Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 1

OKINAWA CASE NEG

BASE TRANSFER CP
1NC Internal Base Transfer CP [1/2] ...................................................................................................................................... 2 1NC Internal Base Transfer CP [2/2] ...................................................................................................................................... 3 **2NC Counter Plan Overview** .......................................................................................................................................... 4 **2NC Interoperability Impact** ........................................................................................................................................... 5 **2NC Solves Alliance Better** ............................................................................................................................................ 6 AT: we only have to reduce Okinawa, not Japan overall .................................................................................................... 7 AT: Perm do both ............................................................................................................................................................. 8 AT: Perm do the counter plan .......................................................................................................................................... 9 AT: Marines Must Train Together .................................................................................................................................... 10 AT: Delays / Negotiation Problems / Political Issues ........................................................................................................... 11 AT: Panetta ........................................................................................................................................................................... 12 AT: Public Support [1/2]....................................................................................................................................................... 13 AT: Public Support [2/2]....................................................................................................................................................... 14 AT: Governor Signs [Delays] ............................................................................................................................................... 15 AT: Offsets Counterplans Bad [Theory] ............................................................................................................................... 16

DETERRENCE DA
1NC Deterrence DA [1/5] ..................................................................................................................................................... 17 1NC Deterrence DA [2/5] ..................................................................................................................................................... 18 1NC Deterrence DA [3/5] ..................................................................................................................................................... 19 1NC Deterrence DA [4/5] ..................................................................................................................................................... 20 1NC Deterrence DA [5/5] ..................................................................................................................................................... 21 **2NC Impact Overview [1/2]** ......................................................................................................................................... 22 **2NC Impact Overview [2/2]** ......................................................................................................................................... 23 **2NC Link Top Level [1/2]** ............................................................................................................................................ 24 **2NC Link Top Level [2/2]** ............................................................................................................................................ 25 Ground Troops Key [1/2] ...................................................................................................................................................... 26 AT: Nuclear Guarantee ......................................................................................................................................................... 27 AT: Gradual Withdrawal ...................................................................................................................................................... 28 AT: Guam Solves .................................................................................................................................................................. 29

CASE ATTACKS - AT: ENVIRONMENT ADVS

1NC Environment ................................................................................................................................................................. 30 1NC Dugong ......................................................................................................................................................................... 31 1NC Marine Life ................................................................................................................................................................... 32

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 2

1NC Internal Base Transfer CP [1/2]

[SAMPLE TEXT:] The United States federal government should transfer and co-locate military presence from Okinawa to other existing bases in Japan. The United States federal government should establish a joint commission with Japan regarding the future of the Japan-US alliance in order to promote transparency and public participation as well as to strengthen and sustain the overall alliance. Implementation should occur as per the details of our solvency advocate. OBSERVATION ONE COMPETITION plan reduces US military presence from Japan removing from Okinawa counter plan maintains STATUS QUO level of US military presence in Japan by transferring from Okinawa to other bases in Japan. OBSERVATION TWO SOLVENCY internal base transfer is quick improves interoperability of Japan and US forces, and maintains deterrence while reducing presence from Okinawa.
Hornung 12/23/10
(Jeffrey, Ph.D. in PoliSci, associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, East Asian Studies Center, Kans Way Forward on Futenma, http://csis.org/files/publication/101223_Hornung_KanWayForward_JapanPlatform.pdf)

Nakaima won by promising to reduce Okinawas burden, he will not respond to talks with Tokyo unless changes are offered. Prime Kan needs to convince the U nited S tates to reduce its presence in Okinawa in some capacity as early as possible to facilitate a compromise. His challenge is doing so without contesting the 2006 agreement. One option is the permanent transfer of a Marine command element to mainland Japan. Not only is it not necessary to have command elements and subordinate units located together, it could also simplify the eventual move to Guam by reducing the number of units having to move. It has the added benefit of offering two possible implementation strategies. If transferred to a Japanese base, the allies could improve their interoperability . If transferred to a U.S. base, the move could occur relatively quickly by taking advantage of existing housing. In either case, the symbolic nature of having the Marines remain in Japan, while simultaneously reducing the U.S. presence in Okinawa, could be claimed a win by all sides . Another option is for Kan to suggest relocating some training exercises to other areas in Japan. To do so, he would need to offer a location to the United States, such as an island where field carrier landing practice could be conducted. While not a means to reduce the Marine presence on Okinawa, it would help reduce training activity. Prime Minister Kan needs to convince the United States that reducing its presence as early as possible is in its best interest. The U nited S tates recognizes the risk posed by Futenma and wants to move forward on relocating its functions to a new facility. Tangible progress on a replacement facility will trigger the process of reducing the number of Marines on Okinawa. If Kan cannot
Because Governor Minister persuade Nakaima, then Futenma cannot close as early as all would like, the Marines cannot begin their move to Guam, and Okinawa base consolidation cannot move forward. This is the worst scenario for Tokyo, Washington, and Naha. Given that it is in the U.S. interest to avoid this situation, it should not be terribly difficult for Kan to make Washington recognize that the political situation in Okinawa requires some compromise.

AND, only base transfer maintains deterrence US forces MUST stay in Japan.
Fackler and Bumiller 1/13/11
(Martin and Elisabeth, Gates Signals U.S. Is Flexible on Moving Air Base in Japan, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/world/asia/14military.html?_r=1) During talks with Japanese leaders in Tokyo, Mr. Gates said he also discussed a sophisticated new antimissile system that the United States is jointly developing with the Japanese, and the two nations response to North Koreas recent military provocations against the South. But

a top item on the agenda was the relocation of the United States Marine Corps Air

Station Futenma, an emotional issue here that drove an uncharacteristic wedge between the allies last year when the prime minister at the time, Yukio Hatoyama, wavered on whether to keep the base on Okinawa. While the two nations finally agreed in May to relocate the noisy helicopter base to a less populated part of Okinawa by 2014, local resistance has made that time

Gates said the administration did not want the Futenma issue to overshadow the countries overall security alliance, which last year reached its 50th anniversary. He signaled that the U nited S tates was willing to be flexible in allowing Tokyo to resolve the domestic political resistance to the relocation plan. We do understand that it is politically a complex matter in Japan, he said after meeting Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. And we intend to follow the lead of the Japanese government in working with the people of Okinawa to take their interests and their concerns into account. The softer tone is a departure from Mr. Gatess visit to Tokyo in October 2009, when he pushed
frame look increasingly unrealistic. On Thursday, Mr. Mr. Hatoyamas fledgling government to honor an earlier deal to relocate the base on Okinawa. Those pressure tactics backfired, creating resentment in the government that the United States was trying to bully it. Mr. Hatoyama eventually stepped down amid criticism that he had mishandled the alliance. His successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, has worked to strengthen security

Gates said the rising tensions in the region, including North Koreas pursuit of nuclear weapons and Chinas expanding military, made it essential to fortify the security alliance between the U nited S tates and Japan. Our alliance is more necessary, more relevant and more important than ever , he said. He said it was essential for American military forces to remain in Japan, particularly as a deterrent against North Korean aggression and the ever-bolder Chinese armed forces. Without the American presence, he said, North Koreas military provocations could be even more dangerous or worse. China, he said, might behave more assertively towards its neighbors.
ties with Tokyos traditional protector. At Keio University in Tokyo on Friday, Mr.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 3

1NC Internal Base Transfer CP [2/2]

