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DD/I STAFF STUDY


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REFERENCE TITLE POLO XVk

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Off. Ser. No. 2

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T SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE' . m


SECTION I I .
(1959-1961)

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T h i s is t h e second i n a aeries of t h r e e working papers on the Sino-Indian border q i s p u t e . T h i s S e c t i o n 11 d e a l s w i t h t h e p e r i o d from l a t e 1959 to e a r l y 1961. S e c t i o n I11 w i l l cover t h e remainder of 1961 and most of 1962, through t h e Chinese a t t a c k of 20 October.
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U s e f u l oomente by P . D. Davis and H . G . Hagerty of OCI have been incorporated. The DDI/RS would welcome comment, addressed e i t h e r t o t h e Chief or to t h e writer, Arthur qqy?B, 1
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SECTION II.

(1959-1961) Summary

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By f a l l 1959 t h e Chinese leaders were convinced of t h e need for n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Nehru, in order t o prevent t h e e i n t e r n a t i o n a l prest ige-including. t h e i r p o s k t i o n in t h e world Communist movement-from deteriorating. Shortly after t h e A u g u s t 1959 clashes t h e y also recognized, or were m a d e aware by Indian p a r t y boss Ghosh, t h a t N e h r u ' s a d v i s e r s might use these s k i r m i s h e s t o push him and t h e e n t i r e government f u r t h e r t o t h e "right"--i.e. towards a m i l i t a n t a n t i-China p o l i c y and a . w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept some degree of Amerioan s u p p o r t in t h i s p o l i c y . The p r a c t i c a l strategic danger such a development posed w a t h a t t h e arc of U . S . ~ bases " e n c i r c l i n g f * China would be extended through I n d i a . They continued t o see Nehru as s t i l l having a 'Igood s i d e " (anti-Western) as w e l l ad a *'bad side" (anti-Chinese) and
therefore as p o s s i b l y p e r s o n a l diplomacy on T h i s meshed w e l l w i t h ing t h e establishment
s t i l l amenable t o persuasion t h r o u g s t h e matter of a border s e t t l e m e n t . t h e i r new-found concern w i t h preventof a m i l i t a r y government in New Delhi.

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As t h e y moved toward n e g o t i a t i o n s , however, t h e y took an i r r a t i o n a l act ion which t e m p o r a r i l y clouded t h e atmosphere for t a l k s in New Delhi. The Chinese p h y s i c a l l y and m e n t a l l y coerced t h e leader of a s m a l l Indian police p a r t y t h e y had c a p t u r e d d u r i n g a clash i n October 1959, in order to s e c u r e a "confession" t h a t t h e I n d i a n s had sparked t h e i n c i d e n t . When it became p u b l i a knowledge t h a t the Indian p r i s o n e r had been manipulated by Maoist methods used i n f o r c e d conf e s s i o n , popular and o i f i a i a l Indian resentment caused a r e a c t i o n which h u r t P e i p i n g more t h a n t h e charge t h a t Chinese t r o o p s had f i r e d f i r s t . Having l e a r n e d t h e l e s s o n , the Chinese have s i n c e made a s p e c i a l p o i n t of t h e i r *vbrotherlgl' concern f o r Indian prisoners.,

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By l a t e f a l l , Chou began t o press N e h r u hard t o begin talks w i t h him. During an exchange of m i n i s t e r i a l l e t t e r s , Nehru raised c e r t a i n pre-condit ions for t a l k s , s t i p u l a t i n g on 10 November t h e requirement t h a t t h e Chinese withdraw from LongJu and t h a t both sides withdraw from t h e d i s p u t e d

area in Ladakh. In t h e l a t t e r area, Indian troops would withdraw s o u t h and west t o t h e l i n e which P e i p i n g claimed on its 1936 maps, and Chinese t r o o p s would withdraw north and east of t h e l i n e claimed by I n d i a on its maps. In effect, N e h r u ' s s t i p u l a t i o n would be tantamount t o a Chinese withdrawal from t h e A k s s i P l a i n and t h e Sinkiang-Tibet road, and t h e Chinese s a i d as much. Chou E n - h i ' s r e p l y of 17 December went r i g h t t o t h e p o i n t of real o l i t i k , arguing from a c t u a l C h i n e s e possession, compr-d-ai- a t N e h r u ' s a n ng concession would be o n l y "theoretical" as I n d i a had no pers o n n e l there t o withdraw, and insfrsting on t h e areaos importance for ' l i t has been a t r a f f i c a r t e r y l i n k i n g up the v a a t regions of Sinkiang and T i b e t . " The Indian leaders indicated some s e n s i t i v i t y on Chou's a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t t h a t New D e l h i was " u t t e r l y unaware" of Chinese r o a d b u i l d i n g in t h e , area u n t i l September 1958--11p~oving1'cont inuaus Chinese ' jurisdiction-and inforlged t h e i r embassies t o take t h e l i n e t h a t i n t r u s i o n s cannot give a neighboring c o u n t r y any legal r i g h t t o an area %erely because such i n t r u s i o n s were n o t resisted by us o r had n o t come t o o u r n o t i c e earlier.1t Turning a c o n c i l i a t o r y side, Chou in t h i s 17 December l e t t e r stated t h a & f o l l o w i n g t h e 21 October 1959 clash P e i p i n g had stopped s e n d i n g o u t p a t r o l s , and he r e q u e s t e d a p e r s o n a l meeting w i t h Nehru t o e s t a b l i s h " p r i n c i p l e s " f o r n e g o t i a t ing t h e d i s p u t e . Chou t h e n h i n t e d t h a t P e i p i n g would be w i l l i n g t o exchange its claim t o t h e area s o u t h of t h e McMahon l i n e for New D e l h i ' s claim t o t h e Aksai P l a i n . N e h r u w a s r e l u c t a n t t o meet p e r s o n a l l y w i t h Ozaou, and persisted in t h i s a t t i t u d e u n t i l January 1960, when, on t h e advice of h i s ambassadors and c e r t a i n cabinet members, he agreed t o drop his pre-condit ions.
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In t h i s period, Khrushchev made s e v e r a l p u b l i c statements i n which he deplored t h e border d i s p u t e , c l e a r l y implying t h a t Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s were j e o p a r d i a i n g MoaCQW'S relations w i t h New Delhi, In November, he described t h e d i s p u t e as a "sad and s t u p i d story1*--a remark which angered t h e Chinese leaders=-and h i n t e d t h a t he favored a compromise. S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s tried t o create t h e Impression among Indian diplomats t h a t Khrushchev had i n t e r v e n e d d i r e c t l y with Peiping on New D e l h i ' s behalf, b u t , when p r e s s e d f o r e x p l i c i t p r o o f , scaled down t h e i r remark6 t o suggest t h a t t h e Russians had merely urged t a l k s on Peiping as soon as

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p o s s i b l e . The Russians, in fact, had no i n f l u e n c e w i t h t h e Chinese leaders. F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y D u t t l a t e r t o l d an Ame r i c a n o f f i c i a l t h a t W u s h c h e v had been no help w i t h t h e Chinese "at a l l , " remaining j u s t as n e u t r a l in p r i v a t e as i n p u b l i c and hoping t h a t these t w o YriendW of t h e Soviet Union would s e t t l e t h e i r d i s p u t e . Although t h e Chinese leaders a l e a r l p viewed Khrushchev's . p u b l i c remarks as h o s t i l e ' t o them, and P e i p i n g subsequently claimed t h a t Sin-Soviet polemics l o g i c a l l y followed t h e September 1959 TASS s t a t e m e n t of n e u t r a l i t y between China and Inilia, t h e S o v i e t p o s i t i o n on the Sino-3ndian d i s p u t e in fact remained a p e r i p h e r a l issue in t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e .

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In January 1960, t h e Chinese moved q u i c k l y t o bring . t h e Burmese t o Peiging f o r a Sino-Burmese border agree,mnt, i n ' o r d e r t o p r o v i d e an' 'vexamplet* how a f r i e n d l y country of should s e t t l e its border problems.with China. Prior t o t h a t time, t h e Chinese for s e v e r a l y e a r s had been p a r r y i n g Burmese requests f o r a settlerpsmt, but, once t h e d e c i s i o n t o b r i n g Nehru t o n e g o t i a t i o n s had been made (October-November 1959), t h e Chinese leaders a p p a r e n t l y calculated t h a t a speedy border agreement w i t h Prime Minister Ne Win would make it more d i f f i c u l t f o r Nehru t o reaet% similar t a l k s . The Chinese also used t h e Sino-Burmese agreensfit a g a i n s t t h e i r c r i t i c s in t h e S o v i e t bloc, and Ne Win s p e c u l a t e d on 30 January that t h e Chinese leaders had been " q u i t e anxious" t o s e t t l e t h e border d i s p u t e w i t h Burma p r i o r t o Khrushchev's stopover i n New D e l h i , ' t r y i n g t h u s t o undercut Nehru's argument t o t h e S o v i e t leader on t h e i n t r a n s i g e n c e of t h e Chinese on t h e border % s s u e .
Constantly under pressure from Parliament and t h e p r e s s not t o take a s o f t line w i t h Peiping, N e h r u w a s compelled to' make even an agreement "to meet" w i t h Chou appear as part-Of a'himd,. Bn$Xi-China policy. Nehru's 5 February 1960 l e t t e r t o Chou agreed t o a meeting b u t n o t t o substant i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s , as t h e Chinese claim t h s t T e e n t i r e bord e r had never been delimited was '* inoorrect...and on t h a t bmis there can be no negotiations.'' Nevertheless, he inv i t e d Chou t o meet w i t h him in New D e l h i t o explore every avenue for a s e t t l s m e n t , and he defended t h i s formal invit a t i o n in Parliament by calmly i n s i s t i n g t h a t no p o l i c y change w a s involved: he had always s a i d he was prepaxed

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"to meet" anybody, anywhere. I t w a s N e h r u ' s i n t e n t i o n merely t o determine what Chou " r e a l l y w a n t s t t - - a s Foreign S e c r e t a r y Dutt p u t it--and t o probe P e i p i n g ' s long-term i n t e n t i o n s on t h e border. The firmness of Nehru's l e t t e r of I n t d t W l O h was intended p a r t l y to scotch rumors t h a t he and h i s a d v i s e r s were w i l l i n g t o exchange t h e Aksai P l a i n f o r formal Chinese r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e McYahom line-rumors f e d by Xrishna Menon's s l i p in a speech t o t h e effect t h a t India would not y i e l d '*...any p a r t of our administered t e r r i t o r y along t h e border, i .e. would remain s i l e n t on are- occupied by t h e Chinese. In February and e a r l y March, there were other i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t Nehru w a 8 l o o k i n g f o r some way t o accept Chinese use of t h e SinkiannTibet road w h i l e r e t a i n i n g nominal Indian s o v e r e i g n t y eve; t h e Aksai P l a i n . The Chinese leaders a p p a r e n t l y read these e a r l y signs as tantamount t o a n I n v i t a t i o n to f u r t h e r probe t h e apparent soft s p o t - - r e l a t i n g t o t h e -ai Plain--in t h e Indian posi- . t i o n , and prepared f o r s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s rather t h a n meaninglese nexploratory" tal&. They Bttempted t o make credible t h e i r expressed w i l l i n g n e s s t o n e g o t i a t e a settlement, n o t o n l y by a g r e e i n g t o send Chou t o I n d i a in t h e face of t w o Nehru r e f u s a l s t o go t o China b u t also by acting q u i c k l y t o sign a border agreement w i t h Nepal in March, j u s t t w o months after Chou's s u c c e s s w i t h t h e Burmese. B u t when Chou i n d i c a t e d t o Nehru h i s i n t e n t i o n t o spend sin days i n New Delhi (despite N e h r u ' s b u s y schedule) and t o come a t t h e head of a high-level d e l e g a t i o n , N e h r u and h i s a d v i s e r s were t a k e n aback. N e h r u ' s a d v i s e r s noted t h a t whereas New D e l h i w a s approaching t h e Chou-Nehru meeting merely in terms of improving r e l a t i o n s , Chinese n o t e s and Chou's acceptance l e t t e r had looked toward a c o n c r e t e border **settlement." When asked what Chou would be doing In New Delhi f o r six d a y s , Nehru r e p l i e d t h a t Chou w a s q u i t e capable of t a l k i n g s t e a d i l y f o r three or f o u r h o u r s a t a s t r e t c h . When Nehru in A p r i l contemplated and d i s c u s s e d t h e l i n e t o take d u r i n g t h e a n t i c i p a t e d b a r g a i n i n g Chou would Conduct, t h e advice he r e c e i v e d from a l l s i d e s was t o be adamant. Thus Chou, who In l a t e April came w i t h a b u s i n e s s - l i k e d e l e g a t i o n and a real hope of g a i n i n g agreement i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e border was not d e l i m i t e d and was therefore subject t o n e g o t i a t i o n , was confronted by a n Indian prime m i n i s t e r who had already rejected b a r g a i n i n g .
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In probing t h e presumed soft spot i n t h e I n d i a n p o s i t i o n , Chou d e p a r t e d from d i p l o m a t i c p r e c e d e n t , worki n g o v e r Nehru and h i s t o p a d v i s e r s , , i n c l u d i n g Krishna Menon, in separate, p r i v a t e , man-t man sessions, In each s e s s i o n , Chou r a n i n t o a s t o n e w a l f ppposition--even w i t h h i s "old f r i e n d , '' Menon-and after three d a y s of almost u n i n t e r r u p t e d d i s c u s s i o n s , he had made no d e n t in t h e Indian p o s i t i o n on Ladakh; in t u r n , he rejected Nehru's s u g g e s t i o n t h a t Chinese t r o o p s be withdrawn f r o m areas. The most Chou w a s able t o s a l v a g e from his t o t a l f a i l u r e was t o be able t o g i v e an impression t h a t t h e t a l k s would be continued. The Chinese c l e a r l y underestimated N e h r u ' s adamancy i n A p r i l 1960. They may have read t h e s i g n 6 of compromise i n New D e l h i correctly in Februar and March, b u t t h e y carried t h a t estimate i n t o m+l r i l , w?PTL-iifter Rehru's back had been s t i f f e n e d deals ve y by h i s a d v i s e r s .
The A p r i l 1960 Chou-Nehru talks seem i n r e t r o s p e o t t o have been P e l p i n g ' s l a s t chance for a n e g o t i a t e d settlement w i t h N e h r u . N e h r u rejected ChouTs proposal t h a t t h e y meet a g a i n , and refused t o agree formally e i t h e r t o a ''line" of a c t u a l c o n t r o l or t o saop sending o u t I n d i a n p a t r o l s . Nehru agwed merely t o a temporary, informal 'tunderstanding't t o h a l t p a t r o l l i n g and t o t u r n t h e issue o v e r t o s u b o r d i n a t e oif4dAa3q,.who were t o meet t o examine t h e h i s t o r i c a l and l e g a l evidence of each s i d e and d r a f t a j o i n t report, b u t who were n o t empowered to recommend a S o l u t i o n .
The border e x p e r t s ' talks i n middle and l a t e 1960 s e r v e d as an inatrument of t h e Chinese effort t o p e r p e t u a t e an impreseion of c o n t i n u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , b u t t h e y eventua l l y proved d e t r i m e n t a l t o P e i p i n g ' s historical and l e g a l case. B y t h e end of t h e t h i r d and final session in December 1960, t h e I n d i a n e x p e r t s were convinced t h a t t h e vaunted Chinese case had proved t o be i n fact a weak one, The Indian case, owing much t o t h e e x c e l l e n t and e x t e n s i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e records t h e B r i t i s h had maintained in t h e I n d i a O f f i c e L i b r a r y in London, and p u b l i s h e d in a detailed Re o r t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c , was impressive. I w a s argued a d r o i t l y on many p o i n t s of fact ( i . e . documentary e v i d e n c e ) , logic, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , demonstrating t h a t New Delhi could produce a respectable legal case

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when B r i t i s h - e d u c a t e d , first-class l e g a l e x p e r t s and h i s t o r i a n s were called on. However, New D e l h i ' s a b i l i t y t o d r i v e bomeeffectively t o laymen s p e c i a l l y selected p o i n t s was i n f e r i o r t o P e l p i n g ' s , and Indian o f f i c i a l s l a t e r commented t h a t I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n i n t h e d i s p u t e had n o t been understood in Southeast Asia, p a r t l y because *I All-India: Radio is no match 'for P e i p i n g Radio.'* That t h e Chinese themselves were troubled and recognized t h a t t h e I n d i a n case w a a t least aa s t r o n g as t h e i r own is suggested by ~ t h e i r f a i l i n g t o p u b l i s h t h e experts reports, I by.,their l i m i t i n g knowledge of t h e reports' c o n t e n t s t o c e r t a i n CCP members and d e p u t i e s of t h e National People's Congress rather t h a n d i s t r i b u t i n g it t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c and f o r e i g n e r s . (As of mid-1963, P e i p l n g has n o t made genera l l y a v a i l a b l e t h e t e x t s of t h e separate Indian and Chinese e x p e r t s reports .) Following t h e Chou-Nehru t a l k s , t h e Chinese leaders a p p a r e n t l y followed a two-fold policy of ceasing r e g u l a r p a t r o l a c t i v i t y a l o n g t h e border w h i l e on occasion sending o u t reconnaissance parties in t h e immediate v i c i n i t y of t h e i r border p o s t s . The primary g o a l w a s t o reduce f u r t h e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of armed clashes, clashes which had h u r t them p o l i t i c a l l y and had s p o i l e d any chance t h e y may have had of n e g o t i a t i n g a s e t t l e m e n t . The r a t i o n a l e of a p o l i c y of o n l y l i m i t e d reconnaissance w a s set f o r t h i n a c a p t u r e d T i b e t a n document of November 1960, which warned P L A personn e l t o remain cool, not t o replace p o l i t i c a l p o l i c y w i t h emotions, o t h e r w i s e
We would not look t o t h e larger s i t u a t i o n and would not ask f o r orders or w a i t for d i r e c t i o n s from above b e f o r e opening f i r e and s t r i k i n g back. I n t h a t case, we might gain a greater m i l i t a r y victory, but p o l i t i c a l l y we would f a l l i n t o the t r a p of the other s i d e and would cause o n l y great inj u r y t o t h e p a r t y and state-the b i g g e s t
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The document a l s o suggested a Chinese estimate as of November 1960 t h a t New Delhi d i d not i n t e n d t o re-take large areas of Chinese-held border t e r r i t o r y because t h e I n d i a n s d i d

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n o t have t h e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o do so. However, t h e c e s s a t i o n of regular forward p a t r o l l i n g d i d not mean an end t o t h e c a u t i o u s and s u r r e p t i t i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n of c e r t a i n new post6 a t s p e c i a l l y selected p o i n t s , p a r t i c u l arly in t h e more I n a c c e s s i b l e v a l l e y s in Ladakh. In addlit ion t o t h i s s t e a l t h y forward movement of i n d i v i d u a l posts, t h e Chineee border experts gave t h e Indian e x p e r t s in 1960 a new map of t h e Chinese-claimed "linen-a "lisp which in 1960 was a t p o i n t s w e l l t o t h e w e s t of the mapalignment of t h e same area which Chou had shown Nehru in
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Regarding Indian protests i n 1960 t h a t Chinese planes were v i o l a t i n g Indian a i r s p a c e , Chou t o l d Nehru in A p r i l that I n d i a need o n l y s h o o t one of t h e p l a n e s down t o see t h a t these were n o t Chinese Communist aircraft. However, t h e Indian leaders continued t o p r o t e s t , relucta n t t o b e l i e v e Pelping's claim that t h e p l a n e s belonged t o t h e U.S., or r e l u c t a n t t o s t a t e p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d t h e claim.

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AB of January 1961, t h e Chinese s t r a t e g y remained: t o work for a rapprochement w i t h New D e l h i , t o t r e a t India as e t i l l nonaligned, and t o avoid p e r s o n a l attacks on Hehru. The prospect of a major Sino-Indian w a r a p p a r e n t l y w a s considered o n l y as an u n l i k e l y e v e n t u a l i t y , which, i f it were t o occur, would completely change t h e n a t u r e of t h e border s t r u g g l e , t h e n regarded ae p o l l t i cal. According t o a chinese Communist Foreign M i n i s t r y r e p o r t of January 1961, it w a a M a o himself who provided t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of diplomatic forbearance f o r t h e period: '*In 1960, Chairman Yao again ins$ruct.ed u s r e p e a t e d l y t h a t in our s t r u g g l e , Borne leeway m u s t be provided /Eo t h e opponent7." This w a s conceived as t h e key p a r t of aao's d u a l p o l i z y of " u n i t y and s t r u g g l e " toward I n d i a , a t times t a k i n g a h a r d . l i n e w i t h New Delhi and a t other times t a k i n g a s o f t line, The C h i nese may have seen t h i s d u a l policy as f l e x i b l e , b u t t o e w m China w a s becoming I n d i a ' s m o s t important enemy and i the p o l i o y of ''unity and struggle" toward I n d i a meant nothing but *'struggle.** I t may be, therefore, t h a t t h e Chinese leaders, i n c l u d i n g Mao, by e a r l y 1981 b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e y had 8ome room f o r f u t u r e d i p l o m a t i c maneuvering w i t h New Delhl, when in f a c t s u c h r o o m no l o n g e r e x i s t e d .

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THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
SECTION 11.
(1959-1961)

Prelude t o Negotiations:

F a l l 1959

- January 1960

The Chinese leaders recognized, OP were made aware, s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e August 1959 clashes, t h a t N e h r u ' s advisers might u s e these skirmishes t o push him add t h e e n t i r e government f u r t h e r t o t h e **right"--i.e. towakds a m i l i t a h t anti-China policy and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept some degree of American s u p p o r t i n t h i s p o l i c y . The p r a c t i c a l s t r a t e g i c danger s u c h a development posed was t h a t t h e arc of U.S. bases % n c I r c l i n g l t China would be extended through I n d i a . Both M a 0 %e-tung and L i u ShaO-chi r e p o r t e d l y a l l u d e d t o t h e danger in their t a l k s w i t h Indian p a r t y boss Ajoy Ghosh i n P e l p i n g i n e a r l y October 1959. A t t h e 8 October meeting w i t h Ghosh, L i u r e p o r t e d l y stated:
W have t a k e n v e r y s e r i o u s l y t h e establishe ment of m i l i t a r y r u l e i n P a k i s t a n . There is an e n t i r e game being planned by t h e U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s t o c a p t u r e major Asian n a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e c o u n t r i e s which are neighbors of China and t h e S o v i e t Union. Burma, Japan,

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*The I n d i a n Communist P a r t y (CPI) Chairman, S.A. Dange, l a t e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e Indian p a r t y had warned t h e CCP, i n letters of 20 August and 13 Spetember 1959, t h a t border developments were p r o v i d i n g t h e " r i g h t wing" 'with t h e opp o r t u n i t y "to p u l l I n d i a towards t h e Anglo-American camp, and t h a t t h e 13 September l e t t e r had urged t h e Chinese t o begin n e g o t i a t i o n s . (Dange: "Neither Revisionism Nor Dogmatiam Is O u r G u i d e , (' New Age, supplement, 21 A p r i l 1963. For an account of S o v i e t m l E c e on Ghosh in connection w i t h t h e c o n t e n t of these letters, see ESAU XVI-62: The Indian Communist P a r t y and t h e Sino-Soviet D i s p u t e . )
If

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s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , t h e S o v i e t Union a n d . China, are being surrounded. In t h i s way, by c a p t u r i n g t h e Asian c o u n t r i e s , t h e U.S. imperialists want t o e n c i r c l e t h e s o c i a l i s t camp m i l i t a r i l y .
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P a k i s t a n , Nepal, Ceylon, I n d i a and other c o u n t r i e s like Indonesia are t h e major Aaian c o u n t r i e s by which t h e two great

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In P a k i s t a n and Burma, t h e y have already succeeded, and t h e y are still t r y i n g t o repeat t h e same episode i n Indonesia. After t h e succeesful coup in P a i s t a n , t h e Americans are now t r y i n g t o make the same t h i n g happen in I n d i a ,
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T h i s p e r s i s t e n t concern w i t h l*encirclementl' by m i l i t a r y regimes combined w i t h General Thimayya's attempt t o force

raised real fears among t h e Chinese leaders (as it had among t h e I n d i a n Communists) t h a t I n d i a was on t h e b r i n k and *?dust be snatched away from going i n t o t h e U.S. imperlal1st amp1* (Liu t o Ghoeh, 8 October meeting).

Kriehna Menon's removal as defense m i n i s t e r a p p a r e n t l y

Regarding t h e i r appraisal of N e b r u t s p o l i t i c a l att i t u d e , Yao is reported t o have t o l d Ghosh on 5 October t h a t t h e Chinese recognize-as Ghosh did-a difference between Nehru and c e r t a i n of h i s a d v i s e r s . The l a t t e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y those in t h e M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affair8 and i n c l u d i n g General Thimapya, were " r i g h t ists" who wanted t o e x p l o i t the border d i s p u t e t o h e l p t h e U.S. "isolate China." According t o L i u Shao-chi's remarks t o Ghosh on 8 October, Nehru might decide i n f a v o r of these i i r l g h t i s t e , l ' b u t f o r t h e p r e s e n t a l l efforts should be directed toward preventing h i m from doing so. Regarding t h e i r appraisal of N e h r u ' s llclass background," L i u atated t h a t t h e Chinese leaders see t h e Indian prime m i n i s t e r as "a r e a c t i o n a r y and b a s i c a l l y anti-Communist; he is n o t even l i k e Sukarno, who h a s appreciated t h e Indonesian ConrPlunist P a r t y . l l Despite t h i s d o c t r i n a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , t h e y seem t o have acted on t h e basis of p o l i t i c a l expediency, e e n t e r i n g t h e i r a t t e n t ion on NehruOe p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e w i t h i n t h e Indian l e a d e r s h i p s --that i e , on t h e i r view of him a still differeht from t h e

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Indian m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s such as Thimayya, who were u n a l t e r a b l y "hard" on t h e matter of p o l i c y toward P e i p i n g ,


The Chinese p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r p r e v e n t i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h ment of a m i l i t a r y dominated government in I n d i a , avoiding t h e r e b y a r e p e t i t i o n of developments in P a k i s t a n and Burma, was two-fold and seemed t o exclude m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e . Acc o r d i n g t o Mao and L i u , there m u s t be
(1) CPI e f f o r t s t o develop more s u p p o r t for Nehru against m i l i t a r y "right-:' ietsl*; and
(2) s e t t l e m e n t

of t h e e n t i r e border d i s p u t e through Sino-Indian negotiacourse which would require tione-a first a "proper atmospherevt and t h e n t h e " p r e s s u r e of t h e masses**on Nehru to negotiate.

n e u t r a l s t a n d t a k e n by t h e Indian p a r t y on t h e border i s s u e provided it o n l y a temporary refuge, and on 1 4 November 1959, under t h e pressure of p u b l i c opinion, t h e Communists f i n a l l y 083118 o u t i n s u p p o r t of I n d i a ' s claim on t h e McMahon l i n e . However, in its important r e s o l u t i o n , t h e Indian p a r t y r e f r a i n e d from condemning Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n on t h e border, equivocated on t h e matter of Ladakh, and inThe second p a r t of t h e p r e s c r i p t i o n r e q u i r e d a major Chinese Communist d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t . Eowever, Mao and L i u had t o l d Ghosh of t h e i r desire n o t t o appear ''weak" in calli n g for n e g o t i a t i o n s . They were aware t h a t some Indian t r o o p s had been moved up t o border p o s t s on t h e Indian s i d e , and t h e y a p p a r e n t l y intended in October 1959 t o have t h e P L A i n c r e a s e i t a own presence on t h e Chinese side. Chinese t r o o p s in October were directed t o warn Indian border-post personnel t o retire f r o m t h e border area. Under these circumatances, an appeal from P e i p i n g for immediate talks--along

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t h e l i n e s r e q u e s t e d by t h e CPI w i t h S o v i e t encouragement-would, in t h e C h i n e s e view, embolden rather t h a n discourage t h e Indian leaders in t h e i r e f f o r t t o f i r m up t h e i r border posts. The Chinese leaders i n s i s t e d t o mosh t h a t negotiat i o n s must await a t*proper atmosphere" in I n d i a and t h a t when circumstances were ripe f o r t a l k s there must be no Indian *9priorconditWns."* They wanted t o approach negot i a t i o n s in a series of steps, in t h e course of which SinoI n d i a n t e n s i o n s were e x p e c t e d t o ease. When Chou f i n a l l y wrote t o Nehru on 19 October s u g g e s t i n g t h a t Vice P r e s i d e n t Radhakrishnan v i s i t P e i p i n g , he i n d i c a t e d t h a t such a v i a i t "might s e r v e as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . " When t h e l e t t e r w a s d e l i v e r e d by t h e Chinese ambassador on 24 October, Nehru and t h e v i c e p r e s i d e n t were i n an angry mood and Nehru t u r n e d t h e proposal down because Chinese troops had shot up a patrol of Indian border police on 21 October. This i n c i d e n t made it n e c e s s a r y for t h e Chinese to reconsider t h e step by s t e p approach t o t a l k s .

