THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Eunju Min, Yanping Zhang, Hyun-Goo Kim, and Suduk Kim, Can China, Korea, and Japan Avoid

the Controversy Over Nuclear Energy?

Volume 37, Number 2

Copyright 2012

CAN CHINA, KOREA, AND JAPAN AVOID THE CONTROVERSY OVER NUCLEAR ENERGY?
Eunju Min, Yanping Zhang, Hyun-Goo Kim, and Suduk Kim*

ith the increasing threat of climate change, nuclear power, as an emissionfree energy source, has received a high level of attention in the Northeast Asian countries of Korea, Japan, and China. It is worth noting that the current total operable nuclear capacity of these three countries accounts for 20 percent of the world total, and that the additional reactors either under construction, planned, or proposed, altogether would account for almost 32 percent of total global nuclear power. Since the Fukushima accident, the controversy over nuclear energy, in addition to questions regarding its safety, has re-emerged as a hot issue.

*Eunju Min, who holds a B.S. in chemical engineering and an M.A. in energy economics from Ajou University, is currently a Ph.D. candidate in energy studies at the same institution. She has been a major contributor in the publication of research reports compiled by the Energy Modeling Lab at Ajou University and has received several awards in recognition of her academic excellence. Yanping Zhang, a native-born Chinese with an M.A. in energy studies from Ajou University, largely handled the collection of information on the Chinese nuclear sector. Hyun-Goo Kim, a principal researcher at the Korea Institute of Energy Research, holds a doctoral degree in mechanical engineering from Pohang University of Science and Technology (Korea). He has previously held positions with the Research Institute of Industrial Science & Technology (RIST) and POSCO, a multi-national steel-making company. The author has published more than 70 papers and acquired 12 patents in the field of wind energy. Suduk Kim, Professor of Energy Studies at the Energy Modeling Lab of Ajou University (Korea), earned his Ph.D. degree in economics from Rutgers University (New Jersey). Prior to this, the author was a senior research fellow at the Korea Energy Economics Institute. Dr. Kim currently is participating in various interdisciplinary energy modeling projects including the Global Change Assessment Model community of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the Asia Energy Modeling Forum, and the World Energy Councils scenario group. He is a lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes Fifth Assessment Report. The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 37, Nos. 1 and 2 Copyright 2012 by the International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development (ICEED). All rights reserved.

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In this paper, the long-term energy forecasts of these three Northeast Asian countries are examined. A simple calculation of replacing nuclear with coal or liquefied natural gas (LNG) is conducted to reveal the potential role of nuclear power for the future reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in order to see how far it will go toward securing a sustainable energy supply. The choice of nuclear power for China, in terms of that nations long-term energy security, is also discussed, while nuclear safety problems of both China and neighboring states also are considered by identifying the seismic zones, nuclear power plant sites, and regional wind fields. Based on the results of our examination in terms of energy security and the reduction of CO2 emissions, we found that China, Korea, and Japan must still grapple with the controversy surrounding the use of nuclear power. This is followed by further discussions on the need for the institutionalization of a sophisticated legal framework in order to secure the safety of nuclear energy in these three nations. It is recommended that a Northeast Asian Nuclear Council be established, which may be similar to EURATOM in Europe, with the initial aim of enhancing mutual cooperation and furthering the promotion of a safe nuclear power future.

Introduction On March 11, 2011, operating nuclear power plants shut down automatically during the major earthquake in Japan. Three of these plants subsequently caused an International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) Level 7 Accident due to the failure of power leading to the loss of cooling and subsequent radioactive releases. This event amplified the controversy over nuclear energy and the role of government energy policy. In Germany, for instance, the coalition government announced a reversal of its prior energy policy by calling for a phase out of all of the countrys nuclear power plants by 2022. In France, nuclear power plants are designed to withstand an earthquake twice as strong as the 1,000-year event calculated for each site. Switzerland suspended approval for three new plants, and Bulgaria prepared to freeze a nuclear project. But not all nations responded by slowing down or halting their nuclear power endeavors: Poland announced it would proceed with its first reactor, Romania decided to construct two additional reactors, and Brazil is building its third plant. According to the World Nuclear Associations Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries, over 45 nations are actively considering embarking upon nuclear power programs.1 However, these programs are not expected to contribute significantly to the expansion of global nuclear capacity in the foreseeable future since their main growth will come from countries where the technology is already well established. However, in the longer term, the trend towards urbanization in less-developed

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nations will greatly increase the demand for electricity, especially for that supplied by base-load plants such as nuclear. It would be almost impossible to review all the publications on nuclear power since it has been such an important and controversial subject. An examination of a few discussions on nuclear energy clearly reveals the nature of the controversy and complexity of this issue. S. Lee argues that the United States needs 1,000 new nuclear reactors to replace all of its coal power plants, at a minimum cost of $5 trillion.2 However, even this would still leave five-sixths of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions untouched, as electrical generation only accounts for one-sixth of the problem. The estimated true costs of electric power that these estimates provided show that nuclear power is the most expensive, ranging from 12.9 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to 17.9 cents/kWh, while the estimated true costs of coal and solar power range from 8.1 cents/kWh to 12 cents/kWh, and from 8.04 cents/kWh to 20.04 cents/kWh, respectively. A 2008 Greenpeace report concludes that nuclear power is not a part of the climate solution, but an expensive and dangerous distraction.3 Greenpeace argues that climate goals only can be reached by employing sustainable renewable energy and energy efficiency. Y. Du and J. Parsons have conducted a comparison of the levelized cost of nuclear power.4 They compare the cost of nuclear power to the costs of coal and natural gas, based on a report by the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), updated construction costs from the U.S. Department of Energy, and a carbon tax of $25 per ton of CO2.5 Their resulting estimates for nuclear power, coal, and natural gas range from 8.7 cents/kWh to 10.5 cents/kWh, from 6.5 cents/ kWh to 9.6 cents/kWh, and from 6.2 cents/kWh to 6.7 cents/kWh, respectively, thus, concluding that nuclear is the most cost ineffective power source.6 A European Commission report explicitly includes quantifiable external costs, suggesting that the social cost of selected electricity generation technologies also should be taken into account.7 In this process, the potential damage of climate change is said to be considered. However, the resulting total costs, calculated with a multi-criteria decision-making analysis (MCDA) ranking, show that nuclear energy is the least expensive choice. Coal technologies are noted to perform worse than centralized natural gas options. J. Lovelock explains the serious situation of global warming with various examples and concludes that nuclear power is the only breakthrough.8 W. Sailor et al. analyze the safety and economics of nuclear power, suggesting that nuclear power should play a major role in the face of climate change as long as it can be secured safety.9 Y. Zhou argues that nuclear power is a relatively clean energy source without greenhouse gas emissions and that nuclear development has a promising future in China.10 Although the conclusions of the above reports vary, most of the discussions seem to agree that conclusions about nuclear power will be different depending upon the assumptions utilized in the analysis. A series of assumptions has been