AND, counter plan defuses local tensions while boosting interoperability.
Cronin et al. 10
(Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security, Members of the Japan-U.S. Study Group, October 27, Renewing Old Promises And Exploring New Frontiers The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order, Joint Statement, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional_info/tfcnas_on_alliance.pdf)

both governments need to articulate unequivocally the enduring value of the alliance. While both governments retain the right to they should make abundantly clear that a long-term military presence is a core value of the alliance. The U nited S tates must take additional measures to defuse local tensions stemming from the presence of American troops in Japan. It can encourage support for U.S. bases (or at least reduce resentment) by granting local Japanese governments the right to conduct environmental inspections of American military facilities, an idea broached by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in May 2010. Whenever feasible, U.S. military bases should be co-located with Japanese bases to ease local concerns . Co-location has already occurred in Yokota with the groundbreaking establishment of a bilateral joint operations and coordination center. Colocating bases not only carries political advantages; it will also contribute to greater interoperability between the U.S. military and the JSDF.
As a starting point, consider changes to the shape of U.S. forces in Japan,

AND, new Japan Defense Ministry study proves Japan likes the counter plan.
Japan Update 1/6/11
(Defense Ministry looking for off-Okinawa site for Futenma, http://www.japanupdate.com/?id=10876)

feasibility study has been conducted quietly, outside view of the news media, as Prime Minister Naoto Kans government looks for a brokered solution to the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station relocation. Defense Ministry workers have been studying the pro-and-con aspects of relocating some Futenma training functions to sites in Hokkaido and Honshu, and even Kyushu. Japan hasnt approached the United States with the ideas, but if the proposals were to be approved, officials say the Okinawa burden of hosting U.S. bases would be greatly reduced. Equally important, they say, moving the helicopter units training functions outside the prefecture would improve safety. Government agencies have been very discrete in conducting the study, which calls G round S elf D efense F orce training areas in Honshu, Kyushu and Hokkaido good possibilities. Toshimi Kitazawa, the Defense Minister, calls the concept good for everyone.
The

FINALLY, counter plan increases cooperation, public diplomacy, and sustains the alliance.
Tanaka 10 (Hitoshi, Senior Fellow, JCIE (Japan Center for International Exchange), Futenma: Diplomatic Mess or Strategic Opportunity? http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/52.pdf)

it is crucially important to quell fears that the alliance is in trouble. The alliance is bigger than any single base, and it is critical that neither side forget how strong the ties are that bind Japan and the U nited S tates in a wide range of areas. Therefore, it is good news that the governments
In order to allow time for consultations to reach a sustainable long-term resolution, Hatoyamas self- imposed deadline is bound to be extended beyond May. Here, of the United States and Japan are reportedly preparing to issue a joint statement by the end of May. This should be a clear statement that demonstrates the commitment of the two governments to work together productively to resolve the issue in an expeditious way after May. The Futenma relocation issue should

be resolved keeping in mind the broader picture of East Asia as a region in transition. To facilitate thinking from this broad perspective, a joint commission on the future of the US-Japan alliance should be established and announced as a part of the joint statement. The timing for such an announcement is opportune given that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The commission does not need to be explicitly linked to the Futenma relocation issue, but it may be helpful in facilitating a forward- thinking mentality on the matter. It needs to be composed of not just government officials but also politicians, public intellectuals, and business leaders to bring greater transparency and public participation into the making of alliance policy. The commission should chart a way forward for the US-Japan alliance, considering matters such as the changing security environment in East Asia, and in particular the rise of China and India; the future security architecture of East Asia; and ways for Japan to have a greater role in ensuring its own security and in contributing to international security. In a sense, the Futenma issue offers adept leaders on both sides a rare opening to strengthen the USJapan alliance. If the US and Japanese governments can use the Futenma issue to encourage a constructive joint exploration of how their alliance can be strengthened and made more sustainable in light of the changing realities in Asia, and if it can be used to promote deeper public discussion of how Japan might make greater contributions to international security, then there is hope that this diplomatic mess can be turned into an important strategic opportunity.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 4

**2NC Counter Plan Overview**

Plan reduces overall military presence from Japan by removing forces from Okinawa counter plan is different because it only MOVES military presence from Okinawa to mainland Japan that solves the entire aff while avoiding a net decrease in presence from the region two net benefits FIRST interoperability consolidating US forces onto other bases shared with Japanese forces helps improve joint training and capabilities which strengthens and sustains the alliance. SECOND deterrence counter plan means no net decrease in US military presence from Asia thats key to credibility, resolve, and overall deterrence if US power in Asia fails then global US power will follow that risks global nuclear extinction dont risk it!

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 5

**2NC Interoperability Impact**

AND, enlarged Japan defense expectations independently check regional conflict
Richard Armitage

and Joseph Nye, 2007, President, Armitage International and Professor of International Relations, JFK School of Government, Harvard, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf, p. 15

Consider Japan's role today. Japan upholds international institutions as the second-largest donor to the U nited N ations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank. Polls in 2006 of countries around the world demonstrate that, with the exception of China and Korea, Japan is the world's most respected contributor of public goods. Japan upholds the balance of power in Asia through its own measured self-defense capabilities and support for U.S. presence . Japan provides relief in cases like the 2004 tsunami, with over $500 million in grants and the dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces [SDF]. Japan has become a positive model for economic development, democratic principles, and global cooperation. / The ability of the Japanese economy to sustain such high levels of financial support for the international system will likely decrease in relative terms by 2020. but after 50 years of passivity, Japan's new leaders are arguing for a more proactive security and diplomatic role that will keep Japan's weight in the international system high. The U nited S tates needs a Japan that is confident and engaged in that way. Turning away from the U.S.-Japan alliance or lowering our expectations of Japan would likely have a negative impact on regional stability and its role in the region. Instead of a Japan that underpins the international system in 2020, it may become comfortable as a "middle power" at best, and recalcitrant, prickly, and nationalistic at worst. Not to encourage Japan to play a more active role in support of international stability and security is to deny the international community Japan's full potential. But if U.S. strategy continues to have high expectations for Japan that meld with Japanese national sentiment. Japan will stand as a powerful model for the region of what leadership based on democratic values means.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 6

**2NC Solves Alliance Better**

Counter plan solves alliance better than plan FIRST both Japan and US leadership supports military presence in Japan reducing from Japan undermines the foundational shared-defense agreement the ENTIRE alliance is based on. AND, more evidence to prove Japan prefers the counter plan.
Xinhua News, 9-9-2010
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-09/10/c_13488603.htm Japan stresses U.S. military role in Japan in defense report Editor)

Japan's annual defense report released on Friday underlined the vital role played by U.S. military forces stationed in Japan in protecting Japan and its neighbors in the region. The 488-page Defense of Japan 2010 report also stressed Japan 's bilateral security alliance with the United States, noting that U.S. military presence in Japan was significant in providing deterrence against a possible attack on Japan. The report document said the U.S. Marines stationed in Japan need to be positioned at a
strategic place to ensure this deterrence.

SECOND counter plan enacts a cooperative Japan-US commission to find alliance sustaining solutions also increases public diplomacy to solve local tension thats Tanaka.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 7

AT: we only have to reduce Okinawa, not Japan overall

NOT TRUE the case limits are listed AFTER the full resolution which reads, quote: substantially reduce military and / or police presence from one or more of the following: Japan this means that in order to be topical the plan must meet both the full resolution AND the topic limitation. Prefer this interp FIRST GROUND without net reductions we dont have links to the core topic arguments we learned to run ALL YEAR it is unfair to neg and ruins the education we got from the debate season if our important arguments are nullified by the topic limits. SECOND DEPTH topic limits should be used to create more complex debates, these are better overall because it makes us more informed about policy if we wanted to have shallow debates we would do public forum policy debate should be held to a higher standard.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 8

