observed in all post-intervention societies by opening the market to electronic communication and TV. Despite many training and proficiency units on site, the problem cannot be solved without an educational and cultural environment. A program of computer literacy could be a special offer by the EU, also as part of broadening competition among lifestyles and cultural choice. Concerning curricula, European support is urgently needed with priority to (re)establish Afghan studies, including anthropology, ethnology, history and sociology of the present society and the recent past. It is without any condescendence or western bias that we recommend a special program for strong cooperation between the local and the European experts. The thirty years war has destroyed so much of tradition and basic knowledge that a complement from the outside, if not imposed, is necessary and fertile.100 Especially since the waves of modernisation in the past had been either orientated on Europe or were defeated by an anti-western, anti-European ideology, there is also a certain post-colonial responsibility for Europe to engage in this task.
99
One negative example for this is the steady decay of the formerly very high level of academic training among Palestinians. The experience of UNMIK in Kosovo supports this view strongly, especially when it comes to the legitimate roots of genealogy and founding myths of a society. Your author Michael Daxner was in charge of education between 2000 and 2002 and observed a dangerous recreation of an artificial rewritten history with more potential of future conflicts.
100
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4.8.2 Safety & Security

We have already pointed out the relation between war and modernisation: Before any discussion arises about security first approaches, some preliminaries should be considered in Afghanistan: Because human security and R2P approaches are generally accepted nowadays, security issues should not be narrowed to the WoT. Two sectors need special attention; the increased level of violence in all kinds of social conflict, and the drug sector. Unless the protection of accomplished progress cannot be granted by ANA and ANP, the international community has a comprehensive responsibility and liability to provide security for these accomplishments. This is not simply an extension of the CIMIC philosophy, and it includes a good deal of inclusiveness for the Afghans, which has not been granted to them so far. The problem is less the ANA than the ANP.
The question of security is highly important in regard to the homeland discourse (see chapter 4.7) because all over Europe people are rightly disturbed by the news from Afghanistan. If we want to sum up the development after 2001, then two developments are obvious: after the Golden Hour, the return of Taliban and the rise of insurgents have increased insecurity and instability, and the number of suicide attacks is steadily rising. The return of the Taliban has been documented and explained so well101 that we can only add one truism: The mounting violence of a decisive fight does not necessarily indicate whether this fight will be lost or won by one or the other side. This should be taken into consideration by those who demand a sudden retreat of military from the ground. All the polls cited before show that despite all their concerns the majority of people want the troops to stay and to protect their attempt to realise their priorities (see especially chapter 4.2). Thus, the question points at how to combine this with a new strategy of enhancing civil reconstruction and step up security.102 As with regard to the suicide-complex, the UNAMA-study of 2007103 and other research are telling enough: there is no way to prevent all attacks and there is no way to prevent enough of them by just increasing passive security measuresagain one has got to aim at the root causes. The motives are not predominantly religious in the sense that faith would force this kind of warfare upon mainly young men and women.104 But religion has become instrumental to an ideology, which cunningly replaces honour, dignity, recognition and other values from people who are cut-off the competition for individual and social satisfaction and inclusion.105 This is neither an excuse nor is its understanding offering a cheap solution of the problem, but should be read as another
101 102
See, for instance, S. G. Jones (2008).
The new strategy is a key term of linking the negative public discourse on Afghanistan with most governments attempt to keep their commitment steady or upgrade it, In Germany, the new strategy is the special Green Party term for committing itself to the previous Afghanistan mandate, but strengthen reservations against any extension and enlargement of the commitment without such new strategy.
103 104 105
See UNAMA (2007). See Munir (2008).
According to credible and authoritative sources in Kabul, the attack on the Serena Hotel (Datum), which on this day hosted the Norwegian Foreign Minister, was not aimed at this person, but was launched because of men and women swimming together in the hotels pool. True or not, this is an illustrative example for instrumental functioning of religion by attackers.
42
piece of evidence that security measures will fall short of tackling the underlying problems of recent terrorism activities in Afghanistan. Certainly, the direct terrorism spreads fear with every attack among the urban populations, but it does not foster their alignment with the Taliban. (It is a good sign that many attacks are being halted by the merging efficiency of the Afghan services, certainly still aided by international agencies, but becoming increasingly self-reliant.) We consider suicide attacks also as a sign of decreasing respect for conventions and rules of conflict; and this critique aims at all partners in the conflict. The EU policies could reverse this trend by strictly applying basic rules of conflict and warfare,106 or even trying to write new ones, where the type of conflict leaves to many blanks.107 It is undeniable that there is some progress in preventing actual bombings by covert activities of the local intelligence, often in cooperation with international partners; but it is also openly discussed how negative the role model of torturing and abusive interveners is for the democratic local authorities in the making. This is
where the EU as a moral force and model should step in much more rigorously than before, and even risk disturbances with the partners in ISAF, OEF and the afghan government who have a more compromising standpoint. This would require no big
resolutions and programs, but simply education, training and implementing plans considering the ethical point of view. A certain demand for ethical support and normative debate can be observed in all training activities for ANA and ANP, in all discussions about filling important positions, when counselling is asked for and accepted by Afghan authorities. We suggest that special and detail studies on a few sectors are made, which will be linked by a few guiding principles: The subjective priorities as discussed as needs of the Afghan people shall be maintained and not become exchanged with a security first option. Reconstruction and re-vitalizing the Afghan society cannot be put on halt, because the security situation is far from optimal: security issues and social problems are far too interconnected than that they could be addressed one after another. Human rights and the rule of law must be embedded as a principle of each and every program or project, and never be treated as isolated sector among others. Security forces should not be exempted from the obligations derived from those basic principles (This is especially true in regard to private security contractors). The loss of civilian lives and the destruction of civilian property accidentally, collaterally, or even deliberatelyby international forces must be reduced at all costs; if such events occur the practice of apology and compensation should not need to be enforced by external urges, but become a matter of political routine and mutual attitudes. This requires particular education for all international actors. Not only preparatory training, but continuing education on site for all international securityincluding private security subcontractorsand for all local security
106 107
In the era of asymmetric warfare and new wars this is not an outlived issue.
Of course, this means in practice to merge the different already existing code of conducts and legal provisions of European countries into one binding European code of conduct for military in peace operations or peace enforcements missions.
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should become part of the common culture of intervention between both interveners and intervened. The curriculum and the training sites should be closely linked to advanced secondary and tertiary education in the Afghan institutions in order to serve as an integrating element for an outreach into civic education that has not many bases yet. The disastrous privatisation of security, especially under the command of US military and police training and protecting measures should be ended.108 The EC can try influence their partner in this direction, but it also needs that more regular troops and trainers would have to be deployed. The scandalous failure of Dyncorp should be a warning.109 The loyalty of private security to principles of human rights in wartime can be doubted, and furthermore, the use of private security contractors is influencing the Homeland Discourse in a negative way (Mercenary policies are counterproductive, if the people shall be convinced that the cause of taking risks out of area are worthy or even unavoidable). As the reference to the Homeland Discourse has been made, it is clear that everything that is being reported at home, i.e. to the diverse publics of the interveners, will sooner or later get an impact on the events on site. We know for sure that the Taliban and other insurgents know sufficiently enough about the cultural and political environment of the Afghanistan discourse in our countries; if they are deriving good analyses, is another question. We need not be very confidential with our civic education material; on the contrary, advertising democratic and transparent culture can ad to the appeal of a positive option and broaden the public space for critical thinking and understanding.
The sectors which need most civic education are all related to human security and protection. Curriculum coordination under Afghan stewardship should create a comprehensive approach on issues such as agreements between local governments and international forces; the protection of women, children, minorities; the prevention of corruption and eradication of immediate, mainly local sources of susceptibility to corruption (no centralised approach is advised).
This brings us to an important aspect of security and safety: the role of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). In many cases, we are not as sceptical as Rashid (2008, p. 198ff), though we share much of his criticism. He is of course right in all cases, when PRTs ally with warlords and other illegitimate forces against their CIMIC assignment. However, from the beginning, even US PRTs had also some strong motivation to protect and support measures like distance education (Herat PRT 2003); other findings are more differentiated, but maintain that the little coordination between the PRT-strategies and the fast changes among commanders and troops are detrimental.110 There is consensus that PRTs are not, and should not try to act as substitute development aid. But then, CIMIC doctrines should be also corrected and changed in a direction, which brings us to the beginning of this report: the society
108 109 110
See, e.g., Wulf (2006). See Rashid (2008, p. 205). See the articles in Feichtinger & Gauster (2008).
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in which they are embedded should be the focus of their assignment and not a civilian coating of a military mission.
5 Donor policies
5.1 Visibility of European efforts in Afghanistan
Up to date, there is no discernable position on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan that could be labelled as European. At first glance, this lack seems to be a consequence of the meagre visibility of European efforts in Afghanistan. The argument is that within the turmoil due to continuing counter-insurgency warfare and poor security, European efforts remain severely underrepresented in the local and international media. In 2006, the European Commission was the third biggest donor in Afghanistan; a fact, thataccording to some observersshould be promoted more firmly, especially in Afghanistan but also in Europe (Gross, 2007; Klaiber, 2007). But low visibility of donors is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, given the recent general trend towards more aid effectiveness andon the more local levelthe aids overall goal to facilitate the emergence of an sovereign and functioning Afghan state, a low-key approach to aid and assistance is a valid tactical choice and grounded in several international declarations and agreements. Since the end of the Taliban regime, it has been the international consensus to use the new administrative institutions of the Afghan state as much as possible for the distribution of ODA (Official Development Assistance). For that end, several trust funds for Afghanistan have been established, most prominently the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF; see Scanteam, 2005). Aid disbursed through these funds inevitably entails diminished donor visibility as the disbursements are organised and executed by the Afghan government and its institutionsand not by the donors development organizations. Being handled that way, development assistance loses gradually its donor stamp. In 2006, 43 per cent of ODA for Afghanistans government sectors were managed by funds or related common arrangements, while the European Commission used those channels for 61 per cent of her aid (OECD, 2007b, p. 9). Given the way those multilateral funds work, a distinct European policy for civil reconstruction in Afghanistan cannot be realized with that money: Ideally, projects on the ground are devised by the institutions of the aid recipient and implemented by local craftsman or firms. A local school, for instance, is thus funded by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and not by, say, the UK or Denmark. That makes the ceremonial unveiling of donated generously by - badgesone of the most popular tools for ensuring donor visibility quite complicated. Accordingly, most criticism with regard to the use of that aid is concerned with the loss of visibility. Although local perception of the family of Europe (Jamea Oropa; as opposed to the sum of all individual European states) is generally favourable, there is little understanding about the scale of the European Commissions financial involvements in, for example, the reform Afghanistans police.111 Although it goes without saying that an informed public is always a laudable aim, an increased visibility solves problems neither in Afghanistan nor in Europe. To put it bluntly: It should not matter to Afghans that in reality the EC pays the salaries of
111
See International Crisis Group (2005, pp. 7-8).
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the Afghan National Police (ANP) and not the Afghanistans Ministry of Interior.112 What matters is that there is a functioning, incorrupt police. As long as the ANP is not perceived by a majority of Afghans as their local trustee for the rule of law and as a guarantee for security, no donor should be advised to use commitments to police reform for promotional ends. This argument applies to every other sector, too. As long as Afghanistan is on the verge of relapsing into an insurgency fuelled civil war or becoming a full-blown narco-state,113 it is simply not the right time to mourn about visibility-issues. First, do it right, only then talk about it.114 Of course, doing it right is not an easy task in a complex environment like a nationbuilding effort, but in the case of European agents in Afghanistan it is even a considerable problem to figure out what is actually being done on the ground. This is not only a problem in Afghanistan but a concern in every large scale intervention of recent years.115 But in the context of Europes development agencies it gets worsened by a confusing multiplicity of institutions, often with conflicting understandings of their areas of authority and expertise, that is hardly comprehensible even for those who work inside these structures.116 This is certainly not an ideal breeding ground for a comprehensive and coherent European policy on reconstruction or state building.117 Granted, the European Commission (EC) has already issued an elaborated reconstruction strategy for Afghanistan, which could be interpreted as a nucleus for an encompassing reconstruction policy, but, needless to say, MS do not follow the same policy. The national profiles have to be understood as the conditions of a European approach to civil reconstruction in Afghanistan and need to be taken into consideration if the aim of any analysis is more than producing yet another utopian rescue plan for Afghanistan with only few doable or at least tangible recommendations. Thus, in the next chapter, we will give a highly condensed account about what European donors are actually doing in Afghanistan.118
The often heard and read comment about the EC financing Afghanistans police is not completely correct. In the Afghan fiscal year 1385 (April 1, 2006 March 31, 2007), the EC contributed with $ 31.7mio to the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOFTA) from which the salaries of the police are abstracted. But in the same period, the USA issued $ 40mio for the LOFTA (see UNDP Afghanistan & Ministry of Interior, 2007).
113
112
A fear that has been placed prominently in the current Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan of the European Commission (European Commission, 2006, p. 7) and has recently gained momentum (e.g., International Crisis Group, 2008, p. ii; Schweich, 2008a).
114
Additionally, the visibility-proponents seem to ignore, that the EC has already implemented measures to improve its visibility: For every project plan, a chapter on visibility activities is mandatory and a prerequisite for funding approval by the EC (e.g., European Commission, 2007). Weiss and Hoffmann (2007) have coined the term fog of humanitarianism for this matter.
115 116
Even the relationship of the EUs own institutions has been proven to be quite an enigma for practitioners, politicians, and diplomats alike (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 7). Although civil reconstruction and state building are not the same, it is not inept to use them nearly synonymically here: In Afghanistan and other cases of fragile statehood, you cannot have one without the other. This will be done by analysing rather the most recent OECD data set about development assistance than the sparsely available policy papers which deal with Afghanistan, because, in the field of development assistance, most donor countries do not offer coherent and transparent accounts of their endeavours. And on top of this, when data are available on a national basis, the methods of data gathering and accounting are seldom compatible.
118 117
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5.2 Multilateral and bilateral aid

