Culture Shift?

A Reassessment of US Regional Political Culture through the 2007 SCHIP Debate

Bryan Williams, MEd, PhD Assistant Professor Dept. of Political Science Mercer University Macon, GA williams_bc@mercer.edu

Jason Kassel, PhD Assistant Professor Dept. of Political Science Valdosta State University Valdosta, GA jskassel@valdosta.edu

Paper prepared for the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Georgia Political Science Association NOT FOR CITATION WITHOUT AUTHORS PERMISSION

More work, in our view, needs to be done, to ascertain whether the cultural clusters that Elazar designates do indeed exist (either at the mass orelite level). This step and, it seems to us, should precede attempts to link public policy outputs with political cultures. Unfortunately most work has started with the second step and assumed the first. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 245) Daniel Elazars Federalism: A view from the states provides the seminal treatment for the relationship between regional political culture, state-level civic attitudes and federalism was. However, few studies in the recent past have been conducted to assess the continued validity of his cultural classifications. Despite the significant influence of Elazars work in the discipline, subsequent studies by other authors center on the adequateness or appropriateness of his typology of political culture in the US rather than assess the continued validity of his classification of states into the various cultural types. Furthermore, despite Thompson, Ellis and Wildavskys exhortation in 1990, such a study has not been conducted linking regional political culture to national political elite using Elazar. This paper attempts to rectify this lacuna through a test of Elazar's tri-partite classification by focusing on how state-level political culture is or is not reflected in elite discourse. We focus our attention on the discourse in the United States Senate throughout the debate that occurred during the first session of the 110th Congress (2007) over the State Children Health Initiative Program (SCHIP). We ask two questions. First, can Elazars tri-partite classification scheme be identified through discourse analysis? Second, should the classification schema prove useful, do the cultural frames of Senate discourse correspond to the home-state culture of the politician? Through the combination of qualitative content analysis with quantitative statistical analysis, we find robust evidence in support of the first question, and significant support for the second, even after controlling for the intervening effect of political party.

Elazars Cultural Theory In his work, Elazar defines state-level political culture within the United States by creating a typology of three distinct ideal-types, and classifying each state into a singular or mixed form. These three ideal-types - individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic differ in terms of the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each [local and regional] political system is embedded, and were rooted in the evolution and local adoption of two opposing views of the American political system. On the one hand, American politics was designed for individuals to bargain over self-interests (e.g. an economic marketplace) and on the other for groups to cooperate to achieve shared goals rooted in moral principles (e.g. the classical conception of a commonwealth). For the individualistic culture, politics is "just another means by which individuals may improve themselves socially and economically." Politics is utilitarian, without moral obligation, and participation is a purely individual activity. For the moralistic culture, politics is "a public activity centered on some notion of the public good, and properly devoted to the advancement of the public interest." Moralist culture sees the political order as a commonwealth in which each individual has a responsibility to participate for the public (not private) good. Far from both of the preceding two, traditionalistic culture envisions government's function, while positive, is limited "to securing the continued maintenance of the existing social order" and its dominating hierarchy of elites who act as custodians of the traditional structures and norms.

Challenges to the Durability of Elazars Classifications In his work classic publication, Elazar categorized states into specific ideal or mixed types of political culture. At first blush, the high mobility rates in the US, as well as several episodes

of mass migration cast doubt on the continued accuracy of his geographical location of the various culture types. It is surprising, then, that, while the details of the cultural aspects and categories have been challenged, the geographical assignments have not. We start with the a priori assumption that patterns of political culture within the US have not altered dramatically since Elazars last update in 1984. Our justification for this is based on studies of the construction and transmission of social norms have shown how migrants can be forced to adopt (or at least conform to) the local political culture . Acculturation may not occur immediately, but given time, the person may slowly adjust their expectations about politicians, policies and campaigns to adapt to their new environment. While steady yet minor population movements between the states are likely to have little overall affect, given the power of acculturation, mass migration could produce large and persistent differences in the rules of the political game, the issues that divide politicians and parties. An example of this is the effect of northerners and Hispanics to Sun Belt states . However, even large-scale population shifts of in- and outmigration may produce contradictory effects on partisanship and, logically, political culture . The attitudinal influence of mass migration is as likely to wash out as not as new populations interact and negotiate conflicts in values, goals, and norms. The formal and informal political institutions that create the context for such conflicts to be resolved, on the other hand, should persist. In general, the findings that emphasize high mobility rates among states suggest that political culture is best seen as dynamic and fluid as individuals carry their cultural norms and expectations with them to new locations. Our expectation, on the other hand, is that citizens that migrate into a region will be affected by, or forced to adopt the regional political culture so that regional subcultures continue to represent the historical extensions of earlier settlement

