MARINE DIVISION

REINFORCED

JIMA
CM.,..

ACTION REPORT
31 OCTOBER 1944-16 MARCH 1945
GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not maticalli/ declassified. DOD Dili 52o0.10

sJE. MA ' GEN: G. B. ERSKINE,

1 1 MAY 1945 '

COMKwJffllWi
4

COPY NO.

Ser,032lB V AMPHIBIOUS

3 June I9U5.

c/o
1st 3ndorsement to CG -JfiMarDiv I t r Ser OI33O dtd

FRAM3ISC0, CALIFORNIA..

From; To : Via :

The Commanding G e n e r a l .
The Commandant of t h e Marine Corps.

(1) (2) (3) (k)

The Commanding General, Expeditionary. Troops. Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.{

Commander Fifth Fleet*
Commander-in-Chief U< S. Pacific Fleet and Facific Ocean
Areas. . .

Subject 1.

Action Heport, IWO JIKA Operation.

Forwarded.

2. The 3& Marine Division was initially in Expeditionary Troops

reserve. One regiment (HOT 21) landed on D plus 2 and was assigned, temporarily
to the 1+th Marine Division. The remainder of the Division landed on D ulus 5
and succeeding days, except HCT 3 which was never released to Landing-Force
control. The Division was committed as a Division on D plus 6 between the
and 5*^ Marine Divisions in the'vicinity of Airfield'Uo. 2.
3 The 3^ Marine Division carried out its assigned tasks aggressively,
efficiently and with dispatch. It was the first to break through the enemy-lines
in the Northern part of the island.
k. The following comments cover statements, comments, and recommenda tions contained in like-numbered pages-.of the basic report:
p. 17 The statement is. made that the 1+th Marine Division consis tently erroneously reported the location of its left flank. This statement
could -be applied both to flank and front line positions of all Divisions, this-
being due" in considerable part to the inaccuracy of the battle map. The
particular situation mentioned was. one in which the 3d Marine Division was'on
the higher ground which still contained a considerable number of enemy1 installa tions which were able to fire into the Uth Marine Division zone of action;
consequently, the 4th Marine Division bowed its left flank back in order not to
retard the entire advance.
p. 23 Heconraendations concerning the necessity for closer con trol of replacements utilized initially in the shore marty .are-concurred in.
These recommendations are largely a matter for handling by the Divisions. Higher
authority should make replacements available, in time for integration into the .
Division for instruction both in their duties as coidbat troops and their
c
duties with the Shore Party.

kl

3 JUN 1945

Ser*03213

Action I^epoyt

IW0' 0

p. 38 Paragraph 7a* In connection with the remarks concern ing massing of artillery fire contained in paragraph 7. the 3& Marine Division
was consistently furnished the bulk of the supporting fires available to Corps.
Ihere were an insufficient number of Corps ArtilleryBattali.ons. The. 3d Marine
Division artillery was not all landed at the time this Division was committed
and battalions were borrowed from the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions to support'
the 3& Division attack at the expense of adequate artillery support for the
flank Divisions. On several occasions fires were massed in support of attack
but in no case did this result in an immediate advance of any consequence.
The effects of th.ese concentrations were, however, usually noted on the days
following that %n which they were employed*
p. i 5 The statement that elements of the 8th Field Depot and
+ G-arrison Forces were laiided too early in the operation is not concurred in.
The Landing Force,had the responsibility for the employment of three divisions
and the execution of.the Base Development Plan, particularly the readiness of
airfields. It is realized that the landing of(such elements used lighterage
that could have been used by other units, but the solution to this problem is
to provide more craft suitable for landing equipment and supplies,
"That an adequate Shore Party be trained and equipped,to
meet any contingency regardless of whether the unit is a reserve unit" is con curred in. The 3& Marine Division had available the same facilities^as the
4th and 5th Marine Divisions with the exception of a construction battalion.
At the time the 3& Marine Division landed all LVT'.s and DUKttf's had been pooled
for utilization wherever required.
p. 46 He commendations have been made concerning armored bull dozers and concerning the supply of an adequate number of .Weasels for any,
projected operation. It is considered that Athey track-laying trailer-tractors
are desirable in special cases.
p. 4 9 At the time the 3d- Marine Division was committed the
fast carriers had been withdrawn and there was a limited amount of close air
uppQirt' available. All available aircraft were employed daily. It was noted,
,iowever, that-fewer requests for air support were received from the.3d Marine
Division 'than'any other unit of the Landing Force. This was probably due in
great measure to the restricted area occupied by the 3& Marine Division and
the practicability of executing missions on the flanks with less danger to-
adjacent units.

- 2

31*. 03313

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation.

Intensive t r a i n i n g of a i r l i a i s o n personnel has been .idertafcen in order to permit more effective employment in future operations,

H. SCHMIDT

opy to;
Commander.in Chief, U.S. Fleet -(Advance Copy)
Commandant of the Marine Corps (Advance Copy)
CINCPAC-OIHPOA (3 copies) (Advance Copies)
CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.(Advance Copy)
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Areas (Advance Copy)
Commander, Fifth Fleet (Advance Copy)
CG, 10th Army
CG, Air, FMF, ac
CG, III Amphibious Corps
CG, 1st Marine Division
CG, 2d Marine Division
CG* 3& Marine Division
CG, 4th Marine Division
CG, 5 h Marine Division
*CG, 6th Marine Division
Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific
' Commander Third Fleet
Commander Seventh Fleet
Commander Third.Amphibious Force
Commander Fifth,Amphibious Force
Commander Seventh Amphibious Force
Army-Navy Staff College, Washington v \
Naval War College., Newport, St. I.
Command and General Staff School, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas
Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Ta. (3 Copies)
Commander Amphibious Training Command' Pacific
Commander Amphibious Training Command Atlantic .
CG, Troops Training Unit Pacific '
CG, Training Center, Camp lejeune, N. C.
CG, Training Center, SDA, Camp1 Pendleton Oceanside, Calif,
OIC Historical Div, HQMC, Washington
CG, Pacific Ocean Areas
Commander Service Forces Pacific
Commander Aircraft'Pacific
Commander Forward Area Central Pacific
CG, Strategical Air Force Pacific Ocean Area
CG, Marine Supply Service, FMF Paa *
CG, III Corps Artillery
CO, V Corps Artillery
CGt AGF, 86

2295 AEB/bp

3D MARIAS DIVISION, T1OT! MA.B1ITS F0RC3, c/o F L S POST OFFICE? SAIT FE/UTCISCO.

30 April From:
Yiaj

The Commanding General. Commandant ofthe Marine Corps* (1) Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps. (2) Commanding General, FMF, Pacific*

Action Report, I O J1MA Operation,, W

Sub j ect ?

References; 5Jn closures:

(a) Pacific Fleet Conf Letter (Jo) FMF, Pacific CenfGO

A. (Intelligence). 3.
(Situation maps - Operations of
C. D, Ba F. H. I . J . K.

Marine Division on W O JIMA, 25 February - 16 March (Action Report, 9th Marines)* (Action Report, 21st Marines).
(Action Report, 3d Marines).
(Action Report, 12th Marines).
(Action Report, Service Troops)*
(Action Report, Tank Battalion) (Action Report, 3d Sfoginecr Battalion), (Action Repprt, 3d Pioneer Battalion) (Action Report, Headquarters Bat&alion)*

I.

S0MMA2ST,

at which time A* This report covers the period Ji October the, V Amphibious Corps tentative Operation Plan # 3 ~ received , until 16 ^ e March 19^5* the date on which organized resistance on I O JIMA. was declared at W an end. . ' B. Th& 3^ Marine Division {Reinf) f assigned as ,3bcpoditionary Troops Reserve, began embarkation 8 February 19^5 and'coatpleted embarkation on Ik n February 19^5* C D, 3^ Medical Battalion, which vras^to set up a hospital o aboard the L V O A K and operate in tho transport area under Landing Force S ZE control, was embarked in the O A K on 7 February 19^5 and departed on 8 February ZS 19^5. for SAIPAH whore i t came 'Under Landing Force control* ^ The 3 Tank 3n was & embarked in L G s 6^6 and ^77 and departed iS February I9U5 for the transport S? area, I O JIHA, whore i t arrived 20 February 19^5 ^ n o division, loss C D, W o 3d Medical Bn and tho 3^ ank Bn^ were embarked in Transport Squadron 11 which was scheduled to s a i l 17 February. 19^5 t"o arrive in tho reserve area, approxi~ mately S miles southeast of ITO JIMAf at 2200, 19 February 3-9^5 (D-day). On O 16 February 19*4-5, Transport Division 32 sailed with RCT^-21 and a detachment of Division Headquarters Group (including the Assistant Division Commander) embarked in compliance with orders received from the Commander Joint Sxpeclitionary Jorco on 15 February 19^5* arriving in the transport area 19 February 19L!-5 where RCft 21 was placed in Landing Force reserve* The remainder of Transport Squadron 11 sailed on 17 February 19^-5 and'arrived in the reserve area as scheduled. On 21 February 19% HCT-21 was landed and attached to the ^th Marino division. Oh 22 February 19^5 Transport Division Jl, with RCT-9 and Division Headquarters Group (less Dot) embarked, moved into tho transport area incompliance with orders received. The division (less RCT-21 and RCT~3)

' V x *'

Action Report, ItfO JIMA. Operation*

(Cont'd),

A zone of action was assigned the division in the center with the Hth Marine Division on the right t and the 5th Marine Division on the left* SGT-21, which was in assault on the loft of the' *4-th Marino Division and in the assigned zone of action of the 3& Marine Division> was ordered released to the 3& Marino Division. effective'at 07OO, 25 Opobruary 19%* Division Headquarters G-roup, S.CT-9* and one battery of the 12th Marines; were landed on the 2*+th, tfntil the 12th Marines ware a l l ashore, a r t i l l e r y support was'provided "by battalions from the 13th and l^th Marines and Corps Artillery. At 093^* 2 5 February 19^5 the division attacked in conjunction with the kth and $th Marine Divisions with one reinforced regiment, passing the 9th Marines (Reinf) through the 21st Marines* She attack was continued in the division zone of action employing two,.regiments,, reinforced, either in column, abreast, or singly u n t i l 3.6 March, 19^5 when a l l organized resistance was declared at an end. (See Part IV for detailed account). On 27 February 19^5, HCI'-'3 i Expeditionary Troops^ rosorvo, v/as moved into the transport area vhoro. i t remained until- i t sailed for G A on 5 March 19^5* UM . - ' . .
II,

Am 1* The following is the composition o:f the command as embarked for the operation:
{

3^- Marine Division 3d JASCo 3d Marine War Dog Platoon JJCPOA Int tTeams >2Bth Replacement Draft 3^-^h Replacement Draft

2* 5?he 3^- Amph Truck Co and.VMO**! were under operational control of the 3d Marine Division. The 3& Amph Truck Co was not included in the task organisation for the operation* VMQ-1 was included, but just prior to embarka tion, instructions wore received from Commander Joint Expeditionary force that i t would not bo ombarked, B. Joint Expeditionary Jorce Operation Plan #A2$*Jl4 assigned the 3d Marino Division (Reinf) as 3xpeditionary Troops reserve. V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan #3-*Hi directed that when released to Corps control, the 3& Marino Division would be prepared to land on IV/0 JIMA. on or after Dog plus 1 day. Based on this mission plans were drawn for landing the division over any of the beaches on tho southeast and west coasts. The preferred plan called for landing the 9th and 21st Marines abreast # 9*h on the right, on Beaches tSLLOtT and BSD, respectively, as*these wore the center beaches on the southeast coast, which was the coast on which the Corps preferred plan called for the i n i t i a l landing to 1 bo made. Alternate plans proscribed/landings of RCT-9 and RCT^21 abreast, B.C2!~3 on tho right, over the remaining southeast beaches and RCT-9 and HCT~21 abreast, RCT-21 on tho right, over the western beaches. In a l l plans CT~3 was assigned as division reserve, prepared to land on beaches when and as ordered* Since the situation at the time of landing could not be foreseen, plans prescribed merely tho landing of tho division, and, movement to assembly areas, to bo assigned just prior to landing, prepared to execute a passage of lines to continue tho attack, or occupy defensive positions, as ordered. It was assumed that tho division would bo landed primarily for tho purpose of p&ssir^^jjJLgf^ggh^ either the ^ or 5tk Marine Divisions, and continuing tho attack in. th(
m 2

-~

'

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation*

(Cont!d).

action of either of those divisions, or,would be assigned a separate zone of

action to attack in conjunction with the *Hh and 5th Marine Divisions. In either
3ase a passage of lines would " e called for* As an outside possibility, it was
b assumed the division might " o required to take up a defensive position to cover
b a withdrawal or to defend against counter landings on the flanks, tentative
iivision preferred and. alternate plans were issued on 7 Hovembor 19^ The final
iivision preferred and alternate plans wo.ro issued on 22 January 19^5
C* 1. ]Trom th'o time the mission-of the division was known, emphasis
- a placed in all training of the various phases a reserve unit passes through
/s LI landing and moving to an assault rolo# Particular emphasis was placed on the
execution of a passage of lines to continue the attack. Since the division was
lot to execute an assault landing, and since the exact scheme of employment of
;ho division could not " e foreseen, no rehearsals, as such, wore carried out,
b Although instructions from Corps indicated that it was.the intention to provide
this division with the shore party facilities of previously landed organizations,
in order to meet all contingenciesk thorough training, including exercises, was
conducted for all the elements of combat team and division shore parties. The
28th. and 3^th Replacement Drafts were attachod to tho 3d Pioneer Battalion for
administration and training as part of the division shore party* As the status
of combat training of those two drafts vaa found to bo "badly deficient, half of
their training time was devoted to individual and small unit training* (Stor
additional details on training for this operation, sec par IT e# l) Maps, models,
studies, estimates, and other intelligence information were procured and dis tributed to all units, droops were given all available information on tho
operation, including instruction from.,maps and models, after sailing from GrUAM
2 Although the assignment of the tactical mission was received
In "tho Corps tontativo operation plan, received 31 October: 19^# a Corps
tentative administrative plan was roccived on 25 October 19^ On receipt of
this plan, immediate steps were taken to procure the.additional equipment and
supplies required for tho reinforced division. D-day, as originally announced,
would have found this -division with a number of critical shortages in major items-
of equipment, particularly water distillation units and general engineering
equipment, but as D-day was progressively moved forward, those shortages were
steadily reduced until preparations for embarkation were begun when substantially
all of the Table of Allowan'ces and special allowances equipment and supplies were
an hand. In order to establish effective liaison with Corps"and the Supply Service,
J - T a representative of tho G-^ section was ordered on two separate occasions
iG, to Pearl'Harbor* This, measure vras very effective, and the resulting information
and arrangements for supply provided the necessary understanding for intelligent
planning and promulgation of administrative orders.. A,tentative administrative
order, 1!List of Vehicles and 3Tuel~Consuming Equipment to be Lifted", and an
embarkation plan were submitted to Corps on 10 November; .19^* Upon, approval,
these were published and distributed, with additions and modifications necessitated
by,changes in successive directives, on 2 + January 19^5 Meanwhile, on 19* December
* 19^<-t the administrative order for the embarkation was'distributed* On 15 January
19te *ke assembling of cargo in areas in the vicinity of the docks was begun, A
eoriiplotc'system* of traffic control, ch'ockago, an communi cat ions was installed. 3y
6 February 19ty5,"before the arrival of the. allocated shipping, all cargo was in
place, palletizing completed, and the loading officers, $($le, and assigned loading
details wero standing by to commence loading* Planned loads were assigned to
the various voidclbs, utilizing their cargo space for tho

- 3-

--

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation.

(Cont*d).

priority equipment* Loading progressed i^'a highly satisfactory manner, and

though the activities, were'spread ov.er a wide area, necessitated,"by the congested
pert conditions, and heavy ground swells in the harbor resulted in temporary
cassation of loading, the completion, hour was met The'cooperation displayed^ by
the officers and crews of all,ships was*decidedly helpful*

' ' ' > '

3D. 1, The task.organization of the 3d Marine Division as embarked for the operation was as follows: ; - a, . . Hq 3d Mar Div Gfrt : , " Hq Ba: . ' Atchd: 3d V/ar J)og F l a t . ^ . :. 3d JASCo ( l e s s Dets) .. J1CPOA Int e?m 3d Sery Bn ( l e s s Dets) 3d, Med Bn ( l e s s Cos A/B 0 8.nd D) 3d M Bn ( l e s s Cos A, B a:trd 0) T 3^ ^ S ^ Bn (loiss Cos A, B and C) 3d Pi on Bn ( l e s s Cos A, B a n d C)

. _~ , . , .

Atchd: ,' ' Set 3d JASCo 2Sth Repl Draft (less Dets) 3*Hh Repl Draft (less Dets)

" '

?
9th Marines . Co A 3^- Shgr Bn. . ' Co A 3d Pioa Bn Co. A'3d MT Bn Co B 3d Med Bn Det 3d JASCo Det 2Sth Repl Draft
Det > t h Repl D*aft

'

, .

^ ' '.
t,

2Xst Marines
Co B 3d Engr Ba
Co B 3d Pion Bn
Co B 3d MT Bn
Co A 3d Med Ba .
Det 34 JASCo
Det 28th Repl Draft
Det 3lfth Repl Draft
-3^ Marines
Co C 3^ %ng* 3n
l Co "C 3d Pion Bn^
Co C 3dM Bn .
Co C 3d Med Bh

Action Report, I W OJIMA. Operation. d. aOE-3. Det I)et ~ Jet

' ^* f.

(Coatkd) - <0ont?&). 3d JASCo Sth Bepl Draft 'jkth Repl Draft

ft

.'

'
..

1 2 t h Marines^ 3d Efc B n .

2. By 2200j 19 February. 19*4-5 (D--Day) this division was in . the combat area and was disposed as follows; * a RCT-21, embarked in (Transport Division 32 was in Landing Porce reserve in the transport area. A detachment of Hq. 3d Marine Divi sion Group was embarked in transport Division32* 3d 9?k Bn, embarked in LSTs &i6 and ^77 was i n the transport area* ' < .
' c* Hq 3d Marine Division Group (less Bet) "and ROT-9,
embarked in Transport Division 31, andRCT-3, embarked in Transport Division y$9
were inExpeditionary Troops reserve, approximately SO miles southeast of IWO JIMA* ' '
B# Enemy forces encountered, composition, numbers, disposition*
1* Captured information hasindicated that the enemy defense
plans, for IWO Jim, contemplated a determined passive defense with strong beach
defenses covering the southerntlanding beaches; a main line of resistance
extending generally northwest-southeast through the Airfield No* 2 area with
the flanks anchored on the coasts; anda final defensive1 line preserve line)
generally in thehigh ground north, and east of and covering Airfield Nb 3
(See Enclosure A (3) Map, e,nemy units encountered), ; "
2, This division, after landing, faced the task of reducing
the enemy MLRin the Airfield Ho. 2 area within its zone of action* Captured
information indicates that, at thecommencement of itsattack, the 3d Mrine Division
was confronted with the bulk of the*310*n Xn<i I&f Bn which, designated initially
as part of thereserve of the 2d Ind Mixed Brigade, wasdefending Airfield Ho*. 2
and the ridges to the north thereof; well supported by'artillery, anti-tank,
and air.defense units located in thearea* The enemy defense's established in
depth between Airfield Ho* 2 and Airfield |To, 3 consisted of mutually supporting
well concealed pillboxes, cave positions, anti-tank emplacements, and some
entrenchments* Excellent enemy observation, well sited and concealed anti tank guns which were-used against infantry as well as tanks, and well directed
artillery an mortar fire, from.both within andwithout thedivision zone of
action, rendered the crossing of Airfield Ho, 2 andthecapture of thehigh
ground to theimmediate-north a particularly difficult task. Mortars andanti . tank guns located east of Airfield Ho* 2 in the4th Marine Division zone of. .
action were troublesome to troops andtanks south of".and crossing the airfield
until the weapons were eliminated by advances of the
b.

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operation*

(Cont'd),

3 Following the capture of the ildges ^#A'?6if'Airfield Ho, 2,

enemy resistance noticeably decreased, it became apparent, th&t his main line, of
resistance had been penetrated;, kad our troops were able to adyance into the
western portions of the Airfield So, 3 area against scattered infantry opposition.
Artillery, mortar, and antitank ;.fire.received from the high ground generally
500 yards north and east of the airfield rendered movement in the areas north
of MOTOYAMA particularly cUfficult. . '
'' ' 4. This Division encountered its next and last serious /opposition
in the rugged, broken higb ground generally 5^0 yards to the north and east of
Airfield Ho* 3 and 500 yards east 'of MOTOYAMA. Here a force occupying that,
portion of the enemyss final defensive line within the 3d Marine Division zone
of action, and .composed of units of the 5l4th Ind Inf Bn, 26th Tank Hegt, l45th
Inf Regt and 3d Bn, 17th Ind Mixed Regt as well as miscellaneous other units,
conducted a determined prolonged final defense ,iri which it resisted from mutually
supporting caves, covered emplacements, and. open and covered rifle pits. The
defense was particularly determined in the center, of resistance around Hill 3^2
(See Enclosure A (5) Map, enemy defensive dispositions east of Airfield Ho. 3
as translated .from map captured by 21st, Marines) .and culminated in the.final
stand of remnants of the 2(Sth Tank Kegt in TA 2Q1-C, D, H, I;.18-X, (See
Enclosure A (4) Sketch, final defenses, 26th Tank Regiment),
5* Based upon captured information, itis estimated that the
3d Marine Divisxont during its operations oa'ltyO JIMX from 25 February 194$ to
16 March 1945 *rast at various times, in contact with enemy units and detachments
whose combined strength totalled 6830* This figure agrees closely with combat
estimates "based on counted dead and type and degree of resistance encountered,
which as of 1S00, 16 March 1945, totalled 6,5^0 including prisoners.
6. For a discussion of enemy units identified in the division.
2one of action during its operation, on IWO JIMA, see Enclosure A (1), Enemy
units encounted.
III. Chronological Account of the Action.

25 February - By Corps order of 24 February the division was

assigned an assault role, given a zone of. action in the center with the 4th
Marine Division on the right and 5^ n on the left, and assigned the mission
of seizing the line 0-2, (See Enclosure B (2)) which extended generally along
the high ground overlooking Airfield Ho, 3, in its zone of action. The 21st
Marines, attached to the 4th Marine Division, occupied thi$ zone of action on
the left of the 4th Marine Division. The Division CP had been established just
north of Airfield Ho 1 ph 24 February. Only one battery of the 12th Marines
having been landed by the morning of 25, February, the 1st Bn, l4th Marines and
the 4th Bn, 13th Marines were attached to the division* These two battalions
:fanctioned under control of the 12th Marines, whose headquarters hp,d been
established ashore. The 1st Bn t l4th Marines was placed in direct support of
the 9th Marines, vfrichwas to make the 'attack in the division zone of action by
passing through the 21st Marines.,, .and the 4th Bn, 13th Marines was assigned the
mission of reinforcing tne fires "of' the istBn, l4th Marines. At 0700 the 3d
Tank Bn was attached to the 9th Marines and the 21st Marines reverted to 3d
Marine Division control,' By O83O the 9*h Marines had moved from "theBivouac
area assigned it on landing and closed in its assembly

'

* 6

Action Report, I W OJIM. Operation,

(Cont'd).

Enclosure 3 ( l ) , Situation'at 0830,'25 February), At 0930 tho 3tli Marinas passed through'the 21st Marines) and launched i t s attack with the 1st ana. 2d Bns abreast, 1st Bn on the right, making i t s main effort on the-left, in conjunction with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The attack was .preceded by a )+5 minute pre paration by one 155mm bat t a l i 6n of Corps a r t i l l e r y with preparatory fire,s by the . 1st Bn, ityth Marines and'Ufch-Bn, 13th Marines as requested by the 9th Marines. Machine guns, 37mm guns, and 60mm mortars of the 21st Marines supported .the attack of the 9th Marines until their fire was'masked. The 81mm mortar platoons of the . 21st Marines-ware attached to "the 9$k Marines. -Both runways, of Airfield Ho. 2 crossed the division zone of action directly to the front of the 9*h Marines, providing perfect fields of fire for enemy machine guns and antitank guns.,across the division zone of action* The two runways--were commanded by high ground immediately to the north. The key ground in the division zone of action was the h i l l s at TAs 199-0 and 200-P which commanded the entire- zone of action. Enemy emplacements, many of reinforced concrete, were located in TAs 1S2-A and B, . 199-S, T, and 200-P immediately in front of the line of departure. The 1st Bn on the right made good progress i n i t i a l l y , but the 2d 3n on the left was taken under heavy fire from enemy emplacements to i t s front and left flank and made l i t t l e progress. Tanks were moved on to the runway to support the attack of the* 2d Bn by direct f i r e on located enemy emplacements* The tanks drew.heavy mortar fire which resulted in a number of "casualties to the. infantry. $nemy a r t i l l e r y and antitank' guns, sited 4own the runwaysf knocked out nine tanks* The tanks destroyed, several enemy emplacements and at least three guns* By early afternoon a con siderable gap had, developed between the-left of the 1st Bn and'the right of the 2d Bn, and the 3d Bnf in regimental reserve, was committed in the gap*, attacking generally norths The 3& Bn was taken under heavy fire anQ. made, l i t t l e progress. Mortar fire was particularly heavy throughout the'day. -Upon being disengaged by the advance of .the 9*h Marines, units of the 21st Marines were assembled in division reserve south of Airfield $fa. 2., Aviation delivered four .strikes in support oft the attack during the day, none in close support. ITaval gunfire , j, delivered call f i r s s on deep targets beginning at dawn. , By 1700, when lines were ordered consolidated for the night, the situation was as shown on- Enclosure "B .(2), Situation, at 1700, 25 February. Gaps were closed for ni'ght defense with support and reserve u n i t s . - . : . 26 February I t was now clear that the division was confronting the hostile main battle position which apparently extended generally northwest, to southeast across the island along the high grcsund to the front* This high ground commanded the entire southern end of the island as far south as Mt Suribachi. including Airfield Uo 1. As long as. the enemy held this ridge, he would be able to place observed fires on our reserve areas and rear installations* This he had been doing, though not.in the volume of which, he was capable, doubtless due to . fear of his guns and mortars being picked \xp by aviation and taken under fire by a r t i l l e r y and naval guns. The heavily organized enemy position clearly indicated the massing of a l l available a r t i l l e r y fire directly in front of the infantry and moving i t ahead of the advance by successive concentrations* On 25 February, * however, only Batteries A, C,' and P of the ,12th Marines were ashore and ready to fire." These were formed into a provisional battalion. The. 1st Bn, ll+th Mprines was released to t\ie"5$h Marine Division in accordance with Corps order.. The 9tli Marines with previous attachments, plus the 3d 3ri, 21st Marines, launched i t s attack at O O in conjunction with the tai and 5th Marine lya^cjjs*. The 1st and gO 2d 3ns were again abreast, 1st on the right, with the 1st

- 7-

Action Report, 2W0 JTMA Operation*

(Centfd).'

Corps artillery (155mm How) fired a 600 round preparation from 0715 to* 0800. . T|ieV
provisional battalion of the 12th Marines, in direct support of the th Marines-,
and the *Hh Bn, 13 Marines, .reinforcing the fires of the 12th Marines', delivered .
fires as requested by the 9th Marines. The $th Marines again received heavy
mortar, artillery, and small arma fire in its attempt to cress Airfield Ho. 2
and seise the high ground.to the north of it, andpragress made during the day-was
negligible* Tanks were again.employed as assault guns and eleven were knocked
out. The 3d Bn, 9th Marines remained in position in, regimental reserve aft'ea*
the attack jumped off and occupied a defensive position just north of the East-West
runway,{ The 3d Bn, 21st Marines remained in.9th Marines reserve in its assembly
?rea south of Airfield Np..2* Naval gunfire was again employed on deep targets. ,
spotted by aircraft, and on suspected gun and mortar positions as called for by
nfantry units. Eight bombers and eight fighters were on station throughout the
Lay and executed four missions for ground troops, none of them in close supports
'xhis line-up of aircraft prevailed throughout the. operation and was entirely inade caiate to meet the requirements of the situation. A much larger number of aircraft
employed in mass against targets holding up the advance of the infantry was
clearly indicated. The situation at 1700 was as shown in Enclosure B (3)* Situa tion at 1700, 26 February* Co %+ 9 th Marines,? was attached to the 1st. Bn to
close the gap between the 1st Bn and the 4th Marine Division. This attachment
was effected at the.conclusion of the attack about 1600.
27 February - The division continued the attack with the kfh and
5th Divisions at 0S00. The 9th Marines,, with no change in*attachments, attacked
w^th'the same formation previously employed. Artillery now available to the
division consisted of the 1st Bn, 12th Marines, placed in direct support of the .9th
Marinesf and the 2d Bn, ,12th Marines* and Uth Bn, 13th Marines^ assigned the mission
of reinforcing the fires of the 1st Bn, 12th Marines, Corps artillery fired a
600 round preparation in 'support of th attack from 0715 to 08>00* Fires of the
division artillery were as requested by the 9th Marines. 3fo progress Was made by
the 1st Bn on the r^ght which was taken under heavy hostile laortar, artillery,
and small arms fire. !?he enemy was located in well concealed emplacements on and
around the hills at IJ^-O and 200-P The 2d Bn on the left advanced about 150
yards initially when it was halted by flanking fire coming from the enemy positions
in front of the 1st Bn, The 3d Bn 21st Marines was reverted to the 21st Marines
at 1200* The initial attack having bogged down, another coordinated attack was
launched at 1250 by the 1st and 2d Bns, 9th Marines following a ten minute pre paration by all artillery, of the division reinforced by Cor$s artillery. The 2d
Bn moved forward rapidly following the preparation for a distance of approximately
700-yards. The 1st, Bn seized the hills at 200-P and 199-0. Although the 1st Bn
occupied the hill at 200-P, many enemy troops still remained in caves in the hill,
^ny attempt at advance beyond the hill was-taken under fire from the rear by enemy
remaining in the'hill* Mopping-up operations on this hill continued for-the,next
two days. Four airstrikes were called for and delivered in support of the attack,
none of them in close support. Naval guns again fired on deep targets, beginning
at dawn. At 1700 lines were ordered consolidated for the night and were, as shown
ua Enclosure B (U), Situation at 1700, 27 Feb^ruary.
28 February - At 0S15 the 21st Marines, with the 3d Tank Bn and
the Slmm mortar platoons of the 9th Marines attached, passed through the 9th.
Marines and continued the attack with the 1st and 3d Bns abreast, 3d %n on the
right, making the jnain effort on the left. The attack was Tp^^i-^^y a 30
minute preparation by the division artillery, reinforced1
g

Action Report, I W JIMA Operation, O

(Con^d).

which was followed by a rolling "barrage which lifted 100 yards every sevfen minutes for 700 yards* The 1st Bn on the left advanced approximately 5 Q yards when i t O was stopped by hostile mortar and small arras f i r e . The. 3d Bn on the right advanced rapidly, closely following the rolling barrage. About midday the attack had bogged' down* The .3d Bn, 9th Marines was attached to the 2lst Marines at 1200 and, 'by Corps order, the Uth Bn, 13th Marines was released to the 5th Division* At 1300, following a five minute preparation by the division a r t i l l e r y , reinforced by -Corps a r t i l l e r y , a coordinated attack was again launched by the 1st and 3d Bns, The 1st Bn was unable to advance, but the 34 Bn, closely following a rolling barrage which lifted 100 yards every seven minutes for 200 yards, advanced rapidly and seized the village of M T YM and the high ground overlooking Airfield No* 3* OO J A The advance of the,3d Bn caused a gap between the left of the 3d Bn and the right of the 1st Bn, andthe 2d.Bn, 21st Marines was ordered to attack in. the gap at' l30 following a five-minute preparation and behirid a rolling barrage, and flank the resistance holding up the 1st Bn, ^Owing to heavy fire received as i t moved uj> to the line of departure, the 2d Bn was u&abild to launch i t s attack on time and consequently was unable to closely follow the rolling'barrage. Slight pro gress was made in this attack. The 9th Marines i n i t i a l l y supported the morning attack of the 21st Marines with machine guns and small arms until fire was masked, When the advance of the 21st Marines permitted disengagement of the 9th Marines, they were moved into a reserve position south of Airfield Ho. 2, Five a i r strikes were delivered, a l l on deep targets. Direct support destroyers fired in a l l preparations with the division a r t i l l e r y , deepening the fires of the a r t i l l e r y . At 1700 the situation was 'as shown on Enclosure B (5), Situation at 1700, 28 February, , 1 March - The'21st Marines, with no changes in attachments, con tinued the attack at OS3O with the 2d and 3d Bns abreast, 3d on the right'making the main effort. The 12th Marine8, a l l battalions now ashore, reinforced by Corps a r t i l l e r y , tfired a fifteen minute preparation in support of the attack, followed by a rolling barrage lifting 100 yards every eight minutes for 300 yards. Direct support destroyers fired a thirty minute preparation from 0S00 to OS3O, deepening the fires of the 12th Marines, The 2d Bn, 21st- Marines which had attack ed to the north the day before was pivoted on its. right and attacked to* the northeast* Both the 2d and 3d Bns, the oriier effectively employing tanks, pro gressed, rapidly initially* moving well ahead of the assault units of the 5th Marine Division on the l e f t . At. 0930 the 9th Marines was ordered t6 move one battalion forward to TA 199 H, S, T, The 1st Bn, 9th Marines moved forward-and had closed in i t s assembly area,at 1125* At 1015 the 3d Bn, 9th Marines was committed in the gap between the 1st Bn, 2lst Marines, which was s t i l l held up t$r a pocket of enemy resistance to i t s front, and the 2d Bn, 21st Marines. The 3d Bn, 9th Marines was assigned the mission of attacking generally north to the division left boundary and protecting the left flank of the 21st Marines, The 1st Bn, 21st Marines was ordered to mop up the pocket of resistance to i t s front. The situation at 1015 was as shown on Enclosure B (6), Situation at .1015, 1 March, The 3d Bn, 9th Marines advanced..against light resistance and prior to 1500 had arrived.at the division left boundary. By this time the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, attacking generally north to mop up the pocket of resistance to i t s front, had mopped up the enemy pocket and also arrived at the division left boundary, on the left of the ~3d Bn, 9th Marines, . By Corps order, at l^OO the boundary between the 3&&&$- 5th Marino Divisions was modified to make the position held by the 1st Bn, 21st Marines inclusive to the 5th Marine Division, The 5th Marine Division was ordered to extend to the northeast and relieyMl^JMt^Bn^ 21st
. : 9

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation*.

(Cont*d),

Marines* By 1^5 the 2d and 3d Bns, 21st Marines had been held up by enemy
resistance, the 3d Bn' by heavy small arms fire from'an enemy position east of
CRr325 (TA 201-B) and the 2d by hostile machine gun and antitank gunfire sweeping
Airfield-So. 3* At 15^5 it was decided to launch another coordinated attack
with-regiments abreast* the 9th Marines taking over the zone of action of the
right battalion of the 21st Marines, with the 3d Bn, 21st.Marines and one tank
company, attached. The 3& ?ank 3n less one company remained attached to the 21st
Marines, . The situation at, 15*+5 was as shown on ^closure B (7), Situation at
15^5, 1 March. At 16^5 the attack was launched, the 9th Marines passing the^ 1st
Bn, th Marines through the 3d Bn, 21st-Marines which took up a reserve position
in the vicinity of MOTOYAM village. The 2d Bn, 9th Marines was placed in division
reserve.in the vicinity,of TA 200-K. The attack was preceded b y a five minute
, preparation by the division artillery and direct support destroyers, which was
followed by a rolling barrage. Sains made were negligible against heavy enemy
resistance, particularly in front of the 9th Marines, Prior to 1800, the 5th
Marine Division had relieved the 1st Bn, 21st Marines which was placed in regi mental reserve in a defensive position west of MOTOYAMA village. At the conclusion
of operations at l$10, the situation was as shown on Enclosure B (8), Situation
'at l$10r 1 March. At 1900, Co Ct 21st Marines was attached, to the E& Bn, 21st
Marines to assist the 2d'Bn'in tying in with the1 1st Bn, 9th Marines on the right.
2 March The ivision continued the attack at 0800 with the
21st Marines (less 3d Bn) (Atchd 3d Bn, 9th Marines and 1 tank Co) and the 9th
Marines (less 3d Bn) (Atchd 3d Bn, 21st Marines, and 1 tank Co) abreast. The
main effort was on the left and the boundary between regiments was changed* The
gist Marines were ordered tb maintain one battalion in regimental reserve, to be
committed only on Division order. The 9th Marines attacked id.th the 1st and 2d
Bns, 9th Marines abreast, 1st on the right. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines remained in
regimental reserve, occupying a defensive position. The 2lst Marines attacked
with the 1st Bn 21st Marines and 3d Bn, 9tn Marines abreast, 1st Bn, 21st Marines
on the right. The 2d Bn, 21st Marines\maintained its.position and supported the
attack by fire initially. This regiment was assigned the mission of seizing
the high ground around TA 235~U. This high ground lay beyond the Division left
boundary in the 5th Marine Division zone of action and commanded the left of
the Division zone of action, making seizure of that high ground imperative in order
to maintain the advance of the left regiment. Authority was secured from Corps,
to extend beyond the Division left boundary to seize, this high ground. The attack
was preceded by a fifteen-minute artillery preparation by the Division Artillery,
reinforced by Corps artillery and by direct support destroyers which fired on deep
targets for thirty minutes. The preparation was followed by a rolling barrage
which lifted 100 ya:rds every eight minutes for 300 yards, Por situation at 0800., <
see Enclosure B (9), Situation at 0800, 2 March. The 9tit Marines made negligible
gains against hostile small arms, mortar, artillery and antitank gun fire. Tanks
were employed in support of the attack employing direct fire. One gun and several
emplacements were destroyed. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the 9th
Marines were confronted by a strong, well organized enemy defensive position. In
the 21st Marines.zone of action the 1st Bn, 21st Marines launched its attack :in a
column of companies* on the left of the 2d Bn, 9th Marines, from the area'TA 218 P,
^with Co C, which was in that position overnight, leading* After a small initial
advance, the battalion was definitely stopped by,heavy hostile machine gun and
anti-tank gun fire sweeping doiwi Airfield Hoi 3, The 3d n, 9th Marines, effectivel;
sipported by tanks firing direct .fire on emplacements, moved
- 10 r

Action Report* IVO JIMA Operation.

(Cont#d>,

against strong enemy resistance and by 1J00 had secured a foothold on the high ground around T 235 tf. The i n i t i a l attack having Tiome to a standstill; a new A coordinated, attack was launched at 1530, This attach was preceded by a lO~minute preparation by eight battalions of artillery, the ])ivision artillery being rein forced by three battalions of the ljth Marines and one of Corps afctiliery. This was followed by a rolling barrage, She 21 at Marines'had moved the 2d Bn, 21st Marines around the western end of Airfield No. 3 to a position in rear pf the 3& Bn, 9th Maxin.es in T 21#-A Pfrora which, they were to launch their attack in a A column of companies with the mission of seizing the high ground in TA 21&-D* The 3d Bn 9th Marines made l i t t l e or no advance, while Co Or, the leading company of the 2d Bn, 2lst Marines advanced a short distance beyond the right flank of the/ 3d Btf, 9th Marines^ The 9th Marines was again unable to advance/ At 17**5 the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, less Go C which was left in position on the left pf the 2d Zn9 9th Marines, was moved to a position west of M T Y M , village where'it OO A A established a reserve line* , ' The situation as the attack came to a halt was as snown on Enclosure B <9)t Situation at 17^5* 2 March* In tying^in for night defense It was necessary to withdraw Co G, 24 Bn, 21st Marines a short distance from i t s exposed position, and also to withdraw slightly the 3d Bn, 9th Marines to better ground* The mewy was v&ry active and close to our lines in the broken terrain on the front of the 21st Marines* Since Airfield Uo. 3 was covered by enemy fire i t was not possible to occupy a continuous line* The lines as organized for night defense were shown oa Enclosure B (10), Situation at 2Q0Q, 2 March* . 3 March ~ 1* During the nigjht of 2 March an enemy sketch of the defensive area in front of the Division (largely in the zone of action of the 9th Marines):, captured by the 21st Marines, wag received and translated at the division b Command Post 0 It could not " e determined whether the defensive area was the enemy's entire final defensive area or just ne sector of it# Eeports of the 21st Marines on 2 March indicated a strong enemy position in the vicinity of T A 235~u s^d enemy resistance to the east and southeast, thereof in front; of the 3d Bn* 21st Marines. The captured sketch bore out the belief that the 9th Marines were In contact with a strongly organized enemy position* It was hoped that a w soft spot11 would be found by the 2lst Marines between this defensive area and the enemy position around T 235-U JO that a wedge could be driven between the two A and $he defensive area in the division sone of action*sould be fianked. For ; detailed ms^ ..of this defensive,,are^>ee Enclosure A (5) Map, Snemy defensive dispositions east of Airfield H ^ 3 as traAsia^ed from map captured by 21st J'larines* l"or outline of defensive area see Enclosure B ( l l ) g Situation at 1^30, 3 March* The attack was launched at 0800 with the same ( / 2* formation but with a &&w boundary* between regiments* It was preceded by a lQ^ preparation >y the division artillery and direct support destroyers which was followed by a rolling barrage lifting 100 yards every seven minutes for 200 y ^ The 9th Marines was again unable to advance* In the 21st Marines 2ohe of action, the 3d 3ar 9th Marines maintained i t s position. By Corps order* the f>th Marine iVision was to extend to the northeast and relieve thev3d Bnr 9th Marines vrhich was in the 5th Marine division 2one of action* The 2d Bn* 21st Marines advanced lowly under heavy fire and by 11^5 had secured a foothold on the h^i^h ground at TA 21&I># Relief, of. the 3t Bn, 9th Marines by units of the 5th Marine pivision was slow as elemehts of both became engaged in fire fights while effecting.the relief. Sy 1^30 the situation was as shown on Enclosure B i ^ J ^ S i t ^ t i o n at ^ 3 March* / * - 11

Action fceport, ' W , JJMA Operation; X O

(Cbat'd,).

. 3 It was believed ttyat no great amounfc of resistance remained in front, of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, though i t received heavy, fire from ... the high ground to i t s left in the 5th Marine Division zone.of action* The de cision was made to change the direction,of attack by assigning a new boundary ,' "between Regiment s in order to attack in flank the enemy defensive area In front of the 9th Marines* M, 1500 a coordinated attack was launched to the southeast with the!iaain effort on the l e f t , employing the same formation. The 1st Bn, 21st Marines was released to the complete control of the 21st Marines and moved into .position in rear of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines to launch an>attack to-tne southeast with the mission of seizing Hill $&% {TA 219-V). The Zi Bn* 21st. Marines was to continue the advance.to the northeast to ,the O+y line, Cos and t of the 3& Bn, 9th Marines had at'this time been relieved by elements of the 5th Marine Division* Co K was attached to the 1st Bh, 21 st Marines, and Co & waa attached to the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, which was greatly depleted as a result of heavy casualties. ' The d 9th' Marines- attacked 'with the 1st and 2dBns. abreast, 1st on the right. The 3 Bn, 21st Marines remained in 9th Marines reserve with,the.proviso that i t was not to be committed without divisi<v authority* The attack was preceded by a five* minute preparation " y artilier^ and naval gunfire. The 1st. Bn, 21st Marines made b rapid progress i n i t i a l l y but was finally halted by heavy fire from the high ground tp i t s front The 2d Bn, 21st.Marines seized the high ground in T 218MD A but was unable to advance further because of. heavy flanking fire which came from the high ground in the 5th Marine Division zone of action. 0&& platoon 0^ tanks pf the 21st Marines, from positions in the vicinity of , MQTOlilia. Village, effective ly supported the attack of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines "by placing direct fire on enemy targets in front of that battalion. The 9th Marines was again unable to advance* Tanks were being used singly *&& in small groups in the broken terrain to i t s front by\the, 9th Marines and though they knocked out a number of enemy emplacements aad some guns, they were-unable to breach this enemy position suffi* ciently to permit advance by'the infantry, A. number of, enemy antitank guns were* . located in this position ?nd several,were sited to deliver converging fixe on CiU3^$ (TA 201rB)% A number of our tanks were knocked out before this position V/P.S finally reduced, Tor, a. detailed report,of tank bpe^tions, see SInclosure H, . Action Iteport, 3d Tank Battalion.' At 1800 the situation was as shown 6& Enclosure B (13), Situation at;18OO^ 3 .March. k' March * I4. The Cqrjts ^attack was set for 0S15 this date, si on orders called for the 34 Bn, 21st" Marines to be released to the 2lst Mariifes and to moVe prior to daylight to be passed through the 1st Bn# 21st Marines and continue the, attack to the southeast to eeise Hill 362 (TA 219-tf), At apprdxi** maiely OO an estimated 200 eneny troops made an infiltration attempt'in the gecp 3O between the 2d Bnt! 9th tiirines and the 1st Bn, 21st! Marines at the "eastern end of Airfield Ho. 3, After a sharp fight, the b^unt of which was borne Tiy the left company of the 2d Bn*- 9th Marines, the enemy was^ repulsed with heavy, ca^ue-lties* The 2d Bnt 9th Marines'suffered numerous casualties also. Heports indicated^some enemy.troops id&A succeeded in infiltrating our lines and were seen moving along ' the airfield* Patrols were sent forward to the .airfield and in rear of the 1st and 2d Bns, 9th Marines by ,the 3d Bn, 21st Marines, The Jd Bn, 21st Marines . Which was under orders to commence moving at O OC, v;as ordered to remain in place ^j) &&& continue patrolling until ?.fter daylight when the situation could,be clari fied* Patrols of the,Jd $n, 21st Marines killed two,or three enemy troops by day light and the situation was found to be satisfactory* " '.
1
..

'

<t.

'

2* Permission was, secured;from Corna to delay the attack of the' division until the 3d ^n t;i 2lst Marines wae in^positij

Action Report, I O J1MA. Operation* W

(Cont!d).

Brij 21st Marines comn)enced movement at O6^5 at which time i t reverted to the 21st Marines, AT circuitous route was talcen to avoid enemy fire \&ich was heavy in the forward area. 3fren so, in crossing the. area -northwest and north of ^Airfield ^To* 3, the 'battalion was taken under fir of enemy mortars and small arms and considerably delayed, finally arriving in position at tlOO. Visibility' was ex tremely poor which Relayed and hindered preparations for the passage of lines. At 11^0 the division attack was launched following the same scheme of maneuver as oh the previous, day* with the exception' that the 3d Sn, 21st Marines % s m passed through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* A twenty-minute preparation by the division a r t i l l e r y with thirty minutes on deeper targets by. direct support destroy ers was fired, and was followed by a rolling barrage lifting one hundred yards ' every seven minutes for 200 yards> The> 9th Marines, vras again unable to dent theenemy position to i t s front. Strong resistance was met by the 21st Marines, :* .'" including direct fire from a r t i l l e r y pieces which were difficult to locate,-and l i t t l e progress was made. The 2d Bn, 31st Marines, s t i l l unable to advance because of hostile flanking f i r e from the high ground to i t s left in the 5*h V Marine Division ^one of actiqny also suffered numerous casualties from a hostile field piece firing direct fire in enfilade of -its l i n e f r o m a position in the vicinity of 219-K or .*;"IV Efforts, to definitely locate and knock this piece out with a r t i l l e r y fire had been unsuccessful* Belief- of the 3d Bn, 9*h Marines by units of. the 5th Marine Division was completed in the morning and Co I was assembled in rear ~pf the line,. , The battalion; less Op K, attached to the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, was moved into position southwest of M T H A village in OO M . ' " division reserve. The 1st Bn, 21st b r i n e s , after being,passed through, by the '-.' 3d Bnt ,21st Marines, was withdrawn'to the vicinity of RJ-33O (tfA 21&-H) where Co If was released to control of the 3d Bn, 9th Marines in i t s reserve position, Co B.was attached to the 2d Bn, 21st Jferines, The 1st Bn, 21st Iferines,(less Co B) was assigned as regimental reserve^ the battalion headquarters and Co A moving into position in the area 199~S T, and Y. Co C remained in the vicinity of BJ~ ' 330 and was employed to cover the gap between the 9^h and 21st Marines when lines were consolidated for the night. The 3d Reconnaissance Co was attached to the 21st Marines at 1^5 and moved to the vicinity of TA 217-V, 200-B. At 1S00 the"situa tion was as shown on ; 2hclosure B .(l^) v Situation ati 1S00, h March; ... 5 March~ Inaccordance with Corps- order, no attacks were to; be launched on this date and'one,battalion of, each regiment was 'to be rested, and reorganized prepared to assume an assault role on the following day. Lines held by two battalions in each regiment, Go B, lst.Bn, 21st Marines, vras detached \ from the 2d Bn, 21st Marines and' together with Co C,. rejoined the l s l Bn, 2,1st Marines in TAs vl99-*S, T, and T where the'battalion was reeguipped and replacements provided* Steps h'ad already been taken to provide rep lac ern on ts. and equipment to the 34 Bfrt: 9th Marines, in ; division reserve. M t t l c Gneriiy activity took place during .the day.. Artilleay an^ naval guns fired^harassing fires, thro ugheut the day, and one a i r s t r i k e was coMucted in the Hill.362 area (o?A;219^U). . 6 March,-, Corps orders for tEis date called for an attack in : echelon,by the 3d Marine Division. At 0^00 ,the 2d Bn^ 21kst Marines, ,v;hose further advance depended directly on progregs made by the 5th Ma^rine Division, vfas to attack vrith that division. At OjOO the remainder of the division was to attack in conjunction with the 1+th Marino Division on the right. ' TTith th" exception that the 2d :Bait 21st Marines (3d Ben Co now attached) was to attack an hour earlier than the remainder of the division, there was no change in the scheme of maneuver previously employed. The 3d Bn, 9th Marines vras attache3j||D| Ui|L21st Marines at

Action Steport, I O JIMA Operation* W

<Cont*dK

0600 and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of BJT-330 ( ^ 218-H). As prescribed by Corps, a ten minute preparation from O75O to 0800 was fired in support of the attack of the 2d'Bn, 21st Marines by'three battalions of the 12th Marines, threis battalions of the l&th Marines and one battalion of Corps artillery* In support of the attack at 0900, tjiree battalions of the 12th Marines and one battalion of Corps Artillery fired a preparation from 08^5 to O85O and from 0g^5 to 0900 and. followed with a rolling barrage lifting. 100 yards every seven minutes for 300 yardsi Ninety minutes of naval gunfire was also put down in support of the attack* The preparation in front of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines was ineffective as the advance was stopped, immediately by heavy hostile mortar and small arms fire from the high ground in the 5 th Marine Division ssone of action, despite the preparation then being fired in that area. At 0900 the 3d Bn, 21st Marines and 9th Marines launched their attack but were able to make only slight gains against email arms, mortar, artillery, and *ntit#nk gun fire. The initial attack having bogged downr another, coordinated attack was launched'at 1^0 with
the 2ist Marines passing the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, which had been released to
'their control, through the Jd Bn, 2lst Marines, This attack was preceded by
a two minute preparation which lifted 100 yards and fired for five minutes* , $he
1st Bn, 21st Marines slowly advanced atyou^ 200 yards against heavy enemy fire
while the 9th Marines made negligible gains* After being disengaged by the ad vance of the 1st Bnt21st Marines, the 3d 2feif'21& Marines reverted to jiivision
reserve in an assembly area west of M TY 1A village. At 1S00 when lines were
Q 0 A4 . ordered consolidated for the night, the situation was as shown on Enclosure B
(15), Situation at 1800, 6 March,
':: 7 March ^ The division continued the, at tack with a pre-dawn attack at O^QQ, K change in boundary or formation was prescribed and the 21st Marines, b making the main effort, were assigned the objective of selling Hill 362 ($A 219 UK The '9'th Marines were ordered to advance 200. yards during darkness, as a divert sionary measure, prepared to continue the attack at daylight to the seacoast* 3vey precaution was taken to preserve secrecy# A request, approved toy Coi$s was made %o cease all "illumination just prior to the attack* tfo preparation was to be fired* The division artillery fired-harassing*'fires throughout the night using white phosphorous, a concentration of white phosphorous'being placed around Hill 362 (TA 219 tJ) five minutes prior to the attack* No mention, of a night attack was permitted on radios* Troops were ordered to move as noiselessly as possible and no firing was to take place until the attack was definitely discovered. The 21st Marines attacked with, one battalion, passing the 3d Bn, 9th Marines through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* The 2d Bn, 21 st Marines were ordered to hold their position and attack in conjunction with the 5th Marine Division during daylight* The 9th Marines (less 3d Bn) attacked with the 1st mid 2d Bns abreast, 1st on the right. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines refined in division reserve. One tank company remained attached to each regiment* The weather was overcast with jtight rain at the, time the attack was launched* The'attack achieved complete surprise, no^ a shot Toeing fired until i t became light, which was about O63O under the prevailing weather conditions* While i t was s t i l l dark the 9th Marines reported they had advanced 200 yards without detection and Were ordered .to advance another 100 yards. The 21st Marines reportedfthe % Bn, 9th Marines on the move with no enemy reaction. At the first light of day the attack of the 9th Marines was detected and the 2d Bn, which was inside the envoy position Was .taken under fire from the fronts flanks, and rear. The 1st Bn had curled i t s right flank around the enemy position and was receiving fire:from the front on the right but i t s left company WAS in the same situatioif m tf2^2 Bn, In the

Action Heport, IWO JIHA. Operation.

(Cont'd)*

21st Marinas zone of action* the 3d B # 9th Marines caught the enemy asleep
in his emplacements and took a heavy toll witft. flame thrower arid automatic
Veppons* The enemy was set "back on his heels in this area And the 3^ jBn?
jth Marines made a slow but steady advance through his position toward Hill.
'$Z% reporting seizure of the hill as of 133O# The 9th Marines suffered immerous casualties and were unable to advance beyond their daylight positions*
"he 1st and 2d Bns, 9th Marines were well depleted by this time and at 1015 s :
the boundary between regiments was changed to pinch out the 9th Marines, The
j'd Bn, 9th Marines encountered strong enemyv re si stance around the top of Hill
;<62. Mopping up operations were Continued around Hill 362 during the remainder
of the afternoon. Efforts of the 3& 3n,- 9th Marines to make contact with the
: iid-Bnt ^th Marines with its reserve company to relieve enemy pressure on, that
"battalion failed. This company struck the right flank of the enemy pocket in
front of the 9th Marines, met stiff resistance and was unable to advance* ^ .
;
]}anks were sent in to assist the 2d Bnf 9th Marines and succeeded in easing . the.pressure* The 2d Bn, 21st Marines made no progress, sin<ie the 5th Marine
Divisipn had failed in its attack to clear the high ground commanding the zone
of action of the 2d Bn, 2lst Marines. This battalion reported it believed no
hostile troops to be in its zone of action* but that further advance took it
down on an open flat shelf overlooking the beacli which was completely commanded
.by the high ground in the 5th Marine Division sbne-'of actiont and every
attemptedvadvance was taken under fire by the enemy on that high ground* Until
the 5th Marine Divisions seized this high ground, further advance by the 2d
Bn, 2lst Marines would be impracticable. At 1700 the situation was as shown
on Enclosure B (16), Situation at 17 00 # 7 March* The'boundary between regiments
was shifted at 17^5 r aigkt defense "and the 9th Marines assumed control
of the right sector with ail three battalions of the 9th Marines* Co B* 21st
Marines remained attached to the 3& Bn, 9th Marines, See Enclosure (17) #
Situation at 17^5 1 March. The 21st Marines pud 3d Bn, 9th Marines tied .
i.
their lines in at the boundary prior to dark.. g March ~ The division continued the attack at 0750. A new
boundary between regiments was assigned for the attack which was to be made
,with regiments abreast, 9th Marines on the right. Co B, 21st Marines remained
attached to. the 9th Marines, each'regiment had one tank company attached,
and the 3& Reconnaissance Co remained attached to the 21st Marines, This
company was now in a reserve position in the vicinity o BJ-33Q (TA 218-tH).
^he attack was preceded by a ten-minute preparation by the division artillery,
reinforced by Corps artillery, which was followed by a rolling barrage.lifting
100 yards every" seven minutes for 200 yards. Direct support destroyers fired
a preparation from O73O to QgOO* The 21st Marines continued the,attack with
the 1st and.2d Bns, 21st Marines abreast, 1st on the right. The 2d Bn, 21st
Marines was ordered to regulate its advance on that of the 5th Marine Division.
Little advance was made by the 21st Marines which was held up by .flanking "fire
delivered:rom the 5th Marine Division and 9th Marines zones of action
whenever an' attempt was made to move down to the cliff overlooking the beach.
Little resistance was believed to be in their front. The 9th Marines attacked
passing the 3d Bn f 21st Marines, which had been attached to them, through
the right of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines, and continuing the attack to the beach
with the 3d Bn f 9th Marines. The 2d Bn, 9th Marines and Co C, the left
company of the 1st Bn, 9th Marines had been closely engaged with the enemy
since the night attack, and were engaged in mopping up the enemy still remaining
in their ,rear, Co C could riot be disengaged and the Is1

. ' "', " . " . 1 5 * *

Action.Report* IttO JIM& Operation.

(Cont^d)

Co G,-was withdrawn into division reserve west "of ^ T y M . village, fhe 3d O OA A Bn, th Marines advanced some fco yards "beyond Hill 362 toward the beach opposed " y "bitter out disorganized Resistance* An air strike Was conducted b " y this battalion against eneihy>A and mortar positions in.2?A 219 B and W b : .2he 3& Bn# 21st Marine-s attacked to flank the pocket wMch had been holding up the 9th Marines with direction of attack generally north, "but made no progress, f fhe action in the 9th ^r'^lnes zone of action,,Was of the Indian 'fighting type t from sandstone butte tp e^ndstone "butt, The hostile, -resistance in the area of the pocket was located in v caves and emplacements in the sandstone and included antitank guns and well concealed, dug-in tanks, ,;Ugllfc and medium, mounting yjxm ah&kim ma* At 1600, the. situation was as shown on JJnclosure . 3 (18)\: Situation atigOQ, $ March. 5he lined of the 21st Marines attd 3d 3h, 9tn Marines^wer6 tied in at the boundary for the night, but no contact existed between the 3d Bnf 9th MarineB and either the 24 Bn* 9*k Marines or
3& Bn, 21st Marines* ".'.'
;

''

: > . .

'.,:.....

/...

9 March - The division continued the attack at 0700 enploying the same scheme of ioianeuver, A ten-minute artillery preparatiott was placed^ ^ ^ in the zoaie of action of the 9th Marinea prior to the attack, Ulhe 3d Bn$: ; 9th Maxines continued to advance toward the beach against sporadic .but stubborn' enemy reaistance and by 1700 had penetrated to the beach area, !Phi s battalion called,o^e air strike on the area 5A 2l9-^S whi,ch had X>$@n. a troublesome spo^ ? for the past two days* She 2d 3n, $tk Marines, with effective assistance from tantkrs, continued to mop up eneny elements in i t s immediate vioinity* Puring the morning, Co 0, 1st 3n#/$tji Marinee was. disengaged and rejoined i t s battalion in division reserve* The 3d Bht 21st Marines, employing tanks, attacked the enemy pocket to its-.froat but^raade ho progress* pnlvr one tank, at a tine could be employed in this terrain* The enemy destroyed one of our tanks by firing a i r bursts oVer the t^nfc; to disperWe the infantry, and coirer* ing by smoke the approach to the tank of a demolition detachment which knocked out the tank with a demolition change and a Molotov cocktail. Be si at ance in this pocket was passive but extremely tenacious*^ The 1st Bn, 21st Marines advanced to the edge of the c l i f f overlooking the beach'.against negligible re fii stance andN sent patrol $ down on the beach to the'water line where no resistance was endou^itered, 3Pire, however, was received in the beach area from the ,5th Marine Division one of action and the battalion raatntai-ned i t s position on the c l i f f . The 2d Bn, 21st Marines advanced i t s right f^tank to tie-in, with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines. A destroyer'was efijployed during the day, with the Division IJaval Gunfire OiffiCerv aboard, to fire on caves and enemy position's located in the beach area. Thi^'was believed to have been quite effective. Infantry battalions were now definitely beginning to feel the presence of. tho large number of replacements, manifested by a sharp drop in , combat efficiency. These men were found to be willing but very poorly trained, especially in basic individual conduct, "the faulty lieamwork, resulting from lack of small unit training, was also a definite hindrance tp the operation of the infantry battalions. Many needless casualties occurred in these replacements because of & lack of knowledge of the proper use of cover and concealment. At 1800 the situation wasi ae shown oh Enelosure B (19), Situation at ISOO, $ March* 1^ Marc^- The attack was continued at 0800 of maneuver* Koartillery, or naval gunfire preparations w

Q
Action Steport, I O JXlfftPfcatioa. W (Contd).

9th Marines pushed down to the beach and turned southward to sweep to the . divi si on right boundary. Thi a battalion was hindered during the, day by ' hostiji small arms firs delivered from the high ground to i t s flenk and rear. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines'continued.its attack against the enemy pocket to i t s front using tanks, but made l i t t l e progress* Difficulty was experienced in getting replacements to work properly with tanks* The 24 Bn 9th Marines continued to mop up enemy elements In i t s immediate Vicinity and l i t t l e advance was made. This battalion was now badly depleted. The ^Ist Marines changed direction and started a sweep toward the north* The 1st Bn, s21st Marines, by patrols, had established that no e&&tay were in the beach area and* advanced generally north with their right -flank on the cliff overlooking the beach. The 2d Bn, 21st Marines was s t i l l unable to advance i t s left flank because of hostile fire from the 5th Marine Division zone of action, although i t kept i t s right flank in contact with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* At 1500 the 21st Marines reported a l l organized resistance eliminated in the zone of action of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines and patrols were dispatched by that battalion through i t s zone of action in rear of the line to mop-up any remaining enemy elements* Just prior to noon information'was received from Corps that the ^th Marine division was advancing rapidly toward the coast line and had Reported their left; flank fOQ yards in advance of the 3& Marine Divi sion* s' right flank* Permission was secured to move the division reserve battalion, the 1st Bn, 9th Marines to an assembly area i n rear of the left flank of the ^th Marino division for a flanking attack through the gp to the northeast to effect a'Juncture with the 3& Bn, 9th Marines, thereby localising remaining enetay resistance in the 9th Marines zone of action. The 1st Bn, 9th b r i n e s was moved out early in tne afternoon and arrangements were made with the 23d Marines to have them guided into an assembly area in rear of the left flank of the kih. Marine Division* On arrival of the battalion In i t s assembly area for the attack, i t WAS found that 'the &ap was only about 200 yards and the 1 tyth Marine Division left flank was not as far forward as i t had reported and much further to the right, being actually some four or five hundred yards from the boundary between divisions. The 1st Bn, 9th Marines launched i t s attack, however, in a column of companies at 1535* The battalion made l i t t l e advance, being'taken under enemy small arms fire from positions on the ridge generally in TAs 201-J and 202-2. During the entire advance down'the northeastern slopes to the coastline, the Uth Marine Division consistently erroneously reported the location of I t s left flank, invariably placing i t forward, and usually further to the l e f t , of i t s actual location. As the advance progressed, the ^th Marine Division gradually puljed i t s left flank away from the division boundary with the result that a considerable part of the operations of the 9th Marines were carried on in the ifth Marine Division zone of action* The" 2d Bn, 9th.Marines was disengaged daring the afternoon end by 1800 had closed O O AA il in i t a assembly area in division reserve %&' the vicinity of M T K ^ villago Steps were immediately taken to provide this battalion with replacements and, equipment. At 1900. the situation was as shown in Enclosure B (20), Situation at 1800, \Q March. , ' 11 March * Ooerations begun on 10 March were continued at O739 The 1st Bn, 9*h Marines> now moving with two companies abreast made excellent progress and with i t s l e f t flank contacted the right flank of the 3d Bn* 9th Marines in T 202-A at 1200. The 1st Bn, fJWferinea\ then sending A i t s tesetve company to the right to sweep ilong t h e ' U ^

Action Report. IWO JTHft. Operation, (Con^d).

'

, ' ' \

left ^f, the 3d Bn* 9th Marines in T A 202-rB at l$00* Enemy resistance, con sisting of a few riflemen and machine guns, was, encountered" on the rlSge in
TA 2Q2-G and H After making contact, these two battalions-changed direction
to the west and advanced abreast up the high ground mopping up scattered enemy
elements* The 3& Bn*. 21st Marines continued mopping up operations on the enemy
pocket to its front* Although the &nemy was now contained "by only one
battalion on one side of this pocket, he made.no effort to leave it to conduct
offensive operations, or withdraw but conducted a.bitter defense in place
which resulted in little or'no progress being made by the J&. Bn, 21st Marines.
A sled-mounted 72tt rocket launcher, towed by a tank, was attached to the 3d
Bn, 21st Marines. Ten barrages were fired into the enemy pocket with un determined results^. The danger Radius of the rockets was greater than fhe
range at which they were fired, but nil men were kept under cover, and no
casualties to our own personnel were suffered* The 21st Marines conducted
mopping up operations in rear of its lines in its zone of action; Further
progress to- the north toward the division left boundary was impracticable-until
the 5tH Marine Division was able to gain control of all the high ground over looking the beach area in the 21st Marines zone of action. Units of the 5th
Marine Division had been brought around in the rear of the left flank of the
2d Bn, 21st Marines in order to maneuver against eneniy positions located in
their zone of action* The left elements of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines-had b,een
passed through and relieved and the right of the 5th Marine Division actually
extended inio the 3d Marine Division zone of action. At .1030 the" 2d Bn* 21st
Marines Was withdrawn to a position just northwest of MOTOYJiMA village. This
battalion was extremely depleted at this tine and no opportunity'had been
afforded to provide it with replacements. The 1st Bn* 21st Marines extended
to the left and tied in with the $th Marine Division. This "battalion had.
cleared out a small pocket of resistance to its front in some coast defense
emplacements, and had blown up the emplacements* Although no resistance was
now remaining in the division zone of action, the 1st Bn, 21st Marines reclined
in position to protect the right flank of. the 5^ n Marine Division, The 2d,
3df and tai Bns, 12th Marines reinforced fires of the 13th Marines during the
day. Ho artillery was fired in the division^zone of action. At 1800 the situa tion was. as shown on Enclosure B (21), Situation at 1S00, 11 March*
12 March ~ At 0700 nopping up operations were continued in the
9th Marines gone of action. The 1st and 3d Bns 9th Marines continued their
advance to the west until stubborn resistance was encountered near the crest
of the ridge overlooking the sea coast. This resistance was mostly in front
of the 1st Bn, 9th Marinos Little advance was made during the remainder
of the, day. The contour of the enemy* pocket which had held up the 9th Marines
was now apparent. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines continued its mopping up operations
and though some caves md emplacements were knocked out. no great advance WP.S
made. This enemy pocket was located'on a slope below the crestline to the
east and the one to the south and was coanmnded by ground occupied by our
troops* However the terrain of the pocket was extremely .broken* consisting
of numerous sandstone buttes and there were many caves ?nd well Concealed
emplacements in the*erea. Hostile positions could not be identified until our
troops were practically on top of them* #or a detailed sketch of the defen sive organization of this pocketr see Enclosure A (k) t Sketch, 3*inal
Defenses 126th Tank Regiment* On the left of the division^Jn accordance
with Corps order, the 1st Bn 21st Marines extended its f j y ^

Action Eeport* *W0 jpSKPIratIon*

(Contd).

\
Marine Division zone of action along the top of the cliff overlooking the "beach
in .rear of the right of the%%h Marine Division in order to protect the right
flank of that division. Ho artillery was fired in the division zone of action.
The 12th Marines again reinforcedNthe" fires, of the 13th Marines in support of
the attack of the 5t n Marine Division* At, 1800 the situation was as shown-on
. , Enclosure B (22), Situation at 1800, 12 March. t 13 March.- Mopping up operations were continued at 073 The;
3d Bn, 21st Marines was withdrawn and reverted to the 21st Marinas in a "bivouac
area west of MOT0YAMA village. The 1st and 3d Bns, 9th Marines continued the
attack against ^the enemy po.cket from the east. $anks were used and some
hostile emplacements were knocked out and caves closed, but little advance
wp.s made. The 1st Bn, 21st .Marines continued to protect the right flank of
the 5th Marine Division* The 3& Reconnaissance Go, attached to the 21st
Marines, reverted to division control in the vicinity of the division command
post, A destroyer, with the Asst Division ftaval Gunfire Officer aboard,
was employed .during, t&e day in firing: at enemy caves and. emplacements in the
cliffs overlooking the beach area, in the northern part of the 5th Marine
Division-zone of action in order to support the 1st Bn, 21st Marines in pro-, :
tecting the right flank; of that division* The 12th Marines continued to
reinforce the fires of the 13th Marines. The situation at 1800 was as, shown on
Snel&sure B (23), Situation at'1800, 13 March. .
lh March - Mopping up operations continued at O63O, The 3&
Bn, 9th Marines was ordered to take up a position on Hill 362. (TA-21$MJ) and
patrol to the beach area in the 9th Marines* zone of action leaving the 1st
Bn, 9th Marines to reduce the enemy pocket.. The 1st Bn, 9th Marines, using
tanks and flamethrower tanks, reduced the si'se of the pocket somewhat* At
I53O this "battalion was relieved by, the 2d Bn, 9th Marines and moved into a
bivouac area in the vicinity -of MQTOYAMiL village* The 2d Bn, 21st Marine* was
ordered to move forward in the afternoon and establish a reserve line in rear
,4 of the right of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines in the vicinity of KT 323 ( T 21S-X).
This was -completed at 1915* ^&e 1st-'Bn, 21st Marines continued its mission
of expending to the northwest behind the right flank of the 5*h Marine Division
in. order to protect the right vflank of that division. The 3& Bn, 21st Marines
was designated as Corps reserve. The situation at 1800 was as. shown on
Enclosure B {Zk) /Situation at 1600, lk March.
lg> March ~ Mopping up operations were continued at 073$.*
2d.Bn, 9th Marines using tanks and flamethrower tanks considerably reduced the
size of the enemy pocket. The 3& Bn, 9th Marines continued.patrol.operations
and mopping up of scattered enemy remnants.. The. 1st Bn, 21st Marines continued
to follow the advance of the 5th Marine Division. The situation at 1000 was
as shown on Enclosure B (25)t, Situation at 1800, 15 March. '"*''
16 March . By Corps order, the division left-boundary was changed
to give the. northern part of the 5^k Marine Division zone of action to the 3d
Marine Division, At 0715'elements of the. 5th Marine Division in the 3d Division
zone of action were relieved by the 1st .and 2(3. .Bns, 21st Marines, 1st Bn on
the right* preparatory t.o an attack by the, 21st Marines to clear the division
zone of action of enemy resistance. The 3& Btt, 21st Marines was noved to'a
position in regimental reserve in the vicinity of BJ 322 (TA 218-1). The $th
Marines.were ordered to hold one battalion in readinesslJfifci3&ak(on one hour's .

Action Heport, IWO < M Operation. H A

(Cont'd)*

notice to support the attack. The 3& BJI, 9th Marines was designated. Th attack was launched at 0815 after a twenty-minute preparation by the division artillery.which was lifted 100 yards at CS15 and continued for another ten ninutes. for. situation at. 03X5,; see'Enclosure 3 (26), Situation at 0S15, 16 March. The 1st and 2d 3ns advanced, steadily against scattered enemy resistance and "by I33O had reached the coastline and seized KITANO Point. Mopping up operations continued throughout the .division zone of action during the day and by l$5 the 2d Bh, 9th Marines, had eliminated the, enemy pocket o f resistance in TA 201-D. At 1800 the situation was as shown on Enclosure. B (27), Situation at 1800, l'S March, At the close of operations "Corps declared a l l organized resistance on IWOJIMA, to have been eliminated.

IT.
A. *
chart below: .

. CASUALTIES,

Administration.
1.- Casualties suffered by this division were as shown on the

QHGJyrizAiiojsr

KILLED "OFF

W0UKD2ID

MISStHG -

TOTAL CASUALTIES

ML

ow

03!F 13S^ 127S

SBflr".

OH1

- !KX

9 t h Marines . 21st Marines 12th Marines Hqs Bn 3d k 3 a 3d Ser Bn. 3d MT Bn *" * 3 d Med Bn 3d Sngr Bn 3d P i on Bn TOTAL 2IVISIOU A!EPACH1D milTS 3d JASCo "'

21

>7S
2SS 12

57
1^ 1 8
2

1
0

17
2 .0 0

13 "- 79 71 1
0
- 1

1S75
1567

100

0
1

. 16 \
1 8 2

112

s
19"0

kl 67
5 :

0.'

51

107

0
0 0

1
0 0 0

. Q

k .

0,
10

. 0
0

-o
0
2 1

0 ,
0 0

^7
80

0 0

57
8

. 9
2 S27

2 1

0
0

6
3032

0
1

H O

139

16

180

3^75

k 3
,0
. 0

.5
0 0 0
N

,22

5
0

26 16 -. 6i

3d Var. 3Dog P l a t 2Sth Repl B r a f t 3^th Repl D r a f t TOTAL AJMkhffBD '

AGGfiSGATl TOTAL

0
0 0 0

13

0 0 0
0

0
0 0 0

6
.,7
1*8
. 30SQ

0 0

7
55

ko

.83^

5" iW

16

Action-Report*, IWO JIMA. Operation, g

:

(Cont'd).

Methods used to maintain high morale throughout the operation*

a. The Division CP was established ashore at 1500, 24

February 1945 (D plus 5 ) . , ,
, b. On 25 February (D plus 6) books (Pocket'Readers) were
distributed by the Division Chaplain. Books were'obtained from ships which
carried troops from Rear Area*
c* On 25 February (D plus 6), and daily thereafter, the
Division Hews Sheet Was published for all units of this Division* A distribution
s
to units down to the platoon-was effected, d* At 1020 on 25.February (D plus 6) the American Red.'
Cross Field Director reported to G-l and was directed by the GKL to move American
Red Gross supplies to Company A' , Jd Med 3n (vicinity of Div GP). Distribution
of supplies was made to all troops with special attention to casualties remaining
on the island. The American Bled Cross rendered invaluable service in furnishing
casualties with much needed personal comfort articles. ' '
e. On 25 February (D plus 6) the first religious services
were conducted wherever conditions permitted, Services were>held on Sundays and
throughout the week in all units of this Division. Unit Chaplains-conducted
individual religious services over their dead* f* On 26 February (D plus 7) the Division 3urial and (Graves
Registration Officer landed and began evacuationand burial( of our dead,
g. At Il45, rMarch (D plus 10) a mail plane (Curtis
Commando) was sighted. It dropped bags of mail on MOTOYAMA Airfield 2To. 1 while
that airfield was under construction. Mail \*as.dispatched from Rear Schelon to
Forward Area on a daily schedule and all troops received mail as it arrived. . The v
prompt delivery of mail was an important morale factor and did much for the
troops of this Division, .
h. 0nx 6 March '(Dplus 15) a Division/Library, under the
control of the Division Chaplain* was established in the vicinity of the Division
C3? Numerous" copies of "Yank11, ^Leatherneck" and "Time" magazines were distribute
to troops on 7 March and frequently thereafter*
1. troops of this,Division* natural hot water shower preference to front line
. c a m p a i g n . '

On 14 March (D plus 23) hot showers were available for

The i?ivision Engineers established and, maintained the
.at the Division Water Point* A schedule which gave
troops was established and maintained throughout the

. ' .. ' ' ".-.. ' . . ' \". .

j. On 14 March (D plus 23), fresh eggs* beef, apples., oranges

potatoes* onions,'lard, turnips and carrots were furnished troops on the front
lines*: More fresh eggs, pork, chicken and other fresh foods were distributed to
the troops on March 15, l6 t 17 13 a^<i21.
k. On 15 March (D plus 24) sel

IIHI:I AWII-UII

Action Report, IWO JIMA. Operation.

(Cont f d)
/ & . .

Office and immediately thereafter a schedule of from two (2) to four(k)

shows daily was maintained. Six of the latest l&nm films were flown to forward
Area for, this purpose.
' ' '

'

'-

'

1. O l6 March (3) plus 2-5) the A M Office made a d i s t r i n & bution of one (l) candy bar and one (l) can of "beer per person. A total of twofe) candy bars and two (2) cans, of beer were, distributed 'during, active operations. Arrangements for a i r transport of these supplies were approved by the Commanding General* who authorized the expenditure of A M funds for this purpose* S . ' . ' m. officially declared
O 16 March (D plus 25)' the Island of I O JIMA was
n W

n O 20 March (D plus 29) the A 6 Office distributed

n & stationery, candles, and athletic gear (softball and volleyball equipment) to
troops of this Division* Candles permitted troops to write letters and read
during hours of darkness* '
o* The Division Band gave frequent concerts for front line troops immediately following the cessation of hostilities* This included a swing session which, gave the troops a great l i f t and.much pleasure* * . p* Frequent v i s i t s during combat by the Commanding General
and other Division staff officers to front line troops did much to bolster their
morale*
3. System of handling replacements during the operation*

a. This report i s divided into three phases, (l) Pre liminary or Preparatory phase, (2) Operations Phase and (3) He commendations.
(1) Preliminary Phase: This is a*brief resume of the administrative preparations prior to embarkation* On 29 December/ 19^,the 2#th and 3*fth Keplacement Drafts were attached to the 3 Pioneer Battalion for purposes & , of administrative supervision, supply and training* The combined total of personnel in these two grafts was 115 officers and 2575 enlisted. These re placements were to be kept intact and were to be organized, trained and used as part of the 3d Marine Division Shore Party. O 1 January, 19^5 a classification officer was n assigned to the Pioneer Battalion to review the classification cards, ascertain special skills, prepare specialty rosters, and to assist *in the ultimate alloca tion of these replacements to the various-units of the Division when the draft w r disbanded. . ' ' I . Only one. dr^ft had a regular admini strative group attached* The other draJt made up an administrative section from personnel in thc 4raft, All administration was under "the supervision of the Pioneer Battalion. Within each draft the administrative section \*ate divided into a reer and forward section* The Rear Echelon was made up of two officers and S enlisted to handle all property, records, change sheets and reports from the Forward Area* The

Action Beport, IW JIMA. Operation* ' O

(Contld)

Porward Schelon was made up of tk.officers and 3 enlisted " e who were to aid in mn disbanding the drafts in- the field, distribute mail and send reports to the Bear Echelon* . , , ' ' About 10 -January the S~l, .Pioneer Battalion "broke down the "replacement personnel into nine. Battalion, Landing Team Shore Parties and from that date on the draft personnel were trained'in those groups with the variotf Regimental Combat Team Shore Parties. They were embarked and functioned during the operation .under this organization*
. ' ' ' . ' ' . '

: During the straining period prior to embarkation, a casualty reporting system was drawn up to conform to the Division Casualty Reporting System. Certain problems arvose in connection with the drafts since thej were so ^short of H O and the men and officers had not worked together for long. ^ C a I t was decided to place the responsibility for reporting all casualties on each officer in .charge of a Shore Party detail and to have reports sent through Pioneer Battalion communication channels to the Pioneer S~l for further reporting to Division. ' , prior to embarkation, personnel* 3?our basic records were developed or maintained

(a), % A alphabetical roster' of a l l replacement n The replacement drafts*debarkation rosters were used for this purpose,

(b) A specialty roster grouping and listing by name a l l men qualified1^ for each military specialty. Basics, likewise, were-groupe according to usable civilian skills or by aptitudes. Por example,' in accordance with the known, desire of the 12th. Marines, men with high, mechanical aptitude test scores and extensive mathematics, background were earmarked for artillery. , (c) An assignment, notice for each officer and enlisted man, prepared; in twp identical sections. (d) personnel* \ A report by military specialty of unassigned . ^

Operations Phase: The personnel used consisted of two classification officers, three enlisted classification specialists,, one clerks-typist, an officer in charge of the assembly area from replacement dr^ft and several guides from the replacement"draftsv ,., In" addition the S-l^of the 3d Pioneer Battalion was always available and frequently assisted in such,matters as eixpecjating the release of p-ersonnel from the Shore Party,* The records maintained weres * " ' - ! ' (a) (b) (c) A log. pf directives. ' . / . .

The military specialty roster. A report of assi

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operati pn,

(Cont'd)*
(I1) Unit to which assigned*
(21) Unit from which assigned*
These cumulative totals were reported to

M L as of 1B00 daily.
...-. (d) A report, of unassigned.personnel, This" report was submitted to the Division Adjutant as of 11300 daily. Replacements were ordered by directive from ACofS, GHU The directive specified the number of personnel to be trans ferred, the units to which the personnel,were to-be assigned and the required time of'arrival of ;the replacements. When practical, the specification serial numbers were included in the directive, . '
1

" ' *: , . , The Classification Officer selected the.', types of personnel to b'e assigned. The types were s located on the specialty roster* The'3-1 of the 3<* Pioneer Battalion was advised as to the Shore Party details in which the needed personnel were located. The S-l provided the information as to which details could most .Readily provide the required number. The assignment notices for those to be assigned were. completed, entry was ma.de- in the withdrawal log and the assignment notice was, divided. One half of the notice then itfas used in this sequence for assembling the personnel, completing the inventory and reporting 1 records, writing the special orders by the Division Adjutant and finally the. return tt> the,Classification Officer for filing. Simultaneously the other half was used for assembling the casualty data sheets, identifying and establishing the qualification of the personnel reporting to the regiments and on down to the \ battalions and, finally, if the Replacement became a casualty, the notice went with the appropriate information to the Division Adjutant who sent i t to the Rear Echelons of the Division and .replacement draft for completing, the personnel records. ,' " . . . ' . 2277 officers and enlisted personnel were O assigned at- I W JIMA* I t i s believed that the keynote to the-, ' assignment procedure i s the preparatory work done. It. made* the selecting from the specialty rosters and-the entries on the assignment notices tiie only paper work necessary prior to the- assembling and dispatching ;of-personnel. I t also . provided the receiving unit $ with a transinittal record that enabled them to dis tribute personnel to lower echelons without .additional paper work. This pro cedure i s adaptable tt> the assignment of individual replacements irtiether or not the Shore Party i a composed of regimental personnel or replacement drafts, personnel* , * - . . ' Personnel were assigned in accordance with their military qualifications to the extent tha,t military specialists were avail able in the replacement drafts.

Action Report, IWO JlMA Operation, (3)

(Contf&) <.]''.'

Recommendations:

(a) I t i B ' recommended that the establishment of an assembly or stand-by pool be made at the earliest practicable time# If the personnel which can be relieved of Shore Party duties i s bivouacked in a eontrolled area the assembling and dispatching time i s greatly reduced and i t i s ' believed, Shore Party Operation i* handicapped to a lesser degree* At I W JIMA, O after an.assembly area was, established one detail of 39 ^ea Was d i s p a t c h e d ^ minutes after the receipt of the directive* . . % ' (b) I t i s recommended that closer control be maintained over records of the replacement drafts* Considerable difficulty was caused by the .laxity with which Shore Party Detail rosters and casualty data sheets were handled. Rosters of personnel coming ashore xirere not retained by the officer or ICO in charge of the detail* Approximately 4$0 casualty data sheets had to be retyped by clerks under the direction of the classification officer*. ' . . . (c) I t i s recommended that personnel going forward frQm the Shore Party be dispatched in groups not to exceed 50 ia number* I t was found that from the standpoints of beach congestion and the- receiving u n i t s ' ability to absorb personnel the number should not exceed 50 VQT half
hour* . . ' . ' ' . . . '

* . ,. . ' (d) . It, i s recommended that replacement draft personnel upon being attached to the Division be assigned to Shore Party details only after a classification officer has made his recommendations as to the,details to which the personnel should go. The specialists likely to be needed f i r s t as replacements should be placed- in beach or dump unloading details* Those most likely to be used last should be placed in ship platoons* . , k*
i

Graves Registration.

"

, a. The Division Graves Registration Section landed on I O W JIMii. beginning on'D plus 7 when the OinP and a small detail were ordered ashore to make a reconnaissance.in order to establish the Division Cemetery* v A site was selected on D plus 7 adjacent to the already established *fth Marine Division Cemetery in the vicinity, of Beach, Y LJ W 2. Surveying and bulldozing began on E 3Q the morning of D plus 8 and the f i r s t 3d- Marine Division dead were interred on the morning of D pus 9* , ' ' ' " b - Establishing the Cemetery in close proximity to that of, the ij-th Marine Division aided this"Division to a great extent when unloading was slowed due to heavy surf and unfavorable beach, conditions. The Graves -Registra tion section equipment did not land u n t i l the evening of D plus 10 The OinC and a l l hands attached to #ie ^th Marine Division Graves Registration Section were extremely cooperative in lending tools and other implements necessary for cemetery work* " . . , c* The site selected for the Cemetery was east of Beach 2 on a gentle slope. Conditions were veryti&MhS&LtkJhlFJQgJ^~first, few

Action Report, IW JIMA Operation. O

(Cont'd).

days due to enemy mortar and artillery fire* Many Japanese land pines were dis covered ancl Division engineer personnel swept the area. Because of the nature of the soil (loose volcanic ash) graves were dug to a.depth of approximately . eight feet to allow for a drift caused by wind. '. d. . Collecting points were established 'by; Division Units and the Division Graves Section collecting parties made a tour of each point twice daily in order to expedite removal of the dead* These "bodies were "brought to the cemetery where they were placed in the processing area,* The first step, at. this point, was to check each body for identification (tags, wallet, name in clothing or any other available means)1 thereafter personnel removed, personal belongings^ corpsmen fingerprinted the body and as a last step the body was tagged arid sprayed prior to burial. The "body thereupon, was wrappeU in a poncho, "blanket or shelter half, depending upon what was available, and carried to the next vacant grave* ' . e. Personal belongings for each individual were secured in a "ditty bag% after proper inventory, and forwarded to the organization concerned The Division Personal Effects Officer made his headquarters with the Graves Registration Officer and maintained Very close liaison with that officer through out; ;' \ . . * . f, . The division Burial and Graves Registration Officer furnished the ACofS, G-l with a daily burial report which became the Division Daily Burial Bulletin, This Burial Bulletin was given wide distribution and was used by subordinate commands as a check-off* Many personnel originally listed as." missing in action were picked-up through the Burial. Bulletin. This Division inter changed bulletins with the 4th and 5*h Marine-Divisions and a coi-iplete . and up to date burial file of all island burials, was maintained, * g. - During the campaign the 3d Marine Division buried the following, personnel; . , MISTED. . B*
i

' . UMHOM ' 1^

hi . ' .,

909

. .,

Intelligence.

Total Inten-ed "-

1.- \Type of maps and photos furnished during operation; their adequacy and completeness? .. , Photos requested during the operation were generally furnished in quantities requested. Poor processing in certain cases reduced the effective ness of some sorties received. .. '' .
e

2. Effectiveness of procedure set up for the recovery of captured enemy documents and material; . 1 * a The enemy, particularly naval units, were definitely security conscious as was verified by P W reports end O

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation,

(Cont'd)*

withstanding, the number of documents turned in and the information gained from
them was highly gratifying* The cooperation of all troops in picking up end
turning in documents was outstanding. Documents were in all cases gatheredf
by troops and intelligence personnel in forward and rear areas and forwarded,
via intelligence channels, to Division Headquarters. Documents of immediate /
tactical value to this or adjacent divisions, or which contained order of "battle
information, were immediately translated and the information disseminated to the
interested parties*. Due to military necessity, imuraerable caves were sealed,
"before a search could "be made of the interiors for intelligence material; and it
is considered that much valuable intelligence material, which may be found
eventually as caves are opened, was thus lost initially to the assault forces*
. ' b Overrun and captured eneny material was recovered by the
Divi sion Salvage Section' operating under G-4# &-2 coop erated by notifyiiig G*k
of the locations of enemy material as reported. Items of special intelligence
value were reported by G-2 directly to JIQPOA representatives for salvage \and
recovery. Salvage of special intelligence items was also handled in many cases
directly by G-2 employing G-2 Scout Observer personnel for the work.
3* personnel:. , Effectiveness and-qualifications of Japanese language;
^ _ V
a. Officers permanently attached:

...-. Of Jthe officers permanently attached to the Division,

seven were in headquarters coinpahy "and six irere temporarily attached to the
infantry regiments, two to each regimental headquarters. All officers, were
graduates of theHavy Japanese Language School and were qualified both for work
in translation and interrogation. In addition, two officers in the headquarters
section specialized in enemy order of battle, 3?he four officers teiqporarily
attached to the infantry regiments which landed, supervised the collection and
preliminary screening of all documents turned in by the respective unit a. This
work was carried out very satisfactorily. In addition they interrogated all
prisoners brought in from the battalions on matters of tactical interest to their
units, and forwarded these prisoners to division with a>minimum of delay.
b* Officers temporarily attached;

There were five officers temporarily attached to the

division from JIGPOA, Pour of these were Uaval Its, (jg) and .one was axi Army
2'd Lt. Three'of the naval officers were well qualified in translation and were
of great help to the section in the screening and translation of documentary
material* >The other naval officer* specialisjed in interrogation and,proved
highly efficient in this field* Jhe Army officer attached assisted in both
translation and interrogation*1 He also was of great assistance in supervising
the use of oral propaganda designed to persuade enemy troops to come out of hidin{
in the, numerous caves on the island and give themselves up to our forces* In
several cases this involved considerable personal riskv ^11 attached officers
assisted in the interrogation of prisoners when large numbers were brought in
and had to be cleexed that day. This work was satisfactory in all cases*

Action Report^1 WO JIMA. Operation. c.

(Cont'd)

Enlisted permanently attached:

, One"enlisted, language man from Division Headquarters

was attached to each battalion- * ad two to infantry regimental headquarters, The
men assigned to battalions were responsible tinder the Battalion S-2 for the super vision of tne collection of documentary material in their respective battalions-
and for the handling: of prisoners brought in to them* In all cases..they per- .
formed their duties with a high degree of efficiency* .
d. Unlisted temporarily attached:
f

There was only one enlisted language man temporarily .

attached, a corporal from Island Command, O U M , This man was a specialist in
interrogation and proved extremely useful, throughout the campaign. :
' e. Hiseit.

Three of the five Uisei assigned were translators pjnd

two were interrogators. These men did the bulk of the translation'work and
proved again that men with their qualification's are indispensible to any language
section operating*in the fields The two interrogators were well qualified
and aided greatly in this field* One in particular proved to be extremely
adept in calling Japanese and Koreans out of caves and was instrumental in in ducing a number of the enemy to surrender,
km Sffectiveness of our vocal and written .propaganda," with any .
suggested improvements:
^ a* Of 13 POWs who said they he?.rd our loudspeaker, 1 - said
they were definitely influenced. Sending recently captured volunteer POWs into
caves, to persuade other Japs to surrender was the Host effective form of oral
propaganda^ In this manner 1^ enemy were captured in one day. !
b. The majority of POTtfs had seen surrender leaflets and
were quite impressed by them. Their'effectiveness was largely due t o the fact
' that, they stressed the point that.surrender could be accomplished with coiaplete
safety if instructions on how to approach our lines were carefully followed.
. -. , c . As in previous operations,, PCWs frequently stated that
the principal hindrance to surrender was fear of being shot before surrender could
be accomplished. Thus, in both, oral and written propaganda, it is necessary to
emphasize the fact that POWs will not be shot if they follow instructions for

surrender,. ' '" ' .

d Propaganda' cannot reverse overnight the results of a

lifetime of indoctrination. It can, however, facilitate surrender of Japs who
wish to give up and who need only assurance thp.t surrender can be accomplished wit

safety. . .

Relative efficiency and assistance

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operation,

(Cont T d), v

' . , a, The JIGPOA language team assigned to the G-2 Section

was, on the whole, well balanced. It is suggested however that he bulk of
Nisei, sent to this Division in the future be .translators with one-lTisei in-*'
terrogator included. , '
b. Due to the small number remaining with the Division .
headquarters after language personnel have been sent to lower echelons,'the
addition of five JIGPOA officers proves to be invaluable. Two of these are gener ally used for screening and two for translation and checking work, The fifth
should be an interrogator. As all of these officers are also capable of doing-
interrogation work, a balanced division section is assured*.
c. In the recently completed campaign the JICP'OA officers
. ' attached proVed exceptionally efficient and cooperative*
6. Intelligence liaison with intelligence section of next higher
and other echelons: * '
liaison with the intelligence sections of higher, lower, and
adjacent echelons was maintained via officer contact and telephone, liaison
was considered, to*.be highly satisfactory* Much of the liaison work was concerned
with, an interchange' of order of battle and other information by language per sonnel. Accordingly, a language officer was detailed to contact twice daily,
the Landing Force intelligence section and intelligence sections,of the adjacent
divisions. In addition, to visiting the language groups, the officer so detailed,
delivered and obtained, information from the combat intelligence groups of the
intelligence secti6ns visited. Liaison with lower intelligence sections was
maintained by telephone, personal contact and visits to regimental and battalion
headquarters hy G~2 or other officer representatives of the fr-2 Section*
7 taken;
.' a. During the initial stages of the planning phase, all
. . . Material relative jbo. the operation was kept in one room under the custody of G~2,
This room, under continual sentry guard,, was opened to, officers of the division
staff, authorized to enter same in connection with planning, upon request.
b. On 7 November 1 9 ^ , certain essential data were issued
to Regimental Commanders in order to prepare plans require^ by higher authority.
They were instructed.that only those members of the regimental staffs who were *
required to possess knowledge of the operatipn in order to complete plans were
to be informed of the operation, . A S a,further security measure* the island was
given Jhe arbitrary designation of "X-BA-T"' and was referred to in preliminary
planning orders by that name. . " . ',
: . e. On 9.November l$kk in view of the fact that frequent
reference' to CIICPAC-CIHCFOA Bulletin $0. 122-^, which had been previously
received and distributed as a routine confidential inte^
result in a, premature disclosure to unauthorized person*
Counter-intelligence measures and precautions which were

Action Report, IW JIM& Operation, O

(Cont'd)*

the objective, all recipien-ts of*same were directed to handle same as'TOP S C E ERT arterial. ' . d. On. I1* November X3kk\ a conference of the commanding officer^ of Service Troops and the separate battalions was called for the purpose of' giving them certain information, concerning the,projected operation which was ne'cessary in order for them to prepare plans* All officers present at the conference were warned as-to the extreme necessity of .preserving secrecy .concern ing the movement. Ho maps, studies, or other intelligence material were issued at this conference. . ' e. On 2 December 19^, certain additional material was , issued to regiments with instructions that the material could be given to battalions for use .by battalion staffs in planning on-1|5 *December* Due to postponement of the operation, however, regiments were subsequently instructed, prior to 15 December, to defer distribution of material to battalions until further orders* f. O k-January_19^5>ins*3nicflone were issued to regiments n to distribute material to. battalions on 13*January for use in planning. g. O 9 January 19^5, instructions relative to sabotage n prevention of material being accumulated in loading areas were issued. h* On 13 January 19**5 in accordance with instructions issued on k January, essential material necessary.tfor planning was distributed to infantry, artillery, an&' separate battalions in order that they might prepare necessary plans. Instructions in effect stated that until further notice only those members of battalion* staffs who needed the information for planning, and. designated enlisted personnel authorized, to assist in the preparation and filing of T P S3CRET matter would be allowed to handle the material issued* O i. O 16 January 19^5 instructions were issued as to the n method to be used in distributing maps and intelligence material to be issued later f Permission was.also given to battalions to indoctrinate and instruct . company commanders arid other.company officers as necessary who required prior knowledge of the operation. Due to; the anticipated short period on board ship, i t was deemed necessary that company officers should be indoctrinated and in structed in the aspects of tue operation prior to embarkation, j. O IS January 19^5t instructions relative to communica n . tions security during" the loading phase1 were issued* k. On 22 January 19^5 m?tps and other intelligence material were distributed to regiments and separate battalions for repackaging end &iat tribution to units after embarkation. Distribution of material to units below battalions, except for ^ower units embarked on separate ships, was not made u n t i l after ships had cleared the harbor bound for the objective. Enlisted' personnel * except for those authorized to handle end prepare TOP SECKET material,, were hot informed as to the identity of the objective until after shAMagdafileacscl. the harbor# . . . . *** ~~
, . , . - , . - . '
;

-30-

Action Report, I W JlUk Operation. O

;

(Cont f d).

lv Troops were allowed to write l e t t e r s find-, send same

after embarkation* tJntiX aft'er ships cleared the harbor, however, they were
authorized to write only as i f they were s t i l l in their permanent cams Mail
censorship after departure o-f ships froET the harbor was in accordance with in structions issued "by higher authority,

"

'

'.

'

n. During the loading and embarkation phase, a radio net

was installed which, served the "various loading j o i n t s , dumps, and division
headquarters. In order to prevent compromise of the movement through intercept:,
code words were assigned various items such as trucks* ammunition, fuel, ships
and other items the naming of which would have given indications that a loading
movement'was in. progress. In order to further insure non^compromise, actual
trafficwas kept to a minimum; but frequent d r i l l messages were inserted. *1$Q
frequency used on this net was the same as the one that had been in continuous
use previously for communications drills* * v
. '.'%' -Counter-intelligence measures during the landing and sub sequent operational phases consisted of those normal instructions relative to - camouflage end blackout discipline; those;prohibitions relative to the carrying of personal l e t t e r s , diaries, and other personal written material; and the instructions relative to the handling of classified documents as contained in the then current orders of higher authority and this division for the
operation* . . ' . . . ' ' . . ;' \ .

.
-f.
. . . . . .

8>. \ Distinctive or special .enemy t a c t i c s observed:

.
. '

,..a.
.

'Infantry:'
. .

' :

'

._'
'

' ' ...',; = "

i . ,

. /.
x

s
. . .

; (l) ..-' 2?he enemy doctrine of resistance was apparently based on the premise of a determined defense from every possible'position with the mission of exacting the maximum in casualties and material losses to ou*r forces* (2) Noticeably absent were large scale uncontrolled ,l so called ^Banzai" attacks* Documents and prisoner reports indicate that"the island defensive policy prohibited,general counterattacksby large units Enemy counterattacks in the division zone of action were limited to unsudcessful local small unit counterattacks launched with the apparent objective of regaining favorable local ground or. defenses. The enemy attempted night infiltrations v;ithr in tho division zone of action generallv v in small'groups. Prisoner reports and captured documents indicate that jsucfr attempts were made mainly for the purpose of scouting and patrolling rather than for destruction or with the intent of counter attack, A possible exception to this policy in, the division' zone of action may have been indicated by infiltration attempts through our lines in the general' area east of Airfield Ho, 3 during the night of 3*1+ Iferch following which an estimated l66cenemy were, found dead within and in front of our lines the next morning. On another occasion 6l enemy, officer led according to a prisoner captured l a t e r , who had been bypassed and were hi ding in caves in the vicinity of Ti, 199-O staged an early morning attack on our< troops in the vicinity. Neither of these attempts were characterized by the shouting and rushes associated'with "Banzairt charges., but were apparently well controlled J l i

Action Report, I O JIMA Operation* . W

. (Cont'd)*. , .

(3) Small arms fire delivered^. >yU$ncealed enemy riflemen was particularly effective and accurate1 at shor~%^ranges*

(k) Snemy defenses on the whole were so sited and con structed as to take maximum advantage of suitable defensive terrain* Deliberate, fortifications in general were effectively camouflaged to the point that on numerous occasions attacking troops were unable to locate the sources of direct fire r small arms, a r t i l l e r y and antitank weapons* b, Artillery, mortars and rockets:

(1)~ The enemy's use of a r t i l l e r y and mortars up to 150mm in caliber, particularly in the i n i t i a l stages ^hen he possessed observation was noteworthy* Our troop'* concentrations, G and administrative installations P were located and brought under fire* liven after apparent, loss of observation* he \*as able to bring fairly effective a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire to bear on defiles avenues of approach,'and observatipn points. , ' (2) The destructive effects of massed a r t i l l e r y and raortar fire were not employed }iy the enemy* The majority of his effective fires are considered to have .been delivered by one- or two gems firing at a time* Fires delivered, however, were for the most part accurate and opportune* . (3) Artillery and mortar f i r e were employed against our tanks and vehicles particularly in1 the Airfield Ho, 2 area during the early phases of the division attack* Our tanks invariably drew concentrations, of fire when approaching or withdrawing from front line areas* Due to the limited and restricted routes' of approach, the tanks and vehicles were canalized in areas over which the enemy .controlled direct observation with the resultant concentrations of a r t i l l e r y , mortar and antitank f i r e whenever our tsinks were sighted* 'Hits N sustained by our tanks fron enemy a r t i l l e r y and mortal' fire Vere, in most cases, v not serious* Timed fire or airbursts were frequently employed, to disperse our infantry advancing with the tanks* The tanl^s, proceeding without infantry support, would then be exposed to the deadly accurate fire of close range antitank guns. Timed" fire 6r airbursts were also employed to. prevent retriever crews fron salvaging tanks immobilized by mines or other causes. (k) Rockets and the 32Onn nortar, although effective to the point of destroying or causing extensive damage to installations they h i t , wer relatively ineffective as compared with a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire, due, i t i s be-* > ' . . lievedjto inherent inaccuracies and slow rate of .fire* (5) In general, i t i s considered that the eneny tech~ nique in the employment of mortars and "artillery represented a distinct improve ment over that previously encountered by this division* c*1 Antitank measures;

(l). The antitank measures employed are considered tor. . have been the most effective encountered by this division to date. The following measures were employed either singly or in combination in action; - ." -32

Action* Report, I O JIM'Operation. W

(Con^d).

' ' ';

Artillery .
, AT Guns
Mortars . Immobile Tanks

; ' .r

Mines Demolitions and "Molotov Gocktails11 Obstacles (antitank ditches) % ' ' ' (2) . .artillery and mortar fire was employed against our .' r tanks not only for purposes of destruction; but also' to drive off supporting infantry* See'discussion under a r t i l l e r y above* . (3) The energy's employment of his numerous Model 1, 47mm AT Guns was particularly effective* These guns,, cleverly concealed in caves and emplacements, were so sited as to cover logical avenues of vehicular approach in the. Airfield Ho* 2* MOUJOXAIU,. and Airfield Ho* 3 areas* They were specifi ' cally sited to cover important road junctions, defiles, and the airfields; were employed ati both long and short ranges; and in many cases were apparently so sited as to take tanks and vehicles under fire fron the flanks* The ammunition employed penetrated up to four inches of armor on our tanks* In many instances, the AT Guns were employed for destructive fire 'after our tanks had been .immobilized by mines or from other causes, and were reported, to have fired on numerous occaeio&s at ranges hot exceeding 200 yards* 3& Tank Battalion reported that some AT guns my have'been employed in a,mobile capacity due to the fact that t in some cases, a ,taiik knocked out, by enemy mines or other causes would not be subjected 0 the'destructive effect of i 7 m AT fire until a considerable . +m period had elapsed* , This may indicate, that the enemy may have shifted guns in 'some instances in order to destroy immobilized tanks* (k) In-the M T Y M area, light and medium tanksOO A & carrying 371 ^7 s^ d 57mm;guns were employed in revetted positions to augment existing ground and.antitank defenses* Sxcept in vejcy few instances, these tan^s were dug in so as to present only the turret to view Although fairly difficult to locate, when once found they were-eliminated without difficulty, by our tank guns. ' " . _' v (5) Tarious type mines including the,following were 'encountered in the division zone of action: , ' \ Box Mines (7x7x^ff spprox^ ,w/black powder charge)* Type 3 Ian4 nines (2 and 3 kg)-. ' . " ' ' "Yardstick Mines1* placed over 63 kg bombs* Beach mines* (single and double horned). Magnetic mines. ' ...

' , Most of the minefields encountered in the division zone of action were apparently hastily laid and presented a generally haphazard pattern* "So- reports of damage to our tanks from the Type 3, Box, Beach, or Magnetic mines were received* The 3d Tk 3a- reported that the Yardstick mine employed in conjunction with the 63 kg aerial bomb wa*ljfc*emely effective in

Action Report# IVO JIMA Operation*

(Cont'd).

inflicting a great deal of external damage, to tanks, setting off anmuiiition in side the tankst and starting fires. In some instances, Box and Type 3 Jans were laid around emplacements, apparently for the purpose of preventing our tanks ,and/or personnel from over running aane. - In one or two instances, the enemy attempted to blind our tanks with snoke. in restricted areas, and under cover of the smoke, endeavored to knock out the tanks "by attacking them with prepared charges and Molotov Cocktails. Large quantities, of Molotov Cocktails which were found x assembled and boxed indicate that the eneiay anticipated their employment in quantity* One attempt to destroy a tank, in which t?he tank was caught in a defile, was successful following an attack by an estimated 15 enemy* The crew* of y&ic two were killed, were forced to abandon the tank before disabling tha ?$&i;San#.- During the night* the,enemy manned , the disabled tanit and succeeded in> knocking out > one of our tanks with the JfyangtiXL of the disabled tank the next
morning. . ' , . ' . ;

' ' (7) AT ditches approximately 10 feet wide, 10 feet deep, and 3^ feet long were encountered in the division zone of action,, but due to the ease of detouring sane, they failed to present a serious obstacle*
' ' . ' * <

(S) . Based upon M s actions^ and their effects, it seems

apparent that the enemy planned basically to employ his AT guns to Gover mine-
fields, which were sited generally in logical areas of vehicular approach, as well
a? to cover defiles and approaches which tanks or other vehicles would be forced
to employ. In order vto permit his AT weapons to operate unhindered at short.
ranges against our disabled.or canalized tanks, he utilized artillery and mortar
fire, both time and impact fuzed, in order to disperse our supporting infantry."
In a few instances, he is reported to have attempted to us the same tactics in
order to drive off our supporting troops, allow, our tanks to "enter restricted
areas within his lines, and then destroy the' tanks with demolitions and Molotov
Cocktails* His employment of his well sited and concealed M-fim. AT Guns is, con sidered to have been particularly effective.
d* . Tanks;. .

Tanks were employed statically in% revetted emplacements to augment existing ground and antitank defenses. Although-reports received indicate 1 that enemy tanks were moved from one position to another, no reports were received of their being employed in any manner other than as indicated above. The dug in tanks were -fairly difficult to locate in some instances,* but once / located were eliminated without, difficulty. See discussion under antitank \ measures above. * / C. Operations, and Training;'- \ . \ 1. a. "_JJo rehearsal exercises of the operation were carried out since, "being i n i t i a l l y in 23xpe;di'tionary Troops reserve, i t was impossible to foresee the method, of ^employment of the division. As i t was expected that N the division would be landed behind an already-established beachhead, no ; training was conducted in ship-1onshore movement, other#|||p.B&sasiimple exercise.

Action Report, IWO J I M Operation

(Cont ! d).

early in the training period* conducted by infantry "battalions* consisting of a movement from a line o:* departure to, the1 beach in LVTs aiid deployment of troops- on the "beach* Emphasis was placed on' the technique of offensive operations of infantry, including the coordination of a l l fires* of infantry weapons..in support of the attack, infantry-artillery coordination, and infantrytank coo Mi nation a ' , ' , K Bal:h infantry regiment, with, a'tank company attached,, /conduct sd a field, exercise r.'a.^o'i-ted by an artillei. battalion. Only the arv'lllery' fired*. !l:h.e purpc^e of the exercise was "to Iruprove coordination, of i.janfiry*-t'ank offensive operations with artillery.- l';anks verb moved forward to the final objective ahead of the infantry and time fire was placed over the tanks* 32mphasis .was on.the maximum exploitation of the effect of. a r t i l l e r y fires by infantry lay having the infantry close to the minimum distance on a r t i l l e r y concentrations in order to -be able to assault the enemy position with the minimum time interval after lifting of the a r t i l l e r y f i r e . e# A demonstration was conducted employing: an infantry battalion in an attack situation supported by a battalion of artillery* a . battery of 105am howitzers (simulating a destroyer), the 1$mm gun platoon of a regimental weapons company, and bomber and fighter aircraft, The purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the ""coordination of a l l firss available .to a* battalion commander in-order to achieve, the maximum fiire effect in support of the attack of his. battalion* Emphasis was placed on the technique of infantry maneuver, the pushing ahead of units through soft spots, and the employment of supports and reserves to protect exposed flanks and to flank resistance holding U|> part/of .the unit. Every effort was made to dispol the. = idea, found to be quite prevalent, that assault units must maintain an1, alignment and that physical cpntact between adjacent units i s essential. Also emphasizedwas the necessity for the infantry to close to,within not more,, than 200 yards of supporting a r t i l l e r y fires* Since i t was expected that the division, or elements thereof, would be called upon to execute a passage of lines in the forthcoming operation, the demonstration began with a simulated" passage of . , tithes, showing particularly the use of the weapons of the unit being passed through to support the attacking unit, Extra machine guns and mortars were' provided to demonstrate this phase. All weapons fired live ammunition and aircraft strafed, fired rockets, and dropped 500 lb bombs. All officers of infantry regiments, the a r t i l l e r y regiment, and the tank battalion were required to. attend. Svery effort was made to have a tank company move to the firing area for participation in the demonstration, but no route was found available ; which did not have a bridge, and none of the bridges would support the medium tank* , ' , ' . ' ; ' . , . . d. All infantry.and a r t i l l e r y battalions, other than the demonstration units, were required to execute in turn the exercise of the demonstration in the same manner that the demonstration was executed, except that a shortage of 105mm ammunition required elimination of the 105mm battery ; used to simulate a destroyer, 7
/

, e. Infantry battalions conducted field exercises"with

tanks, no firing being done.

-35

Action Report, I W JIMA Operation* O

(Cont'd)*

Much small unit training was carried out in the assault and reduction of emplacements, using flamethrower and rocket launcher* . g. Two replacement drafts Joined this division on 2& and 29 December 19*& They were to- be employed primarily as shore party labor troops in the forthcoming operation and were attached to the 3$ Pioneer. &* Investigation of the status of combat training of these replacements revealed that their training was meager,, consisting of two to fotar weeks recruit training, ffany of the men had not irej their weapons.. . A training program was instituted for these menr fifty per cent of their training time being devoted to shore party training and fifty per cent to combat 'training/individual and small unit. The training time was inadequate and the employment of these men during the operation resulted in a definite drop in combat efficiency of a l l infantry units.. Replacements must be given more adequate training in training.centers before being sent overseas to combat units. 2. a* Weapons found most effective against fortified in stallations are as follows: '
. (l) The tank with i t s "JJmBi gunr es^ployed as an assault gun* Tanks* covered by infantry fire,were in many instances able to advance close to emplacements, and effectively take them under fire wiih the 7 m gun. 5 m They were extensively employed in this manner, singly and in small groupst by infantry units, The 7 m shell.with the T-105 concretes-piercing fuze proved 5 m most effective when fired against embrasures* . (2) The flamethrower tank (CB-H-l) was found to be most effective against emplacements and caves. The longer range and all-around traverse of the flamethrower made this type far more effective than the I&H2-5R1 with which this division was equipped. In the l a t t e r stages of the operation this division was.able to borrow from the other divisions the CB--H-1 flamethrower tank and achieved excellent results, against strongly fortified enemy pockets of resistance* The type 3&H2-5E1 flamethrower tank, owing to the short range and limited traverse of i t s flamethrower was considered of l i t t l e value* ^ . ' , (3) $h portable f3,amethro\fer was an excellent weapon against emplacements when i t could be worked to within range-of the ,emplace- rnent^ Casualties among flamethrower operators were very high so that in the l a t t e r stages of the operation i t was difficult to keep flamethrowers manned with personnel of sany experience at all* This weapon was very effective in moppingup operations. , . ' (k) "The antitank rocket launcher (bazooka) was ef fective against emplacements when it' could be moved to a sufficiently short range to obtain hits on embrasures* I t was able to penetrate the lighter constructed emplacements and was also effective in firing into caves* (5) The 3 m gun was effectively used by some units 7 m in situations where the gun could be worked into position to bring direct fire on embrasures of emplacements, ^P-and H shell were used. E (6) The 8 m mortar firing, the M 1 m 5

Action Report* I W JIMA Operation. O

(Cont*d).

delayed action fuze was found to be effective against the lighter types of em*
placements* ' * ' .
(7) Small and:medium demolition charges were sufficient
for destruction of tne average emplacement. In closing caves, i t was usually
found necessary to use forty^pound shaped charges. .
{&) The only a r t i l l e r y ' f i r e s which were effective against the concrete emplacements of the enemy were those of the lj>5mm howitzers of Corps a r t i l l e r y , employing concrete piercing shell* . ; (9) The 7*3" rocket fired from a slad towed by a tank
was employed against a fortified area. Results were undetermined. The fires
could not be pulled in close' enough to our.troops to tajse care of the enemy to
the immediate front.and ho advance was possible after their use.
(XO) For effects of a i r and naval gunfire bombardment of
fortified positions, see-par E t Air, and par F, Naval Gunfire.
3. When the division was attacking with one regiment, in assault, the tank battalion was attached to the assault regiment. After the zone of action widened and two regiments were employed abreast, one tank company was attached -to each regiment. ^Regiments attached companies or platoons to assault battalions in accordance with requirements of the situation. Ho mass' tank-attacks were feasible, owing to the strong enemy antitank defense, lack of suitable tank approaches through the broken-terrain, and the heavily fortified nature of the enemyrs defenses. The largest number of tanks employed together was ten* These were used on the f i r s t day of the division attack and were attached to the left assault battalion of the assault regiment to assist that battalion in penetrating the hostile, defenses around Airfield Ho. 2 , They, however^ functioned as,.assault guns firing on enemy emplacements from positions on the runway in rear of the assault elements* The tanks, massed on the runway, drew heavy fire of a l l types and nine were knocked out. Thereafter, tanks were employed singly or in small groups as assault guns and were very effective, although they suffered heavy losses* In two instances tanks supported infantry attacks by direct overhead f i r e . Armored bulldozers, borrowed from other .divisions, were very.useful in cutting approaches for tanks through the broken terrain. Their lighter weight ciado tjaera less likely to bog down in the loose, sandy soil than the tank bulldozer, they were more maneuverable than the tank bulldozer^ and had the additional advantage of being equipped with angledozer. ^ .... 4. Tank-infantry coordination was satisfactory. Infantry "closely followed the supporting tanks in a few instances, but usually covered the advance of the tanks from positions to the rear of them. The nature, of the enemy defenses did not permit infantry to advance in the open with tanks with impunity* The infantry commander normally pointed out the objective to the tank commander from a position' in the infantry l i n e s . Once' the tanks had launched their attack, communication with the infantry was by 'SCH-^OO radio. Communi** cation by means of the telephone, in the tank grouser box. was not feasible, for infantry because the close proximity of the enemy did not permit infantrymen to expose themselves for this.purpose. The greatest" \&ck, of coordin^tidn frsfrween tanks and infantry occurred in the l a t t e r stages of the operation when replace ment infantry were used in attacks with tanks. These men had had no training with tanks* In one instance, a group of these menswas advancing with a tank toward an enemy position. The eneny placed snokf j j | jbfrfo*fcank and the
infantrymen withdrew, after which a group of energy

-37

Acti on Report, IW ' J | M O^erati on , ( Coat d). O destroyed i t with a demolition charge and Molotov Cocktail. 5 Antitank measures employed by units of this division were normal, > The enemy did not use tanks offensively, so these measures were not put to a test. Rifle companies were providedwith the antitank rocket* launcher and antitank grenade for antitank defense* Defense in depth was provided by 37mm guns sited along roads and likely hostile tank approaches* The 15w& selfpropelled guns were usually kept mobile in the rear. " _ 6*. Little use was found tor war dogs in this .operation. Kot until organized resistance was ended,and mopping-up operations by patrols begun,, were dogs employed* They were then used with delight patrols, aabushesf and for night security* Dogs would not enter caves* TInits state that dogs were unable to differentiate between friend and enemy* They were useful at-night with ambushes and outposts, alerting to the-presence of the'enemy in a number of instances* The presence of dogs with outposts* ambushes, and patrols boosts the morale of the men and. they like to have them present. ; 7# & Standard infantry tactics for normal terrain were employed,throughout by this division. At the time this division was committecC to the assault, the Corps was confronting the enemy's, main battle position, which was a heavily fortified.zone extending continuously across the island* The only possible maneuver open to Oorps, or any division, was a penetration. It i s an established tactical principle that in executing a penetration, the point of penetration should be selected at wiiat is- believed to be the weakest point in the enemy defenses, the main effort should be made at that point, and the bulk of all available artillery, naval guns, and aircraft should be assigned to the support of the main effort, The attack should be preceded by a long prepara tion and successive concentrations should be^placed ahead of the assault ele ments,1 It i s believed that the zone of action assigned tlyis division wes the most suitable for making the main effort as i t extended along the high ground in the center "of the island* Had the bulk of All supporting weapons been allotted to thiis~division instead of being more or less equally distributed between all three divisions, i t i s believed that a penetration would have been effected sooner and at a losJet cost. . b. Since i t was approximately three days before this division\had a full artillery regiment in support of i t s attack, the necessary weight of close supporting fires could not be delivered and the progress of the attack was correspondingly slow and with heavy casualties. The i n i t i a l attack was launched on 2$ February, and, by noon 27 February l i t t l e progress had been, made, A coordinated attack launched in the afternoon of 27 February following a heavy artillery'and naval gunfire preparation resulted in a rapid advance being made well into the enemy1 a main battle position,along theu entire division front. The progress of the attack was closely watched to detect soft spots11 in the enemy defenses which could be exploited* On the following day, after another heavy preparation, and employing a rolling barrage, a'"soft spot" was found to exist in front of the right battalion of the assault regiment ^nd. that battalion was pushed rapidly ahead, Reserves were brought up behind the right, battalion and attacked to the flank through the gap between the assault battalions to widen the breach* This maneuver was successful and by the next afternoon the entire enemy position in the division gone of action was occupied,, This method of at tack; was successfully followed througnuut* Preparations preceded each attack, as heavy as the limitations en artillery ammu followed by rolling barrages* Where attacks "bogged doi

Action Report| IWO O M . Operation T A of the day,, new coordinated attacks were ordered, also preceded by. preparations and vdth rolling barrages. Faval guns were employed- to deepen the a r t i l l e r y fires in a l l cases and Corps a r t i l l e r y was called upon for a l l possible support within the limitations prescribed by Corp's* Assault units which were able to progress were pushed ahead, regardless of the progress of adjacent units, Open flanks were projected by reserves, and reserves were invariably used to widen breaches by launching flanking attacks through gaps between assault units, c. In consolidating positions for night defense* no great
effort was made to establish a continuous line across the front with a l l units
tightly tied~in. Where gaps could be covered by fire of infantry weapons* they
were not occupied. An eheiviy attempt at night infiltration through one of these
gaps was stopped with heavy loss to the enemy. Illumination was sufficiently
continuous to detect any hostile attempt to i n f i l t r a t e through gap^s*

, . i

'.*

d* Hight patrols were regularly employed to determine enemy . dispositions and a c t i v i t i e s . One patrol was sent out at night to destroy a hos t i l e machine gun, which had been firing on our lines t &xiA successfully accom plished it's mission* I t i s believed that night patrols are absolutely essential and a l l infantry units must place more emphasis^on t h i s in training. e. One night attack was successfully launched. The hostile
defense generally northwest of Airfield Ho. 3* proved exceedingly stubborn and
l i t t l e progress was made for several days in daylight attacks. A coordinated
division attack was launched one hour and a half before daylight with one
battalion making the main attack. Complete surprise was achieved and the
objective taken. 3for details of this attack see Par I I J , Chronological account
of the action* : 7 March, and Snclosure C, Action Report, S^h..Marines.

1D

Supply. 1.

Adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies.

a. Supply of all classes (I through V) was/adequate,

and though some items of Class V arrived later than originally planned, arrival
was in time to permit scheduled combat loading*
' 2- Adequacy of re-supply,
a. Re-supply was adequate, though shortages, undoubtedly
the result of the unexpected length and fury of, the operation, did occur,
.namely in Class II, V, &n&a few items of' Class 1 However at no time.were
'weapons silenced for want of ammunition, nor were operations disrupted for a
lack of supply* This division did not need, nor requisition, any medical supplies
or 155mm Howitzer ammunition from the re*supply agency, hence no comment can
be made on the palletizing of this class of supply.
3* Palletized cargo*

a* The value of palletizing certain classes of supply can

not be underestimated. The protection afforded the cargo, the comparative ease'
"
of unloading and transporting, and the desirability of *

. "

. - -39

Action Report, WO.'J1K& Operation*

(Cont'd).

items compact and segregated, amply, repays the additional labor and materials expended in the construction of "the sled p a l l e t , i t must be realized, however, * that early and adequate 'arrangements must "be made with the ships to "be employed,1 for the loading of pallets* Ships assigned to this Division had not been given advance notice t-Iuvfc pallets were to "be embarked, with the result i?hat note .of the ships had proper pallet handling gear* . I t i s mandatory that the necessary mechanical equipment' for the proper handling of p a l l e t s be on the .beach and in , lihe. dumps, prior to the landing of the pallets* * ^* Wilson Drums - The Wilson Drums were not afforded a f a i r t r i a l in t h i s operation aL they were received, shortly before 'embarkation, less their towing bridles* However, their desirability as a means of loading and stowing equipment and. supplies of a nature readily subject to weather deterior-r ation, was readily apparent.. One organization, after the. drum had served i t s primary purpose, ingeniously converted this equipment into v a very satisfactory field oven. . ' -, k0 . D i s t i l l e r s . .

a*' This division lifted from GA a total of 29 water $M d i s t i l l a t i o n units* 27 Badgers with a rated daily capacity of 1500 gallons each, and 2 Cleaverbrooks with a rated daily capacity of $QQQ gal Ions each* providing a potential production of 505QQ gallons-of water daily* Under field conditions, . these units cannot be expected to reach their maximum rated capacity, and actually the daily output of water, maintaining a norm of 23 units in operation, averaged 21000 gallons* With the reserve supply of water embarked at Guam, plus the re* supply from ships, water supply was adequate* -Prom # plus 8, no water limits were imposed and consumption, a v e r t e d about two gallon's per man per day. 5* Wat er Furi f i eat ion tftiit. "

a. A total of Ik portable water purification units were lifted from G A * Iwo of -these units were employed for chlorinating the water r M. U provided by the d i s t i l l a t i o n units. No fresh water was available for purification* 6* Shore Party/. a. * ., .

Control of Shore Party labor:

Organized during the planning &n& training phase, into labor units of 1 Officer and 25 men* including 2 iTCOs, a l l labor elements p a r t i cipated in five (5) $hore.arty exercises before embarkation* $he control and employment of labor elements was stressed in this training. Disembarkation of Shore Party labor elements was restricted to groups no smaller than one Shore Party, labor unit, or multiples thereof* Previous training stressed necessity for the Officer in Charge of .labor unit to report at Shore Party CB "upon landing. All u n i t s of the Shore Party were assigned bivouac areas on beach by SP C0r and in structed to maintain contact with SP GP' for^ employment* Labor was divided into twelve hour shifts as the situation permitted. Control of Shore Party labor throughout operation was excellent , b. lacal defense methods*

on Report* I W JIMA Operation* O

(Cont'd).

In addition to the automatic weapon installations of the Pioneer Battalion, .twenty-four labor teams consisting of 1 officer and-29 men each, were utilized "by the Division Snore Party for p.erimeter defense* Eighteen similar 1 dump unloading teams were available as re.serve, and were assigned areas in which to assemble should their employment for defense "be indicated. c.
1

Mechanical devices.

. .

. Master bri&lea for towing of p a l l e t s were efficiently employed. SliNngs, and chokers for hoisting p a l l e t s , 50. gallon drums, and miscella~ neous. cargo,' were used extensively. Previously prepared lengths pt wire rope up to one inch in diameter and fifty feet long, were used effectively as tow lines, and were attached to tractors in order to hold LCTs, LSMs, and LSTs on the steeply inclined beach, These lengths were also utilized for other tows, as re quired* One rigging t r a i l e r was available in each Pioneer.Company for maintenance, repair, and replenishment of slings, bridles and tow lines. Traversing cranes with boom's up, to 30 feet were used extensively, but should not be considered as a -substitute for man poxirer* . At approximately p plus 20,1 two twenty-ton ffLe . " To.uraeautt cranes were necessary in order to unload heavy : cargo belonging to garrison forces* Tractors with,,blades were adequate and extensively used* Tractors without blades were used as temporary prime-movers in unloading* . d. ' Equipment and personnel furnished the Division Shore Party was adequate* 3d'Marine Division Shore Party and equipment employed was as listed i n Annex Able to }6. division G Il6 -SOP Shore Party,- and-Annex Able - O Shore Party - to 3d Division Administrative Plan l-k% . e* The Sth Held Depot was not utilized by this organization as a Divisional Shore Party Component* One .D plus 5 the Field Depot, acting in i t s capacity as Corps Shore Party, provided this Division with the services of forty LVT*sf four generators and eight flood lights, and on D plus 201 two =twenty-ton !ll*e Touriieau0 cranes were furnished in order to handle the heavy l i f t s of garrison forces, ' . f. Battle Baplacement Drafts No. '2S and 3^ were given inten sive training as labor elements for BLIP and H T Shore- Parties and were< efficiently G employed as such iuring the i n i t i a l phases of the operation. , Their strength was considerably depleted as the operation progressed when they were detached as battle replacements. . . . - ' . , g. Dump and, traffic control,
x

' Dumps and the distribution of supplies therefromt were placed under the supervision of the Divi sion'Quartermaster when Division Shore Party was activated. This procedure placed the responsibility upon the officer best qualified*- and, has repeatedly proven successful* Traffic Control - Military police and guides were posted at strategic points for proper direction* of traffic. Properly planned traffic routes, and dump organization, reduced congestion to a minimum, in the Division Shtf Party zo&e+ h* .Method o'f control, ship to shore c '-41

Action Hep or!.

deration*

(Cont*d).

Division- TC$f remained aboard the flagship of'Tr&nsEon

lX and controlled troop cargo p r i o r i t i e s for ship to snore movement as directed
by Division 0^4. Delivery of high priority items Requested ashore generally
required 12 hours from receipt of request* .
In some, cases cargo designated for 3d Marine Division Beach landed elsewhere, due to misunderstandings between beachmasters and control vessels* . Cargo .tickets showing the-amount and type of cargo load-* ed from the ship into landing' craft were made out in t r i p l i c a t e by the Troop T<$i of each ship, one copy of which he retained, one of which, was designated ..for the control vessel and one to be delivered to the Shore Party Commander. Actually ;-*n most ,case& the control vessel did not accept or receive i t s copy, and, two copies arrived at the beach* Cargo tickets in-some caises were made out improperly and more training in this procedure i s necessary* As t h i s divisionn landed in. reserve, the use of floating dumps and the procedure of placing a nk Section representative on the control vessel was not required oy the Shore Party plan. i. transportation. '

V/heeled transportation embarked was adequate for Shore Party use* however, only limited use was made of wheeled vehicles by the Shore Party i n i t i a l l y because of/the soft sand.. D J W were not assigned to this TK s Division except for casualty evacuation from shore to Bhip.v Some trouble was encountered in negotiating soft sand near water's edgef but otherwise the VUK\f proved to be an excellent vehicle for casualty evacuation. IiYTWs allocatedby Corps to the Division Shore Party proved etfcelle&t and their use greatly simplified movement of cargo from landing, craft to dump areas. Transportation . supplied was as specified in Shore Party anneat to Administrative Plan l-tyjj* One Weasel per l e t t e r company and one per H&S* Company Pioneer Battalion would be useful as command vehicles for the purpose of rapid transportation to assist in coordination of activities in beach and dump* areas. 7 Field Depot,

a Distribution of. re^supply Classes I , I I , 1 1 1 , 17, V The Field Depot was of l i t t l e , benefit in the.re-supply of Classes I , II*, I I I . and IV.- The Field Depot did provide this Division with a total of 17,000 pairs of shoes', 2 outfits* cookingipack, sa^, 7 flamethrowers. The re-supply of Glass V was adequate, although at times, decidedly precarious, particularly in and a r t i l l e i y ammunition. This division was required to furnish 3 O OO to the Corps on D,plus 23. . s . b. Pistribut-jon of Maintenance - 3iJo maintenance f a c i l i t i e s
were provided t h i s divi si on - by ti& j i eld Dep 01.

Action feeport, I W JIMA Operation. O

c

(Cont!d),

* Other Service a - l*or Shore Party assistance, see paragraph 6, above* The SI eld Depot did provide, the f a c i l i t i e s for disposal of salvaged material and equipment beyond repair by elements of the Division*
'. ^ ' ' i . .

SI..

Efficiency of all shore "based supply f a c i l i t i e s ,

ft. All shore based supply f a c i l i t i e s , employed by this

organization, other than the Field Depot covered in paragraph 7 <a"bove# were
inttra-divisional* They functioned in a highly efficient manner,
9, Salvage and Salvage Collection, . ' " .

a. The salvage collection and reclamation as performed by , t h i s Division was exceptionally efficient. In a number of items the Division returned to i t s rehabilitation area with a larger inventory than upon embarkation, Por full report of salvage end disposition thereof see Action Report of 3 & -Service Battalion*
j .

10.

Captur ed Material and Captured Material;Qollection>

a. . Captured enemy material was collected and returned to division installations' by.the lower echelons, coordinating t h e i r ' a c t i v i t i e s through the Division Intelligence Section for observation ..of innovations or . new equipment,'as provided by SOP, However,. other than those items of interest and value to JICPOA, the disposal of enemy material was a decided problem.1 3Jb.e terrain, restricted as i t was, offered l i t t l e space for the storage of these' items, and destruction, particularly of ammunition, was; hazardous due to the congestion,.caused ~by the presence of .friendly forces. Directives were issued, upon approval of higher echelon, to space enemy material dumps throughout the organizational zones of responsibility, erecting barbed wire enclosures about ; , them; and placing them, under guard. A proposal to boat .the ammunition, and d m u p i t at sea was i n i t i a l l y denied, due to a scarcity of landing craft. Towards the end of the operation, this method of disposal was successfully employed*- for full report of captured enemy material and disposition thereof, see Action Hepdrt of 3d Service Battalion* ' , XXm Transporation*
> '

'
. >'

'

'

'a# Adequacy of embarked wheeled and t r a i l e r transportation * The transportation embarked was more, than adequate* The entire operation, con fined -as i t was to the limited terrain, did not require the full employment of the vehicles embarked. However, such an unusual condition was decidedly ad vantageous, other than for the dispersal problem presented, as mobile supply could be cohstatly maintained and forward elements spared the necessity of divert ."-_ ing tactical,vehicles to supply purposes, ** Efficiency of cargo carrier M29Q.(Weasel) -.This, vehicle. was ideally suitedJJO the soft volcanic soil i t so ably navigated* In the i n i t i a l phases, before the construction of,well defined supply roads, the Weasel provided a sure means of. transportation,, .both for tactical and communication purposes as well as for supply and evacuation* As the situation progressed and roads were constructed and repaired t the Weasels were deff^tf^^^Ld jeryiced for future combat operation.

Action Report, I W JIMA Operation, O

(Contrd)*

c. Efficiency of cargo\trailers, amphibious 5ijfrton - (Phis Division was:responsible for pre-loading and embarking 5 of these vehicles aboard an LSV for subsequent employment by other elements of VAC. HO obersvation was made of their landing at the target, but tests,conducted before loading indicated the need, for a more practical hitch, particularly under adverse sea conditions, Prom a brochure prepared by the Cleaverbrook Corp/, recently received at t h i s Headquarters, i t appears such a. hitch has now been ..provided. The loss in, loading space &t embarkation would seem to be more, than offset by the desirable feature of-this vehicle* i,'e*> protection to. cargo, both from the elements- and pilferage* an& ready mobility for immediate dispatch to. the. using forces. d. Adequacy of spare |>arts ~ An ample supply of sp?re
parts we-ro procured, embarked and landed at the target*
> e. Maintenance f a c i l i t i e s - Adequate maintenance personnel
and equipment were provided for constant servicing and. rep^4-r of vehicles, .
12* Efficiency,of supply communication - During-the assembling
of cargo,, and the embarkation of troops.and materiel, a special supply communi-* .
cation net was installed, tying in the Division CP, the supply points, the
control point s t the assembly and staging, areas, and the - embarkation berths.
Tae result was a highly, efficient communications not. During the. assault phase,
the Joint Assault Signal Company,, the ITaval Bep.ch Party, and the Division Signal
Company, provided an efficient and adequate system of communications employing
radio, visual and telephonic equipment. ' Rapid ..communlcation was provided'from.
shore, to ship, from Shore Party to-divisional supply installations* .and from,
the Division'Command Post to the supply, installations of higher and- lower echelons*
' ' '

13. ,

Conclusions' and Recommendations^ -a. In conclusion it'nay toe, stated: , '

' . ^ ' (1) That the shipping allocated was adequate and well designed-for the purpose, except for-the -lifting-of the Sank Ipat t a l i on. " Only ,2 LSTs were provided to l i f t the flanks* (This prevented the. embarkation of necessary supply and raaintainanee vehicles to support tank operations* Hore tanks could have been k^ot in action in the early phase .of the operation if naintainence vehicles and equiv^ment could have been combat unit loaded with the tanks*, t^/hen LSTs are used for the lifting of'**..tank battalion, not,less,,th^ja 3 LS2's should
be provided.^ ' . ' '

., (Z) That the equipment embarked, with'.the exception-of

galley gear, was sufficient to support 'the division.throughput the operation*
(3) That the supplies.embarked,'with the exception of
mortar and a r t i l l e r y ammunition, were adequate*
(k) That the.palletizing of Approximately fifty par cant .of embarked supplies,is-practicable and desirable, providing adequate mechanical- ' handling equipment i s available, both aboard ship and on the beach, (5) That the wisddra of strict ( conbat loading, even for
a division,assigned the role of Reserve, was nost definitely tffii

Action Report* I O JIfaA Operation. W

(Cont!d)#

BCT~21 was ordered to proceed in advance of the balance of the division, there was no delay created by readjustment of cargo; the^equipment and supplies of the R T were entirely self-contained* O ' (6) That the special vehicles, namely, the weasel-, the
armored bulldozer, and the amphibious water tight t r a i l e r , utilized in -combat for
the first time by this division, performed efficiently and are a desirable
addition- to the T/O of a divi sion.
(7) That the Athey track-laying trailer-tractor combi- . . nation again proved i t s decided value. (8) That the "K" ration remains the least popular combat
ration. The "C" ration has been appreciably improved, and i s the most popular
combat ration. However, for a l l troops not actually engaged in combat, the
10 in 1 ration, and the "3" ration, in the- absence of fresh stores, are the most:
desirable. If troops are 1jo be subsisted ashore for prolonged periods, plans
should be made to supplement the field rations with fresh foods.x jSven small
'amounts of meat, potatoes-, apples, oranges * unions, and eggs, are import ant
morale builders when added to the field ration,
. ' . (9) That elements of the Sth H e l d Depot and Gexrison
forces were landed too early in the operation*. The arrival of their personnel
and cargo on assault beaches, utilizing lighterage urgently needed for the lend ing of combat equipment ..and supplies, delayed the landing of the l a t t e r items,
and created undue congestion and confusion in the resticted area available,
b. The following recommendations, based on experience .gained in tki's operation,' are listed below:
(1) That in- Amphibious operations, an adequate Shore . Party ba trained-pud'equipped to -meet any contingency, even though the contemplated role of a Division indicates a low probability of their employment,

(2) That early liaison,^ accomplished prior to the arrival at-the embarkation point, be effected-between the division and the .shipping allocated, in order to avoid any discrepancies in loading date. ' (3) That approximately fifty per cent- of a l l supplies continue to be palletized, p.nd. .that a l l shipping allocated be designed and equipped for the mechanical handling of palletized cargo* '
* >

. (k) That the .Range,' field, Model 1937, or. equal, be. embarked for any future operation, no matter how short the contemplated action. This mage, not included in the equipment embarked for this operation, occupies very l i t t l e -sp.ace. in loading, and CPH readily be en^jloyed to excellent advantage, Very few periods occur during combat, when galleys could not be established,- and .cooked meals provided all troops* ' " . (5) That fresh, stores, 1 from the ships in the area, be sw>pliecL to the forces ashore as early and in as large a quantity as possible* The morale factor gained by serving fresh-food as. ran idly as galleys can be

Action Report, I W J1MA Operation*. O

(Cont'd)* .'

established will amply repay the effort expended,1

(6) That Regimental Train Bivouacs, as defined in M

7*3^ paragraph 57 be" established as rapidly as the terrain can "be, exploited.
This method of containing the service elements, employed in the operation by
RCT~2if proved highly successful in conserving transportation and expediting
the distribution of supply*
-'-' (7) That an'.adequate and balanced supply of olothing, shoes, and individual equipment, be embarked and remain aboard a l l 1ships desig nated to receive casualties. ' In t h i s operation, a number of .""White * casualties were returned to the beach without proper clothing and entirely without equipment. That, as early as/practicable, dual roads be con structed for a l l routes of supply .and evacuation, ^maintaining one road for the
sole use of wheeled transportation. Though directives of higher ecftelon pre~ .
scribed t h i s construction, traffic on many routes remained >eongested for undue
periods, caused by tracked vehicles impeding the movement of the more rapid,
' * ' '
wheeled Vehicles* * k (9) That three TD~18 tractors with bulldozer, equipped with 5/S11 detachable armor, be added to the T/O equipment of the Engineer Battalion, to be attached during combat, to the Tank Battalion, for the construc tion of routes of ingress and egress for areas under enemy observation and fire* > (40) (a) That a total of $k M39C (teasels) be added to
the T/O equipment of a Marine Division, allocated as folldws*
27 * i'or communication vehicles only, distributed, as follows; 6 - Signal Co; 2 - H&S Btry, jirtillery kegiment} 1 - Artillery Bn* 2 H&S Co,.. Infantry Regimentj 1 - Infantry Bn. . 57 - or supply, evacuation and evacuation and rapid movement of supplementary weapons, . distributed as follows: k - H&S Co, Infantry Regt; k^~ Infantry 3n; k ~ H&S , Btry, Artillery &egtI 5'- M Bo. T

(b) This vehicle has proven invaluable in traversing terrain prohibited to wheeled vehicles* I t should be considered a n Vehicle of Opportunity*, and in no sense a replacement for the l/k ton truck (^eep), %en conditions do not dictate i t s employment, the Weasel should be dead~lin.edt completely serviced, and reserved for future employment. During, this operation-, the' Weasels , particularly successful in the i n i t i a l phase* were dead-lined within tliis Division on D plus 15* So successfully were they maintained, that only one We&sel was expended during the* operation, that vehicle being destroyed .by enemy action. , . ' ' . , \ ' ( l l ) That the Athey track^laying,' t r s i l e r - t r a c t o r combi nation be- added to the T/O equipment of "a Marine Division. Thi's Division ha.s
employed,this means of transportation during three combat operations, namely,
^PJ*Sp4nv*y-e. fi'uani, and Iwo' Jima, and in each operation tfhelrs value has been 4eti'niteiy established, A total of 18 trailer-tractors* alEJUblte'ft^lie Motor ^ . .

Action Report, I W JIMA Operation* O

(Cont f d).

Transport Battalion, 6 assigned to each'ROT'during combat, ideally supplement the wheeled car'go transportation normally assigned the-RCT. The TD-l4 tractor, rather than the TD-9 now employed within t h i s Division, would be more .desireable motive power. ITor transporting supplies over terrain impossible or damaging to wheeled vehicles, the Athey track-laying t r a i l e r and trpxtor, eppepr to present the logical solution. . (12) (a} That the Cleaverbrook Distillation unit be wheel or track mounted, preferably the l a t t e r , in order to provide nobility 'for t h i s unwieldy 'equipment. The Cleaverbrook, a more reliable though less economical. d i s t i l l e r than the Badger, i s a most desirable and necessary piece of equipment where ever this mesns of water supply i s indicated* However, i t s size and weight require the employment of crpnes &n.& flat-bed t r a i l e r s , often at times when the l a t t e r equipment i s most urgently needed for Shore Party operations, , Mobility . would increase the value of the'Cleaverbrook considerably. (b) That a one-ton t r a i l e r be provided for each three d i s t i l l a t i o n units employed, for the transportation of chemicals, accessories^ and spare parts,
~E# A r t i l l e r y . . '

" (See Enclosure 3P, Action Report, ( 12th Marines)* T Air, '

. ,

1. The Air Liaison parties of this division performed their duties in a satisfactory manner throughout the operation. Unit commanders were con stantly advised of a l l strikes in or adjacent to their zone of action, - Liaison was maintained at a l l times with naval gunfire and artillery,' and the fires, of ^ these supporting arms were well coordinated. Radio*communication,was maintained at a l l times with Air Support Control except while displacing forward, during whici, times any necessary transmissions could have been relayed via regimental command radio net should the situation have warranted. Requests for air support were made over the Support Air Request (SAR) net and.the direction of these strikes relayed to the aircraft via-Air Support Control, This method of relaying information was satisfactory although i t did take a greater length of time and overcrowded a badly congested SAS net. Directing strikes wa-s quite difficult due to limited observation by Air Liaison Officers on t h i s terrain. 2. Communication equipment of the Air Liaison parties of this division was adequate with the possible exception of a remote control with "battal ion parties for communication .between battalion- OP and G where the radio Jeep^ P was- located. The SAR net was congested at a l l times with too many stations on one frequency. Improper use of the SAB net as an air direction net caused need less congestion. On several occasions,, when urgent strikes were requested "by assault units against targets plainly suited to air attack only, i t was impossible to transmit these requests over the S R net because i t was being employed for the A direction of a strike in progress, Without going into the relative importance of the targets under attack, this, was a flat violation of all* air support doctrine and, in these instances, precluded efficient and correct operation, ftThe control station for the S R nefc did not seem to exercise coajplete control. As a result, A

Action Heport, I WO JIMA Operation.

(Coat 1 *).

traffic on this net tended to get aut of hand on many occasions*

3* Colored panels were used to- some esitent in marking front lines
prior to an air strike* \ Due to- the open terrain and the fact that the enemy had
observation from commanding ground during the greater part of the operation, it
was not practicable to use panels since they served to.draw intensive enemy fire*
HJhe marking of targets was left to' the discretion of the Air Coordinator and Air
Support Control* Mortar and artillery smoke (W?) shells were used but diet,not
prove very satisfactory because of the presence of other smoke in'the same
general area* placed either by our own or enemy troops, or from fires caused by
bombardment* -'
4. a. Requests for dose air "support were held to a minimum by
this division, with only those requests best suited for aviation submitted to M r
Support Control for'consideration* Any targets that were suited for either
artillery ar a'aval gunfire were turned over to those supporting,arms, 2his waa
not occasioned by the fact that the additional effect of air bombardment was not
desirable* ! ? e number of planes on station daily for support of three divisions
3h was j4ght.fighters and eight torpedo bombers, a decidedly inadequate number. An
average of two and a half hours was required before a mission could be executed*
Unless this time interval pan be greatly reduced, infantry units will lose cocr fidence in support aviation and place their dependence entirely in artillery sad
naval gunfire. It is believed that with an adequate number of supporting aircraft.
employed in mass agaiirst the highlv organized enemy defensive areas encountered,
together with artillery and naval gunfire,,that aviation could have made a power ful contribution to the disruption of the enemy defenses. Support aircraft, like
artillery, should not be frittered away in the execution of piecemeal missions but
should be employed in mass in support of the main effort of the ground forces.
b* It is also believed that .general support aircraft carrying
nothing les>e than. 1000 lb delayed action bombs should be used against deep enemy
defenses. Inhere land based heavy bombers are within range of the target, they
should be included in the air support plan for this purpose, Had this type of
general support been employed against the enemy1 s final defensive position while
the ground forces were engaged in the assault of the enemy's main battle position,
it is believed that the last phaae of the operation would have proceeded more
rapidly and with less cost. '
5* Delayed action fuzes are essential in the attack of fortified
positions. After receipt of the air support plan1 for this operation it was noted
that no provision was made fox delayed action fuzes* A special recommendation
was made to Corps and verbal assurance given-that these fuzes would be available
upon request. However, they^ we,re not made available until the closing stages of
the operation* It is considered essential that in the a'tt&ck of field forti fications of whatever strength, delayed action fused bombs, regardless of size,
be used* . . ,
6 Dummy attacks were effectively used, in adjusting air attacks
on the correct target, prior to actual live attacks. While this procedure N
sometimes takes a considerable amount of time, the increased effectiveness of the
attack warrants the expenditure of time.

Action Report, X OJIMA Operation,' W fm a. Conclusions.

(floattd) '

.. / (1) support of this division*

That insufficient aircraft were available for close 7 .- .

(2) General1 support aircraft were not properly employed for deep support of troops of this division. ' (3) . ? n a t tfo greatest single defect to become apparent in this- operation was that the time interval bettireen i n i t i a l request and execution of strikes was far..too great, i , . > (k) That in spite-6f the fact that a l l Air liaison Officers have received basic training from the amphibious Training Cpmmand, Pacific Pleet, i t was .evident throughout the operation that uniformity of .training and indoctrination were noticeably lacking* (5) That an Air Support Control Unit operating'.ashore i s . a definite improvement over shipboard direction in that >t affords more accessi ble channels for close liaison with the front line units, . . b, Kecommendations. ,
:

(l) ; fhat mor aircraft be maintained on station in order that mass air attacks against enemy fortified positions can be delivered in support of ground troops* . . , (2) That the necessity of relaying pertinent information * from Bn O to C to Air Support Control to Air Coordinator be-eliminated. Means P P should be provided whereby a clearer picture can be conveyed to the p i l o t s and thereby cut down the time lag in executing missions, . ;~ ' ' ., ' . (3) $bat BCF, Pa.cific issue an S P for, close air support O so as to standardize the procedure for the employment of air- support. That either the syllabus under which Air Liaison personnel are trained be' thoroughly overhauled and modernized or that BOV Pacific, institute its, own measur.es for centralized advanced training of Air Liaison per- : sonnel prior to their assignment to JASCo. .' ' - f (5) That some system which will shorten the interval be- ; twe'en the request and the execution of air strikes be adopted.- To this endi i t is^recommended that Air Liaison Officers be trained and allpwed to direct planes in'on targets when they have good observation, Pilots/ as. well as Air Liaison Officers^ should be trained in this procedure to gain confidence in each k (6)., That a Support idr Direction frequency (medium high), or ^strike frequency11, be assigned on which the Air Liaison Party r Commander Air Support Control and Mr Coordinator can work uninterruptedly while, running a strike; .' .

Action Report, I W OJTMi Operation*

(Cont'd).

(7) Th*.t night harassment by aircraft be employed in the , early: phases of future operations to compensate for laak of a r t i l l e r y support during this phase of operation, and that night observation be employed also. (8) That strafing In close support of troops only be done on the specific request of the Air Liaison Party concerned. , ' G. -. Haval Gunfire/ 1. . * . '' >
v

Composition of Shore, Fire Control P a r t i e s .

"a* Shore fire control p a r t i e s , as Well as the regimental land. divisional naval gunfire teams, were organized in accordance with the provisions. of IMF, Pacific, Special Order S6~MK I t i s believed that, subject to minp> changes hereinafter suggested, this organization i s at, lasVand for the f i r s t time,adequate to meet the minimum requirements for control of naval gunfire on a l l levels. Training of a l l personnel was excellent, especially.that,of the officers.- This i s apparently the result of the extensive training a c t i v i t i e s maintained by the Haval Gunfire Section, *JM3Pt Pacific, in the BAWAllAlf area. The value of gunnery exercises at I& O L W and of the technical courses of the Pleet t H OA S Gunnery and Torpedo School cannot be overestimated* jjd JASCo enlisted personnel were in a l l cases well trained. b. There'are no recommendations regarding training except that i t be continued on the sam general plan. Three, recommendations, however,, may be presented in regard to personnel. They are: . . ' . (l) That the provisions of BCBVPacific, Special Order %6~kk be continued in force., despite T/O changes to the. contrary. This order provides ' an adequate, r e a l i s t i c shore fire control organization based upon the uniform experience of the . A S A L and MASIANAS operations, and completely confirmed on M HH L S IWO JIHA Any reduction of naval gunfire elements below the-' strengths provided therein will be gravely detrimental to efficient employment of the -arm. .
V . '

, 't _ (2) That, in-view-of the. general shortages of a r t i l l e r y personnel, together with the high a t t r i t i o n !of forward observers and naval gunfire spotters, spotters-be selected from' other sources that' field a r t i l l e r y officers alone. I t i s believed that excellent spotters, of considerable technical training and background, could be .obtained from disbanding base Cefe&se a r t i l l e r y units, . These officers are a l l thoroughly versed in advanced mechanistic systems, of fire control, more so than,field artillerymen/ have received1 elementary field, a r t i l l e r y feiraining,' and would require only additional instruction in terrain appreciation and,forward observer spotiing as well as the Aaval gunnery indoctrination required for either type of officer. . . < (3). That, the Division laval Gunfire team be augmented during operations by one additional officer of the rani of lieutenant or ' .* lieutenant (j.g). When a-division i s embpxked, the "Commending General pnd the Assistant Division Commander are aboard separp^te ships, each with his own "parallel" staff; thus,-the Haval Gunfire Officer, with half the team and the TCS,

Action Iteport, IWO.'JIMA Operation.

(Cont'd)*

remain with the-former, while the Assistant Haval Gunfire Officer, with the balance of the team and the '3EBX, /proceed with the latter* On i t s face, this division would appear to present no difficulties, but in, practice* when the Commanding General's group is,further divided into a rear and forward echelon under the , > , General and Chief of Staff respectively, i t becomes necessary for the Hava'1 Gun- " f i r e Officer to proceed with one or the other, leaving pne echelon inoperative during displacement. Ideally, this may be remedied by coordinated displacement of the Assistant Division Commander group, but in practice this will seldom if . ever occur* 5?hus an additional assistant, to guard frequency and take action dutdng displacement of the Commanding General*s group i s necessary. A further use for this officer i s , in effect, as a communication watch officer during critical periods of the operational day when the Division JfaVal Gunfire Officer and his assistant are necessarily with the G 3 or engaged in planning, when i t i s nevertheless important that ,all radio...transmissions be carefully monitored and acted upon promptly and, correctly. Likewise, this officer,would supervise the repair, reallocation and exchange of communication equipment received from subordinate liaison teams and shore f i r e control parties* . I t may be added that such, an officer ivas available in the foregoing capacities dturing this operation and functioned as herein recommended with efficiency and success. 2 draining and Planning for Operation: . '

a* All shore fir^^ o n " t J r 6 ^ parties of the division had operated together as teams well prior "to the operation, having in some cases functioned t together during; the lUBlMAB, campaign* In spite of the $act that a l l personnel to bring teams to the, strengths prescribed in par l . a . above did not arrive until the month of January, x^ell trained nuclei existed for each, of the nine SPCP, and . sufficient.time remained for intensive training of the regimental and division teams* I t was a matter of standing policy in this division that, whenever eny battalion or regiment took the field for training, i t operatedlr with.complete ST P ., 3G and liaison- team, usually with simulated 'dummy fire support shipsH to enhance realises hus, naval gunfire personnel participated in battalion and regimental field problems and GP3C, and in a two-day division GP#, which was o:f particular value. s As battalions of the division went, through extensive fij.eld problems 11 live' ammunition of a l l calibers, SPGP employed lO^mm batteries to simulate. 5 by supporting DD9 .some 2,000 rounds being expended. b All unit commanders within the division , down to and . including battalion commanders and their staffs, received a''four*hour naval gunfire indoctrination course presented by the Division laval Gunfire Officer and his assistant* This course attempted to demonstrate the capabilities^, charactaristies and limitations of naval gunfire support, and,.when followed up, as i t was., by similar classes and seminars within regiments and battaKons, conducted by the respective naval liaison officers, the results seemed excellent* In, short the division as a whole was thoroughly "gunfire conscious". . c. Coordination between a r t i l l e r y , naval gunfire and air was continuous and complete. Uo plan as such ever existed, coordination being F achieved through mutual understanding of the characteristics and capabilities i / of the respective arms, and through close personal, liaison.. "

Action Heporfc,, IftO JiHA Operation.

(Cont'd)*

d. All naval gunfire officers of the division were given comprehensive "briefing on the "operation as of : the date that this information was released to the respective battalions. Thus a i l officers participated with full knowledge in the planning, of the units to which they were attached. , e. Hot only did spotters and liaison officers confer mutually, but regimental liaison officers held frequent conferences with the officers of their subordin?.te units. * f* Training for the operation was satisfactory and complete, bearing in mind the, consideration that this division's role1, in reserve, prevented specific rehearsal, . 3. Landing of Haval Gunfire Elements:

.a, b, b6 Sin.ce this division landed from reserve, after $* day, no comments or recommendations are giade as to the landing phase/ except to note that no difficulties of communication or coordination were encountered during displacement ashore, inasmuch as on a l l levels except division jfsee (d) below)* timely opportunity was provided for intact landing of SK& and liaison
teams'* . '

d, The only comment regarding displacement concerns the s i t uation which arises as a result of separation of the Commanding Genera! and the Assistant Divisibn- Commander aboard separate ships., necessitating that the NavalGunfire Officer, with half the tepm and the 5?CS jeep, remain with the former^while the assistant, with the balance of the team and\the.TB3C, proceed with the^latter. I t would therefore appear desirable during operations to have an additional Assistant Haval Gunfire Officer, so that the Commanding General 1 s'group could . at a l l times have available the services of a qualified officer. For other reasons rendering the assignment .of such an officer desirable, see par (2) (b) ante. " ' *. k+ Observations of 3ffeet of Scheduled Uaval Gunfire; a This division made an unopposed landing QVear beaches already secured, I t ; appeared*that the prelininary bombardment h,&& been thorough* ly executed in this area, but had not been extended to provide coraplete coverage of the numerous interior strong.points and centers of resistance further inland. " I t i s believed that t had,a longer time (seven'or more days) been available, t o gether with a proportionate increase in bombardment ammunition allowances, the effects of the preliminary fires!could have been considerably increased; that many positions which had to be reduced at high cost to assault units would have already, been damaged or destroyed; an& that the cost of the operation in casualties could hp.ve been substantially decreased. In view of the small size, of tWO JIMA,' a l l the are?, of .which could readily be reached by naVal f i r e s , i t would seem that the i slsnd vouid have been a targef especially suited to prolonged, thorough and complete preliminary .'bombardment* 5 Call 31 re Phase; " . ' .

a Since this division did not land in assault, i n i t i a l communications were readily established*- The 21st Marinas* i n i t i a l l y attached to H iJiarine Division, secured frequencies arid ships wqp^^lfj^fficjalty, and,
,

Action Eeport, I O J1MA, Operation. W (Cont*d)

upon landing of this division with passage of the 9th Marines^ through the 21st, frequencies of.the l a t t e r were assigned to the former6 .Except during two emergencies,'-Wire comaanication was used between division and regiments, whereas wire and SCIKJOO, timed to the tactical frequency of the .."bat tali on concerned, were 'employed "between regiment and battalions;' the' need of a. naval gunfire frequency for SCB-3QO was greatly felt,. Subject to persistent enemy jamming on one frequency (^5^5) coraiminication with ships was goodo b Present organization and doctrine for call fires i s s a t i s factory in a l l save one respect, that of spotting frequencies* If i s strongly recommended that sufficient spotting frequencies be available in each operation to permit the permanent- assignment of a frequency to each SJTCPP as such an. arrangement would reduce the, staff work load markedly on all"levels* co Coordination within regiments was achieved by regimental liaison officers when necessary? Across division boundaries, similar coordination was readily achieved ^r verbal arrangements with adjacent division gunfire of floors through the medium of the supporting arms telephone net maintained by 5*h Amphibious Corps* It uas a natter of standard procedure to coordinate fires along division boundaries or in adjacent zones by this method, and intervention of Corps was rarely required* d. The basic method of coordination between supporting arms
was to achieve close personal liaison on a l l levels. Targets were freely inter**
changed according to the method of attack best suited, "and, whenever operations,
were in progress or prospect,'the a r t i l l e r y , naval gunfire and air officers were
together or readily accessible to each other by wire* Plans, for scheduled fires
or p re-King Hour preparations ware habitually prepared jointly, ,and so'presented
to the O-3-t Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General. Much of "the success
achieved may be traced to the separate maintenance of a n support ing arms vt en t fr ,
so-called, adjacent to the (5-3 Section. In this center, wire communications con verged from the division switchboard, from the similar 5th Ainphibious Corps
establishment, from the division a r t i l l e r y fire direction-center* and from the
naval gunfire and a i r radio centrals* I t was thus possible to establish any sort
of communications necessary, and to plan without interruption* while being within
a few steps of the G-3 Section*.
e SJPGP fired approximately ISO call missions, not including those conducted or called by air spotters, or fired (though technically by call of syCP) as part of an approved and scheduled preparation. In these missions, some 17i5 00 rounds of 5" were expended, of which i t i s estimated thft$ 85$ was AAC, and the balance common or WP, I t i s further estimated that 55$ of a l l missions were conducted by spotters, kQ$ by ?0# spotters, and 5$ by HIOj no missions are known to have ibQ&n. conducted by scout sergeants* Approximately 91&0 rounds of 5|f and 2,400 rounds of main battery were fired in scheduled preparations. ,\ f Ifo night c a l l missions are laaown to have been fired, although harassment by direct support DE on schedules approved by regimental HL0 were delivered nightly, and with seemingly satisfactory results. I t i s believed that, had more ammunition been available, i t could readily have been used for niglit harassing. / g. Call fires were not usually brought closer to friendly

Action Heport, X*!Q JIHA. Operation*

(Contfd),

troops than 150-200 yards, and then only when i t was evident that a good solution had "been. obtained by "the firing ship. In- this-connection, the outstanding performance of 1200 f/s i*v, charges should "be emphasized, 'for i t was with this." 'type of aanunitioh, employing- overhead fires," that, - in at least one instance, 5W fires were brought-to within-75 yards of a supported battalion, the troops of which had previously been .vanned*" In other'cases this fire was "brought within 100 yards, always with'consistent performance, close grouping "both in range and' deflection, and with characteristics generally analagous: to howitzer fire* Safety measures employed were of'.two general types:' - (l) The practice of commencing an .adjust;.!eat on a.point, remote 'from friendly troops, and of gradually "bringing the f i r e i n j (2) That bf .employing SKIP in the front lines for safety control whenever airspot or unobserved fires vrere .employed, thus permitting positive control and instant cessation of fire whenever dangerous conditions obtained. As . a further aethod'of positive safety control, the so-called "ISxbrook" transmissions directing a l l ships to check lines of fire, and announcing .repprts of fire falling short, when not worked to death by poorly confirmed r erroneous reports, were a"lagt resort of much value* . . ; & , (1) 5ft common was employed with some frequency against located pillboxes and similar point targets with which TWO JIKA abounded. Perhaps i t s ' most successful employment was in conjunction with 1200 f/s charges, when good (large) angles of fall could be obtained, thus causing positive setback^ She .' ' * delay, combined with the reinforced ogive, made this type of projectile effective agairist^aany targetsba^tnd the capabilities of AAC, especially small pillboxes and similar emplacements of reinforced contraction* Numerous recommendations have been-received f.or base^detonating elements with longer delay, (as great, as 6*1 second)* If this could be "achieved withiut. prejudicing the success of missions , afloat, it. is considered desirable, _ . . (2) 5" AAG, .as always, was, the work horse. In this operation,
however, i t vas not always1, usable with the "best results f due to the strength of
memy fortifications -and to %the fact that virtually a l l enomy personnel stayed
below ground* . Neverthelesst this type of shell accounted for the gr'eat majority
of rounds fired, and was used against great 'numbers of targets,
' (3) Intermediate and major caliber AP were rarely used by this division, since general support missions were fired throughout under Corps control* Ample opportunity'existed however'.for extensive us.e of such ammunition, and, had the division been allowed reinforcing heavy ships under i t s own control - as had boon anticipated i undoubted benefit would have been .derived* ~ (k) Intermediate and-major caliber H were ^employed in the O majority"of general support or reinforcing missions - on division level, usually for the thickening, and deepening of the intense pre-attatsk preparations vrliich are considered standard in this division. In a few instances-, G vrere assigned L in. direct support of assault battalions, and ~6n H was found to be of great value* O
.
' ^ '-

(5) Air burst was used to a n e g l i g i b l e extent- '^y SJOP although on two occasions, TOT spotters employed i t against pen mortar positions v-Lt.b. good results, ., - : ._ .- (&) .Impact burst comprised the great majority, due-'to t h e . ;ever(f?heliaing;j)roportion of materiel and covered targets* f9t%P~ f a c t o r s , the /hatu:fe.ybf .vrhich ,m'ay. on\y be. hazarded, there appeared to ^ ^ I W ^ ^

Action Heport, %'tiO JIM* Operation.

(Contf^}.

number of impact duds, many- of which were rounds with steel nose plugs* ij)' '-jjp vas, as usual, in much greater demand than: could be supplied. It was uniformly used.* Mid highly valued* as a casualty producing agent, whereas the' screening role was usually left to artillery smok<3, of which the supply was more generous. A deficiency.in ships1 ammunition allowances was the small number of rounds, per; gun of^tfP, Dnemy prisoners indicate that i t i s one of our most feared auaitions.,- Current modifications of W rounds with.the Hk 13 P fuz-e g;Lve good results on impact, but i t i s believed that a W round constructed on the same design as the 5" A&J *- namely, with both time (Mk IS) t*xi&. impact. (Mk 2%) fuzing-would be most satisfactory, . > ' (&) ^ m was. but' rarely employed, due to the .gm&llness of Om the island, the proximity of friendly i^roops, and the broken, rocky terrain which tended to produce ricochets. For cave shooting* so-called, i t was found f e t t e r to employ 5" due to the decreased likelihood of ricochet, and the tight, positive .control not possible with automatic, cannon, even on Wz *37 W gOma was, not employed, for the same reasons; as indica* ted "above,, end, in addition, because i t would have been ineffective against the heavy fortifications and entrenchments on 1V0 ^ ^ 1200 f/s charges, a? indicated in .par (6) (g) ante, played an especially valuable role in close supporting missions ^hen fires 'could best be brought in overhead, 'targets attacked'with these charges were thos3 against which large angles of fall were desired, and results were comparable to -/ those "of overhead,howitzer fire* I t was noted, however, that some ships seemed reluctant or hesitant'to deliver these fires, due apparently to inescperience in applying the necessary computer corrections for the differing trajectory end. change in i # v. I t . i s "accordingly recommended-that further eniphasis be placed up on 1200 f/s exercises at !UH00LAW3 SO that both ships and gunfire personnel may-. . . become b'etter acquainted with i t s use. * ^ ^ Rpffisfcg were not employed in support of the division, due to limiting factors of accuracy, and unavailability of rocketcr&ft. ' '' (12) ^2tt iBortar shells were used, on request to Corps, for night harassing fires; no information i s 'available as to ,its affect. i . Air spot was used on. approximately kOfy of the fir emissions conducted by this, division* ' Standard procedure was used throughout, in which the a i r spotter eaters the SFC, spotting net. In view of the adverse observation, . which frequently limited front line sppttersto a hundred 'y&rds1 field of viex^r, the services of. TOP aircraft were invaluable, and i t i s to the credit of V031 . squadrons that their pilots were able to meet the test so we3i not only in the precision pf their fires, but in the excellent technique end communication procedure-employed, AS an illustration of tlae high coordination end flexibility of VO? work', the following incident is,cited. > V F pi re raft observed an eneuiy O AT gun., firing from a camouflaged position, v/hich was apparently holding.up progress f friendly tanks. ' The spotter reported this-to the If O via the , ' \L spotting frequency, and the information was in turn relayed to the tanks; mean

Action Report, IWO JtMA Operation,

(Cont*&)

while the VOJ spotter commenced strafing the Al gun,' thus leading the tanks i n t designating the target, and neutralizing the weapon which was thenknocked out "by our tanks* . Support Shifts; . .

a* In order to get additional ships, i t \iras, necessary for the originator of the request to obtain approval through-normal channels from division, which then passed the request to Corps for a.ction* Considering the limitations inherent in the situation, when ammunition, end ships had to be care fully apportioned, ships Were furnished-in adequate numbers, and with promptness, nevertheless assignment of at least a G to a division would have materially L assisted us in the prompt execution of count erbattery, count erraortar, and attack preparation,fires, as well as in the other /general support missions, AS matters stood, however, the Division.Gunfire Officer did not ordinarily have means at. hia own disposal for influencing the progress of the b a t t l e , except upon request to Corps* b It* i s no1^ believed efficient or economical to assign more than a single ship to one SPCP, nor toas such a practice ever followed in this division, although the reverse whetfein ships were "split" between two and sometimes three SK3? -. frequently occurred* c In general, requests for ; fires were promptly-.and accurately fulfilled, and a l l observers seem agreed that the standards of efficiency in fire support ships are consistently high* Pew reports of gunfire falling short originated in units of this division, and i t i s to .tire credit of the regimental and battalion liaison officers' that the majority of these WQTQ fully.investigated,. and found to "be groundless or at any rate not -due ,to naval gunfire* As a result, when such reports reached the division lev$l, they were usually factual and accurate, so that prompt action could be taken to l i t or cease firing as might be. necessary. In a very few instances fire support was unsatisfactory, but the overwhelming percentage of missions were faithfully and promptly executed* d* Due to the broken terrain and to the interior zone.of action of the division it'was impossible to engage targets by direct fire u n t i l ' the very l a s t ; when our units were breaking through to the s&a. At t h i s tifte* for two days (9-*10 March), a DD was employed in direct f i r e shooting under the. control of the Division" Naval Gunfire Officer or his assistant, with additional SPgP control for safety* Due to the proximity, of friendly.troops, and the lines f fire (frequently pointed, directly into our own lines), i t was not considered safe to conduct such missions unless under control of an embarked officer from the division. Nevertheless, these missions were-very "useful in' pealing off cave entrances, and demolishing beach defenses which would otherwise have had to*be attacked by infantry* Approximately twenty (20) caves were attacked, with good results* he usual method of target identification was visual; however, smoke grenades and mortar smoke were also employed by SPCP* i , ' - , ' . 7 Scheduled Fires During Continuation Of The Attack:

a. -Preparation fires by ships were fully and habitually used for attacks b^ this division, to thicken 105mm; fires, and to deepen the beaten

Action Report, IW JIlErcSferatioiu O

(Cont*dh

sones of "barrages* Procedure for this type of firs ws.s to have battalion requests for coverage of certain targets coordinated by the regimental M.Os, who would then submit tentative schedules of "fire to the Division Uaval Gunfire Officer, who would in turn prepare the final fire plan, making the necessary adjustments to coordinate naval fires closely with a r t i l l e r y and air and to ensure that the final plan made the best and j-iost complete use of fires available^ /Upon approval of this fire plan, i t would be transmitted for execution at. the times and targets scheduled, by the SKIP to4 whom ships were assigned, - b, targets of opportunity were attacked as they appeared. There were few such, however* due to the poor observation which generally obtained, throughout the operation, and to the enemyrs tenacity in remaining underground* Cave mouths' from which a few rounds at a time were fired by' the enemy were the . most usual type of targets in this category, although mortar positions were ^one times surprised in action by V03? aircraft* c. Counterbattery and countermortar fires were extensively used. Due to close liaison with the artillery* i t was possible to divide counterbattery missions between the two arms. 51* A C was found suitable for countermortar A woric, and to neutralize thougjh not to destroy, enemy gun emplacements i f not too heavily constructed* ?OT heavier counterbattery fires, i t was necessary to submit requests for general support heavy ship missions to Corps* AS a rule", these were promptly executed. Nevertheless, the need for assignment of a heavy ship to division control i s especially evident in connection with counterbattery missions* d. .Might harassing fires were provided by three netiiods,. e*g* the use of 4.'2lf mortar craft in general support for very deep area coverage; hy request to Corps for intermediate or major caliber harassing on selected targets; and by approval and 'coordination of suggested -harassing -plans submitted by the . battalion HttO for ships assigned them in direct support, usually with 75-100 L rounds of 5 per ship.' Had ammunition supply -permitted, the last amount might profitably have been doubled or trebled as enemy nocturnal activity was con siderable* Illumination : provided-iacidental additional harassment* e 3 b interdiction missions as such are known to have been 3 fired, due- to the absence of enemy'movement by day,, and the difficulty in keeping continued fires on a point by night, v;ithout adjustment, " f. for fires against coastal targets and caVes, see par ,. (d) ante. At, the conclusion of the operation, when SHI" elements had reverted to J"ASCo control, one duty SIPGP was kept da 30 minutes1 notice to v take the field t*n<L -render support to any battalion which might need it*. On 23 March, heavy.. fires from two saves embarrassed patrols 6$ the*'file t Marines, and a D was B accordingly requested and dispatched'to tne scene, concurrently with the duty SKIP. The target vicinity end location of friendly troops was reconnoitered,* communication established,, and the target marked by smoke grenades for direct f i r e s . The cave's -were then attacked and sealed, within approximately 90 minutes after the i n i t i a l request. This incident i s related in detail because i t indicate? how efficiently ships', fires can assist coastal mopping-up, even though' SOT have already terminated active operations. ' ' X lluain-aftl on; " ':<

a* Star shell illumination only was u$ed; Searchlights would hav-e. disclosed ships 1 positions not only to enemy submarines, but to return f i r e , ,Which continued u n t i l the l a s t . '" . :*

Action Report, I W J M Operation* O T &

(Cont'd),

b* : Illumination was normally coordinated by having one direct support 3 D illuminate for an entire,.regimental, front, (often this took in the D whole division frontage) whereas the other direct support D# carried out all scheduled harassing missions and remained ready to execute call .missions*' Illumination between divisions was coordinated laterally by 2Taval Gunfire , Officers, and,, in many instances, this division obtained considerable benefit from tea and 5th Marine Division illumination which was obligingly positioned so as to "be most helpful in our zone* er contra, a niglit attack was seriously endangered through failure by an. adjacent division to check starsnell firing, although previous arrangements had been carefully made to prevent such an even tuality* " . c* Rates of fire were kept -as slow as possible, being limited by the division operation order^ to six stars'per hour except when positive evidence existed of enemy activity*. In at least one instance, however* fTrunatirayN "spotters expended, illuminating ammunition at excessive rates before being checked bjr higher authority* Toward the conclusion of the operation, one star every 15 minutes was considered adequate* d. Star shell illumination i s the most practicable type available. On a constricted battlefield such as this* the old type stars were fully adequate; however, with extended frontages^ i t i s probable that the brighter f new type star would be better suited* e, or casesi lF personnel of this division were injured by star shells \o

9* Equipment; a* As provided by M?, Pacific, Special Order SQ~kk equipment was generally sufficient* subject7to recommendations for minor changes in par (c) post* The adequacy of a l l materiel provided by this order was likewise complete, subject to the pressing need for a remote control attachment for the max* / - ' . .; b#- All facilities for repair and replacement wire completely adequate* First and second echelon repair:was accomplished under supervision of the communication officer tof the division team, employing the part tine services of a JASCo technician* ?or higher,echelon repair and for exchange of sets, the Signal (Section of the division was always available and able to provide complete and expeditious service* c* It i s recommended that' the provisions of SMF, Pacific, Special Order. S 6 - ^ be modified as follows* (1) Allow two 3&-S-A telephones and one reel of combat wire to the division.team, to permit intercommunication between radio control and supporting arms tent, . (2) Modify the transportation for regimental teams to substitute one 3 C truck (installation MZ), J ton, Ux&. with t r a i l e r , i ton t 2 ?S wheeled* cargo, for the present J ton cargo truck and TBX* !Ehe reasons for this recommendation are the greater range and power of the TCS, tjfcte AJ3kCnjunction

Action Seport IW JIKA. Operation, O with the fact that regimental CPi vehicular radio rather the

(Cont*d) are sufficiently rearward to allow use of the

{3) With regard to radar "beacon; i t Is recommended that these be subjected to further operational test. In this division, there was no opportunity for proper employment or testing of beacons* due to the pressing exigencies of operations, . It i s believed that i f the "beacon i'B ever to have a fair test} i t must be by A selected team sent in only for this purpose* (k) It i s recommended that current T/A allow one complete spar$ SCfr*28^ or TBX tot each three 8?<3?4 as i t was repeatedly demonstrated that a quick exchange followed bv subsequent repair was the most effective way of keeping the greatest number of sets operational* d# During this operation* pacfcfcoards procured by the G~*t were experimentally employed by SPCP, They were an entire success, and their final allowance in the ratio of one per radio set i s strongly recommenced* / 3 0 Casualties: L

(

a. * The following casualties were sustained among thi naval gunfire elements attached to this division;
"
'

TOTAL

Spotters Scouts Baddomn Wlremen General duty man TOTAL '

2 X Z 0 1

5
2

0 0 0 0 0 0

21

{*) Ineludea k wounded, but not evacuated from IV/0 (#) Includes k evacuations for combat fatigue or ^ associated neuroses. b. The following m ^ r casual ties to communication e<joipment are tabulated* HTumerous minor casualties occurred incident to ordinary operations' or light battle damage, and were made good in the course of the actioiu Destroyed or damaged "beyond repair: 1 TBX; 5 Z SCR^JOO; k telephones 1 HB2, Lost in action: 11* C^trational features: 9 breast reels, (CEIII). """.'

a# The etteetiveness of the chain of command among various echelons of naval gunfire control was complete except in on aspect* th lack of a division common frequency for the SCft*3OO although the reason for this lack (namely, theifae.* that this division had one less frequency than jfche other two of the Corps)' &$\!m$prstood, i t i s strongly believed that control and <joordihation were greatly handicaped^hereby* 2hr^ry division should have an SCR*30O naval ' N

Action Eeport-, *&W0r J-lMk .Operation.

(Coat H)

gunfire common frequency, so assigned, in or4er that the Haval Gunfire Officer
and the regimental'liaison officers may have instantaneous communication with
front line elements*
b# The following outstanding or unusual features of naval
gunfire support during the operation, are summarised: . . (1) .The outstanding degree of coordination achieved ea . a l l levels between artillery,.' naval gunfire and air* The close knit relationship between the supporting arms, especially on the division level, t?ecame a byword* velocity 51* charges. (2) The marked success obtained with 120Q f/s reduced ' . . .

(3) The safe delivery of 5" direct fires into the faces of cliffs whose tops were occupied by friendly troops* . (k) The high quality of air spotting services rendered by VOP aircraft (though t h i s was somewhat restricted due to.the paucity of airplanes). (5) he lack of good ground observation was one of the most evident aspects of the operation, and, i f not taken into account, might lead to the opinion that ground spotting was of secondary importance when compared with air, whereas this i s not the v case except "Vtpon terrain which i s consistently uphill and where the attack tuns against, rather than with the observation, as was . ' the case upon IVO'JIMA. 12 Additional Comments and Recommendations^ * a. In instances in which a single regimental liaison offices or one of h i s subordinate teams was v i t a l l y affected, radio transmissions oh the gunfire control net tended to omit the regimental officers either as action or information addressees* These oiaissions tirould not have caused difficulty were i t not for the fact that'radio watches were habitually maintained by enlisted personnel, rather than the officers concerned, whose station was in the operations section* Thus i t often happened, that regimental sections' failed to receive complete information due to the understandably smaller a b i l i t y of their enlisted personnel to screen and evaluate traffic not addressed to them. b . The heavy a t t r i t i o n among spotters and scout sergeants speaks for i t s e l f . Although this division operated with but six o f . i t s battalions, exactly 5Q$ of the total number of spotters and scouts for the full strength division became'casualties; Applied against the number of teams in action, this percentage rises to 75$ &&&* had i t not been for the availability of replace ments from the uncommitted StCP attached to the 3& Marines, all^of whom were eventually employed, the situation, might have become c r i t i c a l , ft i s accordingly recommended that & minimum of three replacement spotters and three scouts besupplied as b a t t l e replacements sufficiently in advance of pxxy operation to permit their final training and intergration into the gunfire elements of the division. If possible this group should be augmented at the same time by a replacement cadre of Hayy officers qualified to act as battalion mQMtj>M..naval gunfire

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation,

(Cont'd)*

communication personnel* in number to be determined after study of overall attrition,* , ; c. The proposal has been broached of assigning calls, to naval gunfire teams ojther than those now customarily in use, e*g', the "Charley* and >rOboe'1! system* 'Ho single, change in naval gunfire communication procedure could be more pernicious or confusing in i t s effect, inasmuch as i t i s difficult under,fie,ld conditions even to keep track of ships'calls, let alone a whole new vocabulary for naval gunfire teams. . \ '' d It was noted that due to difficulties of ammunition' re supply, a l l general support vessels (CL, C and O B remained under Corps
A B) control; i t i s hoped fchat measures can be taken in future to provide at least
one general support ship for employment under division control* ' '

H, . Engineer.
t

' . ' ' ' " .

(See Enclosure I , Action Report, Jd. Engineer Bn)* I, Trail sport ftuar termast er. .

1# a . Loading and1 embarkation of the 3& Marine Division for

the IWC;JIMjft. Operation commenced at GUAM'on S February 19^5 sn& continued,
uninterrupted, u n t i l 1^ February 19^5, consuming a period of. six days to
^coiitplete tliis phase* of the operation. ' \ * b. Cargo assembly areas were selected in the" S K TC A H S
Q 4-S B A areas and'although, these areas were not in .the immediate-vicinity of tne docks,
l i t t l e difficulty was encountered in view of adequate transportation"facilities
and no time ^^^as lost in this respect.
. c, The assembly area at C B A proved to .be quite undesirable ASS due to natural terrain features which caused'the operation of tractor cranes.on such a severe slope a,s to be a most difficult problem. However, i t was the only area in that general vicinity which was available at the tirae of embarkation, and caused only minor delays in a few instances. Two' (2) cranes and ten (10) trucks were assigned each assembly area. Average running time per truck from assenbly area. U ship was fifteen (l$) minutes. o . . . i . " d. Seven.(7) docks were allotted which permitted'the docking ' of a l l ships of a Transport Division simultaneously (5 < P s and 2 AKAS)^. 6A , . . 2 a The average time consumed.for loading each ship' was approximately sixteen (16) hours* However, a few APAS.; with light tonnage . consumed less tine and UKAQ required more. The average load per +&& was eight hundred (SOO) tons and for each')KA twelve hundred (1200) tons. _ Control Point v/as set up in tlie vicinity of -the
.docks and -periodic progress reports were submitted from each ship when i t was
5ff 75%9 2&ours from 'cor^leUott r and 100$ loacLed.
c When the 2 hour report^ was rece;

Action Eeport, IW JIM* Operation* O

(Contfd).

sonnel for that particular ship were notified to commence embarkation* This1 , system eliminated excess- troops being aboard the ship while the loading of cargo was in progress. d#. Considerable difficulty was encountered in1 the handling of palletized cargo aboard some of the ships due- to the absence of proper equip ment to get the pallets back into the wings and away from the square of the of the hatch* In hold sections- where a smooth^ deck existed i t was possible to rig a snatch block and snake the pallets back-on rollers, which consumed a consider able amount of time and effort* Jn a few instances i t was.necessary to break" down pallets in order to-load, the required amount of supplies and equipment. e. 'The below listed chart gives the total.tine for completing the loading of, each shi-p: . ." '

g/g-i 1800i;2/6/.| 2200J g/9/j 02001.2/9/! 0^00' 2/8/! 23001 2/9/' O3OOJ2/9/I 0500' 2/8/ 1900; 2/9/j 0100; 2/9/! 0800 2/9/1 1000 LESDSTOM 2/8/1 23Q0! z/S/\0lOo\z/9/\ O5OOI

2/S/i 2000; 2/9/1 OlOO! 2/9/i 0600 2/9/1 0830: 2//!'20O0; I 2/10 ' Q800 2/10 PESS J^CKSOHi - 1700

2/9/^0600! 2/9/i
I I I 2/9/! 0800; 2/9/i 2200] 2/10! 0300'

2/lOi 21Q0! 2/Xl! 0100! 2 / l l 0600 2 / l l 1100 2/XI; l^OOJ 2/11: ISOO 2 / l l i 2200 2/12,0600

2/lli I5OO; 2 / l l | 2000

i/lO| 1900| 2/10| 2400!

2/12 1200

2/12; 1900J

g/l3j Q900

2/97 ^A2
2/9/i 2100J

Action Report, I W JIMa Operation, O

(Cont ! d).

'

'>

HAM2 OP SHIP PUE3TOH

SIMS TIME OP OP ARRIVE 1TURE

2p %
DATS,

5C$ 1

nm

L-n ! J

7
T-ESCB! EUJESI (PIMS;

100%

1
DATEJ Tli'jjE

2/9/ 1300 2/3/

1300

O'HAIU ,
ALHSITA

2/9/ 1500

2/10 ' ! i ; 2/9/1 1900 12/10!0100: 2/10 O6OOJ2/K>Ui3Oj 2/lO; 1500 | 1700 j I 2/10 j 0700 2/9/ 2200 [2/1010700! 2/10 113O;2/lO l600! 2/10! igoo ; i 2/11 ' : 2/10 l l60O.:2/l0i23O0 : 2/in 0100^ 1 0700 ' 2/9/! 2300 1
I . f .. 1. j
!

3* a# Only two (2) 5?ransBivs of the SJraapsort Squadron were tmloAd$d on t h i s operation; TransDiv 3^ containing BC!T-9 s^1^ TrpnsSiv 32 which coatfeiaed. RCT-21, " EranaDiv 32 was the f i r s t JrensDiv to commence l e o a r k a t i o n . b. each eaipt STATUS 0? mOAjDIIK}, RCT-21

The oelow l i s t e d chart gives the unloading t i n e s for : :, i : t

! I

' Cargo. Remaining Aboard 60 Tons 60 Tons*

60 Tons 60 Tons UO Tons s 260 Tons 260 Tons

i Conpleted Unloading
. 6 March U March

, -

SHIP
JAOKSOE ADAI i -lS

(Joiamenced Unloading 21 Pe"brup.ry

; t
: '
l

Total Elapsed Time' 1^, 4ays

12 days

21 February

BOLIV.i OiPE JOHiTSOI. D0Y3N , ',

21 Pebruary j . 21.Pebruary ,
i

6 March 5 March 6 March

6 March

'
i

lty days , :
i

13 days Ik days
1 4 days ^-

21 February

LIBHaJUPIT2R

. j j

21 Pebruary .: 21 Pebruary ;

6 March

lk days

3 M U S .OP UHLOADIITG, RCTv9 Comaenced Unloading 2*4- Pebruary Pebriia,r.y

Conipleted .
Unloading . S March

SHIP

Total Elapsed Time1 12 days

Cargo Remaining" Aboard 50 Tons Hone

28 Pebruary 2S Pebruary
S March

days k da:y s

Pebruary
LSBDSTOl^T Pebruary

-Tons

-63

Action Eeport, I W J1R& Operation, O

(Coat'd).

:.

'

STATUS OF JS8XME1S&, KCT-9 Commenced Unloading

(Cont'd) Total Slap sed 'Time k days ,12 days i tr ; t Cargo Remaining . Aboard ":
ETone "

SHIP

'

Completed Unloading 28 February. .8 March

H^HBT IBB j
'AL^CK
WAEHICE

2k February , Zk February : 2^ February ;

' S1
!

15^- Tons 185 Tons

8 March

12 days

H a# Unloading was accompli shad under extremely difficult conditions* n.anely weather and surf conditions. The,debarkation was limited to tfreuse of LCTs or larger landing craft, and these were assigned to the Transport Squadron as. they became available* At no time did the Transport. Squadron have more than two (2) LSMs-and two (2) X C s regularly assigned for-unloading* Other . T craft were assigned.for one or two t r i p s after which they were assigned to other ships having a. higher unloading p r i o r i t y . ' ' b; Tliese conditions, coupled .with, ^piecemeal1* landing.of units of the division, "greatly increased the unloading time* c* A considerable quantity of fuel and certain items of Cd ' p supplies were not required on tho bea.ch' which, resulted in these supplies being returned to Gf M tA * ' . . . 5 . a. Several ships were lacking sufficient or proper handling equipment for- cargo. I t was necessary to-construct slings for the handling of p a l l e t s in severe,! ships* " All. other car go. was handled with the standard-universal sling'and cargo nets. ^ . , ' b. , It i s felt" .that the importance of having ships report to, the embarking unit during the planning phase for temporary'duty cannot be. over emphasized* ,In the case of this division the ships' 9K$le reported in ten (10) days-prior to embarkation and their assistance ,in the planning was \ invaluable. ' J# Ordnance, 1* Weapons. a. dumber,, type and caliber of weapons used. Carbine, cal,.30, HI Rifle, cal.43O, Ml Rifle, cal..3O Browning Automatic Pistol, cal..45, M1911A1 G-un, Submachine, cal.^5 Thompson Shotgun, 12 gauge Gun, Machine, cal* .30 M1919A4-' Oun,' Machine, cal. .30. MI917AI
Oun,. Machine, cal,#5O/M2

"

'

'

Action Report, IttfO JlUk Operation,

(Cont'd)*

Gun, ytmt

AT, M3
J5 26 26 26 139

Mortal',- 60mm, M2 M o r t a r , Slam, Ml Howitzer, Pack,,75mm, M1A1 ' . . Howitweiij 3O5np-, M2A1 . Lauacfc.er9 Roclcot, 2*36", AT, H9A1 Launcher., Grenade* R i f l e 8 147 Launch or t Grenade, Carbine, MS 3<:lame Thrower, 142-2:

7S5

556
172

b,

lumber of days "battle employment*

(See paitIV, par J* 1. b* of ISnclosures C, "3) and H and p a r t IV, par 0.' 1. o of Enclosure S1). c Itfumber, type and caliber of weapons lost*
. H o

. Lo s t

Ho. Salvaged 722 2,242 329 . 2

Z

l?o4 Servicable

iJo# Surveyed , 25S 160

Carbine, cal..3G t Ml Rifle, cal,.3O, Ml Rifle, cal3Q Browning Automatic P i s t o l , c a l , . ^ 5 , ICL911A1 (run, Submachine, cal, f ^5 Thompson Shotgun, 12 guage Gun, machine, caL.30* Gun, machine, cal.30f
M1917A1

75S 651
130

. 1,765 16T

kit

99
15

' . . 2 '" 2 "

75
12 -

72 Ik 2k
tf

42

30
5

9 3 6
29

Gun, machine, cal,,5Q M - = 2

M o r t a r , 60mm, M2 Launcher, r o c k e t , 2m$6a A3?', M9A1 Launcher, Grenade,' R i f l e , M7 Launcher, Grenade, Carbine,
tJtCf !

13 6
103 90

3 is .
17

ki
>32

ss
* 5 ' .

05
12 -,

.3
3 .

HO

Plame Thrower, M2-2' .. d.

.'.

30

Malfunctions,

(See part IV, par J# 1. b of Enclosure C, part IVf par J . 1. d. of Enclosure D, part IV, par C. 1, b# of Enclosure P and part IV, par J , 1. b. of Enclosure H)\ ' ' ^ e# Adequacy of spare p a r t s and accessories.

. (See part IV, par J , ! c. of Enclosure C and D, part IV, par v C. 1. b . of Enclosure f and part IV, par J , 1. d of Enclosure H), f. and for new types. Recommendation's as |o modifications of existing tjpes

Action Report

ation*

* " (See part IV, par J* l*4*of Enclosure C, part IV, par J . 1* f* of Enclosure' D, part IV, par C* i # b of Enclosure ? and part rVVp.ar J* I* c%
of Enclosure H) _ . ."

2*

Combat Vehicles*

,.

a# Humber and type of combat /vehicles used* 3?ank, - medium* Gun, 758femotor> 1 carriage M3 b* Sumber days1 b a t t l e employment. , ' S

(See part XVt par J , 2. of Enclosure Ct part IV, par J* 2* b* of Enclosures D and H and part IV, par C 2* b* of. Enclosure *3P).. * c Humber end type lost or damaged beyond repair* Tanlc, medium, M^A2 d* Malfunctions* . . 15

(See part IV, par J* 2* Of Enclosure C, part IV,par J* 2. d* of Enclosures D "and H and part IV, par p* 2. b* of Enclosure V) + e. Principal items of maintenance difficulty*.

(See part IV, par J* 2* of Enclosure 0, part IT, par J . 2. c. of Enclosure D, part IV, par C 2. b* of Enclosure P.and part IV, par J . # 2. e* of Enclosure H). , / f, Adequacy of spare parts and accessories. (See part IV, par J*. 2* of Enclosure Ct part jV t par J* 2 0 of Enclosure D, part IV, par C. 2. b* of Enclosure I atit part IV, par' J . . 2* e. of Enclosure H). . He commendations as to modification of existing types and for new types* . (See p a r t IV, par J . 2* of Enclosure C, part IV, par J . 2. g* of Enclosure !D, part IV, par 0. 2. b* of Enclosure 21 and part IV par J . 2* e. of Enclosure H). , , 3 Ammunition, .

a Humber of rounds by exact nomenclature, expended (or lost) Cart, b a l l , Carbine Cart, grenade, Carbine, M 6 Cart/AP & t cal**30 Belted Cart, AP cal*,56 5-rd clip 'Cart, J!3? Cftl..3b S-rd clip Cart, AP & Ball, cal*,30 bulls: - 357,100 32,^0 1,71+7,000

3 , 83s, 7.M0 5PQ

Action Report, I$0 JIMA-Operation,

(Cont'd),
62,000 2,400
3t5

,Cart, T r a c e r , c a l f . 3 O Ml Cart, Grenade, H i f l e , M3 Cart, B a l l * c a l . . 4 5 H1911 Cart, A? &'T, c a l . . 5 0 Linked Shell,"HE, M$3, 37mm G Shot, APC M51, 37mm G C a n i s t e r , M2t 37mmG S h e l l , HS, H%A2t 60mm M > S h e l l , Ilium* MS3,'6Omm H . S h e l l , HE,. M43A1, Slmm M S h e l l , HE, M56, Slmm H. " S h e l l , Smk, I P , M.57, Slmm M S h e l l , HE, MUS vr/fuze M^S, 75mm G Shot, APC, M6l, 75mm G ' Shell, Smk, WP,'Mte I I , . 75mm G Fuze, PD, UkS . . Shell, H$, M4S, w/f MU8, 75mm H Shell, mf Uk$t w/f M5^, 75mm H . Shell^ Smk,' W\ Ii6k, 75mm H Shell, HE,- Ml, w/f M^S, lO^mrn H . Shell, HE, Ml, w/f M5V 105mm H . Shell, Smk, W, M60, 105mm H P r o j e c t i l e , HE/.AT, M67, lO^mm H Grenade,. Hand, Prag r Mk IIA1 Grenade, Hand, Smk, HC,'M8 Grenade, Hand, Srak, W9 M15 Grenade, Hand, Smk. Colored, iisst*& Ml6 Grenade, Hand, Ilium. Mkll Grenade, Hand, Incend* Ml^ y Grenade, Hif i e , AT* H9A1 Grenade, E i f l e , ? r a g , Impact, M17 Adapt er, Grenade Proj.,Chem. T2 Adapter,' Grenade Proj k Ml Signal, Tery, As.st'd .Signal, Grnd % Asst r d (f/Proi) , Signal, Grnd A s s t ' d (f/Bfl Lchr) P l a r e , Trip, Parachute J l a r e , Trip, Parachute . Eocket, AT,. 2.36" M6A1 Eocket ,. Smk, 2 36 , -.W? T26 Torpedo, Bpiigalore, Ml .Charge, Demolition, Explosive, THT, l b s B^losiv'e, Composition, 02 Primacord,, Detonating, feet Charge, Shaped, ^ 0 - l b , T3 JuzS, Safety, Time, feet Cap, b l a s t i n g , n o n - e l e c t r i c Ca|>, b l a s t i n g , -electric . Device, f i r i n g , a l l tvp.es Charge, tShaped, 35^-lb, T3. Block, Demolition,,Chain, Ml Block, Demolition, h

277,5^3
100' 100 J 260 29,52^ 17,830 11,966 .1,920 * 7,062 . . k9&Z6 33 283' 37.277 26,63^ 6,265 27,850 19,O2l' 2,$37 27S .29,535 950 3,SOS SI3 2,170 , 600 3,^20 2,S00

1,302 5 265
1,300 2S0 90

2,35|+
120 IS

7,197
5,01*1 12,700
13,900 ^ 1,500 2S0

-67

Action Report* I O JlUk Operation* W

' ' \v

(Conf'd).
.

" N

. Hapalm, type "ii", lbs Napalm* type B\ lbs Cylinder, Nitrogen Cylinder, Ignition, HI Id fitter, fuze b.

. , . , 3>2OO ^7 1,680 , *12,3S0

Methods and problems of supply*

Howitzer ammunition was delivered direct from the beach to the a r t i l l e r y regiment ammunition dump. Al^ other ammunition was delivered to division ammunition dump and there issued to units as required* As defi ciencies developed in certain calibers, and typ*es, requisitions for replenishment were mad on 3Tifth Amphibious Corps* Adequate replenishments were furnished* a* Methods and problems of storage* Bomb and hell craters were utilized for storage of first loads of ammunition delivered to division ammunition dump* Bulldozers were employed for excavation of emplacements* All ammunition at the-dump was segregated by caliber and type* iops of piles were not higher than the surface of the ground of surrounding area. d. Adequacy* types and packaging, {1) As a whole the supply of ammunition was" adequate, although at times reserve stocks of some items reached a c r i t i c a l l y low level. (2) Present packing of non-ele^ctric blasting cssps* 15 second delay detonators* and time fuze. ,is unsatisfactory. Eecommend air tight metal containers. . , ' , {3) New type metal containers for 60mmMortar ammunition i s unsatisfactory* In handling, covers become loose, and moisture enters containers* ; Old type fiber container bundles are preferred ~by using troops,
1

.- .

. e# Recommended changes in Unit of 3'ire.

Presont unit of fire for flamethrower i s excessive. Unit of fire for flamethrower recommended by I t r CQ*felF,PAC* Ser 22260 to CMC, dtd 30 March 1^5, i s considered adequate, * ' f
'

Hew types desired.

> ' ..-

'
.

'

; > . s e l e c t i v e fuze t o p e r m i t super-quick or d e l a y a c t i o n f o r 81mm Mortar, HE. a h e l l . . " - . ^ ' km Mlscel.laneous Ordnance Equipment, a. 2?umber. and type u s e d .

Flaxaethrpwer, 3 ^ 5 (mechanized Tank mounted) Bulldoserv (Tank mounted)

Action Eeport, I W JIMA Operation, O b.

(Cont f d)*

Number of days b a t t l e employment. (See Enclosure H, part XV, par J 3 "&*)*

d*

Malfunctions, (See Enclosure H, part IVt par J* 3 *>)

d. ''Adequacy of spare p a r t s and accessories* (See Enclosure Ht part JV, par J . 3* &) e* Recommendations as to modifications on existing items and \ for n&w types of equipment* . 5* (See Enclosure H,, part IV, par J . 3 ^*) Enemy Materiel. a eapons. (1) ITumlJer, type and caliber salvaged. Zttlo* cal,*3Q3C Gun, machine* c a j , . 3 o 3 l i g h t Gun, machine, caL.303 lewis Gun, machine/ cal^.3^3 f/tank Gun, machine, cal,.3^3 heavy Gun, machine, AA,, cal.51 Gun, AA.,. 20mm Gun,. Ai, 251am , Pi scharger*' grenade Mortar, knee Mortar, &lmm Mortar, 2M)mm Launcher, rocket, Stt Flamethrower Gun, A3\ kjmn . '. Gun, 75 m r a Howitzer, 75'^^ Howitzer, 105mm Bayonet .. (2) Performance, i f used. Hot used* b# Combat Vehicles* (l) Number and types salvaged* Tank, l i g h t , M95
Guui^ yOnua

96
X7 9
1

IS

19 13

12 ik 2
1 2

3
5

2 l l 1

Action Export, IWO JIMA..Operation

(Cont*d)

(2) Performance* i f used. Hot used, c* Ammunition. (1) number, type, and caliber salvaged.
t

Cart, dart, cal..51 . Sh^ll, HE,. A3?, 37mm a Shelly H3#.AT, ^7ram ft . Shell, HSf- 75^m & Shell, HE, 7 7 ^ ft ' Shell, HU/120mm a Shell, H2, 4,7mm G Shell, knee mortar >

X4gS0O 3*75 2,632 2,2^6

200

Shell,'H3,-'giiam M . '
Shell, HB, 15cm M -
Orenade, hand, fragmentation
Mines, ^P, 5 ID
Fuse, mechltr time, ^,7^^ Booster , Flare, asst'd ' Explosive, p i c r i c acid, lb Bomb, denu , 63 kg Performance, i f used. Hot used.
d Miscellaneoixs Ordnance Equipment* (l) Uumber and typ^es of equipment salvaged. Bag, brass,- M G . Bag, grenade - B e l t , bayonet Bracket, aiming. Carrier, ammunition, knee M Carrier, ammunition^ \ Carrierj M.ft. . Case, f i e l d glass Cover, "M.ft. , . .. '
:

1,600 201

156

Mine, yardstick. Fuze, 77& . : .

. , . - ' .
200

990

100

11 1 2 1 1 .2

-Maga^ne, M%(J, . . Mount, if searchlight, binoculat tripod . Sight,-gun, antiaircraft Sight, telescope,-M^O-. . Telescope, spotting, v/tripod Scabbard, bayonet

6 5

1 1

-70

Action Report, I O JIMa Operation. W

(Cont'd).

(2) performance, if used, JTot used. 6 Recommendations, . .

a. That Ordnance Company personnel and repair equipment be brought ashore as soon after D-day as the situation will permit, b* That current T/O be modified to provide an.ammunition
section in the Ordnance Company, this section t a comprise one officer and
twenty five enlisted technicians.
c* That during future operations, a mine* booby trap, and bomb disposal platoon"be attached to the division, ' d That the Tank Maintenance Platoon of the Ordnance Company be deleted from the T/o of that organization, and added to the T/O of . the Tank Battalion, s K, Chemi cal 1 .'
< ;

' . '

Chemical aspect of: a. Planning Phase*

(l) The plan for chemical warfare defense provided for: (a) Sach individual to carry a gas mask, protective cover, one (l) tube each of protective aintiSent S*k&l and BAL* and shoe for emergency protection anot f i r s t aid* (b) Sach battalion to carry one (l) squad decontami nating set with i n i t i a l allowance of expendable supplies, protective clothing, for use loy decontaminating squads, gas alarms and vapor detector k i t s . (c) I n i t i a l reserve supplies of a l l chemical decontamination items tfo be carried by and landed with the Chemical Supply Section. ' (d) Each company or similar unit to have at least one (l) MX) and seven (7) privates trained as a decontamination squadt
' / . ' " * .

(e) Individual, collective and tactical protection to be in accordance with Division SOP (GO # i l 3 ) # ' m ' ' b loading Phase* (1) Gas masks and other individual equipment x^rere carried as unit, baggage by companies and similar units and issued to individuals just prior to disembarkation at target* (2) Baieh battalion loaded i t s decont to assure availability immediately upon landing.

' ' Action Report, IWOTlMA. Operation*

(Cont'd)*

(3) Reserve supplies were palletized and carried by the Division Chemical Supply Section, . c# Landing Phase*

(1) Immediately following the establishment of Division Headquarters ashore, orders were' issued by G-4 authorizing the collection and placing in battalion, dumps of a l l gas masks* \ > . d Inland Phase*.

(l) Chemical warfare supplies carried by battalions were placed in individual battalion dumps. Reserve supplies carried by the Chemical Supply Section were placed in the Division Quartermaster dump under supervision'of the Division Chemical Supply Officer* It* Medical* -1*, Embarkation, a. their respective units* Personnel. Regimental battalion and company personnel embarked with . * ' ' " , ' ' "

Personnel of the medical companies of the medical battalion embarked as follows: Company A, 3d Medical Battalion with RCT~21 i n Transport Division 32 , Contpany B t 3d Medical Battalion with RCT-9 i a Transport Division 31. Company 0 t 3d Medical Battalion with RCT-3 in Transport Division 33. Company D 3d,Medical Battalion was attached to 5th Mphibious Corps for this operation. Company B* 3d Medical Battalion in Transport K Division 31. H & S Company,s3d Medical Battalion in Transport . Division }Z* b.. Material* Ten-day supply was combat loaded in the vehicles of the. regimental, battalion and company medical departments and wag embarked with respective units* , .. .. Medical companies embarked with thirty-days' supplies and equipment^ combat loaded in company vehicles to c&pacity f :with remaining supplies palletized or in Wilson Drums. 2. Aboard Ship.

'

Action Report t XWa Jlm^JIBstioa* "a. ; . , . .

v

(Cont*d).. . The health

Sickness.

Admissions to the sick l i s t were minimal.

of the troops.in .general was excellent, b.

No epidemic diseases occurred, . '

Sanitary Conditions.

(l) Sanitary conditions.in general were excellent. (a) Heads on.all ships were inspected daily and were found to.be clean and in excellent police, ("b) Living quarters were clean and comfortable, ventilation was adequate, and no condition of serious overcrowding was reported "by troop medical officers, . ) <(c) Messes were excellent* factory as to quality and quantity. Pood was s a t i s

(d) Galleys were inspected daily by troop medical officers and, found to "be clean and well policed* Pood was prepared in a sanitary manner. Galley utensils were clean. in proper uniform. personnel*, (e) Cooks and messmen were' clean, efficient and Troop cooks and messmen were assigned to assist ships 1 ? c, 'Special Precautions,

Paily inspections of heads, troop living quarters, messes and galleys were made by troop commanders and troop medical officers. Troop sick-call was held twice daily by medical officers of their respective units, 3 Debarkation. a. Personnel.

Regimental, battalion.and company medical personnel debarked with their respective units* Personnel of the medical companies of the medical battalion debarked as follows: Company A, 3d Medical 2k February 19^5. Company B$ 3d Medical 2 + February 19^5 * Company C 3d Medical and remained aboard ship. Company B, 3d Medical ship. Battalion with RCT-21, on Battalion with HCT-9, on Battalion did not debark Battalion remained aboard

-73

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operation. . (Cont'd)*

II & S Company, 3d Medical Battalion debarked on

26 ! friary 1 9 ^ . ,

'I'fce.collecting section of Company D was attached

to H & S Company for this operation and wasr used as
replacement pool*
b. Material*

Regimental, battalion and company medical equipment was landed in combat loaded vehicles and by corpsmen-carried packs* Medical company supplies and equipment were landed in combat loaded vehicles, land palletized supplies were landed in small landing craft and trucked to medical company areas, c# Losses of personnel and material. .

k*

Ashore - Assault Phase.

v a.

Medical Installations.

(l) Regimental* battalion and company aid stations were set up immediately upon the establishment of their respective CPs* Companies A and B gradually evolved from aid stations to company hospitals. The gradual evolution was due to the different times of landing of personnel and material. The f i r s t casualties were received 26 February 19^5 (2). Location with regard to; (a) Roads or t r a i l s *

. Company A, Target Area 165-F in a revetment west of H"-S runway of Motoyama Airfield L Ho. 1. Jt was accessible by roads from north and south. ' "!' directly on supply road. main supply road* Company B, i n i t i a l l y at Target Area 1S1-X On 20 March 19^5 moved to Target Area I63-J just off

Regimental, battalion and company aid stations were established near main roads and t r a i l s . (b) Cover.

. " Company*A was located in a revetment and utilized two concrete water storage tanks for surgery and first-aid. Company B was situated southwest of a high embankment which afforded good, cover from flat trajectory weapons.

Action Beport, I WO JIMA Operation*

(Cont'd).

' ' : Regimental," b a t ^ stations ; utilized a l l natural cover -available and also previously construeted Japanese caves and pillboxes* '
: ' . '' ' ' ,"' -'". , ( c ) D i s p e r s i o n , . ..

' Companies'A and B dispersion was limited due to the confines of the areas assigned. . battalion and company aid
stations had maximum dispersion consistent with the terrain.
(d) Other Medical' Installations, f. '
s

/'- (I 1 ) Whole blood.bank for the entire island Was situated at target Area ISl-^X adjacent to Company B, 3d Medical Bat t a l i on (*)
l o c a t e d in the same.area, ./ ; \ .
/

33ie island a i r evacuation station was

. .. / . ,'''. ;',.'

, .

'

(e) Proximity to c r i t i c a l points.

Companies1 A and B areas were well chosen on main roads, as far from military targets as possible and taking full advantage of the high bluff offering cover on the north. (f) All medical installations were a.long the natural lines of drift of walking wounded. i (3) Protective measures taken: (a) ....'. local security^ Within the perimeter of defense, all unit0

established outposts with adjacent units. .. (b) Cover,

" All'advantage taken of bover offered by nature of terrain an4 captured Japanese installations, (c) Concealment. By natural features of terrain, Japanese inetallations and in some, cases by camouflage nets and natural vegetation. (d)
foxholes. ' ' , ' _ ^ '

Shelters and dugouts. Captured Japanese installations, caves, and

: ;

"

''

/ _' ... .

'

......-..';.;

(e)

Blackiput precautions.

Action Report, I W JJMA Operation. O

(Cont'd),

Be^d mental sick bays in small black-out t e n t s . Company B had Dallas Hut operating room. Company A utilized light tight Japanese water tanks as firet-oicl and operating rooms. Red flash lights used at night when required. Any special features or comments. The new type Dallas Hut i s much harder to erect
than the type previously used, due to the increased size and weight of the sec tions.

b. Hospitalization.
(1) Sunctibningi

Medical companies functioned as aid'and screening

stations during the early phase, and patients were rapidly evacuated to ships
present.
(2) Adequacy.

Hospital f a c i l i t i e s were adequate due to the rapid evacuation of wounded to the ships* and to. Corps Medical f a c i l i t i e s already established. (3) Equipment, supplies and personnel. Adequate. (k) Number of patients. "

' . 2,666.
(5)

/.

Operations performed.

General surgery was performed by Companies A and

B after 15 March 19^5* Only emergency life-saving surgery was done.
c. Evacuations. (1) How effected. ' , '

During.the early phase evacuation was handled by the 4th and 5th 1 Divisions 1 Evacuation Stations. Immediately upon landing of the 3& Division s Evacuation Unit ^evacuation was started on respective beaches. Casualties were given emergency care by company aidraen, transported by l i t t e r to battalion aid stations* Ambulances conveyed wounded from regimental and battalion aid stations to the medical companies. Prior to 15 March 19^5 a l l patients were given'any additional emergency treatment necessary and evacuated to the 9fch and 21st Evacuation Stations on the beaches for evacuation to ships present* After 15 March 19^5 the medical companies performed major surgery, Air. evacuation became available on 3.March 1.9^5, -and typg patf#i6%&re_ so
::'' :.:'-<': , . ' O - r e

Action Bepor?J88SiW!!nHFMfffljjgfation.

(Coht f d).' - ' *

evacuated* Patients evacuated to 5th Aisphibious Corps numbered 66O* -Total*

evacuations were H,5Of of these 3l2 were evacuated to ships present.
Total e v a c u a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ambulatory*..*..*,
L i t t e r , . . *
Air**...*..*.. *.. . 5
Other f a c i l i t i e s on island** 860 To ships present*.. 3,182. These figures include some ^th and 5th Division personnel (2) Adequate or inadequate*

Considered adequate in that a l l patients were

evacuated within an hour after their arrival at evacuation stations,
/.
: d Casualties Treated. (l) Number* (a) (b) (c) (2) -..;' ' Type. Retained* :.,. 92 Evacuated*' 19^7 Di,ed,, 25 . . . , * . . . : * 206k . . .

Medical and surgical*

(3) Walking wounded -- 1117. ,

" (k) e. Stretcher cases -.- 9^7* -
; .

Sanitation. . (1) Special measures:

The principal problem in.sanitation was-fly

control* This was effected"by such measures1 as policing of areas to remove and
bury food residues, both ours and the enemy s; the insistence on the use of
"heads, preferably the barrel type; early burial of a l l dead; and the liberal . use of D T insecticide in places which seemed likely to breed or harbor f l i e s . D This program was aided very greatly by airplane spraying of large areas of the island with DDT. (2)
1

Food:

* ' During "the. greater .part of the campaign mosfr of-. the troops subsisted oh individual canned rations. Although this was primarily a matter of military expediency, i t also acted as a factor in preventing the onset of food-born^ diseases. "Galleys were,operated in nqat^f_the rear units during the l a t t e r ' p a r t of the" campaign. These W r e inspT "" "

-77

Action Report, I W O

SpefRfion.

(Cont'd),

that proper standards of sanitation were being maintained in the preparation and handling of food, in the cleaning of mess gear and the disposal of galley waste* (3) from the following sources; Water: Drinking water was derived in sufficient quantities

(a) Ships; This water was obtained from the islands of GrVM and SAI3W and transported in suitable containers by ships* Five (5) gallon expeditionary cans were refilled from LSTs at the beaches, (b) Distillation Units: There were two units in operation by the 3& Engineer Battalion with a- combined d i s t i l l a t i o n capacity of about 30*000 gallons daily, (Che raw water was obtained from the sea. Samples from a l l sources were examined daily and found to be. potable, Ground water could not be used except for showers because of the high sulphur content. Many of the enemy-built cisterns were inspected but in most cases i t was found that the water was so grossly dirty as to be of no use, and no cistern water was used for any purpose at any time. In some of the cisterns fecal contamination-was revealed, but in none was any evidence found of attempted poisoning of the water by the enemy* f. Disposal of Dead.

' _(l) Our own dead were removed by Graves Registration personnel and details from the troops, and interred in the Division Cemetery. Shis was inspected by.personnel of the Epidemiology Unit and found to be done in a sanitary manner. . (2) Many enemy dead were left in the caves in which they were killed f and the cave entrances blasted shut by the engineers. Other enemy dead were buried near the place where they f e l l , generally being placed in bomb craters and covered. !This was done by details from various battalions, Graves Registration personnel* and by Korean prisoners, # This was supervised by personnel of the Epidemiology Unit, insofar as i t was feasible. (3) either !b.e done Sanitary precautions taken;

In most cases enemy dead were, sprayed with D 2~ D? at/tjie.timfe of burial. Xn some c^ea^wlaere this^cpu:14,4P'b f q the graves was sprayed later. , g;, " Epidemics; or unusuaX diseases in (1) Our troopsj Ho epidemics or any prevalence- of any disease* (2) Civilians: M civilians encountered. b

Action Heport, IWO JIMA. Operation. _

' , " ' (3)

(Coat'd)*

Enemy forces?

No disease was found in any of the pri goners examined, Japanese medical officers and corpsmen captured*stated that the only diseases prevalent in their forces to any appreciable extent were dysentery and upper respiratory infections. Stool examinations of prisoners revealed, no parasites or pathogenic organisms. All prisoners examined were found to be infested with body l i c e .

Insects:.

;,

By far the most important encountered were f l i e s of several species, the breeding of which was favored by the presence of unburied enemy dead, human excreta, and decomposing food* These were controlled satisfactorily by policing, the areas and spraying with DDT* A small amount of mosquito breeding was found In cisterns, but were not of disease bearing species* All prisoners examined we,re found to harbor lice* There was an isolated, instance in which a group of marines was bitten by fleas. 3?hee men had loeen sleeping in a cave formerly occupied by the enemy. At the time of examination none of the pests were present, but the men stated that they had recognized the fleas themselves* A few mites were found on some of the sparce vegetation, but these were not the species that convey Scrub Typhus* ., h* treatment. treatment. Dental Service:

There was no dental service other than emergency f Each medical company dental officer did occasional emergency dental -..-" i. Care of Civilians* 2 o civilians were encountered*' S j* Prisoners of

Battalion sick bay.

Wounded prisoners of war were treated at Headquarters Seriously wounded ware evacuated at once* k. Medical Organization: (1) Suitability of present type: Found suitable for this operation*, (2) Suggested changes: Fone. 1* ' . .

Medical personnel: " (1) Adequate or inadequate:

- ~ Adequate, as i t was brought to J.0^ above !TaT?les of Organization prior to campaign.

-79

Action Report, IWJXMA. Operation. (2)

(Cont'd),

Employment?

The organic medical, personnel of regiments* battalions and companies were- employed by carrying out their normal functions, The personnel of medical companies were divided into, four groups, i . e , 9 Hospital Section (6 officer, 36 corpsmen and 30 marines), and three Collecting Sections (13 corpsmen an&1 marine)* (3) Losses and replacements: , , .

9th Marines: 65 casualties* ^replacements. 21st Marines* 79 casualties, 27 replacements. Company A* 3d Medical B&ttaliom 35 casualties, 1&' evacuated* ' . t , Company B, 3d Medical Battalion; ' 15 casualties,' i 9 evacuated. ,; . ft & S Company, 3d Medical Battalion; to casualties* Medical Companies A, B# and H & S'had no- replace ments* N (4) State of training; Considered good. ' ' , (5) ..Specialties neededt

m.
' '

Pi e l d Medical Equipment}
' . ' '

.
^

(1)

Proportion of allowance carriedi

. All H e l d Medical units allowed for medical companies were carried except H e l d Bent&l Units (Unit Ho# 35)* " , . ' All Field'Medical units allowed for'regimental t ' and battalion.aid stations were carried. (2)

Pilferage and losses:

* * '

Ho pilferage or loss was reported. . (3) Adequate, inadequate or overage: . (k) Equipment was adequate at a l l times. N

Suitability of. present type:

'

"

, Present portable operating hut {Dallas Hut) i s considered too bulky for ship loading. f _ / , .

Action Report, 1W0 JIMA. Operation. (5) more satisfactory. (6)

(ContJd). , , , .

Improyements:

Small type portable operating hut, formerly used, Resupply: Ifo resupply of equipment was necessary, n. Medical Supply: (1) Amount carried:

A thirty-dayisupply for each medical company, and a ten-day supply fdr each regimental and battalion aid station was carried into combat, (2) Pilferage and losses:
4

Ho pilferage was reported. 15 Wilson Drums filled with "blankets were landed "but not received by Division Medical Supply Officer. (3) exception of l i t t e r s . Adequate, inadequate and overage: .

There were adequate supplies at a l l times with the This shortage existed only one day. (k) Resupply: ''

Supplies were furnished by 8th H e l d Depot and 3d-Marine Division Salvage. These supplies were issued to Medical Companies A and 3 which in turn furnished medical, supplies to the 9th and 21st Regiments, Separate'battalions were supplied by 3d Marine Division Medical Supply Officer. ' (5) Adequacy of block shipments: Ho block shipments were landed. Om Motor vehicles and rolling stock: (1) Humber and type carried:
s

Regiments and battalions l i f t e d their Tables of Organization strength in'vehicles* The medical battalion lifted the follow ing vehicles: ' , __ . 30 6 3 6 6 5 J-ton k x h ambulances, 3-ton k x k ambulances. -|-ton k x k ca^go, , l^ton k x h cargo* 2f~tdii 6 x 6 cargo. 1-ton 2*-wheel t r a i l e r s

'

''

Action Heport IWO JIMA O p e r a t i o n .

(Cont'd).

5 ,3-ton 2~wheel t r a i l e r s , sterilizer, shower* 5 generators* 9.^ KVA, t r a i l e r mounted. (E) ' ' (3) iosses: ^

1 - t~ton k x k ambulance, enemy action, 1 l--ton k x ^ trucks en y action. m H w utilized and maintained* ., o

"Vehicles were a l l combat loaded. When in the target area they were used for the evacuation of patients &n$ the procurement of food and water. ,
* ' '

Maintenance was accomplished by personnel of the medical companies- with J>h exception of lubrication and major repair done by the Division Motor .Transport repair section. ' /
Adequacy! .

operation were adequate* Would facilitate movementv

.
;

Vehicles and rolling stocjt available for the

addition, of one jeep trailer for each company
"

p.

Quartermaster Supplies:
. :

.,.}

(1)

Amount carried:

Only class II equipment in the amount necessary. , for the operation for the field hospital* regimental end battalion aid stations and evacuation stations was taken forward. Pour portable operating, rooms were . carried but only tfne utilised* ' , (2) Availability ofj . Pield

Most of the equipment was combat' loaded. cots and pads were palletized and, easily obtainable on the-beadi. (3) Eesupply:'

"Mo eq.uipment was replaced during the operation*

Automatic supplies and" clothing wore obtained from the quartermaster* . ,
(k) Eeclothing of patientsj
%

'

'

Adequate quantities'* were: on hand and available..

(5) Adequate pr inadequate: Adequate* . .
' * , ~

''

Action Report, I O JIM Operation* W (6)

(Cont'd).

Suitability: Present supply i s considered suitable.

q.

Malaria and Epidemic control supplies: (1) Amount and type carried;

(a) Insect repellent (Sfcat) 2 (b) Insect repellent (1 gal. cans).... IS cans. (c) Insecticide powder ,.. 200 cans, (d) Atabrine 500,000 tablets, \ (e) Pield tools (shovels, picks, etc). (f) Decontamination sprayers, (g) Laboratory equipment and. supplies - for doing
bacteriology, parasitology, chemistry and toxicology.'
(2) H w used: o

Items' (a), (b) and (d) above were not used.

Items (c) and (f) above were used in fly control. Item (e) was used in the
burial of enemy dead, and item (g) for the daily examination of drinking water
for potability, examination of water remaining in old cisterns for possible
poison and for examination of F W and food handlers*
O s (3) Availability of:

Except for DDT which was not landed by the

quartermaster, all necessary supplies were available.

Losses:
H losses,
o (5) Suitability of present type:

Present Ifcype of equipment and supplies i s considered suitable and adequate, 5* Ashore After completion of assault phase. a, Hospitalization:

Considered adequate,. This organization remained on

the island only a short time after the island was secured*
b. Medical supplies, Quartermaster supplies and equipment! 'Adequate.
" c, Food and* w a t e r :

.. . . . . ? available.

Adequate*

Galley f a c i l i t i e s

-S3

Action Report, IWO JIMA, Operation* d# *-. r e native population: ' - . . . Sanitation;

(Cont'd)* . '

Improvement was noted in the Litter part of the campaign^ Sickness, epidemic or unusual diseases in troops or There was no epidemic or unusual diseases,

Recommendations.

a. That each medical company with i t s equipment "be embarked intact aboard a single ship. b supplies.
c. battalion* . . . That six amphibious t r a i l e r s be assigaed each medidal N ' \ That the priority be raised on debarkation of medical

d. That a suitable black-out tent,, permitting the entrance of a patient on a l i t t e r , be made standard equipment for medical companies and regimental aid stations. The standard black-out tent i s too small for surgery and first-aicl and a-patient on a l i t t e r , danhot T e carried through the entrance, & . e. ' The new type Dallas. Hut i s composed of .pieces so large and heavy that heavy equipment i s needed to l i f t and erect. Recommended that they be modified and reduced in size and weight, f. That the. new high top field boot without leggings be made uniform for combat duty. The few pairs tested in t h i s campaign were reported as far superior to the standard boot with leggings. g. That instructions be issued to a l l medical officers explaining the proper use of the diagnosis "Combat Fatigue",. "War Neurosis" and "Blast Concussion". The present confusion in the us of'these, diagnosis, may lead to future unwarrantable disability claims against the government. h* That each division participating in a campaign place contact men at each evacuation station to obtain reports of their own men evacuated by other divisions, these reports to be submitted to their respective Evacuation Officers, i 1, That contact men, previously trained in their duties, be left aboard each ship receiving casualties as long as the ship remains in the t area* The reports received from marines left aboard ship to l i s t pertinent data on division casualties brought aboard proved"most helpful to the.Division Evacuation Officer during this campaign* jv That medical companies be* Jnot placed under ROT control, or if they must be so placed due to the military situation, that they revert to | l ian4:m,edica^Lj;battalion control as early as possible*]

Action Report, Iwu H$isl8eration.

(Cont'd).

k. That E S commanders be instructed to locate their

C? regimental aid stations not too f?x forward,
M * Signal. 1. Communication Plan (SOI). a Q. Was the plan adequate? .

Ao The plan was excellent. The only confusion that arose was in the various uses of the "Shackle11 for encipherment, message text authentication and station authentication. Some of the changes were made rather late and were not altogether clear. t>. tactical organization? Q,. Were sufficient frequencies made available to .

A. Sufficient frequencies were available for a l l radios except SCR-536 and. SCR-JZO* More could not be made available due to the limitation of the sets. I t i s believed that the sets should be redesigned to admit of more frequencies for the infantry, Also, if the frequency range i s extended to give consideration to reequipping the a r t i l l e r y with SCR-3OOS in lieu of SCR-6lOs in some instances, c, Q. Were sufficient call signs assigned? The discontinuance |jf

A. Call signs were satisfactory. of persona,! call signs was an improvement, . d. so, to what extent? unnecessary and \*asteful. are usually unnecessary. Q,. A.

Was there duplication of c'ommunication 'systems? ; .

Yes, all liaison comnunications are duplication* Staff communications paralleling command comnunications

e, Q. Was liaison effected during the planning stages? If so, how was this accomplished? ' A, Yes, by a v i s i t of the Division Signal Officer to Fifth Amphibious Corps Headquarters in lovember. Information received then required l i t t l e revision for the final plan and was very valuable in allowing adequate time for planning and for training purposes. More valuable training would have been received had SCR-5OO and SCR-600 radio series been received sooner, f, cation plan? A. g, Q. Yes, see above# * Q. " a sufficient time available to draw up coDpnuni* Ws

Were communication plans

-85

Action Report* IWQ JIMA Operation, ' (Cont'd).

in sufficient time to permit study, criticism, and make necessary changes?
A. , To be answered by:C.Ts- (The plan of higher
echelons were not included in the SOI until just prior to embarkation for security
reasons in order that .SOI might be used for training by all personnel without
disclosing to them the order of battle and destination. The Signal Communication.
Annex to Operation Order which .was classified Top Secret did include such
information. The 501 was -Confidential). ; '
h. Q^ Did plan include preventative measures for avoid ances of destruction of wire lines by our own vehicles? Was this part of plan
successful in the operation?
A* Yes, it was included in Communication Annex to
Division Operation Order. The only interruption of wire by own vehicles were
by tanks in forward areas and was unavoidable* The overbading of wire contri buted substantially to the success, of wire communications.
2 Rehearsal. Ha-> rehearsal was held by this division 3*' Embarkation and Voyage*
Was equipment loaded according to plan? A. in Administrative Plan. b. describe.
A.. c. Q. A. d. ty. None known. \Jere such items as storage b a t t e r i e s checked during Yes, they were readily accessible and checked as What type of training was carried out aboard ship?
* s S

loading was in accordance "With space assigned by

any equipment damaged in loading? If yes,

o%

voyage?'
required*

A. All personnel on ship on which Division Headquarters was embarked were on radio, message center or messenger watch throughout-period from embarkation to debarkation. Air and 3F -1 nets were monitored prior to D*-day SG J and delivery of intercept affected.- Thereafter a l l command nets in addition thereto were jnonitored and delivery of intercept effected* muni cation officer? e. Q,. Were personnel of any assistance to ship's com** If yes, v what did they do? '

A, Messengers were provided in Communication Office* The ship did not guard.the majority of the above nets and information received thereon was routed to Commander Expeditionary 'Force Reserve and was available for

Action Eeport, IWO JIHA Operation. others* .

(Cont*d), . .

f. Q. Did landing force* message center and ship (or flag)

communication officer operate Jointly? Comment,

' ,

A#- .iTo, Our activities were coordinated out operated

separately, generally, troops guarded Landing Force, M r and Naval Gunfire nets,
and ship guarded Itfavy and control nets. There were no radio rooms where all
nets, could be guarded in the same place andhj the same token other staff sections
operated more or less' separately from their. Havy counterpart due largely to
accomodations not "being sufficient for "both at asay. one place and to a certain
extent to lack of necessity for same. There was no lack of liaison but due to the
type of ship and our manner of employment, the separation of activities seemed
_ -.
highly satisfactory and preferable* k. sonnel?
A. Personnel requirements are elastic and vary with each operation* Present allowances are satisfactory as a mean but would not" be adequate i n a l l situations* .Whea prior knowledge of the type of operation dictates the necessity for more personnel, such should be furnished regardless . . of T/O. b. , . Q. A. What changes, i f any, are specifically recommended? A light construction wire platoon should be temporal Personnel. a. Q. .

Are you satisfied with present allowances of per

r i l y attached to Division Signal Company for each operation al < . Was* 'training, of- personnel adequate? ^"

A.; , Yes* Some non->GP^utilized' x^rere not received P sufficiently in advance to be up to standard for G but their performance was excellent considering their"backgrounds v d* Q. What recommendations, i f any, are made., for special
training? . .

A.. Stress communication procedure for radio and message center, switchboard operation for wire, 1st and 2d echelon maintenance for a l l
personnel." ' . . . . .

' , e. %9 List overages.or shortages of communication personnel in your unit embarked aboard ship for the. operation*, A. The division was short 3^0 Communication Personnel. This deficiency was largely filled by u t i l i z i n g non-CP. 39 replacement wire personnel and one wire platoon.-wete assigned to division from Mfth Amphibious Corps,, Provisional; Signal, Construction Company* ;' V . f. ' QList losses of personnel ab
-87

JIHA.. Operation. A* Hone

(Cont'd).

g. Q List lasses of personnel in the period from after landing u n t i l operation was completed, . o A, 1 K GPt non-GP doing GP duty not known, *) h. fy. A* List losses o | personnel in effecting the landing* Hone known*

i . fy. Were, communication personnel employed for duties other than communications? What were their duties?
A , , - B b . . - . .

Q>* How were b a t t l e casualties replaced?

A. 35 radio operators were assigned from Replacement grafts* As "beaches were consolidated personnel-from Shore Party Conmunication Teams were used as replacements for infantry u n i t s . Since a l l Air Liaispn Parties and Shore H r e Gontrol Parties were not employed at one time they provided their own replacements or received them from Shore Party Comiawnication Yearns as . necessary* Equipment* a. equipment. A, Ihe only major shortages were k 2?C-4s; in addition some SD~96s wore used in lieu of TC^^s, Overages consisted of e^erimental weasels equipped as; radio vehicles and/or \wire laying vehicles* t>* i c. C^. List losses of equipment aboard ship before landing. , ' C^. . .

List overages and shortages -of major items of

A# / / .lone known. . C^

List losses of equipment in effecting the landing.

. A, 3^ JASCo lost one iMPA-l^ and damaged one MPA-1 and in unloading*. One -infantry battalion lost several items in un loading; the l a t t e r &ay aot have been unloaded., 3d Seconnaissance Company landed at night and had 3 SCR^JOOs damaged by salt' water* ITo other losses known. d Qt List losses of equipment in the period from after landing u n t i l operation was completed., A. ' This l i s t has been submitted separately, e. Qt* Was equipment suitable (desi^L^n^^iiantity) for the particular task to"be performed? Jf not, l i s t

Action Report* rIWO JIMA Operation.

(Cont'd).

A* The equipment i s "better than any previously avail able. JM radios are excellent but SCR-6O9/6lO and 5O9/5IO are not sufficiently portable for some of the uses that the troops desire them for; the SCR-609/6IQ i s considered not sufficiently portable for a r t i l l e r y FOsj likewise the SCR-509/ 510 for tank reconnaissance elements and observers* SPB-3OQ needs more channels for a 3 division operation* The SCR-6O9/6IO could be made more portable by changing position of handles* About one half of wire and radio jeeps should be replaced by weasels. The quantity of equipment i s adequate. f. Q v In light of the specific operation, what changes in equipment are recommended? State reason. A. See fe%i above.

g. ty. What new equipmment i s recommended? Explain specific proposed employment and "whether or not additional personnel would be required to operate i t . A. sonnel.
(2) Cable plow, earth auger, rubber cable, wire laying vans - a l l to be operated by light construction platoon on temporary duty from Corps. h. q,. Did your organization employ &ny equipment which i t had never used in action before? If yes, state items and describe performance* Gave recommendations for improvements. A e.. above. (1) (2) Yes. (a) SCR-610 and SCR-6OS - excellent - see (1) Radio and wire weasels - no additional per

Kb) tyeasel - excellent - make TA item. (c) SGR-508 - excellent - substitute SCR-5OS for like number of SCRr[>10s as follows: 2.Headquarters, Tank Battalion; 1 each Tank Company. (d) SCR-510 - fair - not comparable to SCB-61O in range and ruggedness; make more portable. was it? A. All equipment likely to be exposed to salt water was waterproofed or carried in.rubber bags; loss due to salt water was negligible. j . Q,- tfes there, any equipment used, not included in If yes, l i s t and state how employed.' Make recommendation for inclusion in T/A. A.. Yes, wea,sels; employed as radio and wire vehicles; recommend 6/Signal Company, 6/Artillery Regiment,
-69

i.

Q.

What water proofing was done and how effective

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operation.

(Cont'd).

equipped as combined radio and wire vehicles.

k. Q . ' Was all signal equipment authorized by T/A used?
, If not, should it " e deleted from T/A? State reason.
b At Substantially all equipmejit was used. If weasels
are received, some reduction in jeeps could be made.

!
the operation?

Was all you equipment unloaded from the ship during

A. All except 30 days replenishment of 3d JASCo which was not needed, and was l e f t aboard for that reason, m. I f n o t , why not? A. 6. behind? A. b. Q * A* c* supply? A.' ,d.
recommended?

Q*

Was your equipment landed a,t the proper beach? Yes.

Supply, a. Q. What equipment could not be loaded and.was l e f t ' Substantially none* Did this effect the operation in any way? Ho. What specific items placed the greatest strain on. The supply was never c r i t i c a l on any items*. What change in replenishment rated* if any, are

Q,.

Q,

A.* Replenishment rates should depend on the type of operation, arrival of resupply ships, and duration of operation, * Present rates are adequate as a mean. However, ultraportable radios, mine detectors, and items of a like nature should be carried in .a pool as well as replenishment items.. The pool should be about kOfo of i n i t i a l allowance. e. resupply? ment was ashore* A. This division required no resupply after a l l equip Corps,, other divisions, and Base Depot were available if required, f.' . . Q, (l) (2) (3) What reppir f a c i l i t i e s did you have available? Were they used?
What major items of eq\
90 Q,, What method was employed by your organization for

Action Report, I WO JIMA. Operation, A.

(Cont'd),.

(l) Generally, 3^- Schelon maintenance facilities.

(2) (3) Yes* All authorized and requiring same,

g*

ty.

What method was employed for resupply and repair?

A. A forward wire and battery dump was established near regiments; main dump and repair f a c i l i t i e s at division GP; units turned in equipment and drew from dumps on verbal requisition? division delivered i f the unit so desired, or i t was more convenient to do so* h* Cc f. A, i. not* state why* A* 60S.or 6lO* j. Q # A* k. equipment .spares? A * Some spares were taken from destroyed equipment and some by cannibal! zation * not adequate* * 1* transporting equipment? Q,, A* m. transportation? A* Ho* ty* Was there sufficient transportation available for Yes, Are there any recommendations for changes in Q,, Were equipment spares adequate? lio, not in aXl instances* Were , sufficient spare parts available other than Ho spares were available for SCR-510, 50gt $36* Q,. H w could repair f a c i l i t i e s be improved? o F a c i l i t i e s were satisfactory* Were equipment spares carried with equipment? If

n*. Q , * Did the field depot signal corcpany oper?.te under the Signal Officer command? If not, under whose command was i t ? A, 0. Q , early stages of the assault? A# p Q. ment and assist in repair"? Stee Fifth Amphibious Corps answer. H w was the depot signal company employed in the' o .See Slfth Amphibious Corps answer* IVhen was depot signal company ready to_ supply equip

Action Heport, IWO JIMA. Operation. A*

(Cont'd).

See H f t h Amphibious Corps answer. '

p. Q. When was depot signal company ready to supply

equipment and a s s i s t i n r e p a i r ?
A, See tfifth. Amphibious Corps answer. signal

q $ e r e any t a c t i c a l signal u n i t s furnished r e p a i r 'detachments from tlie depot s i g n a l company?

-A. See Pi fth'Amphibious Corps answer.

r. Q. Did the depot s i g n a l company d e l i v e r s u p p l i e s and

equipment t o Corps and d i v i s i o n s i g n a l dumps?
A s. s i g n a l company*
A. 7 Operation. a, Q,, A* b, most.
c, i n b . above? A. d, Q. used? Ho t r o u b l e was experienced. k^. What steps were taken to overcome t r o u b l e experiencec Q,. A. See P i f t h Amphibious Corps answer. " What agencies were e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t were not normal? Message c e n t e r runs to higher and adjacent echelons, What was the most overloaded agency? I\To agencies were overloaded, telephone was XL&8&
Q,. See P i f t h Amphibious Corps answer, Comment a t length on method of operation of depot

Was t h e r e any unnecessary d u p l i c a t i o n of agencies

. .
A. There was some d u p l i c a t i o n i n a, above but t h e r e
was adequate p e r s o n n e l and equipment to perform same*
e, Q* I n the l i g h t of p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s on l a r g e land
masses, would p r e s e n t normal o p e r a t i n g agencies be adequate?
A# I r a n s p o r t a t i o n would probably be. inadequate for wire and message c e n t e r , andTpersonnel would be inadequate for wire* f* C^ A. Where would t h e agencies probably break down? See e above,

Of the frequencies assigned to ..your u n i t , were t h e r e g* Q,# any not used?/ I f , y e s , s t a t e why, > v... . A. Due to t h i s d i v i s i o n landing ^ n r e s e r v e t h e l o g i s t i c a l frequency was not used.

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation, h. Q,.

(Cont'd)

List difficulties encountered inr (1) Radio communication. (2) Wire communication. (3) Visual communication. (h). Messenger coranunication.

A. rectified.

'All difficulties were minor and easily and.rapidly

i. Q. Were any communication difficulties encountered in t h i s operation that were not 'encountered in the previous operations? If yes y what do you-at tribute the difficulties to? A. Ho.

j Q. Was any communication improvement noticed "between t h i s operation and previous operations? A. k. movement. A. Hone.
1. Q . Were officers required to operate and maintain any
, agency of communication "because of enlisted casualties? If yes, describe.

Yes, primarily because of reduced distances. Idst communication failures during the ship-to-shore

Q.

A.

Hone known.

nu Q . \^QVQ any enemy communications installations captured?

, If yes, wnat use was made of them?
A. Ho.

n. tractor communications?

Q, Tiftiat methods vrere used for the Infantry-AmphiMous' Were they successful? A. C ? (lo Amphibious Tractors used). O What methods' wove used for the Infantry-Tank C (Covered in Division SOP)* T ,

o* communications?

^. A.

S,

Operation in Headquarters Ship.

Hote: ' This division did not have a headquarters "ship* The ship provided was satisfactory but many of the questions "below are not pertinent "because we did not have a combined set-up. ' a. Q,. Were additional personnel required other than that normally assigned-to the ship?

Action Report, I W JIMA Operation, O

(Cont!d)

A.'

JTo.

b. Q Were headquarters ships signal or Marine Corps communications detachment assigned to landing circuits?

c. Q. Was additional equipment operated in addition to that normally installed aboard ship? A, Ho. This division used equipment i n i t i a l l y installed for the Support Air Commander on a previous operation* Headquarters? A. same room with the radios* e. Q> See c. Message center was also installed in the Q,. What, f a c i l i t i e s were made available to Landing ITorce

If answers to a,, b , f and c. are yes, explain.

f.

Q, Was net discipline satisfactory? A. Yes* Was there interference between radio nets? Ho. Was there interference betv/een radio and radar Hone identified, Were messenger boats available to landing force on Hone required but available. Describe operation of ship-^to-shore teletypewriter Hone installed,

g.

Q. ^ A

h. equipments?

Q. A

i. call?

Q,. A,

j circuit?

Q. . A.

Security and Countermeasures by the Enemyt a. Q. IVhkt cryptographic aids were used? loat

A. Ashore - Shackle and Code words Shackle, CCBP QI3O-D2, Hagelin, Ships 3CM and Code words.

Action Report, IWO JIMA*Operation. b. Q. , A. c was it?

Q

(Cont f d),

I s ; any criticism made of present aids?

COHP 0130-1)2 and Hagelin are too slow,
What authenticator system was used and how effective
Shackle. Adequate,

system?

d. ^ Did the enemy attempt to use pur authenticator

If yes, describe. How effective were their attempts?
There were no well 'authenticated instances of the

A, enemy attempting deception, e, security?

'.. A .

<<

Were personnel sufficiently trained.in signal .

Y e s *

- . . . . . - '

'

'

.,

f, proper security?
' '

Q, What specific recommendations are made to insure

" " ' " . "
:

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

"

'

'

'

-. A. g Q,, A,1 h , \ - Q^ M interference? necessary* i.

Continue t r a i n i n g by .ROM u n i t s .

'

X)id your o r g a n i z a t i o n have a n S i g n a l S e c u r i t y Plan"? Yes. I t i s i n c l u d e d i n d i v i s i o n SOP, Signal* Did t h e enemy u s e radio countermeasures? Describe^

There were no well authenticated instances of same*

Q,+ Wha.t measures were- employed to-overcome eneiny j '

'
/

Am-

I n t e r f e r e n c e was almost n e g l i g i b l e - no measures

j. ^* : What recommendations-do you ma3s:e t o a i d i n t r a i n i n g p e r s o n n e l t o overcome enemy^interference? . A # . Continue t r a i n i n g by ROM u n i t s ; orgaM'zation h a s o p e r a t o r s coxoy through i n t e r f e r e a c e ; .introduce deception t n GPXs by u s i n g additional stations; bring results to attention of all personnel.
: : .

..;

' 10#

Air

. ..'. Since t h i s division did not 3.an& in assault, no Ait-Warning units were attached to -it* However, this Headquarters guarded the local Air. Warning circuit ajid received early warning over same as well- as over a l l other'Hi-Command circuits gu?xded* I t was also received over land teletyo^^fl^feWLi-tLwas established

Action Report, I WO JIMA. Operation.

(Contrd)

ashore. Information received was disseminated to subordinate units by the most

expeditious agency for units concerned* The system proved most satisfactory^

11# party? A. Air Warning was received from Division Headquarters and from Corps Shore Party by telephone and by radio on the Shore Party Lateral and the Shore Party Command Net a respectively* I t was disseminated locally by telephone t public address system, and siren, b. Cfr Was there coordinated training before operations? . Shore Party Communications, a. Qm What type of a i r warning was established by shore

A. Yes, each Shore .and Beach. Party Team trained with i t s respective Shore Party Plp.toon as well as! participating in Command Post Exercises of the various echelons. . c. Q. When was inter-beach wire established after landing?

A. The Division Shore Party was established on D plus 5 and two (2) trunks installed to e"ach of the following on the same day: Begimental Shore Parties, Division Headquarters, Corps Shore Party, Vehicles? d C. J1 Were wire lines damaged tor a great extent by our What steps were taken to overcome this?

A. Maintenance was difficult during the f i r s t twentyfour (2^) hours prior to the complete overloading of a l l wire l i n e s . Thereafter damage was negligible. satisfactory? e. Q,. If not, why? Was the ship-to-shore administrative radio circuit

A. This circuit was efficiently operated by the Navy Beachmasters, Shore Party and Beach Communications, were coordinated through the Shore Party Message Center. f. fy. What were the losses in men and materials?

A. One (l) man was wounded and one (l) TBZ radio was lost and one (l) MPA-1 Public Address System was damaged on the beaches' while employed in the Shore arty phase,. Subsequently, Communication personnel of the Shore Party section were used as communication replacements in the infantry units and suffered additional casualties of two (2) killed and eight (g) woundecU g. Q,. A.
'

H w wer<3 losses in f# replaced? o Consolidation of beaches prec^j^ffL^tJie necessity

-96

.'

Action Report, I WO JIMA Operation,

{Cont'd),

for replacements within the Shore Party* h* Q

. .

Was unit held afloat -until operationally required?

A* Two teams attached to the regiment landing under

operational control of thekth Division were not required for about forty-eight
(k%) hours after landing due to the fact that the "beach was not taken over from
other units of the 4th Division until approximately that time*
i* $. How was consolidation of the "beaches accomplished
as pertains to communications?
A* Consolidation was normal. Radio nets were dis continued when reliable wire communications were established. Wire installations
of lower echelons were consolidated as the beaches of such units were consolidated,
j* Q. Was coordination between snore party and beachmaster
communications accomplished satisfactorily? . '
A. 12# Yes. See e* above.

Air Liaison Communications* .

a* Q. , Was the support air request circuit overcrowded?

A* . Yes. The erroneous use of this circuit for support

air direction was the principal,reason for congestion,
b# ty*| Were aircraft available when request? A. c# aircraft reported? A * d. q. T o and a half hours, w \fhat method was employed to .direct aircreJ't? Q , * Hot always*
What was the average time from a request until .

, A. The battalions passed information and directions over the Support Air Request net to Air Support Control and the l a t t e r directed the planes on the Support Air Direction net* v liaison Parties? &. Q Was lateral coaumunication maintained between Air If not, why not?
A* Y e s * * : \\,

fm

<^.

How were front- l i n e s marked f o r a i r c r a f t ?

A* . B y colored panels and colored smoke grenades* g* Q^ What were t h e l o s s e s i n men

-97

Action,Report, I0 JIMA Operation*

1

(Cont'd).

A. -Six (6) enlisted men were wounded and one (l)

AM/VRO-1 radio was destroyed*
h. Q . Was present equipment adequate?
, A13* ires*.