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made on the future energy price of substitutes, such as coal and natural gas, the cost of capital with an uncertain risk premium, and the unknown opportunity cost of CO2 emissions in the future, many of which only can be partially verified empirically and affect the resulting estimates. Therefore, it should be noted that any attempt made by a nuclear project analyst to arrive at a unique figure by which to measure the worth of a project should be regarded merely as a guideline for good judgment, rather than as a substitute for it.11 Moreover, it is worth noting here that few research attempts include or quantify the opportunity cost of not being able to supply sustainable power. The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance of this issue for three Northeast Asian countries, namely, China, Korea, and Japan, and to see if they can avoid such controversy over nuclear power generation. It will be shown that it is highly likely that these three countries will continue to use nuclear power. Discussions will follow regarding what else would be required for this region if this is the case. According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), Chinas electricity consumption rose by 9.1 percent during the first eight months of 2011.12 By around the year 2040, pressurized water reactors are expected to level off at 200 gigawatts electrical (GWe). From the year 2020 onwards, it is thought that fast reactors progressively will increase until they provide at least 200 GWe by 2050 and 1,400 GWe by 2100. Prior to 2008, the Chinese government had planned to increase its nuclear power capacity to 40 GWe by 2020 (out of a total 1,000 GWe planned), with a further 18 GWe nuclear plants under construction. However, government targets for nuclear power have been increasing. As of June 2010, new projections for the number of official installed nuclear capacity projects were announced: 7080 GWe by 2020, 200 GWe by 2030, and 400500 GWe by 2050. Following the Fukushima accident, China announced a freeze on approvals for new reactors while regulators examined safety procedures. China finished a half-year safety check on both of its nuclear facilities that were already operational and for plants that were under construction as of July 2011. The resumption of approvals for further new plants has been suspended until a new nuclear safety plan is in place. Concerns regarding possible river pollution will probably delay the inland AP1000 plants, which were due to start construction in 2011.13 According to the WNA, no nuclear incident in China has so far exceeded the INES Level 2. In December 2011, the National Energy Administration (NEA) asserted that China would make nuclear energy the foundation of its power-generation system in the next 10 to 20 years, with an increase of perhaps 300 GWe of nuclear capacity over that period. Two weeks earlier, the vice-director of Chinas National Development and Reform Commission said the country would not swerve from its goal of greater reliance on nuclear power. The former head of the NEA predicted that full-scale construction of nuclear plants would resume in March 2012.14

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On July 13, 2011, Japans Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, stated that he wanted his nation to learn from its ongoing crisis and become less reliant on nuclear energy. He said at a news conference that the risks were too high and that renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and biomass should eventually replace nuclear as the new pillar of Japans energy supply, along with conservation. Kan noted he earlier believed that nuclear energy could be useful as long as ample safety measures were taken, but that the recent crisis had forced him to change his view. However, Kan was ousted barely a year after taking officein part because of a widespread perception that he had mishandled the Fukushima accident. According to an interview by The Wall Street Journal on September 21, 2011, the new Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, was determined to restart the idled reactors by summer 2012, adding that it was impossible for the country to get by without them or to consider a quick phase-out of nuclear energy.15 Nodas determination to preserve nuclear power, at least in the short run, stands in contrast to the position of his predecessor and against mounting popular opposition to nuclear power in Japan. On September 22, 2011, Korean President Lee Myung-Bak delivered a keynote speech on nuclear safety and security at a high-level United Nations meeting. He said that the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which dealt a huge blow to global confidence in nuclear safety, should not be a cause to renounce nuclear energy. He also stated that the use of nuclear energy is inevitable, as it is one of the best alternatives capable of meeting growing global power demand and of helping solve the problems of climate change. He argued that regional cooperation should be strengthened as a nuclear accident is transnational. Both the volatility and high price of energy pose a serious concern for nations such as Korea, Japan, and Chinawhich rely heavily on energy imports. The International Energy Agency (IEA) warned that there could be another oil market crisis within five years (20112016) due to supply uncertainty. Moreover, no transnational agreement on climate issues has yet been achieved, since it is also a political and economic issue. Under these circumstances, ensuring a stable and steady energy supply to meet the nations energy demand is a great necessity, and this is why the promotion of nuclear energy in this region is still under hot debate. In this paper, issues related to the future energy mix in the power sector for Korea, Japan, and China are reviewed and evaluated. In the following section, nuclear power plans from around the world are examined to highlight how important the nuclear issue in this geographic region could be from a global perspective. Subsequently, each countrys long-term energy mix is briefly introduced in conjunction with their respective planned nuclear program. A simple calculation is conducted to see the impact of nuclear power generation in terms of CO2 emission reduction for these states. In the next section, we present issues related to

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Chinas nuclear promotion plan and details of its nuclear plan are assessed from the perspective of the potential impact on Northeast Asia. The regional nuclear safety issue will be raised by examining the locational distribution of Chinas nuclear power plants, combined with the distribution of the known earthquake zones. Here, an analysis is conducted for seasonal wind fields to reveal the potential impact of a nuclear accident on neighboring countries. This is followed by our conclusions and recommendations. Energy Mix and Nuclear Power in the Power Sector for Three Northeast Asian Countries
An Overview of the Nuclear Power Plans of These Nations: To facilitate the related discussions, a summary table from the WNA is provided for future reactors world-wide. This categorizes the nuclear power plants in operation, under construction, planned, and proposed as of August 1, 2011. According to table 1, the United States ranks first for operable capacity, but in the long term, China will hold the largest total capacity (including reactors under construction, planned, and proposed)a much larger capacity than that of United States, which ranks second in the world in this category. Table 1 shows that the nuclear power capacity of China is expected to grow continuously when reactors currently under construction, planned, and proposed are considered in addition to those currently in operation, with a total of over 222 GW. Japan and Korea, currently third and sixth in the world in terms of their nuclear power capacity, respectively, are expected to be fifth and eighth after all the future plans of other countries are taken into account. In terms of total nuclear power capacity and if all of the planned and proposed projects come into operation, Russia and India are expected to be ranked third and fourth, respectively, following the United States. It is worth noting that the current total operable nuclear capacity of the three Northeast Asian countries accounts for 20.1 percent of the world total, while the same figure would be 32.6 percent when the additional reactors under construction, planned, and proposed are all considered. Moreover, the total plan for nuclear promotion in China is over 150 percent that of the United States. The fact that China has the worlds largest nuclear promotion plan and the greatest combined share of nuclear power capacity among the three Northeast Asian countries is enough to draw special attention to this region. In terms of CO2 emissions, China is the worlds largest emitter while Japan and Korea also are listed within the global top ten. Table 2 summarizes the top eleven most significant CO2-emitting countries in the world, based on 2008 figures. A simple calculation shows that 27.78 percent of global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion originated from the Northeast Asian region in 2008.

Table 1
RANKING OF WORLD NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY (in net megawatts electrical MWe) Operable, Under Construction, and Planned United States China France Japan Russia Korea India Germany Canada United Kingdom World Total 605,013 109,839 99,971 66,570 61,170 48,044 32,985 23,985 20,339 17,479 17,425 China United States Russia India Japan France Ukraine Korea United Kingdom Canada World Total Operable, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed 222,971 148,439 76,044 72,985 67,930 67,670 37,868 32,985 29,425 21,279 993,318
a

Operable United States France Japan China Russia Korea Germany Canada Ukraine United Kingdom World Total 432,918 102,639 64,850 47,398 39,981 32,044 24,585 20,339 14,179 13,168 10,745

Operable and Under Construction

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

United States France Japan Russia Germany Korea Ukraine Canada China United Kingdom

101,421 63,130 44,642 23,084 20,339 18,785 13,168 12,679 11,271 10,745

World Total

371,584

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN

This figure reported by the World Nuclear Association is much different from what is reported on Chinas nuclear website (see Appendix Table A). Source: World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, Japan, South Korea, London, updated August 1, 2011, available at http:// www.world-nuclear.org.