AT: Perm do both

1) IMPOSSIBLE you cant reduce presence from Okinawa while simultaneously maintaining presence in Japan as a whole Okinawa is part of Japan so the perm is illogical. 2) STILL LINKS TO THE NET BENFITS do both includes the plan means the perm crushes the alliance and deterrence. 3) PERM CRUSHES US POWER IN ASIA it requires presence.
Richard Armitage

and Joseph Nye, 2007, President, Armitage International and Professor of International Relations, JFK School of Government, Harvard, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf, p. 20 We would be remiss if we did not also acknowledge that one of the most important variables affecting East Asia for good or for ill in the future relates to the positioning of the United States. Though there is little doubt that in virtually every measure of national power, the United States' preeminence will be sustained through 2020, we cannot discount the possibility that our relative influence for shaping events in Asia will be diminished over time. This is far from certain, but in order to keep a leadership role in the region. U.S.

policymakers must remain vigilant to encroaching challenges to our influence. In other words, U.S. advantages in Asia are impermanent and should be treated as such. / First, the U nited S tates must view itself as an Asia-Pacific power and decide to take part in all aspects of life in Asia. At the best of times, the U nited S tates is seen by many Asians as a capricious power, too often driven by narrow domestic interests and ideological imperatives. But even worse in the minds of many is a tendency for prolonged inattention to Asia . Arguably, the U nited S tates presently suffers from a strategic preoccupation with another region of the world. If engagement in Asia remains episodic, or lacks sufficient senior-level involvement on the part of U.S. officials, a transition in the region's power hierarchy is possible. Even absent precipitous events, a gradual erosion of U.S. influence could occur if China continues to extend its reach and if the region as a whole loses confidence in the staying power of the U nited S tates.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 9

AT: Perm do the counter plan

1) REJECT THE PERM FOR SEVERENCE they kicked out of their military presence reduction that destroys all neg ground and nullifies all our arguments in the debate aff should be forced to defend stable positions to ensure we learn and have good clash. 2) PERMS CAN ONLY BE EXTRA TOPICAL NOT ANTI-TOPICAL keeping presence level stable is anti-topical so this perm does not justify the resolution this means that if aff goes for perm do the counter plan then vote neg. [insert AT: we only have to reduce Okinawa, not Japan if necessary]

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 10

AT: Marines Must Train Together

FIRST plan links more by removing presence from Japan altogether that splits up Marines even more. SECOND counter plan solves base transfers boost interoperability and joint collaboration with Japan.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 11

AT: Delays / Negotiation Problems / Political Issues

Counter plan is fast delay arguments dont apply 1) Pre-existing bases makes transfer and co-location an easy transition thats Hornung. 2) Japan-US commissions increase transparency, cooperation, and reduce existing tensions thats Tanaka.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 12

AT: Panetta
Panetta will support the best possible relocation plan and maintain Asia deterrence.
Japan Times, 6-11-2011, Defense pick Panetta to address Futenma plan, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110611a6.html Panetta, nominated to succeed Robert Gates as U.S. defense secretary, indicated Thursday in a congressional panel hearing that he will decide whether to review a plan to realign U.S. forces in Japan, including the relocation of the Futenma base within Okinawa, after assuming his new post. / Panetta said he is willing to work with Congress "to determine what the best and most cost-effective approach would be," in response to a question from Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee. / "We do have to maintain a presence there," he said. / Responding to a question from Jim Webb, a Democrat from Virginia, Panetta said he knows the relocation is "not an easy issue . . . but it absolutely has to be
Leon addressed." / Despite strong opposition in Okinawa, Japan and the United States are clinging to a policy of moving U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from a residential area in Ginowan to the less densely populated coastal area of Henoko in Nago, both on Okinawa Island. / But it is now accepted that the 2014 deadline for completing the realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa will not be met due to a stalemate in negotiations between Tokyo and the prefecture. / Levin, a Democrat from Michigan, has proposed integrating the Futenma base into the U.S. Kadena Air

Panetta, currently director of the CIA, said he plans to review U.S. forces in Asia, while stressing Washington's continuing commitment to ensure security, economic development and prosperity in the region. / "If confirmed, I will review the Defense Department's posture in Asia and make appropriate recommendations on any enhancements," he said. / Panetta said that North Korea, through its ballistic missiles and nuclear threat, "poses a growing and direct threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and to the international community." / The CIA chief said he will monitor the situation closely and maintain the military capability necessary to protect U.S. interests, defend its allies and deter Pyongyang from acts of aggression and intimidation. / Panetta was also critical of China's growing military power. "The pace and scale of China's military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raised many questions," he noted. / China appears to be strengthening its military capability, with its near-term focus on potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention, Panetta said. / He also said China is building up its nuclear deterrence and strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear weapons and improvement of computer network operations. / On Afghanistan, he said he supports Gate's policy to start pulling U.S. forces out of the country in July. / Panetta is expected to take the helm at the Pentagon on July 1.
Base, also in Okinawa, saying the current relocation plan is unrealistic. / In written testimony submitted to the panel,

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 13

AT: Public Support [1/2]

Counterplan solves PUBLIC SUPPORT 1) All their evidence indicates that the public wants the Okinawa burden reduced we do exactly that 2) Deferral would address the concerns of both leaders AND the PUBLIC
Kosuke Takahashi 1/14/11 (Journalist for the Asia Times in Tokyo, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/MA15Dh01.htmlGates changes stripes on Okinawa)

Gates said on Thursday during his visit to Japan that the US administration would defer to Tokyo in solving the long-standing dispute of moving the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma out of a densely populated area in Okinawa prefecture and consider the perceptions of the local public, who want the American forces out. "We do understand that it is politically a complex matter in Japan," Gates said in a joint press conference with Toshimi Kitazawa, his Japanese counterpart . "And we intend to follow the lead of the Japanese government in working with the people of Okinawa to take their interests and their concerns into account, and that obviously needs to happen."
What a difference a year makes. During his last visit to Tokyo in October 2009, one month after Yukio Hatoyama's center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took the reins of government, Gates had demanded that the transfer of around 8,000 Okinawa-based Marines to the US Pacific territory of Guam would not occur unless the heliport functions of the Futenma facility were moved by 2014 to a coastal area of the marines' Camp Schwab in Nago City, northern Okinawa - as agreed in a 2006 bilateral pact for the realignment of US forces in Japan. At the time, the Japanese media denounced him as intimidating. Hatoyama reneged on an election promise to enter negotiations with the US to move the American bases off Okinawa, and was forced to quit

the US-Japan defense alliance is broader, deeper and indeed richer than any single issue," Gates said on Thursday. Japanese military analyst Toshiyuki Shikata echoed Gates' statement. "Yes, Futenma is just a one-of-them issue in the Japan-US alliance," Shikata, a professor of International Affairs at Teikyo University, told Asia Times Online. "The US knows Japan's DPJ-led administration won't be able to solve the Futenma issue any time soon, so the US does not want to make this single issue crack the bilateral alliance as a whole ." "With the Futenma base never moved out, Okinawa people will suffer most," Shikata added. "For them, it's a danger of continuing the status quo." Training of F-15 fighters at Kadena Still, to make the US presence less visible on Okinawa and to ease the burden on Okinawa to some extent, the two nations this time "agreed to step up the efforts to finalize" the relocation of part of aviation drills of F-15 fighters at the US Kadena Air Base in Okinawa to Guam, Kitazawa said. Despite the two defense chiefs' measured comments, Japanese media reported
In June 2010. "While issues associated with Okinawa and Futenma have tended to dominate the headlines this past year, the two nations had already largely agreed on this issue.

3) Co-location specifically solves public backlash

Cronin et al. 10
(Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security, Members of the Japan-U.S. Study Group, October 27, Renewing Old Promises And Exploring New Frontiers The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order, Joint Statement, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional_info/tfcnas_on_alliance.pdf)

The basic notions of where Japan stands and where it is headed should be shared by the Japanese people. Tokyo and Washington should interact with and more fully articulate the enduring values of the alliance to the Japanese public . The U nited S tates should take additional measures to defuse local tensions stemming from the presence of American troops in Japan, and, whenever feasible, U.S. bases should be co-located with Japanese 8 bases to ease local concerns . Needless to say, Japan and the
United States should make additional efforts to redress the disproportionate basing burden borne by Okinawa in the postwar years.