In h i s 7 November l e t t e r t o Nehru, Chou i n d i c a t e d t h a t t a l k s were now an u r g e n t matter and requested t h a t t h e I n d i a n prime minister meet w i t h him " i n t h e immediate f u t u r e " t o d i s c u s s a border s e t t l e m e n t . Chou also i n d i c a t e d h i s concern about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of f u t u r e clashes. He stated t h a t t h e " o t Important d u t y " w a s f o r both s i d e s t o work ms f o r t h e complete e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y "of any border c l a s h in t h e f u t u r e , " and suggested t h a t i n order t o create (*af a v o r a b l e atmosphere" for s e t t l e m e n t oi t h e border issue, both Indian and Chinese troops should w i t h draw 133 miles from the McMahon l i n e i n the east and t h e l i n e of actual c o n t r o l in t h e west. T h i s s u g g e s t i o n , he

*They t h u s rejected Nehru's s t i p u l a t i o n of 26 SeDtember t h a t , before t a l k s could begin, t h e Chinese m u s t withdraw t h e i r t r o o p s "from a number of p o s t s which you have opened in r e c e n t months a t Spanggur, l a n d a l , and one o r two other places in e a s t e r n Ladakh." Ma0 and L i u t o l d Ghosh, however, t h a t t h e y were w i l l i n g t o exchange ownership of NEFA for p a r t of Lad-, a c c e p t i n g t h e d e facto McMahon l i n e w i t h c e r t a i n minor adjustments

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asserted, was m e r e l y an e x t e n s i o n t o t h e e n t i r e border of an earlier I n d i a n proposal (note of 10 Septerdber 1959) t h a t n e i t h e r s i d e send its t r o o p s i n t o LongJn. A c t u a l l y , Chouts s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t r o o p s withdraw, l e a v i n g a d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone under " c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e personnel and unarmed police,*' was a refinement of h i s own 8 September proposal for a r e t u r n t o t h e " l o n g - e x i s t i n g s t a t u s quo" under which t h e Chinese accepted t h e McMahon l i n e de facto w h i l e r e t a i n ing unchallenged possession of n o r t h e a s t e r n Ladakh. thou's view of m i l i t a r y disengagement a l o n g t h e border included no real Chinese concessions. His l e t t e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t a mutual, rather t h a n a u n i l a t e r a l , withdrawal was necessary; Chou in t h i s way t r i e d t o break t h e impasse created by.Nehru's s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t Chinese troops m u s t be p u l l e d back from c e r t a i n outposts in Ladakh before n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Chou's l e t t e r l e f t Nehru w i t h t h e choice of accepting t h e m u t u a l withdrawal proposal o r a p p e a r h g t h e i n t r a n s i g e n t p a r t y . Eowever, it w a s not an attempt t o s t a l l any f u r t h e r on t h e matter of beginning m i n i s t e r i a l talks.

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Nehru's 'first response i n d i c a t e d t h a t the. atmosphere in I n d i a w a s still not r i p e for b a r g a i n i n g , nor were his a d v i s e r s disposed t o do so. Cabinet PaernberS a t ' t h e 9 November Congress Working Committee meeting recorded t h e i r opinion t h a t adequate steps should indeed be t a k e n t o prevent f u r t h e r clashes, b u t these steps should not affect I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y o r involve any acceptance of "Chinese That i a , Nehru's s t i p u l a t i o n of 26 September, r e g a r d i n g Chinese withdrawals p r i o r t o n e g o t i a t i o n s , still held. However, t h e Indian leaders d i d n o t sa t h e door: t h e y iniormed lm t h e press t h a t Nehru on 9 November had stated t h a t "the s p i r i t of t h e Chinese l e t t e r is n o t bad."
A t t h i s t i m e , when t h e Chinese leaders were moving toward n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e y indulged in a b i t of i r r a t i o n a l Maoist gaucherie which clouded rather t h a n cleared t h e atmosphere. Through a Foreign M i n i s t r y n o t e , t h e Chinese had informed t h e Indian ambassador on 12 November t h a t Chinese " f r o n t i e r guards" were prepared t o t u r n o v e r t h e .10 Indian "soldiers" (New D e l h i i n s i s t e d t h e y were border p o l i c e ) captured by them and the bodies of t h e nine who had been k i l l e d . The I n d i a n s were handed over on 14 November

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n e a r t h e Kongka Pass together w i t h t h e i r arms and.ammunition, 20 days a f t e r t h e y had been c a p t u r e d . New D e l h i ' s s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e Chinese had been h a n d l i n g t h e captured police in a t y p i c a l Maoist manner, a t t e m p t i n g t o coerce them i n t o seeing t h i n g s Peipipg's way, was confirmed. A t t h e p r i s o n e r r e t u r n ceremony, Karam Singh, t h e leader of t h e c a p t u r e d Indian group, waved goodby t o h i s Chinese "brothers, It acc o r d i n g t o an NCNA d i s p a t c h , and according t o t h e l e f t i s t p r e s i d e n t of t h e Ind la-USSR Society f o r C u l t u r a1 Riel a t i o n s , Baliga, who had had t w o long i n t e r v i e w s w i t h Chou En-lai i n P e i p i n g i n e a r l y November, Chou claimed t h a t Karam Singh had "confessed" t h a t t h e Chinese troops had n o t u s e d mortars In t h e 21 October clash as I n d i a had alleged. Baliga t o l d American o f f i c i a l s i n Hong Kong on 1 November 1 t h a t h e w a s convinced t h e release, of t h e Indian p r i s o n e r s had been delayed u n t i l t h e Chinese were c e r t a i n t h e i r brainwashing had been completed. When it became p u b l i c l y known* t h a t t h e y had been " i n t e r r o g a t e d 9 ' in a special M a p i s t way and t h a t Karam Singh had been forced t o v*confess,'t** a wave of anger swept Parliament and t h e Indian press, n u l l i f y i n g any' propaganda g a i n s t h e Chinese may have made o r i$hought t h e y had made by t h e " f r a t e r n a l " release of t h e p r i s o n e r s w i t h t h e i r weapons.

*There w a s littl e p u b l i c awareness of t h e matter in e a r l y November, b u t in mid-December, t h e f u l l account of t h e Maoist t r e a t m e n t of t h e prisoners, when placed b e f o r e Par1 iament , caused a s h a r p p u b l i c r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t Peiping.

**In view of t h e i r desire t o create a "proper atnosphere" in I n d i a 88 a prelude t o n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e p h y s i c a l and mental c o e r c i o n of t h e policeman, Karam Singh, was n o t completely r a t i o n a l . By t h i s t r e a t m e n t t h e y were seeking t o d i s p e l t h e widespread assumption of a locallzed, Chinesei n i t iated border s k i r m i s h , b u t by t h e "confession" of an obviously manipulated p r i s o n e r . P o p u l a r and o f f i c i a l Indim resentment a g a i n s t t h i s b l a t a n t manipulation became more important t h a n t h e i s s u e of which s i d e had sparked the patrol clash.

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of E x t e r n a l Affairs i s s u e d a s t a t e m e n t (17 November) comp l a i n i n g t h a t p r e l i m i n a r y reports from t h e p r i s o n e r s , inc l u d i n g K a r a m Singh, i n d i c a t e d t h a t while in Chinese custody they were "kept under severe l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s " and eubjected t o c o n s t a n t i n t e r r o g a t i o n , pressure, and t h r e a t s i n anattempt t o force them "to make s t a t e m e n t s desired by t h e i r captors.'1 K a h x u Singh's p e r s o n a l acoount of how t h e Chinese compelled him t o *'confess** c o n t a i n e d in is New D e l h i ' s White Paper No. I11 on t h e border dfidpute, pages 10-22.

new w i n 1 - s noze or 4 N O W mwr naa provided t he Chinese 9*in4xwrogators" w i t h a target. The n o t e had s t a t e d t h a t T h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e Indian police p a r t y , armed o n l y w i t h e i f l e s , w o u l d attack a h e a v i l y armed Chinese force s t r o n g l y entrenched on a h i l l - t o p above them, dnd$squipped w i t h mortars and grenades, cannot be accepted by any r e a s o n a b l e person." It w a s t o t h i s specific charge of heavy weapons t h a t t h e Chinese, had directed t h e i r forcedoonfeseion a c t i v i t y w i t h t h e Indian p r i s o n e r s . Both sides had been a c t i n g t o s u p p o r t t h e i r v e r s i o n of t h e 21 October clash. When New Delhi announced on 1 November t h a t t h e I n d i a n Army would take o v e r control of border posts in Ladakh, it stressed t h a t h i t h e r t o these posts had been manned by police detachments armed o n l y w i t h r i f l e s . For its p a r t , P e i p i n g (note of 20 December X959) t r i e d t o c o u n t e r t h e Indian a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e Chinese were s t r o n g e r in number and arms by c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e lfChineee p a t r o l numbered 1 4 o n l y and carried l i g h t arms alone" w h i l e t h e I n d i a n s "carried l i g h t and heavy machine guns and other weapons.rt Regarding t h e troublesome fact t h a t t h e I n d i a n s l o s t nore men i n t h e c l a s h than t h e Chinese, P e i p i n g had already "explained" (statement of 26 October) t h a t j u s t as in t h e August 1959 c l a s h , t h e l i g h t e r losses of t h e Chinese l'proves t h a t on both occasions, t h e Chinese s i d e w a s on t h e defensive." The choplogic c o n c l u s i o n w a s t h a t "Anybody w i t h a ;LI%tle knowledge of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s knows t h a t g e n e r a l l y speaking t h e o f f e n s i v e s i d e alwapg suffers more c a s u a l t i e s t h a n t h e d e f e n s i v e s i d e . " /-: 7 After t h e relsass of t h e p r i s o n e r s , t h e I n d i a n M i n i s t r y

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The Indian leaders d i d not accept Chou's p r o p o s a l s f o r m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l t a l k s and a m u t u a l t r o o p pullback, and t h e y countered by s t i p u l a t i n g a new set of pre-condit i o n s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s , N e h r u ' s answer t o Chou's 7 November l e t t m r w a s d r a f t e d p r i m a r i l y by Home M i n i s t e r Pant and reviewed by t h e Prime M i n i s t e r before it was dispatched on 16 November. A s p r e l i m i n a r y s t i p u l a t i o n a f o r negotiat i o n s , it advanced t h e following p r o p o s a l s and f o r t h e f ol.lowing reasons:
(1) Chinese w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Longju, w i t h I n d i a ,ensuring t h a t it w i l l n o t be re-occ u p i e d by Indian forces. (This was stlp u l a t e d because it was i n ffour p o s s e s s i o n f 1 and I'our p e r s o n n e l were f o r c i b l y ousted by t h e Chinese:..,therefore t h e y s h o u l d

withdraw,

I'

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(2) Mutual Indian and Chinese withdrawal from t h e e n t i r e d i s p u t e d area in Ladakh. I n d i a n troops would withdraw south and west t o t h e l i n e which China claimed on its 1956 maps and Chinese troops would withdraw n o r t h and east t o t h e l i n e claimed by I n d i a on its maps. (This required t h e Chinese t o withdraw f r o m Aksai P l a i n , t h e area t r a v e r s e d by t h e Sinkiang-Tibet road, imposing a v e r y small burden on t h e Indians, as t h e y had n o t yet moved .any regular' army o r a d d i t i o n a l police-admini s t r a t i v e personnel i n t o t h e area.)*

a i t e r a 5-day tr ip.

c e p t e d . In t h e l e t t e r as f i n a l l y approved by Nehru and (continued on page 9 )


- 8 -

(3) P e r s o n a l t a l k s w i t h Chou En-la1 are a c c e p t a b l e , b u t "preliminary s t e p s " s h o u l d first be taken t o reach an " i n t e r i m understanding" t o ease t e n s i o n s q u i c k l y . . (This w 8 s intended t o s i d e s t e p a Chinese e f f o r t t o r u s h Nehru i n t o ''summit" t a l k s w i t h Chou and t o premit s p e c i a l r e # r e s e n t a t i v e s wWh d e t a i l e d information t o argue w i t h t h e Chinese over s p e c i f i c claims. )
t h e border is unnecessary, as no clashes would occur if both sides r e f r a i n e d from s e n d i n g o u t p a t r o l s . India h a s a l r e a d y halted p a t r o l l i n g . (This w a s intended t o
(4) A m u t u a l 12&-mile withdrawal a l l along

.'

811 posts on t h e HcYahon l i n e , &m.ch ari f a v o r a b l y s i t u a t e d on "high h i l l tops" and are s u p p l i e d by a i r , t o prevent t h e l 2 i - m i l e proposed f a l l b a c k from eleaving new posts 5-days march from t h e NF.FA border, and t o r e t a i n a " l a r g e majority" of t h e p a s s e s which open from T i b e t i h t o I n d i a . If no s e t t l e m e n t were reached, "it would be impossible f o r us t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s t a t u s quo In a l l these p l a c e s and easy for t h e Chinese t o come down and occupy them. *')

retain1

311

Foreign S e c r e t a r y D u t t r e p o r t e d l y a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e Chinese would attempt t o compromise on these p r o p o s a l s by acc e p t i n g t h e Longju s t i p u l a t i o n , b u t i n s i s t i n g t h a t New Delhi

' 1

illfootnote continued Z r o m page 8 ) s e n t t o Chou on 16 November, however, no r e f e r e n c e w a s made t o the idea of conaeding any Chinese occupation of t h e Aksal P l a i n . I t is p o s s i b l e t h a t Nehru himself may have vetoed t h e s u g g e s t i o n o r decided t o hold it in r e s e r v e .

- 9 -

in t u r n a c c e p t t h e s t a t u s q u o in Ladakh. The counterprop o s a l s provided Nehru w i t h a p o l i c y which rejected any m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against t h e Chinese and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e border d i s p u t e 88 a long-term matter r e q u i r i n g c a u t i o u s and adroit p o l i t i c a l maneuvering. H e had moved e f f e c t i v e l y t o disarm h i s c r i t i c s among t h e p r e s s and in Parliament by n o t a g r e e i n g t o withdrawals from Indian t e r r i t o r y ; on t h e c o n t r a r y , he called for Chinese withdrawals from Longju and t h e Aksai P l a i n , i n d i c a t i n g thereby t h a t he was t a k i n g a f i r m l i n e w i t h Peiping. A t t h e same t i m e , he suggested t o t h e Chinese t h a t he w a s w i l l i n g t o c o n s i d e r t h e merits of t h e i r claim t o t h e Aksai P l a i n d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t t h e y would be required t o withdraw as a price f o r s u c h considera t i o n . On t h i s p o i n t , he expected the stalemate t o cont i n u e , which w a s an i m p l i c i t a s s u r a n c e t o P e i p i n g t h a t I n d i a w o u l d n o t attempt t o retake t h e area by m i l i t a r y -a c t i o n . I f t h e f i n a l outcome of t h e exchange of l e t t e r s in November were o n l y an agreement t o begin t a l k s on a lower l e v e l , n e i t h e r he nor Chou would be conceding anyt h i n g important t o t h e other and n e i t h e r w o u l d lose face.

During t h e three-day debate i n P a r l i a m e n t in l a t e November, Nehru demonstrated a remarkable a b i l i t y f o r maint a i n i n g 811 even keel, He spoke of t h e need t o m a i n t a i n I n d i a ' s nonalignment p o l i c y b u t conceded t h a t it m u s t necessarily become nonalignment " w i t h a d i f f e r e n c e , t h e d i f f e r e n c e presumably being a new p o l i c y toward m i p i n g . * I n r c p l y t o t h e O p p o s i t i o n ' s call f o r *'action1' t o make t h e Chinese v a c a t e Indian t e r r i t o r y , Nehru s a i d t h e border i s s u e was s i m p l y p a r t of a greater problem--i,e. t h e overa l l Chinese p o l i t i c a l and economic as w e l l as a m i l i t a r y c h a l l e n g e , which is a long-term matter--that t h e issue was n o t j u s t one of war and peace between two c o u n t r i e s , b u t one concerning t h e whole world, and there is no n a t i o n more anxious f o r peace t h a n t h e S o v i e t Union and none which oares less f o r peace t h a n Communist China. Following a
It

*This t1dEF3 erence," however, excluded any desire t o a c c e p t a i d from t h e West cbopneet I n d i a n m i l i t a r y requirements.

10

..

concerted Opposition attack on Defense M i n i s t e r Krishna Menon, Behru i n t e r v e n e d t o stress t h e e n t i r e C a b i n e t ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r I n d i a ' s defense p o l i c y . In h i s speech of 27 November, he vouched for Menon's p a t r i o t i s m and hoped the d i s p u t e sparked by Thlmagya's t h r e a t e n e d r e s i g n a t i o n would d i e down: we are working t o g e t h e r s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and t o c o n t i n u e t h e d i s p u t e '*especially in p r e s e n t clrcuarstances" would be "harmful. '* When t h e Opposition conunented f a v o r a b l y on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a common defense arrangemerit w i t h P a k i s t a n , N e h r u p o i n t e d to a recent s t a l e m e n t by P r e s i d e n t Ayub, r e f u s i n g to accept any Indian proposals a f f e c t i n g Ladakh's s t a t u s , as an example of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s involved in s u g g e s t i o n s f o r common defense. As a result, by 28 November m s of t h e press and Parliament appeared ot t o be t e m p o r a r i l y satisfied t h a t Nehru's a t t i t u d e toward Pelping had hardened and t h a t h i & l i n e would be f i r m and""' unyielding. *
A sign of N e h r u ' s changed a t t i t u d e toward t h e Chinese was h i s new view on t h e need t o o b t a i n better i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h e border areas. On 19 Novamber he t o l d Parliament t h a t he could n o t confirm a r e p o r t t h a t t h e Chinese had b u i l t an a i r s t r i p i n t h e Aksai P l a i n , b u t t h a t he could not deny it either. He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t Inasmuch as t h e Chinese h e l d t h e area i t w a s d i f f f c u l t for Indian I n t e l l i way being f o r Indian a i r c r a f t t o conduct photo missions,

gence t o o b t a i n d e f i n i t e information, the o n l y p o s s i b l e

.
-.

* N e h r u ' s defense of h i s past a c t i o n s i n Parliament on 8 and 9 December was rather weak. He i n s i s t e d t h a t a l l along New Delhl had f o r e s e e n t r o u b l e w i t h t h e Chinese b u t needed t o p l a y f o r t i m e . Former Indian Ambassador t o P e i p i n g It. M. Panikkar, who also claimed New D e l h i w m aware of t h e real Chinese a t t i t u d e s i n c e 1950, s t a t e d t h a t I n d i a had been making d e f e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s s i n c e t h a t date. However, t h e evidence Panikkar cited, s u c h aa t h e treatiels w$th Nepal and BUhtan, were s i g n e d nine years p r i o r t o Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n inside T i b e t and along t h e border.

- 11 -

which w a s a matter for t h e Indian m i l i t a r y t o c o n s i d e r . His a t t i t u d e i n November t h u s d i f f e r e d from h i s view p r i o r t o t h e October clash. When t h e q u e s t i o n of aerial reconn a i s s a n c e arose i n connection w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c e of Chinese roads, Nehru had t o l d Parliament on 1 2 September t h a t I n d i a b e l i e v e d t h a t photographing t h e areas was n o t feasible and he p o i n t e d djo t h e d a n g e r ' t o t h e a i r c r a f t from mountainous t e r r a i n and from being s h o t down.

..

. ,

'.

'

'

.:

Chou En-lai, r e p l y i n g on 17 December t o Hehru's count e r p r o p o s a l s of 10 November, reiterated P e i p i n g ' s claim t o t h e Aksai P l a i n more s t r o n g l y t h a n before. Chou went r i g h t t o t h e p o i n t of r e a l p o l i t i k , arguing from actual possession. H e first noted that the Indian press i t s e l f had viewed Nehru's 16 November p r o p o s a l f o r a mutual wlthdrawal i n Ladakh as only a concession because I n d i a had no personnel there t o withdraw while China would have t o withdraw from a t e r r i t o r y of about 33,000 square-kilometem, ttwhich h a s belonged t o it, its m i l i t a r y personnel guarding Its f r o n t i e r " as were i t a c i v i l personnel. Chou t h e n i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e area is of " g r e a t importancett t o China and claimed t h a t s i n c e t h e Ching Dynasty, " t h i s area ha6 been t h e t r a f f i c a r t e r y l i n k i n g up t h e v a s t regions of Sinklang and T i b e t After t h u s i n d i c a t i n g t h e strategic importance of t h e Aksai P l a i n road t o China, Chou described P L A u s e of t h e area t o make ttregular'v s u p p l y r u n s i n t o T i b e t &om Sinkiang s i n c e 1950 and t h e r o a d b u i l d i n g a c t i v i t y since March 1956. That New D e l h i was " u t t e r l y unawarett of t h i s a c t i v i t y u n t i l September 1958 was, Chou s a i d , "eloquent proof t h a t t h i s area has indeed always been under Chinese j u r i s d i c t i o n and n o t under I n d i a n j u r i s d i c t i o n . " *
.It

II
t
I
I

*The Indian leaders' r e a c t i o n t o t h i s argument from actual c o n t r o l was t o deny t h a t Indian ignorance of Chinese " i n t r u sionatl j u s t i f i e d Chou's claim of ownership. In a c i r c u l a r nqvq@;* of a1 Wceaober, t h e y informed t h e i r embaseies of Chou's l e t t e r and stated t h a t : (continued on page 13)

12

= 0
I
I

Chou made two pyoposals which t h e I n d i a n s a p p a r e n t l y (1) He agreed t o t h e e v a c u a t i o n of had n o t a n t i c i p a t e d . Longju (occupied in August 1959) i n t h e east, b u t o n l y on c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e I n d i a n s withdraw a l s o f r o m r o t h e r d i s puted outposts, m o s t of which are in t h e w e s t (occupied s i n c e 1964-55). (2) He made h i s proposal f o r a m e e t i n g w i t h Nehru appear more urgent t h a n before by naming a specif l c time--26 December--and place--either i n China or i n Rangoon-- i n s i s t i n g t h a t unless "some agreements on p r i n c i p l e s " were reached by t h e premiers, lower level t a l k s on detailed border matters "may bog down in e n d l e s s and f r u i t l e s s debates." The I n d i a n s probably were p r e p a r e d , however, f o r h i s s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e Chinese had stopped s e n d i n g o u t patrols from t h e i r posts. Chou added t h a t t h i s s t e p had been t a k e n immediately f o l l o w i n g t h e l a t e October 1959 clash, p o i n t i n g up t h e Chinese leaders' desire t o t r y t o prepare an atmosphere f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . Regarding t h e apparent Chinese w i l l i n g n e s s t o exchange t h e i r claim t o t h e NEFA for ownership 02 t h e Aksai P l a i n ,

( f o o t n o t e continued f r o m page 12) While t h e Aksai P l a i n was occupied by t h e Chinese i n 1956, t h e y have b u i l t a network of r o a d s f a r t h e r w e s t i n Ladakh d u r i n g t h e l a s t 12 months. Reconnaissance p a r t i e s which were s e n t o u t l a s t year and t h e year before had not seen these roads. As we have s t a t e d before, i n t h i s desolate wastel a n d w e do not t h i n k it necessary t o poet a d m i n i s t r a t i v e personnel. I n t r u s i o n s by a neighbor c o u n t r y cannot g i v e any r i g h t t o t h a t c o u n t r y merely because such int r u s i o n s were n o t resisted by u s or had not come t o o u r n o t i c e e a r l i e r . T h i s s t a t e m e n t is f u r t h e r evidence of t h e poor s t a t e of Ind i a n i n t e l l i g e n c e m t h e western sector p r i o r t o September 1958. I t a l s o suggests Indian apprehensions t h a t Chou had s c o r e d e f f e c t i v e l y on t h i s p o i n t .

13

..

Chou rejected 88 l t u n f a i r t ' Nehru's proposal for a m u t u a l withdrawal -in Ladakh. He pointed o u t t h a t t h e Chinese had made no corresponding demand on New Delhi t o withdraw its forces from t h e Chinese-claimed area south of t h e McMahon l i n e . Chou h i n t e d more s t r o n g l y t h a n b e f o r e t h a t P e i p i n g w a s willing t o waive its claim t o t h i s area i f New Delhi would do t h e same r e g a r d i n g the Aksai P l a i n . Thus regarding t h e McBdahon l i n e , Chou s t a t e d :

Your Excellency is aware t h a t t h e so-called McMahon l i n e . . .has never been recognized by p a s t Chinese governments nor by t h e government of t h e People's R e p u b l i c of China DRV, y e t t h e government of t h e PRC has Etr'Zctly abided by its < s t a t e m e n t of absol u t e l y n o t allowing its armed m r s o n n e- t_ o l _ c r o s s - t h i s l i n e .in-waitinn for- a f r i e n d ll y in-waiting d r s e t t l e m e n t of t h e boundary q u e s t i o n . 7mphasis s u p p l i e d / In sum, t h e Chinese were anxious t o begin n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l and t o move s t e p by s t e p toward an o v e r a l l s e t t l e m e n t , b u t remained adamant on r e t a i n i n g t h e Aksai P l a i n . This l e f t t h e d i s p u t e deadlocked.
~~ ~

. .

The deadlock w a s affirmed by Nehru in has f l a t rej e c t i o n on 21 December of Chou's claim t o t h e Aksai P l a i n and of Chou's t w o proposals r e g a r d i n g Indian withdrawals from 10 o u t p o s t s and a minitaterial meeting on 26 December. Nehru advanced no new proposals, n o t i n g t h a t Chou had found tils "practical" s u g g e s t i o n s unacceptable and had merely reiterated P e i p i n g ' s claims, which were based on "resent /Fost-19567 intrusions by Chinese e r s o n n e l '* H e s a i d h e W m w i l l i K g t o meet w i t h Chou anyw ere and anyt i n e , * but saw no p o i n t in engaging in such U g h - l e v e l d i s cuaaions of p r i n c i p l e s when t h e two s i d e s had n o t y e t agreed

*The Indian leaders a p p a r e n t l y i n t e r p r e t e d Chou's d i s p l a y of anxiety t o reach agreements on p r i n c i p l e s Immedia t e l y as e n t i r e l y a propaganda e f f o r t directed toward other

(continued on page 15)

- 14 1

on t h e facts. Presumably, low-level t a l k s , too, c o u l d n o t begin u w t h e Chinese showed a w i l l i n g n e s s a t least t o withdraw from Longju.
Nehru ' s uncompromising off ic i a l p o s i t ion had been reached i n l a r g e p a r t as a r e s u l t of c a b i n e t , Opposition, and publdc pressure, and it a p p a r e n t l y w a s d i f f i c u l t f o r him t o abandon t h i s s t a n d and simultaneously s a t i s f y publ i c o p i n i o n . He n e v e r t h e l e s s r u l e d o u t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n and l e f t t h e door open f o r f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s . When chided by an opponent in Parliament on 21 December r e g a r d i n g t h e I d e s i r a b i l i t y of any n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e Chinese, N e h r u a n g r i l y r e p l i e d that .there were only t w o choices, "war or negotiation." "1 w i l l always n e g o t i a t e , n e g o t i a t e , negotiate, r i g h t t o t h e b i t t e r end." On 22 December, he e x p r e s s e surprise in Parliament a t t h 6 idea of Itpolice a c t ion, which, he i n s i s t e d , is possible o n l y against a v e r y weak adversary. " L i t t l e w a r s , " Nehru continued, do not take place between two great c o u n t r i e s and any kind of w a r l i k e development would mean " i n d e f i n i t e " w a r because n e i t h e r I n d i a nor China would e v e r give in and n e i t h e r could conque* t h e other.
((

(rootnote continued f r o m page 14) c o u n t r i e s . In its 21 December circular message, New Delhi informed its embassies t h a t Chou "must have known t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r m u l d not proceed t o Rangoon on a week's n o t ice. " Chou was indeed t r y i n g t o convince n e u t r a l s of P e i p i n g ' s s i n c e r i t y i n s e e k i n g immediate t a l k s (he w 8 8 also t r y i n g t o c o u n t e r S o v i e t arguments), b u t he clearly d e s i r e d those t a l k s , and apparently hoped N e h r u would consent without too much d e l a y . Prime M i n i s t e r N e Win t o l d t h e American ambassador on 21 December t h a t t h e Chingse had asked h i m whether he would agree t o have t h e Sino-Indian t a l k s take place in Rangoon, and, in h i s 17 December l e t t e r t o Nehru, Chou had indicated he would c o n s i d e r "any other date" Nehru might suggest. The Indian ambassador t o P e i p i n g l a t e r r e p o r t e d t h a t Chou beyond doubt was anxious to get t a l k s started quickly.