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THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Table 2

CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) EMISSIONS OF TOP 11 COUNTRIES, 2008 (in million tons of CO2 emissions) Total CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 6,508.2 5,595.9 3,849.5 1,593.8 1,427.6 1,151.1 803.9 550.9 510.6 505.0 501.3 Cumulative Percentage (%) 22.15 41.20 54.30 59.72 64.58 68.50 71.24 73.11 74.85 76.57 78.27

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Region/Country/ Economy China United States European Union - 27 Russian Federation India Japan Germany Canada United Kingdom Islamic Rep. of Iran Korea

Percentage (%) 22.15 19.05 13.10 5.42 4.86 3.92 2.74 1.88 1.74 1.72 1.71

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, IEA Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/IEA, 2010).

Korea: Currently, Korean dependency on imported energy varies monthly from 95 percent to 97 percent. Securing energy stability by reducing this dependency on imported energy is one of the most important energy policies for the Korean government. Figure 1 shows the past and current energy mix in the power sector from 1978, with the changes in crude oil price and average domestic retail electricity price. A projection is then extended through the mid-2030s. An examination of the previous energy mix between 1978 and the mid-1980s clearly shows how vulnerable the domestic power mix was to external oil price shocks. Oil-power generation accounted for 72.51 percent of total electricity generation in Korea when the oil price hike of 173.9 percent hit the world energy market within the two-year period around 1980. Due to this international oil price shock, the average retail electricity price went up from 22.33 won/kWh in 1978 to 69.87 won/kWh in 1985, which is a 212.89 percent price spike in a short period of time.16 Subsequently, the Korean government drastically changed its policy in terms of the power-sector energy mix and, as a result, by the year 2010, oil power generation accounted for a mere 3.57 percent of total power generation, while nuclear power generation was 31.36 percent, liquefied natural gas (LNG) was 21.69 percent, and coal power generation was 41.85 percent, as shown in table 3. Though there were more oil price fluctuations, with crude oil price continuously increasing from $20 per barrel in 2000 to over $90 in 2008, the average price of electricity has not changed much, as can be seen in figure 1.17

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Figure 1

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KOREAN GOVERNMENTS POLICY FOR POWER MIX CHANGE FROM THE EARLY 1980s ONWARDS (terawatt-hours of electricity on the left axis; Dubai price per barrel of crude oil on right axis; with cost of power production in Korean won per kilowatt-hours)

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), The 5th Electric Power Demand-Supply Plan (2010-2024), MKE publication no. 2010-490 (Gyeonggi-do: Republic of Korea, 2010).

In addition to reducing the heavy reliance on foreign energy sources for securing energy supply stability, Korea also has to reduce CO2 emissions, since it is currently the eleventh highest emitter in the world (table 2). The Korean government set a goal in Copenhagen of a 30-percent reduction of CO2 emissions, based on the expected emission levels of 2020, in an effort to play a leading role in reducing greenhouse gases globally. Recent analysis shows that this target cannot be achieved without the active promotion and development of nuclear power.18 Nuclear activities were initiated when Korea became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. In 1958, the domestic Atomic Energy Law was passed, and the Korean government established the Office of Atomic Energy in 1959. The first Korean nuclear reactor to achieve criticality was a small research unit built in 1962. Ten years later, the construction of the first

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THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Table 3

KOREA: ENERGY MIX IN THE POWER SECTOR, 19782024 (in percent)

Year 1978 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2024

Hydro 0.00 0.17 1.56 0.61 0.59 1.06 1.35

Coal 12.76 11.69 20.90 38.00 41.85 36.93 30.96

Oil 75.08 77.81 16.75 8.86 3.57 0.52 0.48

Liquefied Natural Gas 4.79 0.99 11.54 10.89 21.69 10.54 9.73

Nuclear 7.38 9.34 49.25 41.64 31.36 44.05 48.54

Renewables 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 6.90 8.95

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), The 5th Electric Power Demand-Supply Plan (2010-2024), MKE publication no. 2010-490 (Gyeonggi-do: Republic of Korea, 2010).

nuclear power plant, Kori-1, began with the capacity of 573 megawatts electrical (MWe). This was a Westinghouse unit built on turnkey contract. Its commercial operation began in 1978. As of 2010, 32 years after the first nuclear power plant was put into commercial operation, there were a total of 21 operating nuclear power facilities. The total installed capacity of nuclear power plants is 18,715 MW. Table 4 summarizes the current status and future nuclear plans of Korea up to 2024.19
Japan: The nation of Japan has few natural resources of its own and depends heavily upon foreign energy resources. According to the energy balance data of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the rate of self-sufficiency for its primary energy demands is only 17.7 percent.20

Table 4
NUCLEAR REACTORS IN KOREA Number of Reactors Operating Under construction Planned Total 21 5 6 32 Capacity (megawatt electricalMWe) 18,785 5,700 8,500 32,985 Share (%) 56.95 17.28 25.77 100.00

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), The 5th Electric Power Demand-Supply Plan (2010-2024), MKE publication no. 2010-490 (Gyeonggi-do: Republic of Korea, 2010).

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Figure 2

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CURRENT AND FUTURE POWER MIX OF THE JAPANESE POWER SECTOR, 19782034 (in terawatt-hours)

Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/IEA, 2010) and World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010). This outlook is based on the assumption that the total Japanese nuclear capacity by the year 2030 will be 61gigawatt electrical (GWe).

The major source of power generation in Japan during the 1980s was oil, as depicted in the figure 2. However, after the first and second oil shocks during the 1970s, the share of oil in the power sector has been gradually replaced by LNG and nuclear power generation, as was the case of Korea. Like Korea, previously having relied highly upon overseas energy sources and imports, Japan has attempted to reduce the share of oil in its energy mix to secure a more sustainable power supply. Figure 2 shows that oil-fired power generation has decreased continuously since 1980 and is expected to be only 5 percent by the year 2019. Due to the lack of a significant domestic source of fossil fuel energy, Japan started its nuclear research program in 1954 and the Basic Atomic Energy Lawwhich strictly limits the use of nuclear technology to peaceful purposes onlywas introduced in 1955. Since then, Japan has been working to increase the availability of nuclear power. Currently, the total capacity of operating nuclear reactors has reached 44.6 GWe. In the longer term, the nuclear sector is a growing industry and nuclear power had been expected to play an even greater role in the

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future, making up 41 percent of all resources for power generation in 2019, which is much higher than the 1980 figure of 17 percent. The previous plan regarding the power generation mix clearly reveals that Japan was well aware of the significance of energy diversification for energy security and of the importance of the reduction of greenhouse gases. Japan has had a long history of earthquakes and seismic activity. Destructive earthquakes, often resulting in tsunamis, occur several times a century. Concerns regarding the particular risks of constructing and operating nuclear power plants have been expressed continuously in Japan. After the earthquake and tsunami, followed by the failure of the cooling systems at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on March 11, 2011, a nuclear emergency was declared. As can be seen in figure 2, nuclear power had been chosen to be an alternative for the future power generation mix; although the future energy mix in the Japanese power sector is still under discussion after the Fukushima accident. Table 5 summarizes the nuclear facilities in Japan. The installed capacity of constructed nuclear power plants44.6 GWis as of March 2011. Those under construction, or to be constructed up to 2020, account for a further 8.2GW.21
China: According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2011 China has an estimated 128 billion short tons of recoverable coal reserves, which is 13 percent of the worlds total, making it the third-largest reserve holder in the world behind the United States and Russia.22 The western part of China has the greatest abundance of reserves and, thus, produces more coal compared to other areas. With all the economic activities centered in the southeastern area, specifically around Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, a large amount of coal must be transported to the eastern coastal regions from the west. This not only causes heavy demand for land transportation but also puts pressure on the price of coal.