4) Joint commission would address public concerns and defuse local hostility by increasing public participation and granting local governments the right to conduct environmental inspections thats Cronin 5) The plan collapses the alliance which turns public support counterplan is key
Oros 10
(Andrew, , political science and international studies prof, The 50th Anniversary: Time for a Renewal of Vows, Asia Policy, Number 10 (July 2010), 1-41, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdf)

Japanese voters and bureaucrats have clearly indicated their preference for a continued close alliance relationship with the United States. The fact that the latest annual poll conducted by Japans Cabinet Office in December 2009 found the highest level of friendly feelings toward the United States (78.9%) since the polling began in the mid-1970s and that 81.8% of respondents held a favorable view of U.S.-Japan relations should encourage leaders of both states. Voters have criticized the DPJ for undermining U.S.-Japan relations, criticism the DPJ must effectively address to remain in power. The latest Diplomatic Bluebook issued by Japans Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2010 also underscores the importance of the alliance to Japans overall foreign policy.
At another level, though,

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 14

AT: Public Support [2/2]

AND Public opposition has no effect
Yeo 10
(Andrew, Anti-Base Movements in South Korea: Comparative Perspective on the Asia-Pacific, 14 June 2010, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrew-Yeo/3373)

Although anti-base movements may successfully mobilize, as witnessed in Maehyangri and Pyeongtaek, they may not be equally successful in shaping policy outcomes. More often than not, activists face significant structural constraints. In all anti-base movements, whether in Okinawa, South Korea, Guam or the Philippines, activists face great challenges when confronting U.S. base issues because political elites tend to prioritize robust alliance relations with the U.S. Whether a progressive or conservative-leaning government, regardless of who comes to power, political leaders in Tokyo and Seoul generally accept in principle the necessity for U.S. forces to provide regional stability in the mid- to long-term. A pro-U.S. consensus among political leaders and bureaucracies, particularly within the defense and foreign policy establishments, drowns out activist calls for an alternative security framework centered on a reduction of U.S. forces. This ideological constraint makes it difficult for anti-base movements to shift public discussion on U.S. base issues. Moreover, host governments constantly receive a mixture of political pressure and economic incentives to support U.S. alliance obligations.
While some government elites are genuinely sympathetic to the plight of local residents, in most cases political and economic forces prevent these actors from executing policy changes that would significantly eliminate or ameliorate the negative effects of U.S. military presence.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 15

AT: Governor Signs [Delays]

FIRST this is entirely irrelevant Gates has deferred policy to Japan, which means that even if the governor has to sign a statement, the process would be immediate SECOND this is in no way different than the affirmative because Futenma disputes are still going on in the status quo

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 16

AT: Offsets Counterplans Bad [Theory]

Offsets counterplans are good 1) Tests the word reduce in the resolution aff has to defend against redeployment our model of debate promotes real world policymaking that ensures the best education. AND redeployment is discussed robustly in the literature
Cashner 9
(http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/redeployment_process.html)

Redeployment is defined as the transfer of forces and materiel to support another Joint Force Commander's operational requirements, or the return of personnel, equipment, and materiel to home/demobilization stations for reintegration/outprocessing. Redeployment operations have four phases: Redeployment Planning Pre-Redeployment Activities Movement Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (see Joint Publication 3-35) Historically, redeployments have been considered "administrative movements" with no emphasis on aggregating unit cargo or expeditiously returning the cargo . Therefore, units often had their equipment returned on multiple ships (20 or more) or received their equipment 120 to 150 days after returning to their home station. However, due to dwell times averaging 12 months or less between deployments, the Army shortened unit redeployment timelines in order to meet Army Force Generation Process and RESET requirements. What has the Army done? The Army has influenced the Joint redeployment
process in two key areas. The first is updating old and creating new Joint and Army doctrine and policy to operationalize the redeployment process and stress its importance in sustaining combat operations. The second is convincing the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to take a thorough look at their business processes and determine ways to reduce redeployment timelines; particularly the time it takes from the seaport of embarkation to the destination (e.g., depot, home station, or

Joint and Army doctrine now addresses redeployments as operational (as opposed to administrative) movements that are critical in "re-establishing Joint Force readiness" that must be planned and managed as intensively as deployments. Specific
mobilization station). examples include: Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, dated May 7, 2007, Draft Army Regulation 525-30, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and the Defense Transportation Regulation, Part 3, Mobility, Chapter 305 Redeployment dated August 17, 2007. In 2008, the Army influenced USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM to conduct redeployments as operational movements, reduce timelines, and establish firm metrics. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) sealift timelines are now programmed to take less than 58 days for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 65 days for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The OEF timelines were reduced to a relatively low cost by increasing ship speed and reducing the time it takes to return equipment from "port to fort". For example, the sailing time from Fujairah, United Arab Emirates to the East coast of the United States has been reduced from 32 days to 26 days by increasing the average sailing speed from15 to 18 knots. Furthermore, USTRANSCOM compressed the discharge and movement of unit equipment from the seaport of debarkation to home station from 14 to 8 days. Subsequently, the Army G-4 standardized BCT redeployments from OEF by way of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The TTPs provide continuity and will help deployed BCTs clearly identify "who does what, when, and where" so that the process remains the same from one rotation to the next. The Army requires redeployment equipment to be returned to depot or home installation in 50 days or less. This represents an 8 to 15 day decrease in current metrics. The USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM are now looking at ways to reduce OIF timelines by looking at similar efficiencies as discovered when examining the OEF redeployment process. From June to August 2008, USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM conducted a proof of principle to redeploy a Stryker BCT from Iraq in 50 days or less. Remarkably, the entire movement took 42 days - exceeding the current standard by 16 days. Subsequently, on October 3, 2008, the Department of the Army G4, USTRANSCOM, and CENTCOM staff officers conducted an after action review and analysis of this movement. As a result, CENTCOM validated, and USTRANSCOM confirmed, the feasibility of a 50 day redeployment for two additional BCTs redeploying in January 2009. On December 8, 2008, the USTRANSCOM staff was scheduled to brief their commander on the Army's 50 day initiative, and recommend approval of the concept as "a goal" for future BCT redeployments. If their analysis indicates a 50 day sealift timeline is not feasible, they will provide an amended "projected closure date" and attempt to come as close to 50 days as possible. The Army staff will continue its efforts to improve redeployment doctrine and policy and institutionalize the ethos that redeployment operations are as critical as deployment. Current redeployment metrics allow BCTs approximately 9 months to conduct collective training between consecutive deployments. This time allows units to meet minimal standards for preparing for counterinsurgency operations. Collective training for full spectrum operations requires approximately 12 months of training (9 months for counter insurgency trainng and 3 months for major combat operations training). In order to allow units the time to train for full spectrum operations, equipment must be returned to depot or home installation for RESET, inventory, and individual training no later than 50 days after its sealift available load date. POC: LTC Mike Cashner (703) 614-5066

2) Checks educational binarism they make debates purely about presence vs. reduction turns us into dogmatic citizens who never realize alternatives within presence, reduction, and redeployment narrowmindedness makes debate education bankrupt. 3) Resolution focus is good only predictable way to ensure fair division of ground checks small affs by leveling the playing field thats key to portable education skills. 4) Solvency advocates check; its predictable there are only a few places in the literature discussed for relocation of Marines in Japan to other places such as Guam, bases in Japan, and home basing them in the U.S. 5) Gut check its the end of the year, this is a common counterplan, and were redeploying the troops within the same country they should be prepared dont decide a national championship round on a whine. 6) Err neg aff gets infinite prep and ends the debate allows prediction of our strategies and ways to screw us we need to compensate.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 17