. . .. .
I

15

I ,

During t h e deadlock, t h e Chinese c o n t i n u a l l y t r i e d They seemed t o b e l i e v e t h a t i f s u c h a meeting c o u l d be arranged w i t h o u t d e l a y and N e h r u w e r e t o agree (1) t o t h e ''principle'* t h a t t h e border was not d e l i m i t e d and (2) afterward, t o subcommittee meetings of e x p e r t s , t h e hard d e t a i l s of c o n t r a d i c t o r y border claims could be argued over i n t h e p r i v a c y of t h e conference room. In his l e t t e r of X.7 December, Chou had l e f t unanswered q u e s t i o n s on d e t a i l s of border claims which t h e I n d i a n s had raised i n N e h r u ' s 26 September 'letter and New D e l h i ' s 4 Novem5er n o t e . The Indians persisted, asking f o r a Chinese answer on t h e matter of s u b s t a n t i v e c l a i m . I t w a s A n response t o these repeated requests t h a t t h e Chinese Foreign M i n i s t r y s e n t its note of 26 December, d e c l a r i n g t h e Peipring "feels s o r r y " t h a t it m u s t go i n t o d e t a i l , b u t it 'appears t h a t lfsome arguing cannot be helped." The 26 December n o t e r e f e r r e d t o "the forthcoming meeting" between Chou and Nehru almost as though t h e I n d i a n s had a l r e a d y agreed t o it. It s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e Chinese conc e r n w i t h first of a l l having t h e prime m i n i s t e r s meet r e f l e c t e d t h e i r aim of first o b t a i n i n g t h e "necessary" acknolwedgment i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e border had n o t been d e l i m i t e d , and t h a t it is therefore "yet to be settled through n e g o t i a t i o n s

t o draw Nehru i n t o a meeting w i t h Chou.

I "

V I . .

.- .

In t o n e , t h e Chinese n o t e w a a moderate. A s p e c i a l e f f o r t w a s made t o a l l a y t h e fears of a l l neighbor c o u n t r i e s a b o u t a l l e g e d Chinese expansionism. I t is "impossible', improper, and unnecessary" for China t o aggress a g a i n s t c o u n t r i e s on its borders. The n o t e p o i n t e d t o Chinese domestic problems and t o P e i p i n g ' s need f o r peace t o o b t a i n u I t then p o i n t e d t o goals, of 81peacef l c o n s t r u c t ion. P e l p i n g ' s r e c o r d of t r y i n g t o avoid provocation and border i n c i d e n t s w i t h I n d i a , p l a c i n g t h e blame f o r t h e A u g u s t and October 1959 clashes e n t i r e l y on New D e l h i . F i n a l l y , it l i n k e d Indian t e r r i t o r i a l claims t o t h e B r i t i s h p o l i c y of "aggression and expansion, '* making t h e Indian argument deem in e f f e c t a c o n t i n u a t i o n of B r i t i s h imperialism in Tibek

The n o t e then touched on Bhutan and Sikkim. Regarding Bhutan, it made t h e first formal Chinese statemen't reg a r d i n g t h i s s e c t o r of t h e border, claiming t h a t t h e r e is

16

"a certain discrepancy between t h e d e l i n e a t i o n s on t h e maps of t h e two sides in t h e sector s o u t h of t h e so-called McMahon line," b u t t h e China-Bhutan border "has always been t r a n q u i l , " R e g a r d i n g Sikkim, t h e boundary "has l o n g been f o r m a l l y del i m i t e d and there is n e i t h e r any discrepancy between t h e maps nor any d i s p u t e s in practice.** A l l e g a t i o n s , therefore, t h a t C h i n a wants t o %ncroach onf* Bhutan and Sikkim are "sheer nonsense." In t h i s way, t h e Chinese sought t o cont r a d i c t p e r s i s t e n t reports about Chinese s u b v e r s i v e aims i n
,

'A.

these border s t a t e s .
The Chinese note w a s hard on matters of s u b s t a n c e . I t gave a d e t a i l e d l e g a l and h i s t o r i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r P e i p i n g ' s border claims, c r e a t i n g a massive case on t h e matters of (1) whether the border had e v e r been formally ?d e l i m i t e d and (2) where t h e * ' t r a d i t i o n a l customaryt* bounaary l i n e a c t u a l l y la. Regarding t h e Aksai P l a i n , it is t h e "only t r a f f i c a r t e r y l i n k i n g Sinkiang and western Tibet." A s for t h e McMahon l i n e , C h i n e s e Communist m i l i t a r y and c i v i l personnel were under o r d e r s "not t o cross it,'' b u t C h o u ' s r e f e r e n c e s t o it I n h i s t a l k s w i t h N e h r u in l a t e 1950 lWan by no means be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s l i n e " by Peiping. The n o t e t h e n emphasized t h a t t h e prerequisites f o r an o v e r a l l s e t t l e m e n t were r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e undelimited s t a t u s of t h e border and a m u t u a l w i t h d r a w a l of 124 miles or any d i s t a n c e j o i n t l y agreed on.
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In sum, t h e note's e a r l y p o r t i o n s contained a c l e v e r r e f u t a t i o n of Indian claims and its final p o r t i o n s sounded almost aggrieved t h a t Nehru had so mlsdudged Chinese intent i o n s . The massive case it presented on t h e matter of border delimitat i o n and on t h e "tradit i o n a l customary" boundary

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l i n e c o n s t i t u t e d a direct c o n t r a d i c t i o n of N e h r u ' s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n t h a t adjustments on s m a l l s e c t o r s along t h e border were n e g o t i a b l e b u t on t h e e n t i r e border l i n e were n o t .

P e l p i n g ' s 26 December n o t e t h u s confronted Nehru w i t h s e v e r a l immediate courses o f a c t i o n : t o begin subs t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e basis t h a t t h e e n t i r e border remained t o be d e l i m i t e d , t o take no a c t i o n allowing t h e Chinese t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r holdings, or, as t h e n o t e p u t i t , t o c o n t i n u e "arguing l i k e t h i s without end.'' S t i l l under Opposition and publdc pressure, Nehru decided on t h e l a s t alternative-1.0. t o keep t h e Sino-Indian argument going on paper.
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Nehru w a s awar that t h e long-range Chines L was TO accepr t n e MClahOn line i n r e t u r n f o r Indian acceptance of P e l p i n g ' s claims i n Ladakh. A t t h e C a b i n e t ' s Foreign Affairs subcommittee meeti n g i n t h e first week of January 1960, Nehru i n d i c a t e d t h a t he n e v e r t h e l e s s wanted e x p l i c i t Chinese acceptance of t h e McYahon l i n e - - s u b j e c t only t o minor demarcation a d j u s t ments--t h e p r i c e f o r s t a r t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s "at; any l e v e l . * * The Chinese note of 26 December had rejected h i s earlier c o n t e n t i o n t h a t C ~ O U ' S1956 s t a t e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t e d recognit i o n of t h e l i n e . Nehru c e n t e r e d h i s a t t e n t i o n on t h i s

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*This p o s i t i o n was a g a i n set f o r t h in t h e M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s brochure of 12 January 1960, which, howe v e r , had been prepared l o n g b e f o r e receipt of P e l p i n g ' s 26 December n o t e . The main conclusions of t h e brochure were: (1) I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r is w e l l known, being based on t r e a t y agreements and custom, and no Chihese government has e v e r ahallenged i t , (2) t h e p r e s e n t d i s p u t e arose because i n Chou's 8 September 1959 l e t t e r P e i p i n g f o r t h e first t i m e l a i d claim t o e x t e n s i v e areas of Indian territ o r y , (3) border t e n s i o n stems from Chinese a c t i o n t o ass e r t t h e i r claims, and (4) n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e e n t i r e border is n o t d e l i m i t e d are unacceptable t o I n d i a , which is prepared t o d i s c u s e o n l y minor r e o t i f i c a t i o n s of t h e f r o n t i e r

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r e j e c t i o n , v i r t u a l l y ignoring t h e hint-by then standard w i t h Peiping--that Chinese t r o o p s were under o r d e r s n o t t o cross t h e McMahoa l i n e . A t t h e e a r l y January meeting, Nehru i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e only possible Indian concession

w a s a "pre=negot i a t i o n " agreement on c o n t inued "non-military'! Chinese occupation of p a r t of Ladakh, i n c l u d i n g t h e &sal P l a i n road, b u t o n l y if t h e McMahon l i n e were f i r s t e x p l i c i t l y accepted as t h e e a s t e r n border.

N e h r u ' s first p u b l i c response t o t h e Chinese n o t e was made a t a press conference on 8 January. He reaffirmed h i e w i l l i n g n e e s t o meet and negotiate, b u t stated t h a t t h e t i m e of t h e meeting depended on "conditions" being s u c h t h a t good r e s u l t s would be produced. That he d i d n o t see c o n d i t i o n e as f a v o r a b l e w a s implied i n h i s remark t h a t there w a s '*a v e r y big gap" between t h e I n d i a n and Chinese p o s i t i o n s and " t h e r e does not appear t o be any meeting ground. ') Nehru c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e Chinese note as "argumentative" and stated t h a t a r e p l y would be s e n t in due t i m e . Nehru and h i s a d v i s e r s a p p a r e n t l y needed time t o d r a f t I n d i a ' s formal r e p l y . The Indian ambassadors t o P e i p i n g and Moscow were summoned t o New Delhi f o r consult a t i o n s and M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs o f f i o i a l s were reported on 1 2 January t o be m a r s h a l l i n g evidence t o r e f u t e t h e massive Chinese case.

Nehru Advised t o Meet w i t h Chou:

Januarv 1960

I n t h e i r r l b r i e f i n g s of Nehru, t h e t w o ambass a d o r s are r e l i a y reported t o have advised t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o moderate h i s p o s i t i o n and work toward a settlement as quickly as possible. Each ambassador stated d i f f e r e n t grounds for such a course.
h i s view of t h e Chinese t h r e a t t o I n d i a a s a long-term %on-

The ambassador t o Peiping, P a r t h a s a r a t h y , gave Nehru

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m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c y in Mia.'' He s t a t e d t h a t it would be unwise for I n d i a t o make too much of an e s s e n t i a l l y t a c t i c a l issue which would d i v e r t its a t t e n t i o n from t h e major "strategic" competition ahead. He t h e n recommended t h a t New Delhi not make t h i n g s worse on t h e porder issue

19

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by s h o u t i n g about t h i s long-range Sino-Indian competition and urged Nehru t o begin t a l k s w i t h t h e Chinese as soon as p o s s i b l e . He t o l d Nehru t h a t in a mid-November t a l k w i t h Chou, t h e Chinese: premier had been "very earnest" a b o u t a personal meeting. Parthasarathy was r e p o r t e d t o be a p r o t e g e of Krishna Menon, w i t h whom he had had s e v e r a l t a l k s s i n c e h i s r e t u r n from Peiping. Both were i n g a view--directly opposed t o t h e o f f i c a e rn- i n i s t r y of E3rternal Affairs l i n e - - t h a t t h e border i n c i d e n t s of August and October 1959 were probably a c c i d e n t a l , and t h a t t h e Chinese had had no i n t e n t i o n of k i l l i n g any Indians.

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The ambassador t o Moscow, K.P.S. Menon, advised Nehru t h a t t h e Russians could n o t do much more t h a n t h e y already had done. The best t h a t . N e w Delhi cmld hope f o r was t h a t t h e 'vadvicel' Khrushchev had given t h e C h i n e s e leaders would have a n edfect on t h e i r policy. Wnon went on t o t r a n s m i t t h e g i s t of Khrushchev's f i n a l r e m a r k s t o him i n Moscow in mid-January: we have e x e r c i s e d "what inf l u e n c e w e could"; t h e Chinese are far t o o s e n s i t i v e t o world o p i n i o n t o i n d i c a t e immediately t h a t t h e y have "subm i t t e d " t o o u r advice; and I n d i a s h o u l d not make it too hard f o r t h e Chinese t o come t o an agreement. Menon t h e n urged t h a t e v e r y t h i n g be done t o b r i n g t h e border c o n f l i c t t o an end as soon as possible. I t was apparent from t h i s b r i e f i n g t h a t Khrushchev w a s w e l l aware of h i s i n a b i l i t y t o change P e i p i n g ' s p o s i t i o n , b u t was t r y i n g t o c r e a t e t h e impression t h a t he had s o u g h t t o make t h e Chinese leaders more c o n c i l i a t o r y . A t t h e same t i m e , he was s e e k i n g I n d i a n cooperation.

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I n t h i s p e r i o d , Khrushchev had been a t t e m p t i n g by p u b l i c and p r i v a t e means t o prevent t h e d i s p u t e from jeopardizing t h e S o v i e t Union's r e l a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a . Khrushchev made s e v e r a l p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s on t h e border c o n f l i c t in October and November 1959. Speaking t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t on 31 October, he had s t a t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union was " e s p e c i a l l y g r i e v e d by t h e f a c t t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h e r e c e n t i n d i d e n t s , casualties occurred on both sides...we would be glad i f t h e i n c i d e n t s were n o t r e p e a t e d and i f t h e e x i s t i n g u n s e t t l e d f r o n t i e r q u e s t i o n s could be solved by

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means of f r i e n d l y negotiations."* He w a s less cautious a t a Kremlin r e c e p t i o n on 7 November, and after r e i t e r a t i n g t h e remarks he had made t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t , he made t h e f o l l o w i n g amplifications, according t o a correspondent *s account (published i n New Age, 15 November 1959):

--

A f t e r a pause, he added t h a t it was a sad and s t u p i d s t o r y . Nobody knew where t h e border w a s , he declared, and agreed w i t h m remark t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y no one l i v e d i n y t h a t area. Continuing, Khrushchev recalled t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union had amicably settled d i f f e r e n c e s over t h e border w i t h I r a n . "We gave up more t h a n w e gained," he s a i d and added, "What were a few kilometers for a t h e Soviet Union?" s/

These remarks suggested t h a t Khrushchev in November 1959 favored a Chinese concession, presumably in t h e form of a p a r t i a l withdrawal from t h e -ai P l a i n , and t h a t he wanted New D e l h i t o be informed of h i s view. His agreement w i t h t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e border area w a s s p a r s e l y populated

* i a nese communist p u b l i c a t i o n s d i d n o t c a r r y these remarks, merely r e p o r t i n g on 31 October t h a t "Khrushchev" had discussed " t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and t h e foreign p o l i c y of t h e S o v i e t Union."
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**The Chinese e x p l i c i t 1 y charged Khrushchev w i t h having made these r e m a r k s a f t e r M0 p e r s o n a l l y had explained t h e a Chinese p o s i t i o n t o m i n October 1959. According t o t h e CCP l e t t e r of 10 September 1960, t h e September 1959 TASS

a t atement was

a clear condemnation of t h e CCP. M o a Tse-tung explained t h i s t o Khrushchev, b u t on 7 November 1959, in an i n t e r v i e w given t o a n I n d i a n Communist newspaper, Khrushchev s a i d t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t was "deplorable and st u p i d '*

...

21

(and, by i m p l i c a t i o n , not w a r t h a quarrel)* has been c r i t i cized by t h e Chinese on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s , t h e l a t e s t b e i n g in t h e P e i p i n g P e o p l e ' s D a i l e d i t o r i a l of 5 March 1903. According t o one v e r s i o n o eng Bsiao-ping's closed-door speech in Moscow on 1 4 November 1960, Teng charged t h a t Khrushchev's remarks t o t h e newsman made N e h r u "more adamant", p r e v e n t i n g Chou from r e a c h i n g a compromise w i t h Nehru. The charge is a d i s t o r t i o n of Xhrushchev's preference f o r a compromise. As w i l l be shown, Nehru's own adv i s e r s were l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s adamant stand.

7 4

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Chinese border claims as " t e n d e n t i o u s h i s t o r y . " On 23 November, Khruehchev t r a n s m i t t e d a n o r a l message t o Nehru through t h e Indian ambassldor i n Moscow s t a t i n g t h a t t h e USSR had given ' * f r i e n d l y advice1' t o P e i p i n g t o work o u t a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t of t h e border d i s p u t e w i t h I n d i a . Khrushchev s t a t e d t h a t he would l i k e t o see n e g o t i a t i o n s begin '*as soon 88 p o s s i b l e . ' ~ Partly as a result of these ambassadorial brriefi n g s , Nehru changed h i e e a r l y January p o s i t i o n of no m i n i s t e r i a l \ -

S o v i e t diplomats in t a l k s w i t h Indian off i c i a l s Cried t o i n d i c a t e ntercession to bring t h e Chinese t o a "reasonable" p o s i t i o n . In mid-November, Sov i e t c u l t u r a l counselor Efimov had t o l d Indian o f f i c i a l s t h a t Chbu En-lai's' 7 November l e t t e r o f f e r i n g t o n e g o t i a t e t h e d i s p u t e w a s s e n t on S o v i e t advice. When pressed, howe v e r , on how his government had exerted i t s e l f , Efimov s t a t e d , '1 would n o t s a y w e have d i r e c t l y intervened, b u t ' w e have made them more aware of real Indian f e e l i n g s . The Russians had worked hard even in Pelping. The new S o v i e t ambassador, Chervonenko, who a r r i v e d i n P e i p i n g i n e a r l y November, had impressed Indian Ambassador , Parthasarathy as " f r i e n d l y , warm-hearted, and helpful.I* Chervonenko t o l d P a r t h a s a r a t h y t h a t t h e Chinese d i d n o t a p p r e c i a t e t h e f u l l imp1icat ions of peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e and characterized

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+Khrushchev ma have been h i n t i n g t o New D e l h i , as w e l l as Peiping, t h a a f e w kilometers of b a r r e n l a n d were h a r d l y worth a major d i s p u t e .

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level t a l k s without Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh and e x p l i c i t acceptance of t h e McMahon 1i n e reported t o have relaxed these p r e c o n d i t i o He and ns decided t o meet w i t h Chou En-lai. Foreign S e c r e t a r y Dutt i n d i c a t e d on 23 January t h a t Nehru was c o n s i d e r i n g such a meeting f o r A p r i l , w i t h N e h r u i n v i t i n g Chou t o New D e l h i . D u t t also i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e I n d i a n government would merely acknowledge Peiping's 26 December note rather t h a n r e p l y in d e t a i l in order t o avoid a "hardening of p o s i t i o n s " on

both sides.

A c t u a l l y , Indian o f f i c i a l s were hard put t o come, up on s h o r t n o t i c e w i t h a d e t a i l e d d i p l o m a t i c r e p l y s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e f u t i n g t h e Chinese case on t h e l e g a l i t i e s of owners h i p and t h e p r e c i s e border alignment. A team of Indian h i s t o r i a n s , c ledr-by Dr. 6 . Gopal, who l a t e r in 1960 p a r t i c i pated i n t h e border experts' t a l k s , had been s e n t t o London t o t r y t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e documentation of I n d i a ' s claims.

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. . .

The I n d i a n s c o n c e n t r a t e d on drawing up a documented S h o r t l y a f t e r Khrushchev had i n d i c a t e d t o Nehru his desire t o s t o p over in New %lb* e n r o u t e t o Djakarta, Nehru on 23 January r e v e r s e d t h e i n i t i a l M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Aff a i r s d e c i s i o n n o t t o provide a d e t a i l e d r e p l y t o P e l p i n g ' s 16 Deaember note; he r e v e r s e d t h i s i n order t o have I n d i a ' s f u l l legal p o s i t i o n on t h e record before Khrushchev's a r r i v a l . Ae a first s t e p i n p r e p a r i n g p u b l i c i o n f o r h i s s h i f t of p o s i t i o n on t h e matter of t a l k s w i t h Chou En-lai, t h e M i n i s t r y of External Affairs a p p a r e n t l y leaked t h e informat i o n t o t h e Times of I n d i a , which carried a feature a r t i c l e on 26 J a n u a r m E Earlg Nehru-Chou Meeting." The f i n a l d r a f t of t h e Indian r e p l y t o P e l p i n g ' s n o t e w a s approved and t h e d e u i s i o n f o r a Nehru-Chou meeting was made a t a Foreign Affairs subcommittee meeting on 2 February. When Nehru announced t h a t he had decided t o neet w i t h Chou w i t h o u t reply.

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p r i o r Chinese acceptance of New Delhl's p r e c o n d i t i o n s , Home M i n i s t e r Pant a l o n e objected. I - -

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no u z e r If we do n o t meet, w w i l l have a n o t h e r long l e t t e r from Peiping, and t h i s e w i l l go on e n d l e s s l y . L e t u s c o n t i n u e t o maintain our case, b u t n o t avoid a meeting." (2) Nehru i n s i s t e d t h a t there w a s great p r e s s u r e on I n d i a , which would appear t o be t h e r e c a l c i t r a n t p a r t y if it were t o reject a meeting. R e h r u cited,the Sino-Burmese border agreement and Burmese press' o p i n i o n t h a t I n d i a s h o u l d n e g o t i a t e . Actually, Nehru had r.decided on a meeting w i t h Chou a t least f i v e days p r i o r t o t h e announcement of t h e 28 January Slno-Burmese border
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agreement.

The Slno-Burmese Border Agreement of 28 January 1960 The Sino-Burmese border agreement provided t h e Chinese leaders w i t h t h e i r f i r s t "exampleit among accords with border c o u n t r i e s t o be used t o pressure New D e l h i i n t o beginning n e g o t i a t i o n s . Prior t o f a l l 1959, however, they had been moving v e r y s l o w l y and w i t h reluctance toward t h e agreement. A t an e a r l y date t h e y had explored t h e advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g e s of g i v i n g t h e Burmese s u c h an accord and a p p a r e n t l y decided t o hold t h e matter i n d e f i n i t e l y i n abeyance. So long as t h e B u r m e s e prime m i n i s t e r w a s n o t s t i m u l a t e d to demand a s e t t l e m e n t , t h e Chinese were anxious t o avoid committing themselves t o one. Chou En-lai declared i n a j o i n t communique with P r i m e M i n i s t e r U Nu on 1 2 December 1954 t h a t t h e undefined p o r t i o n s of t h e border should be settled Itat an a p p r o p r i a t e time t h r o u g h normal diplomatic channels." In November 1955, an armed c l a s b occurred between Chinese and Burmese o u t p o s t u n i t s , and it was only on Burmese i n i t i a t i v e t h a t p r e l i m i n a r y t a l k s begah ili 1956, s u r f a c i n g t h e f a c t of a Sino-Burmese border d i s p u t e three y e a r s b e f o r e t h e one between China and I n d i a .

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Prior t o October 1959, t h e B u r m e s e s i d e w a s t h e a c t i v e s i d e i n p r e s s i n g for a border s e t t l e m e n t In February 1956, t h e Burmese leaders began t o press Chou E n - l a i v i g o r o u s l y for t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t df a j o i n t commiss i o n t o d e f i n e d i s p u t e d sectors of Burma's 1,000-mile f r o n t i e r w i t h China. Chou took a stiff s t a n d on a l l t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p o i n t s a t issue and i n d i c a t e d r e l u c t a n c e t o n e g o t i a t e f o r any overall s e t t l e m e n t , l e a v i n g some Burmese t o conclude t h a t t h e y could not hope for a f a v o r a b l e agreement in t h e n e a r f u t u r e .

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The new prime m i n i s t e r , General Ba Swe, however, was u n w i l l i n g t o be p u t off. In summer 1956,,a Burmese p r e s s campaign ( a t t a c k i n g Chinese border " i n c u r s i o n s t t ) , which had been s t i m u l a t e d + b y t h e government, combined w i t h Ba Swe's warnings of possible Burmese e n m i t y , compelled t h e Chinese leaders t o r e c o n s i d e r and agree t o early border t a l k s . Ba Swe s e n t a n o t e on 31 A u g u s t t o Chou En-la1 through h i s new ambassador t o Peiping, B l a Maung, s t r o n g l y u r g i n g t h e Chinese to accept t h e "1941 Xine'? in t h e W States area and a t o withdraw t h e i r t r o o p s which were west of t h a t l i n e . "To do otherwise,?*Ba S e warned, "wauld...open up t h e possiw b i l i t y of l a s t i n g enmity. .between. t h e two c o u n t r i e s . " Ba Swe also warned t h a t he would be compelled t o r e p o r t off i c i a l l y on t h e presence of Chinese Communist troops on Burmese s o i l * when Parliament convened on 30 A u g u s t and urged Chou to withdraw t h e t r o o p s before t h a t date or, i f t h i s were p h y s i c a l l y impossible, g i v e assurance8 by 30 A u g u s t t h a t t h e y would go as soon as p o s s i b l e . Ba Swe rejected Chou's characterization of t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e bord e r as '*the s o u t h e r n undetermined a e c t i o n , '* i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h e boundary demarcated i n 1941 by Nationalist China and B r i t a i n s h o u l d be accepted and requested t h a t a j o i n t commission be e s t a b l i s h e d t o set up boundary markers along

*In his report t o t h e National People's Congress (NPC) on 9 J u l y 1957, Chou stated t h a t Chinese Communist troopa moved i n t o t h e W States area west of t h e "1941 l i n e . . .in a 1952 when c h a s i n g after remnant Kuomintang troops.'?

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t h i s s e c t i o n . This b l u n e langauge w a s unusual f o r a Burmese prime m i n i s t e r t o u s e in communioating w i t h Chou and appare n t l y was t a k e n by t h e Chinese as evidence t h a t Ba S w e would persist i n hid demands f o r a Chinese troop withdrawal and acceptance of Rangoon's border claims.

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on Chinese Communist border q'incursionst' and Ba Swe cabled Indonesian Prime M i n i s t e r A l i and Nehru t o w i t h h o l d "ternp o r a r i l y " any a c t i o n on Rangoon's behalf u n t i l ' t h e results of t h e new " i n t e n s i v e " phase of Sina-Burmese d i p l o m a t i c exchanges were a p p r a i s e d . In l a t e A u g u s t , t h e Burmese ambassador in Peiping urged Rangoon t o seek i n t e r v e n t ion by t h e Colombo powers only as a last resort. Chou had indicated c o n s i d e r a b l e s e n s i t i v i t y t o Ambassador ma Yanngts s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t Burma might appeal t o t h e Colombo powers and was anxious t h a t Xndia and Indonesia be k e p t o u t of the d i s p u t e . (Nehru d i d , in f a c t , write t o Chou in midSeptember, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t he agree t o n e g o t i a t e a settlement w i t h t h e Burmese.) ?la Maung also requedted t h a t Rangoon moderate t h e anti-Chinese p r e s s campaign. He r e p o r t e d t h a t Chou had been annoyed and angered by t h e p r e s s attacks --and t h e bad p u b l i c i t y f o r P e i p i n g from them--and t h a t t h e Chinese premier assumed t h a t t h e Burmese eovernuent had inspired t h e s e attacks

General B a Swe a l s o moved t o l a y t h e groundwork for t h e i n t e r c e s s i o n of o t h e r n e u t r a l i s t powers on Rangoon's behalf were his own e f f o r t s t o f a i l in o b t a i n i n g satisfact i o n from Chou. General N e Win b r i e f e d T i t o on 25 AugnsC

The vigorous e f f o r t of Premier Ba Swe t o assert Burma's border claims w a s a c l e a r - c u t departure from t h e cautious p o l i c y of U N u which had been motivated by a pervas i v e fear of antagonizing P e i p i n g . U Nu w a s r e l i a b l y rep o r t e d t o have t r i e d in August and September 1956, without success, t o r e s t r a i n Ba Swe from c h a l l e g i n g Chinese Communist claims and from warning Chinese eaders too openly and t o o f o r c i b l y .