Table 5
NUCLEAR REACTORS IN JAPAN Number of Reactors Operating Under construction Planned Proposed Total 51 2 10 5 68 Capacity (megawatt electricalMWe) 44,642 2,756 13,772 6,760 69,730 Share (%) 65.7 4.1 20.3 9.9 100.0

Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/IEA, 2010) and World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010).

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Although China holds richer energy resources than Korea and Japan, it became a net oil importer in 1993 and a net coal importer in 2007, with the nations real economic growth rate of over 9 percent per year going hand in hand with rapidly increasing energy demands. China now faces a great challenge in meeting increasing energy demand while securing sustainable energy supplies. The current power supply barely satisfies the demands of cities in the eastern area. In 2004, China suffered its worst power shortage since the 1990s, and the government started to impose power rationing in 27 out of 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.23 Since then, China has faced summer power shortages almost every year. In some areas, the power has had to be shut down, which has hindered local economic activities, causing major difficulties for residents at the same time. Nuclear, as a relatively clean energy source, has received significant attention by the Chinese government. Since China put its first nuclear power plant (named Qinshan) into commercial operation in 1992, 14 nuclear reactors have come on line with a combined capacity of 11,271 MWe. By August 1, 2011, electricity generation reached 71 billion terawatt hours (TWh). In March 2006, the China State Council issued the Medium and Long-Term Nuclear Power Development Plan (20052020), which outlined its goal of increasing nuclear capacity to 40 GWe by 2020.24 In July 2009, the State Council reported the plan to raise the target up to 86 GW installed and 18 GW under construction by 2020. Figure 3 and table 6 are based upon the International Energy Agencys 2010 Energy Balance of OECD Countries. This outlook makes the assumption that the total Chinese nuclear capacity by the year 2030 will be 65 GWe, which does not fully reflect the massive Chinese nuclear expansion plans included in the WNAs assessments.25 However, it does show the general trend of the current and future energy mix in Chinas power sector. Table 7 summarizes the current nuclear plan of China, including plants under construction, planned, and proposed. It is noted here that the total figure of 284 GW does not include the nuclear reactors of Jiyang, Yingtan, Lanzhou, Yibin, Hebaodao, Xianning, Qiaofushan, or Shizuwhose planned and proposed capacity is not yet clearly identified in the official website. However, it is still a much higher figure than what was reported in the WNAs 2011 assessment, as discussed above.
A Simple Calculation of Emission Reduction by Nuclear Power: In the following section, a simple calculation is presented to explore the potential role of nuclear power in CO2 emission reduction by examining the expected increase in CO2 emissions if, based on the previous summary of the WNAs world nuclear plan, the total capacity of the nuclear plan was replaced by coal or LNG in these three countries. For this purpose, a 1,000-MW coal power plant is assumed to burn about 2 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) annually, so CO2 emissions can be calculated per ton of coal burned. For a 1,000-MW LNG power plant, 827,632 tons of LNG are assumed to be consumed a year; thus, CO2 emissions can be calculated

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THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Figure 3

CURRENT AND FUTURE POWER MIX OF THE CHINESE POWER SECTOR, 19782034 (in terawatt-hours)

Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/IEA, 2010) and World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010).

per ton of LNG burned. This is equivalent to the capacity factor of 61.7 percent and 65.3 percent for coal and LNG power plants, respectively.26 Assume i as the indicator of coal or LNG, and E(i) as coal or LNG if i equals 1 or 2, respectively. Therefore, we can set up a simple equation for this calculation as follows: CO2 i Ei 3 F EC i 3 F CC i; where CO2 (i) = CO2 emissions from the ith fuel; FEC (i) = the energy conversion factor; and FCC (i) = carbon emission conversion factor. Here, FEC (1) and FEC (2) for coal are assumed to be 0.000595 tons of oil equivalent (toe)/ton and 0.001175 toe/ton, respectively; while FCC (1) and FCC (2) are 1.059 tons carbon (TonC)/toe and 0.637 TonC/toe, respectively. This gives CO2 (1) representing CO2 emissions from burning 1 ton of coal, and CO2 (2) represents emissions from burning 1 ton of LNG as 0.630 TonC and 0.637 TonC, respectively. Table 8 summarizes the resulting CO2 emissions that theoretically would be produced by replacing nuclear with coal, while table 9 offers the resulting emissions that theoretically would be produced by replacing nuclear with LNG.

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Table 6

CHINA: ENERGY MIX IN POWER SECTOR, 19782035 (in percent) Year 1978 1980 1990 2000 2009 2020 2030 2035 Coal 65.32 59.42 72.48 79.19 78.95 73.91 75.11 76.29 Gas 0.00 0.25 0.45 0.43 1.39 1.89 1.52 1.40 Oil 16.32 19.07 6.27 2.39 0.21 0.82 0.55 0.45 Nuclear 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 1.92 5.75 5.86 5.85 Hydro 18.36 21.23 20.80 16.69 16.81 14.52 13.35 12.35

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Wind 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.73 3.11 3.61 3.66

Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/IEA, 2010) and World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010).

Challenges in the Development of Nuclear Power and Additional Requirements to Be Taken Considered
Issues Regarding the Promotion of Inland Nuclear Power Plants and Fast Reactors in China: China has embarked upon a significant expansion plan of its

inland nuclear power plants, with half of the planned nuclear power plants to be located inland. The first of this type of plants is reported to be in Taohuajing in Hunan province. Since inland nuclear power utilizes fresh water for its cooling purposes, it needs to have a large cooling tower. The first inland nuclear power plant in China is reported to have the worlds largest cooling tower: a natural draft Table 7
NUCLEAR REACTORS IN CHINA Number of Reactors Operating Under construction Planned Proposed Total 14 26 50 116 206 Capacity (megawatt electricalMWe) 11,271 28,710 58,320 186,160 284,461 Share (%) 4.0 10.1 20.5 65.4 100.0

Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/IEA, 2010) and World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010).