patterns and the continuing advantages of the first effect of settler groups over later arrivals that were placed in the culture . Immigrants will adjust their expectations about politicians, policies and campaigns to adapt to their new environment, or they will move on to look for a more compatible and culturally attractive location (c.f. Wirt, 1997 ). All of this suggests that it is important to reassess Elazars classification of states 50 years after it was constructed. The theory and research design to test this linkage is straightforward. Democratic theory requires that public officials reflect dominant orientations in their state or community while nonconformists are not often elected or appointed. Some of these orientations differ among the states, and the differences may be due to Elazar's political cultures. Consequently, to test for any such association, elite attitudes should be matched to Elazars typologies.

Political Culture, Political Elites and Policy Rhetoric To assess Elazars relevance for understanding 21st century state-level political culture our study is concerned with revealing political belief systems through an analysis of the Senate-level rhetorical justifications and rationalizations that went into crafting the particular public policy known as the State Childrens Health Initiative Program (SCHIP). Our central contention is that U.S. Senators, and political representatives more broadly, embrace and mimic the political culture of their constituency. This may be in rhetoric alone, in order to more effectively communicate their suitability as a delegate, or it may a true assimilation of the beliefs. In either case, the words of a politician matter, particularly in the role of district spokesperson or on a stage where there is an expectation of being observed by their electorate. Analysis of the content of elite discourse should provide a detailed measure of conformity

between a representative and their home districteven when a politician does not vote as a faithful delegate, they will communicate with their constituents and must speak the same language, address the same concepts, and use the same vernacular. In this way, discourse analysis may lead to a better, or certainly more nuanced, way to evaluate elite representation instead of relying on voting records. That is, we hypothesize that elite speech represents culture because that speech is cultural acceptable to their constituents. A record of senate floor proceedings, then, should be ideal for revealing the political culture of the senators home state. A simple model of this hypothesis can be constructed as follows: State Political Culture > Political Elite > Policy Rhetoric The logic behind this hypothesis comes from the central premise of elections in a democracy, which posits a hierarchical relationship between constituents and representatives. This relationship creates a bounded rationality in which representatives must conform or be punished. Constituents reward their representatives with their electoral support, campaign contributions, and popularity in polls that can be translated into political capital in Washington as colleagues vest more interest and support in their fellows who show promise of longevity through reelection. Punishment is the opposite, and results in the loss of direct influence in the government and greater electoral uncertainty. Thus, as rational actors, elites will mimic the dominant political cultural rhetoric within their state in order to prevent being punished. Conformity in rhetoric may, in future studies, help explain how representatives maintain reelection despite deviating from voting consistently with constituent opinion.

The SCHIP Debate The policy we are looking at, SCHIP, was originally passed by a Republican-led Congress

in 1996. The 2007 debate considered its reauthorization and possible limitation or expansion to bridge a gap between families eligible for Medicaid coverage and those able to purchase health insurance on their own. Originally a bi-partisan program, SCHIP continued to find support on both sides of the aisle. However, in 2007, the partisan divisiveness between a Democratic Congress and a Republican President created gridlock. Although the program remained popular and passed both the House and Senate with overwhelming majorities, it was vetoed by President Bush and the Congress was unable to muster the two-thirds required to override the veto. The SCHIP debate is a good case-study of state-level political culture for a number of reasons. Most importantly, after ten years, it retained great bipartisan support in the middle of one of the most polarized congresses in history (cite from Poole and Rosenthal). Providing healthcare for Americas children was supported in general by at least 88 Senators, and the final bill received 68 votes (18 Republicans joining 48 Democrats and 2 independents). The bipartisan nature of support of this case should allow us to minimize the effect of partisanship as a causal variable in the outcome. Further, unlike purely procedural or process-oriented debates, the justification of a public good that affects every state allows for greater variety in the discussion, which provides ample opportunities to display the three cultures developed by Elazar: Moral, Traditional, and Individual. Furthermore, as Congress maneuvered to either avoid or override presidential veto, the prolonged debate provides ample material for analysis.