P a r t l y because of Ba Swe's adamancy and r e f u s a l t o suberide and p a r t l y because t h e Chinese were anxious t h a t

Nehru n o t be s t i m u l a t e d t o q u e s t i o n Peiping's i n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e Sino-Indian border, Chou agreed t o withdraw C h i n e s e troops from t h e d i s p u t e d W States area. In a a

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message of 1 4 September t o Peiping, Premier Ba Swe welcomed C h o u ' s promise t o withdraw t h e t r o o p s and agreed t o keep Burmese troops o u t of t h e area. However, he i n s i s t e d on t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e W States boundary as demarcated by Nationa a l i s t China and B r i t a i n i n 1941 and on t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e Kachin S t a t e border f a r t h e r n o r t h as a de facto l i n e , and complained t h a t Chinese troops had a l s o ? r m t h e border a t t h e n o r t h e r n t i p of t h e s t a t e and should be withdrawn. He t h e n s t a t e d t h a t Burma would a c c e p t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a j o i n t boundary commission--actually an earlier Burmese proposal--which would examine t h e Kachin f r o n t i e r and make "recommendat ions t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e governments. On t h e s u g g e s t i o n of Hla Maung i n Peiping, Chou En-lai--who was anxious t o undercut Burmese p r e s s attacks--in e a r l y Sepeember i n v i t e d U Nu t o lead a d e l e g a t i o n t o China t o d i s c u s s t h e d i s p u t e . The Burmese stressed, however, that U Nu would go only in an ' * u n o f f i c i a l f 1 capacity and would n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e government i n d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Chou--i.e. his s t a t e m e n t s would n o t prejudice Ba Swe's f i r m p o s i t i o n . The Burmese hoped f o r informal p r o p o s a l s l e a d i n g t o an a c c e p t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t and Chou fostered t h e impression t h a t China w a s prepared t o m a k e them. During t a l k s w i t h t h e U Nu d e l e g a t i o n in November 1956, Chou made a "proposal a b o u t p r i n c i p l e s " r e l a t i n g t o three s e c t i o n s of t h e border still i n d i s p u t e . (1) Regarding t h e "1941 l i n e " i n t h e W a States area, Chou i n d i c a t e d r e a d i n e s s t o withdraw Chinese t r o o p s and asked t h a t "pending a f i n a l agreement on t h e l i n e and t h e s e t t i n g up of boundary markers," Burmese t r o o p s not e n t e r t h e evacuated area. Chou and Ba Swe had in f a c t agreed p r i v a t e l y on t h i s matter in September. (2) Regarding t h e Namwan leased t r a c t , Chou w a s p r e p a r e d t o n e g o t i a t e so as t o d e c i d e on conCrete steps t o abrogate t h e " p e r p e t u a l lease.1f (3) Regarding t h e n o r t h e r n border, t h e s e c t i o n from t h e I s u r a z i Pass nrmthward t o t h e Diphu Pass was to be demarcated along t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l boundary line" and from t h e I z u r a z i Pass t o t h e High Conical Peak w a s t o be determined a l o n g t h e watershed. The Hpimaw t r a c t of three villages-Hpimaw, Kangf ang, and Gawlun--vas t o be "returned" t o China, and Burmese t r o o p s i n t h e area were t o withdraw at t h e same time t h a t Chinese t r o o p s were r e t i r i n g from t h e "1941 l i n e 1 ' f a r t h e r s o u t h . In sum, Chou i n d i c a t e d that P e i p i n g was prepared t o withdraw i n t h e W States and y i e l d a

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long-standing Chinese claims t o p a r t s of n o r t h e r n Burma--on t h e f a c b of it, a r e a s o n a b l e p o s i t i o n c o n t a i n i n g no loopholes. &lowever, w i t h regard t o t h e seemingly small matter of t h e e x t e n t of China's c l a i m t o about 500 s q u a r e m i l e s around t h e r e e v i l l a g e s in t h e Hpimaw t r a c t , Chou remained adamant.
Chou's discussions w i t h U Nu in November 1956 f e l l s h o r t of producing an o v e r a l l s e t t l e m e n t and appear t o have been intended as a h o l d i n g o p e r a t i o n . The withdrawal of Chinese t r o o p s from p o s i t i o n s we3.t of t h e *'1941 l i n e " in December e f f e c t i v e l y negated Bangoon's l i v e l y propaganda At campaign about Chinese Communist border " i n c u r s i o n s t h e 8-8 time, t h e Chinese began t o act on t h e i r apparent d e c i s i o n t o coast along on t h e momentum of t h e i r concession ( t r o o p withdrawals), which m o l l i f i e d t h e Burmese i n December.
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Throughout 1937, t h e Chinese continued t o avoid a f i n a l o v e r a l l s e t t l e m e n t , t h e i r t a s k having been made easier by t h e e l e c t i o n of U Nu t o t h e premiership in February. Prime M i n i s t e r U Nu s p e n t 1 days in China in March 1957, 1 t a l k i n g w i t h Chou a t Kunming without moving him toward a f i n a l agreement. U Nu stated on 9 A p r i l t h a t h i s t a l k s w i t h t h e Chinese premier s t i l l l e f t " t w o or three d e t a i l s which need t o be ironed o u t " and t h a t t h e border issue was Ira big problem not amenable t o easy s o l u t i o n . " In l a t e A p r i l , t h e Chinese used a second-rank o f f i c i a l (the a c t i n g governor of Yunnan Province) t o make a new demand f o r Burmese terr i t o r y n e a r t h e Namwan leased tract. The permanent secret a r y of t h e Burmese Foreign O f f i c e t o l d t h e B r i t i s h ambassador i n e a r l y May t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e Namwan area, t h e Chlnese had "recently" asked for a "readjustment1' in t h e i r f'avor a t t h e n o r t h e r n end of t h e "1941 l i n e . " The area claimed w a s small, and t h e claim was made ambiguously, f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e Chinese had d e s i r e d merely t o keep t h e e n t i r e q u e s t i o n of a border s e t t l e m e n t open ind e , f i n i t e l y . Chou's i m p l i c i t refusal t o go ahead w i t h a s e t t l e m e n t was a s h a r p disappointment t o U Nu, who had desired an agreement t o p r o v i d e an a u s p i c i o u s beginning f o r h i s new term as premier. Prior t o h i s Kunming v i s i t , U Nu was reported t o have s t a t e d p r i v a t e l y t h a t he considered P e i p i n g "morally obligated" t o l i v e u p t o t h e t e n t a t i v e agreement he and Chou had reached i n November 1956.

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Chou En-lai sought t o b l u r t h e s t r o n g impression in Burma and elswwhere t h a t P e i p i n g w a s s t a l l i n g . He t o l d t h e National People's Congress (NPC) on 9 J u l y 1957 t h a t "a good start" had been made w i t h U Nu for s e t t l e m e n t of t h e d i s p u t e and t h a t a "general agreement of views1' had been reached. He added s i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, t h a t a "comprehensive, f a i r , and reasonable s e t t l e m e n t " would be reached when t h e views of both c o u n t r i e s were brought into accord "through cont inued n e g o t i a t i o n s " on c o n c r e t e "problems. Chou's s t a t e m e n t s were r e s e n t e d i n Rangoon, as U Nu had told t h e p r e s s earlier t h a t Chou was expected t o s u b m i t t h e g e n e r a l agreement t o t h e NPC f o r f i n a l approval p r i o r t o intergovernmental accords. On 22 the usually o p t i m i a t i c Ambassador H l a Maung in P e i p i n g had become convinced t h a t t h e C h i n i s e "are now ck on a l l of t h e i r words" in connection w i t h t h e t e n t a t i v e border agreement reached between Chou and U Nu i n November 1956. H l a Maung cited C h o u ' s apparent questioning of t h e Burmese v e r s i o n of t h e n o r t h e r n sector of t h e boundary as t h e l a t e s t of a number of i n c i d e n t s which had l e d him t o t h i s conclusion. He commented s a r c a s t i c a l l y t h a t on t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e border t h e Chinese had now challenged Burmese claims t o l a n d in t h e n o r t h and t h e east and t h a t h e "would n o t be s u r p r i s e d i f t h e y also mentioned t h e west, were there any l a n d t o t h e west."

U Nu r e c e i v e d Chou En-lai's long-awaited l e t t e r cont a i n i n g P e i p i n g ' s formal border proposals i n l a t e J u l y and, a c d o r d i n g t o t h e American embassy in Rangoon, t h e y included a new demand f o r t h e c e s s i o n of some 70 s q u a r e m i l e s of t e r r i t o r y in t h e Lufang area of t h e W S t a t e s . Taken t o a gether w i t h a demand f o r more t e r r i t o r y i n the Hpimaw area, t h e new Chinese p o s i t i o n on L u f a n g i n d i c a t e d t o t h e American embassy a Chinese e f f o r t t o create maximum problems for t h e Burmese government w i t h v a r i o u s border peoples w h i l e still m a i n t a i n i n g a pose of f r i e n d s h i p and desire t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t . Thus w h i l e avoiding a s e t t l e m e n t , Chou made it d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e Burmese leaders t o accuaePeiping publ i c l y of o u t r i g h t i n t r a n s i g e n c e . After t h e y d i s p a t c h e d Chief Justice U Myint Thein t o China in t h e hope of ending Chinese s t a l l i n g , Chou t o l d Myint Thein on 28 September t h a t he would have t o take t i m e t o s t u d y t h e new Burmese p r o p o s a l s and t h a t although t h e "1941 l i n e " w a s " u n j u s t , " Peiping

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would a c c e p t it "out of f e e l i n g s of f r i e n d s h i p . " Nevertheless, t h e Burmese considered Myint Thein's mission a f a i l u r e and in l a t e October, when Foreign M i n i s t e r Sao Hktm Hkio spoke t o t h e A u s t r a l i a n ambassador, he stated t h a t "negotiat i o n s might w e l l take f i v e o r t e n years.'1 The Chinese leaders continued t o p a r r y Burntese req u e s t s for a settlemen$ i n 1958. They began t o invoke' "Tibetan i n t e r e s t s v 1 in t h e border area 88 a d e v i c e t o , p r o long t h e deadlock. The Burmese ambassador i n PeIpingLOold Foreign Minister Chen Y i on 1 A p r i l t h a t China's new 'argument w a s "dif f i c u l t 1 * f o r Rangoon t o accept and stated t h a t there are T i b e t a n s living on t h e Burmese s i d e who h paying taxes t o Burma "for generations." In refere P e i p i n g ' s claims r e g a r d i n g T i b e t a n s l i v i n g f a r t o t of t h e border, he prQtested t h a t '*a big portionv1 of n o r t h e r n Burma would have t o be ceded t o China.
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The Chinese a t t h i s time a p p a r e n t l y were t r y i n g o u t on t h e Burmese a claim t h e y hoped later t o use w i t h t h e l Indians, v i z . t h a t borderland peoples, and t h e territ in which t h e y resided, t r a d i t i o n a l l y had been Chinese Since e a r l y 1950, the Chinese policy toward Himalayan d e r t r i b a l p e o p l e s had c e n t e r e d on e x p l o i t i n g their e t h n i c and h i s t o r i c a l t i e s w i t h T i b e t . Chinese propaganda, seminated through a g e n t s by word of mouth and p u b l i s materials and through broadcasts by Lhasa Radio, had essed t h e theme of "democratic reform and progress" i n T i b e t , with t h e goal of d i r e a t i n g t h e l o y a l t i e s of these pe more and more toward t h e i r e t h n i c homeland and away from Indian and Burmese influence.*

The Chinese s u b s e q u e n t l y worked h a r d t o recoup, a t t e m p t i n g t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e m s Tibetan and o t h e r border peoples from ot t h e " t i n y group of rebel$' i n order t o s a l v a g e some goodwill (continued on page 31)

*The Tibe t a n r e v o l t of March 1959, however, r e s u l t e d i n a major setback for t h i s h e r e t o f o r e r e l a t i v e l y successful Chinese p o l i c y , as the borderland peoples watched t h e spectacle of t h e i r e t h n i c b r o t h e r s being butchered by P L A forces.

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The Chinese i n d i c a t e d no desire t o resume border -. t a l k s u n t i l J u l y , when t h e Burmese press began another major propaganda campaign, c h a r g i n g t h a t Peipdng was clearly s t a l l i n g and g u i l t y of bad f a i t h . Again, as in s m e 1956, t h e press campaign compelled t h e Chinese u mr leaders t o re8ume top-level t a l k s . Chen Y i t o l d t h e Burmese tipbassador a t a banquet on 31 J u l y t h a t a l e t t e r soon t o be s e n t from Choa En-lai t o Premier U Nu would t*eliminatel' the argument of t h e Burmese press t h a t t h e Chinese are u n w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e . Chen declared: ltIf we go on d i s c u s s i n g , nobody w i l l be able t o make up storieslw--an undiplomat i c b i t of outspokenness which l e d Hla Yaung t o report t h a t Chen, who had r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e primary alm of t h e Chinese in resuming border t a l k s w a s t o keep Burmese newspapers "muzzled up,'' was "not so sharptw a Chou. , A t i t h e same bgnquet, Chou took t h e l i n e t h a t t h e s p r e v a i l i n g no-settlement $ t t u a a i o n favored Rangoon. Chou t o l d Hila Maung t h a t t h e p r e s e n t i n d e f i n i t e border wgymgement

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mo'tnote continued from page 30) and work toward r e b u i l d i n g a degree of v o l u n t a r y responsiven e s s t o P L A border p e r s o n n e l and CCP cadres. New D e l h i ' s e f f o r t t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h e r e v o l t and t u r n the l o y a l t i e s of these peoples toward I n d i a became a source bf considerable concern, as many in Tibetan areas n e a r t h e border who continued t o cross over t o t h e Indian side, b r i n g i n g firsthand accounts of P L A suppression, provided Indian news media w i t h e f f e c t i v e anti-Chinese m a t e k i a l . In order t o stem t h e flow and t o r e g a i n some degree of i n f l u e n c e , t h e Chinese leaders a p p a r e n t l y directed t h e CCP-mtA author it ies in Lhasa t o draw up a p o l i c y g u i d e l i n e f o r a l l cadres. The p o l i a y , appearing In one p a r t of a larger document on troop indoctrinaDion i s s u e d i n November 1960 for border forces, concentrated on d i s p l a y s of moderation: (1) p e r m i t t i n g borderland peoples t o c o n t i n u e s e a s o n a l moves a c r o s s t h e border, (3) h a n d l i n g d i s p u t e s w i t h t r i b a l peoples by local proxy, and (3) i n d o c t r i n a t i n g these peoples i n CCP nationa l i t i e s p o l i c y , w h i l e s t r e s s i n g t o cadres t h e need for using "patience t o dissuade" ahem f r o m fleeing. However, because t h e T i b e t a n rebels remained a c t i v e i n s i d e and o u t s i d e T i b e t , Chinese policy in T i b e t and a l o n g t h e border w a s hampered by t h e continued Tibet-Han (Chinese) dichotomy in t h e clashes. 31 -

=-

wlts t o Burma's advantage because Rangoon continued t o adm i n i s t e r s m a l l areas claimed by Pe;Pping in t h e Kachin and Shan states. When H l a Maung countered by saying a d e f i n i t i v e agreement would s i l e n c e those who seek t o d r i v e a wedge between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , Chou t e m p e r a t e l y advised t h a t he n o t l i s t e n to " t h i r d p a r t i e s " and reassured t h e envoy t h a t P e i p i n g would n e g o t i a t e t h e border q u e s t i o n wi0hin t h e framework of t h e f i v e p r i n c i p l e s . The g e n e r a l imp l i c a t i o n of Chou's remarks was t h a t Burma s h o u l d rest cont e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u s quo.

The new prime ministmg Ne Win, began t o press t h e Chinese more v i orously t h a n h i s predecessor, U Nu. Ne Win is r e p o r t e d t o have t o l d Burmese o f f i c i a l s i n t the new ambassador t o China would make s" Januar a f r e s h " approach t o P e i p i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e unresolved borl ' '" der d i s p u t e . The new prime m i n i s t e r may have been encouraged t o order a new aetempt to a s c e r t a i n t h e C h h e s e leaders' p o s i t i o n on a s e t t l e m e n t because t h e Chinese were malting aerial s u r v e y s o cerOain p o r t i o n s of t h e border, Ne Win f i n d i c a t e d to t h e Chinese t h a t h e w a s prepared t o confirm the concessions, made by U Nu i n f o r m a l l y t o Chon E n - l a i in November 1956, of t h e thnee border v i l l a g e s in t h e Hpixuaw area and t h e Namwan leased t r a c t , b u t w a s u n w i l l i n g t o sucr e n d e r any t e r r i t o r y where t h e boundary had been f o r m a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e p a s t . If t h e Chinese were t o remain adamant on concluding an agreement, Re Win stated in e a r l y May t o Burmese o f f i c i a l s , he w o u l d c o n s i d e r c a n c e l l i n g Chinese a i v i l a v i a t i o n r i g h t s in Burma. Ne Win sabsequentlp proposed Ohat Peiping accept a group of proposals as a paokage, buO in June..1959, Chen Y i riposted by t e l l i n g t h e new Burmese ambassador thaC the npackage deal" had t o be "studied" and h i n t e d t h e r e might be no s o l u t i o n for some t i m e , as i n t e r e e f e d " racial m i n o r i t i e s - - p r i m a r i l y Tibetans-had t o be ttconeu16ed** e g a r d i n g any border settlemtrnt. r Chen r e p e a t e d l y &tressedt h e need for cordial r e l a t i o n s and stated t h a t whether t h e q u e s t i o n of "conceding a l i t t l e p o r t i o n here o r there'' is agreed upon or n o t , "it is the f r i e n d s h i p t h a t r e a l l y counts.t1 N e Win a p p a r e n t l y had a n t i cipated f u r t h e r Chinese s t a l l i n g and had informed the Americ m ambassador in mid-May t h a t his "package deal" would be a withdrawn i n December and t h a t he would t h e n proceed w i t h a h a r d e r l i n e in d e a l i n g w i t h t h e Chinese.

32

F T O

".

. .

..

The A u g u s t and October 1959 c l a s h e s between Chinese and Indian forces a p p a r e n t l y l e d t h e Chinese leaders t o review t h e advantages and disadvantages of granting t h e Burmese a border s e t t l e m e n t . They a p p a r e n t l y calculated t h a t an agreement w i t h Bangoon would ,mUe it more d i f f i c u l t f o r New Delhi t o reject n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e SinoZ i n border d i s p u t e . In October 1959, t h e Chinese amma bassador in Rangoon charactmrized N e Win's package proposal ELB being "very near t h e mark." Rangoon informed P e i p i n g on 4 November t h a t if t h e Chinese were indeed prepared t o accept t h e package-containing the maximum concessions ~ Burma w a w i l l i n g t o make--Ne Win would p e r s o n a l l y come t o Bhina t o iormalize "an agreement in p r i n c i p l e " on the border i s s u e . The Burmese also i n d i c a t e d w i l l i n g n e s s t o @ccept t h e Chinese suggeseion %hat a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p and nonaggression accompany t h e border accord. l ~ h o uinviC n in 'to Peiping t o hold t a l k s on "matters of p r i n c i p l e on how t o settle" t h e dWpute. Chou promised that t h e s e Oalks would "promote concre41e d i s c u s s i o n s and set$lement** of t h e border i s s u e . Chou's stress on r e a c h i n g an agreement on p r i n c i p l e s first of a l l w a a similar t o t h e l i n e he w a s t a k i n g w i t h Nehru--i.e. his l e t t e r of 17 December--that lower l e v e l talka w o u l d bog down u n l e s s "some agreements on p r i n c i p l e s " were reached by t h e premiers. Thus by December 1959, t h e Chinese seemed t o be p r e s s i n g t h e Burmese t o begin serious talks for a f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . Diplomats from almost every Bast European mission in P e i p i n g had approached t h e Burmese first secretary in December and suggested t h a t t h e time w a s "opportune" for t h e Chinese t o agree t o a s e t t l e m e n t , s u g g e s t i n g a new, c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o a r r a n g e a quick agreement w i t h Rangoon.
. I

In J a n u a r y 1960, Chou moved a d r o i t l y t o b r i n g Pripae M i n i s t e r Ne Win q u i c k l y t o Peiping. Re Win had rejected Chou's i n v i t a t i o n on 3 January, r e q u e s t i n g t h a t P e i p i n g a c c e p t in advance Burma's June 1959 package proposals as thecooddttaoa 'for coming t o China and i n i t i a l i n g a border agreement. In a l e t t e r of 12 January, Chou repeated h i s 23 December i n v i t a t i o n and carer u l l y avoided mentioning Ne Win's c o n d i t i o n . Chou s a i d he f e l t it would be "very usef u l " toward promoting a s e t t l e m e n t i f Ne Win were t o give him t h e chance t o e x p l a i n t h e Chinese government's p o s i t i o n

33

and t o d i s c u s s "matters of p r i n c i p l e " for e l i m i n a t i n g the remaining d i f f e r e n c e s . Chou w a s also c a r e f u l t o minimize t h e p o i n t s of disagreement between t h e two s i d e s as "relat i v e l p s m a l l .'* Ne. .Win responded by dropping his condition of p r i o r Chinese acceptance of t h e "package d e a l " and iaformed Chou t h a t he could a r r i v e on 23 January for three d a y a - - s u f f i c i e n t ~ time, he hoped, Wto e l i m i n a t e t h e relat i v e l y small d i f f e r e n c e * * between t h e p o s f t i o n s . H e a r r i v e d

be referred t o a " j o i n t
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' a n d mutual nonaggression.

days after Ne Win a r r i v e d in Pelping, I C N A announced the elgnlng of a border agreement and a t r e a t y of '- r i e n d s h i p f

January, four

Thus, in s t r i k i n g c o n t r a s t wiOb h i s footdragging since e a r l y 1956, Chou had moved w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e speed in order t o conclude an "agreement on p r i n c i p l e s . " He a p p a r e n t l y oalcula4md t h a t it would be s e e n by n e u t r a l s and New Delhl $8 analogous to t h e "agreement on p r i n c i p l e s " he WBB trying t o o b t a i n f r o m lrlehru and would h e l p t o promote s i m i l a r negotiations w i t h New Delhi. Chou seemed to . b e l l e v e t h a t Nehru would f i n d it d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n t h a t t a l k s on t * p r i n c i p l e s * * i t h the Chinese would serve w no u s e f u l purpose before t h e **facts"were agreed on. That t h i s is what Chou w a s d r i v i n g a t is i n d i c a t e d by t h e following s e n t e n c e in t h e 29 January Peiping People's D a i l y e d i t o r i a l on %he accord:

This ragreement7 proves t h a t OB s u c h a complrcated quest inn as t h e boundary i s s u e , it is a practical and feasible means conducive t o a speedy s o l u t i o n of t h e q u e s t i o n for t h e premiers of two n a t i o n s t o reach, f irst of a l l , an agreement in p r i n c i p l e and t h e n t o l e a v e t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both p a r t i e s t o work o u t a c o n c r e t e s e t t l e m e n t .
!

This s t a t e m e n t d i r e c t l y contradicted, and w a s i n t e n d e d t o r e f u t e , R e h r u ' s 21 December r e p l y t o Chou in which t h e Indian

34

Prime M i n i s t e r had maintained t h a t s u c h high-level discusslions of p r i n c i p l e s were p o i n t l e s s when both s i d e s had n o t y e t agreed on t h e facts.
Following h i s r e t u r n t o Rangoon, N e Win on 30 January e d d Burmese off i c i a l 8 t h a t &he Rangoon-claimed "1941 l i n e " i n t h e l a S t a t e a r e a would not change except for an area of a b o u t f i v e m i l e s , t h a t t h e Chinese also accepted Burma's p o s i t i o n on t h e watershed boundary f o r t h e Kachin State--which would be f o r m a l l y defermined by a j o i n t border commission--and t h a t the ChPnese had backed off from t h e i r o r i g i n a l demand of about 500 s q u a r e miles r e g a r d i n g t h e Rpimaw area, asking iastead f o r an area of between 50 add 100 square m i l e s . In sum, Ne Win stated (with slight exaggeration) t h a t t h e Chinese had h e n $ so eager t o o b t a i n

a s e t t l e m e n t t h a t Burma could have r e c e i v e d "apytRing" it demanded, and t h e Burmese M i l i t a r y l k a i n i n g Director concluded t h a t Burma had done " q u i t e w e l l " w i t h t h e Chinese.*

*Xn the 38 January accord, t h e Chinese had accepted, w i t h two small excepBions, t h e hradif i o n a l boundary, f o l l o w i n g t h e watershed in the n o r t h and t h e "1941 line'* in t h e s o u t h - - t h a t , i s , t h e substance of B u r m a ' s p o s i t i o n . The remaining b u t narrowed d i f f e r e n c e s concerned t h e e x t e n t of v i l l a g e t r a c t s in t h e Kachin and W states c e d e d h l n a a and of t h e Namwan t r a c t ceded t o Burma.
The agreement set a precedent f o r d e f i n i n g t h e e a s t e r n end ok the border between t h e NEFA and T i b e t , w i t h minor adjustments, on t h e basis of t h e McPahon l i n e . The Indian ambassador i n Rangoon t o l d t h e American ambassador there on 27 J a n u a r y t h a t he assumed P e i p i n g would have t o accept t h e "Indian p o r t i o n " of t h e McMahon l i n e if t h e Burmese p o r t ion were accepted. Ambassador Mehrotra t h e n stated t h a t t h e Chinese wepe r e a l l y more i n t e r e s t e d in Ladakh: " i f t h e y could get even p a r t of what t h e y want there, t h e y might n o t p r e s s t h e NEFA claim."

- 35 L
1

A f o r t h e Chinese, t h e y were n o t o n l y better armed s

Win p a t t e r n ) , b u t also were i n a t a c t i c a l l y better posit i o n t h a n t h e y had been t o undercut N e h r u ' s l i k e l y line of argument w i t h Khrushchev r e g a r d i n g Chinese i n t r a n s i g e n c e . N e Win s p e c u l a t e d on 30 January t h a t t h e Chinese had been " q u i t e anxious** t o s e t t l e t h e Sino-Burma border d i s p u t e p r i o r t o Khrushchev's stopover in New Delhi e n route t o Djakarta. *
The Chou-Nehru Talks:
19-25 A p r i l 1960

t o p r e s s New Delhi for m i n i s t e r i a l talks (on t h e Chou-Ne

The Chinese e x t e n s i v e l ~ : - e x p l o i t e d h e Sino-Burmese t agreement t o disarm t h e arguments.of n e u t r a l c r i t i c s and c r i t i c s i n $he S o v i e t bloc t h a t P e i p i n g w a s u n w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e its border d i s p u t e s amicably. They hope$ it would

*The C h i ne88 a l s o seemed apprehensive t h a t t h e Indonesi a n s would provide Khrushchev w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n c r e t e evidence of Chinese '*nationalism" and pugnacity in r e l a t i o n s w i t h a n e u t r a l in t h e l'peace zone," p a r t i c u l a r l y r e g a r d i n g t h e lr c r u d e hand1 ing of Forei gn M i n i s t e r Subandr io d n r i n g h i s t r i p t o China.
. .