Since the end of the Cold War, donors usually have some common aims with respect to the objectives of their assistance and reconstruction efforts in a given region. Therefore, they tend to agreetacitly or explicitlyon a shared strategic framework. And although those agreements are hardly ever more than accounts of the lowest common denominator of the involved donors, these interorganizational conventions are certainly not without impact and have substantially gained importance in the recent years. But, of course, the individual donors still have policy preferences, shaped by previous experiences and specific areas of expertise. Indeed, the trend towards multilateral mechanisms of aid funding and delivery might even lead to a higher degree of specialization and differentiation in the field of development assistance and conflict management. The current process towards improved aid effectiveness emphasises the need for more donor specialization albeit more on a technical than on a policy leveland urges the donors to increase the complementarities of their actions. In the light of that, the EU has agreed on a Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy (COM[2007]72), consisting of ten guiding principles which deepen and specify precepts of the The European Consensus on Development (Council of the European Union, 2005). Obviously, this process of specialization requires enhanced coordination, and it is the EUs stated aim to take over that role, at least for member states. But as we will see, the EU has not lived up to its expectations in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Afghanistan is quite a challenge for any coordination effort. Nearly every donor who is active in reconstruction and development aid is also active in Afghanistan. Moreover, the scale of neediness has been overwhelming at times: After 30 years of war, there was not much left to re-construct. And where many donors do many things, it is easy to lose overview. In order to regain a glimpse of the bigger picture of Afghanistans reconstruction, we will profile the biggest government donors and their strategies, starting with the general policy framework of multilateral spending.
5.3 The global policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan

Without much discussion, fragile statehood has been diagnosed as the root cause for the endemic instability in Afghanistan. Although the main reason for intervention was the threat of terrorism, it was clear from the beginning that the military components of the intervention had to be backed up by substantial civil reconstruction efforts. As early as in December 2001, in the Bonn Agreement, the recreation of Afghanistan as a western-style state was established as the long-term aim of the international engagement in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Judging from the following performance on the ground, the Bonn Agreements seem to be based on mainly political reasons (e.g., ensuring the support of local power players for the internationals and creating a generally acceptable legitimacy for the intervention) and without sufficient intelligence data about the poor condition of the states bodies and the magnitude of devastation in Afghanistan.119 Consequently, from the start not enough financial resources were scheduled for the civil components of the intervention. And, furthermore, the finally disbursed pledges were consumed in emergency relief activities in an unforeseen high degree and not allocated ade119
See for a more detailed discussion of the Bonn Agreement and its consequences Goodhand & Sedra (2007), Suhrke (2008b), and Suhrke, Harpviken, and Strand (2002).
47
quately to reconstruction of civil institutions of any kind. Accordingly, advancements in the field of state building were rare, but the euphoria during The Golden Hourthe window of good will immediately after a military-backed interventioncreated the perception of fast and sustainable progress in civil reconstruction.120 The intervention in Afghanistan had established itself as a good war.121 In early 2002, Afghanistan was officially entering the post-conflict phase and stopped being a humanitarian emergencyat least on paper.122 In the next years, the general policy on reconstruction changed: Within two years, disbursements for humanitarian relief operations dropped from $ 1,200mio in 2002 to $ 30mio in 2004.123 In the same time, official development assistance to Afghanistan by OECD member states rose from $ 985mio (2002) to $ 1.701mio (2004).124 In other words, humanitarian assistance was essentially non-existent in 2004. And this was not due to an overall and unquestionable improvement of social conditions which would have made humanitarian efforts superfluous but to strategic reasons: In order to strengthen the Afghan state, the interveners channelled their resources rather through the institutions of the new administration than through NGOs, whose activities doubtlessly ameliorated the day-to-day hardship of Afghans but were deemed to not contribute sufficiently to the long-term goals of state building. Moreover, the newly established trust funds had demonstrated their operability, while PRTs seemed capable of fulfilling some tasks which had been the domain of NGOs. In the end, the EU had halved their support for NGOs: In 2002 the EU had channelled roughly 40 per cent of its funds through NGOs, but only around 20 per cent in 2004.125 To sum up: In the first years after the end of the Taliban regime, the interveners were concerned with institution creating rather than institution building. Developing the probably best structure of the administrations bodies was the priority. Tasks on the ground were handled by a great extent by NGOs specialized for emergency relief. But by 2004, the interveners had mostly implemented their strategy of state creating. As a result, NGOs often became reduced to sub-contractors of the Afghan government and its nascent institutions or left the Afghan theatre. Since then, global policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan has been a firm alignment of international assistance with the Afghan National Development Programs in the framework of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). Priority is the consolidation of the Afghan state by capacity building and enforcement of
The concept of the Golden Hour is elaborated in Dobbins et al. (2007, p. 15) (Dexter, 2007; Rohde & Sanger, 2007). In Afghanistan, the Golden Hour euphoria lasted longer than usual (e.g., in Kosovo) because of the degree of devastation and neediness of the local population.
121 122
120
See, for instance, Dexter (2007) and Rohde & Sanger (2007).
See Donini (2006, p. 32). From the perspective of desk research, it cannot be said with certainty which reasons led to this somewhat outlandish decision. Maybe the humanitarian situation had improved so dramatically in specific locations, that some decision-makers in Kabul fell victim to wishful thinking, but a distinct interest of the USA to produce fast and concrete successes in Afghanistan in order to reallocate troops for the up-coming war against Iraq with more legitimacy has also played an important role (Rashid, 2008, p. lvii). Data according to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Data according to dataset 2.a ODA by recipient by country of OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/). See International Crisis Group (2005, p. 10).
123
124 125
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the monopoly on the use of forcea policy deeply entrenched in every policy paper since the Bonn Agreement and endorsed by nearly every important donor.126 But despite the overall agreement about the ultimate objective of the intervention in Afghanistan, national policies vary considerably. As mentioned before, not all differences are due to strategic or tactical disagreements but to the current trend toward more aid effectiveness by improving international complementarities of aid and developing a more productive division of activity-areas. But without any doubt, not all donors agree about the appropriate means to the end of a fully operational Afghan state. As we now focus on the biggest bilateral donors,127 these disparities will become more apparent.
5.4 Bilateral Aid