1NC Deterrence DA [1/5]

Even the plans partial withdrawal destroys the overall credibility and capability of our commitment throughout Asia and in Japan
Lawless 10 - former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Department of Defense in charge of Asia-Pacific affairs [Richard P. Lawless was an employee at the Central Intelligence Agency,
serving in Washington, D.C. and various postings in the Far East and Europe received his B.S. in International Relations from Bradley Universitys School of International Studies, and studied at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. As interviewed by YOICHI KATO, Asahi Shimbun Senior Staff Writer http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003040361.html

Any relocation out of Japan of all or even a major part of our combined Marine presence in Japan would represent a fundamental relocation of a critical capability for the defense of Japan . Therefore, making a decision about Henoko has a potential to force the United States, probably sooner rather than later, to make a negative decision to base itself elsewhere. We must be located where we can properly exercise that capability. It really means that we would have to rethink our entire deployment strategy. These are heavy decisions that have long-lasting consequences. Q: Where would they go? A: That's the $64,000 question. I cannot say where they would go, but this would be a strategic decision that would have to be made. But certainly, they would be going away from Japan, and this displacement, we must assume, will reduce substantially the defense posture of Japan. This would also result in a reduced credibility of the United States' presence in Japan, our forward-basing in Japan. Q: Would they go to Guam? A: Perhaps some could go to Guam. Perhaps some would go to Hawaii. Perhaps back to the United States West Coast or elsewhere.
There is an additional danger here. That is, once this issue causes a process of fundamental repositioning to begin to occur, understand that many forces will be at work, including U.S. congressional forces. It will be very difficult to manage the sequence of events that play out. And this is not something we want to see happen. But our biggest concern is that it seems the people in Japan that are making these decisions, the Hatoyama government and its political overlords, do not have any sense of the magnitude of the issue with which they are playing. In the greater scheme of things (for) the security of Japan, it almost seems we have a group of boys and girls playing with a box of matches as they sit in a room of dynamite. Long after they have endangered themselves, the real damage will be done to the house of Japan. And the American firemen will not be around once the decision is made to burn down the house. You know what I'm saying. It is, "Do the people that are making these decisions understand the second and third order consequences of forcing the United States to make a very difficult decision?" That's the issue. Q: ell me about what's happening in Congress. We know that Daniel Inouye and Jim Webb recently visited Okinawa. What's the atmosphere in Congress regarding this issue? A: I think the atmosphere in Congress is one of disappointment. They believed that there was a realignment agreement that would protect and preserve the bilateral security relationship for the next 50 to 100 years. We told them that. We assured them that this was the outcome of the realignment and rebalancing we had agreed to with Japan when the agreement was reached. Our Congress was intensely involved, Senator Inouye among other leaders, in the agreement. And these congressmen understood the details. And now these congressional leaders see an agreement--and I here would not presume to speak for Senator Inouye--that is unraveling. And they're very disappointed. I think this development causes them to question the entire posture, our ability to retain a forward-based posture in the Pacific. The reasonable question they're asking is, "If you fail to follow through with this realignment, how will this affect our U.S. capabilities to execute on our national commitments to the people of Japan?" And that's the question that's being asked. As the Henoko agreement spirals down, you can bet this question will be pressed more

Tell me about the potential impact on deterrence if the Marines in Okinawa, or even Sasebo and Iwakuni, withdraw from Japan. What kind of a change would occur in the deterrence factor? A: I think it would be hugely damaging to the credibility of our deterrence posture. Beyond deterrence, it substantially damages our ability to execute on the planning we have in place and the commitments we've made to Japan. So you have a loss of deterrence value, which is very important. But the second half of this is if you lose the deterrence value, you also lose the ability to execute. So you have to ask yourself, "What is the net impact on the alliance?" We have obligations under the alliance. Japan has obligations . This is Article 5 and Article 6,
aggressively in our Congress, as it should be. Q: respectively. If Japan is unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations under the alliance . . . Q: Under Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty? A: Yes. We have to re-evaluate our ability to deliver, under Article 5. It is that simple! This is not rocket science. Q: Are you saying that the United States would not defend Japan? A: No. What I am saying is the Hatoyama government must consider the real extended impact, having put us in the position of having a reduced capability to defend Japan. If the Hatoyama government puts us in that position, we have to be honest about what that action will have then done to the alliance. There doesn't seem to be any--any--consideration of the strategic impact of this issue on our ability to deliver what we have promised to deliver to the alliance. No consideration of the impact on

But can the United States really afford to reduce its deterrence value in Japan? Won't that damage the U.S. presence in this region in light of other major powers in this region, including China? A: We cannot afford to do that. We cannot, from the standpoint of the United States. Q: So you would stay anyway. A: As best we can, but only as we can. But the first country that cannot afford the departure of these defense-ofJapan capabilities is Japan. The first endangered body is not the United States; it is Japan! So why should this responsibility for such a
our ability to deter and our ability to execute. Never has that issue, to my knowledge, been raised. Q: fundamental adjustment be put on the shoulders of the United States rather than on the shoulders of the nation that is most directly affected? We cannot afford to withdraw. But if we have to, we will. If we are given no choice, one has to leave. The party that is most affected, Japan, doesn't seem to grasp that elemental fact, nor does it understand that it is very close to putting us in an almost impossible position, pressing us to make a difficult decision. Q: Tell me the realities we may face if we really go down the road of having the Marines forced to leave Okinawa and Japan. What's would happen? Would China, for example, take over the disputed Senkakus? A: I have no idea how this would play out. But think about this. What is happening--what might happen, what could happen, will happen, and very probably would

This will be an unmistakable signal to the other powers in the region, both our friends, our potential enemies, and other third-level powers who have ambitions to be disruptive or troublemakers. I certainly would put North Korea in that latter category, as its grinds out its nuclear weapons. Think of the message that is being communicated today to China, to the Korean Peninsula, to our allies in the region, be it Australia, Singapore, to India. The message is that Japan and the United States cannot properly manage their security relationship, a Japan that is unwilling and unable to execute agreements it has entered into with its alliance partner. The assorted nations of Greater Asia are watching a situation evolve in which the United States may have to, may be forced to, reposture itself in the Western Pacific. For all them--friend, foe, fence-sitters and assorted trouble-makers--this is a huge issue. If the body politic of Japan
happen--is that the responsibility for making the decision to stay in Japan will be put exclusively on the back of the United States. At some point we'll have to make that decision.

is too busy with domestic politics to watch this play out, other parties will do so for them and draw the appropriate conclusions. In fact, it seems to us that this is almost more important to other countries in the region, like Australia, Singapore, India and certainly South Korea, than it is to Japan. Which is incredible! Q: If the Marines leave, could Japan fill the vacuum by enhancing its

But remember, what you're losing is not just a given capability. You're losing an alliance capability and the strategic connection, which eventually leads to strategic deterrence, that the Marine Corps' presence provides. This is assured, in the final instance, by the U.S. Marine Corps' physical presence in the territory of Japan , which is Okinawa. When you start disturbing that fundamental relationship, it leads to a range of other questions about the sustainability of the alliance. And I would suggest that the departure of the Marines would call into question the basic sustainability of this alliance as it is.
own defense capabilities? A: I think that will be a decision that will have to be made by the Japanese government and the Japanese people.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 18

1NC Deterrence DA [2/5]

AND, Withdrawal obliterates primacy and causes regional conflict
Goh 8
[Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order, 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database] The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is funda mentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits and ideational convictions the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical

analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is
today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US'

role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing
US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain

Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is
why Japan is not yet a normal country. that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a

Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist hawks in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained normalization process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United StatesJapan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United StatesROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification in South Korea, the image of the US as the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North, and in the United States, an
security community between them (Nau, 2003). image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an evil state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.7980). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference

The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United StatesROK bilateral relationship is not always easy,
toward the United States, rather than China. its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis--vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence

against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 19

1NC Deterrence DA [3/5]

to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and
economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to choose sides between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United StatesChina relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As

Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at
discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being lost to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable regional stakeholder that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional

East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5. Conclusion
hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright

history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is
Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

AND, that risks global nuclear omnicide

Bradley Thayer, Professor, Security Studies, Missouri State University, 11/06, The National Interest, In Defense of Primacy.

Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the
costs of U.S. actionbut they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical

Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in
resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 20

1NC Deterrence DA [4/5]

secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because

threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in

international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and

it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"the oceans, the world's airspace and outer spaceallowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States'

kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics todayin a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on displayis that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposestheir own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with Americatheir security is tied to the U nited States through treaties and other informal arrangementsand they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to
conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. (2) This is not an advantage

Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacyand the bandwagoning effecthas also given us
one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. extensive in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing power. China proclaims that it

influence

is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting

But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" casesVenezuela, Iran, Cubait is an anti-U.S. regime that is the
communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT

peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of
HISTORY, international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international orderfree trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing

Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral
democratization is directly linked to U.S. power. behind it. In that they Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and

American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships alignedbetween Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where
its allies,

a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much
Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United

the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more
States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. (3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 21

1NC Deterrence DA [5/5]

Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. growth of the

Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the
liberal worldwide network The economic stability and prosperity that stems

global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically

characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets.

from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the
development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy. (4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it

Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold Warand most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force "it serves, de facto, as
provides. the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort.

communications capabilities or global United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80
percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11,

No other force possesses the logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the

support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.
polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 22

**2NC Impact Overview [1/2]**

1.) Certainty of extinction A.) Empirics The dark ages followed Romes collapse, Hitler followed France, US Primacy has brought the longest period of peace in human history, the alternative is multiple hotspots going nuclear and great power war

And, 500 years flow neg

Joseph Nye, 1990, fmr Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, Bound

to Lead, p. 17

the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If as Robert Gilpin argues, international politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia, the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it may end.
Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the relationship between decline and war. One of

B.) Prefer Horizontal Escalation Thayer cites Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, US and China, and China and Taiwan if even one of these conflict escalates it means the end of humanity you can mentally double the probability that the plan causes extinction for each specific scenario the 1AR does not answer C.) Terminal Uniqueness US credibility checks conflict escalation solving the affs impacts And, regional conflicts races go nuclear
Landay 2K
[Jonathon S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent for Knight Ridder, has written about foreign affairs and U.S. defense, intelligence and foreign policies, Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts, 3-11, L/N]

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even

a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster."

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 23

**2NC Impact Overview [2/2]**

And, these are uniquely fast no impact turns apply
Aaron Friedburg 94 [Frmr deputy assistant for national-security affairs and director of policy planning. for the Vice president, PhD in Politics from Harvard, He has served as Director of Princeton's Research Program in International Security at the Woodrow Wilson School,. Frmr fellow at Smithsonian Institutions Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and Harvard Universitys Center for International Affairs, and Chairman of the Board of Counselors for the National Bureau of Asian Research's Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies., International Security, Winter, p. 8, p. asp//wfi-tjc]

Most of the mitigating factors discussed here are likely, by their very nature, to evolve at a modest pace. Even nations that have experienced revolutions do not always change their characters overnight. The maturation of democracy in Russia and Korea and its birth in China will take time, as will the fading of decades-old national grievances and the resolution of the disputes that have helped keep them alive. The development of powerful international institutions in Europe took many years. A similar achievement will not be accomplished in Asia , under less auspicious circumstances, with the mere wave of a hand. Economic interdependence is advancing at a rapid pace, but its geographic scope is still limited, its political effects mixed, and its future course uncertain. Nuclear weapons could spread quite quickly across Asia and, by fundamentally altering the balance between the perceived costs and benefits of war, their proliferation could conceivably promise more stability than insecurity. Needless to say, however, this scenario is fraught with uncertainties and dangers. While they may only just be beginning to do so, the competitive interactions conducive to greater instability could gain strength quite rapidly. The security dilemma is, in essence, an amplifier for anxieties, in which the defensive exertions of the participants stimulate each other and feed back upon themselves. Once initiated, a multi-sided security scramble could accelerate quickly to high levels of competitive military and diplomatic activity. Among its other consequences, this turn of events would likely disrupt the further evolution of whatever mitigating tendencies are presently developing in Asia. Mounting insecurity could intensify feelings of nationalism, slow the construction of sturdy economic and institutional ties, and weaken or reverse any trend toward increasing democratization. If they did not actually promote it, these developments, in turn, would certainly do nothing to discourage further competitive behavior. The anticipation of war, like the expectation of peace, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Virtuous upward spirals can become vicious downward ones.

2.) Timeframe Now Key - countries are looking to the US for leadership - perception of weakness gives a green light to challengers thats Goh 3.) Turns Case - the US would logically be forced to re-intervene in Japan when its interests in trade and capital are threatened by instability ensuring their impacts, only a risk we preclude tensions And, turns case means we only have to win a fractional risk of the disad to win the debate, because Asia is already unstable now as per 1NC Kelly, even a small increase in tensions short-circuits aff solvency

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 24

**2NC Link Top Level [1/2]**

Partial withdrawal from Japan kills credibility 1NC Lawless evidence is explicit by removing troops from the country, it sends the signal to potential foes and allies that we arent prepared, committed or willing to manage the region. Marine presence in Japan is literally key to prevent conflicts Top commanders agree they decimate overall perception and capabilities throughout the region
Japan Today, 10
(U.S. Marines in Okinawa necessary for deterrence: U.S. commander, 2010,http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/us-marines-in-okinawa-necessary-for-deterrence-uscommander)

The outgoing commander of U.S. forces in Japan said Thursday that the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa Prefecture is necessary to maintain deterrence in the region. The Marines are uniquely suited to a set of activities that we dont have anywhere else in the United States military, Lt Gen Edward Rice told a press conference in Tokyo. They have a very significant deterrent effect on the people that we might want to deter. Rice explained that the Marines in thesouthwestern Japanese prefecture are effective in signaling to potential foes the forces proximity and capacity to deal with possible contingencies in the region as well as the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

2.) Futenma withdrawal Collapses Credibility A.) Resolve - Removing a base we have recognized as vital to regional deterrence just because Japan doesnt like them shatters our credibility as a hegemon to keep the peace no matter what thats Lawless and Goh And, Short term credibility outweighs
Tun 8
Hakan Tun, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008, Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq, Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

In international politics, a major component of building or maintaining a countrys reputation involves resolve.5 Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in one military confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.6 According to Shiping Tang, this concern frequently amounts to a cult of reputation among foreign policy makers, which he defines as a belief system holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead ones adversaries or allies to underestimate ones resolve in the next crisis.7 Of particular importance to the cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of the cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a theater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a countrys reputation and thus embolden the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment to their cause.8 / Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength and resolve.9 According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversaries and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely, being perceived as weak and irresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being less supportive. / This logic has had two general consequences for Americas use of force abroad: First, exhibiting resolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the mere perception of power generates tangible power,
Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actors past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior. thereby reducing the need to use actual physical force against every adversary.10 In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in several places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States appeared questionable to some.1 / Second, reputational

concerns made it difficult for the United States to withdraw from a theater of war. The Vietnam War is the most prominent case, although the logic was also evident during the Korean conflict in the early 1950s.12 As is
well-documented by historians, both the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations took reputation seriously and argued that leaving Vietnam without an honorable exit would seriously hurt U.S. credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. For both Johnson and Nixon, an honorable exit meant creating an autonomous South Vietnam (much like independent, anti-communist South Korea after the Korean war) that was recognized by all parties involved in the conflict, particularly by the North Vietnamese government. Such an outcome would vindicate U.S. sacrifices.13