Data Source for Senate Rhetoric Our data comes from analyzing political rhetoric of U.S. Senators in the 110th Congress contained in the Congressional Record. For our purposes, rhetorical data has the advantage over other types of data used in other political-culture studies in that it doesnt rely on popular or elite

voting patterns or policy preferences, which can be determined by many confounding influences, nor does it rely on attitudinal surveys, which suffer from the typical problems of social acceptability and satisficing. In utilizing this data, we are positing that rhetoric on the Senate floor removes the requirement to 'know' what a political representative is thinking or what they believe. Instead, the floor is a stage on which they speak to their constituents and demonstrate their connection to the dominant political culture (Mixon Jr. et. al. 2001; Frantzich and Sullivan 1996). To derive as complete a catalog as possible of the SCHIP debate we used the search feature of the electronic version of the Congressional Record found at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/retrieve.html. We cast our net wide and entered related search terms such as childrens health. We read the content of this expanded set and eliminated findings that were substantively unrelated to the SCHIP debate. After this culling, we ended up with 352 Senatorial speeches by 88 Senators.

Coding Rhetoric Our first focus analyzing Elazars tripartite theory through elite discourse required establishing rules for the methodical analysis of the Congressional Record. From this methodical analysis, we sought to create a discourse dataset that could be used to assess our second focus analyzing the continued stability of Elazars classifications. This section addresses the first question and tests our ability to methodically create and apply rules that would allow us to successfully place Elazars typology within discourse analysis. We began by establishing the rule that the unit of analysis was not the Congressional Record itself but the Senators and the logic of their speeches. We immediately identified two

important characteristics of our data set. First, there was little variance within a set of speeches by the same Senatordespite variation in purpose and length of speech, senators tended to demonstrate the same intensity of each discourse frame across all instances. Second, while there were 71 Senators the number of speeches was heavily skewed toward 11 speakers who each had between 10 and 30 speeches while the average number of speeches in this debate was five, and the median was 4. These two findings enabled us to have confidence in coding four speeches per Senator (or all of a Senators speeches if the number were less than four), selecting every fourth speech to provide chronological variation when necessary. With this in mind we then established a conceptual rule we labeled the speech object rule. By emphasizing speech objects we were able to focus our attention on the words contained in the totality of a speech by each Senator rather than emphasizing the overall length or number of words contained in each speech. The speech object concept allowed us to emphasize meaning and develop a thicker understanding of the discourse data. From this concept, we then sought to apply it to the logic contained within Elazars typology. We began by reading through the first chronological ten speech objects to identify ways to connect the concept to Elazar and comparing findings. At the end of this process we held extensive discussions to refine the speech object concept tool and to identify paradigmatic words and phrases to distinguish the meaning of one speech object from another. We repeated this exercise, with a discussion period at the end of each, until we reached a total of fifty speech objects. This methodical exercise allowed us to fruitfully update our shared list of paradigmatic words and phrases, revise our speech object coding definitions, and coordinate our definitional applications. The speech objects were coded into different variables that represent aspects of the three political culture types. Each variable was evaluated on a five-point scale relating to the intensity

and centrality of the particular discourse frame or component within a given speech object. The scale runs from not present to strongly present. After coding the speech objects, the Senators scores were averaged across each variable in order to obviate the uneven number of contributions. Although some variation was lost using this method, we found it preferable to the high probability of over representing states or views by weighting the cases. Through our analysis of nearly 200 speech objects, we identified that the speech object concept could be fruitfully distinguished by rhetoric connected to debate concerning the processes or possible outcomes of the SCHIP policy As we were concerned with connecting political culture as a whole with Senatorial rhetoric we identified both types of rhetoric. By the end of this exercise we were satisfied that we had achieved a high degree of mutual reliability in our independent analyses and then divided the speech objects alphabetically and worked independently to create the final analytic dataset. This extensive process led us to recognize that Elazars tri-partite typology could be fruitfully applied to the elite discourse of the SCHIP debate.