During h i s s t o p o v e r in New Delhi on 1 Feburary, Icbru1 shchev spoke p r i v a f e l y w i t h Nehru f o r , t h r e e hours b u t , a p a r t 'from Nehru's brief remarks t o Parliament, t h e d e t a i l s of t h e d i s c u s s i o n have n o t been reported. The o n l y apparent connection between Nehru's 5 February l e t t e r t o Chou and Khrushchev's s t o p o v e r was t h a t t h e v i s f t speeded up t h e Indian a c t i o n t o place t h e i r p o s i t i o n on t h e record before t h e S o v i e t leader a r r i v e d , t h u s showdng t h e independence of N e h r u ' s i n i t i a t i v e . In Parliament on 33 F e b r u a r y , Nehru sought t o underscore h i s own i n i t i a t i v e , s t a t i n g tha* h i s i n v i t a t i o n t o Qou had no r e l a t i o n t o Khrushchev's v i s i t . H e s a i d t h a t he had b r i e f l y t o l d Khrushchev of I n d i a ' s case in t h e c o n t e x t of a world survey. ''1 d i d n o t ask him t o bring p r e s s u r e t o bear on China. It was for them t o c o n s i d e r what t h e y had t o s a y or what t h e y were going t o do.'*

. .

36

p r o v i d e them w i t h an important propaganda instrument f o r promoting d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h New Delhi.* Chinese a n x i e t y i n e a r l y 1960 t o a r r a n g e a Chou-Nehru meeting and Nehru's t a o t i o a l d e c i s i o n of l a t e January n o t t o appear i n t r a n s i g e n t prepared t h e way f o r m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l t a l k s . Ambassador P a r t h a a a r a t h y l e f t f o r P e i p i n g on 9 February, c ing a c a r e f u l l y drafted Indian n o t e r e p l y i n g t o t h e Chinese n o t e of 26 December as well 85 Hehru's l e t t e r t o Chou. t h e Indian n o t e w a s d r a f t e n sucn a way as t o : i n a i c a t e h a t New Delhi was n o t opposed to a Chou-Nehru meeting. The note d i d not mention t h e earlier pre-conditions of Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh and e x p l i c i t acceptance of t h e McMahon l i n e . Nehru's 5 February l e t t e r t o Chou also s i g n i f i c a n t l y omitaed these stipulations.
i
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sponded t o opponents in Parliament i n such a way as t o create t h e impression t h a t he w a s a g a i n s t even meeting w i t h Chou. Actually, he had been c a r e f u l t o reject o n l y ' h e g o t i a t i o n s N b u t n o t a face-to-face meeting:
I see no ground whatever a t p r e s e n t , no bridge beaween t h e Chinese p o s i t ion and

Constantly under p r e s s u r e f r o m Parliament and t h e press n o t t o take a s o f t l i n e w i t h Peiping, Nehru was comp e l l e d t o make even an agreement "to meet" w i t h Chou appear as par*;,68 ai-haad; hnti-China pblicy. P r i o r t o 8 u r f a c i n g his i n v i t a t i o n to Chou, Nehru on 1 2 February re-

ours...,There is nothing t o n e g o t i a t e a t p r e s e n t . Whether t h a t w i l l arise l a t e r I cannoO s a y . These remarks, c a r r y i n g a hard t o n e and i n d i c a t i n g a firm 1 n e of no n e g o t i a t i o n s , brought cheers from Par1iament i However, p a r l i a m e n t a r y and press tempers were r e k i n d l e d on 15 February, when t h e government released t h e t e x t s of

t a k e p l a c e between China and other c o u n t r i e s .

*Thus t h e Pedple's D a i l y on 1 February s t a t e d t h a t : "Surely what has h a p p e r n e t w e e n China and Burma can
(*

- 37 -

(1) Nehru's 5 February l e t t e r t o Chou i n v i t i n g h i m t o a meeting i n I n d i a and (2) t h e Indian 12 February r e p l y ' t o P e i p i n g ' s 20 December note. The finesse of M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f f i c i a l s i n handling t h e press by briefings had minimized adverse p u b l i c r e a c t i o n b u t d i d not s t i f l e a l l criticism. On 10 February, t h e Times characterized Nehru's alleged r e v e r s a l as **astoXElXng.. n o u r i s h i n g dangerous i l l u s i o n s ' * and t h e Hindustan Standard referred t o t h e whole matter as rrinsulting'g t o Parliament and t h e country. Hehru i s . r e l i a b l g reported t o have been d i s t r u b e d by even t h i s limited r e a c t i o n and t o have l a i d on a f u r t h e r "off-the-record'* M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Aff a i r s press b r i e f i n g

j -

..

Nehru's 3 February l e t t e r t o Chou agreed t o a meeting but not t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . Nehru restated h i s p o s i t i o n (16 November 1959 l e t t e r t o Chou) t h a t t h e Chineee and Indian p o s i t i o n s were so wide a p a r t t h a t there w a s l i t t l e ground l e f t for u s e f u l t a l k s and thaa * * c e r t a i np r e l i m i n a r y steps**--the meeting ,of e x p e r t q t o d i s c u s s h i s t o r i c a l data . and alignment-would have f a c i l i t a t e d d i s c u s s i o n s . Nehru t h e n f l a t l y asserted t h a t t h e Chinese claim t h a t t h e e n t i r e border had never been delimited w a s " i n c o r r e c t . . ; on t h a t bagie there can be no negotiations.** Nevertheless, in the i n t e r e s t of e x p l o r i n g e v e r y avenue for a s e t t l e m e n t , Nehru f i n a l l y agreed t h a t '*itmight be h e l p f u l f o r u s t o meet," and thereupon issued hie i n v i t a t i o n for Chou t o come t o I n d i a some time a f t e r mid-March. Nehru defended t h i s formal i n v i t a t i o n in Parliament on 16 February, calmly i n s i s t i n g t h a t no p o l i c y change w a s involved: h e had always s a i d he waa prepared " t o meet" anybody, anywhere, $8 this was i n g r a i n e d from 40 y e a r s of t r a i n i n g .

Nehru therefore a p p a r e n t l y viewed a meeting a8 a t a c t i c t o appear anmaable t o a peaceful s e t t l e m e n t and t o

'

-38-

probe Chinese long-term i n t e n t ions, b u t he did n o t i n t e n d t o make t h e concess3ons t h e Chinese considered necessary f o r a s e t t l e m e n t o t h e border d i s p u t e . * f
The Indian n o t e of 1 2 February covered in g r e a t e r d e t a i l t h e basic premise of Nehru's l e t t e r t o Chou. I t reiterated t h a t New Delhi w a s prepared t o d i s c u s s o n l y specific d i s p u t e s r e g a r d i n g t h e l o c a t i o n of places on t h e border and t o make minor border rectifications where agreed necessary. As for d e t e r n i n i n g t h e e n t i r e border on a new basis, "such a b a s i s for n e g o t i a t i o n s would i g n o r e p a s t h i s t o r y , c u s t o m , t r a d i t i o n , and inCernat i o n a l agreements, and is, therefore, e n t i r e l y unacceptable t o t h e Governmeit of I n d i a , " The note t h e n argued in support of I n d i a ' s c a s e f o r t h e watershed p r i n c i p l e , complaining t h a t Peipiag "seems unaware t h a t ' - t r a d i t i o n a l boundaries i n mountainous areas t e n d t o follow t h e m a i n .Watershed rather than any other n a t u r a l f e a t u r e . . . . T h a t t h e alignment of t h e n o r t h e r n boundary of I n d i a throughout follows t h e major watershed supports t h e fact t h a t t h i s befame t h e boundary through custom and tradition. After apglping t h e watershed p r i n c i p l e to Ladakh, t h e n o t e stated t h a t t h e l i n e along t h i s western s e o t o r of t h e border had been f i x e d and "well recognized" from t h e 17th c e n t u r y onward and t h a t t h e Chfaese complaint t h a t t h i s sector w a s n&t delimited w In fact supported m by evidenoe which shows only t h a t t h e boundary " w a s not demarcated on t h e ground.t1

. 1

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a
"
** 4+,

The n o t e ' s point-by-point r e b u t t a l of t h e Chinese p o s i t i o n as s e t f o r t h on 26 December 1959 was accompanied by remarks designed t o r e p a i r Bhe damage done t o t h e SinIndian r e l a t i o n s h i p . It stressed t h e urgent need for an

*Foreign Secretary Dut t stated =Ion 16 Bebruary t h a t Nehru d i d n o t expect a n y t h i n g ang e to come o u t of a meeting w i t h Chou, b u t hoped t o determine (1) why t h e C h i n e s e had behaved i n s u c h a h o s t i l e way and (2) what Chou ' * r e a l l y wants.'* D u t f concluded t h a t *'at best" t h e meeting might provide a b a s i s f o r f u r t h e r t a l k s .

- 39 -

Anterim unt a r s t a n d i n g t o avoid a f u r t h s r worsening o1 t h e situation-i.e more border clashes-and t h e need t o do e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e t o remove h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and restore t r a d i t i o n a l f r i e n d s h i p . This appeal f o r a more normal r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s intended t o provide a t o n e conducive t o a Chou-Nehru meeting, after t h e attempt, Bn 14 pages, t o d e s t r o y t h e Chinese case f o r d e f i n i n g t h e border anew,
The f i r m n e s s of Nehru's l e t t e r and t h e Indian n o t e on t h e r n b x l d g ~ ~ ~ h l e between t h e Chinese and Indian posigap

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. .

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t i o n s w a s intended p a r t l y t o scotch r u m o r s t h a t Nehru, M i n i s t r y of External Affairs off i c i a l s , and the Indian m i l i t a r y chiefs were w i l l i n g t o exchange t h e Aksai P l a i n for formal C h i n e s e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e McMahon l i n e . Such rumors had been fed by Krishna Menon's s l i p i n a speech" which,:waa brought t o l i g h t by t h e Binduetan T h e s e d i t o r ' on 1 February. Menon a p p a r e n t l y stated C h a * I n d i a would not y i e l d . . any p a r t of o u r administered t e r r i t o r y along t h e border." There were other i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e rumors had some basis i n fact. M i n i s t r y of Exte rs oXxlc1als had been e r i n g i n F e b r u a r y a p o s s i b l e formula f o r Lsldakh ent a i l i n g some form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s for t h e road t r a v e r s i n g t h e Aksai P l a i n . Moreover, after r e c e i v i n g Chou's r e p l y , Nehru r e p o r t e d l y t o l d P r e s i d e n t Prasad on 29 February t h a t in t a l k i n g w i t h Chou, he would adhere t o t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y s e t f o r t h in Hew D e l h i ' s n o t e s , b u t would t r y t o avoid appearing i n t r a n s i g e n t . If Choh re= mained adamant on Ladakh, he might agree t o n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e area occup$ed' by t h e Chinese i f an adequately supervised agreement c o u l d be reached whereby t h e road l i n k i n g Sinklang w i t h T i b e t could be used by both countries. From q u e e t i o n s directed t o him on 1 March by a M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs o f f i c i a l , re ardipg cases in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law where one country ? h i n a 7 had access through a second c o u n t r y / I n d i a 7 t o a p5rtioIi of its own territ o r y which w a s CUEoff-from t h e motherland by natura$ barriers, an American embassy o f f i c e r gained t h e d e f i n i t e

,.;'

... .

40

impression t h a t t h e Indian leaders were s e a r c h i n g f o r some s a n c t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e which would permit Nehru t o . p r o p o s e Chinese use of t h e road while r e t a i n i n g nominal Indian s o v e r e i g n t y over t h e Aksai Plain.*
Chou'a r e p l y t o Nehru's i n v i t a t - i o n was devoid of r a n c o r and a g a i n i n d i c a t e d P e i p i n g ' s desire f o r an early meeting. I n c o n t r a s t t o h i s l e t t e r s t o Nehru since January 1959, C h o u ' s 26 February 1960 l e t t e r a c c e p t i n g Nehru's i n v i t a t i o n and s e t t i n g A p r i l as t h e t i m e avoided any d i s c u s s i o n of s u b s t a n c e on t h e border d i s p u t e - - p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e claim that t h e e n t i r e border w a s undelimited--and t h u s appeared accommodating to N e h r u ' s r e f u s a l t o n e g o t i a t e on t h i s basis. Chou deacrilped Sino-Indian d i f f e r e n c e s as Ymmporary, implying a w i l l i n g n e s s t o compromise, and v ;:., c h a r a o t e r l z e d t;he border c l a s h e s of f a l l 1959 as '"unfortunate and unexpected," implying P e i p i n g had n o t planned them and even regretted them. Chou w a s a l s o prepared t o rel i n q u i s h some "face'* by coming t o New Delhl, r e v e r s i n g t h e i m p l i c a t i o n of h i s 17 December 1959 l e t t e r t h a t I n d i a was n o t a s o i t a b l e site f o r talks because of " a c t i v i t i e s h o s t i l e t o Sino-Indian f r i e n d s h i p . " Nehru had twice refused C h o u ' s i n v i t a t i o n , and Chou's acceptance despite t h i s record w a s

. .

I,

. . ..

. .

.-

*However, aocording t o M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs deputy s e c r e t a r y Mehta's remarks t o an American o f f i c i a l on 9 March, t h e acid test f o r a real compromise s o l u t i o n was not Chinese w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept t h e McMahon line-as t h e y had a l r e a d y accepted t h e l i n e " i n factl*--but w i l l i n g n e s s t o withdraw from the Aksai PaBin. That is, Chinese acceptance of t h e Aksai P l a i n as Indian t e r r i t o r y and r e t r a c t i o n of t h e i r demand t h a t t h i s p a r t of Ladakh be considered a t least disputed l a n d . P e i p i n g i n d i c a t e d , through a d i s c u s s i o n by its m i l i t a r y attache in E a s t Germany w i C h a Western j o u r n a l i s t on 3 March, t h a t China might agree t o a demilitarized zone in l l c e r t a i n p o r t i o n s " of Ladakh. However, s u c h agreement w a s c o n d i t i o n a l on Indian acceptance of t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t Ladakh w a s d i s p u t e d t e r r i t o r y . The attache t h e n made It clear t h a v u n d e r no circumstances" would the Chinese withdraw from t h e road.

41

- .

a n o t h e r small concession of "face, evidencing P e i p i n g ' s u r g e n t desire t o m o l l i f y t h e Indians+ and work toward ~II o v e r a l l border s e t t l e m e n t .
The Chinese acted t o create an impression of conf i d e n c e t h a t t h e meeting would b r i n g s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s . Ambassador P a r t h a s a r a t h y reported h i s impression from Peip&ng-:on 7 March t h a t t h e Chinese were prepared t o compromise, A t t h e same time, D e p u t y Foreign Secretary,Mehta had noted t h a t whereas New D e l h i w a s approaching t h e - m e e t i n g in terms of improving r e l a t i o n s , Chinese n o t e s and Chou's latest l e t t e r had stressed a border "settlement." I
#

The Chinese t r i e d t o make t h e impression of t h e i r w i l l i n g a e s s t o n e g o t i a t e a s e t t l e m e n t even more credible by a o t i n g q u i c k l y t o sign a border agreement w i t h Nepal. Nepalese P r i m e M i n i s t e r Koirala a r r i v e d in China on 1 1 March a t Chou E n - h i ' s i n v i t a t i o n , apprehensive t h a t t h e Chinese intended t o Cake a hard l i n e w i t h h i m . However, h i s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Chou a p p a r e n t l y went along w i t h o u t a ma;lor hitch-although t h e Chinese tabled a claim t o Mt. Everest-and on 29 March Koirala s i g n e d w i t h Chou a SinoNepalese border agreement c a l l i n g f o r t h e e n t i r e boundary t o be d e l i n e a t e d and demarcated "on t h e b a s i s of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l customary l i n e As w i t h t h e Sino-Burmese border agreement ai 28 January, t h e Sino-Nepalese accord
.It

*Chou's l e t t e r had a marked s a l u t a r y effect on some Indian'opinion. I t was described by New D e l h i ' s Engllshlanguage press as I*cordial and c o n c i l i a t o r y , llcouched in f r i e n d l y terms," and "very f r i e n d l y When Nehru i n d i c a t e d t o Parliament on 29 F e b r u a r y t h a t A p r i l was s a t i s f a c t o r y t o him and expressed t h e hope i n Parliament t h a t I n d i a w o u l d r e c e i v e h e r g u e s t w i t h c o u r t e s y and h o s p i t a l i t y , Congress P a r t y and Communist r a n k s both b u r s t i n t o applause.

42

TI T

e s t a b l i s h e d a j o i n t commission t o discuss and s o l v e v a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s 8 d e t a i l , conduct border s u r v e y s , erect boundary f marker8, and d r a f t a border *'treaty.'* ,Thus t h e Nepalese were used in r o u g h l y t h e same manner as t h e Burmese; t h a t is, t h e y were persuaded t o s e t t l e t h e i r bordef. d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h China In a two-step process, first a g r e e i n g t o p r i n ciplee and t h e e s t a b l l s h d m n t of a j o i n t commission and t h e n working out a f i n a l t r e a t y . The 21 March agreement provided for t h e m u t u a l cessation of armed p a t r o l l i n g w i t h i n a 124 m i l e zone from t h e border-a proposal f o r a q u a s i - d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone similar t o one made by Chou eiwfier and rejected by Nehru for $he Sino-Indian border. I t a l s o called f o r determining t h e border l i n e in accordance w i t h t e r r a i n feat u r e s and t h e "actual j u r i s d i c t i o n " by e a c h side, and, where s o t u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n was d i s p u t e d , teams d i s p a t c h e d by t h e j o i n t commission were t o a s c e r t a i n actual c o n t r o l *'on'the spot.*' The P e l p i n g P e o p l e ' s D a i l y stressed on 26 March t h a t a l l border d i s p u t e s b e t w e e n n a and its neighbors could be s o l v e d by t a k i n g i n t o account t h e h i s t o r i c a l background and the wpresent acOual canditioaa'' and by maint a i n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo, c i t i n g t h e agreement w i t h Burma as well as Nepal. S h o r t l y a f t e r Koirala a r r i v e d in Peiping, t h e chief e d i t o r of a Hong Kong Communist newspaper t o l d h i s staff t h a t P e i p i n g hoped t h e c o r d i a l i t y of t h e t a l k s between t h e Nepalese and Chinese pr-e m i n i s t e r s w o u l d be

noted by I n d i a , * and l a t e r a t an "exclusive i n t e r v i e w with

..

*Actually, t h e Indian and Nepalese border i s s u e s were n o t comparable. The Chinese had occupied a l a r g e area of Indian-claimed t e r r i t o r y b u t had not done so w i t h Nepalese t e r r i t o r y . Nevertheless, Indian leaders,were d i s t u r b e d by t h e propaganda i m p l i c a t i o n s of Chou's use of Koirala to s i g n an agreement which seemed t o be a r e l e v a n t precedent for t h e Sino-Indian bord-pute. Moreover, t h e y feared a Chinese e f f o r t t o detach Nepal from its m i l i t a r y arrangementawith I n d i a , and New D e l h i on 1 A p r i l directed its ambassador in Katmandu t o warn the Nepalese t h a t Chott's p r o p o s a l for a non-aggression t r e a t y would a f f e c t t h e p r e s e n t India-Nepal "defense understanding."

43

NCNA" i n Hong Kong on 25 March, Koirala w a s quoted a s

follows :
I t h i n k t h e p r e s e n t unhappy c o n d i t i o n between China and I n d t a s h o u l d be ended and I hope the coming t a l k s between Premier Chou and Premier N e h r u w i l l be s u c c e s s f u l .
ing w a s i n c e s s a n t .
,

Chinese maneuvering p r i o r t o t h e Chou-Nehru meetFor example, M i n i s t r y of Foreign Affairs o f f i c i a l s informed t h e Burmese ambassador i n l a t e March t h a t Qou planned a s t o p o v e r i n Rangoon from 16 t o 18 A p r i l w i t h "noshing p a r t i c u l a r in mind" except, t h a t he hoped t h e I n s t r u m e n t s of r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Slno-Burma border agreement could be:>exchanged d u r i n g hie stay, On 7 A p r i l , t h e B u m e s e were e p o r t e d r u s h i n g prepa r a t i o n s t o r a t i f y t h e bo a g r e e L n t and f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y . Rangoon's D i r e c t o r of H i l i t > a r yT r a i n i n g , Maung conceded t h a t these Ow0 accords were being Maung, 1 used da weapons by P e i p i n g , b u t Burma "had to look ; u t = d l f . ') The Chinese i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y were coming t o engage i n more t h a n a mere exchange of g e n e r a l i t i e s and h i s t o r i cal arguwents and t h a t t h e y e r p e d e d p o s i t i v e c o n c r e t e res u l t s . When, in l a t e March, Chou (through t h e Indian ambass a d o r ) indicatwd t o Nehru h i s i n t e n t i o n t o spend six days in New Delhi--despite Nehru's busy schedule--and *hat he w o u l d come a t t h e head of a h i g h - l e v e l d e l e g a t i o n t o a r r i v e 30-strong in three a i r c r a f t , Nehru and h i s M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs a d v i s e r s were somewhat taken aback. They had seen n o t h i n g in t h e s u b s t a n c e of P e l p i n g ' s n o t e s %hat would necessitate a b u s i n e s s - l i k e d e l e g a t i o n and a l o n g v i s i t . When asked a t an offifhe-record news conference on 5 April what Chou would be doing f o r six days in New D e l h i , Nehru r e p l i e d t h a t Chou was'quite capable of t a l k i n g s t e a d i l y for three or four: hburs a t a stretch, b u t d i d n o t f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e . On t h e same dag, Nehru informed t h e c a b i n e t Foreign Affairs Bubcommittee t h a t P e i p i n g ' s 3 A p r i l n o t e merely reiterated earlier Chinese p o s i t ions-- i n c l u d i n g a d e n i a l t h a t t h e e n t i r e boundary f o l l o w s t h e I n d i a n - c i t e d

44

watershed--and Nehru expressed t o t a l pessimism on t h e poss i b l e outcome of h i s m e t i n g w i t h Chou: "1 map have t o break off the t a l k s in t w o days."*
As Nehru contemplated and d i s c u s s e d t h e l i n e t o t a k e w i t h Chou, t h e advice he r e c e i v e d from v a r i o u s q u a r t e r s was t o be adamant. During d i s c u s s i o n s i n New D e l h i in early A p r i l , N a s i r urged him t o resist Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l demands, and Sukarno warned t h a t "Any weakening on y o u r ' p a r t w i l l have a s t r o n g l y adverse effect on Asian r e s i s t a n c e t o Com-

munism. P r e s i d e n t Prasad r e p e a t e d l y counselled Nehru n o t t o make any concessions t o Chou, and on 13 April wrote t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r in order t o e n s u r e t h a t f u t u r e generat i o n s would have no cause t o blame t h o s e who t o o k p a r t in t h e freedom s t r u g g l e f o r any " c a p i t u l a t i o n " now. Ambassador P a r t h a s a r a t h y implied t o American offici.als i n Hong gong on 12 April that he was concerned t h a t Nehru might be t a k e n In by Chou and, on a r r i v i n g i n New D e l h i , he suggested t o Nehru t h a t I n d i a n ' s ~ ~ po'lricy can o n l y be t o reject f i r m l y a l l Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l claims. In a d d i t i o n , t h e p r e s s and Opposition leaders-the l a t t e r in a 4 A p r i l letter--admanished Nehru h o t t o concede any Indian t e r r i t o r y .
Thus Chou, who came w i t h a real hope*+ of g a i n i n g agreement i n p r d n c i p l e t h a t t h e border w a s not delimited and t h e r e f o r e s u b j e c t t o n e g o t i a t i o n , w a s confronted by an

tl

*Nehru is - J r e p o r t e d t o have made t h e f o l l o w i n g comment t o Kingsley Martin i n e a r l y April: "In c e r t a i n circumstances I would n o t have minded g i v i n g away a l i t t l e bit of Ladakh firesumably t h e Aksai P l a i n 7 , but I do n o t want t h e Chinese t o t a k e me for a sucker: Chou En-la1 h a s l i e d t o m so o f t e n t h a t I do n o t f e e l l i k e t r u s t i n g him e , any morerTT

+*The b u s i n e s s - l i k e Chinese delegat i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e Chinese premier had come--as h e said on a r r i v a l on 19 April-" t h i s t i m e . . . w i t h t h e s i n c e r e desire t o s e t t l e questions.*T Chou a p p a r e n t l y believed t h a t Nehru's s t a t e m e n t s i n f a l l 1959 r e g a r d i n g t h e of t h e Aksai P l a i n and I n d i a ' e record of having had no a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in t h a t **barren, uninhabited place" i n d i c a t e d Nehru's real poaftion--vi2 w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept Chinese presence i n t h e P l a i n , v i r t u a l l y w r i t i n g it o f f . H e was aware-and, in t r y i n g t o prove Peiping's case on j u r i s d i c t i o n , Chinese border arperts l a t e r pointed out--that Nehru had t o l d Parliamenton 10 September 1959 t h a t t h e Aksai P l a i n Ifhas n o t been under any kind of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " and on 23 November t h a t under B r i t i s h r u l e , (continued on page 46)

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. .
. .

Indian prime m i n i s t e r who was more adamant t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d . N e h r u ' s p l a n was t o reject s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s pending Chinese withdrawal from t h e Askai P l a i n . H i s t a c t i c w a s t o exclude a d v i s e r s from t h e t a l k s as l o n g as p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r "to have it o u t p e r s o n a l l y " w i t h Chou f o r t w o o r three daya, From t h e v e r y s t a r t of Chou's v i e i t , N e h r u used unu s u a l l y direct language. A t t h e airport on 19 A p r i l , Nehru stated t h a t s i n c e Chou's last v i s i t in 1956 e v e n t s had placed a great s t r a i n on Sino-Indian f r i e n d s h i p and had shocked I n d i a , i m p e r i l l i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a t p r e s e n t and i n t h e f y t u r e . On 20 A p r i l , Nehru spent most of h i s first two-hour t a l k s w i t h Chou l e c t u r i n g t h e l a t t e r on "ancient h i s t o r y " of t h e border. After Chou responded by maintaining t h a t t h e Aksai P l a i n belonged t o China and t h a t Chinese e n g i n e e r s , having found no a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in t h e area, simply had gone ahead w i t h b u i l d i n g t h e road, Nehru decided t o g i v e Chou more "lectures.** Chou r a n i n t o a s t o n e wall even w i t h h i s * o l d f r i e n d , Defense M i h i s t e r Kriehna Menon, whom Nehru conspicuously had excluded, f o r domestic pol it i. cal r e a s o n s , from h i s a d v i s o r y entourage b u t whom Chou requested* t o see "to thank h i m for s u p p o r t i n t h e UN." Menon reportedly t o l d Chou on 20 A p r i l t h a t no p a r t of Indian t e r r i t o r y would be y i e l d e d and t h a t t h e Chtnese s h o u l d take advantage of t h e f a c t t h a t N e h r u ' s government w a s more f r i e n d l y t o China t h a n any subsequent Indian government could be, implying t h a t Chou s h o u l d make some concession.
On 21 A p r i l , Chou continued t o d e p a r t from diplomatic precedent by resuming his e f f o r t t o Influence Indian leadere in s e p a r a t e , p r i v a t e talks--a t a c t i c Nehru had not

. .
. ..

L+,

Ij

(footnote contlnued from page 45) as far a8 I know, t h i s area w a s n e i t h e r i n h a b i t e d by any people, nor were there any outposts." I n f a c t , however, Nehru's wavering between u l t i m a t e c e s s i o n of t h e P l a i n and demands for a Chinese withdrawal had come t o an end d u r i n g t h e April consultations with h i s advisers.