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THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Table 8

ADDITIONAL CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) EXPECTED BY REPLACING NUCLEAR WITH COAL Total Capacity of Nuclear Power Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed (in megawatts MW)

Amount of Coal Required (in million tons of coal equivalent tce) 65.97 445.94 139.46

Additional CO2 Emissions (in million tons) 41.56 280.94 87.86

Korea China Japan

32,985 222,971 67,930

unit some 200 meters in height and 160 meters in diameter. Nanyang nuclear power plant in Henan province also has been proposed as an inland nuclear site and is shown in figure 4a. However, this accommodation of a huge cooling tower inevitably raises the issue of nuclear safety when potential seismic activities are considered, especially since the Fukushima accident began with the failure in the cooling facilities. According to the WNA, of the 5.469 million tons of uranium (tU) resources reported to be available in the world in 2007, less than 1 percent are located in China. Due to the small scale of nuclear generation during the past 20 years (1990 2010), uranium demand has been relatively small. However, in the long term, uranium demand is expected to increase with Chinas ambitious nuclear strategy. Chinas demand for uranium primarily will be dependent upon imported uranium resources. Ensuring the sustained supply of uranium, therefore, will be critical for that nation. This is one of the main reasons that China started its fast reactor program. The first fast nuclear reactor, named the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), is located at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) outside of Beijing (figure 4b). It is a sodium-cooled, pool-type reactor, which has a thermal Table 9
ADDITIONAL CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) EXPECTED BY REPLACING NUCLEAR WITH LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) Total Capacity of Nuclear Power Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed (in megawatts MW) Korea China Japan 32,985 222,971 67,930

Amount of LNG Required (in million tons) 27.30 184.54 56.22

Additional CO2 Emissions (in million tons) 20.42 138.03 42.05

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Figure 4a

NANYANG NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

159

Source: China Nuclear Information, available at http://www.heneng.net.

capacity of 65 MW and can produce 20 MW of electrical power. The turbine generator was finished in 1993, achieved first criticality on July 21, 2010, and began generating power one year later on July 21, 2011. A fast nuclear reactor is reported to be capable of reducing the total radio toxicity of nuclear waste through the reduced use of uranium. A fast nuclear reactor utilizes uranium 60 times more Figure 4b
CHINA EXPERIMENTAL FAST REACTOR (CEFR)

Source: China Nuclear Information, available at http://www.heneng.net.

160

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

efficiently than a normal reactor; thus, it can help China reduce its reliance on uranium imports.27 A 1,000-MWe Chinese prototype fast reactor (CDFR), based on the CEFR, has been proposed with construction to commence in 2017 as the next step in the CIAEs program. Furthermore, an agreement was signed in October 2009 with Russias Atomstroyexport to begin pre-project and design work for a commercial nuclear power plant in China. It is being referred to by CIAE as project 2 Chinese Demonstration Fast Reactors (CDFR), with its construction starting in 2013 and operational by around 20182019. According to the WNA, the CIAEs projections show fast reactors progressively increasing from 2020 to at least 200 GWe by 2050. However, the number of units in operation, reported as of December 2011, was only six according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Fast reactor technology, therefore, can be said to be still under development.
Chinas Nuclear Plants, Earthquake Zones, and Regional Wind Directions: Most of the nuclear reactors in China are currently located in coastal areas and generally use seawater for cooling with a direct once-through cycle. The power supply they have created has been playing a crucial role in coastal economic development. However, according to the seismic risk map of Asia (Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program), seismic risks on the eastern coastal area of China are much higher than in the inner parts of the country. Moreover, Chinas fault lines and plate boundaries cross over Shandong and Liaoning Provinces. This fact could bring about serious concerns regarding Chinas nuclear plans for the area, especially after the Fukushima accident. Figure 5 shows the locational distribution of nuclear power plants in operation, under construction, planned, and proposed. In figure 6, an illustration of Chinas earthquake zone, taken from the Institute of Geology of the China Earthquake Administration, is provided. The issue is that some of the plants are located near earthquake zones, which could be a serious threat for nuclear safety, not only to China but also to neighboring countries. Since Korea is located downwind from China with respect to the prevailing westerly wind, that nation is vulnerable to the atmospheric dispersion of radioactive matter emitted from China if an accident similar to Fukushima were to occur in China. According to a trajectory analysis using the U.S. NASAs Modern Era Retrospective-Analysis for Research and Applications (MERRA) reanalysis dataset for the last 10 years (20012010) and the Hybrid Single Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory Model (HYSPLIT), almost 50 percent of wind arriving in Korea originates from the eastern part of China, with the exception of during the summer months, which implies that not only China, but Korea and Japan would be exposed to direct damage from a potential Chinese nuclear accident. Figures 7 through 10 which follow show why this would be the case.

Figure 5
NUCLEAR REACTOR DISTRIBUTION IN CHINA

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN 161

Source: World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, London, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org, accessed September 2011.

162

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Figure 6

EARTHQUAKE ZONES OF CHINA

Source: Institute of Geology, China Earthquake Administration, 2011, available at http:// www.doyj.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/dza2.jpg.

The averaged monthly wind field in April (figure 7) clearly indicates a prevailing westerly wind from the eastern part of China coming into Korea. In July, the prevailing wind coming into Korea changes to a southerly wind direction (figure 8) and a northwesterly wind direction in November (figure 9). As depicted in figure 9, any incident in Liaoning Province, which is located on the upwind side of Korea, may become a direct concern to Korea with respect to the prevailing northwesterly winds in winter. Figure 10 shows a pattern from April 2010 with an extreme situation of the wind field, where westerly winds lasting for four days originating on the eastern coastal area of China converged into Korea and Japan. If a nuclear accident occurred under these wind conditions, huge damage would be expected due not only to the winds direction being toward Korea, but also due to the winds high degree of concentrated and very short transportation time. In summary, it is an urgent issue for Korea and Japan, not to mention China, to find a way to actively respond to these potentially very serious accidents and to collaborate in order to further enhance the safety of nuclear power since they all are the potential victims of any nuclear accident in this geographic vicinity.

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Figure 7

MONTHLY AVERAGED WIND FIELD IN APRIL, 2001 TO 2010

163

Other Challenges: Chinas rapid nuclear expansion poses other challenges in addition to the issues previously outlined. Serious financial, political, and security problems, in addition to environmental challenges, are noted by the research of Y. Zhou et al.28 This study investigates Chinas claim that nuclear energy is necessary to meet its growing energy demands by analyzing Chinas energy alternatives and assessing their likelihood of contributing to the nations total energy capacity. By looking at Chinas energy policy from several perspectives, this study concludes that nuclear energy is a necessity for China. However, it also notes that Chinas future nuclear expansion should address the following issues: (1) the need to strengthen the nuclear safety and security culture; (2) the incomplete and weak nuclear regulatory systems; (3) an inadequate nuclear work force; (4) lagging public participation; (5) transparency in the policy-making process; and (6) insufficient research and development capabilities. A similar argument is made by K. Ioannis regarding nuclear projects in general.29 The author states that the consideration of nuclear power as a significant low-carbon supply option needs to address four critical issues: cost, safety, waste,

164

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Figure 8

MONTHLY AVERAGED WIND FIELD IN JULY, 2001 TO 2010

and proliferation.30 The issue of public acceptance is examined empirically by E. Jun et al. in terms of delivering proper information on nuclear energy to the public.31 In addition to the estimation results, this paper shows how relevant information on nuclear energy delivered to the public could affect public acceptance. The fact that most of the controversy over nuclear power stems from the uncertainty of empirical quantification, as discussed earlier, reveals the challenge arising from this issue. Moreover, Korea and Japan are more like islands in terms of their power interconnection, with no international power connections that easily can be established in the near future. Japan has two different frequency zones for electrical power. Also, an island country of Japans nature should have a bridge to connect its power grid to the rest of the continent, while Korea, which can play such a role, has faced political difficulties in persuading North Korealocated between Korea and mainland Chinato cooperate. The fact that both Korea and Japan are not connected to a larger international power grid hinders them from fully adopting new technologies in the power sector. This would imply that new and renewable

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Figure 9

MONTHLY AVERAGED WIND FIELD IN NOVEMBER, 2001 TO 2010

165

technologies with intermittency problems will encounter additional burdens for the existing power grid.
Future Framework for Enhancing Nuclear Safety in Korea, Japan, and China:

China began the first draft of its Atomic Energy Act in 1984, although the official legislation has not been issued yet. The Atomic Energy Law is crucial for safety supervision and management, radiation protection, non-proliferation, and physical protection.32 Based on the issues examined in this paper, it is necessary to have a clearly elaborated legal framework in order to enhance the nuclear safety of this Northeast Asian region. A variety of international conventions exist in the nuclear field. These include the convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident for Radiological Emergency, which has been a subsidiary body of the IAEA since 1987, and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), an international organization of nuclear operators created to improve nuclear safety following the Chernobyl accident.

