Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Key Messages
Measures of effectiveness of business model for credit ratings
High-quality and accurate credit ratings Widespread availability of credit ratings
Presentation Flow
Background: what credit ratings are The framework for evaluation An evaluation of the business models
The issuer-pays model The investor-pays model The government-pays model and its variants
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Usually indicate probability of default or expected loss Not recommendations to buy, sell, or hold rated securities
Other considerations would enter into the decision, e.g. price, investors preferred risk profile
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Allows large numbers of issuers to competitively access funding at a low transaction cost A rating is an easy-to-understand opinion from an independent party
Establishes a common currency across market participants Allows specification and measurement of capital adequacy and capital allocation in a transparent manner
Publicly available credit ratings add to the information and research available about companies and securities
Allow market participants to make better-informed decisions
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Potential risks:
Potential for conflicts of interest. Strong mechanisms are needed for managing these, including
Multilevel rating processes Strict separation of the analytical and marketing functions Delinking compensation from level of ratings
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Potential risks:
Conflicts of interest in the opposite direction. Rating agencies could face pressure from investors to give lower-than-warranted ratings so that yields can be higher, and to not downgrade once rated so that mark-tomarket losses can be avoided Dependence on public information for ratings, given the absence of a relationship with the entity being rated Taking ratings out of the public domain, since ratings would be available only to investors who agree to pay for them
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Potential risks:
Moral hazard. Ratings that are paid for by government or regulators can be seen to have an official approval or even amount to a payment guarantee Guaranteed business for rating agencies. Since government cannot be seen to be favoring any party, all empanelled agencies will be guaranteed business, removing any incentive to demonstrate analytical rigor or to update and improve criteria and processes
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PBT INR Mn
2,075
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
1,000
54 86 120 127
154
208
192
127
272
268
281
500
1994 Total Rev Int Rev PBT 90 1 54 1995 126 0 86 1996 183 3 120 1997 238 2 127 1998 323 3 154 1999 364 12 208 2000 340 4 192 2001 441 20 127 2002 685 40 272 2003 714 37 268 2004 854 143 281 2005 1,193 365 314
0
2006 2,873 1,705 802 2007 4,043 2,629 1,106 2008 5,146 2,823 1,875 2009 5,603 2,911 2,075
Year Headcount
1994 141
1995 161
1996 191
1997 182
1998 205
1999 197
2000 202
2001 368
2002 370
2003 394
2004 496
2005# 638
2005^ 1155
2006 1484
2007 1750
2008* 1956
2009 2164
#Up to 2005 CRISILs reporting year was April to March ^2005 was a nine month year from April to December 2005 *Majority stake in Gas Strategies sold on 10th Dec 2008
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Developed awareness
Outreach with regulators, borrowers, users, intermediaries
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Went public
CRISIL has never borrowed Comfortable with transparency and exposure that a public listing entails
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0.8
50 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1
40 30 20 10
0.0 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 Modified Credit Ratio Market Share in ratings business (%)
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48
50
Indias rating agencies and its CRA regulations have served the market well
Subprime crisis and its fallout have had relatively little effect on the industry in India
Rapid evolution of Indias markets and capabilities have opened up myriad business opportunities
www.crisil.com www.standardandpoors.com
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