Shore Based Air Support Communications.

Shore Based Air Communications were not under the control

of this division* therefore, I do not feel qualified to report in that respect*
l4.

Shore M.re Control Commu&ications.

a, ^ H w soon after reaching the "beach did ST P establish o 3C communications with i t s assigned firing ship? A. Since the division did not land in assault, communi cations were not established with, ships until units went into the lines* This was, in both the 9*k sad- 22^st Marines-, shortly prior to E-hour. Ho difficulties or undue delays were experienced in establishing prompt communication with ships.
b#

Did each

SJOT

keep i t s frequency throughout the

operation? A., 23b. Frequencies were assigned at the same time as fire-support ships. The necessity for continually juggling frequencies was one of the most troublesome staff-problems of the operation*
c.
;

Was net discipline practiced?

A, Habitually. Procedure and discipline were excellent and personnel took full advantage of alternate means of communication, such as telephones (over which wire-communications were highly satisfactory). d Q,. A. What were the losses in men and material? Casualties:

EIA
Spotters Scout s Radiomen (CP) Wlremen (GP)
General duty, men
TOTAL (*) , , (#) 2 1
2 0

WIA
2 2

MIA
0
0
0

TOTAL

5
3 3

0
0 *

X-.

D"

k 6 k

21

includes k wounded but not evacuated from *IW0 JIMA*

^

includes ^ evacuations for combat fatigue or associated neurosis.

Actio.i Report, I W T A Operation. OJ M .

(Cont'd),

Serious materiel casualties: Destroyed or damaged beyond repair, 1 TBX; y SGK-ZBk; 2 SGR-3OO; \ telephones/sE-S-A; l.HBZ. Lost in action: 9 breast-reels, CS-0.11, There were no equipment-failures worthy of comment, e* Q,. H w were losses listed in d replaced? o

By obtaining spare sets from the 3d JASCo (mainly

A. shore and beach equipment) arid from the i3ignal Hep a i r Section of the Division.
1 adequate? f Qo , I s present naval gunfire communication plan If not, how may i t be improved?

The principal inadequacies of the gunfire comrauni A * cation-plan are those of frequencies* More SFCP. frequencies are urgently needed, so that p a r t i e s can have and retain their own throughout an operation* Further more, in t h i s division (due to lack of an extra frequency), a serious handicap was imposed upon a aval gunfire communication's through lack of an SCR-3OQ common frequency, which would have enabled the Division Naval Gunfire Officer to retain continual communication with forward observers as well as a l l otKer elements of division gunfire. The only materiel lack i s that of a remote control system for the T X radios with which we were equipped* B 15 Summary. a* questions.
_

. (rive account of difficulties not covered in previous

'Am The overall communication plan was excellent. Certain undesireable* features were contained for which there was no solution because i t was necessary to make compromise due to limitations of-.the frequency spectrum, types pf equipment employed, and'conflicting interest. Other features required interpretation or clarification. I t is acknowledged that the overall plan cannot cover a l l contingencies that may arise, and certain improvisations must be made to f i t the changing tactical situation. Lack of prior knowledge of the exact details of employment of this division required that the communica tion plan be sufficiently flexible to meet changing requirements* The . difficulties encountered did not constitute major problems and were solved' by 1t on the spottr coordination, by clarification from higher headquarters, or \>y " interpretation by this headquarters. They are listed for information: (l) he classification of the Communication Plan i s Top Secret and Cent Cm T o and Pac calls are secret* I t i s necessary that o w a l l communication personnel be familiar with certain portions of all these documents.. The distribution of these documents, restrictions governing their handling and accounting, and their high c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . j f c

Action Report* I W J'IMA. Operation* O

(Cont'd)*

restrictions on the dissemination of information to the people required to have

same* 3&L restricted distribution, bulk, and regulations governing handling and
accounting preclude their being given to a l l concerned and require that essential
information be extracted and disseminated* This i s normally done by including
such extracts in the Signal Operation Instructions (SOI) of the unit concerned*
Because of the wide distribution of the SOI and the necessity for i t being used .
by a l l communication personnel for training, i t i s not feasible to accord i t
handling and stowage higher than Confidential. Provisions should be included i n .
the basic documents so that a division could extract a l l information required for
internal training and reclassify same as Confidential.
(2) Security regulations governing radio-transmissions during training in forward Areas were too stringent to^ permit efficient training for combat if interpreted literally', ,It i s believed that the advantages,gained by supervised training using effective frequencies, calls, authentication, and cipher systems outweigh any disadvantages that might- accrue through the enemy having an opportunity to intercept such transmissions. (3) Shore Sire Control Parties of this division were not assigned individual spotting frequencies* There were a limited number of frequencies available to the Corps for that purpose and p r i o r i t y was given to the assault divisions because of their paramount requirements. Subsequently, t h i s division was committed and continuous coordination was necessary in order to obtain the required spotting frequencies and keep a l l concerned informed, .Whenever practicable each Shore Pire Control Party should have en individual spotting frequency* A suggested method of obtaining same would be to reduce the number of frequencies for internal assignment to a division and specify -that the infantry battalion medium frequency net and the naval, gunfire spotting net be combined* Heither net i s overcrowded, the requirements are not conflicting, and i t would frequently result in an economy of personnel and equipment* The frequency plan provided for separate frequencies
for a i r observation and for a r t i l l e r y air spot of each division Such missions
were performed by carrier based planes as well as OY-1 planes. OY-1 planes
attached to landing force units were pooled for this purpose but could not guard the frequencies for a l l units for whom they were required to fly missions* Such planes should be equipped to guard the frequencies of a l l units with whoa they may be required to work. (5) The tfasic system of message text and s.tation
authentication should be changed so that the number of variations based upon the
form of the messages and type of transmission'is reduced. Variations,between
voice, C , code, plain t phonetic, and abbreviated transmissions are not necessary
W and result in confusion. Some changes to the authentication system were ambiguous
and received too late to obtain clarification, requiring interpretation by this .
headquarters prior to dissemination.
(6) There'was one instance of a regiment of this division
having a telephone code name corresponding to the radio call of an adjacent unit
in another division* This resulted in some confusion.
b* Q. ' Comments and recommendations.

Action Report, 1 W J I M Operation* O A

(Cont*d)

\ 'V'

A* The,following comments and recommendations are submitted i n addition to those made above: -JHtf ' * (1) Communication plans have become overly complicated in an effort to maintain security of information, to prevent deception, and in order to cloak the Order of Battle after battle has been joined. At the same time l i t t l o effort i s made to simplify operation instructions and thereby speed, . up communications* Any compromise between speed and security are usually decided in favor of security in the planning phase. However,, complicated instructions favoring security are disregarded to a large degree in combat when the need or speed becomes paramount* Different standards of security are promulgated for infantry, air f : and naval gunfire in communication plans,- Hot only does the stand ard of security become the same aa that of the unit having the lowest standard, i t may result in a false sen"se of security and the compromise of existing security systems* In view of the inability 61 certain units to operate with and enforce complicated security regulations, and in view of the fact that the enemy does not .appear to make any effort to benefit by interception of our transmissions, i t seems that simplification of operation instructions are justified even though i t may result in an apparent reduction in security* The following changes are suggested for purpose of simplification: , (a) Usejths sane system of radio code words for a l l units and the same system of code words for both telephone and radio* (b) above. Simplify th authentication system as outlined .

(c) Reduce the number of codes held by "units below a division or separate unit to one* The Joint Assault Code could be discontinued as i t i s rarely used and once compromised the complete code must be superseded since there i s no key that can be changed*. (2) This division carried a non table of allowance i ton k X k truck outfitted to serve as a small repair shop until less portable equipment could be moved ashore. It.was equipped with a generator (PE-75) for power supply, a drying oven, trays for spare parts and space for carrying test equipment* I t was landed i n i t i a l l y with the regiment initially attached to the 4th Division and performed the major portion of a l l repairs for that * regiment until such time as this headquarters was landed and the Division Repair Shop was established ashore* A repair team from the Division Repair Section landed with this truck* It i s recommended that three (3) similar trucks be authorized for each division. They should be a p a r t of the Signal Goripaay but loaded one to. the Embarkation Group of each Regimental Combat Team* I t should remain with the Regimental Combat Team until the Division Repair- Section i s pre pared to function ashore. - . , . . . . ,. (3) A light wire construction platoon should be opera tionally ..^tt^ched f*om a Corps pool to each division during the period of a provided for over&eading of Ah .allowaiice'of.'2O* X Z" JJH $2ji&-~ should be always

-aox

Action Report* I O JIMA. Operation* W T, A*..

Centfd),, ,

Conclusions and Recommendations: Conclusions*

1. That the combat training of the 28th and 3*tth Heplacement Drafts assigned this division as battle replacements prior to the operation was extremely poor* Insufficient $ime was available to adequately train them within the division. Forced employment of these men with infantry Units in combat resuited.in a sharp drop in combat efficiency, and an increase in casualties* l 2. That the C3-H-1 flamethrower tank proved to be one f the most effective weapons in dealing with enemy-occupied emplacements and caves* 3* That the armored bulldoz-er proved more effective in cutting routes of approach to enemy positions in the terrain encountered than the tank bulldozer because of i t s lighter weight, better maneuverability, and because i t i s equipped with angiedozei*. 1 * That aircraft were provided in insufficient strength for + the si?>port of ground operations after the first few days of the operation, and bombardment aircraft employed instantaneous fuzed'bombs almost entirely with l i t t l e effect on enemy fortified positions. /5 3fibat insufficient attention was given to the massing of the bulk of available fires, including aircraft* in support of the main effort of the ground forces, with resultant slower progress and greater casualties. B* Recommendations.

1* That replacements be given more and better training before being assigned to divisions, or that they be assigned a sufficient length of time prior to operations to enable divisions to adequately train them with infantry units to which they will be assigned in combat* 2# That the present organization of the tank battalion be increased by one company of CB-H-1 flamethrower tanks* 3* That in future operations against well-fortified areas a much larger number of aircraft be maintained oh station, or at least on call', for close support of ground troops, and that bombs carried for such operations be preponderantly delayed action fuzed* * / km That in future operations more use be made of ^massed fires", to. include the bulk of artillery, naval gunfire, and aircraft, in close support of the main effort of the ground- forces. 5* Ska* three (|) TD-1S tractors with bulldozer, equipped with 5/8tt detachable armor, be- added ba the1 Tables of. Organ* salfBfc' equipment of the engineer battalion, to be attached during, combat to the tankn&attalion for the construction pf routes of ingress and egress for areas uj||p||^^nein.v observation and fire. / . > '
'I'V *

~1Q3~

Action Report, I0. JIMA. Operation, (<k>ntfd).

. 6 That a t o t a l of eighty-four (S4) M29& (weasels) be added to the Tables of Organisation equipment of the Marine Division, allocated as follows: Twenty-seven (27) for communication vehicles only, distributed as follows:
i.

Six Two One Two One

(6) (2) (l) . (2) (1) -

Signal Company.
H & 8 Battery, Artillery Regiment.
Artillery Battalion.
H & S Company, Infantry Regiment,
Infantry Battalion*

Ilfty-seven ($?) for supply, evacuation^ and rapid movement of supplementary weapons, distributed as followss Four your Pour Five (l|>) (k) (k} (5) - B & S Company, Infantry Regiment*
*- Infantry Battalion*
H & S Battery, Artillery Regiment.
- Motor Transport Battalion,

7 That the Athey track-laying t r a i l e r - t r a c t o r combination be added to the Tables of Organization equipment of a Marine Division. A, total of eighteen (IS) t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r s attached to the Motor Transport Battalion; six (6) assigned to each RCT during combat, ideally supplement the wheeled cargo transportation normally assigned the RCT. 8# That over-printed enemy installations be eliminated from future tactical map3 prepared for use by infantry units* That the new high-top field boot be made uniform for combat duty.
* ' "

'

ft. B. ERSKIN3

ENCLOSURE INTELLIGENCE

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Enemy

Units

Encountered.

Comments and Recommendations. Map. Enemy Units Encountered. Sketch. Final Defenses, 26th Tank Regiment Map. Enemy Defensive Dispositions East of Airfield No. 3 os translated from map captured by 21st Mar.

Based on available prisoner reports and documentary information, it is

estimated that units of the following organizations were contacted,either in
whole or part, "by the 3& Marine Division in the course of its operations on
I WO JIMA during the period 25 February - 16 March, ^
109th Div A A Arty Unit
Mkth. Machine Cann6n (MO) Unit
109th Div Keikaitai (Radar Unit)
' 2d M B Arty Unit 2d M B Sngr Unit ,
310th. Ind Inf Bn . . - ' '
311th Ind Inf 3n
3lUth Ind.Inf Bn , - . . ;
1^+5th Inf-Hegt Arty Unit'-' ' 3dln, 17th Ind Mixed. Eegt .. ' 26th Tank Regt < - ' 9th Ind. A T Bn ' "" ". 11th Ind A T Bn
12th IncL A T B n ' '. ,% . , 1st Ind hG Bn 2d Ind M a Bn.
20th Ind Arty Mortar 3n 2d Medium Mortar Bn " * " * .
^d, Medium Mortar Bn
Socket Unit (Army)
I WO J I M A N A Y A L G U A R D FORCE . :
AA Btry G-roups. & CD Btry Groups; .
20th Machine Cannon (MO) Unit*(Army)
21st Machine Cannon (MC) Unit (Army)
SHOTO Air Group BLF
25th Torpedo Maintenance Unit
.
2d Kav.al-. A^r Depot A discussion of principle units follows. Hefer also to Enclosure A- (3)*"
' ' 109th, P i v H g '
r

'

'
1

" " .

, .

' * . .

Army Units
;

"

. .
_'...

109th.Div AA Arty Unit: The 2d, 3d, and one half of the Hth (Searchlight)
Btrys of the 109th A A Unit were identified in TA 213 HE # - Three prisoners infti-1
cated that the 2d Ptry had.90 men'"and operated'6-7cm AA guns. The 3 d ^try had
120 men operating 6* 7cm AA guns. The Uth Btry had kQ men making,- with a Hq of
^ 2 , around 290-300 men and 12-7cra AA guns* Aleo attached to this AA Unit were
two MC Units (J+3& and UUth) consisting of SO and 60 en respectively with 6-2$m
machine cannons in each unit* This "brought the total of the 109th A A Unit 0
around ^30 men. It^is believed the.t of the attached units, only the UUth MC
Unit was encountered in the division Z of A
109th Div-Radar Unit (Attached 'to the Ifctvy): This is the first operation
in which the 3 d MarDiv has encountered.an Army-Radar Unit* This unit consisted
of around 5^ m e n operating a Eadar Station in HA 219-Q*
2d Mixed Brigade " ;-1 ' -' .

2d Mixed 3riga.de .Arty Uniti' 'The'1st Btry .of the Brigade, Arty Unit;.^hich
documents indicated. ha,d its'gtm-position'in the central sector around _ JJOjOYjtMA;
( T A 200-3)' was the principal uhit'endouhtered':. The 1st Btry originally con^ sisted of 5-75mm field.-guns and,around 120 men..- Later-, however,, a,pla'tobft of
3*-12cm howitzers was addled. ' . ';'-;

page 1 of 5 pages

foQ t i Ind, Inf- 3 ' .Ihis Bn was the principal- infantry unit encountered*
l n i The 310th In& Inf Bn was designated as the Brigade reserve unit; and captured
maps/indicate positions of this Bn in TA. 200 and 199 North Bast. . Document and
POV/-reports indicate that this unit formed, the island reserve or second line *f
defense* Documents indicate that the organization of the 310th1 Ind Inf Bn was
approximately as follows at full strengths
Bn Hq 1st Hifle Co 2d Rifle Co 3d itifle Co HMG Co Inf Gun Co TOTAL

MO

125 125
125
130
80
625'

*HGD, LMG

12 HMG

2-70mm flow

*H&avy Grenade Discharger

The 311th Ind Inf Bn was"defending the HISHI Sector (TA 181, IJB)* On Feb 25th
it is "believed that the 3d MarDiv was in contact with, the main strength of the
310th Ind Inf Bn, and with possible units of the 311th Ind Inf 3n (defending in
T*s 181 and 198 on the.left)
3 Ind Inf Bn; Identifications of this Bn were made in the Div Z tf A .
in TA 216, 21^, 201 and 202 A captured man indicated that the company positions
of this Bn were in this general area of the Sast Sector under lQ9th Div control.
Prisoner reports and units in contact as reported l y the 5th MarDiv indicate
a that units of this Bn were withdrawn from the East Sector and committed inTA's
235t 251 in the last stages of the Japanese defense,, Documents indicate that
the organization of the 31^th Ind Inf Bn. was as follows:
3n Hq (and attached" elements) 1st Sifle Co 2d Eifle Co 3d Eifle Co MG Co Inf Gun Co

go 135
1^-5 1^+5

H G D, LMG

HGD, LMG
HGD, LMG

170 125
BOO

16 HMG (?)

4-7Omm

How (?)

TOTAL

2d 1MB Sngr Unit,? Identifications of this unit were made in TA 201;, "but
it is not believed that main strength of the Brigade Engr Unit was encountered*
3dBnt lfth Ind Mj.xed;Hegt: The presence of this unit bn IWO J1MA was ntt
known "before B-Day Documents and maps indicate, however, that its lines were
In the T E E M Sector (TA 235-W) an<i formed m r t of the final line_ 6f defense.
This Bn was under 109th D4v control* Organization was as follows:

Hq
7th Hifle Co ' 8th Rifle Co 3d MG C# . Attached Units:
2dCo, 1st Ind MG
Bn ' 1st Light Mortar

35 115 115
120 100

5 LMG, 6 HGD
5 LMG,
6 HGD
5 LMG, 6 H G D

g HHG
g HMG -

Bn

155

12-glmm Mortars

TOTaL

755

Identific:-.tions' Cf the 3d3n, 17th IMR were made in TA 235 end 21S Central and
Northeast This unit had nt Bn guns ( 0 i m How) or A T guns and relied mainly on
7ii

page* 2 of 5

EHCLOSOBB
small arms fire.* FOWs have reported, that an J2ngr Unit of around 100 men was
attached.
l^th Inf Regt; Identifications of the lstBn, l ^ t h Eegt were made in T A l6^
and 182; "but according to prisoners* this Bn was withdrawn on 21Feb to I A 2l6#
On the basis of this information it would appear that no major units of this
Bn were contacted* Identifications of the l&Bn 1^5*h Inf Regt were made in

.TA's 201-202; "hat is is "believed that the main strength of the 3 & S n w a s
against the 4th MarDiv in conjunction with units of the 31^*^ * n & Xnf Bn con-*
tacted in "both zones of action.
Inf Regt: The 3d and *Hh Btrys of the lU5th Arty Bn were
Arty Bn, located in T A 219 &nd 218* Captured maps have confirmed these positions; and have
indicated that the 1st and 2d were in 218~J and 235-V respectively. The T/0
of' the iU5th Arty Bn specified 3 batteries. However, early in 19^5 # & "battery
of 12cm howitzer was added to this Bn* Therefore the organisation was as follows:
q
1st Btry
2d" - Btry'
34 Btry
4th Btry
Approx TOTAL
26th Tank Hegt: Tnis unit was contacted inlA r s 200 and 201 A captured map
indicated defensive positions o this unit in 201^I>,I "Documents found in this
area further identified the 26th Tank Eegt It is believed that this unit con stituted the main strength of the determined final defense conducted in the
vicinity ofT A ! S 20l-C,D,H,IJ 21&-X. A count of destroyed enemy tanks in this
area, after resistance had Ijeen eliminated, showed g medium tanks and f light
tanks dug in and revetted in support of tne defenses. Ti:is fact combined with
the discovery of lt.rge stores of tank parts tjid-tne type and degree of resis tance offered, gives eve.-y evidence tht.t the entire tank regiment (less one
company believed,to have been employed principally in tne M O T O I A M A area) may
have been committed to the defense of this pocket* See Enclosure A ( O , for
* sketch description of the defenses* The organisation of the 26th Tank Hegt
wes unioue. The 26th Tank Hegt lost 36 tanks in transit to IVO JIMA, although no
personnel were lost according to a captured document.. There were 2^ tanks on
I / O JIMA according to Captured documents. .Presumably, therefore, the Tpnk Segt
TT originally had 60 tanks. . The Japanese ^rmy Mobilization Flan Order for 19^1
shows ^such a Tt.nk Hegt as having 65O men. Assuming that there were 6^0 men,
the 26th Tank Hegt is believed to have been reorganized into the following
reinforced organization for a static defense:
Hegt H q 1st : Tank Co 2d' Tank#d 3d Tank ^0 Maintenance Co Arty Co Sngr'Plat"" Inf Co 3 Fd Guns (75mm?)
" 3 ^ G>uns
(75 mm?)
3 Fd Guns (75mm?)
(est) 5-12cm Howitsera

fc

50 'go
'go
80

k Light T?>nks, U Med Tanks M Light Trnks, k Med Tanks U Light Tanks, k Med Tanks h T 90 75mm Field G-uns

100 125 * 20 115 - 630

Is t & 2d Ind US Identifications of these units were made in the division

zone offciCtjion,' UniUs of theT'2cL Co.'lst-Ind MG Bn which-was attached.to the
3d J3n, 17th Ii-iS infch'eTJS^Zii*1. Sector (T-.s*21S), we're probably encountered. Other documentary'evidence is not conclusive-as to what 'Org8Hiied5units of these

page 3 of 5 pages

ENGLO5D33B'A

Ind MO Bns -were definitely contacted in 3d MarDiv Z of A, Documents, htwever,

indicate that M3- Cos supoerted Inf Bn sectors of defense. The 1st and 3& Cos
6f the'1st MG- Bn and 1st G of 2d HO Bn-were.under Brigade control "but it is
not certain how they were employed*
,_9th, 3.1th, j.2th Ind AT Bns: Of the five Ind AT !Bns on jn/OJIMA, three were
^identified in the DivZ of A . AS these units were orincioally deployed initially
r
to cver the probable approaches 01 tanks oarticUlarly in Tx>.s 182, l#3r 199 &ncl 200t it i s believed that a considerable portion of the fire power of these AT Bns
l v a concentrated in the Div 2 of ;w Of the three A T Bns identified, it is "be .s lieved that initially the 11th AT Bn was deployed with company positions'in
To. 200, 201 and 185 ilorth, and the 12th AT Bn was deployed above and covering
the wo, 1 airfield in TA 1S2; and that subsequently, units of this 3n withdrew
to positions covering Airfield ao 2. The 9tk AT Bn was deployed with positions in TA l&il North, 199 and 2l6 Central. This Bn was reinforced by 2 companies
(less 1 plat) from the 10th #$ Bn, but no identifications from those units were
reported (positions in TA.196K Identifications of the Sth A T Bn in TA 183,
were reported also; -but tsough fire, from this unit may have been received, it
is doubtful if it was actually Contacted by this division*
Mortar Units an4 .Socket'Units:
20th Ind Mortar Bn;' The following rare estimated to have been contacted-in

235,, 236, 2ia, 219

"/

"
2 320 Mortars 2 320 Mortars 1+320 Mortars 25 70-glmm Mortars l6 Rocket Launchers

Bn Hq . 60 1st Co ."".65 2d Co ( ) ! 65 3d Co 130 150 Light Mortar Co Hq j. 1 docket Plat I7O

TOTAL
2d & 3d Medium Mortar Bni Small detachments of thesr units were identified.
The positions of thes.-* two units were concentrated in the III SHI' Sector (TA 2l6,
199. 19S} and MINijMI Sector (TA 201, 202, ISk, 185), Fire from these positions
however was received within the Z of A o f this division. " * '< ' '
Haval Units
IWQ JIMA Q-uard Uniti Captured documents-arid maps indicate positions for the
following principal guns in the 3^ MarDiv Z of A (personnel strength estimated).
and it is reasonable to consider that the main strength of these units were

encountered: .

North Sector Group:

2-15cm 2-12cm .10-13cm 5~25mm &-25'mm .S~25mm 10-13om CD (219-1,,M) Short (235)
MO (219) '
(TM) (21^-0) (SM) (235)
(SM)
MG- (218)

ho
35
50

OP (235~v)

MOTOXitMn. Sector group:

5H-12cm UP (199-6)

110

>}r &?'::<&'

page h>- of 5 pages

ENCLOSURE A (1)

(Cont!d) 75 30 60 $0

,g~25mm (TM) (199) 5-25nun (SM) (200) (TM) (218-.U) Mortar (201-G)

TOTAL

685 SHOTO Air G-roup HLF and one conroany

North Sector ILF:

Units of the

of t h e 204th Havy C o n s t r u c t i o n tTnit were o r g a n i s e d i n t o a North S e c t o r Ifravy land Force 1 of a"bout UOO-U5O men o r g a n i z e d with 2^0 r i f l e s , 8 HM5, 13 HD, U Plame t h r o w e r s , 11 MO, and 1 LMCr, These u n i t s c o o p e r a t e d with t h e army u n i t s i n defense of t h e Horth Sector and i t i s "believed t h a t t h e main u n i t s of t h i s NLF wore con

tacted.
ISTLF: Although the main s t r e n g t h of t h i s u n i t was c o n t a c t e d "by kth MarDiv i n TA 1S3~181+ elements of t h i s u n i t were i d e n t i f i e d i n TA 2 0 1 , 202' North, I t i s Relieved t o have been--organized from 1,500 W M O SHOTO Air Group A P G-round p e r s o n n e l , 200 maintenance men of 2d Mavy A i r Depot, 25th. Torpedo Main tenance S e c t i o n ( ? ) , and 1 Co of the 2 0 ^ t h SETSUEITAl.

page 5

ISJJIGLOSUKB A
'V

(2)

HSaOMMSIT'DATIOIJS

a.

Maps:

(X) It is recommended that overprinted enemy installations " e eliminated

b from future tactical maps prepared for use by infantry units. The obscuring of
terrain detail due to overprinted installations; and the attempt by personnel to
use the indicated installations as land marks vhen, in fact, they may have been
obliterated or buried due to the effects of gunfire and bombing, tend to confuse
rather than clarify the maps*
(2) Roads should be indicated by their correct conventional sign. The
tactical maps of IWO 'JIMh. indicated, as improved, roads which by American stand ards t.re unimproved. If only surfciced roads are indicated as improved on maps,
and all others are correctly indicated as unimproved roads and trails, troops
will encounter less difficulty in orienting tnemselves by road networks,
(3) Tactical maps for use in the ox^eration should be prepared at the
latest possible date in prder to indicate correctly the latest changes in ter rain, particularly road and airfield construction.
Legible gridded mosaics, scale 1:12,500 should be provided for all
officers to include forward observers, naval gunfire spotters and platoon lead ers* Half tone photomaps, unless prepared very carefully and made from excep tionally clear photographs, are generally too blurred for effective orientation
purposes.
(5) - JPor effective use, relief maps must be accurately prepared not
only as to scale, but also as to exact ground conformation. It is not considered
that relief maps furnished prior to the operation were accurate enough as to
terrain details. It is recommended that every effort be exerted to render as
exact a portrayal of the terrain as possible, particularly of rugged areas, in
future relief maps prepared.
b. Photos:
(l) Naval and other bombardment, was so effective on 1*10 JIMA that
practically all of the vegetation was burned or destroyed; and in many localities,
the surface of the ground itself was Considerably changed* Cue to these changes,
it was found that photographs taken prior to the beginning of the intensive
bombardments, although still useful, were greatly reduced in effectiveness. Due
to the changes in terrain and vegetation, small unit leaders had considerable
difficulty in locating themselves on the ground exactly by using the map or
previously issued photos. When landing and subsequent inland operations are
preceeded and supported by similar intensive bombardments, it is recommended
that Consideration be given to providing as many prints of late aerial cover ages as may be required to equip properly all combatant officers, to include
company officeis4 with the latest photographic information of the terrain over
which they must operate*
2 JICF'OA Teams
a. ,-.fter landing, a JICPQ*'Field Study Team for the study of enemy installa tions, was temporarily assigned to work with the Division by IuiiJKJR. This team
performed highly satisfactory work and it is recommended that similar tec.uis be
employed in the future, attached to divisions, for the purpose of obtaining,
directly, that information desired by higher authority for the preparation of
their studies on enemy installations* In this operation, the JICPOA Team

page 1'of 2 page s

SiJCLOSUHS A (2)

(Cont*d)

assigned worked in very close cooperation with division APt and Engineer person nel vho were engaged in a detailed study and survey plot of all enemy installa tions encotinterod within the division zone of action*
tu A JIGPOtt, Salvage Team was not assigned for this . operation. It is con-*
sidered highly desirable that such a team equipped with proper salvage facilities
"be furnished each division, wheto committed^ in, order that highly important
equipment of intelligence value can be removed, to a place of safe Iceeping as
soon as possible^

',.

. ' ,

page' 2 erf 2. pages

ENCLOSURE A (3) ENEMY UNITS ENCOUNTERED CONFIDENTIAL

c?

A 7 5 M M ANTI-TANK GUN y 47 MM ANTI-TANK GUN

S DUG IN TANK jj REVETED TANK - TANK 11 EMPTY TANK * R TRUCK REVETMENT

MACHINE GUN POSITION 7 f COVERED RIFLE PIT A PILLBOX

ENCLOSURE A O) SKETCH. DEFENSES, 2 6 T H TK. REGT.

REVETMENT

VJ-U-TRENCHES ooo. ROCK WALL <*. TANK. US MEDIUM O WATER CISTERN

dCAVE J . AMMUNITION STORAGE CAMOUFLAGED POSITION UNIDENTIFIED

1OO YDS

NOTE: ARROWS INDICATE PRINCIPLE DIRECTIONS OF FIRE. ENTIRE AREA DOTTED WITH RIFLE PITS AND FOX HOLES

ENCLOSURE A (5) ENEMY DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS EAST OF AIRFIELD NO.3 AS TRANSLATED FROM MAP CAlfliAECk Rl 2 1ST. MAR.

ENCLOSURE
OPERATION15 OF

SITUAT ION MAPS

3D MARINE DIVISION

IWO

JIM A

25 FEBRUARY - 16 MARCH, 1945

(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13) (14) ^ (15) i (16) (17) (18) (19)

(2)

(i)

(27

(20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)

(28)

Situation 0830 , 1700 , Situation 1700 , Situation 1700 , Situation 1700 Situation 1015, Situation 1545, Situation Situation , 1810 , 0800 , Situation 1700, Situation 2000 Situation 1430, Situation 18 0 0 , Situation 1800, Situation 1800, Situation Situation , 1 7 0 0 , 1^45 r Situation IB 0 0 , Situation 1800, Situation 1800 , Situation 1800, Situation 1800 , Situation 1800 , Situation 1800 , Situation 1800 , Situation 0815 Situation 1800, Situation Map of Iwo Jima'

25 25 26 27 28 1 1 1 2 2 , 2 3 3 4 6 7 - 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 16

February February February February February March March March March March March March March March March
March

March March March March March

March

March March March March March

'

'

'

l>-r

'B

'

'

'

'

'

Q U A B C V

R W

S X U V

R W

S X

T Y U V W X Y C F G H D E A B C D

P U

Q V

R W

S X

Q V

R W

S X

T Y

P U

Q V

R W

S X

T Y

X^

U A B C

X
A B C

R W C

S X D

T Y E A F B G C H D 1 E J F G H
C D E HIRAIWA BAY G H

- U

B /

- Ak

-C

SPECIAL

AIR AND GUNNERY

TARGET MAP
SCALE I : 20.000

THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE COLOR THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESK3WATIONS. THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE JSED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS THE NUMBERING OF THE 1000-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING OF THE 200-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM EXAMPLES FOLLOW

U A

V B G

W C H

X D I

Y E J

R J I 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF R J I 0 6 IS BC 7 5 0 - 7 0 9 0 AND ] IN SMALL TARGET AREA SQUARES ARE UNDERLINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISTING UISHING THESE TWO LETTERS FROM THE NUMERALS ZERO AND ONE

DEFENSE SYMBOL KEY

6 COASTAL DEFENSE GUN mi DUAL MOUNT DUAL PURPOSE GUN DUAL PURPOSE GUN POSITION (Empty) SINGLE MOUNT HEAVY A A AUTOMATIC A A COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT RANGE FINDER 0 UNIDENTIFIED INSTALLATION B R.D.F. 4 RIFLE PIT OR FOX HOLE A MAST OR TOWER D UNDERGROUND ENTRANCE AIR RAID SHELTER 9 ANTI-TANK GUN O WATER STORAGE 0 MACHINE GUN PILLBOX RADAR SEARCHLIGHT COMMAND POST OBSERVATION TOWER ANTI-TANK BARRIER RADIO STATION RADIO TOWER ANTI-BOAT BARRIER OPEN ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT ANTI-TANK TRENCH EMPTY REVETMENT AMMUNITION STORAGE FIRE TRENCH SHORT SECTIONS OF ANTI-TANK TRENCH xBARBED WIRE EARTH COVERED STRUCTURE

X
+-H 1I

BLOCKHOUSE
CAUTION:

DOTTED SYMBOL INDICATES POSSIBLE INSTALLATIONS POSITIONS MARKED AUTO AA CAN BE USEO AS AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AGAINST GROUND TROOPS

j
S

Q7
T
P

Q V
J

R W
1

S X

V i W
CAUTION: THIS MAP HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS w'lTHOUT ADVANTAGE GROUND CONTROL OR RECONNAISSANCE; THEREFORE AZIMUTH ACCURATELY DETERMINED. THEY ARE REPRESENTED FROM AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION. CORRECTIONS AND SCALE AS ACCURATELY Of

ARE NOT COMMENTS '000

AS POSSIBLE

AND OTHER

SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO CINCPAC-CINCPOA, PH.

THIS CLASSIFICATION Mil .' Bf t\ (HIGHLY DURABLi AND UO/SfU/t ReSISTAHT)

NOTE: CONTOURS BY I633RD ENGR. PHOTOMAPPING PLATOON, SEPT 1944 UTILIZING MULTIPLEX AERO-PROJECTORS FROM SINGLE LENS AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS. 6 4 T H ENGR. TOR BN. U S A F C P B f MAP REPRODUCTION WO 1 0 7 0 - 1 PLANT NOV. 1944

IWO JIMA

ENCLOSURE C

9TH MARINES

ACTION REPORT

S, tflBTH MARIHSS,

VISION, FL3ST MASlSTHi FOF.C1, , SAN FRAtTOISCO, CJ 20 April CG, 3d Msr Div Subject: Reference: Snclesures: Action (a) G 137* * Mar Div. O A. 3, 0* Action Report, 1 s t -sn-9th Marines. Action Report, 2d 2n 9^& Marines* Action Report, J& 3a 9th.Marines..

In accordance with Ref (a) the following report of action of t h e 9th Marines at IWO JIKA, VI i s hereby submitted: FAKE! I . A.
Summary of Action,

This report covers the period from 24 Fetouary to k April **

3 Included herein i s & report of actions of the Ninth Marines, 3d Marine Division at r*0 JTMA, VOLCANO XSI4JSFDS. !This Re^t as a part of the landing Force Reserve, Task Force 51* landed on 2*f February 19^5 (D plus 5) was committed to action near'Airfield #2 on'25 February. It then remained in a'ction occupying all" or part of the 3d Division zone of action for a total of 18 out of 20 days that the division was engaged until the zone was declared'se cure on 16 March 19^5 ^he regiment participated in the capture of Airfield num"ber 2, and in the subsequent continuous attack to the north and east end of the island* After the cessation of organized resistance, tjfcie regiment en gaged in mopping up operations until 0700 k April 19^5, at which time i t was released from tactical responsibility "by the 1^7tii Inff AITS, PART I I . Preliminaries. .landedD plus 5 on:IIjf0~JIMA -was

A ' The 9th posed of the following units:

9th Marines.
Co A 3 Snginear isn.
Co A 3& Pioneer Bn
Co A 3d- Motor Transport 3n, Co 3 3d Medical 3n.
Det 3d JASQO,
Det 23th Replacement Draft.
Det 3^th Replacement Draft.

3* ' Prior to the action this raim*nt was stationed at G A and was UM undorgoing intense training in infantry t a c t i c s . Among -th& most emi:Kasi12dd training ribjecta were: assault and reduction of pillboxes ty small oidtSi snell unit te.ctic.si infentry-artillery coordinated training, This training included a large amount of field firing; of a l l types of Inf I^ns and de-mcXitions, 0, Our mission, as a regiment of the Sspeditionary Force Reserve was to land on any of the designated landing "beaches on order. Plans were formula ted acfcrdingly and necessary operation orders issued, Loading plans were pre pared, "based-on regular assault landing requirements.. Loading.plans having "been completed and preliminary preparations made, ship loading on TRA3TSDI7 J l com menced on 8 FeT/ru&ry .19^5 at GUM. Ship assignments and units ware as follows:
3LT 1-9 FAYSTT3

&

&

Strt>jet:

Saport

(Cont'd)

20 April

s
Additional detachments of reinforcltfg units end cargo wara T l o a d e d o n I SS JA.W.QIVS^ t S3 xL.33.~TL32, .tTGS JL&'JL.\CT * U H T78S *t.3?.IC,E.
Cara loading and embarkation, t troops was completed by "2000
10 February
T

D E T 9 departed from GttiM for TfO J l l i i on the morning of 17

O February aboard T'iUlISFOit? DIV 31, arriving in the reserve area on 19 3 *
Orders for landing war^ received at the S U IIq. aboard tha
O? USS KHtiX in the early morning on 24 February end debarkation of troops com menced at 0330 the sassa'data, xw*nty*-four (2*+) I&Ms .were used for
aacfy 31$ said assault vehicles in the following order:
3LT - 2
3LT - 1
Thar a was no t a c t i c s ! disposition of units for landing i n a s much as the. regiment was landing cvax. previously, established "beaches, l(5Ha
ware .used because heavy surf conditions precluded tha use of smaller craft,
Sach L M landed from 90 to 100 troops* Tho lnnding was made by two or thrsa
C LCMs at a single instance over a beach area which was roughly the boundary
between Beaches 335>-2 and TSLLCW-l. ( l a t e r redesi'gnated as B A K >each). ^>--- ..v
LC Th.e regiment assembled in &n ersa just aouthcasiToT the" south
end of Airfield Fo 1 (See Map). +U1 three 3LTs hf.d arrived in t h i s assembly
area prior to dark on 2 4 IPebrurry 19^5* Tha units ashore at that time end >
* their disposition was as follows:
313J 1-9 1st 1st 1st 1st ^ et D" In Hagtl . 3LT 2-9 2d 2d 2d -2d jj 3n 9th Mar. Plp.t Co A 3d 3ngr 3n. Plat '''fpns Co 9th Max.Coll Sec Co 3 3d Mad'Bn. 3d JASCO.
assembly area at 1^7-3,J.

'

'

'. . ' " "

3n ?th Mex, Plat,0a A 3d 3ngr 3n, Plat %ns Go 9th Max, Coll Sac Co 3 3d Med 3n,

. ^-r^. . ......mm . ..***..

In Hagtl as^cirbly area &t 1^7~D,I# ' 3L2 3-9 . ' 3d 3n 9th Mar,
3d Pl'at Cft A 3d ^ingr 3n.
3d P l a t Vona Co 9th Mar. ,
3d Coll Sec C 3 3d-Mad 3n,
Det 3d JAoCO.
In Hegtl assembly area at l6W7,Q.

C A 3d Pin ^n. * On 3each,.IS33>-2 commencing Shore Party functions. Co A 3d VLT 3n. On 3aach 3J1>-2 commencing Shore Psxty functions, - Co 3 3d Med 3n, In 2egtl assembly ?
,

(Contfd)

.0 April

The Hegtl CP was established ashore at lUOO 2k February

at l^S-A (Q),
31, Enemy, composition, disposition and number.

b Prior to the landing " y the 5*h Phib Corps on I WO JIMA., the
Japanese had a defense force of about 22,000 troops, both army and navy, but
predominantly the former, under' the command of Lt, General X'JRIBAIYASHI CG
of the Ogase.wara Sector,
During the operation the 3& Mar Div met elements of almost .
every unit that was on the island* With approximately 50 separate units
present, with numerous attachments and support missions, with elements of
overrun organizations falling back and taking up positions with other outfits,
it is difficult to report what unit faced CT 9, where end when* Thus, any
recapitulation of the enemy forces ril.Y be in part inaccurate.
Th3 HOT 9 moved into the line- 25 Eeb J45 in lAs lS2t IS3 onthe
south side of Airfield #2, There they faced and overran elements of 310 Ind
Inf Bn, 309th Ind Inf and the left flank of the 311th Ind Inf Bn, all units
of the 2d Mixed Brigade,
Vfaile clearing these positions around the second Airfield
they came under fire from artillery, mortar and rocket units set up through out the Northern half of IWO. In the vicinity of both eirfie3ds personnel
from the Navy Iwo Guard Force whose primary job was AA and CD fell in with
the army infantry units defending that sector, Setsueitai (construction)
personnel v/ere also armed and fought from caves vrhere they had hidden.
Part of the 2d Co, -1st Ind MG En defendedfc.b.epecoDd field
from the NW, supporting the 9 ^ Independent AT Bn arired with high velocity
hfvw AT guns. To the east of the field the 11thid1 5n covered all approached
and the runways themselves. Several tanks from the cSth 0?tak regiment were
employed from du-dn positions in the indicate tfeferse of Airfield #2,
Tie defense&s after the taking of this objective, were never
again so effective froa the standpoint cf casra.lt iec infIf. cted. Between #2
and #3 airfields, on.1 y t h e 3 1 0 I n < i e P Inf Bn blocked the way using straggler*
from other imits to fill the gaps. In the attenk toward the third airfield
*the "Pocket" was iaet on the right flank and a 2 week battle ensued,
A last line of* defense running SI from TA 233 through the air field and into the pocket was manned in the HOT 9 2 of A by an assortment of
stragglers; melded. Into a defensive sector held chiefly by the 26th Tk
Hegt, 3d. Bn 1^5thEe/rt and the North Sector NI*F of the Iwo Guard Unit,
. . > ' .. Escorting constant pressure all along its front, HOT 9 f Of feed
.-;; - .a, we<ige on its ^eft flank which'reached the ocean and mopping up from the.

r e a r b e g a n , ' : . . . . . .-..- ~ " " : ; ^ ' ' -'" ;,. ' "
;

'

/j

^ : ' '

Supporting the three units manning the last defensive line

were elements of ths 1st Indep M& Bnr- the Arty Bn of the ikyth Inf Regt (use*
as infantry when their weapons were; destroyed) and the 11th Ind ATBn,
Slowly-a Btrons well OrganizeB. pdek^^ was <i<?ve3opedin TAs
216-X,T, 201-D,B,I,J and 202-AfB with the ?.6th Tk Regt s s a cere with about
. 20 flight and modfauntanks, s.11 diig in. The 11thAT Xa protected the approach es from attack from any direction, Remnants of the 3lA!-th Ind Inf and most of
the Tamanayama N J s formed the infantry component of the pocket, Prom acom Lt1 plex cave system of many entrances, chambers a hundied feet deep, passages
hundreds of yards long, .thepocket withstood two weeks cf reaseless assault
before being overrun, ^__,
This pocket typefteii jthe enemy infa.it 1 / cction throughout,
yrom their cave and pillbox positions, they could fira 'n any direction. When
rockets, artillery, mortars and 'tanks supported cur attack, the enemy moved
deeper into his cave system until the preparation or barrage had ceased, then
returned to hir, protected firifig'positions; Long after the pocket had been
ovcrrvji and ca~ee see.le'*.. the' on-^my vouxd dig or blast lfis way out ?nd fight
again. . " '

Subject; Action Heport

WtmW)t%j^

20 April

During the campaign tmvrtwfdflL fa landing to the day when

the bulk of R T 9 reembarked, February 2k-Afi{l^m an estimated *4219 eneay C were killed, 1208 caves and pillboxes destroyec$^9 tanks knocked out, 66 a r t i l l e r y pieces, mortars, rockets anJL A ? guns captured or destroyed. S3 S P W were taken* O a P R III. AT Chronological account of the action.

Note: The map herein referred to is the Special Air and Oun netfy ffsrget Map I O JIJU, Scale: 1:10,000, All time referred to herein i t W Zone KING (2-10),. A. The regiment was committed to action on 25 February by pass-* in through the lines of the 21st Marines, 3d Mar Bir, The i n i t i a l attack commenced at 0930 following a heavy Arty and Naval gunfire preparation with the 1st and 2d battalions abreast, 1st Bn on the right. Heevy f i r e from . along the entire front met any of our advances. 'i'Lis recistance* the type of which was foimd to prevail throughout the several Keeksr action, consisted of snail armc f i r e from except iona,.\ly well concealed -positions, so well concle4 in fact, that our troops were unable to locate the srorae in many instances un t i l within 25 yards of i t . Areas in defilade to one enemy automatic weapon were covered by another and presented a difficult problem throughout the action. In addition enemy mortar, a r t i l l e r y and occassaionally rccket fire was well sightad in on a l l approaches to his positions and many times intense fire on our advancing troops and front lines caused severe damage and stopped any move ment at i t s inception. l h a , f i r s t day!s attack progressed slow3y in face of heavy mortar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e . Tanks were brought into,use, but because of accurate heavy anti-tank fire they were unable to assist appreciably. This d&y:e acticu took place on and around Airfield number 2. The 1st 3n having crossed the E W run ~ way in passing througL the 21:sV Marines right, advanced tovarA Hill 200-P; the commahdihg ground directly in i t s sector. Reaching Thi". h i l l necessitate"! crossing* the NB-SV runway of Airfield number 2 which, was well oovered by small arms, mortar and anti-tank f i r e . A number of the taioks which nosed cntb the runway became casualties* almost immediately, and some of the infantry troops fared l i t t l e better. However, units did, with the assistance of supporting a r t i l l e r y and NG3\ cross and gain the base of 200-P* %nd after heavy fighting, had a foothold on the hill* . The 2d Bn on the left met heavy resistance in the form of small , arms f i r e ftfom well dug-in and concealed pillboxes on ^ rici^e in i t s left flank. At t h i s particular area tanks were able to render valuable assistance with point-blank fire on enemy installations. Tank acbivity was confined to a small area because of the terrain and enemy f i r e , but the presence and fire support of two or three tanks was a decided advantage* Co G, the left Co'of the 2d Bn, after sustaining serious losses made a 200 yard advance oh the left. The right of the 2d Bn made similiar gains against heavy reactance. At 1^30 of the f i r s t day, the 3d Bii Was c o u n t e d to flank from the v*ight th6 strb'hg enemy positions holding up ihe 2d Bn. Thie battalion crossed tlite airfield' between tho f i r s t and second batteJLicns at 195-V,' and in d rapid 'thrust auc c edod in advancing feo yards from the a i r f i e l d . The advance war stopped y aa tae enemy poured well aimed, intense Arty and rortar fire en the , elements of this battalion thus interdicting them from the &ro\Jid The f i r e was so intense aB to cause an adjnsirnoiD'1' <y9 posi^icvi b;r the 3d 3n. to the north e<Xge of the airfield wnore i t tied f.a oeJvv'ee.i the 1st anX 2r? r.B+ The f i r s t ^ayTs fighting then netted this rc.^int^Av <& dd^arcy ax1 a2one i t s front of froa 200 cp '400 yards. Action of the ?auu< .iatr.ro r.3 th?.t described above conl'oiued for two more drys on 2o and 27 if^bna^y v- the general vicini.ty of airfield number 2. Eacli mcrniiw; a pre-Ki \:f hou.. ftitil.'-oiy ar.d FG31 preparation of he^vy intensity was laiC down on en^iry pooifiontJ- Tanks ramr into more c,nd more use, asp.eria.1 ly'on" the left, and aided the advance materially* Infantry troops1 fought cloce :".n, using flame throwsrs, anti-taak rockets to goou adv.aiitage# wtoalc' on 27 IPebxiaary resulted ir. sjaall g*\5no 0:1 the left onet* ow the" righ4"- of the rg''.me.it. The 1st B en n the' north slope of Hill 20C-P and around the base or. boti

20 ^ p r i l l91+5

Fire from well concepled positions on the north slope of HILL 200-P and frow
the h i l l at 199*-Q prevented a sizeable advance, l i r e from 1B9-0 also hindred
the 2d battalion 1 8 movement on the left. An attack at 1250 the "seme day, how ever, well coordinated with Arty fife finally "broke the severity of the r e sistance^ and both battalions were able to .move ahead'and clean out a great
many positions to their immediate fronts, hi afternoon attack was made not
without losses to our own troops as the enemy, though overwhelmed with fire,
continued to fiis&t "back, Both h i l l s 200~? and 199-0 were taken. At the close
of the third day of action of the regiment (B plus %), i t had captured e.ir* f ield Ho 2 and commanding terrain in proximity of i t and had advanced the 3&
Mar Div front Iin3s from 300 to 1200 yards, features of this action were the
s k i l l , determination and aggressivaness displayed "by our own troops* the un precedented tenacity and defensive resourc#fullness displayed by the enemy
(in the left of the 2d 3n 77 large pillboxes were counted); the decisive aid
rondsr^d infantry troops by tanks; and finally* the excellent coordination of
a l l supporting units with infantry manauvera. After the action described above, the 9th Marines passed into
division reserve aftar a passage of lines by the 21st Marines at 0S15 on Tab
23. On March 1st at 1&J-5 th* 1st 3n 9th Marines passed through the 3d 3n 21st Marines, the right battalion of that regiment, and began an action which might be called the second phase of the 9th rMar action* Here commenced an attack on &. strongly fortified enemy position manned by an estimated Inf b&ttaltanless one company (the 1^5th -Inf) plus tanks. The enemy had. organised an area of roughly 600 by 300 yards, the center of which appeared to be about at 201-D end a, or 1000 yards due east t>f the village of M65JOT.$U* . In this .area the enemy resisted savagely to the lest man for sixteen days.. He,fought from well concealed caves dug deep into rock; from large bunkers each pro tected by mutually supporting pillboxes which' wera in turn protectect.by r i f l e p i t s , end from d-sip pits dug straight, down 15 to *K) feet into the .aerth. At lb^-5 on 1 March, tha 1st 3n passed through the lines of the 3d 3n 21st Marines snd mrda small gains bafore being stopped by small arms fire from conceded positions to the front pnd right front, he Bagtl frpnt line at the time was about $00 yerds 3ast of M T T M running north end south OOA u end w*is of some 300 yerds froxitagd. This point may^be spid to 'be the outer defense of the enemy strong point just described.' On th3 morning of 2 Marcli the'2d in moved into position on the* left of tha 1st 3n and the two battalions, attacked abreast at 0S00. This attack was precdaded by 30 minutes each of 5GS1 and a r t i l l e r y preparation, 3oth battplions werj &bl^ to move forwexd i n i t i a l l y , but were stopped soon by intense enemy f i r e . Another atte-ck 'b:r both battalions at 1*53$ the *ama day, this also proceeded by a r t i l l e r y rnd H - ' barrs^es, netted only small gains, G7 the result again of hc3avy small earns fir a from the front end right front. At intervals intanse anamy inortcr and a r t i l l e r y fir<3 f e l l on the attackdra and inflicted numerous casualties, Supporting a r t i l l e r y was drpwn in close to the front lines in an attempt to alleviate the f i r e , lanxt enemy M positions & even closer to the front lines than p.rtillery could safely be placed con tinued to pin down the pttacking elements^. Tenks from Co C ^d Tank 3n sup porting the 1st 3n succeeded in knocking out a number of enemy installations late' in the afternoon of this day,. Attacks wera made on 3 ^ && & of March against enamy posi tions in this area. On each day the 1st and 2d 3ns attacked abreast after th> usual heavy, a r t i l l e r y , air and BQrY prapp-ration. In spit a of a l l of the preparatory fires (artillery alone fired upwards from 1500 rds per preparation), no large gains' ware- made. Supporting firas ware not confined to preparations, but- continued elDost constantly and s t i l l the enemy persisted apparently N.in-* effected. Advances up to a total, of 150 yards wer^ made during these three df^ys, afcar wjiich no noticeeble decrease of onrfmy resistance prevail-ad, The egtl; frontage during this period was about 5OO-6OO yp;:ds running north and south, and the center of the front lines was about 600 yards due ea.3t of
Page 5

Subject:

Action Report

On the. night of 6 Mtrch the regiment received order for an attack to jump off at 0500 on 7 March thus tfJdtng advantage of about 1 hour of darkness. The 3d 3n 9th Mar, at .the time attached to the 21st Marines, was to"attack at the same hour in a southeasterly direction from a position on the left of the 2d 3n and seize HILL 362, The attack jumped off at 0500 7 March, preceeded hy smoke preparation. Tha attack apparently heA i t s de sired surprise effect and both battalions advanced up to 200 yards a l l along their fronts. 3y 0100 of the ssjne day, howevar, the two assault companies of the 2d 3n and the l e f t company of the 1st 3n were pinned down by fire from both the front and from by-prssed positions to the rear. Tha 2d 3n companies, Co 3 and Co 3 suffered here their severest casualties of the campaign. About ? noon the enemy counterattacked in the 2d 3n sector accompanied by heavy mortax f i r a . The 2es company of the 2d 3n with supporting tanks was moved into posit ion and aided tho assault companies in repulsing the attack. Assault platoons of Co f of the 2d 2n were pinned down by enemy fie for more than 30 hours and were finally removed from the position by tafrkS|Who skillfully moved into the area and brought out the few remaining riflemen and company commander. Meanwhile during the day of 7 March, Co C of the 1st 3n attacked and seized some high ground on the right of the battalion sector* The enemy, however, soon placed effective heavy mortax fire on the h i l l eii6. inflicted a loss of ^h o.ut of the 5^ attacking troops forcing them to abandon this pesition in the face of registered K and Mort fira for one in defilade behind the h i l l . G The 3d 3n, during this day succeeded in capturing HILL 3^2, an important gain for the entire Corps. During the last four days' action tanks of the 3d Tk 3n, 3d Mar Div ware employed and proved to ba the most formidable supporting weapon at our disposal, hair use wns restricted *gr two features, namaly terrain and well sighted heavy enemy anti-tank guns which disabled tanks in some in stances with one well placed round* The former difficulty was overcome to some extent by bulldozing roads with tank dozers and an exmored ftulldo*er; the l a t t e r difficulty by overrunning AT gun positions. A mines were also a T serious hazard which was difficult to ovarcoj&a as en?my f i r e prevented mine removal. Special engineer aiid Inf teams arid tank and Inf teams had t e be im provised for use of tanks due to nt. reads- or mined roads. In the vicinity of the area under discussion an estimated 15 tenks were disabled, nevertheless, tank support was the deciding factor in this action as will be further veri fied belew, With the seizure of HILL 362 en March 7 by the 3d 3n, the reg iment was.able to surround partially the enemy resistance which had been hold ing up any considerable advance for days. Sasistanca now remained in front of the 1st end 2d battalions and on the .long ridge at 202-A,3,G-,E. On Mex'ch.U the 3d 3n 21st Marines was attached to the 9th Max, The former passed through the 1st 3n 9th Max and attacked with the 3d 3n 9th Max on i t s l e f t . The 2d 3n held i t s ground of the previous day pnd with the assistance of tanks begfn a systematic cleaning up of the resistance to i t s front. On this day the 3d-"3n 9th Mar began en attack from HILL 362 to the coastline/ reaching i t s objective on the morning of March 10. The 3d 3n 21st on the right of the regiment hammered at what later va.s found to be the approximate center of the enemy position* Arty and rockets did l i t t l e to soften the resistance, and the use of tanks was very restricted, the rough terrain being the limiting factor. The 3d 3n 21st Marinas continued i t s attack in the face of fierce resistance, on March 9 rnd 10, and n&&& small gains. Thasa gains, though they did result in tha OT-%rr*Jinring of soma positions, did not noti cably decrease tha enemy's .defnsiv3 power. I t WF,S decided to further an valop this strong point by attaching the ridge 202~A,3,G>E from the south rr.ther than frontally, and to than push to tha coast on the risrht of the ?.egtl Z of A and join the 3d "n 9th Mar on the bench. Orders were issued accordingly to the 1st 3n, and i t jumped off on'ah attack to the north at 1535 10 March. Tha attack was mat immediately by enamy small arms f i r e and this battalion succeeded no farther than to a smaller ridge\at 201-U, 600 yarls from i t s objective where i t tied in on the left.with tjfr* 3d 3n 21st Max. On March 11 tha 1st 3n was ordered to contact Jh6 3* 3n 9th Page .

* *
#

$ .

4{-.0it\

Subject:

Action Beport

(Cont!d)

20 April

Mar along the beach at 202-3, the approximate center of the Segtl Zone of Action* The 2egtl attack order for the dey called for, in. addition to that v mission just stated, the 1st Jin to'attack KS? sieze the ridge, and then attack !3e,st, The attack jumped off at O73> At l5l5 the 1st 3n^and 3d 2n 9th made physical contact on the "beach in the centar of the Begtl Zone of Action and "began mopping up toward the high ground overlooking the "beach, These two battalions made contact a f just south of KILL 3^2* O h i l l 202 H% n *i, which the 3d 3n seized in a rapid adven*ce from just east of i l l l l 3^2 against slight resistance. T < high ground S O yards off of the beech was h C organized for the night, and the beach i t s e l f 'eatposted. The 3 ^ n 21st Mar & during the day attacked eastward against the ever-strong defenses, a . suc a& ceeded in destroying positions, but were unable to mske a meeiureable advance. On March 12 th enemy s t i l l held'out in two areas. One in the previously described area 1000 yards Sast of K T YA A an area of about kOO OO - M , yards square and, two, on the extreme S3 end of the ridge 202-G,H an area of about 200 yards sq.uare. i t was the decision of the 3.egtl Comdr to neglect the l a t t e r pocket until a few days l a t e r , since i t was small and isolated end offered no serious trouble, and to concent ret e on the larger end far more heavily defended area. The disposition of our troops on the evening of 11 March wp.s t h i s : The, 3d 3n 21st Mer facing eastward in frontage of 200-300 yards, and the 1st and 3& 3ns 9th Mar facing westward on a frontage of cboub 600 yards. 500^600 yprds separated thasa two forces who were in fact facing each other. The ground, "between these forces contained the last large remnanty of Jap anese in the 3d Mar Div Sone of Action. The 2d 3n as division reserve was just east of M T Y M , and had been engaged during the days previous to t h i s OO A A in mopping up the northernmost remaining enemy of the satte strong point. I t also formed a line some ^-00 yards! long which presented a etop^gap for my enemy withdrawal or escape westward from this pocket. Orders were given for an attack in a westward direction with two battalions abreast; the 1st rnd 3<i 3ns 9th Mar.- The 3d 3n 21st Mar was to act as a holding force as was the division reserve,- the 2d Sn 9th Msr, The attack ^uiff^ed off at 0700, 12 y$rmThe 1st 3n met strong resistance pnd it advance was slow* Tanks were brought into the action^ but their use was again restricted by poor terrain. An armvad bulldozer was used to d e a r a road for the tanks. At.most, two tanks were able t operate in $hls area, ' ^ i e 3& 3a 9th Mer to the north had some what easier going as resistance was l i g h t , especially on i t s righfc (H) The same attack was continued *n March 13th and agaii> on March, The 1st ^n relieved the engaged elements of the 3d Bn 21st Mar on the morning of March 13th and the l e t t e r reverted t control of i t s own regiment at 0930 13 .March'., definite progress was made by the 1st 3n who, with the use of tamjes, succeeded in knocking out many well fortified positions* The 3^ 5n had cleared i t s zone of action and had withdrawn-on the morning of lh .March. to the vicinity. f HILL 362 thereat* iiommence systematic mopping up* *.t 153 the 24 3n 9th Mex reverted from Div Hes to control, and et 17^+5 passed through the 1st isn in an attack on the rejoining enemy pocket- which at this i.lme.\he.d "been reduced to an area x f about l^0 ycrds square. AX 1100 on the lUth the > WeKp^na Company 9th Marine* commenced mopping up the aforementioned remaining resistance on the ridge at 202~0-,H, ?he enemy here vrns again dug-in, in .caves <ai/5ng the seaweed cliff face of the ridge E M on top ^of t h e ridge at ..fche. S3 tip* The; enemy forces hsra, were not l^.rge, but ware p,s tenacious ;f-fi-:-else"riaereen4-resisted to tho las';. On the 15th and l6;jh of Mrx'ch tha -2d 3n rirtA the Wpns 0--cOBk |;inued their actions tigainsb refpective i>ockdts. The 2d 3n had use of a 3-aree flama thrower tank which belons^d to -the 5th Krx Div end used i t to ex^^iiant-advantage, Thi& taak, which shoots a flnme about 125 .vards, proved to * a the weapon that worked when'ell other* failed. I t s long tlzma rftn^e > end the area corerad by Dne "burst were the contributing factors, to i t s r^ The Weapons*' Co used i t s 75ram SF guns to blast coves in the seaward- face of the cliff 3 on l}Hh March, and the entire C operated as 1ft o f entry on the 15th and l^th Krrch in u*- attack S J ^ | | | ^ ^ ^ f j h a Hdga. 3

Subject*.

Action Report

(Oont'd)

'

20 April,

At 1350 n 16 March tha 2d 3n repprted overrunning a l l ised resistance in the enemy strong point at, 2G1-P aa& tha-tfpns Co had com pleted i t s mopping up an tb.d ridge at 202-0 ,H : to such an. arb*?nt that the Ragtl CoinSr was a"ble to r.dpTt that all, organized-reistance-had ceasad in the 9th Marinas Zkno of Action,. This ended the'assault.- phaso of this operation,, On 17 Mar^h, >*gstn the'mopping up phe,sd of the rtper&tion.,- .This operated l a the-...original* cone of action on this, date. On IS March mo?ad into the Uth Biv zone of, action relieving that.Div end "bag^nning pa t r o l l i n g and napping up perations in that sector. Mopping up was carried, on t>y patrols ranging in size, from on roinferced Sq,d to osa' roinf6u?c-i. p l a - : t5n. Th* average num"ber of patrols daily: was f i f t e e n , , Demolition men from Ca A 3d 3n^r 3n accompanied the patrols and tlaw ca^es as they wero aisoovered. On 26 March the Eegt todlt ever an additional area of-patrol which then'gave i t roughly half of the i'sland to patrol and mop-'up. up progressed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , Uo or^ai1.sed resistance s^ain presented *.$>self save a sjall pocket at 18^U2J, lfi?5-A which hetd, out against the ^i for three days after i t was discovered. It was f i n a l l y eliminated-with flam^e throvers, AT rockets -and Aeiaoli.feiojftiu AmTsushes were sat. at night and succeeded in killlni?WndBrinarwngH"E!rWps end'individuals u of hiding in saai^ch of food-end water. During the mopping " p phase the r e g i meni k i l l e d 306 and captured 65 Japanese and sealed 7^7 caves. Tha re/jimant-. found and "buried 3^5 previously, k i l l e d Japs end removed nineteen Marine "bodies of tae.Uth Mar Div to the Division Gametery* . . ;.., . Qn April kth 19U5 the l ^ t h Inf AtJS-relieved the 9th -Her,..-of. a l l patrol and security .responsi"bility, Tha.'battallans coaimencad.reembarkaw tion on 6 April, The 1 s t and 2d battalions em"barkei that date de.parta,&fr.oa UM n IVO.JIMA on 7 April* and arrived at G A % April 3 19^5. The Third b a t t a l i o n embarked April 12 arrived at G JM April IS l9"+5^ T^ * * ,; . i PART IV. V / &* 1. Comments. .> . , . . ,' . -,

Administration.

Casualties of .th^s regiment to 1300 k ^ r i l 19U5 are as follows 1 KU tU MIA GST 22

62
0 IB

1*402 19^

k&

ML

TOTALS

50S

lJ+o*^ 2Q3b

vrn
TOTALS

7 53

7 57

Parssnnal data sheets- prepared prior to combat provad a very expeditious means of casualty raport^g^v I t was necessary to-prepare ^ddit ionel sheats to report second jwyund^or a .chanfra i n / s t a t u s , A supply of the5 should "be prepared prior to, an>f oper^ajtiQ^^ . SJr-rqrs occur ad i n reporting da^s of casual.ties, Greater accur-aey 0 0 ^ d -havevbean obtained *ap ?>ori allovi-sg company ttyp$&1$i%%tg$&:m6r*- tln>. to verify'infot from squad leaders, ate, . > 2. Morale throughout the operation was excellent. Graves r a e i s personnel functioned a^sresivaly in the prompt removal of our dead, MaM received yas promptly, dispatched to front l i n e units sad .distribution effected in every case as soon as tha t^eb-tc.al situation allowed. In tha dec-n up phaee of tha campaign movias vjre efcu*n nightly, 3 PO'ffs were processed " y Xntllieanc.a end laneuaga personnel. b Ho c i v i l i a n s or natiires were encour.toredw Page < ^

r f l (Contact) 3, 1,
'

'

20 April,

Intelligence.
Maps end Photos, prior U operation*

a ; M a p s . : . . / . . ; . -. ..r ' . ' ' .

1:5,000 IWO, Terrain, Special Air & Gunnery.

3.rlOf<Pp XtfOy !?firr*.in; Special Air A Gunnery.
l?100C0 X O Eifemy F.spo^it?.on, Special Air & Gunnery.
W? lJlCfQOi') IWOi 3 shaftt^j 3ne-iy i)i spo.sitioti, Special Air

Gunnery.

:
1:20,000 IWOi t e r r a i n , Special Air & Gunnery. l n - 2 nautical miles XVrOj^fcr^ain. 1:30,000 (approximately) . W - lov Troops. Y O. 1? 1[>,000 (spproxJ-ta^te^y) TWO, Hoad Ma.pe .

There was an adequate supply of a31 maps. More *raaps of scale 1120,000 could hare been used Lecause J I tb.e:'xs .uonv**nleii* risse* The 1?20,000, for an operafc5.on on an island tMs $\\:z is very satisfactory. The l?f-,OCO map was too large to "be us^fi'5!., and where i s l i t t l e need .for a Etap of fchis scale for any kici of work, l'he Eaps whan made wera eviden'tXy accurate. Subsequent cons-ruction by the enemy and great changes "brought about by bombar<?mort and shelling, howeverf' raada the iaaps almost unreadable at some stages of the cam paign. " . b* Photos.

Prior to the operation, a large number of photos, ob lique, verticals and mosaics of a l l scales, were distributed to this Hq..
Sime t h i r organization did not land J n assault, obliqueg of^ t i e beach were
^ only of casual interest. Oblique^ taken of verz'ai'a inland are seldom of
mr.cn value because of their inherent orientation characteristics except as
net el i?i p2,rai'raph 2 .
Sufficient photos of scale 1,10r000 and above were available, buk these photos lose much of their value because of need for magnifying glasses, stereoscopes and considerable API training to understand thea, lijiCOO photos can be read and understood by a l l personnel who will have acres'? to photos. Sufficient quantities of photos of this scale were net f-vailatle. The value of mosaics i s questionable t but they are better than no photo (unless lithographed), and thsy are easy to handle* 2. Maps and Photos* during operation,

Up to date maps of..enemy dispositions (1:10,000) were

iistriimted during the operation. All requests for maps needed to replace
losoes were filled. There were sufficient maps at a l l times, . Sorae photos in small quantity but large scale were during the operation. The pho^oe, u.ucrti;nate}y, vere of very poor * Several rsquost-i for phoJjoe vere :nade bub revolts were URfcr/bis in ^jxntity. Coverage and qt^ality. It :ls >elieved that if high and ?.ow an,,^le ob~-iqj.es of centers of reaistanoe or pockets couldbe x iri:*ta^ aad ii-siribiitad -^tain Pk hours t.hey wauld be of

B 1? lar.dod in reserve cjid a l l necessary hydro graphic O) .3 information was sent frc.a tan b^ac'i. iiiiTu whi.-;L<wap available pricr to vho lauding was .rear.ourVly a:.cu:-ata and -in suf fic.ien-i q,iantity. Pago 9

Subject: Action Report k.

(Ctnt'd)

* t f ^ f S O April 19**$

Intelligence diseminated from G-2.

-j .

Jlasn reports frtm IJivision were made promptly and completely and follcw-upB were made where necessary* G-2 Periodic re ports reached this Bq about l6 hour* after the end of the period* facil~ i t i e s were not available in this Hq t send copies down to battalions and i t i s suggested k or 5 copies of 0-2 report be sent by 0-2, It i s f e l t that more information of an intelligence nature b made available concern ing adjacent divisions. The C~2 report i s received Mo hours after the period and i s only a summary. 5. Recovery of enemy documents and material.

The use of Intelligence Teams composed of about 5 men under an N O i s effective in recovery of enemy documents and naterial. C JICP0A Div Reconnaissance Co and similiar organizations are of help in ltcating documents and material, 6* a* Language Personnel* No language officers permanently attached*

b Two language officers were attached temporarily. Their work in document sorting was satisfactory. They were the chief factors in the capture of most of the S3 P W taken by the 9th Marines* O s ^ ;4 It iai recommended that sia^h officers, "be atta^h^ll^jiiii: about ono month prior to date of; embarkation in order to train Intelligence teams and to indoctrinate all personnel in the importance of capturing P0Wst turning in documents and reporting locations of material* c. No language enlisted personnel attached*

d* The enlisted men, temporarily attached* of whom there were five, one in each Bn, two in fi&S 0o were used to make the preliminary interrogation of prisoners, %ct guard them, to sort documents and to deliver them to the next echelon* Insofar as thoy had been trained* they were effective. They are not qualified to make more than a preliminary interrogation* In further questioning, the interrogators tend to use leading questions which almost invariably result in an exaggerated report* They tend to over emphasise the importance of many documents* e. No Nisei attached. In one case a USA Nisei of Island Conwaand made a hasty interrogation of a wounded prisoner, passed on, with out further checking, the report that 1000 organised armed enemy remained^ in the E T 9 area under eomaAnd of a major. This report caused ooj C erable unnecessary effort on the pan of the 9th CT. Our fleers further interrogated this prisoner and learned that: (1) prisoner gave wrong name and rank. (2) Prisoner had never seen more than U of-this ^1000

anapd enemyf.

(3) He w4s ia ths area named only 2 nights* (H) Xi oMstderst estimaU was possibly 300 aad know no%hinf m^it their weapons*
" ' ' (?) Ali ^fficr^i^od.^^'t^^

J00 f had, eeoording to other prisoners, been dead for cone time.

On the other hand, Nisei attached to Division working in this CT*s Z af A showed considerable -bravery and ingeniuty in their attempts to induee enemy to surrender. ' Page 10

Action lieport 7,

(Ooat1^)

20 * p r i ! 19*+5.

Yocftl eJid

Afccrttthalf tk# prisoners had seen written propaganda, "but only 5-10 acted on i t . Very faw reportad h e x i n g the sound truck. Sound equipment, hand carried to the mouths of caves, was af;ffeefctvi# Troops should "be carefully informed of instructions contained in l e a f l e t s . Closer liaison should 'be established between sound truck personnel end the unit present in the area they intend to -work* H. JlpPOA and Qaves.

Uo JICPOA personae! attached. - Bequests for tOTPOA T personnel to pick up captured equipment, supposedly of interest to them, were seldom answered the day of the request. 9,
:

Counter Intelligence.

''Uo counter int elligence measures taken other than those N established in SOQ?s. ' Special or dis tinctive enemy t a c t i c s , * From the f i r s t contact i t wag evident th?t the enemy in tended to conduct a defensive "battle from long prepared positions,f making the capture of each position es expensive as possible. The enemy s tanks, of which ha had about 20 in the 9th 0!T 2 of A, were never used as more than highly mobile a r t i l l e r y , to be dug-in whenever possible. They were not u*d in an attack against any elements of this unit. . His aaifci-fcank guns which were very effective against our tsinks completely covered airfields' #2 and #3 e^d- * ild approaches to them. When teaks Were not p r e s e t as targets, the enemy usad his &T guns against personnel. His fear of our taafcs was evident from the "beginning, imy un covered movement "by the tanks brought a shower of a r t i l l e r y and mortar f i r e , Almost without exception! Wads were mined, approaches to important i n s t a l l ations were mined. In several instances, when tanks preceeded the infantry in attack* the enemy laid a smokescreen round the tf-nks in order to permit his infantry to attack them. Such attacks were "broken up chiefly "because of the poor quality of t h e i r smokancreen, His defense, as a whole, was orthodox, well thought out end tenaciously maintained. !Phe enemy counter attacked only to regain close in local objectives. Ho large scale ^bBeizai1' attacks were made. Whenever gaps in our lines ware discovered, the enemy attempted infiltration. His defense in 3D? 9 Z of A wes built altxng two lines, ona running through e i r field #2 from east to west and the second in the vicinity of airfield #3 running W-S3. She enemyfs intricate crve system combined with wall placed pillbdSes ma;da him axtremajy difficult to reach, either with infan try or shelling or bombing. His defense which pertoitted him to f i ^ t from covered positions with, adequate a r t i l l e r y and mortar support. aerainst ex posed troops was the most 3ffactive yet encountered by this organization. 111. Snamy. Intalligdnce Orgpjiization* 10.

3n3myfs intelligence organization is difficult to evaluate. His usa of obsarvrtipn was excellent throughout the operation. He usually knavr of 6r found the gaps in our lines and attempted i n f i l t r a tion through them. On at least on* occ&sfcion, his night security was poor for in a predawn attack our troops moved to or passed through his lines virtually no opposition for as long as half Page 11

Action Jtepor*rf .W^f t ^ | | ^ p t ^ ^

20 April

S&ere was no evidence of his destroying documents, "but the nature of his defense caused many documents to T * buried or'sealed in " y our > b Prisoner8 showed no evidence of having >ean told how to conduct i f eaptured; for the most part they were willing to answer.any question they could, and many volunteered to help in ai^ way they could. TJnder interro gation they so lacked instruction thet %bo$r gave the password end counter signs '-.. . . -" Diaries and reports indicate that they had "been expect ing the landing, hut no evidence was found to show that this was more than estimation of plans. . ; < '
12. C i v i l i a n Population. -:'

civilian personnel on the island had "been evacua- ' ted prior to our landing* ^ X$i . a. Hew Tactics and New tactics* (xj Time-fire* ' '""*"'"**'*"'"*-"*"'

(2) T7se of smoke against /m individual tank to cofer and infmtry attack* ' " (3) TTse of caves to h o u a s a l l personnel; on island . with installations as much as 1000 yards long end 100 feet deep* "b.
tank*

Uew Weapons.

' ; ' -
::

(1)
'

^7XT shell which would pierce Current of Sherman

. V ' .

(2) "dockets*
(3) 150m and 320mm mortars.

-.^ ...:^ . . -*
.. .... * *

(k) '' Pottery end wooden land mines. lU- # Jiaison. .

Intelligence liaison vltEin the Uivision WP.S good. As noted earlier, i t is suggested th&t enoui^i 'copies of l^eridfiic^report " e b made to effect distriijution to "battalions* * Tery l i t t l e knowledge of tha situation of Divisions on "both flanks we.s available* A summary of R4T . jacent division activity included in or with 34 W^ DivPeriodic report
w o u l d "be h e l p f u l . ";;f^;

. . / .
;;>

' . . / ' y . * - / * -

0. .

_ '

Operations and draining*

::

' - >''

1* ?ro'ba'g5v)<^e m s t ^ZnjStfrSaa^hksised training' subject wasJthe tactics of the P. SojLr^^tiCuT^ tions. All r i f l e units' had a considera^ii enibtait of t h i i training which in** eluded a great deal of field firing 'and he4 "become hi #ly proficient. Troops were trained to assault'^ililfoiaji^4n'%eai!hf^^V''ifaeA lirith a flsjne thrower, smoke grenades end demolitions. Inf-^k;-training was instituted, 'but insuf-^ f i c i e n t l y enrphasi^ed. Kdre small uitlij tr^inine with trnk will famili^risse Sq.ds with tank problems of the type encountered at- r*0 JIMA vhe*e .tank roeds and tank operations had t<? " e made under cover of infantry weapons, b - L Of i^eat "benefit during the pre-operption training period,was a large amount of f i e l d firing of a l l infantry weapons. All r i f l e company men were familiar with their company weapons* they were well trained in moving under their ow-*itre and employing and coordinatii ing weapons. *ag 12 ' j

Subject:

Action Report

(Cent rd)

'

20 April

2, The most effective supporting weapon in this action was the. tank. Of the tanks the C3-H-1, which shoots a 125 yard flame from the muz zle of i t s 75mm gun, proved to be ^h most powerful offensive weapon at our disposal, <2he reason for this, it It supposed, i s that the flame wes able to enter small pillbox apertures end small cavo openings and to engulf all contours and folds of the structures. Positions that withstood constant v artillery, HG3\ ajad 7 m direct fire succumbed to the '03-8*1 taaks1 envelop- ;; 5 m
ing .-flame.. ' ' ''. ' . ' . . ., ". ' . '.,, , -.

;; The regular tank is, tq&ally a* i n s e r t a n t as the C3~K-1, ' v ^ throughout the a c t i o n these tanks rendered valuable stuport by. t h e | r ' h e a v y ' mobile f i r e power and s h i e l d i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , They destroyed :nundre.ds of p j l l b o x e s end other emplacement^ and were a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n t h e success of the a c t i o n , Tank crews were w e l l tr&ined, leadership, and cooperation were exemplary and worthy of commendiitionV / A r t i l l e r y , Hay, Air. "boraherdj&ent and mofter f i r e a l l aided. I t

i s difficult to judge the relative effectiveness 6f one against the other.

Generally, supporting fire from these weepont would have probably "been more
effective had larger shells and "boci^s all with delayed fuses /been us#d. A
75a fuze q.uick shell had l i t t l e ffe6t on an enemy "bunker. 5* Naval*'shells,
of which the largest'amount used was. the MO shall, in many instances
chipped the outer surfaces of some pillboxes which had walls of rein/orci&d
V*o#pVweiie' v^jtl under "'overhead' c^v 3^" 3Plem throwtw?s were valuable weapons. The .portable' tjrpe# ,27 f which were, carried " y each "battalion, were put to continual use in pleen b ing tut pillboxes and cav.es. T&era w^re occassjLdaa "where, on account,pf the flame throwers1 restricted range, thej^were ineffective, as the operator* could not get close enough to the target. . . , . . , . - - . . , . i Standard flame thrower tankB, the^type which' fired-f:Lm& its, front K - port f .were used to some..artent, "but this ,ves limited " y the G b terrain, Under -*fchis limitation tanks could not is'aneuvar^ sufficiantly to within 50 yards af*the target "and- so' tne -f 1 &Be' th*6wer"*was of not much use. Furthermore this flame thrower could'not be aimed*' without "moving tne tank which again handicapped,its value. The C3-H-1 tank, on the other hand, was an exceptional weapon and proved i t s worth time after time, as has been pr*~
v l o u s l y
.

recorded,
. , .
:

' .
. . . " .

'

-vt

. -," .' , ; ; W ' : ' V - :"'

' ' , ' > f ' ' ' ' . ,

_.". '/. ,".:'.. . . ' .

' * . ' ,

U, Infantry-tank coordination we* very good considering the dif ficulties encountered in terrain and severe battle conditions. Tank-person nel were very cooperative and familiar with infantry demands. ; There exists a * definite need, however, for additional training in'tank-infaatry taqtica. The tactics of tanfc-infantry ^un^Le fighting which emphasizes the employment of tank platoons, protected by an Inf unit, had been' discarded in our pre oparation t-raining infevor of open^erffain, tank-mess tactics. The former tactics- had to be used end were employed with the Resultant loss of effic- _. iency because of l i t t l e training, Surther trfining on all types of tankinfantry tectics i s highly advisable. All Comdrs and men must be taught to use tanks at every turn. They are a formidable weapon rnd make going ' ' ' *>Vy raaeaytfhfe-teaak^measuresconsiste'd primarily of very well emplaced anti-tank guns, the majority of which were U7mm, augmented by di rect fire from large eaiibre *U Wpns and Arty; : All open appropches^ to $he enemy! s pol i t ion which could be-;:negotifid^ed by tanks were veil covered. In addition-to these well spotted AS gvaas*? Arty Pnd Mortar enncantrat ions hadobviously been plotted, on certain tank approaches, and during.the early phase of the regiments p&rtiSip&tion-, hafy interdictor-" fire wws placed on tanks wherever they come".under the nemyfs observation. Anti-tank'mines Cttasdd some--trouble- and knocked o_ut'..aa2srFl tpuvs, though not-destroying th*m bayond recovery and repair in most ca^e. M1na removal was carried ^y BSngr and Inf tdkitft uftdar covering fira f r o m t t j M ) | | n | f | t 'f*f*

Subject: Actitn report . (Cont fl>rjLl 1 jGpfr^

20 April

The 3nemy had not cof*structed m J sonw ditches and remnant* of concrete obstacles were.encaunterQd,~T&" thTs"" RCtipn the terrain was itself an exc^ll^nt tnk obstacle especially at the northern twb-^thirds of the island* 6. War dogs ward not. used until the latter, stages of the opera tion and than not extensively* Thei* Soain lisa was' employmnt with moppinfe up patrols* an assig&mea'V;at which they worked, satisfa$ttitflly> though not exceptionally w$ll. $oga, also worked at nlgjit security. Reports from 3ns are not over commendatory about the? use: of 4&gIn *tE& cisufipaign. There were colp^laini* about performances and instanced cie where dogs hare not acted properly, stmt i t can "e iaid that dogs wer d&ciiely helpful in the task- as fd signed them, The psychological -factor nlone was a benefit especially as : security at night. ' . . ,. , Tha unuauel 'Dfidbtle conditions duriiig the assault phase of the operption,more or Lass precluded en extensive u^e of dogs at that" time except perhaps as^messengers and for security purposes. .7.^ . AT rockets were,, used extensively, " y front Una troops against b caves and pillboxes. These; rockets must >e classified as an effective w^e^ pon. They ware used to fi.rd..deep %u%&_peves which- could not otherwise- " e _ . b brought under fir^e. They were feble to penetrate small pillboxes, though re-^ latively few of thesewere encountered, and also to neutralize hasty Jio emplacements, j" . _ ' . . . 1 ' * . . iV Sarra^e rockets were used at 2Q1-!D by the ^d,3n, l^lst Marines whij.e attached to,this' regiment. Hea*^ pr^Pfsrations1 w&re fired for J w deys bo afc the same* general area fin en -attempt %<y soften .up the r^$istance-.thr^, It is almost unbelievable that their apparent effect,on this particular defeW sive position was neiigtt>re# Troops met he*vy resistance when, attacking on l i f t i n g of this fire, Thoui the resistance a,t t^tf peared not refected, it is believed, thft this rocket fire did hjnre'fW Effect on the uitimate downfall of the re$stence et this point. .The emtire s i t uation here speaks again for the unparalleled defense system ?nd the, deter mined deferisive spirit' of the enemy* ^ Supply.
%

1. .; "The mounting.i*ut supplies-^of .Olass I,( I| IIfI, IV, and V ^ we're adequate in every respect. *it aohtime during iheN inftipl ishase of the operation was there a shorte^e of any typ^T of .supplies. , ' . . 2 . . a, THe resupply of "Glass X articles (rations, "type 3) wes inadequate in thr.t before thie ^rm%r^jfirx\ of %#$ operation there wks'a short age of certain t^pesef food. sTMs^'aiio doubt caused' <fcie to the operation extending over a Ipnger period^ihan-^yaifc^anticipated, 'Jhdre WES ^a-s^ffiie^ quantity of emergency rations at <&Xl~ times'. In general* "although there * the vexied diet desired ther^ was sAfficifent food at all times* b, %b&. resuppljr of. glasses II, III, IV, end V was .adeq.uate a l l times' with the exception of tofiffl J.lluminoting, KS3 w/f 6 3 Ja# k Palietied Ccrgo ,^ri s;^veral instances,became, a. very > < . serious problem, bbtli In the XiHfcdl&? and ;t,jaldaciing. . *?hen loadingftfl-4un<-* loading palletised -carg i^ is* very esedntial ,that adequate exid proper equip ment_ i s furnished, , It was also fo,und t f t t seVereJ. of, the ships "hed nd ejg.ulp taent for handling-palleti*e^ cargo ?jid i t Xe-s impossible to u/fciy^e all available space, in the holdjs because the pallets were too/heavy Tor working pestles to staolc on top *f one another^ Proper slings for.loading end un loading palletized cargo is very essi.ehtlsl also. In severe! c*aq%l^-watf. necessary to break down a' good many pellets before they could be"Io"a3!ed# ' advantage. b,.' Wilson Drums proved satisfactory but It was noted, however> that, while they were Page Ik

Subjects Action Report . < Cont1 d

Segtl Q# dump i t was unnecessary to Wep. them covered in ^rder to keep equip ment Inside dry. The use of the drum i s limited in that Only mfclllartfcdk-ee can 'be stored therein. Some unite packed radio batteries and other heavy articles in the drums causing t&m to be too heavy to be easily.handled, kt Salvage and salvage collection worked very smoothly and very successfully in this regiment, A Salvage officer waa appointed prior to the operation along with a salvage detail $ tem men taken from the S and 8 platoon, During the final phase of salvage it was found thevt additional personnel were ndiddd and working parties of from ten to thirty additional men were furnished " y unit* of the regiment in a reserve status* All s a l b vage was "brought into the Su^.ld, dump where i t was "broken down, segregating the serviceable and unserviceable, Snougi serviceable equipment was re tained for re-issue to casualties returning to duty and replacing lost iterns> the remainder along with the unserviceable was turned into the division salvage. Salvaged enemy ammuni'tion and salvaged unusable} Amartean ammunition was turned over to the Oorps/Salvage dump* Items, of .anamy eojaipment too large to "be handled " y organisational equipment was reported to Division b
Salvage* . ,. . , ' '

Salvage during an operation "becomes a function of priae im portance. ong "before the lending, units should h?ve salvage crews design^' at ad and under the supervi si 6n ef en officer who i s thoroughly cojn
petent*. ' . ' ''."; ','; .

Salvage crews should "be trained in the proper procedure for

handling 'snemy mines, "boo"by traps and ejcmunition of all types, .:ilthough
a l l typee 'of equipment end' ammunition were telvaged,. only one accident oc curred in salvage during the entire operation. This accident in juried
three men, none critically. .
5; '.& Transportation during the entira operation presented b no pro^lei6'whktevar. With the unit transportation and Hhat furnished " y the attached K*T* Compeny adequate transportation was avail&'ble at a l l times The gdod ro%ds and short hauls, helped greatly' in the conservation of a l l transportation. Maintenance f a c i l i t i e s and edeqtuacv- of spere ^>arta were excellent1, fh MT. unit attached to this organization gnve excellent end prompt service on a l l vehicles needing servicing " * The Cargo Carrier M29c (Weasel) i s not satisfactory as
b a gendral purpoSd>vehicid. There 'are, however, several types of terrain in
whichvthis vehicle operates well, such.es deep loose sand, deep mud and
-swamps, ojiiat "bodies of watsr ana very st^ej? grades. Generally, tha cexgo carrier opafata8 wall in rough country whara roads ^re not available, "but dud to i t s low center, i t i s easily hung up, Ifhara roads era available, i t s slow speed and "the ease with which the tracks are thrown on turns greatly handicaps- i t s use. It has "be^n stated that tha cafgt carrier's low silhou ette makes this vahicla highly desirable for operation naar tha front lines. The silhouette of tha- truck t tA ^*K c?rgo# top removed, i s lowar. Tha Truck i ton, kiks cargo has much greatar speed and meneuvarability. In tha futura, i f cergo carriars era used, i t i s racom m^nded that they be stripped of pontoons and used exclusively as land operat ad veh'iclas* Vltb this racommandc'tion i t i s suggaatad that tha body panel b on the left aida of tka driver " a raaovad for ease in dismounting during . ' combat, It was found that tha trailer-1 ton, cargo i s too heavy a load for the Weasel* Pintlas wara ruined by too great a trailer load. The cargo carriar cannot compete with the $ ton truck . except under vary special conditions^
' . Page 15

Subject:

Action Report Artillery.

w * a n l _ l C%<^

20 April

The 1st jallat ion 12th Marines was embarked and landed by ; "batteries with the 3_Ts of this regiment. A rtillery fire was furnished this ragiraent from i t s first attack until ihe cessation of hostilities, A liaison officer from the 1st 3n 12th Marines was always presant with the . Hegtl operations section pnd the Inf 3ns ware likewise in liaison with the Arty. . '..;. Artillery fira w > always prompt pnd.in the quantity called *s for. This fire support was th# most reliable for *all missions of all sup ' ' porting arms, . . ,*, * < *&* *
The a r t i l l e r y communication system, as i t a f f e c t e d t h i s !l3gt functioned p e r f e c t l y almost throughout the. operation. Telephone communi* c a t i o n with the front l i n e forward obsarverB was e x c e l l e n t and w a l l main

tained, and of ten resulted in rapid dispatch 6f first hand information to. the JUgtl CP. itadio also was good* though, some difficulty was encountered with the $03. 6l0 radio "because of i t s frequency selectivity, A change to the 50H J00 radio is recommendecL. Most fire missions were conducted " y tele b phone. The 75ram shell was too small to Ife effective against the type of installatiftna encountered. More d^siructive. power was needed. There were very few instances where rd enemy personnel were ^eoqJosed Sufficiently to " e b seriously affected " y 7 5 ^ *"i ^ nd expected decrease in enemy resistance b as a result of a heavy artillery "bomisardraent "byt75Si 105 end 155s was not realized. This may " e -explained, however, Tjy the fact that meny c?ves were b ten to fifty feet underground, end no weapon at ^our disposal could touch" them, Haa-lar guns, the 105 lor instance, tx$ much "better for any type of resistance which is at'all &ug~in in fortified positions. All artillery had one particularly advantageous effect in that i t completely and continually prevented any movement " y the eneiny, b eithar " y da^ or l5y night. He was una"ble to cpunterattii.ck he,d ha so desired, b so well were his positions covered, . Boiling 'barrages were used considerp*>ly in the morning Atks, It was a mistake to expect the infantry to maintain tjia speed isiven the ^.ng T>errage which was usually 100 yards every ,? minutes* The rolling 'b was as such a.waste of ammunition or at "best a poor use of ammunition,. The enemv employed hi s^-rtll^ery well,until, the last, Eis ' positions were well concealed and cov^rdd-i his prearranged f iije concantret'ions well placed. Important terra|n; f^ati^^Jlost to him camd undfr intense f i r * which included time fire ^j^^^^qm^^o&pB. reached thdse positions, 3y far the majority of our casualtias wdra^from" an^my firtill#fy fire. His in tention apparently was to deny.all prominent ground and approaches thereto by artillery fira once his troops ha4 bean driven off, ,, Snemy gun positions were^located mostly by gvm flashes and effective counterbatt^ry placed on them, Othp targets for -otr -aarjbillery wr located by fcont line troops and artillery forward observers.
I
1

A i r .

'

'

' . ' .

1, The effectiveness of preliminary heavy stVf&e-sTagainst

enemy installations is difficult*to estimate. The desired degree of neu tralization; was not attained, "though scores of known targets were
2. Air liaison parties performed their duties in .a commendable manner. They were well informed, of the; situation both of infantry end avail able air support, The 2.egtl Air In 0 coordinated air activities of the three battalions so thet at no time was thdraany gr^&t difficulty in air liaison. The Icegtl Air Ln 0 worked closely withArfey and N P ^^5f3^&t all_times, G Pag* 16

AeUea *?**

(OtdMlM*" 1 " 1 ***

"

20 April

y air strike was coordinated with ether support ing firea. Air attacks were direct ad expeditioualy end well once planes had been allotted, 3, Communications was good with the following exceptions: a* The j A . net was overcrowded. SR

b. The Air Ln Officers with battalions at times could not take their radio Jeeps over the rough terrain to forward positions from wherd they were to direct strikes* It i s suggested that in addition to the radio jeep, a portable radio " e part of the 3n i\&h teams' equipment for use in. b emergencies, ' k, Targets, were marked by smoke from mortars or artillery or " y b .oral description " y the "battalion A L officer. These methods were satis b G factory to,air, as in most cases the targets were well identified " y planes, b Planes after having "been directed'to targets by smoke and far description " y battalion A L officer^, then made d m y runs on the fcsrget and were fur b & u m ther .adjusted* on target " y radio. Front lines ware marked with smoke on some b occassions, "but not #to a" great extent since i t disclosed our position. j?enels were seldon used, 5 timing of air support missions was not entirely satisfactory.
Air missions from their beginning until completed required usually ovar one
hour. There seemed to "be a conatpnt "backlog of requested fire missions,
Time required to get on target was long, "but probably seemed the more so in
contrast with repid fire adjustment of KG? and artillery. It. is appreciated
that planes require much more time to get adjusted on target then do Arty
and ]p? particularly when close support is desirecL, but some improvement
might be ma^e in Air-ground technique of adjustment*
D m y attacks were used only in adjusting on terget. This um 6# may have had some effect on enemy troops but probably not as they were well prepared even for air attack. D m y attacks did assist the A f and infantry um Gr officers in adjusting fire and gave front line troops an opportunity to see . exactly where the strike was being placed. Control of air from the flouad , was satisfactory and i s more effective than trying to contrel the same from the air, ' 7i It is recommended that further instructions inair support
be given infantry officers so thr.t they will know whet to expect of air
support and moreover when to ask for i t . Air spot features of air support
shoul'd be improved. One tactical air observer for the three divisions was
not sufficient. Heavier bombs with delayed fuses would probably have been
more effective. 1000 pounders might have destroyed some positions not ..
nautralizsod by smaller bombs,

Gv Naval Gunfire.

1, Shore F i r e Control personnel attached t o t h i s regiment were,, without exception, w e l l trained end performed t h e i r jobs i n an e x emplary manner. There were, o c c a s s i o n s where.additional s p o t t e r s could have been used advantageously., but i n general the number of personnel was adequate* , 2 The T3X radio now used by SK! p a r t i e s with b a t t a l i o n s i s too-cumbersome f o r those teams to handle i n any unstable s i t u a t i o n . I t i s recommended by 1 G 1 o f f i c e r s that the 5<n 69U be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t h e T5 T3X with b a t t a l i o n S?C teama-and a T0*5 -be s u b s t i t u t e d i n t h e case of the regimental NLO. Otherwise comiDunisatians worked wel! Page 17

Action- Report

(0<t%)ri\\*W#fr*^

2 April' 13U5

-" 3 I n general, i t appeared thpt,n4MMpmfira, though well plan ned end executed,' did not create, the effect, that wns desired from i t . This, in fact, may be said of all' support ine fires. The explanation i s thfc,t the _ defenses were too heavy and well 4dug~in<for th# shells used, There i s l i t t l e doubt, however, that naval gunfire, both the pre-1 an&in* bombardment and call fires, destroyed practically al]t exposed gan positions and installations, probably destroyed many covered positions pud installations, a. Targets of opportunity were fired on constantly. Such targets as located pillboxes or instHations and occassionally exposed, enemy troops. The effect of this-, fire on'pillboxes was varied. Some were destroyed, "but the larger ories were not .affected; C*?vas were damaged very l i t t l e being, -as they were, well underground, b. Counterbattery missions were fired occassionaly at locajted targets, ^dsults in some cases were unknown, but on several in stances definite proof of enemy gun.positions being destroyed was estab lished. Count erbattery fires were adjusted^by SFC spotters. aa&~Air spo***-" ; r; . Missions of this type w^re rapidly executed, c. light harassing fire, though i t may- never havd account ed for destroying personnel or positions did prevent movement of any size and generally contributed to the anxiety of the enemy. Illumination* In addition to 112, restricted movement or located i t for the front lines. There i s a need, in this connection, to acquaint Co Comdrs in the use of illumination and to prevent waste when i t i s unnecessary. Some officers did not realize the ran^e of effective illumination from one stsx shell, d. Interdiction and night harassing fires by $0$ and Arty could reasonably >a credited with preventing large counterattacks or night infiltration whether or not the enemjt was inclined to these tactics. In terdiction fires were., plpeed on roads end road junctions and other pret viously'located or established opportune targets.- Many times night haras sing fires and interdiction fires were one and the same,
*

. e, fires a#ainst coastal targets did considerable damage because ships were able to put point blpnk direct fire on the target. How ever, some CPV3S on the coast fired at by DDs were found unharmed. The Weapons Co 9th Mar finally destroyed many of these caves with direct fire ', from 75mm guns at 150-200 yards rpnge. It'appeared from this thpt a direct hit was the only one that had any effedt. Some other caves farther inland and,many of the larger pillboxes could withstand 5 inch direct hits end of these, several were unharmed by % inch fire. Larger calibre, naval gunfire . direct hits were not observed. f. Air spot was used for fire missions oiL.t.arge.ts of op portunity deep within the zone of action Host deep^ir spot -lira, in 9th Mar zone was straight from plane to ship without close control on the part of the Itegt. This was satisfactory end in fact an aid. Air spot on targets located by air observers and front line troops was celled for about six or eight times and each time executed well, g. This reginunt fired approximately 95 call-missions . and used some 10,000 rounds, ^, a* Excellent coordination by H P with" adjacent units, Arty O and air always existed, ^equests for fire into an pdjacent unitfs zone.. * were made of the unit concerned before any type of fire was placed there in,, Of'fcan fires across each other's front in support of ep.ch other's attack wore arranged and coordine,ted with the ^+th Marine

Page 18

Subject?

Action .leport

. (Oont'd). .

..

UNCIASSIB

20 A p r i l ,, 19Ui 20 April

?*<,

IILO, AGLofficer* andartillery liaison officer, all had .offleas in the

section of the regiment, andeach was readily conversant with the others1
supporting' fires. . .
The UtrF control chain of command functioned smoothly.
Requests foradditional ships were promply filled andcoordination with
hitler echelons effected.
5. It is recommended that in the future employment of Wrff two
spotters "be attached to each assault "battalion rethep than the present one
in Order to give "better ISQrJ coverage to the attacking units.
Heavier shells with delayed fuses should \be used Whenever it
"becomes apparent- th&t heavily constructed positions rather than unprotected
personnel comprise the resistance. * . Hi Engineer;

.. ' ' .1, Go A 3^ Engineer battaJtion was attached to this regiment throughout the action. The. times platoons of Co A wera attached each to one of the battalions. Their duties were primarily."basic engineer. At the beginning of the^ operation they were used and performed excellently di an emergency as stretcher "bearers. Mine detection and removal was the most im portant engineer function required from these u n i t s . I t was found that only 5 or b jnen of the platoon wera proficient at mine removfi-X. This is according to T/O, but was far from the number needed to accomplish the task* The entire 1 platoon should be well trained at mine removal and also engineering demol i t i o n . During the mopping up phase engineers wera used as demolition teams to blow caves, end pillboxes and remove booby traps. This they did satisfaci~ orily. . The equipment carried was adeq.ue.te; road construction and r e pair adequately-handled? It* i s recommended that the engineers be equipped with armored bull-dosfcrs to overcome the very difficult problem of making tank'roads under r i f l e and mortar ,fire. . I, Transport Q;cup,ri;armaster.

1, Total time required to lo?u pud embark the 9th Embarkation Q-roup was forty ho^'s- atid thirty .minutes, This was the t o t a l time required "by the A3O-SQ;, (USS ^arrick). ' ' The greatest difficulty encountered during the loading was the handling of the palletized cargo in the limited cargo assembly areas. S m .assembly areas wkra located on. h i l l y terrain making i t difficult to * e move trucks an/ cranas with efficiency and safety. iSvery effort should be made to provide sufficient cexgo nets durisg loading. *i.lso if pallets ere to be ust'd th^y should Ve provided with propar slings before being deliver ad to the a&s^aibly area* It is very essential that sufficient cranes and com petent operators be on h a& at a l l timas during the loading, proper l i g h t &. ing for night loading is rory"essentlair' In meny cases i t was necessary to o Toreek down a good mciny paileen In order to gat the j^quipment aboard. Tho aoser:.Vl7 area for troops awaiting embarkation w^.s not satisfactory^ I t is .."believed that t* cleared assembly area, providing tem porary heads *md garbage pi';s and the erection of more prominent signs would eliminate s m 3 difficulticj*? in loading troops, o > \ ' , ,. The unloftd.tng cf ship& was a very difficult and uncertain task. Due to the fact that orJly equipmeni that was called for tt&s unload ed i t took several days to onload the) eauipmant rnd gssr thft wes landed. A very high surf at a l l times raa,de i t impossible to unload with LCM'a. LST's and ISM^sv&ra

19

Subject: Action Report

J Ordnance.

f o W w # Jff0b.

20 April,

1. . a, following number, typfr<(^l caliber of weapons were used and l o s t during t h eoperation which covered a period of 22 days Type and Caliber Total Lost tJsed 171A 339

Oar"bine, cal, 3^ Ml Flame thrower^ portable, M2-2 Gun, Machine, cal. 30 Browning
Gun, Machine, cal. 30. Browning (Jlexlble)
Gun, Machine, cal. 50 Browning M2 H.3.

Sun, 37nim M^, (Anti-tenk) Gun, 7 ^ . M139?A*V (Hadio Squip) Launcher, docket, 2.36l!M$Al Mortar, 60mm, M2 Mortar t Slmm,Ml P i s t o l , Automatic,..Cal. *+5, M19U-A1 ?dfla, TJS, c a l . 3O.'M1 Hifle, Auttmp^ic, c a l . 30,Browning, !

91 36
10 12

0.
0 . .
0 0

k 62

0
2 0 0

Uo

13
2352

^6 317

"b. A^ e a t a j n o u n V of trouble dixreloped in t h e functioning of a l l weapons due t o the rolcenrcTdust and the prasenpe of sulphur "bed's* * throughout t h e i s l a n d . She weapon most affeiete^ WPS t h e Browning .Automatic B i f l e . 3>ust f i l l e d t h egas p o r t s causing f a i l u r e t o eject and/or improper feeding. Dust collected i n t h ereceiver slowing down the foreword motion of the "bolt end so causing m i s s f i r e s , Bust entered the "buffer, group caus ing the ,sear r e l e a s e end/or actuator to- freeze i n t h e rearward p o s i t i o n , This prohibited the weapon from-firing the slow. r,r.te of f u l l automatic f i r e , although single shots, could/be f i r e d . The R i f l e , US Cal, 30,Mlend the Oarbino, Cal. 30, Ml were affected "by ^ust i n t h ege.a port requiring manual operation of t h e s l i d e a f t e r every round fired* The piston heads seemed to receive exees sive wear and allowed gas to escape, t h i s ceuaad f a i l u r e of extraction of th expended round and/or feeding of.the new round. . The sulphur T3?ds gave off much steam and' gass, caus ing a l l metals t o r u s t and corrode overnight, .^hen necessary t o dig fox holes i n a sulphur a r e a the weapons underwent severe punishment r turning red with rust i n foui? hours. Oil could "be used onweapons "but sparingly as t h e dust adhered to t h e o i l and allowed dpim or completely stopped t h e normal action of t h aweapon, ' ' Other weapons in t h i s organisation wete no*b fffacted "by the elements as gun covers protected them or they were protected "by non-, us3. Ilhera tr,B no complaint other than h*r& stated on the functioning of e l l weapons. \ c, The allowance of orgenizatiAn&l spare p a r t s and acces sories s e t s a r e sufficient f o r e l l normal operations end seemed to be ( i n t h i s campaign), i n excess of thf.t a c t u a l l y needed. . _ During t h ef i r s t f i f t y cornet hours ashore the rapedr * and supply of weapons was a mavi6r~pro"blam as t h e 3d m y i s i o n Ordnance~Co'*~~* WFS s t i l l a t sep,# J f t e r t h e ^d Division Ordnance Co landed our contact "bet ween front end r e a r l i n e s was Easily medntpinad and weapons needing r e p a i r * or cleaning were serviced i n t h er a ^ r are^s much more 8Ftis|cJ:orl;ly than
in forward areas. *-

20

Subject;

Action Seport

(Cont'd)

20 April 19^5

A definite shortage which has "^aen prevalent for quite some time i s the Belt mag, ?/3 f A.B. K1937* *iaee the Bandoleer 3,A,"*.4 h?s "becons obsolete the assistant PAitomatic rlfleft&i has no syB<tem of cprrying his quota of magazines, A substitute f o r the Bandoleer 3,A.":, id definitely
needed, , .

A device for checking the completed e l e c t r i c a l circuit on the Launcher, rocket, 2.36", M9A1 i s needed. Vith this device* launchers (new or used) issued during combat could "be tested for completed circuit without actually firing the weapon. The supply of Launchers,, grenade, M i s inadequate. 7 This organization used everyone i t could acquire. All launchers were con* tinually i n us^ during the campaign. 2, The following combat vehicles were used:

13

75mm Guns, AJ trucks, 1 ton

cexgo

guns were employed for five days end the Trucks, 1 t on for twenty-two days* One $ruck, 1 ton was destroyed "by enemy f i r e . 2hera.,waa no malfunctions of any vehicles nor any maintenance d i f f i c u l t i e s . / 3 "below l i s t e d number of rounds of ammunition were expended during th'e operation. . . ' ^art ridge, _0al. }0., Oerbine," Ul A ? 4 T, "blt'd ( a l l ratios) " ? or "ball, 3rd clip A A Tzar "ball, Srd clip nJracer, ..Ml " ' Cert, "ball CPI. M, V-1911 6 m Mortar Qm ;3i'V$9Ar*fi 32. (light) ., Illuminating M?3 w/f M65 Fortar ' w/f M52 in, M56, w/ Smoke, Phos, M57

173,000 721,000 266,000 59,000

: 7,1.66 ; ^0,535 ! *S5* ' 3-32 ' 13.176

725
3,533 500 2,550 150 .2,200
1,520
1*5 90 1,672
1,559

J^mm Gun
w /f

M^a, esc)

Grens-des/ Hand Pre.g, Mkllal, w/f M10A3 Smoke, H0 H3 Smoke,. WP, Ml5 Smoke colored asstd Ml6 Illuminating, Mkl Inceadiary, Ml^Grenade, Iiifla AT, M9A1 - Jrag, Impact, M17 Pyrotechnics Signgrd asstd ( f / r f l lchr) l l a r e , t r i p parachute \^Z flare, trip, M ^9 docket, AT M6A1, 2.36" . Socket, Smoke 2.36" X d 21

Subject:

Action Report

(Cont !d)

20 April 19*5.

Engineer Demolitions Torpedo, "bangalore, Mi Srplosive, OT? Primacord, detonating 3\ize, safety, time Caps "blasting, non-elec device, (all types) shaped 351Vi T3 Block demolition, M 3 Cylinders Mtrogen

60 226 cases 6,000 feet 3,000 faet 1*000 2S0 150 37

^7

Ammunition supply functioned very well durine the- entire operation, mainly due to the fact that there wps an -adequate amount of t r r n s portation "both in the regiment and "battalions* Durine the f i r s t few days the munitions officer operated directly from the division ammunition dump, Su"b sequent to that a regimental ammunition dump was established and a lerel of one-unit of fire was maintained at a l l times". All the pole charges used "by the regiment were constructed at the regimental dump and made ready for units at any time. This was also is:<ue as far as flame thrower fuel was concerned, A supply of ready mixed fuel was available at all times at the regimental ammunition dump. All ammunition on hand in the regimental dump was stored in r revetments dug "by a "bull dozer on the reverse side of, a h i l l . Demolitions and pyrotechnics were kept covered trith canvas. . Adequate amounts of a l l types of ammunition were available at a l l times m th the exception of 60mm Illuminating, M83 w/f M65. . I t i s recommended that "blasting caps, non-electric and electric* primer cord and safety fuse "be packed in water tight containers. The CinCi O Tj/lP i s considered adequate for weapons in this A organization. k,
1

jjJnemy Material

a. The "below l i s t e d salvaged enemy weapons were turned into the salvage section of division ordnance during the operation.; . . 27 2 7 5 5 5 1 2 2 " ? l f l e , Cal, 30? Gun, Machine light, Cal, 303 Gun, AA/AT 51 Cal. H G M Mortar, 31mm . Gun, AA/AT Automatic 25ram, Gon, 20mm, A/A ' Tinme thrower Gun, H G Cal. 31 M, Lauaeher, Rocket .

D. The division salvage section was notified of the loca tion of a l l enemy vehicles. Ho enemy vehicles were salvaged "by this organ ization. c. The following is a l i s t of splvaged enemy ammuniti'ori which was turned over to thd'Oorps salvage dump during the operation, . 911 ^ 91 30 172 7 7 cases . ^Jram, cases
Slmin, oases oases
v f/TJ 3 u3e f/TJmm, cases ~(*Jmm c a r t r i d g e ,cases cas 50ram Kortar,'-. case ^ cases
9 ^ , cases
Grenade, Frag, C8

31 30

rage 22

Action Report

(Cont & )

20 April

16 30

kk
3

200

3odie for Rocfcet# cases 51 Gal. cases , 20mm, cases 27naft.| cases T a i l assmy f o r Rocket, cases Me.g, for 27mm, cases
70nan, cases

6
27
96
9

12
8

ISOnaa, cases 6" Mortar, cases Tuse for 120cm, cases

Boosters for 120cm, cases
25mm, cases
37mm, cases

K.

Chemical,

1. T?he chemical aspect of this operation consisted mainly of planning defense chemical warfare* Decontaminating agents and gas masks were the main items of stipp-lies. Gas masks, shoe impregnate, and gas proof capes were issued each individual immediately prior to embarkation, All troops landed with gas N . masks prepared to use them. On ?eb 25, ,iust prior to this regiments f i r s t attpck, geti masks w#re collected by "battalion quartermasters #nd later returned to the Division QK. 2. The enemy did not actively use chemicals in his defense However, one patrol on March 3V-in "blowing a cave at 201-3 exploded a cy linder of Adamsite or sinili^r gas* Several men "became nauseated, "but no serious casualties resulted. v h gas was tested "by I O M I O JIMA Int De SO W
L,

Medical.

1. The Hedical Section emberked on the 9th of February H S Co and 2d ^afrtalion aboard the V3S K O , the 1st i a t t a l l e n aboard the A HX USS FAYST'TU and the 3d battalion al5OeJ:d tiie tJSS' LjJ!i2)ST0^. Unit material was embarked on the same ships as th^ personnel, 2. Abo^xd ship there wai very l i t t l e sickness. A few cases of mild respiratory infection occurred* The majority of patients seen were for blistered feet from the preeinbarkation hike* Sanitary conditions aboard ship were excellent, Itfo special precautions othur than routine inspections ,.>,'. were observed* 3* Upob reaching the theater of operations the Kedieal;Sections da"barkad ^dth their respective units ov$r a rou^fe, surf in LCMs All units were ashore by 1200 on 2^- February U Personnel went ashore with individual madicel units and car ried extra case* of stretchers, plasma, and battle dressings* Two of the Eeelraants eight ambulances vrere lended by 1700 on the 2^+th of February 19^5f the others were sent ashore duririg the next seven days. There were no losses of personnel or material during d:eb-arkption, . 5. TTpon arriving at our f i r s t bivouac area, units, set up Aid Stations in shell holes. As the different- T;p,t t a l i on s want into assault, A& Stations wara set. up in the vicinity of tha 3n C?s These locations were always by & road or t r a i l . The installations were set up in shell holes f-nd sr.m<L "bags were us^d to ^ive added protection, ' I age 23

Action Report

20 April

were dispersed in severe! holes.. Ike locations were such & to give the turning casualties the mogt available protection. All posi"ble measures were taken to provide protection, Stations were placed "below ground level, s?nd "bags were used, tsl&ckout precautions were followed s.t ni|3att. captured ceves were used vary nicely at several locations sad affor<&d wonderful protection as they gave the "best protection from morto and artill'ery fire. 6, ifracuation was " y jeep ambulances from.the Aid Stations, the b first three or four $ays, all cases were sent to the "beech end were handled " y the Regtl Shore Party. Then the attached Medical Kio set up an evacuation, b station end all casualties were sent to that station, and evacuated -ffroo there to ships, " y air to i>ase Hospitals ;and also to Oorpe Medical 3n Hosp b itals which were set up tfter the first tan or twelve dayP; Ivacur^ioi repid said efficient. Casual t,ies treated " y the Regt were as: foOELowsi: b 160
casualties, Hn o cpm"bai;ant casualties Stretcher casualties
Recapitulation of Casualties is
IIA JTLA. MIA" 1KRIA

57 ;
;
153 1130 follows:

Off "22
1M02

Total m 7* The fir8t two^day ashore, straddle tranches were used for heads. After that lime, drums with prefabricated seat covers were used. All garbage and trash was disposed of " y "burial. Thirlng the assault phase only b packaged food was eateni water was supplied " y the Quartermaster section in b cans and trailer tanks. JThis water .was made " y evaporation of sea water at b the Division water pfcint, and waschlorineted as an added protection.. S, Our dead were collected'"by the Graves Registration Section, identified end moved to the division Cemetery as rapidly as the tactical situ* ati.}D /culd allow. The. enemy dead were "buried where they were fo;un& also as repxdly as the tactical situation would allow, There were ?n;:epi^mits and practically no infections diseases in the troops. Only 158 patients were
conditions. ' ' J.;.^-::^'^..., .,;..;....'..?

9 Dental 8eiairlo#^wa&-eiapjiiiad 1y a Regtl De^itiat... Ntunber^ of^

ca^es., Two (2). Shose two cases "being, a Fractured Mendi'ble, which was evb
cuate&j and a soft tissue infection of the 3d Molar region. This patient was fd.\rah systematic treatment with Sulfadiazine. ?wo othar cesas were s ent^ to he l i f t h iunph Oorps Ked 3n for treatment. 2 o additional duties for Segtl ^ T 10. Twenty-ning prisoners nt war were csred f or. All Were treat ed for Fragment v/ouiids or flash "burns., "'hey were then evacuated to the Div Eq. Co Aid Station.,
.2k

Subject:

Action Report

(Cont rd)

. " &*&#

20

11. The Medical Organisation in i t s present type functions exceed ingly well. Recommendations w i l l follow in paragraph 16. The personnel are adequate. Their employment will be discussed in paragraph 16, The Regiment landed with 137 Corpsmen and kO Corpsman attached as collecting sections. Seventeen Corpsmen were k i l l e d , Fifty-four were wounded of which twelve r e turned to duty, sixteen were evacuated with Combat Ueurosis and 4isea.se; Sixteen Corpsmenwfrom the collecting sections'were used*as company aid men, Two replacements were supplied "by TA.vision Medical * a i t a l i o n . Training of the Oorpsmen was excellent & regards to f i r s t aid, "but should "be improved as to inf s&try tactics and "battle techniques, 12. Helical equipment and supplies are very satisfactory end ade quate* A ten day Supply was carried ashore by. the Regt, Resupply from be,p.ch party,, ships, and from Division Radical battalion yes excellent. 13. five jeep ambulances were crrried "by the Pest, plus three collecting section ambulances from the v attached Medics! Go, One erabulan&e x was knocked out due t o enemy action. The sfc'bulpnces were u t i l i z e d to eve*-,
cuate .casualties, haul medical supplies and aare very suitable in every way,
. 1^* Malaria and epidemic control equipment Was carried by Division, The Division Sanitation Officer furnished a three gallon s}pray with " D in DT diesel o i l to spray galleys and heads for f l y control, Th# island was dusted with i>DT powder from planas, which probatly helped control tha f l / popu l a t i o n , \\xb hot as Wdll as should, "be done. 15. lifter -ths completion f the as a suit phase, hospitaliaati&a was furnished " y the attached Ma4icel Company. Medical supplies from tha attached b Medical Company. Quartermaster supplies from the Regimental QuartermEster, Sanitation was carried on cs "before. 'Wat or'Was the seme as et the "beginning of tha operation* Son fresh food was preprred at Company galleys. Ho e p i demics or unusual diseases were encountered,
> ' . .

16*

Recommendations t

'

,,

a. If possible, Corpsmen replacements be screened, and none over twenty-eight.years of age or physically below ar lent' to infantry Rag^s, One mora ambulenee and ?ive more Corp amen be seiit Xo each infantry, battalion. All Corpsmen in the Regt be trained ao that any man could ba used for front lijne duty. Do away with the collecting section as such. ># In this operation were used *s company aid men and iour Oorpsmen were used-as company aid men more training in infantry t a c t i c s and they were serving. Vim Signal, , sixteen collecting section
were k i l l e d , whereas 10^ Battalion
and only tMrtean were k i l l e d due to
better acquaintanceship with the man

Herein included as the signal report i s the Comraunicp.tion -

Operational Report on th 1^0 ;JIWA Operation furnished by-thi* organization
to CG, 3?aeet Marine 3Torce Tacific.

iVi.. ' * . . . '

1,

Communi cati on i- Ian (301)

a, Were communi.cation plans received by lower echelons in

Sufficient time to permit study, criticism, and maka necessary changes.
Yes, m
lage 25 I

t . Action Eeport b

(Cont!d) ,
-
.

20 April 1

Rehearsal, < Uo comment.

3nTbarkation and Voyage,

1, Vaa equipment loaded according to plan? Yes.
"

describe? ing the rcyage?

2, 3 h,

^as any equipment damaged in loading? if yes, Wtdre such items, as storage batteries checked dur
T e a , ' : ' ' . /
:

'

>Jhat type of .training was carried * u f aboard . Instruction in the SOI, Communication Annex to the Opn Order, study of Opn Plan, instruction in SO?Sltt 3JVO, and instruction v fr each indiridual in his particular assignment, 5 Were personnel of any assistance to ship's cinamuni cation officer? If yes,- what did they do? Personnel from Hsg Cen section "ass'ltfted, ship's com munication officer* Mag Can personnel serviced a l l inctming ani outgoing traffic for troop commander and operated in conjunction with the ship's per sonnel, '";. '.-/ d. .1. sonnel? 2.
T e a .

Are you s a t i s f i e d with present allowance of per

. * ' " * .

- . - , .

3.
4. training?

changes i f any are specifically recommericte&? Ho comment, . '. . ." training of personnel adequaia^

Vhat recommendations if any are made fdr special *. ^ Ho comment, .; *'".-.. 5 List overages or shortages of communication person nel, in your unit embarked aboard ship for the operation* Shortage of 57 CP men in this HOT, "l6S embarked . aboard ship for this operation. There were 67 non-C? men th*t had been train ed Vy this H T for communication work and these men were usad as' communication O personnel to augment thd existing shortage, List losses of personnel aboard ship before landing. Two (2) men. 7 List l o s s e s of personnel in effecting the landing.
Hone.
r

' '

5. List l o s s e s of personnel fn t^he period from after landing u n t i l operation was completed, ' \ * tifty-one (51) men, ' 9. were communication personnel employed for/duties- ' other t^an communications? ^hat were their duties?
1

'

'

'

"

'

'

How were battle casualties replaced? ^ff^drsonnel from the 3d JASCO end by CP per sonnel from replacement drafts, 26

. 10,

Subject:

Action Report a.

(Oont ' f j W ^ / l i J

Iff1* ##* f f 2

Pril

Squipment, 1,

List verges end shortages of major items of There was a pool of fi*e '(5) SCB-3^O! in ex cess of T,v. ' ., 2, LiBt losses of equipment aboard ship "before landing, ^ None, . 3* List losses of equipment in effecting the-landing Hone, k+ t i s t losses of equipment in the period .from after lending until operation was completed. Hadio equipment; 22 SCB-^36, 2 SC^OO; T*ire equipment; 6 telephones, 13~-Af 20 CS-11, 11^3-33, 2 terminal s t r i p s , 1 Tsuzaer M3Z-2, 2 sound-powered handsets, U sound-powered hea4*chest sets* 1 > equipment. 5 *AT&S equipment suitable (design and quantity) for the particular task to *beperformed? Tf no, l i s t equipment and state reason 6. In light of the specific operation, what changesin
equipment arerecommended? State reason?
No comment, ,
7 *Vhat new equipment is recommended? Sxplen specific
proptsed employment and whether or not additional personnel would "be required
to operate it.
No comment,
8, Bid your organization employ any equipment which it
had never used in action "before? if yes, state itams and describe performance,
(rive recommendations for improvements,
SCR-6O0, lerformed in a very creditable manner'
in Eegtl and Division nets* . . - , . * ,
SCB-610, This portable setperformed vary satis factorily in Regtl andDivision nets. "
9* ' t c water proofing; was done and how effective was'it?
f i .t Vfeterproof "ba^s ware used to waterproof all sets
and.telephone switchboards. Vehicles were waterproofed according to division
specifications, vaterproofing was very effective, SCB-53^rs were water proofed "by placing cellophane over thediaphrams.
10, *7as ther;e any equipment used not included in TA? If
yes, list andstate hqw employa'd. Make recommendations for inclusion in TA
None,
11, Was a l l signal equipment authorized "by TA used? If not r ahauld i t "be dale tad from TA, State ree.son. Tour (k) T(V-5fs authorized " y T b Awere not used*, ; 12, **afc a l l your Equipment unloaded from tha ship dur ing tha operation? . Yes* 13, V'as your equipment landed a t the proper T^each? If not, why not? Yes, fi hind? Supply* 1# 2,
T

Jhat Equipment cotild not "be loaded pnd was left "be

Did this affect theoperation in anyway?