And, Regional Credibility - biggest potential challengers to US primacy originate in Asia, and maintaining commitments in the region are vital to convince regional states to diplomatically contain rising powers thats Goh that means every reason theyre key to regional stability is another internal to heg

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 25

**2NC Link Top Level [2/2]**

3.) Causes Regional instability A.) Perception
Jiji Press 10 (2/17/10, U.S. Commander Stresses Importance of Okinawa Base pg online @ lexisnexis//)
A U.S. Marines commander on Wednesday emphasized the significance of the Marines staying in Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture in Japan, in terms of quick reactions to contingencies in East Asia. In a speech in Tokyo, Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder, commanding general for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said that the U.S. military "must be based in Okinawa" to maintain security in a region where there are potential threats to Japan, including North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Regarding the controversial relocation of the Marines' Futenma airfield in Ginowan, Okinawa, he stressed that "it is not just about a local base issue," given the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance for regional stability and economic prosperity. The Japanese government has been looking into an alternative site, as part of a review to the 2006 bilateral agreement to move the Futenma base to the Marines' Camp Schwab in Nago in the same

prefecture. Regarding

calls by some members of Japan's ruling coalition for the Futenma military facility to be moved out of the Japan, Stalder warned that if countries in the region begin to see the U.S. military presence in Japan receding, they would "drastically increase their defense budgets...leading to a regional arms race."
prefecture, or even out of

B.) Destroys effective intervention

Klinger 9- Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asiat at the Heritage Foundations Asian Studies Center
(Bruce, U.S. Should Stay Firm on Implementation of Okinawa Force Realignment December 15, 2009, pg online @ [http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/bg_2352.pdf]//)

Okinawas strategic location contributes to potent U.S. deterrent and power projection capabilities as well as enabling rapid and flexible contingency response, including to natural disasters in Asia. Marine ground units on Okinawa can utilize Futenma airlift to deploy quickly to amphibious assault and landing ships stationed at the nearby U.S. Naval Base at Sasebo,
Nagasaki Prefecture. Okinawa has four long runways: two at Kadena Air Base, one at Futenma, and one at Naha civilian airfield. The Futenma runway would likely be eliminated after return to Okinawa control to enable further civilian urban expansion. The planned FRF would compensate by building two new (albeit shorter) runways at Camp Schwab. However, if the Futenma unit redeployed to Guam instead, no new runway on Okinawa would be built. Japan

would have thus lost a strategic national security asset, which includes the capability to augment U.S. or Japanese forces during a crisis in the region. Not having runways at Futenma or Schwab would be like sinking ones own aircraft carrier, putting further strain on the two runways at Kadena. Redeploying U.S. forces from Japan and Okinawa to Guam would reduce alliance deterrent and combat capabilities. Guam is 1,400 miles, a threehour flight, and multiple refueling operations farther from potential conflict zones. Furthermore, moving fixed-wing aircraft to Guam would drastically reduce the number of combat aircraft sorties that U.S. forces could conduct during crises with North Korea or China, while exponentially increasing refueling and logistic requirements.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 26

Ground Troops Key [1/2]

Ground Troops key to regional and global credibility 1.) Triggers back all of the reasons why an Okinawa withdrawal would be bad, if we pulled half our forces out, our enemies and allies would perceive it 2.) The Signal - Removing Okinawa troops we assess as vital to regional peacekeeping just because Japan doesnt like them shatters our credibility as a hegemon to keep the peace no matter what thats GAO and Goh 3.) Nullifies nuke guarantees
Nye 9
(Joseph, Prof. IR Harvard U., Korea Times, Will US-Japan Alliance Survive, 7-14, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/07/137_48423.html)

Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent , and
wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on

parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain
with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.

And, causes Japan nuke prolif

Bakanic et al 8
(Elizabeth, Mark Christopher, Sandya Das, Laurie Freeman, George Hodgson, Mike Hunzeker, R. Scott Kemp, Sung Hwan Lee, Florentina Mulaj, Ryan Phillips, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Relations, Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt.

The strength of the U.S-Japan alliance and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella are critical to Japans sense of security. A perceived U.S. failure to live up to its obligations, especially in a regional crisis situation, would undermine Japanese confidence in the alliance and could drive Japan to consider seeking security through its own nuclear capabilities. Such a
Erosion of confidence in the U.S.- Japan security alliance:

fracture might arise if the United States failed to provide adequate support to Japan in a potential conflict with China, if it sided with South Korea over possession of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands14 or in other historical disputes, or if it undertook major regional security decisions (e.g. significant troop

reductions or realignments) without first consulting Tokyo.

Extinction
Circione 2K
(3/22, Director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Foreign Policy) The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world .

If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses.Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play
guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear

Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence.Five

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 27

AT: Nuclear Guarantee

Cross apply troops key thats above And, Troops are key to it thats Nye, its a question of perception And, Permanent troops key
Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt
Guthe, U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia, http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20Extend-Deter-for%20print.pdf, JMP)
Forward Deployments

The forward presence of U.S. military forces has value for deterrence and assurance that is well recognized. Forces routinely deployed on or near the territory of an ally not only, or even primarily, augment the armed strength of that country, but also serve as a concrete and continuing reminder that the U nited S tates has a strong interest in its security and will fight in its defense. Permanently stationed ground forces, in particular, seem to have an assurance effect not duplicated by temporary deployments (port calls to show the flag, for example), probably because they are unlikely to be withdrawn overnight and often are positioned where they will be directly engaged by an enemy attack, thus ensuring U.S. involvement in a conflict. The likelihood, if not certainty, that U.S. forces would be engaged in a conflict can lend credibility to an associated nuclear guarantee. If forward deployments include U.S. nuclear weapons, those arms
themselves offer a tangible assurance that the ally is covered by the nuclear umbrella.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 28

AT: Gradual Withdrawal

Withdrawal speed is irrelevant, perception is key if regional countries see US commitment reductions they see it as the beginning of a full-scale withdraw sparks immediate arms race to cope with the future lack of presence thats Lawless and Goh. And, still collapses credibility with a global signal of weakness removing troops that have been stationed in Japan for the last 50 years and are considered vital to peace global trust in US resolve will fail that risks multiple conflicts thats Thayer. And, slow withdraw boosts our turns case arguments because arms races will happen years before plan solvency begins our link and impact happen before their link turn EVEN BEGINS.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 29

AT: Guam Solves

Perceptions key leaving Japan signals the end of US credibility. And, Guam is too far away prevents intervention.
GAO, 98
(Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence on Okinawa pg online @ [http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98066.pdf]//au)

If hostilities erupt in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. forces need to arrive in the crisis area quickly to repel aggression and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. U.S. forces could be used in a conflict and could deploy from their bases on Okinawa. The forward deployment on Okinawa significantly shortens transit times, thereby promoting early arrival in potential regional trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits, a significant benefit in the initial stages of a conflict. For example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States. Similarly, it takes about 1 1/2 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 30

1NC Environment
US base protects endangered species.
Jonathan Taylor, no date, assistant professor, Geography Cal State University, Fullerton , Anti-Military and Environmental Movements in Okinawa, http://www.uky.edu/~ppkaran/conference/Anti-Military%20and%20Environmental%20Movements%20in%20Okinawa.pdf

the other large military base in the North, now called the Jungle Warfare Training Center. This area is extremely undeveloped, with only a few facilities, one main road, and a few small helipads. The main use of this area is for jungle warfare training, which involves neither the firing of live bullets nor the use of many vehicles. There therefore have been extremely minimal environmental impacts on this area. In essence, this base is the de facto largest semi-wilderness area in Okinawa, and certainly by far the largest contiguous protected area in the Ryukyu Islands. Recent surveys have found scores of endangered endemic species which are found only in this area.4
On the opposite extreme though is

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 31

1NC Dugong
Dugong extinction inevitable.
Philippa Fogarty, 10-7-2010, Anger simmers over Okinawa base burden, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11404406 Taro Hosokawa

problems like aircraft noise, pollution and damage to sea grasses caused by the landfill. /

of the Dugong Network Okinawa says the whole area should be given special protection. / "Of course the base will have an effect," he says, citing "Looking at the current situation, even if they don't make the base, the Okinawa dugong will become extinct . But if they build the base, it will happen faster." / Residents have other concerns, such as base-related crime. They also

believe there will be no way to prevent the base plan expanding once approved. Already it has grown from a small heliport in 1996 to a large two-runway airfield in 2010. / The US ConsulGeneral in Okinawa, Raymond Greene, says planners studied numerous options as they looked for an operationally effective site with an acceptable impact level on the environment and local residents.