Elazars description of individualistic political culture turned out to be the broadest of the three, encompassing both process and policy. Moral political culture is strongly output- or policyoriented. Traditional cultures emphasis on hierarchy and status quo makes its application to process and policy fairly straightforward. Individual political culture, on the other hand, has a different emphasis in process than it does in policy. We attempted to account for this by disaggregating the components of individual political culture into separate variables: individualrealism refers to a description of the political process as negotiation, bargaining, and brinksmanship; individual-utility refers to the policy output, which should be both fiscally

responsible and have benefit that is clearly related to the constituents. Also, as individual political culture is distrustful of big government, the policy output should not grow the governments size or influence. Further, aware of a self-interested explanation, we also coded the political interest of each speech object by noting whether the emphasis was on state or national interests. That is, if the speech object contained an anecdote about a specific person in a state or if specific numbers of individuals in the state were mentioned code as state focus. If the speakers focus was on the benefit to the overall country then identify as a national focus. These rules enabled us to apply a five point scale to code the final speech object and categorize the strength of each speech object within Elazars typology.

Qualitative Findings Question I Our first question in this study asks whether or not Elazars cultural typology can be applied to elite speech. This led to the following hypothesis: H1: Senators floor debate can be categorized into moral, traditional, and individual frames as described by Elazar. Through content analysis, we found a robust use of moralistic language that cited scripture, referenced a moral imperative to help children and, in general, emphasized a lack of self-interest and were the least ambiguous of all cultures. Morality was focused on the process in terms of the rightness or obligation of the Senate to provide for children health also be found in terms of policy output, such as the judgment of how a particular bill would contribute to positive, affective outcomes for children, such as a more fulfilling life. We found a strong indication of traditionalist language by identifying language that focused on maintaining existing relationships and societal power centers that emphasized the 10

original purpose of the SCHIP bill ten years earlier and sought to maintain the status quo. Traditionalistic speech objects had common expressions of the process and product of SCHIP legislation. We identified rhetoric that supported sustaining institutional arrangements that would maintain proper procedures in the Senate by reinforcing the hierarchy of the Senate through deference to the Senate leadership, not-too-subtle reminders to support the institutional organization in terms of respect for the thoughtful deliberations that resulted in committee decisions and the proper role of the Senate vis a vis the House. Traditionalist rhetoric also sought to maintain existing federal-state relations by emphasizing that states should be given the freedom to vary under this program and minimizing the importance of the federal government in solving conflicts between the states. Traditionalist speech objects also sought to convey that Senators should jump on the bandwagon by pointing to powerful people and interests that supported the legislation. Individualistic speech objects turned out to be the most complex and we identified two distinct ways in which to code this form of rhetoric. The first, coded as utilitarian language, emphasized the manner in which the program was an investment in the countrys future because it would help recipients get a job in the future and thereby increase overall efficiency and productivity (i.e. healthy children equals healthy workers). The second, coded as realist language, emphasized the different ways in which government is a process of competing forces and occasionally dirty politics (i.e. politics is nothing but corrupt bargains). Quantitative Findings Question II The standard answer to the two questions addressed in this study holds partisan affiliation to be the determining factor behind Senate voting behavior and rhetoric. Our analysis of the Senate debates revealed consistent use of standard frames or memes consistent with the partisan