Menon s t i m u l a t e d t h e inte DY m n g AmDaBsauor Part a s a r a t h y t o ask Chou t o r e q u e s t of Nehru t h a t Menon be permitted t o v i s i t w i t h him, Nebru l a t e r defended Menon's meeting w i t h Chou b e f o r e t h e Chinese premier met w i t h t h e . o f f i c i a l l y d e s i g n a t e d c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s by s t a t i n g t h a t he had a u t h o r i z e d t h e mee t i n g

46

a n t i c i p a t e d b u t d i d n o t t r y t o block. Chou's separate t a l k w i t h Home M i n i s t e r Pant on 21 A p r i l w a s e s s e n t i a l l y another lecture, as Pant spoke b l u n t l y and w i t h some heat on t h e theme of "We f e e l betrayed." Finance M i n i s t e r Desai d i d n o t mince words when he too2 h i s t u r n w i t h Chou on 32 A p r i l . When Chou w a s stimulated t o c r i t i c i z i n g New D e l h i f o r g r a n t i n g asylum t o t h e Dalai Lama, Desai was r e p o r t e d t o have replied: 'tYou should be t h e on t o objec% t o p o l i t i c a l asylum. Where would you be today if p o l i t i c a l asylum had n o t been given t o Lenin?" On t h e same day, when Chou t o l d V i c e P r e s i d e n t Badhakrishnan--also a t a s e p a r a t e talk-Chht ' he could not convince "the Chinese peoplett t h a t Ladakh and t h e Aksai P l a i n in p a r t i c u l a r d i d not belong t o them because of t h e legends going back t o t h e 1 2 t h c e n t u r y which s u p p o r t e d .'' Chinese claims, t h e vice p r e s i d e n t r e p o r t d d l y r e p l i e d that? on s u c h a basis I n d i a could claim Kandahar, K a b u l , and many other areas i n c l u d i n g p a r t s of China. Radhakrishnan went on t o n e t t l e Chou w i t h t h e comment t h a t "You have h u r t us deeply, and it is s u r p r i s i n g you d o n ' t know it!" Thus a t t h e end of three days of almost u n i n t e r r u p t e d d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Nehru and top o f f i c i a l s , Chou had not made a dent i n t h e I n d i a n p o s i t i o n on tadakh and had shown no w i l l i n g n e s s t o agree t o N e h r u ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t Chinese troops be withdrawn from t'occupiedlq areas.
C h o u ' s p u b l i c and p r i v a t e remarks made it clear t h a t t h e Chinese had t r i e d t o g a i n from I n d i a n o f f i c i a l s an exchange of t h e NEFA f o r Chinese-occupied Ladrilth. The 27 A p r i l circular message t o I n d i a n embassies stated t h a t t h e Chinese "throughout t h e d i s c u s s i o n s had i n v a r i a b l y l i n k e d Ladakh w i t h t h e NEFA and stressed t h a t t h e same p r i n c i p l e s of s e t t l i n g t h e boundary m u s t govern both areas, I t w a s also obvious t h a t if we accepted t h e l i n e claimed by China in Ladakh, t h e y would a c c e p t t h e McMahon l i n e . " A t one p o i n t in t h e i r l o n g c o n v e r s a t i o n s , Chou r e p o r t e d l y had offered t o withdraw Chinese troops from Longju as d f r i e n d l y g e s t u r e , and Nehru had responded by o f f e r i n g a withdrawal of some Indian f o r c e s a t one p o i n t in Ladakh, b u t d u r i n g t h e f i n a l d r a f t i n g of t h e communique, Chou waa again adamant and dropped h i s o r i g i n a l o f f e r . Regarding a f u t u r e meeting, Chou proposed t h a t a slbatement t o t h a t effect be Included i n t h e communique as w e l l as t h e phrase,

1
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I .

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'*and w e hope t h i s border d i s p u t e w i l l be solved forever;1* Nehru rejected both p r o p o s a l s and agreed o n l y o r a l l y t o meet w i t h Chou.Qn:.condition t h a t t h e t a l k s t o be held by s u b o r d i n a t e o f f i c i a l s produced c o n c r e t e progress.* A t h i s 25 A p r i l press conference--reportedly held d e s p i t e o f f i c i a l I n d i a n disapproval--Chou prof eased w i l l i n g n e s s t o come a g a i n t o New D e l h i if n e c e s s a r y f o r Sino-Indian amity. Thus t h e most Chou was able t o s a l v a g e from t h e t o t a l deadlock w a s some leeway t o g i v e an impression of p a r t i a l s u c c e s s and t h e impression also thaC t h e t a l k s would be continued.
The f a i l u r e of Chou'a probe f o r a s o f t spot i n t h e p o s i t i o n of Nehru and h i s advisers**- w a s clearay i n d i c a t e d in t h e 25 A p r i l communique- he i s s u e d w i t h Nehru. The t a l k s understanding of opposing views b u t had l e d t o a ltbetterVf @ @ dnd t r e s o l v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t had a r i s e n . " Nehru io rejected Chou's proposal t o i n c l u d e in t h e communique t h a t he would meet a g a i n w i t h Chou. A l l t h a t Nehru d i d agree t o was t o t u r n t h e i s s u e over t o s u b o r d i n a t e o f f i c i a l s of both c o u n t r i e s , who were t o meet from June t o September t o

..

*In advancing this c o n d i t i o n , Nehru w a s aware t h a t t h e lower l e v e l t a l k s would come t o nothing, and s e v e r a l c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s stated j u s t t h a t . I n a d d i t i o n t o remarks on t h e matter made by Finance M i n i s t e r Desai on 26 April, Foreign Secretary Dutt t o l d t h e American charge on 28 April t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l s would " c e r t a i n l y not1* come t o any agreement, as each would merely s t a t e h i s c o u n t r y ' s claims and r e p o r t back t o t h e c a b i n e t . D u t t added t h a t he p e r s o n a l l y would n o t w a n t t o be one of them.
**Chou eV8n arranged a separate meeting w i t h former ambassador t o P e i p i n g , R. K. Nehru, on 22 A p r i l , who l a t e r stated t h a t t h e Indian p o s i t i o n w a s too r i g i d and t h a t some accomodation s h o u l d be made t o Chinese claims t o t h e Aksai Plain--the o n l y break in an otherwise s o l i d Indian diplomatic f r o n t . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e r e p o r t e d in t h e Chinese d e l e g a t i o n was t h a t Chou w a s less g r u f f t h a n Chen Yi in maintaining t h e same Chinese p o s i t i o n w i t h monotonous regular it y

48

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examine, check, and s t u d y t h e h i s t o r i c a l evidence of each side and d r a f t a j o i n t r e p o r t on p o i n t s of "agreement and disagreement" b u t t h e y were not empowered t o recommend a s o l u t i o n . F a i l u r e w a s a l s o reflected i n Chou's formal s t a t e m e n t t o a press conference in New D e l h i on 25 A p r i l , when he conceded there were "still d i s t a n c e s " between t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s on s i x points "of proximity'' i n c l u d i n g t h e m a t t e r of p a t r o l l i n g along t h e bordbr. After r e a d i n g t h f 8 prepared s t a t e m e n t , Chou answered ' q u e a t i o n s and made a comment about t h e border, drawing d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e three sectors. The d i f f e r e n c e s (1) in t h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r were qlsmall...and o n l y on p a r t i c u l a r amms," (2) in t h e e a s t e r n sector were minor because t h e Chinese would not cross t h e so-called McMahon l i n e and '*we have n o t s e t . f o r t h any t e r r i t o r i a l claims," and (3) in t h e Western sector were '*bigger" because t h e Chinese asked New D e l h i t o take a s i m i l a r stand--i.e. in r e t u r n f o r Chinese acceptance of t h e NEPA s t a t u s quo, " I n d i a w a s asked n o t t o c r o s s t h e l i n e which appears on Chlnese maps" i n Ladakh--but New D e l h i '*has not e n t i r e l y agreed."* R egard i n g Longj u , Chou i n s i s t e d t o t h e j o u r n a l i s t s t'hat it was Chinese territ o r y and n o r t h of t h e McMahon l i n e . Trying t o s a l v a g e a modicum of goodwill, Chou referred t o h i s formal s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e d i s p u t e is o n l y "temporary" and i n v i t e d Nehru t o come t o Peiping when convenient f o r f u r t h e r t a l k s and " t o promote f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . 1 1 An Indian c i r c u l a r message of 27 A p r i l summed up t h e results of Chougs v i s i t in terse language--ttThe views of t h e two governments remain as far a p a r t as beforel'--and directed Indian embassies to r e b u t t t h e f i n a l impression Chou sought t o create a t h i s s u r p r i s e news conference (at which he i s s u e d what w a s , in effect, a u n A l a t e r a l communique) t h a t each s i d e now a p p r e c i a t e d t h e other's p o i n t of view better o r t h a t there w a s a p r o s p e c t f p r a %ettlement
.It

*Foreign Secretary D u f t t o l d t h e A p r i l t h a t Indian o f f i c i a l s d i d n o t press claims t o t e r r i t o r y n o r t h and though in effect t he i r agreement t o keep t h e m from doing SO;

American charge on 28 agree w i t h Chou not t o east of t he Karakorams, avoid in c i d e n t s would

r-

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When Chou and h i s d e l e g a t i o n had l e f t f o r Katmandu, Nehru a p p a r e n t l y decided t o insist p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e tvwrong"' m u s t be undone-that is, t h a t . t l e Chinese '..vabate.-thlelr .."aggression." D u r i n g h i s t a l k s w i t h Chou, h i s a t t i t u d e had been t h a t t h e d i s p u t e could n o t be settled by b a r g a i d i n g or by an exchange b u t rather by Chinese withdrawals i d Ladakh. Chou's p o s i t i o n was t h a t if t h e y were t o withdraw, n o t h i n g Would be l e f t t o n e g o t i a t e about. Wehru t o l d P a r l i a m e n t on 26 A p r i l t h a t I n d i a ' s e n t i r e argument w a s based on "Chinese fyrcea having come i n t o our t e r r i C o r y . I q Returning from Nepal-where he had s i g n e d a Treaty of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p (not a non-aggression pact as Chou had proposed in March i n Peiping) and had t r i e d t o s o o t h tempers aroused by P e i p i n g ' s claim t o Mt. E v e r e s t d u r i n g h i s March 1960 t a l k s w i t h Koirala--Chou on 29 A p r i l stated in C a l c u t t a w i t h f a i n t l y concealed pique t h a t Nehru had never mentioned a g g r e s s i o n d u r i n g t h e i r New D e l h i t a l k s and t h a t such an a c c u s a t i o n a f t e r t h e Chinese d e p a r t u r e was '@unfriendly.** The Chou-Nehru r e l a t i o n s h i p had f a l l e n t o its lowest p o i n t ever.
The Chou-Nehru

''Understanding'@ on Border P a t r o l 1i n g

Chou d i d not g a i n f r o m N e h r u an e x p l i c i t , formal agreement t o s t o p s e n d i n g o u t Indian p a t r o l s . H e b e l i e v e d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t a n Informal m u t u a l understanding had been reached t o suspend forward p a t r o l l i n g . The Chinese premier had i n d i c a t e d in h i s 25 A p r i l formal s t a t e m e n t in New D e l h i t h a t both sides had agreed t h a t " a l l efforts" s h o u l d be made t o avoid clashes. However, t h i s had n o t been w r i t t e n i n t o t h e 25 A p r i l communique. Chou a l s o s t a t e d a t h i s p r e s s conference t h a t there were ' W i l l d i s t a n c e s " between t h e two s i d e s on t h e matter of " r e f r a i n i n g from p a t r o l l i n g a l l along t h e border. Nevertheless, t h a t some form of a v e r b a l m u t u a l understanding had been reached was s u g g e s t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t N e h r u in Parliament on 29 A p r i l d i d n o t c o n t r a d i c t an opponent who claimed t h a t Nehru had agreed with Chou t o s t o p s e n d i n g o u t p a t r o l s . The I n d i a n Director of M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e had t o l d t h e American m i l i t a r y a t t a c h e on 26 A p r i l t h a t Chinese forward p a t r o l l i n g had ceased and t h a t t h e I n d i a n s would take no a c t i o n which

I I '

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might provoke border i n c i d e n t s .

I'

The apparent informal o r a l understanding t e m p o r a r i l y t o cease s e n d i n g o u t forward patrols d i d not a f f e c t New D b l h i ' s program of reinforcement in Ladakh.. N e h r u reporte d l y t o l d P r e s i d e n t Praaad on 25 April t h a t regardless of t h e outcome of h i s t a l k s w i t h Chou, police c o n s t a b u l a r y u n i t s would be replaced by regular army u n i t s and t h a t t h e government would press forward w i t h t h e development of t h e e n t i r e border area and w i t h ..the c o n s t r u c t ion of communicat i o n l i n e s and new roads.- A t t h e opening of t h e N a t i o n a l Defehse College on 27 A p r i l , Nehru described t h e border s i t u a t i o n as '*ane n t i r e l y new danger" which r e q u i r e d an o v e r a l l defense s t r s t w g y based on " r e a l i s t i c and n o t ideali s t i c grounds .'' Eowever, r e g a r d i n g t h e important matter of a c q u i r i n g m i l i t a r y aid f r o m t h e West, as suggested by some newspapers and members of P a r l i a m e n t , Nehru on 29 A p r i l v i g o r o u s l y reiterated his n a t i o n a l go-it a l o n e p o l i c y of t*non-alignment.
On 3 June, a Chinese p a t r o l of about 25 men c r o s s e d i n t o Indian-claimed t e r r i t o r y in t h e Kameng D i v i s i o n of t h e NEPA and p e n e t r a t e d t o Taksang Monastery about 4 . 5 m i l e s s o u t h of t h e McMahon l i n e . I - -

1"

'

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. : ,

noz-unti~ zv ~ u r y n a t N ew mini rormallj protested t t h e Chinese i n c u r a i o n and n o t u n t i l 1 2 A u g u s t t h a t t h e matter was nade p u b l i c in P a r l i a m e n t . In reporting t h e i n c i d e n t , deputy m i n i s t e r of E x t e r n a l Affairs M s Lakshmi r. Menon s t a t e d t h a t t h e Chinese p a t r o l withdrew "when t h e a t t e n t i o n of the local people was drawn t o t h e i r presence." Nehru himaelf, a t t e m p t i n g t o c o u n t e r q u e s t i o n s from t h e Opposition, stressed t h a t t h e Chinese had come and gone . s t e a l t h i l g - - ' * l i k e t h i e v e s in t h e n i g h t avoiding places . where t h e y might be seen." Nehru in effect conceded t h a t

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t h e r e had been a " p r o v i s i o n a l understanding" w i t h Chou?t o cease forward p a t r o l l i n g , by s t a t i n g t h a t P e i p i n g had comm i t t e d *'a breach of t h e understanding."*
A c t u a l l y , t h e Chou-Nehru "understanding" had not resulted in a complete suspension of p a t r o l a c t i v i t y but rather in c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e scope of s u c h a c t i v i t y . ks e x p l a i n e d t o an American o f f i c i a l on 19 August by a s e n i o r M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs o f f i c i a l , t h e unders t a n d i n g between t h e t w o prime m i n i s t e r s had been not'to send out forward p a t r o l s beyond t h e , p o i n t of "actual control." Patrols a p p a r e n t l y continued t o operate w i t h i n t h e border area u p t o t h e l i n e of a c t u a l c o n t r o l as i n t e r p r e t e d by each s i d e . The Indian o f f i c i a l admitted t h a t there'were

.. ..

*When Menon asked Nehru in e a r l y June t o adopt a more aggreas i v e p o l icy of forward p a t r o l 1 ing, N e h r u r e p o r t e d l y t o l d t h e d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r t6at he d i d n o t want s u c h a c t i o n Y o r t h e time being" and would await developments before making a p o s i t i v e d e c i s i o n . I n d i a n p a t r o l l i n g may have been i n c r e a s e d f o l l o w i n g t h e 3 June i n c i d e n t .

. .

By A p r i l 1960, when t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e erupted i n t o a b i t t e r polemic, Krishna Menon's a t t i t u d e toward Peiping had hardened d e c i s i v e l y . One month earlier, Menon a p p a r e n t l y had been willing to h i n t p u b l i c l y a b o u t Indian acceptance of Chinese c o n t r o l of t h e Aksai P l a i n , b u t ' i n l a t e April--following P e l p i n g ' s p u b l i c a t i o n of its Lon L i v e Lsninism d i a t r i b e a g a i n s t Khrushchev's p o l i c i e d e took a no-compromise l i n e w i t h Chou En-lai, and by June, Menon was more anti-Chinese t h a n he e v e r had been.

.-

. .

MBnon, who has o f t e n appeared t o be a w i l l i n g S o v i e t s u p p o r t e r , is t h e dominant i n f l u e n c e i n t h e paper, Link. Link is s u p p o r t e d by Soviet funds and, in t u r n , s u p p o r t s m e t p o l i c i e s , t a k i n g a clear pro-Moscow l i n e in t h e ' c o n t i n u i n g Moscow-Peiping d i s p u t e .

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no boundary markings, making it easy f o r a p a t r o l t o c r o s s t h e watershed w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g it.* Nevertheless, he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e Chinese were engaged i n probing a c t i o n s to extend t h e i r area of control.
Chinese P a t r o l l i n g P o l i c y :
1960

Following t h e Chou-Nehru O a l k s , t h e Chinese leaders in summer and f a l l 1960 a p p a r e n t l y employed a two-fold p o l i c y of (1) c e a s i n g regular patrol a c t i v i t y in t h e i r selfimposed demilitarized zones along t h e border, w h i l e (2) on occmion s e n d i n g o u t reconnaissance parties i n the immediate v i c i n i t y of t h e i r border p o s t s . The primary goal w a s t o reduce f u r t h e r the p o s e i b i l i t y of armed clashes, clashes which had h u r t them p o l i t i c a l l y .

The f i r s t p a r t of t h e p o l i c y was directed toward t h i s According Bo a captured Chinese Communist document which had been i s s u e d by t h e T i b e t M i l i t a r y Region Command Headquarters of t h e PLA on 1 4 November 1960, a l l border t r o o p s were t o e x e r c i s e extreme r e s t r a i n t . The document, which was used f o r troop i n d o c t r i n a t i o n on border p o l i c y , quoted from t h e Border Defense P r i n c i p l e s for t h e Southwest Regions--a h i g h - l e v e l p o l i c y guide which had been "approved b y p a r t y C e n t r a l Committee and Chairman Maol*=-on t h e need t o m a i n t a i n conanand d i s c i p l i n e : goal.

,' .'

. .' . -

Peiping r e j e c t i n g the Chinese v e r s i o n as f a t u o u s . The n o t e stated t h a t t h e Indian government doubted t h a t the i n c i d e n t was a "mistake" made by nine Chinese " l o c a l working personnel'* who had l o s t ther way w h i l e "felling'bambool* --because t h e number observed w a s 25, t h e y carried arms s l u n g from t h e shoulder, and there is no bainboo in t h e Himalayas or elsewhere a t e l e v a t i o n s of 12,000 t o 15,000 feet above sea l e v e l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e Chanese r e p l y had been v e r y close t o a formal apology.

*Following the Chinese r e p l y t o I n d i a ' s protest of t h e 3 J u n e i n t r u s i o n , New Delhi on 24 October s e n t a note t o

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w i t h i n a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e on o u r s i d e of t h e border, p a t r o l 6 are n o t p e r m i t t e d . . A t t h e same t i m e , when armed personnel from the neighboring country creafe prov o c a t i o n s and begin t o attack, t h e y m u s t be warned t o h a l t t h e i r attack and t o w i t h draw w i t h i n t h e i r own boundary. Even though t h e warning proves i n e f f e c t i v e , 'it is uniformly forbidden t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k b e f o r e r e c e i v i n g orders from higher l e v e l s . . . /emphasis s u p p l led/ This s t i p u l a t i o n a p p a r e n t l y had stirred soae of t h e P L A rank and f i l e t o q u e s t i o n its f e a s i b i l i t y in t a c t i c a l s i t u a tions. The document charged t h a t **somepeople" agree with t h e .party's o v e r a l l border p o l i c y , but f i n d it very 'aiffic u l t t o c a r r y o u t . They complain, and, in f a c t , "do n o t have enough f a i t h in t h e border s t r u g g l e policy.1v One of t h e complaints cited w a s t h e following:

...

If t h e armed personnel of the neighboring c o u n t r y do n o t l i s t e n fo our warnings and w i t h great bombast and arrogance c a r r y o u t aggression, what s h o u l d we do? If t h e y cannot be t r u s t e d and, on t h e cont r a r y , surround us, blocking our way, what Ohen?
The answer missed t h e m a r k , cauticbnlng: troops first not t o n s p e c u l a t e v l about what mi ht occur, then r e j e c t i n g as a prob a b i l i t y large-scale a t ac s, and f i n a l l y begging t h e quest i o n of what t o do i f c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d i d occur. I t concluded mere1y by r e i t e r a t i n g a b l a n k e f i o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i v e

*The document p r o v i d e s c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence t h a t many PLA cadres d i s l i k e d t h e i r assignment t o T i b e t and were simply w a i t i n g t o complete t h e i r s t i n t and r e t u r n t o areas of more f a v o r a b l e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s .

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. . .

t o await orders from "higher l e v e l s , f f of which t h e h i g h e s t t u r n e d o u t t o be t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committee, Presumably, m i l i t a r y moves a g a i n s t t h e Indian border forces were t o be t a k e n on even t h e smallest scale only on direct order from t h e T i b e t Region Command Headquarters, which may have acted only, even i n Oactlcal s i t u a t i o n s , on i n s t r u c t i o n s from Peaping. Although t h e regional headquarters 9 have had some t a c t i c a l command autonomy, t h e p a t r o l s seem t o have had v i r e u a l l y none :
Matters concerning border defense, whether large o ' small, m u s t be a c c u r a t e l y reported l t o higher l e v e l s and i n s t r u c t i o n s r e q u e s t e d . We cannot be n e g l i g e n t or get b i g ideas. Even less can we handle t h i n g s on o u r own.

. ..
' i

.
~

..

As for m i l i t a r y a u t i o n a g a i n s t t h e T i b e t a n rebels, it was t o take place w e l l w i t h i n T i b e t ' s borders: "no' combat near t h e borders...these rebels would be l u r e d i n t o deep p e n e t r a t i o n f * and then.. a n n i h i l a t e d
The second p a r t of t h e p o l i c y called f o r maintaining a c o u r a t e i n t e l l i g e n c e on Indian and Tibetan-rebel m i l i t a r y moves through some reconnaissance a c t i v i t y . The captured document stated:
If w j u s t sit a t o u r p o s t s and know n o t h i n g e of c o n d i t i o n s , we w i l l be unable t o p r e v e n t o r expose t h e provocations and attacks of t h e r e a c t i o n a r i e s o r t o make p r e p a r a t i o n s t o meet an actual development. The r e g u l a t i o n c a l l i n g f o r c e s s a t i o n of patrols a l o n g t h e border does not mean t h a t reconnaissance and t h e understanding of c o n d i t i o n s are p r o h i b i t e d . The s t r e n g t h e n i n g of v i l i g a n c e and c a u t i o n a t t h e v a r i o u s posts and t h e u s e of reconnaissance t o observe t h e l o c a l sit u a t ion is st ill necessary.

Rgconnaissance a c t i v i t y apparently w a s restricted t o t h e area in t h e immediate locale of t h e border p o s t s , There were, of course, o t h e r means of c o l l e c t i n g m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e on Indian and Tibetan-rebel p o s i t i o n s and movements.

- 55 -

These included t h e u s e of border t r i b a l people, p r i m a r i l y T i b e t a n s . In d i s c u s s i n g reasons f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e good w i l l of border p e o p l e s , t h e documents made t h e f o l l o w i n g comment : S t r o n g p o i n t s fir, camps7 can be set up o n l y on passes that-overlook t h e r o u t e s and highways. I t is impossible t o e s t a b l i s h d e f e n s e s a t p o i n t s a l l along t h e border. Thus there w i l l be a great expanse of empty ground, and, under these d o n d l t i o n s , w e have t o depend on t h e broad masses of t h e people t o p l u g these gaps and prevent p e n e t r a t i o n by t h e enemy and bad elements. If t h e enemy does p e n e t r a t e , he can be detected r e a d i l y and h i s p r o g r e s s made d i f f i c u l t . In order t o prevent border p e n e t r a t i o n s by armed pers o n n e l of t h e neighboring s t a t e and t o f lrmly, d e l i b e r a t e l y , and f i e r c e l p attack r e t u r n i n g rebels, we must have t i m e l y coll e c t i o n of v a r i o u s kinds of i n t e l l i g e n c e and immediate knowledge of and r e a c t i o n t o t h e enemy's moves... P a r t l y t o meet t h i s m S l I t a r y - i n t e l l i g e n c e r e q u i r e m e n t , t h e " m a s s l i n e " of t h e P L A i n T i b e t was t o be I m p l W n t e d r i g orously. However, it c l a s h e d d i r e c t l y with t h e p o l i c y of a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e T i b e t a n rebels, many of whose r e l a t i v e s and f r i e n d s were t h e very same " m a s s e s ' * t h e Chinese were t r y i n g t o use. The r e f e r e n c e t o g r e a t gaps in t h e defense line--which was n o t r e a l l y a *'line** u t r a t h e r a s e r i e s b of w i d e l y separated posts--suggests t h a t even if there had been an a c t i v e and e x t e n s i v e patrol p o l i c y i n f a l l 1960, t h e Chinese would have been unable t o cover t h e ent i r e Pokder.
The imposition of more s t r i n g e n t l i m i t a t i o n s on p a t r o l l i n g d e s p i t e Indian moves up t o t h e border and T i b e t a n r a i d s acros8 it a p p a r e h t l y l e d t o grumbling among t h e PLA rank and f i l e . The c a p t u r e d document t r i e d t o provide a rationale for d e f e n s i v e n e s s and caution. It i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e whole border s t r u g g l e w a s p r i m a r i l y a p o l i t i c a l , f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a t t e r and o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y a m i l i t a r y matter.

" ...

56

Repeatedly, it stressed t h a t a r e s t r a i n e d p a t r o l p o l i c y was " a b s o l u t e l y not a show of weakness," b u t rather a d i s p l a y of " t h e scope of our p o l i t i c a l vision." I t c u t t i n g l y attacked t h e " p u r e l y m i l i t a r y " viewpoint of c e r t a i n unnamed PLA personnel :
W absolutely cannot view t h e provocations e and attacks of t h e neighboring country on

o u r border merely from t h e p u r e m i l i t a r y s t a n d p o i n t . We m u s t n o t replace poldcies w i t h emotions and e r r o n e o u s l y regard t he s t r u g g l e s t r a t e g y of avoiding armed clashes as an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t we are weaker t h a n t h e neighboring country, o r t h a t t h i s s t r a t e g y means t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y had abandoned its dQty bf pr8te0tiag the f a t h e r l a n d . If w e view t h i n g s in t h i s way, w e w i l l n o t be able t o remain cool when we encounter t h e armea personnel of' t h e neighboring c o u n t r y c a r r y i n g o u t p r o v o c a t i o n s and creati n g confusion. O u r emotions w o u l d overw h e l m u s and w e would be unable t o r e g r a i n from s t r i k i n g o u t . We would n o t look t o t h e larger s i t u a t i o n and would n o t ask for orders o r w a i t I'or d i r e c t i o n s from above before opening iire and s t r i k i n g back. In t h a t case, we might g a i n a greaCer m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y , b u t p o l i t i c a l l y we would f a l l i n t o t h e t r a p of t h e other s i d e and w o u l d cause o n l y great i n d u r y t o t h e p a r t y and s t a t e --the biggest mistake. /zmphasis s u p p l i e d 7

The d e t r i m e n t a l consequences of a " p u r e l y m i l i t a r y " viewp o i n t were described f o r PLA border personnel by drawing on t h e f o r e i g n policy r e p e r c u s s i o n s of t h e Sino-Nepalese c l a s h of 28 June near Mustang.* The document referred t o

*The Sino-Indian c l a s h e s of August and October 1959, howe v e r , were n o t cited as PLA m i s t a k e s b u t rather aa I n d i a n "attacks." This p o s i t i o n complied w i t h t h e document's l i n e t h a t Nepal and Burma were f r i e n d l y neighbors and t h a t t h e y shollld therefore be seen as " d i f f e r e n t from" I n d i a .