Kugnus ACTS

Okinawa Neg 32

1NC Marine Life

Ocean collapse imminent too many alt causes.
Wynne Parry, 7-28-2010, Oceans in Peril: Primed for Mass Extinction? http://www.ouramazingplanet.com/earth-oceans-mass-extinction-0385/ One hundred days ago Thursday, the barrels of oil

oil rig Deepwater Horizon began spewing oil into the Gulf of Mexico. As profoundly as the leak of millions of is injuring the Gulf ecosystem, it is only one of many threats to the Earth's oceans that , many experts say, could change the makeup of the oceans as we know them and wipe out a large portion of marine life. / The waters of the Gulf were already heavily fished, and the Gulf has been home to an
oxygen-depleted dead zone generated by agricultural runoff rich in nutrients. / The Gulf and the rest of the world's waters also face the uncertain and potentially devastating effects of climate change. Warming

ocean temperatures reduce the water's oxygen content, and rising atmospheric carbon dioxide is altering the basic chemistry of the ocean, making it more acidic. There is no shortage of evidence that both of these effects have begun to wreak havoc on certain important creatures. / Human beings created these problems, largely in the two centuries since the Industrial Revolution, but for some researchers, they bring to mind the ancient past. The Earth has seen several mass extinctions, including five that annihilated more than half the planet's species. Experts now believe Earth is in the midst of a sixth event, the first one caused by humans. / "Today the synergistic effects of human impacts are laying the groundwork for a comparably great Anthropocene mass extinction in the oceans, with unknown ecological and evolutionary consequences," Jeremy Jackson of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the U niversity of C alifornia, San Diego, wrote in a 2008 article published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. / Frightening parallel / When it comes to the oceans, research shows a parallel to the Permian-Triassic extinction also known as the Great Dying which eradicated 95 percent of marine species when the oceans lost their oxygen about 250 million years ago. / The same phenomenon is taking place in many areas of today's oceans. The entry of fertilizers into rivers and subsequently oceans is eating up the oceans' oxygen that runoff is the primary source of the Gulf of Mexico's 3,000-square-mile (7,770-square-kilometer)
dead zone. Around the world, the number of dead zones, some of which are naturally occurring, increased from 149 in 2003 to more than 200 in 2006, according to a 2008 report by the United Nations Environmental Program. / What's more, the ocean surface is warming, driven by the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. This keeps the deeper waters, which are rich in nutrients but low in oxygen, from mixing with the oxygenated surface. According to a 2007 report from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global surface temperatures increased by 1.1 degrees Fahrenheit (0.6 degrees Celsius) throughout the 21st century, and, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), this decade is the warmest since record-keeping began in 1880. / At the time of the third of the Big Five extinctions, the Permian-Triassic, there was only one massive continent and one massive ocean, conditions that disrupted ocean circulation and inhibited oxygen circulation in an already warm world, according to Lee Kump, a geoscientist at Pennsylvania State University. That set the stage for the ultimate trigger, a series of massive volcanic eruptions in Siberia. / The eruptions pumped massive amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. This warmed the ocean further, exacerbating its oxygen problem. Meanwhile, more storms on land washed more oxygen-eating nutrients into the ocean. Bacteria began producing hydrogen sulfide, which was ultimately expelled into an atmosphere already toxic with carbon dioxide, according to Kump. / A comparison of carbon dioxide release then versus now is telling, Kump said. Siberian volcanoes emitted tens of thousands of gigatons of carbon dioxide into the air over what was probably thousands of years. Humans currently are producing 9 gigatons per year from fossil fuel reservoirs that contain up to 4,000 gigatons. / The rate of carbon dioxide release matters, Kump said, because life has to have time to adapt. / "It's: Would you rather be squeezed or punched?" Kump said. "The Permian extinction was a squeeze that gradually got tighter and tighter It may ultimately have been more fatal than the punch we are going to get, but the punch

The parallel in ocean chemistry between the past and present isn't limited to oxygen depletion. The Permian ocean became more acidic as the climate changed, just as the modern ocean is doing. / The ocean has
is going to hurt more." / Crumbling at the base / absorbed about 30 percent of human-produced carbon dioxide to date, and as a result, its waters have experienced a 30 percent increase in acidity, according to Richard Feely, a senior scientist with NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory. If trends continue, ocean acidity will increase by up to 150 percent by the end of this century, he said. / Increased carbon dioxide and ocean acidity played a role in all of the Big Five mass extinctions, but in those cases the change in acidity was tens to hundreds of times slower than what's happening now. When changes

Increasingly acidic waters affect a number of species that are key parts of the ocean's ecosystems. / Acidification interferes with the ability of oysters, marine snails and other creatures to build shells or skeletons from calcium carbonate. In
happen quickly, "the ocean system itself doesn't have time to adapt," Feely said. / oyster hatcheries on the West Coast of the United States, more-acidic waters prevent oyster larvae from forming shells, and have been shown to dissolve the shells of pteropods small marine snails that feed salmon and other commercially caught fish from around the living creatures, Feely said. / Not least among the victims of acidification are corals, whose growth is inhibited in affected waters. But climate change poses another problem for coral reefs: Sunlight and small increases in water temperature cause corals to expel the symbiotic algae that provide them with energy, which causes them to turn white, an effect called bleaching that can be short-lived or fatal. Mass bleaching was first observed in the late 1970s. By 2008, an estimated 19 percent of the

Coral bleaching has an impact on not just the corals. Reefs are key habitats for many marine species. / "Perhaps 25 percent of ocean species spend at least part of their life cycle on coral reefs," said Ken Caldeira with the Carnegie Institution for Science.
world's coral reefs had been lost and 35 percent seriously threatened. / "When we lose corals, we are likely to lose many of these species." / A recently published paper in the journal Nature documented what may be another domino in the decline of the oceans, this one at the very base of the marine food chain. Over the past century, the authors found, global phytoplankton levels have declined by 1 percent per year, a phenomenon they link to

Amid the specter of climate change, the most immediate threat to species and ecosystems is overfishing, according to Susan Lieberman, director of international policy with the Pew Environmental Group. / "We should not take
warming ocean surfaces. / Incidental victims / out more than is being produced," Lieberman said. "It sounds very logical, but that is not what is happening." / Sharks are emblematic of this problem. The International Union for Conservation

In addition to removing seafood, some fishing practices kill other creatures incidentally, a phenomenon known as bycatch. Sea turtles are among the victims of this problem; a study published in April estimated that millions of sea turtles have been inadvertently caught as part of commercial fishing over the past 20 years. / Bottom trawling in which a large, heavy net is dragged over the sea floor is another problem, as it destroys habitat, according to the Pew Environmental report "Protecting Life in the Sea." This report cites studies suggesting 90 percent of the world's large fish have disappeared and that nearly one third of the world supply of commercially caught fish has collapsed.
of Nature has listed about a third of all open-ocean shark species as threatened with extinction due to overfishing. /