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perspective. For example, a common Republican frame was to return to the bills 1996 original intent and keep the S in SCHIP meaning it should be a state rather than national program. On the other side of the aisle, Democrats consistently argued that it was important to put children first and pass the bill for their protection. The party line was more or less skillfully woven into each Senators discourse for some, it was merely bookends to their main message, while others more convincingly integrated the ideas and words into their presentation. We thus found evidence supporting the idea of partisan rhetoric but, with each speech object containing up to thousands of words, there was ample rhetorical data to test the degree to which partisanship would challenge our cultural analysis. Our impression while coding the Senate debate was that the various cultural frames were clearly distinct with only a little overlap. Even so, each discourse frame was often visible to a varying degree within a single speech object and certainly across the speech objects of a single senator. The first test, then, was to measure the extent to which the frames were mutually exclusive, that a Senator who, on average, strongly used one frame would use the other frames more weakly. A positive finding on this front would provide sufficient face validity to our model and methodology to warrant that we continue our investigation. Table 2 below contains the results of the bivariate correlations of the intensity of one Senators use of the three frames. After coding each speech object on a five-point scale (0=none, 4=strong), all of a Senators coded speech objects were averaged so as not to create a disparity between those who contributed to the debate on many occasions and those who did not. The numbers on top are the correlation coefficient accompanied by the p-value immediately below. As this is a preliminary test of concept, we opted to accept results within a two-tailed confidence interval of p<.10. Given the strongly divided nature of the 110th Congress, in addition to running

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zero-order correlations, we decided to run first-order partial correlations controlling for the confounding effect of political partythese two models are interposed in order to facilitate comparison across a single variable. Zero-order correlation results are in the odd numbered rows, and the partial correlation results are reported in the even-numbered columns. Comparing the outcomes shows that, while partisanship does count for some of the negative correlation, the relative strength of one frame is generally inversely related to that of the others. Future studies along these lines may want to code the partisan memes separately from the political-culture frames in order to allow more sensitivity to party effects. Our model anticipates political culture to flow from the state to the discourse of its Senators. Our expectations are that each of the three types of states will be highly positively correlated with higher intensity or strength of the related discourse frame. Furthermore, the mixed subtypes will align with discourse from their dominant cultural component, but at a weaker intensity than the states with a singular cultural component. The obverse is also true, we would expect related discourse frames to be negatively correlated with states where such a culture is not present according to Elazar. In summary: H2: the frame of a Senators discourse is positively correlated with a state's corresponding political culture. H3: the strength of a Senators discourse is negatively correlated with the absence of the corresponding culture within the state. H4: the strength of a Senators discourse is relative to the dilution of a states culturethe correlation is stronger with unitary-culture states than with mixed-type states. Table 3 below reports the number of senators in the study by state and by party. The effect of partisanship is clearly evinced by the very low proportion of Democrats in traditional states

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(12.5% including the subtypes), and the similarly low proportion of Republicans from individual states (10.3% including subtypes). The remaining Democrats are equally divided into Moral and Individual states (43.8% each, including subtypes). The Republicans in this study draw a majority of their ranks from traditional states (58.6% including subtypes), with almost one-third elected from moral states (31.0% including subtypes). Nevertheless, there is sufficient variation in partisanship within and between states to allow for meaningful quantitative analysis. Consistent with our expectations, Table 4 shows the bivariate correlation estimations for political party with strength of discourse type and with state culturein this case, all states are collapsed under the dominant culture (e.g. moral-individual is counted as moral). Republicans and traditional states, along with their subtypes, show the most significant association (r=.447 p=.000). The significance of the relationship between political party and all moral states as a group suggests near randomness (r=.055 p=.672), but there is a moderate correlation between party and individual states as a whole (r=.241 p=.061). Party also proves to be highly deterministic of a Senators use of a particular frame. Democrats are shown to use moral and individual-utility frames (r=.712 p=.000, r=.225 p=.085) and republicans have a positive relationship with the use and intensity of the traditional frame (r=.428 p=.001). Not reported in the table are the few, mostly confirmatory correlations found when separating the states into nine-cultural subtypes. Republicans remain highly correlated to singleculture traditional states (r=.376 p=.003) and weakly correlated with states of the traditionalindividual subtype (r=.214 p=.098). Additionally, Democrats are shown to be highly correlated with single-culture individual states (r=.391 p=.002). The many, significant associations between party and culture are generally sufficient to stop further investigationfor political culture to be valuable, it has to provide explanations that party alone cant.