57

t h e 1960 i n c i d e n t a& p r o v i d i n g a " p a i n f u l lesson, ," ' t h e results of which should be s e e n as h a r m f u l t o China's f o r e i g n pol i c y e f f o r t :
. .

start another anti-Chinese movement t o p u t u s p o l i t i c a l l y on t h e d e f e n s i v e . Our c o u n t r y not o n l y paid a n indemnity, b u t Premier Chou En-la1 made a formal apology on behalf of o u r government t o t h e government of Nepal.

Imper la1ism and fore i g n react i o n a r 1 s used 8 t h i s i n c i d e n t t o s l a n d e r u s , create an atmosphere of c r i s i s , and stir up trouble in o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Nepal, p l o t t i n g t o

We c a n see from this t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y can only serve the political uggle. If w e i g n o r e our p o l i t i c a l d u t i and s i m p l y f i g h t f o r t h e sake of f i g h t i n g , we n o t o n l y a*.s t h e p o i n t a b o u t , f i g h t i n g , b u t a l s o inev5tably make mistakes and cause losses t o the f a t h e r l a n d . W ndst, therefore, solemnly e accept t h e p a i n f u l l e s s o n of t h e gel1 Bass i n c i d e n t and take it as a warning,..We must have s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n e 'and resolutely and unswervingly implement t h e poliaies and regulations of t h e p a r t y .
On 39 June, one day after t h e i n c i d e n t , Katmandu had protested o f f i c i a l l y t o P e i p i n g , charging t h a t t h e Chinese had k i l l e d a Nepalese checkpost o f f i c e r and had arrested 15 Nepalese n a t i o n a l s . The Nepalese complained t h a t t h e attack had been unprovoked and c o n s t i t u t e d a v i o l a t ionrof t h e agrebrnent reached i n March 1960 d e m i l i t a r i z i n g t h e Sino-Nepalese border. Prime M i n i s t e r Jbirala cont iaued t o press Chou through letters f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n , and on 1 1 J u l y s e n t a t h i r d l e t t e r t o the Chinese premier, demanding t h a t Chinese troops be p u l l e d back 124 miles f-m t h e border as agreed on in March and t h r e a t e n i n g t o d e l a y the s t a v t of t h e Sino-Nepalese j o i n t commission tallis an border demarc a t i o n . S t a r t i n g on 30 June, Chou r e p o r t e d l y s e n t a t o t a l of four l e t t e r s i n r e p l y , t r y i n g t o m o l l i f y t h e angered Nepalese. Chou admitted t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t w a s t h e r e s u l t

58

..

.&

of Chinese l v c a r e l e s s n e s s ,'' expressed regret, and accepted Nepalese demands for compensat ion--all t h i s in an e f f o r t t o prevent t h e Nepalese from e x t e n s i v e l y p u b l i c i z i n g t h e Chinese m i l i t a r y a c t i o n and thereby proodding New D e l h i w i t h an e x p l o i t a b l e e v e n t . Chou r e p o r t e d l y offered "prof u s e apologies" for t h e action of Chinese t r o o p s in e x t r a c t ing "coni eseions'* from t h e Nepalese v i l l a g e r s c a p t u r e d during t h e i n c i d e n t , and t h e n s t a t e d t h a t Chinese troops had been withdrawn from t h e Sino-Nepalese d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone. The only 2hing Chau f a i l e d to do in t h i s almost abject apology w'aa t o admit t h a t Chinese troops had entered Nepalese t e r r i t o r y . To have'done so would have been t a n t a mount t o a d m i t t i n g t h a t China had committed aggression.
The captured document suggests t h a t t h e Mustang inc i d e n t damaged 'Peiping's " f o r e i g n p o l i c y etruggle'* s u i f ic i e n t l y t o have s t i m u l a t e d t h e Chinese l e a d e r s t o order t h e T i b e t M i l i t a r y Region Command Headquarters t o i n t e n s i f troop i n d o c t r i n a t i e n on t h e m a t t e r of a v o i d d i r e f i g h t s . The primary purpose of t h e document seems, therefore, t o have been t o provide t h e basic rationale, f o r a border policy of r e s t r a i n t . The document stated t h a t t h e

..

objective of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n was t o make P L A units lvcorrectlp understand the great a i g n i f i c a n c e of a v o i d i n g armed clashes and t o rake them understand t h a t t h e r e s u l a t i o n s are n o t a show of weakness.. .or a compromise of p r i n c i p l e , b u t rather a p o l i c y which is a c t i v e and has i n i t i a t i v e . " The basic r a t i o n a L e .wae+.:,d in..Btgps. It was c e n t e r e d on t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t **defensealong t h e T i b e t border is, a t p r e s e n t , p r i m a r i l y a p o l i t i a a l s t r u g g l e and a s t r u g g l e in f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . " The argument t h e n proceeded to' d e f i n e New Delhi's f o r e i g n policy motives and its major goal :

...

The main o b j e c t i v e of t h e r e a c t i a n a r p and e x p a n s i o n i s t elements of t h e neighboring count r y in provoltin and attacking us is n o t t o occupy fiore big chunk6 of our la= or t o provae S large-scale w a r . Their objective is to attempt t o use t h e border confusion t o create a s i t u a t i o n of crisis along t h e border, develop pretexts, write many a r t i a l e s , and t h u s whip up anti-Chinese

59

and anti-Communist sentiment, attack t h e l o f t y p r e s t i g e of o u r country, d e s t r o y t h e i n f l u e n c e of socialism, force us t o accept t h e i r unreasonable demands, and p l o t t o remain i n v a s t areas of our terr i t o r y indef i n l t e l y fimphaeis supplied7

. -

Thais p a r t of t h e argument a p p a r e n t l y c o n t a i n e d t h e Chinese l e a d e r s ' probable estimate, i n f a l l 1960, of Indian tactics. From t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of motives, t h e r a t i o n a l e moved . t o Its conclusion, i . e . t h e need "to expose" New D e l h i ' s p l o t s by e x e r c i s i n g m i l i t a r y r e s t r a i n t . T h i s larger s i g n i f i c a n c e of r e s t r a i n t w a s p r e s e n t e d as p r o v i d i n g P e i p i n g w i t h a d e f i n i t e f o r e i g n pol i c y advantage :
w i t h them, we make t h e i r p r o v o c a t i o n s and t r i o k a p o l i t i c a l l y u n f e a s i b l e . . .Thus, in

By d o i n g our utmost t o avoid armed clashes

< k

t h e p o l i t i c a l and f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t r u g g l e , w w i l l be in t h e position of i n f t i a t i v e , e reason, and advantage from beginning t o end

In sum, t h e document suggests t h a t , by f a l l 1960, t h e C h l nese leaders were t r y i n g t o prevent f u r t h e r Indian and 80v i e t bloc o r i t i c i s m of t h e i r a g g r e s s i v e n e s s by r e d w i n g t h e nuqsber of r e g u l a r border patrols and i n t e n s i f y i n g t h e ind o d t r i n a t i o n of PLA border forces on t h e matter of m i l i t a r y c a u t i o n . However, some reconnaistaance w a s to c o n t i n u e In t h e immediate v i o i n w o f Chinese border p o s t s . They streersed t o these forces t h e d e t r i m e n t a l p o l i t i c a l effects of border skirmishes--even i f "a great n r l l i t a r y v i c t o r y " were attained--and probably estimated t h a t New Delhi d i d n o t i n t e n d t o re-take l a r g e a r e a s of Chinese-held border t e r r i t o r y because t h e Indians d i d n o t have t h e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o do so.
TWO Chin868 "Lin88"

of Actual Control:

1956 and 1960

The c e s s a t i o n of regular forward p a t r o l l i n g n o t o n l y d i d n o t mean t h e end of l i m i t e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e near e x i s t i n g

- 60 I '

Chinese p o s t s , b u t a l s o d i d n o t mean t h e end of s u r r e p t i t i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n of new p o s t s a t s p e c i a l l y eelected p o i n t s . Although new p o s t s had b e e n s e s t a b l i s h e d earlier, it was p r i m a r i l y as a r e s u l t of t h e T i b e t a n r e v o l t of March 1959 t h a t t h e Chinese moved s t e a l t h i l y t o e s t a b l i s h even more p o s t s a t scattered p o i n t s in Ladakh, p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e more i n a c c e s s i b l e v a l l e y s . The 21 October 1959 c l a s h w a s a clear i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e Chinese had moved forward on t h e western sector, 88 t h e c l a s h occurred near H o t Spring, southwest of their previous Kongka Pass p o s i t i o n s . These t h i n l y scattered p o s t s may have been set up even beyond t h e **line" of actual c o n t r o l claimed by Chou E n - l a i in 1956 and confirmed by him i n November and December 1959.
.C

'- by

The 1956 Chinese-claimed "1 ine" had been coni irmed Chou in his l e t t e r to Nehru on 17 December 1959.' Chou had stated t h a t , "As a matter of f a c t , t h e Chinese map published in 1956, to'wbich Your Excellency referred, correct1 shows t h e t r a d i t i o n a l boundary between t h e two in t h i s fiestern7 sector.** However, i n l a t e 1960, the Indian b o r d e r Zxperts-noted t h a t in t h e i r t a l k s w i t h t h e Chinese e x p e r t s , Peiping was c l a i m i n g a new **line.'1 The Indian Report s t a t e d :

B u t t h e map given t o t h e I n d i a n s i d e by t h e Chinese s i d e under I t e m One d i f f e r e d cons i d e r a b l y from t h e map of 1956 which Premier Chou En-lai had declared t o be correct. For i n s t a n c e , t h e map given to t h e Indian s i d e showed the alignment from t h e Karakoram Pass t o t h e Chang Chenmo v a l l e y t o the w e s t of t h e alignment shown in t h e 1956 map; a m t c u t Pangong Lake t o t h e w e s t of where it was c u t in t h e 1956 map. There w a s divergence, theref o r e , n o t merely among Chinese o f f i c i a l maps b u t between the alignment confirmed by Premier Chou En-lai l a s t year and t h a t claimed by t h e Chinese s i d e this ear a t these meetings. fimphas is s u p p l i e d

This charge w a s soon t o prove embarrassing t o Peiping, and t h e Indian citation of t h i s c a r t o g r a p h i c , legerdemain proba b l y helped convince t h e Chinese leaders t h a t it would be p o l i t i c a l l y f o o l i s h t o p u b l i s h t h e border experts r e p o r t .
"

-61-

Thus, d e s p i t e P e i p i n g ' s a n x i e t y t o avoid p a t r o l clashes, t h e Chinese continued t o i n c h forward i n t h e western s e c t o r . They pushed their map claim w e s t w a r d , beyond t h e i r 1956 claims, takiag'in more Indian territ o r y t h a n e v e r before s i n c e 1949.
Chinese Deny Violating Indian Airspace:
1960

0 .

..

. . ..

D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t a e r i a l reconnaissance w a s inf r e q u e n t l y used against I n d i a by P L A forces i n T i b e t and .Sinkiang, New Delhi in late 1959 began t o p r o t e s t alleged Chinese Communist o v e r f l i g h t s of Indian t e r r i t o r y . The M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs f irst p r o t e s t e d t h e " v i o l a t i o n of Indian airspace'! in a n o t e of 5 Decmnber 1959, claiazing t h a t 3 r i o l a t i o n s " had occurred ''in t h e l a s t t w o months'* a&,ong t h e e n t i r e border. The M i n i s t r y again s e n t a n o t e of p r o t e s t on 4 A p r i l 1960 concerning " v i o l a t i o n s " by Chinese p l a n e s " i n t h e previous three months.fm The Chinese remained s i l e n t , avoiding any r e p l y u n t i l Nehru took t h e matter up p e r s o n a l l y with Chou E n - 1 a i . h their p r i v a t e t a l k s on 25 A p r i l . Nehru l a t e r t o l d Mayor Willy Brandt t h a t In r e p l y , Chou merely suggested t h a t I n d i a s h o o t one of t h e p l a n e s down, and t h a t Nehru would t h e n see t h a t these p l a n e s were n o t Chinese Communist. After s u c h a shootdown, Chou c o x u d e d , Nehru would see t h a t no PeipingNew Delhi i n c i d e n t would ensue. The Indian leaders a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t accept Chou's d e n i a l t h a t t h e p l a n e s were P e i p i n g ' s , and on 22 A u g u s u t 1960, t h e M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affairs sent a n o t h e r note, p r o t e s t i n g 52 " v i o l a t ions" of Indian airspace s i n c e March 1960 by Chinese p l a n e s coming from T i b e t . On 16 September, Peiping f i n a l l y responded w i t h a note r e j e c t i n g New Delhi's protest on t h e grounds t h a t a f t e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s it w a s found t h a t "no e n t r y of Chinese aircraft i n t o Indian airs p a c e had occurred a t a l l . " On t h e n e x t day, a Chinese Foreign M i n i s t r y spokesman w a s i n s t r u c t e d t o set f o r t h t h e "real f a c t s , " which he d i d as follows:
.

- 62 -

I n t h e e a r l y days of A p r i l 1960, t h e Indian government informed t h e Chinese government t h a t aircraft had been discovered f l y i n g o v e r t h e Sino-Indian border area. During h i s v i s i t t o I n d i a in A p r i l , Premier Chou En-lai t o l d Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru in t h e i r t a l k s on A p r i l 25 t h a t it had been found through i n v e s t i g a t i o n s by t h e Chinese government t h a t these were U.S. a i r o r a f t . They took off from Bangkok, passed o v e r Burma and China, and crossed t h e Siao-Indian border t o p e n e t r a t e deep i n t o China's I n t e r i o r t o parachute Chiqese secret a g e n t s , weapons, s u p p l i e s , and w i r e less sets, and t h e n f l e w back t o Bangkok, a g a i n pahlsing o v e r t h e Sino-Indian b o r d e r .

Premier Chou E n - l a i assured Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru a t t h e time t h a t t h e Chinese government would never allow its airc r a f t t o f l y over the border, and s a i d t h a t t h e Chinese government had s e n t a n o t e t o the Burmese government s t a t i n g t h a t s h o u l d Burma d i s c o v e r any u n i d e n t i f i e d a i r o r a f t i n its airspace, it was f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o take any countermeasure, either force them t o l a n d or shoot them down. China would do likewise should it discover such aircraft in i t a own airspace.
The n o t e went on t o describe continued Indian protests, i n t h e f a c e of Chou's earlier o l a r i f i c a t i o n , as ''a v e r y unf r i e n d l y act" toward P e i p i n g . However, Pelping's content i o n t h a t t h e a i r a r a f t involved were in f a c t U.S. p l a n e s was rejected by New Delhi in a n o t h e r note (36 October), which w a s followed by more protests on 13 February and 29 A p r i l 1961, and 10 March, 24 March, and 25 J u l y 1962, t h e l a s t v i o l a t i o n a l l e g e d l y o c c u r r i n g over C h u s h u l . The Chinese practice g e n e r a l l y ha6 been n o t t o r e p l y t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s , a p p a r e n t l y r e l u c t a n t t o c m t i n u e t o admit deep p e n e t r a t i o n of its airsapace and s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e i r 17 September 1960 s t a t e m e n t w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y clear t o s t a n d as a permanent p o s i t ion.

63

I
I .

The Border E x p e r t s T a l k s :

16 June

- 1 2 December

1960

I t w a s Chou who had insisted--and Behru who had r e l u c t a n t l y agreed--that p o l i t i c a l c o n t a c t be continued by meetings of border e x p e r t s rather t h a n completely broken off. A f t e r h i s f r u s t r a t i n g talks w i t h N e h r u ' a n d ' h i s t o p a d v i s e r s , Chou had c l e v e r l y devised s i x p o i n t s of "common ground" or %lose proximity" which he p r e s e n t e d i n h i s formal statement of 25 A p r i l , t r y i n g t o create t h e impression t h a t $here was s u f f i c i e n t accord (even after t h e dismal f a i l u r e of t h e Chou-Nehru t a l k s ) for n e g o t i a t i o n :

1.
2.

There e x i s t d i s p u t e s w i t h regard t o t h e boundary between t h e t w o sides. . ..


D

There e x i s t s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s 8 l i n e of actual c u n t r o l up t o which

each s i d e e x e r c i s e s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e j u r i d d i c ti o n .

3.

In determining t h e boundary between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , c e r t a i n geograp h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , such as watersheds, r i v e r v a l l e y s and mountain passes, should be e q u a l l y applicable t o all seators of t h e boundasy.
A s e t t l e m e n t of t h e bouhdary q u e s t ion between t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s s h o u l d t a k e i n t o account t h e n a t i o n a l f e e l i n g s of t h e two peoples towards t h e Himalayas and t h e Karakoram Mountains.

4.

5.

Pending a s e t t l e m e n t of t h e boundary q u e s t ion between t h e two c o u n t r i e s through d i s c u s s i o n s , both sides should keep t o t h e l i n e of actual c o n t r o l and should n o t p u t forward t e r r i t o r i a l claim as pre-condit ions, b u t i n d i v i d u a l adjustments may be made.

- 64 ..

6.

border so as t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e discussion, both s i d e s should c o n t i n u e t o r e f r a i n from p a t r o l l i n g a l o n g a l l sectors of t h e boundary,

I n order t o e n s u r e t r a n q u i l i t y on t h e

. .

Nehru had refused t o confirm any of these p o i n t s , i n d i c a t i n g New D e l h i wa8 u n w i l l i n g f o r m a l l y t o accept a " l i n e " of a c t u a l c o n t r o l o r even t h e fact t hT T F E Z Z & y was a a cuselon. The I n d i a n s c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t o accept such. a ?,f&rne" would be in effect t o accept t h e border s t a t u s quo, f r e e z i n g t h e 1 n d i a n " p o s i t i o n i n Ladakh and a c q u i e s c i n g i n Chinese occupation.

The I n d i a n s recognized t h a t t h e Chinese saw hbeir big push f o r s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s as having f a i l e d and t h a t Chou w a s merely t r y i n g t o demonstrate some progress and a c o n t i n u i n g p r o c e s s of d i s c u s s i o n . B u t Nehru acquiesced a p p a r e n t l y t o avoid t h e appearance of unreasonable i n t r a n s i g e n c e and because a t t h e t i m e t h e k i l i t a r y a l t e r n a t i v e w a s unacceptable for I n d i a . From t h e start, therefore, t h e t a l k s s e r v e d as a p o l i t i c a l buffer f o r both sides and as an instrument of t h e Chinese policy t o perpetuate t h e impression of c o n t i n u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . Both sides also recognized t h e i r p o l i t i c a l importance, t h e stakes b e i n g a propaganda advantage for t h e s i d e w i t h t h e better h l s t o r i c a l and l e g a l case. A t t h e end of t h e first s e s s i o n , *

+There were three s e s s i o n s h e l d o v e r a six-month period, the first In Peiping from 15 June t o 25 Jbly, t h e second i n New D e l h i from 19 August t o S'October, antlithe t h i r d in Rangoon from 7 November *o 12 December. The Chinese rev e r t e d t o t h e basic i s s u e of d e l i n i t a t i o n , i n s i s t i n g t h a t it w a s n o t merely r e l e v a n t b u t crucial t o t h e e n t i r e border d i s p u t e , i n s t e a d of adhering t o t h e Chou-Nehru agreement t h a t t h e y merely examine, check, and s t u d y t h e h i s t o r i c a l evidence submitted by each side. Thus In t h e bord e r expertst' t a l k s , as i n t h e Chou-Nehru d i s c u s s i o n s , t h e Chinese attempted (unsuccessfully) t o budge t h e I n d i a n s from t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e border for many p e a r s h a s been d e l i m i t e d and t h a t t h i s bad i n . f a c t been accepted by P e i p i n g .

I
1

,
I

I
~

65

o f f i c i a l s of t h e Indian team t o l d American o f f i c i a l s i n Hong Kong on 1 August t h a t no progress toward a s e t t l e m e n t had been made, none had been expected, and none had been desiked. New D e l h i ' s p o s i t i o n w a s described by them as being t h a t t h e border w a s already d e f i n e d , while P e i p i n g hoped t o port r a y it as s t i l l under n e g o t i a t i o n .
simple procedure whereby Nehru would agree t o accept Chou's formula of a n Aksai Plain-for-NEPA exchange. The I n d h n o f f i c i a l s reported t o New D e l h i t h a t a t their p a r t i n g recept i o n g i v e n i n l a t e J u l y by Foredgn M i n i s t e r Chen Yi, Chen e x p l i c i t l y stated t h a t t h e Chinese were ready "to n e g o t i a t e " on t h e baais of C h o u g s formula, and added t h a t Chou would

N e g o t i a t i o n , i n t h e Chinese view, a c t u a l l y meant a

'

be w i l l i n g t o v i s i t I n d i a a g a i n t o s i g n an agreement t o s u c h a formula ':if Nehru had no time" t o come t o Peiping. A s i m i l a r message was l a t e r conveyed by Burmese Prime M i n i s t e r U Nu i n t a l k s w i t h P r e s i d e n t Prasad i n New Delhi on 1 4 November. U Nu is reported t o have been t o l d by Chou En-la1 t h a t h ared t o give up China's claim t o t h e KEFA i n r e t u r n for I n d i a ' s acceptancetof t h e s t a t u s QUO i n Ladakh, even though t h i s would mean g i v i n g up " v a s t t e r r i t o r i e s t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y belonged t o T i b e t .It When Prasad d i s c u s s e d U NU'S s t a t e m e n t w i t h Nehru, t h e l a t t e r --according t o Prasad--connnented:

' I

Chou's s u g g e s t i o n for s o l v i n g t h e d i s p u t e h a s some merit, f o r i f t h e y /Tee. t h e C h i nese7 can prove t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y Ladakh belzngs t o them, what is t h e reason for
I

Angered, Praead r e p o r t e d l y t o l d Nehru t h a t it w a s h i s d u t y t o keep I n d i a ' s borders i n t a o t , t o which Nehru r e p l i e d , i n a t o n e of r e a s s u r a n c e , t h a t f o r t h e tine b e i n g there were many praatical d l f f i o u l t i e s i n t h e way of any s e t t l e m e n t . r e p o r t e d exchange p o i n t s up t h e apparent inThiss i s ency n Nehru's ''hard l i n e " t h i n k i n g on Peiping and con h i s p e r s o n a l i n c l i n a t i o n t o v a c i l l a t e , keeping a l i v e t h e hope of a way out through compromise. It a l s o underscores t h e i n f l u e n c e of h i s a s s o c i a t e s i n s u s t a i n i n g a t c r u o i a l timers a n adamant o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e .

Lf-i

- 66 I

' '.
, .

..

By 5 Ootober, t h e date on which t h e second series t a l k s ended i n New D e l h i , Indian o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r case w a s proving t o be s t r o n g e r t h a n Pe%ping*a. Members of t h e Indian team were reported j u b i l a n t in e a r l y O c t o b e r , a t t r i b u t i n g t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e i r case t o t h e e x c e l l e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e records t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had maintained on t h e border are-. On t h e crucial i s s u e of Ladakh, when t h e Chinese p r e s e n t e d o l d documents, t h e I n d i a n s t a b l e d more and older manuscripts, some of which went back six or seven c e n t u r i e s , t o show t h a t Ladakh had been a separate e n t i t y f r o m T i b e t . I

of e x p e r t s

t h e Chinese case " o b j e c t i v e l y speaking" was . w i t h "theoretical and f a c t u a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , n o t r e a l l y as s t r o n g as it had appeared b e f o r e t h e e x p e r t s t a l k s began.

. Mehta, iidtled
I *

"4'
i

.. .

.. .

The I n d i a n case, published i n a detailed r e p o r t (February 1961) of t h e border e x p e r t s ' t a l k s f o l l o w i n g t h e 1asto-t he Rangoon--sess ion (December 1060) , was impress ive I t w a s argued a d r o i t l y on many p o i n t s of f a c t ( i . e . h i s torical documentary evidence), logic, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. The f i n a l report w a a h i g h l y p r o f e s s i o n a l and precise where p r e o i s i o n w a s crucial, avoiding i r r e l e v a n c i e s f o r t h e most p a r t and meeting many Chinese arguments head-on. It demonstrated t h a t New D e l h i could produce a respectable legal case when British-educated, f i r s t - c l a s s legal e x p e r t s and h i s t o r i a n s were called on. However, New Delhi's a b i l i t y t o d r i v e home e f f e c t i v e l y t o laymen s p e c i a l l y selected podnte

67

seem t o be i n f e r i o r t o Peiping*s.* The Chinese u s e t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l propaganda machine t o good advantage, having l e a r n e d well t h e r e c e p t i v i t y of v a r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l audie n c e s - - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s o u t h and s o u t h e a s t Aha--to c e r t a i n t y p e s of argument and having alwayg a v a i l a b l e t h e ad hominem charge of " B r i t i s h imperialism'* t o p i l l o r y the c o e n historical c u l p r i t .
I n c o l l e c t i n g materials for t h e i r case, t h e I n d i a n ' h i s t o r i a n s had t h e a s s i s t a n c e of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i n t h e Commonwealth Relations O f f i c e and t h e use of t h e e x t e n s i v e IndiarfQffice l i b r a r y in London.** B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e app a r e n t l y w a s c e n t e r e d on s t r e n g t h e n i n g New D e l h i ' s document a t i o n , b u t may have included an exchange of views on v a l i d i t y and r e l e v a n c e of certain l i n e s of argumentation. Off i c i a l s i n t h e B r i t i l s h Foreign O f f iceas Bar E a s t e r n '.I Department, d i s c u s s i n g t h e Indian case on 25 January w i t h an American embassy officer, regarded t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of t h e Indian and Chinese historical claims t o much of t h e area along t h e McMahon l i n e as ''probably a atandoff.*' The

* T h i s c o n t r a s t i n Chinese and Indian propaganda c a p a b i l i t y w a s s t r i k i n g in 1960 and 1961, and it a t i l l is today. Ind i a n d i p l o m a t i c off i c i a l s themselves have commented on t h e matter. During t h e l a t e May 1963 conference of heads of mission i n s o u t h e a s t Asia, t h e mission heads agreed t h a t I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n i n t h e Sino-Indian d i s p u t e had n o t been understood i n s o u t h e a s t Asia. Thay a t t r i b u t e d t h i s f a c t p a r t l y t o t h e i n e f f e c t i v e Indian propaganda s e r v i c e s , claiming t h a t **All-India Radio is no match f o r Peiping Radio."

**In a d d i t i o n t o . documents a v a i l a b l e in Peiping, t h e C h i nese a p p a r e n t l y recovered some T i b e t a n materials r e l e v a n t t o t h e i r claims i n Lhasa. They also tried t o acquire documents from local T i b e t a n s , as is i n d i c a t e d by a T i b e t P L A troop i n d o a t r i n a t ion brochure of November 1960: "If mass work is e f f e c t i v e , t h e people w i l l t r u s t u s and b r i n g o u t a l l kinds of h i s t o r i c a l proof t o show t h a t Tibet is under China's sovereignty.'*

..
I

68

- m =

..

c o n f l i c t i n g claims in Ladakh were viewed aa even more d i f f i c u l t t o s o r t out l e g a l l y . However, t h e head of t h e Foreign R e l a t i o n s Department of t h e Commonwealth Relations O f f i c e d i f f e r e d w i t h t h e Foreign O f f i c e a p p r a i s a l of I n d i a ' s claim t o t h e McYahon line, viewing it as a f a i r l y s t r o n g case. Dr. Gopal and t h e other Indian h i s t o r i a n s had exp r e s s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e m a s s of documents t h e y had found i n t h e I n d i a O f f i c e l i b r a r y . Later, i n t h e i r February 1961 report on t h e border e x p e r t s t a l k s , t h e I n d i a n s r e p e a t e d l y stressed n o t only t h e q u a l i t y (aut h e n t i c i t y , r e l e v a n c e , and p r e c i s i o n ) of these h i s t o r i c a l documenta b u t also t h e q u a n t i t y , which exceeded by far what t h e Chinese were able t o present.*
.,
"' ci. * '.

