1. How did Aristotle distinguish moral and intellectual virtue?

Could moral agents possibly attain the good with only one kind of virtue in possession? The division between the two types of virtues roots first and foremost from Aristotles division of the soul into the irrational and the rational part. The irrational is further divided into the vegetative and the appetitive part. It is in the latter, since it shares in a rational principle that moral virtues stem. The appetitive soul has something to do with our passions and desires, and given the power of our reason, we have the ability to choose to entertain, and control our passions. Through learning to control our animalistic passions such as that of hunger we avoid asceticism and gluttony and learn the virtue of proper consumption. The moral virtues need a golden mean to be struck between the excessive and deficient. Controlling our anger for one can lead us to develop temperance and proper courage. However, moral virtues are not achieved with the simple accomplishment of a single act. A display of kindness once does immediately make a person kind in nature. Moral virtues are attained through habit, doing the same virtuous act again and again until it has been perfected and embedded in our character. The word virtue after all is synonymous with excellence, and in this case a moral virtue is an excellence of a certain state of character. Yet, this does not mean that attaining a virtue makes our actions automatically in line with it. There is still the presence of deliberation in every act, and the fact that we have developed a virtue only reinforces the way we react to certain situations but, it doesnt mean that we dont have a choice to deviate from our virtuousness or fail to act accordingly. Also, though a generally virtuous man may act against his character once does not erase virtue from his character. Deviation from what is morally virtuous may arise through a number of factors, such as necessity, or uncontrollable feelings. Moreover, it is the moral virtues that we place praise and blame upon. These are the virtues that we are held responsible for having or not having. On the other hand, the intellectual virtues are those that belong to the part of the soul that is fully rational, with a part that is scientific dealing with the unchanging and another that is calculative, dealing with the variable. Unlike the numerous moral virtues, the intellectual virtues are limited to just five. These are art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, intuitive reason, and philosophic wisdom. Also, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness is not held over the intellectual virtues, its either you have it or you dont. One cannot be blamed for not being artistic or a philosopher, and it would seem that these virtues are good on their own. They have no middle ground as well, one is artistic or not. There is no golden mean between excess or deficiency of creation, only creation. The same goes with the other intellectual virtues. If there is an intellectual virtue that shares in a moral principle it would be that of practical wisdom, since its acquisition requires the perfection of all the moral virtues. Philosophic wisdom however, is linked to the contemplative life, one devoted to self-understanding and of things transcendent, and such is a noble and divine cause. It must be understood that the good in its final form of happiness can only be attained through the mastery of all virtues. However, the good in its basic form can be attained already through the presence of one virtue though this is a good that may be done for the sake of another good. Happiness is attained through the perfection of every virtue, but we may not say that a single virtue cannot produce the good in its own way. Having mastered the virtue of temperance for example allows us to

make temperate acts, and these are good in the sense that they avoid strife and promote peace. There is pleasure attained and pain avoided in the mastery of a single virtue and though this may not lead to happiness per se, they are still in general good.

2. Kant The categorical imperatives are set by Kant as maxims that should be followed on the very basis of their being universal and thus, necessary. This is opposed to what Kant call hypothetical imperatives which are followed for other ends. These imperatives are dependent on the subjectivity of human preference. We follow them because we are motivated by a certain reason or a certain goal that following the certain imperative may satisfy. However, categorical imperatives are followed free of any motivation or goal. Its universality already proposes a duty to follow it. To not abide by the categorical imperatives is blameworthy. But how do we determine in the first place what should be held as a categorical imperative? Kant suggests to, "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." This means that what one cannot imagine as a universal law is not a categorical imperative. All the more that it is unimaginable, the more that it could not be willed into a universal law. Now, if we imagine a world where killing is illegal, we could easily imagine a world and not find it hard to make such a principle universal, as opposed to a world where killing and suicide is legal. Categorical imperatives should not only be easily followed but necessarily followed for Kant. For Kant, the moral worth of an act is not judged by the means or the ends or consequences that it brings about, but by the maxim that it follows. Since the categorical imperatives are in themselves good, acts done in respect to them are good. The consequences of our actions according to Kant are morally neutral. Praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act lies in our obedience to the universal moral law. For example, we know that killing is wrong so we refrain from killing a certain person we had an argument with, and since we did not kill that certain person, that person in the near future became a mass murderer, killing a dozen people and destroying the lives of several families. Can we then be held blameworthy for the consequences of our actions? The maxim of thou shall not kill justifies our action, and any consequence it may bring is out of our control. What makes it praiseworthy is the upholding of our moral duty to follow a certain universal maxim. This is because that we have displayed what Kant calls, goodwill in our actions. In other words, we had a good intention regardless if the consequences of the act did not turn out for the best. As for duty there are two: there are perfect and imperfect duties. The former done in accordance to the categorical imperatives while the latter for hypothetical imperatives. Our duties to the latter kind result from our moral preferences that may be not universal, meaning as well that we can imagine a world without it. For example, our duty to pay taxes is an imperfect duty since they do not indulge in a universal principle. Perfect duties on the other hand root from universal law. We follow them because we should not because it is required by human law or tradition, or the fear of sanction if not followed. Perfect duties are free of personal interest, and completely unbiased. They are required of us as men of reason to follow without question or aim.