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To verify our belief that there is a first-order relationship between state culture and discourse type, even after controlling for partisanship, we ran estimations of the correlations between state type and discourse frame. The results found in Table 5 below support the importance of political culture, which remains even after controlling for partisanship. In Table 5 below, political party is demonstrated to be an intervening factor in the relationship between state political culture and the intensity and consistency of a Senators use of a particular discourse frame. Nevertheless, the first-order relationships predicted by H2and H3 are found in the first three rows of the table above. Support for H2 is evident in the moderate positive correlation between individual states and individual-realism discourse (r=.261 p=.055). We found more support for H3 in the strong negative correlation between traditional states and moral discourse (r= -.427 p=.001) and the moderate negative correlation between moral states and individual-utility discourse (r= -.362 p=.007). Contradicting H3 is the weak positive firstorder relationship of traditional states and their subtypes to the individual-utility discourse frame (r=.237 p=.082), which cannot be explained by political party. The test of H4 comes from comparing the first three rows of data to the bottom three. The categorization of states for the correlations in the first three rows of the table is a dummy variable that combines states with a single culture with the states that have that single culture as the dominant one in the subtype (e.g. moral AND moral-individual). The dummy variable in the second case is only for single-type states (i.e. moral, traditional, and individual with no subtypes). Although the partial-correlation between traditional states and moral discourse from H3 remains significant in this test, it is less significant and of a lesser magnitude (r2 of .064 vs r2 of .182). As our coding schema disaggregates elements that fit under Elazars descriptions of the

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various cultural types, we found it useful to try to recombine these elements and run the test again. The results were the same: we were unable to confirm H4. It is our opinion that this effect may be more mathematical than anything else. The significantly reduced sample of Senators from single-culture states led to a corresponding lack of significance in correlations. Additionally, that the individual-realism component added no further sensitivity is likely due to the heated political rhetoric from both parties after President Bush vetoed the bill. We did not code specifically for that, and so were unable to make an adequate test of how individual-realism discourse contributes to an understanding of political culture. In the final analysis, the face validity of our model suggests that H4 deserves further consideration in future studies.

Conclusion Overall, the strength of the party-to-state culture relationship is interesting, and consistent with our model. In terms of our study, we attribute this to how Elazar developed the classification of states from historical religious and ethnic migration patterns across the nation. In this light, political culture becomes the primary explanatory factor for political behavior and partisanship instead of vice versa. The relative stability of political culture over time can be explained by the weak effects of in- and outmigration relative to the strength and durability of local institutions. Acculturation and self-selection steer new residents and new generations into old patterns whose cultural roots are ingrained in local political institutions and norms. Such institutions include party primaries versus caucuses, method of selection of local and state judges, and sunshine laws around local and state political meetings. These institutions set up the framework for residents civil and political interaction, and the parameters for discussions about political satisfaction and plans for

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political change. Even the salience of issues, then, is a result of these institutional and cultural bounds, which translates into the acceptability and attractiveness of political platforms. Had political party explained all of the variation in the cultural framing of Senate discourse, we would have a hard time justifying this idea.

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Table 1: Paradigmatic speech objects Typology Paradigmatic Concept Policy Concept Children deserve SCHIP because they are the most vulnerable and least capable members of society Process Concept

Moralistic

Traditionalistic

Individualistic

SCHIP allows for individuals Values morality of development and society further policy expansion SCHIP is valuable but must be focused on SCHIP is natural cost containment Values orderly society extension of Medicare and procedures support by Medicaid policies established organizations Only truly poor children SCHIP must be deserve the benefits Values economic developed in a contained in the original productivity and transparent manner in SCHIP program and any highlights political order to clearly attempt to reauthorization bargaining demonstrate there is must be focused on who no corruption benefits and who pays.

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Table 2: Bivariate correlations and partial correlations (controlling for party) between Senators relative use of frames Partial Moral 1.000 . Partial Trad -0.268* 0.048 1.000 . -0.331 0.014 0.122 0.375 IndividUtility 0.071 0.587 -.416** 0.001 1.000 Partial IndividUtility -0.179 0.191 IndividRealism -.299** 0.025 Partial IndividRealism -0.174 0.203 0.122 0.375 -0.014 0.920 1.000 `

Discourse Frame Moral

Moral 1.000

Trad -.495** 0.000

Traditional

-.495*** 0.000 0.071 0.587 -.299** 0.025

-0.268** 1.000 0.048 -0.179 0.191 -0.174 0.203 -.416** 0.001 0.224* 0.096

-0.331** 0.224* 0.014 0.096 1.000 . -0.014 0.920 -0.067 0.624 1.000

Individ-Utility

Individ-Realism

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 The top row of each entry is Pearsons r, or the first-order correlation coefficient. The second row is the p value.