Ho comment,

27

20

April

supply? , Wire

specific items pieced ffcia greatest strain Wire W-110, 3&ttery 3A-70* 3attery-a&~30, Battery

^fhat changes in replenishment rates i f any are r e commended? v I t i s recommended that allowances of ty-110 "be i n creased about 17 miles for Regt Connranication Ilatoon end allowance of ^,130 "be increased for the "battalions. The "battalion allowance of combat wire has proven insufficient. , 5, Wip.t' method was employed >y your organization for The exchange of operative ecjuiP^en* for t i v e equipment " y the RC* Thi^ inoperative eJquipraent was sent to division b and exchanged for operative equipment end t he inoperative equipment was r e paired "by division repair section for farther exehsngs* 6 (a) '"ftiat repair f a c i l i t i e s did you have avella'blef ("b) >Tere they used? (c) *4iat mp^or items of equipment were repairedt (a) ^here ytm a smell repair unit, for e l l items of signa^ equipment, set up which allowed a minimum 1st and 2& echelon repair, "'', ("b) It.was used for minor repairs, of radio and wire equipment. (c) Repairs were made on SCS-3^'s f ? 3 A , andswitchboard 3D-71. 7 Were equipment spaJes carried with equipment? If not, state why? . Yes. 3 Vere equipment spares adequate?
'
T e s . . Tes.

'

'

.:[

'

Were sufficient spare parts available tther than

equipment spares? 10 ' -Was"there sufficient transportation available for
transporting equipment? - . .
portation? Are there my recommendations for changes in trans~ '. I t i s recommended that a 1 ton truck be added to transportation allowance for RC? and 3LT communication platoons. ' llv

1, 2# 3* enced in *k> above?

'tfhat agencies werj established that were not normal? Hone. Khat was the most overloaded agency? *fcat steps were %dken to overcome trouble experi

Thero .was no undue trouble expert anc3d in *^2 ,.' v above, but i t was urged that pdministrftive t r a f f i c of a len^fthy nature end low precadancta-^ put out on r?.<iio to avoid f>ny possible delay in operational tffi '
ttsadf lifo, '

.r duplication of agencies

Subject:

Action Report

.(GoS^f.^ W M | I

fLIJ>0 April

any not used?

5. .Of the,frequencies assigned to your to.it, ware there If yea, steta why. 6* Liet difficulties encountered in: (a) (b) (c) (d) Ila&io communication. Wire communication. ' Visual communication. Messenger communication. ,

(a) At extended ranges \l% miles) the SCH-30G had a tendency to fade However, over the terrain in which i t was operated, there was frequent possibility of masking the set and this would proT^tiXy account for a large percentage of the trouble, SOE-300 handset geve trouble, "because of the "brittle wiring which had a tendency to "break and short out. ' . (ID) Wire lines were cut " y enemy mortar f i r e , b friendly tanks, "bulldozers, graders,fenff*JWtHervehicles. The existing t e r r a i n made i t difficult to lay wire safely, "but "by "burying or ovarhaa&i-ng lined at known road crossings & < laying along axis presumably inaccessaole t% vehic nl l e s , wire line trouble was kept to a minimum, Whan poles .were made available* a l l lines to units of this commend were cabled end overheaded, and there was l i t t l e trouble thereef t e r , ' ' . . - , . (e) No visual communication used. (d) Thdre were no difficulties encountered In /messenger communication^ fiuay c^mmjiai.cation difficulties encountered in this operation that were not encounterad in the previous operation? If yes, what do you attribute the difficulties to? *;. N 3acPU8e of the. -small-area of o p e r a t i o n s and hesvy enemy f i r e t h e r e \rm an i n c r e a s e i n wire lianas knocked o u t . " Other than t h i s , there were no other increased d i f f i c u l t i e s , #, Was any' communication improvement noticed between . J this operation and previous operations? '
. .

Yes.

'

',

' -

"

-* ,

9. shore movement.

List coramuriication failures during the ship-to

10, Were officers required to oper^tw and maintain any agency of'communication because of enlisted casualties? If yes, describe, Ho, . .. . , 11. V/are any enemy communication installations captured? If yes, what use was made of them? Tnare were few enemy communielation i n s t a l l a t i o n s captured ejad these wer^' not used* . . . -. 12*, What methods were used for the inf&try tank cem wunications? Were they successful? . S3B-30Q communication between tank and infantry compani es was successful. When tanks oper&t ed wi th pi at oonspetrol s, the tank was furnished an SCB-53^ f or communication with the.$>letoon pnd t h i s proved successful. Locel wire communication was also successful, 13> ^het methods,were used for the Infantry-AmphiTiious tractor communications? Ware they succoi:;ful? . . This E ! did not operate with Amph t r a c t o r s . CT h. Operation Iji Edad^u^rters Ship, Uo.comment,. .', I age 23

Subject:
"'''

Action Report
*

(Cont'd)
. ,.

'&P*i*L

, Security.

.
t

1. What cryptographic aids were used?. The shackle nuraaral cipher. . '
2, Are any critism mada of present aids!

No.* " " " ' . "' ' ."'"'

f

3, tive was it?

Vhat euthenticator system, was uAed and how

:

Message text authentication and station uthan~

tication systems were used effectively.' ' ' .
W Did the enemy attempt to use our authenticator
. system? If yos, describe. H w effective were their attempts?
o "5* security?
-

^Tere personnel sufficiently trained in signal

' .

Y e s *
;

'

'

"

'

'

proper security? SO?.

6, . 7

-/flaat specific recommendations are madd to insure . ."" .**.-......*...-.. None other then adherence to existing security
;

Did your cr^anis^atiGn have a. "Signal Security -J'lan1!'!' . . Yes, the signal security'plan for this E T was O included ^.n paragraph 3 W and paragraph 5 of tha signal annex to the Qpn
Order. . , . ... . . . , . . " ' . .

Counter measure 8 "by 3nemy,

. ' ;.

1. count ermeasur es.

ference? 2.

Did lo

use radio* cqunterraeasures? Descried* knbwledgti of the enemy usinc radio

"What measures ware empltyed to overcome enemy i n t e r

No comment. 3 Vhftt.rdcomm'endatioiRf do you mak^'to a i d i n t r a i n i n g personnel t o overcomd enemy interference? . ' ITo comment,

Alt
No comment. <

k.

Shore Tpxty Communlcations'.

Air Liai8on Communication* No comment.'

m,

Shoye ^ased ^ l r Supx^ort Communications. No cmmemt.

n.

Shore ? l r e Control Oommunlcations*

Nft c o m m e ^ i t .
>
*

. . -

Summary. vious questions* 1. Give account of difficulties not covered in

Nona.
30

Subjecti

Action Bep6rt
2

( * f l J L M \ ^ i r l r l i 2 0 April

Comments end recommendations, Ir the most efficient i n s t a l l a t i o n ! operation, and maintenance of a complete communication system, i t i s essential that b there " e close l i a i s o n "between the aomwaiication officer and the unit operations officer or section, PART V.
A

Conclusion and Recommendation* Conclusion, :

The training methods and combat effectiveness of t h i s regiment were proven satisfactory in combat by the operation records of the yd. Mar Viv which show that officers end troops of the >th Marines attacked aggressively and advanced over and captured the major hervily defended areas of t h e sector operated i n "by the 3& Mar Div, These facts are "borne out "by the fcollewing records: ' . ' 1* Officers and men k i l l e d in action ejid died of wounds i n 9th Marines exceeded the t o t a l ,of such losses of a l l other troops^ of the 3d Mer Div combined. Along-with these figures the non-effective relative figure for the Regt was much "below that of the total for the remaining troops of tha 3d Division* The other infentry regiment engaged carried 6 xwm~tfff estiva figure more than 35^ higher than that of the 9th Marines. . 2# The defense of Airfield fe9 .the h l g i ground from HH-L 362 (TA 235-tr) t o Hill 36a ($A 219-tT) and eest to the sea, the enemy pocket in TA 218UXT* 201-D3I and the remainder of the enemy pocket in the ^th P i v ision sector at l S ^ B , lS^-A wert a l l f i n a l l y taken and cleaned out " y troops b of the 9th Merines. captured.

1. That every possible effort agd safeguard be interposed to prevent the use of In8d.equa.taly trained recruits in action as replacements. 2; That every possible effort be made to increase ammunition and time allowance to train as many men as possible in every arm of the infantry, , 3 That th* major features of training be built about the squad and i t s operations with tanks and supporting weapons, end that the major portion of training time be used in the operation of the squad. N-. That sguad training be placed upon the use of just the two elements (assault and support) of the squad we have had men enough to operate tfith both i n training end in combat, end that l i t t l e time ba wast 3d ; on theoretical sfiued operation* that is" l o s t by the time infantry units to furnish scouts and special d e t a i l s ,

HCWAHD H,

31

A.
ACTION ESPOHC 1ST? 3ATTALI0H SW MABIK3S

From: To ; Subject: Reference:

CO.
CO* 9th Marines*
Action Report* Iwo Jime.
(a) 3d Marine Division General Order 137* dated

PART I, Summary,
A. The period covered bg^t&i* *$of* t |rom
All times mentioned ars KING times.
This battalion participated isi p& of the actual ground B* fighting on Iwo Jima le?.anl from BO* plut 6, wlieji i t paed through units of the 21at Maxdnes, unirJl the':'i*3ancL was officially declared secured and then continued with mopT>inp:~up ope.ratisuvs and active patrolling. I t par ticipated in the fight fc * Moto/ama Airfield No, 2, and in the fight for the ruggad terrain in tiie northsm section bi I wo. Jima, PAST II. Preliminaries.

A# BLT 1-9 consisted of |he lstBn, SthMar; Btpr A, ISthMar; 1st

Hegi f l % n s Co, 9thMar; istPlal, C J^ jdShgrlnj lsf>lat, Co A, 3d Pion
Bn; air aad B&f Xialson tenms froa the 3d JASCO; detachments from the 28th
and 3^th re^acement diaftej aadrajR0llec1;lng secMot from Co 3, 3dMedBn,
Hewe-76r> t^ia report #ill: deal mainly nith the Istln, ?thpar, in that the
units mentioned above were not attached throughout the action.
B. The training of this battalion prior to the campaign consisted
of ell phases of infantry works from the squad to the battalion, attack: and
defense, night and day, The emphasis was placed oa the attack and reduction
of fortified positions by Squads and platoons. This battalion was la an ex cellent state of training at the outset of the #pration, the morale was high*
and the quality of officers and aba-commissioned officers was excellent.
C. PAST IIX. All orders issued daring the action were oral orders*
' Chronological account of the action,

A. This account commence* with the day this battalion landed on

the island and includes all the important actions until the time we de parted from the island. . .
I * Shis BLJ completed loading cargo and troops aboard the
USS PAYSETS (PA U3) on 9 February, l9U5, Immediately after which
we pulled out into the harbor emd. remained there until the oon~
voy departed for the operation. We received word on the after*
noon of 23FebU5 that we would laad on the following day. V
landed as ordered in LCM<s~the surf being too heavy for tCVP*
at XkoOt on 2*tFebU5 *a Beach Yellow 2, aad proceeded to an as*
sembly area south aad watt bt Motoyama Airfield Ho. 1. Btry A,
12thMar, and the Ship's Platoon rsmained aboard as did the Ba
5?qH who wes prepared to unload iae ship upon order. We re ceived s$HMMio mortar and artillery fire in the aeaably area
throughout the night.

- Page 1 af 11

Subject;

Jteport.

18 April, 191*5,

8. Ihe following day, 2 5 2 ^ 5 , t h i s - f ^ j i a / i 0 * 1 passed through elements of t h e 21 s t Marinas witii the ni4ss5cn cf seising the high ground overlooking Airfield No ,1. M5.th I>VL r.P" a.v.d ' 01' a b r e a s t , n 3 " jn the r i ^ J i t , ' v e effected u j)i.8z~* cf H\.es a a l ware x-a the a t t a c k a 1. O^.vO wrMi "talk, ftitMl'uy* &'iC:TUJP v''?9pcru, T/bir- wa th *" ;.in^ of a: ^h^ee oay ai8;.ut * r ch 5 high g;rcuid 't T!')O P Clwo % L/.l^rOv/O) e n i tlie v-iclrilij" *M 3}</rf^ qniue o La"*. c ''Kill 3# Jfftljt James S, Bo-wHi^ fl0" s h o r t l y eftftr '-he.att.acfe van vjJ3
6..-.ff much r,To mori-ix, a r d of | f 0" Co, v the? l i i l l . ^.-u .i un-*er O.rt;t '?oi:i;'^'.i I "beLiui l/.e .isw.il;, of " 1 " Oo hyc* "u?^a Viiliair. wcC^ory wa

, was wounded .-lo gain

\j,
v

Co Clajyp

prsition
'- S.

the en l a
r

v>K*avdyd 'vxlw tiio :Tii-jr..;c S'Vi 1 I n e s ' w*are r.iori In w i t h &. i t h e ?.uPii# 9 ^ r ^ T on hs l e f t ,

*r. The n e ' t t day Oo "A" p a s c e d t r o u g h Co " 0 u t aod w i t h "A aitd "E 1 i n i h e a s r a u l t ve or-oo a g g i i t i * i ? l t o e^inp ; : K i i l P e t e r " V I A i t s - a ^ s - s ^f ^avefi ?nd pi.iT>-:ie.;, Oa^t M^Crory of ir:.d sa
11

Af.3? P
Co "L<<:,

.-I i s 'r ?

gained*

jnt aid

;' in

1 ?P 0^ the <?7*^ O* P9T8riary we case agiin attacked with r lf "A", B ar.d "L" (attached), a n l tif^fr intense figiiitag a l l day tiie P9isy:ji back va^ l>ikni, 915 3 * hc;,0. *;he hjlg/' ground whec daT^r-eee f o i l . Bma?,L pat^oifi were seut cut dariaij that night ,it-h the s-ission oi" Cbptiiri*g p r i s o n e r s , Intt were un succesrful,

o. At OS15 on the 28th of February the 3dBn, 21st Ma-* r i n e s passed through our l i n e * and continued the a t t a c h . W a went into a reserve p o s i t i o n *&&$* we remained u n t i l Iw5. I V ^ when w? pa&qed i^rou^L p p ^ ipQtwflfttii of i^ie ^ l e t Maria* about 600 ysrds eaft a? McioyamavTiila* ana continued the a t t a c k t j . 8<*i8rt "tife layft'iil'fih ground <i t h e 3^te%D'i^ :soae of action in the northern end t>t. *h.e island. By t h i s time our c a s u a l t i e s hed ts'e^n hcavyy.particularly i n o f f i c e r s and n&iw cpffiffiissioxidd officers., . \ ^ i u s d received replacements some of whom wer? ptit cut r,o -cb-3 ceotpanj ar 4 others of *jhon w*re r e t a i n e l "by t!ie 3n CP for supply aad evacJUafcicn purposes. W e W attacked 3a;& in ^he at i*?ii\ooa with Cofe, "B*1 e^5, ftC^ a e b r e a s t , and iuadc l i t t l e ^ro^ress s^ainet intei^.^c ev.cwy f i r e of a l l type's .bef&'K n i g h t f a l l , Co"B'f was' ^ cc:.r:-a-\^d by 2dLt John H^. ; ^ i # o t Co M0M by i^t-t.^; Bftvwtna s Coet-jatf.-.ui,1 and Co A!' b y , ( ^ t ^ y ^ 4 i 6 ; ^ r J t t r p e i ly crganxaction ' against pillboxes and caves and s t i l l . o u r advance could measured in yards. W managed to pass one company ihrotgh 2 of 11 Pages _

'

ion Report.

(Coat *d)

IS Sprit,

other or to make a relief after darkness every day* ao that each company could get into a reserve position for rest and re organization once about every third day. W suffered more e casualties during those days and gained but about 350 yards, 6, At O&55 IMar^, we attacked under caver of darkness with HBW and ttOl! 06*8 in the assault, flBH on the right, and by dawn both companies had made approximately 200 yards with no resistance. Ac i t appeared, they had by-passed the pillboxes and caves which had previously held them up. Conseijuently, i t took several hours for the assault platoons to send back strong patrol* to their rear to clean out these pockets. W were un e able to evacuate wounded or to supply the "front line platoons until this was done. This being done, the assault companies jumped off in an organized attack at 1200, Shortly afterwards* Co HCH, on the l e f t , was held up, having once again met strong enemy resistance. On the other hand> "B", the right company, n reported that they were moving steadily forward and that Co wGr , 2Jd Marines, on their right, was4I doing the same. It was then that the order was issued to Co BH to disregard the company on i t s left and continue the attack to the last high ground* at which place they could tie in with the JdBn, 9th Marines* who held Hill 362 in 219 tJi This would cut off completely all remaining Japanese in that area. The company pushed for ward as directed and gained a foothold on the high ground, and were holding i t under severe enemy fire from the front and l e f t flank. The 3dBn, 9th Marines, marked their right flank with smoke and the .gap was too large to fill,. Furthermore* the enemy s t i l l held the intervening ground, and the company on n3M 'Co.1 s right had pulled back to a better defensive line*' Confronted with this situation and with many casualties, we o withdrew flB11 C to a better defensive line. Under cover of 2dLt William J. Zimmer (later killed in action) of Co HA, and his platoon, Co " B* withdrew to the new line. Twenty-four *. dead had to be left on the h i l l and twenty wounded were e vacuated under cover of darkness, % The following day elements of the 21st Marines once again passed through our .lines after which we went into Di vision reserve until 10&$arty># On this day we received orders to sweep the beach area in the 9th Marines eone of action. W commenced this action late in the afternoon and finished e i t the next day, A socket of Japs was l e f t , however, in 202 H, That night we moved up on to the* high ground over looking the beach and prepared to attack west the next, day against a pocket of the enemy which the 3dBn, 21st Marines had been attacking from the east, 10. For three days we attacked this -nocket and gained about 350 yards until on the lkth of March at 17^5* the 2&Bn, 9th Marines* passed through our lines and continued the attack e on what later became known as "Oushmen's Pocket*1. W moved to a reserve area and from there to a patrol area on the eastern side of the island, From there we actively patrolled until the bat talion left the island and returned to the base camp. IV.
A. Comments, Administrative. - Page J of 11 Pages
\

18 April,

1. This battalion landed with 3J Marine officer* and J59 men, 2 officers (USN) and 38 men. Total casualties, as of k April* l9ty>i wre 25 officers and 6fift msa. This figure includes a l l replacements sent to this organisation after landing* Tne A ) following i s a breakdown of the casualties as reported on that
day:
' ,
; ;

_ .

OFFICERS

ENLISTED

TOTAL

Killed in Action Wounded in Action

Missing in Action Died of Wounds Received in
Action Non-effective

xk
I
I
55

Iks klk
5
20

157

98

709

97
S8\

Side, war neurosis, etc, (a) 7 officers and 196 men joined this battalion during the'campaign, a very large majority of whom were nothing more than recruits, and we had very many ttn* fortunate experiences. wiAk~ttierl~.*Xfc. is strongly. reCjjm mended that such individuals not "be sent as front line replacements, for they simply cannot do the job without first having "been' trained with the unit with which they ere fighting, They cannot "be expected to f i l l in the ranks when noaae of them knew how to operate a flame thrower, a "bazooka", or how to set off a r>ole change, . and many did not know how to $$$?&$& a BAR, much less a machine gun/of mortar. Uon-commissioned officer re placements were mainly experienced only as drill in structors; occasionally one was found who had had pre-* vious field work. However* these same replacements proved their mettle, as carrying parties to supply the companies and to evacuate woun&ed. W could not have e done without them. Hence, onfthe basis^ of this, i t i s further recommended that If re|^ceaients are available they be sent to the infantr^ Vittaiions for just such purposes, but not for duty with the rifle companies. In that way they do not have to do, a job which requires previous training; they are of invaluable assistance and simultaneously they "become accustomed to the noise and confusion of battle. When the - jMR$l'gn * s over and they receive training with the compariieej they should nrove easy to indoctrinate. Replacement officers, though in-* experienced, proved capable of taking over at any time* Four but of seven became casualties in this organisation *the other three have platoons and are rendering com mendable service.
2 The morale of ^ r tifrffairpi". Wtf m? a ? 1 **" * vp9$ . l a A d , i n S t u t . decreased gradually as the operation continued. There was' not* a great deal that we could do for morale except when, in a reserve status we would serve hot coffee and doughnuts, allow the men to r e s t , and have the Red Cross representatives and the chaplains do their share-. It Is no coincidence that the chaplains always have a large turnout during a campaign.

3# ^T prisoners captured war* briefly questione given first aid if needed, and sent to higher echelon. ft - Page k of 11 Pages

Subject:

Action Report* ence.

(Cont'd).

18 April,

The inapt, and photographs furnished for our use were very good. Mostly ufcei va* Iwo Jima, i/10,000; however, i t was not en tirely accurat3. Pfcovcgrsphs -err -excellent, particularly gridded ones. The 3-- office fcerst us some laOe photographs .taken after the operation had commenced) of the area in which we were working at one particular time, and A,hey were extremely helpful. It i s recommended that in the future, battalions be furnished gridded phonographs of a scale l/5f00O to be used in conjunction with the map, and that they be crf^iaually furnished late photographs of their sectors as the battle progresses and the terrain becomes distorted. 2. One Japanese language man,, a private first class, was at tached throughout. He appeared well-trained, efficient, and was very satisfactory. 3* No new Japanese tactics were encountered except possibly his reluctance to counter-attack. The enemy simply has got to be given credit for conducting an intelligent defenaa. k. The use of POW!s to induce their comrades tft surrender worked well at one time during the patrolling phase. A group tf enemy soldiers were hiding in a deep cave and would not surrender to the interpreter, but did so after a P Il was sent into the cave Off to talk to them. On another occasion when this was triad the enemy in tip cave held the P W end would not l e t him come tack out. O
C

Operations and training.

1. Troops ;were schooled on details of the operation while

aboard ship. All maps, phoicgraphs, charta, orders, intelligence
data, etc., were made available for platoon leaders to hold in struction! which they did. Debarkation drills were held often*

* . . "

2. The infantry Scfua& v/ith flame throwers, pole charges, smoke grenades, rocket laimcfcers, etc., i s uti.M the most affec tive weapon again*t enemy fortifications. The infancry-tank team Cannot be beaten. They should train together a3 imicli as possible* When o&r men, skilled in these things were gone, our attack suffered gjreatjy* The portable flam* thrower, M2-2* ia excellent. Flame thrower operators must be taught to crawl or. -tlaeir oellies and operate from their belliee. 3. Enemy AT measures were not unusual; they use their tanks as pillboxes, digging thorn in leaving them immobile. They were known to change the location of these tanks during the night. Infantry-tack coordination was carried on by the use kt of the S R 300 5n the platoon leader f tank and Ui- xrtip com C panies* SCR 200, ?*he araorod Imlldoser w & v.seci -. IH;.flerably on a this operation. It wu3 blow but to was the en*:./? ^cr.Ttion. 5. ' War dogs wer3 i^oc- n.^i . r -'L. '^?e ;o^. roll ing -jhase of the operation. The d^a rcttc^a v... -v.wi tli?. 7vh ~J?T Dog Pla^ toon, and as a group did aoi; a;v>s>. v.--.a- t.?aiJie5. In-one irstance a Jap cravrled to within 10 ya.?/.? of ?. &J? and ?e fsiled On anather occasion, the ecjv-t <^C^P ief c a T>6i*7.1; r^n

R of .11

Subject:

Action PspcrC

bivouac area, and b i t tvo marines, . i t i s reeffdraijlld that war . dogs be trained in working against, caves* The non-commissioned officer in charge of this platcon admitted that he had seme verypoor dogs. Ba further said that he had recommended that J,Me dogs be replaced "before th^ O'nenviozi.t "but his recoiniranda.::.on was turned dcwn, C. Diiring the campaign one night attack was oor.cca-.te-i b^* the "battalion, the order for which wts received after darkness?, t h i s , the attack w*nfc f a i i l y well, for the enemy v~s ;'- caught sleeping. fl-*vaver, i t 1.3 ra^commend^i 4.li*rl night opera'-3 ^r. orders >.e iesied at 3e,3st f>j f&^ one-half hour** before darkness. Hhe reasons ;cr.' t.hxe- are cW^'oa?5, Nitjht efc^acJcfi witfe limited objectives may prove very effective particularly rince the Japanese io not. p-xpect th^m from -us.- ' D. 1. The supply picture >"ab whcl3.7% ^i-ecp.acr ertcej. t for the shortage of 8 m mortar aamuaJtSon i.&l>. t-pa?^ i"! dJlf ctrtre:.t 1 m periods. In connection with I h i i , hor^?., ai- "-];luaiiy ierge amount of Slmm mortar anmuniti'.on wa e:.Tsep.'tel on Miis ox,er&v>cn 2. Bations yere adequate, iTba ?!OJ ration i s very we'j.l liked {by the troops now that i t has levisea. menae. W s t e B e ration when we commenced atr-olling; however, very l i t t l e variety in those rations made a*fry monotonous, diet. N25ie *Cn ration with the Ten-in-One along with the extra components of the B would have served j u s t as well, The CoXemen gasoline stove was widely used and should be issued on the basis of one per eight men, 3. Palletized cargo did not work out satisfactorily be cause the U3S 2 O U E did aot have the f a c i l i t i e s to handle i t . V T T I t could be loaded only on the hatch square, because they had no equipment to move i t from there to the corners of the holds, and tbe pallet loads were too heavy to manhao.ais# Cpn^eqaently, the p a l l e t s had to be broken down and the cargo loaded by cargo nets except for the l a s t pallet a loaded, which were left on the hatch 8cpaarea, The Wilson drums ,were satisfactory. They were easy to handle, they kept the paa^o-dty.and undamaged, and whan the time came to reembark they were used again, A wooden oraie %ormai;ty. - ., . ' i s sira shed beyond any possibility ^- : iag i t twice. k, T'ie shore party functioned well ai\d ao change is, recommsnd^d. 5. Tn;.s battalion had two cargo carriers M 9 (Weasel), 2C two cna-ton trucks, four one-toa t r a i l e r ^ four quarter-ton trucks, and five qtiarter-ton t r a i l e r s , a i l of which, was adequate transport it ion for our supply nee&s. W packed one Weasel e and t r a i l sr w5th heavy machine uns and ammuniticn; a ono^-ton tnct" ard t r a i l e r with Home thrower servicing gea1*, and another ore-ton truck anC t r a i l e r vith extra flame throwers and Slmm therie specially iostcLfrd V3'* C.LOS we* >u,c uerjdedj'buit i s o x c s l l ^ t enl sliov-l ''.IV*,' re^ in- WJ* h ihe idea

> Page 5 of U prges -

18 A p r i l , 19U5.

1. Ih: ? l a r a U o t t had the r.sual a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n and 50 teams, "both of vlj.^L +rr.ntidied ex~ei:.en';ly. Two FO teams, one vibh ep.cn as-.&uH ^'..-.v^ir-, ^;uri coiAp*ac.My with u s . Each team ex o u o ' l i j e i , o:ie 3oc.it. aer^esnt, one radioman, one r d mo . . u i e t r ^ i ^ t r>r.i*-8^, whioL ivas adequate personnel, i ue-am. whicr o p e ^ t ^ in. the b a t t a l i o n GP, consisted of Ar.e cf-ticei, one zo^serge,, .-,ne ral:\o:.iaa, and six wiremeni which r i s e p-o > . >.c "be a uequ +.>, ' i l l i n f 9 i i * r y - a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n was "1 by d i r e c t ^ot'T^rsatior oetweeu *hc '"battrlicn commander ". a v t i l l e r y liaiHo;i o f f i c e r . The system i s e f f i c i e n t and 2 The personnel of the FO teams eni the l i a i s o n team v/ero Tsry well >iained; Vaey knew t h e i r jr"bs thoror.ghly. 3, .Both used the SCS 6lO which functjonod e y c c l l e n t l y . 110 roinirunications wire wr>.s .layed from the "bat i-,ery p o ^ i t i c i to +ha infentry "battalion C? a i d l}0 comaran5.cai,i .)r*e wS.re war Isy fror. the b a t t a l i o n CP i*c !?0 'ieanir. wf th'fue a"'sa*vufc companies, JLs v.sual, the t:mks vere eta carare cf troJren v.i.-:e .T031; ).T the x'j in ganer&l, the commuiicaticTi'i wore s-9l"l-'Ca' ory. i-, 0"br,eTr-at:.on va"5 f a i r on iwy JLma insoiTr -^s s<?Zac;:ton % n f OrJ? i^ concej:nev3.: i..Awdve* ? i t was rn P%:^f>edingly rtsi-rtiroes ; t l ^ e :o 'voc w fVrra fror. the front li.aes *dl. H cv.e- ">>? of
. ^
'.out

5, Amr.uni'-i-jn nupply Permed ta present no problem. thon^h we vere :L;.fo,?ned a fe-Ar time3 that 75 pack h o v i t t e r ara munition -'/a? rTraniA^ t'ho.fi wo-^era a"b? e to obtain a i l ra 6, The effect of our own ev'tiXlevy wa& hard to determine i n tlteU the i n s t a l l a t i o n ' s above g:rDuivl v^ere VedXy iJ.stcrtad t-y a l l types of i"2ro. Foweve.r, our ar^il" 1 e*rr w*.t> ru-t ef^ec+.jve aga'ns'i caves and concrete pillbox: wM c?\ r.ne l e *el vi*.h vc t} e surface of the ground, 7* Snamy a r t i l l e r y was d e f i n i t e ] / cf/.-c^JTe agrinr-t n s . However, i t could have "heen more so i f they v<,.d un^i-ed th.oir S Enmy t a r g e t s were located and f i r e d itpon mainly by the FG nethod 9, Fo change i s recommended in the present i aptlxl-3ry x i i i

3.. Pro.Hm5nary heavy flt.r^kds h^d l i t t l e , if eryf effect npon enery i ^ a t a l l a i - r^v Vxi in-, -it-/ o^ t-ie r>08iiir>u8 er 1 countered werft inde^r-')'.- -"!. ?.-a ... _r VXIV-J b3en d i f f i ^ u l i t^> icnojk j^.t -Tve.n with pz-a-^i-^.?r >-.^i.. i,.j g r e a t e r de'.ay finer si" )\t] a 1 vrc, 'Le.a p or ?. -* could lot, oTisiive ttv.: aJTfeitr of pr3ll.iinary ft*,?;.fc
'-cjfce " T 11 Pag

Subject;

,\ct.\on Bepoxi.

3. Performance by t h e a i ^ l i a i F s n p a r i / i e a wa? w r c o i l e r t , Th^y ver** well t r r i n ^ c i "Old sf^ir".e;:*-,. VrtTus"1. cont'ac* 'c3 :ia..r\~ tarne."1. with naval g*oaii.: Jird a t ^ l l p x y Ii?-'l3on off5cart- ^ ch'.n t h e bat^tcliojc vl.p., Mi.fyxoc r:5.^e*s <'o/.: a i r e d a I"1 p - i c* ue-vl Air rt-ceckr were d n e o t a d we?.I v u d . r ;,td,rvaif;i;-ii l v .i0*iaa*i6n. CoDdlt.ijns, Hsdio coLaciuiications wi - ,b-i.lr S^ippoi-t JcuVp:1oI vo;*e ma.in^rinod r t ^.11 l i ^ e s v/xiMe ih'.v II'T wei

hare Ve^ri r . ' e l t-.3T^.-3er. ACI/ 1.8% s '-wn.tn -'j tl;,-- .J: 1 rpo^Ci^ft t-oi, v i - u ICC - w i t > i . i ^ .

'.Vno st:.5.t^-si sn.l

o.. 6, started.,

Pan-e."'.. crera effcv-1;..-5-v^-.:i..a markirg fri'^ni";/ "-'iiypR. T'im^ng of s t r i k o * vas SjowTintii Vo.c/ ec-ju^lly g o t Tilts iva" r!?-.e '' .i r,-jjibj? -jf ^c. t o r i . 1 , c , ..-.--v-ra . >

long ( 7 iDumny attack3 wore not unr.c! *-n x-"-2 rn .?.:>-i/"n Vr our troops :> Tkurcny attacks p r i o r to !o-,r<-: ..7"ins xo~" a'^^rix^i iware efv'BC-VjV''?* partic*i.1.at*.L^- in ac .iur-t-ing (."'r^i^o.a oJ s^ach., ?, nonJ ^'o!'. of aircTafVfrod the gr.:ind C(/cli b^Ts "baeii b e t t e r had -ihs SaTj net been uflod^ 9. I t 5e re'ioir.TneDied tbat night observation plane? bo kept 5n the a i r a4- a l l *;1JI?B# When these vrere enplov3ur enemy ax"! j.a.'ler;" ard ror^ar ii"*e --TR* minimised,

J0 'J't.^ 1:i'i3 l i r e Oc?itrol personnel that opara'ied vi';!\ T tli's >a^a_?6a cor.&it9d of one " O tea*i ( l officer ard 5 men) > anr". ure Mar* so:v ^am Ci officer and f raen). They were cd^^Uat > fo^ vl.e tpe:.pt.;.on an! wsre' ffff^.clent and well vrniaod. c-.
p e d

I t 3 SOH28ij was f.sec. by the Tia.'.son and PO teams and

:;o "0.^ ar> 3.T.C3"J.3 e n t eb .

j, r i g h t harasemen'; f i r e s were used every night, the effeu 0^ wLJ'T'i coulu. not ae o>se?rvd.
*, i'C wdine.tic-i ta^^aer. aC^acent u n i t e regardJ.ng f i r i n g .Vf -"3 ve.r H2 rijic' i.l l . ^ i a A t i ^ i i vas do.nfc eif--wtfvely "hj rarHc i a a ricrao'o.a wn*re > e we"*e rec?3v4.:\g :O ie-ri'll';.- x-^-c.j ^ r i : / : ra lux T;C 97X01, *',& 3i::iH*vr. o+f-.?s.v aa3.1.?';; t>?. -vivr;*--<'"" r^. x i. who i:" run wailed tHc '^n+-..*o''. "-lixj, > r.L..<- jcnt.'."j >;--i:'p ^Le'

cf

COT1 S ! 7.1 Pages .

, on v ' u.)

E,

1. , At least one p}atoon cf en^ia^ere WPS attached to us a.bio?-*-. continuous Ly !Tie Brigineerr lid rot turn cut. to be en*.i.rely satisfactory i-i that tkaii tiatriir 1 ^ and e^nerionco with mines and booty traps Peers to hav^ b>?6,a tie^leVuel.,, fiho IM'arv^ry Vrully n3ed3 combat engineers WIJO ran ag^rs.^si^ely clear mine :?iel<?.3 and booby-trapped areas. They must jrke their rirfca also. Their use of demolitioDB,in'cealiog' cever v<rs -s-ei'y well done however.

X, It tcok 2.9 hours to load the USS FATlTTE, which time could have "been decreased but for the fo?lowing: (l) Almost a l l pallets had to "be brokeit down at the cargo assembly ?xrea, (2) The cargo assembly area was too small; only two trucks could load there simultaneously, (3) There were no lights in the cargo as sembly area and there was a delay while they were being installed, and (k) A Plash Red delayed the loading slightly but when i t was over no one around knew how to start the generator which caused further delay u n t i l i t could be started* 2. Total time elapsed in unloading was 12 days, which was a result of poor hydro'graphic conditions, and the overall picture of the operation i t s e l f .
J.
Ordnance,

1 iDhia battalion used the following weapons, all of

which functioned normally, for the entire operation.
Rifle, Ml 1*55
Carbine klk
BAR 81
LMG IS
HMO 18
Rocket Launcher 12
Flame Thrower, M2-2 37
M cal., pistol 21
The following is an approximate list of ammunition

TYPE Cartridge. Oertrid^e, "artri'lge : ."ar.jrjge, ver u rid^;e, v)pvi-.j.r<ife3 OLjtiidge, f( artir^e, B a l l , Carbine, Cal .30 Ml Grenade, Carbine, Cal .30 M6 A? Cil .30 M2 (5 rd. clip) AP Cal .30 M2- (8 rd. clip) Trace^, Cal .30 M ? M f l e Grenade, Cal .30 M3 A? St Cr, Belied Cal .JO B a l l , Cal \ r
ROTJITDS

g,000 3,000 50,000

<,ono ".0,000

V;00.
, IIS, Shell, Cre-v-.ed3, Hani, ? g C-reaado, Kpnd, I l l u n ,
?"..nrr 500

Pa-^es

ibjeci

nt'd).

Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Y2, M15 Grenade, Hand, Colored, Red 3, Haad, Oolorei, Yellow >, P d f l e , AT, K9A1 Li-r eua da, its f i e , Fraf, T mp, Ml 7 G-rsnade, k i ' f i e , ftriolra Grenade, R i f l e , Cmoke, Golored, Red Grenade, R i f l e , Lmoke.. Colored, Yellow Grenade, R i f l e , fcmoke, Colored, Amber Rocket, HE, AT, .36", MaA3 Adapter Gx*enade P r o j e c t i o r , Ml F l a r e , T r i p , MU9 Caps, B l a s t i n g , N o n - e l e c t r i c , #g Cord, d e t o n a t i n g (prima Cori) Block, Demolition, Chain, Ml Block, Demolition, .0-2 Explosive, (DM, 3 / 2 l o , b l o c k s Fuse, blasting* time Fuse lightera
Cylinder, Ignition; Ml Napalm Hitrogen cylinder

-!-, X)O <5 T . H 2 f 000

. . , ' '

25 2 5
200

50 rolls 50 cases 50 cases 75 cases ^,000 feet

1,000

?.vX>0

150
700 gal.
15 cyl.

3. One jeep ambulance from "B" Medical Co and our own

jeep ambulance were used in addition to the vehicles mentioned
earlier in the report. All vehicles proved satisfactory and
were used during the entire campaign. One Weasel was destroyed
by a direct artillery hit. The Weasel is good ia the saad, but
it throws tracks very easily. Turns have to be made very slowly.
The pintle on the rear of it to which the one-ton trailer was
latched was not strong enough. They bent easily and even snapped
at times.
K, Chemical.

1, Prior to the operation every man was trained in the use

of the gas mask, Each Co had trained decontamination squad. Masks
were issued prior to embarkation; they were carried ashore and placed
in dumps on D plus 6. The remainder of the battalion gas equipment*
which consists chiefly of decontamination gear, was unloaded and
kept in a dump during the entire operation. No enemy use of chemi cals was noted,

L.

Medical.

1. There were no great problems of sanitation during the

operation; however, there were many casualties to be treated.
The battalion aid station treated 523 casualties, I+U7 of which
were evacuated, and fG returned to duty on Iwo Jima. There were
317 walking wounded and 206 stretcher cases. Evacuation was ef fected by litter bearers from the front line companies to the bat talion aid station, and by jeep ambulance from there to the medical
companies. The 2$ litter bearers in each coutpany were definitely
inadequate. The aid station was always set up within the perimeter
of the battalion CP and its secur:.ty and protection came from it.
One blackout tent was used vixen the situation permitted.
2. The equipment carried ashore consisted of four combat
cases with bare essentials, two Cases of plasr
rest of the gear was unloaded and kept

>.*'

V Pages

-i

* . '

18

?f<

The two J^rn? am"bulanc3B w$re adequate for evacuation purposes, Wound*!#0W>a were gt^tt th aam **aiea* -as our ment aad seat to the*rea* S&eay dead were Juried wherever found; own ^were'dent io the* eemetsryf ^ ^ ^'^^* ' -." *4' * * * ^ "^ 3. Albtiaen was frequently used tn l i e u of plasma, cause i t i s easier to carry and to '\, Because of tH heavy casualties suffered, i t WAS necessary to replace k i l l e d , wounded, and fatigued corpamen from the r i f l e companies with those from the aid station group. I t was discovered that the aid station corpsmn were not well enough acquainted with the way the companies worked in matters of cover, concealment, etc* Jt i s recommended that a l l corpsmen receive training with the r i f l e companies. That will be the policy in t h i s battalion in the 5. This organisation had, upon landing, two doctors and thirty~eiht hospital com&men. The T c a l l s for three corpsmen O -attached t><>each r i f l e corapaaayj laowever, ye use s^x in each i^pany an.% tvp wi:fh ijk -S|mw mortar is(|tfeo^a,, a n t ' ^ e res^t e battalion aid station. It i s a much more satisfactory

works

wire

a l l of^which funetiened excellently. The 110 Iatera3 in.adjaceftt. unjlt.affords, the n*es:t e f f i c i e n t

ther

<

*>"UU Li
\
'..
. * *

. .

"A

*' 1 *
i
'

4 .., n .

- ?

2B01OS0ES-3, ACTIOH to

RSC/reb HEADQUARTERS, SECOND 3ATTALI F, NINTH MARINES MARINE DIVISION, FL3ET MARINE FORGE, JN THE FIELD, 19 April, From* To t C0 CO, 9th Marines* Action Report, IVO JIMA.

Subject! References

(a) GO 137> 3* Mar 2>iv. In accordance with Ref (a) the following report of action of the Second Battalion 9th Marines, IWO JIMA Operation is hereby submitted?
Summary.
km Period covered 2U Feb-" 7 April, 19^5.

PART I

B* This battalions campaign on Iw> Jima foils into k phases; l)

Capture of Airfield #2j 2) assault on enemy strong point 201 Es 3) Hedr uction of 201 E from rear after it had become a pocket: k) Patrolling
and mopping up.
PART II Preliminaries.
A* Composition of the reporting command.
1. 2, 3 b. 5* 6 7* 2nd Bn 9th Mar.
Arty Ln Personnel*
Naval Gunfire Ln Personnel*
Air Ln Personnel.
2nd Plat Regt'l Wpns Co, 9th Mar.
Two Plrts 3& Tk Bn.
One Plat Co A 3d Engr Bn.

B The mission of this battalion was the destruction of the

enemy in its zone of action* The action involving the battalion was one of
continuous assault on enemy emplacements and pillboxes. The mission was
assigned from day to day the evening before the attack, leaving no time
for rehearsal or training for the attapk. The planning involved was that
of coordinating the fires of the attached supporting weapons and units.
The .only training conducted ly the battalion bccured toward the and of
the period when casualties1 in tr ined personnel made it necessary to
instruct the replacement personnel in the intricacies of pillbox reduc tion and the special werjpons (flame throwers, demolitions, bazookas,
automatic rifles, etc) employed in such assaults.
C, This battalion is credited with having killed 12^0 enemy
troops* This figure being a summary of daily estima-tes. The total enemy
dead cannot be accurately oreported as the number of enemy sealed into
emplacements and caves can never be sccuratly determined. Throughout the
Battalion Z of & stragglers and remnants of enoffijr units, destroyed else where, were met* . In these instances they had been molded into a defen sive tatt fm^L assigned a definite defensive area* During the attack from
the vicinity of Airfield #2 to the berch this Bn encountered parts of the
Iwo Jima Guard Faces, 9 Navrl Unit, comprised of both infantry and &nti~
aircraft personneli thi 11th Anti Tonk Company; the 20th Mcciiin
Cannon Company; elements of the 20th Independent Kortar Battalion; and
elements of the 1^5th Inf Regt. The finol oi-gr-r^zed strong point in
201 B was composed of the 31^+th Independent Inf Bn vdtli at le^st two
companies of the 26th Tank Regt ?>s its core* Fribdy defenses were charac terised by numerous pillboxes of ftone constmcrlon ^s*.one blocks ap-prox-*
iaataly one foot square} each sited to d e l i v p | ^ l l y supporting grazing

Subject?

Action Report*_IWO JTKA,

fire* Individual rifle p5.i,e constructed similar to the pillboxes were so

disposed as to cover each pillbox* In addition to the aforementioned
defensive installations artillery and mortar "barrages were employed
extensively* After the assault phase was over and patrolling and mopping
up .started* the enemy used>caves and o#en holes as D defense* These position*
offered little difficulty tn that the caves and tunnels were of such depth
thrt sealing the entrances was sufficient The caves and tunnels required-
huge quantities of explosives to accomplish this sealing operation*
PART III Account of Action, . *4r

FIRST P A - E C P U B OF A i m W ) #2 . B S3 ? A T K

& After an uneventful landing on 2k Feb and one night in

assembly area ikfyD f the b&ttolion was ordered to. pass through 2~21 and +-&
seize 0-2 at 0330, 25 Feb* Vo were faced with a UoO yd reentrant which
precluded close support byheavy weapons* Reconnaissance wra made and 3n
attack order issued at OS^O* Consideration was j^iven to riding infantry
on "backs of ,tan2 across airfield but ws rejected "because height of enemy
M& fire was not known and because tanks could not be deployed in a covered
position and mortar fire on tanks was intense* Consequently Inf followed

LDt ran into o highly organised maise of rauturlly supporting pillboxes with automatic wpns and AT guns slipcovered by riflemen in cavea nd trencher* After 2 | days of painstaking t^nk infantry assault t h i s strong point f e l l on the 27th* In the mean time at 1130 on 26 Feb the reserve Co was pushed up behind the right company, ^ The F.es Co attacked to the West, madte contact with the unit on the lt. and thus eliminated the reentrant* On the morning of the 2jth both a s s r u l t Cos lumped off rad by the end of t h e day had token the hi#h ground a t 1.95 I aa. i.a ka]*d to hand assault with the 7 bnyonet* On the morning of the 29th 1-21 executed a passage of limes an we went into Reft. ^ 2* ThiB phase w*s marked by continuous use of support by t r n k s , a r t y 1 Favel Gunfire, a i r , and mortars* Both HE o.n& smoke were used* For the Inf i t was a continuous pillbox assault using immense quantities of ; rocketsj.and flame* livery yard was fought for, andwhen washeld under intense enemy mcrt^r and arty fire* Without our own s-jiperb supporting werpons, success would h?ve been doubtful^
D ...3* ) To our credit? t h i s atk rdvanoed one mile {1700 yds) through fierce r e s i s t a n c e , breo.ched the Jvp M R defending ."irfield #2, L k i l l e d ^nroximptoLy 730 Japs and knockec. out 77 pillboxes*

b)

To our debit: t h i s r.tk cost us about 250 casualties

including a large number of -leaders which was to prove serious l a t e r * , SSCOflD PHASE; ASSAtLT PIT 201 E* 1* After being ^.n Res 2? ?eb and."l Mar W w? ordered to otk e N of Motoyama in a wedp:e shaped sector* The ptk w: e nrde in a column of . U omp-mios inltir.lly V/hen the etk had .^dvfnced 200 yda tuo sector hrd vudejLRd PO that at 1300 a second Co wrs pushsd to the fron^;* At about t h i s t i r e J r p center of resistance was encconierei r.bout 500 y6x square, the core cf \-hich was in 201 S 2y W beat against t h i s position fo:v eifh'j cortiruons days usin^; e every supporting weapon* ^/hen relieved on }0 Viv 'v& he? descroyod r l l AT f i r e 5.n our S of A and had eliminated 25C yds of wiio r si stance,, TLe coro t 201 iJ; s t i l l remained* The 3n was exhr.usted - a^r-.o^l rli ler'de^s were jone * and the In nupiwered ab^ut- '400 including sane Zb& '.t-eT'I^emont^* Xt wp.d e^dent tfc^t the Pi rat Hiass, iird t.*?.cn. the EK*1.1-J^ leader J ^id !ihe "drive 11

Subject*

v t , IVfO JIMA

3 This phase w?.s a eonttnuoup p i l l b o x a s s a u l t for the Inf and we lacked s k i l l e d troops p S apr, nrt .in .weapon* were-cup&2ib again and accounted for our l i m i t e d ;succeed -* some 40C ^ds i n E ..clays, . Sneny a r t y and mortar f i r e were n o c ' a s hervy as i n Phrse Ons and l e s s e n e d dry "by day;' however Jap machine, ^;un ond r i f i e f i r e was dovn-stctinf; end u s u r l l y f a t a l . A l l vacua** t i o n s , supply, and r e l i e f s had' t c "be na&e c t nif<ht. They were so mn.de with g r e a t success,, This phase was a l s o c h a r a c t e r i z e d "by 2 ni;:ht i n f i l t e a j i o n p i n forc e (1H0 J r p s oech tims)) , on" J ond 9 Mar These were not Bsnari These were not on" J ond 9 Mar i n forc e (1H0 J r p s oech t i m s a t t a c k s end. were repulsed* '

a) The enemy position was a maze of CPVCS, piiD boxe"~, tanks, stone walls* PE& tr^r-o'i-So Only'these JTinedJr.toly in fie troops cc*a3& be lccai.ee!*- fuel oerbu-3 of tlie J&pa uso of ">owd-er s^me of" these were xwfc krown0 "Out r.f f>tout 150 oi these positions (by r l' r ter count) we knev about 20 - 30 ^f tliemc The' closest of > these known positions were about 50 yds from our frrnt lines, b) About 75$ of the attacking riflemen had' norcr be jn in a ni,;jTit operation even in tr^iiiing, .sone 2 ^ h?>d never been in any kind of an attack* Very few lenders were leffc-> ''The troops haji assruluid these positions for four dry3 with he>vy les'-es and were discouraged* No fresh troops were avoi The ;BtrimeiTt# on the left has.pushed' throudi to high c) ground, md I felt this shctJLd be exploited to attack this center of r e s i s tance from i t s re^r. I hed so reconifiended verbally to the^ADCt C~3 C~3i and He^t , 1 . d) The r t k or&er" wntOrecelved about 2kOO - five hours to Kin#; hour asid during These regoranendnt-i^s di^. not outweir;ht other factors, the order wrs /^iven, careful prenar^ti^ns were mrdef *nd the assault troops jucrped off et 0500* Suich pillboxes ^s were known or found were knocked out r SurpriBewae -cos^lete* fhe trorp. preceeded v200 yds ond re,flrrnizcd as dawn brolcer In" the dnxk thby hufi. slipped through nlr;ost to
the* c e n t e r frf t h i s mcze of f o r t i f l o ^ ' t i o r i s and when d^yliyi cut then to. Pieces frorcf *>11-* s i d e s , '#&$- fl$*ilfi*?' wnif* fidrce- bat-confused, At noon enough informstion W$Bo b t r i n e d to c o u n t e r a t t a c k with t h e Res Co, -JSyf i g h t i n g u n t i l n l * & t f l l they e x t r i c a t e d mest of tho remnants* The next day a foray-by tf>nk extrid&fced the remrin^ieif^ ^.bfeut- JO "out cf ,100 'attacking troops returned* They fe^d i n f l l ^ t e ' d tfror1t> d^R??^e on t h e ^ n s ^ knocking out r:-tank PXUX ^juciei*f>,us piiiboac>oe*> but- a t such c o s t they were unable to const1 licVi.te And hold their-' p i n s , ~-no^> could the Res Co do mo-re thnn reach o ncsltiom to cover them by f i r e . This rvtk did soften the position, sr t h r t V the 10th of, J4P.r' tf-nks and Inf pushed SCJUQ X50 yds from tho Of-00 LB of 7 Mar-* The Bn was thr& put i n -Div-Hes for- .four -d^ya v.i5 ca ijiten?1ve trrinin^-and r ^ t r o l l i n c were crnducted* TTACK C^1 01 B PJBOI>: 1',. The cen'tcr- of r.i)sistance in 201 % h.ving been made a pocket by 1-9 c l ^ s i n ^ a ^ i n s t l-refi/^ttoie-Ba-<nr*se& jthru$i'Z-9 a r to the v/c-st of 173-'5 on. lU Mor* Inconclusive har^d jo h' nd f i r h t i n g a n t i l dark** The s t k W " ^ reeuneti the Brext &~.yand "by us in:; tmKB abou+ Jn^. *S ' the pocket v?Sf reduced d u r i n g the l5t^- ? t t1 ccsiv of Ul cr.^ufi..ties, $. ni^h* r e l i e f of one Cc wns n^dej the ^ t k wr-s uonli-a'acd" ond- b / ROOH cf the iGth th-e socket wrs c l e a r e d , , and.by e^pening ex tLr. ^7t,h wr.r uc-j ;cd irp* ~

Subject*

Action Report, IW JIMA, O

2. Almost a l l of the Inf were replacesent8,ThJfo lacked entirely the will to close with the enemy* Tanks mad* success possible* Armored bulldfcsers were also *ery valuable* A flame throwar tpnk, new type,
borrowed and proved the aelutlon to the whole problem*

, - .

FOURTH PHASE?
Commencing 0700, 16 Mar this Bn was assigned a,patrol sector 1 % in the Forth of the old Uth Mar Sir Z of A* Qo patrolled and closed with, demolitions; Ambushes were set at night,. Dogs were used to some tage* Boring" this period .small poorly armed {$roups of Japs {from 1 to 10) were a l l that were encountered *- mostly tfy the night ambushes* IV Comments* A* Administration* 1* . ,

A personnel report was submitted to the R-l office at This rqporVshowed e*feetl* strength* mm*** of itt? MIA, and the non effetti^es* Thie report was contolidpted from reports of the CoU and, ty cheeking with the Aid Station when i t b tc cofttasi th
2% A iftsvXty repvT% wns submitted on each casualty by the These reports were mode on forms preriously provided by the showed th&*d&t* typ of psualty andother information ecrerintf the the c^sev .. . - . - . , * . . % . . 3 r. ' T At .this KIA b Off W A 26 ' J DWIA 2 ' TOTAL: s# 88 %% enlisted. W t

0 the 52** WlAt 65 *e effective^atid^are.inowTon duty*

^. (Mxe 3n feceivd^X6 officer** and; 356* enlisted

. monts during the period 1 Har .29-Maf*>

-
if;

TV

:. . il$t

. '

The strength of the Bn when i t landejl was J5 of fibers

' ."

827 enlisted*,, ' - l a o t y r ^ >.*

6 The effective Strength of theBn t the cl^ee of the

e,B 20,offic
B. '
1 The maps and aerirl photos furnished this organization *)rior tc the derationcwereisufficieatvin numb#f*,-dH-ps.,wefce*fmttL4t|ol-^t^ ,^naccur>:t.Q:-ini'So.ei'.tplac-es.: possibly- ftue to- the ,recent construction ^n-ltfc:1 4 i ^ n of ground-iforne, :-rMB,.

^ furnished during,J$ obliques and soipe verticals These photos were excellent one rcopu of each was furnished; therefore their T*lue w#s limited*

HeDort, -W JIMA I O 3# ' Hydrographic information was correct " u as this Bn did
bt not land In the assault its importance *7>s greatly redeced*
h9 v O-2 intelligence reports were not received from Regiment
two days before we left the is
5 ?he procedure set up for the recovery of car>tured
ments and materials was
6# The enlisted Jr.pr.nese language interpreter attached ta
this organization was used only to segregate or.ptured documents* Since the
only c a fares by this organization oecured lato in the canpaign^and ftinoe
no lfhotM
documents were captured, his services cannot be fairly judged* His
services to the organization are highly desirable* however*
7% No visible results were obtained from written or vccal
b propaganda* If vocal propaganda Is to " e used in the future it-must be
c rrdinated with the units on the ground. These cannot be fighting on one
side of a rord and ft unit on the other side trying to talk the Jrp into
surrenduring as occured oh one occasion*
S# JICPOA temrfi rendered some assistance to this or^artlaa
tion in the renoTal rf captured material*
% Intelligence liaison with the next higher echelone was
satisfactory as regards emergency information but not w s regard* routine
periodic reports. ^
10* 11, 12, Counter intelligence mepsurss were adequate*
He encountered no B3anz*i attacks"
Hew tacticd encountered were*

', cur tanks*

C

. ,

b. c#

Rockets*
fimely and effeetlve use of smrke when fighting

Operation pnd Training

1, Due to the original assif>ned missions of this 3n, part

of Ccrps Reserve, and due t^ the short lrpso of time following the
as filing of a specific attack mission and its execution* nc rehearsals
were conducted. An extensive over .?il study,of the entire crmpain was
made aboard ship and the progress of the assault units ashrre closely
followed to prepared for any eventuality* All hands were kept abreast of the
situation ashrre through daily instruction^ map and aerial photo ctudy.
2.0 Tanks f i r i n g Vytm antiHjoncrete s h e l l s bazookas, flame throwers i demo l i t i o n s , and p o l e chr>r/5ee with a 3 s e e fu,e were fcund to be the most e f f e c t i v e werpfrne used a g a i n s t f o r t i f i e d T>ositions 3* The fl*me throwers were i n d i s p e n s a b l e . !Phe p o r t a b l e flame throwers were hi^h^y s a t i s f a c t o r y , f u n c t i o n i n g w e l l a t a l l t i m e s . The tank mounted flame throwers c f the 3d Mar Div were somewhat b e t t e r than our p o r t a l b e v r f i e t y # 3y f^r t h e b e s t flame thrower wss the tank mounted flame thrower o f t h e Uth and 5 t h Mar B4or This type tank h^s a 300 g a l f u e l tank and shoots a flame 100 to 150 yds loiuj f o r U minutes. i^# The Japrnese used AT s^uns,> their own tanks dug in as pillboxes* AT mineftf and assaults by individual soldiers with sachel g

explosives as counter measures a^inst s u r - t g y ^ ^ Thejlr j^uns^ tanks, and mines were skillfull^ placed eM enrpred. U f l N J i " ^ "

Action Report, IWO J.IKA*

defensive position** .

5* War & were 6rloyed for ni.;ht securityt .

and rJLlit ambushes during the final phase of the operation* Security
ambush do$6 alerted en every occasion except one when Jeps approached.
Several times ambush do^s brrked or growled thus giving away our positions,
Dcgs used on patrols were highly satisfactory; none of these dc^s were tv&.
shy but were very scared of demolitions, Future training of do#s should
teach them to alert at night without barkkag or growll&g* to acquaint th&m
with demolitions and to tench then to "be a "one ram* dog* TDo^e 'that'could
be handled by several people did -unsatisfactory work*
D* Supnly*
li 2. All types of mounting out supplies were adequate.
Hesupply was excellent*

3, Palletised Cargo was satisfactory* Wllion Druns pro vided excellent storage space for medical and communication supplies*
U. Salvage of our own equipment as well A S enemy equip ment was carried out when the situation permitted* S*lvre during the
assault phases was extrenely difficult due to the he^vy enemy fire covering
all sectors of the Z of A V.hen sudden moves by the Battalion to r new Z of
A occured, salv^je bec^-ine impossible as all agencies of the orf^nitation
been me tiec1. ur> in supply*
5 ^neay orterials were either salvaged by this organisation
or reported to the nex$ higher echelon for srlvage,
6* All transportation employed by this organization with
the exception of the Ureas eft was satlsfaftory* The terrain in most ins tances was unsuited for the Wensel, the soft sand and rugged terrain
caused frequent breaking or throwing of tracks* Jn most instances the
ton UxU Truck accomrilished the mission with less oechanical failures*
B* Transport Quartermrster*

1* Trocps were debrrked in about two hours* The artillery

was loaded in the second trip of the boats* All troops were debrrked In
LCM*s and troops had some difficuliiet getting into the boats* The ship
was equipped with the new type debarkation nets made of chain and wood*
Several of these ladders broke and due to the rough seas it was difficult
to hold then inoide the landing boats* All c^jgo wat unloaded in five^
days* Pue to the heavy seas and hi^h surf most cargo had to be unloaded
by LCTs or LSM&. A few vehicles were loaded in tCk** Some boats were
loaded and could not get on the beaeh for twelve houfs or" more* SoVe,^!
times cargo ids taken ^bac>c aboard ship from,boat! khrl h^d broken down or
were about to sink due to leaks* Only one IC$ w>i assit^ried to the ihlp
for unloading find that was for one load only* Other iCTs 6t LSMs were
part loaded by other ships slid wfre loaded to cnpacHy by the Knox*
JSvery ship should be assigned ofce or two W$ or LSMs for unloading in future
operations where there is a rough sen and higjfc surf* All officers and men of
the ship were very Cooperative in the unloading* They used every possible
means to get cargo on the
* IH ship used the svinf;in^ boom for unloading vehicles*
U!he boom aad stay was used to unload all bulk eargo and pallets* The ship
had adequate equipment for~ unloo'd^ng all types of c^rgo and a minimum
amount-Of' tifflje wa* lo*fc,
3 Presuma^biy chain and wood debark nets are to replace
l-Ianilr. nets* If rope is available .it is stron^tly reoommended as the chain
nets now is use ^k terrible* Thejyjbre^icr tea^r'ttw^s and equipment d
are alia(yst lmpMiJWLe to climb ^ " ^ B

Subject:

^ AcJ&iog.^egpjPt^ IWO JIMA

Weapons,
a# Funiber #yoe and caliber of weapons usedt

US3 turbines- 774 Ml Rif3 a*

121 J&R
P6 LMG 12 Mortars ^ Mortars, 27 -Sinnie Throwers

Cal \ 3
it

it

IT

n
tt

tt

60mra Blnra

2,36 in*
Gal .

19 pistols

b Due^ib turn over In personnel and the continual

replacement of worpons of snai& caliber it is impossible to estimate the
number of days that types of-^weapons were used* ?he renj&inCng weapons
employed continuously through the entire c
Ntuater, type and crliter of weapon* fk>t
The following is a list of all types of werponr
drawn by this battalion during the c^mpr.ign, These figures do not give an
accurate picture of wer.pons lost * the major portion of them were evacuated
with the wounded personnel* The Heavier weapons, nachie P & 8 , mortars, flame
throwers and bazookas were damaged during the battle and turned in to
salvage when the replacement was drawn*
205 Carbines hyt Ml R i f l e s . 16 BAB,
11 1KG 13 Tlrme Throwers 13 3o?ookp.s Cal 30,
tt

ft

tt tt

60 nun 2*36 in.

d Initially all reported malfunctions were found to

be caused by the 4ust and dirt? clog, i&g the moving parts of the weapons*
An investigation showed that -tels*ran$.fujieti0ni^was not due to negltgenie
on the part of the individual as first suspected^ but due solely to the
accumulation of dirt, etc f^i.-occured during the attack^ During the
final phrses reported malfunctions in automatic weapons ware found to *bd
due to inadequate knowledge $ the weapon by new personnel*
e, ecsily obtained, Sp^rf prrts and accessories were wdequ^te rnd
.

t$ TSacis'ting Weapons nre adequate and no modifications

are suggested, A Hapolm type shell that could be fired from the
Mortar would be of great assistance*
2 Combrt Vehicles,
e,9 Iftiniber and type of vehicles usedj
k * ton kxk truck.'
1 J tt ff
ambulance,
1 t " " TCS Hrdio ffruck
5 i n toilers,

2 1 " kxk trucks,

k 2 1 " Trucks. Carg c-p^r-lorfc M290 ( l

Subject:

Action Report X O JIMA W

b All venicles l i s t e d above were employed every dajr from 2$ fob for *+l dr,ys* c On vehicle* \ ton J a ftabulrnfce was drjnaged beyond *&

d* The only iBP-lfunctioa* in any of the Above yahiel%s was in the Cfcrgo Carrier H29C (We^sej.) vrlkich continually l o s t trflelM or tracks In the rouga tandy terrain. e $ accomplished* no recoaundnd^tions for modifications these vehlclsst 3* Ammunition, There wejro no m4.ntainaace d i f f i c u l t i e s S3*1 re prrt^ were adequate pad rsprlr apeedily

a. Number gff rounds by e*ac$ nomenclature unit of f i r e originally landed, expanded or lost* These figures include thrt ararrunition turned over in dijcips to relieving; units, or issued to units when their ^munition supply was low, 20,000 rdi of carbine* 318*opb rdt-A) or 63#i0# rds # w * rdi * * rdi Ml tracer, rds Cart*" Rifle Grenada rdi 3^11 C^l ^5* rds HS<K* 3$O# rds illumine-ting M83 wt 375 200 ^00 75 73Q ; ;

^ K15 Hftfed Grenades* ,

Smoke colored Ml6, Hand torenede*
Illuminating* Hrnd
Incendpry HPH& Orenfdei Rifle, AT " Impoct VXJ. Adftptcrs eren^des f or Bftngolore Torpedo cases TPT explosive* crses C2 rolls prioftcord, detonating 3ft fu$e, safety time, elect rid l p cylinders nitrogen*v ^ ignition rds HS M6 W/PM 53 (glmra Mort rdi HE M&3*1 /5M52 (61no Mort Sirioke W*
,: ; ,,-.;.., . .

*O f 60 100 50 300

12 136 k 200
0% Medical*. ..

' ,-. '

Embarkation*

. % Personnel? Medical section carrying assault embfrke4 wiih th-3n ,

Action Report % X O JIMA* W >,i * ^ * ' ' W$>$$%*& i * o n ambulance and t r a i l e r , loaded with sttpi3iementary supplied, were taken aboard with the high priority Bn Train* 30 day replenishment was packed in water tight .Wilson Drums end loaded with low priority Quartermaster supplies, 2 Aboard Ship*

a* Sickness was nogligeble except for an epidemic

acute upper respiratory infection of virus Ayes* This was probably spread
from replacement personnel who recently left the tJ*S* and joined this Bn
on ship* Six men were hospitalized for 2-6 days with complications
(Sinusitis and pheumoniti*)* One troop medical officer and about six
troop corpsmen handled troop sj.ck call daily in the Ship Sick Bay. Ship's
staff tended hospitalized patients*
b* Sanitary conditions satisfactory* Heat and
humidity of living quarters exaggerated existing tropical skin diseases
while in port. Sleeping on deck was prohibited by theShip1* Captain*
C Special Precaution*: The Ship's Senirr Medical
Officer assigned troop Medical Officers and Picked Corpsmen to stations
and duties designed to supplement theShip1* Staff in event of major
combat medical emergency on Ship*
3* Debarkation (2k Fob, 19^5)

a. Personnel were debarked by boat groups (3 boat

groups to one LCM) with the Bn assault medical supplies carried ashore in
two equal loads. The Bn Surgeon and half the Corpsmen. landed in the assigned
JPifth wave LCMJ the Assistant Surgeon and other half of the Corpsraen in
the Sixth Wave t*CM* Although this was not an assault landing the beach was
under sporadic mortar fire, so both group* moved rapidly inland to the Bn
assembly area, im. Aid Station was set up here for the night*
b* boat group* on landing* (2) Ambulance on&. trailer loaded with supplnm*. entnry supplies landed on 26 #eb, 19^5 heavy surf and beach congestion pre vented earlier landing* Cammandered vehicles evacuated wounded adequately
until ambulance arrived,
Bn medical replenishment in Wilson Drums
(3) was located late in March in the Hegtfl dump; condition good*
C No losses of personnel ct material occurred
during the debarkation pha.se*
H, a* Medical installations*on 25 Peb, this Bn attacked,
executing a passage of lines through the 2nd 3n ,21st Marines, During the
First Phase of this Bn's combat (25 feb - 2S Feb) a forward Aid Station
was maintained adjacent to tho Bn C0!s OP anda. rear Aid Station was set up
within the 3n CP, OneMedical Officer and approximately half the Hq Coll
Sec Hosp Corpsmen manned each Aid Station* When the CP displaced forwnrdf
tha rear Aid Station moved up to join it, becoraming the forward Aid Station
until tho next move* during the Second Phase of combat (28Fob - 10 Mar),
only the forward Aid Station was maintained; tho CP wa.s out of the Bn Z of
A* Difficult1 front lino evacuation made for much night work; a cave was
used as a black out room for ni^ht medical treatments and as shelter for the
medical personnel* Because of the limited cover from frequent raortar barr-*
ages and the volume of the ni^ht work, the Hq Co Medical personnel again wa*
split into two group*; one group rrsted at the CP while the other operated t
a 1 Material*
(1) Assault sup-olios were hand carried by the

the Aid Station at the OP, alternating ^ *-^Mm%yMV Hl^StflilftPV !^^

Phases (lk Mar and subsequently) the CPQ^^JHlffPffOT t % 3 ^ 3 ^M'll y ^1 ^ r e

Subject*

Action Report, IWO JIMA*

Hq Med Secj ouch reduced "by casualties, worked

Location With regard to*
(a) were on roads*
(b) Cover - Defilades* .caret* or
tunnels and foxholes were used at all times*
(c) Dispersion - working in two groups
was an effective measure of dispersion during the mortar barra^gs of the
First and Second Fhases*
* (d) Other Medical Installations - excellent cooperation "between this and adjacent 3a Aid Stations was main**
tPined at all times*
() Walking Wounded - cane from front
lines with stretcher or carrying parties.
(2) Protective Measures Taken*
Roads all A14 Station setups
*

(a) Local security!medical personnel

stood night foxhole sentry duty the same as adjacent OP or CJ* personnel.
(b) Strict "blackout was maintained*
Fight medical trertment was ^iven in caves when possible*
b* HoSpitaliaationf the only hospital!tation prac ticed at this activity was ll^ht duty parties at the OP for the less Severe
BP problems and minor injuries. These patients were returned to full duty
as rapidly as shrapnel fragments were removed* .
c* Evacuation* Front line to Aid Station by Maiine
stretcher parties recruited from Hq personneliattached units and replace* mento. Stretcher parties were well handled, often heroic* always adequate*
Aid Station to Higher Echelons: "by vehicle* Velicuter evacuation was
adequate but haphazard until ambulances came ashore 26 3Peb* A third
arabulance was nedestary* during the Second Phrse* because of the velume of
casualties and distance of evacuation*
d. C8U3ltles Treated;

(1) lumbers (a) (b> (c) (2) Hypei (a) Concussion Atmospheric was Retained Evacuated Died 2Z f2k 3^

prominent during the fierce mortar barrages of the Jirst andSecond IhaseSp
and absent in the small arms action t h M characterised the Third and
Fourth phases*
(b) IT*I* problems were reraarkedly
rare* A very few Coabat Fatigue and 'ar Feurosis cases were seen during
the TirBt and Second day fi^htinf; DJXC in the l^.rge replacement: groups*
During the Second Phr.se Atmospheric Ooncussion and Overwork Sxhauaation were
complicating factors*
(c) Fra.gment wounds were prominent in
the Pirst T^hase and progressively diminished as mortar fire died out* Gun
Shot wounds became relatively more frequent in the.letter phases; the ratio
of killed to wounded showed a shp.rp rise with the small arms close contact

v^.' CJJ. ./*

II

(O

'?.) Ho* s a l t ws/ier shower was nr: y'djl 20 ilarj -the water-vw.t too Let mo. insufficient In quantity for \ < -d > qua<E> This r*n.8 the f i r s ' : a';T,e.:.i7-)t vo provide general washing, f re Ilrflie'-' r'.nco *he So lanled^ (t) !D* s^pa;r from niro-nL^-ne vas in ) "J he for appar^iifc effect, in this LD o;t A 'The d r y ^ i ^ f nature of tU^ f.cTxr.in defeated the spraj% Eanci pprn^rox f'.y infested nreaa was carried oat when p o s s i t l o ,

I! \F) 0 ' : *-Eirji and " ** rations were T1 ii5ed entirely and individually during vhoFlret rncl Second Phases. They were available as supplements duri.iK "the Third, and Fourth Fhr.ees*

(b; T O cooked meals a dc.y of fresh W food were prepared daily in a recr <-.rea inri served in Co areas during the 'Third and Fourth Phases. UsueJ b^nitaiy rae^avxes and inspections wero ecplcyed (3) ^at.fci'j in drums and expeditionary cans " obtained from rear area sources in satisfactory quality and quantity for eating and drinking. I t was insufficient for adequate "bathing.and washing purposes* f Disposal nf Dead; (1) Cemetery for internment (2) Jai^anese ** sprayed with D T solution and D buried on the "battlefield as soon as possible* Epidemics of Unusual Diseases in Troops: (l) h. measures were encountered* i% Noen hnve "be m otisorved. Marine - collected and sent to 3^ Mar Div

Dental Sorvices} (l) No dental problems "beyond Aid Ho dentist i s attached to this 3s.fctPlion P r i s o n e r s of War, Care of,

(1) One prisoner of War was treated with Flasrwa, Morph* sulfa pr^wder dresein^s; a second prisoner was examined, dressings changed, and medical str.uur noted on intelligence record. 3oth T were evacuated to the Berriirait-^i C * r-'n."c was adequate ajid no special dls ^ftses vrero noted* j# M^dioal Or ^ (i N I13nej.1t cypo appears sufficient^

(l> Acorju^o in maabcsr... Of this nuiuly./. : ra^ny are unfit for IrJTantty 3r. 3>:.i,y 07 reibon o^ a^e (over 2b years) *)eir.perraer.t * pnysiquej and yi#eviois comoat wound.3 or combat fatx.'nie

'&)

ii"'fc Co Aid men to each chr-?e

'cl) '?; \'^)

7o on proper by supplies,, Tv:o o:a c l e r i c a l ; . C.a*3 to S..;re.ve"-- .?.ogictrr,tior*e

i)

remainder in Aic. Station

(3;

("b)

bounded and evacuated

18

(e) (d) (e) (f) orrowed from other Bns twice.

Wour.ded returned to duty 3 F.? 7 Mod Evacuated* * Two .Replacements were received* Two Collecting Sec Corpsmen wero

This i s gceatly inadequate com pared to Marino replacements received during the campaign and for the /best medical service* -Replacements of Company Corpsmen casualties were drawn from the Aid Station group and the Collecting Section* I t was necessary to cut the companies from 5 to 3 Hospital Corpsmen apiece during-the Second Thaso and from 3 to 1 during the Third and Fourth Thases 0 "because of lack of Corpsmen replacements to the Bn* (k) Stpvte of training v/as excellent in
primary assignments* Seme of the C o l l e c t i n g Section Cer?>sraen lr>ck "basic A*d F t a t i o n t r a i n i n g * Compruy Aid rr-^.'.f-^eFents suffered probably un~' necessary c a s u a l t i e s baca^rc of I r . j r r + .i.nfojitrv t r a i n i n g *

\\. "J^o^ia^tios needed - none* The addition of a l o l i p l r i s t about b m'ruthu >.<$ Las "beon 1* vo>ry valuable asset during ohe ^rrdning period; ho do^p r e ^ u l u Vi.c1 bta'bi on work In combat*

'

Subject:

Action Report* IWD J I M .

(3) Suitable.

/i /

Medical Supplies*

(1) Contents of all Medical Units except

Qas Casualty units were made up "by the 3n Surgeon based on his and other 3n
Surgeons experience*
(2) Ho losses,

(3) Medical supplies were adequate except

the brinndy ration vhich was incomplete snd inadequf te
(k) m# Sesupily was excellent (3 Med Co*)

Motor Vehicles and JRollin^. Stock*

(1) One i ton ambulance and trailer is assl<?

ned this. 3nt One J ton ambulance is attached with the Collecting Section
from n 3 * Med Co*
because of combat damage*
lf

(2) Losses on i ton ambulance was surveyed

3* Md Co furnished a temporary replacement*

(3) Adequney tw^ ambulances were adequate

* most of the time* One additional arabulance was necessary as noted
(k) Ira-ororeraents - An Infantry 3n should have
$ two ambulances and one trailer permanently assigned and cne ambulance on
coll during combat from' the Med Co ; .. .
.. 5* Ashore - After completion of Assault Thass*
a^ 6 Bl8cuseed in Third and Fourth Phases*

Becoiaaendationst

a Medical Tersonnel careful selection of

* RBSignad and attached Hospital Corpsmen frr infantry 3ns to fulfill these
< _ *
requirements. (1)
>

Age - under 26 years*

* .

(2) mental nakup of a Marine, , (3) wound or Combat 3?atiUe

..

.
v

Aptitude * should have the physical and . :'* " ' HeB.i6ai History - no previous severe
...
<

. " jRota.ti-on of Corpsmen to a Med Co after

812 months infantry 3n service wruld.promote morale* increase efficiency,
and provide a trained nucleus for Collecting Section combat fg^ups. 75^
of 3n Corpsmen whould be trained ^Co .Afld men to allow for replacement and
rotation of duty in combat=-.. b Vehicles 'two' ton ambulances and one trailer
should be permanently assigned each infrntry 3n#
c He-It cements Corpsmen replacements in combat
nust be available in proportion to Marina Replrcements received by a ^
3tw
d Three ^rer-tiaent. features deserve note*

Subjecti

action Report, 1WD JIMA

Co aid men carried 1 or 2 units of serum

(l) albumen, for emergency use on the front line w^ile the troops were well
hydratedj plasma was substituted during; the letter part of the campaign.
These blood substitutes were used with good effoet on night casualties that
"be evacuated for some hours and on severely wounded men*
(2) Whole "blood was available to the Aid
Station after the First Thase, It was not used due principal^ to the rapid
evacuation available to higher echelons. Under other conditions this
be very
(3) 'Captured Jap aviators oxygen cylinder
about 2 feet long and U inch diameter was fitted in place of the eannister
on an American gns mask pnd oxygen administered to one patient in deep
treuraatic shock with excellent effect* Five such units could be used to
good effect in a Battalion Aid Station and during.evacuation*
e. Medical personnel* worWrag with their
constantly and using weapons only for defense at close range, should be armed
with .V> caliber pistols instead of carbines. This Is especially true for
Company Aid men*
H . Signalj
1. Frequency of interference encountered!

ITo outside interferences were encountered en frequencies

used by this 3n during, the major portion of the operation* On number
1891.9 slight interference was caused by local M Sa This was taken care of
by having them shi^t to their alternate channel. On 25 and 26 Feb Japanese
talked on the compsny SCR 300 command net to jam it# it did not work as
the Japs didn1t talk enough*
2, Adequacy of 3ns System of Hadio Fets:

system of nets eimloyed was sufficient but an

alternate channel for the SCR 300 would be desirable for the Faval Gun Fire
Teams,
3 Communication delays involved in spotting fire,
Fonet as they were given priority,
U, Assistance if any given by ^rrrison force Communication
personnel and Equipment
Fone,
5 Communica.tion during Operations

TCS SCR SCR SCR SCR T?X SCR SCR 610 300 300 Ste^jtl Command N e t ,
if
n n

193

536

n u n
3n Command Fet including Tks & FGF,
Air l-n Net,
11 H M & HGF Ln Het*
F&F Spotter Team,
Co n e t s , 81mm Mort, Fwd Obs Teams.

Subject!

Action .Report, IWO JIMA,

Performance of Hadio - All radioB performed

in a creditable manner*
b containers* c* Other communication Tele-phono and .Runner McsBangers were the only other means of coiruiranication employed* ?hey were
both highly satisfactory*
d throuejhlut the campaign.
PAST T Conclusion.
Communication Supply ~ Supply was excellent
How were radios waterproofed by use of rubber

1* The Pir force -produced zero results from an infantry -point of

view by preinvasion bombardment.
2 Against enemy dug intn solid rock at least 2000 lb bombs should
have been used and preferably 6, 8, or 11 ton bombs. For close support,
later, we found it took 2tk hrs to get a Ifcvpalin strike and that 500 lb
bombs were the largest we could get*
3 It is my considered opinion thct against such an intricate and
highly organized position* night raids ngainst known pillboxes * progress^
ing deeper each time> would be preferable to n general ni^ht attack* Raids
would keep %ibblihg w at tho position and would not result in men being
surrounded by enemy pillboxes. In ny case trained men only should be used at
- excellent, including low velocity overhead fire and smoke.
5 Tanks need heavier armor - Jap kjmm penetrates at present**

6* We need the bijj flame thrower tank, Compared to this tank cur
own 3& War Dlv flame thrower tanks are almost useless, This tank scouts huge
flaraes 100-150 yds for k minutes and can traverse the flame in any direction
and can change its elevation* Vte must have some of these tanks*
7 Detailing of personnel with other jobs as 2$ litter bearer does
not work* We need the band section back for this*
8* Armored bulldozers are ood when covered by fire - much better
than tank doier*
9* Jap smokeless powder is an Immense advantage to them.

JRO?BRT 3. CtlSHMAlx, Jr.,

, USMC#

UNCLAS

MCLOSTIRS C ACTION BSPOB2! - 3D

HCB/tjb

'

Hq, 3d Bnf 9th Marines,

3D MAR DIV, FMF, In the Field,
20 April, 1945,
CO
CO, 9th Marinee.
Action Report, IWO JIMA* (a) GO 137, 3d Mar Div.
' . '

From: T :

Subject: Reference;

In accordance with Ref (a) the following report of

action of the Third Battalion 9th Marines, IWO JIMA Operation is
hereby submitted:
I* Summary .

A* This report covers, mainly, the period from the landing of

this battalion on IWO JIMA on 24 February, 1945 to the departure
from IWO JIKA on 13 April, 1945.
B The 3d Bn, 9th Marines, landed on BLACK BEACH at about 1600,
24 Feb 45 and went into an assembly area at TA 164-U,Q. ' The next
day, 25 Feb, the battalion moved to an assembly area at TA 165-A in
Regimental reserve at about 0930, as the 1st and,2d Bn*s passed
through the 21st Marines and attacked. At about 1400 the Bn re ceived orders to pass through the 2d Bn, 9th Mar, and continue the
attack which it did executing the passage of lines at 1500 sustain*
ing heavy casualties, and gaining very little ground before night fall* '
The battalion was-in turn passed through by the 2d at 0900,
26 Feb, and reverted to Regimental Reserve with companies remaining
in position at TA ^-WjX,?.. Co t was attached to 1st Bn, 9th Mar,
late in afternoon to fill gap7 between 3d and 4th Divisions* Batta~
lion remained in this position on the 27th with the exception that
L Co attached with the 1st Bn until pinched out of the line. On
,
the 28th, the Battalion moved back to A 182-K,IJ at 1100 to re.organize, then was attached to the 21st Marines at 1400, and at
about 1600, established a Regimental Reserve line through TA 199-J,
200<-F,GjM and organised forward slope's of hill at 2Q0-P.
On the 1st of March, the battalion attacked on the left of
the 21st Mar to close the gap between the43d and 5th Divisions
(21st & 26th on the left) which it was successful in doing. On the
2d, the battalion attacked and seized hill 362 in TA 235-U and ad jacent high ground in a costly but highly successful push, thrust ing a 700 yard wedge into the Jap lines. The battalion reverted
to Regimental Reserve on the 3d. I Co was attached to the 2d Bn,
21-st Mar, as Bn Reserve for their attack on hill 357, K & L Co* s
remained in position on Hill 362 until passed through by the 1st
Bn, 21st Mar, then K Co was attached, about 1630, to the 1st Bn,
21st, to protect the latter1 open right, flank. During the night,
L Co was moved to aposition in-218-F to cover the flat across the
airfield when a report was received that a break through had occurr ed between the 9th & 21st. No contacts made*
Upon reverting back to 9th Mar control 4 March, the battalion
went into an assembly area at TA 182-3,J,I to rest and reorganize*
The strength of the rifle companies at this time was I 4 Off - 67
Enl, K 3 Off - 52 Snl, L 1 Off - 1 WO - 100 Snl, which was built
up by replacement during the 4th and 5th of March to I 5 Off - 111
Enl, K 6 Off - 115 Enl, L 3 Off - 1 W/0'--122 Enl. The two days at
this area were spent resting, cleaning up, reorganizing and train ing replacements in use of flame thrower, bazooka, demolitions, MG-
and mortar; and first mail was received. Battalion manned Div Res
Line at TA 200-H,N from dusk to daylight the 4th-and 5th.

Action Report, I WO J1MA

(Contact)

The battalion was again attached to the 21st Mser on the 6th
of March and moved to ah assembly area in TA 218^G> H in Regimental
Reserve. Received orders at 2230 to make a pre~dawn attack to
seize Hill .362 in TA 219-U. Movement of.companies to k/D commenced
0530, 7 March, and attack jumped off at 0500, as scheduled,, with
two companies abreast. Hill 362, which was 600 yards from the L/D
rather than t;he 200 yards reported by the unit passed through, was
seised and occupied by 1400 af $&,.& viry stiff fight entailing
heatoy losses. The battalion reverted back to 9th Mar at 1745,
The attack was resumed at* 0750, 8 March, and the high ground
overlooking the sea at Ta 219-Q,V was seized. On 9 March the batta^
lion, two companies abreast, attacked to the sea (a canteen of ocean
water was sent to CG, 3d Mar Divj and patrols swept the beach for
200 yards on either side of the battalionfs Z of A. Having received
order's to do so, a company patrol was sent out ta the right of the
battalion's Z of A on 10 March to patrol the shelf above the beach
in front of the 1st Bn*s % of A* The patrol was pinnod down by
automatic weapons fire from pill-boxes and caves in the overhanging
cliff-line to its right as it advanced southward, and was extricated
with difficulty with the support of very excellentfire (HE & smoke)
by the 81mm Mortars, Casualties light considering serious predica ment. The beach itself was patrolled without contact. The batta^
lion line was adjusted so that it faced South, left flanks on wa -ter's edge, right flanks on high ground at TA 219-V. On*ll March
the pill-boxes and caves in the cliff face on the northeastern side
of TA 20-F,G were neutralized or destroyed by the employment of
tanks'at point blaTik range, To assist the 1st Bn, one company of
tjie 3rd Bn seized and occupied the hill at TA 202-A. In the evening
the battalion moved bafek from the beach area to the high ground and
established a line facing west in the vicinity Hill 362.
On 12 March the battalion, in. conjunction with 1st Bn on the
left, advanced to TA 2l8-R,W in mop-up operation toward Regimental
Rear Boundary, Only light resistance received at first which was
quickly overcome; tanks employed later to destroy a few UG- positions,
Severe resistance was met by 1st Bn on'left. The situation remained
the asme on the 13th,. no movement? "being made. On 14 March the batta lion, less I Co moved again to the high ground overlooking the beach
and dug in a perimeter defense in* TA 219~V, 202-A. Ambushes es~
tablished for night on beach and high ground overlooking beach
killed seven (7) Japs.
A combat patrol consisting of one rifle company sent to pa^
trol high ground on TA 202-E,G, on 15 March, met severe resistance
(rifle, MG and mortar fire) when it was within 75 yards of the tip
of the spur and was unable to advance further before dusk. iLints
vere adjusted, and the .company dug in at TA 202-G- for the ni'ght. On
16 March, the company was passed through by R / W CO, 9th Mar, and
withdrew to formna perimeter with K Co at 219~n,V. Patrolling of
Bn Z of A was conducted on 17 March, no contacts.
On 18 March, battalion mQved to an assembly area: at 201-J,
P,K,Q from whence intensive patrolling was begun in an allotted sec tor of the vacated 4th Div Z of A. The sector was divided into four
sub-sectors, each of which was thoroughly patrolled daily by a rein forced platoon from the 18th to the 25th of March at which time the
2

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(Cont'd)

battalion's patrol sector was changed and inlarged. The new area
divided into six sub-sectors each of which was patrolled daily
a rifle platoon or the equivalent from the 26th of March to 0700
f^pril, 45, when the battalion was relieved by a battalion of the ;
$4?th Infantry1 which took over the patrol sector.
Worthy of mention during the patrolling phase is the fact
that this battalion wiped out a well organized enemy pocket of re sistance in TA 184-E, 185~#"on 22 March by a concerted company attack
supported by a platoon of tanks plus one flame-thrower tank* 1During:
the entire period 2 to 6 ambushes were established nightly and were :
regularly successful* The patrolling phase resulted in the killing ;
of 169 Japs', capturing of 6, burial of .231 dead Japs, recovery of
17 dead Marines, closing of 53g caves (quite of number of which con-*
tained live JapsJ disposal of innumerable unmarked duds and mines
and one unmarked mine field, very extensive policing of unsanitary
trash .(empty ration cans, and bits of ration's,, human excreta, etc)
and salvage of vast quantities of usable supplies and equipment (amm^
- >
unition, water, rations, weapons, stretchers, -etcj. II*. Preliminaries,
- A. This Battalion Landing Team consisted of the infantry batta lion, one 37mm gun platoon of the Regimental Weapons Cof one platoon
of combat engineers, one pioneer platoon, and NGF .I4e.is.p-n and sp<&t~
ter team, one Air Liaison team and one Shore & Beach Party Communi cation Team from, JASCO* one Medical Collecting Section, one Artillery
Liaison Team, and two Artillery Forward Observer Te,ams*
B* Very little pointed training and no rehearsal was effected
between the assignment of the mission and the beginning of its exe cution because of the general and tentative nature rof the mission*
Training with tanks in comparatively large numbers, passage of lines,
and attack of fortified positions in open terrain were emphasized in
unit training with a view toward an operation of the type undergone*
Specific planning was almost impossible; however, an intensive study
of maps and photograps was undergone aboard ship tty all officers.and
ranking N,CO' s, partlcul.r-|tttention being paid to beaches and routes
northward therefrom.
C* The mission of the Battalion. Landing Team was to land on a
beach to be designated by CO, RCT-9, move, to an assembly #rea to be
allotted, prepared to execute any reserve mission assigned* The
initial plan being simply to get the battalion across the beach in
a well dispersed byt well organized formation, orders were issued
to subordinate units directing the' portion of the specified beach they
were to land on, when they were to land* that they take up approach
march formation upon landing prepared tp move to an assembly area
inland, and that the right company was the base company*
D. The landing of this battalion on IWO JIMA was anything but
organized. A last minute change in landing plans called for debark- .
ation into LCYP's, transfer to LCM's at the control1vessel, and
landing from the LCM*s. The result was a very scattered landing of
various "lumps" of' the battalion in a very non-tactical sequence
anywhere from the lett of beach R2D-2 to the right of beach BLUE^l.

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(dont<d)

The situation proved one things - that a well $rairied outfit "nangs
together" in the face of the greatest disorganization - for* in an
* extremely short space of time, the BLT was formed intact and moved '
in route^ column to initial assembly, area at 164#uVQ,L ,* .
E, No enemy forces were encountered duringthe landing or on
the move to.the assembly area. Very little or no enemy fire was
received. " .
Ill Chronological Account of Individual Actions,
A. The following account Is of movements and' actions participate
ed in by this battalion which are thought worthy of; detailed narra-'
tion* 'The chronology of intervening events of lesser note may be '
readily gleaned by reference to Part I (B).
1, On 25 Fefy 45\the battalion, was in Regiment ai Re serve-
in an assembly area'at tA 164-E, 165~A, when, at about 1400, the " .
battalion commander was summoned to the BegimenfcalOP and issued an.'
order to pass through the right of the 2d Bn*a lines* continue the attack and effect a junction with the 26th Mar on the left if possi ble. The situation at the time was stagnant, t>bth assault battalions.
(1st on th* right, 2d on the left) being held up by heavy automatic
weapons fire from concrete pill-boxes and by acourMe mortar and
artillery fire* The stiffest resistance being on .the Regimental left
flanks, the schewe of the CO, 9th Mar, was to pass this battalion th
through the right of the left battalion, avoiding the heavy resistancei
make contact with the 1st Bn oh the right and >then; by extending the,
line to the left, gain contact with the 26th x%r whose right flank
was about 300 yards "in advance of the 9th Mar left. The resulting
by-passed pocket on the left was to be contained and subseouently re duced by the 2d Bn Speed of execution of this mission was of prime
importance*
The plan of the CO, 3d Bn, was to execute the passage of
lines with two companies abreast, each on a narrow frontage, make con tact with the 1st Bn and drive forward in a concerted attack until
the main center of resistance on thetleft was passed, then to focus
efforts toward gaining contact with the unit on the left. If an^.ad justment of lines (by increasing company frontages' to, the left) proved
unsuccessful, it was planned to utilize the reserve company in "effect ing .the contact, if possible pinching out the left company in the pro cess. Orders were issued to the companies before leaving the assembly
area with exception of the dosignation of K hour* In brief, the order
directed that the passage of line and attack would bs made with I and
K Co's abreast, K Co an the right, e^ich on a frontage, of 200 yards/
K Co to gain and maintain contact with the 1st Bn on the right; I Co'
to maintain contact with K Co prepared to effect a junction with 26th
. d r on the left; L Co in reserve prepared follow I Co by bounds and '
a contact 26th *i4ar by passage of extension of lines on order.
The battalion, less Hq Co,- moved out from the assembly " area at about 1420 in an approach march formation .and the assault'}$*&:$$<
companies were in position along the south side of Airfield No 2 by *
X445* Guides from the/2d Bn were contacted and the companies commen ced crossing the airfield, under see11 arms rnd artillery fire, at 1500

Action Report, IWO J I M

(Cont'd)

The actual passage of lines was made at 1510*

. ' Immediately upon advancing forward of the 2d En's lines, tt
the assault companies began receiving intense rifle and automatic \
weapons fire from the front and left flank, and the mortar and
artillery fire increased in volume and accuracy. I Co's left jila-*
i toon was pinned down by extremely Heavy maching gun fire from pill boxes directly on its left flank while K Co, and I Co's right pla*
toon, were able to make very slow progress by fir.* and movement;
each company &adhbeen able to work machine guns into positions
from.which covering fire was being delivered, and K Co had begun
firing 60mm mortars at targets of opportunity% Casualties from
mortar and artillery, fire" were mounting and the companies were direct ed to advance as rapidly as possible to the high groun$ to the front;'
I Co Comdr was instructed to attempt to move his left platoon through
the.zone of action of his right platoon until the center of resis tance on the left lanH was by-passed. It seemed at the time that .
the success of the attack was contingent upon the seizure of the
high ground to the immediate.front - contact with the unit on the
left would have to be effected later. K Co was in contact with
' . .
the 1st Bn on the right* , Slow but steady progress was made by the right and center
of the assault line, with K Co supporting I Go by fire, until an
approximate East-West line through the north of $ & T in TA 199
was reached* The volume, of small arms fire from the front,- left
flank and left rear at this stage of,the attack was' extremely in tense while the mortar barrage, which had moved as the troops moved,
was still falling accurately along the assault line, and casualties
to key personnel caused,the attack to falter. Both assault company
commanders were killed within a few minutes of each other and-7
other officers and a large percentage of key-NCO's became casualties
in rapiq succession. The time was about 1700 and the assault
troops were showing signs of disorganization. Leaderless elements
of the lines were giving under the withering fire and moving back
over" some of the ground gained. This was particularly prevalent in
K Co on the right which had lost 5 officers and many NCO's. The
Bn-3j Capt J, T. McFadden, was summoned to the Bn OP (on the air field) and directed to take command of K Co, reorganize it, regain
contact with .the 1st En, and report when this was accomplished,
1st Lieut R A Overpeck, senior* officer left in I Co, was also con~
tacted at the OP and given similar instructions. Capt McFadden.did "
an outstanding job in rallying the company and accomplishing,his
mission i i the face of serious difficulties, and I Co> reestablish r ing contact with K, was able to follow suit. Since I, to keep in
contact with K, was unable to make contact with any unit on its
left, and darkness was about to fall, h Co was committed at 1830
to effect a tie in for the night between the left flanks of I Co
and a point in the 2d Bnfs line. By 1915 the battalion had esta blished a line estimated to run from TA 199-S(SE), where it joined
the 1st Bn, west to R(SC), southwest to W(WC), south to the edge of
the airstrip in TA 182-C(NW) where it joined a point in the 2d Bn's
lines. Estimated Japs killed in the attack were 75;. casualties to
own troops were I 73, K 20, L 3, Hq S,'total for Bn 104. The 2d
Bn passed through our lines the morning of the 26th and the battalion

Action Report, I WO JIMA

(Cont'd)

again went into Regimental Reserve in an assembly area at TA

L , i 4 , N . , . '

2* On the 1st of March the battalion, then attached to the

23.st i i r was given the mission of closing the gap between the 2lst
^a, Mar and the 26th Mar on the" left. The situation reported to the
battalion commander at the Regimental OP (200-P) at 1000 was that
the left flank of the 21st (2-21) was in the vicinity of RJ at TA
217~H(S),, the right flank of the 26th Mar somewher-e along the
boundary between divisions in the vicinity of 21?-P(NE) or L(SW) t
The battalion, at' the\ time the orders were received, was in Regi mental Reserve at TA 200-F,<T,M

'

'

The battalion w^s moved in route column to the vicinity

of RJ 336 where it was held uhwr^cover until the-commander con tacted the Co, 2-21, to ascertain the exact location of his left
flank. It developed that the situation as regarded the flank loca tion was somewhat.hazy and that it was not actually as far left ae,
previously reported. It was decided to attack along the road run ning north in column of companies, the assault company (I) on a
frontage of 250 yds, jumping off from an East~Tvest line through
RJ 338 with its left just inclusive of the road. L Co to. follow
the advance of Co I* echeloned 150 yds to the left rear protecting
I Cols left flank, prepared to oiake contact with the 26th Mar on
the-left. K Co was hel,d in - reserve assembly ,area prepared, on
a k order, to follow the advance of the attaking companies by bounds*
Orders to this effect were issued to the company commanders near
HJ 336- at abfut 1115 and K-houH'for the attack was set at 1150.
^, The attack jumped off as scheduled and I Co began re*
ceiving a moderate volume of small arms and intermittent mortar fire
almast immediately after leaving the L/D. The most effective enemy
fire seemed to*be coming from their left front and the I Co MG
platoon took that pprtion of the front under covering fire. Upon
reaching the north side of the airstrip, it was learned by action
of small contact patrols sent out from I Co and 2-21 that the flank
sought was, at that time, some 300 yards to the right rear of I
Co's right flank* Acting upon' this information, I Co Was directed
to move to the right, covered by fire of Co L, until it gained con tact with 2-21, then to take up a line of 300 yard frontage facing
north. With the left company of 2-21 cooperating this was accom plished by about 1530, the very small -gap resulting being heavily
covered by mutually supporting automatic weapons of the two compan ies. This put the right f l a n f % r C o at about Ta 217-T(EC) and
it extended northwest to about N(C) #
The movement of Co I to make the junction with 2-21 had
drawn considerable fire from a low, broken ridgeline in TA 217-M re sulting in a few casualties* It was decided therefore to capture
this ridgeline using L Co which was in an excellent position to do
so. L Co was accordinly ordered to attack from its present posi tion, on a frontage of 250 yards, seize the ridge in question, and
to establish contact with I Co on the right. The attack jumped off"
at about 1600 and, by utilizing a*holding force ot one rifle platoon
plus two sections. o^-M&'s firing from positions in R while one rifle
platoon with a && section attached maneuvered around the left and

Action Report, IVC J I M

(Cont*d)

attacked- from the enemy's right flank, the mission was accomplished!*
in less than an hour. By 1700 L Co had established a line extend ing from TA 217-M(WC) east to N(C) where it made physical contact
with I Cors line. Shortly thereafter s company of the 26th ^ar
moved u > behind L Co and filled in the gap between the 3d and 5th
Divisions before dart. K Co established a B R L from RJ 338 to
As a result of the days action, the battalion killed
an estimated 50 Japs; casualties to own troops were I 55, K 40,
L 12, Hq 10,
3* On 2 war 45, he 3d En, 9th iar, was ordered to attack
in column of companies and seize Hill 362 and the adjacent high
ground in TA 235-U,V. We were to be the left battalion in the
attack and m?ke the ma.in effort in the 21st #ar Z of A; the 1st
Bn, 21st was on our right with a similar mission. Attached were
two platoons of tanks and one Platoon of engineers. K hour was
set at 0800 with the normal, higher echelon"controlled supporting
fires of the various heavier arms scheduled to fall on the objec tive and other points of,enemy vantage from X-30 to K plus 10 with
a three-lift rolling barrage of artillery thereafter. . The plan of the battalion commander was to attack.with
I Co in assault jumping off from its ppesent lines (see ;above) at
K h/our on a frontage of 250 yards, and seizing the objective; l >
Co to follow the advance of I Co echeloned 150 yds to the left
rear protecting the left flank of the 21st ilar and maintaining
contact with the 5th Division on the Left; K Co in .reserve, to
await orders in its present position. The 3d platoon' , Co B Engrs
were-set to work immediately after reporting (about 0700.) clearing
a "safe" lane for the tanks to the immediate" rear of the front lines*
The tanks were brought up as far as RJ 336 as soon as possible
(shortly after X hour) and ordered to stand by prepared to move to
the L/D and deliver supporting fire.
Orders were Issued to the unit commanders about 0645
at RJ 338 and, by 0730, the companies were in position waiting to
jump off at K hour. However, one battery of artillery falling short
into I Co's lines during; almost the entire 10 minute preparation
caused a number of casualties nd so disorganized that company that
it was decided to use L Co in assault instead of I. Orders to that
effect were, issued to L Co by SCR 300 at about 0:00 and the attack-
did not get under way until 0820. I Co was ordered to fullfill the
mission orginally assigned to L Co as it was able to reorganize
in time to do so. K Co's orders remained the same.
As L Co's line moved forward of the broken ground into
the open flat which had to be crossed before the objective was reach ed, it received fire from several large caliber flat trajectory
pieces which 'opened up from the vicinity of "Hill 362, and it was de~
cidod to use the tanks in direct support of the company's attack.
The general target.area was pointed out to the tank company commander
f o T the battaliqn commander1 s OP at TA 217-R(NC), and also an area
rii in ./A(C) from "which it seamed tanks would be afforded hull-down fire
positions. The position proved very satisfactory and one platoon of
tanks was quickly moved in. T<Jith the L Co Commander directing the fire
by SCR 00, the tanks brought individual gun positions under heavy
and accurate fire enabling the attacking troops to advance.

Action Report, Itto JI^A

(Cont'd)

Although the tanks drew both mortar and flat trajectory gun fire while
moving "from RJ 333 to the firing position, very little (and.that
inaccurate) fire was brought t o bear on them once in position. They
, kept up a continuous and very effective fire on the objective and
the high ground on either side, interchanging platoons when one
k d DO take on more ammunition, so that there would be no lull in
the firing. At least five enemy guns were pierced by tank fire.
It became evident very early in the attack that -one
company of the present reduced strenght could not adequately cover .
. the zone of action assigned and, since the larger gap was on the
right (I Co had to the left rear as ordered), K Go was committed
to the attack in the right of the battalion Z of A,with orders to
seize the portion of the battalion objective in its zone, maintain ing contact with h Co on the Left* By about 1100 the attack
had advancv3d to the hill at TA 217-S(e) and small arms resistance
was greatly intensified, while a'fev flat trajectory pieces were
firing from the right of Hill 362 down the draw at TA 218~A, F into-
K Co1s lines* 81mm Mortars were effectively used against the
latter, the tanks, by exercising care, were still able to fire
at targets of opportunity over the heads of the advancing troops.
Following a 10 minute preparation of artillery, the attack contin ued/ The battalion had pulle'ST'awa^ from units on right and left
in advancing the attack and a report was made of this situation to
CO, 21st liar. In answer, the battalion received orders to advance
as rapidly as possible to its objective irrescardless of units on
either flank. . " ,
T&e attack contintf&5^very slowly aginst increasingly
heavy resistance, all companies (including I) making full and
effective use of 50mm mortars for general close support and on tar gets of opportunity. As the troops approached to'within 10 to 150
yds of the ridgeline. I Co became heavily engaged with the enemy
firing from the left'of the battalion1s Z of A, and it was largely
through that-company1s efforts that the assault line'was able to
continue its advance to .the objective^ Around 1350, the gunfire
from the vicinity of T& 2c'5^V(S) caused, a separation between I Co*s
two rifle platoon,, tho left platoon remaining fcn contact with L Co.
Following a bitter struggle at close quarters, the ob jective was occupied at about 1420."~The right platoon ofJK Co was
pinned down,by fiat trajectory and MG fire, "still separated from the
rest of the line, somewhere in 218~B(W). An intense fire fight
continued between our troops on the hish ground and the enemy just
beyond until a barrage of friendly artillery, fired in preparation
for a renewal of the attack of adjacent units, fell short into our *
lines. There was some delay in getting the barrage lifted and quite
i. few casualties were caused in I and L Cos. As a result, the for ward progress of the battalion was halted for reorganization*
From positions in K Co's left platoon, excellent obser vation of the^un positions wffich seemed to be disrupting the line
was afforded. They croved to be open AA emplacements and I Co was
able to place ~.ccuraie 60mm mortar fire- 'on them at close range,
putting at least fou>" of the guns out of action. Under cover of this
concentration and small arms covering fire from the rest of K Co,

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(Cont*d)

the right platoon moved to the left and made contact with its company*
I Co made contact with L GO'S, left flank and established a line
bending back and facing west to protect the battalion's left flank
K Co*s right platoon went into a similar position facing east to
protect the right flank.
A battalion of the -2~th Mar and then the 2d En, 21st
moved in behind Hill 362 in our Z of A and attacked left and right
respectively just before dusk. Each effected a tie-in on the batta lion's flanks. The battalion due: in for the night along a line
running from TA 234-Y(SC) to Y.(EC) to 235-U(SE) to 218~A(EC). As
a result of the days action the battalion killed an estimated 50
Japs and knocked out a minimum of nine large caliber guns in addi tion to numerous pill boxes housing automatic weapons. Casualties
to own troo e were I 20, K 30, L 65, Hq 8.
. 4. Worthy of passing note was a limited *,ctioji by I Co of
this battalion on 3 Mar 45. Acting as flank protection for the
2d Bn, 21st Mar to whom they were temporarily attached, the company
echeloned to the left rear, found itself within very close range
of several dual purpose guns (estimated 3 inch) in the vicinity of
TA 218-C(WC) which the enemy were preparing for action. Unseen by
the, enemy, the company commander forked three "bazookas11 into a
position about 75 yards from the guns and, at the same time, laid
his.60mm mortars on them. He opened fire with both weapons
simultaneously and kept up a heavy arid accurate barrage on the po sitions for about 10 minutes making only the changes necessary to
move his fire from one enemy emplacement to another. Due to the
facts that the Japs were taken completely by surprise (their atten-*
tlon had been focused-on units of the 5th Division moving up on the ' .
left) and that the emplacements were of the open type, the action
resulted in the almost complete annihilation of the enemy manning
the guns, and casualties to I Co's troops were only 3 wounded (by
hasty email arms fire). The enemy guns failed to get off a round.
Four were knocked out and an estimated 25 Japs killed.
5. Again attached to the 21st Mar, the battalion was in
an assembly area in reserve in the vicinity of RJ 330 (218-H) on
6 aar. At about 2230 that date, the battalion.commander received
verbal orders by telephone to pass through the lines of the 1st Bn,
21st at 0500 7.Mar) and seize Hill 362 in TA 219~U. Since a day light reconnaissance was denied the CO, the HmechanicsJI of the attack
was to be based upon the position of 1-21's front lines (the L/D) and
the relative position of the objective, which was to be pointed out
to the assault company colandere by the company commanders of 1-21
then in the line. The front line of 1-21 was reported to be -accurate ly determined and running from 219-K(C) to P(K) to *>(WC) to T(WC),
and Hill 362, was reported to have been observed during daylight just
200-250 yards to the front.
The battalion commander, with the Bn-3 ends radioman,
moved from the Bn CP (217-0) to a%nown point near RJ 330, where the
company commanders had (just prior) been instructed to meet, at about
2300. The CO^ .1-21,- was contacted in that vicinity and orders issued
to the companies. Realizing from past experience the possibility of
errors in pinpointing positions on the map, it W E S decided not to

Action Report; IWO JIMA

(Cont'd)

assign a direction of attack (which would have-had to be measured

by protractor), but to make a concerted attack on the objective pointy
ed out by 1-21 and, at daylight, make any necessary adjustments, from
an observation of the ground, so as to remain in the zone of action
assigned. It was planned to move all three rifle companies to the
vicinity of the L/D under cover of darkness, the two assault companies
$o take up positions immediately behind tfye right and left com:
panies of 1-21 at the L/D, the reserve company to go into an
assembly area behind the assault comjjnies, K and L Cos were to
attack abreast with K the base company, on the right; I Co was in
resei've. The assault companies were directed to shoot ah azimuth
on the objectives indicated by 1-21fs company commanders, contatt
each otfyer to make certain there .was no appreciable variance be~
t.ween the azimuths, and attack on 200 yd frontage in a tight lino
of skirmishers in the direction ascertained, - Co to maintain
L physical contact with K, radio silence to be maintained until
active contact with the enemy was made*
At 0320, the companies moved from the assembly area
to the L/D in column' of files in the order K, L, I led by the
company commanders of 1-21 who had returned to -that point to act
as guides* * "
The orders issued were ^carefully carried out and the *
attack jumped off promptly at 0500 under cover of a heavy smoke
preparation. The first resistance was in the form, of a Jap MG-
which opened up in L Go's Z of A about 0535 followed by a sustained
burst from an L Co flame thrower/ Thereafter there;was scattered
rifle and automatic xveapons fire with occasional flame thrower
-burst, principally in the left .of the battalion Z of A, .until shortly
after 0600 when L Co ran into iieavy resistance on its left* Hav ing closed to within very short range of the Jap position, L Co
was obliged to reduce it by small unit maneuvering with use of
Bazooka, flame thrower, demolitions and small arms* Scattered *
resistance was being met by K Co on the right but nothing heavy
enough to hold them up. .
At daybreak (about 0620) the battalion commander, from
an Op in the center of the L/D, made a thorough check of the ground
against map and photograph and washable to definitely locate the
positions of the companies- It was discovered that the general sit -jtion was not as far advanced as previously supposed* At 0645, the
right company was in the process of occupying Hill 331, and the
e-D^roxicsate front line ran from 218~S(SS) to T(NC) to'O(NE); stiffest
iii&tance was on the left where automatic weapons were firing from
plxl boxes and caves. The Bn OP was at 218-N(NE) and the front line
^ 1-214(still in position) was found to run from 218-M(SC) to 'N(SW)
UJ .N(NS) to I(EC). This showed &.n advance of 200-250 yards since
t n start of the attack. Evidently Hill 331 had. been mis taken for
,o .-... 362* The assault company commanders were contacted and an
:71 opder for the continuation of thS Attack issued over %he SCR 500.
I4; was a point of extreme good fortune that the direction of attack
was almost exactly correct, and the* order was Very brief (mostly a
matter of 'reorientat}.on)* K hour was set at 0715 with a ten minute
artillery-preparation from K-10 to K hour on Hill 562 and adjacont

Action Report, IWO JIKA

(Cont*d)

high ground. K Co, making the main effort,, was ordered to seize
Hill 362 and support by fire the attack of I Co on the left.
* The attack moved forward very slowly over broken and '
treacherous ground, the heaviest resistance still on the left*
K Co moved forward more rapidly on the right but its fires in sup
port of L Co were almost totally ineffective due to the extremely
chopped up nature of the terrain. The most telling resistance during
this phase of the attack Came from caves and bunkers, set low in thq
numerous gullys, from which fire was delivered at very close range
at the attacking troops as they came into, or through, the gulleys.
It was simply a matter of having to reduce position after position
with flame thrower, bazooka and demolitions, each position calling
for a separate bit of manuevering by the small unit which contacted
it. The resuld was painfully slow advanfee*
K Co seized and occupied Hill 362 just prldr'to 1400
and it was ordered to organize the hill and assist the attack of L
Co by fire. L Co was having considerable trouble advancing to the
high ground in 219-P, An effort to gain contact with 'theunit on
the right by committing I Co on K Co1s right flank proved unsuccess . f ul and, at about 1800, I Co was ordered tomake contact with K Co'-s
right flank and take up a line bending back and facing south to
secure the battalions right flank. The front line at this time ran
from 218-0(SE) to 219-P(SC) to U(C) to U(SW) to 218-Y(-$C) A sup- .
pbrt platoon from K Co, not used in the attack, was attached to L Co
for left flank security andj on the line specified above the battalion
dug in for the night. - . . _ Most notable, in the night attach, was the'fact that, al though nearly all the basic, dope was ba&,^ the strategy proved very
sound, since it turned out that the open ground taken under cover
of-darkness was the most heavily fortified of all terrain,captured that day, in fact, the strongest center of resistance encountered '
between RJ 330 and the beach, and the enemy occupying this vital
ground were taken completely by surprise (actually sleeping in their
pill boxes and caves). It is assumed that this strongpoint was part
of the defense system of which TA 201-E was- an adjacent part.
Amongst the weapons reduced in this area were two heavy caliber AT*
weapons (approx 3") in reinforced concrete pill boxes about 75 yards
apart in 218-0, four 13mm MGs1 in pillboxes, numerous 7.7mm MCJs in
bunkers, and five 8" rocket launchers(wheel type). It'should be kept
in mind, however, that a stroke of luck went a long way toward mak . ing the attack a success. v
Having reverted to control,of the 9th Mar, the battalion
with B Co., 21st Mar attached continued'the. attack at 0750 on^the
8th of inarch with orders to seize the coastline in its~ Z of A. *
Mortar and artillery preparations were laid down on the high ground
in the north and south of TA 219-^ prior to the jump off, and the*
companies continued to use 60mm Mortars on those points in close
support until the troops virtually overran them. The attack was
made with'B-21 & K Co abreast, K Co'on the right making tho main
effort. An. intermediate objective (the. lip of the high ground in
219-Q,, V ) was pointed out to the company commanders on the ground
. from the "CO1 s-OP. I Co and L Co (when passed through by B-21) were
to regain in position prepared to protect the respective flanks
the battalion or to fill in any gap occurring on the glanks.

Action Report, IWO J I M

(Cont'd)

With a DD firing into the draws at 219-*R,W. the attack

jumped off at K hour and progressed slowly, with I Co (as later or dered) following & Co by bounds, protecting the open right flank,
and, by 1600 had moved to the intermediate objective against contin-/ ,
uous "last ditch" fighting from caves and bunkers in the broken g
ground; Close support by 60fs as well,as the usual short range fights
ing with individual weapons played the important roles in the attafek^;.
The left company, which was in contact with the 21st Mar on the left,
was ordered to continue the attaok^-down the dr&w, which was gently
sloping (on the right it.was a precipitous cliff). The ri^ht com pany was held up on t i high ground and directed to cover the ad-* le ; .
.vance of B-21 on the left; A,wide'gap had occurred on the right due*
to the1 unit on the right being held up by-fierce resistance in its
zone of actitm and it was thought beet to hold the commanding grounUl
in the area until the'adjacent"'high ground was seized by bur tfoops.
If the ba.t tali on moved over the qliffs down to the' beach .it would,
be open to fire from' the (high ground at fA 202-PjG- which would then:.
be above and to t j ? right .rear, arid there wasv nothing to prevent *'>' ^
he retreating enemy frb^ then occupying" the tjommanding ground given,
up by such .an advance/ whicfe would cut, us off from the rear (supply,
evacuation, communication)* The situation was reported to the RegV-\;
mental Commander with'a-recommendation that every .effort be made to.
occupy the >frigk, ground on our right before the battalion was moved
to the beach. It Vsrs directed that the high ground now held was to
be organized for the night. B Co, 21st had moved down the draw in
219-Q, to where any further advance would have broken contact with
the. unit on the left,and they were ordered to ho14 up the advance
and dig in for the night. The front line ran from TA 219-QlNC) to
Q,(SC) to Q(SS) to V(cT s toV(SC), I Co was brought upland/ from,a
position behind K Co, attacked and seited with "little resistancb^the
C?e hill in V(s;2). They tied in to K " o . right fland and organized the
hill facing south(right) and west (rear) to protect the battalionrs
exposed right flank. During the day's action the battalion killed .
an estimated 175 Japs and had 65 casualties* / " "
" On 9 March, the battalion received orders to attack to
the sea in its Z of A, Orders were issued for K Co and B-21 (still
. attached) to continue the. attack, K on the right. : I Co was ordered
to maintain its position on the hill but to adjust its lines so as
to deliver supporting fire for K Cofs advance, lu Co was ordered to
move to and organize the forward slopes of the spur in 219-V(N) at"
V K hour, and support by fire the advance of both B-21 a n d j . 81 and
S i r mortar preparations were laid in the draws through whfcfch the
Oaa attack must move from K-15 to K^hour, and a 15 oiinute NG-F pfepara " tion was fired in- TA 2l5^T,Y. fhe attack jumped off on schedule, with
,the supporting fires from thespurs on either side of the right draw
aiding K Co considerably. The initial slope leadihg down through
this draw was, in reality, a broken cliff, down which the troops
had to inch their way, firing flame thrower and placing charges into
the countless caves dug irito the cliffy-face* Nearly all of the caves
were occupied by groups of Japs-and considerable, though indatermi ' nate, number were destroyed in the action. The method of attacking,
this unusual position wae simple^ but the actual work was difficult.
x Covered by small arms from the out^tting spurs (wnich afforded
firing back into the cliff from*forward positions) the small assault
groups worked toward the caves from above or wither side, hugging
N the c.liff-face and avoiding the mouth of the cave, until right next .
to the opening. The flame thrower would open up (perhaps preceeded
by a couple of fragmentation or smoke grenades) and close in behind

..