166

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT Figure 10

WIND FIELD IN APRIL 2010

The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is an example of a regional framework of cooperation in nuclear energy.33 Six founding states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) initially considered nuclear energy as a means of achieving energy independence. EURATOM today helps pool knowledge, infrastructure, and the funding of nuclear energy among its 27 member countries. Korea, Japan, and China also need to have a well-designed legal framework for nuclear safety in this area. The safer use of nuclear energy, which is also a means of securing energy independence, would require closer cooperation and continuous communication among the three states. Concluding Remarks In this paper, both the potential opportunities and challenges in the development of nuclear power have been discussed in view of the long-term energy mix in Korea, China, and Japan.

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN

167

In this process, lessons from Korea and Japan in the early 1980s, when they reduced their dependency on imported energy by diversifying their energy mix and including nuclear energy in the power sector, were briefly examined. It is very interesting to note that nuclear power generation has been and is expected to be a small portion of the power sector, with more than 70 percent of power still supplied by coal in China, even after a part of its massive nuclear strategy has been taken into account. Furthermore, it is found that Korea and China officially are still pursuing or at least not giving up nuclear energy even after the Fukushima accident. Although Japan is still weighing its long-term energy mix choices, it is not quite clear whether it can completely abandon nuclear power in the future. Taking into consideration Chinas strategy to significantly increase its nuclear power, details of its plan have been reviewed, in conjunction with their potential impact on its neighbors. Once a nuclear accident happens in any one of these three countries, it surely will affect other Asian states. Therefore, China, Korea, and Japan need to establish a Northeast Asian Nuclear Council, a legally binding institutional framework to enhance cooperation for the safety of nuclear power utilization. EURATOM could be an example for founding such a framework. But these three nations may need much closer cooperation. There are special conditions that should be factored into this case. The Chinese nuclear promotion plan is reported to be the worlds largest at more than 150 percent of that of the United States, which has the second largest plan. Moreover, the combined expected nuclear share of Korea, China, and Japan will represent more than 32 percent of the world total and their economies likely will remain very active with growing energy demands. In addition, these countries are located quite close to each other and the regional wind field analysis indicates that hazardous nuclear materials could be carried throughout the region if any potential nuclear accident were to occur in any one of the nations.
NOTES
1

World Nuclear Association, Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries, London, updated De-

cember 2011, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html, accessed January 19, 2012.

2

S. Lee, True Costs of Nuclear Power, Synthesis/Regeneration, vol. 11 (fall 1996), available

at http://www.greens.org/s-r/11/11-00.html.
3

Greenpeace, Nuclear Power Undermining Climate Protection (Amsterdam, Netherlands:

Greenpeace International, October 2008), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/ PageFiles/25048/nuclear-power-undermining-cl.pdf.

4

Yangbo Du and John E. Parsons, Update of the Cost of Nuclear Power, Working paper no.

09-004, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009.

168
5

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

John M. Deutch, Charles F. Forsberg, Andrew C. Kadak, Mujid S. Kazimi, Ernest J. Moniz, Yangboo Du, Lara Pierpoint, and John E. Parsons, Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), MIT Energy Initiative, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009, and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA), Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants, Washington, D.C., EIA, released November 2010. Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for U.S. Nuclear Power After Fukushima, Working paper no. 218, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California, Energy Institute at Haas, August 2011, available at http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working_papers/WP218.pdf. European Commission, New Energy Externalities Development for Sustainability (Luxemburg: Joint Research Centre, 2009), available at http://www.cordis.europa.eu.
8 9 7 6

James Lovelock, Nuclear Power Is the Only Green Solution, The Independent, May 24, 2004.

William C. Sailor, David Bodansky, Chaim Braun, Steve Fetter, and Bob van der Zwaan, A Nuclear Solution to Climate Change? Science, vol. 288, no. 5469 (May 19, 2000), pp. 1177 178.
10 11

Yun Zhou, Why is China Going Nuclear? Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 7 (2010), pp. 77181.

Abdul-Karim T. Sadik, A Note on Some Practical Limitations of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis Measures, World Development, vol. 6, no. 2 (1978), pp. 22125. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China, London, updated December 2011, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org, accessed January 19, 2012.
13 W. E. Cummins, M. M. Corletti, and T. T. Schulz, Westinghouse AP1000 Advanced Passive Plant, Paper no. 3235, Proceedings of the International Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants (ICAPP), Cordoba, Spain, May 47, 2003. 14 15 16 17 12

World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in China. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2011. All the price figures are nominal.

International Energy Agency (IEA), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, IEA Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/IEA, 2010). Republic of Korea, Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), The 5th Electric Power Demand-Supply Plan (2010-2024), MKE publication no. 2010-490 (Gyeonggi-do: Republic of Korea, 2010). World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Korea, London, updated August 1, 2011, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org, accessed September 2011. International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) /IEA, 2010) and World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010).
20 19 18

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN

21

169

For more detailed information, see the Appendix.

22 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China Country Analysis Briefing (Washington, D.C.: EIA, September 2012). 23 24

Worse Power Gap in Summer, China Business News, September 3, 2012.

China National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Medium- and Long-Term Nuclear Power Development Plan (2005-2020) (Beijing: NDRC, 2007). International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balance of OECD Countries and World Energy Outlook. Coal power plant is assumed to require 355g/kWh of standard quality coal while that of a LNG plant requires 144.59g/kWh of LNG. Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) unpublished manuscript, Seoul, Korea, 2010, and Stan Mark Kaplan, Displacing Coal with Generation from Existing Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, no. 7-5700, Washington, D.C., January 2010. World Nuclear Association, Fast Neutron Reactors, London, updated November 2011, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org. Yun Zhou, Christhian Rengifo, Peipei Chen, and Jonathan Hinze, Is China Ready for Its Nuclear Expansion? Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 2 (2011), pp. 77181. Kessides Ioannis, Nuclear Power and Sustainable Energy Policy: Promises and Perils, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 25, no. 2 (2010), pp. 32362.
30 29 28 27 26 25

Ibid.

31 The social value of nuclear energy increases approximately 68.5 percent with the provision of adequate information on nuclear energy delivered to the public. In this research, the contingent valuation method (CVM) was applied; however, this methodology might generate different results depending on how the survey is designed and conducted. See Eunju Jun, Wonjoon Kim, Yong Hoon Jeong, and Soon Heung Chang, Measuring the Social Value of Nuclear Energy Using Contingent Valuation Methodology, Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 3 (2010), pp. 1470476.