Although recent international declarations strongly advise donors to increase their coordination and therefore multilateral aid mechanisms as much as possible, member states of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), who contributed nearly 96 per cent of globally disbursed ODA in 2006, still cling to bilateral arrangements: Slightly less than one quarter of the aid disbursed by OECD DAC members was accounted as multilateral aid to the OECD DAC in 2006. This share is even smaller than it was in 2000 when multilateral mechanisms were utilized for 30 per cent of ODA.128 Obviously, bilateral aid is not as anachronistic as the gushy and rousing declarations in the race toward improved aid effectiveness might suggest.129 In the case of Afghanistan, the OECD DAC flags data for multilateral ODA only as imputed. According to their analysis, the multilateral label applies for just 14.7 per cent of all aid disbursed in 2006.130 If we follow the rule of thumb-assumption that bilateral aid bears a bigger imprint of national policies, Afghanistan should suffer from relatively nationalized aid. But, as closer look at the individual donors show, the total numbers are rather misdirecting. There is such a harsh imbalance regarding quantitative and qualitative dimensions of ODA between donors that averages and totals lose nearly all significance. In 2006, 46 per cent of ODA for Afghanistan was issued by the USA. Obviously, that kind of purchasing power distorts any analysis based on arithmetic means. Denmark for instance, the 12th biggest governmental donor in 2006 contributed only about 2 per cent of the USAs ODA. Although this quantitative dominance often translates into de facto-policy setting on the ground, there is no need for a EuroBut the official rhetoric is implemented differently from donor to donor, as the following chapters on individual donors will show. Because of missing data, some donors have not been analysed: India is only partially covered in OECD DAC stats, while Russia, Iran, and Pakistans data is missing at all. Therefore, we give rather rough sketches of those countrys profile in a separate chapter.
128 129 127 126
Data according to dataset 1. ODA by Donor of OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/).
Critics may object that these documents need some time to create effects, wherefore data from 2006 cannot be convincing. But even OECD DAC data so new that it is still unpublished seems to confirm the impression of an implementation deficit. In a hearing of the UKs International Development Committee, Brenda Killen, Head of the Aid Effectiveness Division at the OECD, statedvery tentatively due to the ongoing analysisthat regarding the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, it does not look like things have changed a great deal [since 2006 MDJF] and the same problems are still there (International Development Committee, 2008, p. Q58). Data according to dataset DAC2a ODA disbursements of OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/).
130
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pean surrender. Compared to the USAs aid, ODA from member states of the EU is 40 times more frequently multilateral,131 which indicates a higher degree of coordination and harmonization. These coordination efforts have become more and more institutionalized and could be used for the implementation of a distinct European policy on civil reconstructionprovided, of course, that necessary political will and such a policy do exist. So, as a notable silver lining, an EU policy on civil reconstruction must not start from scratch.
disbursements Figure 1: ODA to Afghanistan by Recipient by country (net disbursements in $, in millions)132 Donor
United States United Kingdom EC Canada Germany Japan Netherlands Norway Turkey Sweden Italy Denmark
2000
2,42 12,65 17,73 6,66 10,63 0,21 10,17 12,57 0,07 11,50 0,71 0,32
2002
367,61 130,80 143,72 35,81 92,57 31,70 88,28 60,86 0,38 27,52 28,34 7,75
2004
778,29 224,01 212,00 56,24 75,13 172,52 90,31 67,73 8,74 55,68 37,31 14,18
2006
1403,71 246,49 220,90 140,27 117,99 107,42 87,34 69,68 57,65 46,42 32,50 29,63
This table of ODA disbursements to Afghanistan shows a perhaps surprising absence of France. With only $ 14.62mio in 2006, Frances ODA numbers are even lower than those of Switzerland or Spain.133 But because France is a significant provider of troops for ISAF, we will cover the reconstruction policy of France nevertheless. Regrettably, analyses of Italys and Turkeys efforts are rather inaccurate because both countries do not use the OECDs Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which provides the micro data studied for the following donor profiles. Further please note that India has disbursed $ 198mio in 2006,134 but is missing from the table above because other data could not be established or is inconclusive.
5.4.1 USA
Overview: As expected, the USA is by far the donor with the highest disbursements
in Afghanistan. After all, the USA is the worlds biggest donor of ODA in general and, adding to this, the intervention in Afghanistan had been a foremost USAmerican initiative, for evident reason. Although the spending disparities are striking, in Iraq ODA is even more concentrated in the hands of the USA: The USA accounts for 47 per cent of ODA in Afghanistan but for even 55 per cent in Iraq. And although the total amount of the USAs aid for Afghanistan, $ 1403mio, appears to
In 2006, only 0.98% of USAs ODA to Afghanistan was disbursed multilaterally ($ 13.78mio compared to $ 1403.71mio), compared to 44.80% of DAC EU members ODA ($ 287.34mio compared to $ 641.44mio, all data according to dataset DAC2a ODA disbursements of OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/).
132 133
131
Data according to dataset DAC2a ODA disbursements of OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/).
In 2008, France announced an additional commitment of app. $ 50mio ( 33mio, see http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/afghanistan_2665/ [Aug 26, 2008]). For comparison only: That is roughly the amount USAID spends on extended vocational training for teachers in Afghanistan alone.
134
See OECD (2007a, p. 9).
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be exceptionally high, USAs ODA disbursements in Iraq are four times higher.135 Moreover, American disbursements skyrocketed only recently: In the beginning, the USA had considered the intervention in Afghanistan more as a military affair without much re-construction efforts than as a long-term state building mission. It was supposed to be an inexpensive war, followed by a short peace keeping element after the re-establishment of a democratic government.136 Of course, this became an obsolete position quite soon, leading to hasty re-adjustments on-site. How changes in the US policies occurred and how they affected reconstruction activities in Afghanistan has not yet been investigated sufficiently; the explanation of a constant rivalry between the State Department and Pentagon respectively the White House is not satisfactory.137 Although US-American dominance in Afghanistan is undeniable, it should not be used as an excuse for abandoning any policies that run contrary to the USAs. Even the USA cannot operate at will, like the on going discussion about the proper counter-narcotics measures show: Aerial eradication of poppy cultivation areas is not utilized although strongly promoted by the USA.138
Activities & policy changes: In the first years after the Taliban regime, the USA had a
track record of rebuilding infrastructure and agricultural programsbesides the notorious funding of the Afghan National Army (ANA), which are not treated as ODA by the USA and surely not constitute a direct civilian reconstruction effort. For instance, in 2005, the USA spent $ 382.6mio for programs in the transportation & storage sector, with the EC as the second biggest donors disbursing only $ 19.7mio. But in 2006, the USA more than halved their efforts, spending then only $ 145.34mio. And, moreover, the most voluminously transport & storage program in 2006 was CERP whose $ 141mio were issued explicitly for instant emergency relief in the context of military operations. In the same time, support of business & other services increased by $ 340mio alone. Ironically, this increase is due to a rather opaque $ 280mio program that is executed by enterprises from the donor country.139 Another focus had been education. Nearly $ 90mio were disbursed in this sector in 2005, but that number fell significantly in 2006 to just $ 10mio. New educational programs have been issued in 2006 so that we will see higher disbursements again from 2007 onwards.140 And despite the meagre spending in 2006, infrastructure seems to still be a priority for the USA, judging by USAIDs homepage.
135 136
All data refer to 2006 and are taken from dataset DAC2a ODA disbursements of OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/).
For example, the USA never cared about monitoring Taliban activities in South Afghanistan, partly because of financial constraint (Rashid, 2008, p. 223). Only after the expansion of the ISAF mandate and the arrival of NATO troops in the southern Provinces, the lack of reliable intelligence was addressed by the interveners. But in the crucial early years of reconstruction, US intelligence relied heavily on information provided by local strong men, which was treated rather navely in general (Chayes, 2006).
137
One striking example is how USAID has taken over the lead in education and higher education, and as far as sources are available, this significant increase of quantitative and qualitative aid cannot be explained by a simple downstepping of other donors or a specific US policy. See, for example, Goodhand (2008), Koehler & Zrcher (2007b), and Schweich (2008b).
138 139
Data accoring to the dataset Creditor Reporting System OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/). Unless otherwise noted, this dataset has been used for the following microdata analysis on donors.
140
But the spending will stay far below the 2005s level. James Sarn, USAID-Kabuls Social Sector Development Officer, calculated on $ 100mio disbursements for 2007-2011 (personal conversation, Kabul, October 2007, see also http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/article.296.aspx [Aug 26, 2008])
51
Since 2005, the USA is enhancing disbursements to multilateral organization, most notably to agencies of the UN: In 2006, nearly a third of total USAs ODA for Afghanistan ($ 441.9mio) was channelled through those organizations.141 Furthermore, 100 per cent of USAs aid for government sectors used institutions of the Afghan government and administrationa highly exemplary proceeding.142
Analysis & recommendations: Although the USAs ODA spending is extremely high
compared to other donors, in the light of the situation on ground it is still insufficient. The ending of the Taliban regime has been characterized as the cheapest war America was ever to fight (Rashid, 2008, p. 63), due to the massive usage of indigenous fighters,143 and subsequently, the Bush administration was headed for another rather economical success in civil reconstruction. Using the then popular soft footprintprinciple, a concept of nation building lite was projected and hastily implemented that relied heavily on proposed self-healing potentials of the Afghan state and society.144 Although USAs ODA has more than tripled since 2002, it is allocated on the basis of a too narrow understanding of statehood and societys dynamics: The pivotal moment of the USAs ODA strategy is the assumption that a healthy Afghan society will emerge more or less by itself as a correlation to state building and economic growth. This centrepiece of the liberal peacethesis is echoed by current development policies of the Afghan government and EU foreign policy145 but not easily applicable to Afghanistan where important elements of western gouvernementalit146 that are crucial to the liberal peaceargument cannot be presupposed. We recommend: The EU and EU member states are in urgent need for a shared reconstruction policy for Afghanistan. If a European perspective should have any impact on agenda setting, European donors must agree on one at first. The EU and EU member state should increase their ODA disbursements to Afghanistan by 40 per cent. Thus, European spending would arrive at app. $ 900mio or two third of USAs ODA, given the numbers of 2006. Backed by this level of spending, a European voice may stand a chance against the USAs dominance. The EU and EU member states should exploit the USAs inner policy conflict: For the USA, Afghanistan is still primarily a fight against terrorism, with civil reconstruction only of lower priority. As a result, a subtle disregard for the needs and hopes of the Afghan population (not the Afghan government!) is
Statistically, those disbursements count as bilateral aid because they did not contribute to the regular budgets of the involved multilateral organizations (see OECD, Directives for Reporting to the Creditor Reporting Systems Aid Activity Database, OECD: Paris 2002, 8). Therefore it is accounted as bilateral aid that utilizes multilateral channels.
142 143
141
See OECD (2007b, p. 6).
For a detailed account of the early operations of CIA agents in Afghanistan see Schoen (2006). Further, for a more tactical analysis, see Biddle (2003). See Rashid (2008) for a condensed account of the US-policy in late 2001 and early 2002. See Mller (2008). This term describes the art of governance, in both its active and passive understanding, see Foucault (2004).
144 145 146
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noticeable at times. The EU and EU member states should focus on addressing this essential civilian needs.147
5.4.2 United Kingdom Overview: In many ways, the UK is on the brink of becoming the poster child for aid
in the 21th century. Its global development policy is focused on poverty reduction, which is widely believed to be the best strategy today. The UKs Department for International Development (DFID) has endorsed and implemented local ownership from early on and has contributed substantially in the preparations of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the related papers of the EU.148 Accordingly, UKs contributions in Afghanistan, reaching $ 246.49mio in 2006, are disbursed to a high degree to trust funds and budget support programs, in line with the guidelines for aid effectiveness by the OECD DAC. UKs ODA tends to get overshadowed by the countrys substantial military support to ISAF. Currently, 8530 British soldiers are deployed in Afghanistan, mostly in the embattled southern provinces of Afghanistan.149 The UK is the interveners lead nation in counter-narcotics and supports a PRT in Lashkar Gan in the notorious Helmand province, which by itself produces 50 per cent of Afghanistans opium.150 As a result of this precarious environment and an explicit focus on local stabilityrather than on propagation of western values and institutions, the UK stresses the importance of security as a precondition for any further development.151 In order to achieve this objective, UKs tactics have been criticized as being overly pragmatic. For the sake of keeping the peace, the UK appears to be too compliant toward local strongmen at times and too hesitant in its counter-narcotics efforts.152
Activities & policy changes: Because the UK is putting most of its ODA via Trust
Funds in the hands of the Government of Afghanistan, no UK-specific areas of activities are discernable. In 2006 for instance, the UK issued $ 92mio for the ARTF, by far the most voluminous item of UKs ODA budget for Afghanistan. Regrettably, the UK withholds some data from the OECD DAC CRS, but according to the DFIDs factsheet, 80 per cent of UKs ODA to Afghanistan is channelled through the Afghan Governments institutions.153 This share seems credible, given that in 2006, UKs aid for the government sectorwhich was, by the way, nearly as high as the USAs was completely handled by Afghan institutions. Another focus of UKs aid has been the promotion of alternative livelihood for former opium farmers. Those programs are concentrated on the Helmand province.
Analysis & recommendations: In regard to the mechanics of aid delivery and allocation, the UK seems to have found a most doable solution. By providing the Government of Afghanistan the measurably bigger part of ODAand thus supporting
This is not a plea for ISAF withdrawal. The opposite is true: In order to ensure security, substantially more boots on the ground are needed. Without any doubt security is a civilian need, but one that has to be guaranteed by the military in times of severe turmoil.
148 149 150 151 152 153 147
For an general overview of UKs development activities, see OECD DAC (2006b). ISAF Fact Sheet, June 10, 2008 (http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf [Aug 27, 2008]. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008, p. 20). See Pistor (2008). See International Crisis Group (2008, p. 16) and Schweich (2008a). See http://dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/afghan-factsheet.pdf [Aug 27, 2008].
53
the reconstruction of Afghanistans state in accordance with the latest lessons learnedrecommendations, the UK can concentrate the residual aid resources (personnel as well as money) on programs that aim at specific British interests in Afghanistan like, for instance, a huge agricultural program only for Helmand. Of course, this strict geographical scope was criticised, but such objections have been easily weakened by referring to the extensive budget support efforts of the UK. Seemingly, the UK has reached a modus operandi how to align aid with donor specific interests (like guaranteeing security for national troops) with universal goals of development assistance (like poverty reduction). In a fierce, but objective and precise internal debate about CIMIC and the overall strategic goals of the UKs PRTs, the lack of a fully operational and doable policy on civil reconstruction became apparent in 2006. Since then, interdepartmental planning and an intensified participation of developmental actors in the operational processes have been promoted more firmly.154 But this assessment should not cover the meagre record of the UK as the leadnation in counter-narcotics. Under the British lead, opium production has multiplied. Admittedly, most reasons for this increase are beyond British reach, but distributing counter-productive hand-outs155 and a rather neglected coordination with other major reform processes156 surely does not help either. Because tackling the drug problem would most surely entail a certain amount of disturbance and therefore a possible further worsening of the security situation, the British seem to be reluctant to engage more forceful measures against local drug barons in order to ensure a basic local stability. We recommend: The EU should evaluate how good practices of the UKs aid system could be implemented in the administrative and institutional set-up of the EUs own development units. The EU should fathom if the UKs focus on poverty reduction and general support of the recipients administration budget could serve as an overall European policy directive for the civil reconstruction of Afghanistan. Undeniably, the UK is a forerunner of aid effectiveness today, but the EU should investigate whether the policy of general budget support (accompanied, of course, by consultations and guidance) is a valid and successful strategy in the cases of both complete state failure and severely internally divided populations like in Afghanistan. The UKs policy in Afghanistan has a bias toward state building, thus occasionally disregarding more soft approaches like society building. Moreover, this policy is always in danger of preferring state building to good governance, hence strengthening official institutions regardless of their actions. Therefore, the EU should use its local delegates (primarily the EUSR to
154 155 156
See Jackson & Gordon (2007). See Schweich (2008a). See Korski (2008, p. 13).
54
Afghanistan) to keep an eye on the level of British pragmatic collusion with local power players.157
5.4.3 European Commission Overview: The European Commission has its own development bodies with regular,
recurrent budgets. Therefore, the EC counts as a bilateral donor, a fact that sometimes fuddles at the first glance at international aid statistics and documents. Generally, the European public is rather uninformed about the ECs efforts in the field of development assistance, what may be partly due to the rather poor record of the European development programs.158 However, since a wave of reforms since 2000, aid effectiveness has improved in general, but some issues remain: The ECs bodies are considered to be excessively bureaucratic and therefore slow and inflexible, and the qualification of its personnel is regarded as upgradeable.159 In Afghanistan, the EU as the third biggest donor in 2006 has undergone a recent policy change that stands exemplary for general policy trends regarding civil reconstruction: While in the first years after the Taliban the EU was mainly concerned with rebuilding basic infrastructure and assisting the establishment of administrative structures, the current EUs Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (CSP)160 stresses the need for concentrated and specific programs as well as for increasing and fine-tuning the Governments capacities. The CSP endorses Afghan ownership and affirms the alignment of ECs programs with the ANDS and related priorities developed by the Government of Afghanistan. Indeed, the CSPs focal areasrural development, governance, and healthmatch those of the ANDS. Geographically, the EC will focus its activities on the eastern and north eastern provinces.161
Activities and policy changes: Most ECs ODA for Afghanistan is marked as support
to governance in Afghanistan. Those activities include contributions to trust funds and some other disbursements for the public sector. According to the CRS, 51.5 per cent of the ECs ODA was disbursed through multilateral arrangements in 2006, while 27.2 per cent was channelled through the public administration of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, none of these resources went through the hands of Afghan financial institutionsa strikingly low share compared to the 100 per cent achieved by USAs and UKs aid.162 Although rural development has been flagged as a focal point, the ECs involvement appears to be rather desultory. As the hallmark of ECs contributions to local governance the Annual Action Programme 2007 cites the funding of the Provincial Reconstruction Facility that supports governance-related projects of EU-led PRTs163a surprisingly unspecific and volatile way to reform and enhance local governance. Furthermore, most programs aim at the administrational capacities. Although that is in line with the overall policy of both the EC and the Government
157
Please note that we are not invoking any juridical understanding of collusion here but follow the arguments about the intertwined relationship of interveners and intervened as presented recently by several authors (e.g., Barnett & Zrcher, 2007; Daxner, 2008; Goodhand, 2008; Goodhand & Sedra, 2007). See for a general evaluation Nuscheler (2004, pp. 525-537). (Busek, 2007; DFID, 2007) See Busek (2007) and DFID (2007). See European Commission (2006). See European Commission (2006, p. 15). See OECD (2007b, p. 6). European Commission (2007, p. 3)
158 159 160 161 162 163
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of Afghanistan, additional efforts for short-term amelioration of local farmers livelihoods would be appropriate and meet with the expectations of the rural population in a more direct and tangible way. On the other hand, the ECs support to the health system, which rose from $ 6.8mio to $ 43.3mio between 2005 and 2006, has been generally successful, judging by the significant increase of public health care over the recent years. In June 2007, the EU took over the responsibility of training Afghanistans national Police (ANP) in the form of the ESDP-mission EUPOL. As per original mandate, EUPOL should consist of 192 police officers and experts, responsible for training the upper ranks of the ANP.164 As of September 11, 2008, staffing level remains at 181,165 despite all recent announcements about doubling deployment of police officers.166 Although it is far too early to evaluate the effort, this slow start suggests that EUPOL might not fare any better than the half-hearted and badly planned activities by the former lead-nation for police reform, Germany.167 Adding to this, the hectic planning phase, characterized by sudden policy changes and subsequent down-scaling, bodes ill for EUPOL.168
Analysis & recommendations: First of it all, the ECs aid activities do not provide a
proper foundation for a future EU policy for civil reconstruction of Afghanistan because of its high degree of alignment and of its emphasis of areas that are marginalized by other donors. Of course, this unselfishness is laudable in regard to general aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, but it does not contain a holistic approach to civil reconstruction. Therefore, an overarching EU policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan is not in immediate hands reach. But there are some good starting points: In the margins, the EC was able to envisage quite fitting programs like vocational training of veterinarians or support for customs offices in North Afghanistan.169 The EC has proven to implement their policy directives without much deviation and delay on ground.170 Furthermore, the total amount of ODA disbursements by the EC is relatively higha fact that could strengthen a unanimous European voice. Moreover, the EC has no own troops de-
164 165
(Council of the European Union, 2007a)
See EUPOL Factsheet Police Strength, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/110908_EUPOL_AFGHANISTAN-Police_Strength_chart.pdf [Sep 14, 2008]. Another Factsheet notes 184 deployed police officers (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/SPARpresentationwithoutfigures.pdf, [Sep 14, 2008]) and notes 90 local staff members.
166 167 168 169
E.g., Council of the European Union (2008a, pp. 12, 13). See Bundesregierung (2008, pp. 4, 26) or International Crisis Group (2007) See Gya (2007)
Although, in the process of implementing the latter program, a possible collision between ECs CSP policy goals and on-ground lessons learnt happened without being noticed (a rather bad omen in regard to policy coherence): While the CSP calls for greater decentralization of development planning (European Commission, 2007, Annex CUSTOMS, p.4), the Support to Customs Administration program aims at a stricter centralization of the customs collection system (European Commission, 2006, p. 16). That, of course, is a reasonable strategy in order to discipline the local customs officers, who are prone to corruption, but still, if unmediated, both directives could conflict. Especially, when the recommendation for more centralization is considered as a rather general lesson to be learnt, as it is in 2007s Annual Action Plan (European Commission, 2007, p. 3). Judging by a comparison of 2003s CSD and the following recorded disbursements.
170