L. C. Green, lecturer in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law a t Wnivers i t y College, London, h a s w r i t t e n a brief account &oft h e respective cases whfch mainly f a v o r s India's.**
Regarding Ladakh, Green maintained t h a t t h e watershed, or "height of l a n d , " p r i n c i p l e as t h e b a s i s f o r a boundary

*The Indian team caught t h e Chinese in s e v e r a l apparent f a l s i f i c a t i o n s of t h e c o n t e n t of Chinese-tabled documents. For example, according t o t h e Indfan f i n a l r e p o r t , "There were other cases where t h e t r a n s l a t i o n and examination of t h e p h o t o s t a t s s u p p l i e d by t h e Chinese s i d e showed t h a t t h e passages cited...and said t o be t a k e n from seecified documents a c t u a l l y were not t o be found in t h e f u l l t e x t s contained in t h e p h o t o s t a t s . " (Report of t h e O f f i c i a l s of t h e Governments of I n d i a and t h e People's R e p u b l i c of C h ina on t h e Boundary Question, Ministry o Exte r n a l Mi.a** # f Government of I n d i a , Hew Delhi, Bebruagy l36L. p. 2 0 ) 6. The I n d i a n s a l s o exposed t h e s o p h i s t r y of t h e Chinese claim t h a t Sino- Indian correspondence in 1950 i n d i c a t e d Peiping accepted only t h e Indian %order'' rather t h a n t h e "boundary." ( I b i d . , p. 375.)

*st'Lega1 Aspects of t h e Sino-Indian Border D i s p u t e , " The China Q u a r t e r l y , July-September 1960, pp. 42-58.
. .

'

69

claim f a v o r s t h e Indian case, as t h e p r i n c i p l e is f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . He viewed t h e Indian case on t h i s p o i n t as f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Chinese accept t h e watershed p r i n c i p l e iCdr t h e middle sector. The Chinese, however, complained a t t h e t a l k s t h a t t h e Indian alignment i n Ladakh Is i n w n s i s t e n t , as it '*Jump& from t h e Karakoram Mountains f i . e . , t h e Chinese-claimed l i n e 7 t o t h e Kun Lun Mountgins, rather t h a n f o l l o w i n g t h e Gigher Karakoram crests southeast*ard f r o m t h e Karakoram Pass. The Chinese also argued t h a t i f t h e l i n e is t o r u n along t h e higher Himalayas in t h e east--i.e., r o u g h l y along t h e McMahon l i n e , as I n d i a claims--"then why s h o u l d t h e western s e c t o r of t h i s boundary; n o t also r u n along t h e crest of t h e H i m a l a as f i h e Xarakorams7, rather t h a n a l o n g the...Kun Luns he Tower WElle overr a n g e 7 as-contended by t h e Indian side... a i m i ~ l f i e d ,t h e Chinese logic here seems v a l i d , and p o i n t s up t h e r e l a t i v & ) y s t r o n g e r Indian case i n t h e e a s t e r n sector in c o n t r a s t t o t h e western sector. The historical documentation tabled by t h e Indian team f o r t r a d i t i o n a l ownership of Ladakh, however, w a s n o t d e c i s i v e l y countered by t h e Chinese t e Actually, the C h i n e s e case on Ladakh derives i t a force CC t h e U t t e r 'of BctLaik.cbat2ol.

."*

..

Regarding t h e McMahon l i n e , Green maintained t h a t t h e l i n e may have been t h e w r i t t e n confirmation of what was already accepted as t h e f r o n t i e r de facto and t h a t almost half a a e n t u r y h a s elapsed s i n = t h e i m l a Conference of 1914, "during which Chinese practice f i f keeping n o r t h of t h e l i n e 7 may have created an e f f e c t T v e e s t o p p e l t o Chinese deniaT of t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e l i n e . " The C h i nese, i n 8 c o u n t e r t o t h i s argument, merely p o i n t e d t o t h e i r claim t h a t p r i o r t o 1949, China and B r i t a i n had many "exchanges1* on t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e boundary, and t h a t after 1949, China had stated t h a t t h e boundary had not been "delimited."** However, t h e Chinese d i d not argue t h e p o i n t

*Report

...., op.
CR-39.

c i t . , CR-4 IB 5 .

** I b i d . ,

70

w i t h t h e same v i g o r as t h e y argued t h e i r case on t h e weste r n sector, and t h e y h i n t e d a g a i n in October 1960, when t h e Sino-Burma border t r e a t y w a s f o r m a l l y s i g n e d , t h a t t h e y would accept t h e watershed as t h e t r a d i t i o n a l boundary as *hey had w i t h t h e Burmese.*

.-

by f u r t h e r i n f l a m i n g Indian f e e l i n g a g a i n s t P e i p i n g and res u l t i n g in more p a r l i a m e n t a r y and p u b l i c p r e s s u r e on t h e government f o r f o r c e f u l "act ion. Following Indian publ ic a t i o n of t h e r e s p e c t i v e team r e p o r t s , t h e Chinese team's p o i n t e d i n a i s t e n c e t h a t t h e Bhutan and S i n border matter w a beyond t h e scope of t h e t a l k s ~ t h e widespread impression in I n d i a t h a t P e i p i n g areas aa not
I'

The p o s i t i o n of t h e teams remained diametrically opposed on 1 2 December a t t h e f i n a l session In Rangoon, and t h e w r i t i n g (on Chinese demand) of s e p a r a t e r e p o r t s , r a t h e r t h a n a j o i n t one, aa envisaged in t h e Chou-Nehru A p r i l 1960 communique, formalized t h e d i s p a r i t y . t h e Indian leaders i n sanUary IYOI were I a w u t t n e d o l i t i c a l wisdom of p u b l i s h i n g t h e reports. T h e i r doubts d i d not s t e m from any view t h a t New Delhi's case had been weak. They f e l t compelled t o s a t i s f y p u b l i c o p i n i o n and members of Par1 iament by publ icat ion, b u t were concerned t h a t t e reports w o u l d disclose f u r t h e r M i n e t a n c e s of Chinese d e c e p t i o n and new Chinese claims, there-

*However, n o t every s e c t i o n of t h e mutually accepted SinoBurmese l i n e followed t h e t r a d i t i o n a l alignment of t h e McMahon l i n e . Attempting t o m a i n t a i n a c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n on t h e t r a d i t i o n a l alignment, t h e Indians on 20 December p r o t e s t e d t o P e i p l n g over a Sino-Burmese map showing t h e western terminus of t h e Burma-China border as f i v e m i l e s below t h e t r i p a r t i t e J u n c t i o n which I n d i a claims is t h e traditional China-Burma-Indian meeting p o i n t

- 71 I
I

w i t h i n I n d i a ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . * The Chinese p o s i t i o n on X a s h m i r d u r i n g t h e t a l k s w a s also intended t o create d i f f i c u l t i r e s for Nehru, i n I n d i a as w e l l as in P a k i s t a n . According t 6 t h e Indian report, t h e C h i n e s e team r e f u s e d t o d i s c u s s t h e Ladakh i s s u e except on t h e b a s i s t h a t X a s h m i r does n o t belong t o India--that is, on t h e b a s i s t h a t K s mr is d i s p u t e d t e r r i t o r y between P a k i s t a n and India.** ah i

As t h e border experts t a l k s wore on, t h e Chinese leaders a p p a r e n t l y had t o recognize t h e fact t h a t t h e Indian

*In mid-1961 , according t o t h e Bhutanese Maharaja's p o l i t i c a l agent in I n d i a Jigme"Dorji, t h e Chinese approached t h e Bhutanese w i t h an o f f e r t o n e g o t i a t e a border agreement; also, t o r e c o g n i z e Bhutan's s o v e r e i g n t y , t o extend diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n , and t o provide t e c h n i c a l aid. I n r o u g h l y t h e same period, t h e Chinese reportedly advanced a proposal f o r a Confederation of Himalayan States t o some Sikkimese g o l i t i c a l figures

. . .

**The report a t a t e s t h a t : "The Chinese r e f u s a l t o d i s c u s ~ h e segment oi t h e boundary w e s t of t h e Karakoram Pass t w a s tantamount t o q u e e t i o n i n g t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e accession of t h e State of Jammu and K a s h m i r t o I n d i a . . (Ibid., p 269;) 'The I n d i a n s p r i v a t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d t h e Chinese . p o s i t i o n t o mean t h a t I n d i a w a s an i l l e g a l occupation power in t h e area west of t h e Pass. (For t h e Chinese refusal t o discuss t h e area, see i b i d . , CR-156.)

.'*

The Chinese later used t h e P a k i s t a n i s t o demonstrate t h a t although I n d i a c o u l d n o t n e g o t i a t e a border agreement w i t h any of its neighbors, China could, even w i t h a government a l i g n e d w i t h t h e West. When, on 10 May 1963, New D e l h i protested Sino-Pakistani border n e g o t i a t i o n s , -$ping replied on 31 May t h a t China has a r i g h t t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h P a k i s t a n on boundary matters because (1) P e i p i n g never accepted I n d i a n s o v e r e i g n t y over K a s h m i r , (2) t h e negotiations with Pakistan do n o t involve t h e q u e s t i o n of owners h i p of K a s h m i r , and (3) after t h e India-Pakistan d m e E e t t l e d , b o t h governments w i l l reopen n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h China on t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e Kashmir boundary.

72

case had proven t o be strong-stronger t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d , and a t l e a s t as good as P e i p i n g ' s . They were, therefore, careful not t o p u b l i s h t h e t e x t s of t h e border e x p e r t s , r e p o r t s , as New D e l h i had done. D e s p i t e badgering from '! t h e Indians, f o r a long t i m e thereafter--l6 months--they avoided even acknowledging t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e r e p o r t s . When t h e y f i n a l l y d i d "publish" t h e December 1960 reports on 13 April 1962, t h e Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement i n d i c a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t h e y had been d i s t r i b u t e d t o d e p u t i e s of t h e National People's Congress b u t d i d n o t i n d i c h t e whether t h e y had been made a v a i h b l e outside t h i s puppet group t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c and t o f o r e i g n e r s . Moreover, the Chinese leaders d e l i b e r a t e l y restricted publ i c knowledge of t h e c o n t e n t of t h e r e p o r t s t o a c r y p t i c and h i g h l y p r o p a g a n d i s t i c v e r s i o n of t h e Chinese case. The f u l l texts w e r e never published; in t h e i r place, t h e P e i p i n g P e o p l e ' s D a i l y carried o n l y a garbled and truncated "brief account" o m Chinese p o s i t i o n . T h u s t h e Chinese leaders were compelled t o conceal t h e real Indian case and t h e w e e p o i n t s of t h e i r own, r e l y i n g on their e f f e c t i v e propaganda machine t o provide t h e smokescreen f o r t h i s
defeat

When Nehru defended h i e border p o l i c y a t t h e Governor&' Conference h e l d on 8 and 9 November, he i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e Indian team had proven t h e better, s u b m i t t i n g data which t h e Chinese found they were unable e f f e c t i v e l y t o counter. This w a s t h e p r i v a t e , and soon became t h e p u b l i a , p o s i t i o n of New Delhi on t h e border e x p e r t s . t a l k s . Nehru went on t o t e l l t h e governors t h a t Peiping, rather t h a n New D e l h i , had been set back by t h e border d i s p u t e . He pointed t o Wrushchev's criticism of t h e Chinese a t B u c h a r e s t in June

73

l960j* and stated t h a t t h e Chinese had protested t h e sale of S o v i e t helicopters t o I n d i a as a v i o l a t i o n of t h e p r i n ciple of * * p r o l e t a r i a ni n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , " * * The Chinese were also said t o have asked for a j o i n t commission t o demarcate t h e boundaries of Sinkiang and Mongolia, t h e

*For an account of Ehrushchev's c r i t i c i s m , see ESAU XVI-

63:

The Indian Communist P a r t y and t h e Sino-Soviet D i s p u t e .

Iowever, New D e l h i w a s unable t o exploit Sino-Soviet d i f f e r e n c e s d u r i n g t h e border e x p e r t s t a l k s . That is, t h e Russians refused t o i n t e r c e d e d i r e c t l y on I n d i a ' s behalf , m a i n t a i n i n g t h e position established in September 19S9. S h o r t l y after t h e Chou-Nehru d i s c u s s i o n s , Foreign Secretary b u t t t o l d t h e American charge on 28 April t h a t Khrushchev had been "no help a t a l l , " remaining J u s t as n e u t r a l in p r i v a t e as in p u b l i c and hoping t h a t both these **friends** t h e S o v i e t Union would settle t h e i r d i s p u t e . of
**The S o v i e t s a p p a r e n t l y first offered helicopters t o t h e I n d i a n s i n June 1960. I n J u l y the I n d i a n s tested one M I - 4 copter, in August t h e y decided t o buy s e v e r a l of these, and by f a l l t h e y had discussed t h e purchase of other t r a n s p o r t aircraft. A Soviet-Indian agreement for the sale of m i l i t a r y t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t t o I n d i a w a s s i g n e d in March
1961
Whether Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's p o l i c i e s or Khrushchev's desire t o m a i n t a i n Indian goodwill w a s t h e primary factor in t h e S o v i e t d e c i s i o n t o provide these a i r c r a f t is conjectural. In any case, Sino-Soviet polemics were p a r t i c u l a r l y b i t t e r i n April and Yay 1960, and Khrushchev probably waa f u r i o u s w f t h Chinese o p p o s i t i o n . Ambassador Parthasarathy reported t h a t S o v i e t Ambassador Chervonenko went t o t h e Chinese M i n i s t r y of Foreign Affairs t o protest Mao's 1 4 May s t a t e m e n t , j u s t before t h e P a r i s **aumnritt* meeting, t h a t t*sonmpeople had described Eisenhower as a man who loved peace v e r y much." P a r t h a s a r a t h y reported t h a t t h e Russians had taken t h i s remark as a personal rebuke t o Khrushchev.

r 3.

'r

ra

..

- 74 --

areas t h e Chinese claimed on their maps being somewhat greater t h a n t h e y a c t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . * The c o n t e n t s of N e h r u ' s remarks r e p o r t e d l y were passed t o Chinese

embassy personnel in New Delhi on 1 November by an In1 d i a n Communist. The Chinese, as a result, were probably f u r t h e r impelled t o a t t a c k Khrushchev f o r defending a non-Communist country in a d i s p u t e w i t h a Communist one.

P e l p i n g ' s E s t i m a t e of Indian I n t e n t i o n s and C a p a b i l i t i e s :

- Early

lsgl

. .

..

. .
. I

'

A t t h e end of 1960, t h e Chinese leaders continued to, view a h o s t i l e I n d i a as a prospect t o be avoided. They .recognized t h a t border clashes had made t h i s prospect aL"''"f real one, r e q u i r i n g therefore an avoidance of such c l M h e a and a major effort "to recover" some of t h e I l d l a n good w i l l t h a t had marked t h e b r i g h t e r day= t h e e a r l y Chou-Nehru r e l a t i o n s h i p . They apparently viewed I n d i a 88 a m i l i t a r y power t h e y could handle, b u t were concerned l e s t Nehru, a man of i n t e r n a t i o n a l prestige, c o n t i n u e t o undercut P e l p i n g ' s

. . .

..

*BY s p r i n g 1962, Sin-Mongolian d i f f e r e n c e s regarding t h e boundary a p p a r e n t l y had I n t e n s i f i e d , owing t o an i n c i d e n t i n which Chinese personnel s h i f t e d some markers and t h e Mongolians moved them back, b r i n g i n g up a detachment of Mongolian t r o o p s t o end t h e s h i f t i n g back and f o r t h . The Mongolian ambassador i n Pelping reportedly stated t h a t i n August 1962, n e g o t i a t i o n s t o d e f i n e t h e border were under way. No p u b l i c mention w a s made of these t a l k s u n t i l 23 December 1962, when t h e Chinese announced t h a t Premier Teendenbal w a s coming t o P e l p i n g t o sign a SinoMongolian border t r e a t y . When, on 26 December, t h e t r e a t y was s i g n e d , t h e Chinese stressed t h a t d i s c u s s i o n s had gone smoothly and agreement was reached "quickly," implying a c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e p r o t r a c t e d and f r u i t l e s s Sino-Indian d i e e u s s i o n s . The Chinese seem t o have made t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of t h e concessions where their alaims dUfered from those of Ulan Bator.

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. .

i n t e r n a t i o n a l 2mage w i t h complaints of Chinese **aggression." They were a a r e f u l t o s u s t a i n t h e p u b l i c p o s i t i o n t h a t I n d i a w a s a t i l l on b a l a n c e a n e u t r a l s t a t e , squaring this l i n e w i t h t h e doctrinal a n a l y s i s of Mebru as a bourgeois** leader by a a i n t a i n i n g t h a t many nbourgeoie n a t i o n a l l s t ' o leaders in near-by c o u n t r i e s have a d u a l n a t u r e , of whiah one s i d e is indeed f r i e n d l y t o China. Furthermore, I n d i a w a s still held t o be a s t a t e i n the **peace zone" between t h e two major amps and an object of the Bast-West struggle. T e h captured T i b e t a n troop i n d o c t r i n a t i o n document on border policy of mid-November 1960 p r e s e n t e d Pao's o p p o r t u n i s t i c d o c t r i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n on t h e d u a l nature of bourgeois-led near-by states as followe:

powers--between t h e s o o i a l i s t camp and t h e imperialist aamps.. .They are t&e objeats of s t r u g g l e between u s and t h e imperialists. The aim df t h e imperialists is t o p u l l them i n t o t h e m i l i t a r y aggress i v e bloc. Our a h I s t o win them over aa allies of socialism against imperialism. Therefore, toward these c o u n t r i e s , we have adopted a two-sided r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i c y of u n i t y a w e l l as atruggle... w

Because they are two-faced and r u l e d by,' t h e bourgeoieie, t h e y are t h e in-between\:

'.

a160 advocate peace and n e u t r a l b e our f r l e n d 6 h i p . {amphasIs SUpPlles/

t h a t I6 u n f r i e n d l y t o us, b u t t h e

W should remember t h a t t h e r u l i n g o l i q u e e of t h e neighboring c o u n t r y h a s a side

Itbwent on t o state t h e case for avoiding border s k i r m i s h e s by using a s i m p l e formula t h a t '*to make a f r i e n d la to l o s e an There is l i t t l e dioubt t h a t t h e Chineee leadere by t h e end of 1860 were under no i l l u s i o n s about New D e l h i ' e deoire for Chineee "friendship.'1 Y e t it w 8 8 p o l i t l a a l l y neueesary t o m a i n t a i n publicly--and for P L A troops-the poeition t h a t a dryla f r a n t i e r together with n e g o t i a t i o n a would e v e n t u a l l y p o i n t t h e way back t o a Sin-Indian rapproohement. T h i s w a s i n fact n o t 8 Indian desire b u t a Chinere one.

- 76 I

F=n
I

m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . The T i b e t a n t r o o p - i n d o c t r i n a t i o n 'o d o c h n t s t a t e d f l a t l y t h a t t h e Indiana * d not have t h e s t r e n g t h o p e n l y t o declare w a r on us and attack t8 m i l i 1 t a r i l y on a l a r g e scale." As f o r Hew D e l h i ' s i n t e n t i o n s , t h e document stated t h a t t h e r e a l , p r i m a r y a i m w a s t o reduce China's " l o f t y prestige" and "itdrce unreasonable demands on us" by c r e a t i n g minor s k i r m i s h e s . The prospeut of a major S u o - I n d i a n w a r was discussed on$y as an unl i k e l y e v e n t u a l i t y , which, i f it w e r e t o t U e place, would c r u c i a l l y change P e i p i n g ' s border p o l i c y of r e s t r a i n t :
..I

The Chinese desire for some form of rapprochement, or at least t o f i n d some way t o n e u t r a l b e New Delhi's a n t i p a t h y , a p p a r e n t l y d i d not r e s u l t from a fear of I n d l a g a

.
.

Of course, there is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e a c t i o n a r i e s of t h e neighboring count r y , in conneetion w i t h t h e scheming and p l a n n i n g of t h e imperialists, might c a r r y olit large-scale v i o l a t i o n s of o u r territ o r y . However, i f t h i s were t o occur, t h e n a t u r e 61 t h e border s t r u g g l e would change completely, and it would no l o n g e r remain w i t h i n t h e s p h e r e of t h e p r e s e n t policy.

The document w a s e l l i p t i c a l on t h i s p o i n t , f a i l i n g t o s t a t e precisely what w a s meant by t h e phrase "large-scale v i o l a t i o n e of o u r t e r r i t o r y . " It was, however, s u f f i o i e n t l y broad t b cover t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o a series of Indian crosf sings of t h e of actual c o n t r o l 'and establishment of

- 77 -

pos e on t h e Chinese-claimed side.* That t h e Chinese might u n i a t e r a l l y move forward t h e e n t i r e ?'linet*themselves by e s t a b l i s h i n g new po8taD w a s n o t even h i n t e d , of comse.
A of January 1961, t h e Chinese strategy remained: s t o work f o r a rapprochement w i t h Hew Delhi, t o c o n s i d e r

I n d i a as s t i l l nonaligned, and t o avoid personal attacks on Nehru. Po t h i s end, t h e border w a s t o remain calm and Chinese i n i t i a t i v e s were t o be diplomatic, directed toward d i s c o u r a g i n g t h e I n d i a n s f r o m moving acroes t h e Chineeed e f i n e d ? * l i n e " of actual c o n t r o l . Following a review of 1960, a Chinese Foreign M i n i s t r y report, i s s u e d i n January 1961, o u t l i n e d m i p i n g ' s p r o s p e c t i v e policy toward I n d i a , c e n t e r i n g on t h e need t o m o l l i f y New D e l h i :
W w i l l s t r i v e t o have better - r e l a t i o n s e w i t h I n d i a and i d f l u e n c e - I n d i a i n t o assuming a passive p o s i t i o n on t h e border problem. This is important.

The M i n i s t r y report went on t o e n v i s a g e an i n v i t a t i o n t o Nehru t o v i s i t China "at an opportune moment" and a c a l l for a n o t h e r conference of border experts. However, it

. .

..

L=J
' I

were n o r t h of it. Longju w a a an important case in p o i n t . When, in December 1960, Indian a i r c r a f t confirmed that the Chinese had withdrawn from Longju-leaving over.lOO dead bodies i n t h e area as a r e s u l t of an epidemic--Nehru waa reported as f a v o r i n g I n d i a n r e o w u p a t i o n of t h e e Army, however, reportedly dissuaded him, on t h e grounds t h a t l o g i a t i o s u p p o r t f aoiliCiee were inadequate t o eustain Indian occupation of Longju.
~

line" so t h a t s e v e r a l posts, on e t h e l o c a t i o n of which both sides had c o n s t a n t l y disagreed,

-c

. .

Nehru's w i l l i n g n e s s t o send I n d i a n t r o o p e i n t o Longju a _l - _ _ u__ p o i n t s up - e _ g n l f i o a n t abange in h i s a t t i t - d e , - inasmuch aa N8w Delhi's n o t e s of 10 September irnd 10 November 1959--ppore t h a n a year earlier--had proposed t h a t n d f t h e r s i d e send i t 6 1 t r o o p s i n t o t h e outpost.

78

-. .
..

warned diplomatic personnel t o be prepared f o r another a n t i China \tlBs which night be started i n I n d i a and placed that c o u n t r y i n a c a t e g o r y d i f f e r e n t from Burma, Nepal, Afghani s t a n , and Cambodia, w i t h whom China has n f r i e n d l y t *relat Ions

The Chinese leaders in January 1961 would have t h e i r diplomatic o f f i c i a l s view Pelping's 1960 policies as ref l e c t i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e "tactical f l e x i b i l i t y . " With t h e ' e x c e p t i o n of a possible mid-June c l a s h , there were no SlnoIndian border skirmishes, Indian propaganda w a s oountered i n 1960 b u t New D e l h i w a s et131 considered t o be nonaligned, and Nehru was n o t s i n g l e d o u t for v i t u p e r a t i v e criticism.' This w a s s a i d t o be p a r t of Mao's p o l i c y of "unity as well as s t r u g g l e w i t h I n d i a and other n a t i o n a l sta%es." Ac cord'ing t o t h e January 196lrforeign Painistry report, Y h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t India shows how we. .used t h e t a c t i c of'' f l e x i b i l it y :'*

I n d i a s t a r t e d an anti-China movement, and this w e opposed w i t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Then, after opposing it, t h e Premier went t o New Delhi t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h Mehru. The two chaefe of s t a t e m e t . A t t h e border, clashes were avoided. Thus t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s a g a i n calmed down temporarily.
It was in t h i s context (and in c o n n e c t i o n d t h a discussion of taaOice toward newly independent African c o u n t r i e s still having diplomatic relations w i t h T a i p e i ) t h a t M a 0 was o i t e d as p r o v i d i n g t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of diplomatic forbearance: * I 1960, Chairman M a o again i n s t r u c t e d u s 'n r e p e a t e d l y t h a t i n our s t r u g g l e s , some leeway must be provided. '@ The practical c ~ n c l u ion which f lowed from t h i s e p r i n c i p l e and Ohe view of t h e U.S. as t h e main enemy wm" that

our s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t I n d i a s h o u l d be s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e s t r u g g l e against /U. 8 7 imperialism. Our s t r u g g l e against . 'fndiz should not go beyond t h i s l i m i t .

...

- 79 .. . .
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v n

The order of p r i o r i t i e s which t h e document o u t l i n e 4 for Chinese diplomatic .off c l a l s i n d i c a t e s t h a t r e s t r a i n t i toward I n d i a w a s t o be a f e l a t i v e matter, a matter of degree. While t h e U . S . w a s P e i p i n g ' s maJor world enemy, I n d i a w a s second on t h e list, 1.e. t h e ~ ' r n a ~ g in t e S o u t h e a s t Asia," as t h e document p u t it. In t u r n , t h e Chinese campaign a g a i n s t India could (and d i d ) exceed in scope and i n t e n s i t y t h e campaagn a g a i n s t Indonesia. Given t h i s order of i n t e n s i t y , t h e Chinese leaders may have missed t h e p o i n t t h a t , although t h e y were t*hardef' o n h e U.S. and ''softert1on Indonesia r e l a t i v e t o I n d i a , t h e I n d i a n leaders s a w no s u c h scale of i n t e n s i t y and were provoked by even t h e smallest degree of Chinese animosity. TO New Delhi, China was becoming I n d i a ' s most important enemy and t h e Maoist p o l i c y o " u n i t y and straggle" toward I n d i a f meant nothing' b u t The o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s , therefore, t h a t t h e ChAnese leaders,-ao hiasself, by early 1961 b e l i e v e d t h e y had s u f f i c i e n t room for f e u r e diplomatic maneuvering w i t h New Delhi when I n fact such room no l o n g e r e x i s t e d .

:xlc

121
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p o l i t i c a l l*arrogance.w

*This M a o i s t p o l i c y had been colmnented on by Teng Hsiaoping in h i s speech in Moscow on 14 November 1960 a t t h e meeting of world Communist parties. Teng reportedly saated t h a t a d u a l p o l i c y w a s r e q u i r e d t o handle Hehru: "We m u s t follow a p r u d e n t p o l i c y of both s t r u g g l e and f r i e n d s h i p . " "If one were t o adapt o n e s e l f s o l e l y t o t h e p r o g r e s s i v e Wpect of Nehru's p o l i c y and evade t h e n e c e s s a r y s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t him, this would only Inflate h i s r e a c t i o n a r y arrogance." What Teng failed t o s a y w a t h a t t h e "necessary ~ s t r u g g l e " a g a i n s t Rehru would c o u n t e r o n l y h i s m i l i t a r y while it would almost i n e v i t a b l y I n c r e a s e his

Teng's e f f o r t waa p r i m a r i l y a defensive maneuver against Khrushchev's charge a t Bucharest on 26 June 1960 t h a t t h e Chinese way of handling t h e d i s p u t e wae a "tactical error" and a clear sign of vvChinese Khrushchev had gone on t o s a y t h a t f f t h e USSR used Chinese logic, " w a r would have been d e c l a r e d on I r a n on m r t h a n one o c c a s i o n , oe s i n c e some soldiers had been k i l l e d and others might also be k i l l e d .

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SINO-INDIAN BORDER Chinese Claim ' Lines' of 1956 and 1960 in the Western Sector

Daulat Ebg Oldl.

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Polnts to which lndlon patrols hod boon golnp up to 1958

New Delhl, December 1962

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