'

'

'

-'

"

'

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(ConUd)

his burst until he could pour it deep into, the cave. Following
clo|ely, the demolitionist would ignite r n hurl his charge as
.d deeply into the cave as possible, which action, would be followed ^
by & general assault and close checking of the cave for possible
further action. At approximately 1300^ the line had moved to a .
ledge overlooking the sandy strip of bea&h about 100-150 yards from
the water's edge from which it could commence the entire beach.
IBince B-21 had pulled left in order to maintain contact with the
JBlst.'Aar,and because the battalion right flank was still dangling,
L Co was committed on the right to extend the line and protect
the flank. Patrols swept the beach for at least 200 yards on either
side of the battalion zone of action without contact-, I'Co was
held in position on the hill in 219-V(S) where it could cover the
rear of the battalion from above and also prevent enemy troops fitbm .
occupying the high ground just evacuated by the assault line. F Go
8-9* was attached for the purposes of defense and were utilized
inttying in between L Co, which bent its right flank to the rear, and
I Co, which extended its line toward the sea to meet F Co. The
troops dug.in for the night fairly secure,; Japs killed for the day were
an estimated 125, with 36 casualties to the battalion.
Japs from TA 201-E in pulling back from the pressure exert ed there, had gotten into the broken ground between Kill 362 and the '
battalion CP and.forward dump overnight, and were seriously harassing
the supply1and evacuation line (7 men were killed this day, the 10th
carrying supplies or evacuating wounded)* F Co was assigned the
mission of. mopping up the area~ which, after an all',day .fight, they
were successful in doing. The battalion commander was ordered to
patrol to the right with a company the shelf immediately belot* the
cliffs of TA 202~F,3 in front of the 1st n's zone of action. 'Be cause of the fact that the high ground (cliffs) commanding the
shelf was still in the hands of the enemy, it was strenuously recom* mended that the patrol be held up until the Nose in TA 202-F,G captjured by the 1st In. Upon receiving word that the order must .
" e carried out,: the patrol (K\ Co) moved, south from the vicinity of
b EJ 230 (TA 219-^) covered by L and I Co nd I Go's own MG f s. Trouble
was expected and received. When the patrol re"Ched a point about
half way to the end of the nose from tueir L/D, very heavy MG- fire
broke out from various well concealed positions in the face of the
cliff. The patrol tood cover in the numerous shell holes at hand
and were literally pinned to the ground by fire from'above. It could
r.ove neither forward nor backward - if a member so much, as wiggled
s toe he drew heavy automatic fire. A large volume of fire from
. our covering units directed at all possible enemy positions in the
cliff free had little or no effect - the patrol still couldn't
move. Orders were issued to the K Co commander to move hie patrol
baci to * the L/D under cover of the mortar concentration which would
immediately follow, and the 81mm mortar observer then with I Co
wes brought to the battalion commander1s OP at 219-V(SC) which af forded excellent observation of the target., cliff-line. A steady and
^oiazjingly accurate barrage was laid down on the target(from the end
of the nose back to within 75 yards of the patuol) by the 81' s,
first with smoke, then a mixture of light and meduim H-.E*, then'
smoke again, while the entire cliff face was subjected to an intense,
concentration, of KG fire by I> K and L Co guns, and with this ex cellent coverage the patrol was enabled to.1 extricate itself with

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(Cont!d)

comparatively' few casualties* It was the smoke coverage' of the tar get which was primarily responsible for the movement of the patrol* < _
The wind was gentle and in exactly the right direction and the ,
accuracy of the mortar fire wea singularly admirable; Tha battalion
was ordered to dig in an East-Vest line covering the beach area fae4
ing south end, upon' adjustment ran from 219-.(WC), where a KG pa*
too)i was placed covering the beach, to X(NW)- td,W(NW) to and, includ- / .
ing the hill in'V(S), E-21 was moved to the high ground in V(N-) in re serve. F-9 reverted bsck to its parent organization. ' ,. . .: .
No movement of note was made by the battalion on the 11th
with the exception that 'B-21 attacked tnd seized, without a single 5 ;
loss, the hill in TA SQ2-A, organized it and made contact with I Co >
who was still occupying the hill in 219-V(S). I and B-21 were in ex cellent position to support by fire the attack of the 1st Bn which .
was at that time attacking the nose in TA 202-*F,G from the south, and
between them, killed about 25-30 Japs *whom they caught crawling into
position to meet the 1st En's attacks When the left flank company
of 1-T9 pinched out B-21'and made contact with I Co, B~2l reverted
to its parent organization.
On the morning.of the llthj tanks were requested for use ,
C against the positibns in the* cliff face vhich had pinned ! Co down
the day before* Many caves and a couple-of positions) which seemed to
be well camouflaged pillboxes were visible from the Bn Commander's
OP. A route from the 1st Bn!s 2 of A, where the tanks then>ere, '<
to the desired pasitiNon was specified (a distance of about 500 .'yara#
along a road) and after five or six hours the tanks appeared* Con-*,
siderable difficulty was experienced moving, t h tanks, into, position
^e (a route had to be .dozed around an impaS;SaTble shell crater) but,at
about 1500 they were ready to fire at short range point blank into .
the wall of the nose-, With the .battalion commander directing the
fire from his OF by SCR 300 and I and K Co M U in position covering '
the target, the .tanks (two platoons) did'-a/fine job of reducing a
formidable position. The camouflaged positions proved, in r.ealifcy,
to be heavy concrete pillboxes with small apertures and, by persis tent firing with APC, they were broken wide apon* Japs attempting:
to escape from the various positions were moved down by the cover*- '
ing viG-'s, By 176 all'organized resistance from the sea side of the
big spur had been obliterated and'the tanks retired with the mission
very successfully completed, Persuant to orders received from the
F,:e2iniental Commander, I and K Co1 s were move'd to the vici i^y of Hill
oS2'where they took up a line facing west preparatory to the mapping
up operation which was- carried on next day^ ,L Co was placed on the
high'ground in 219-V(W) wipers they completed the battalion perimeter*
6* On the 18th of March, the battalion moved to an assembly
area to TA 201-J, P, KQ; and was assigned a sector of the vacated 4th
Division ZofA to patrol, daily. The sector was. divided into sub*,
seeders each of which was patrolled daily by a rifle platoon with
sn MG section and a demolition squad of' engineers attached (see
Part I - B for results of patrolling phase) until the battalion '
was tactically relieved fey a battalion of 147th Infantry of the Army :
at 0700 on 4 April, 45# During this patrolling phase, a company
of the battalion was forced to make a concerted attack on a center
of organized resistance which had been referred to as, the 4th Division

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(Cont'd)
This i p B

Pocket" just prior to the official securing of the island. action is worthy of detailed note,

A platoon patrol moving through TA 184-E,J on 20 Mar 45

was fired, upon from the vicinity of 1 8 4 - E T B ) , 185 A(W) and, in the .
ensuing fire fight, sustained a few casualties. It was reported by
the patrol that the enemy had several M& positions* and a considerable
number cf dug in riflemen in the draw and surrounding ground in that i
area. Accordingly, a company patrol (K) was sent against it from
northwest to southeast the next day(21st) and, although it cleaned
out the west side of the draw, tj^e main center of resistance still
remained. Well camouflaged positions dug' into the western face of
ac."sugar loaf" hill on the easl side'of the .draw (185-At-WC)} were
denying the use of the road running across the northwest comes of
184-J, and a section of tanks was brought up the' road to destroy these
positions. The tanks did a good job, covering all of the cliff like"
face of the hill that wasn't masked from their view with a heavy .
concentration of fire* Two emplacements housing heavy MG's, and
numerous rifle positions, were destroyed. From that time on the roa4
in question was freely used without danger. A>platoon of K Co, left
in ambush guarding the "pocket",received mortar fire during the night.
From the previous two days action the defense system in
the pocket was definitely established and, on the 22d of March, I Co,
with a platoon of tanks plus one flame-thrower tank attached was
ordered to attack and seize the enemy position from the west and south
covered by fire fffom the high ground on the western side of the
draw* The small Jap force occupied a trench system running along the
base of the "sugar-loaf11 hill ftom, the southern end of the hill.
northwest to the head of the draw, with a couple of MG- bunkers (still
in. operation) built into" the trench parapet aU key points* Caves ran
(^his was assumed and established later to be a fact) from the bottom,
of trench into a-largeffiaincave under the hill, which enabled the
Japs to vacate the trench and return to it at will.- Due to the fact
that the tanks requested were late in arriving and'because a passage
through masking ground had to be bulldozed for the tanks to reach a
position from which the main targets could be engaged and close enough
for use of the flame-thrower tank, the assault by I Co did not jump
off until about 1500.
At about 1220 th& tanks (without the flame thrower tank)
moved into position within 50Tards of the target and fired steadily
with A P C and H E for 20 minutes, the fire being directed over SCR
300 by the I Co commander and by a Marine, who knew the targets' placed
inside of the platoon leader1s tank. The entire trench system was .
thoroughly and heavily worked over, all visible caves in the hill ,sico
fired into, and the last remaining M& bunkers completely destroyed,'
The flame-thrower tank was moved into position about 40 yards from
the trench system and sprayed its. charge back and forth along the
trench until its fuel .was exhausted. 5 or 6 Japs were shot down at-r
tempting to escape from the trench as the flame diminished, and
others were seen to blow themselves up with grenades. As the flame
thrower tank ceased firing the two assault platoons closed with the
objective (the L/D was7 just 75 yard fr'um it) and, using their own
flame throwers on targets the tank had missed, almost immediately
occupied it* With the platoon which h?<d enveloped and come up along
the spur from the south covering the mv.^n length of trench, the pla toon from the west moved into the trench and systematically closed
r t "'^"' : ' : : ;*:\ oi ^ hi15 ' l b

Action Report, I WO JIwA

(Cont'd)

each of the "communication" caves which ran into the large chamber
under the hill with large demolition charges. Two main entrances to
the large cave were found, one leading from the south end of the :
trench and one in the south side of the hill itself., Fragmentation
and. smoke grenades, flame and large TFT charges were thrown into these,
a great cmount of activity and commotion In the . c&ve resulting* Engi*;
ns-ers were brought in to comp!e4ft-/b*ie job of sealing all the caves - ;
and, where they were too large to completely seal .with charges, they
were bulldozed shut. Two 81m:fl m o r W r s end a good supply of ammuni* tion was removed from a section-of the trench.
One platoon was sent to the top of the sugar-loaf hill and
by working from the top down on the reverse side with flame thrower
and demolitions, destroyed what proved to be the ldst two emplacements
of the center of resistance.
IV Comments
A. Administration

1. In an operation such as IWO, errors in casualty reports

are almost sure to occur -.but the system of submitting the reports
is, not faulty. It may be recommended, however, that not only the
1st Sgt and a clerk, but three or four men in each Co Hq be familiar
with the preparation and submission of those reports so that casual ties to the key administrative personnel will not disrupt the flow of
casualty information,
* . * '
2, It is, of course, submitted that the method of absorbing
replacements in this operation can be definitely, improved % upon. The
ideal time to receive replacements is prior to departure for the
projected operation ?.nd, if possible, in time to run them through a
short period of small unit training. It is personally believed that
the replacement personnel should not be absorbed at this time to
build the battalion, to overstrength, but that they' should be treated
in much the same way as rsser*#t..oa a football team* They should be
organized into squads and platoons, "te.m their signals" and do a
little "dummy scrimmanging". Provision, should- be made to balance the
training of the "reserves" so tiaat. all "positions" are covered (some
mortarmen, machine gunners, flsm> thrower operators, rocket launcher
operators, deraolitionists, etc)' perhaps some may1 even be trained in
the "signals" for a couple of "positions". After the landing is made
by the "first team", replacements (reserves) should be ^substituted",
as units, as they become necessary. A unit may be anything from "a
fire group to a platoon (less the key NCO's), It is understood that
rninior adjustments within the small units will often have to be made
but, compared to other operational derangements, tney will be negli gible in" scope. Replacements should be made _as the units lose per- .
sonnel - not after a company is 'so depleted tht the older men are not-
in great enough number to have a steadying effect on the new, Re pla.cerii.ent by squads would seem ideal.
$, follow: :T
C#uslUe* of thin bstt^lion to 1800, 4 April 1945 are an.
KIA WIA MIA DWRIA TOTALS OFF " 7& 19 0 1 27 ENL
v

' 3P1' ~O 18 531

TOTAL
139
400
0
19
558

1. Oontiary t^^:onJ.e enable cited opinion^! t 15 the opinion

of this reporting o f f ^ h .h^^#;.r* ma.pg and photr^Baphs furniched, for
the operation were no', only S S u ^ e but good. Tne scale 1/10,000

Action Report, IWO JIMA

(Cont'd)

of the basic map is just about what' is needed for terrain use by com pany commanders and platoon leaders and, in general, it was as accu-.;
rate as could be expected or as was -required. It is believed
th:t, where discrepancy occurs, the fault lies mainly with the
map reader and not with the map* One just doesn't look, at maps .
and read them as he would a printed page - they must be studied
carefully and, yes* even a little old time resection might
be necessary. Some features must be read into a map because
of the effect of "outside forces" upon the terrain since the
map was compiled; for instance, cliffs appear where the map
might show a 50 degree slop? but the map can't be blamed - NGF did it. And you just don't'find a pretty closed contour on the '
on the map for every little hill you see on the ground - and vice-
versa. The 1/5,000 vertical photograph seems to be ideal for use
by company and battalion commanders and the ultimate is reached
when -the map and photograph are used together supplementarily.
Drawing the target,squad grid system on the photograph helped a
great deal,
2; The procedure set up for the recovery of captured enemy
documents and materiel was -evidently satisfactory but, except by
way of general dissemination, this battalion never heard whether
or not the stuff it took such pains to recover was of any value to
the general effort. It is known that certain documents turned in
by the battalion were of considerable intelligei qe value but no one
made notification to us of the fact, "Credit given where credit
is due" will, if nothing else maintain incentive end aid morale.
3. It is known that vocal propaganda had a degree of suc cess. However, coordination with attacking units is wanting. There
v;ere instances in which sound equipment was calling the Japs out
of their caves to surrender in the same immediate area where units
of this battalion were doing their dead level best to exterminate
any and all Japs who showed themselves. This situation is cited
merely for the sake of proferring information, no recommendation
pro, or con is offe"red* iUJap to the reporting officer is an animal
to be hunted down and killed at every available opportunity,
4. The only thing distinctive about the Jap and his tac tics is the lack of that particular quality. He never acts the
same way twice (except dig big caves). Different Japs are differ ent people - they donTt even know what to expect of* each other,
5. As far.as enemy tactics is concerned, on typo was used
with singular effectiveness. Outlet caves wore dug along the bs.se
of a trench system, into which the Japs crawled when our troops
assaulted the trench. G-renades, flame and demolitions thrown*into
the trench had little effect on the Japs where they had -taken re fuge and the trench appeared unoccupied* Upon moving over the
trench and past it^ our troops were subjected to grenades thrown
oat of the trench at their rear by the Japs who had crawled back
into-the trench. Heavy rockets were also used-for the first time
against this battalion. .
C. Operations and Training

1. No criticism is offered of the' type and method of train ing which was undergone before the4 operation. It was good and

I *

Action Report, I WO JIMA

(Cont'd)

proved Itself in the results shown. However, more and closer tank-
infantry training is recommended for the next training period. All
phases of tank-infantry work should be.Included - guiding tanks
by SCR 300, by 536,, and by telephone, directing fire by these same
communi cat ion means, etc. Actual combat firing of tanks, directed
by -company commands and. platoon leaders at obscure targets is needed
plenty of it. Too, more emphasis and time c/ould have been placed on ;
small unit training ( squad, and Platoon).. Finally, It is believed
that more extensive use could have been made of the rifle range*
There are being developed a. large number of Hintense firers" and not
enough good shooters. It has become the field policy to kill the
enemy with sheer volume of fire rather than a few well aimed shots,
and it is believed that mor thorough indoctrination on the range'
will remedy this shortcoming,
2. Both the rocket-launcher(bazooka) and AT.rifle grenade
proved effective against fortified positions of the lighter type
(log and sandstone bunkers). The most effective weapon used by this
battalion against fortified positions was the medium tanks. By firing
tanks from hull-down positions at observed enemy emplacements an
attack was enabled to advance Where otherwise it would have bogged
down. Tanks were also effectively used out In the open firing point
blank at pillboxes and caves when it was ascertained that no AT wea pons were ^present, and they were successfully used against "area"
targets when the vicinity of the enemy positions but not the positions
themselves were known/ 'ihe A-P C shell was motet effective and was able
to penetrate many thick concrete emplacements by continuous firing at
the same point in a given emplacement. Where two or three hits showed
no apparent effect, ten or twelve*in the same place broke it wide open,
3. The flame thrower was the one indispensible infantry weapon
us^d in the operation, -Their employment, with demolition charges fol lowing, in the assault teams was, throughout, the principal infantry
tactics used in destroying the enemy. The tank equipped to throw flame
through i.-ts main gun should develop into the prime weapon for rqduc4ior
tion of enemy fortified positions in future operations. This battalion
had only one opportunity to use this tank and Its worth was quickly
recognized; The^greater volume of flame, .the greater range, and the
longer sustained'burst than the pack flame thrower, ace exactly what
is needed to effectively reach the .enemy in his deep and elaborate
cave positions,
4. The bazooka was used quite often by the battalion with
varying success. On small type pillboxes or bunkers, particularly
those constructed of sandstone, they were highly effective at close
range. At ranges over 100 yards the percentage of hits was very
small , the range should be kept down. More intensive firing prac tice is heeded with the rocket-launcher to increase accuracy which
f oould only be classed as * air.
D. Supply

! It is the opinion of the reporting officer during com bat field.rations could be adequately supplied In two types only,
the "C*' rat ion for actively engaged troops vnd. the "10 in 1* ration
for those in. reorganization assembly areas. .All other rations,
with the exception of supplementary bread/ fruit, fruit, juices, and
coffee could be dispensed with"/ In ..bivouac, 3 ration is satisfac

*t'U

Action Report, I WO JItfA

(Contd)

tdry and A is highly appreciated.

2. The initial supply of all items was.found adequate but
the resupply/Df 81mm mortar ammunition of all types and 6 a a mortar
Oii illuminating 'ammunition was lacking; riore illumination ammumition
of all kinds was needed - both;types of trip~flares.and .illuminating
grenades. Tater was never a problem - the battatlicn was afforded
.all the water it had facilitie to draw.
3. The supply of clothing was poorly handled - wrong sizes
again. Nearly all trousers were size 36 waist and all coats size
40 when the popular size in sny organization is 30-32.for trousers
and 36 coat* However, this was considered no drawback as it was 'ex pected by all handsi ' " ' ' x . .
4. Pallets should)be dispensed with unless the hatches of
all-ships -are rigged to handle them - men can't.

2 . A i r ' ' ./ ' ' . ' :

' 1. This battalion had occasion.to use two or three strikes

which it took hours to get. One strikeftttto be run- on target
square fqrward of the original targets requested because, b;y the
time the-planes were available, the troops had fought their way up
onto the original target area* There was never any close support
by planes except once when they got about three hundred yards off the
designated-target and straffcd 50 yards in front of our lines.
2-0 ' The accuracy of'the planes wes very poor, and they didn't
seem to bev able to feet on the designated TA!s as assigned from the
map- It is believed that a gridded photograph ,with the TA system
imposed will aid the flyers to find the targets on the ground. The-
purpose of dummy runs continue to be a mystery to.the reporting officer.
Through a liaison team, the TA and direction of flight will be definite.*
ly specified to the planes and a dummy run requested* The run is made 4
at right angles to the direction requested and three or four hundred f
yards off the target* The falacies in the run are stremuously pointed
out and new'runs made until one is exactly as desired.. The planes
are given the "go11 .ahead and the live run is made - at right angles
to the .direction, requested ;.and three'or four hundred yards off
the target. .

3. A request was made for a heavy plane strike on the tip

of the spur at TA 2O2-H(W), the.type of target which is every
airman1e dream ~ a very prominent nose^ ideal direction of flight,
a pin-point target- which couldn't be mistaken by e blind man -"and,
though planes were available, the stride was turned down. Quite a
few marines lost their lives in .attacking this .point the next day, ,
a strong concentrated center of resistance being encountered. When
.the planes are available, it is recommended that the battalion corn iudiiders"judgement in requesting a given fetrike be relied upon more
4. It was repeatedly requested,that air observers be kept
over likely enemj;v,t.argeyt^r Friendly observation planes over the
enemy brings about bne of two conditions, each of which are highly

Action Report, IWO JIMA - (Cont'd)

beneficial to attacking infantry: (1} the enemy is observed if
he opens fire and can be then taken under fire himself or (Z) he
refrains from opening fire for fear of being spotted. At times \
when these planes were in the air over enemy'areas^Jap artillery,
mortar and rocket-fire was noticeably lighter, and a mere rapid
and less costly advance was made by attacking infantry,
F Engineers

1. Engineers were used extensively in this operation to

clear lanes for tanks, demolish caves and emplacements, bulldoze
routes af supply and Has sage. for. tanks, end to destroy duds of
smaller caliber. They operated in close oooperation with the in fantry in closing of caves and emplacements, moving a couple of
hundred yards behind the attacking troops and working on the enemji
positions bejaind them. The armored bulldozer is ideal for clearing
a way for tanks or other combat vehicles and such superior in that
respect to the bulldozer tanks,
0. Ammunition . .

1. The 30 caliber ammunition |>oxes (rifle and^BAR) are

too heavy. All other, types of infantry battalion ammunition now
comes in containers wjfrich, full, are a orre man load. This is not
true of ,30 caliber ammunition in 8 an<| i> round clips and steps
should be'taken to reduce the size and wpight of the pull contain er to a load that can be hand-carried toy one individual over

short distances. < ~

H, Signal

1. Communicationa during the operation were al^:that could

be expected. In the offense the SCR 3C0 was heavily relied upon
and proved highly dependable. The SCR 536 was used successfully
in intra-company communication during the attack minuimizing the
employment of runners. All FO1 s (Arty and 8 lam) used wire commun ication between observer and gun as continuously as they could
keep it in, However, both SCR's 300 and 556 wpge employed to
fire missions by the 81mm mortar platoon and 300's by the artillery
when wire conUBunication was disrupted. Wire communication was
within the battalion at every appreciabia
2. Interference in radio nets was negligible except in
the case of SCR 536 nets. So many radios were on the one battalion
channel at one time that interference was. bound to occur. If prae~
ticable, two channel setting should be allowed,the battalion. The
basic radio system for the BLT was otherwise adequate except that
the 81mm mortar platoon should be allotted three SCR's 300 on a
separate channel. ^
3. All main wire trunks should be laid with W-110 wire;
W-130 will not stand up under any appreciable harsh treatment.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

A* Quite a few'conclusions h?VG been drawn and recommenda tUons made in the comments in.Part TV, The following are, in brief,

Action Report, ItooJIMA (Cont:&)

in addition to those above o * emphasizing the more important of
r them*
1. In the new training period, the phases should be gradual
and definitely progressive, even to the extent of commencing with
a little close and extended order drill. The same old FMrs still *
held good in specifying sequence of training. The individual
skirmisher must learn his & signals'' before he can perform with the
"little" teamX"fire group). Then school the fire group before squad
training and on up the line. The principal unit training to em phasize is the assault team, composed of rifle squad, flame-thrower,
and demolitionist. Every man in the squad should be a BAR man and
know well how to handle both pole and satchel charges. Before com bat faring is undertaken, thorough indoctrination on the rifle
range should be received - to such an extent that the men "squeeze'
l em off!J at the silhouettes on the combat range from habit. It
worked before, it will again.
2* Both flame thrower and bazooka should become organic
weapons in the rifle company - just as organic as the BAR* The per sonnel' manning K Co!s flame throwers and bazookas should e K Co*s
personnel, A flame thrower section of 6 flame throwers and 12
operators is suggested for each rifle company and one bazooka team
per rifle, platoon* A maintenance section of three or four men should
be kept in Bn Hq Co to refuel flame throwers, maintain and repair
rocket launchers and continually make up pole and satchel demolition
charges. It is recommended that the allotments of these weapons
remain the same, the extras to be maintained in readiness by the
maintenance section at the forward dump.
3 The present organization of the rifle squad seems
sound and it recommended that it remain as it is. It is understpod
that all that is actually'needed is an assault group and a covering
grouptoafl,.aoh,how relieving it is to have fchat little maneuver group
as an ace in the hole when the squad leader's first decision doesnft
pan out. As a matter of fact, it is the worth squad leader who can
utilize that third group to advantage. The old maxium.was never
more pertinent than when applied to organizations (large or small)
of a military unit: "Never two without three"*

ENCLOSURE D

21ST MARINES

ACTION REPORT

HeadduAHfer# 21st l&rine la the f i e l d . 4 10 Ais*Si|*

UNCLASSIFIED
Subjects Inferences jSnclosuress 1.

3d MarDiv.

"Action Report, IWO JTJ'A Operation.

(a) 3d MarDiv GO#137 (Confidential)/dated 3
and modification #L thereto*
(a) Action Report of 1st Bn. "1st Mar.
(T>) Action Repot*, of 2d Bn, 21 et Mar.
(c) Action Report of 3& Bn, 21et Mar,

In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted:

* tiJdT X. Summary.

A. Period covered "by this report: 23JanH5 (time mission was assigned)
to l6Mar^5 (end of operation)*
B. This Regt landed on the southeast coast of IWQ JIM& 2 2 3 ^ 5 ,
to ^th MarDiv and was committed 22 Feb, passing through elements of 2JJ4
south of Airfield &o 2. Regt made negligible progress 222"ebt continued Atk
r_3 feb^ and by 1J30 had reached Airfield Ho 2, The following morning, 21 JFeb,.
*the Atk was continued and by 1100 the southern jend of the airfield wa^ su*w
rounded and the center crossed, by evening the north side was firmly held by
two Cos of 3d Bn an^ one from the 2d Bn. This Regt reverted 3& MarDiv contiroi
0700 25 Feb and was passed through by 9th Mar at 0930 and became Div Res from
2*j 7eb to the morning of 2S Feb conducted mopping up operations in rear of Bir
ZofA. At 0815 2$ Feb Ufcis Regt passed through 5th Mar and continued the Atk
to'Q-3* At I33O 33 Feb Motayama Town was taken by tha right Bn. The Atk wa
continued 0030 1 Mar, employing one Bn 9th Mar on the left flank of the Regtl
:^ofA. The ri^ht Regtl 2ofA passed to 9th Mar control at 15HS By 16^5 the
western part of Airfield JTo 3 was overrun. The Atk was continued at 0S15 2 Mar#
0.7 1305 Hill 362 (235*J) and mos^t of Airfield ITo 3 w-.s in our hands. The Atk
vjrtinued 3 Mar, by 1655 the hi^h ground northeast of Airfieldfto3 ^ s secured.
5e eligible progress waa made h Mar. 5 I toWa^ utilized to re supply, improve
iefensive positions, and conduct mopping tip operations. The Atk to Hill 3
{>:19 II) on 6 Mar and J Mar made little air o ^ain. The Atk on & Mar resulted
in the capture of 0-3 along the risht Bn ZofA.- 9*h Mar was utilized in mop-pin**
ip and patrolling. One patrol reached the coastline a a 1355 within Re^tl 2oA.
' c 1500 10 Mar ri^ht Re^tl ZofA was declared clear of all organized resistance*
i.1 and 12 Mar were utilized in mopping up and patrolling* The entire Re^tl
TofL was cleared of organized resistance 12 Mat* tfrom 13 Mar to 15 Mar this
Regt protected the 5th Div right flank, and conducted mopping up operations in
Segtl ZofA. At OtOO 16 Mar thie Regt took over the right sector of 5th Div
zone and continued the Atk to Kitano Point. By I33O our troops occupied
Eitano Point in Regtl ZofA. Prom 17 M&r to 2^ Mar conducted mopping up
operations, patrolling,salvage work, burijal of enemy dead and police within
assigned Regtl ZofA. At 0700 2U Mar this: Regt was relieved of responsibility
of patrol .-sector by elements of the l^?th Inf. '

. *

II.

Preliminaries.
A. ROT 21.
21st Marines.
Co B, 3d Sngr Bh, Co B # 3d H o n Bn# %
Co B, 3d M T l n .
Co A t 3^ Med Bn. Bet |i tUSCo. Det 2Sth Repl $raft,

,

" ,

35et 3 t o Repl Jfoaft.

3. ( l ) Planning; Prom the time the Div Opn Order was received until this Regt landed, frequent conferences were held vith Hegtl and Bn Staff officers 1 CO1 s of a l l attached units,, ship's 0ff 1rrmgjKW*

HK!

(Cont'd)

^ Jach tnf Bn participated in a Bn Atk p ^ close Arty ftupporteSdthB firing of a l l Inf Vpn# $ * Jtegt participated In one Mr and two Segtl CHCs and one Hegtl problem. All troopa received instruction in the use of flame throwers, demolitions and methods of neutralising and dis arming of enemy land mines* All,units conducted some TkuXnf training; * ducted* O ) Rehearsals; Ifo rehearsals In ship-to-shore movement were con

C. ( l ) the mission of this Hegt was to land on order in Res (in various formations on various beaches) and move to assigned assembly area. Vith the above in mind a preferred plan and five (5) alternate plans were drawn up which included landings on either the southeast or southwest coasts of TWO J M 2d $ & Bn 12th Mar was Atchd to this H T for embarkation only* However, plans were O perfected to land: ( l ) the Inf, (2j Inf and Arty simultaneously, or (5) the Arty prior t^ the Inf i s necessary. , (3) It was assumed that this R T vould land in reserve on a secured C beach and pass through* However, all plans and details were perfected for in assault. '..'., D. for own forces, position, composition and disposition at the of action see Atchd overlay, 3. Elements of following units were contacted In B D 51 ZofAl K 9 q
109th D4t M- Arty tfnlt.

UtB.1i6.-imu

2d M Arty
B 509th In
310th ind Inf Bn,
311th tad Inf Bxu
5lUth Ind Inf Bn.
1st Bn# >^5t^ Inf
Bn, ^ 5 t h Inf j t h Inf Itest Arty
3d Sn. 17th |nd Kixed
26th g?ank Hegt.
Sta Ind AT Bn.
9th Ind AS Bn.
U t h Ind ASBxw
12th Ind A? Bn.
1st Ind K BH.
G 2d Ind M5 Bn,
20th Ind Arty Mortar Bn.
2d Medium Mortar Bn.
3d Medium Mortar Bn,
Socket TJ!alt (Army).
IVO JIMA. tTaval ttuard

Or^anlgation ^ Army
DIV

109th Piv A Arty TTnit; The 2Af Jd and one halt of the *Wx ( s e a r c h l ^ t ) A of the 109th A unit were n.&$ 21 ZofA LTA ?lSne). K>V have indicated that A the 2d Btry had 90 men and operated nix *lm 4A guns. The 3d Btry had 120 m% operating six Tea AA guns, fh& Uth Btry had ^p making, with a Hq of kz, ^ A l 29O-.3OO men and 12 Jca AA ^uns^ Also attached to this A Unit were,, two JJ(J t s (^3* V 1 4 ^ ^ consisting of S and 66 men respectively with six O cannons In each unit. This makes the total of the 1091

Action Report, I O Jl^P^peration (Contfd} W

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The let Btry of the Bri^cade Arty Unit which docw uments indicated had 14s "^uS^Oflitiona around M D Y M was the principal element EOA / l encountered in "RQT 21 ZofA, ha l s t Btry originally consisted of five 75Bfl*~^a guns and around 120 men. Later, however, a platoon, of three 12cm howitzers was added to this battery, constituting the only noteworthy new development in the organisation of the Brigade Arty Unit* The 3d Btry alsd had three 129m howitzers, making a total of six for the entire unit* 310th Ind Inf Bnt This Inf Bn i s the principal tnf unit encountered in BfJJ 21/ ZofA. Captured maps indicate the positions of this Bn in IA 200 and 199ne* arid documents and IW reports indicate that this unit formed the island second line oT defense."* Initially RC2 21 was i s contact if1th elements of the 309th Ind Inf Eu on 22 Peb. By the time the southern half of & T Y<K AIHFISLD W 2 was over > 0 .\ A run, this ECS Was in contact with the main elements of the 310th Ind Inf Bn, Documents have indicated, the organization of the 310th Ind Inf Bn was approxi mately as follows at fLl strength: ' ... " t

Hq
ist a Co 2d E Co 3d R Co HMG Co Inf Gun Co

125

i2g
136

125
SO
625

organization generally corresponds to the T/O strength of an Ind Inf Bn which calls for 579 men*1, There were no : J ^uns in this Bn. Af C Ind Inf, Bn* SLements of ;this Bn were contacted in H T 21 2ojfA in 21$9 2191 235 and 251# Initially this Bn defended the t^eneral area around : 1GASHL, and POtf reports indicate that elements of this Bn were withdrawn from "he EKJASH2 sector and recommitted In TAs 235 and 251* Doctunentg indicate that
rhe organisation of the 31%h Ind tnf Bn t#as as follows: V
, Hq (and Atchd elements) 00 l s t E Co ' - X35
2 d E Co
3d R Co
M Co G 170
1^5 j ^ ^ Co

_.

^ . /

This Bn has the standard 3 rifle Cos, KG Co, and Inf Gun.Co, but its companies
are a great deal larger than the 5/0 calls for* Here a^in there were no ASP
in the Inf Gun Co.
Ed Ba, 17th Ind Mixed Eegtt The presence of this unit on IWO JIMA was not

known before 3%-day. Documents and maps indicate however, that i t s lines around the TBSZSJS lector (!EA 235 V) formed the third line of defense* This unit does hot reflect any new changes in or.^anixation except that the usual, tnf Gun Co <
not present* . '" .,-

Inf Hegtt 3leaentc of the 1st Bn l^thlUjft were contacted early in th operation in T 1S2, "but according to POVs this 3n was withdrawn to T 21$, A A Small elements of the j d Bh, l ^ t i i Re^t were also contacted* 26th TankJBlegtt R T 21 contacted elements of the 26th Tank Begt in, the vicinity C of Kbtoyama aW in*.SKA ?17se, .... . ^ th t 11th. 12th Ind AT Bnat Since their unit's Were"principally deployed to cover \ ne proo&bie approacnesu or olue tanks particularly in TAs \ZZ* 217se and 200# It is believed that a lar^e portion of the ifire Ji^wer of these A ? Bns was con* 3 cent rated in ECT21 2ofA Of the-throe iff Bns contacted, the main elements of the Uth AT were deployed in TAB 20O and 20i; : with th |JtkJ^TA^LSZ S Jl

ii , I M I I I I I I I .11

Man (Cont'd) of the 9 th AT Bn

a coagp^ny strength of 70 mon and indicating the number of ^

m AT m These Ind i f Bns are tho f i r s t units of this type encountered ty RCT 21. \>'.

vas received llok position* outside of ^EKJf

Of the 3,000 (approx) strictly j

indicate positions for the following principal ^una in our

and .lt^--^st*aafcW^

acouaf^afli^

(an) im

mortars and dockets, mid lareje numVer of AT not encountered l)y t h i s RCT. ' ' . III. Chronological account <>f the action.

':

'''(' feronces 'to

ation (Cont*d) * 30 3teb The Rogt wae boated prepared to land on I O JIMA, and proceeded W to rendezvous areas near control vessels, however dud to the congested beach areas and limited space Inland* the Uegt reeobarked on respective ships in the late afternoon., * B. 23J5b The Regt was boated at OS0O and etHnmoneed landing on B3ACS3S TC0V Tand xfeawir 2! at 13**5 The Advance CP landed at 1200 and establishedat 1225 in vicinity of l^g By 1J20 a l l thrr> 3ns were ashore and In assembly areas in iHg DtS, I,^. A warning order was received at l00 ml easing the Regi l to the ^th Div with expectation of passing i t through el orients of 23d and 2^th Mar the following morning* JTecessary liaison was .Hnirdiately established with the 23d Hap and supporting unite, however, dnly limited reconnaissance was con* ducted due to ^nrlmess* Burin.* ^he night heavy enemy mortar and Arty fire f e l l in the vicl.iiv of the assembly area bat caused no casualties* C. J3JLS&. *tth Dir Opn Order 3-^5 was received at 0001 ordering the
fter^t to relieve the 23d Mar " y 0730 and to continue t--o Atk at 0$35 The re~
b i *'-f commenced under the cover of darkness with 1st and 2d Bns, 1st 3n on the
right. 2d Bn moved into/position anif'effected the relief by 06U5 with l i t t l e
w no difficulty under the cover of darkness* 1st Bn received heavy,enemy mortar and Arty fire during the early hour's of daylight causing many casualties while camesing the eastern part of Airfield So 1, and i t was doubtful that the v 1st Bn would be able to effect the / relief and be in position to Jump off on time. Ah 0755 l 8 t B n w a 3 not in position and i t was requested that 2d Bn 2^th Mar ('occupying right ZofA) be Atohd in order to attack on schedule. At 0825 the above request was cancelled since the Eegt was prepared to attack on tiae* Ths Atk to 0-1 jumped off on schedule from, a gen era! line (181 S,T; 162 Vl 1&5 ABt 0} : precqeded by an Arty and 3 G preparation. The Atk pro pressed slowly onT9 g a series of heavily fortified emplacemont s alortT the entire front* , J CP and Arty were employed repeatedly with some results. Progress of T3 50 yards on the ri^xt and 250 yards on the l e f t was made during the. entire However, many enemy, emplacements were reduced iri Regtl ZofA Ihrln^ the the enemy placed Arty, mortar and rockets and some small arms fire along l the entire Regtl front, ^ ^ ?^*J ^ e Re ^i w a s * continue the *ltk to 0-1 at 07]P proceeded
an Arty, H 3 and tank preparation on known enemy targets* C^e {1} Plat of
GT va3 Atchd to each assault Bn for demolition md mine clearing details* 1st Bn
Juaped off on tlae, 2d Bn became engau^ed in a *ha^p i"ire fight during the early
Lours of daylight and was unable to advance uatil 0335* By early afternoon 2d
n assault Cos reached the soithwc^t approaches of Airfield $0 2 w^th styae advance, elements crossing the southwastern pori of the northeast-southwest run way, but later the few remaining! men were driven back by very heavy US' and direct A^ fire which also prevented the other troops fro gaining the ground* Stegtl 0 > $ displaced to 1SU t at 1515* 3d Bn was placed in an a--3e#ly area l6U 5J, 165 A at 1615." Assault Bns established contact ri^ht and l e f t and Consolidated positions along the line Iff2 Af?tQ,Q,RvS for the ni/?ht The enemy continued to, place mortar, rocket and Arty fire along the entire front causing many casualties* . , ' 2U geb 2d Bn sighted a sriall number of japs in rear of their lines at 0630* they were hunted down and killed immediately The ftegt with two (2) Tk Cog 4th Div in support continued the Atk at 0915 in assigned ZofA with the 2d Bn and 3d Bn abreast* 3d Bn executed a passage of l i n e s through the 1st Bn* 1st Bn assembled as Regtl Res In vicinity of 182 W, Excellent progress was made aloVig the entire front with the 3d Bn advancing approximately 600 yards against well organised mutually supporting pillboxes* The Atk was continued at }33Q At 1^5 twelve < 12) blue tanks were operating ^ Airfield Ho 2 3nemy, mines and direct AT fire caused many tank c asualties* 2d Bn made good progress "around the west side of the airfield, however due to heavy casual ti*a3S*aa ift and mortar,
-5 "

Action Ueport,

and conducted antt-sni|*e3P Itrol9 aad aoppin^ up bi coatrol at X73O. 1st aad 2d Sns est^lished the

in rar of

field ^ . | ^ continvLedthe Atk

j . 3 T*

- the Atk duo to

and
of

inued at OS35 vith the ^ B n

^jut met

at this time

of the 5th Div and over-er

it right and l e f t . At 15^5 control of ri^ht 3d Bn 21 $% Mar Atchd to 9 Continued the Atk with the % Bn 9th Mar and the 2d

tion 1st Bn 21st Map protecting the fiegtl left fttt^j&$p the Dir boundary was re* lieved by 3d Bn 26th Mar and then occupied a BeJ$| ResLine alons 200 B#C,5. . By l6^5 the western;part of airfield JTo *3 was o^abpun* One Co 1st Bn was re leased to the Sd Bn for tying in right and left* 1 :;Iines fo?. the* night, were con solidated as follove? 217 M,U,Oj 218 Pftfi .. ' '< X. 2 Mar. One Co 1st Bn released from 2d Bn and reverted to parent zation. The Regt continued the Atk at 0S00 with 3d Bn 9th liar and 1st Bn 21st Mar abreast. Little or no progress was made by the 1st Bn 21st Mar <iUe to heavy enemy H and direct. A fire covering the etst-west runway of the Airfield Jfoi3* O T 3d Bn 9th Mar made steady process and after heavy continuous fighting reached Hill 362 (335tT) At I525 the 2d Bn was placed in position at 218 At? and jumped off in the Atk to Hill 357 (218 D) at 1530* Aftpr two hours of continuous f'i^t^ in* the 2d Bn held a line extending from 218 B to 210 %; contact with 3d Bn 9th Mar was1 established on the left; One Co 1st Bn 21st Mar was utilised to tie in with the 9th Mar on the right. Remainder of 1st Bn 21 st Mar established HX at B 217 X,T. Elements of Efith Mar in and alotog the left S^tl ZofA established contact with 3d Bn 9th Mar. !The' following general line was held during the ni^hti 217 2; 2X0 X**JtZJ& lAUftft* tJMpr ortar, M and iff fire WAS recairod the aMf ftmt taM tilt * # ! % 4qp off in the Atk to seise 0*3 a* 07%* 3* S $t* tfer was ordered to hold U l l 362 (235 13) ontil pas sod throu^i or relieved by element* cf the 26th Mar, then protect the left flank of 3d Bn with one Co. 2d Bn 21st 7 !ar made some progress against heavy resistance* 3d Sn 9thMar was relieved by rlemente of the 26th Mar about 1^30 and assembled in vicinity of 218 % \ 1st Bn 21st liar was placed in position at 21S C#H and Jumped off in the Atk southeast to Hill 362 (219 TJ), Se-tl CP displaced to 200 I* at l600. 1st Bn made ^ood progress against stubborn enemy reeiet'ance Most of the hi^h ground northeast of Airfield ITo 3 was taken and the beach area in Zfi could be observed from same* Contact was established rl^ht and left* The following line was held during the M. k Kar> At O3IO an .unknown number of Japs infiltrated through the ri^ht flank, these were hunted down and killed during the early hours pf daylight. 3d Bn released to this Re^t at 06^$* King,hour scheduled at 0930 was postponed to 11^0 due to the movement of 3d Bn from 9th tttr sector to line of departure in 21st Mar ZofA. 3d Bn 9th Mar (lees 1 Co) rdleasod to 9th Mar at IC&5* At 11H0 l-Bo Re4t jumped off to 0-3 with the 2d and 3d Bns abreast, 3d Bn passing through Itt Bn. which occupied the right Sogil ?ofA, Homaining Co 3d Bn 9th Knr rovertod uo parent organisation, 2d Bn made l i t t l e or no progress while the 3d Bn managed to advance about 100 yards against deadly enemy IS and direct AS fire* Biy Ben Jo At end at 1^5. (Jiven mission reporting sources enemy fire and searching rear areas for mastf documents and materiel. Positions were consolidated generally along the same.line held the previous night, * ^* '?,, ffif* ^ ho R e ^ re supplied, improved positions and conducted mopping up operations inHe^tl ZofA. Moderate to heavy enemy mdrtar Arty, rocket and email arms fires were received alon^ the entire front during the ni^ht. ^Haap * Bn 9th Mar Ateha at 060G ani placed in He^l Hes at 21S A pirior to 0900. fhe Rect continued the Atk to 0-3 with two (2) Bns abreast f /the 2d Bn Jumping off at 0800 and. the 1st Bn pa^sin^ through the 3d Bn at. 0$b6* 2d 3n made no progress during the dayf 1st Bn advanced about 150 yards against stubborn enemy resistance. Positions were consolidated for the ni^ht alon^.the hi^h ground north and east of Airfield So 3. 3d Bn 21st Mar was released to Div control for tfee'nl^ht* 4 * 7 Ifetr* 3d Bn 9th Mar passed through ti^ht 6"f 1st Bn at OO and continued 5O the Atk to Hill 362 {219 td, Sd Bn was scheduled tdv jump off to 0-J at 0800 but vis> unable to advance due to' heavy enemy MJ fire coming from the hi^h ground on left in 5th Dir ZofA* 3d 3n' $th Marrna^e,good progress | # i % i l A e ^ef^ern jlopee

IFD

tion. (Contd)*
mm, mm f*

.pr

Bn 9th Mar was released to 9th Ifar and a new right H{jtl "botrndary, with f d fcite 9th J% became *ff faftfcto a$

I ' Little or no progress heavy enoay fire froa the hi^h ^ound on O B established a Bfil. la vicinity of 218 H. C
-.-'

'

; 27th Mar wat made -round in vicinity of through thg Ifer' and l t t 3n e u t i t t l e or the

flank to

continued to patrol "beach1 area aid conduct mopping up operatloni In tJ. 12 Man lrb held out in caves and popping up s alon the cHf f area.

% '41

!WW.

continued to pattol

Kitano Point orermnnin^ a l l or.^anised

to sample attached* higher echelons*

ayttea of on bulletins

staffAseotlons should
and ime, an for the sam
~ report of unit ur^on 8 should cover the
report of causlf submitted %y unit adjutants,
down of casuals in this

hi

Oc f

en

Ol

i
0 o
p
68

w
O

<

I
M

cs?

CO

1 O B

vo

g s
2
o
...

CA

8 fc

I* & ^
9
H>

A 0 fir o

8.

I I

I 3m 1
o

H A O

O A

I I I

ca

* I 1 1

8. ?
Pu

A &

0
A

I &

1
O

I
tt O H*

I A

s.
o

&

s
9

ration (Cont'd) XUt 17 ?77 XXAt U5 - I0U5 DO\f: 0 57 MUi f> 0 In addition to those shown above the following casualties were suffered by men from replacement^drafts who were subsequently detached from the regiment: XUt 0 11

9-253 2. The morale of this re^laeat was high throughout the operation, Supply
of beer, fresh rations and hot coffee or meals daily were a strong contributing
factor in maintaining high morale. Ihe rapid eracuation of wounded personnel
and personnel killed in the fiold ware also contributing factors,
3. Hethod of handling POVat
Division SOP as written would prove satisfactory if followed* In
this operation# particularly in its earlier stages* there was interference with
normal handling of POWs V adjacent units and higher authority, and this die**
regard of proper channels and responsibility in 2a of A prevented adequate in terrogation by this ROT*
Greater emphasis should be placed on lover echelon interrogation in
future operations, Toll questioning of FOVs near their place of capture is
essential if their information is to prove of value to front line units. It
cannot be emphasized too ouch that a POWs greatest value to fighting units comes
when he can point to a hill and tell a company, commander or a battalion conw
Bander that there are three machine guns there, a* that a company of enemy
troops is behind that ridge* Once a |0tf loses uls*orientation, it is doubtful
"
that he can regain it by looking as a map in the r^ar areas* One change in SOP, actually carried out during the operation, is re commended for continuance. Wounded POVa should be routed through successive
echelon aid stations, rather than direct to hosritals, in order that all pos sible intelligence information may be gathered by units.
Normal methods of interrogation proved satisfactory*
S, Intelligence
, , .

,
. ,

. . '

- ..
,

. . - , . '

. . ' ' ; " .

1. (a) Maps furnished before operation:

(1) Special Air and Gunnery Target Jlap,
(2) t ' *

1 J 5 0 0 0 .
! itiboOO.

(J) ' ' " * - V l|20000.

;; " {*) Photo Itep, lilO.OOO*
(5) Enemy Situation Map, It 10,000*
*( 6) belief Ma|ff tairtm*, lt^.OOO*
it) Belief Hapf piaster of PaVis, It7,000.

(S) ifydrographic charts, (9) Japanese place name map, It30,000,
She number of maps received were adequate, although it was necessary
to request a small number of additional maps during th- operation* The most
useful map received was the Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, lj 10,000. This
map would have been even more useful had it been more accurate. Doe to the
fact that it was made from photos which were taken more than four months prior
to Duday, a great number of buildinge, installations and even the nature of the
terrain had been altered or completely changed* This was particularly true of
configuration of HOTOTAKA AIB^nXD No* 2, In some instances, unit commanders
who were told to guide on a building shown on the map, found no building on the

tion (Cont'd)*

of photos Air and tomer

aly to its $
that additional
tranBlations ia Slavish of
r ^ i e f aap rocetrod wr cxcelX^t* value
60

It i*

#4
tvo to oae.

ft* J^pnaee plic aAffie map ^ p adequat4 It wotad have boen more raXuable in orienting l"0* until rplaood ty % captured Japanese map had It beon contoured^ and had OTO plsu^e name* -.''-.'-' been: ehown* /' . / . 1'V-. -' ' - (*) photo fcirnlolied %*tt>ve-*&$mm^ifa\', '. , / . tudea dovn to 5000 foot ver received In cuffici^nt quantatie. %i i s e timatod hovover# tnat apjffoximately fifty percent of tii^ photo received vare uselea* duo to cloud interf6rence, oxtretto. altitudo, or iatorforenc of. duet caused by bom^. Low level obliques of the beaches wre excellent but not Important7 due to the f<ict that this RCI did not land In the a98dti!lt Vertic&lo at 000 feet were excellent when clear # It i s reconffiiended thnt a larger amount of duplicate prints of clear photos at 5000 feet ot less be supplied so that all unit commanders down to and i n c i t i n g coapany comnandors f f ^ l ifck tfeilb^lit aay *% use ti "aw*p&ot^apiw ^hen grtdded to jaap# these photos -Iwrlf-pi^m to bo of extteise vfl3Lue# ^Rd vcre twed , ly by tM Bdl when aiiii!ible# the "irait^e of M31 photos would bo greatly. Sweated estiiaobXe nunty&r of hourt of wtk saved If tne ne^atiiren, We ^ridded respond with the "battle nap prior to printing the photographs. (a) Haps furnished during operation* Maps received during the operation included copies of maps previously distributed, captured map showing enemy units and uncaptured enr emy positions, and the V C road net map which were accurate and proved useful* A Captured Japanese maps were;useful# but It i s felt'that a greater effort should ^a made in this vein, since adequate reproduction by lower ech&Xons le difficult. The following features ftre desired? Information from captured inap should be '- transferred to maps or overlays with blue grid coordinates, and the Japanese map symbols should be translatedinto standard blue symbols* (A sample of the type of map needed i s appended.) Instances occured during the operation in which captured msps bf talue to this &3f wete onreildejiii V division ap parently because most of the area concerned l*y in the ZofA of adjacent units* Since the enemy had excellent observation from thd flanks4 particular*. ly when this BCf was in the vicinity of H W A A AI2FISU3 !To 3, information D TM of the enemy in adjacent 2& of A was of vital importance to this WE, in as
h 2.

n-vich as a great number of enemy flat trajactory weapons and mortars took this
RCT under fire from positions outside our ZofA. In another instance, this
Kq {&-Z) was informed that one captured map could not be oriented, Shis Ho.
(8-2) succeeded in orienting the, map in question and reproduced the appended
map mentioned above.

' / / '

Action Seport, IWO JXMATojperatioa (Cont f d)*

Maps of minefields reported, fire swept rear areas, areas ,
clear of mines should "be prapare^."by highest unit and widely districted daily,
It should cover, entire friendly area "because of the interchanging of zones due
to attachments and maneuvering.
(b) Photos furnished during operation!
Photos received during the operation were not satisfactory*
The majority of them" were "blurred, gray, unclear,1 and did not encompass the
desired terrain, The direction of flight was reversed, "being north to south
instead of south' to north, The type df photos needed were low level obliques
down the center of this RCTs ZofA and in the direction of attack. It is sug gested that one or two OY-ls under the direct control of Q~2 would rectify.;
this situation and would provide the type of photos requested by regimental
commanders, , Intelligence from
Intelligence disseminated by G*-2 during the operation was
adequate, although details of the enemy- situation ir?. Za of A adjacent to this
ROT were somewhat Lacking* Plash reports reached this headquarters promptly*
More translatirurj of capturacL documents and diaries are desired for general
information ^d general interest *,nd would be B definite morale factor to">fr':-" frent line troops, especially documents which ind1' ate %h&% the enemy is re ceiving heavy casualties, Front line tropa .h-ire no way of knowing how the
enemy feels or whether or not he is taking a beating* < In one instance a POVT .
t.dvealed' that our artillery was inflicting heVr/ casualties on the enemy where as many men believed.that our artillery was doin^ little more than confining
"^.s enemy to his caves. More translations wonla also contribute to the gen eral knowledge^ education and effectiveness of all troops, ' Many should be
miiDaographed and distributed down to platoons,
H, Recovery of captured enemy documents and materiel: ' ,
Ihe procedure set up for the recovery of captured memy documents
..ws and materiel...a 151 tie more than theoretical, due to the shortage of per
sonnet.' This would have been felt more keenly had the enemy abandoned'more
documents and. materiel. However, future operations may re eal a much larger
Quantity of materiel, and a system should be provided* The present system of
intelligence tosms has proven unsatisfactory* Had intelligence teams been
available it is believed that they would have been absorbed into line units as
thpy were in some instances during the GR3AM operation as well as during the
current one. It is recommended that G--2 organise a special unit, attaching
approximately 15-20 men to each HOT for temporary duty during an operation to
recover enemy documents and materiel! enabling this work to continue despite
the number o casualties in line units* Personnel from the 3& Sen Co*, made
available to this &GT -2, rendered Valuable a distance. Indoctrination of
troog* in the value and importance of turning in documents proved to have been
>: e*ffectivei and it is believod that, in most cases, documonos were ^e#^||5r*o covered and submitted, . ^"
It is generally known that a great deal of difficulty was encountered
in the collect}on of enemy rifles. It would be idea! if enemy rifles could be
authbriared as legitiiaate souvenirs, and quotas for same abolished,
raise morale inmmasurably and it is believed that It womld^rettult in the
recovery of more materiel by front line troops* But as long as quotas
tinue to be ordered, it Is believed that les* difficulty would Result if all
rifles are turned in untilvquotas are met* tt i-% recommended that responsin
bility far collecting enemy rifles during combat be placed In the sMvage sec**
'Ion, since that section recovers all types of enemy ordnance*
personnelf
officers were temporarily attached to this RCT* Their
were valuable and well used* Their willingness to go forward to ia terregate prisoners waa exemplary*
3

-1U

tion (Cont'd). five enlisted personnel vere temporallyattached to this HOT, one
In each 3f and two in regimental .headquarters. Two of these men were not ^
qualified graduates of the Japanese language School for enlisted men, and had
received only makeshift training which did not eaable*^hem to cope with some
of the language problems'encountered, although they were of great assistance
to BLTs as far as their knowledge of Japanese allowed* It is recommended
that an enlisted $angoage'mfca be assigned each rifle Co and promotions for.
certain enlisted personnel "be positively considered. It is also recommended
that more language personnel be procured frojfa the San IH ego Language School,
Ho Nisei were attached to this BC$, but their attachment Is desired*
6, Propagandas
In line with past .experience* propaganda proved effective generally
only after the enemy had been reduced to a desperate and hopelessly die*
organised situation*' In exception to this was the case of the Korean labor
troops, who showed a desire to surrender whonover possible. It was found that
individuals were disposed to surrender when isolated in caves* although,,they
were always fearful that they would thus meet a.more dreadful end than *
qiuek death in pat tie** . -.
The effectiveness of the vocal propaganda by the sound truck was
extremely limited by tne short cord attached to the speaker, A longer cord
;:MU enable the speaker to be carried to caves in terrain which precluded
the use of vehicles. It is believed that this phase of propaganda should be
e^rpiiasiaed even more strongly in future operations, together with the use of
]&.Uei> This Bl plans to continue school in pertinent Japanese phrases for
all troops, since tho mere knowledge of "kosan &eN tfas instrumental in o.ne
instance in coaxing Aaemy troops from a c^ve*
Written propaganda brought results in the final stage of. the
creation, Bnemjf troops who had seen surrender leaflets believed the state~
r.eitts contained in them, but seldom responded to their'appeal until the
situation had become hopeless, and then only in small numbers* The wounded
i*~re particularly vulnerable to propaganda urging surrender.

:
- ? JICPOA Team* . The only contact this KCT had with the JICPOA, team was the sotiftd
truck personnel, consisting of one Army officer -and several ITiseif. The sound
track was readily available except for one occasion"and operated well up toward
l-Le front, rendering valuable assistance, (See 6 % a>ove) #

Pi-ior. to, the operation/ill maps, photos and.,other, documents r** % yarding, the,|W0 J|H% Qjfrltti^n wejre closely* gu^r$e< and w^fre lAck^d in chests* V'bou not in use, Unlisted personnel whose work was necessary iiTtne planning at?.ges -were- stHctJy s^ervisei-and l indoctrin&ted f #* security ineasureW" I t WtdlieVed tha security-was strictly 4bs"erv4d in t h i r t(^ t lut in ^he^case"it f -he relief maps'!* unfortunately prevented sftffifientv time,for-thorough:in fctifth ^
t Va&'erotfr violations of shackling massages were noted during the
operation* plrticularl^on the $CH*3OO seV^
bersome" an&icaused delay and"errors, Tmt in spite of this it is; believed-.
i >.t serious consideration be given this poini" since enemy radio equipment
b>8 increased both \a number and quality, *&willrprobably continue to do so#
,. Xt^is suggested th&t the namfi of the targetvbe omitted from 9*11
ooapa and^ photos; an^r a number be, used. " This wo^d>\iminate^many hours work
* . . * . , .
spout insisting jfeh^fjf.naaiji.^ ' >;fcv^ H I)spite r^id.s^urity.measures"]Ln 4inis R0Tf information invariably
comes from oiher sources prior to an operatiba, * There are few concrete"
M'ggestibas -that this;RC!t can off er with tha One exception'of severe di*^ cxplinary measures against* of fenders, regardless of rank or status, although
c: pular periodicals seem "to keep the enem^r! fairly well posted* on'

t i e s , '- -^' ^' * . ' . * i*; ,

#?

Ion (Cont'd).
9, Snemy Tactics;
The outstanding fact about enemy tactics was'that lie fought the
campaign according to our defensive principles, augmented with an inherent dcv eire to maintain this defense to the last man* ?he absence of traditional
Banzai attacks was unprecedented,* Little el so can "be said about enemy tactics
p.nd it is generally agreed that the>enemy showed a keen appreciation of the
use of terrain and of defensive principles,
Enemy:'ruses encountered were of the same nature as previously en*
jcouaf-erod* In one instance an enemy wearing Marine clothing popped an aa*,..-,
bu.1 .^ e at night and shot tiie driver. One enemy faked surrender while covered
by ,c M n e guns which fired when our troops tried to capture the imposter,
4 I f e . is. enemy posing as dead were found covered with sand around a pillbox on
thr- northern beach, and fled when confronted with a flame thrower. Mines
/ivo:;::.* pillboxes had pull type ign3.ters attached, and c ould be detonated from
r " i ^ the pillbox with a wire attached to the Igniter. A small.unit tfhich
r^ ' tered to reinforce an outpost during the night encountered a group of
s : 6 on the way, Jollied six of them, and later found two more in'their column*
.. Hew ordnance encountered, included heavy mortars and rocket devices
of' v-Vious calibers*
10* Enemy Intelligence?
the enemy showed a marked increase In security measures* The fact
that comparatively few documents and no large dumps were encountered until
the "later stages of the operation is unprecedented, ITnemy commadd posts were
ajsparenvtly wi&ll policed before they were overrun by Blue troops* r
\.. Instances In which the enemy may have anticipated our action were
not entirely due to his intelligence organisation, but rather due to the fact
that he initially had excellent observation and that King hours were set for
approximately the same hour of the day and were preceded by approximately the
same type of preparatory fires* fhis developed to a point where the enemy
aay conceivably have withdrawn to his caves during the nigkti slept soundly
and waited for the morning barrage to awake him. Blue attacks were 8teretyped
and telegraphed11, Kore fake rolling barrages, Blue night activity, flanking
action* and changes in..the direction of 31ue attacks may serve to confuse the
;aemy intelligence officers*
<
C. Operations and training,
l t IJuring the operation this Hegt requested 500 1b delayed fuse bomis* ,
for bombing fortified positions. It was discovered t^hat no delayed fuse bombs
were available* When attacking a f ortified position where the enemy has had
the opportunity to build shelters and pillboxes, delayed fuse bombs are much
'more effective'* It is recommended that vhen p > ans require an attack on a
fortified position similar to IWt) JIMA delayed fuse bombs be made available*
? In the ease of planes it is also recommended that In order to
obtain maximum small arms fire effect,. greater penetration, and normal angle
Of Impact against the enemy In defilade, pits and foxholes covered or open,
the experiments be conducted in developing a unit composed of a number of 30 or 50 caliber machine guns to be mounted with guns fixed vertical in the
t>omb bays to fire verlcal, straight down, while the plane flys horisontally.
It is believed this would give a continuous moving pattern ar.cl be far more
effective thia?ttte long range short >urst now u s M is strafing, :

'.

-'

2. Shlp-to-Shore Movementj The Hegt with normal attachments and a large

number of small detachments of other division units were embarked aboard ships
of TransWv 32, Some difficulty was encountered, in landing the small'dotactw
ment8-from certain ships due to the fact that elements of1 these small detach- A
ments were embarked on more than one ship* It Is,recommended that all unite,
on every fhip, be g|rea a Serial number by Div at the time of preparing the
^ Organisation iirasx of the Embarkation Order*

43.

-----

if

tion (Cont'd)*
3* Tank*Inf Coordinationj On 2** #e* this Sect was scheduled to oontinue
the Atk, supported by tankt of "both the Uth ^nd 5th Divff. ill tanks were placed
wfc&er the control of the 5th. Div tank officer* Heavy tank casualties quickly
convinced him tfcat a large number of tanks can not be controlled or operated
effectively in general support against enemy infantry protected by mine fields
and AT guns, but must operate in small group* helped by, controlled by, and in
<Ureet support of small unite of friendly troops. It Is recommended that in
future operaiiont tank unite be attached to Inf Hegtt for landing and reassign ment t.o smaller units as the situation requires. This is also the only way
tanks can receive the proper reconnaissance data operating against fortified

p o s i t i o n * *
'

k* Demolitions and H a s e Throverst Demolitions and flame throwers

(portable and tank mounted). were used extensively with very good results. The
casualty rate of portable flame thrower personnel vat extremely higfr, 39* tank
mounted flaao thrower covered by the, infantry succeeded in reducing many fo rti fied emplacements under conditions that would have cost heavily in infantry
casualties, had the tank flags thrower not been u#c& It is reomm#ndod that a
pool of demolition awa and portable flae thrower operators be made arailabie
to replace casualties as required^ ot thoroughly train all infantry Iroops ift
the handling of demolitions and flame throwers.

1. Adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies*

(a) Class t (Stations).

* ' " . ' ' " '

(%) She amount and type embarked for the original mission was
sufficient. ,
(2) It is believed that the necessity for hat food or a hot
ration supplement to the landing type ration, even when supply routes are under *
fire, hat now >een recognised. It has been the policy of this Hegt to serve'
at least by B plus U, and for every dfljr thereafteir, hot Coffee and soae* fortt
of pastry until B rations become available. Hot only in this operation, but
previously, lard, which is essential to baking, has not been available in
sufficient quantity. It is recommended that a combat allowance of Six (6)
pounds per one hundred (100) men be embarked.
(3) fruit and fruit Juice was made available in sufficient
quantities during this operation for the first time. A recommended combat
allowance is a*-fallowet Forty (^0) pounds Of Juice per one hundred (100)
and twenty (20) pounds of fruit por one hundred (100).
(k) All men heartily endorsed the use of assault rations.
They are wll packaged. It is believed that a two (2) to five (5) day
allowance should be embarked and available for immediate unlftadin^ in addition
to one (1) ration carried by the individual* .
(5) The 10 in 1 ration was issued to units as they returned
to reserve areas, and under existing conditions, served as a>satisfactory
substitute for the B ration. * Due to the.grouping of men required in the front
line to serve this ration, however, it is not recognised as desirable for
front line distribution.
(6) The supply of heat.tabs vs more adequate in this operation
than previously. Hecommend amounts to be embarked are three (3) packages per
individual and a two (2) day allowance to be loaded by the' Hegtl Quartermaster.
(7) The new type 0 ration with its variety and more desirable
cosponents was a decided improvement.
(g) As previously recommended by this Regt, the post exchange
component should be eliminated as an item Of standard issue* The percentage
of shaving cream in the package is far too great in c omparison to the" recast
and actual consumption* Host men will use one bar of soap for both washing and

on, (Coat'dK

having. It i* estimated that seven (7) of every ten (10) tube* of shaving
cream, packed in PX components and delivered to the front lines, were never
opened* On the other hand, the amount of soap is not sufficient. It is
believed that as a more satisfactory answer to distribution and demand fr
these items they should be packaged in bulki In this manner a request for any
one of these items could be filled Individually.

W)

Claes II.

(1) jor the actual mission tf this regiment the general

supplies and equipment embarked was sufficient to support the operation. The
' following comments are submitted* however, for consider at ionJ
(2) the plywood packboards issued prior to embarkation were
not used* It is believed however, that they are a worthy addition to Marine
Corps supply but were not used during this operation for the following reasons:
(1) Terrain was not rugged in the sense of hills, cliffs, etc. (2) Relatively
short distances for hand carry (if hand carry wag necessary). (3) Men were not
educated to the use of this Item due to the short time they were used prior to
the operation. (*0 Transportation wes readily available. (5) Roads were re latively easy to construct throughout the $ofc*
(3) \kytter bags were embarked and were ueed only in assembly
arg*t It is recommended that they be dyed or manufactured In a black, brewn
or green dolor (outside).
(if) Mosquito nets* both head and cot, w^ra not required.
(5) A ten (10) or twenty (20) day complete ordnance cleaning
gear supiy should be issued to the Regt approximately (10) days prior to
embarkation in order that it nay be more readily available to the Regt. This
supply should in no manner be included in the allowance issued normally for
x
expenditure during the days prior to embarkation* (6) Hospital corpman knives should be deleted as an intrench ing tool. This tool is of little value to an Infantryman as an intrenching
tool and is invariably exchanged for a salvaged shovel er pi ck in the combat
area. Individual shovels or pick-mattocks should be substituted.
(7) On the basis of the past three operations it is believed
that the knapsack could be left in the base camp. The men have never been
able to uee this piece of equipment, because 6f the tactical situation, until
two (2) to three (3) weeks after the operation has started. To the seasoned
marine* it is merely a source of clean clothes, tn view of the past fact that
men cannot ^et into individual packs, it is recommended that the clothing
ordinarily packed.in the knapsack and tne knapsack bo "loft in the base camp
in the tea bag 4 (in this manner* if ft tUan il n Xtk or MlA his equipment is all
in one piece of bnggage). One uit of uiility, twe (2) pair of 4oe)ts, one
pair of shoes, one undershirt, and one drawers, in the re quo seed sizes, should
be issued to the Eegt^rior to embarkation* This clothing would bepackaged
in Wilson drums marked, and loaded a Regtl quartermaster cargo. Approximately
forty five (**$) drums would be rsquired to package this amount of clothing.
In this connection, a similar means might be devised on a smaller scale to
insure proper outfitting of casualties sent from snips to duty* The manner in
which marines were clothed for roturn to duty during the XWP JlUk operation
was not satisfactory. Sufficient salvaged equipment is generally available
in the combat area for issue but clean clothing is not*
(&) A new camouflage helraent cover should be adopted if it is
to be continued as an item of issuiu The cover is not satisfactory to adjust
and causes wear on the liner* Many liners are'worn, out by continual removal
of the lines' in erder that the helmet can be used for washing purposes.
(9) It is recommended that the legging should be cut down
about two (2) inches, or the boot, army type, be substituted for field use. ,
The present legging binds the muscle of %ho leg and causes numerous cases of
chaffing*, It is believed that is the logging was cut, a small, medium and large
sise only would be required to adequately meet the demands for sixes.

tion (Coat'd)*

(10) Shenow tjpe CP teat preved invaluable andwas * very

neeesisary and satisfactory addition to cemmand pott equipaent. folding b
are essential for efficient staff work. Xt is recommended that the 3dSttgr Bn
construct seven^ (7) simlX folding type tablet to,augment thepresent TO
allowance, Thsarmy type field desk is aery satisfactory forwee in the
combat w>ne* However, those now inuse are 'rejpic:/ becoming unserviceable
and should be replaced* ' - '
(11) Thewater drum used on this operation vat by far superior
to aay container of its kind previously used* To difficulties of rutting, ;
bad taste, or leakage were experienced,. Inaddition this container was ideal
*vo supply washing water in quantity tounits as they returned to reserve areas
for short periods of time during the operation* Inorder to reduce the rate,
of loss in transferring thewater from drums to various type containers, it* is
recommended that twenty five (25) 3 A iach fittings with fauoets be isetted
each Eegt prior toanother operation. (Jive (5)of these will beused in fuel
drums in theBBB). ,\

2,
1 abover . '

Adequacy $ (a) Ilefluprly was sufficient with the exception, noted in paragraph : ; ;
. ' . , " , ^ ' ' '" ' ;.

3#

Wilson Drums,

(a) It was found during this operation, that the Wilson Drum provided an excellent means cf transporting certain bulk type cargo and afforded a very satisfactory meant of storage and protection from the weather in the early stages of combat* It was used as a crnte in vr*ich i n i t i a l l y coffee and sugar, clothes, blanket!* and medical supplies ware loaded. The drum WAS even uead as an oven and set in a side-hill when field ranges wo, 3 not available*

k Salvage.

_ < ' , ' . . . / ' , . , .

(a) This iiegt carried cut extensive salvage operations. A s a

matter of infomation, approximately 120# more f*i*.psie^t andproperty was
salvaged on the IWD JIMA. operation than on the C A M operation* These results
were obtained largely because (1)Open terrain rather than wooded terrain
allowed property tobe easily seen, (2V Area over which trdopa operated was
limited and concentrated, (3)Transportations' alltypes was available on
call, W Esplacements were available asworking parties*

(b) The T does not provide for any salvage personnel in the O Inf Eegt ?md as a result, if salvage operations aro carried out they ar accomplished by working parties, when and if .available. This situation provides that salvage will be conductad only when working details ar available or when other tasks In the supply plan will permit i t . In order to overcome this i t is recommended that a salvage section be provided in the Service Plat TC (1+ I O 8 and 20 men), While av-iting approval of this change i t i s recommended that one (1) U O and twelve (IS) men from the Division Savage Section be ad C minlstratively attached to each Eegt prior to entry into a combat operation, 5, ' Transportation* / (a) The transportation embarked proved more than adequate for the assigned mission. In making future Y3HICL3S T B3 LIPPSD charts, consideration O must be given to the fact that one (1) truck, i ton (wire Jeep), aat be sub tracted from any total deciaed upon te be lifted by jach Inf Bn in order to figure the total organic vahiclos available f^r supply and evacuation of that ttatt* Shi* i s also true in the H S Co Inf Hegt which has two (a) trucks, i ten & (wire Jeeps),

Action lleT3orT,~iJ4 tt iJiation (Cont'd).

(b) It i s believed that a ton trailer should be available and be embarked behind every truck, J ton and ambulance, t *on of the Inf Hegt. An increase n Z% ton trucks does not alleviate front line suroly as such supply requires the use of ^ tra trucks and trailorsv (c) The cargo carrier M ' C proved an excellent vehicle for this 29 type terrain, 100$ of forward supply during the first five ($) days was via this carrier. Drivers have become better trained, tracs have now had time to "stretch" and become readjusted so that r,-, difficulty w* found in the functioning. It is believed that "if advanced information on any operation indicates there will "bo no rivsr crossings, the pontoons should be removed and left in the base camp. By actual experience, the Weazel with a one (1) ton trailer operated throughout the average terrain ancountsred with very * favorable results, however, i t i s believed t'hat the i ton trailer should bo jnsidered i t s standard trailer load. If the Weazel i s to be equipped with radio i t cannot be considered available as a vehicle for supply and evacuation. - (d) The method of loading flame throwers and reserve machine guns on one (1) ton trucks, weazels, and one (1) ton trailers worked most satis factorily. It is recommended, however, that separate weapons carriers (one (1) ton trucks or*I-| ton 6x6 trucks) be added to Bn TOs rather than using transportation belonging to another unit who may be requirsd to revert them for other tactical purposes. Until this change can be accomplished the present method of assignment to Bns is satisfactory, (a) It is recommended that the Inf Hegt be issued prior to the next operation one (1) tow line for each weazel and ton truck to be embarked. This tow line should be m\de of 3/8 inch cable with one (1) loop on each end, (f) Ones again in thi's operation the athey trailer was invaluable s ; to this Inf Eegt in the oxocution of the plan of -u; jiy and evacuation. Except in salvage operations, when the campaign was over, this vehicle was not used beyond tiie Regtl Train Bivouac, It was the only c^rgo carrying vehicle in the ear^Ly stages that could negotiate -iifye terrain Jfrom the water I>oint to the ETB, On one o.f i t s trips, during x^e ; Mupaign, i t was loaded with mortar ammunition, hitched behind one tanjk and pulled across the a i r field ITo 2 when that sector was linlsr heavy mortar and small arms fire. Throughout -tho first twelve (12) days i t was the ore vehicle which kept the ilTB supplied with large quantities of ammunition, water, and rations from tHe rear, (g) The vehicles embarked and the n m .r of day's battle employe uV ment are as follows: . . ......
ITo. 20 20 20 12 Truck, -|t on

Vehicle.

Ho Days Used.
22 22 21

Ik 5

Trailer, i ton Truck, 1 Trailer, 1 ton Carrier, C^rgo, H29C . Trailer. vratar Ambulance * i ton

23 23
20 22

(h) No vehicles ware lest in this Hegt. 6ns (1) one (1) ton trailer had Its axle pulled ofx the body while being towed across the beach by a tractor. One (1) ambulance body ^ a damaged beyond repair by mortar Ws shell. One (1) one (1) ton 'truck previously destined as a survey vehicles was worn out in service* -17

Action Beport, IND JJHA Operations (Cont'd).

( i ) It i s recommended that the body of the ten. trailer be rein forced to make It more sturdy. It l i further recommended that a t a i l gfite be x ovided in order that cargo may *e more easily loaded into the body of the trailer rather than lifted or pushed over the Bide, (j) Considerable work will be necessary to put the water trailer! in good condition* If extensive work cannot be completed they mast be replaced prior to another operation. Ho malfunctions or serious maintenance difficulties however, wore experienced with any piece of equipment. Duo to the much improved overall program established recently in the Division, a l l equipment undoubtedly was ; placed in bett'er condition than it had been prior to entry into any other operafci 6, Transport Quartermaster.
f

(a) From past experience and in the planning for the T O JIKA opera W tion, i t was found that ship's characteristics 1 and troop accomodations as far-, nishad were inaccurate, This lack of accurate information results in unnecessary changes in embarkation plans after the arrival of the ships. It i s recommended that, every effort be made by the "oigher echelon to injure that the ship 1 * charw acJ;erifltics as proyided, ba checked for accuracy prior to delivery to assigned unit (b) The T for an Irif Hegt does net provide for any trained enlisted O Q Tqil Pers for the actual preparation of ship1 e piany* Previously, T K Pers h4 been provided by the division T:. inaport Quartermaster to assist in this work* The preparation of landing plane lor the tVO JIM. operation was unsatisfactory and slow because of the lack of trained personnel ^ assist in the mechanical preparation of these plans. It is raquestad tha-u in the future enlisted Pers from the Division Transport Q^ttormaster Section be made available to assist troop HQJtV* in the preparation of ship loading plans. S. Medical, ^

* fc Smbarkation. (a) Two Medical Officers and one Dental pffieer plus eighteen Hospital corpsmen comprised the E ^ t l H?S Med Sec, One Medical Officer and ten Hospital c: coxpsmen boarded the jPiWj^. One Dental Officer and seven Hospital corpsmen bo trded the AJ?Ar49, One Medical Officer and one Hospital corpsman boarded the P18 ' (b) All Ifedical Pers were equipped with Hospital Corps TJnit #3, vhich
contained the required omergeicy medical sujnlies together with an additional
four units of Serum Albumin.
2, Aboard Ship,
t

(a) Onboard the iiPA-lS troop sick calls were conducted at OSJO'and -.
1530 daily by passenger Medical Officers and corpsmer., The majority of thie
troops were in good health and the sick calls % ^re light*

/ . . .

* (t>) Sanitary inspec ions of the entire ship ware conducted daily
at I03O. One Troop Medical Officer was included in the inspecting party. San itary conditions in general were excellent, with the exception of a few drinking
fountains which on various ocoar- icr.s could not be kept functioning, water was
available e-sewhere.
(1) Headss Drainage was inadequate at first, thus causing an
overflow a water on decks, th*u was corrected.
X2) Idving Qcuorters: Adequate.

.-
-IS

ition (Coat's)*
(3) Messes: Adequate*
(k) Galleys: Satisfactory.
(5) Cooks and Hossmen: Satisfactory*

(c) Special Precautions: Hone*

3* Debarkation.

(a) Personnel,
(1) Wave: Hot in assault phase,
(2) How boated: iiPA~19, all H&S lied ? era debarked in one beat,
together with Collecting Sec ambulance. A ^ A ~ 1 O , Segtl Surg and Chief Pharmacist
2'Iate in separate Eegtl 2rae Bor,ts APA-3*K *H ^e<i P^rs in -vegtl Tree Boats.
(3) Time of landing; A P A - I S - D plus 2, .*P-rt.-l<M> plu ^, APA-31* 3 plus 3,
. (b) Material.
(1) How transported: In ambulances, trailers and crates together
with quartermaster gear.
(2) Time of landing: One ambulance! L plus 3i other ambulances
and material intermittently for several days thareafter.
(3) How landed: Jeeps on LSH, other material under Quartermaster
-apervislon.
(c) Losses of Pers and material: Hone,
k, Ashore-*issault Phase,
(a) Medical Installations.
(1) When set up: tfpon landing D plus 2.
(2) Location with regard to:
(a) Eoads or trails: Bn and Eegtl Aid Stations wars located
in areas where jeep ambulances could reach them.
() CoverJ Bn and Eegtl Aid Stations were located in dug-*
outs, plane revetments, caves or other accessabla areas, offering best possible
protection from shell fragments and observation,
(jc) Dispersion: Each Bn the majority of the time, maintained
a forward and read Aid Station. Eegtl Aid Station w<-3 maintained in the Eegtl CP.
(d.) Other Med'Installations* Uo attempt was made to estab lish near other Ued. Tnstallatlons due to the fact thnV eont'ct was at all times
possible by jaep ambulances.
ie) Proximity to critical points: T:egtl Aid Station was at
all times established in the Eegtl CP.
(jf) Hatural line of drift of walking wounded: At one location
walking casualties w,;ra evacuated from the Bn Aid Station to the Eegtl Aid
Station. Bn Aid Stations were set up in the natural line of drift, which fac ilitated their care of wounded from their own units anddfrom adjacent units which
were evacuating along the most natural course to ihe rear.
(3) Protective measures taken:
(a) Local security: A daily watch was established in the
Hegtl Med Sec from 1900 to 0600.
(b) Cover: Camouflage nets were carried for both jeep ,
ambulances. Eegtl Aid Station was always^ established so ,aa to t^ke advantage of
all possible terrain coverage. , '
(c) Concealment; Eegtl Aid Station was always located in back
of an embankment or in a dugout. ,
(d) Shelters and dugouts: Tha protection of embankments or
bulldozer holes and concrete dugouts was used.

Action Beport, IfflD JIMa. Operation (Cont'd), (e) Blackout .precautions* A "blackout teat was used moat of
Light proof material was used over the entrances while in dugouts*
the time. (k) Any Special features or comments: Hone

(1) (2) Medical Companies and . (3) (k) (5)

Sectioning: Ho nvallafcle f a c i l i t i e s at the Eegtl Aid Station Adequacy: All hospitalization -as adequately handled "by the higher echelons. ' Equipment, supplies and Pers: Hone . Humber of patients: Hone. * . Operations performed: Hone,

(c) Evacuation. (1) How effected; By jeep airibulancd from 3n and Segtl Aid Station to the Beach Evacuation Stations. Upon establishment of Medical Company, a l l patients were evacuated there. . (2) Adequate* (d) Casualties treated, 3& MarDiv
(l) Humber (a) detained (b) Evacuated (e) Died of wounds (2) Type. (a) Chest {%) Head (jc) Abdomen (cL) Lower extremities (jg.) Vpper extremities (t) Concussion, Blast .
At H 8 . W

H&S 1st Bn 2d Bn
kl kOk 358 29**

3d Bn
U55

Total
1261*

10

35
2

35 365
k
12 11 98
9 1

63

45
1*07

7
78 31 91

3
10

153 1103 16
106 123

b k
18

53

35
i**3 117 125 221 238

25

kS 350
280

9
7
16 26

l]>99

57
119

359

(3) Walking Wounded (k) Stretcher Cases

18**

177

175

623

533

Casualties treated other than 3d MarDiv Pers. (1) Huraber (^) detained (b) Evacuated (c[) Died of Wounds (2) Typo. (a) Chest (b) Head (JB) Abdomen @ Upper extremities {o) Lower extremities (t) Concussion, Blast , "" Atraos (3) Walking bounded (k) Stretcher Cases

9
0 0

83 18

186 20

101 8

1*71

1*6

9
a? i 0

i$3
2 ik

156
10

92
1 11

teo
X3
8i* X8 105 128

58
22

19

23

I 3 3
1 8

6
23

?5

66
21* 61 122

**5 22
28 128

35
1**

Ik
1*1 60

63
131 318 2191.

Total number of casualties treated, al

-20

Action Jteport, I O JXU& deration (Cont'd). W

, (e) Sanitation,
(1) Special ifeasurefiit G m areas, heads, galleys, and tents were ap frequently sprayed with D T solution. D (2) yood: Field rations, C, K D, and* 10 in 1 were used prior to the last few days of the campaign,* when field galleys were established. Boiling water was available for mess gear sterilisation. Hot coffee was served twice daily after D plus 6. Doughnuts or turnovers that could be eaten without mess 3&? were served once daily. (3) Water: Originally supplied by ships until the 2ngrs estab lished a Water Point along the beach. Approximately 1 gallon per man per day was b a i l a b l e , Water was chlorinated at the source, . (f) Disposal of Dead* (1) Oar: Handled by Graves Hegistration. v (2) Enemy: Working details from combat units in the area, "buried
t'ie enemy dead. J

(3) Sanitary precautions taken: Before burial, bodies were sprayed with D T solution or Sodium ArSemite. D (g) Epidemics or unusual'diseases in t^rc-ps* None, (h) Dental Service* Unit #2* (l) H w and by whom furnished: Begtl Dentist,- using Held lied o ' " (2), Bumber of easest 9. (3) $y*Pe cases! Temporary f i l l i n g s . 0 0 Adequate. (5) Additional duties of dentisti Temporary relief of lied Officers
>

and Mail Censor. (1) Care of Civilians: None, (j) Prisoners of War, care of, (1) dumber cared fdr: 12. (2) Sow and by whom cared for $ Pirst aid treatments by Begtl / Surgeon and assisting Corpsmen. (3) location: Begtl Aid Station. ' {k) Type of, service rendered: jpirst aid. . (5) Evacuation of: Evacuated by jeep ambulance to Div Aid Station. () Adequate. (7) Diseases present: None noted, (k) Medical Organization. (l) Suitability of present type: The present type of medical organization i s well suited to render the required medical aid under combat renditions. The efficiency of the organisation could be improved by modifying ' " H o status of the collecting section. h \2) Suggested changes: Collecting section did good worlc in evao v';lng wounded from the aid stations to the beach or medioal companies by jeep ambulance. However the jeep driver "and a corpsman rider, did the work which Left the remaining twelve corpamen with l i t t l e .to do since they could not be used forward of the aid station. It i s suggested that the collecting section Crom the tied Co be reduced to three jeep drivers, with their rjabulcnces. The remaining thirty-nine corpsmen could be designated as a replacement group under B&gtl control to be used as needed when any of. the Begtl or Bn corpsmen become

ration (Contfd). casualties, It is further suggested that these corpeoen be made - available to the Begt at least thirty days /before combat for training with the troops in any dirties they might have to perform in combat. IPhiB would put them in "better physical and mental condition and would teach them how to care for casualties while at the same time talcing advantage of the greatest possible protection for themselves, (l) Medical Personnel* ^

(1) Adequate.
(2) Employments Satisfactory,
(3)bosses and replacements: Assistant Begtl Surgeon wounded and evacuated* Beplacement furnished " y 3^-th Bepl Draft, Bn Surgeon* 2d Bn 21st b jiegt remained on board ship and was replaced by a lied Officer from Co A 3d tied .3n 3Venty-seven- replacement corpsmen were received from H S 3d lied Bn. &
Stotal

'founded in Action f i l l e d in Action Concussion, Blast, Atmospheric Miscellaneous Total losses. Losses, replacement corpsmen;
y Yfounded in Action "Killed in Action , ( jncueeion, Blasts Atmospheric :d3cellane<jus

66
Losses, collecting section: 6 S 2 1 17 Wounded in Action 7 Concussion* Blast* Atmospheric 2 Ta ecus 9 Total Losses*. 15

.'otal losses

(k) State of training: Satisfactory.

(5) Specialties needed? JTone,
(m) Piold Medical" Squipmont.
(1) Proportion of allowance carried; 100^,
(2) Pilferage and loesoBt Hone*
(3) Adequate* inadequate and overage: Adequate except for blankets
and litters*
(k) Suitability of present type? Satisfactory.
(5) Improvements: Hone* . (6) Sesupply: Adequate when exchange of blankets and litters was
carefully done by all hands* but this system broke dawn partially when air
evacuation received the litters without replacement.
(n) Medical Supplies.
(1) Amount carried: field lledical Units v5-A (k), 5-3 (*0 6. .($)

7 (ID. 6 (k), 9 (10), 10 (k)t U-A (H)* 11*.B ik\> 12fr),13 (1),Ik (k), 15 (5).

17 (?), 19 (l). In addition the following items were carried:

Ten day replenishments...^*,... * 4
L i t t e r s , Metal p o l e , . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 5 Plasma ( u n i t s ) * . . , f . . . . . . . . . . ^
Serum albumin ( u n i t s ) * (2) P i l f e r a g e and l o s s e s ; ITone ' -.22 '

Action Seport, lW$mmBp4r&toa.

(Cont'd),

(3) Adequate, inadequato and overt^e; Adequate except for in sufficient amount of Serum Albumin and Brandy. (k) Resupply: adequate from 3each 3vac Stations f with the exception of Scrum Albumin and Brandy, (5) Adequacy of "block shipments: Hone in 3egt. . (0) Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock,

(1) Number and type carried: H&3 Co two jeep ambulances and one t r a i l e r , Sach Bn carried one jeep aabulance and one trailer* Collecting Sec carried three jeep ambulances. (2) Losses! Two jeep ambulances* (3) How utilized and maintained: 2vacuation of the wounded from 3n and Begtl Aid Stations. Maintenance under supervision of M Sec. T (k) Adeqtuacy: Adequate. (5) Improvements: A Weazel could "be used to evacuato over terrain which is too rough for a jeep ambulance to travel over* (p) Quartermaster Scuipment and Supplies. (1) Allowance carried: One blackout tent and three water p u r i f i cation unitsk ' . (2) Availability of: Jeep t r a i l e r . (3) Sesupply; Hone,
$+) Heclothing of patients: Hone4
(5) Ade-uate or inade<-uate : Ader?uate 1 (6) Suitability: Suitable, ' (q) lialaria and Spideiaic Control 3nuipment and Supplies. (1) of insect repellent (2) (3) (5-) v (5) Amount and type carried. Sach 'r-dividual carried two bottlos v and l/2 can of D 2 powder prior to combat, B? How usedt By* individual on clothing and body, Availability of: General issue, plus resupply, Losses: Hone.
Suitability of present types; Suitable,

^.$ Ashore - After coopletion Assault Phase. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) tion: Hone. 6# Secommendations: Change status of collecting section from the medical company as suggested in paragraph l+(k)(2). 7m Signal, ... 1. Communication Plan,
, (a) SChe communication plans were ret dved by lower echelons in suffi cient time to permit study, criticism and make necessary chants. The policy, of
freouent meetings of communication officers for discussion of Signal Instructions
prior to final compilation reduced greatly tho necessity for last minute changes
in the order,
2. Smbarkation and Voyage,
-23 Hospitalization: Established by higher echelon. Hedical aid Quartermaster supplies and eouipment: Adeouate, Saiitation: Controlled by daily sanitary inspections* Food and water: Aderuate. Sickness-*Spidemic o^r unusual diseases in tx-oops or native popula

tion (Cont*d). (a) All items of signal equipment, including vehicles, were loaded according to plan, o (b) N equipment was damaged during the process of loading, (c) .All items such as storage "batteries \vcro checked prior to landing, and a l l communication vehicles were started pricr to debarkation to test ignition system and oil pressure. W X & (d) School on the enemy situation, terrain features of I O J M and information on flanking units as well as the proposed glans of Atk for R T 21 O was given to a l l Pers. .Additional review on the SOI and shackle cipher was given as needed. 'Jill Pors were "brief od on call si^ns and frequencies of own and adjacent u n i t s . * (e) Marine Pers wore of assistance to the 3hip ! s communication officer. i l l incoming messages for C troops were routed and distributed " y 1CT 21 message O b ! centers. .Marine radio pers manned voice circuits in the ship s radio room when called^upon lay the -ship's communication officer. Code clerks aided in the de ciphering of coded messages addressed to C Embarkation Group. O 3. personnel*

creased.

(a) ! h number of wire and radio Pers in an Inf 3n should " o in Ee b The number of Pers in Hegt K i s satisfactory. c

(b) Uho number of wire Pors in an Inf 3n should be increased by three to auguaent the present personnel in the Slmm mortar platoon. 2ho muabor of radio Pers in an Inf Bn should be increased by four to f a c i l i t a t o echeloning of a Bn C with the additional f/U equipment in the / P (c) Training of Pors w a adequate. <s (d) K special training other than normal is necessary. o (e) H T 21 embarked short tho follovring percentr^e of Pers: ilsg Cen C - 10$, Wire Pers - 15& Hadio Pars ^ (f) losses of Pers aboard ship before lending: One ( l ) B^.d Op (776)t Ship^s Hospital.

pleted:

Loeees of Pers in pori<*4 after lpr:,iag m t i l operation coaOfficers Msg Cen Wire Hadio
XIA 2 1

WIA
1
20

16

(h) H loss of Pers in effecting landing. o (i) H communication Pcrs were employed for duties other than o communications. (j) Battle casualties vere reported to Div Sig 0 who arranged for temporary attachment of communication Pers from Div, JASCo units, and Corps separate wire platoons as needed.. U. IBquipment. .

(a) Overages and shortages of major items of

Action. Report,

ion (Cont ! d). 2 Wire jeeps - short. 2 TCS (mounted in weazels) - over* 1 SCB.61O - over. .
5 SCR 300 - over.

(b) $ o equipment was lost aboard ship "before landing. T (c) Losses of equipment in effecting landing: TSX BC-5 BL-27-B 2 U 3 . . *

(d) losses of equipment in the period from after landing until operation completed? SCR 536
scs

- 16 . - 10

3 0 0 - 3

(e) The equipment (design and-nudity) was suitable'for the task to "be performed with the exception of the connection in the handset of the SCR 300. (f) It i s roconmended that the cord to the 3CB 3^0 handset "be secured within the handset to' avoid strain and frifetion on the .lead-ins which causes them to "break and short out. (g) It is recommended that each Inf Bn Communication Plat "be pro vided with one weazel (TCS equipped) as a u t i l i t y car^o barrying vehicle and alsjo as a Mobile Hadio. In sanay or swampy terrain tnese vehicles are in valuable for moving signal supplies. ;*' (h) This organization made use of sevoral typos of equipment which i t |?ad never used in action before. B/M radios (SCH 6OS-6IO) v/ere used from Bn to Begt and Bogt to Div. These radios gave extremely.satisfactory operation for 'the duration of the operation with a minimum of maintenance. SCR 53^ radios were used for the f i r s t time for platoon, to company communication and though often blocked by unsuitable terrain and short range limitations they did provide excellent communications at times. Switchboards B &9 an& 3D-97 1 -& were also used by the organisation for the f i r s t time, and because of tho extensive use of telephone communications on the operation greatly speeded the handling of c a l l s . (i) Ml radio vehicles* and radios not landed in waterproof rubber bags were thorughly watprproofed.. The heavy duty generators were ^removed from the radio Jeeps and inserted in waterproof rubber bags and reins tailed on beach. !Sho vehicles were waterproofed in the manner prescribed by Div WO. The radios were completely waterproofed with asbestos grease, varnish t masking tape and waterproof paper. This waterproofing was 100$ effpetive. TCS radios^ mounted in weazels and switchboards 3D-96 fmd 3D-97 were used though not included in T/A. The radio weasels were used in echeloning Bsgt CP forward over soft and undesireable terrain and to hasten the delivery of communication gear to tho lower echelons. The BD-96-97 Swbd was used in the Hegt communication platoon to speod" tho handling of phone c a l l s . Because of the short distances involved wire conounication was emphasized and the added Swbd f a c i l i t i e s became a necessity.

tion (Oont'dK (k) All signal equipment authorised by tho T/A with the exception of lineman's equipment K S L was used to good advantage* Terrain features and 3M lack of vegetation prohibited the installation of estensivo overhead l i n e s . 5* Supply. (a) Complete allowance of signal equipment was taken into combat by this organization. (b) All.equipment taken with the exception of lineman!s equipment*
was used to good advantage and aided in the rapid installation and effective
maintenance?of the various channels.
(c) The inability of small boats to land initial replacement gear immediately made the supply of batteries and combat wire critical in tho initial stages of tho operation; however, this matter was rectified and supply then con tinued in a satisfactory manner. (d) No changes in replenishments rated\axe necessary. (e.) Bo-supply of items of signal equipment was handled through a Eegt Com. dusip. Sach Inf Bn communication storeroom keeper remained at this
dump and located and moved all Bn gear arriving on the "beaches to this durapv
Bns would call on this dump for supplios as needed andf i f available, i t Would*
be Immediately dispatched. If not available efforts would bo made to procure
such.items from higher echelons to issue or store at tho I^gtl dump and issue
as called for. This system worked very effectively since a minimum of gear
i n i t i a l l y w?.s distributed as needed to give the maximum use in.Jtogt.
(f) (l) All Div repair f a c i l i t i e s were available to the Begt. (2) They were used extensively whenever the need arose. (3) All types of radios as well as telephones and Swbds were
efficiently rcpairod by tho Div repair soction and rc-usod by the Begt.
(Q) Equipment spare'parts were not Carried with the equipment lEhcsc items-wore pooled at the Div r^air soction and there used to their fullest . advantage. . 1 (h) Those spares were presumably adequate sinco all gear wn.s repaired and re-issued,
1

(i) Sufficient spare parts other than equipment spares were available.

(j) Though this JSegt was two (2) wire jeeps short tho use of wc^zcls and a one (l) ton trucfc as woll as jeep trailers and a ono (l) ton trailer made the transportation of signal equipment ontiroly adequate. (k;) It i s recommended that a ono (l) ton truck bo added to the vohiele allowance 'Of each Itegtl communication platoon* and that each Bn commun icatibn platoon be issued one weazel equipped with TCS radio for transportation of signal goarv and mobile C use, P 6. Operation. (a) All normal agencies of communication were established. (b) Wire wf\s tho most overloaded agency of communication. possible.
*

(c) To counteract this overload wire lines were duplicated as much as A BD-96 JI& 97 was installed at Begtl C? and e^h Bn was furnished an -26

Action R e p o r t X#tfraCi*C#erat5 on (Cont>&).

additional BD-72* Forward Switch Sta-tions were established to handle the addi tional company lines where necessary. Pertinent staff sections were informed of the proper uso of the message center and available radio channels to relievo the stress on wire communications. (d) Thcro was no unnecessary duplication of agencies during this
operation.
(e) The Bn C \1 frcruoncies assigned to this Begt wore not used, necessity for this channel of communication arose, * H o

(f) (l) Difficulties encountered in radio communication: I n i t i a l l y the supply of "batteries was very c r i t i c a l since the rough surf prevented rc eupply for a period of three days after landing* Lack of complete Signal Operating Instructions for the ^th and 5th liar Divs also caused difficulty prior to the attachment of this Begt to the 3d Mar Div. Vehicular radios were not able to land immediately, and equipment was not available to change the crystal settings of the S R 6lO radios to enter tho Corps and Uth Div 3 / nets. As eoon C TM as proper equipment was landed this situation Was rectified* At Various times the F/H radios were "masked" by unsuitable terrain'features* but this situation did not become c r i t i c a l due to the short range and the fact that a short move nont of the set would allow the incoming signal to be heard, With the three Marino Divisions on the line the number of stations on each S R 536 frequency C restricted the handling of messages by this agency at many times, (2) Difficulties encountered in wire communications: Wire communication was disrupted often by tanks and bulldozers tearing out the linos in the forward areas. Because of tho lack of vegetation, it was impossible .to overhead a l l lines, though lance poles were used whenever possiblo for this purpose* (3) H difficulties were encountered in visual communication, o (Q-) N difficult!os wore encountered in wire communication, o (g) Communication difficulties were encountered in this operation that were not encountered in previous operations. These difficulties Can be attributed "in the most part to the complete lack of vegetation on the island rhich would not allow for normal overloading of wire lines, > (h) On'20 ?eb this Eegt was boated and prepared to land on order. wTdcrs were received from LP to reembark the Begt on respective ships, C of I O this Regt experienced considerable difficulty in sending this order to his subordinate units as his S R 3^0 frequency was being used by tho iiDCls staff C Tor the,purpose of sending a very lengthy routine message encoded in p, code not hold'by the Rcgt. It is recommended that in the future S R 300 frequencies C be used for tactical transmissions only. (i) H officers wore roruircd to opera/be or maintain any agency of o communication because of enlisted casualties, (j) A small number of enemy communication installations wore captured. I'lifc eruipment from these was immediately turned in to Div Signal Company. (k) This Rcgt wax not boated in amphibious tractors so communication to them was not necessary* (1) Methods used in this operation for Inf-Hk communications with tanks from the 3d liar Div were as follows: An S R 300 w~s mounted in a l l command C tanks for the purpose of entering the Inf Bn S R 300 nets to receive ordors and C pass information. The tank company sent a liaison SC3. 510 jeep to the Bn C to P which attached to provide direct contact with operating tanks. The tank telephone was used whore possible, and arm and haad signals were also used on occasion.

'

-27

tion (Coat*d). 7. Oporation In Ifead-uartcrs Ship: This Bcgt was not ombr.rked on a hoad uarters ship for this operation, howevert use was made of available* ships communication to enter various retfuirod radio nets upon arrival in transport area. The ship*s visu-1 system, and two SCR 608 f s wcro made available "by tho ship's communication officer and the Bogt furnished an additional T X and two B $CR 3QOfs* I*10 commanding officer, executive officer and conuminication officer were given accoss to a l l the ship's Ejossage f i l e s and included on the routing of a l l pertinent messages. Pile oopioB wore furnished if desired. After do-^ barking of troops ah SCR 300 was loft aboard th... ship to communicate direct to .Bcgt until unloading was completed. 6. Security and counter measures by tho enony.

(a) Oryptographic aids used were the Shackle-Humeral Cypher, tho Joint Assault Aaphibious Code, and llavajo Talkors. (b) Tho present cryptographic r?,ids ' seem*sufficient to haadle a l l messages of the lower echelons. (c) Tho shacklc-authcnticator was used and proved entirely offoctivo* (d) Uo attempt, was made by tho enemy to uso our authonticator system. (o) Communication personnel wore sufficiently trained in signal security though other Pors having access to direct phono conmxrications or voice r did* transmissions did not in a l l cases exercise security in the proper manner.
* . .

(f) I t i s rocommended that a l l staff soctions be thoroughly trained in signal security and that messages be roloasod by prodesignatcd officers only whenever possible. ' , (g) OTiis Bogt had a "Signal Socurity Plan" in accordance with 3d Mar Div General Order ITo 13^^5 and current SOD. (h) though enemy transmissions were heard 't various times, few attompts at actual counterEioaaiiroB occurred. Snemy did attenipt to transmit messages in English on the Begtl SCR 3OO net on three differ^.it occasions. (i) Sncmy attempts to send false messages using other station's calls caused no damago sinco station actually holding call imnodiatcly denied trans mission* and use 01 station authonticators cleared net. These attempts to enter not were reported to Div Sig 0 and Intelligence Section, * (j) It is recommended that the Marino Corps Snemy Counter Measure
Course bo continued and prescntod to Pcrs at least every sis months. This
course is complete enough to eifcctivoly instruct oper vtors on action to bo
taken upon encountering enemy interference and how to overcome it
9. Summary.

(a) This Segt embarked for tho operation from 10 to 15 porcent under strength in Pors* It i s recommended that a l l communication soctions be embarked at least 10 percent ovorstrength in the future. This would provide replacements for casualties onrouto, as well as trained replacements for key Pers injured in combat. The failure to give full distribution of other Divisions Signal Orders to this Bogt caused difficulty when this Bogt was landed as Corps Reserve prior to r-*attachmcnt to 3d Mar Div.

Ion (Cont'd) (b) I n i t i a l l y the rough surf made supply of communication gear difficult "but upon arrival of the 3d Sig Co became efficient and worked ex ceptionally well for the duration of the operation, The forward echelon of the Division repair section Imdod shortly after this Bcgt ?iid provided oxcollont repair f a c i l i t i e s to this ization subsequent to that time. It i s recommended that this policy be contin ued in the future and if practicable a snail,ccholon of Div repair section with sufficient gear bo landed with each 3CT to revert to parent organization upon i t s arrival at "beach at a l a t e r time. Subbor bags B - 16O and 3G- l6l were used G extensively by this RCT r.nd proved invaluable for efficient hmdling of fragile communication gear which was susceptible to moisture .datiago, The apparent duplication of call signs between the radio call of the'3<13Ei 28th Marines and tolcphono exchange code name of this organization caused some confusion and delay through inadvertant misaddressing of messages by the sender. It i s recommended that pers who carry SC3. 300 radios be armed with ITS Govt.^5 caliber p i s t o l . It is further recommended that 50$ of wire Pers also be equipped with a US Govt.^5 caliber pistol to provide a maximum of protection while engaged in climbing trees and telephone polos to overhead wire lines* . !Eho short distances involved in this operation nado for particu larly , desire able communications to be affected in practically nil instance s. Badio content was n<?antainod constantly aid with but few exceptions i t was possible to keep wire lines intact. 0, Additional Goaments. 1. Assignment of replacements during actual ongagoments in highly desireablo, howcvcrt the system used in the recent operation leaves much to be desired. It i s believed that better results would bo obtained if replace ments wore assigned to Inf Begts prior to departure for an operation, piciked up by such Hegts administratively, trrined by the Bcgts, and, prior to an operation* formed into pioneer units on temporary duty, for shore party duty. 5his system would give- the man v i t a l l y required training to prepare him for strenuous operation, would eliminate the mass of administrative do flail which i s extremely difficult under combat conditions, would f a c i l i t a t e and expedite assignment of replacements in combat, md would eliminate the foreign feeling which seriously detracts from a replacement ! s combat efficiency. BART V, Conclusions and recommendations. Stecommendations have been made as each subject was discussed, there are none remaining fn conclusion, *

-T.29

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION.

TWENTY.-FIRST MARINES, 3D MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELD,

4MHASSIF
Map; PART I* SUMMARY *

6 A p r i l , 1945. ACTION REPORT

Special Air and Gunnery -Target, i s l a n d of IWO JIMA, Scale 1:10,OOO.

A. This report overs the a c t i v i t y of t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n from 29 Jan 1945 to 26 March 1945,

B,- Essential features of t h i s organization's p a r t i c i pation in the Iwo Jlma operation are as follows: 1* Embarked aboard USS PRES, A A S (APA 19) on DM IB F*b 1945. 2. Sailed from G A for J-WO JIMA on 16 Feb 1945. UM 3. Boated qn 0 Feb 1945, but did not land* Re~ embarked aboard ADAMS on 20 Feb 1945, 4. Boated and landed (administratively) on Beach Y L O 1 at 1230 on 21 Feb 1945 (E/2)* EL W 5. Engaged in f i r s t action on 22 Feb&945. Effected a passage of l i n e s of 2'^d Bn 24th Jlar at 1205 and continued Atk through remaining daylight hotfrs of 22 Feb. Continued Atk at 0730, 23 Feb and fought throughout the daylight hours. Passed throu^di by
3d Bn 21st Mar at 0915, 24 Feb. This Bn committed*to
Regtl Res on 24 Feb at 0915 and remained in the status
/ o f Regtl and Div Res u n t i l 28 Feb* Anti-sniper patroi l i n g and mopplng-oip Opng conducted during t n i s period. 'Engaged in second action on 28 Feb. Effected a passage of l i n e s through 2nd Bn 9th Mar at 0815, afl& continued the Atk throughout the daylight hours of 2& Feb and 1 March* A and B Cos withdrawn from l i n e s and com~ mtttea to Regtl Res at 1700, 1 March* C Co remained in position on l i n e s during; night* Continued Atk on 2 March, and fought throughout the daylight hours. At 1745, A and B Cos committed to Hdgtl Res. C. Co remained in position on front l i n e s untij. 0530, 3 March, when also withdrawn to become part of Ref?tl Res. Bn re-committed to Atk at 13OO 3 March and fou#it through out the regaining daylight hours of 3 March and through-* out 4 March, ' Bn withdrawn from l i n e s rat 0500, 5 March. Replacement Pere received and reorganisation conducted during remainder of day. Effected passage of l i n e s of 3d Bn 21s.t Mar at 0900, 6 fcarch and Attacked through.* out daylight hours. Continued Atk throughout 7, 8 and 9 March. Patrols reached water's edge on NE Ccast at 1400 on 9 March. Activity throughout 10,. 11, 12, JL3, 14, and 15 March consisted of patrol a c t i v i t y and j&opplng^up Opns along NE Coastal Area, v Effected passage of l i n e s of 3d Bn 7th Mar a t 0715 on 16 March, and attacked toward North Coast (KITANO ST). Water's edge reached by 1130 by patrols and in strength by 1400, Hopping^up Opns conducted through out 17 March* Bn idthdrawn to rear area at 0800, 18 March, and coRuucted p a t r o l l i n g and p o l i c i n g Opns in ass.i^ne<3, patrol area throughout 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25. March. Reembarked aboard ship on 26 March and s a i l e d from I O JIMA for Gf M on 28 March W tA 1045 at 1230. Arrived G A 1 A$>rll, commenced un~. UM loading and dla&abarking at 0800, 2 April. Completed unloading troops and cargo at JLSOj >.* ^age 1 of 27

SuigW<ntliil"#fTl.Pi*RT I I . PRELIMINARIES.

Action Report. \. . . '

v f

A. At time of engaging in f i r s t aotion f t h i s Bn consisted of a BnHq C embracing an 81mm Mort Plat,'A o m

and Pion P l a t , Com P l a t , Med Sec, HqSec* andBn Hq, and
three Rifle Cos. each consisting of a Co HqSec, 3 Rifle
Plate, a M TP l a t, anda 60ma Mort SecQ This Bn was C organised andequipped i n accordance with MC.TO F6.
* . ' . '

B. A c t i v i t i e s o f t h i s Bn after mission Was assigned (29 Jan1945) andthe beginning o f the f i r s t action (22 Feb 1945) consisted of a final; check of a l l equipment* completion of plans for Opn, movement to Target Area, and subsequent landing a t 1W0 JI&A* A l l major training had been completed prior to 29 Jan. C. ( l ) Copies of Unit Journal, Unit Reports are appended hereto. (2) Refer to Overlay on Map attached for sequence of p o s i t i o n s occupied by t h i s Bn at close of day when committed to action with enemy. Dates are l i s t e d opposite p o s i t i o n s occupied. PART I I I , CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION. A* Herea&toy"#eai9AtfB & narrative f t h i s Bnl|S~ a c t i v i t i e s during the actlonY ashore at IWO-JIMA./ Refer to Map or Overlay attached for sequence of p o s i t i o n s occupied by thxs Bn during Opn* 21 FEB 1945 'I f , ' / y

At 0930, all troops infirst trip ofboats had

been boated* This Bnstarted landing on Beac^ YELLOW 1
at1230. By1600, all waves were ashore and Bh was in
Assembly Area at 148-E (See Map orOverlay). At approx*
imately 1600, warning order was received to the effect
that this Bnwoiild gxeoute a passage of lines of 2nd Bn
24th Mar the morning of 22 Feb. Reconnaissance was ex ecuted byBn C.O. in preparation for this passage of
lines. Anoral order was i^su'ed by the BnC O . to Co
Comdrs and Stf upon his return to the Assembly Area,
and reconnaissance was conducted by CoComdrs in so far
as possible, prior todarkness. Surf conditions were
favorable to the landing, but rain fell during the after noon and nltfhtt The temperature was considerably lower
during the nlght| than the troops.were accustomed to.
22 FEB 1946 Bn moved from Assembly Area commencing at 0530. Guides sent from 2ndBn 24th Mar. At 0830, G Plocated at 165-G in revetment #2 (from South). Troops moving into p o s i t i o n . A C on ..right, B C on l e f t , CCo in Res. o o Passed throughQnAi'^ g^th.^lar at 1205^ Atk-inove{L^, extremely, slowly, due to; numerous p i l l b o x e s and emplace- ' / ments encountered, Atls; halted and front l i n e s consolidated for ni^ht a t 1800. Front l i n e s a t 182^V,W Southwest to Northeast cortferB. No enemy activity'during hours of darkness. , I j I 2 3 FED 19 4^ . .

f v'v

B n received orders to A t kat 0430, orders to b e

Page 2 of 27 Pages.

Subject:*niWir,IIJp

Action Report*

('Contf d)

executed at 0730* Jumped off in Atk at 0730, but were unable to advance due to extremely heavy resistance from right flank. At 1330, main resistance had been reduced and Bn was able to advance slowly. At 1730, Atk was halted and consolidation of positions was initiated* ^ At 1830, consolidation was completed and Bn had tied in on both flanks. Front l i n e s at 182-K (center) > ft (south center), R and S (south). No enemy activity during^the hours of darkness. 24 FE3 1945
3d Bn 21st Mar executed a passage of our lines,
at 0915. Orders received to remain in position prepared
to support 3d 3n. Mort Plat in direct support of 3d Bn,
Engineer Plat detached and reattached to 3d Dn, Passage
of lines completed, at 0915* Am, w^uer, and rations
carried forward by A Co* I3n completed resupply by 1330.
At 1515, orders received to alert two Cos, one to stand
by at present location (3), one tj proceed to Regtl OP
(C) immediately* Complied with at 1546* A Co Issued
warning order at 1545 to be prepared to man Regtl Res
Line. At 1600, second Co (B) ordered to proceed to
182-L. At 1730, both B and C Cos in Assembly Area at
18~L prepared to resist oounter-attack. At 1830, C Co
manned secondary (RRL) defenses at south end of Airfield
#2. Cos remained in these positions throughout the night.
No enemy activity during the hours of darkness* B and C
Cos attached to 3d Bn.
25 FEB 1945 '

At 0600, B and C Cos s t i l l attached to 3d Bn* At 1145, orders received to i n s t i t u t e anti^sniper patrols* 3 and C Cos reverted to 1st Bn at t h i s time* A Co fur nished above p a t r o l s . Patrols i n i t i a t e d at 1210. Patrols, secured at 1415 on receipt of orders to stand-by on 30 Mlns notice* At 1630, orders receive^ to* man Div Res Line* Complied with by 1730* 3 Co on r i g h t , A Co on l e f t , C Co in Res. No enemy' activity throughout the hours of darkness. 26 FEB 1945
At 0730. all Cos returned to Assembly Area*
Carrying Ptys carried forward two uoaXe nZ* rations,to be
put in pack. Coffee served at 0800 -In. Assembly Area. No
other activity until), coffee carried forward at 1500* Bn
alerted at 0900 to 30 Mins notice, Orders received at
1000 to have Bn prepared to move at 1200. Bn in state
of readiness to move at 1200* Notification received at
1400 that n.o- movement Indicated afr that time. No further
orders received by 1630. At 1700, orders received to
establish Dlv. Res Line on same ground as on the 25th*
At 1815, B Co*-in position on DRL* A and C Cos in Assembly
Area, due to .3d Bn occupying position of DRL assigned to
us. No enemy activity throughout the hours of darkness*

27 FED 1945

At 0730, 3 Co ordered to return to Assembly Area*

At 0830, Bn in Assembly Area prepared to support the Atk
of 9th Mar, if ordered. At 1045^ the'"
I age 5 of 27 Pages*1

Su

Action Report
attached to 2nd Bn 9th ^ar. At 1900, Bn~6 and Bn~5 called to Duplex C and issued warning order in pre P paration for a passage of l i n e s of 2nd Bn 9th Mar at K-Hbur on 28 Feb. At 2130, Bn~6 and Bn-*5 returned to Red G and Bn-6 Issued orders to assemble Co Comdrs P and hnOSm No' further a c t i v i t y during hours of darkness. 28 FEB 19'4&

\ \

Bn' started"moving into position to effect

passage of lines of 2nd 3n 9th Mar at 0600. At O8O0f Bn
was in position. At 0814, 3n moved forward and effected
a passage of lines of 2nd i3n 9th Mar at C815. After
moving forward for only a short dis canoe (approximately
100 to 150 Yds) both assault Cos were stopped and pinned
down by extremely aeavy fires from all types of Japanese
Inf Wpns. These fires were delivered from caves, pill**/
boxes, trenches and dugouts. No further advance was,
made prior to 1800, although constant aggressive action
was taken to effect a penetration of these positions.
At 1800, the left flank Co was tidd in solidly with
the unit to its left, but a gap existed between this Bn
and the unit to our right (3d Bn 21st Mar). Bn Res
consists of one Rifle Plat. By 1845^ the gap existing
between this Bn and the unit to our right t3d Dn 21et Mar)
had been closed, and the lines were tied in sol idly#
There was sporadic enemy fire received during the hours
of darkness, andvseveral small skirmishes

1 MARCttl94&

At 0830, the 3d Bn 9th Mar attacked from the

Vlght across our front. This Bn, fist Bn (ELst Mar) con**,
ducted mopplng^up Opnp throughout the day, clearing5
those pockets, cf resistance which had been by~passed
by 3d 3n 9th Mar. At 1600, this Bn was relieved by the
3d Bn 26th Mar on the lines, and orders weve received
to be prepared to man R$gtl Res Line 0? the night.
At 1730, C Go was relieved and ordered to the rear.
At"1800, confirmation of orders to man RHL had been
received, but Bn had not yet movefd into position. At
1900, A and 1 Cos were'in position on RRL, with no
3 contact to either flank. C Co had been detached to
2nd Dn 21st Mar and was canning right flank positions
on front lines. There was no enemy activity during the
hours of darkness, but sporadic fieiy and'Mort fire was
received.

2 M R H 1945 ' AC At 03001 orders were received for the continu ation of the Atk to 0-3,. with one Co in assault, others echeloned to the right rear. At 0800, 3n jump eel off in Atk, but after advance of approximately 150 Yds was held up by very heavy M, AT Yln, and Mort f i r e at southern edge of Mo toy ama Field #3. All attempts to cross t h i s f i e l d were stopped;by t h i s same f i r e . At 1530, the 2nd Bn 21st Mar attacked from our l e f t 'front, and across our front, and succeeded in pushing well forward. This Bn conducted mopplng-up Opns behind 2nd Bn. At 1745, orders received to leave 0 Co in position on southern edge of f i e l d and place A arid 3 COB on RRL to the rear. Thes$ orders being complied with at 1800> At 2030, A an&B Cos wer< age 4 of 27 I ages.

Action Report.

(Cont'd).

on RRL (217~X,Y). There was# no enemy activity during

the hours of darkness, but sporadic Mort and Arty fire
# ' . ' .
was received, 3 MARCH 1946
At 2400, orders "received to withdraw C Co from
front lines to RRL prior to daylights Orders complied
with by 0530. At 0330, Engineer Plat i^elea^ed to Co
B 3d Engineer Bn. At 0030, orders received to hold Bn
in Assembly Area at 217~X,x as Div Res. Bn in Assembly
Area and standlng-by for further orders at 0800. At
1300 (approximately)| orders were received to Atk
toward Hill 862 (219-U) and secure the'northern slope.
Bn Jumped off at 1530 in Atk. By 1730, left Co had
advanced approximately 350 Yds and right Co approxi mately 250 Yds. At 180O> Bn was starting to consolidate
positions for night. By 2000, Bn had tied in left flank
with 2nd Bn 21st Mar, but clld not have contact with
3d Bn 9th Mar to right. A gap of approximately 150 Yds
existed between this Bn and 3d Bn 9th Mar. This gap
was covered by fire,, . .

'

4 MARCH 1946

At 0030, a l o c a l Japanese counter-attack was started, and penetrated the l i n e s as far as the Bn 0P This Atk was stopped by 0430, but a nu iber of Japanese Continued to harass our troops fmm positions within our lines* At 0430, orders received effecting a passage of our l i n e s by 3d Bn 21st Mar, and committing t h i s Bn to moppingw-up Opns in r e a r areas. This Bn held the ?.lnee i t had established the nigl&t previous u n t i l 1140 at which time a passage of l i n e s of our right Co was effected. The right Co of 3d Bn 21st Mar was net by s t i f f enemy resistance and was unable to effect a passage of l i n e s . At 1400 (approximately), B Co was attached to 2nd Bn 21st Mar. At 180O: C Co was s t i l l .In position on the front l i n e s and orciers had been received from Regt .to the effect-that C Co would cover the gap in the front l i n e s existing between the right flank of 3d Bn 21st Mar and the l e f t flank of the 9th Regt. Sporadic small arms fire was received on the front l i n e s between 1800 and 0500. 5 MARCH 1945

' . '

At 0500, remnants* of A and C Cos withdrew from

the front lines. All Cos returned to the rear Assembly
Area and started reorganization. Reorganization was
continued throughout the day with replacements bringing
the strength of the IIifle Cos to approximately 160 men
and offioers. At 1800, reorganization had been completed
and Bn was awaiting further orders. No enemy activity
during the hours of.darkness,
6 MARCH 1945
At, 0500, Bn aef ^Assembly Area to move into
position to. effect a passage of lines.of 3d Bn 21st Mar.
At 0800, B and C Cos were in position behind the assault
Cos of the 34 Bn. B Co on the right, C Co on the left,
A Go in Res, At 0900*, B and C Cos moved out and effected
a passage of lines of 3d Bn 21*61 Mar. Process was
slow throughout the day with heavy s i

>

tage 5 of 27 Xages!

Action Report,

(Cofct'd).

received and also fire from a hlgfe caliber flat trajectory

Wpn, which was thought to be looted off xmr left flank*
At 1800, B and C Cos had started to consolidate their
v
positions for night defense and attempts were being made to get visual contact between our right flank and the
unit to our right* . Our left flank Was tied in solidly
with 2nd Bn 21st Mar. The Bn made advances of from
approximately 100 Yds on our right flank to approximately
250-300 Yds on our left flank daring the day* Also
captured quantities of explosives, Am and rations* By'
1930, the gap on our right flank had been covered by
fire. ^ Enemy activity during the hours of darkness
consisted mainly of sporadic small arms fire with some
Mort fire being received,

~ . * ~ *

7 MARCH 194$
At 0520, 3d Bn 9th Mar coiiuoenced a passage of
lines'through positions oocupied by B Co (our right Co).
Activity throughout the day was limited to moving A and
B Cos, slightly to/the SW of positions occupied during
the night,' Throughout the day, enemy, activity consisted
of harassing small arms fire by snipers and sporadic
Mort firo which at times was quite heavy. At 1800, our
left Co (C Co) was tied in solidly with 2nd Bn 2Jst Mar
to the left and with B Co to the right. 3 Co was tied
in solidly with L Co, 3d Bn 9th Mar to the right. A
Co was committed to Regtl Res, Enemy activity through**
out the night consisted of harassing fire by small arms
and Morts.
8 MARCH 1945

At 0730, Bn continued the Atk, with A Go on the

left effecting a passage.of lines through E Cc 21st Mar,
and C Co on the right. Enemy opposition consisted of.
receiving fire fr6m caves for the most part, but very
heavy fire was received sporadically from enemy Morts*
B Co Was detached at approximately t)730 to 3d 3n 9th Mar
At 1800, A and C Cos occupied positions as shown on nap
or overlay. A Co was tied in solidly to its left with
2nd Bn 21st Mar and to its right with C Co, 1st Bn 21st
Mar. C Co was tied in solidly to its right with B Co
(attached to 3d Bn 9 th Mar), During the day the Bn
made gains aloni; its front of approximately 300-400 Yds
and reduced many caves and other emplacements. Enemy
activity during the hours of darkness was limited to '
snail anas fire in our sector* At approximately 2200,
the enemy fired numerous rockets from an area to our
right fronts 9 MARCH 1946
At 0700, the Atk Was resun^d in our Z of A. By 1400, a patrol from A Co had reached the waters edge in our Z of A. Enemy activity throughout the day con-, tinued to consist of heavy small arms fire against our troops from caves, with heavy Mort fire being received sporadically. At 1700, our troops were withdrawn from positions attained during the day to positions as shown on map or overlay. This withdrawal, and.subsequent consolidation of positions on high ground to the. rear was necessitated in part by exposure of our l e f t flank and in par'tj by over-extension of our lines; also^ the Page 6 of 27 Pages.

Action Report,

:S

^J

fact that the high ground to the rear was more suitable for defense was taken into consideration. At 1800, our l e f t flank was tied in sp'lidly with 2nd Bn 21st Mar, and our r^ght flank was tied in solidly with B Co (attached to 3d Bn 9th Mar) This* Bn-'aade an advance of 300-500 Yds in Z of A. Destruction of numerous caves and many enemy troopb (estimated 300) Enemy activity during the hours ci darkness consist d mainly of small arms f i r s directed at our positions. There was some a c t i v i t y ' t o the front which seemed to consist mainly of individuals, changing positions or moving from onecave to another, "* 10 M R H 1945 AC Shortly after K-Hour (0800) patrols from A and C Cos started working toward the beach* These patrols met resistance from pillboxes! but were able to reaoh the beach,. Said patrols arrived on the beach at 1200 (approximately)* At approximately 1100, one patrol from C Co entered a mine field, thought to be located in 219-N (West), and received casualties from exploding mines. I t 1B thought that these mines were exploded e l e c t r i c a l l y by the enemy, rather than by pressure type fuses. The 3n conducted moping~up Opns through-, ouj;. the'day and successfully closed many caves. At 1800, A and C Cos were located as shown on overlay, and organized for all-around defense. A Co was t i e d . In solidly with 2nd Bn 21st Mar, our right flank rested on the beach. The Bn closed numerous caves, reduced several pillboxes, and occupied ground to waters edge during-the day's a c t i v i t i e s . Enemy resistance through** out the hours of darn&ess consisted of small -arms fire being directed against our positions, and some activity of personnel to our front, although no attempts at i n f i l t r a t i o n or penetration of our positions was made. ' 11 M R H 1945 AC

At approximately 0930, our advance was con~

tinued* Very little enemy opposition was encountered,
except that many caves were encountered and it/Was
found necessary to destroy these caves as we moved
forward. At 1800, ourpositions:were as.shown on
overlay to accompany this report, Our left flank was
tied in solidly w;tth I Co 27th Mar. The Bn made
advances of approximately 100 Yds on the right and 300
Yds on the left and also reduced numerous caves through out the day* Limited small arms fire was received during
the hours of darkness.
12 MARCH 1945
At approximately 0430, a group of about 30
of the enemy attempted a penetration of A Cole lines*
Twenty (20) of these were killed and the remainder are
believed to; have disappeared Into caves to our rear.
At 0700, patrols from A and' C Cb^ were sent forward.
These patrols, throughout the day, met only slight
resistance 'from sniperis., -and succeeded in sweeping all
remaining ground within this Bn's 2 of A, clear o f the
" enemy, At .approximately lt)OC, B Ob was committed to the
> assault in the center ;of our linea, and immediately sent
patrols forward to work in conjunction with those of
A and C Cos. In general, activity
tage/7 of 27 Pages

Action Report,

*(Cont f d).

was limited to patrolling and mop; in$-up rear areas. At

1800, our position's Were as shown on nap or overlay.
A Co,on our left,was tied in solidly with the 27th Regt,
to pur left. Enemy .activity during the hours- of dark ness consisted of harassing snail arms fire being de livered against our positions, and an attempt by a small
'group'of the enemy -to penetrate our positions. This
attempt was repulsed with nine (9) of the eneuy killed.
At H O C , orders were received to protect the right
flarJt of the 5th Piv in its continuation of the Atk at
0730 the following norning, and to mop^up "bsach areas
from our present front lines to 51*0C Inclusive; our
movement ndrthward depending on thenorthward movement
of the right flank of the 5th Mar Dlv.
. ' 13 MARCH 1946 .