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ployed in Afghanistan, which reduces policy quagmires and distractions. Therefore the ECor the EU, respectivelycan focus solely on civilian issues.171 The most serious handicap of the EU is its institutional fragmentation. We will not plunge into the extensive debate about EUs reform, but even in Afghanistan, the EU is present with too much agencies. For starters, its three bodies are situated in three different locations, at least 1.5km apart. Furthermore, their responsibilities are unclearat least from the outsiders perspectiveand overlapping, even on paper. For instance, both the Delegation of the European Commission to Afghanistan and the European Commissions Aid Department (ECHO) in Kabul are responsible for implementation of external aid.172 And the mandate of the Special Representative of the European Union for Afghanistan remains enigmatic even for local politicians.173 This situation only worsened with the start of EUPOL: Now a fourth European agency is in Afghanistan. Because EUPOL is an ESDP-mission, it is considered as an other donor-activity by the development agencies of the EU/EC.174 EUPOL is instructed to consult with the EUSR and other EU actors,175 but given that technically neither EUSR nor the Delegation of the EU has any political or fiscal authority over EUPOL,176 some scepticism concerning inter-European coordination is advised. Of course, any reform of the institutions of the EU has been set back by the Irish referendum, but that must to be an excuse for not tackling the institutional set-up of the EU in Afghanistan. The EU can survive another ten years of delayed reform, but Afghanistan cannot. We recommend: The EU should not be primarily concerned with visibility but with doing good work on-site. The EU should not follow the international trend overfeeding the Afghan state and neglecting society: a functioning and peaceful society is not the automatic result of a functioning state. The EU has to overcome its persistent division of military and civilian planning177 or otherwise performance in post-conflict theatres like Afghanistan will remain deficient. The EU should start to concentrate their administration and agencies in Afghanistan immediately, at the very least on the informal level. Due to the formal structure of the EU it may not be possible to merge all European institutions in Afghanistan into one responsible and accountable super-
171 172
Cf. chapter 5.4.1.
See http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/about_us/role.htm [Aug 28, 2008] and http://www.delafg.ec.europa.eu/en/echa/index.htm [Aug 28, 2008].
See International Crisis Group (2005, p. 7) and Korski (2008, pp. 9-10). This being the case, the good work of Francesc Vendrell, the long-term EUSR for Afghanistan, is even more exceptional.
174 175 176
173
See, for instance, European Commission (2007, p. 4). See Council of the European Union (2007b, 2.6, 3.8).
EUPOL is financed through the funding mechanisms of the CSDP, thus remains outside of the ODA budget (Kempin, 2007). For further information about the dualism of European development policy and European foreign policy see Santiso (2002). See Whitney (2008).
177
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institution, but we strongly advise to move all European bodies under one roof, in the very literal sense. The contradiction between high alignment and zero channelling of fund for government and administration programs through local institutions should be resolved. The EU has much expertise in overarching different legal systems and normative settings, which should be applied in Afghanistan, where several layers of normative culture exist and overlap (multi-legality, dominance of informal law, etc.)178, and are in need of a better linkage. The EU should encourage its member states to agree on a shared and binding code of conduct for European PRTs. Furthermore, a common understanding of the strategic role of PRTs should be aimed at, in order to harmonize the reconstruction processes in Afghanistan.
5.4.4 India
Overview: India is a newcomer in the group of ODA donors. Like many other new
donorsmost notably China, Indonesia and BrazilIndia is not a member of the OECD DAC and therefore not covered by its reporting. Furthermore, these new donors are considered to have a decisively bilateral mind-set, performing rather poorly in regard to common aid effectiveness indicators.179 Indias long-term rivalry with Pakistan prompted India to support the Northern Alliance and non-Pashtun mudjahedin groups in order to counter Pakistans assistance for the Taliban.180 Indias aid for civil reconstruction has to be seen as a continuation of this support: Some anti-Pashtun still linger on in Indias aid, and it should be kept in mind that Indian aid for Afghanistan is always instrumental in the struggle between India and Pakistan.
Activities & Policy Changes: Indias activities in Afghanistan aim mostly at the reconstruction of heavy infrastructure (road construction and electricity transmission), but some softer issues like education (scholarships) are also targeted.181 India is not contributing to major multilateral agreements like ARFT or LOFTA.
Analysis & Recommendation: By some observers, Indias aid is presented as a forerunner of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, because of its assumed high degree of community participation and utilization of governmental channels, and its avowed aspiration to increase long-term sustainability of Indians aid projects.182 However, available data suggest otherwise: In 2006, none of the disbursements by India were based on programs developed by the Government of Afghanistan, nor did any Indian aid use Afghanistans budget execution, nancial reporting or procurement systems. Furthermore, none of Indias five donor missions is co-ordinated with other donors agencies in Afghanistan.183
We recommend:
178 179 180 181 182 183
See Hainzl & Zips (2005), Nojumi, Mazurana, & Stites (2004), and Wardak (2006). See International Development Committee (2008) See Human Rights Watch (2001) and Rashid (2001, p. 39; 2008, p. 206). See DSouza (2007a; 2007b) See Rashid (2008, p. 248) and DSouza (2007a). See OECD (2007b).
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Given the recent OECD-data, India performance is still unreliable and enigmatic from a policy point of view. Therefore, Indias activities in Afghanistan should be closely monitored in order to keep track with developments on ground and to be prepared for possible interferences between a future unified European approach and Indias activities. Indias bias toward heavy infrastructure projects appears to be slightly out of date. India should be encouraged to increase its participation in the current process toward more aid effectiveness. It should be kept in mind anytime that Indias assistance for Afghanistan serves not only humanitarian purposes but also Indias political ends in its vicinity.
5.4.5 Canada Overview: Compared to its overall level of ODA disbursements, Canadas involvement in Afghanistan is rather high: Nearly 4 per cent of its total ODA in 2006 was spent in Afghanistan, reaching $ 140.27mioa share only surpassed by Turkey (8.07%) and the USA (5.97%). This concentration reflects the missing Kosovo/Balkan-factor for some non-EU countries: Because they are not tied to any long term commitment in Southeast Europe, ODA budgets could be redeployed to a greater extent in reaction to current events since 9/11. Besides these civilian efforts, Canada has roughly 3.500 soldiers and army members on ground in Afghanistan, of these around 2.500 are under ISAF command.184 Like the UK, Canada views security as crucial precondition for any other development.185 Serving mostly in southern provinces of Afghanistan, the Canadian Army has suffered the third highest death toll: As of September 1st, 2008, 93 members of the Canadian Army died in Afghanistan.186 And since progress in reconstruction and security seem to be lacking, the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan has been questioned and demands for withdrawal are gaining resonance. In September 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Canadian troops will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2011.187
Activities & policy changes: The biggest individual items in Canadas ODA budget in
2006 were several budget support programs like $ 28mio for the ARTF and $ 20mio for the National Solidarity Program of the Government of Afghanistan, which is mostly directed at rural development. Besides that, Canadas priorities in Afghanistan in regard to civil reconstruction are democratic development & good governance, local rural livelihood, women and girls, and basic human needs. A geographical focus is Kandahar, which receives 15 per cent of Canadas ODA to Afghanistan (and predominately aid concerned with basic human needs).188 In Kandahar, Can-
184 In 2006, Canada had a total of 2500 military deployed in Afghanistan. The parliamentary debate whether to increase this number or not had been intense, and the continued military commitment to Afghanistan was linked to a stronger involvement of NATO members: For instance, should ISAF fail to mobilize the necessary helicopters for Afghanistan, Canada would withdraw its forces at the end of its mandate (see Canada extends deployment in Afghanistan, Sydney Morning Herald, March 21, 2008). 185 186
See Maloney (2005) and Pistor (2008, p. 3).
Data according to http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/oef.casualties [Sep 01, 2008] and http://www.icasualties.org/OEF/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=Canada [Sep 01, 2008]. See Lee Carter, Canada Afghan mission ends 2011, BBC News, Sep 11, 2008. See CCIC (2008).
187 188
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adas sole PRT is located, so this regional emphasis is part of a general pattern in the landscape of Afghanistans civil reconstruction. In 2006, Canada has started an ambitious programme to develop some Microfinance institutions in order to facilitate economic endeavours of women ($ 19mio).189 Over the years, Canadas spending patters show no grave changes, although in practice Canada emphasises civilian elements more firmly than in the beginning of its engagement, while simultaneously upgrading its military equipment. Obviously, becoming lead nation in Kandahar has caused a reality shock that induced policy changes as well as more concentrated and appropriate efforts on-site.190
Analysis & recommendations: Canada is implementing the Paris Declaration rather slowly and cannot be called an overachiever regarding aid effectiveness in Afghanistan. For instance, none of its donor missions in Afghanistan was co-ordinated in 2006, and an independent team of researchers had a hard time of finding any tangible results of Canadian development activities in Kandahar.191 But, on the other hand, Canada, for the most part, follows the path of untying aid, channelling it through Afghanistans institutions, and aligning it with development programs of the Government of Afghanistan. Apart from the Microfinance program, Canadas policy is rather conventional than innovative.192 Although following the beaten path has not been a good choice in Afghanistan so far, the current trends and aid commitments suggest a strategy of more-of-the-same for Canadas aid.
We recommend: Canada is a reliable and steady partner in development issues, focused on thoroughly civilian aims, albeit with a considerable bias toward technical solutions. Considering the substantial likeness of their general approaches to civil reconstruction, the EU should always pay attention to possible effects of synergy, resulting from coordinated programs or coordinated planning with Canada.
5.4.6 Germany Overview: Recently, Germany has improved its aid effectiveness significantly according to the indicators of the Paris Declaration.193 However, Germany was not exactly a role model of aid effectiveness, so the starting point of this progress was fairly low. Furthermore, in the case of Afghanistan some statistics suggest severe failings: Only 9 per cent of Germanys government aid actually utilizes administrative institutions of Afghanistan and alarmingly zero per cent of Germany aids was
189 190 191
This program absorbs 60 per cent of all resources earmarked for gender issues (CCIC, 2008, p. 2). See Sorenson (2008).
For example, Canada reported to have provided the hospital in Kandahar with a maternity unit, which was evidently neither operation nor in construction nor did any of the hospital officials was informed about any Canadian initiative regarding the hospital (Senlis Council, 2007, p. 24).
192 193
See OECD (2007b) and country specific data in OECD DAC (2008a).
See country specific data in OECD DAC (2008a). But the devil is in the details: In the latest self-assessment, Germany declares to have reduced sector fragmentation by concentration on three focal areas per recipient (OECD DAC, 2008b, p. 40)a claim that is simply not true in the case of Afghanistan: Even the official homepage of the implementing ministry notes four focal areas, without including Germanys engagement in SSR and police reform (see http://www.bmz.de/de/laender/partnerlaender/afghanistan/zusammenarbeit.html [Sep 01, 2008]).
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based on programs developed by the Government of Afghanistan.194 Adding to this the generally insufficient performance as the lead nation for police reform195 and an evident disinterest to engage in Afghanistan,196 calling Germanys involvement in Afghanistan successful would be quite a stretch. On the upside, Germanys commitment to a reconstruction policy that is consistently civilian in nature is more pronounced than that of any other big donor and most apparent in the dual leadership of its PRTs: Every PRTs has a civilian head and a military commander whose authority is nominally equivalent.197 Sceptic about the war against terrorism, Germany is reluctant to use its 3400 soldiers under ISAF command for fighting in Afghanistans south,198 thus creating animosities and debate within NATO, respectively ISAF. Moreover, Germanys civilian efforts have not yet proven to be the appropriate measure against counter-insurgencyperhaps due to a level of disbursements that cannot back up Germanys official civilian rhetoric.
Activities & policy changes: As mentioned above, Germany was the lead nation for
police reform before the EU took over responsibility in July 2007. Since then, Germany continues its commitment to police reform in Afghanistan at the same level, but under the umbrella of EUPOL. Other focal areas of Germanys engagement are energy (with a focus on renewable resources), drinking water supply, sustainable economic development, and primary education.199 Lately, the last item on that list has received considerably more attention: Between 2005 and 2006 Germanys ODA for the education sector jumped up from $ 6.3mio to $ 12.4mioan increase that is affirmed by the current official policy paper on Afghanistan.200 Contrary to earlier programs, since 2006 Germany is again funding directly the reconstruction of schools and NGO-activities in the field of education.201 The original leading role in higher education (after 2002) has been reduced to a level of normal partnership with other donors in the lead, mainly USAID. Officially, Germany does not endorse budget support. The general line is that it would be irresponsible to lose track of taxpayers money that way. Despite of that
See OECD (2007b). Considering that Germany has nearly doubled its overall share of program-based aid since 2006s OECD survey, its performance in regard to this indicator might be better since 2006 (OECD DAC, 2008a, p. 94). But recipient-specific data for Afghanistan is not available from the OECD DAC to date [Sep 01, 2008].
195
194
The poor performance of Germany as a lead nation in police reform is a frequently recurrent theme in most reports on Afghanistan (e.g., International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 204-206; J. L. Jones & Pickering, 2008, p. 20; Rashid, 2008; Rubin, 2007).
Although this statement comes close to over-emphasise quantities: In 2006, Afghanistan received even less aid than Egypt or China, and only a tenth of Germanys ODA for Nigeria (data according to OECD DAC dataset 2a. ODA by recipient by country, ODA Total Net Disbursements). How Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, arrived at the result, that no country received more aid from us than Afghanistan (Pressemitteilung des Bundesministeriums fr wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Mar 28, 2008 [http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/pm/2008/maerz/pm_20080325_27.html [Sep 01, 2008]) remains a mystery against the background of OECD-data.
197 198
196
See Gauster (2008, pp. 23-26).
Probably the need for an annual mandate from Germanys parliament is another incentive to keep German troops in their camps.
199 200 201
See http://www.bmz.de/de/laender/partnerlaender/afghanistan/zusammenarbeit.html [Sep 01, 2008]. See Bundesregierung (2007, pp. 26-27). According the microdata of OECD DAC dataset Creditor Reporting System(http://stats.oecd.org/).
61
official rhetoric,202 Germany supports Afghanistans trust funds, albeit in a quite clandestine way: On paper, not the ARFT is funded but certain projects that are financed though the ARFT. For instance, $ 6.3mio were disbursed through the LOFTA mechanisms for ANP remuneration but not directly accounted as contributions for LOFTA.203
Analysis & Recommendations: Germanys assistance to Afghanistan has a deepseated strategic flaw: It pretends that Afghanistan is a functioning state already. See for instance Germanys approach to police reform: Although there was virtually no police in the streets, Germany insisted on a strategy of advanced training for police commanders who, after a tedious study of two years, should then train their subordinates themselves. What seems blatantly rational and economic within developed police forcescreating a snowball effectwas simply bad, inadequate planning in Afghanistan. State building needs security forces on the ground from day one to be successfulregardless of who provides this security.204 Maybe this boots-on-theground approach is not the most didactic one, but in every case more appropriate in a post-conflict situation like in Afghanistan than Germanys.205 Furthermore, Germany inability to align its aid with the national programs of Afghanistan is staggering. Adding to the numbers stated above, Germany failed to coordinate one single technical assistance project with an Afghan program.206 Although there are sometimes good reasons to avoid too much alignment with local governments, Germanys consistent lack of coordination and alignment is quite odd, especially since Afghan ownership has been promoted as a core value of German aid.207 Overall, Germanys ODA seems to suffer from sector fragmentation and to be in need for a cohesive strategy. For instance, when the 2006s NSP of the EC listed the focal areas of other donors, Germany was not mentioned once.208 Add to this an apparent resistance to concrete coordination on-site,209 and Germany appears to be rather an obstacle for an overarching and integrative EU policy on civil reconstruction. However, in late 2008 the German development institutions are obviously in a rebuilding phase, so that hopefully the next update on ODA flows to Afghanistan proves our analysis to be out-dated, but latest anecdotes from the field do not point to that direction. We recommend: In 2007, only the USA disbursed more ODA than Germany.210 This purchasing power doubtlessly will affect European policy on Afghanistanbut
202 203 204 205
See, for example, the news release cited above and see International Development Committee (2008, Q53). See the available CRS microdata (http://stats.oecd.org/). See Dobbins et al. (2007).
Of course it is not just Germany to blame: The international response to civilian needs of Afghanistan was far too small and too late in every sector (Rashid, 2008), but Germanys special failure was to stick stubbornly to a wrong approach even when its limitation became evident. See OECD (2007b, p. 5). See Daxner et al. (2007). See European Commission (2006, pp. 16-17). Of course, there is no shortage of coordination rhetoric in Germany. According to OECD DAC dataset 1. ODA by Donor(http://stats.oecd.org/).
206 207 208 209 210
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rather in an indirect way, through the European development institutions, given that Germanys direct engagement in Afghanistan is more or less limited. Therefore Germanys mixed record in Afghanistan should be kept in mind during in the next intra-European debates about the best approach in Afghanistan. A distinct and comprehensive German approach to civil reconstruction in Afghanistan is not distinguishable, thus it is unlikely that an emergence of a European policy on civil reconstruction in Afghanistan will start from there. It seems like Germanys several development institutions are more concerned with themselves (implementing the Paris Declaration) and other parts of the world than with Afghanistan.211
5.4.7 Japan
Overview: In term of aid effectiveness, Japan cannot be considered a role model.
Neither is Japans aid much aligned nor overly co-ordinated. In Afghanistan Japans involvement has been unsteady, but not entirely unreliable. Contrary to other major donor countries, Japan does not contribute manpower to ISAF or OEF.
Activities & Policy Changes: Since September 2001, Japan has been involved in Afghanistan, mostly through road construction and several budget support programs. Moreover, Japan was the lead-nation for DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) until the process was deemed to be completed successfully in 2006 and since then engaged in DIAG (disbandment of illegal armed groups) programs. There has been a remarkable policy change during 2004 and 2006: Japan nearly stopped funding the reconstruction & storage sectorthe former hallmark of Japans reconstruction effortsand instead focused on institution building.212 This change is only partly due to the start of DDR programs in 2004, which were funded by Japan to a great extent: Japan was concerned about security issues and stopped its road building programs entirely.213 Lately, in mid-2007, Japans focus shifted again. This time, the majority of Japans programs aim at relief for refugees in the border regions to Pakistan and Iran and, in addition to that, at empowerment of the local communities.214
Analysis & Recommendations: Japans performance in Afghanistan resembles Germanys. Japan avoids Trust Funds most of the time, channels rather few resources through local institutions, and its programs are not highly coordinated with other donors or the recipients institutions. But unlike Germany, Japans activities always indicate a general strategy. Obviously, this strategy changes frequently sometimes from year to yearwhich makes harmonization and coordination fairly difficult, but, on the other hand, proves the flexibility of Japans aid system.
This sentence is to be read without any normative undertones: We do not expect every donor country to prioritize Afghanistan, and it can be a reasonable choice to concentrate on internal issues for some time.
212 213 214
211
In 2004 Japan disbursed $ 111.96mio in the transport & storage sector, but only $ 0.51mio in 2006. See Rashid (2008, p. 186).
See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance for Afghanistan, Especially for the stabilization of the Border Areas (Mar 21, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/3/0321.html [Sep 02, 2008]).
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Unfortunately, Japans role in the DDR process is ambivalent. Eager to avoid conflict with local strongmen, Japan even proposed to suspend disarmament and to start with re-integration right away. Moreover, UNAMA reports stated that 80 per cent of combatants who entered the program were indeed impostors and fraudsnot exactly a demonstration of effectivity.215 We recommend: Japans new focus on the border regions covers a tactically decisive area that even may gain importance, given the heightened international pressure on Pakistan to step up in its fight against the Taliban structures in Pakistans border regions.216 The EU should pay attention to a sufficient protection of Japans civil aid workers in order to prevent yet another rather ineffective implementation of Japans programs.
5.4.8 Netherlands Overview: The Netherlands is considered to be an effective and innovative donor
as well as a reliable partner in co-ordination efforts. Furthermore, Netherlands aid agencies have already reached several of the 2010 targets of the Paris Declaration.217 In Afghanistan, the Netherlands focuses its efforts on the southern provinces, in particular on the province of Uruzgan, where the Dutch PRT is located. Since ISAF took over in the south in 2006, the Netherlands has endorsed the philosophy of an integrated mission similar to the UK and Canada: putting security first. In practice however, reconstruction in less hostile areas and thereby slowly winning over the local population is preferred to direct confrontation with local armed groups.218 Nevertheless, the military engagement has been unpopular in the Netherlands from the beginning and is expected to end in 2010 or 2011.219
Activities & Policy Changes: In the first years of the intervention, the Netherlands
funded first and foremost emergency relief operations and reconstruction of urgently needed infrastructure. With the expansion of the ISAF mission into Afghanistans south, the Dutch ODA changed priorities and implemented a stricter focus on state building, in accordance with the general change regarding reconstruction policy in Afghanistan around 2004. Now the spending pattern of the Netherlands resembles that of the UK: Nearly half of the Netherlands ODA for Afghanistan (app. $ 85mio annually since 2002) is allocated to local programs in Uruzgan, while the rest is contributed to Afghanistans several trust funds.220 In 2006, the Netherlands spend $ 50.21mio for the ARTF, but diversified their portfolio in 2007, disbursing ca. $ 25mio to ARTF, $ 10mio to LOFTA, and $ 8mio for several UN agencies funds. Aid in Uruzgan is fragmented, but the most substantial programs aim at strengthening local counter-narcotics institutions and rural development (including road construction). Since 2006, the Netherlands
215 216 217 218 219 220
See on this issue (Rossi & Giustozzi, 2006). See T. H. Johnson and Mason (2008). See OECD DAC (2006a). See OECD DAC (2008a) and Chivers (2007). See Pistor (2008, pp. 3-4).
See http://nl.sitestat.com/minbuza/minbuza/s?en-pdf.afghanistan-pdf.development-cooperationafghanistan_version-januar&ns_type=pdf&ns_url=http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistanpdf/development-cooperation-afghanistan_version-januar.pdf [Sep 03, 2008].
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has increased its disbursements in Afghanistan significantly to annually $ 130mio, but corresponding to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2010 or 2011, Dutch disbursements are likely to lessen again after that date.
Analysis & Recommendations: Although the Netherlands have a high standing