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-0.067 0.624

Table 3: Sample number and proportions of Senators from states, as categorized by Elazar, and political party count dem 12 7 Moral %within Moral states 19.4% 58.3% %within pol party 21.9% 0 0 Moral-Traditional %within Moral-Traditional states %within pol party 12 7 Moral-Individual %within Moral-Individual states 19.4% 58.3% %within pol party 21.9% 10 1 Traditional %within Traditional states 16.1% 10.0% %within pol party 3.1% 3 1 Traditional-Moral %within Traditional-Moral states 4.8% 33.3% %within pol party 3.1% 8 2 Traditional-Individual %within Traditional-Individual states 12.9% 25.0% %within pol party 6.3% 15 13 Individual %within Individual states 24.2% 86.7% %within pol party 40.6% 1 0 Individual-Moral %within Individual-Moral states 1.6% 0.0% %within pol party 0.0% 1 1 Individual-Traditional %within Individual-Traditional states 1.6% 100.0% %within pol party 3.1% Totals 62 32 State Culture repub 4 indep 1

33.3% 8.3% 13.8% 100.0% 0 0 moral subtotal 0 24

dem 14

repub 9

41.7% 0.0% 38.7% 17.2% 0.0% 9 0 90.0% 0.0% 31.0% 0.0% 2 0 trad 66.7% 0.0% 6.9% 0.0% subtotal 6 0 21 75.0% 0.0% 33.9% 20.7% 0.0% 2 0 13.3% 0.0% 6.9% 0.0% 1 0 individ 100.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% subtotal 0 0 17 0.0% 0.0% 27.4% 0.0% 0.0% 29 1

22.6% 14.5% 43.8% 31.0%

dem 4

repub 17

6.5% 27.4% 12.5% 58.6%

dem 14

repub 3

22.6% 4.8% 43.8% 10.3%

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Table 4: Correlations between political party and Senators discourse and state culture ----------Senator discourse----------------------state culture-------political party moral trad individ- individ- moral trad individ util real Dem. .712*** -.428*** .225* -.200 .055 -.447*** .241* .000 .001 .085 .143 .672 .000 .061 Rep. -.712*** .000 .428*** .001 -.225* .085 .200 .143 -.055 .672 .447*** .000 -.241* .061

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 The top row of each entry is Pearsons r, or the first-order correlation coefficient. The second row is the p value.

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Table 5: Zero- and first-order correlations (controlling for political party) between state type and use of discourse frame

state_moral (incl. subtypes) state_traditional (incl. subtypes) state_individual (incl. subtypes) state__moral (no subtypes) state_trad (no subtypes) state_individ (no subtypes)

partial partial partial partial senator_ senator_ senator_ senator_ Senator senator_ senator_ senator_ Moral Moral Trad Trad Ind-Util Ind-Util Ind-Real Ind-Real 0.107 0.109 0.176 0.170 -.351** -0.362** -0.065 -0.049 0.412 0.427 0.175 0.216 0.005 0.007 0.635 0.720 -.506*** 0.000 0.100 0.442 .260** 0.043 -.308** 0.016 .335** 0.008 -0.427** 0.001 0.118 0.391 0.187 0.173 -0.254* 0.062 0.213 0.119 0.129 0.320 0.022 0.869 -0.074 0.572 -0.023 0.861 -.284** 0.027 -0.066 0.634 0.127 0.355 -0.037 0.787 -0.198 0.146 -0.094 0.494 0.120 0.357 -0.020 0.879 -0.027 0.839 0.119 0.361 0.223* 0.084 0.237* 0.082 -0.023 0.870 -0.077 0.578 0.170 0.215 0.157 0.252 0.019 0.892 0.227* 0.092 -0.261* 0.052 0.017 0.899 0.024 0.862 -0.096 0.487 0.261* 0.055 -0.224 0.101 -0.062 0.651 0.119 0.387 22

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 The top row of each entry is Pearsons r, or the first-order correlation coefficient. The second row is the p value.

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