The expected movement of the Sth.Div f a i l i n g to materialise, our p o s i t i o n s Remained as previously reported; the dajrlii^t nours bein^ spent "in mopping~up a l l remaining resistance and enemy positions within our Z of A. At 180C v our l e f t flank was t i e d in soli(31y with I.Co 27th Mar to o\ir l e f t , our right flank resting as shown on map or overlay. Approximately f i f t y :\ 50) enemy *kllle&; approximately twelve (12; pillboxes and caves destroyed; completion of destruction of two 200 centimeter coaet defense gun emplacements* which contained an unknown number of enemy, but thought to be approximately 150, was the extent of t h i s Bn's a c t i v i t y throughout the day. Bne^y a c t i v i t y during the hours of darkness consisted of harassing small arms f i r e being delivered against our p o s i t ions* 14 H K H 1945 AC At approximately 0430, ihree of the enemy were k i l l e d attempting a penetration of our l i n e s . Throughout the day, t h i s Bn protected the right flank of the 5th Div in i t s continuation of the Atk, and oontinued mopping** up in the beach areas. At 1800, B Co on our l e f t flank was tifed in s o l i d l y wltfc I O 27th Mar to our l e f t , our o right flank rested as shown oh mgip or overlay. In ad~ ^ dltlon, one Plat combat? outpost was establishecl at 236^K (center-north) and one Sqd combat outpost . established, at 236K (center^south), The eneay was active in and about ourllnes during the hours of darknesst These enemy apparently came from d^ves in and to the rear of our l i n e s . No eoordin^t-ed Atk was made and enemy t a c t i c s consisted of appearing suddenly froo a cave, throwing grenades into our p o s i t i o n s , and attempting to regain their caves. There wad a total of approxi mately thirty (30) of the enemy k i l l e d during the night, the majority by A Co and the remainder*by B Co. 15 M R H 1945 AC During the daylight hours* t h i s 3n continued to *
maintain contact on our right flank ( I Co 27th Regt)
as the 5th Div advanced northward. Approximately '
ton ( i o ) of the enemy were k i l l e d during the day**
l i g h t hours by A and D Cos. At 1800, warning orders
had been received that t h i s Bn would pass through
part, or a l l of the 27th Regt at some ttoe during the

Action Heport.

.(Cont'd)-,

morning of Kerch 16, Final d i s p o s i t i o n of Cos for the- ni ( ;ht had. be en made. Activity during the day con- . s i s t e d ' o f forty (40; of the enemy ueing k i l l e d ; twentysix (26) caves - d o s e l ; one (1) p i l l b o x destroyed; one 50 Calc (estimated) r.'ir-cooled liOr captured by A Co, The enemy was active in and about our l i n e s during the hours of darkness,* iliese enemy apparently came,from caves in and to tfcr, x-jav of our l i n e s . No coordinated Atk was made and ev.hi:\y t a c t i c s c o n s i s t e d of appearing suddenly from a c&vs, throwing grenades into our p o s i t i o n s , and attempting to regain t h e i r caves. There was a t o t a l of twelve (12) of the enemy k i l l e d during the n i g h t . * 16 MARCH 1945 ' ' , .

At 0715, A and 3 Cos commenced effecting a r e l i e f of the 3d 3n 27th Mar on the l i n e s . - A Co was on the l e f t , 3 Co on the r i g h t . At 0830 (approximately), Cos moved out in the Atk. 3y 1400. both Cos were on the objective (waters: edge N c o a s t ) , having met but s l i g h t opposition in 1 he form of Inf vvpns f i r e from enemy in caves. From 1400 u n t i l 1730, Both A and 3 Cos engaged in mopp]"g~up t a c t i c s , and at I?o0, com menced movement Into p o s i t i o n for the n i g h t . At 1800, Cos were n-t yet in p o s i t i o n for the n i g h t . The 3n made ar advance of ap-c.roximatily 600 Yds to the "North in Z ov 1} and destroyed, 24 caves, 2 p i l l b o x e s , and 36 of the enemy (in addition to tho^e k i l l e d during the night) during the day. ' 3y 1900, A and C Cos were in an Assembly Area in 251-W ( s o u t h ) . C Co was detached to 2nd 3n 21st Mar. Enemy a c t i v i t y during the hours of darkness was extremely l i m i t e d , and only typ (2) of the enemy w^re k i l l e d throughout the n i g h t . . 17 MARCH 1945 At 0800 (approximately), the 3n resumed moppingup Opns. These operations were continued throughout the day u n t i l 1730. At 1545, C Co was released by 2nd 3n 21st Mar and r e t u r n e d to 1st 3ri 21st Har. At 1730, a l l Cos secured from mopping-up Opns and returned to 251-W (south) where a perimeter defense was e s t a b l i s h e d for the forthcoming n i g h t . One ambush was e s t a b l i s h e d by each Co. This gnSkilled eighty (80) of the enemy (including two k i l l e d during the night) and closed twenty-five (25) caves during the day. 3y 1900, A, 3 and C Cos were closing the perimeter for the n i g h t in area 251 ^ ( s o u t h ) , 235-C (northeast) and 235-C W ( n o r t h - c e n t e r ) . Enemy a c t i v i t y during tbfe hours of darkness Was l i m i t e d to harassing our p o s i t i o n s and ten (XO) of the enemy were killec~. 18 KARCH 1945 At 0800, a l l Cos ,and", attached u n i t s were d i r e c t e d to p o l i c e t h e i r areas and r e t u r n to Assembly Area in 217-Vf (southeast)>and 217-X ( southwest) in order C, 3 and A Cos. Units' closed in Assembly Area a t approximately 0930. A Co was d i r e c t e d to p a t r o l 3n s e c t o r . Three p a t r o l s despatched c o n s i s t i n g of. 18 infantrymen, 7 engineers^ 1 War Dog and handler. 3 Co was d i r e c t e d to carry *mt salvage Opns in areas 2OO-3S, 201-A, 3, T Xnortii h a l f ) , 0 (north h a l f ) , 218-U, Y9 P a t r o l s and salvage detail&to*MPe4 a t 9 of 27'.

Report.

(Oont'd)

approximately 1000^ C fo remained in bivouac. All patrols returned by approximate!/ 1^45. Patrols in areas #1 and #3 encountered no enemy troops. Patrol in area #2 encountered seemingly organized enemy forces, possibly a Sv.i or more, in area bounded by 20I-B/C, T>t Q, By I, Active sniping in areas 201~B, 218-Va Our patrol M 'suffered no casualties. One enemy wounded^ bir; t; soaped; other casualties in flicted not observe!o Eight enemy dead (previously killed) buried; 11 caves closed In patrol areas # 2 and #3#: N eneny activity during the hours of o darkness. 19ftARCH1945 B Co directed to patrol Bn Sector; C Co directed
to carry out,salvage Opns throughout #1 patrol area;
A Co remained In bivouac* ^%*ee patrols from B Co
departed assigned area by 0800. Each patrol consisted
of 13 infantrymen {approximately)9 7 engineers, and
1 War Dog and hnrvilcr One patrol assigned to each
patrol area in the Bn patrol sector. The patrols
returned to bivouac .rad made reports by 1146* The same
patrols departed from the bivouac area at 1300 and
carried out mission*; in patrol areas previously mentioned.
Patrols returned to bivouac and made reports by 1555.
C Co continued salvage Opns throughout the day, trans**
porting salvage materials to the RT"H and making stacks
to be transported during later salvage Opns* No enemy
foroes sighted at any time during the dayj 23 oaves
clo.sed li^th demolitions* 7 mines and 5 booby traps dis armed; quantities of enemy Am located and also caves
to be closed were located. Our patrols suffered no
casualties. No enemy activity during the hours of
darkness,
20 MARCH 1945
C Co was directed to patrol Bn sector; A and
B Cos directed to carry out salvage Opns throughout
the Bn sector. Three patrols from C Co departed assigned
area by 0745* Each patrol consisted of 12 (approximately)
infantrymen, 7 engineers, and 1 War Dog and. handler.
The patrols returned to assigned area and made reports
by 1030. The same patrols left the assigned area at 1300
and carried out missions in patrol area. The patrols
returned and made reports-by 1530. A and B Cos oon~
tinued salvage Opns throughout the day, transporting
salvage materials to the RTB and stacking other materials
to be transported. No enemy forces wore sighted at
any time during the day. WA total of 13 oaves were
closed throughout the Bn sector. Our patrols suffered
no casualties. No enemy activity during, the hours of
darkness.

2 1 MARCH 194%

A Co was directed to patrol Bn sector; B and C Cos directed to carry out salvage Opns in Bn sector. Three patrols' from A Co departed 3n bivouac by 0745," each patrol consisting of 12 (approximately) infantry men, 7 engineers, and 1 War Dog and handler. The patrols returned to assigned area and made reports by 1045; same patrols resumed patrol missions in . Page'10 of 2? Pages.

Action Report,

(Cont'd),

*
1300, Patrols returned and made reports by 1560, 3
and C Cos continued salvage Opns throughout' the day*
One enemy, apparently Navy, killed In TA C9~N (north east) at approximately 1445. One pillbox and one cave
destroyed during the day, also five water holes des troyed. Our patrols suffered no casualties. Ho enemy
activity during the hours of darkness.
22 M R H 1945 AC B Co was directed to patrol tL$ I3n sector; A and C Cos were directed to carry out salvage Opns throughout th o Dn sector. Three patrols f i : u D Co, departed Dn bivouae by 0800. Each pntr-ol consisted of 12 (approximately) infantrymen, and 5 engineers* The patrols returned to their assigned areas and made reports by 1100. A and C Cos continued salvage Opns throughout the day, transporting sn?"aged material * to the RT2. No enemy sighted, throughout the day; four caves destroyed; mine field located in 200~L. Our patrol3 suffered no casualties, -to enemy activity during the hours of darkness, 23 M R H 1946 AC C Co was directed to patrol the Bn sector;
A and B Cos were directed to carry out salvage Opns
throughout the 3n sector. Three patrols from C Co
departed 3n bivouac by 0800. Each patrol consisted
of 20 (approximately) Infantrymen and five engineers*
The patrols returned to their assigned area and made
reports by itCC. The same patrols left aeoigned area
at 13C0 and carried out missions in patroi area. The
patrols returned and made reports by 1500, A* and 1 3
'Cos continued salvage Opns throughout the day. One
cave was closed during the day. Our patrols suffered
no casualties. No enemy activity during the hours
of darkness.
24 MARCH 1945
One 11) of th* eneay was killed at 0545'ifc*
TA 21?~S (CP). B and 0 Co6 conducted salvage Opns
throughout the day; A Co remained in bivouac. No
enemy activity throughout the hours of darkness,

25 M R H 194S; AC . . ' A and ft Cos conducted salvage Opns throughout the day; C Co remained lr> bivouac. No enemy a c t i v i t y throughout the hours of darkness,

PART IV, tJOMHENTS. .

< , '

A. Administration. ;
1)1

* "

\* The system of casualty reporting was satis** factory. I t is recommended that copies of the burial bulletin and other casualty bulletins be distributed as far down as indivudtial battalions. Much information and many cases that remain unknown on personnel evao* uated through other aid stations oould be obta'lned from these bulletins. I t is believed thaJt_jjiajiY of the cases
::

Page 11 of 27 Page

Subject:

w w

* i *WmU Action Report,

that clrag on tov months after a campaign could be cleared up in a short period were these bulletins made available to the battalions* . . \. 2* In general, the morale of the troops was good*, , The following was done to maintain morale throughout the campaign,
. ' t . .' .

b. The new type rtCM ration was issued quite regularly* These proved to be very popular. c* A limited amount of transportation was made available for the purpose of taking troppfl to the mowies i towards the end of the campaign. , d* Troops were taken to a construeted shower and given the opportunity to take a good bath* e* The Blv band performed at the Bn area one afternoon. 3* In so far as was poBSlbJ.e, the Div SOP was followed. P W tags and envelopes proved beneficial. O Herein, very close cooperation was aihorded by Regt* Questioning of POW/s In Bn was eh. rt, oon~ cise, and pertained only to such enemy information as would immediately effect the, Bn situation* POWls were, used as guides and friendly agents to.talk' fellow Japanese into surrendering, but l i t t l e success was met* Pertinent information was forwarded immediately from higher echelon. Systen'qulte successful in 1-21
v

mitted.

a. Hot chow was served when the situation per- *

1 % Xottlllgence.

1. The over-all coverage by maps and aerial photo a of I O JIMA prior to the Opn was excellent* * W Restrictions were, appreciable in the doubt of a de* finite beach designation, and the varied zories in which this unit was to operate*
. ' ' * ' . "

2. Map and aerial photo coverage during the Opn was inadequate* Due to heavy shelling, the terrain visibly changed from day to day. Friendly situation* front line8, enemy emplacements, and etc*, were reported to higher echelon* Few attempts were made to pass con solidated information baoh down the line in the form of maps* overlays, or recent aerial photos* Efforts to gather any an& a l l information were admirable, but here the process seamed to cease, for i t seldom returned* 3* Hydrographic information furnished was adequate*

4. Intelligence information disseminated by _ might have been effective and sufficient, but i t seldom arrived in time to be of any use. Herein, i t i s d i f f i cult to place any blame> but i t waff invariably held up along the line* " . 5* Five men were authorifco&v by a Dlv G for ' O each Bn i n t Sec as a collecting agency*" Detailed ln~ structions and rules concerning this s^S&ibns* concfcict and training were put out. No enforcement or cooperation
% , . ' . . , ' . ' . '

\r'r{.

..

Page 12 of 27 Pages.

Action Report,

(Cont ! d).

was noted from higher echelon* No collecting sections were forced^; Recovery of captured documents and materiel had to-be l e f t to front line fighting troops, who were usually preoccupied^ % 6, b* Offioer Language personnel temporarily attached was quite'adequate. d* Enlisted Language personnel temporarily attached was also adequate. 7* The terrain and type of Opn r e s t r i c t e d vocal propaganda* Also considering these factors, printed pro-" paganda was about as successful as possible* 8. JICPOA teams were more of a hindrmce than an aid* The attached personnel of this unit was adequate to handle a l l occurrences* 9* In many cases, communication between the OP and CP was out for hours* Information on the front l i n e s , etc*, was sadly lacking in the Bn, Regtl, and Div X2P4s. Rather than wait for the lines to be repaired* why not come forward or send someone forward to make personal contact? Suggest keeping G closer to OP* P 10. Camouflage was n i l , but n-% impossible. Blaokout was enforced. Password and counter**sign Was effective. At times the Bn OP was cluttered up with unnecessary personnel* With suoh scant cover as was noted on IWO, three or four radio antennas, and personnel streaming In and out are a dead give-away* 11. a* Use o? Marine Corps clothing by Japanese for ambushes in two known cases In the 1 s t Bn eeotor. b. Use of one Japanese apparently attempting to surrender to draw a group of Marines into fields of fire for automatic weapons* . 12* Destruction of manuals, mapa, and weapons were, noted in many easels. Their schooling in such matters seemed thorough and detailed. They were quite successful. G Operations and * 1. Three deliberate exercises were held by this organization in preparation for possible employment ashore at I O JIMA. Although these exercises can not be classed W as Amphibious rehearsal exercises, i t i s f e l t that they proved to be of definite value in t h i s B a t t a l i o n ^ oper** ations after arrival ashore at IWO JIMA. . (a) The fir ? et exercise consisted of two placements, mutually supporting, the redaction of which was assigned as a plataon problem,* This exercise was f3.red with l i v e ainraunitlon .and participated in by a l l r i f l e platoons in t h i s Bn, each r i f l e platoon having one section of MGs attached* The exercise was deelgned> to I l l u s t r a t e the coordination of employment o f r i f l e ' squads against mutually supporting emplacements,, and the actual use of f i r e , movement, flame thrower, de molitions, and final assault necessary to the reduction of a heavily defended concrete empln>J6iin^r cave. Page 13 *f 27 Pag

Action Report*

(ConVa)*

(b) The second, exercise was a tank**infantry

exercise and was participated in by the Bn as a unit,
this exercise was
:and by each Rifle Co separately, designed to illustrate the employment of a-ssaulting troops
with tanks, and to exercise tank-infantry eotamunications*
It was held over terrain closely simulating that 6f IWO
(c) The\ third exercise was a combined Infantry Artillery-Air Attach exercise* and was fired with live
ammunition. This exercises was designed to illustrate
the employment of infantry in.assault, with, the- supporting
arms and Wpns that a Bn Comdr has at his disposal. The
exercise consisted of the assault and capture of successive
objectives within the Bn Z of A with orders for the co^*
ordinated continuation of the Atk being issued after the
capture of each Bn objective, "
(d) De tail s of the Bor ear Op era tin were not
released,to troops until after departure <&6tn the harbor
at <3Uj&i. All troops were briefed after departure first
by the Bn Staff in general, and then by Unit Comdrs in '
detail. Belief and terrain maps were used, and each
0quad Leader was issued a small* scale map of the entire
island of IWO JIMA.
2*. The following Wpns were, in order of listing,
found most effective against fortified installations.
. (a) Shape Charges {both 10# and 4O# depending
>
on size of position). . (b) Compos it ion C.2 (in 18# Knapsack as
tt Satchel Charge11). 11 ,
(c> 2.36 Anti^-Tk Rockets (used at close range
where accurate fire could be directed against embrasures)* (d)^8M Naval (kxntXvp and larger; caliber and
Medium Artillery was effective when direct hits with
time-delay fuse were mad? on lightly fortified positions*
In many instances, near misses were noted by personnel
of this Bn as having little or na effect against occupants
of position. .
(e) Air bombardment was effectivD against
fortified poeitons only when direct hits we're made with
500# bombs^ It Is felt that against positions such as
encountered on IVO JIUA, 1000# or larger bombs with
tlme^delay fuse would have been much more effective than
the 300# instantaneous fuse bombs
$ The portable flame throwers used by this Bn
were found to beTo.ghly effioient and extremely effective
against caves, bunker8* and pillboxes encountered during
this operatipn* Normal employment consisted of moving
the flame thrower operator into position from a flank,
covering him the meanwhile with rifle and BAR fire*
Upon arrival within range of target, the operator would
shoot his flame across the cave or emplacement entrance
or embrasure, and advancing quickly under.cover of his
own fire,, place himself in position to direct his1 fire
directly in^o. the cave opening or embrasure. When ^o
directed, flame thrower fire was consistently effective
in silencing, the cave or emplacement to'the extent
necessary to allow the placing of a demolitions charge.

age 14 of 27

Subject;

Action Report.

(dont'd).

,4. Tanks were successfully used by' this Bn in

the roll of direct close support artillery for the
assault and reduction of caves and other emplacements.
Normal usage consisted of the tank (s) *being directed
by SCR-3OO Radio to fire into openings or embrasures,
while under cover of infantry fire. Upon completion of
its firing mission, the tank Cs) would withdraw, and
infantry would move in to compl^H the reduction of the
emplacement. It was found iiapj&e^icable to have infantry
closely follow tank's, dut to tM^r terrain beings highly
condusive to enemy observation of our movements, and
because the resultant fire that was directed against
our tanks caused numerous casualties among foot troops.
5, Coordination between iux'a#try' and tanks was
normally effected by the infantry Comdr'pointing out to
the tank Comdr the target or objective on the ground, and
then further directing the movement of the tank (s) by
SCR-3OO Radio*
6* Enemy anti-tank measures consisted mainly of
the extensive use of AT 1-iines along all arteries of traffic
and around major emplacements or strong points, the ex*
tensive use of high velocity 47 and 57mm Wpns sited to
cover all roads, trails, and open areas, and a limited
use of a Wpn similar to our AT Rocket discharger. The
enemy was found to be fully and heavily equipped with
magnetic and yardstick mines, which he attempted to use
in soe instances by directly-.attacking our tanks with
the intension of placing these charges by hand'* His
most effective AT Wpn appeared to be his 47 and 57mm
high velocity guns. These Wpns were extremely accurate
at ranges up to 2000 yards.
7. War dogs we're used tactically in conjunction
with day and night patrols, and on th? lines at night.
Dogs were found to be of little * alue due to their in~
ability to distinguish between^ friendly and unemy troops.
Dogs were of no value in searching caves, as their training
had not included entering caves. \ It.'is .felt that the
tactical value and usage of war dogs in'future operations
similar to the IWO JILA campaign will be extremely limited
if ".cgs can not be trained to differentiate "between friendly
and enemy troops.
8* The 2.361 AT Rocket was vu^ed primarily by
this organization as an anti-pillbox Wpn. Satisfactory
results were obtained when hits could be made in em brasures. This organization had no contact with enemy
tanks which required the use of this Wpn. Barrage
rocket6 were not used by this organization.

D. {Supply. i
'

1.

Adequacy of a l l types1 of mounting out supplies.

a. Adequate amounts of a l l Class I items were carried for the operation as planned. However, i t i s recommended that - the"aildwance of l a r d or lard substitute be increased regardless of operation changes. During the combat stage th $eed for tpore lard i s necessary due to the preparation of foods which necessari: in preparation. Doughnuts, f r u i t pies

Action Report;

(Cont r a),

were served front line units whenever tactical situations

\
warranted* b. Adequate amounts of all types of Class II
items were carried except for clothing. In future operations
it is desired that one Vl) outfit of clothing for each
individual embarked be carried either by BOM or Bn QJi*
This would facilitate issue to combat troops and, in part,
do away with baggage packs now carried,by individuals.
It has Jpeen noted in this and past operations that a large
percentage of- baggage packs have been lost in transit thus
making issue by the ' i imperative. It is felt that some
Ol satisfactory plan coul4 be made whereby individuals could
exchange soiled clothing for new or laundered clothing
and thus bring about a smaller loss of clothing as well
as keep the troops in clean clothing,
c. Adequate amounts of all types of Class III
items were carried except for kerosene. If available,
kerosene should be made available for all cooking purposes,
since the type of burners now issued do not function well
using diesel or other mixed fuels* Also, life of combustion
heads is increased about 100$ and Jthjui'ire hflzard depressecL.
ccyiLTT^i-i.iTvr"
: p ^ j p . n ^ l ^ d, Adequate amounts of A all types of Class IV
items were carried*.
e, Adequate amounts of all types of Class V
items were carried except for the below listed'Items:
1, 60mm iiortar, III, M83,
(a) It is recommc -3d that increased
amounts of this type be made available for pombat operations*
Front line troops feel that constant illumination decreases
the possibility of enemy night attacks. Due to the limited
supply of this type during the operation constant illumi nation was not possible.

2. 81mm Mortar, HE, M43A1. .

(a) It is recommended that the unit of
fire of this type be tripled. During the operation the *
shortage was acute* At times, there^ was none in .gun
positions or in dumps. If no increase in the U/F can be
made, it is recommended that all 81mm ammunition be
equipped with an adjustable fuse having bo*uh super-quick
',
. and delayed action. 2. Adequacy of Resupply.
a. Resupply 6X/ailv^Jksses of supplies was
adequate except for the itetoBpTevlouBiy discussed.

3. F a l l e t f e ^ c f e g ^ a ^ l Vit son' druasQO1 ^

. a. Kuch difficulty was noted in *he use of pallets for cargo f^ K the loading stage throughout the unloading rD stage* During the ^eh^p loa&lrig^ t was found Shat, eVeh V ; though space was available, pallets couldn't be moved in the holds without much difficulty and undue loss of time. In unloading on the beach, ^ great percentage of pallets were stuck in the sand and had to be broken and transported by other means. Taking" this into consideration, i t is felt tha^ much time and labor could be saved Js supplies instead of palletizing.

e. 16^of g7 .Pages*

Action Report*
b. Use of Wilson drums proved to be excellent.
Supplies carried in these were found to be in excellent
condition, ,It is recommended that all supplies of such
a nature as would be ruined by water or moisture be packed
in Wilson drums,
4. The efficiency of all shore based supply
facilities was good* Had the operation progressed as
planned, it is felt that supply would have been excellent
as well as adequate.

5,

Transportation

a. Wheeled and trailer transportation embarked

was adequate in all respects,
b. The Cargo Carrier H29C proved to be out standing in sandy and other rough terrain. This was the
"only vehicle that could be used tor supply of this unit
until front lines had moved well'beyond the beach area.
Too much cannot be said as to the efficiency of this type
vehicle in sandy and other difficult terrain. However,
it is recommended that this vehicle be used only when jeep
transportation cannot be utilized.
c* The'only special purpose vehicles embarked
by this unit were two (2) trucks, 1 T, 4x4 and two (2)
trailers, 1 T, cargo, to be used as flame thrower servicing
units. The purpose was defeated, however, du^ to break downs on the beach which could^t be repaired immediately*
Had these difficulties not come about, it is felt that
excellent use of such vehicles could have been made.
F. Alr .

, 1. Preliminary air strikes against emplacements

on IWO JIMA inflicted negligible damage.
2. Air Liason for this Bn was performed by JAS Co
personnel and conducted in an exaei.1'. - ;r manner*'
. 3. Communications between AGL tear. ASC, and
support aircraft w t at all times excellent aJ 4 / Although no air strikes were called by this
Bn, re suites of air strikes were- many times observed. It
-is felt that the o l ^ effective fusing for use against
nv" fortifications such as encountered on IWO JIMA,- is time-
delay fusing* It'is also recommended that 100Q# or larger
bombs be used in lieu of, 500-!* bombs, :~or destructive bom bardcient, !
Ck Naval Gunfire.

1. Shore fire cbntrol personnel attached to this

Bn< were JAS Co personnel an4 were adequate in number and '
had reached a high degree of training. /
2. No failures of .SFCP equipment other than radi6
, (TBX) were noted. 3 (a) Preparation fires against beach targets
were highly effective when direct h&is. e made on em placements. "
Page Ir7. of 21? Pag

Action Report.

(Cont'd)*

(b) Fires conducted against targets of oppor tunity consisted mainly of placing direct fire from close
range in cave entrances, and was highly effective in all
cases*
(c) Night harassing fires, when used, proved
effective in keeping the enemy under cover, and in all
probability prevented many night attacks arainst our
positions*
(d) NGF was requested by this Bn on approxi- *
mately ,twelve (12) occasions.
Xm Transport Quartermaster.
1, The APA for this BLT was loaded at the dock in
approximately 24| hours. Cargo was hauled from a-cargo
assembly area three miles from. tir? dock, employing from
ten to fifteen trucks throughout loading. . Tuere were" a
few delays resulting from* a breakdown of the crane at
assembly area and because all.loading into the ship was
done on one side only. Over all, except for these in stances, the loading went smoothly. The ship could handle
pallets only in #5 hold and after this hold was filled,
it was necessary to break-down approximately Zb% of
pallatized ammunition and 16ad in #3 hold. No. 3 hold
was made up of seven lockers which w#re ideal for the
stowing of ammunition* however, palletized supplies could
not be handled because of the separation into compartments*
The loading of vehicles was accomplished in approximately four hours with no delays. Personnel were embarked in
one hour and twenty minutes with no confusibn or holdups.
Units were met at the gangplank by unit guides .of the
advance billeting detail and were conducted to their re spective compartments*
2. The ship was completely unloaded in approxl-v
mately nine days. This was due to the tactical employment
of the BLT and to the unfavorable beach conditions* Un loading was done on "callw for both vehicles and supplies.
Few vehicles and supplies went ashore aboard LCMs and
LCVPs because of broaching, therefore, it was mecessary
to use LSTs, LSMs and LCTs to land the bulk of the cargo
and this was done as these latter craft became available.
Continual rough sea made the unloading of personnel and
vehicles difficult, causing damage to a few vehicles.
3. Although heavy sea was the sourc of trouble
in the transport area, the greatest difficulties were en countered on the beach. Small craft broached due to
heavy surf and the condition of the beach. Palletized
supplies bogged ^pwn in the sand and could not be pulled
by tractors. Time was cpnsumed in breaking down pallets*
The ship could unload from only the leeward side throughout*
4, It is felt that the use of pallets does not
save any time in the over-all unloading and therefore
serves to no advantage. It was found that in the holds
pallets take up extra space and cannot be loaded more
than two high without damaging supplies 0/1 the lower pallet*
Vehicles were.loaded in #1 and # hatches, heavy vehicles
being in #2 under the Jumbo boom* Vehicle slings wj
at these two hatches. Rations, ammunition,
gear was unloaded from #3 by use of cargo
lUfl^veasl unloaded from #4-by employment of
-with exception of palletized supplies in thisThoTd, whicfa.
directly in the square of the hatch and placed on drums*
Page 18 of 27 Pages. '

Action Report.

ACant'd).

All palletized cargo was unloaded by use of vehicle slings*

It is felt that slings and cargo handling gear aboard this
ship was adequate. i Due to the circumstances which governed
the unloading, it is- impossible to make any suggestions
to reduce the time required to unload ships*
J prdnance. ' 1* 'Weapons.
e. Type, caliber and number of T ~apons embarked.
te-l ~ 453
1. Carbine, cal.30, 2. Rifle, cal.30, Ml - 451
3. Rifls, Auto, Browning, oal.30,
M1918A1 & A2 ' ' ~ 81
4. Gun, machine, Bro i-ing, cal.30,
..'111919A4 & A5 , - 18
5. Gun, machine, Browning, cal*30,
M1917A1 - 18
6. Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36" - 9
7. Mortar, 60mm . - 1 3
8... Mortar, 81mm - 4.
9, Launcher, grenade, rifle, M7 - 103
10. Launcher, grenade, carbine, MS - 90
'

' . .

b. Weapons of this unit were employed in battle

for a period of twenty-four (24) days*
c. Type, caliber and number of weapons lost.<
1. Carbine, cal*30, Ml 2. Rifle, cal.30, Ml , ' - 350 **
- 150

38 *

4. Gun, machine, Browning, cal.30,

143919A4 & A5 - 5
5. Gun, machine, Browni-.^, cal.30>
M1917A1 - 6
6. Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.?^' - 0
7. Mortar, 60mm - 3
8. Mortar, 81mm 0
; 9. Launcher, grenade, rifle, M7i *- 103 * '
10* Launcher, grenade," carbine, M8 - 90 "
** Figures are orO "r approximate due to
lacking consolidaoed salvage reports from
d. Many reports were received concerning mal function of the Rifle, 130 cal, Ml. At least fifty (50J
percent of this type weapon failed to function properly.
Men interviewed stated that there was insufficient gas to
force the op.erating rod to the rear and compress the re turn sp'ring thus making hand operation of the operating
rod necessary. Most-weapons'were, found to be clean and
free of excessive carbon in the gas cylinder* Most men
thought that uge of AP -amiaunition only was the reason for
this malfunction, since weapons operated well when ball
ammunition was substituted. Perhaps this is due to the
extra powder charge in AP ammunition thus causing>a col lection of excess carbon in the gas oylinder making the
weapon sluggish and failing to feed and men not recognizing
this fact. Regardless, it would be ,^excellent idea
to run tests and ascertain the real
-e 19 of 27 Page!!

3. R i f l e , Auto, Browning, cal*30, M1918A1 & A? ;

Action Report/ malfunction. I t might also be suggested that more stress be made of the oafie, cleaning and functioning of the in dividual weapon ' e* There was an adequate .supply of spare partB and accessories available tat this operatlbn. Thou-gfa there were few in the hands of troops operating crew served weapons, no difficulty was had in the operation of such weapons. Too, the Issue oi' complete sets of spare parts and accessories i s unnecessary sinceraost are always lost due to a feeling by troops that t:.3y are excess baggage* However, the most essential ones should be issued. Re placement and repair of weapons by Piv Ordnance was ex*, cellent* < 2. Combat Vehicles. a* 'Type and number embarked. ! &i 5i 4i 5. 6. 7. Truck, i*-T, cargo, 4x4 Truck, i ~ T , TCS, 4x4 Ambulance, | ~ T , 4 x 4 Cargo d a r r i e r , M290 \ Truck, l~Ti cargo* 4x,4 Trailer, i-T, cargo Trailer, 1~T, cargo 4 1 1 2 2 5 4

b. Vehicles of t h i s u n i t were employed i n b a t t l e f o r a period ^of twenty-four (2?) 'days. Cr Maifunetions occurred i n both 1~T, and 4x4
t r u c k s . One truck was overturned i n landing c r a f t during
ship unloading, causing damage to r a d i a t o r , b a t t e r y and

other minor parts. The other had a bad clutch and was of no use for pulling in the sancl, Later, this vehicle was cannibalized for spare parts, slice i t was up for survey before embarkation. 3. Ammunition.

af Type* caliber and number of rounds expended.

1 . Cartridge, caUSO, Carbine, 111 2 . Cartridge, cal.30, AP&bltfd ( a l l
r a t i o s ; - . . , ' .

44,730

4. 5 6. 7, 8.. 9. 10. 11. 12* 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Cartridge, c a l . 3 0 i AP bulk * 139,440 Cartridge, c a l . 3 0 , <A, 8 rd c l i p s 172,080 3,024 60mm Mortar, jHE,K49A2, s / f M52 60mm Mortar, 1 1 1 , M83, s/f,M65 1,350 81mm Mortar, HE, M43A1, w^f M62 2,212 81mm Mortar, HE, M56, w/f 55 1,515 O 81mm Mortal*, Smoke, Fhos, W , M57 291 Grenade, hand, f r a g , MkllAl, w/f . 8,525 M10A3 .* S95 Grenade, hand, smoke, VP# M15 Grenade^ hand, smoke, colored,

153,500

Grenade, handj ilium, M X k Grenade, r i f l e j AT, M9ia Grenade, r i f l e , frag, ioipFct Adapters, grenade, prop, Ml Fyrotechriics, s i g , grnd, asst ! d* Pyrotechnics, f l a r e , trip s>ara chute, M49 . -<* , Page 20 of 27 Pages.

75 30 1,070 0 96 30

Action Repor*. 19 /botechnic, flare, trip, M49 20. Rocket, AT, M6A1, .36" 21 Rocket, Smoke, 2.36", W, T26
22* Torpedd, bangalore, Ml 23* Explosive, TNT
24. Explosive, Comp C2 25. Primaoord, detonating 26. Charge, shaped, *1O#, Ml, K2 27;, Charge, shaped, 40#, T$ 28. Fuse, safety, time 29. Cap8, nonelectric 30. Block, demolition, chain, Ml,
M3 M 4 ' ;

tCbnt*d) r
125
630

- 4

70
249cs
29rolls
8
28
ISrolls
902
314cS

b. Normally, this unit established forward

dumps as far forward as enemy fire would permit safety of
dumps and vehicles* From these f rward dumps supply was
handled by carrying parties who distributed riamunitlon to-
front line compan^s* The only problems'that confronted
this unit were lack of personnel for carrying parties at
times and the intensity of enemy fire so that carrying
parties had to wait until dusk to supply companies.
c. The only methods of storage weret
' 1. Establishing of dump in defiladed areas,
well protected areas or revetment:*
2. Segregation of small arms, high explosives
and demolitions and dispersion of each type dump ,so that
least damage would occur from enemy fire.
d* There was an adequate amount of all types
except 60mm Mortar, Illuminating arid 81mm Mortar, HE, -
M43A1. The packaging was.found to be good in all types*
However, there were instances where metal containers had
been- stacked incorrectly (upside down), thus letting water
seep in and cause rust and deterioration of powder charges
or increments. ,
e. It Is 'recommended that U/F for 81mm Mortar,
HE, M43A1 be tripled since this type is most commonly used'
against personnel. The most critical shortage of ammunition
was this type, it is further recommended that all 81mm
ammunition be equipped with a combination fuse having both
super-qiilck and delayed action. Much better use of the
Shell, U&6 could have been made !. this operation had it
"been equipped' with such a fuse* , In part, this would have-
alleviated the critical shortage of M43A1 for use against
personnel. .
4.' Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment.*
a. Flame thrower.
1. tFlame throwers of this unit were employed
in battle for a period of twenty-four -(24) days.
2. Excellent use-of the f^ame thrower was
made in this operation and functioning Was very good,
K. Chemical.

1 # a. Personnel were trained in detection and

characteristics of various chemical agents, px-inciples
ot collective and individual protect;
Page 2> of 27

Action Report*

(Cont ! d).

-means of decomtajBinationY Each company detailed one, (l)

man as chemical H00 and he had a seven (?) man decon tamination quad under his control/ .
b. A gas xaas^! protective ointjnent, protective cover and eye shad^ were issued to each individual soon after embarking. All chemical warfare supplies were stowed in #3 hold With high p r i o r i t y and were available at any time for emergency use* c. The collection of gas masks was authorised when this BLT reached the f i r s t assembly area upon landing. These masks were put into Co dumpra l a t e r to be consoli dated into a Bn dump* , < . ' '
. .

d. Chemical warfare, supplies and equipment

were kept in the JITB as the unit moved inland and were
available on call. ,
2* The Intelligence Section reports that in at
least the initial stages of the campaign, all enemy'dead
had gas masks and snail amounts of decoatanimating ppw&er,
indicating that" gas discipline of the enemy was good.

* ' , . - , '

3. There was no salvage of gas masks by this Bn

due to the fact that the masks were dumped in the 4th
Kar Biv sector and were salvaged by that organization*
During the policing period,, all salvaged gear was picked
up by higher echelon.
& Medical*,
1 Embarkation was on 15Feb45 aboard fA 19.
Personnel consisted of two (2) Medical Officers, forty-
one (41) enlisted, personnel and thirteen (.13) enlisted
personnel attached as collecting section from Co A
3d Medical Bn. Material consisted of units 1 t<j 10
inclusive, excepting units 2 and ,4, plus 10 day backup.

2. Aboard: ship there werp 18 reported cases of

diarrhea of short duration. A search for the origin was*
unsuccessful*. Sanitary conditions were satis facto ry.
except foi* the excessive heat in tr^oop compartment. 4B '
3* Personnel and material landed administratively and without loss by LCVP at 1400 on 4# ASsauXt p.hase. a* Hedical installation's were set up as follows;
' . > . . .

#1 TA i65-& revetment Feb 22 #2 ?A 165rG- tipper Fkb 22-27 inclusive #3 TA 165-B upper l e f t Feb 22-24 #4 TA 199-X Feb ^ - l l a r c h 2 #5 TA 199-J March 1, March 2 #6*TA 200-D March 2, March 4 . #7 TA 218-V upper l e f t Karch S e a r c h 4 * . #8 1A 217-S. March oWMarch 9 * #9 TA 218-H March 7^4larcJa 17 #10 TA 251-W March 16-March 17 #11 TA 2i7-S March l8-4iarch .27 ** Page 22 of 27 Pages.

Subjeotr* "V(#f| I F If Action Report/

<Cont!d),

All installations were set up with access abifkfty and ease of evacuation as the primary consideration.
Good defilade was present In almost'all cases. Personal
and unity security measures were maintained at all times.
Sandbag structures and caves were utilized whenever,
possible* In reference to the legation of aid stations,
the coordinates given above refer to the Special Air
and Gurinery. Target kap issued prior to the assault, All
dates are inclusive.'
b. Hospitallzation was done in rear areas by
other units.
c. Aid stations were located as lose to the
combat units as conditions warranted and ambulanc#
were worked up to the aid stations with few exception^ '
Evacuation from the front lines to the aid station w#
performed by litter teams of Marine personnel* ^These \i
teams were made' available by the Joint efforts of the
Regtl Surgeon and Bn Executive Officer and did a wonder-.
ful Job. The most rapid evacuation was achieved by
having litter teams stancUby in the -Company Command Post*
d. Casualties treated - 3d Mar Div Personnel.
(1) dumber - 404
(a) Retained - 35
(b) Evacuated- 36&
(Q) Pied m 4.
(2) Type.
- 53
(a) Head (b) Chest - 12
(c) Abdomen - 11
(d) Upper Extremities -*"139 (e) Lower Extremities - C$
(f} - Concussion Blast, Atmospheric - 9.
(3) Walking Wounded - 177.
(4) Stretcher Cases ~ x84.

Personnel

'

, Casualties treated other than 3d Ma#

(1) Number ~ 183. < (a) Retained - 18 N (b) Evacuated - 163 (c) Died \ 2* (2) Type. fa) Head , (b) Che^t (c) Abdomen (d) Upper Extremities ie) Lower Extremities (f) Concus?i.on 'Blast, Atmospheric (3) Walking Wounde<a 6 1 .
i

- 19 - 14 0 - 46 -' 6^ 24.

(4) Stretcher Cases - 122.

l^age S3 of 27 iages.

Repoi"';'

. tCont'd),

e. Sanitation followed SO",- Water was brought . up from :d-j;st'HJa;tiGrh-;- -glants on thevbeach pr ?rom ships in trb Uera or ^ ^ e ^ i t i ^ n a r y cftns. Ppod w&s packaged* Botil* water ;ax*3. fcod were adequate.
, . / . '

f. Qur &ea<i we*\i/collected by sanitation , personnel and bur:'ad.in the* Piv. C.emetk:.?* Enemy dead were buried on'the spot as soon ; conditions warranted* o g. N epidemics or unusual diseases were encountered^ '''.

h. Dental cases were referred to the Regtl dental dfficer whp referred,some cases to ships dental officers when his facilities were no,t adequate for the
care needed. . ,
, - ' '

[
*

'

i . N civilians wore treated. o j . Our funded prisoner 'was treated and tamed over to Bn-2 for questioning. k* Medical organization i s suitable.
* \ ' \ . ;

'

1 # As an i n i t i a l assignment the forty-one (41) enlisted personnel' wer.e adequate, The a men were em ployed as company aid meir; one t each platopn, and to establish and. conduct the aid stations, Ti.ilve (12) re-* placements Were received from the He gel Surgeon and were * used in the aid station and as cenpa^y aid men* There were 40 casualt.las^ The majority were among the company aid mei'. Some oX the wourided company aid men and most of tificfcG returned from the compani^ becauee of combat fatigue or anxiety neurosis were k.^t^on duty in the aid station* Hen Ruf^ering from combat fatigue or anxiety states^ who returned to daty" a ; company aid menafter rest and sedation, had an ; " .nost immediate return ' of symptonis usually in an aggravated' form. At times, only one o r t w o men were available for each company as - company aid men* Even when the collecting section was used to supply aid men i t was dif^ici^lt tp supply a 7 company aid man to each platoon. The heavy casualties suffered by Marine personnel wer^ replaced and companies . were brought up to strength* This aggravated the shortage of corpsmen,, whose casualtlee hadnot been replaced,, The replacement of corpsmen was. not adequate. Training was adequate and there was no need for men with specialist
training. .'<'

m&n. .Equipment/ supply and resupply were generally . . adequate rv see recommendations, ; 0. One Jep ambulance with t r a i l e r constituted th^ mo tor iadd equipment* Additional, anfoul anc& a, when . needed, were 6tit^ined promptly from tl;.e Regtl Surgeon, j>.% No cbmment* '-

' . ' q . Adequate;DDT spray facilities were made

. available by Kalarla and Epidemic Control unit#
. . 5, No comment*.
? * * . ' . . _

.
.

*''.-'-. . 6, Recommendations. Page 24of 27 II

Action Report,.

(Cont'd)*

a. Desifi, produce and issue a 'blackout tent

which will permit "easy access of a patient on a litter,
b* Make a better selection.-jof corpsmen who'
are assigned to infantry units of the BIF. These men,
especially those assigned duty as .company aid-men, are
subjected to great physical hardship and dangers. They
should be rugged and able to meet the strain of the many
emergencies with which they are faced. Men in the very
young, or the older age bracket, should not be assigned
this type duty*
c. Weasels were capable o going over muddy
areas and up grades covered with loose dirt where jeep
ambulances were unable to travel. They should.be avails
able for evacuation where such terrain is encountered.
d. Hake mosre adequate provision for the re placement of casual tins among the corpsmen,
H* Signal*

"1* 'Due to t i fact that there is only 200 kc

je difference between channels of the SGR-300 radio: there
is slight inference and "cut off" when there are two
nets operating in a small area on adjacent channels.
There was no inference on the SCR-610, SCR-536, TBX
and TCS. " .
2. There-were adequate nets and frequencies
4
assigned for! radio communication. . 5* There was no communication between ships and '
this communication platoon. * .
4. The assault force and g?r^ison wbrked together
in keeping all equipment operation and. supplied. There
were exchanges of wire and 'oatteries made very frequently. /
PART V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOWiENDATICIS.
u/:

I, . :

The following recommendations are made for consideration.

1. Against emplacements suc.h as: encountered on IWO
JIMA only time delay fuses should be used by Artillery.
It is recommended'that in future .similar operations that*
the majority of Artillery ainmu^tion landed, be so fused*

2. Comments and recb'nto^no^ations on Air Support rendered f r o n t l i n e , units. o,n I:OiJlHA operation, (l) Comments:
The support rendered to troops during the
IWO JIKA operation was on the whole, good. Strikes con ducted against enemy personnel and emplacements atpve ,
the surface of the ground was excellent..' Howeverj/ strikes
ote' against enemy emplacement'si in ' a f e * ^and Bunkers was not
very good for the following reaso .s: .. ,.
af TBFs were used as attacking aircraft against
point targets. \-.. ~ " - *;
" *V* Instantaneou-s ftBQ&:%odb^^^^,Qm^oge6. when
delay', elements wei*e necessary. - -
* Page 25 of 2? Pages.

Action Report,

(*Cont!d).

c# Munitions used were of too small a caliber*

It must be borne in mind that a TBF, although
an excellent plane for attacking enemy positions on a
broad front,, is not suited for point -targets. A gilot
in a TBF dropping a bomb must carefully judge his ""drop"
because at that moment he"cannot see his target. For
that reason, most "drops" made by TBFs on point targets
were either long or short.
The munitions used were in most cases im<~
properly fused and too light in weight. It was proven
in .the IWO JIMA operation that large bombs (1OOO#, 2000#",
or 500#) with delay elements varying from 1/10 to 10
seconds were the ideal munitions.
(2) Recofflnendat ions:
It is recommended that in future operations
SB2C aircraft be included in- each flight of support air craft to be employed against point targets. It is also
recommended that these planes be armed with large caliber
bombs with delay fuses. It must be considered that in
future operations the enemy will nave simllrr emplace ments, caves and dugouts.
Another instance where SB2Cs Would prove
to bc'thevideal plane is when a salient has been effected
into the enemy defenses. This particular situation existed
on IWO JIMA and the .flank units on cither side of the
salient were refused air support for fear of dropping
bombs on troops forming the salient. It is believed that
the SB n C could have effectively supported those flank
units by reason of its accuracy in bombing and the
pattern of the bombs dropped*
It is further recommended, if possible,
the SB2C replace the TBF as a close support plane, that
the SB2C be used for close supports and the TBF for general
support missions deeper i t enemy defenses. By reason of
f the bomb load the TBF carries it would do an excellent
Job against enemy targets ranging from 1000 Yds on up
from the front lines,
3. Replacement personnel fihould be allowed to train,
if possible^' for a period of at least two (2)' months
prior to an operation with the organization to which they
will be assigned. It is recommended*that such personnel be
assigned Infantry Bns in time to conduct such training,
but used until required g& replacements for duty such as
assigned for this operation.
4 It is recommended that'the. Unit of Fire for all
types of both 60 and 81mm Mortar ammunition oe tripled.
. 5. It 'is recommended that the 81mm Mortar Plat be
issued one (1) Carrier, cargo, amphibious -(Weasel) with
1 ton Trailer as organic equipment.
6. It is recommended that for future similar operations
against Japanese forces, specific ships (DDs) be assigned
a s njght illumination ships,, and c&rry illuminating am munition gniy^ excepting that which is necessary to its

IIAII'I im^

Page 26 of 27 Pages*

Action Report.

(Cont'd).

own defense. Continuous night illumination was highly desired and could be classed as rmndatox'y during the I O JBiA operation, W 7, I t is recommended that training be conducted at a l l recruit depots in flame thrower and rocket launcher operating to the extent that all enlisted personnel have at least a working knowledge i5T~these weapons in addition to basic individual weapons, ANNEX; " A> O v e r l a y t o accompany A c t i o n R e p o r t . ENCLOSURES: A. C o n s o l i d a t i o n o f U n i t R e p o r t s from 21Feb45-25March45*
B C o n s o l i d a t i o n o f U n i t J o u r n a l s from 21Feb45--25March45.

IU '\ WILLIAMS', LtCoX, Comdg.

Page 2 ? o f 27 P a g e s ,

Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 21st Marines,

3dfcarineDivision, Fleet Marine Force,
In The Field,
IIff
If

12 A p r i l , 1945.

CO, 21st Marines. Subject; Reference: Action Report, Iwo Jima Operation. 3d MarDiv Conf G 137. O

1. In accordance with r e f e r e n c e , the r e p o r t of t h i s B a t t a l i o n ' s action-on IWO JII1A i s submitted herewith: FART I, SUMKAHY.

A. This report covers the period from 30 'January, 1945

(date of receipt of Hegtl Opn Plan 2-45) to 24 liarch, 1945 (date
/s this 3n t a relieved of responsibility of its assigned, sector 'oy
2d 3n 147th Inf).
B# This 3n wrs ordered to Ian:" on 21 Feb. 45 and x: c-
proceed to assigned assembly area at TA 146 DOG-. 3n landed at 1430, on 35ACK Y2LL0 1. Before dawn ox the 22d the 3n moved to
an as-sembly area to the 2?ear of the.3d Bn, 23d kar lines, pre-* pared to effect a passage of lines at SIlTG-.Hour, The Atk, launched
f*time', progressed slowly against heavy enemy opposition and by
ot dusk our lines were just short of the of the southern edge of
ia A1RPIZLD No,, Z.
The Bn continued the Atk on the left of the Hegtl
ZofA on 23 Feb. The Ati was delayed due to tardiness of Tks
t attached and to intensity of enemy Arty and Mort.fire. 3y end of day' all efforts to hold a line up on the Field-.had failed and the lines were weith drawn fifty yards to more tenable
positions on the embankment at the southern edge of the Field*
' ' The Atk on the morning of the.24th"was delayed
again, due to tardiness of the Tks reporting to the Bn. "The Tks
were unable to &et up onto the Field in the mornrng, and the
assault Co received heavy casualties-whenever it attempted to
move up onto the Field. A second Atk, launched up either side
of. the'"NE .strip at 1330, carried the ri^ht -ascault Co across
the east-west strip, but the left assault Co became disorganized
after an advance of but 200 yards up the west edge of the Field,
The Co was withdrawn under-cover of the Res Co, which in turn nao.
to withdrew at dusk because it could not move out .across the
the Field to contact the right Co, Lines for the night snowea

n o g a i n o nl e f t , , . . . '; . / -.; , ;, V ;-':...;- -:-'r'

'

,
\

' ... The-2dBn, 9th Mar executea a passage o? our

lines the morning of the 25th, and lst Har reverted to Div 'r: Bes, During period from 25 Feb through 27 F ' the Bn remained
eb an element of Div Hes, provided.anti-sniper patrols in Div
ZofA and effected-reorganization-^Jid resupply,
21st Mar continued :Atk "across Fid No 2 on 28
Feo, this 3n in Hegtl Hes. . Bn.was cor; itted at 1530,to close
gap created by unequal ..advance of assault 3nsf 3y dark the 3n
lines were consolidated in"area HJ336,. I^T of Sulpher Iline

Refinery. . > ". '

, -
i

The Bn continued ..the Atk on the left of the '

" Hegtl ZofA at 0830, l.Kar* 'Direction of Atk was generally IG
across IIOTOIAI-IA AIHFJiiLD No, 3. The Atk sloped do^nby noon
due to heavy resistance, from, .the jfront
the left front, . , - J " . ' \ , .
'..- .:;;; P W ^ ^ ' o f ; ^ 1 ? page

PERATION.

(COHTfD)

Despite excellent SJffgnt from Tks, the lines by night were only
one-third of the way across the field and so extended that it was
necessary to employ one Co of the 1st Bn 21st to gain contact with
1st 3n 9th on our right* Casualties, officer and enlisted, were
heavy during the period.
On 2 Mar this Bn was to Spt the Regtl Atk by fire
from existing positions until pinched out by 3d Bn 9th on left and
1st Bn 21st on right." 3y noon Bn fires were masked completely.
Late in the afternoon the Bn, from positions behind the 3d 3n 9th,
launched an Atk toward HILL 218 DOG'in an effort to take the ground
commanding the eastern end of the Field and establish contact be tween the assault 3ns in the Regtl ZofAt The Bn was stopped.400 Yds
short of RJ 330 and the right flank was ...nable to push out to contac
the right assault 3n. 3y the. .end. of the day, the gap existing was
the width.of the Field* The Bn Comdr becejn; a casualty at 1730,
On 3 Mar this 3n continued the Atk to seize HILL
218 DOG- in left of Regtl ZofA. By mid-morning the 3n had a tenuous
hold on HILL 218 DOG* Res Co and one Co of 3d Bn 9th Mar were
committed, due to extended lines and heavy casualties. By dark
contact was established with 1st Bn 21st Mar in vicinity of RJ322.
No contact on left with 5th Div, whose elements were to our left
rear.
On 4 Mar this Bn continued the Atk In
^gtl^Zof&'i to seize Oa3*. No; gains were meJe during day, though
extensive mopping up with Dmls and flame thrower teams from 1st Bn
21st liar was conducted on HILL 218 DOG-. 3n under heavy enemy fire
during the day.
-a 5 I l r positions were maintained, as ordered, and
mopping-up was conducted in vicinity of front lines (HILL 218 DOG).
The 3n was ordered to continue the Atk to 0-3 in
the left of the Regtl ZofA on 6 Mar. 3n left fl-nk moved out to
forward slopes HILL 218 DOG. Despite fire from liigher ground to
left flank, lines were maintained and mopping-up conducted. At
dark, flank withdrew to form positions and consolidate lines.
On 7 Mar this Bn continued the Atk in the left of
the Regtl ZofA, to seize 0-3. The left .asault Co moved out to
0-3, remained there during day conducting moppitfg-up in TA 218 DOG,
Position untenable at night, since unit on left was unable to move
up with Bn, and 3n lines were receiving heavy fire of all types
from high ground to left flank. Lines for night were consolidated
on crest of HILL 218 DOG, to regain contact and secure 3n left
flank.
The 3n continued the Atk to coastline on 8 Mar,
having been ordered to advance in conjunction with 5th 3n on left.
By end of day, Bn able to consolidate lines generrlly along 0-5,
tying in with 5th Div-on left. . Opposition to front was negligible,
the heaviest fire coming from the high ground to 3n left flank*
The Bn continued the Atk on 9 kar, attacking in
conjunction with 5th Div on left. Gains during day were slight,
due to progress of unit on left. No resistance remaining in 3n#
ZofA.
At noon of 10 Mar the 3n was ordered to swing
north, pivoting on 5th Div right flank. By evening the lines.had
moved north, abreast of HILL 218 DOG, rhero heavy fire again
stopped the unit on the left and thic Bn l s left flank company.
Page 2 of 27 pages

OPERATION, ,^.. r p e r i o d from IX Mar t o 15 Mar, 3n was i n R e g t l R e s , conM*<fci%fe^salvage o p e r a t i o n s and e f f e c t i n g rssup-oly and r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , RRLwas manned from dusk t o dawn. . On 15 Mar 3n p a s s e d t h r o u g h Ed Bn 2 6 t h Mar l i n e s . . t o Atk n o r t h t o ICITANO P t , By end of day r i g h t f l a n k .had r e a c h e d c o a s t n o r t h of HILL 165 a n d - l e f t .flank was t i e d i n stf-th 5 t h Div s o u t h 01 s HILL 1 6 5 . . < ... ** On 17 Mar l i n e s r e u a i m d uncnanged and Bn conducted mbpping-up o p e r a t i o n s i n ZofA. -From 18 Mar u n t i l r e l i e v e d by 2d Bn 147th .Jnf on 24 Mar, Bn conducted mop-up and s a l v a g e o p e r a t i o n s i n M part of island.

PARTII.

PRELIMINARIES,
A, Composition of reporting command.
BLT 2-21 U ColEnglish

2d Bn 21st Mar 2d Plat ^pnCo 21st*Mar . , 4th Plat ( 2 Secs)*Wpn Co 21st-Mar. '. 2d Plat Co B - d Engr 3n 3 . 2dPlat Co B 3dPion Bn 2d plat Co B 3d Med Bn . . 2d Coll Sec Co A 3d Med 3n NC-F Team No 8 3d JA SCO . A Ln Team No 4 3d JASCO . Det 28th Repl Draft Det 34th Repl Draft

B. Between the time theRegtl Opn plan was received

and the- beginning of.the action, frequent conferences were held
with staff andCo officers and officers of attached units, A
combat firing exercise was held, involving the 3n inAtk and co ordinated employment of all Ifpns, both organic andsupporting,in
the Atk, Two CPXs were ^onducted, oneinvolving just theBn staff
and the* other both staff andCo Comdr : and officers of attached
and supporting units. One Tk-Inf exercise was rmducted and aJTk
demonstration andlecture was given. Intense Tng in Dmls^ a c ^flame
n! throwers was conducted and schooling ^jas" given all-hands in the
disarming and neutralizing of Jap mines. No rehearsal was oonauotst
on ship-to-shore movement, though Co officers lectured their men
on Amph Opns.
C, The mission assigned this Bn was to land on order
in Res (various alternate formations and beaches were specified)
and.move t-o.an assigned assembley area,
. D. At thetime the 3n was committed its composition
was 1 P latof 37mm guns Regfl pn Co, 2 Sees 75 SP guns"Regtl rfpn
Co, B Co 4th Tk Bn, 2d Coll; SecCo A' 3d Med Bh, and NQ-F and A Ln
Teams 3d JASCO, Strength ofR Cos was: S Co, 7 0 - 192Enl; F Co
7 0 < 188 Enl; G Co, 7 0"- 214Bnl, For position and disposition
see overlay attached, . %
S, Snemy units encountered by this 3n vere asfollows:
Unit Original Strength
3200-3400 580 Approx 450

145th/Indlnf Rqgt (46th Div) 310th Ind Inf'Bn 314th Ind Inf Bn. 8th Ind'AT Bn Naval Guard Force (Sast Sector-AA) Army Fortification 3ection Page 3 of 27 ]

OPERATION._ lCOHTfl>).

The above information was obtained from captured

documents and PO s. A more complete and reliable record would be
found in t a -Regtl Intelligence Section records. The same applies
ie to the disposition of enemy forces Wjich we had no opportunity of
>
discovering. x PART III. Chronological account of the action,
Note:. All times stated are KING Zone Time (-10)

The mission assigned this Bn was to land-on order

and move to an assembly area to be designated prepared to execute
a passage of lines to continue the Atk, or occupy defensive
positions as ordered. ,
A. 20Feb45. BLT 2-21 was bo-, ?d by 0930 prepared- to
land on order. At 1700 the BLT was reembarked.
*
2lFeb45. Bn GP landed on-33ACH Y3LL0W 1 at 1430
and proceeded to assigned assembly ar^a at TA 148 DOG-. All troops
ashore by 1530.
" C. 22Feb45. Received the " :gtl Atk order at 03001
Ren was limited to route of approach to rear of lines du to dark ness.' At 0500 the Bn proceeded to assembly area at TA 1S4 "JASY,
Crossing AIRFIELD"NO. 1 under cover of darkness with no casualties*
Bn in position, prepared to effect passage of 3d Bn 23d Hex lines
by 0830:' A few casualties inflicted by sporadic mort fire. Atk\
order issued to Co Comdrs at 0730;: F Co in assault, KING: Hour at
0835. Atk was launched at 0840, but by 1000 assault Co had pro gressed only 50'yards under intense Mort, MG- & small-arms fire.
F Co became badly disorganized at this time, due to the loss of the
Co Cocidr and critical intermingling of elements of the 3d 3n 26th
liar which had crossed over into this 3n ZofA. Due to this inter mingling, officers and NCOs had little or no control over their
respective units. Attempts to use Tks (Co B 4th Tk 3n) drew heavy
Arty and I I r fire on the Inf without any gain JVom their use. All
-ot attempts at air Spt failed due to weather condttions. At 1S15 G Co
continued the Atk and F Co reverted to Res. There was no airor
NGF Spt available. Tks were blinded ^oy the rain and could not oe
employed. Perhaps because of the weather, however, C Co carried
the Atk to the southern embankment of AIRFI2LD NO. 2 by 1700, when
the Atk was halted and lines consolidated for the night. The Co
Comdr had become a casualty, and both G end F Co had suffered
heavy casualties.
25Feb45, Regtl Atk order received at 0640. Bn Atk
order issued to continue Atk to 030i 1 on l.ft of Regtl ZofA. One
Co frontage, 3 Co in assault, KING--Hour 0730. Cos in position by
KING- Hour, but Atk not launched due to heavy fire of all types,
loss of Com and-.tardiness of attached T7-% -A second Arty prepar ation called at 0855. Inf Atk launched at 0935 after Tks had*
.neutralized known targets up on AIHFI2LD NO. 2, At 1005 2 Co was
held up by intense Aufco-Wpns fire from positions vicinity of TAs
199 XRAY, 182A3LS, BAK3H, K0?7. Froid 1000 to 1300, every effort
to gettropps up onto field failed, despite good spt by NG-F and
barrage rockets. Inf casualties heavy, A second Atk was launched
at 1327 following an airstrike, but the assault Co was again force-
back ofx the Field .by 1350. The lines were consolidated for the
night on the embankment: at the southern edge of the Field, showing
no gain for the-day. . " , '..,
Page 4 of 27 pa.

&. 24Feb45, Regtl Atk order received 0300. At 0600 a

Email group of Japs infiltrated,- attacked Bn Fvd Switchboard and
inflicted 3 casualties killed* Bn Atk order issued at 0715:

Tks attached to unit on right drew intense Mort fire and Arty fire on
lines during this period* Tks attached to this Bn reported to
their Atk areas (TA 182 PETSR) at 1000. Tks ordered to work up
onto Field and fire at known targets. By noon situation had bogged
down considerably and at' 1200 a second Atk order was issued. E and
G Co in assault, 2 Co on the right. S Co was to work up onto Field
from positons in rear of unit on right, at Ta 182 DOG-, G Co was
to go up under cover of the west embankment of the Field, continue
attack to 0-la. King Hour 1330. Atk launched as scheduled. At
1400 E Co was hit by a rocket barrage fired into our Z of A by some
unit of the 5th Div. Arty FOteam was among the casualties. At
1415 G Co was hit heavily by Mort and small-arms fire (TA 182 BAX2R-;
North) and its* advance stopped. Acting Co Comdr became casualtyt
At. 1500 E Co proceeded across strip to high v round at TA 199 XRAX*
At 1510 F Co was sent up the left of the ZofA to cover G Go's with drawal and reorganization| and became' engaged in a closed encounter
with the enemy at short rpnge which continued until dusk. 3n OP
displaced to TA 182 PETER at 1650. Due to approaching darkness and
undiminished enemy fire 6t all types it was impossible for the left
and right assault Cos to m&ke contact up on the Field. As a result-,
the left.assault Co was withdrawn at 1730 to the south edge of the
Field and lines were consolidated for the night. Only gain was on
the right, to TA 199 XRAY, Two COG 1st 3n 21st Mar employed to
cover critical part of tho gap from souther edge of Field to TA
182 DOG-. ' . :
F 25Feb45. Atk order received from Regt at 0605.
2d Bn 9th Mar to make a passage of 2d 3n 21st Mar line.s at 0930,
this Bn to Spt Atk from present positions,. At 0730 the orders
were issued to Co Comdrs and at 0755 the CO 2d Bn 9th Mar arrived
at OP for Ren, At 0930 2d Bn 9th Mar effected the passage of lines*
At 1230 this Bn completed withdrawal to Div Res assembly area. At
3.415 anti-sniper patrols were dispatched through rear area of Div
ZofA. At 1715 the patrols returned with a negative report and the
8J.mm Mort plat reverted to 3n control,, At 1915 the Bn completed
erganizatiort af its sector of the DRL.
& 26Feb45. At 0645 order received from Regt that
Bn remain in assembly area prepared to Spt Atk as ordered. 3y
0700 Cos returned to assembly area from DRL and at 0800 anti sriper patrols dispatched Bn continued resupply and reorganization.
At 1745 3n established it s sector of DHL.
H*. 27Feb45.. Bn remained an element of >iv Res. 3y
0805 Cos had returned to assembly area from DRL anl at 0800 anti-
sniper patrols dispatched,, &t 1045 vt^eoS 1mm 4Iort plat .detached .and:
attached to 9th Mar.\$#t" 1855 Bn established its sector of the DRL.
! 28Feb45. " "Earning order received from Regt at 0130,
This Bn to be in Regtl Res, follow rear elements assault 3ns at
300 Yds, conduct extensive mopping up Opus in ZofA. F Co furnished
2 litter teams of 1/2 Co strength to 1st and 3d 3ns at 0715. Bn
(less 1 Co $n& 81mm Mort Plat) moving out behind assault 3ns at
1125. 3 and C Cos ordered to follow riht assault Bn. At 1200 2 Co
ordered to mop up in TA 200 P2T2R* At 1425 Regt issued a warning
order to 3n and at 1500 Cos were assembled at. TA 200 v?.>vvn
Page 5 of 27 pag

Order feeing issued tcTCo Coindrs. Bn (Less F Co and 81mmm Mort plat)
to Atk in direction of RJ338, through gap caused by unequal Adv
of assault 3ns,- and gain contact with right assault Bn. King Hour
set at 1530, which allowed insufficient time tp move Cos 600 Yds to
assigned LD. As a consequence, 3n Come.!- set LD at RD 200 i:TC-*QU3N
and sacrificed Arty,preparation. Cos attacked at 1535, 0 Co on left,
At 1600, Bn CP displaced to TA 199 XHAY. At 1650 the Bn 81mm Mort
Plat reverted to 2d Bn control. At 1700 E Co cantacted right assault
*n in TA 200 DOB(NW). Atk was halted at 1730 and Bn was in contact
with left assault; 3n at 200 BAK2R- (Central) and with right assault
En at HJ 217 XRAY. One R plat K Co 9th'Mar assigned to G Co, and
Lines consolidated for night. At 1810, hu CP came under rocket
barrage.
JV !Ma,r45. At 0130 10 Jcxfj attacked a Cos left flank
200 BAIC2R) and inflicted 6 casualties. At 0400 received Regtl
/Vtk order for this Bn to continue Atk on 60 Az across AIRFIELD.Ho.
6, on the left of the Regtl ZqfA, KING Hour at 0830. The Bn
attacked on time, two .Cos abreast, G Co on left a-nd F Co in Res.
Due to the fact'-that the Atk order required a change in direction of
approximately 150 to the right, the left assault Co didn't complete
its swing and start put to the NE along the N edge of the Field until
0935. By 1100 the Bn was pinned down on a line TA 217 0302 - 217 '
YOKE by small-arms, Auto-Wpns end Mort Fi^e from front and left
flank. Tks (Co B 3d Tk Bn) were committed in Ta 217 YOKE to neutral ize fire. By 1155, 5 enemy Tks had been destroyed in Enrols where
they wore dug in. At 1310 a pafcEOl sent out to the left discovered
enemy resistance in Smpls in rising ground vicinity TA 218 FOX.
Activity for balance of the day was restricted to mopping up on
left flank and local Tk actions on the right flank. At 1540 the Bn
CP was displaced to TA 217.-WILLIAK (East). Our lines during the day
were over-extended and there was no physical contact withinr'the Bn
or with either flanking unic. Co effective strengths were 80 and
officer casualties were high. So at 1.00 the'Res Co w~as placed on
the,left flank and contact with unit on left was established. At
1800 0 Co 1st 3n 21st Mar was- attached and placed on our right flank
to establish contact with unit on ritJrc. 3y 1900 lines were estab lished at TA 217 0B02 (Ssst), TARS, 218 UNCL3 (SW), Between the
hours of 2ooO and 0130 2 "ar, an enemy Tk maneuvered aimlessly 200
Yds in front of 3n left f.i.ank, finally moving off without firing a
round. At 2300 an AT gun fired several .ounds into lines from
positions estimated at TA 218 HAI-!. Sniper and Mort fire was rec eived all during the nignt, .
& 2Mar5. This Bn was orc.ered to Spt the Regtl Atk
from-existing TOO sit ions by fire. Upon being pinched out, it was
to revert to"Regtl Resd At 1145 all 3n fires were masked but the
two assault 3ns had not yet made contact with each other. At 1400
received oral order from Regt to Atk toward HILL 218 DOC- from
positions in. rear of left assault Bn, and seize ground commanding
eastern end of AIRFIELD NO. 3 and establish contact between assault
Bns in Re^tl ZoTA. Cos reached point in raar of left assault 3n by
1545 and Bn attacked at 1600, G Co in assault. The adv was tempor arily halted at 1645 when the assault -Co came under intense Mort
and Auto~pn fire- from TA 218 DOG- and 235 WILLIAM, Ono Plat of
assault Co reached 235 VICTOR (South) and 218 BA&SR (North) at J1700,
where it x?as committed in a violent close engagement'for a half hour
It was under constant fire of all typos, especially a number of higl.
velocity Tfons from positions in TA 235 OTCL3. At 1730 the 3n Conor
became'a casualty end the SxO took command. The assault Co *ms
ordered to .withdraw to tenable positions on the right flank of "die
unit on left.
. " ' Pr-ge 6 Of 27 pag

0P2RATI0N. The other-two Cos were unable t o .push .ouV/onto Field, to make contact with unit on t i g h t , due to Intense ^ r e of a l l types ana the l a t e ness of the hour-. At 1800 the l i n e s yere consolidated at-TA-s 218 BAKER (Southwest), FOX and 217 0 3 0 ^ f i % Contact left,, no contact r i g h t , During night l e f t Co r e ce4rtne&'heavy f i r e from'high v e l o c i t y Vons, small-arms and I-lorts. ' ' ->' L. 3Mai*45* This' Bn. was ordered; to continue the Atk v i t a . 2 Cos a b r e a s t , main e f f o r t . o n the right s seize 0-3 in .Regtl ; T'.ofA, paying p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o HILL 218 DOG-. KING- Hour at 0745. Atk r a s launched on time, Gf-.Co on the l e f t , E Co i n Res, At 0840 C Co received heavy f i r e from high-velocity !*pns in TA 35 UNCLE* By 0900 l i n e s were in TA 235 "ULLIAK (South) -218 H W ( C e n t r a l ) , At 1000 I Co .9th ilex was attached t o G Co. t o secure O i t s exposed l e f t flank.. 3y 1100 l e f t and r i ^ h t a s s a u l t Cos had made physical contact on HILL 218 D C Res Co committed on r i g h t OK to p r o t e c t exposed r i g h t flank. No Adv w.as made during r e s t of day. 3xfcensive mopping up on HILL 218 D G conducted, supported Oby flame throwers from I Co 9th 2<Iar. By 1800 l i n e s were c o n s o l i d a t e d , contact established'.with 1st Bn 21st'Kar on r i g h t . I Co 9th Mar was s i t e d t o l e f t r e a r of left, Co to' cover exposed flank. Supply t o the l i n e s durin day was s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d by heavy enemy i n t e r d i c t o r y f i r e s on the F i e l d . ^ * AHar45. This 3n was ordered t o continue Atk and ** seize 0-3 on the l e f t of the E e g t l 2bfA,, protect Regtl l e f t flank. 1 Co 9th I-Iar. detached at 0730. KING- Hour 0616. At 0915 KIKG Hour was i n d e f i n i t e l y delayed. By 0930 left- assault Co established T con t a c t with 3d Bn 27th Mar. Cos receiving intense s n i p e r , Auto~ fpn.8? and high-velocity gun f i r e . Heavy gun i s f i r i n g from p o s i t i o n apparently v i c i n i t y TA 219 UNCLS i n t o 3n r i g h t and center a s s a u l t ' . Cos. At 1155 word was received t h a t KING- Hour was set at 1140. At 1330 center Co requested permission t o withdraw SO Yds out of t r a j e c t o r y of the Wpn in T^ 219 UNCLS. No \dv had been made during day, but i n t e n s i v e mopping up was convicted throughout day i n ex tensive enemy p o s i t i o n s on HILL 218 DOG-. At 1 3 4 * / 2 5 men fron-B* Go 21st liar wore attached for flame thrower operc.tors and Dmls P e r s Contact with u n i t s on both flanks was reported at 1345# At 1645 B Co 21st liar was attached to Bn and employed to strengthen l i n e on l e f t flank: At 1700 a<Gp-n;;~c up operations were suspended and l i n e s O consolidated by 1730 o n ' i i n i TA 235 -TILLIAM (S3), 218 D G (West C e n t e r l ) , RJ 322. N* 5Mar45. Ordered at 0130: tc r e l e a s e B Co 21st liar at dawn* At 0630 received order from. ?.egt to maintain e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n s , continue mopping-up v i c i n i t y front l i n e s . Mopping-up conducted throughout- day* Combrt efficiency of Bn reported to Regt at 1100 as 20$. .At 1730 24 and 13 replacements were sent to G ana 2 Cos r e s p e c t i v e l y . . /
" 0. 6Mar45. At. 0345 received order to continue Atk,
seize 0-3 in left of Regtl AofA. KING Hour set at 0800, three
Cos on lino, G Co on left, S Oo .on right. For the preceeding 3^
days heavy enemy resistance by fire evas encountered from Bn lefc
flank whenever units moved forward. So it- was decided that^Bn
would Atk in conjunction with 2&?*Bn''27th' Mar on left, as soon as
that unit had moved abreast. . 3y 0820 unit on left was abreast
of left assault Co, but its further advance was denied-bar strong
enemy resistsiice in draw .betweei) HILL 235 -"7ILLIAM and HILL 218
DOG. 2d Bn 27th liar and'2d 3n 21st Mar planned a coordinated &r,)a
at 1245, At 1245 G Co attacked tdwardO-3', advanced to eescern ^
slopes of HILL-218 JDOG.. 2d,Bn 27th Mar failed to Adv, and concacu

was broken*
:

/> i U-,r

**-

'

Page 7 of 27 p

Respite fire from left flank, assault units "jgaintataed positions

and conducted mopping up on HILL 218,D 0 % At"1730 G Oo withdrew
to former positions and established contact to the left, consol idated lines for night. By 1830 right flank was consolidated, with
contact with unit on right. 7 Mar45. 0055 received Regtl orde'r to continue
' Atk, seize 0-3 in left of Regtl ZofA* Atk to be in conjunction
At 0730 the Bn launched
vith 5th Div on left. KING Hour, 0730, its Atk, and by 0845 the left fleak had reached-0-3. (It is to
V- noted at'this pointt>that once the Bn had reached th high ground
on 3 Mar, resistance-wit'.in the Bn Zof-.-was scattered and easily
isolated by assault teams operating on mop-up patrols. 3ut due to
ihe nature of the terrain, the Bn, depleted in strength as it was,
was unable to Adv more rapidly than the left flank unit, or to hoi :
hold lines at night in .Adv of its flanking units^ It was evident : :
that/ at any time after, 7 Mar the S i could have advanced to the sea'
r with little difficulty,-but could hold the ground gained only if
unit on left were able to Adv with the Bn. Only resistance exper* iehced tras from, an apparently stubborn center'of resistance in 235
VILLIAI<I~ IBM and, initially from a high-velocity flat trajectory
I f n somepalce negr TA 219 UNCLS which could deny to our troops, tp ground in vicinity RJ 322 and southern slopes oi HILL 218 DOG.)
At 1130 a plat of Sngrs was attached and throughout day mopping-up
was conducted vicinity HILL 218 DOG. Mor and sniper fire received
sporadically all.day, causing considerable casualties to left
assault Co. 2d 3h 27th Mar, left flank unit# failed to move up
during day. so at 1500 Bn lines wore withdrawn to crest of HILL
218 DOG. A Qq 27th Mar was placed on Bn left flank to tie back . .
to 2d 3n 27tivMar.
Q* 8Mf\r45. Order from Regt. directed this 3n to Adv .
in conjunction with Atk of 5th Div on ,left, seize coastline in
left of Regtl Zo^A Order specified "push-the Adv in ZofA as
soon as situation on-.left permits." 2 Plats of Co A 3d Tk Bn,
1 Plat of Hegtl lilpn Cot and 1 plat Sngrs were attached. A Co 21st
Mar was to pass through this Bnrs right assault Co, thus decreasing
our previously assigned ZofA. Unit on _jrt did not move out during
morning. At 12CQ Bn Comer this 3n and 3n Comdr 2d Bn 27th i i r
-a arranged a coordinated ^ck, employing Tk.s. KING Hour to be 1230,
At 1230 left assault Co moved out, pr. needed by Tks. . Unit on left
came under Intense light Mort and MG fire and failed to Adv a s
' scheduled. At 1245 A Co 21st Mar completed a passage of right
assault Co lines. Our lines receiving Mort fire. About 1230 the
Bn Comdr was wounded, but remained forward. At 1300 right Co had
contact with A co 21st Mar. Tks operrting with left assault Co
still firing as directed by Co Comdr left assault Co, At 1430 Bn .
. Comdr and Bn Comdr 2d Bn 27th Mar coordinated a racket barrage,
and left assault Co was withdrawn S 0 yards. At 1500 unit on left
. moved out in Atk and by 1555 left assault Co and unit on left were
abreast on another. At 1635 lines were consolidated onO-3, con tact left' and right* Bn Comdr wounded a second time, returned to .
H* 9Mar45. The Bn,-^as-ordered to continue the Atk
to the coastline on the loft of the Regtl ZofA, attacking in con junction with the 5th Div on the left. KING Hour 0700. l o change
^ in attached units* 3y 1350 the Tks. followed by center assault Co.
were on plateau above beach east, of- HXLL HQ DOG, Enemy resistance
consiscQd of snipor, Auto-IJpnsj: and right kort fire from nign
ground in TA 235 tflLLIAK (Sast). XRKI (est)# D-yfs activity con^
sisted of-mopping-up &nd placing of Tk neutralizing ana des'cruetiv
fires in CLYGD in area previously nqntiondd , Oppo^tion to front;

/ : , . ' ..' '; ' P a g e 8 o f :tf

ACTION. I
within Bn ZofA was non-existent* At 1615 contact was reported-
right and left* Right flank advanced east from RJ 322 100 yards
to maintain contact with unit on right. At 173P center and left
Gos withdrew to 'high ground to avoid fire from l,igh ground to
left and to maintain contact with unit on left,
lOHar45. Atk order provided for 3d Bn 27th Mar
executing a passage of this Bn1s lines at KING- Hour (0800) and
xaon swinging to the north. Upon completion of passage of lines,
of Regtl ZofA. Bn 81mm Mort Plat to Spt Atk of 3d Bn 27th Mar.
At 0920 3d Bn 27th Mar had completed passarn of lines and had
swung to the north. Only cue Co of that uiilz was on plateau east
of HILLS 218 DOG - 235 XRAY. At 121J5 .his 3n was. ordered to change
its direction and Atk to north in conjunction wit,. 3d Bn 27th Mar.
At 1347 P and E Cos, P on left, attacked to the north. At 1500 F .
Co gained contact with right flank of cd 3n 27th Mar in TA235
XRAY.(Southeast), Bn was unable to continue Atk through 235 YOKE
until unit on left-secured pluffs in TA 235 XRAY. Enemy fire'
from caves in these bluffs.consisted of \.^o-^pns, light Mortj
sniper and grenade fire. At 1800 right Co of unit on left with drew from face of bluffs and this 3n withdrew to consolidate lines*
Contact left and right. Lines of 3n at KIL_i 218 DOG- - EASY
(South).
HMar45 to 15Mar45, Incl. On 11 liar the 3n was
ordered to Regtl Res. lst.Bri 21st Mar attacked across 3n left
front at KING Hour, and by 0930 this Bn was disengaged. At
1330 Regt ordered two Cos to return to Regtl Res area at TA217
"rILLIAK~XRAY and at 1510 the third Go was ordered to the area.
By 1545 the Bn was assembled in the Res area.
On 12 Mar, Bn remained in assembly area as regtl Res, con ducting salvage, resupply and reorganization. t 1450 Bn ordered
to establish a RRL on line TAs 217 XRAY (SS> to 217 ROGER (SW).
Line established by 1750.
On 13 Mar Bn continued as Regtl Res. Cos returned from RRL
to assembly area at 0720o RHL reestablished at 1750.
On 14 Mar 3n continued as Regtl Res, . Cos returned from RRL
to assembly area at 0500. At 1650 Bn orele: e l to establish-.RRL'
c on line from RJ 332 to TA-219 KING. Lino establJshed at 1915.
On 15 Mar 3n continued as Regtl Res, conducting moppingup
and salvage operations in vicinity of RRL (vicinity RJ 322).
tf* 16Mar45.v Au 0100 Bn ordered to execute, passage
of lines of 2d Bn 26th Mar at KING Hour (:815)., Atk on left of
Regtl ZofA and seize coastline. ^2 Plats. Co A Tks and. 1 37mm Plat
T f n Co attached. At 0715 Cos moving into positions behind lines
tp . (235 ABLE (S3)fc~ 251 VICTOR (SE)... . Also at.0715 3n OP*displaced
to TA 234 YOKE, Bn Atk delayed to coordinate Atk with units on
left and right. Bn launched Atk at. 0840, F and G Cos in assault,
F Co on left, 3y 1000 right flank had advanced 100 yards under '
Intense sniper fire and individual suicide Atks* "(Enemy ran into
groups of men and Tks with Dml charges and grenades) Tks and
Tk-mountcd flamethrowers offered excellent Spt, Right flank
advanced 200 yards against light opposition, At 1045 81mmMorts
displaced to TA 217 EASY. At 1145.E. Co moved up behind right
assault Co to cover gap caused by uneven Adv of assault Cos. By
13.10 ri^ht assault Co had reached coast at jA, 251 KING*
Page 9 of 27 pages

T s

AT; 1400 four war' dogs attached to Bn. At 1615 front lines were
at TA 251 UNCLE (North), PSTZ&, KING, three Cos on line. At ,
1630 C Co 21st Mar attached to Bn to Spt lines for night* 3n
in visual.contact with unit on left. At 1700 left flank with*
drew 50 yards to contact unit on left and lines consolidated
for night,
"V* 17Mar45. 3n ordered to maintain lines and con -Jinue mopping-up in assigned 2ofA. At 1535 C Co '21st detached,,
At 1730 two ambushes vere established, as directed, at TAs 251
KING- and $51 PETER (West Central),

tf. !5Mar45 to 2#ter45j Incl. On 18 Mar Bn ordered

to withdraw, to 3n patrol base at~TA 235 HO?r, MIKE and conduct'
tensive patrolling in assigned sector (generally TAs 251, 235,
536), ests-blish and maintain three outposts along coastline in.,
assigned sector, and establish ambushes nightly. All Cos in
assigned area, by 0925. Bn CP.established at TA 235 NIKE at 1200*
Patrolling smarted and outposts established at TA 251 KING- (South*,
wosty^ 235 ITEM (Central) and 219 ABLE (Norhtvest). Salvage and
toppingup operations were conducted throughout period, as directed.
Extensive' use of Dmls was made, Engr Pers being assigned to every
patrol, War dogs were used only as security, .Uoc-c extensive-
patrolling was conducted in beach-area*
At 0700, t 23 Mar, two Cos of 2d Bn 147th Inf. were tactically '
attached to this Bn, for employment in mopping-up operations. At
1510 war dogs and Engr Pers detached. . '
At 0800, 24 Mar, 2d 3n 147th Inf assumed responsibility of
Bn patrol sector and Bn standing by to move to assigned.assembly
area prepared to embark on order,
PART IV. COMMENTS. A, Ad ;JI iBJst v atlp.iu
. .

1* Our casualties from 1 ?eb through 28 Mar are

as follows: 17 officers tflA and 7 KIA; 401 Snl men WIA, 11 DOW,
and 101 ICU- 17 Navy Enl VJIA, 1 .DOT, and-1 KIA.
2, Concerning the morale of the troops, every
possible effort was made to promote good morale throughout the Opiu
Mail-was-brought ashore on the seventh da^, arid at frequent inter vals thereafter. Hot coffee and some :-rarm chow was brought to the
front lines after the first few days* A system was .worked out '
whereby the 3n was echeloned to the beach and given & chance to tals*
a hot shower,; and'a-change of clothing was givety them* Later in
the Opn movies were .s.liawn to the troops nightly. Before leaving .
the island arragnomehts were ma'de so that the* men could visit.the
oemetary. On the whole, everything was done for the men that was
possible under the circumstances. ' '
. 3# This Bn .captured nineteen POtfs. All
handled in the same manner. The R Cos brought them into the 3n
CP and after informing the Intel section of the details of capture-
released them to the Intel sec* They were then given cigarettes,
food, water, interrogated, and taken to Regt. All'POWs were taken
when the operations of the Bn had; reached a patrolling stage'so thr
the only questions asked.More concerned, with the whereabouts, num ber, arms, and condition of other enemy known to be in the Bn secto
by the POlf. In almost all, .caspa-.t.hey had very little-.information'

to give. '
"

; ! .*' ' ' '

Page 10 of 27

ICONT* D)_

B. Intelligence.
1. a. This Bn received a sufficient number of
maps for the Opn but it is doubtful that all were in the most
apposite scale. The official Opn map, scall: 1:10,000, \:as ex cellent for purposes of the 3n staff but w-as too bulky a sheet
of paper for Co officers and unsuitable'for the 3n OP. The Bn
received only 2 maps on a scale of 1:20,000. It is suggested
that for future operations the 3n be supplies with a sufficient
number of the latter scale maps to supply at' least the Co officers
of the 3ii* The large number of 1:5,000 maps issued proved to be
'-. great waste for their only value was for Vng aboard ship arid
as that time was so brief the 3n coulC not use them to advantage,
The maps themselver wore excellent in that they vjre very read able. However, as regards to their ability to reproduce the , "
nature of the terrain, it is felt that much is desired. They
v;ere adequate up to Opn around the AIRFIELD MO. 2 but did not
give a true picture of the .terrain from that point north. A
Kachured map would have-been far better f n r our purposes. All
maps issued have pr coper at ion enemy -installations .printed on
thorn arid for general purposes 011157- confused our mapr-reading. The
email"maps issued to the NCOs of the Bn were good for general
.indoctrination*"
b. The photos issued to the Bn were excel lent as far as coverage but were insufficient .in number to 'allow,
all troops to study them.
2. There were no maps or photos issued to this
Bn during the operation. New photos would have been used to
advantage.
3. To our knowledge, hydrographic information
was good but,it was not necessary at any time for us to possess
such information.
4. Intelligence disseminated to this Bn i-ias \ *
rarely, if ever, of much value during the operation. Tre received
very little in the way of timely intelligence f and that was usually
concerned with enemy installations at least a thousand yards in
'front of our lines. Tor close-in enemy information we had to rely
on intelligence sources within the Bn. Intelligence mattor issued
prior to the operation was excellent. .
5. This 3n had two means of collecting enemy
documents and materiel. One was our own troops on the line, 1 who
throughout the operation were most helpful in collecting enemy
documents and informing the 3n Intelligence section of the where abouts of enemy mater-iel and installations. They passed this in formation back by any means of traffic- that happened to be avail- ,
able. The other collective agency we had within the 3n was the
Bn Intelligence Section. It moved throughout the area behind the
front lines and collected any remaining intelligence material.
It proved capable as a collecting agency because the enemy was
counter-intelligence conscious and left relatively little material
on any value in our sector.
a. No officers permanently attached,
b. No officers .temporarily at'cached.
' c. No enlisted permanently attached.
d Attached to the Bn temporarily was one
enlisted interpreter. This man 1 s training seemed inadequate to the task of purposefully examining and questioning" POWs.
. . > \\ * Page 11 of 27
6.

However, under the circumstances it is doubtful if a better trained

man would hatfe functioned more efficiently since we could have a
thorough report on anything we might want to know from Regt within
thirty minuter of the PO!fs departure from the 3n CP. While in the
Atk it was not feasible to interrogate J O f because experience
?!s showed that the nature of the information gained thereby was vacil~
lativc and long-ranged, While communications remain effictive there
seems to be no need for language personnel in a 3n.
ef No Nisei attached,

7. Vocal propaganda was only employed once by

this Bn and at that time to no effect. Two enemy were discovered
in a cave and we brought up a sound truck and had out interpreter
ask them to come out. They did not and we were forced to blow up
"he cave. T/ritten propaganda proved effective twice because two
o r the POtJs taken by the 'Bn carried th^m. ' e feel that surrender
T j oaflets could be effective but in this Opn they Tere dropped only
along the beach area to the north and south. No propaganda ever
roa.ch.od the enemy directly to our front. Also, the only type of
wvitten propaganda encountered by this Bn was in the form of sur render leaflets. It is suggested that*a progressive approach might
be more efficacious. The dropping of current news dispatches might
bo the first s c j . An enemy 'whose morale is so high nqeds soften fdp ing up and surrender leaflets might be calledva final blow rather
than the only one. ' . .
8. This Bn had no JICPOA team attached to i.

9. Intelligence liaison within the Bn was adequate

but sluggish and showed a need of more extensive training, !7ith
other units within the Regt we had practically no intelligence
liaison because of lack of communication, With Regt during the
first two weeks liaison was poor due to the difficulty in reaching
the Regtl Intelligence section by phone. During the hours of day light it usually took thirty minutes to get a call through. Host
information received by this Bn from Regt was of no immediate value
zo us because it always pertained to enemy personnel or installation?
too far to our front, 3est liaison as far as intelligence is con cerned was with the '26th Mar, This was so, primarily because the 5th Mar Div had established a twenty-four hour intelligence net
within the Div, . This supplied a constant flow of enemy information
to our left and left front. The 5th Div also has a policy of main taining direct lines between adjacent 3ns, It is suggested "that
these two policies be embodied in our own SCr *
10* The password and countersign x o this operation,
'r was, perhaps, over-complicated, but .did fulfill itB function," The
shackle code used in communications, worked when used,' At times the (
situation demanded.speed and it was necessary to put messages out *
over radio unshackled. The radio was where most violations of sec urity were committed. The probable reason for. these violations is
that the responsibility for such security rests uncertainly between\ the Bn Communications and Intelligence Officers. It was observed
that most officers within the Regt were careless in this respect.
Responsibilities for counter-intelligence should be more clearly
defined.
11, From^ a 3n standpoint the enemy tactics which
gave us the most trouble was;their constant defense of reverse
slopes. This made . t difficult, be cause our supporting fires were
i useless* The enemy was thoroughly dug in throughout their entire
v Page 12 of 27 pages

IMA OPERATION
Def of the 1! several times fires against it.
r a unit in our case this happened"
ts flanks they were quick to direct

12. This 3n had little opportunity to study enemy

intelligence Opns or methods* Whfcn we made a salient the enemy was
quick to discern it and was always ready to withdraw to more tenable
positions. Knowing that eventually they must succumb they chose
defensive positions which would prove most costly in the taking.
j iiroughout the Opn until we had reached the northern cliffs above
tho sea the enemy had excellent Obsn and used it to advantage in
" i placing of his fires. ic .. "
13. \!c encountered no civilian population.

14. While the high ty e of enemy met during this

Opn ifas comparatively new to us, there was relatively little new
:,a the way of tactics found here. He had scon their Def in depth
boiore but never so extensive nor viciouc one. This was as thor ough a Dcf of selected terrain as they could make it. 'Jhcrever
wo turned we were hit by fresh fire. The day this 3n advanced to .
the north edge of Motoyama Airfield No. 3 we received firet from 360
degrees. At the end, when the enemy hau little bcj'ond hastily con- i;rived spider traps to use to stop us, they still managed to employ
the terrain to impede our Adv. The above factors, plus the patienco
of the enemy, worked^together so that all our strength was needed to
encompass even the smallest enemy position.
C. Operations and Training,

! No rehearsal exercise was conducted to indoctri nate troops in details of Opn.

2. No Tks were attached to this Bn in landing.

3. The 37mm AT gun and Tk 75mm gun were the two

most effective 'fpns used by this unit*: against fortified instal lations. Most effective Am was found to be a combination, of AP
and'AP-HB# For close-in Inf action, the rocket, AT, flame.thrower
and satchel charges, were used effectively*
4. Flame throwers, portable and Tk mounted, were
used.with efficient results "on numerous occasions, though pri marily in mopping-up rather than offensive Opns. The casualty
rate of portable flame thrower operators was 92$, but there is no
question that the ' . n is a valuable and necessary one in tho re .p duction of Smpls and the neutralization of caves. The Tk mounted
- lame thrower was used with excellent results in the difficult
terrain south-east of KILL 165, There, flame thrower Tks covered
by Inf, succeeded in reducing individual Smpls or flushing tho
onemy under conditions that would have crnt heavily in Inf cas ualties had the Tk mounted flame thrower not been used.
5. This unit employed no LVT (A) (4)ls. employed in accordance with current doctrine.
Tks were

6. Inf-Tk coordination in the early phases uas

poor to non-existant. On 23 and 24 Feb elements of the 4th Tk Bn
were attached to this Bn. No opportunity to confer with Tk Plat
Ldrs or Go Comdrs was afforded prior to the timo the Tks actually
reported to' the Atk area, which was consistantly after 1CING-Hdlx#
Page 13 of 27 pages

OPERATION^ jCOU'D).

On one morning the Tk Ln officer reported to the Bn Comder .with no

radio contact to his Tks and the Tks wore not instructed to come
up on the 3n SCR 300 channel. Initially there'was contact between
Tks and Inf by Tk-tpJLophone, but as the situation progressed and
the Inf became pinned down, there was no contact whatever. Sub sequently the 3d Tk Bn landed and elements were normally attached
to this Bn.. With the latter unit no difficulty in Tk-Inf Com was
experienced and conferences-and Hen with Tk" officers were held
prior to actual employment of.Tks.
7. Enemy AT measures consisted of high-velocity . T guns, Arty field pieces firing direct fire, .Tks which were dug
A in and hence not inane uverablo and land mines which were often
attached to aerial bombs'. The mines encountered were placed in
roads and just off roads in logical detour routes* Magnetic AT
mines wore found in 4 um PS in large quantities but no AT assault
ioams were encountered. AT guns were well emplaccd in such a
manner- that their field of fire was restricted to an'extremely,
narrow fire lane covering roads or approached onto AIRFIELD N0 2.
/ : u s ucro either in concrete Empls or the mcuths of caves.
:-n 8. War dogs t r r of no value in patrolling. This
oeo unit employed them primarily as security in outposts and ambushes
and found them effective in this function,
9. ATRoeivot launchers, while carried by the R
Plats in the Atk and sited tactically on# night Def lines, were
never utilized as an AT Wpn, They provou quite effective/in re duction of Empls, however, This unit used barrage rockets on
several occasions for neutralization fire. Due to their charact eristics and dispersion pattern, considerable care had to'be
exercised in their employment. But they proved effective, duo
primarily to their great volume of fire in a short period of time
and to their high-tangle trajectory. In addition they arc apparently-
quitc demoralizing to the enem;*.
D. '# Supply* 1.
( x

Adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies;

Class I.
Rations were sufficient. ,Tho ten-in-oneoration
was preferred by the troops when in a stabilized position. The now
type "C" ration 4 s far superior to the old type*
. Vfatcr was in sufficient quantity. The new
/ater drum is an excellent container. Spigots should be issued
prior to embarkation for use with the drur.i.

rations.

If galleys hp.c1 been set up.

before extra components were landed, the coffee, sugar and milk
Issued prior to embarkation would not have boon sufficient. Every
rood container should be filled prior to loading.
Class II.
All items were adequate for combat purposes
except the following:
1. Ranges, field. Opns.'
Page 14 of 27
These should be taken on all

ACTICI'_REPCRT,_IW;O J3$K OPERATION._/ (CCNT'D).

2* The present type carrier, food, vacuum,
was unwieldy when long hand-carries were made. It is believed
that the shorter carrier used by the ' r a would be better.
ary 3. The carrier, grenade, made up by the
salvage section, was an improvement over any previously used; but it should be better constructed and made so that grenades
fitted with adapters would have separate pockets from whicht
the grenade could be easily and rapidly withdrawn. It shouid
be designed to accoraodate either grenades or rocket (bazooka)
ammunition,
4. It is believed that inrfutur'e operations
the knapsack should be left in the base 'camp*. Sea bags should
not be taken. The Bn S~4.should carry, in Wilson Drums, enough
clothing to issue each man a complete change of clothing. The
Regtl ,QM should carry an additional change of clothing. (The
army type boot, worn by twenty-five men, was excellent. The* sole
wears much better than the liar in e Qorpo shoe.)
Glass III.
. . Fuel was .adequate.
Class IV.

Not.applicable-.

Class V.
All types of Am were adequate except ,81mm
Ilort Am which is necessarily limited by the number of Am bearers.
2* Adequacy of Hesupply.
Class I. .

No problems were faced in being resupplied

with the exception of one day when the distillation units were
not in good working condition. ,
Rations and water were always available. The .
problem was in moving the supplies from the 3n Fwd Dps to the front
lines. Carrying parties suffered many casualties. Air drop; was
considered but not used due to the fact that most of the casualties
occured just in rear of Co CPs. We took every advantage of air
strikes and Arty barrages in moving supplies up but many times the
fire was from AT Wpns located on our flanks.

C l a s s .II.,.' \ .
.

No difficulty was encountered due to the fact, tr

that equipment of'casualties was available. I l n men returning to
-ay duty from ships were issued no shoes, exc^t canvass sneakers, and
a few returned with Navy dungarees instead of liar clothing.
, Class III

. .., 1: I ,, } , " !
_. ..

Page 15 of 27 pages

IV.
(See Paragraph H.)
Class V.
Not applicable*
3. Palletized Cargo.
Wilson Drums were used to carry additional
Class II equipment. The drums kept the contents dry and also
eliminated any tendency to pilfering.
Some Drums were used uo make Dutch ovens
and served the purpose very satisfactorily.
4. This unit experience no difficulty in secur ing needed equipment from the RTB* The RTB was very efficient/
5. Salvage*

Pers gathered salvage at aid stations/

and from Co salvage dumps and returned the salvage, to the RTB,
Some trouble was encountered by having salvage dumpt> which were
located near roads, picked up by trucks of this and other Divs.
Men left behind to. guard the dumps were informed by the truck
riders that the dump was to be moved by the true: . This resulted
in the Bn losing credit for some- salvage*
In salvaging it was noted that field glasses
and watches were seldom discovered.,
Huoh of the equipment salvaged was unservice able and beyond repair. This unserviceable equipment was reported
to have been burned by the iv Salvage Section. It is believed
that the burning should not take place rintil troops leave due to
the fact that some casualties^.occured in salvage collection. The
burning tended to make men think salvage was-unnecessary and
caused some to feel that the casualties were unnecessarily suffered.
6, Captured materiel and captured materiel col lection was mainly a function of the Bn S-2 section. Large dumps
were reported to the Regtl S-4 and Div ti ,,cs collected the mater .-k ial. , ,
7. Transportation. .

Wheeled vehicles embarked by the organi zation were sufficient to fulfill all requirements. The trailer
used by the ambulance was a great aid'in moving Led'supplies.
/ The cargo carriers li B9C (Weasels) embarked
were ideal for the first fev. days of the Opn. They were the only
Bn vehicles able to cross the beaoh and haul supplies to the. Bn. .
No/spare parts were needed for the i T.
trucks except batteries which were easily secured*
A fan belt on one Weasel broke and there
were no spare parts available. Thte repair section of Co B HT Bn
Improvised a belt which was used throughout the campaign.

Page 16 of 7 piges

OPERATION.

(CCIJT'D).

No work was necessary on the vehicles of

this unit except routine servicing and greasing which was accomp lished in the RTB.
E* Trar. sport Quartermaster.

L Due to the fact that, the troop T 1 I was a cas Qualty evacuated, an accurate account covering his- work cannot be
given.

2. follows:

Some difficulties the Tvil-I experienced were as

(1) The space allot^d for the storage of

equipment prior to loading was not large enough.
(2) Palletized cargo was difficult to place
in holds and very' hard for the working parties to handle. Upon
unloading the same difficulty was experienced in handling pallet ized cargo.

F.

Ordnance
a
1. Wpns

a. No Used !
400 20 81 352 9
18 18 9 5

Type

Cal.
.30 .45 .30 .30 .30 .30

Carbine Ml Pistol, Auto. Rifle, BAR Rifle, Ml Launcher, Rocket, AT. . G-u1 , Machine, .10.91741 Gun, Machine, U1919A4 Ilortar, 112 Ilortar, i L J.

60ms 81mm

'

b,

1'Jpns were employed twenty-one (21) days.

c. In determining the number of Wpns lost

difficulty is encountered due to the fact that replacements
joined without being inventoried by this unit. Wpns turned in
-JO'RTB and credited to this unit include the following:
Type Carbine U.S. Rifle, Cal, HI
.30, BAR . ' Launcher, Rocket (Bazooka) Flame Thrower * B.U.G., 1917A1 B.li.G., 1919A4 Mortar, 60mm
No

48
177
38

4
9

:.o

Accurate statement as to loss of Wpns

cannot be made until complete, accurate, inventories of original
and replacement troops are made'.

Page 17'of 27 pa^es

OPERATION.^ ipUl'D) d. Malfunctions. *" ' *

Kany troops complained that the

IQ. failed to function:properly in that the bolt failed to lock
on,the forward motion cf the bolt. All mr:~ questioned stated
that it was due to sand and grit on the piece.
Some trouble was experienced in BAR funct ioning properly but investigations show 3d it to be due to sand and
dirt on the working parta. In terrain such as on Iwo Jima it is
,:ost difficult to keep Wpns clean. \
v One 81mm llort had a leaky end cap. The
end cap was tightened as well as possible but after a few rounds
it would again be loose. Div Ord solved the problem by welding
the end cap to the tube.
e. Spare Parts and Accessories.

Spare parts for BARs were not adequate.,

\ ' -No difficulty was experienced in repair due to the fact that sal vaged BARs, which were beyond repairt were utilized to repair
,
those still in fair condition. f. Recommendations.

B A R bipods and stock - eats should be

carried as organizational equipment.
The Launcher, rocket, !i9Al, den-ted
easily thus making it unserviceable. Troops attained a high
degree of accuracy with the new type launcher. It is easier to
carry than tne former model.
The flame thrower, fuel, which was mixed
prior'* to embarkation, settled and men preferred a mixture of gas oline and oil' rather than the napalm mixture because it would
carry farther. All functioned properly and no misfires were re-

ported. " ,

One Co used the heavy machine gun on a

light mount and was well satisfied with the results.
The 5th Div used the new type light
machine gun and from talking to machine gunners, from that Div
and those of this unit and appraising their comments we believe
this unit should-get the new model which is easier to carry.
2, Combat Vehicles.
a. , , N0, 4 1 : 1 5 ~;Z 4 b
combat u s e .

Types * i T 4x4 Trk* -f T 4x4 Ambulance. i T 4x4 TCSV T T r a i l e r . 2 Ktti. Carrier, Carro H29C (Weasel) I T Trailer I vfh
. ' '

Vehicles employed twenty-one. (21) days,

.-.'. . '

Page 18 of 27 page

OPERATION. (&) i T ix4 Trks were damaged. One (1) could, be operated and one (1)" could not be used or repaired* ' . One (1) 1 T t r a i l e r 2 W was damaged . h beyond repair on the first'day of combat* . . d. No malfunctions occurred.
x

e. . Tire and tulpe repairs wero one of our 4 biggest obstacles* However, no vehicle was out of operation for this res.son for more than a few hours f No difficulty was experienced except in repairing a Weasel due to the lack of the -;:>roper type fan b e l t . g. Fo recommendations as to modification of existing types of trucks. In the case of \ T 2 W t r a i l e r s i t is h believed that if the-bed could be made of a stronger material and a drop end gate installed they would, be better A c a r r i e r s . m In the case of carrier cargo 1129C (teasel) i t is believed that if spare parts could be available and a better track installed; i . e . , one Which itfould not become disengaged from the Sprockets and bogy sheels, each Bn should be assigned two (2). For every two jeeps an extra t i r e and tube should be carried in addition to the spare t i r e . 3* Ammunition.

Type C a r t , B a l l , Car. C a l . . 3 O , HI C a r t , AP, C a l . . 3 O , :*2, 5 - c l i p C a r t , AP, C a l . , 3 0 , 1.12, 8 - c l i p C a r t , R i f l e Grenade, C a l , . 3 Q , li C a r t , AP 8c T r , (Belted) Cal..3O C a r t , B a l l , C a l . , 4 5 , K1911 S h e l l , HEy H49A2, Isf/Fuse PB, S h e l l , I3.1uminiiting;, H83A1, K65 S h e l l , HE, H43A1, W/Fufle 1-152 S h e l l , HE-, H56 " S h e l l , Smoke, WPH57 Grenade, Hand, f r a g * , 1-klIAl Grenade, Hand, smoke, H - 118 C Grenade, Hand, sm^ke;ifefPl-i.~ ^Grenade, Hand, i n c e n d i a r y , 1114 Grenade, Hand, c o l o r e d , 1116, Red Grenade, Hand, c o l o r e d , 1116, Yellow Grenade, Hand, c o l o r e d , 1116, V i o l e t Grenade, Hand, i l l u m i n a t i n g , likX Grenade, R i f l e , AT, iR&l Grenade, R i f l e , F r a g , Impact, 1117 Adapter, Grenade, P r o j e c t i o n , Ml F l a r e , T r i p , P a r a c h u t e , 1148 Rocket, HE, AT, 2 . 3 6 " , JI6A3 Cap, Blasting, Tetryl, lion-electric Block, Dml, Chain, Ml Explosive, TNT, i l b , blocks

Expenditure 34500 33000 76094 250 199000 310 6092 1445 6221 2086 . 434 8850 75 375 25 25 25 15 450 140 10.0 96 40 320 600 31 Cs. 17 Cs.

Page 13 of 27 pages

Type
Torpedo, Bangalore, K1A1 Explosive, Composition C2 Fus e, Blast ing Cylinder, Ignition, & * Cylinder, Nitrogen Lighters, Fuse Napalm-, 5 gal cans

Expenditure 10 (1 Box)
10 Cs 500 F t . 10 9\ 310 10

b, In supply, the Bn 8-4 wculd request froa

the Regtl Ordnance Officer and receive the necessary Am, and
transport it to the Bn Dp, From this Dp the Cos would receive,
by meansixof carrying parties., the Am they needed.
One problem which .. J never fully solved
was the practice of men placing several grenades in their fox
holes at night and then having to move cut t: * early in the morning-
to return the grenades, which would not ^e carried, to a Dp from
which they" could be retrieved. The depletion of men through cas ualties made it impossible to police properly after the troops
moved out,
. c. Storage was not too difficult due to the
fact that shell holes were readily available in which to store Am*
However, the similarity of the packing in the case oS 60mm Ilort
111 shell, and grenades, rifle, frag, impact Ml7 caused some
difficulties in securing the desired Am after dark.
d The men did not like the new metal con-'
tainer for the shell, HE, 81mm l.ort due to the fact that as many
rounds can not be hand transported as the former cloverleaf packing*
The packing of machine gun belted Am is
unsatisfactory as the metal chest is very prone to admit moisture;
If a new outer packing could be developed- that is moisture-proof,
but still retain the metal chest, it would bp most satisfactory*
e. The U/F for the 81mm Tort should be in creased at least e,ixty (0) rounds on shell, HE, 1I43A1 W/Fuse 1152,
The u/P for the 60mm Kort should be in creased at least forty-five (45) rds on shell, 111, M83A1. All
other U/F seemed to fit the Iwo Opn in a satisfactory manner.
f. The 81mm Kc^t shell should be a shell of
uniform weight with a fuse which would be set for either delayed
or instantaneous action. Due to the scrrcity of the light shell,
equipped with the instantaneous fuse, harrassing fire was done
with the medium shell (delayed fuse), and in two instances when
Lanzai charges were attempted it was only the excellence of a
Superior 81mm Kort Plat which stopped the charge by quickly re adjusting thej'ort sights to fire the light shell. An average
Plat could no have accomplished this as rapidly, thus endangering '
the Bn zone.
The new grenade, hand, T-13 should be
tried in Tng for experimentation and study for future'us*e

Page 20 of 27 pages

Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipggnt;

a* This unit used "^-renty-seven (27) flame throwers, portable, H2AS. (21) days. b. c. The flame throwers were used twenty-one* There wr; no malfunctions*
-Vi.

d. No spare parts were required. e No modification^ on tfpn. However, either

the service unit should be equipped with a reduction nipple to f i t
the Navy type nitrogen c y l i n d e r / or the Army type nitrogen cylinder be adopted- The service unit is designed to f i l l the flame thrower from the Arrny^ylinder, not the Navy cylinder. # 5. Enemy a. Weapons. ,

This unit turned over to a Div Salvage

truck three (5) heavy machine guns, type and caliber not known.
b, Ammunition.
Several caves of Am were cleared and the
Am stored in Dps near roads and the location reported to Regtl
S-4. This Am was; subsequently picked up by Div. Kany types, of
Am were noted but due to lack of Pers and tire, nosattempt was ,
made to classify the types.
Gk Chemical.
1, a. Training conducted in chemical warfare,
and defense against it, covered little but the b&sic fundamentals.
Each Co in the 2d Bn was given abox^t five hours instruction in
chemical warfaref If this period of time liaci been devoted to any
one of the many subjects, which come under the general subject of
ohemical warfare, the average individual would have had a; more
thorough understanding of that subject- As the five hours in struction cgarered chemical warfare from its history to gas mask
drill, the fLme allotted was insufficient. Although their train ing could have been more extensive/ the men had a pretty good.
knowledge of the types of chemicals, Its effects and its remedies *
They were indoctrinated in the gas alarms and' the use of their
gas masks. ., . . . ,

. * ' ' . '

b. Before landing all troops were issued

gas masks, protective capes, and protective ointment. Add itional protective ointment-, shoe impregnite, impregnated clothing,
and decontaminating apparatus was carried in general cargo aboard
shipB. Any of that gear could have been made available on call.
Each vehicle was equipped with*a one and one-half^quart decontam inating apparatus.
c* On 25 Feb 45, D pi 6, the collection of
gas masks w^s authorised. Each Co collected its gas masks and
placed them in a Go Dp. "Bn Qtl P.ers using En vehlclee collected
the masks from the Co Dps and placed t^em in the 3n Dps,

Page 21 of 27 Pages

OPERATION.

mmm

""*

W^

*"*

Chemical warfare supplies and equipment

were kept in the Bn. Dps after they came ashore.
2.
* .

None*

3,

None.

4. Gas discipline among our troops was unobserved

except for the fact that the* troops did not'drop their gas masks
until authorized by the Bn Com&r to do G O .
5, Taking the terrain and number of casualties
into consideration, the salvage of gas masks was conducted very .
successfully There were no particular organization or equip ment allotted for the salvage of chemical warfare equipment alone*
Salvage of all equipment including chemical warfare equipment, was
done by working parties from each Cov' Each day trucks were made
available to us for salvage. This Bn turned*in 538 gas masks for
salvage. A the time those/masks were'turned*. In we were not given
credit for any salvage equipment*; The number of ttiese gas masks
which were repaired or found unserviceable is unknown as they, were
turned over to Regt immediately after salvage.
G. Medical 1. *Embarkation.
a. Personnel. The medical Pers embarked
aboard the USS. PRESIDENT JACKSON on 111 ab45 along with the troops
of the Bn, the Co Aid Hen with their respective 0r3, and the two
aid station teams with a collecting section from Co A 3d Hed Bn
with^Hq Co. ^
b. Material. Immediate medical equipment and
supplies were carried aboard by the Pers* The Jeep ambulance and
one trailer of medical equipment was loaded and stored inithe hold
of the ship. Our ten day back-up supplies and our heavy combat
field equipment was loaded as bulk cargo in che hold of the ship.
2. Aboard Ship.

. .

a, Sickness. There was no incidence of ser ious sickness ~ aboard sh'ip. Sick calls were held twice daily and
only the ordinary monor ailments were encountered.
b. Sanitary Conditions. The sanitary con ditions aboard the USS PRESIDENT J A C K S C N were very satisfactory..
Heads were kept clean at all times and thoroughly scrubbed down
daily. Living quarters were clean, although the*r were crowded and
ventilation was poor. The messes* galleys, cooks and messmen were
satisfactory* . ". , . .
c. Special Precautions. than general sanitary measures~
3. Debarkation.
None were taken other

a. Personnel. Kedioal Per6 were debarked as

follows: Co Aid Hen went ashore with their respective units. The
Fwd echelon aid station consisting of one Kedical Officer, twelve
corpsmen and on half of the at:tacHed collect ion section was in
one boat. The rear echelon aid1 station consisting \of one Medical
Officpr, fourteen corpsmen? and( second half of attached collecting

Page 22 of 27 Pages

ACTICJi.REFORT, IWC JII-IA OPERATION.

(CGNT'D)

s e c t i o n was in second b o a t . Both boats were in the f o u r t h wave. Remark*. Due to unavoidable circumstances of a c t i o n the Bn was in LCVP's for seven (7) hours on 20Feb45 and were then brought back and were reembarked on the APA. Due to the exposure t h e r e was a considerable incidence of c h i l l s and fever and seasickness t h a t evening and n i g h t , which was e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d . The same plan of debarkation was followed on 21Feb45 and a f t e r five hours in LCVP's the fourth wave landed at approximately 1500 b Material. The immediate nedical supplies
were carried ashore by the Bers. That portion packed on our jeep
ambulance and trailer, came ashore with one Corpsman in charge of
supply on D plus four. The ten (10) day back-up medical supplies
were not brought ashore until D plus fourteen (14).
c. Losses of Pers a . . : .Material, None.
4, Ashore - Assault Phase.
a* Medical Installations.

1. The Bn aid Stations were set up as

soon as our Bn was committed in the attack on 22Fcb45, and were
functioning at all times during the attack phase. Originally
the forward and rear echelons worked as a single unit in the Bn
CP area,,and as soon as possible a forward dressing station was
set up as close behind the lines as possible. This forward dres sing station would generally move back and consolidate with the
rear aid station in the late afternoon after the line Cos had tied
in for the night, moving forward again the next morning. The rear
Aid Station would move forward with the Bn CP
2. Both the Aid Stations were generally
set up on a road, as close to the center of the ZofA of the'Bn,
as cover and passable roads would allow Cover was good in most
instances, a well defiladed site was used. The Pers were kept as
well dispersed as possible, particular strcrs being placed in
keeping men not actually treating casualties in fox-holes away
from the aid station team. Whenever possible, close contact was
kept with other Bn Aid Stations, so, that mutual assistance could
be given when needed. The forward dressing station which was
quite mobile was placed a$ close to. critical points and along the'
natural line of drift of the walking wounded as was possible and
still not be under too heavy enemy fire*' .
3. Protective Measures Taken. Local
security was provided at all. times by .having guards posted. In
the rear Aid station this was part of the GP Dr,f,while- in the
.forward dressing station the Harine li'tter-bearers were dispersed
around the station forming a perimeter. Cover and concealment was
n the form of deep shell holes or bull-dozed excavations or natur al terrain features affording protection. Black-out precautions
were strictly enforced. At night the rear Aid Station had a black out tent in which casualties gould be treated.
4. The purpose of moving the forward
dressing station back to the Bn CP with .the rear Aid Station at
night was to give greater security, and to be able to go over
the next days plans with the Bn staff. Also treatment could be
given in the black-out tent. : . -

Page 23 of 27 pages

jSm Hospitalization. carried out by this activity,

c. Evacuation.

Ifo hospitalization was

!/ Evacuation of the wounded from the front

lines was carried out by means of litter-bearers, mainly Marines and
especially designated Corpsmen who accompanied the Marine litter-
bearers. These teams brought the stretcher casxjs and walking woundec
back to the-forward dressing station, and after emergency treatment
was given, 'these casualties were evacuated by jeep ambulance. Some
of the cases were evacuated back to the rear Aid Station where fur ther treatment was instituted before evacuation to the lied Co;
others were evacuated directly to the Ked Co without 'going through
the rear Aid Station.
8. Evacuation of ths casualties on the
whole was adequate and also with the greatest expediency possible,
,0n occasions litter-parties were pinned down by enemy fire for some
time and not until late in the. evenings after, the line Cos had tied
Cn one occasion, it
%in was it possible to get the*casualties out. was impossible to get jeep ambulances,up' to the forward Aid Station
because of mortar fire along the road. The Collecting Section was
then used to take stretcher parties back to a position where they
could be .put on the ambulance* After several hours, a new trail
was located and^made passable for' the ambulance and this condition
was relieved.

d. Casualties treated.

1, Total number - 648. Includes Sk, W I A , DGtf

VIA
Duty Evaciiated: Ambulatory Stretcher
TV\T-f

SICK

83

Duty I^acuated: 76 330

o
8

3

22
126

Ambvo.itory Stretcher

DOW

TOTAL
RECAP
WI*. 489
DO^ 8'
SICK 15J. ,
Grand Total 648
2. Types^ of wounds:
Head Trunk (Chest & Back) tipper Extremities . Lower Extremities Abdomen TOTAL Blast Concussion

TO&aL .

"TBT

52
129
104
112
14
411

78

Page 24 of 27 Pages

ACTION REPORTjTMb $*!/ CPEHaTICN

(CCOT'D)

2. The types of casualties treated were

varied. Wounds of the extremmties predominated. Head injuries
were also quite high* The incidence of penetrating chest and
abdominal wounds was not extremely high. Blast Concussion cases
were extremely high for the first three days of the operation.
During the latter stages there were fewer of these cases, and
many of these had fragmentation wounds.
e. Sanitation. The usual sanitary measures
in the field were carried oat adequately, * & no special pre ; cautions were necessar.y. When the Bn *Tas in an assembly area
closed-in heads were used. These and all garbage and trash dis posal Dps were either burned out or sprayed'daily. When hot food
was brought up hot water for washing mess gear was furnished*
Treated water was supplied by Bn QM.
f. Disposal of Dead,

1. Our ( c d wore removed as soon as it

"a was possible to get to them, by a party of r o from the Bn Burial
.n and G-raves Detail. The bodies were collected into one area and
picked up by truck from the,Regtl Burial and G-raves Detail/ and
transported to the Div Cem ' . .
2. Enemy dead that were encountered were
buried under several feet of earth. These burial places were'
sprayed-when spraying solution was obtained. After this the bodies
were first sprayed before being buried.
g. in the troops* h. 1. Dental Service. No dental service given. Care of Civilians. None There were no epidemics or unusual diseases

J. Prisoners of War, care of. There were only

two (2) PCWs cared for by this activity. On 16Mar45 when the for ward dressing station was located at 235" H " r (SW) the first PCW
O. was brought in by a stretcher from 0 Co, and was treated by the 3n
Surg, The P O T had three (3) badly infected wounc1^ about the head .
'V and chin and an infected vound on each leg. . A la^je wooden splinter
was extracted from the chin wound* The wounds were dressed with
sulfa dressings. POW was evacuated to Regt by jeep-ambulaiace. On
21Har45, at Bn Aid Station, located at 235 I.IKE (WC), the second
PCW was treated by the Bn Surg. He had detonated a grenade in his
hand, and had severely lacerated both hi", uands. A sulfa dressing
was applied and morphine was given. Ho was evacuated by jeep-am bulance to Regt.
kt 'Medical Organization. The present type of
organization for the Bn was very adequate and suitable. The att ached collecting section, however, was used very little because
the ambulance was able to evacuate directly from the forward dres sing station except on two occasions. The collection section does
not work forward of the Aid Station therefore they were not needed.
It is suggested that the collecting section be dropped from the lied
Organization of the Bn, except possibly two (2) or three (3) men
who would be used to accompany the ambulance on its ;trip to the
Field Hospital to give any treatment needed'' during that period.