within the ODA community, the mission in Afghanistan revealed serious shortcomings in the domain of CIMIC (civil military co-ordination), in particular regarding information sharing and policy planning of the Dutch PRT. Needless to say, PRTs generally are still a matter of trial-and-error, but in the Dutch case the military command appears to be overly self-referential.221 In the context of counter-narcotics, the Dutch approach has been criticized as too tolerant and, indeed, Uruzgans drug industry has been soaring to new highs since the Dutch arrived.222 Providing local farmers alternatives to opium cultivation is convincing on paper and surely less confrontational than other approaches, but this strategy has had only limited success. Maybe this is due to the low level of disbursements for rural development and counter-narcotics, but given the interaction of drug trafficking and counterinsurgency, the Netherlands indirect approach is probably too one-dimensional in general.223 But in the light of public opinion, Dutch decision makers are reluctant to tackle security and drug problems in a more direct way. However, in some regions of Uruzgan province, the Dutch forces lately managed to drive out insurgents and to stabilize the areas subsequently.224 We recommend: The Netherlands funding scheme (splitting disbursement between national-wide funds and geographically concentrated programs) should considered as a role model for ODA allocations of EU member states. The Dutch experiences show, that counter-narcotics measures should not neglect a coherent and firm military engagement with illegally armed groups and local strongmen.
5.4.9 Norway Overview: Norways ODA/GNI ratio of 0.95 (2007) is the highest of all DAC member
states. Add to this Norways good performance in the monitoring process of the Paris Declaration and you understand the high reputation of Norway in the aid community. But because Norways aid system is spread between four ministries, policy coherence has proven to be problematica problem that has been addressed through an internal administrative reorganisation.225 As of June 2008, 560 Norwegian soldiers are stationed in Afghanistan, with a geographical focus on Meymana (Faryab), where the Norway-led PRT is located.
Activities & Policy Changes: Norway is known for relying heavily on NGOs in the implementation of Norwegian aid. Therefore, Norwegian performance might have had been compromised by the subsequent decrease in NGO funding in Afghani-
221 222 223
See Rietjens (2008). See J. L. Anderson (2007) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008).
Theoretically, creating alternatives to opium seems to be simple: Cultivating onions, for instance, is more profitable than opium (Ward, Mansfield, Oldham, & Byrd, 2008, p. 9). But the crucial point here is that within a fragile, unsafe environment, applying the behavioural rules of homo oeconomicus cannot be the basis for programs and policy planning.
224 225
See Nachtwei (2008). See OECD DAC (2004).
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stan, but because there is a operational trust fund for virtually everything in Afghanistan, Norways aid disbursements have not sufferedrather the opposite. In 2006, Norway allocated roughly $ 70mio to Afghanistan and has announced to double its contributions in 2008 up to app. $ 133mio (or 740mio NOK).226 In Afghanistan, Norway pursues a reconstruction policy focused on infrastructure (including energy) and education. Regarding preferred channels, Norway has a bias toward trust funds and funding multilateral organizations: In 2006, nearly 55 per cent of Norways ODA was disbursed to ARTF or other trust funds and UN-agencies. In accordance with its tradition, Norway pays 32 per cent of its aid to NGOsa share far above average.227 Norways low-key approach becomes most apparent in its PRTs strategy: Norways PRT does not implement reconstruction projects on its own. Instead, Norway aims to allure multilaterally funded programs to Faryab.228
Analysis & Recommendations: As measured by the indicators for aid effectiveness,