Related information can be found at the Nuclear Power Plant Site Selection Safety Regulation (HAF101), China National Nuclear Safety Administration, 1991, and the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, Nuclear Power Site Selection Safety Regulation (HAF002), 1993. European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Nuclear Energy, available at www.euratom.org, accessed January 19, 2012.
33

32

170

Appendix Table A
a

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN CHINA (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe)

Units China: Operating Nuclear Reactors 944 279 610 665 935 1,000 1,037 CPR-1000 CGNPC VVER-1000 CNNC PWR CGNPC Candu 6 CNNC 1998 1997 1999 2005 CNP-600 CNNC CNP-300 CNNC 3/1985 6/1996, 3/1997, 2006 PWR CGNPC 1987, 1987

Net Province Capacity Operator

Reactor Model

Start of Construction

Start of Operation

Daya Bay 1 & 2

Guangdong

1994 4/1994 2002, 2004, 2010 2002, 2003 2002, 2003 2007, 2007 9/2010, 2011

Qinshan Phase I

Zhejiang

Qinshan Phase II, 13

Zhejiang

Qinshan Phase III, 1 & 2

Zhejiang

Ling Ao Phase I, 1 & 2

Guangdong

Tianwan 1 & 2

Jiangsu

Ling Ao Phase II, 1 & 2

Guangdong

China: Nuclear Reactors Under Construction 650 4*1,080 4*1,080 2*1,080 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CGNPC CGNPC CNNC CNNC CNNC CNP-600 CNNC 1/2007 8/2007, 4/2008, 3/2009, 8/2009 2012 10/2012, 2013, 2014 2/2008, 11/2008, 1/2010, 9/2010 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 11/2008, 6/2009 12/2008, 8/2009, 11/2010 12/2008, 7/2009 10/2013, 8/2014 8/2013, 2014, 2015 12/2013, 10/2014
(continued)

Qinshan Phase II, 4

Zhejiang

Hongyanhe Units 14

Liaoning

Ningde Units 14

Fujian

Fuqing Units 1 & 2

Fujian

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Yangjiang Units 13 2*1,080

Guangdong 3*1,080

Fangjiashan Units 1 & 2

Zhejiang

Table A (continued)
a

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN CHINA (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe)

Units 2*1,250 2*1,250 EPR CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CNP-600 China: Nuclear Reactors Planned 1,080 2*1,080 1,080 2*1,080 2*1,080 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 AP1000 AP1000 CPR-1000 CNEC/CNNC CGNPC CGNPC CGNPC CNNC 2011 or 2015 2011 CPR-1000 or CNP1000 CNNC Deferred from 2009? 2011? CPR-1000 CNGPC CPR-1000 CNGPC CPR-1000 CNGPC 2011 2011 2011 CNNC 4/2010, 11/2010 CNNC 7/2010 CGNPC 7/2010 CGNPC 10/2009, 4/2010 AP1000 CPI 9/2009, 6/2010 AP1000 CNNC 3/2009, 12/2009

Province

Net Capacity Operator

Reactor Model

Start of Construction

Start of Operation 11/2013, 9/2014 5/2014, 3/2015 10/2013, 11/2014 2015 7/2015 2014, 2015

Sanmen Units 1 & 2

Zhejiang

Haiyang Units 1 & 2

Shandong

Taishan Units 1 & 2 2*1,080 2*1,080 2*650

Guangdong 2*1,770

Fangchenggang Unit 1

Guangxi

Fuqing Units 3 & 4

Fujian

Changjiang Units 1 & 2

Hainan

Yangjiang Unit 4

Guangdong

2016 2015 2016

Hongyanhe Units 5 & 6

Liaoning

Fangchenggang Unit 2

Guangxi

Fuqing Units 5 & 6

Fujian

Hongshiding Units 1 & 2

Shandong

2015 2017

Yangjiang Units 5 & 6 2*1,080 2*1,250 4*1,250

Guangdong 2*1,080

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN

Ningde Units 5 & 6

Fujian

Xianning Units 1 & 2

Hubei

2015? 20152018
(continued)

Taohuajiang Units 14

Hunan

171

172

Table A (continued)
a

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN CHINA (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe)

Units 2*1,250 2*1,250 2*1,250 2*,1250 2*1,250 2*1,250 2*880 2*1,250 2*1,250 AP1000 CPR-1000 VVER-1000 AP1000 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CNNC CGNPC CGNPC CGNPC Late 2012? 2012 CNNC CGNPC AP1000 CNNC AP1000 CNNC & Guodian BN-800 CNNC AP1000 CNNC 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2012, 2013 AP1000 CPI 2012 AP1000 CPI AP1000 CNNC AP1000 CNNC with Datang 2011 delayed AP1000 CPI 2011

Net Province Capacity Operator

Reactor Model

Start of Construction

Start of Operation 2015

Pengze Units 1 & 2

Jiangxi

Xudabao Units 1 & 2

Liaoning

Sanmen Units 3 & 4

Zhejiang

Haiyang Units 3 & 4

Shandong

Xiaomoshan Units 1 & 2

Hunan

Longyou Units 1 & 2

Zhejiang

Sanming Units 1 & 2

Fujian

2019, 2020

Zhangzhou Units 1 & 2

Fujian

Yanjiashan Units 1 & 2

Jiangxi

Shaoguan Units 14 2*1,080 2*1,060 2*1,250 2*1,080

Guangdong 4*1,250

Tianwan Units 5 & 6

Jiangsu

Tianwan Units 3 & 4

Jiangsu

Wuhu Units 1 & 2

Anhui

8/2016

Lianyungang Units 1 & 2

Jiangsu

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Shanwei Units 1 & 2

Guangdong 2*1,080

(continued)

Table A (continued)
a

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN CHINA (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe)

Units China: Further Nuclear Power Units Proposed 2*1,080 EPR CPR-1000 VVER-1200 CPR-1000 AP1000 CAP1400 CNP-600 or ACP-600 AP1000 AP1000 CPR-1000 CPR-1000 CGNPC CGNPC Huaneng CNNC or CPI CNGPC? CNNC with Datang CPI CNNC & Huaneng Huaneng CGNPC CGNPC CNNC CGNPC CGNPC By 2015 CPR-1000 CGNPC

Net Province Capacity Operator

Reactor Model

Start of Construction

Start of Operation

Lianyungang Units 3 & 4

Jiangsu

Taishan Units 3 & 4 4*1,080 2*1,200

Guangdong 2*1,770

Nanchong (Nanchun)

Sichuan

Tianwan Units 7 & 8

Jiangsu

Yangjiang Units 5 & 6 2*1,250 2*1,400 2*650 2*1,250 4*1,250

Guangdong 2*1,080

Xianning Units 14

Hubei

Shidaowan Units 5 & 6

Shandong

Changjiang

Hainan

Haiyang Units 5 & 6

Shandong

Xiaomoshan Units 36

Liaoning

Shanwei Units 36 4*1,080 2*(NA) 6*1,250 AP1000 (if CPI) 4*1,080 CPR-1000?