Page 25 of 27 pages

OPERATION

1. Iledlcal Personnel* < 1. The Medical Pcrs of the Bn was quite

adequate going into the assault .phase*. Five Aid lien were assigned
to each of i h throe line Cos, one Aid Kan with the 1 rt Plat, one
;e ; man in charge of resupply, and the remain...ig Gorpsrnen were assigned
to each of the two Aid Stations." A collecting section of thirteen
(13) men was attached to the Bn, but were UJ cd very 3-ittle. (See
para K.)
2. The to&al number of Corpsmen, who wore
originally with the Bn on landing, lost during the Opn was W o (S)
KIA and twenty-one (21) WIA or sick, and evacuated. Four (4) of
those men returned to duty and finished the Opn, .
3. We received a total of SI replacement
Corpsmen during the Cpn. Of those twenty-one, three (3) were KIA
and one (l) DOtf, Three (3) were wounded"and one (1) of these re turned to duty. Ten (10) were transferred back to their parent
organization before the end of the assault phase* Two more re-*
turned o the parent organization at the end of the assault phase.
4. The state of training of all the Corps men was very good, and they functioned well*.
Bn lied Org. 5. There are no specialties needed in the #
>

"m. Field Kedical Equipemnt. Nearly all our

full allowances of. combat .field equipment was curled. This in cluded units 1 and 3/ 5 to 12, and 14 and 15* These units were'
up to full allownace.
Our only loss was in litters. One unit
9 was stolen and several litters were 1c; .> when litter-teams were
hit by enemy.fire.
Field equipment x < s very adequate and
fa suitable. Some of it was unnecessary in a Bn lied set-up, the
most notable examples being unit 12 and 15. Unit 12 is not
practicable to set .up and the litters in unit 15 are awkward for
the men to carry and do not fit well on the jeep ambulance.
. Resupply from the" Reg Ifcd Co, and Evae
Hosp was very satisfactory except during the latter stages of the
Opn. It was difficult to obtain litters because air evacuation
was being used extensively,, and the litters were flown out, but
none brought back to the island.
n, Medical Supplies. & full allowance of Ued
Supplies plus a ton (10) day back-up supply were carried into the
OpnV However, the ten (10) day back-up supply was not brought
ashore until D plus fourteen (14), and if resupply from rear ech elons had not been so satisfactory, we would have been in. dire
need of supplies. There were no-appreciable losses.
The supply of large battle dressings in
the unit 7 is far above that required, >and it wcnr.d be better, to
increase the quantiuy of c;mall battle dressings; The allowance
of serum albumin is too small. An allowance .of 2bO units would
be more satisfactory. It is also suggested that 500cc u - f s of
nic plasma be supplied rather than the 250cc unit. An allowanoe of 100
units is suggested.
L Page 26 of 27 pages

Resupply of medical supplies was quite good,

except for an occasional shortage of serum albumin. There was no
resupply of brandy, * '
o. Motor Vehicles and Rolling stock. One jeep
ambulance and one trailer were taken ashore. T < a c was no loss
/.r except for the-loss of the spare tire for the jeep., Attached jeep
ambulances from Regt and Mcd Co were very adequate
supplies and equipment, The trailer was used in transporting lied
. ,

p. Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies. No

quartermaster equipment or supplies used e::jcpt for black-out tent.
q. Supplies*
Atabrine Or. I i None used,
Quinine 0-r. Ill None used.
2,000 tablets carried*
2,000 tablet carried.
Kalaria and Epidemic Cont-'ol Equipment and

5, Ashore - After completion Assault Phase*

a.
' >

Hospitalization, None

b. Equipment. Adequate.
c. measures carried out,
d.

Medical and Quartermaster supplies and

Sanitation. General Field Sanitation
Food and Water, Adequate.

e. Sickness.* Epidemic or unusual diseases in

troops or native population. None.
6, PART V* Recommendations: See paragraphs k, m, and n.

0CH01.USIGN' AND ^ECOlil-iENDaTlONS. '

A. No additional recommendations to make. All recom mendations and conclusions are embodied in the p-^agraphs o f PART
'
J

"

C-* A, PERCY

Page 27 of 27 pages

HEADQUARTERS, ID SATTALIOIT,
2BT 11VHIBB FORCE." IF TK8 1 ^.
11 April,
From; fo:
Subject: References Enclosure: !rhe Commanding Officer.
The Commanding Officer. 21st Marines,
Action Report.

(a) Jd Marine Division General Order

>T

umber 137*

(A) Special Air and Gunnery Target Map 1:10,000 of Iwo Jima*
Volcano Islands.
Part I# Summary.

1. Mission of this organization, namely to be embarked as landing

force reserve, was made known to the officers of this command. J) January, U
(a) 15 January, 19^5 to 12 February, I9H5 complete training phase.
(b) 13 February,. 19^5 to 21 February to target area. (c) 21 February, 19^5 to 16 March, 19^5 conducted active oper ations on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands. * 2. This battalion leading team ("*-2i) -. r>art of RCT 21 arrived at
> the transport area the morning of I W a y at 1000 is Corps landing Force Reserve.
On D/l it was debarked 1 :to sma*1"1 boats, snent tho d^y on+ water and w^.s
reembarked without landing, On U/2 (February 21) it wo,s aebarked again in
accordance with the debarkation schedule and was la.r.ilod on beach Tellow 2 at 1600
thai date and proceeded to an assembly area^ The regiment was attached then to ;
the Fourth !Division* This battalion made one major attack during this phase in
which it seized the center of airfield number two tt was then passed through ' .
byva battalion of the 9tk Marines and remained in reserve attached to the 9th
Marines. Its next major attach was under 21st Marines control when it seijsed the
village of Mdtoyama. It was then attached, to the 9th Marines and remained in
reserve for a day. It reverted again to 21st Marines control and attacked again
on the left of the Division ZofA* Upon reverting to reserve it was again
attached to the 9*h Marines and concluded the remaining d'ays of the active oper ation in liquidating the area known as Cushmanfs Pocket* Upon conclusion of the
organized resistance this battalion was assigned the patrol area in the north
central part of the island (around Hill 362) and eliminated al^. enemy resistance
there.
Part II. Preliminaries.
1. Composition of reporting command*
embarked for passage

(a) This command was composed of an Infantry battalion with

temporarily attached Joint Assault Signal Company units consisting of an air
liaison group and a naval gunfire group and at Various times had a platoon of
Company Engineers, a platoon of War Dogs and a platoon of tanks attached.
2* Inasmuch as the .mission assigned thJ unit placed it as the
* reserve battalion of a regiment a part of a division'in corps' reserve, no specific
missibn c ould be assigned prior to D-day* The general natu:. ^ of the. attack was
known and extensive time was devoted to.the assault of pill "boxes and use of pole
charges, flame throwers and demolitions* As'.for'rf^tGa^^^s^ one division C^X was

rt (Cont'd).
held to perfect communi#^jlrinsf one regimental CMC was held to further perfect
technique and one combineaiHfantry artillery firing problem was held for the
battalion in which all infantry battalion weapons plus one platoon of regimental
weapons J5m Self Propelled, one pTatoon of 31ML Anti-tank with one battalion of
75 m m Pack Howitzers in direct support participated.
3 Since t^e miss Jon of this battalion was to land on order on a
beach to be announced as regimental combat team reserve no specific mission was
assigned and no plans could be made other than to embark, prepared to land in the
assault if necessary and to axpecs anything. . ' ,
^. For position, and disposition of *r^opa at the outset of the
action see overlay number (l). Composition* Headquarters Company and 3 rifle
companies, attached: 81mm Kbrt*,-r platoon 1-21, Co "C*, *Hh Tank Battalion.
5 In the first major attack of this unit in the vicinity of air field number two the following enemy forces were estimated (&-2)j
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 309 Ind Bn. Ind M Co 2d N 3n. S D 3d Anti-Tank Co. 10 Ind 3n. Uaval Cruard Force (35O.men). ^Taval Construction Engineers (35O)fflen),

Approximate tota^ defending the entire se-.^or 1,750 men. In the second major attack in /v the vicinity of the sulphur mine and'the village of Motoyama thence north the following were estimated: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 3d Bn i f Ind Regt. ' '. One (l) Co of 1st Ind MJ Bn* ( One (l) light mortar platoon* ' Naval Gaard Force' (250 men). . ' . * Naval Construction Bn (Par^u - 2^0 men)n 26tix Tank I.-\>tl Hqs - lU tanks. ' ~"' "

Ifoto; ThGGO forces were so intermingled that it is not possible

to indicate frow material now at hand their correct disposition on the ground. In
some instances Faval Guard Force and Army units were killed in the same pill box
manning a single machine gun. . '
part III. Chronological account of ts.e action.
1. All time referred to is 2^10 hours (King time).
Map reference: Special Air and Gunnery Target MaJ> 1:10,000 of
Iwo Jimat Volcano Islands, See Snclosure(A).
B-Day. 19 February, I9U5.
1000 Arrived in transport are^ off Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands*
Smbarked in USS Bolivar.
D/l. 20 February, I9U5.
0S0O Disembarked landing team and proceeded to control vessel
off Beach Yellow 2. Continued to rendezvous varea, awaiting orders.
IU30 Ordered to return to Bolivar and reembark.
1730 All troops ^.nd. vehicles of flr.^t trip of boats reembarked.
Ship retired for the night*
Sained

CR2

/57J

iotj

Action Report (Cont f d).

ruary, 19U5
disembarked landing team and proceeded to control
vessel off Beach. Yellow
I63O Received orders to proceed to 3eacn Yellow and land troops
then to proceed to regimental assembly area l^S How.
1710 CP established, deceiving sporadic mortar and artillery
fire. Ho casualties. Rained all day affording some concealment for debarkation
and landing which, due to difficult beach was made two boats abreast at a time.
Reported to Regimental CP as regiirental reserve.
D/3. 22 TVoruaiy, 19^5.

Remaii ^d in ar^embly area as regimental r; jrve. Receiving

occasional mortar andart-1"1.. Lory fire, 23 st RCT attache/ ic * &h Marine Division
; executos a passage of liroj of 3d R'.U and attacks in its zone of action, 1st
Battalion on the right, .. j3atteiion on the left, 3d Battalion remain in regimen ;' tal reserve. .
Si mm Mortar Platoon attaciied in support of 1st Battalion
21 st Marines* Went ixito pos5 ; - c * 1^'j
.i* / . Has continued to rain with lio*nt fog all day. Received inter mittent shelling all day in the assembly area with only one casualty, fortunately
Dfk, reserve.
1000 Received orders to proceed to assembly area 16^ Easy at
discretion.
IU15 Arrived at assembly area in l6U Sasy, receiving heavy
mortar fire with considerable casualties.
B/5. 2U February, 19U5.
23 2'ebruary,

Regiment continues in the attack 3-21 still remain regimental

0U3O Received warning orc^.er to pass through 1-21 and attack in

zone of action at 0915 - to foll-w three battalions of tanks across airfield
number 2.
0900 Completed move to U ) # Ha s i ^ of + ks

' ' < * , * .

0310 Orders received to Jucrg p.xf on $im& tanks or no tanks. 0915 Jumped off on'time, receiving heavy mortar, artillery
and anti-tank gun fire. (S00 overlay number 1)-'
0923 3n CP- OP and reserve com'pany being heavily shelled.
Still no sign of the tanks.
0930 Received written attack order (15 minutes after t. hour),
.Plan for 3 battalions of tanks under division control changed. One company
of tanks to be attached.
O9U5 Tank liaison officer arrived at OP. Co "C11, Uth $ank
Battalion reported 6 tanks operational and were placed in support of "I"
Company to reduce pill boxes. Both companies advancing against heavy opposition
and sustaining extremely heavy casualties.
IOI3 Company Commander H K W Company hap been wounded. Executive
.
Officer directed to move forward and assume commartd/

1017 Company,Commander H I W Compaq has been killed. Executive

Officer directed to assume command*
1057 Left'platoon of "K* Company "badly disorganized and swing ing far to the left.
"K* Company reorganized and in contact with wIfl
Company,
lead tank^ disabled "by anti-tank gun. Remainder ordered to withdraw until gun
could "be silenced,
1120 ttItt -Company sending a patrol to make contact with Uth
Division on the right.
OP heavily shelled including air bursts.
platoon of "K H Company has broken across airfield
number 2 and is attacking high gri nd at 199 ,Xray.
115S left platoon of "K" Comp \y is across strip, both platoons
attacking hill with bayc ots anr1 grenades,
1215 Our artillery has driven nXn
Company back off the hill.
2*21 called and told to lift, "K" Company again seized hill but was driven back

b y J a p s . * . . - .

K Company again attacked and seized hill 199 Xray,

but was again driven back. Both companies receiving enfilade fire from both,
flanks due to failure of units on right and left to kc p abreast,
1350 "I" Company has reached the airfield. nX? Company has
attached and again holds hill 199 "ray after desperate hand to hand struggle.
Left platoon of "I* Company has crossed the field and
is attacking to tie in with nRfr
Company.
1510 Both companies are across the field and hold the line
199 Xray, Yoke - receiving heavy fire of all types, casualties heavy,
1520 Moved ?.$f. Company battalion reserve to 182 William*
Ordered to mop up behind front lines,
1S20 V Company located and destroyed carefully concealed
anti-tank gun that had disabled 3LTJE tank ttis morning. Companies ordered to
dig in and hQld positions at all costs*
to tank, 2000 Ammunition taken to front line companies in trailer tied
. * , .

n l!

2015 Cie platan of "L w Company attached tr w I rt

Company to
affect tie in with l}th Division on the right. :::.'. .:;.,* "'.
.2100.to 2^00 Both companies received small local counter attacks easily repfrlsed, .
! U/6. .25 February, 19^5.

0100 nK* Company repulsed a heavy local counterattack, regain* ing the position occupied by one squad which War wiped out.
013O Three (3) six inch or ^larger coastal defense guns firing
into our lines observed, JTaval Gun ?ire silenced them but not known whether
they are permanently knocked out.
X. , ,

&P*

- . ; , * .

'

^i Actiojn Report (Cont fd)

received that 3-21 would be paHed through by
1-9 at O93O and 3-21 would assemble in 165 Able, F
P700 ttK" Company again repulsed a sharp counterattack. officer remaining with company now Istlt Archambault.
Only

O93O 1-9 passed through our lines* Commanding Officer, 1st

Battalion, 9th Marines took command of; zone of action at 0S00. 3-21 31mm Mortar
platoon attached to 1-9. -, 1000 BCT 21 now passed to control" of 3d Marine Division*
1200 Commenced withdrawal from the lines one squad at a timet
receiving mortar and artillery fire.
l600 Battalion assembled in 165 Able, tfoau Attached to 9th
Marines as regimental reserve. Alerted to be ready to attack innfiediately.
l6lO Received attack order.
I63O Orders cancelled.
I63O Ordered to move to new assembly area.
I635 Orders cancelled. Received intermittent shelling through out the night.
D/7. 26 February, 191*5.
Remained in assembly area as regimental rpp- *ve receiving
occasional shelling.
1530 Received orders from Regimental Executive Officer, 9-th
Marines to commit battalion immediately on the right of the lino - Commanding
Officer report to Commanding Officer 9th Marines fn- instruction.
Orders cancelled* Directed to -nut battalion in 12 Hike,
ITun as regimental reserve. Proceeded to new assembly area, receiving light
eaelling on the way. Received 3 heavy mortar siioll hits - believed to be
or larger* Sustained lk casualties*
Heavily shelled at intervals throughout the night.
27 February,
Remained in assembly area, receiving occasional shelling from
a large caliber mortar, probably 150mm.
1200 Reverted to control of parent organisation.
5 355 from their CP.

tt r

I Company observed an enemy socket launcher bearing

.

B/9. 2S February, I9U5.

0626 Two (2) 100 pound rocket bombs landed near the CP
Still receiving occasional shelling by artillery usin^ time fire and by a heavy
mortar. Received orders to pass through 1st Battalion, 9th J'irines to continue
att.acl^ to 0-1. tSee oveilay nur"ber 2). Moved ttIn'and "L11 companies across,
airfield number 2. -Receiving sniper and-some machine 'gun fire.
ara Io2 How, 0700 -Established OP at 199 Yoke.* Moved ffKft Company to reserve
.. .

0800 Both companies, enraged in fire fight trying to reach

designated L35 on 200 Peter and 199 Oboe.

rt (Cont'd).
0S15 Xing hour. 3oth companies jumped off on time "L* on
the right nln on the left. Proceeding forward against heavy Resistance.
O83O Vtn
Company right.being crowded by left company of
Division* Requested Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 23rd Marines to
change his direction of attack and stay within his "boundaries.
0930 Battalion has advanced HoO yards against heavy resist-*
ance. *!w Company, 23rd Marines Still crowding into our onet fore trig"*%*
Company to the left. > > . 1112 Situation now yery difficult; entire direction of attack
has swung 90 to the left. Our front is now on the line which should'indicate
our "boundary. Elements of "E" Company, 23rd Harined ordered to bre^c contact,
withdraw and assemble near airfield number 2. (north c.~"*.)#. Ekve alerted reserve
(nKfl Company) to cover the gap as soon as it is
1150 Committed reserve company on irLn 'Coispaay's right to
rectify direction of attack. Mii" Company ordered to commit support platoon on
its right, pull left platoon back in support, then commit it on the right to
reorganize the line*
1200 nIfl
Company ordered in <batwfil*on reserve, continue
cleaning up pocket of resistance in 200 4'ole
OP established on 200 PeV~r. tfill resume the attack
at 1300.
1300 1305
fl w

Company jumped off on time,

.
,

%* Company jumped^ off.

Attack is progressing steadily meeting heavy resistance. ^

Displaced CP to defilade in rear of 200 Peter.
Both assault companies receiving an unuaaally heavy
shelling sustaining many casualties; left company has reached the 02 line,
right company is fighting their w^y through Motoyama.
1600 "I* Company ordered to pass through nK* Company. "X11
Company withdrawn into reserve, badly shot up and disorganized.
I63O A new type high velocity anti-t vik gun knocked out at
HJ 330 Able.
Jour enemy tanks (2 medium and 2 light) destroyed. Japs
reported by observer plane to be fleeing to the north. Shelled the iridieated
area with unobserved results. . .
1730 Issued orders to dig in for the night, left flank badly exposed* 1900 .Sound of enemy tanks heard in f ..'ont of n I H Company. Slight shelling throughout the -night*
1 March, ^

0015 "I" Company repulsed small local counterattack.

0700 ttl1* Company captured a wounded prisoner the first taken
in the operation by this battalion. Heceived orders t<
0055* ' "*'

'-6

ort (Contrd)
O85& Resumed the attack n L M Company cn the left, R I W on the
right.
O9I+5 ^eft assault company has taken the village of Motoyama,
capturing two (2) 70mm guns. Course of attack is swinging too far to the right
in endeavoring tommaintain Acontact with **th Division.1 A TBl spotting plane was
shot down which crashed just "behind H L n Company in the village.
0950 OP and CP were intensively shelled "by heavy caliber
mortars.
1120 Displaced OP to 200 Jig. That ar*.-. "being heavily shelle*
"by several flat trajectory guns later learned to "be enemy tank guns, the tanks
themselves being covered with rocks and carefully camouflaged.
1135 SVont iSnes now at 200 Charlie, How.
1330 Commenced displacing o5 *? to 200 Item.
Hecaived a direct hii in ths CP "by a 100 pound rocket
bomb. CP temporarily inoperative, heavy ca&urltiea.
l600 Battalion attached to 9th Marines again. Attack is
stalemated. Both companies pinned down "by heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar
fire from entrenched positions in the area 201 ]3asy, Jig later known as Oushman's
pocket. Dug in for the night, received sporadic shelling all night and several
small scali counterattacks which Here easily repulsed.
* D/ll, 2 March, I9I+5.,
0800 Passed through by 1st and 2d Battalions, 9th Marines. '
Able, Pox as and night.
D/12 3 MarcxL,
1st and 2d Battalions, 9*k ^iarines have "been unable to advance
against the'^Pocket*. Ordered to remain as before as regiirantal reserve but not
to be committed except with O.K. from Division.
\
1200 Completely disengaged. Withdrew to assembly area 201
Regimental reserve. CP remained in its position.
Eeceived sporadic shelling of all types throughout the day

D/13 k March, 19^5

0300 Revsrted to control of ~lat Marines. Ordered to proceea

to Division left flank and attack. King hour to be set when in position. (See
overlay number 3)
0*400 Commenced movement in 1 0 position.
, Held up until 0700 because of threat of counterattack in 9th
Marines Z of A,
0930 Established CP at 217 <** Op at 218 Baker, Sxtremely
heavy fog and slight mist visibility 25 yards, making movement into position
extremely slow and hazardous. "I w Company engaged in fire fighfcyattacking four
large bunkers which must be cleaned out before reaching the I*D.
1100 Battalion will attack at 1130, 'V-In Company 0$ the right,
Company on the left, "ZiU Company in reserve at 218 Baker.

1110 King hour changed to

ori (Cont*d) Both companies jumped off on time*; right flank exposed* no headway. 122$ Left flank progressing slowly W t right flank making

3.335 Have advanced about IOC :ards, n I * Company* having td

destroy many pill "boxes and hunkers.
1500 IJLM
Company advance stopped "by fire from a field piece 0:
heavy caliber. Company Commander, Captain 3 V. Stephenson killed. Both
companies ordered to consolidate positions. "IC* Company moved up to cover expose
right flank gap of 300 yards across airfield to 9th Marines covered "by machine
v
gun and mortar fire, l600 "C" Company 1-21 ordered to prolong w I n Company lines to
edge of airfield hut to remain under 1st Battalion control.
Action of the entire day was seriously handicapped hy heavy fc,
5 March,

0600 Received orders' to maintain position throughout Ahe day. Ordered companies to thoroughly reconnciter area which had not baen previously possible due to heavy fog. 1200 Reconnaissance party led "by Battalion Ccmaanding Officer located the field piece that had halted the advance of ffLlt Company the day'before. Commanding Officer of 2d Battalion, 12th Marines at^entpted to destroy i t with a 105 mission which failed due to angle of fall,, PJ*C. M Clnre, glmm Mortar e oh server/ finally got 1 direct hXi putting the gun out of otion and k i l l i n g the cfcew. , 1600 Two anti-tank guns located in same strong point .firing from concrete tunnels whose enuru^ces were "blocked at will"S^- concrete slabs. Two ,50 caliber machine gui.i: were "brought up and -mplaced to fire into the entrance lf 'bottling tt them up0 Request attack s h i i t to right of ridge along road to RJ 322 on "basis of reconnaissance. Hocket s t r i k e denied, D/15 6 March, 19^5.

Several attempts at infiltration blocked during the night.

0930 1st Battalion, 21st Marines ordered to execute passage
<
of lines. Upon being disengaged to assemble in 200 iblet Baker as division reserve.
1500 Assembled in 200 Able, Baker light ehalling during
movement, sustaining several casualties*

. 7 March, 19*6. ' 0700 No contacts during night. Revert to regimental control, commenced movement to assembly area EJ 330 as regimental reserve; " ' 1155 < P set up 217 J i g . 3 Receiving sporadic mortar f i r e .

Ordered to return to assembly a r : i 200 Able, Baker.

Again shelled enroute,

D/17 8 March,

0300 Attached to 9*^ .Marines*.. Ordered to pass through 1st .Battalion, 9th, klarines and attack 0750. (See ove^laf

ort (CcntM).

0500 Commenced movement. .

0700. CP established 200 Item. 0750 Jumped off on time, *Tf< on right, "K11 on l e f t , ffL in rBserve. I Company right flank moving forward slowly; l e f t flank of ttIw Ccmpany and nKff Company making l i t t l e or no gain,
H n

0810 "I" Co pinned down "by Blue planes bonbing and strafing
our lines in carrjring out a ^th Division strike* Requested strike cancelled.
0900 Strafed again by Blue planes. to stop strike had no e f f e c t .

* ~ "

Reported requests made

1000 nln Company "badly shaken up by "bombing - suffered many

casualties teinly blast or consusion* Thb impetus of the attack has "been lost*
1100 Attack has stalemated. irKn Company pinned down, sustain ing heavy casualties in the replacements received the night before* Blue tank knocked out by satchel charge* Japs used time f i r e to drive back our covering. 1700 Uo further gains made. Ordered .to dig in for the nig&i. D/lS S March, I9U5.

0733 A local counterattack against "" rompany was repulsed* 0950 Resumed the attack. maneuver tanks well. ' about 75 yards. Terrain very d i f f i c u l t , unable to ' (

H13O n]pf^Company has destroy^; 17 p i l l bases and has gained Also destroyed 2 large caliber anti-tank guns.

Caught a large group of Japs in a martar barrage killing

a great many, estimated at 175 "but this figure is probably over estimated,
D/19
Xing hour 0$10. resistance,

10 March, 191*5.

0800 Passed *Ln Company through ttKff Company to continue attack. " " t 0900
n n

ompany moving forward slowly against extremely heavy

1100 Japs manned the turret of Blue trnk destroyed the day before and knocked out another Blu-e Tank in a defile which i s the only avenue f approach for tanks to the center of resistance. 1217 Received orders to disengage a l l companies, bypass pocket and push to the sea. * f 1230 Orders cancelled, resumed the attack though making no progress. Scored a hit on the Jap manned Blue tank and 'completely destroyed it brought up. 1500 Attack i s stopped. 3>ag in for the night* .' D/20 11 March, Requested rocket sled ($*2) to be

Remained in position to, fi.re.'.rocks ,,s. During ^course of day

fired 200 rockets into thearea;i preparing to ^ t "**' ^ " '"" " """ ~

rt (Cont'd). 1500 ttLtt Company Jumped off, "I*- Company ordered to maintain position and Support wLn Company "by f i r e , Made a gain of about 50 yards and were immediatley piimed dtwn. Companies ordered to dig in for the night. Rec eived sporadic shelling throughout the night but i s lessaning in volumn every day. . . . Vfel 12 March, 1^5

0600 Ordered to hold post ion and send" n Company arouh& the
right flank to the sea and then move *" Company up the ridge in a westerly
direction to approach the pocket from the rear* flKH
Company was then to fill
the gap from 1-9 to "I* Company flank.
0830 out orders,
n

K* Company is fighting their way up the ridge to carry

*

I315 H W Company using tanks a s s i ^ e d to RCn Company, Jthr K Marines has knocked out 3 large bunkers and in making progress. 1800 nt}f Company ordered to ba relieved by reserve companyof 19* He turned to former, reserve position * D/32 13 March,

07OO Ho activity during the 1

09*42 Received orders to move to ~n assembly area 200 George,
How, revert to 21st Marines control.
1300 Designated Corps Resarye,
D/23. li* March,
i Ko a c t i v i t y . Remained in position* ments on use of flamethrowers and squad t a c t i c s . 15 March, 1 9 ^ 1030 B/25 regimental reserve.
N

Held school for replace

Set up CP in new assembly area* 3 16 March, 19^5*

2 o activity. T

0600 Battalion reverted to control 21st 14arines 0700 Ordered to proceed to v i c i n i t y RJ J30 and assemble as

0830 Battalion placed in assembly area in 218> Item. 05[00 One platoon Company rtKtr plus attached Engineers demoii.W ions team ordered to patrol the beach behind the l i n e s , Killed Ik Japs, no casualties. No further a c t i v i t y . on the island bad been eliminated* B/26. 17 March, 191+5. number 5)
areas.

Word received that organized resistance ;.; 4 . , ..

Commenced active patrolling. in ; assigned aector (See overlay Dispatched 3 patrols consisting of reinforced platoons in respective '
" " .

Total tFaps. k i l l e d for the

sort (Cont'd).
March, I9U5/.'
Continued Patrolling,
1300 Displaced battalion to new -assembly area tn 219Love.
l600 3sta&lished utposts at 219Tare, 202 2asy, 202Toke. ,
Provided for local security by establishing cossack posts
around perimeter* Bstablished coast watch OP on Hill 36*.* Total Japs killed
for the day - 2,
D/2& 19 March, l$k%
Continued partolling and destroying #f caves, ftight v>as acti\
with many small enemy groups harrassing outposts-. Total Japs killed, - 25 t
.Blue * *casualties, '
D/29 20 March* I9I+5.
Continued patrolling and destroying of caves> salvage andpolice ofpatrol area* Total Japs killed -l4 #
D/30 21 March,
Ccntinuedpafcfrtllin^ and closing of caves, salvaging andpollc
-Buried 182dead Japs,
Killed'and buried 17 Japs
D/31 22 March, 19^5, .
Commenced .

Continued routine patrolling and salvage work,

0S00 Xiaipon group of 1stBattalion, Ikjtb. Infantry, tj. S; .
Army Garrison force arrived cr reconnaissance of sector.
Killed andburied 2k Japs* Sustained ^.casualties ~ 1*#ar Dog, D/32 23 March,

' 0600 for patrol purposes.

tt

/
. ,
.

&n and ^"Companies, l^fth Infantry attached tb 5-21

0600 Dispatched 6 patrols "of ls^i^ad =ach (Reinforced) with l^Iarine guides, radio operators*. War Dogs and demol i t ions .men. Total Japs k i l l e d - 18 . . ' D/33 2k March, 0700 Commanding Officer, 1stBattalion, ll+7th Infantry assume for patrol arsa. Continued salvage .nd police *f the area. D/3U 25 March,
x

'

' "

'

'

Continued police vorfe awaiting orders to embark. B&5 26 March, 19%. I7OO Smbarked in LST SOO, then return to uam.

ort (Cont'd)

J>art IV. Comment*

* . . . * ,

A*

Administration. <

1. . , Eecommen4 that SOJP,for casualty reporting to"be carried out*

It is imperative t&at allunit leaders down to anct including group leaders "be
r
thoroughly familiar with allphases ofcasualty reporting, A ledger wasused by .this battalion vith each casualty being
entered as verified report severe received from companies on caausuLty report li

as follows;
;

' .

i i i . t r i
it t;

i t
I I

i t ' . t

i
i

i i i

t t t

i i i

~~*~

This ledger served as the permanent record for refersnce thro/Ughdo&tthe combat phase of the-operation. It i s a quick, easy reference in"* compact form. The present Burial and Graves Begistration Section has proved to be invaluable d*2rin the operation. It was experienced that when a man ^s KIA or D01 the name of the man should be ttLrn,ed over to the section for their action. They kept a l i s t of a l l dead checking th'e names off when dead wkrea found and delivered to the cemetery* When < t a* a-e thus delivered; an entr|ris 3 ( made in the above mentionfed ledger as to ^rrave Humber, Row'Number, etc. This information is checked with the Division Burial Bulletin, It i s recommended ' that the distribution of this bulletin ba made down to and including the # battalion* It i s hi^hily recommended that the unit be indicated of each man on this bulletin, 2. .. The mprale of troops of this organization continued .to be high ihroughout the operation. The adequate distribution of the news sheets^ letters of appreciation, and letters of commendation was an important factor in. maintaining good morale. Publicity seems to be one of the Neatest morale builders; the men want to know that their_efforts are being recogniz&d. Thr rations issued were adequate and of wider variety than heretofore issued. Distribution of mail when the tacti'cal situation permitted was of great help* , the immediate removal of own dead i s considered imperative when tactical situation permits* 3 B " Recommend that SOP for, handling Irtelligerce. ' risoners be carried out*

1* The maps and photos furnished before the operation were adecu and s a t i s f a c t o r i l y complete, but later were found not to be correct. Zm The maps received during th@ operation were satisfactory in numbers,"but somewhat incorrect. Although we received numerous photos (high in number because of needless duplication) i t i s folt that they were not always sen to us as proaptly as possible. It would be a help i f the photographing unit' would place grid lines on the photos of sect rs ta coincide wjtth the map being' used. It i s suggested tjiat the higher echelon do this to assure uniformity between units. ' * 3^ had on enlisted man of Japanese language personnel temporarily attached to the intelligence section. He was well qualified and could converse with the POTs very efficiently* The'language officers we worker' with from regimental headquatters were very cooperative and promptly gave us
' .

12~

.-

'

action Heport (Cont'd)

ed from prisoners* Their POW interrogation report! were
always
to use the loudspeCker for vocal propaganda, Among the PO#fs this bat^ftftlSn captured only one had a surrender leaflet with him. The other prisoners had not seen any of the leaflets. 5, ative. 6. factory. , 7 The JIGPOiv team we had caflled upon was very -orompt and cooper Intelligence liaison with tho next higher echelon was satis Distinct enemy tactics observed; (a) Infiltration to booby trap a m dumps. m o (b) Written orders found di" ^cting Japs to put acid in water not taken with them whrn they withdrew. (c) Booby trapped saki bottles. 8. Hew enemy tactirs encountered; (a) Palling in behind and pro< - ;cihg with our troops at night, (b) While T trolling, Japs would d'scharge grenades in caves# V simulating suicida, their objective being to ^ o l our troops so as to k i l l them i f they carelessly approached the ca,ve thinking the enem^ to be dead. C. Operations and Training.
1

1. For several, months prior to the operation this battalion has had no rehearsal in debarking from jiP's in LCVP!s. I t was impossible to conduct any debarkation rehearsals because of a lack of ship? ing f a c i l i t i e s . Two debarkation drills were held daily while anroute to the target area and these proved sufficient. The actual debarkation ran smoothly and was reasonably'^ast.
2 The flamethrower was the most effective weapon against fortified i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Small and medium size demolitions charges (up to twenty potyids) were sufficient for p i l l boxes but were not satisfactory when used on cave mouths. Shape charges (forty pounds) were necessary to close these. 81mm fobrtars firing the M 6 s h e l l with the M53 delayed action fuse did considerable damage to p i l l 5* boxes and was especially good on opan gun emplacements which could not be reached

by artillery fire.

'

3* Portable flamethrowers wsre used axtensi^aly against all types

of enemy emplacements t-nd werp. fo-nnd to be very satisfactory. The tank-irounted
flamethrowers were useless because of their short range and the difficulty of
changing their direction of fire. In many instances the large flamethrowers
mounted in turrets would have been invaluable. It is urged that they be made
available in this division before the next operation.
At one time in the oT>3ration, tanks were used to haul ammunitioz.
h. across open terrain which was denied to normal transport tion because of small
arms fire.
5* Infantry-Tank Coordination presented a very minor -problem to
this battalion because large groups of tanks ware never us d. Tanks were employee
individually or by platoons and normal communication proved satisfactory*
6. The enemy employed high velocity anti-tank guns with devastating
effect throughout the entire campaign. *int*tank mines were used extensively and
slowed the employment of tanks considerably. It was always necessary to clear ,
lanes prior to calling up tanks. In at least one instance the enemy employed an
infantry assault team to demolish a tank. The

ort (Cont^&K
and then demolished with a satchel charge. 7,
T

" '
*

far Dogs wore used on patrols during mopping up operations,

' / ' .

$. The rocket laun&her Was found satisfactory against tanks at

ranges up to one hundred and fifty yards, iiocket "barrages were used against well
dug in positions. They caused appreciable damage "but could not "be "brought close
enough to our front lines to knock out the resistance to our immediate front.
The 7-2 rockets fired from tank pulled aled& are well controlled and should be
very helpful in future operations.
D. 1. Supjcly. Adequacy of all types, of mounting out supplies,
.

a* Hat ions 10 in 1 are inadequate when issued on the "basis of

one menu serving thirty (30) men one meal. Since Uie infantry are constantly on
the move, the prescribed menu 6an not be followed? therefore 1 case of 10 in 1
should "be issued to infantry troops on the "basis of or a (1) menu per seven (7)
men for one (1) meal.
b Lard or shortening for "baking purposes to supplement (C)
.and nKtt
rations should "be increased at least $
2. The new type metal containers for 60mm mortar ammunition-sweat
and cause the shell to rust. The old type clovsr^leaf is preferred. Small arms
ammunition .30 caliber cases should be half their sise and tf*i ^ht and equipped
with carrying handles.
3t Pdlletiaed cargo.

a. Wilson drums are limited to actual use by their size and

shape, A water tight aperture would increase their value for transporting small
items requiring protection such as communication and medical supplies*
*+. Captured material: Previous to an operation units should be
informed as to their quote of weapons etci to be turned in to higher echelons.
This would prevent the embarrassii^ confiscation of ^ticies from the men in the
last phase of an operation.
5, Transportati- . Organic plus the freedom of regiment vehicles
solved every transportation problem on the past operation. The availability of
iruck 1 ton and truck, 2-J ton to battalions' at all times cut the wear and tear
of -t ton trucks to a minimum.
B. Air.

1, Due to exten^iva construction under-^ound, preliminary heavy

strikes were ineffectual. The desired degree of neutralization was not attained.
2# 3* Air liaison party functioned extremely well.
Communication's were adequate.

^. Air support for this battalion was a total failure. Only three
requests were made. Those were for strikes against definitely located enemy gun
positions and all three were refused due to unavailability of. planes,
5* It is believed that many strikes were granted for targets of
low priority and consequently planes were not adequate to gr?ait later requests
for high priority targets. For example planes were not available to attack three
(3) definitely located guns firing from concrete tunnel positions. A low level
attack wi$h rockets was the only solution but planes were not available because
they were orbiting in response to a request for a general strafing mission. The
responsibility clearly lies with battalion commanders who must consider the fact

, 4

niReport (Cont'd)
that their request may dejfiri^f, someone else wl:o nay ct.ll $0 minutes later for a
strike that might make the difference between success and failure. They must
also "be instructed that their air strike may deny someone else the use of
artillery and naval gunfire and that before the matter could be rectified through
Corps coordinated a critical situation raay develop* On March 8, 19^5
n%n
Company?s attack was stopped in its tracks at 201 Charlie by an air strike called
for by the U-th. Division in squares 201 Sugar and Nan. four times tl*e attack was
resumed but each time Blue strikes pinned down 41.3 assault companies. Svery effcr
was made t6 have the strike halted all pf which proved to no avail* However this
is" the only instance known by this organization of l^>ck of excellent control* ^
To reduce the number of strikes called just because "planes were overhead and l-:
might as well be used" and to prevent bombing cf Blue troops who have been able to
forge ahead it is recommended that no request for a strike closer than 1000 yards
to the most forward element be approved unless the requester can show that the
target, has been definitly located, can ba accurately designated and that no other
moans {artillery, navaii gunfire or mortars} can neutralizo it.
P. : ' JJaval Gunfire*

1. The Shore Fire Control group was well organized, adequate in

'
number.and veil trained* . u 2. 3. . All equipment functioned properly,
. Effectiveness of fires,
a. Fire was most effective against targets of opportunity,
b. Fires were ineffective against the coastal caves for the
caves were constructed with trajectories of naval gr.ufirb in mind.
c* .""Ires with air spots were regular^, "iod due to the fact tha
most of the fighting was uphril work and enemy artillery positions could not be
observed from the ground. , ,
d. It is ,estimated that about 30 fire missions were called. ITo
counting niht illumination.
- ' . ' .
The coordination between naval gunfire and air support seemed
h% poor on occasion. For' example; on one ocdasion the air observer located ah
enemy artillery position, the guns just goinr into action. Plan Itan prevented
the use of naval ganfire due to planes orbiting-for a general strafing mission.
Ths next day when the spotting plane arrived over the area the guns could not
be found.
5 The outstanding feature of naval gunfire in this operation
seemed to be the excellence of night illumination and secondly, th.3 great amount
of naval ganfire of all types was used,
6. G. The present system of employment is highly satisfactory,
Transport Quartermaster. '

1. Twelve, hours were necessary to lead APA 3*+ with 88 vehicles an

short tons of total cargo. Spotting of cargo at cargo-assembly area saved
time, but could have saved more time if cajgo delivery to assembly area had baen
arranged o that we could have spotted it with regard to individual holds and
with regard to the priority of tha specific cargo. . Loading at reembarkation
was delayed because of insufficiant lighterage.
2, T t . 3 necessary to unload the ship was five days due to unfavor
ir< abl$ beach conditions and request for spot cargo rather than general unloading.
All requests for specific cargo ware promptly handled. Unloading after reembarka
ion was accomplished in four and one half hours.under ideal conditions* The
dock used afforded space enough to unload five holds

ort (Cont1d)
H. 1. Ordnance. Weapons.

a. Below i s l i s t e d nuttber, type and caliber or weapons taken forward on the recent operation: 352 Carbine, caliber, 30, Ml, 92 Launcher* gtfenade, MS, This launcher was not used as no M 6 cartridges were available. IS Gun, machine , caliber .30, Brownings 9 81 R i f l e , automatic, caliber ..30, Browning, MI9I8A2. lf33Hifle, -U..S, Caliber ,30, id.. 20 P i s t o l , automatic, caliber .^5* Ml?11. 9 launcherst rocket, M^Al. 13 Mortars, 60ram M2, Pour were held in reserve in Headquarters Company. k Mortar, 81mmt Ml. b . I t i s impossible at the present time to know exactly how many weapons were l o s t . Inventories are now being taken. c. .Tfyere was an adequate s iv oply ox spare parts. armorer repa*ed numerous weapons from spare pafts taken forward. Battalion \

d. I t i s recommended an increased allowance of four rocket, M9A1 for an infantry battalion, Theso launchers should be carried as reserve in Headquarters Company as are the four S ma Mortars. Or 2. . Combat vehicles.

a. This infantry battalion used the following numbers and typot of vehicles during combats ' 1 Ambulance, J ton, kxk.
5 Trailers* t * on ^ vheel.
Trucks, 1 ton cargo were drawn.from regimental motor transport
officer daily as the situation permitted their use. Battle employment 32 days*
b. T A G one (1) ambulance, J ton, kxk was damaged beyond repair
This vehicle is novr deadlined for body repairs. Mechanically this vehicle is
serviceable.
c. The short time this infantry battalion was in actual combat
there was no maintenance difficulty.
d* Ho spare parts or accessories wore required other than one
( (!) storage battery, tire and tube patching equipment.
3. . Ammunition.

a. The following i s an expenditure of ammunition by this

battalion on the recer-t operation:
36560 Cartridge, B a l l , carbine, caliber 30, ML 229OO Cartridge, AP&TH, (belted) caliber. , 3 0 . 62OOO Cartridge, .AP-, caliber .30, M2, 5 / c l i p . 98268 Cartridge, At, caliber ^ 0 , M2, S / . c l i p / 7620 Shell, HB, M^9A^r w/Puso PD-M52, 60mm. gi+3 Shell, illumiaating, U$3Al, w/Puse M65, 60mm. 1530 Shell, HSJ, MU3A1, w/Jusa M3a, 81mm. 309^ Shell, HE, 1456, w/i\i3 M5.2, 81ij%# 313 Shell, smoke, W, M57, w/Puse M52, 81mm. 7725 &renade, band fragmentation, MKIIA1. I75 Grenade,, hand, smoke, HC~M8#

rporfc (Contf'd) 325 Grenade, hand* smoke, W, ML5 125 Grenade, hand, colored, 10.6. 275 Grenade, hand, illuminating* 130 Grenade, r i f l o , AT, M9A1 140 Grenade, r i f l e , saoko, W, Ml9* 60 3*1 are, t r i p , parachute, J&8. 50 3!bare, t r i p , *&9 235 Eockot, H3, AT,'M6A1. 800 Caps, blasting, totryl, n 900 Cord, detonating. 36 Black, dcmolition t chain, i&, cs. 3 Explosive, 2NT, J pound blocks, cs, ^00 Fuse, blasting, ft* 50 cylinder, ignition, Ml. ' '

-. ,

b.Ammunition was drawn from regimental munitions dump and moved forward principaly by truck, ton kxk and t r a i l o r , J ton although SISiam mortar aa^munition whon the situation permitted was moved with truck, 1-ton, cargo. During tho last operation this battalibn operated many t i r s without a forward dump duo to the short supply linos. c. Storage was no problem as only one (l) unit of firo wae on hand in rovctmonts or other places of protection against enemy fire* d. It i s recommended tho tJ/lf bo increased for the Carbine, caliber .30, ^H. According to the Tnblo of Allowance the present allowance of magazines, carbine, caliber .30 is five;(5) Beconaci-cl increase of ammunition allowance to 7^ ball and 1 tracer. e . This battalion took forward on the recent Operation twenty sovon (27) flamethrowers, portablo, K2-2* ' Hine.vjcrc kept in riflo companies at a l l times, remainder was kopt in, HTB as roserve. . ! Hiscellancqus .Ordnaacc Squipmont a. Hone salvaged. Snemy Katorial* a W 17 1 2 1 1 Rifle,,Model 99. Model 11 light riiachine gun. Model 97 tank machine gun. Kodcl 3 heavy machine gun. 81mm Hortar model 3*

b . Combat Vehicles. Hone salvaged. ' c Ammunition. 225 Typo 91 Grenade. 150 Type 99 Grcr.adc, 2 Model 99 Magnetic' Anti-trnk mine k Model 93 nTape measure"^ mine, 1 Model 3 torra cotta land mine; 500 Cartridges, f^rm (.303 i n ) . 200 Cartridges, 65mm (.2b Cal). 700- Cartridges, 12.7mm (,.50 i n ) . 50 Shell,' 20mm (.780) rds. 75 Shell* 37mm (l.^S in) rds. 50 Sholl, 75mm (2.^5 in) rds.

ort (Cont'd), -d-. Miscellaneous Ordnance Squipnont

None salvaged. I. Chemical.
,

All masks > gas wore loaded in troop cargo space, and issued to
1. troops prior to debarkation. . ,
2. Remainder of chemical warcfaro o.quipmcnt was loaded in such, a
manner to bo available for unloading quickly in case cf an omorgency call.
3. All masks* gas were collected on 22 February, 19^5 ^Y order of
Commanding Officer, 3^ Battalion in company dumps. These were then consolidated
into battalion dump and turned in to Hegimental Quartermaster for further dis position. This battalion salvaged a total of IOU7 masks, ^as on the recent
operation.
U.. All chemical warfare supplies that were unloaded wore turned
in to Begimontal Quartermaster* Almost all of this equipment was never unloaded.
9 Medical.

a. There wore two doctors aid forty-three corpsmon attached to this battalion at embarkation. b . The doctors carried. Medical Units #1, aid the corpsmon carried tfcdiCal Units 5*3 Additional Medical Units carried wore: ^5, 5a, 6, 7 8, 9t 10 l l a , 12, Plasma, and Scrum albumin. 2. Aboard Ship.

a. Sick Calls were held daily at OS3O and 1530, Sick Calls
were light except for a Diarrhea tlpidcmic* After galleys wero properly pollcod
theso cases decreased. There wore also several casos of Oatarrhal Pobcr.
b # Sanitary inspections wore hold daily. The inspecting party
consisted of both Ships Company and passenger personnel* On several occasions a,
passenger Medical Officor accoEtnaniod the inspecting party
(1) The heads were adequate and were policed by marine
personnel,
(2) The ship was short 200 bunk spaces vhich necessitated
sleeping personnel in shifts*
(3) The quantity, and quality of the food was adequate (k) The galleys were in a vory good condition.
(5) $he cooks and messmon were marine personnel and wore inspected daily by the senior medical officor of the ship. 3. Debarkation*
.

a. There were twelve Collecting section corpsmon attached for the campaign and ^3, battalion corpamen of which four 1 :>ro attached to each company except Headquarters. The rest v/erc divided into two groups? one group was with the forward aid station md the other, roar aid station. ' b . forward aid station landed with the third and the rear
ttation landed with the fifth wave from our ship.

.ction Boport (Qont'd). "modical personnel of this battalion went ashore aboard The four corpsiaefHifctached to the companies landed with same, d Tho time of landing was approximately 1700 on 21 February k* Anhorc .Assault Phase t '

a* Medical installations? (l) Medical installations wore sot up immediately upon landing* When this battalion was in the assault tjic Forward Aid Station was set up with tho observation post. (One doctor with attached corpsi-ion). The Bear Aid Station was set UD with the Command Post. b. Location. (l) Were sot up near roads and t r a i l s with Jeep Ambulances available. (2) Foxholes, cavos, and rovotnonts served as cover. (3) The other nodical installations near by wore the Aid Stations of other battalions. c. Protective measures taken: (l) There were one-third of the personnel, which consisted of corpamon and marine personnel, on watch at a l l times," * (2) Sand-bag;jod.revetiiionts and CP.VOS wore the best moans of cover. (3) Natural concealment was tho only menus of concealnent, (*!) Blackout precautions wcro always taken. Caves with black-out covering over entrance wero used, Tho aid station also had a black-out tent which was used when caves wore not available. d. Hoepitalization. (1) In tho early part of the assruLt tho casualties wore evacuated to the beach for further disposition. When Conpany "A", 3& iiedical . Battalion, apt up the casualties wero sent to thoa for further disposition and ireatoont. (2) Hcsuoply of equipwnt .was adequate and satisfactory. (3) Four hundred-*seven Ot-07) patients were eva-Cuated for hospitalization. 0. Svacuation, ") l^arinc l i t t e r teams from tho lines to the Aid Station, accompanied by a corpsraan, ambulances from the Md Station to Beach Svacuation or Hospital wore the means of evacuation. (2) Casualties treated.
Kan of tho 3d i'arSiv. 1. Humber Be tanned
Svacuated Died i^i. other than 3d li-rl)iv.
101
U07

92

(Cont'd).
2. Type of casualties treated: Chest Head Abdomen Lower Sxtrcm Uppor Extrcm Con, Blast Atmos 10
11
.

35 2 5

1H3

23

"

'

'

'

117
125
' '

' 3 5

kl 0 > ' .

3. Walking wounded 221 km Stretcher cases 23S

f. Sanitation.

<l) 3111 trenches and Cat Holes were set up for human disposal* Cans were flattened and bxiriod. . (2) ttCn, **", and "D" rations, with hot coffee occasionally was tho only ncsus of f ood* . (3) V/ator was hauled to the lines from tho ships and no Ideal water was used. . . for burial. ,. g. Disposal of the dead. (1) Our dead were colloctod and sent to Division Cemetery ' r ,

(2) The enemy dead were sprayed with 3 J T solution and 33 Arsenitc and buried by a detail of marines, h. There were no epidemics or unusual diseases of troopa. 1* Dental Service, officer.

(1) Tho dontal work Was done by a temporarily attached dent a-. The work was accomplished with Dental Officer Kit. Hedical Unit #2,

(2) The nimbcr of dental cases treated wero approximately nine (9) extractions and a few temporary filling-s, (3) The additional duty of tho ^cntal officcr attachod was assisting tho battalion surgepn, (k) There wore no civilians found. , .

(5) Ho prisoners of wnr passed through our aid station, (6) Medical Organization. It is our opinion that the present medical organization is
adequate and satisfactory. Hcsorvc platodhs nnd replacements acted as' letter
bearers, (7) i^odical Personnel, (a5 Corpsmon were Used as company aid men and battalion
aid station' assistants. Their work under combat conditions wa& very satisfactory.
(b) There wore twenty, (26) corpsaon wounded and scvon (7*
killed in action* This number includes the corpsmen temporarily attached from ,
H&S collecting section. "
-20

r t (Cont!&) (c) Our battalion corpaiaon were viry well trained "both in f i r s t aid and personnel fiold precautions, The replacement corpsmen sent to us although well XrainQd. in f i r s t aid had l i t t l e knowledge ot field work, exposing thcnsclvcs to fire on numerous occasions* j . Field iriodical Equipjacnt. (1) Al though our o\m nodical re supplies wore not Imded, r e suppler wag adequately carried out. "by Scgiiaent and Division Pie Id Hospital, Our losses of medical supplies wore not ossoervc* though there Wore tiacs that mortar and artillery f5ro had destroyed our aodicrJ units, vhich were immediately replaced* (2) The present type of nodical field equipment has provon to bo very satisfactory and easy to trrmsport, k, 14odieal Supplies. (l) The Bupplios carried were I dical Units #1 and 3 carried "by the doctors and 5 5a 6 ? 3 9 10* 11- 12 Plas;m and Scrum iilbunin carried "by corpdiaen. The amount -carried w o enough to supply two aid stations, <s and keep tho corpsmon on the linos well supplied, HesumLy was carried out from oithcr Regimental Aid Station or Division Picld Hosi?itdl, 1, Hotor Vehicles and Boiling Stock, (l) There wuro two (2) Jpcp atabulances old ono (l) t r a i l e r . Thcro were two (2) Jeep juibulrncos l o s t , which wore destroyed "by oncny fire* They were replaced "by regiment. The notor vehicles attached'to our unit were used to evacuate patients and re supply nodical o^uipiaont m, I&ilaria control and SpideQiology wac taken c;u*o of by division %>ideiaiology Unit, n, Ashore - After completion of assault phase, (l) All patients- that noeded ocdical attention wore taken en. of in the Battalion Aid Station i r evacuatod to Division S'iold Hospital for further disposition and troatwor.:, All field aanitr.r,/ precautions were ttf-kon. Heads were now constructed of oil druns and "bi rhod out fl daily* ttCans were , flat^enod and "buried. ?ood s t U l consisted of "C", "K md " rations v/ith hot coff00 occasionally, The last few days on the isl'nnd doughnuts and turnovers wore scrved^with hot-coffee. Water was sent to tlic linos froEirthfl ocach, troatracnt was available at a l l tines during and after the assault,
K.

(a) (1) In nets using Amplitude Modulated Hadio Hquipmont,

vory l i t t l e frequency interference occurred.
(2) Crystal controlled SfiB-53^ radio nets cscperionccd a , groat deal of interference duo to the limited number of broadcasting channels available and tho short range at which those sets were o-ocratod. (3) Froqucncy Modulated Equipment proved highly s a t i s factory. Some interference occurred on SC&-3OO channels due to inductive blocking. Jhis was caused by the cj.oso proximity of radio sets on different nets which was dictated by tho only terrain available which offorod some cover and concealment. (b) 3asic systonis of radio nots prove
except in the case of SCB-536 nets which were """*"

j^ ^

Action Bcport lOont1 &}

(c) No groat communication delays in spotting ships firo wore
encountered*

, W. H..

-22

ENCLOSURE E

3D

MARINES

ACTION REPORT

HEADQUARTERS, 32 Mi&INES,
3D K A R E I E DIVISION, R E S T MARE'S FORCE,
C/O FLE2T. POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.
1? April, 1945.
From: To : Commanding "Officer, 3d Marines,
Commanding General. 3d Marine Division.
Action- Report, 'TWO JBIA Operation,
137.
Report 1st Bn, 3d Marines.
Report 2d Bn, 3d Marines.
Report 3d Bn, 3d Marines*
.

Subject:

Reference: (a) Div GO Inclosures:(A) Action (B) Action (C) Action I. Summary.

A. This report covers period November, 1944, time

mission was assigned to 8 Inarch, 1945, time this organization
debarked on GUAM,
B. RCT-3 was in floating reserve for the operation.
Did not land.
** Preliminaries.
A. RCT-3 was composed of the 3d Marines plus attached
units: Co C 3d MT Bn, Co C 3d Med Bn, Co C 3d Sngr Bn, Co C
3d<Pion Bn, det 3d JASCO.
B. From time mission was assinged to the beginning
of the action an intensive training program was conducted. Em phasis Was placed on training of individuals and small units with
many hours being devoted to reduction of fortified positions.
All personnel received training in combinedtaafc-infantry and
artillery-infantry tactics*
C. Assigned mission of RCT-3: Land initially in Div
Res on order on Dog plus 1 day or after on beaches to be designated,
prepared to move to assigned assembly areas*
D. At outset of action RCT-3 was aboard Trans Div 33.

III. Chronological acpount of the action.

A. RCT-3 arrived in the transport area fct-IWO JIMA 27
February, 1945. 3d and 4th Bns, 12th Marines debarked 28-29 Feb.
KGF elements, 3d JASCO debarked 28 Feb and 3 March, Replacements
and SP personnel debarked 28 Feb, Cargo unloading began 2 March.
Ships platoons debarked 5 March. RCT-3 sailed for GUAM 5 March
and arrived*8 March, 1945. All troops debarked and unloading
completed by 10 liarch, 1945, .
IV. Comments,
i. administration.
1, 2. B* This organization suffered no casualities,
Morale of troops was excellent.

Intelligence.

1. Maps: Special air*and Gunnery Target Map,

Scale: 1:6,000, 1:10,000 and 1:20,000 of PfO JIM,, with target
area grid {64th Engr Top Bn 1944).
- 1

eratlon.

Cont*d.

Special Air and Gunnery TargetMap,

.IWO JIKiA, Scale 2 inches equal 1 nautical mile,
Spe'cial Aerial !rosiac, ITfO JIMA, Scale
1:20,000 with" target area grid.
. Special-Aerial llosiac, IWCJIMA, Scale
1:10,000 with target area' grid.
Chart (H.O.) No.6101; 1W0 JBIiv.
Vertical overlapping strips sutle,ble
for stereo study, high and low level obliques.
. complete*
effective*
4, Procedure for recovery of captured enemy
documents andmaterial good,
5, qualified. Japanese language Officers effective and
. : .
. (a) 8 Officers permenantly attchd - none,
(b) Officers temporarily attchd - 1st I t , W. B, ViTVLlhM and 1st I t . K, K. HOFFAT. (c) Unlisted permenantly attchd - none. <d) Enlisted temporarily attchd - Oorfc. J. P, -PATRICK, Corp, W. J, STSTINA, Pfc 3 . A, PETERSON, Pfc T. I , (e) Nisei - none.
C. .Operations and Training.
IV BCT-3 held no rehearsal exercises. While aboard
ship to indoctrinate troops in details of the operation,all were
instructed on the Regtl Opn Order, Also regular Periods were set
aside to allovr troops to study all available intelligence data in cluding maps andphotos, fit Supply.
1, Due to the fact that this organization did not .
land during the BIO Jill*, operation it is difficult to comment
on the.adequacy of supplies lifted,, adequacy of resupply, Shore
Party, transportation, other equipment or supplies. However, it
is believed that the supplies and equipment lifted for the oper ation were adequate,

;>l|E^i#1iize&
".10

Relief Maps ~ BfO JIKA 1:7000.

1W. JIKA 1:5000.

2* 3,

Kydrographic information very accurate and

Intelligence data furnished on time and

2, Greatest difficulty encountered with the

eargo lifted was the incorrect data furs
the exact percentage of supplies that could be pal
Z ''

Action Report, 1m) TnWirOperation.

Cont*d.

the last minute palletized supplies had to be broken open in

order to meet square foot requirements. In addition/ there were
npt enough cranes in the staging areas to handle the pallets and
not sufficient slings aboard the ships to^ handle the pallets,
3 No Wilson cargo drums were unloaded by this
organization. There were approximately sixty (60) of the drums
lifted. The drums loaded contained medical supplies, chemical
supplies, motpr transport spare parts, and miscellaneous quarter master suppliesf It is believed that wooden crates are better
for packing of supplies. The drums are hard to handle and diff icult to pack. Crates are made to size as needed and conserve cargo
! space . .'.,
E
i
. . >.

Transport quartermaster.
. .

1, Time required to load and embark RCT-3 was

twenty-two (22) hours. No personnel should be embarked prior to
the completion of the loading. Troops lined u to go aboard
crowded the doclcs and made it difficult for the trucks bringing
an supplies from the staging areas to pull along side of the ships
for rapid unloading. i4$o the decks oX the ships were crowded
with men coming aboard and affected the unloading.
2# Greatest difficulty encountered was the in~
correct data furnished this-organization by the'Division Trans-,
port Quartermaster OffIce on the tonnage, cube! square footage,
and billiting space. The discrepancy between the data furnished
by the TQM and the dp.ta given by Trans Civ Comdr revealed man
changes that had to be made at the last minute. Cargo had to be .
adjusted to meet the tonnage and square foot allowance and per sonnel had to be changed from one ship to another.
3. Difficulty was encountered during the loadin
due to the lack of sufficient lighting facilities on the docks
and in the staging areas.
F.'> Signal*
1. Communication Plan (SOI).
Communications plan was received in ample
time to permit study, changes, and criticism.
2. Embarkation and Voyage.
fa) All equipment, was loaded according to plan.
(b) No equipment suffered any damage in loading.
(c) All batteries were checked at least once
during the voyage.

(<t) -No training was parried on while aboard

ship. iq) Message center personnel operated jointl
with the ships communications officer to facilitate delivery of
to troop officers.
3. Personnel*
- 3

Action Repor sufficients

Operation,

Contrd

(a) .Present allowance -of personnel Is

tb) No changes are recommended.
(c) All personnel was sufficiently trained,'

(d) Np recommendations for special training.

(e) This organization was short (14) fourteen
communication personnel* '
(f) No personnel was lost aboard ship.
NOTE: Since this regiment was not committed only the pertinent
questions were answered.
Q-. He&lcal.
1, Embarkation.

(a) Personnel: Following a training program

as outlined by the Regimental Surgeon, Headquarters and Service Co,
Regimental Weapons and the three battalions marched to their
respective staging areas from which they went aboard ship. All
medical personnel accompanied their respective units on the march.
(b) Material: Medical material other than'the
units #1 and #3 went aboard shix> by assigned vehicles. H&S Co's
equipment was distributed between the two Jeet> ambulances, a
weasel and a reconnaissance truck, all of which were on different
-.
ships .than the company personnel * ^ 2. ,' Aboard ship.

(a) Sickness: HAS Co personnel were aboard

the same ship as the 2d Battalion. All procedures and care of
casualities were carried out in the ame manner as the 2d Battal*
ion, 3d l*arine Regiment. Action Report so states,. In general,
sick call for the Marine personnel aboard airships transporting
the Regiment1 was conducted by the Medical Officer attached to their
respective Karine units and patients requiring hospltalizatlon
were admitted to the ship's sick bay under the supervision of the
ship's Uedical personnel. All uch patients received excellent .
care and no epidemics were encountered; the general health of the ,
troops being good. Dermatologlcal problems such as fungus of the
feet were intensified during the early days aboard ship due to
the march to the docks * There was an increase in the incidence
of colds after the ship arrived in a cooler,climate.
, fc (b) Sanitary Conditions: In general^ the
sanitary conditions were satisfactory and a daily inspection of
the heads, living quarters, messed, galleys, and the cooks and
messmen were held by both ship's and Marine units Medical personnel*
(c) Special Precautions: All suspected
tagious diseases were Immediately Isolated and n#i2J4emics were
encountered,"
(d) Hostdtalization: All
requiring hospital!station -were admitted to the ship's s
and were under the supervision of the Shirks Medical personnel.
The management of the cases was excellent and'the equipment and
supplies were more than adequate. The average number of Marine
.jggrsonnel required hospitalization; only one major operatlye pro*
^ceSare was necq-ssary^or the, entire Regiment during its stay aboard

-4-

ship.
(e) Casualities treated: The number of cas ualities received aboard the various ships assigned to the Regiment
varied, depending on available space and Ledical personnel avail able. The APAVs received from two hundred and fifty (250) to four
hundred ana fifty'(450) casualities, nearly all of which were re tained, a few serious cases were transferred to a Hospital Ship
which was leaving the area. All deaths occuring before ships left
the combat area were returned to the beach for burial in Marine
Cemeteries! There were three burials at sea in the Regiment and
several bodies were carried aboard ship until our arrival at GUAM
where burial in the Marine Cemetery was undertaken. All types of
casualities were received, most of them being of an orthet)e41c
nature Most of the,mental cases showed marked improvement within
forty-eight (48) hours. The prpportion of head, chest, abdomen,
and extremity wounds was about the same as usual.
(f) Medical Personnel: XX was the opinion
of nearly all the Medical personnel attached to the Marine units
staying aboard ship, that ship's Medical personnel was not ade quate in number .during the actual phase of receiving "casualities
aboard hip. All Medical personnel and Corpsmen attached to Marine
units aboard ships receiving casualities* volunteered their ser vices and worked under the Shirks Medical Officer. The corpsmen
were well utilised in caring for the minor wounds, plasma teams
and ward work as casualitlee came aboard so'fast, a good deal, of
responsibility was placed in their hands. No losses nor replace ments were necessary and all personnel did an excellent job. While
mo$t of the work was surgical in nature, it was the opinion of most
of the staff that roughly eighty percent of caBualities received
did not require the training of a specialist to give proper medical
care.
(g) Field Uedical Equipment: About eighty
percent of allowance was carried and there was no pilferage.
However, several of- the Battalions lost part of their Medical
supplies and equipment when an A ^ A carrying these items, unloaded
on the beach at IWO JIMA and medical units were-taken ashore by
mistake. Since the Regiment did not go ashore, it is not ppsslble
to determine the adequacy or suitability of the present types
v
available(h) Medical supplies: No pilferage was re ported but some supplies were lost in the same manner as medical
equipment*
3. Debarkation*
This unit did'npt debark until the ship re turned to' GUAM, vHariannas Islands.
4. Recommendations.
(a) A S has been stated by the various Battalion
Surgeons, It is the opinion of the-Medical Staff of this Regiment
after working aboard ship during the combat phase of an operation;
that available Medical personnel aboard ships receiving casualities
is not adequate in number. This is true only for the actual irtiase
of receiving casualities since In a large number of the cases, this
point was the first in the chain of evacuation that the patient was
able to receive anything more than first aid. All Medical personnel
available were well utilized and since Marine attached units would

. :

'

Operation.

Ooxit'd*

^ be ordinarily present*; it is suggested that a Medical pool be

available for such ships during the phase of receiving casualities
only. Ships Medical Personnel is more than adequate at all other.
times.

'

N .

Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR,

Commanding.

- 6

HEADQUARTERS,

1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, 3D MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE*,' C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAft FRANCISCO.

Witf)
From: To: Subject: Reference I.

21 April, 1945*

thmaiiding ' O f f i c e r . . The Contoiftding O f f i c e r , T h i r d M a r i n e s . A c t i o n R e p o r t , IWO MlUk O p e r a t i o n . Div GO 1 3 7 , d a t e d 3 F e b r u a r y , 1 9 4 5 . SUMMARY

A, This report covers the period from 5 November, 1944, to 8 March, 194?, the date on which the battalion disem barked^from the transport ship at GUAM, M.I. Included in the re port are.the phases of training, loading aboard shiprf movement
to target area, and return.
B # As this unit was part of a reserve which was not
committed in the action, the report contains no narrative of par ticipation. ,
II. PRELIMINARIES
A # This command was organized as a Battalion Land ing Team whose composition was as follows:
! 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 1st Bn, 3d Marines.
1st Flat, Wpns Co, 3d Marines*
1st Plat, Co !Cfl, 3d Engr Bn.
1st Plat, Co I C % 3d Pion Bn.
Collecting Sec, Co "C", 3d Med Bn.
Det, 3d JASCO.
Det, 28th Repl Draft.
Det, 34th Repl Draft,

B f During the period 5 November, 1944, to 10 Febru ary, 1945> this battalion engaged in intensive training for the
operation. The training included all phases from basic weapons
training and tactics of small units to regimental problems, the em*
ployment of supporting weapons, and one (1) Division CPX. As it
was planned that this unit would be a part of a reserve during the
initial assault landing, stress was placed upoii training in the ex
ecution of a passage of lines.
During training only standard doctrines were fol lowed and it was emphasized that accepted publications formed the
basis on which the battalion would operate. Much time was devoted
to working with attached units: i.e. artillery, tanks, naval gun fire liaison and spotter teams; and all personnel were familiar ized with the function of these organizations.
Planning alqng specifics lines was necessarily
limited due to the nature of the mission and the fact that sec urity prevented dessemination of any detailed information* Within
the limitations above planning consisted of making a complete
study of existing maps and relief models. Such study could be made
prior to embarkation only by a limited number of officers* Several
alternate plans were formulated, all quite general in nature, for
the employment of the BLT. No rehearsals, as such, were held, although field
problems, meant to simulate actual conditions, were.run.

Action Report, IWO JIM& Operation,

Cont'd,

C No definite mission was assigned to this unit

initially. Several alternate plans were presented for the possi ble employment of the reserve/ The operations plan published con tained no unusual features,
D # At the outset of the action the BLT was located
aboard ship waiting to be called to the transport area.
III, Chronological account of the action,
A. The bulk of the BLT remained aboard ship
throughout the action. On orders from higher authority the Engr
Platoon, Pion Platoon, Det 3d JASCQ, Dets 28th and 34th Repl
Drafts were sent ashore and subsequently participated in the ac tion there. The reaainder of the BLT was returned to. GUAM prior
to the completion of the action, ,
IV. A. INTELLIGENCE
' 1, Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps;
1:5,000; 1:10,000; 1:20,000 were furnished. Enemy situation map
1:10,00b, Relief model 1:7,000 (approx). Vertical and oblique
photographs with various R,F. fs were furnished. Maps andphotos
were sufficient in number and apparently accurate in coverage al though practical use was not required.
2. Since no intelligence instructions were put
into use it is not felt that comments on the adequacy or inade quacy are appropriate,in this report.

B . OPERATIONS

1 # As previously stated no actual rehearsals

for the operation were held. After loading and prior to arrival
in the target area, a room was set aside aboard ship in which all
maps, operations plans etc. were set up. Officers were first in structed in all phases of the operation and they in turn instruct ed the troops. This' method of indoctrination, in which small
groups studied maps and photos was found to be quite satisfactory*
C. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER
1. Loading and embarkation were accomplished
separately. Loading was completed within approximately fifteen
(15) hours and embarkation in about three 13) hours. Both appeared
to proceed smoothly without unusual difficulties and without the
employment of unusual methods.
2. The*>one major difficulty in loading was in
the preparation of preliminary plans. Much of this difficulty
was due to the inaccuracy of information on shipfs characteristics
(particularly troop carrying capacity) in the officer of the Divi sion TQM. Also there seemed to be considerable indecision just
prior to preparing the loading plan as to just what would be car ried and how certain items would be stowed.

-2

Action Repor

Operation. D. MEDICAL
1, Embarkation.

Cont'd*

(a) Thirty nine (39) corpsmen and two (2)

doctors moved with the battalion from the camp area to embarkation
point. Point was reached on foot, covering about eleven (11) miles.
Great increase in fungus infection of the feet and acne, vulgaris
was noted*
(b) All medical supplies for the battalion ex cept individual first aid units were transported by vehicle.
2. Aboard Ship.
(a) Great increase in common colds among
Marine personnel noted due to change in climate and close living
quarters. No outbreak of food poisdaing or epidemics encountered;
general he&lth was good.
(b) The Sanitary conditions were all rated as
excellent.
(c) All suspected cases were isolated immed iately as precautionary measures eyen though no definite contagi ous diseases were diagnosed.
(d) Hospitalization.
(1) Troop sick calls were held 1*y troop
doctors and corpsmen, all cases necessitating hospitalization were
admitted to thip's sick bay and treated by ship's medical staff.
(2) Facilities for hospitalization were
excellent in type and adequate.
(3) Ship's-medical supplies were used in cluding those used during troop sick call. Ship*s personnel were
used on ly for hospitalized cases.
(4) Usual number of patients from the
battalion* at no time exceeding ten (10) in number, were hospit alized.
(e) Approximately two hundred and fifty
(250) casualties were treated aboard the U.S.S. Fredrick Funston.
Of this number eight (8) were transferred to U.S.S. Solace while
lying off shore. /
(1) Three (3> men died aboard ship and
were buried ashore.
(2) From the time casualties were re ceived until the battalion disembarked at GUAM, M.I. the medical
department of this activity offered their services and worked
with the medical staff aboard the U.S.S. Fredrick Funston. All
the corpsmen and both doctors were used to good advantage and
worked harmonously with the staff aboard. The corpsmen did a won derful work acting as blood and plasma teams, assisting with the
surgery, and as individual special watcli on particularly serious
cases. All hands turned to in a very satisfactory and effective
manner. The medical group of this command reffdff^^iejiighest of

Action Report, IWO JIMA Operation,

Cont'd,

praise and many thanks for their splendid work from the ship's
medical staff.
(3) All types of casualties were handled,
with more stretcher cases than walking wounded. Most cases were
orthopedic in naturet but chest wounds, head and face wounds and
others were handled. A fair proportion were psychiatric cases, a
great majority of which showed marked improvement within.a period
of forty-eight (48) hours,
(f) Medical Personnel:
(1) It is the opinion of this medical
section that the medical personnel of transports receiving large
numbers of casualties during an invasion should be augmented ati
that time. Temporary additional medical personnel, both doctors
and corpsmen would save lives and permit more rapid turnover of
patients. At one time we received one hundred ten (110) casual ties during a period of about four (4) hours. Eight (8) doctors,
three (3) of whom were unassigned passengers wereokept extremely
busy and fifty (50) corpsmen who happened to be aboard were giv ing immediate service. Temporary increase in staff would undoubt edly be a great help during such periods.
(2) For the simple transportation of
troops the complement of the medical staff aboard ship was quite
adequate,
(3) All medical personnel were used to
good advantage.
*
(4) All medical personnel seemed well
trained for their work and did an excellent job.
(5) Neurosurgeons are the greatest need,
but neurosurgical cases are generally easy to transfer to hospital
ships when such are available.
(g) Field Medical Equipment:
as it was not used. (1) No comment can be made at this time
. , .
(h) Medical Supplies:
(1) No comment can be made at this time
as it was not used.
3* Comments
No comment can be made at this time since
we did not disembark into action. However the fact may be restated
that the work of all medical personnel concerned was outstanding.
They were untiring in their efforts on behalf of the wounded and
unfagging in their devotion to duty. They showed no let down in
the standards of their work and it was always of the highest order.
Also, the medical personnel of transports receiving large numbers
of casualties during an invasion should be augmented at the time
of such an invasion by having additional personnel temporarily
attached, " ;*"

Action Report, IWO JIMA. Operation,

Cont'd.

V.

ppnc,3ru,sjrqfls afld Recommendations

A* In view of the fact that this unit did not

participate in the action it is felt that opinions and recommen dations from units who di<J participate would have much greater
practical value. The phases of training and loading undergone by
this organization seemdd to be handled in & satisfactory manner.

THEODORE

(JEJARTERS, 2D BATTALION, . .Vi ** . ES, 3D MARINE DIVISION,FM*1, O/O FljET, POST, OFFICE., SAN FRANCISCO.' 17 April, 1945. From: To: Subject: References: The Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division* Action Report, Iwo Jima. (a) Headquarters, 3d Marines Memo to CO ! s 1st, 2d, and 3d Bn, dtd 14Apr45\ ' (b) Division General Order #137,

1. In compliance with references (a)and (b), the following information is submitted:

PART I Summary. ' *

A. Period covered by repdr't dates from 5Nov44 to

8Mar45.
B. This organization embarked aboard USS Callaway
10Feb45, arrived at IwoJima, Volcano Islands on 27Feb45,
but did not land, and sailed therefrom 5Mar45.
PAR? II Preliminaries:
$he reporting command'was B.L.T.-2 and was com A. posed of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines;,attached 2d Platoon
Weapons Company; 2d Platoon Company n C H # 3d PioneerBat talion; collecting section Company "C", 3d MedicalBat talion; detachment 3d JASCO; detachment 28th Replacement;
Draff and detachment V34th Replacement Draft.
B The reporting unit devoted particular emphasis
to the following types of training: Tank-infantry coor dination, attack of a fortified position, reduction of
a pill box by small assault teams, and squad and platoon
tactics. No rehearsals for this operation were conducted,

C. BLT-2 was to land on order-on beaches to be

designated/ This battalion was the reserve battalion of
the reserve division and was to go into assembly area if
landed and await further orders.,
A. Embarked aboard theUSS Gallaway, 10Feb45 at
Guam, Marianas Islands, arid sailed therefrom on 17Feb45/
Arrived at IwoJima, Volcano Islands on 27Feb45.and sail ed therefrom &Mar46, arrived and disembarked at Guam^
Marianas Islands on 8Mar45#

PART III Chronological account of the action,

PART IV Comments.
A. Administration*
1. Concerning morale of troops: Importance of the operation to the final assault P^fmgmof the en tire Pacific War against Japan was streffttJWi^ejstures.

:0M REPORT*. IWO JTMA^

Physical frills conducted aboard ship maintained high body
condition. Frequent Church Services were held,
B. Intelligence,
1. Maps* '
eu Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of
Iwo Jima, cscale 1:5,000 with target area grid.
"b. Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of
Iwo Jima, scale It10,000 with target area grid.
c, Same 1; 20,000.
d, Special Air and Gunnery Target Map of
Iwo Jima, scale 2 inches equal nautical mile.
e, Special Aerial Mosaic, Iwo Jima, scale
1:20,000 without target area grid.
2. Photographs.
a. Vertical overlapping strips suitable for
stereo studies,
b. High and low level, obliques.
3. Relief Maps.
* a. Iwo Jima, scale 1:7.,000*
b. Iwo Jima, scale 1;5,000, rubber,
4,'-If la felt that the number and diversity
of maps and, photos was adequate. No comment on accuracy.
5. One enlisted Japanese language man, PFC /
J. P. PATRICK, JR., (817284), USMCR, was temporarily at tached to this organization* No comment on his effect-*
iv.ene'ss or qualifications. . ' ' ,
6- Counter intelligence measures.and precau tions included strict censorship regulations ridgidly
.enforced, and witholdlng of destination until ship was
fully loaded. All maps and secret documents were placed,
under guard preceding embarkation of troops.
C* Operations and Training . 1-4 No Rehearsal exercises were conducted.
Troops were'indoctrinated aboard ship in details of
operation b y frequent briefings with map and photo aids
* and by lectures on miscellaneous information concerning
Volcano Islands.
D. Supply. . ' . . -

Adequacy of a l l types of mounting out Supplies, Class I (Rations - T y p e . . . . 1 0 days. - 1 0 - 1 . . . .10 days, * Type C. 5 days. > Type K* 5 day8, Type D. 2 days.

-*&.

In cans, drums, water

trailers or other organiza tional equipment-2gals per
man per day, for 5 days..
Class II Maintenance items of clothing,
equipment and general supplies.30 days.
Class III Fuels atid lubricants,.........30 days.
Class IV Chemical Warfare Supplies,..;..30 days.
Note; The Chemical Warfare Supplies were
loaded with high priority so that
thej- were readily acces
Immediate use.
-2

Water " '

ACTION REPORT,

(Cont'd)

*M#

Class V Ammunition! One (1) unit of fire

small arms was stored in readily
accessible spaces to expedite issue
to individuals prior to debarkation;
fyortars-seven units of fire; all
other types of weapons five (5) units
of fire.
Note: The above quantities loaded were based
on the 3d Marines Administrative Order
number 1-45, and due.to the fact that
we did not land it is not known whether
the quantities were sufficient for a
successful combat mission.
E Transport quartermaster, . '

1. Twenty*-five (25) hours required to Toad ship;

two hours to embark troops. No difficulties encountered
in embarking troops or loading cargo,
F. Chemical,
1.

Chemical, aspects of.

a. Planning Phase,
1. Instruction of troops in defense
against chemical attack.
2, Distribution of gasmasks, protect ive ointment and protective 'covers, to all troops prior
to embarkation.
b. Loading Phase.
x , 1. Chemical warfare supplies were loaded with high priority classifications'so that they were readily available for immediate use. 0. fcedloal.

1, ' Embarkation, ' . , , *

a. Personnel; Medical Troops attached to
the Battalion marched from the camp at Barrigada to the
ship at Sumay. ' ^
b. Material; Except for field marching
^unif o?m, all other .medical equipment "was transported by
vehicle to the ship,
2. Aboard ship.
a. Sickness: About 20$ of the Battalion
personnel required care of the feet during the first
week and a half aboard ship, due to foot ai-lments sus tained on the march to the staging areas. After the ship
left the tropical zones, about 35$ of the Battalion per sonnel required treatment for upper respiratory Infections.
Medical troops attached to the Marines helped with daily
Sick Call. But all hospitalized cases were turned over to
the care of the ships doctors.
b. Sanitary Conditions: Daily inspection by
Medical Troops attached to the Marines in cooperation with
the ship's medical personnel was made,
,1. Heads; Sufficient in number and
cleanliness, but closed too long for use by the troops when
*
being inspected.

REPORT, IWO JIM, (Cont'd).

2v Living Quarters! -Good,, except

scarcities of fresh water prevented adequate bathing.
3. Mesees: Food, excellent.
4. (rallies: In good repair and
running condition* "'.'..
5. Cooks and hessmen: Both ship and
Marine cooks and mesemen cooperated in preparing the food*
Upper respiratory infections in this, group made them some what of a menace*
c. Special Precautions: / None.
* 'd. Hospitalization: All personnel of this
Battalion hospitalized,, were admitted to the ship* s-Sick Bay.
1. Adequacy: Sufficient* * * . '
2. Equipment, Supplies, and Personnel:
Ship's equipment and supplies were used throughout and w$re
sufficient, Medical Personnel attached to the Marines coop erated with ship's Medical personnel.
3. Number of Patients: About thirty (30)
Marine* Personnel were hospitalized for periods of two (2) to
seven (?) days. . ,
4# Operations Performed* One (1)- append ectomy.
e. Casualties Treated: Kedical Personnel *
attached to the Marine Corps cooperated with ship1s per sonnel in care of casualties received.
1. Number: , 180.
(a) Retained: All.
(b) Evacuated: None.

.- (c) Died: Five ( >

>

6. Type: All casualties were those

' wounded in action against an organized enemy or Combat
Fatigue. . .
3. Walking Wounded: About 80.
4. Stretcher cases: About 80.
f. - kedical Personnel:
1. Adequate: Yes,
2. Employment: Assisted in Marine Sick
Call and care of Casualties.
3. Losses: None.
4. State of Training: Good.
5. Specialties Needed: None.
g Field Medical Equipment:
1* 10-^day Back up as perscribed by Div ision Order. (440 Small Battle Dressings.)
(a) To be carried in assault. Three :
(3) Unit 5-A. ( s d f made.)
One (1) Unit,?.
2. Pilferage, and losses: None.
3. Adequate: Not known.
4. Suitable: Yes.
.5. Improvements: None.
6. Resupply: Not necessary, ' v
h. Medical Supplies: ^
1. 1 Amount Carried:
(a) To be beach supply;
Ten (10) day back up as pres cribed by Division Order.
Unit 10. (440 Small Battle Dress ings. ) v
Unit Combat Be|

ORT, IWO JIKA, 2. 3.

4. 6.-

(Cont'd).

Pilferage and losses; None.

Debarkation: None. '
Ashore; None*
Recommendations:
(a), It is recommended that no such
twenty (20) mile hike prior to
embarkation for combat again be
ordered, for medical casualties,
particularly in care of the feet
as well as heat collapses incapa citated a good 20$ of foarine Per-t
spnnel for one and one-half weeks
aboard ship*

Signal.
*..
,

1. Refer to Modification No. 1 to General Order

Number 1 3 % dated 3 April, 1945, enclosure (A) Signal
Q,uestionaire, Notes 1, 2, and 3.
PART V* Conclusions and recommendations,
A* Due to 1jhe fact that this unit did not partici pates in the Combat Operation, many topics which apply
solely to the cpmbat phase are omitted*

. . - * \

r/"/

-5

3D BATTAUQN, 3D i--j*RItfES, 3D ftARXNE DIVISION, FLSST 0 FL&CT POST OFFICE, S W A 17 April, 1945, The Commanding Officer, The Commanding Offieer, 3d Marines. Subject: Reference PART I . A. The period covered by this report is the period frm 5 November, 1944, t# 8 naroh, 1945.
3. This Bn embarked aboard the USS Ji-hLS QlH^-A An
10 February, 1945 et GUAM,fo.I. and sailed #n 17 February for
iv/a J I i . We arrived at the transport area at IWO JIKA on 21
I'A i February, 1945* V e remained floating reserves until 5 liarch,
1945 at which time we left Itfo J I i and sailed fir GUAM, 11.1.
I-A We arrived at StfAH, M.I. #n 8 liarch and disembarked.
ACTION Heptrt, IWO JTl-iA'Operation. Div 00 13?, "

PART II.

PESLIKI JU

A. The oomptsltitn tf this command from 10 February,

45 to 8 karch 45 was one (1) B.LT composed of:
3d 3n, 5d Uar.
3d Plat, 'vpns C.
3d Plat, Co. C, 3d i^ngr 'Bn*
3d Plat, Co. C, 3d PiAn 3n.
Collecting Sec, Co. C, 3d hod Bn.
'Jet 3d JASCO.
Det 28th Replacement i)raft.
Det 34th Replercement Draft.
B. Up#n being assigned this mission, this 3n began
an intensive training schedule. Huoh time was spent on tank infantry-artillery coordination, over-running strongly fortified
positions with emphasis on over-running pill boxes by the proper
use of flame throwers and demolitltns. This Bn also participated
in a throe (3) day prAblem using artillery, Naval gunfirv3 (simul ated by 105 114 HAW) , and air support. This Bn devoted consider -1 able time to physical conditioning, of the troops and participated
in numerous conditioning hikes.
C. The 3d 3n, 3d 1 i r was to land on order on Dog plus
-a 1 day or after on beaches t be designated, prepared to move to
assigned assembly area. J>11 companies were to be prepared for
immediate offensive action on landing.
D. This 3n was nat landed and so encountered no
enemy resistance.

I'-

ACTION r^POl-:T, III.

Cont'd
CH^OLQ<>ICAL.TACGOtfaTTjOF THE

A. This Bn embarked aboard USS JAIIS8 O'HARA on 10Feb45,

and sailed from GUAli, on 17Feb45, T're arrived in the transport
area at V*O JIJ1A an 26Feb45. Artillery started landing on 28th
Feb and completed unloading all artillery tn 29 Feb. Replace ments snd Shore Party personnel were landed 28 Feb, Unloading
#f ammo and priority vehicles began 28 Feb. The USS JAhS;.QlHAi"vA
began taking casualties aboard on 1 Larch and our Bn medical
section gavo valuable assistance to the Ship18 medical depart ment, 'General cargo unloading began on 2 i*arch Ship platoon
was landed on 5 karoh. U&8 JAl-iES O'HArwA sailed fr*m IVO JIliA n
& March end arrived at OUAIi, h. I* an 8 aarch, and disembarked all
trops and remaining cargo.

A.

Admlnlstratlan.
1. We suffered n# casualties due t# enemy
2, The marale #f the troops was ^excellent.

3,

Intelligence.

1. haps used were Special Air and Gunnery Target

hap. Scales 1:5,000 and 1:10,000 of IWO JXhj* and Aerial photo graphs, ^'e did ntt use stereoscopic pairs, ^e had an adequate
supply mt maps.
2. MQ had *ns (1) enlisted Jap language man attach ed to the 3n.
0. Operations and Training^
1, This Bn intensively trained in over-running a
fortified position end concentrated on the t acticpl use of 3az otkps, flame throwers and demolitions.
2. Supply. *
I> It is believed that this Bn had an adequate-
amount of mounting out supplies*
. Transport Quartermester.
1. All troops and cargo were embarked in app^tx imately 22 hours* The cargo leading wss not as fast as it .
*^ should

Opnfd.

been owing to faulty rigging on the 'ship and the ship had no f a c i l i t i e s f~r handling large quantities of palletized cargo. Ship unloading tools: place between 27Feb end bl^arch. personnel end cargo vere unloaded on call, F. Chemical.

1, All hands carried gas masks, protective capes

and protective ointment. Defensive chemical warfare supplies
end equipment vere so loaded aboard ship that they were reaS.ily
accessible for emergency use.
Or. IJedlcal.
1. 2mba r k a t i o n.

Personnel: Personnel embarked included

two (2) liedical Officers and forty (4Q) hospital corpsmen, who
hiked from the camp site to the docks on 9 February, 1945 and
embarked the following morning aboard the USS O'HAJFtA.
^* Material: ICedical supplies vere loaded
on vehicles end loaded with the vehicles on 7 February, 1945.
Some of the vehicles vent aboard the USS C ! HARA and some vent
aboard the USS ALHSKA.
2. Aboard Ship.

,* Sickness: Embarked medical personnel held

sick call for troops twice daily BnC. patients needing hospital ization were admitted to the ship lc sick bay. There w&g very
little sickness and. no epidemics.
b Sanitary Conditions: Sanitary conditions
vere very satisfactory in heads, living quarters, messes and
galleys.
.6. Specie! Precautions: A daily inspection
by a medical officer W s made of the heads, troop spaces, messes,
galleys, cooks, and messmen.
Hospitalization; Facilities vere adequate
B far as equipment and supplies end sick bay space vere con cerned. "When asualties vere taken aboard, it was obvious that
the medical department of the ship could not have adequately
Cared for them without help. The medical department of the ship
consisted, of four (4) medical officers and twenty-nine (29) hos pital corpsmen. with the Troops vere our two (2) gpe^ical officer

ACTIOK

and forty (40) corpeaen plus two (2) medical officers and about
fifteen (15) corpsmen from attached units* The number of
patient8 on the sick list averaged about thirty (30) until ca sualties were taken aboard* .Approximately fifty (50). major
surgical procedures were done.
* pastt&l'fcles Treat ed: A total of about four
hundred and sixty (460) casualties were treated, of which about
thirty (30) were returned to duty and the remainder retained.
Six (6) patients died. Casualties were of various types. One
hundred and- twenty-five (125) vere stretcher cases and three
hundred and five (305) were walking wounded.
f ? f edlcal Personnel: Medical personnel was
adequate All the medical1 officers and hospital corpsmen worked
under the direction of the senior medical officer of the ship
and did the same work as the shlp!s medical personnel. There
were no losses or replacements. All hands were well trained
and did satisfactory work/ There was no need for specialists.
g. Field Medical Squlpment; About eighty f
cent (80$) of our allowances was loaded aboard ship, approx imately two-thirds of it was landed- on 1 - 0 JIKA frbm the" ALHZrU,
13 and was used by other units, v e have been unable to obtain any
i of that equipment. Since we did net use any cf the other third
we have no opinion regarding its adequacy, suitability, or im provements needed.
h. H edical Supplies; The same statement made
regarding medical equipment applies to medical supplies*
Debarkation:
We did not debark until we reach ed 0U4M, H.I* on 6 Harch, 1945* On that date the troops debark ed and went back to camp in trucks. The following day we receiv
ed what was left of our equipment and supplies,
Recommendations:
1. That a pool of medical
personnel be made available for temporary duty aboard trans ports which ere to take casualties during an amphibious oper ation to supplement the ship^ medical department.
4* 3,
e

" yAtTlA&u***

I&CHARD T; :IC

Lt^Col., USHC*,
Commanding..

- 4

ENCLOSURE F

I2TH MARINES

ACTION REPORT

. - <
*

RFC/peg
So*.No* 3-02^45

Headquarters
12th Marines, 3d Marine Division,

From: To : Subject: Reference: Enclosures

12th Marines.
Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
Action Report IWO
JIMA

Operation.
Operation, 1st Battalion

JIMA JIMA JIMA

Division General Order Number 137.

(A) action Report 12th Marines.
(B) Action Report 12th Marines.
(C) Action Report * 12th Marines.
(D) action Report 12th Marines.
IWO IWO IWO IWO

Operation, 2d Battalion.
Operation, 3d Battalion

Operation, 4th Battalion

Sugary.
A. The mission was first assigned (tentatively) on 7 November
1944* 12th Marines assumed tactical control of the 3d ferine Division
Artillery ashore o*n two JIMA on 25 February, 1945, and turned tac tical control over to 4th Battalion 12th Marines at 1800 on March 16*
1945.
B. The forward observers and liaison officers of the 2d Bat talion 12th Marines landed with the 21st Marines on the afternoon of
21 February. The forward observers adjusted the fires of the 14th
Marines during 22, 23, and 24 February when the 2l6t Marines were
attached to the 4th Marine Division.
The Executive Officers Reconnaissance Party was ordered to land
with the Assistant Division Commander on 23 February to make posit ion area reconnaissance for the 12th Marines, A report was made tov
tha Commanding Offleer recommending the landing of the regaining
elements of 12th Marines then in the Transport ^rea. The Executive
Officer recommended the 2d Battalion 12th Marines land on 24 February.
The Commanding Officer and the 2d Battalion 12th Marines Recon naissance Parties landed just after noon on 24 February, and proc eeded to position areas selected. Because of a misunderstanding
with the Captain of the ship on which embarked, M B H Battery 1st
Battalion 12th Marines landed late in the afternoon this day. 12th
Marines had four (4j pieces in position during this period.
The remainder of 2d Battalion.12th Marines and 1st Battalion
12th Marines were ordered to land on 25 February. Due to lack of
boats, only nine (9) pieces of 2d Battalion 12th Marines came ashore
this day. Both 1st and 2d Battalions 12th Marines pieces were reg-
istered'during the day by Air Spot and 1st Battalion 12th Marines
assumed direct support at 1700. firing eight (8) pieces of 2d Batt alion 12th Marines and four (4) pieces of 1st Battalion 12th. Marines
1st Battalion 12th Marines and 4th Battalion 13th Marines reinf^ced
the fires of 1st battalion 12th Marines. /
During 26 February the 1st Battalion 12th Marines managed to
get the remaining two (2) Batteries ashore, but the 2d Battalion
12th Marines -ot only one (1) more piece ashore. The 1st Battaiion
12th Marines continued %n direct support of the 9th Marines, rein forced by the ten (10) pieces of the 2d Battalion 12th Marine* and
tha 4tb Battalion 13th Marines.

12th Marines Action Report IWO JIMA Operation

(Cont'd)

During 27 February the 2d Battalion 12th Marines landed the

remaining two (2) pieces of that Battalion, and the 4th Battalion
12th Marines landed "K'f Battery; "the 3d Battalion 12th Marines landed
three (3) guns each from " r1 and "H" 3atteries. The four (4) pieces
(1 of the 4th Battalion 12th Marines and the six (6) pieces of the 3d
Battalion 12th narines were registered by Air Spot and were put
under operational control of the 3d Battalion 12th marines# The 1st
Battalion 12th Marines continued in direct support of the 9th Marines,
reinforced by the 2d Battalion 12th Marines, provisional 105mm Batt alion controlled by 3d Battalion 12th Marines, and the 4th Battalion
13th Marines*
During 28 February the 4th Battalion 12th Marines landed the
remaining guns of that Battalion and one (1) spare gun which was
given to the 3d Battalion 12th Marines, The 3d Battalion 12th Mari nes landed four (4) more pieces of "I" Battery and with the piece
loaned by the 4th Battalion 12th Marines had eleven (11) pieces
firing. During this period the 2d Battalion 12th Marines went into
direct support of the 21st Marines, reinforced by the fires of 1st,
3d and 4th Battalions %Zth Marines and 4th Battalion 13th Marines.
4th Battalion 13th Marines was released at moon of 28 February.
During 1 March the remaining two (2) pieces of 3d Battalion
12th marines came ashore and the 12th Marines tactical organisation
was now entirely ashore. The 2d Battalion 12th Marines continued
in direct support of the 21st Marines, reinforced by the fires of
1st, 3d and 4th Battalions 12th Marines.
On 2 ^arch both the 9th and 21st Marines went into the line and
the 1st Battalion 12th Marines was placed in direct support of the
9th Marines, reinforced by the fires of 3d Battalion 12th Marines;
the 2d Battalion 12th Marines waa,placed in direct support of the
21st Marines, reinforced by the fires of 4th 3attalion 12th Marines.
From 2 March until 15 ^arch the assignment of Battalions rem ained the same.
On 16 March at 0700 the 3d Battalion 12th Marines was given
permission to close station prior to embarkation that day. The 21st
Marines were in the line and the 2d Battalion 12th Marines were in
direct support reinforced by 1st and 4th Battalions 12th Marines,
and Corps Artillery firing in general support.
At 1800 on 16 March, 1st and 2d 3attallons and Kegimental Head quarters and Service Battery 12th Marines were given permission to
close station prior to embarkation the following day, leaving 4th
Battalion 12th Marines in support of the 3d Marine Division.

- 2

rt IWO J1MA Operation

PART, II, Prsllininar
A. Composition of reporting command - 1st, 2d 3d, 4th Battal ions And Regimental Headquarters & Service Battery, 12th Marines,
3d Marine Division, *
B. The nature of the mission assigned to the 12th Marines made
very little detailed planning possible Since the regiment was
ordered to land on order on beaches to b$ designated, no detailed
studies of beaches, routes, or position areas could be made, A
general study'of the entire southern end of the island was made.
Prom the tine the mission was assigned it \ms obtious that the
artillery problem involved in this operation would be quite simple.
The island was so small that no displacements were necessary during
the operation* Mo specialized training was indicated or needed*
Training for this operation included infantry-artillery prob lems stressing close-supporting fires and preparations, passage of
linos and problems supporting tanks and infantry* These were in
addition to battalion and regimental (day and night) service prac~
tices, RSOF f a, *uid other field exorcise normal for field artillery,
6, Mission: 12th Marines land on order on beaches to be
designated. Be prepared to furnish one battalion in direct support
of each assault regiment on order and to support the attack a,nyvhere
in the zone of action of the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force*
1st Battalion,18th Marines xms ordered to be prepared to be in
direct support of the 9th Marines on order and was loaded with this
regiment so prepared.
2d Battalidn 12th Marines was ordered to be prepared to be In
direct support of the 21st Marines on order and was loaded with this
regiment so prepared*
Battalion *&a 4th Battalion 12thMarines were ordered to land
in general support. As directed by dispatch from V Amphibicus Corps
these battalions were loaded as first priority cargo for unloading.
Both battalions were loaded with 3d Marines, who were to be in
Division Reserve.
Since definite beaches and position areas were not assigned
prior to arrival in the Transport Area all studies were general and
no specific plans were made other than normal dispositions of re connaissance parties, etc.
D. See
E. See 3d Marine Division OS Periodic Repo

- 3

' N
.

ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION

Regimental Combat Team 21 (V Amphibious Corps f l o a t i n g r e s e r v e ) put t o s e a on t h e m i n i n g of 16 February. Transport D i v i s i o n 32, c o n s i s t i n g of s i x (6) ahips (which were t r a n s p o r t i n g t h i s combat team) had t h e Regimental Executive Officer Reconnaissance Par$y of 12th Marines and t h e e n t i r e 3d B a t t a l i o n , 12thMarines (75mm Pack Howitzers) on board* . At some time during t h e night of 12 February t h i s convoy passed POINT EQUITY and proceeded toward t h e p r e d e s i g n a t e d T r a n s p o r t Area, At about 0830 on t h e morning of 19 February t h e convoy stood off IWO JIMA and remained t h e r e u n t i l Regimental Combat Team 21 landed on 21 February. Meanwhile, Transport D i v i s i o n 31 and 33, which was t r a n s p o r t i n g the 1 s t , 3d and 4 t h B a t t a l i o n s , 1 2 t h Marines andthe & M & 4 Reconnaissance P a r t y of t h e 1 2 t h Marines, had r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o proceed t o t h e rendezvous a r e a . On t h e morning of 17 February t h i s convoy p u t t o sea and 20 February found t h e s h i p s a t POINT EQUITY some 80 miles o f f IWO JIMA. Transport Division 31, transporting the 1st Battalion and Headquarters & Service Battery, 12th Marines, remained in t h i s area (POINT EQUITY) until the morning of 22 February at which time they moved into the Transport Area. On the night of 22 February the shjps put to sea and the morning of 23 February found them back in the Transport Area where they remained. Debarkation began on the morn ing of 24 February, Transport Division 33, transporting the 3d and 4th Battalions, 12th Marines, remained at POINT EQUITY until the night cf 26 February at which time they received orders to lay into the Transport Area. On the morning of 27 February the 3d and 4th Battalions, 12th Marines began debarkation. The forward observers and liaison officers of the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines landed with the 21st 'Marines, on the afternoon of 21 February and adjusted the firss of the. 14th Marines during 22* 23, and 24 February while the 21st Marines were attached to the 4th Marine Division. 23 February: On or about 1700 orders were received aboard the USS D Y N for the Regimental Executive Officer Reconnaissance Party OE to proceed ashore with the Assistant Division Commander, and to r e peat to the Commanding Officer, 12th Marines aboard the Command Shij ccmceming the advisability of landing the remaining elements of thf 12th Marines, then in the Transport Area, The Regimental Executive Officer Reconnaissance Party consisted of the Regimental Executive Officer, Assistant Communications Office Assistant R-*3, one radio corporal with SCR-6J0 and five Sound Rangpersonnel to act as guides. " This Party landed at approximately ISCc

- 4

'ort IWO JIMA Operation (ContTd)t

and proceeded to V Corps Artillery Command Post located at TA 147
ITEM where they remained for the night. t The Regimental Executive
Officer contacted Corps Artillery Executive Officer *nd was given
definite areas to reconnoiter, possible routes into position areas,
extent of aid to be expected from Corps Artillery, and the general t ? * x
tactical situation.

,
'"

'

24 February: At 0730'the Regimental Executive Officer Recon naissance Party proceeded to TA 163 TflLLIAK, 164 and 121 StK>ARpand
tentatively selected position areas for all battalions. Regimental
Executive Officer sent a dispatch to Commanding .Offleer advising 2d
Battalion 12th Marines to commence landing. The Regimental Executive
Officer .Reconnaissance Party then proceeded to Corps Artillery to
await further orders.
* At 0910 the remainder of the Regimental Executive Officer Re connaissance Party, consisting of the Assistant R-2, Sound Ranging
Officer, Regimental Dentist, with 53 enlisted landed and proceeded
to Corps Artillery Command Post. ' > " ' '
. **
At 1330 the Commanding Officer Advance Reconnaissance Party
landed, consisting of lommanding Officer, R-2, R-3, Regimental
Communications Officer', and Regimental Survey Officer,- with 33
enlisted, and was guided to the.Coips Artillery. .Command Post, After
conference with the Regimental Executive Officer, the Commanding
Officer went to the Division Command post located In TA 164 EASY,
and the Regimental Executive Officer with both Reconnaissance Parties
proceeded to the position area selected for the Regimental Coaimand
Post in 164 GEORGE.
At 1330 the Advance Reconnaissance Party of 2d Battalion 12th
Marinas landed and proceeded with the Commanding Officer Reconnais sance' Parties to the Corps Artillery Command Post and thence on to *a
their position area located in TA 164 FOX (South). Because of a misunderstanding, the Captain of the ship, on
which "B" Battery, 1st Battalion 12th Marines was embarked, put this
battery ashore late in the afternoon, When Battery Commander was
guided to the Regimental Comiiiand Post, he was shown his battery
position area and as soon as he had given all necessary information
to his Executive Officer he was sent to 2d Battalion 14th Marines
to act as Liaison Officer, lpt Battalion 14th Marines was to provide
direct support for the 9th Marines the following day.
At 1530 one NCO and 25 enlisted, remainder of the Commanding
Officer Reconnaissance Party, landed and were directed to the Regi mental Command Post. ' : .
During the afternoon Regiment, 2d Battalion 12th Marines and
"B" Battery, surveyed in position areas and installed wire- -communi cation.' 2d Battalion, 12th Marines ran wire to the 21st Marines
Command Post and installed a forward switching central. Local in stallations were made and local security provided for the night.
2d .Battalion 14th Marines was in'direct support of the 21st
Marines.with 4th Battalion 13th Marines reinforcing. All fires were
adjusted by 2d Battalion 12th Marines forward observers. Corps
Artillery provided general supporting fires. The 12thMarines ex-
G-reised no tactical control of fire direction during, this period.

. 5 .

UNCLASSiF

12th marines Action Report IWO JIJMA Operatidn (Cont'd)*

5 February: i t 0800 the Regimental Fire Direction enter was
i installed and the Unit Journal opened at thsi time. Shortly there after, the Corps .artillery Liaison Officer reported to this head quarters.
At 0815 the 9th Marines executed a passage of lines of the 21st
karines and continued the attack. 1st Battalion 14th Marines in
direct support, 4th Battalion 13th Marines reinforcing, a t Corps
fd Artillery furnishing general supporting fires. 1st Battalion 12th
Marines forward observers and Liaison Officers relieved the forward
observers ana Liaison Officers of 2d Battalion 12th Marines in the
line.
The 2d Battalion 12th Marines Fire Direction Center opened the
Unit Journal at 1015, but lacking equipment and pieces, remained non functional until 1130 when pieces from H E" Battery began to arrive.
This Battery was in position ready to fire at 1230.
1st Battalion 12th Marines Advance Reconnaissance Party landed
at approximately 0800 and arrived at the Regimental Command Post and
were directed to their position. "B" Battery was in position ready
to fire at 1130, but due to the fact that 1st Battalion 12th Marines
equipment had not arrivedas yet, the Regimental Fire Direction Center
acted as Fire Direction Center to register that Battery.
Both "E!t and "B11 Batteries, were registered by Air Spot
(borrowed from Corps Artillery) on Check Points 7, 9 and 10 prior
to 1400.
Three (3) pieces of MD" Battery were in position ready to fire
at 1500. The fourth piece of "Dlf Battery had been damaged in landing
Two (2) pieces of nFlf Battery were in position at 1700 and one of
these was given to "D" Battery to complete that Battery, - t 1700 the
a Fire Direction Center of the 1st and 2d Battalions 12th Marines were
directed to combine to fire "B11 Battery, M E H Battery and n D M
Battery
as a provisional Battalion in direct support of the 9th Marines
1st Battalion,12th Marines to be in tactical control. At thife time
1st Battalion* 14th Marines was relieved as direct support Battalion,
but continued to deliver reinforcing fires until 0700 the next
morning. 4th Battalion 13th Marines also reinforced the fires of
1st Battalion 12th Marines (Provisional Battalion).
The 12th Marines now had complete tactical control and fire
direction. .
26 February: At 0700 1st Battalion 14th Marines was released
and reverted back to control of 14th Marines. The Provisional
Battalion under control of 1st Battalion 12th Marines was in direct
support of the 9th Marines and fired a preparation for the attack
from K minus 45 to K hour. 4th Battalion 13th Jaarines provided re inforcing fires and Corps Artillery fired in general support. At
0800 the Liaison Officer from"4th Battalion 13th Marines arrived aZ
1st Battalion 12th Marines with direct wire communication from 4th
Battalion 13th Marines Fire Direction Center.
' At 0800 "Cfl Battery was in position and ready to fire and at .
0830 "A" Battery was in position ready to fire. " These Batteries ' *
were checked by Air Spot and fired during the day.in support of the
attack.

- 6

12th Marines motion Report I i JIM* Operation VO

(Cont'd).

At 1305 the fire Direction Center of 2d Battalion 12th Marines

assumed operational control of thenine (9) pieces of Sd Battalion
12th Marines, reinforcing the fires of 1stBattalion 12th Marines.
during theday theRegimental Chemical Officer with eleven(11)
enlisted disembarked from the USS FELAND and arrived at the Regimen tal Command Post. The Air Spot coordinator landed from the USS
FREMONT. . ' At 1700 an additional piece of tfFw Battery went into position;
2d Battalion 12th Marines now had ten (10) guns firing.
Harassing fires and fires on call were fired during the night
by 1st and 2d Battalions 12th Marines, 4th Battalion 13th Marines
and Corps
During the day the12th Marines Air Spot (based on carriers)
checked registrations, flew scarch^missions, andfired the.Re^Jbment
on targets of opportunity*
27 February: At 0210 an additional piece of "F" Battery
arrived. This nowgave "Fu Battery four (4) pieces, one of which
wae in ttDM Battery*
The 9th Marines supported by an Intense artillery, preparation
lasting from K minus 30 to K hour (0800) continued the attack with
the 0-2 line as the objective. 1st Battalion 12th Marines was in,
direct support of the 9th Marines, 2d Battalion 12th Marines with'
eleven (11; pieces, and4th Battalion 13th Marines provided"'" re in-
forcing fires. Corps Artillery fired in general-support.
At 1130 the advance Reconnaissance Party of 4th Battalion 12th
Marines landed andproceeded to Regimental Command Post where they
were directed to the 3attalion position area selected by the Exec utive Officer.
At 1130 theR-4, Rr-1, Headquarters andService Battery
R-8, -assistant Rr-4 and'fifty two (52) enlisted from USS FUNSTER
. ,
. arrived at Regimental Command Post. At 1230 theadvance Reconnaiseance Party of 3d Battalion ,12th
Marines arrived at theRegimental Gor^and Post andwere directed
to the Battalion position area selected by theExecutive Officer,
* At 1300 the 9th Marines attacked supported by "*w andH 3 V B a t teries firing HE and "CH Battery firing WP. Preparation lasted
from K minus ten (10) to K hour.
Two (2) pieces of HK" Battery arrived in position at 1358and
two (2) pieces of "G-" a-t,tery arrived in:position at 1500* Regis- .
. tration<;Of these two (2) Batteries by Air Spot on Check Point's 9
and 10 wascompleted by 1645. The spare piece of 2d 3attalion 12th
Marines arrived and twelve (12) pieces were firing by 1800.
Prior to 1800 one (1) more piece of "G" Battery and three (3)
pieces of "H" Battery arrived in position, . t2300 two (2) more
a guns of "K11 Battery were in position and ready tofire.

- 7

12th Marines Action Report IQ Jlita Operation

(Cont!d).

the end of this period 1st Battalion 12th Marines continued

in direct support of the 9th Marines reinforced by 2d Battalion 12th
Marines (complete), 3d Battalion 12th Marines (Provisional Battalion
consisting of "K" Battery,* three (3) pieces of "G11 Battery, and
three (3) pieces of "H" Battery), 4th Battalion 13th Marines, and
Corps Artillery-firing in general support.
From 0700 to 1815 12th Marines Air Spot (carrier borne) conduc ted registration, search missions, and fired on targets of opportun ity, '
28 February: The 21st marines passed through tie 9th Marines
at 0815 and continued the attack in the Division Zone of Action
supported by .artillery and Navai G-un fire. .A thirty (30) minute
preparation was fired in support of the attack' which'-^included 2&
Battalion 12th Marines in direct support, 1st Battalion 12th Marines,
3d Battalion 12th MarineetProvisional Battalion consisting of MK"
Battery, three (3) guns from "G" Battery and three (3) guns fromflH"
Battery), 4th Battalion 13th Marines and Corps Artillery firing
general support* At K hour a rolling barrage was placed forward of
each assault Battalion to lift 100 yards every seven (7) minutes
for forty nine- (49) minutes.
1300 a coordinated attack tyas launched precedacU. by a five'
(5) minute .artillery, preparation . A rolling barrage was laid
down and lifted 100 yards every seven (7) minutes for two (2) lifts.
Another coordinated attack at 1530 was preceded.by a five (5) minute
.artillery preparation and a rolling barrage placed forward of the
assault Battalions of 21st Marines^
During this time four (4) pieces of "L11 Battery had landed and
were in position ready to fire at 1630. The 4th Battalion 12th
Marines spare piece was landed and given to the 3d Battalion 12th
Marines; "I" Battery had also landed. At 1830 MM Battery was in
position ready to fire. At 1645 the 4th Battalioft 12th Marines had
ben ordered to assume operational control of their own pieces, so
a t the end of the'period 2d Battalion 12th-Marines in direct support
of the 21st Marines were reinforced by 1st Battalion 12th Marines,
4th Battalion 12th Marines, 3d 3attalion 12th Marines;(firing eleven
(11) pieces, one spare from 4th Battalion 12thJ>iarines), and Corps
artillery firing in general support. 4th Battalion 13th Marines
released to 13th Marines at 1200.'
From 0700 to 1815, 12th Marines Air Spot (carrier borne) conduc ted registrations for 3d and 4th Battalidas 12th Marines, search
missions, and fired on targets of opportunity.

1 March: Two (2) guns came into the 3d Battalion 12th Marines
position and this Battalion now had twelve (12) guns'firing in
support of the attack.: This Battalion ' was now reinforcing the fir-r
of 1st Battalion 12th Marines an# the tactical set-up wa's ddmpl'ete.
The 21st marines continued the attack in the Division Zone of
Action. A fifteen (15) minute preparation was fired in*'"support of
the attack which included 75mm, 105mm and 15*5 Howitzers. At K'Hour
a rolling barrage was placed forward of each assault Battalion to
lift 100 yards every eight (8) minutes for twenty-four (24) minutes. *
At 1645 both the 9th and 21st marines launched a coordinated
attack after a five C^)jfMfttt>^||p^rai^4l1^^ attack was preceded
by a rolling barrage.* ! ^ W d | x*t|^\oi| Ifetn* 2-mrines was in direct
support- of the 21st Marines during,both* attacks and was reinforced
by 4th Battalion 2^h Marines.
% CONFIDENTIAL
- 8

.L .

12th Marines "Action fteort IWO Jlkn Operation

(Contld).

The 1st Battalion 12th Marines took-over direct support fires of the
9th Marines and was reinforced by 3d Battalion 12th Marines.
Air Spot was on station from 0700 to 1815 and conducted regis n
tration, search missions and fired on targets of The 12th marines was now a complete tactical and firing organ ization with Regimental Fire Direction Center coordinating all fires.
2 March: The Division continued the attack with the 9th and
21st Marines abreast. A fifteen (15.0. minute preparation wasfired
in support of the attack which included 75mm, 105mm and 155mm
Howitzers* At K Hour a rolling barrage was placed' forward of each
assault regiment to lift 100 yards every eight (8) minutes for
twenty-four (24) minutes.
At 1530 a coordinated attack was launched after a ten (10)
minute artillery preparation which was fired by eight (8) battalions.
A rolling barrage preceded the attack, , .
The 1st Battalion 12th Marines was in direct support of the 9th
Marines reinforced by the 3d Battalion 12th Marines. The 2d Battal ion 12th Marines was in direct support of the 21st Marines reinforced
by throe (3) battalions of the 13th Marines and.one battalion of
155mm from Corps Artillery for the attack preparation and the rolling
barrages.
Air Spot was on station from 0700 to 1815 and condujct.cd regis trations, search missions, and fired on targets of opportunity.
5 March: The Division continued the attack with the 9th Marines
and 21st Marines abreast. A ton (10) minute preparation was fired.j
in support of the attack which- included 75mm, 105mm and 155mm Howit zers. At K Hour a rolling barrage- was placed forward of the Division
front to lift 100 yards every seven (7) minutes for 200 yards.
At 1500 a coordinated attack was- launched preceded by a five
(5) minute artillery preparation*
The 12th Marines sustained no change in the assignment of
artillery battalions.

Air Spot was on station from 0700 to 1815 carrying out search
missions and registering on points called for by R-3.
4 March: The Division attacked in its Division Zone of action
at 1140. A twenty (20) mi nut "preparation was fired in support of
the attack which included 75mmr 105mm and 155mm Howitzers. At
K Hour a rolling barrage was placed forward of the Division front
and lifted 100 yards every seven (7)-minutes for 200 yards.
No change in assignment of battalions during this period.
No Air Spots were on station during this period - inclement
weather.
5March: N attacks launched during this- period. o i

From 07uC> tto 1800 Air Spot registered the 2d Battalion 12th Marines on Check Point 12 n:nd the 4th Battalion 12th Marines on ChecJ Point 9. Search missions were also carried out. 12th Marines f i r M harassing fires throughc|a|*to}A ^a^v and ...nigh*.

12th karIn&s"55Titfrr-Keport IWQ JIMa.

g torch: The Division continued the attach in echelon.
K Houf the left battalion of the 21st Marines .attacked supported by
artilleryfiring a preparation from K minus 10 to K Hour* At K plus
one hour the fright battalion of the 21st-Marines and the 9th Marines
attacked, fhis attack was supported by an artillery preparation
from K jlus 4 to IL'&iua 50 and K plus 55 to K plus 60, This attack
wap p|egded by a. rolling barrage which lifted one hundred (100)
yards ev^ry seven (7) minutes for threo hundred (300) yards.
1440 another coordinated attack was launched preceded by an
artillery preparation from K minus 2 to K 8our and then lifting
one hundred (100) yards and firing for fivfe (5) minutes.
Spotters came ashore from the carrier and continued search
missions for the 12th Marines from OY-1 aircraft from 1300 to 1700,
No change in the assignment of artillery battalions.
12th Marines fired preparation^ in support of the attack in
accordance with Corps order.
7 March: The Division' continued the attack with a pre-dawn
attack which jumped off at 0500. No artillery preparation was
employed prior to the attack.
12th Marines fired harassing fires with W.P. the nip:ht of
6-7 March, At 0455 a smoke screen Was placed forward of the 9th
and 21st Marines to screen the attack*
*iir Spotters were grounded during this period - inclement
weather,
No change in the assignment of battalions.
$ jiaych: Tne Division continued the attack at 0750 supported
T,- a. trtL'"(10) minute artillery preparation in the Zone of action of
py Stfo Marines and followed it with a rolling barrage lifting 100 yardi
overy seven (?) minutes for 200 yards.
No change in tae assigniaQnt of artillery battalions during tii
period.
From 07^5 to X63Q 4ir ^pot carried out search, missions for
the 12th Marines,"
9 March: The division continued the attack at 07Op v?|th the
9th and 21st Marines abreast, n ton (10) 4aute artili^^y prepar
tion was fired W thq l^th brines in support of tfco att^cfc'| I'ai

9th marines '". " " ' ' ' " ' '

m 10 -

12th Marines Action*Reptfrt IWO J I M A Operation

(Cont f d).

No change in the assignment of Artillery Battalions.

Air Spot registered the 4th Battalion 12th Marines on HONAHE
ROCK using high-angle fire and also continued to carry out search
missions during this period.
10 March:' The Division continued the attack with the 9th and
21st Marines abreast*
The 1st Battalion 12th Marines was in direct support of 9th
Marines and 2d Battalion 12th Marines was in direct support of 21st
Marines* The 3d Hattalion and 4th Battalion 12th Marines fired a
fifteen (15) minute preparation from K minus 15 to K hour in support
of 5th Marine Division, and fired a thirty (30) minute preparation
from K minus 5 to K plus 25 in suppprt of 4th Marine Division.
Fr6m 0800 to 1630 Air Spot carried out search missions for the
12th Marines.
Harassing fires were continued throughout the night and early
morning hours.
11 March: The 9th Marines attacked at 0730 on the right of
the Division Zone of Action* The 21st Marines attacked at 0730.
There were no preparations fired for the attack by the 12th
Marines, The 1st 3attalion 12th marines was available to units of
this Division for call fires.. The 2d, 3d, and 4th Battalions 12th
Marines reinforced the fires of the 13th Marines in the 5th Marine
Division Zone of Action.
Air Spot was on call from 0900 to 1500 to determine disposit ion of friendly troops.
12 March; Division continued mopping up operations in the
DiviBion Zone of action* 12th Marines reinforced the fires of the
13th Marines during this period.
Prom 1430 to 1600 Air Spot registered all four (4) Battalions
of 12th Marines in the 5th Marine Division Zone of Action for
harassing and preparation fires.
13 March: The Division continued mopping up operations within
^the Division Zone of .Acfcioxu 12th Marines reinforced the "fires of
x
13th Marines. Division MJ Diisio
n continued mopping up operations witfcj
i f d f 3 of .action. 12th M i Marines reinforced th f the fires of the 1
13th

in03 '

- 11

12th Marines Action MpoVt

IWO

JIMA

Operation

(Cont l d).

,15 March: The Division continued mopping up operations in the

Division Zone of Action. No requests for fires were made from uWie
12th Marines. 3d 3attalion 12th Marines was given permission to close
station at 1800 and prepare to embark,
16 inarch: The 21st Marines relieved the 26th and 27th Marines
in the 5th Division sector at 0715 and continued the attack to the
0*3 line in that sector.
A smoke screen was fire,d by 12th haria.es from 0705 to 0734 to
cover the relief. From K mnus 20 to K hour (0815) an artillery-
preparation was fiyed by 24 Battalion 12th Marines in direct support,
reinforced by 1st and 4th Battalions 12th Marines, and Corps Artillery
At K hour the preparation JLif ted one hundred (100) yards in the dire* ction of the attack and fired until K plus 10. The 12th Marines
fired no other missions during the/ day.
At 1800 the 1st and 2d Battalions and Regimental Headquarters
closed station leaving the 4th Battalion 12th Marines prepared to
furnish artillery suppor-t to the Division..on request.

12th Marines PART IV. A. Comments.

Administration:

IWO JIM* Operation

(Cont'd)

1.

Killed in Action Wounded in Action

- 2 officers and 12 enlisted.

- 13 officers, 1 warrant officer
and 100 enlisted.
Hissing in Action None.
Died of Wound - 2 officers and 5 enlisted.
Effective strength for this unit 6n 16 karch:
USMC USN
TOTAL Officers 129 Warrant Officers ~T4 T
4 Enlisted
1975

T3F

I?

2. Morale was excellent during this operation. The

rapid delivery of mail and excellent rations contributed greatly
to this.
3. by this unit.
1. No prisoners, military or civilian, were handled

Artillery.

1. Loading - Regimental Reconnaissance Parties had in sufficient equipment embarked on the ships they were on to set up
and function efficiently. Many items of essential equipment were
embarked on ships which did not unload for several days after the
Command Post was established. For loading of battalions, &ee
attached Battalion reports.
2. Landing - See PART III, Chronological Report.

3. Survey Initial survey control on the beachhead

was established by the 14th Marines and coordinated by Corps Art illery. Upon arrival of the 12th Marines Reconnaissance Party on *
24 February, the Corps Artillery Survey Officer designated an I.P.
with all necessary information. That afternoon 2d Battalion 12th . ,
Marines put in their position area survey, and the Regimental team
surveyed in "3H Battery 1st Battalion 12th marines.
On 7 February the Regimental Survey Section established
an I.P. for 3d Battalion 12th Marines and 4th Battalion 12th Marinet
and surveyed in the base piece of the adjusting Battery. The Survey
Section of 3d and 4th Battalions 12th Marines completed their pos ition area survey upon arrival.

Marines Action Report IWO JIMA Operation (Cont'd).