Norway fares fairly well, although its share of program-based aid could surely be higher (2006: 42%).229 However, in regard to a future EU policy on civil reconstruction of Afghanistan, the Norwegian example contains barely potential guiding principles. On the on hand, Norways high degree utilization of NGOs runs contrary to the current general strategy in Afghanistan, and on the other hand, adopting Norways emphasis on multilateralism and trust funds would not result in a distinct European policy stance. We recommend: Norways performance in the north-western provinces should be regarded as a rather singular example from which lessons can be drawn. Thus, a detailed study and evaluation of Norways approach in Afghanistan in relation to other European countries should be initiated.
5.4.10 Turkey Overview: Turkey does not participate in OECDs CRS, making it hard to discern
funding patterns. Moreover, although Turkey has signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, it does not take part in the monitoring process, thus further limiting available verified data. Turkey contributes to ISAF with 760 soldiers (as of June 2008) and shares the Regional Command Capital with Italy and France. Up to date, Turkey had not counted casualties.
Activities & Policy Changes: Turkeys ODA disbursements skyrocketed in recent

years: Virtually zero aid was disbursed in 2003, but remarkable $ 57.65mio in 2006. This increase may be the effect of the instalment of Turkeys PRT in Wardak. Unfortunately, the purposes of this ODA are hard to discern due to little reporting. But, for a start, available data show that Turkey does not contribute to ARFT, LOFTA, or other funds managed by UNDP.230
226 227 228 229
See http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL1159571720080611 [Sep 03, 2008]. In 2006, only 4.5 per cent of all bilateral aid to Afghanistan was disbursed to NGOs. See http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/faryab.htm [Sep 03, 2008].
See OECD (2007b, p. 9). Generally, utilizing NGOs goes hand in hand with less program-based aid, because NGOs naturally keep their distance to the Governments program in order to maintain their neutrality. Thus, NGOs are on principle deemed to be a hindrance to aid effectiveness by current indicators. UNDP records a total of $ 100,000 by Turkey in its list of donors (http://www.undp.org.af/Funding/index.htm, [Sep 04, 2008]).
230
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Analysis & Recommendations: Turkey pledged its commitment to Afghanistan from