Guangdong 4*1,080

Fangchenggan Units 36

Guangxi

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN

Yingtan

Jiangxi

Nanyang Units 16

Henan

Xinyang Units 14

Henan

(continued)

173

174

Table A (continued)
a

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN CHINA (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe)

Units 4*1,000? 4*(NA) 2*1,250 6*1,000 2*1,250 CGNPC AP1000 CNNC CNGPC / Huneng AP1000 CNNC CNNC

Net Province Capacity Operator

Reactor Model

Start of Construction

Start of Operation

Changde Units 14

Hunan

Jiyang

Anhui

Sanmen Units 5 & 6

Zhejiang

Cangnan

Zhejiang

Zhexi/Longyou 3 & 4

Zhejiang

Haijia/Haifeng 1 & 2 2*1,000 AP1000 AP1000 AP1000 AP1000 AP1000 AP1000 AP1000 CNGPC & Guodian CNGPC & Guodian CGNPC CPI CNNC AP1000 AP1000 CPI CPI CGNPC & Guodian CPI CPI

Guangdong 2*1,000

Jinzhouwan 14

Liaoning

Fuling Units 14 4*1,250 2*1,250 2*1,250 2*1,250 2*1,250 2*1,100

Chongqing 4*1,250

Jingyu Units 14

Jilin

Liangjiashan

Jilin

Changchun Jiutai

Jilin

Songjiang

Shanghai

Wuhu Units 3 & 4

Anhui

Pengze Units 3 & 4

Jiangxi

THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Heyuan/Jieyangu 14 2*1,250 4*1,250

Guangdong 4*1,000

Haiyang 7 & 8

Shandong

Pingnan/Baisha 14

Guangxi

(continued)

Table A (continued)
a

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN CHINA (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe)

Units 2*(NA) 4*1,250 4*1,000 4*1,000 NA NA NA 4*1,250 5,000 NA NA 2*880 CNNC CNNC AP1000 CNGPC AP1000 CNGPC CNNC CNNC Huadian Huadian AP1000 Huadian CNNC

Net Province Capacity Operator

Reactor Model

Start of Construction

Start of Operation

Lanzhou

Gansu

Xiangtan

Hunan

Donggang

Liaoning

Haixing

Liaoning

Shizu

Chongqing

Qiaofushan

Hebai

Songzi/ Xianning

Hubei

Guangshui

Hubei

Zhongxiang

Hubei

Hebaodao

Guangdong

Yibin

Sichuan

Sanming Units 3 & 4

Fujian

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN

NA = not available; the 284,461 MWe total is composed of nuclear reactors currently operating (11,271 MWe), under construction (28,710 MWe), planned (58,320 MWe), and proposed (186,160 MWe) and excluding those projects net for which capacity information is not available.

175

176

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Table B

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN JAPAN (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe) Commercial Operation

Reactor

Type

Net Capacity

Utility

Japan: Operating Nuclear Reactors Fukushima I-5 Fukushima I-6 Fukushima II 1 & 2 Fukushima II 3 & 4 Genkai 1 & 2 Genka 3 & 4 Hamaoka 3 Hamaoka 4 Hamaoka 5 Higashidori-1Tohoku Ikata 1 & 2 Ikata 3 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa13 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 4 & 5 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 & 7 Mihama 13 Ohi 1 & 2 Ohi 3 & 4 Onagawa 1 Onagawa 2 & 3 Sendai 1 & 2 Shika-1 Shika-2 Shinmane 1 Shinmane 2 Takahama 1 & 2 BWR BWR BWR BWR PWR PWR BWR BWR ABWR BWR PWR PWR BWR BWR ABWR PWR PWR PWR BWR BWR BWR BWR BWR BWR BWR PWR 760 1,067 1,067*2 1,067*2 529*2 1,127*2 1,056 1,092 1,325 1,067 538*2 846 1,067*3 1,067*2 1,315*2 320/470/780 1,120*2 1,127*2 498 796*2 846*2 505 1,304 439 791 780*2 TEPCO TEPCO TEPCO TEPCO Kyushu Kyushu Chubu Chubu Chubu Tohoku Shikoku Shikoku TEPCO TEPCO TEPCO Kansai Kansai Kansai Tohoku Tohoku Kyushu Hokuriku Hokuriku Kansai Kansai Kansai 1978 1979 1982/1984 1985/1987 1975/1981 1994/1997 1987 1993 2005 2005 1977/1982 1994 1985/1990/1993 1994/1990 1996/1997 1970/1972/1976 1979/1979 1991/1993 1984 1995/2002 1984/1985 1993 2006 1974 1989 1974/1975
(continued)

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA, KOREA, & JAPAN Table B (continued)

177

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN JAPAN (Operating, Under Construction, Planned, and Proposed in megawatt electricalMWe) Commercial Operation
1985/1985 1978 1989/1991 2009 1970 1987 19941995

Reactor
Takahama 3 & 4 Tokai 2 Tomari12 Tomari 3 Tsuruga 1 Tsuruga 2 Monju
b

Type
PWR BWR PWR PWR BWR PWR FNR

Net Capacity
830*2 1,060 550*2 866 341 1,110 246 44,642

Utility
Kansai JAPC Hokkaido Hokkaido Hokkaido JAPC JAPC

Total: 51

Japan: Nuclear Reactors Under Construction Shimane 3 Ohma 1 Total: 2 ABWR ABWR 1,373 1,383 2,756 Japan: Nuclear Reactors Planned Tsuruga 3 & 4 Higashidori 1Tepco Kaminoseki 1 Sendai 3 Higasshidori 2 Tepco Hamaoka 6 Higashidori 2 Tohoku Namie-odaka Kaminoseki 2 Total: 10 APWR APWR ABWR APWR ABWR ABWR ABWR BWR ABWR 1,538/1,538 1,385 1,373 1,590 1,385 1,380 1,385 825 1,373 13,772 Japan: Nuclear Reactors Proposed Fukushima I-7 Fukushima I-8 Not identified Total: 5
a

2005 2011

2012 2014

2012/2012 2011 2012 2014 2014 2016 2016 2017 2018

2017/2018 2017 2018 2019 2019 2020 2021 2021 2022

ABWR ABWR ABWR

1,380 1,380 4,000 total 6,760

2012 2012 2030

The 67,930 MWe total is composed of nuclear reactors currently operating (44,642 MWe), under construction (2,756 MWe), planned (13,772 MWe), and proposed (6,760 MWe). b Monju was restarted on May 2010.

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Table C
PLANNED AND PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN KOREA (in megawatt electricalMWe) Year 2011 2012 2013 Month 12 3 1 9 2014 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total 9 6 6 12 12 6 6 6 6 Location Pusan Kuungbuk Kuungbuk Pusan Pusan Kuungbuk Kuungbuk Pusan Pusan Kuungbuk Kuungbuk Pusan Pusan Facility Shingori #2(KHNP) Shinwolsung #1(KHNP) Shinwolsung #2(KHNP) Shingori #3(KHNP) Shingori #4(KHNP) Shinwuljin #1(KHNP) Shinwuljin #2(KHNP) Shingori #5(KHNP) Shingori #6(KHNP) Shinwuljin #3(KHNP) Shinwuljin #4(KHNP) Shingori #7(KHNP) Shingori #8(KHNP) Capacity 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,500 1,500 17,200

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), The 5th Master Plan of Power Supply (Gyeonggi-do: Republic of Korea, 2010).