#70 Perfecto v.

Meer (85 Phil 552) Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. It also provides that until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. When Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not provided otherwise, by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos ayear. The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under protest. He contended that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes there on would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution. Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amounts to adiminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a mans subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the partof the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely anominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

#85 Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance (52 OG 1982)

Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4 warehouses in Tabaco, Albay used
for the storage of stocks of copra and of hemp in which he dealt extensively. They had been, with their contents, insured with the Insurance Company since 1937, and the lose made payable to the Philippine National Bank as mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the extent of its interest. On 21 July1940, fire of undetermined origin that broke out and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyed Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintiff-appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the same date. The insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with him. Qua Chee Gan, his brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the trial court in a final decision on 9 July 1941.With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the Court of First Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21 June 1940. The records of the original case were destroyed during the liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After a trial that lasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the insurance company to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000(2nd), P5,000 (3rd), P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September 1940, until each is paid, with costs against the defendant. It also dismissed the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Company appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid products having a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein. Issue: Whether or not gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims under the insurance policy. Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a flash point below 300 Fahrenheit, and is decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, Oils mean lubricants and not gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the prohibition of keeping gasoline in the premises could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms that the general public can readily understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though prohibited by the policy, does not void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and according to the weight of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against keeping certain articles on the insured premises the policy will not be avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business conducted on the premises. In the present case,

no gasoline was stored in the burned bodegas, and that Bodega No. 2 which was not burned and where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured bodegas. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, thus affirming it; with costs against the appellant.

#68 People of the Philippines v. Purisima 86 SCRA 542 Facts: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. Issue: WoN P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. Held: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9,it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. #86 QUISUMBING vs. MERALCO FACTS: Inspectors from MERALCO went to the furniture shop of the Quisumbing Spouses to conduct their routinary inspections with the permission of the Spouses and witnessed by their secretary. The inspectors found the electric meter tampered. Because of this, they disconnected the electric supply of the furniture shop. To make sure of the accuracy of their findings, they subjected the electric meter to laboratory testing. The tests show that the meter was really tampered. As a result, the inspectors billed the Quisumbing Spouses the differential caused by the tampering and until they pay, their electric supply will be disconnected. However, on the same day the inspectors officer caused the reconnection of their electric supply. But despite this, the Spouses still filed a complaint for damages against MERALCO alleging that they acted with wanton, capricious, malicious, and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due regard to their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business standing. ISSUE: Is MERALCO liable to the Quisumbing Spouses because the inspectors disconnected their electric supply immediately? RULING: YES. Sec. 4 of RA 7832 necessitates that immediate disconnection by MERALCO of a consumers electric supply can only be had IF an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board personally witnessed and attested the disconnection. Even if the secretary of the company witnessed the inspection and disconnection, MERALCO cannot claim that they complied

with the law because the provisions categorically provide for the people required to be present during inspection and disconnection and the secretary of the company of the Quisumbing Spouses clearly does not fall under any of the enumerated persons. Moreover, the presence of an ERB officer during the examination of the electric meter in the laboratory would not cure the defect in due process. The law is CLEAR that the ERB officer must have attested to the disconnection BEFORE its occurrence unlike what happened in this case. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnection go into the essence of due process. Indeed, the Court cannot allow MERALCO to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, MERALCO is a monopoly that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.

#87 RCBC vs. IAC 320 SCRA 279 Facts: On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments with the SEC. RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and liabilities, on October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond. Presumably unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of the auction sale, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of the certificate of sale covering the auctioned properties. On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties. On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes. Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale. On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF Homes take effect? Held: Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law --- plainly judicial legislation.

It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.

#88 Republic. v. Estenzo 95 SCRA 651 Facts: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. Issue: WoN RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. Held: No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. The Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of the judiciary is to apply laws, not interpret it.

#89 REPUBLIC vs.COURT OF APPEALS 227 SCRA 509 Facts: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, PhilippineJapan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial Court ruled for the private respondents. When elevated to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition by the Republic. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Court in Epza vs.Hon. Dulay, et al. (G.R. No. 59603) declaring PD 1533 unconstitutional and void, be applied in this case. Held: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is

therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity. Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound. To this day, the controversy between the petitioner and the private respondents on the issue of just compensation is still unresolved, partly attributable to the instant petition that has prevented the finality of the decision appealed from. The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties. In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. No costs.

# 90 Republic vs. Desierto 363 scra 585

Facts: Respondents, subordinates and close associates of Dictator Marcos, are members of the Boards
of Directors of United Coconut Planter Bank and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. They are charged with taking undue advantage of their public office and close relationship with Dictator Marcos in unlawfully misappropriating huge amounts of coconut levy funds in connection with the acquisition of 16 oil mills in order to establish a monopoly, violating RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act). The PCGG then transmitted the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action, OMB-0-90-2811. Thereafter, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Amanete, issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of said case, finding no sufficient evidence to believe that violation of Anti-Graft Law was committed. Petitioner filed with the SC a x x x petition for certiorari on the ff grounds: (a) respondents made convenient use of PD 961, PD 1468 and LOI 926 to carry out their grand design to establish a coco monopoly to the detriment of poor coco farmers; (b) there is no legal basis for the contention that the acts of respondents had been decriminalized; and (c) allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted as respondents failed to submit their counter-affidavit. Respondents Regala and Concepcion contend, inter alia, that petitioner has no cause of action against them because their acts were performed in the course of their duties as counsels. Issue: Whether or not Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution is applicable to criminal complaint against the respondents. Held: It has already been settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto (317 SCRA 272) that section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases such as complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-90-2808. Conversely, prescription of criminal cases are governed by special laws on prescription. To construe Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution in order to give it retroactive application to

the private respondents will run counter to another constitutional provision, that is, Section 22, Article III which provides that No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. An ex post facto law defined, in part, as a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. A construction which raises a conflict between different parts of the constitution is not permissible when by reasonable construction, the parts may made to harmonize.

#69 People vs. Pacificador 354 SCRA 311 Facts: October 27, 1988, respondent Arturo Pacificador and his co-accused, Jose Marcelo, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of RA No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 on July 15,1988 on 2 grounds: (1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by prescription; and (2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al., vs. Hon. Constante A. Achete, et al.,. On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On November 10 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss. Thereupon, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan contending that the prosecution of the crime charged is timebarred by prescription as shown by facts and circumstances on record and of judicial notice. The urgent motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the prescriptions favorable to the accused id to be adopted. Held: It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said

Legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberty on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran, the Supreme Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of the limitations on criminal cases, as follows: The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his municipalities as a citizen; and that form henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.