the beginning,231 but confined its engagement mainly on military contributions. Only lately, Turkeys ODA has significantly increased but remains unevaluated up to date. However, the recent emergence of Taliban and other insurgents in the province of Wardak indicates some backlog, at least in regard to CIMIC.232 We recommend: A small study should be funded to evaluate Turkeys approach to civil reconstruction in Afghanistan.
5.4.11 Sweden Overview: Like any other Scandinavian countrys, Swedens reputation in the ODA
community is nearly spotless. Its ODA/GNI ratio is the second best and several EU targets in regard to implementing the Paris Declaration for 2010 have been reached already. Afghanistan, however, cannot be considered a top priority for Sweden. Swedens contribution to ISAF adds up to 250 soldiers, mainly stationed in Northern Afghanistan, where Swedens PRT is located (in Mazar-e-Sharif, Balkh).
Activities & Policy Changes: Swedens ODA is mainly aimed at education, specifically primary education, and contributes to trust funds, in particular to the ARTF. Sweden channels its aid through NGOs or multilateral institutions and supports Afghanistans public sector only indirect via trust funds.233 Since 2002, neither spending patterns nor sector priorities have changed significantly.
Analysis & Recommendations: Frankly, with app. $ 45mio disbursements, a donor should not try to implement a far reaching, holistic strategy in a country like Afghanistan. Being aware of that, Sweden focuses strictly on selected areas, like education. Although it is fitting to put education first in Afghanistan, the overall mixed performance of the north western provinces does not fully verify the Swedish approach. Gauged by aid effectiveness indicators, Sweden fares well, so that the ambivalent status in Afghanistans north west appears to be rather the consequence of donors being too effective (Remember that another overachiever concerning aid effectiveness, Norway, is also emphasizing this region): Maybe the volatile environment in Afghanistan impedes a chiefly civilian approach to civil reconstruction, or other donors occupy and influence the disbursement plan of multilateral institutions (esp. trust funds) to their liking, thereby depriving provinces associated with rather altruistic or multilateral-minded donors from much needed resources.
We recommend: Generally, the north west of Afghanistan is rather poorly covered by studies and researchers. In order to facilitate a fruitful discussion about policy amendments and to address the questions stated above, a small independent fact-finding study should be conducted.
231
See Bulent Ecevit, Turkeys role: Reconstruction and nation-building, International Herald Tribune, July 31, 2008 (http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/07/31/edbulent_ed3_.php, [Sep 04, 2008]). See Senlis Council (2008).
232 233
In 2006, 52% of Swedens aid was disbursed through multilateral organization and their trust funds, while 44% was channelled through NGOs (see OECD DACs CRS)
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5.4.12 Italy
Overview: With nearly an amount of $ 4,000mio in 2007, Italys global ODA disbursements are of considerable heights. Still, Italys engagement in Afghanistan has been lowactually surprisingly low, given that Italy is lead nation for the critical reform of Afghanistans justice sector. Not that more is always better, but it is hard not to correlate Italys meagre spending with the poor results achieved in reforming Afghanistans courts and prosecution institutions.234 Italy accomplished a constructive coordination neither with related reform process (e.g., police reform), nor with similar programs and missions of other donors (e.g. the Justice program of the Council of Europe or Drug Courts program of the UK).235 Furthermore, Italy lags behind in implementing the Paris Declaration, leading to serious irritation among other donors, most noticeable the UK.236
Currently, 2350 Italian soldiers are stationed in Afghanistan, mainly in the west. Like German troops, they are not allowed to operate in Afghanistans south. Italy also has the lead in PRT Herat.
Activities & Policy Change: Like Turkey, Italy does not report its activities in Afghanistan to OECDs CRS, so that a detailed analysis is not possible. Besides its involvement in a protracted consulting process concerned the formulation of a new Afghan code of law and general capacity building in the justice sector, Italys engagement in civil reconstruction has been spotty sector-wise and focused on western Afghanistan geographicallylacking an nation-wide, more encompassing approach.237
Additionally, Italy has contributed since 2002 $ 45mio to UNDF Afghanistan respectively its trust funds for Afghanistan and contributes to World Banks ARFT, albeit on a rather small scale.238
Analysis & Recommendation: Italy is known for supporting the USA in the war on
terror more firmly than most other European countries. Italys involvement in Afghanistan is understood primarily as an anti-terrorism measure, not as a civilian reconstruction effort. Accordingly, the Italian engagement has been predominately military in nature, whereas the scope of the rebuilding of the Justice sector has been clearly underestimated. Like Germany, Italy has failed to increase its engagement in correspondence with the growing realization of slow progress or re-design its strategies. And given the history of its current administration,239 a more co-
We do not want to belittle the hard work of several individuals in the Italian embassy and within the Italian academic or cheapen the recent progress in judicial reform, but the general situation, however improved, remains severely deficient (e.g., Secretary-General, 2008, 24). Moreover, the positive developments seem to be largely due to Afghan initiatives while the influence of the interveners lead-nation remains vague. For instance, the celebrated change of personnel at Afghanistans Supreme Court should be attributed rather to political pressure of the Afghan opposition than to Italian efforts (Katzmann, 2008, p. 2).
235 236
234
See Korski (2008, pp. 12-13) and Tondini (2007).
In an act of unusual bluntness, the chairman of the House of Commonss International Development Committee characterized the Italian aid and development programs as to be going rapidly backwards (International Development Committee, 2008, Q45). See Pistor (2008, p. 6).
237 238
See http://www.undp.org.af/Funding/index.htm [Sep 04, 2008] and http://web.worldbank.org/servlets/ECR?contentMDK=21846272&contTypePK=217180&folderPK=147245&sitePK=30588 5&callCR=true [Sep 04, 2008]. See Andreatta (2008).
239
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operative, innovative, and more extensive involvement of Italy in Afghanistan seems to be unlikely. We recommend: Italy should be encouraged to report in more detail to the OECD DAC. Italy should be supported more firmly in its effort to reform the Justice sector by the EU. In the long run, the EU should assume responsibility in this sector in order to facilitate coordination with related reforms, like police reform.
5.4.13 Denmark Overview: Like any other Scandinavian country, Denmark has a high standing
among donors. Its aid system is known for its policy coherence and its endorsement and implementation of practices that are promoted as most effective in the recent ODA literature, in particular budget support and capacity building. To strengthen effectiveness and local ownership altogether, Denmark is decentralizing its aid administration, transferring authority towards the recipient countries.240 In recent years, development aid has been re-framed as a means for political ends. Taking the link between development and security seriously, Denmark has deployed roughly 700 soldiers in Afghanistan, mostly in the South, where they support the British-led Task Force Helmand as an independent battalion.241 While the Danish death toll of 16 casualties is relatively high, domestic debate about the Afghanistan mission has been not very agitated and official support remains high.242
Activities & Policy Changes: With 1.33 per cent of its ODA flowing to Afghanistan, Denmarks aid is not overly concentrated on this countryin fact Afghanistan was not within Denmarks Top 10 of funded countries in 2006. But since 2006, Denmark has increased its aid commitments significantly: In 2008, $ 70mio have been committed, even $ 90mio annually from 2009 to 2012.243
Because Denmark reporting to the OECDs CRS is inconclusive, Denmarks focus in Afghanistan cannot be derived from facts as accurate as in the case of most prior donors. Overall, however, Denmark follows the path of other forerunners of aid effectiveness like US or Sweden: splitting disbursements between trust funds and specialized projects. According to the official policy paper, Afghanistan-Denmark Partnership, Denmarks priority areas in Afghanistanbesides the overall goal of state buildingare education, rural development, democratization, and support of refugeesa prioritization that is confirmed by available CRS-micro data. Up to date, these focal areas have not changed since 2002. A new Danish strategy for Afghanistan is announced for December 2008, but there are no indications that this paper will bring along any policy changes.
Analysis & Recommendations: Denmarks performance in Afghanistan is as good as

in other parts of the world, or in other words: better than the average of OECD
240
See OECD DAC (2007).
241 See Denmark doubles its forces in Southern Afghanistan and increases aid to the Afghan school system, Aug 5, 2008, www.ambottwa.um.dk/news/ [Sep 5, 2008]. 242 According to Foreign Policy, Denmarks share of fatalities in relation to its domestic population of 20-39-year olds is the biggest of all countries contributing to ISAF (see Foreign Policy, Might Denmark pulls its weight, Apr 02, 2008)
See Denmarks engagement in Afghanistan, Factsheet prepared for the Afghanistan Conference in Paris 12 June 2008, http://www.diplomatie.gov.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Danish_engagement_in_Afghanistan.pdf (Sep 05, 2008).
243
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member states. For example, two thirds of its aid is program-based (: 43%) and one third of its donor missions are co-ordinated (: 26%).244 It is a debatable point whether the sharp increase of aid flows can be absorbed by Denmarks own implementation organizations: According to local media, Danish projects suffer from a lack of personnel.245 Thus, it seems probable that not all commitments will be disbursedas long as the resources that cannot be absorbed by Danish bilateral projects will not be re-allocated to multilateral institutions and trust funds. But despite of this problem, Denmarks approach to civil reconstruction is small in scale but well designed. Its overall aims are in accordance with the relevant international agreements and understandings, while the donor-specific focal areas address issues that are crucial for the emergence of an Afghan society free from endemic violence right now: education and rural development. We recommend: Denmarks decision to expand its education program to institutions of secondary education should stimulate future EU programs to put a stronger emphasis on secondary and tertiary education institutions, which have been neglected by European countries up to date.
5.4.14 France Overview: Although France spend less on ODA for Afghanistan in 2006reaching
$ 14.62miothan Australia ($ 21.15mio), Spain ($ 18.11mio), Switzerland ($ 17.58mio), or Finland ($ 14.62mio)246, France is included in this discussion of donor behaviour in Afghanistan, because France has significant military numbers deployed in Afghanistan andmore importantlyis a political force that should not be ignored when it comes to European politics. Beside its 1700 soldiers, France contributions to Afghanistan are more or less humble. For a country that is considered a key player in the international scene of development aid and co-operation, its level of engagement in Afghanistan is astonishingly low. But traditionally, France is more concerned with its former colonies and Africa in general, so Afghanistan is clearly not within the regional focus of French aid.
Activities & Policy Changes: On the whole, France stance towards Afghanistan is
dominated by a focus on security. Because security and development are far less linked within Frances policy, there is virtually no coherent approach to civilian reconstruction. For instance, France does not approve the PRT-concept.247 Available CRS micro data248 suggest that education is a focal area of Frances ODA, whereas other programs aim at the training of judges, counter-narcotics, and assistance to the Afghan parliament. But, again, the scale of these activities is very low. For comparison: In 2006, Norway contributed nearly twice as much to the ARTF alone than France disbursed in Afghanistan altogether. In 2008, France announced to increase
244 245
See OECD (2007b).
This shortage has been confirmed by Danish Officials, see China View, Danish civilian projects in Afghanistan lack personnel, July 17, 2007 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/17/content_8558172.htm). According to dataset 2. ODA by Recipient by country, http://stats.oecd.org/. See Pistor (2008, p. 5).
246 247 248
NB: The Development Assistance Database (DAD) for Afghanistan, maintained by the Government of Afghanistan, was not accessible during research.
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its aid for Afghanistan to $ 82.5mio per year,249 but because the purpose of this money is still unknown, it is unclear if these commitments will fully count as ODA or are truly civilian in nature.
Analysis & Recommendation: According to latest country-specific OECD data,

Frances performance in Afghanistan is rather insufficient, because Frances aid is not aligned with programs and priorities developed by the Government of Afghanistan. Neither are Frances three donor missions co-ordinated with other donors projects or activities.250 Moreover, France has a policy deficit concerning civilmilitary cooperation or any other cross-cutting issues, which is most evident in Afghanistan.
We recommend:
France should increase its civilian engagement in Afghanistan and develop a coherent strategy for its civil reconstruction efforts that is more in accordance with current international best practice. Frances focus on military security should not serve as a example for an European policy on civil security
5.4.15 Other Countries: Pakistan and Iran Pakistan: For several reasons, Pakistan has a track record of influencing Afghan politics like no other country. On the on hand, Pakistan and Afghanistan share a troublesome borderthe infamous Durand Line, which was established in 1897 by British diplomacy and cut right through villages and local topography, dividing the Pashtun tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan.251 Issues about the boundary line and its legitimacy have always been the cause for harsh conflicts between the two countries.252 On the other hand, Pakistan understood (and understands) Afghanistan as a steady opportunity to gain strategic depth in its quarrels with arch-rival India.253 Thus, strengthening Islamic militants has been an approved Pakistani method of regional politics, and it remains highly doubtful if Pakistan despite all official rhetorichas really abandoned this approach.254 Pakistans intelligence agency, the ISI, is known for being extremely nationalistic and Talibanfriendly, and furthermore, for having a huge influence on official politics in Islamabad. Rather unexpected, Pakistan became a close ally in the USAs war on terrorism, without being overly helpful in fighting the Taliban255 or in re-building Afghanistan. Even worse, international aid for Pakistan after 9/11 has reportedly been used for equipping Taliban insurgents.256 Only lately, the Americans have increased pressure
249
See With reservations, countries pledge $17 billion in aid for Afghanistan, International Herald Tribune, June 12, 2008. See OECD (2007b) See Chayes (2006, pp. 130-132) and Ewans (2002, pp. 108-109). See Schetter (2004, pp. 81-83). See Human Rights Watch (2001) and Rashid (2001, pp. 299-315) See the respective chapters in Rashid (2008) with copious references.
250 251 252 253 254 255
In the fight against Al-Queda, however, Pakistan appeared to be more wholeheartedlyprobably because the presence of Al-Queda limited Pakistans control over the Taliban and southern Afghanistan. Until June 2004, Pakistan had arrested 689 alleged members of Al-Queda, but failed to capture one Taliban commander until 2007, although notable figures of the Taliban chain of command remained a fairly public profile in Pakistan (Rashid, 2008, pp. 238, 241-242). See Cole (2008).
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on Islamabad to stop the ISI from countering the Afghanistans state building process.257 Against this backdrop, Pakistans contributions to civil reconstruction in Afghanistan are negligible. We recommend the EU to be most sceptical about any Pakistan initiatives. Also, intelligence information from Pakistan should never be taken at face value.258 Instead, the recently growth of economic cross-border activities259 might be a possibility for European activities which would help directly Afghan traders in the impoverished south as well as merchants in Pakistan while indirectly forward the civil reconstruction of Afghanistan through economic growth.
Iran: Like India and Russia, Iran has a history of supporting the Northern Alliance.
Irans special focus has been funding Shiite militants in Central Afghanistan. Since the end of the Taliban regime, Iran has disbursed huge amounts of aid for Afghanistanabout $ 600mio until 2007, according to Government officials.260 The western city of Herat is the priority area of Iranian aid, and Herats remarkable revival is often attributed to Iranian assistance.261 On the other hand, Iran is regularly accused of supporting the insurgency. Allegedly, Iranian help now reaches even its former enemies, the Taliban,262 but although Afghan border guards are positive about weapons being smuggled into Afghanistan from Iran, Iranian aid for the insurgency is still a thesis to be proven.263 However, such actions would fit perfectly well into Irans general strategy of weakening American influence throughout the world and especially in its neighbourhood. But, in the long run, Iran, unlike Pakistan, should be more interested in stable Afghanistan than in a prolonged civil war because Iran and western Afghanistan are closely connected264 and Iran needs a strong state in Afghanistan in order to tackle its domestic drug problems which are extremely exacerbated by Afghanistans drug industry. Furthermore, Iran might be interested in an obliged and stable Afghanistan for the purpose of containing Pakistan.265 In times of Iranian ambitions to become a nuclear power, it is not easy to say, but we recommend the EU to consider the positive effects of Irans assistance to Afghanistan, where Iran has used its influence in a rather constructive way, and we encourage the EU to curb American reservations regarding Iran. Of course, the problem of Irans nuclear program needs to be solvedand at best in a way, that results in an Iran without atomic bombs. But these tensions should not force the EU and the interveners to give away the opportunity to channel Irans activities in
257 258
See Iqbal (2008) and Mazzetti & Schmitt (2008).
Which, by the way, is also true in the case of information provided by Afghan strong men. We know that this comes close to stating the obvious but in Afghanistan the interveners have proven to be rather nave, so that a little bit explicitness seems to be appropriate (see, again, for examples Chayes, 2006). See Kumar (2008). See Tahir (2007, p. 11). Please note that Iran does not account its disbursements in keeping with OECD DAC standards. See Leithead (2007). See Tahir (2007). See Associated Press (2007).
259 260 261 262 263 264
Of course, Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely connected too. But the Afghan-Pakistani border crosses mainly through Pashtun areas, which are often considered not to be true Pakistan (see the administrative autonomy of the Pashtun tribal areas). See Cristiani (2007).
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Afghanistan in a way that is most beneficial for the Afghan population as well as for the state of Afghanistaneven If that means to include Iran more closely into the interveners decision making and co-ordination processes. Nevertheless, this rather positive assessment should not be read as a free ticket: Iran has without any doubt strong geopolitical interest in Afghanistan, so Iranian aid usually comes with strings attached.
5.5 Summary: policies of bilateral donors in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, role models for civil reconstruction are in shortage. The sad news is that none of the bilateral donors reviewed above is without issues. The UKs performance, for example, is quite impressive in terms of aid effectiveness indicators but has not proven to be overly successful on the ground yet. However, the UK is next to exemplary compared with other donors but bears a problem that is typical for current civilian aid: considerations about security overshadow anything else. Even if general policy objectives prioritize civil reconstruction, in practice on-site military tactics and imperatives gain the upper hand. Given that the profiles of the individual donors differ substantially, it is fairly problematic to arrive at a typology of donors in Afghanistan. With the adequate degree of over-simplifying, the donors could be classified in the following way: Well-funded,266 ineffective,267 and high-aiming268 donors: USA, India, Germany, with Japan and Canada on the brink of being rather low-aiming and effective. Well-funded, effective, and low-aiming donors: UK, Netherlands, Norway Well-funded, ineffective, low-aiming: EC Poorly-funded, effective, low-aiming: Sweden, Denmark Poorly-funded, ineffective, low-aiming: Turkey, Italy, France269
There may be protests against this simple typology, and examples for the contrary will be singled out. But your authors think that it is absolutely necessary to measure effectiveness and not just efficiency, as it occurs in most accounts of success. Furthermore, the review shows the quantitative dominance of the USA in the civil reconstruction of Afghanistan (47% of all ODA disbursements in Afghanistan were made by the USA). Given this impressive share, it is most troubling that the USA failed to devise a conclusive policy on civil reconstruction. But equally troubling is the fact, that no other country could fill that void. Thus, the intervention in Afghani-
266
Well-funded does not refer only to the total amount of ODA, but also to proportionality of initiated programs and available funding. Effectiveness as measured and defined by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the OECD DAC Monitoring process of the Paris Declaration. We admit that the distinction between high-aiming and low-aiming is hard to quantify. We understand a donor as high-aiming if it addresses several unrelated problems simultaneously, spreads its resources over a lot programs and projects, and sticks to the prospect of installing a fully functioning western democracyat best within only a few years. Please note that the distinction between high-aiming and low-aiming is not intended to be normative.
267
268
Please note that we do not claim that this classification is valid: there are not enough data available to test our proposed categorizations sufficiently.
269
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stan was de facto ruled by a country without a plan how to treat the civil elements of this interventionwith the most serious results.270 The absence of policy shows that the endeavour in Afghanistan has been underestimated by all intervening parties. The former deputy head of UKs Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, Daniel Korski, summarizes the expectations in European capitals in a quite illustrative manner:
In Europe, many initially saw the Afghan mission as a largely risk-free peace-building exercise. The repressive and misogynist Taliban regime would be replaced by a democratic government that would build hospitals and allow European NATO soldiers to escort smiling school girls to their classrooms - pictures of which would be beamed back to satisfied European publics. (Korski, 2008, p. 9)
Even as late as 2005, staff members of the EC Delegation to Afghanistan had a hard time convincing the headquarters in Brussels about the extent of poverty and neediness in Afghanistan.271 Obviously, no big player was sufficiently prepared for re-building Afghanistan. A common theme in the reviews of bilateral donors in Afghanistan is a deficient operationalisation of official rhetoric: Although most intervening countries share a similar analysis of the problems in Afghanistan on paper (e.g., need for more civil reconstruction),272 conclusions do not translate into actions on ground or are too limited in scope: The need for more co-ordination was addressed by extending the mandate of the EUs Special Representative for Afghanistan, but without an adequate increase in staff numbers. Hence, the EUSR will face a hard time trying to coordinate civil reconstruction in Afghanistan with a staff of only six experts.273 Apparently, most donor countries still cling to the idea of a cheap victory in Afghanistan.
5.6 General Recommendations Regarding ODA for Afghanistan

The interveners need a policy on civil reconstruction that is as pragmatic, concrete, and doable as the already existing and implemented military operational plans and strategies in order to counter-balance the militarys dominance on the ground in Afghanistan. Such a policy would facilitate a true civil-military co-ordination that is currently rather a sequencing of military and civilian elements: military first, civilian second. Donors should use Trust Funds and related multi-lateral mechanisms as much as possible. Furthermore, we recognize that the current practice of virtually partitioning the land between donor countries (s. PRT-lead concept) cannot be revised at this time of the intervention, although it furthers uneven development and policy conflicts between the interveners. In order to limit these negative effects, donors should disburse the majority of their funds to national Trust Funds. Local ownership should not be confused with participation of the national or provincial government only. Community driven development designs for
270 271 272 273
(see, for instance, Chapter 2.4) See International Crisis Group (2005, p. 6). See Korski (2008).
See Council of the European Union (2008b). The EUSR office consists of 6 international experts (including 1 security officer and 1 financial accountant), 2 seconded experts (by Denmark and Finland), and 38 local staff in auxiliary positions. So the EUSR has a staff of effectively six experts (4 international + 2 seconded).
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implementation of aid should be endorsed more firmly, although they tend to be more time consuming and may produce results that have not been anticipated by funding donors because they guarantee a high degree of local buy-in and identification with state-building processes in general. We recommend implementing more community driven programs like the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Developments National Solidarity Programme (NSP).274 Advisory programs should not only focus on teach how-tos but also whatfors: It is just as important to know how to get things done technically as to know why you are doing it. Of course, Afghan police officers, for instance, should be able to conduct arrests, but the interveners training should also make sure that they do not turn out to be the Governments militia. During our field-research, we got the impression that the cultural values of main social institutions are not sufficiently present in the interveners curricula.
274
See Barakat (2006) for a detailed analysis and evaluation of the NSP (also see the programs exemplary website http://www.nspafghanistan.org/).
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6 Conclusion
In June 2001, the most respected and renowned specialists on Afghanistan issued a report that analysed the conflict in Afghanistan and proposed actions for ending it.275 In hindsight it might come as a surprise to some that they did not favour a large-scale military intervention or state building operation but endorsed rather soft measures in order to help the Afghans: In their recommendations, improving education for Afghans ranked first.276 After 9/11, improving social conditions in Afghanistan were tied to WoT and the hunt for Al-Queda. Accordingly, the general policy on Afghanistan became militarized while decision makers adhered to the thought that fighting terrorism and building a state in Afghanistan were complementary goals. In fact, they are not: You cannot build peace while waging war and you cannot have an agenda that prioritizes short-term stability (at all costs) as well as long-term durable peace building. In practice, the security and stability centred objectives of the WoT have always prevailed, resulting in an imbalanced approach to reconstruction of Afghanistan. As the security situation deteriorated, this imbalance got even worse while the underlying flaws of the intervention in Afghanistan were not addressed. Of course, security and safety are important issues, but they should be seen as instrumental to progress in the economic and cultural stabilisation of the society, not vice versa, since a state is more than just an agency that can keep its population secure. Therefore, building a state in Afghanistan entails more than an immense security sector reform. It entails, for instance, improving the educational systems so that Afghans in all parts of the country and from every social strata can use it. Rather than a police station in every village, Afghans demand access to formal educationa fact that was well known in 2001 but not reflected in the practice and priorities of the interveners. Building a state in Afghanistan requires more engagement in society building, because the attempts to create a new sovereign and democratic state under the rule of law and the market economy will need a complex re-organisation of a society torn apart by thirty years of war, poverty, deprivation and displacement. By focussing too much on institutional state building and security, the intervention is in danger of creating a state that is detached from the Afghans and without local buy-in of its governed population.
275
See Rubin, Ghani, Maley, Rashid and Roy (2001). The same scholars had formed the UN Working Group on Afghanistan in 1999, headed by Lakhdar Brahimi. See Rubin, Ghani, Maley, Rashid and Roy (2001, p. 41).
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Working Group Cultures of Intervention
CONTACT MIChAel DAxNeR Carl von Ossietky University of Oldenburg, Institute of Social Science 26111 Oldenburg Mobil: +49 (0) 174 180 5837 Tel.: +49 (0) 441 798 3291 FAx: +49 (0) 441 798 5815 e-Mail: michaeldaxner@yahoo.com
JAN h. FRee e-Mail: jan.free@uni-oldenburg.de

http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/interventionskultur/

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Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

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Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Preface and Executive Summary

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

1.2 Executive Summary

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

1.3 The Authors

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

2 Why Afghanistan matters

2.1 Internal reasons: The EU as a project of what?

See Gourly (2004) and Stewart (2008).

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

2.2 External reasons: Proving the EUs ability to act

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

2.3 External reasons: Re-adjusting the transatlantic relationship

See the chapters on the respective European lead-nations for references.

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

2.4 What is wrong with Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

2.5 Why now is a good time for Europe to re-engage in Afghanistan

Rashid (2008, pp. 75, 171)

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Right now, a re-modelling of the global aid-system takes place. We do not

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

This statement holds not true for military activities in Afghanistan.

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

See Dobbins (2007), and Dobbins et al. (2007).

See Korski (2008), but cf. Sullivan (2008).

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

g. It is not unlikely that Afghanistan offered some European governments a good

3.1 A brief intermediate summary of problems and questions

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

4 Decisive issues: What is crucial in Afghanistan

4.1 Afghan Ownership in a conflict of global dimension

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

4.2 How to learn to get the priorities straight

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

See Bourdieu (1976; 1993).

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

4.3 Trust in institutions

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

4.4 Corruption, first guilt, and returnees

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

4.5 How to deal with religious leaders

See Spanta (2004). See Rashid (2001, 2008).

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Judicial reform: It is imperative to in corporate traditional and informal rule

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

See Suhrke (2007).

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

4.7 Homeland Discourse

Daxner, Free: Civil Reconstruction in Afghanistan

See http://nl.sitestat.com/minbuza/minbuza/s?en-pdf.afghanistan-pdf.development-cooperationafghanistan_version-januar&ns_type=pdf&ns_url=http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/afghanistanpdf/development-cooperation-afghanistan_version-januar.pdf [Sep 03, 2008].