3. Survey (Cont'd).

On 14 March Sound and Flash OP's were located and surv^r ed.
Initial control for these OP's wure taken from stations established
by the 15th Marines. Control was oarried to these I.Pfsby
triangulation. .- - -* ., .. ,<
On 15March n$w -battalion position areas were surveyed in the
Vicinity ofKOTOYAMA. 0. * These were established for the possible . . . .
forward displacemeint-./pf the 12thMarines*
4. Fire Adjustment - Fire was adjusted during the operation
by forward observation, sound adjustment by forward observers, ....
... adjustment byAir Spotters, adjustment by Dodar (Sound Ranging),'.. .
adjustment by flash ranging, and unobserved fires, . '
5. Fire Direction - Fire direction (as described in FM 6-40)
was normal. This operation presented no n t r problems infire
edirection.
6* Organization for Combat and Tactical Employment Organization for Combat- 1st Battalion 12th Marines prepared
to beindirect support ofthe 9th Marines; 2d .Battalion 12th
Marines prpeared to be indirect support of21st.Marines;3d
Battalion 12th Marines prepared to be ingeneral support; 4th
Battalion 12th Marines prepared to be ingeneral support.
Tactical Employment - Tactical employment depended upon the
disposition ofthe infantry regiments. During the greater part of
the operation both the 9th and 21st Marines were in the line andthe
1st Battalion 12th Marines vras indirect support ofthe. 9th,Marines
reinforced by 3d Battalion 12th Marines; 2dBattalion 12th Marines
vras indirect support ofthe 21st Marines reinforced by 4th Battal ion 12th Marines. For details, sec PART III,.Chronological Report.
7. Liaison -Command liaison was established between the
12th Marines and 3dMarine Division by Commanding Officer whowas
quartered at Division'Headquarters, and operated from the G3
office. A direct lino was maintained between the 0-3 office and
the R-3 office.
A liaison section was sent tothe 12th Marines from Corps
Artillery toprovide information'on air strikes besides normal
liaison functions.

>* ~ ' * *

A liaison officer f'rom"4tVr 'feattalion 13th Marines was -sent to the 12th Marines while that battalion was reinforcing the -flakes of the 12th Marines. Later a direct line was laid between the 12th Marines Fire Direction C'entier';and the 13th Marines Fire Direction Center, and no liaison Officer between these regiments was deemed necessary. For liaison between the battalions of 12th Marines and the 21st and 9th Marines see battalion reports attached.

- 14

wiyyt

12th Marines Action import I WO Jltoa. Op* ration, ..'.(Cant1&}

_ _ _ _ , _ . '- - f j > * - - - < - ---

8 Observation - Ground observation by forward observers

was principle means of observation used for fire adjustment. During
the latter phases of the campaign some of. the observers were able
to occupy OP's near the front lines from which they could adjust
fires, but, in the main, the low rolling character of the terrain
made OP l s impossible.
The next best observation was obtained by air* This Division
vras severly handicapped by not having its own VkO squadron present.
The carrier-based planes flew too high and fast to permit good
observation, and later VkO'planes were only available on loan from
other units. During the entire operation the 12th karines were only
allowed one plane on station at a time and this did not allow search-,
ing and firing to be done simultaneously.
integrated flash and sound ranging system was being
operated by Corps, 13th Marines and 14th Marines when this regiment
landed. This system provided data on activity located in the 3d
karine Division Zone of Action. The flash ranging base was set up
on h? SURIRdCHI) this base was too short for accurate results* The se-und ranging system gave satisfactory results at night when our
own pieces were not firing.
9. Personnel - The few o-asulties sustained by this unit
did not hamper operations. Some of the specialized replacements
received were not capable of carrying out their assignments. Radio
operators were received who had received no training for seven (7)
months and were not familiar with some of the radio material being
used. . .
? 10. Training deficiencies - Some few forward observers
and air observers were-hot as well training as they should have been,
both with regards to shooting and target designation. Target desig nation was particularly bad. Forward observers habitually failed
to describe the target sufficiently to permit the Fire Direction
Centers to select the proper type of fuze, or decide the best means
to attack the target (i.e., single gun, battery converged, or
battalion open or"converged). In order to obtain this information
much time was lost and the communication channels were overloaded.
There were no other training deficiencies noted.
11. kaps and Photos - 1:10,000 and1:20,000 maps and photos
were provided* The vertical control in the nortern end of the
island.proved to be wrong by about 20 feet. The cliffs were not
shown properly nor were ground contours correct in the coastal
areas. The horizontal control had a fairly constant,map lfK" of
35 yards/thousand. Grid North was 30 minutes from* True North.

- 15

l-2th karines action "Report IW JIk, Operation

41. iaaps and Photos (Cont'd).

K.O. (6101) was more accurate in horizontal control and

should have oe&n used for basic horizontal control.
a A book of 1:1G,0QQ gridded photos were used by the forward
observers very successfully.
Stereo-pairs were not furnished in quantities great enough
to allow distribution of a good coverage to each battalion.
12. Communications - wire communications were established
upon landing and were maintained as %he primary means of communica tion threughout the entire operation, kaintenance of wire continued
uninterrupted. In many cases, poles wsre required to overhead lines
because of congestion of ground installations and construction work
on roads, xill lines laid were normal* '
Radio difficulties were encountered on the nets established,
between forward observer teams and the resulting chain of communi cation - liaison officers and fire direction center.. In the main,
thcea difficulties stemmed from the following:
(1) The SCR 610 is too heavy and bulky for use with
forward observer teams.
(2) The SCR thus were tive 610 was easily jarred cut of alignment,
reducing the effective, range. Relay stations
frequently necessary which hampered offcc transmicsion. , . . ;

(3) The SCR 610 frequency plan is too inflexible.

Initially the forward observers and liaison
officers (attached to the 21st Marines) worked
with the fire direction centers of the 14th
Marines. This necessit&ted a shift .in radios
which presented many difficulties. It was noted
almost immediately that artillery frequencies
were too close. Similarity of transmissions
caused garbled fire missions which demanded
complete check-up and re-heck-up greatly reduc ing this units efficiency.
13. ! Enemy motion gainst our artillery - Some -shelling,
rocket and mortar fire was received in the position ar.oa. .Slight
damage was done to material and some casualties were caused-.. This
enemy fire was sporadic and unstematic. There werc.no. attempts
reported to infiltrate personnel into the position-'areas and directly
attack the n

- 16

12th Marines .action Report r"0 JI*i OpfiratiQnU(Coht)d)

14. Effectiveness of Own artillery - The effectiveness of
our artillery "was limited by the disposition of the znc^y in pill boxes, bunkers and caves which had overhead cover too thick to be
destroyed by the light calibre of Division artillery. Fire by 155fs
using concrete piercing shell was necessary to destroy these
structures. Many of the enemy installations were so disposed that
they were inacceessible to low angle artillery fire. It is felt that
many more installations oould have be en neutralized or destroyed if
high angle fire had been permitted sooner.
Lack of information as to the disposition of the enemy to
our front also limited the effectiveness of our artillery* Generally
artillery was placed unlformily across the front, and we vero net
able to mass fires on any definite strong point,
However, it was determined tha,t harassing fires, both day
and night, kept the e-nemy deep in their holes and greatly reduced the
mortar, rocket, and small arias fires. During the last phases of
the operation when the enemy no longer had prepared emplacements our
artillery fires were very effective.
15. Tactical Employment of Enemy artillery - After the
enemy was pushed back and deprived of observation into any area, the
effectiveness and-volume of fire received"lessened considerably.
.nil types of weapons were used by the enemy to fire direct
fire into our troops, and any activity by our troops brought both
mortar and artillery fire. Extremely good,camouflage often made
these weapons very difficult to located Frequently, these-guns would
fire several rounds and then retire back into caves and revetments
which wore"almost inacccssablc to our light artillery. Concrete
pillboxes and steel doors proved to be effective protection for- the
guns and crews - twelve direct hits using 155m^ concrete piercing shells were required to knock out one pillbox.
Tho enemy moved guns (by night) into a position to impede
our advance, and guns thought to be knocked out were re-manned by
new crews. Shooting into our lines while friendly artillery was
firing was a co^mon^practicc. One forward observer of the 2d Bn,
12th marines reported observing six pieces firing into the same area
simultaneously. However, OF1e continued to be a favorite target for
both artillery and ^ortar fire.
Firing; into apparently the enmey landing and was able calibre weapons wore entire island.
rear areas is beet described as harassing, fires,
had located major installations prior to our
to place fire on these at will. Until the larg;
knocked out, artillery fire was common over the

- 1?

IWO JIMA Operation (Cont'd).

16. Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery - Tho congestion of in-
stations made the enemy indirect fire effective. It is best de scribed as harassing fire and the damage done was not important.
The direct fire used by the enemy against our tanks and infantry
was very effective. The positions of the pieces were very well
camouflaged and protected, which often allowed them to continue fire
until our troops were very close.
OP's were attacked as soon as established and this hampered
our observation. With observation the enemy was able to hamper the
movement of our troops and supplies. Their principle Op's were
located outside the Division Zone of Action and this required great
coordination with other units to neutralize these.
17. Methods used to locate Artillery Targets - Ground observ ation by forward observers, air observation, and flash and sound
OF's were the primary means of locating enemy artillery. Until
14 March, a coordinated system of flash and sound Optswas function ing. This system was manned by personnel from Corps Artillery,
13th and 14th Marines. On 14 March suitable locations were found
to operate the Flash and Sound Ranging Section of this regiment.
Any activity located in 3d Marine Division Zone of Action was
promptly relayed to 12th Marines Regimental Command Post.
Forward observers gave the largest amount of accurate data on
enemy weapons. Often these were not located until the forward ob servers were within a few hundred yards from the emplacements.
Shelling Reports - These were of little use since direction
and calibre were very difficult to determine, Tho multiplicity of
weapons and locations made this information only of general inter est, unless it could be combined with information from other sources
18. Motor Transportation - The number of vehicles was adequate
for tlae mission. All trucks were used constantly to deliver ammuni tion. The Cargo Carrier, M-29c, was of great value for reconnais sance work in the sandy terrain of IWO JIMA.
19. Material used - This Regiment landed two (2) Battalions
of ?5mm Pack Howitzers and two (2) Battalions of 105mm Howitzers.
Only minor repairs were ever necessary and these were made by
Battalion Ordarnce sections.

- 18

12th karines Action Report IW Jliia $pspatton O 20. fiuooaujy of AtiaunitiGn Expenditures by Type of Fire kission.
pate 24-25 Bn 1*12 2-12

Res
38 42

Pren
1219

KF
533 307 720

CL Spt . Gen Spt

C.B.

Total 140

68 685
1076 2195 1208

25-26 26-27

27-28

28-1

1,-2

2-3

3-4

1-12 2-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12
2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12

854
1321 2948

648 82 6 273
1450

5446

110
10292

25 36

15
36 15 23 65

4255 1898 596 284 4916 442 1557 609 . 1202 2894 177 176 527 200 2535 2741 204 2990 399 2439 ' 116 " 1315 2360 50 316 77 116 2379 191 2022 518 1487

29

178 114 30
16125

95 554
13566
L

261 93

345 '

311" 1112
827 983
1377 1760

366 509 99 99 366 344

442

625 174 229

223 502 414 321 113 106 14 137 166 88 44

172

989
1151

181 561
196 380

43 285 333 408 92 328 102 276 70 226 519

13324

.8365

!
.9959

4-5

150 24 63 50

. . .. : ..

30
* *

372 379
2569 2450 2707 2176

5-6

12;
152 365
936

23
38

328 69 60 107 90

3895

122
209 '

12242

6-7

26

303

153
19
1908
1164

285 328
12
1058

5
190 7 42 156 36

57
1617

7-6
5-J

i-l
2-12 3-12 J 4-12

61
163, 7723

84 ?6

902 690

177 292 297

645 85

- 1 9 v

; ft*

12th Karl nee' Date 8-9 Bn 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 1-12 2-12 3-12 4-12 Reg Prep 4; 257 234 1014 950 72 977 1028 856

IWO

(Cont f d). Cl Spt

105
27
30
-126
51
94
5
.199
G-en Spt C.B.
40
111
424

">

HF

288 ]
988 '
547
743
396
452
375
290
735
431
349
424
420
302
110
153
300

Total

9-10

3952 ,

3826

10-11

11-12

55
5
93

4156
355
1665
194
83
114

19

12-13

80
72
296
108

1036

13-14

776

14-15 No l e
15-16 1-12 2-12 4-12 1421 1300 1503

4224

- 20

ft**

12th Marines Action Report IWO JIMA Operation (Cont'd)

21. Summary of ammunition expenditures by, item from 24
February to 17 March.
75mm 75mm 75mm Total 105mm 105mm 105mm 105mm Total HE, M48, w/f M48 HS, M48, w/f M54 , Smoke, phos., WP, M64 75mm Howitzer Ammunition HE, Ml, w/f M48 HE, Ml, w/f M54 Smoke, phos,, WPy M60 HE, AT, M67, w/f M62 105mm Howitzer Ammunition
59557 26957 6446 72960 Bounds
Rounds
Rounds
Rounds

24802 Rounds
19021 Rounds
2883 Rounds
135 Rounds
46841 Rounds
119801 Rounds

Total Artillery Ammunition

22. Ammunition supply - The seven (7) units of fire of

artillery ammunition initially embarked were satisfactory. The
arrival of subsequent block loaded ammunition ships readily supplied
the additional ammunition to make up the nine and one-half (94) units
of fire expended. (For further amplification see Part IV, paragraph
" C % subparagrauh 3,)
23. Supply - No appreciable supply problem was encountered.
With no displacements required, the short distances between position
areas- and division dumpa did away with the necessity for any battal ion or regimental supply Installations.
C. Ordnance.
1* Weapons.
a. Number, type and caliber of weapons used.

Carbines, }ll> caliber .30 2135

Pistols, &J1911, caliber .45 11
Rifles, automatic, Browning, M1918A2, caliber .30 88
Launchers, rocket 34
Guns, machine, HB, AC, caliber ,30 33
Guns, machine, HB, AC, caliber .50 . 4 2
Guns, machine, WC, caliber .50 12
Howitzers, 105mm 26
Howitzers> pack, 75mm 26
b* Of the above noted weapons, practically no small
arms were used. Battle employment for the 75mm Pack Howitzers was
twenty (20) days, for the 105mra Howitzers, sixteen (16) days for
one tlJtbattaallofl. iy^drtjiirty-six (36) days for the other. No artill ' .
ery pieces were lost or destroyed and no major malfunctions occure d It was found that eparfi parts were adequate for maintenance required.
2. Combat Vehicles*
a. Number and type of combat vehicles used.
Tractors, light, V/angle dozer, TD-9
Trucks, 24 Ton, 6x6, Dump
Truck, ~%\ Ton, 6x6, Wrecker
Carrier^, cargo, K-29-C
*Trucks# 1 Ton, 4x4, cargo
Trucks, i Ton, 4x4

12th Marines Action Report IWO JIMA Operation (Cont'd).

Ambulances, i Ton, 4x4 Trucks, i Ton, 4x4, radio ^Trailer,:\ Ton, 2wh, cargo Trailer, i Ton, 2wh, cargo Trailer, 1 Ton, 2wh, greasing Trailer, 1 Ton, 300gal., water Trailer, 1 Ton, 2wh, spare parts Trailer, Water-, improvised
#

5
36
38
40
4
10
1
7

One (l) damaged beyond repair.

b. It is recommended that differential side gear (w/18

teeth) for M24,. 1 Ton Truck, 4x4, International be hardened. It was
found that operating in rough terrain or in sand the present gear
breaks with comparative ease.
Cargo carrier M29C was very satisfactory as prime
mover and cargo carrier* The tracks,t however, were found to be too
light and should be, made heavier,
3. Ammunition.

a. For number of rounds expended see Part IV, paragraph

B, subparagraph ~2
b. Artillery ammunition had a &igh unloading priority
and the flow from ship to shore was regulated by the landing craft
available. Due t > the beach condition (a fairly steep grade of soft
| sand) it was founi that the most rapid unloading could be accomplished
by transferring the ammunition from the landing craft to amphibian'
tractors at the be&ch, re transferring this at the PivJLsion Ammunition
Dump to artillery prime movers. Although this entailed a double
handling, it excluded the otherwise inevitable bogging of the prime
movers in the sand,
Du$ to the slow rate of landing, as well as the high
rate of expenditure it was,impossible to build to and maintain a
level of two units of fire as ordered.
It vas found that in spite of clearly worded
dispatches calling f$r the landing of 75mm Howitzer ammunition, 75mm
gun ammunition was often landed. A definite need was demonstrated
that competant personnel, capable of distinguishing between various
types of ammunitions^ be placed on each ship discharging ammunition
in order to preclude the possibility of landing undesired types and
fuzes*
c. The wtQden ammunition box containing two rounds of
iO5mm Howitzer ammunition was most satisfactory. It facilitated
handling and offered a &igh degree of protection to the shell casing.
Of the ammunition received only twelve ( . ) rounds were found to be
32 damaged.
d. The present unit of fire is satisfactory, however
it is recommenced that: twenty percent (2Q#) of shell HE, Ml, w/f *M54
be decavitate<J and an allowance of twenty percent (2QJ#) of VT fuze
should be added. It ie recommended that this additional ^allowance
of VT fuze t0 be separately packaged.

~ 22

$mbarkation:
(a) Personnel consisted of the Regimental Surgeon, Regimental
Dentist and ten(lQ) oorpamen. They were divided, proportionately
among troops attached to Br-L Gotu^anding Officer and the Executive
Officer, embarking on three (3) ships,, .
(b) Material carried by personnel consisted of.:. twelve (12)
field medical units of #1, 2, and 3 with two (2) units of albumin in
each; five (5) stretchers, one (1) plasma and one (1) battle dressing
unit (#7). The remainder of equipment was packed on a trailer and
the jeep ambulance which were loaded on a fourth (4) ship.. This
equipment consisted of units #5A and B 6, 8, 9, 10 .11A, and 3,
and 102; one (1) blackout tent, one (1) fly, one (1) jpy.r^mldal tent,
camouflage nets and sand bags. v .A.,.
v 2. Aboard ship:
ifo sickness; Sanitation good in all departments, no special
precautions necessary.
3* Debarkation:
(a) On call
(b) Regimental dentist and two (2) corpsmen landed with a
small reconnaisance party at 0910, February 24, Regimental Surgeon
and two (2) corpsmen landed with the Commanding Officer at 1330,
February 24. Six (6) corpsmen with R-l section landed at 1130 Feb ruary 27.
(c) Material accompanying personnel was man handled and car ried in. Vehicles and remalnder^of equipment came in on March 2
There were no losses.
Ashore (assault phase not applicable to this activity.)
(a) Medical installations were the usual dugouts, sand bagge
and camouflaged. The four (4) battalions of the regiment were in th
immediate vicinity and their aid stations centrally located.
(b) Evacuatipn effected via beach evacuation centers until
February 27, after which to B Medical 'Company of the 3d Medical
3attalion.. It was rapid "and effective,
(c) Casualties:
1. A %otzl 02B three (3) (2 fragment and 1 contusion)
were treated in Headquarters Battary Aid Station. All were returned
to duty. X
(d) Sanitationr * v N
1. Routine field sanitation measures ettkpbky&,,.,_.,. 7
2. Foo4 consisted of regulation field rations\and was
not contaminated, galley set up for coffee and rinse water only.
3. Wafer was not contaminated. Enough was landed w i W
troops to last unt|l the Divl6iGnnset up a water point. There was
no shortage.
4. DDf spray most effective in eliminating f^y hazard
(e) Dead were immediately transported to the Division Ce^e
No precautions by this activity necessary.
Recommendations:
(a) That one (1) medical vehicle (Jeep ambulance)-be inclui '
with the essential operations equipment in order that adequate
sujpplies can acc|iupany the first of the personaaJL to land.
5. 4.

- 23

E.

Signal
1. Communication Plan (SOI)

(a)

Were communication plans received by lover echelons

in sufficient time to permit study, criticism, and
necessary changes?
(A) Yes
2. Embarkation and Voyage

(a) (b)

U)

Was equipment loaded accor&iag to plan?

(A) Yes.

Was any equipment damaged in loading? If yes, describe.

No.
Were such items *s Storage batteries checked during
voyage?
(A)
Items such as storage batteries which were carried in
cargo were not checked. Items carried in setB and the
reconnaissance.party for immediate use were checked.
What type of training was carried out aboard ship?
(d) (A) Briefirig of troops on target.
(e) Were personnel of any assistance to ship's communication
officer? If yes, what did they do?
(A) Message Centerthis organization operated as an integral
part of the Troop Message Center which was operated by
the senior signal unit prese.itUfclvisA^i* Signal Company
3.
(A) Yes. (A)

U) (A)

Personnel

(a). VI) Are you satisfied with present allowances of personnel?

(b)

U)
(A)

What changes, if any, are specifically recommended? None. Yes.

(o)
(d)

(1) Was training of personnel adequate?

(0.) What recommendations, if any, are made for special

(A)

training?
None.

(e)

U)

List overages or shortages of communication personnel

in your unit embarked aboard ship for the operations.
(A) This unit was short 17 wir* personnel; 42 radio personne
(A)

(f)

' 1 ) List losses of personnel aboard ship before landing.

Two. wire men.

(g)

U)

List losses of personnel in the period from after land ing until operation was completed.
(A) Radio
Killed in Action 6
Wounded in Action 14
Died of Wounds 1
Missing in Action None
-24

>rational Report (cont'd)

(h) (Q,) List losses of personnel in effecting the landing.
(A) None "
(i) (Q,) Were communication personnel employed for duties other
than communications? What were their duties.
(A) No.
(j) (Q) H O W were battle casualties replaced?
(A) From 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts for radio personnel
No replacement of wire personnel was made. Distribution
of wire personnel was made witnin units to offset short ages in any particular unit. Basic privates were used,
in soiae cases.
4. Equipment

(a) (Q,) List overages and shortages of major items of equipment.

(A) Over:
2 switchboards, 3D-71
2 switchboards, 3D-72
13 telephones, EE-8
1 TCS, mounted in truck, cargo, 4x4
2 TC3, mounted in carrier, M-29 (weasel)
27 Remote Control Unit, RI4-29
Short:
4 Radio T&R equipment, SCR-6O8
(b) (Q,) List losses of equipment aboard ship before landing.
(A) None
(c) (Q) List losses of. equipment in effecting the landing.

(A) None . .

List losses of eotftoment in the r>eriod from after land ing until operation was completed.
U ) SCR-610 're-| TBX Gen Wire, W l O B
9 5 1 - 40 mi,
(e) (Q) Was equipment suitable (design and quantity) for the
particular task to tte -oerforjned? If no, list equipment
and state reason.
(A) No. The SCR-610 whiQh is prescribed for this organiza tion is not suitable for the task performed.
(1) The set is not a portable set and is not conducive
to continuous operation during movement, a character istic very necessary for most desirable function of
artillery forward observers and liaison officers.
(2) The sat is too bulky and too heavy for use by for ward observers and liaison officersT who must pack
their equipment in their movemen};ttja ith the infantry.

(a)

- 25

erational Report (cont'd)

(3) The open terrain over which this organization opera ted and the distinctive silhouette of the set and
Its antenna are a critical danger to anyone who must
be near the set (radio operators). Concealment
which is a defense in the last case was very limited.
(4) The semi-fixed frequency selection arrangement
limits the use of the set. This was -particularly
vital when some forward observers are called upon to
function outside of their immediate organization.
(5) The SCR-61O is easily Jarred off frequency alignment
and its combat efficiency (in range and selectivity)
is reduced.
(f) (Q) In light of the specific operation, what changes in equip ment are recommended? State reason?
(A) A portable set similar to the ^CR-300 in.Hweight and fre quency selection is recommended. Set - should cover a
separate frequency range in order to minimize interfer * ence with infantry units.
(g) (Q) What new equipment is recommended? Explain specific
proposed employment and whether or not additional per sonnel would be required to operate it.
(A) None
(h) (Q) Did your organization employ any equipment which it had
never used in action before? If yes, state items and
describe performance. Give recommendations fqr improve ments.
.(A) Yes. SCR-61O and SCR-608. See(6)(6} and(g)above for
SCR-61O. SCR-608 is satisfactory and worked well when
it got ashore. In event any-change in portable sets is
contemplated to correct SCR-61O difficulties, portable
sets should be within SCR-608 range.
This organization used ten (10) weasels or Carriers, M-29,
six (6) of T^hich were equipped with TCS radio equipment
and wire laying equipment. This carrier is escellent
equipment for the terrain in which this organization
operated, but as this organization was not in the assault
echelon of the operation, no comment can be made other
than to state that it is believed this equipment would
be invaluable in the ! assault. It is felt, however, that
SCR-6081 mor SCR-610 s would be of more utility and valut
than TCS and those sets will probably be used in- the
future by this organization. x
(i) (Q) What water proofing was done and how effective was it?
(A) All vehicles were completely waterproofed mechanically
using Motor Transport materials which were also used to
secure loose wire leads to 12-volt TCS and SCR-608 gen erator. Generators were packed in MBG-159. Motor
Transport i*aterp roof ing was used around TCS cases, and
metal openings of SCR-608. Telephone equipment was
brought ashore in communication carts, the box of which
was waterproofed. SCR-610's were waterproofed with Motor*
Transport waterproofing equipment.

Operational Report (cont'd)

All waterproofing -proved very effective-even when one set
was subjected to sea water. Although that SCR-6O8 be came moist and required 3rd echelon repair',^ it was placed
in operation within 48 hours of its arrival ashore.
(Q,) Was there any eoulpment used not included in T/A? If
yes, list and state how employed. Make recommendations
for inclusion in T/A.
(A) No.
(k) (Q) Was all signal equipment authorized by T/A used? If not,
should it be deleted from T/A? State reason.
(a) (1) MPA-1, two (2) of which are authorized for H&S,
Artillery Regiment, was not used and no use can be
foreseen for such an item of equipment. It is recom mended that it be deleted.
(2) TG-5 was not used, but it is believed that this item
is potentially an item that would be needed and
should not be deleted from the T/A.
(1) (Q,) Was all your equipment unloaded from the ship during the
operation?
(A) Yes.
(m) (Q,) Was your equipment landed at the proper beach? why not?
(A) Yes.
5.
(A) None.

If not,

Supply

'

(a) (Q) What equipment could not be loaded and was left behind?
(b) (Q) Did this effect the operation in any way? (A) No.
^

(c) (Q,) What specific items placed, the greatest strain on supply?
(A) BA-39's, BA-40's, and W-110B in the initial phases' be fore complete unloading of this headquarters was com pleted. This was due to the piecemeal committal of the ..
, organization, and the strain was not critical at any time.
(d) (Q) What changes in replenishment rated, if any, are recom mended?
(A) None.
(e) (Q)^ What method was employed by your organization for re supply? .
(A) Organizational equipment was sufficient.
(f) (Q) (1) What repair facilities did you have available?
(2) Were they used?
(3) What major items of equipment wer#J)|MDalre&?
(A) (1) (a) DivSigRepair Section and p r i q H M H w arrival
ashore the ivSigSo's Radio
(b) Organizational repair
- 27

iperational Report (cont'cl)

(2) Yes
(3) 3 SCR-608 radios
3 SCR-610 radios
4 Units, ES-2C for switchboards (g) (Q,) Were equipment spares carried with equipment? state why?
(A) Yes.
(h) (Q) Were equipment sioares adequate?
(A) Yes.
(i) (Q) Were sufficient spare parts available other than equip ment spares?

'
If not,

(A) Yes.

(j) (Q) Was there sufficient transportation available for

transporting equipment?
(A) Yes.
(k) (Q) Are there any recommendations for changes in transpor tation?
(A) No.
6. Operation

(a) (Q) What agencies were established that were not normal?
(A) None
(b) (Q,) What was the most overloaded agency?
(A) Radio
ic) (Q,) What steps were taken to overcome trouble experienced
in (b) above?
(A) Overload was relieved as soon as wire could be installed,
which installation was normal and unhindered.
(d) (Q) Was there any unnecessary duplication of agencies used?
(A) No.
(e) (Q,) Of the frequencies assigned to your unit, were there any
not used?. If yes, state why.
(A) No.
(f) (Q) List difficulties encountered in:
(1) Radio communication
(2) Wire communication
(3) Visual communication
(4) Messenger communication
(A) (1) (a) The SCR-610 as described in 4-e.

- 28

Operational Report (cont'd)

(b) Frequency assignment in some cases caused inter ference between adjacent artillery units. This
was particularly confusing because of similarity
of traffic between all artillery FO f s and their
fire direction units. '-,
. (c) VMO-5 was pot equipped with the frequency crystal
of the air spot of this organization. For that
reason it was necessary to clear for use a
frequency the crystal for which that unit had.
VMO-5 was the only observation aBit which could
furnish air spot service to this organization as
VMO-4 had limited supply of planes and VMO-1 did
not participate in the operation. It is recom mended that VMO units be provided with the ob servation frequencies of all artillery units.
(2) (a) Necessary to obtain poles for overhead wire,
(b) No other abnormal difficulties.
(3) None
(4) None
(g) (Q) Were any communication difficulties encountered in this
operation that were not encountered in the previous op erations? If yes, what do you attribute the difficulties
to?
(A) Yes. It was necessary to procure oles in order to over head wire routes.
(h) (Q) Was any communication improvement noticed between this
operation and previous operations?
(A) Yes. Due primarily to short lines el communication
and secondarily to more experience personnel.
(i) (Q) List communication failures during the ship-to-shore
movement.
(A) None
Were officers required to operate and eaintain any agen cy of communication because of enlisted caaiaalties?
If yes, describe.
(A) No.
(Q) Were any enemy communication installations captured? yes, what use was made of them?
(A) No.
7. (note) Operation in Headquarters Ship
If

This headquarters was embarked aboard the same ship as

Division Headquarters, and operated directly under that
headquarters.

- 29

Operational Report (cont'd)

*.'* ' Securely and Contermeasures by the Enemy
(a) (Q,) ,What crotographic aids were used?
(A) Combined Assault Code, CCBP-Q130-D2, Hagelin and CSP 1607; and Numeral Cipher Code.
(b) (Q,) Are any criticism made of present aids?
(A) No.
(c) (q) What authenticator system was used and how effective was
it?
(A) Numeral Cit>her Authenticatorsatisfactory. (d) (Q) Did the enemy attempt to use our authenticator system?
If yes, describe* How effective were their attempts?
(A) No.
(e) (Q) Were personnel sufficiently trained in signal security?
(A) Yes.
(f) (Q) What specific recommendations are made to Insure proper
security$
(A) None.
(g) (Q) Did your organization have a "Signal Security Plan?11
(A) Yes.
(h) (Q) Did the enemy use radio coutermeasures? (A) No.
Describe.

v*>

'

(i) {) What measures were employed to overcome enemy interfer ence? .

(A) None
(j) (0,) What recommendations do you make to aid in training per sonnel to overcome enemy interference?
(A) None. ;
9. . Summary

(a) (Q) Give account of difficulties not covered in previous

questions?
(A) (1) Although the general plan of rapid replacement of
oersonnel is very satisfactory, the radio operator
replacements which were received by this organ!zatio
had had no radio experience for the -previous seven
(7) months, which made these men of limited value.
In addition to refreshment in radio procedure these
men must be taught artillery terminology and proce dure before they are of efficient use.
(2) As this organization landed from a reserve status in
this operation after the initial assault had been
made, this report snould be interpreted as not givir
the picture of an operation, of an faaatflt unit.

Operational Report (cont'd)

(b) (Q,) Comments and recommendations,
(A) (1) It is recommended that:
(a) A portable set similar to the SCR-300 in weight and
frequency selection be adopted. Set should cover a
ket>arate frequency range in order to minimize inter ference with infantry units,
(b) Forty-five.(45) telephones, EE-8, be allowed an H&S
Btry, Artillery Regt instead of twenty-nine (29).
(c) Pour (4) switchboards BD-72's and two (2) BD-71's
be allowed an H&S Btry, Artillery Regiment instead of
three (3) and one (1) respectively.
(d) Three (3) Radio TBX 1 s be allowed an H&S Btry, Artil lery Regiment instead of two (2).
(e) Three (3) switchboards BD-?2's be allowed oach.H&S
Btry in Artillery Regmment Instead of two.(2).
(2) The necessity for. additional telephones and switch boardr equipment arises out of the fact that two
switchboard., installations, a Fire Control Board and
Administrative Board are normal for all units of
this organization. In addition to these requirements
which have proved advantageous in the three ot>era-
tions of this regiment, the necessity for a forward
switching central for all artillery battalions has
also proved advantageous. This organization has
made previous recommendations for the increase of
switchboards and telephones.

- 31

12th Marines Action Report IWO JIMA Operation (Cant'd).

PART V Conclusions and Recommendations

A Front Line Location: It is essential for divisional art illery to have accurate, up to date, frbnt line information if close
support is to be rendered effectively* Fire control channels, both
wire and radio, were loaded with traffic to secure this information
to the detriment of fire missions. Aerial observers generally were
of little assistance, since panels were not used by our infantry.
It is felt that the use of panels or a similar system ( i.e, pyro technics, smoke grenades ) would greatly facilitate this. Some
definite and sound working agreement between infantry and artillery
i UL be established.
B. Use of WP: It was noted that Vl proved to be very effective
fB in driving the enemy fjipm dug-in positions. Whereas HE was having
little apparent effect \n the enemy, WP often succeeded in reaching
down and driving the enemy out into the open where HE and small aras
fire could destroy them. More dbphasis should be placed on the
value of Wp as a lethal weapon.
C. Training of Small Units: During the operation some of the
forward observer teams, survey and communications personnel were
found to be inadequately prepared for operating in the areas adjacent
to the front lines. These seotioneiauBt be .thoroughly trained in the
infantry tactics if they are to carry out thfcir missions. It is
recommended that survey sections, forward observer teams and com munications personnel operating as small units be given training in
infantry tactics and small arms firing (specialized). This will
keep them from inadvertantly allowing themselves to draw enemy fire
and also to defend themselves when in isolated OP1s, switching
centrals, and other places where they must rely upon themselves for
defense.
D. Battle Sounds: It is considered essential for forward
observers to undergo a course of training on battle sounds. This
will enable them to distinguish without hesitation .their own fires
from those of the enemy. Our fires will not be subject to so many
interruptions while it is being determined whether our front lines
are actually receiving fire from the enemy or shorts " from our
own pieces. This should also assist In the location of enemy pieces.
It is felt that this could be accomplished by constructing a series
of dugouts and foxholes at the artillery range and firing various
weapons over personael to accustom them to battle sounds. The dug outs could be put to further use for bringing artillery fire
( particularly 105mm ) close to the observer while they have pro tection from fragmentation.
E. Observation: The regimental survey section, sound an4
flash section, and metro section should be organized ae an obser vation platoon. This platoon should include a survey officer, ass'U
survey officer, ( in charge ot flash ranging ) and a sound i i
officer. lfl

12th Marines Action Report IVO JIM* 0p*pat4<m (Cont ! dK

The survey section should be large enough to make all necessary
surveys. The sound ranging section to install own lines and assist
the regimental communications section in the installations and
maintenance of flash ranging lines* This would provide an officer
who could direct the establishment and maintenance of observation
and whose presence is not necessary in the CP, It is believed that
this necessary coordination of observation activities can better be
accomplished in this way rather than by a staff officer in the CP.

F. CHI ST., JR..

~ 33

rtere, 1st Battalion, 12th rine Division, Fleet Marine In the Field. 27 Karch, 19U5, From: To;
Subject: Reference: 1.

Commanding Officer* 12th Marines.

Xvo Jima Operation, Action Report of. (a) 3d Marine Division General Order 137. STftftAKX

(a) The period covered by this report is from 22 January, 9 5 (date of 3* Marine Division Operation Plan 1-1*5) to 2100, 21 March, 19^5, when
the advance echelon debarked at Guam.
(b) The 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was combat loaded with the
9th Combat Team at Guam, beginning 0 IVbruary, 19^5. Tiring batteries were
embarked with battalion landing teams, and Headquarters and Service Battery
was divided between two ships, the Command Post being on APA HARRY LEB, where
the Battalion Commander was also Commanding Officer of Troops. H B" Battery was
landed 24 February, 19^5 by order of Commanding Officer APA KNOX. The same day,
Forward Observer teams and Liaison parties landed with the battalion landing
teams of the $th Combat Team. On 25 February, 19U5, the remaining batteries
and Battalion Headquarters landed and occupied positions west of Motoyama Air field number one (l) By 1700 1st Battalion, 12th Marines Fire Direction Center
had assumed control of seven (7) pack howitsers of 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines
and had been placed in direct support of the 9th Marines, The 4th Battalion,
13th Marines had been ordered to reinforce 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, but did
not actually begin to do so until the following morning. The 1st Battalion,
lHth Marines had been in direct support of the 9th Marines, with an officer from
1st Battalion, 12th Marines serving as liaison with 1st Battalion, lUth Marines.
The 1st Battalion, l4th Marines reverted to lUth Marines control at 0730, 26
February, 19**5. By 1315, 26 February, 19H5, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines Fire
Direction Center was ready to operate. The 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines had been
released from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines control and ordered to reinforce
1st Battalion, 12th Marines. The 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines continued reinforcing
until placed in direct support of 21st Marines on 28 February, 19**5t At which
time 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was ordered to reinforce 2nd Battalion, 12th
Marines. On 2 March, 1945* lt Battalion, 12th Marines was placed in direct
support of 9th Marines, with 3d Battalion, 12th Marines reinforcing. During
the ope cation 1st Battalion, 12th Marines fired approximately fort/ thousand
(Ho,000) rounds of ammunition. The largest expenditure was on preparations, as
many as three (3) being fired in a single day. Forward Observers fired on tar gets of opportunity both during the day and at night. Defensive fires were re gistered just before darkness when possible! Harassing fires were fired nearly
&r^ry night. At 1500, 16 March, 19^5* 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was ordered
to prepare to embark an advance echelon* At 17OO "Close Station, March Order*
was received from Commanding Officer, 12th Marines. Twenty-five (25) officers
and three hundred and ninety-two (392) enlisted were embarked at 1100, 17 March*
19^5 on the S.&. Santa Isabel, leaving & rear echelon of five (5) officers and
fifty-two (52) enlisted on I wo Jima. The advance echelon debarked at Guam at
2100, 21 March, 19U5 and returned to base camp.

2. FRELIKIHARISS

(a) Composition of this Command: Three firing batteries and

the Headquarters and Service battery.
(b) While the plans called for no special plans and training
other than the doctrine laid down in Artillery Field Manuals, special emphasi*
was placed on the following:
(1) Infantry - Artillery -Tank firing problems.
<2) Infantry - Artillery firing exercies stressing cl4*9
support,
(3) Flash ranging by forward observers.
(4) Massing fires.
(c) O^r mission was, direct support of the 9th Marines,
(d) At out*** of action t h i s battalion was aboard four A* Battery * M *be*sd' th FAXSWX, NB" Battery was aboard the KHOX, f "Ratter^ -'i *>h ono command group from Headquarters and S*&Hd*sSftttery * aboar4
n

riOL

on Heport,

Cont*d

v .Orders to *3|nd wore received on D / & t a A C TH 0? T E ACTIOH C OJ T H

February, 19^5: At 1135 King minus ton (10) zome time, S"
Battery was ordered to land by Commanding Officer APA X O , and without the
&X knowledge of Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. The Battery
Commander of "3" Battery informed the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 12th
Marines that he had been ordered to land* nB!l Battery landed on beach Bed two B (2) at 1300 and went into rendezvous off the beach. The Battery Commander, W M Battery contacted Commanding Officer, 12th Marines and was directed to go into position at xGk F. A bivouac area was occupied at position area and local security was posted by 1530 with four hundred (UOO) rounds of ammunition on hand. At 1000, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines commenced to land with Forward Observer teams and Liaison parties and at 1300, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines began landing with Forward Observer toam^and Liaison party. At l600 Commanding Officer, 1st 3attalion, 12th Marines received orders from Commanding Officer, 12th Marines to land Roconnaissanee parties end remaining battoriOB at dawn on 25 February, fl 19ty> Commanding Officer, 1st Sattalion, 3.2th. Marines was A also informed that ttB Battery was in position at T 164 F. At 1800 Commending Officer, 12th Marines ordered the Battery Commander, MB" Battery to 1st Battal ion, 14th Marines as Liaison Officer; 1st Battalion, l^th Marines., vas to be in direct support of the 9th Marines the following morning. 25 February, 19I+5: At 0930 with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on the right, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines on the l e f t and 3& Battalion, 9th Marines in reserve the 9th Marines passed through the 2lst Marines to continue the attack. A preparation was fired by 1st Battalion, l4th Marines. At 1130 MB" Battery was in position and ready to fire. Undor Eogimental control "3W Battery was registered on Check Points seven (7) nine (9) ten (10); registration complete at 1300, 1st Battalion, 12th Mrrincs Reconnaissance party landed on beach Hod two (2) at 1130* The remaining batteries were orderod to land by Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines when Reconnaissance parties were picked up from the FAYETTE and L3i)DST0WN. Position areas were selected in A XSkl and position area survey was immediately instigated. Approximately four hundred (400) rounds of ammunition on hand per battery. The Battery Commander, M ir B Battery was orderod back to the battery at l&Xh 1st Battalion, 12th kc.rincs Command Post opened at 1600 and at l6lO 1st Battalion, 12th Marines took over control of seven (7) pack howitzers of 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines and at 1700 was placed in direct support of 9*& Marines. At 1700 ^th Battalion, 13th Marines was ordered to reinforce the fires of 1st Battalion, 12th Karinos. From 1700 to 18Q3 defensive firos were registered in front of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines " y 1st Battalion, 12th Karinos and in front of 2nd Battalion, b 9th Marines by 1st Battalion, l^th Marines. **th Battalion, 13th Marines did not actually start reinforcing our firos until the following morning. WA " Battory landed at ifiOO and wasMin rendezvousMat position area by 2300. From 1S20 to 1915 registrations of D!IM "2", and. BW Batteries were checked on Check Point ilumber seven (7) by lfA Battery Forward Observer. Harassing missions wore fired Airing the night and during the day two missions wore firod by Forward Observers. The Battalion SxocutivQ Officer with tfco remainder of Headquarters and Service Battery and "C* Battory landed at 2300 and were in rendezvous at position area by 0100, 26 February, 1 9 ^ : 1st Battalion, l^th Mrines reverted to 63 control of l^th ^iexinQS at O73Of M In support of 9th liarines attack at OCO a preparation was firod l|y "B", DM, and "JS" under control Qt 1st Battalion, 12th Marines from O73Q tft 0815. At 0600 end 0S30 respectively "C* and MAH Batteries were in position rnd ready to fire. From 1008 to 1200 "A* Battery registered by air spot I&ndar adverse weather conditions on Check Point !ftsaber A ten (10). Corrections, for "Ctt Battery were trJcon from " M Battery's regis tration. At 1305 who* the Fire Direction Center of 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines was ready to operate, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines was released from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines control, and at 1315 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines was . ordered to reinforce the fires of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. Defensive firos wero registered in faiont of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines from 1001 to 2135. From 20^5 to 2100 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
-2

firod on a counter atta&J? Ifr "AM Battery Forward Observer Humber one (1).
Attack repulsed.. (200Fno) Eighteen (IS) missions wero fired "by Forward
Observers during tho day, ilo harassing fires were fired during the day or
night.
27 February, 1945: From 0*63 to 0503 "3" 3attery firod Baker
emergency barrage dumber two (2) on a counter attack for "A" Battery Forward
Observer dumber two (3). From 0513 to 0520 and from 0530 to 0539 "3" 3attory
fired 3akor emergency barrage dumber two (2) on possible counter attacks. For
a continuation of tho attack at QSQQ by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2d
Battalion, 9th Marinas, 1st Battalion* 12th Marines and 4th Battalion, 13th
Karinos firod a preparation from 0730 to 0S00, From 12*40 to 1250 a preparation
for 1st Battalion, 9th Karinos and 2nd Battalion, 9th Kerines was firod by
1st Battalion, 12th Marines. C Battery fired a smoke mission fron 1250 to
1300. From 1250 to 1300 "B" andHAlf Batteries fired a rolling barrago in con tinuation of the proparation in front of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd
Battalion, 9th Karinoe Another preparation for tho 9th Karinos was fired fron
13^1, Defensive fires wore registered from 1710 to 1905. From 1732
1321 to M M to 19^+5 C Battery firod a smoke screen to remove casurlities. An excellent
scresn was maintained. Twenty-two (22) missions were firod by Forward Observers
during the day and harassing fires wore fired throughout the night.
2S February, 1945 s Able cud Charlie normal barrages wore firod
on a possible counter attack for "Ctt Battery Forward Observer number tv/o (2)
from 0550 to 0552 and again from 0650 to 0651. At 07^5 when tho 21st Marines
passed through tho 9th Karinos 2nd Battalion, 12th Layines was released fron
its reinforcing missions end assigned direct support of the 21st Kfrinos. 1st
Battalion, 12th Harinos and 4th Battalion, 13th liariao*. wore then ordered to
reinforce tho fires of 2nd Battalion, 12th Karincs, From 0745 to O915 1st
Battalion, 12th Marines fired a preparation reinforcing 2nd Battalion, 12th
Karinos, in support of an attack by tho 21st Kerines. Another preparation
was fired roinforcing 2nd Battalion, 12th K&rincs from 1255 to 1310, and again
from 1525 to 15*40. Defensive fires wore registered from 1330 to 190*+, Eighteen
(IS) missions, wore firod during the&ey raid harassing missions were fired during
the day and night.
1 liarch, 1945: 1st 3attalion 12th Karinos firod in a Division
preparation in support of an attack by tho 21st Marines from OS25 to OS'45 and
then fired a smoke mission from OS45 to 0905. For this attack the 9th Harinos
wero in Division resorve following the 21st Karinos by bounds. At l645 1st
Battalion, 9th Harinos passed through jd Battalion, 2ist Karinos to continue
the attack and a preparation was firod fron 16^5 to 173? Defensive firos
wore registered from 1S0S to 20^4# Fourteen {lk) missions wcro fired during
tho day by Forward Observers and harassing missions woro fired throughout the
night.
2 March, 19^5: l s t Battalion, 12th Karinos fired on a counter
attack (23^Tno) from OOU7 to 0118 for "C11 Battery Forward Observer Number one
(l). At 0750 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was placed |n cliroct support of tho
9th Marinas end. 3d Battalion, 12th Marines was ordered to reinforce tho firos
fires of 1st Battalion, 12th Karinos, From 0750 to 0S00 a preparation was firod
for theM Karinos followed by a rolling barrage until 0624. From 09^6 to
9th 1024 "B Battery maintained e smoke screen on enemy machine guns, A preparation
was fired from 11*40 to Il45 and another fron 1520 to 1535 for attack by 1st
Battalion, 9th Karines and 2nd Battalion, 9t& Harinos. Defensive firos were
rogistored from ISO! to 1903. Twenty-three (23) missions wero fired during the
day by Forward Observers and no harassing fires wcro firod duo to a shortage of
ammunition.
3 torch, 1945: In support of an attack by the 9*k Marines at
0745 1st Battalion, 12th Marines fired a smoke mission from 0735 to 0745 and
then a preparation was fired from 0745 to 0755. Fron 1030 to 1045 1st. Battalion,
12th Marines fired on a counter attack (235^) for "0" Battery Forward Observer
"ijumber one (l). "B" Battery registered smoke at l4l5 to mark target for air
strike. A preparation was fired for the 9th Karinos fron 14^*0 to 14*45. de fensive fires wore registered from 174S to 2030. Fron 1920 to 1925 Charlio
normal barrago was fired on a counter attack for "." Battery Forward Observer
*-- - - * -
lumber one (l). Slwolvo missions wore fired during - ^ * - * ^ * ^

Action Report,

CGntd

night.
k March, 19*45* In support of an attack "by the 9th Marines a
preparation was fired from 06^5 to 0710, Defensive firee were registered from
iGkS to 1S5^ and harassing missions were fired during the night. Eleven (11)
c&asions wore .firod dioring the day.
5 March, 19^5 "A11, "B" and "C11 Batteries were registered on the new Base Point in 219W b;f air spot from 1330 to 1*415. "B" Battery was registered at 1*400 to mark target for an air strike. wCn Battery was registered on Check Point Number nine (90 (SJ^lnw) "by air spot from 1^22 to 1*435. Defensive fires were registered from 17J5 to 1900. Ten (10) missions were fired during the day and harassing missions wef-e fired throughout the night. Ho attack; by the 9th Marines, 6 March, 19^5: from 0750 to 0821 and from 08^5 to 0921 1st Battalion, 12th Marines fired a preparation and rolling barrage for Fifth Amphibious Corps Landing Forc$; the l a t t e r In support of an attack by the Fifth Amphibious Corps. A preparation-was fired for the 9th Marines from 1**38 to lkk5. Defensive f i r e s we*3 registered from 1605 to 1800. Three (3) missions were fired during the day as well as {harassing missions. Throughout the night smoke was used to ^arass. 7 'March, 1&5: The 9th Marines continued the attack at 0500 under cover <jf darkness #d the smoke screen resulting from harassing fires* At 0755 "A" Bat%Qfy Forward Observer Number one ( l ) registered "B11 Battery to locate front l i n e s . From 12p5 |o 1300 a preparation was fired far the 9th Marines. Defensive fi^es wero registered from 190^ to 1910, Seven (7) missions wore firod during the ^jay and harafsing missions were* fired during the night. At 17^5 3& Battalion, 9th Marinas was released from control of the 21st Marines and reverted to 9th Marines control. 8 Marchi 19*45* In support of an attack by the 9th Marines at 0750 a preparation an# rolling barrage was fi$ed from 07*40 to OSOU. "Att Battery fired another preparation for the 9th Karines from 1625 to 16^0, Defensive fire? were registorei from 16^8 to 1750. No missions were fired for Forward Observers but harassing missions wpre fired during the day and night. At 0300 3d Battalion, 21st Marines was attached to the 9V1 Marines* 9 Marh, 19^5? No preparations r e l a t e d by 9th Marines in the attack at 0700. Defensive fires were registered fa&m 1 8 ^ to 19*40. Four {k) missions were firod during the day for Forward Observers and during the night harassing missions yfere fired. 10 M^rch, 1945: Ho preparations requeffcod by the 9th Marines in the attack at 0800. At 1530 9th Marines patrols wore #ej>orted to be ofc^ths beach. Two (2) mi scions were fired during the day. N$ defensive f i r e s w registered and no harassing missions were fired. 11 March, 19**5J No preparation requested by the 9th Marines*
no missions fired fey forward Observers, and no defensive fires registered.
Harassing missions w^fe fired during the night.
12 MaSch, 19*+5: From 0900 to 0910 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
fired a preparation ior 13th Marines in support of an attack by the 5thMarine1
Division. No missions fired by Forward Observers and no defensive fires
registered. Harassing missions were fired during the day and night.
13 Ka3fch, 19*45: Three missions were fired by the Forward
Observers during tho'day. No defensive fires wero registered but harassing :(
miscions were fired iuring "he day and night.
1*4 MaJrch, 19*45: Two (2) missions adjusted by DO-H&B (13th Marine;
Section) were fired on gun flashes in TA 219X at 1130 and 0215. Harassing
were fired during the nigh/j,.

Cont'd

15 torch, 19^5: Ho firing this data.

16 March, 1 9 ^ 1 From 06U0 to O73U 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
fired a smoke mission under 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines control to cover passage
of lines of 21st Marine* through the 26th and 27th Marines. From 07*+0 to 0825
1st Battalion, 12th Marines fired a preparation reinforcing 2nd Battalion, 12th
Marines in -support ffinattack "by the 21st Marines, ThiB was the last mission
fired "by 1st Battalion, 12th Marines on Iwo Jima. At 1500, 1st Battalion, 12th
Marines was ordered, to prepare to embark an advance echelon. At 1700 "Closo
Station, March Qrde*" Was received from Commanding Officer, 12th Marines.
17 March, 19^5: At 1100, twenty-five (25) officers and three
hundred and ninety-two (392) enlisted from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines were
embarked on the SS Santa Isabel, leaving a rear echelon of five (5) officers
and fifty-two (52) enlisted, witja organizational equipment, on Iwo Jima to
await transportation.
IS, \%, 20 *iarch, 1945* Aboard SS Santa Isabel.
21 March, 19^5: The advance echelon debarked at Guam at 2100
and returned to base camp.
k. COMMENTS
(a) A $ I A $ V E
il) Casualty report:
Killed in Action - Seven (7) enlisted. . gfg
Wounded in Action - Bight (S) officers and thtfty-eight
(38) enlisted.
Died of tyounds Received in Action - One (1) officer and
one (1) enlisted.
Total Casualties - Sine (9) officers and forty-six (46)
enlisted.
(b) ARTILLBHX"
(l) Loading of this unit, firing batteries under direction
of and with the battalion landing teams of the 9*h Marines and Headquarters
and Service Battefcy under own control - was very satisfactory. Headquarters
and Service Battery and other units loading aboard the APA Ten (10) experienced
difficulties in the cargo area, caused by having their cargo placed in an area
far removed from where the ship docked. This caused the time of loading to be
extended several hours. It is recommended that the ships loading officer be
allowed to begin assembling the cargo at the dock, where. i^Ls ship is to load,
-) itor to the arrival of the ship.
Due to a lack of LCMs and a Tory high surf this unit
required approximately eighteen (18) hours to complete unloading11after orders
to debark on the morning of 25 February, 1945 were received. "B Battery landed,
24 February, 1945 on orders from the Captain of theAPA XNOX.M The Battalion < ^ 5
Commander had received np orders to effect the landing of flB Battery. The
equipment of the battalion was landed in a satisfactory condition and in a
quantity adequate to fulfill our mission.
(3) Survey was limited to a position area survey. It was
not considered feasible or necessary to carry survey to the front linos.
(4) fire adjustment was generally con:trolled by air spotters
and forward observers. 3his unit was adjusted by DO-DAS on two occasions and
once by flash ranging. Air spot was used mainly for registrations, which wore
considered to bo very good. The forward observers conducted, by far, the
majority of our fire using forward observer methods. Precision adjustments were
used on point targets, however excellent camouflage by the enemy coupled with
heavy enemy fire made the location of enemy targets quits difficult. Adjustment
by sound was frequently used when observation was Lacking. Due to the heavy

Action Report,

Oont'd

volvjne of ftWMLriaj|^|fry fire the problem of an observer being able to pick being pi up his adjusting rounds was often encountered. This brought about the use of smoke for registration on most targets. (5) Fire direction technique was unchanged from that laid down in field manual six (6) - forty (*4O) (6) Organization for combat and tactical employment was normal. (7) Liaison with the infantry regiment and infantry battalions was normal and-carried out in an excellent manner. The supported infantry was very cooperative in working with our liaison parties. (8) Communications were carried out in normal manner, but due to enemy fire, friendly tanks and bull dozers, i t was difficult to maintain wire communications, A forward switching central and a forward radio relay station were used with good results, ?ive (5)' 6lO radios were destroyed by enemy fire. The telescopic antonna drew heavy enemy fire. Ihis radio was not as portable as was desired. The batteries (BJlUO'e) generally lasted for only one day of normal operation. One instance of interference on our assigned frequency " y a friendly b nnit was noted and reported. The maximum distance at whic communication by 6lQ radio could be maintained without relay was about two (2) miles. It is believed that the 300 radio would have been more satisfactory for Forward Observer use. (9) Observation by forward observers was very limitedcduring most of operation l>y rough terrain and scrub brush. Upon reaching the high ground north of Motoyama Airstrip Humber two (.2) observation was increased, Heav enemy small arms fire and mortar fire covered the majority of positions favorable for observation, making them untenable. (J.Q) Personnel Replacement personnel, radio operators in particular, were not qualified to carry out the duties to which i t was necessary to assign them. Communication school was carried on at the battalion Command Post for the replacements in order to alleviate the above situation, (14) Ammunition supply was slow and the battalion was,never able to build up to 1 w (2) units of fire $n hand. ' It is believed that this was o due to the difficulty of getting 15w pack Jiowitzer ammunition from the ship to the beach and in many cases i t had to be sorted from 75cm gun ammunition after i t reached the beachefc. (12) Motor transportation waa adequate. (13) The one to twenty thousand (l;20,000) gunnery map gave good horizontal contr<si,but tliis unit found the Vertical control to be consider ably off. It was fourid normal in time fire missions to raise the height of burst &pprnyinately eighty (SO) yas0,s to get a zero height 6f burst. { action against this unit was confined to infrequent artillery and mortar jshell^ng of short duration and light intensity. Stajpply of all necessary items Vas satisfactory. (1$) Stimmary of Ammunition expenditure by item: 20,239 15,382 K-57 3,627 Arty Eoc kets 20 6g 236 ,

Eegis Pr^ia-4 Harass Close Pr^ia-t General Kortars M G Support Swnport Date tration ration 4.2 *;. 25 Feb 26 2 " 627 260 27 Z.10
1 Mar . lUr 5 Mar

U7)

30 go

95 96

29

Action Seport,

Cont*d

Date 6 Mar 7 Mar

g Mar 9 Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar
12 Mar
1 3 M Mar
1 4 to Mar
15 Mar
16 Mar

Totals

ass-

26

2569
303 190S

12 285 1058
288

Close Support 137 5

General Mortar^ M G Support 60 60

Arty Hoc-
kets
119

156
105 51

61

396
302 300

687

20816

6216

339

2092

761 165^ 220

(18) During this Operation the 75mm pack howitzer proved to be

effective- against only those targets for which it was designed. The fire was
very effective against troops in the open . eospecially close-in support during
counter attacks* troops entrenched, open machine gun and mortar positions, and
for harassing missions. Against pill boxes and under ground installations the
effect was negligible* It was evident that in many ins truces our troops were
held up by enemy installations close to our own lines which could not be touched
by our preparations. In other instances there was not sufficient time prior to
a preparation to adjust our artillery on the most important targets - targets
known to the infantry and forward observers.

MEDICAL.

(a) Embarkation: All medical personnel were embarked oft four

(k) AP*s on 9 February, 19^5. This included eleven (11) hospital corpsmen, oaah ca.
rylng a unit number three (3) ancL two (2) units of serum albumen, and one (1)
medical officer who carried a unit number one (l).
Material consisted of Units Number five (5) A, Number five
(5) B, Number seven (7) Number ei^it (8), Number eleven (11) At Number eleven
(11) B, and Number fourteen (1*0. Most of these units were carried in a one
(l) ton trailer and a Jeep ambulance aboard the U.b.o. EbBBX LES. In addition
a sick bay unit and additional plasmawor carried aboard three other AP's with
the firing battery personnel.
(b) Aboard Ship: During the period spent aboard ship there was
a minimum of disease among our troops. Sanitary conditions were excellent on
the US.S. HAEBT LEE, the AP carrying Headquarters and Service Battery. No
defects were noted which were below Navy standard requirements.
Special Precautions - None,
(c) This organization went ashore on D plus 5 &ndD plus 6 in
L.C.7.Pfs. Medical personnel Were dispersed with no more than one to any boat.
Most of the material went ashore on D pluB 6; part of it was transferred to
L.C.Mfs and part went ashore on L.C.V.P1^. There were no losses of personnel
or material in this phase of the operation.
(d) Ashore - Assualt Phase:
(1) This organization was not ashore during the initial
assualt phase. Medical installations were set up in an area relatively close to
all batteries and on a main road. Since it was to be a semi-permanent camp,
little regard was given to the features so important to an infantry organization.
Local security was provided by the battalion* Camouflage nets were used over
all vehicles and tents. Personnel were all dispersed. A black out tent was set
up and dug in as was the sick bey tent. Blackout was preserved until the island
was secured,
(2) No patients were'hospitalized in our aid station.
(3) Patients were evacuated with facility b / ambulance jeep.
(- 5.'iiare were twenty-one (21) casualties treated by our
') tick bay.

?0 "ji'j casualties were detained, v'b) S'ourtucn (ik) of our casualties were evacuated, (c) JTJLT *) cf our casualties died.

Contd

Ihere were fourteen (l^-) walking wounded.

!hree (3) of our casualties were stretcher cases.
(5) Sanitation presented less protxlom than anticipated. This
was due to cool weather and the fact that we remained in one position the entire
period. Ho galleys were set up, Sations consisted of C type and ten (10) in
one (l) type. They were obtained in sufficient quantity and in ay opinion were
ideal for this type operation. Water was obtained from the distillation unit
which was operated " y the division. There was sufficient quantities for drink b ing "but never an adequate quantity for bathing and washing clothes.
(6) All our daad were "buried in the 3& Marine Division
Cemetery.
(7) There were no epidemics or unusual diseases*
(S) Adequate dental service was provided " y the Regimental
b Dental Officer,
(9) Ho civilians or prisoners of war were cered for "j this
br organisation
(10) The medical organization of this battalion was entirely
adequate and suitable on this operation. Personnel were nore than adequate in
number and worked efficiently,
(11) tiedlc^J. supplies were entirely adequate. There were no
loss es through pilferage.
(e) Recommendations: In view of the small number of casualties
cared for by this organization I do not believe recommendations for any changes
are justified. The only appropriate comment in this regard is that we were
oquiped for caring for several times as many casualties as we did care for. At
no tine was there any sty&in on our medical section.

G. 3.

-S

* ; ;

3D

JEADQUA3T2RS, ?TALIOK, TWELFTH kARINES, '.VISION, FMF, IN THE FIELD,

From:
To ;
Subject:

GO.
CO, 12th Marines.
Action Report.

Enclosuro:
(A) Action Report.
Reference:
Divison General Order No. 15?
1. In compliance with reference (a)
Enclosure (A) is submitted.

W.T. FAIRBOURM

tart X Summary.
A. The mission vas assigned on 7 Hovember, 19*&, at a conference of
battalion commanders and was completed on l6 Maroh, ^
B. At 1J00 on 21 February the forward observers and liaison officers
of 2d battalion 12th Marines, began landing with the 21st Marines on two
Jima, prepared to conduct fire for the 2d battalion l^th Marines, until
such time as the 2d battalion 12th'Marines, was prepared to go into direct
support of the 21st Marines. The reconnaissance elements of the 2d battalion
12th Marines, were* landed on Zk February 19^5. &n& the remainder Qf the
battalion was ordered to land on the morning of 25 February* Prom 25 Feb ruary 19^5 to 27 February 19^5 inclusive 2d battalion 12th Marines reinforced
the fires of 1st battalion 12th Marines, On 2S February, 2d battalion
12th Marines, was assigned direct support of 21st Marines which continued
until 1500* 16 March 19*4-5, at which time the 4th battalion 12th Marines*
relieved this battalion of its mission and preparations woro made to rcembarl
for departure from. Iwo Jima on 17 March 19^5*
tart II treliminariest
A. Tbue command was composed as proscribed by 3d Marine Bivision
Administrative Order 1-^5.
B. Since the Divison was landing in reserve no fixed plan could bo
prescribed. Observers and liaison parties were loaded with the 21st Marines.
Roconnaissanco parties to select position areas were provided. Firing
batteries wcro given unloading priorities following tho infantry elements
of the 21st Marines
Daring the training period ending 10 February 19^5 the following
was stressed:
(1) Service Practice (day and night)
(2) Firing KSQt's
(3) Camouflage
) Field Fortifications Tho rehearsals consisted of participation in a "Division CtX end a
21st Marines CtX "based On tho type of operation indicated by the character
of tho terrain and enemy dispositions on Iwo Jima.
Firing oxerciscs stressing the use of a l l infantry and a r t i l l e r y weapons in a passage of linos suc+i as was indicated by tho Iwo Jima operation were conducted in conjunction with1; tho 21st Marines and 1st battalion 3d Marines. ' t 0* This battalion was assigned the mission of landing on call on
"beaches to bo designated prepared for direct support of tho 21st Marines
on order.
D. E. i'art I I I Sec t a r t I, Section B. Sec intelligence reports of higher ocholons. Chronological account of tho action.

Tho forward observers and liaison officer boated with the 1st batta 21st Marines began to land on Iwo Jima at approximately 13OO (K *40 timo) 21 February 19H5# and were soon followed by the forward observer and parties boated with other battalions and the headquarters of the 21st The forward observer teams and liaison parties proceeded with the 21st n to an Assigned assembly area whore they were to await further orders, fy I63O the a r t i l l e r y liaison officer, normally with tho headquarters of #1$ 21et Mariiics, reported to tho Commanding Officer, lUth Marines, where bo was infvisaed that the 2d battalion i t o Marines had been assigned direct saj^ of tho 21st Marines. The liaison officer completed plans with the l^ih Kor^a l b ^ f f t ^ ^ 2d battalion 12th tiariaos conducted tip

performod liason functions with the 21tt Marines. The 2d "battalion

Mr.rinos assigned a liaison officer to report to the Commanding Officer,
21st Karinos.
At 0730 on 22 February the 2d "battalion 12th Marines1 liaison offices
reported to the Commanding Officer, 2d "battalion l^th Marines, to perform ,
liaison duties, which duties he performed until 1200, 2*+ February 13^5. at
which time ha resumed his normal duties at tho 21st Marines1 command post.
The 2d "battalion l^th Marines was in direct aa^ort of tho 21st Marines from
0730, 22 February, when the 21st Marines vor committed in the ^th Merino
I&vision zone of action until the 9th Marines oxecutcd a passage of linos
through the 21st Marinos on 25 February 9^
The Commanding Officer, 12th Marines, ordered ashore tho reconnaissance
elements of the 2d battalion 12th Marines on 2U Fobruary 19^5> and these clo nonts landed at 1325 that date. Hie reconnaissance party proceeded from the
beach area to VJrhib Corps Artillery Headquarters where a representative of fee
Commanding Officer, 12th Marinos, assigned positions to tho battalion in the
vicinity of TA l6^K. A battalion command post was established in the vicinity
of S?A l6HK at 1U3O on 2*+ February. At 1830 the remainder of the battalion was
ordered to land at dawn on 25 February 19^5*
Tho remainder of the battalion began landing at 093^ on 25 February
and at irregular intervals, continued to land throughout the day* At 1^10 n 3"
battery completed air spot registration on three (3) checkpoints. 3y 1^52
seven (73 guns wore ashoro and in position ready to firo with 807 rounds of
finmunitioji (67S rounds of high explosive and 129 rounds of smoke), dao to the
lack of some necessary equipment and porsonnol on tho ^art of both the 1st and
2d battalions, the Commanding Officer, 12th Marinos, directed tho two batta lions combined for purposes of fire direction undejr the 1st battalion firo
direction center. At that timo the 1st battalion 12th Marines was in diroct
support of the 9th Marines. Hie 1st battalion firo direction center, augnonted
by personnel and equipment of the 2d battalion, assumed control of the fires
at lSlO.
With the additional personnel and equipment landed during, the morning
of 26 February, both the 1st and 2d battalions bould operate as separate
battalions. As a result tho 2d battalion was directed to establish a separate
fire direction center, and at I3O5 this Was accomplished. At 1315 the 2d
battalion was assigned tho utission of reinforcing the fires of tho 1st battrv lion. Ton (10) guns wore in the battalion position by 1835; however, onp (l)
gun of "D 8 battery had been damaged in unloading and aould not be fired.
With the 21st Marines passage- of the 9th Marines linos on 2S February,
the 2d battalion 12th Marinos was assigned diroct support of the 21st Marines,
who had orders to continue the attack. King hour was set at O815. Tho prepa ration for the attack; began at O7*+5 and continued until King hour, at which
timo a rolling barragp and harrassing firos, which lasted until 0922, wero
fired. At 1300 a coordinated attack, procoded by a five (5) minute prcparatlafci
was launched. At King hpur artillery gifted and fired a rolling barrage and
harassing fires until 1J35 At 152J a five (5) minuto preparation was fired
for an attack n,t 1530* 4 rolling barrage and harrassing fires woro firc in
support of tho attack un^il 1600. During the day and night -there were six (6J
call missions by forward observers. - Harrassing and defensive iircs yoro
x
fired throughout tho nigtyb. On 2 March, the preparation for the attack began at 0750 and continued
until King hour (0300), at which timo a rolling barrage, whioh latto'4 u
032^, was fired. At 1530 ft coordinated attack was Jaunohod after a f o n
miauto preparation. At King hour a rolling* barrage was firod wntil i*frK
Thorc woro th*00 (3) ocXX missions during the poriodr th6 usual night ttivoa
On 3 March, tho preparation for U f ^
until King hour. (073^), at which timij a roliihg
vcro firod uafcil 0&X). At 1025 tho bet tali o&y viib
-2

reinforcing, fired on p8ilRc>attaclc in $A 23fftJ. At ihk^ a five (5) minute

preparation was fired for the attack at 1500. There were ten (10) call m
during the poriod* Earraesing cud defensive fires were fired during the night.
On k March, the* preparation for the attack began at 1120 and continued
until Kins hour (11*40), at which time a rolling barrage was fired until 1201,
Shore wore four (h) cr.ll missions during the period. Harrassiiyc fires-were
firod throughout the day on suspected mortar locations. Defensive and
harrassing fires were fired during the night*
On 5 Harch, *])", *%*, and nln "batteries were registered'on checkpoint
#12 (&T at 219W) "by air spot. There was one (l) call mission during the
poriod* Defensive and harrassing fires were firod throughout the night.
On 6 March, a ton (10) minute preparation-was firod in support of the
left "battalion of the 21st Marines lifting at Sing hour (0600) to suspected
gun positions in- front of the right "battalion of the 2lst Marines. At King
plus ^5 * King pljis 50 &*>& King plus 55 to King plus 60 a preparation was
firod in support of the right battalion of^the ,21st Marines. At King plus 60
tho preparation was lifted and a rolling barrage was fired until Kins plus S5*
At 1H3S a two (2) minute preparation was firod until King hour (1*+HO) and then
lifted one hundred (100) yards and fired until 1500. There were threo (3) call
missions during the period; harrassing and defensive fires were fired through out the nidrt.
On 7 Harch, there wore four (4) call missions. Defensive and harrassiiv:
fires wore fired durinc the night, from 0^55 to 0500 snoko was fired to screen
tho ni^ht attack of the 3^ "battalion 9th Marines.
On S March, tho preparation for the attack "bo^on at 07^-0 and continued
until Kin.'-; hour (0750), at which time a rolling barrage was fired until 0S05.
Defensive and harrassing fires were fired throughout the ni^ht.
On S March, tho preparation for tho attack "bewail at 0 6 ^ and continued
until 0710. ICinrc hour was set at 0700. Harrassing fires were fired throughout
the day on sugpocted mortar and artillery locations. Ihere was ono (l) call
mission during the poriod. Dcfon&ivo and harrassing fires were fired throurihr out they night.
On 10 M&rch, no fires wore placed in tho 3^ Marino Division sector.
5?he battalion, fired ono (l) call mission reinforcing the fires of the 13th
Karines.
.All fires were reinforcing the 13th Marines on 11 March, A preparation
for tho 5^h Marine Division was fired from 0820 to 0S50* Harrassiilg fires
were fired iurinr; the night for the 5t^ Marino Division.
On 12 March, only harrassing fires for tho 5th Marine Division were fixc\.
On 13 March, tho battalion was directed to reinforce the 13th Marines
in support of the 5th Marine Division* Harrassing fires for the 5th liarinc
Division were fired.
On 1^ March, only harrassing fires for the 5th Marine J&vision woro
firel.
Ho missions were fired on 15 March.
On 16 March the battalion, reinforced by the 1st and UtJa battalions,
fired a smoke mission from 0705 to 0725 to screen tho 21st Marines while
relieved two (2) rogimonts of tho 5*& Marine Division. A preparation wae
fired for the 21st Marines from King minus 20 to Xing plus 10* King hour
set at 0S15. 1st and kth battalions and one (l) corps artillery battalion
wero reinforcing. At 1500 orders wcro received relieving the battajion of
diroct support of tho 21st Marines as soon as tho relief oould bo exc<Jtttod
try tho te bAttolion J2th Kajrince. At 1700 thp relief was compJUsted and th

21 "battalion was ordered to closo station to make preparations for doparturc from two Jima on 17 March 19^5,, Jart IV Comments.
W B

Administration. 1, Killed in action ~ two' (2) officers and sovon (7) enlistee!.. Wounded in action - two (2) offiocrs and tliirty five (35) onlistcl

2 Morale Of troops throughout operation was excellent, Hi$x morale was maintained by reaion of hot food, excellent mail service, and general esprit do 3 'Mo prisoners, natives or civilians wore handled by this
"battalion.

* loading of the firing "batteries was correct. The headquarters

"batters' \ms s^lit "between two (2) shi*s, either element boin/i; enable of
oxcrcisiiVC firo direction once established ashore. !Ihis was a mistako since
i t was impossible to kec^ "both cloments of the hoadquartors a^rised of a
chfijvjinr: situation; once ^lans wore male they could not "be chanced with
facility to suit the local situation.
fc-ndin^. There is a docided need of nore instruction for all'
officers as to the echelons of command during a shi^-to-shoro movement, Uh j o
reconnaissance elements of this battalion were ordered ashore direct without
roferonco to the Transport division Coiimian^er who controlled the "boct allo cation and unloading priorities. Jhc' leading of the remainder of the "batta lion was accomplished as ox^editiously as was cofianensurate with availability
of boat-s since i t was handled throwdi naval channels*
3 ^iyo AdJListment. J:111 adjustnents, except initial registrations, wore by forward observers. Observers fiiowoi. a, tendency to fire for effect before a positive a^Justncnt was obtained. This was excusable when observers could not ascertain the exact location of the target but adjuster! on an area which hostile fire was coming or in which hostile elements were believed to be located. * giro direction. The /gunnery tochniquo was excellent, but a K ^ro^.er appreciation of the tacticvl use of artillery fire was lacking. rolling barra-^o ty^-o of preparation was effective Uirinf": the advaiice fron nujabor two airfield to number throe airfield but was not effective tho advance from nuobor throo airfield to the coast, & "bcxxcAo ty^e atlon i s wasteful of ammunition and does not ^lacc sufficient firo at j^riato tiacs on kiaown and suspected onony installations, routes of etc, in do^th. $hi is evidonced ^ the fact that troops mado only limited advances behind tho barrage and wore stored by firo froa en cay strong to the flanks and rear of the area covered by tho preparation. Had a short intense preparation immeliatoly in front af ou? troops (for the ^.ur^oso of establishing firo su^erioritsO witliout tho barrp/i:c boon used, aoro ammunition would have boon available to delivor ^ supportin~ firos following Klar, hour in order to ostablisli and maintain neutralization on known or suspected enemy installations dco^or in our *ono of action but capable of delaying the ^ro^ress of our infantry. It is bolicvod th insufficient emphasis wae x-laced on deep fires: hpA such boon done the cnony'fi conmunication an1 su^ly lines would havo been disru^tel, at an earlier time pw was cccoq^lishod. Thero was l i t t l e attempt male to coordinato and make avajl-* able to those ^jn^i^iLOr firing #reparations sufficient data on enemy instal lations i n > c ^ ^ ^ j t t | W ' J i r o f f l v J*w3? oda^\pns rarely had a complete of tho enemy ^ v f W ^ f f fj ^font in tintf' to act u^on i t . M a h l squ&rlit|Jk(JK v$7>otxtoqual 'attention during; ^roi/aratory
2

Wire communication was excellent. The policy

of kec^inft a "forward switch woll forward with tost, stations "between swltchr*
boards f;avo a very flexible and dependable communication system,1 There was
a tendency to "party* too many forward observer lines through the switchboard*
Iho forward switches of both direct su^ort battalions were trunkod ^ivin^
additional flexibility to the "forward switch* system. Lateral linos botwoon
direct su^*ort battalions adjacent to division boundaries should bo adopted
as standard ^rocodusc throughout the Cor^s. Many difficulties arising; from
artillery fire alon^ tho division boundaries could havo been solved if tho
two fircr direction centers had been connected by lateral linos.

11

Radio communications woro very i.oor. The SOB 6lO is definitely

a sto^. backward from tho SCR 30Q for the following reasons:
(a) Too hoavy <5^ l"bs vs 38 lbs). (b) Will not stay in ali/?nmcnt. (c) No flexibility in shifting frequencies. Two frequencies arc not enough. Cannot shift to infantry frequencies or to adjacent a r t i l l e r y froquoncies when tho occasion requires. (d) Will not "bend11 over h i l l masses as woll as SCR 30. (0) 4*ntQnna i s too conspicuous. I t draws too much fj.ro. (f) Short lifo of batteries. 6* Observation. I f uso of sound and flash personnel by Regiment. So

? iasmunition. Tho s u ^ l y was adoquato, but thoro was l i t t l e coordination by hif^h6r echelons. The "Oomo and sort it M system was used. *i.8 a result ammunition was not ko^t equally divided amoiv: battalions, neccs^ sitatin/i; a rohraiilinio; which was ontirely unnecessary. A system of marking 75&ft howitzer, lmm mortar, and 75m *-nn rjnmunition with different colors of i-aint should be adopted, iftich time and effort was wasted by the necessity for sorting howitzer, rcun, and mortar amiaunition in the a r t i l l e r y position areas. 8. Transportation. The numbor.of vehicles was adequate, and a l l were? needed for handling amraunition throwchout the operation. 9 Materiol Used. The 75^^ i-aok howitzer i s much too li(~ht a weapon for the ty^c of operation oncountcroi, and every effort should have been na-io to"convert to 105mm howitzers boforo^tho operation. Ho howitzers wore rloiw^cl beyond repair by tlie enemy action; the front t r a i l of ono was damped beyond repair in landing by caroloss handling while i t was boiiy; unloaded from ^ an L M undor difficult surf conditions. C 10.
f

Training Doficioncios. (a) Additional training for forward observer teams in the ^ro^cr uso of cover i s nocdod. (b) Forward observer tosms need more indoctrination in the i-roivor mo tho d of loa^ fro,T forward from observation to observation. A system wherein the forward observer remained on his observation while the scout sergeant and two men from the wire team moved forward behind the infantry maintaining contact with the infantry and Booking new observation was finally used. Whon tho scout sor^oant found new observation ho chockod in by telephone, ox\ took over tho observation whilo tho forward observer, with his radio and the remainder of his team, movod forward. This system ^avo continuous observation, permitted tho observer to study the terrain in front of tho infantry, and search out and destroy (or noutralizo) onomy elements that could inx-odo $ho pro^ross of our infantry.

^ - 9 ?&$. Photos. (a) Tlio 1/20,000 Aorial and Qunnory Target llc^ was ao as a fir^Atf^^ap-ndii-rovod very accurate. AvCr&SQ KTs

deflection correction of loft *evon (7) ails

and a ranc-;o correction of^lus. twenty-two (22) yards
#QT thousand. !Eho?crt>atost difference "botwocn cor rections on difforont checkpoints was twonty~fivo (25)
yards in rcn^o or deflection.
("b) Iho l/lQfOQO ^hoto m % s in "booklet f o m provide! for
forward observers woro excellent* They should bo made
standard forf\xturo operations "but should "bo pecurod
with rlnfts or
our artillory* Two rounds of eneny * Bnomy action n artillery 5 ^) wore
received in t&io position area during the operation* to inatoriol.
one wounded rjid no of oiamnition o^ondituros ]>y iten; Bate 1-P-KI &-5** ^57 Total all ty^o

36
2319
5259
57-96 3262
2713
2676
.517
2S75
728!
1377
1272
5^
^6
9Y9
355
*3.
296
9
1503
Summary of araaunition expenditures by ty^-o of fire mission:
35321

Dati ration
20 62 71 39 Marl Harl-2 Har2-3 Mar3- Mart-5 Har5-o Mar6-7 rd* yield
mortars
nortars;
M r^lB
rockets
nortars
field
Close Countor-*Battery

7/ nortars 15 field 70

3 jaortars

107 nortars 'k mortars 3 rockets

Marll-U Karl2~l

rounds firod: 15. ^ffoctivencss f Artillery. (a)

35321.

The 75mn ^ c k howitzer ^rovod effective only for neutrali sation fires fcn targets of opportunity, that wore not lur, in. I t neutralized enemy machine sun and mortar fire " y b harrassin^ firos during darkness and observed fires during daylight. I t s effectiveness against ^re^arod x ositions was nc-'l

16. Tactical employment _ f enemy a r t i l l e r y . o Hat trajectory field i-ieccs were frequently employed close to the front where direct fire could bo used rvcainst our forces. Often these enemy field pieces were skillfully concealed in well camouflaged i-ositi-ons covered " y automatic weapons' fire. b They were not fired until our troops were so close to the ^iocc that our artillery could not briii--; down counter battery fire. Q scvoral occasions ,?, direct firing field ^iocc had "been, moved v* under cover of darkness and
employed in an effort to chock our attacks...
In indirect fire the onony.made -,'ood adjustments on his targets "but s t i l l frailed to mass his fires. O one occasion a forward observer re n ported observing what a^-oared to " e six (6) pieces firing in the same area b ( i t was imxossiblc to dctcmine whether i t was nortar or artillery fire)j i t is ^ossiblo that this was the fire of two y-f&xi battories massed on one area, Snony artillery or nortar firo was frequently placed on our obser C vation },osts forward observers found that the lon^ antenna of the S R 6lO attracted firo from "both artillery and mortars. 17. Ijnoiny Mat oriel. In the sector of advance of the 21st iiarinos few artillory pieces were encountered. Host of the firo received was fron artillery located in sectors of adjacent organizations. T o (2) 7 5 ^ field w Those wore the standard x.ioccs were overrun in the vicinity of liotoyama. i:9^ nountain f;^uns. A nunber of ^7nm anti-tank f'^ins wore encountorod. a?our (k) 12cn dual-irur^osc anti-aircraft ^-uns wore overrun in the vicinity of Hotoyama airfield number two. I t i s believed that onony matoriol has been buried by the cnony riid by our own cave-sealing dotails. IS. JSffoctivonoss of enemy a r t i l l e r y . Only two (2) rounds of onony rxtillory fire fell in the battalion aroa. This resulted in the wouniinr: of one man rjad no donate to natoriol. The enemy's indiroct fire was ineffective, but his direct firo ^iocos, used to slow the advance of our forces, wr^s very effective. Tho enemy obtained ^ood effect fron the ^7^m anti-tank ^un that ho employed against our tallies. Tine firo fron a twin-mount, ijOmn, hi^h velocity -~un was cn^loycd against our troox.s; i t inflicted .some casualties but the general effect was only harrasain^. The enemy's anti-aircraft and,anti-tank ^uns covered the a^i.roaches to the airfields. Effective direct fire fron both tfoOB of riuns was cnaountorcd by the 21st H^rinos when alvancinrr fron Hotoynir airfield number one to Kotoyana airfield number two. 19. I'iothods employed jt locate a r t i l l e r y targets. Host tar-cots in our zone of action were located by forward observers. Air s^ot was of l i t t l e value in locating tar;;*ots to our innodiato front. Medical. 1. Smbarlcation (a) Battalion Surgeon with six (6) cor,-anon with Headquarter and Service battery. T o (2) cor^anon with each of the w throe (3) firing batterios. Battalion aid station oar on a ono-ton trailer n >d one (l) -ton jce^ ambulance. Individual battory -voar b ono-ton trucks with respective ba

(b)

2.

Ajbbarft Shi A . ' . (a) Ho lidcnoss. (b) Sanitation <^ood in. a l l departments, (c) Ho asocial ^recautions necessary.,

3 So'frarkation. , (a) t or sound with respective batteries on J) *lus six (6) day (25 tfoTDmary 19^5). On qall. Landed 0930. (I?) I'iatorial: Pirst aid, plasma, albiunin, sick call,
stretcher, lalonkot, and 8i>lint units. Landed. 1000,
26 Po"bruary 19U5.
(c) Pour (h) stretchers l o s t . k. Ashore (Assault ^iiase not e^licaMo to this activity), (a) 25ntiro ro^iaont centrally located as was the battalion aid station. (*b) Evacuation via l^cach evacuation centers for two (2) days, ?JTterv;ards to "it" and lf 3 tt Hodical Companies. Entirely adoquato. (c) Casualties troatodi Sholl frar^iontft and sdall arms. . Bunker* Z . Betainod! 2 . Svacuatodi 6
JMlod: 0 (d) H o u t i n o , f i e l d s a n i t a t i o n moasuros e n t i r e l y adoquato. Be^alation f i e l d r a t i o n s , Gtelloy set ui> for coffoc and r i n s e water only. Kedical p e r s o n n e l , oqui^nent, and s U t i l i c s adequate,

D.J).J s^ray offectivo g a i n s t f l i c s . 5 Ashore - after conviction of assault ^haso (Sco ^rcvious notes). 6. Recommendations

Mutt

HEADQUARTERS
3d BATTALION, TWELFTH .KARIESS
3d MARIAS DIVISION, IMP, IE THE FIELD

From: To : Subject: Reference:

The Commanding Officer. T&e CSmmahding^Gffieer, Twelfth Marines. Operation an Ivro tXlwa, report of. (a) Division General Order Ho. 137.

1, In compliance with reference (a) the following report is submitted.

Part 1 Summary.
A. The period covered by this summary is from 7 2'ovember, 19^+,
when the plan of attack on Iwo Jima was first made known to the commanding
officer of the battalion, to l6 Iifcrch, 19*4-5, when this unit departed from
the island.
B. Intensive training was fsarried out by this unit in preparation
for the landing. Prior $0 embarkation, on 9 February, 19U5, all officers
had familiarized themselves vitJL all orders, photos, and maps involved in
the operation.
The mission assigned t{> the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines
was to land on call on beach t$ be designated, in general support. On
27 February, 19^5 at 1215,fchfcbattalion reconnaissance party.landed on
Beach Black. The battalion wa* assigned an area in target squares l6Up.
and 104-1, The first gun laMeft and was in position by 1500; by 10+0 this
piece had coupleted registration. Axl twelve guns in the battalion were
in position and firing by 113JD 1 March,
During the time this m & t was on Iwo Jima it was assigned re inforcing missions for the First Battalion, Twelfth '.iarinea and the
Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines as well as its originally assigned
mission of general support. Forward observers from this battalion were
temporarily assigned to the direct support battalions from time to time
in order to rotate their- forward observers on the line and also to re place their casualties.
This battalion fired 23,^31 rounds during the operation.
George and How batteries displaced to new positions in target
areas 16UG and 16UK on 5 ^arch, 19^5. This displacement started'at 0635
and was completed by 1000 of the same day. There was no other displacement
juade until reembarkation took place.
The last mission fired was on 13 March, 19^5 at 1315. The
battalion remained in position ready to fire until 15 1-arch, 19^5* At
1635 on that day all ammunition was delivered to the fourth Battalion,
Twelfth Marines and tho Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines had completed
its participation in the Ivro Jima operation. On the following day this
battalion departed from the island.
-1.

Part 11 Preliminaries.
A. Composition of reporting command. This battalion is composed
of a Headquarters and Service Battery and three firing batteries, "G-eorge11,
and "Item".
B. Preliminary planning by this battalion for the operation at Iwp
Jima began on receipt of verbal instructions from the Commanding Officer,
Twelfth Marines on November 7, 19U^. Immediately, plans were made for an
intensive training program to consist of conditioning of troops; to con tinue to improve artillery technique; to participate in Infantry-Artillery
field exercises. *
The highlights of training accomplished by the battalion were as
follows; battalion service practice of field exercises twice weekly;
participated in one field exercise with the infantry andianks; forward
observers and liaison section participated in one Infantry-Artillery field
exercise; T3articipated in two Eegimental field exercises; participated in
one Division Command Post Sxerclso. ocal security, camouflage and complete
occupation of position, were stressed.
This battalion did not participate in a rehearsal prior to the
landing on I wo Jiaa.
C. The mission assigned to the battalion was to land on call, on
beach to be designated, in general supr>ortfi Thw plan was for the Battalion
Commander and his reconnaissance party to land as soon as possible on the
designated beach and make the reconnaissance for a battalion position area.
In the mean time the remainder of the battalion wuuld go into a rendezvous
area under control of the' Battalion Executive Officer and await orders to
land. Badio communication was to-be maintained between the Battalion
Commander and Battalion Executive Officer. A complete organisation of
position was to be accomplished as soon as possible.
A thorough study of maps, photos and stereo-photos were made
of all landing beaches and likely position areas by all officers and by
noncoimnissioned officers prior to the landing.
D. This battalion was aboard ships at the outset of action on Iwo
Jima. All troops were kepf up to date on the situation and continual
study of the terrain features was conducted.
S .0 enemy forces were encountered by this battalion, in the
J. battalion position area.
Part 111 Chronological account of the action.
26 February,
At 2230, King zone time, a dispatch was receive^ aboard the
AP TTSS CALLAWAY to be prepared to land the remaining elements of the
Twelfth Marines commencing s t 0730, 27 February, 19^5. Orders were
i issued to other elements of the Third and Fourth Battalions, Twelfth
Marines to be prepared to land reconnaissance parties after 0730 o n
order and be prepared to land remaining personnel and materiel as boats
became available.

27 February, 1 9 5

At 1215 the battalion reconnaissance party landed on Beach Black

and arrived at the regimental command post at 1230. The Regimental
Executive assigned a battalion position asrga in target areas l6UH&. Pattery
positions wr:e assigned i.. this are?, and the battery commanders dispatched
:' . guides to 3ea ri Black to: guide tLe materiel and personnel to the position
area. The first piece landed a 1335 and was in Position at 1500. Regis tration was begun at 1515 on Check Points $ and $L0 by air spot and was

completed at l6U0, Prior to 1800 three (3) pieces of George Battery and
three (3) pieces of How Battery were in position ready to fire. JTo
missions other than registration were fired during the day.
28 February, 19U5
During this period the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines reinforced
the fires of the Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines* At this time the
battalion consisted of George and How Batteries and King Battery of the
Fourth Battalion were fired. Prior to 1800 all of Item Battery and an
additional piece attached to George Battery on temporary loan from the
Fourth Battalion, Twelfth r.arines wore in position and King Battery was
released to the Fourth Battalion.
1 Ifcrch,
The Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines reinforced the fires of the
Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines until 1800. Six (6) missions were fired.
At 1800 the Third Battalion was given the mission of reinforcing the fires
of the First Battalion, Twelfth Marines. The remaining two pieces arrived
in thts position area and by Jl600 the 0 ^rational set-up was complete.
Barrages were adjusted in ftfont of the NintehhMarines. How Hormal Barrage
was fired twice during thefcigit of 1-2 Msxch* Harassing fires were fired
during the night.
2 March, 19U5
The Third Battal^n, Twelfth Marines continued to reinforce the
First Battalion, Twelfth brines. Eleven (11) missions were fired during
the period. Formal barrages were adjusted in front of the Hinth Marines
but were not fired. Harassing fire was fired during the night of 2-3 :rarch.
3 March, 19U5
The Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines continued to reinforce the
First Battalion, Twelfth Karines during the period. Fourteen (lU) missions
were fired during the period. Normal and emergency barrages were adjusted
in front of theftinthbrines. Both How and Item emergency barrages ware
called for during tho night. Eaarassing fires were fired during the night
of 3 l - March.
-J k March,
Tile Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines continued to reinforce the
First Battalion, Twelfth Marines' fir^s. Twelve missions were fired during
the period. Formal and emergency barrages were adjusted in front of the
2'inth Marines. Harassing fires were fired during the night.
5 March, 9 5 George and Few Batteries displaced to new positions at Earget area l6^. George and Mike at 0635. The displacement was conrolet^d at 1000 and the battalion registered oh check point # 1 at 1225. The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged during the period. nineteen (19) missions vere fired during the period. Haurassing fires were fired during the n$ght. 6 March, 9 5
The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period. Two (2) missions were fired during the period.
7 March,
The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period. One (!) infusion was fired. Haffrapsing fires were fired
during the

S March,
The mission $f the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period, rite (5) missions were fired and harassing fire was
fired during the night* Two of these missions were fired for the fourth
Division.
9 Karch,
The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period. Five (5) missions were fired. Harassing fires were
fired during the night. One mission was fired for the Fourth Division.
10 torch,
The mission of the Third Battali6n, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period, F$ve ($) missions were fired during the period. Har assing fires were fired during the night. Three of these missions were
for the Fourth Division and two for the Fifth Division.
11 March,
The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period. Five (5) missions were fired during the period. Har assing fires were fired during the night*
12 March,
The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period, jtwo (2) missions were fired for the Fifth Division.
Harassing fires were fired during tho night.
13 March,
The mission of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period. Two (2) missions were fired for the Fifth Division.

Ik March, 9 5 The iid8 si on. of %he Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged during the p^ridd. l?o missions were fired.

15 March,
The mission of tha Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the period. No missions were fired. The battalion was ordered to
secure at 1300 and deliver flll ammunition to the Fourth Battalion, Twelfth
Marines and embark the next day with all personnel and materiel aboard the

s.s. sm

Part IV Comments. A. Administration. 1. Casualties. Wounded in action. Killed in action. One (l) officer and seven (7) enlisted. Fone

2. The morale of this unit is excellent. (The rapid delivery of

incoming mail and the expediting of censorship Sni forwarding of outgoing
mail during the operation was a great factor in maintaining an excellent
state of morale. The establishment of a "battalion galley and the serving
of hot meals as early after arrival on the "beach as possible further aided
in maintaining an excellent state of morale.
B. Artillery.
1. The loading of this battalion was satisfactory. 2ach firing
"battery was loaded with the infantry "battalion they normally supported.
Headquarters and Service Battery was divided into two sections which were
loaded with two of the firing "batteries.
2. Landing of the battalion was made under difficult conditions.
The Battalion Comir&nder and his party had to "hitch-hike" from the shit) to
the beach in order to make the reconnaissance for the battalion position
area. One battery reconnaissance party had to wait and land with the
battery because no boats were available, The landing of vehicles and guns
was very slow due to the fact the number of boats available were not prop erly allocated to the ships and also surf conditions were bad, necessitating
use of LSTs, LSMs and XCTs. The S-J+ and Battalion Motor Transport Officer
with guides remained on the beach until all equipment had been landed, and
was reported present in the "battalion position area. Ho equipment was lost
in the landing.
3. Survey for th operation was simple. How and Item Battery
positions were located by very short traverse from George Battery, George
Battery was located by Regiuentp.1 survey prior to the arrival of the
battalion survey team. Separate orientation lines were located for each
battery.
h. Fire adjustments were by airspots and forward observers. All
base point and check point adjustments were by airs^ot, however this was
not to satisfactory due to the difficulty in identification of the correct
target by the air observer, on th.e ground. In most cases adjustments were
slow due to the altitude at which the observer had to fly in order to re main out of range of anti-aircraft fire. Good observation posts were not
to be found in most cases until the latter phases.
5. Fire direction procedure as taught at Fort Sill and Marine
Corps Schools was used by this battalion and found adequate for the operation.
^% Organization for combat and tactical employment. This battalion
was organized for either 'direct support or general sup >ort. The operation
order called for this battalion to go into general support initially because
the Tliird Marines were Hi reserve. Tactical employment for this battalion
was to reinforce the fi*e$ of the First Battalion. However, general support
missions were fired frequently. Forward observer teams were furnished to
the First and Second Pattalions, to replace casualties and orovide relief
for those teams. *
7. Liaison vfts maintained by a direct telephone line from the
Fire Direction Center pf this battalion to the Fire.Direction Center of the
supported battalion, this system of liaison was satisfactory.

8 Communications. The S.C.E. 6lO radio is undesirable for for ward observers because of its bulk. Khen carried by two men (two man load)
the use of the radio is impaired. When carried on a pack-board (one man
load) it is practically impossible for the radio operator to keep up with
the forward observer for any distance at more than a walk. The set is
excellent so far as operation and oerformance is concerned. The S.C.fc,
300, which was used at Guam, proved to be the ideal forward observer set
considering mobility as well as performance. A minimum of three (3) fire
direction channels for forward observers is desirable* One frequency does
not permit simultaneous shooting by radio.
The S.C.l, 60S was used for air ground communications and was
satisfactory.
9* Observation.was by airspot and forward observers. This bat talion was not called on to establish an observation post.
10. Personnel. This battalion brought forward a total of thirty-
four (3) officers and four hundred and fifty-one (U5D enlisted for the
operation. These figures represent a table of organization strength of
99$& officers and 89$ enlisted, which includes two (2) officers on temporary
detached duty with the fleet, (airspot) and five (5) enlisted personnel
temporarily attached to this battalion.
This organization suffered a total of eight (8) casualties,
consisting of one (l) officer and seven (7) enlisted, wounded in action.
Morale of troops enroute and in action was excellent. The
setting up of batteries galleys as early as possible and preparation and
serving of hot chow was a great factor in establishing and maintaining
excellent morale. The morale of troops was further retained in an excellent
state by the speedy delivery of incoming mail and censorship of outgoing
mail, both by the most expeditious methods, throughout the operation.
The Battalion Commander made frequent visits to each battery and talked to
each section about the situation andthe effect of the artillery. The S-2
periodically gave information to the Battery 3-xecutive Officer vrho passed
it on to the cannoneers.
Personnel was adequate to achieve the mission assigned to the
battalion,, however, if the battalion had been placed in direct support
there would have been a serious shortage of personnel. Personnel normally
used for maintaining infantry artillery comrmini cat ions, liaison etc., were
used to augment ammunition sections.
11. Ammunition supply was good throughout the entire operation
and there was no delay in getting the ammunition from the beach to the
position area. On several occasions this battalion was ordered to de liver ammunition to other division artillery regiments which made it
apoear that control on the beach was not as efficient as it should have
"been. This requires double handling by ammunition sections and should be
avoided. If this must be done, at least the organization receiving the
ammunition should do its own handling.
y transportation was adequate for the operation although
only about ho% of the battalions vehicles were carried into combat. IMO
vehicles were uriservicseblr for a period of longer than twenty-four hours.
The 6x6 dump truck, which was used as a prime-mover, wae not
very satisfactory on the sandy terrain encountered at Iwo Jima. The small
bed limits the amount of ammunition that can be hauled. By replacing the
small tires on this truck with a larger balloon type tire, it is believed
the performance '"ill be much improved in eand.

The T.D.-9 bulldozer is not heavy enough for the work required
in a 105 howitzer battalion, A T.D.-lU or T.D.-18 would be much more
satisfactory,
13. The. materiel used by the battal ion was in excellent condition
before entering combat and was still in excellent condition at the end of the
operation. Minor repairs had to be made on the guns which battalion ordnance
rectified in a very short time. Care and upkeep of all materiel was stressed
daily and checked by the battery and ordnance personnel. The sling for the
105 howitzer was satisfactory except when adjusted by the ships crew* Unless
care was taken the on-carriage range quadrant was damaged. The gun crews
should do all the necessary adjustment's of these slings and thespreader bar
should be two inches longer to reduce this difficulty,
lU, Training deficiencies, Jor the mission assigned; none,
15 Maps and photos were supplied to this battalion in sufficient
quantity to fulfill our mission. However, to function properly as a direct .^^
support battalion at least Id more 1:20,000 maps and 5 more 1:10,000 photo
booklets would have been needed, 1:20,000 maps and seven 1:10,000 photo book lets were furnished the battalion. The photo booklet was found exceptionally
will suited for the forward observer and should be used for all future
operations.
The 1:20,000 map was used for the firing chart and was satis factory. The corrections for the map were fairly constant range U K" of-f55
yards per 100 and def&iction "KIf of about left 10 mils.
^* Enemy action against our artillery, None.

17# Supply of all commodities was good on the operation, The new
"C" ration proved a very satisfactory variety, especially when it was suplement ed by fruits and juices. With the addition of enough lard for doughnuts and
pastries, the menu would have been as complete as possible under combat opera tions. At least one cabinet range per battery should be carried,
18. Summary of ammunition expenditures by item, Date 27 FeSJ+51 28 Feb '1+5' 1 Mar 1+5' 2 Mar 1+51 3 Mar 1+5' k Mar 1+5' 5 Mar 1+5 6 Mar 1+51 7 Mar U5 1 8 Mar-1+5' 9 Mar 1+51 10 Mar 1+5f 11 Mar 1+5 12 Mar U5 1 3 Mar 1+5' 19. M-l+8 23 U67 1318 1300 760 679 120U Ul+9 1807 89*+ 338 lUOl I&+7 ;+!+ 209 M-5*+ IO67 1200 1+19 6ll+ 57U 108U 299 12W+ 862 >+3 1^33 206 196 1-3+ M-57 2 6 150 127 267 223 7I+ 77 20 17 8 115 8 3 5 M-62 Total all types
25
221+0
2668
18U6
161+1
IU76
2U29
863
3080
1773
689
31^9
66l
-9+3
3^+8

67 38 9

Summary of ammunition expended by type of fire mission.

19. Fire missions by typesoof mission.

(Note: Date indicates time period from 1800 - 1800 e.g., 26 Feb indicates
time period from 1800, 26 Feb to 1800, 27 Feb.)
Date Regist ration Prep

Haras. Close Mission Supt.

General Supt.

Counter Battery
Missions

26 Feb 27 Feb 28 Feb 1 Har 2 Mar ^ Mar U Max 3 Mar 6 Mar

7 Mar 8 Mar 9 Mar 10 Mar 11 Mar 12 Mar 13 Mar lU Mar

25

15 15

1557 27UL, 2379

827

609
20^

29
116 106
88

30
55^

285
328
226
328
90

111

77 99
181

93
172

989 63

23
2707

372 365
292

902
72 19
1. " 111 0* 1028

7
6U5

30

5^7 375 735

k2k

110

T.
T.

R.

R.

20* Effectiveness of artillery for the operation was poc

ing the number of rounds expended on the number of targets. The nature of the
majority of the targets fired were such that the 105 had- very little
destructive value, however, it is believed that excellent results were received
from a standpoint of neutralization and morale factors, (See Part 5, Para A ) .
21.
22

Tactical employment of enemy artillery, No comment,

No comment,

* ffypes f materiel used by enemy artillery.

23.

Effectiveness o enemy artillery. No comments.

2k. Methods used j locate artillery targets were forward observers,

airspots, and the use of do-dar which was operated by higher echelon.
C. Medical
1, Embarkation,

a. Personnel consisted of the Battalion Surgeon and 11 corpsmen.

The corpsmen were divided among the batteries and were aboard k ships.
Personnel embarked on 10 February,
b. Material consisted of Units 5A, 6, 8, 9, 11A, Pharmacy box,
Plasma, and water on a jeep ambulance; Units 5B, 6, 7 3 10, 11B, lU, 10 day
supplies, Plasma, tent and net,
2 Aboard Ship,

a. Sanitary consitions aboard ship were satisfactory. Ho

special precautions were necessary, A few recurrent malaria cases occurred,
required evacuation. Qifa CABB dk Spontaneous Pneumothorax was evacuated.

-g-.

Bebarka,'

3. Debarkation,
a. Personnel^

(1) On c a U .
(2) Landed on 2? February and proceeded to a previously-
assigned area. 20 men, one corpsman and 2 vehicles to a "boat. Personne 1
debarked in LCM 1 S and LSM'S, One corpsman was injured while descending cargo
net, evacuated.
(3) Materiel: Both vehi&les came ashore on 28 February in
good condition. Ho supplies were lost or pilfered.
U, Ashore,
This battalion was not in the assault phase.
a. Battalion &id station was set up on 28 February, centrally
located in close proximity to a road, A small aid station and 3 corpsmen .
were assigned to each firing battery, A pyrdmidal tent was dug in and sand
bagged and blacked out at night. It was covered by a camouflage net,
b. No patients were hospitalized in the aid station.
c. Evacuation.was accomplished by ambulance to "Ef! Medical
Company, 3d Medical Battalion. It was rapid and efficient.
d. Casualties;B treated,
1. Number: (8)

(a) Retained; (5)

(b) Bracuated: (3)
(c) Died: 2. Type? (0)

6 shell fragment and 2 gunshot wounds,

(6)

3. Walking wounded:

k. Stretcher cases: (2)

e. Sanitation was excellent. Flies were at a minimum,
Dichloro-diphenyl-prichloroethane (DDT) was effective in spraying the island,
(l) Regular field rations were adequate and the new type
ration was an improvement. Water was obtained from the Division tfgcte,r Point*
f. There were no epidemics, no cases of gastro-enteritis,

g. The medical organization of the battalion was adequate and

functioned efficiently. h. Medical, supplies were adequate. However, there was a shout-
age of mediaal Brandy.
5, Recommendations: No changes are deemed necessary in the m
organization of this battalion.
Part V Conclusions a$d recommendations.
A, Conclusions,
1, Violation of recognized artillery massed fire principles,
a. On many occassions, preparations were fired by this unit ^
which each was fired on a differeat target area, over a relatively long p
of time {15 to 2O ninutea), at a slow rate of fire (2 to 3 rounds per g&h

Part V.
A* 1. a. Cont'd.
This is a violation of a well established artillery principle of volume and
mass of< fire. Such, artillery supporting fires should employ the maximum rate
of fire, the maximum number of guns, all massed on a specific target or area.
Then, the mass of fire nay be shifted successively to each target in its
relative importance to the scheme of maneuver of the supported troops. This
may mean concentrated fire support in one infantry battalion or regiment's
zone of action, to further its own attack, and no fire support or subsequent
support in another zone. However, it will produce the maximum effect of
destruction, neutralization, shock and mprale effect on that particular target.
The two effects may be likened to wounding a man in many places lightly with a
"scatter" shotgun, or hitting him squarely in the chest and killing him, with
a full choke shotgun.
2, Organization for combat.

a. At times, some doubt existed in this unit as to exactly what

our mission was. That is, whether we were in general support or in a re enforcing mission, subject to fire direction by another battalion. b. Relief forward observer teams were called for directly by
other artillery battalions, ra&her than at the direction of a higher coord inating agency, the artillery regiment.
3. The largest field piece used against the enemy was millimeter howitzer of V Corps Artillery. It is believed that field piece with more weight of projectile and higher terminal is necessary to breach and destroy the types of fortifications at Iwo Jima.
B. Eecommendations.
1. It is recommended that artillery fire be placed on the enemy by
the massing of all possible fires, for shorter periods of time and at higher
rates of fire, in one area, and, if necessary shifting to other areas in
succession, rather than"scattering" artillery fire across a wide and deep
area, at a slow rate of fire. That is particularly applicable where enemy
troops are not in the open, and effect of light artillery fire must be shock
and morale effect produced by mass and volume, rather than physical destruci
tion,
2. It is recommended that specific missions and time extent of same
be assigned by artillery regiments to battalions not in direct support, and,
that forward observer teams of artillery battalions not in direct sup-oort
be employed under the direction of the artillery regiment, and not by
agreement between two or three battalion commanders.
3. It is recommended that, wherever Japanese fortifications of the
type encountered at Iwo Jima must be breached rather than by-passed, field
nieces of suitable striking power be included in the landing force. The 8 inch Howitzer, 8-inch Gain, or $4-0 millimeter Howitzer should be considered
for specific tasks. This does not constitute a recommendation that this
type of weapon be adopted as organic artillery, but.only where it is known
ahead of time that heavy fortifications must be destroyed or rendered in operative by large caliber weapons with heavy hitting power.
the 155
a larger
velocity
encountered

A. 1. B0W53R, Jr.

-10

nt 12thMar, 3dMarDiv,
o FPO, San Francisco.
k. April,

From: To: Subject; Reference: I*

The Commanding Officer.

The Commanding Officer, ,12th Marines.
Action Seport, I wo Jima operation.
(a) Division General Ordgr #137.

Summary
A. The Uth Battalion, 12th Marines, on 22 January, 19**5t re ceived the operation order for I wo Jima. The operation was completed on 1
3, ' The ^th Battalion, 12th Marines was assigned the mission
of a general suppprt artillery battalion for the 3 d Marine Division. The Uth
Battalion was embarked as part of the 3& Embarkation G-roup, Transport Division
33, on 10 February, 19*+5, The battalion debarked at Iwo Jima at 1130 on 27
February1 19ty? *e battalion position area was selected immediately and reg istration was completed by 1715* On 28 February, 19^5 twelve howitzers were
ashore and firing as general support for the 3& Marine^ Division. On 28 Febnt*
ary, X9^5 tlie battalion was. assigned the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bat talion, 12th Marines, Daring the operation this battalion expended 23,^13
rounds.
II* A. Preliminaries
Composition (1) H($Serv (2) Battery (3) Battery W Battery of command* .
Battery, 105nun howitzer battalion,
n n |C , 105mm howitzer battalion,
"Ln, 105mm howitzer battalion,
"M11, 105mm howitzer battalion.

B. The training program for the ^th Battalion, 12th Marines was
planned by the .battalion and higher echelon so that the necessary training for
combat was accomplished. This included:
(1) Two regimental firing problems.
(2) Two"battalion firing problems per week.
(3) One division command post exercise,
(4) Three conditioning marches of five, seven, and ten miles.
(5) Instruction of communication personnel on newly acquired
SCft-6lO and SCB-6O8 radios.
(S) Preparation of unit personnel and tonnage tables,
(7) Indoctrination of essential personnel on pending'oper ation of Iwo Jima.
(S) practice combat loading of vehicles until desired loa ding was attained.
(9) Instruction.on and waterproofing of vehicles and radios.
C. - The mission of the h%h Battalion, 12th Marines was to land
on call on a beach to be designated, in general support of the 3& Marine Di vision.
D. _ On call from the 12th Marine Hegimont it was planned to land
two reconnaissance parties, either of which was_capable of executing a complete
reconnaissance mission. This included setting up the J^jsJDirection Center,

I wo Jima Operation (continued)

survey and communications for. the "battalion* These two reconnaissance parties
were embarked pn different ships. Radio communication was to be established
"between reconnaissance parties and the firing batteries upon entrance into the
transport area. It was planned that the firing batteries would land on call
by the battalion commander and be met at the beach by guides who would conduct
them to surveyed positions. Registration was to be completed by air spot on
request to regiment. The firing batteries were to land with fifty rounds per
gun in the prime movers' and ammunition was to be built and maintained at two
units of fire,
*** Chronological account of the action (time zone King-10)

26 February, 19U5
2300 - The Battalion Commander of the Uth Battalion, 12th Marines received a
copy of the order to Transport Division 33 which stated that Transport
Division 33 w as to be prepared to debark all elements of the 12th K
rines on order after O73O on #7 February, 19^5
27 February, 19U5
Heavy seas made it impossible to use LCVPs, and only ICMs could be used
to land the battalion,
OS3O Radio communication was established with regiment and with, all units of
* the Uth Battalion.
1130 - The Battalion Commander and his reconnaissance party, accompanied by
the battery commanders and their reconnaissance parties, landed on
beach black and were met at the Shore Party Cornmand. Post by a regimen tal guide, The party was directed to the Regimental Command Post,
The Executive Officer f the 12th Marines then showed the Battalion
Commander his position area in which survey control had been establish
ed by the regimental survey section.
135*3 - King Battery reported two howitzers in position ready to fire,
I5U5 - Air spot began registration.
1715 r Registration complete on three check points.
23OO - King Battery reported remainder of howitzers in position ready to fire.
No fire missions were assigned the battalion for the night. Ammunition
was hauled all night and 1000 rounds were brought in. Also 5^0 rounds
werG hauled to the 13th Marines, 5th Marine Division,
Throughout the day enemy shells fell in the area. The fir was spor adic and no.damage was done,
.Mike and Love Batteries were unable to land, There was a high surf
;> which made it impossible to use LCVPs and sufficient LCHs wore not
available. Radio communication was maintained between battalion and
Mike and Love Batteries, , .
At the end of the day the battalion had the following equipment ashore?
U Howitzers, 105mm U Truck, 2^-ton, 6x6, dump 1 Tractor, Tfr*9, w/ad Truck, ^-ton, radio 3 Truck, l~ton* cargo t 1 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, 3^0 gallon, water . 2 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, cargo 1 Trailer, -J^ton, 2-wheel, cargo 28 February, g y Tire missions were assigned this battalion by the 3& 3attalion, 12th
,'Marines until 1300, .
0715 - King Battery fired preparation reinforcing the fires of the 2d Battalion,
12th Marines for an attack by the 3& Marino Division, 7^9 rounds were
expended.
1200 - King Battery fired preparation for an attack by the 3& Marino Division.
196 rounds were expended.

f l

- 2

rt, Iwo Jima Operation

(continued)

1300 - 2Jhe Battalion took over its own fire direction and was assigned the
mission of reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines,
- One howitzer was loaned to the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines to complete .
one of their batteries.,
1500 - King Battery fired a preparation in support of* an attack "by the 3d Ma rine Division, 217 rounds were expended,
1710 - Love Battery reported in position ready to fire.
1800 - Ammunition on hand 12^2 rounds* 12C2 rounds expended.
IS30 - Mike Battery reported in position ready to fire.
1915 - Four rocket "bombs fell in front of position. There was no damage.
2100-2U00 - Battalion fired harassing fire. *
Organization of the battalion position was completed "by the end of the
day.
1 March, 9^
0000^0600 i Harassing fire by battalion. From 2100 to 0600, 100 rounds expended.
0700 - Registered Love Battery on Check Point 10 by air spot; "Registration com pleted at O726, 19 rounds oxpendod.
0731 ~ Registered Mike Battery on Check Point 10 by air spot. Registration com pleted at 0750 ^ rounds expended,
0820 - Battalion fired preparation for 3& Marine Division, Preparation com pleted at 05591 II3U ro'unds expendod.
O925 . Battalion assigned harassing fires. Harassing fires completed at
2V7 rounds expended.
102S - On assignment by B~3 fired on enemy mortars in TA 23^-U. Mission com pleted at 1O33 26 rounds expensed.
- Fire, mission. Concentration 70*2, enemy mortars in TA 21S-G- and H, fired
battalion. Mission completed at 10U6 60 rounds expended,
1130 - Ammunition on hand U672 rounds. 160S rounds expended.
1223 - Battalion fired preparation in TA 217-C. Preparation completed at 1255*
571 rounds expanded.
1305 - Battalion fired harassing fire in $& 2 3 M L Harassing fire completed aV v
1^30 52 rounds expended* I6U5 ~ Battalion fired preparation in 235-W* Xi and fy. preparation completed
at 1600. ^36 rounds expended,
3-T55 * .Tow enemy shells landed in area. Estimated to be 75 caliber, No damage*
1800 - Ammunition on hand ^-197 rounds, 3U97 rounds expended.
18*4-0 -.Battalion fired harassing fire in A 21S-3 and G on Concentrations
and 70^. Harassing fire completed at 1900* IZk rounds expended.
19Q0 - Han direct wire to 2d.Battalion, 12th l.'arines.
1910 - Registered King Battery on normal barrage in TA 21S-I. Registration
Completed at 1915* 16 rounds cccponded.
1920-2U00 - Mike- Battpry fired harnssing fires in !CA 210-D, H, O, and K.
2 Mar chj
0000-0600 - Harassing fires. 160 rounds expended, \
O1H5 - Fire mission assigned by 2d Bat^lion, 12th Marines, Enemy tanks In TA
2l9-L(Ff). Mission completed at 0153. 171 rounds oxpended.
O75O - Battalion fired on preparation in U?A 21S-0, H, and C at maximum rate of
fire. Preparation completed at.0Sl5. 1073 rotoids expended,
.0905 - Harassing fire Love Battery on 3?A 2^.S-D* Harassing fire completed at
10*47, 9^ rounds expended* .
Harassing fire King Battery on 93A 235-U. Harassing fire completed at IO56
S2 rounds expended. ' v
- Iove Battery fired on enemy mortars in 5?A 218-0. Mission compile ted'at
1050. 39 rounds expended.
1050 - Battalion fired on enemy field pieces in TA 235-X, S, and '-fm Mission
completed at 1110, 3^ rounds expended.
1200 - Battalion fired on entrenched enemy in TA 219-rP Mission was not com / pleted and battalion was shifted to another mission, k rounds expended.

ort, Ivro Jima Opcraton

(continued)

1230 - Battalion fired on enemy artillery pieces in TA 235~tf Mission com-*

" pleted at 12^7# fO rounds expended,
I323 - Battalion fired'harassing fire in TA 219~(r. Harassing fire completed
at 1325* 67 rounds expended, .
I3U0 - Battalion fired on rocket launchers. Mission completed at IU07. 32
rounds expended.
- Battalion fired preparation in TA 21.9-P,tf,anV. Preparationcom pleted at IU5U, gHUrounds expended.
1500 Howitzer, loaned to 3& Battalion, 12th Marines i*as returned,
* I615- Three enemy artillery shells landed on right flank of position, Ho
damage.
1800 - Ammunition on hand 3055 rounds* 2902 rounds expended.
190^ - Registered King Battery onnormal "barrage in HA 235~P. Registration
completed at 193^* 3 5 rounds expended,
1935 - Registered King Battery on emergency "barrage in TA 23^-R. Registration
completed at 1937 7 rounds expended.
1938 - Registered Love Battery on normal barrage in TA 235-R. ,Registration
j completed at 2002. j> rounds expended.
2003 ~ Registered love Battery on emergency "barrage inTA 235-X. Registration
completed at 2008. 5 rounds expended.
2009 - Registered Hike Battery on normal "barrage in TA 218-3), Registration
complete^ at 2010, 5 rounds expended.
2127 - H a s h Red.
2151 - Plash t M t e .
2210-2^00 - Harassing fires in TA 235-P, TA 21S-II, "by King andMike Batteries,
3 March, 0000-0600 - Harassing fire. !+5 rounds, smoke, expended,
0215 ~ lipvo Battery fired on enemy mortars mounted on -tank in TA 35
\' * .Mission completed at 0220, 7^rounds expended. Forward observers
later observed tanks had"been destroyed,
0227 r Wikb Battery.fifod on enemy mortars in TA 21S-D, Mission completed at
0232. 23 rounds expended,
02^+5 * Love Battery fired on enemy mortars in TA 235^^ (S). Mission completed,
* at'0259* 7^ rounds expended. 0259 ^ King Battery fired on enemy mortars in TA 235~? Mission complct6d at
O315.. 20 rounds expended.
0300 - IfQVe Battery fired on encny field piece inTA 235^^ (S). Missioncom pleted at 0312, 7^- rounds depended.
03IS - King Battery fired on enemy mortars in TA 23M? (KB). Mission completed
' . ,
at O33O, 6 rounds expended, 0U05 - Love Battery fired.on encny. mortars in TA 235-X (S), Mission completed
at 0^15. 7 7 rounds expended,
0^+05 - Mike Battery fired on enemy mortars in TA 21S-D. Mission completed at
0^15* 2^ rounds expended.
O63O - Battalion fired preparation on TA 21S~S# T, and M. Preparation com> pletcd at O7^5 933rounds expended,
O&55 * Love Battery fired at enemy field piece in TA 23^-R. Mission completed
at P9O0, 26 rounds/expended. 0855 - King Battery fired harassing fire in TA 235-*R and Q, Mission completed
at O926. HU rounds expended,
1010 - Radio operator on Love Battery forward observation team "badly wounded
and evacuated.
1010 - Love Battery fired on enemy field pieco. Mission comnletod at 1015.
' ' .
Z rounds, smoke, expend6cL 1029 - Love 3attcry fired on enemy counter-attack in TA 235-P (^ Mission
completed, 119rounds expended.
I33O - OnemanLove Battery forward observation team seriously wounded and
evacuated.
- Battalion fired preparation in TA 219-K, P, andT* preparation completed
at 1500, 25Orounds e'xpended.

, -A

ort, IwoCTima Operation (continued)

1S00 - Ammunition on hand 2l6l rounds. 1^62 round? expended.
IS30 - A sergeant on King Battery forward observation team was injured
slightly.
1923*2^00 - Battalion fired harassing fire in TA 219-P and IT.
Love Battery furnished a nine manforward observation team to the 2d
Battalion, 12th Marines as a relief team.
k March,
OOOO-06OO - Harassing fire. 137rounds expended*
02^6 - Battalion fired at rocket launchers in TA 235-1, Mission completed
at O2J5O. 50 rounds expended. .
. 0S15. .- Sergeant on King Battery forv/ard observation team wounded ajid evacua * ted. Another man slightly'wounded.
1130 - Battalion fired preparation in TA 202-A, TA 219-U and P. Preparation
completed at 1200. 10^1 rounds expended.
1230 - Battalion fired preparation in TA 219-U, V andty.Preparation completed
at 125S, U^9rounds expended,
1320 - Forward observation party returning in truck hit landmine. Only minor
injuries.
1620 - Battalion fired harassing fire in TA 219-^, P, andR, Mission completed
at 1700. k2krounds expended.
1S00 - Ammunition on hand 2719 rounds, 23^0 rounds expended.
1S00 - Love Battery fired normal "barrage in TA 235-5, S, andW. Barragecom pleted at 1S01. 6 rounds expended.
- King andMike Batteries fired harassing firo in TA-219-U,
During the daytwo forward observer teams were sent forward from Mike and King Batteries to relieve our other forward observers.
5 March, ^
0000-0600 - Harassing fire, 322rounds expended,
0120 ~ Love^'Battery fired normal barrage in TA 235-T (SW), Mission completed
at 0125-. S round s expended,
O915 - Battalion fired on TA 219-W. Mission completed at 095^, 23 rounds
expended,
1220 - A field piece located in TA 21STO, "
1237 - King Battery fired on enemy field piece in TA 218-0, Mission completed
at 1320. 22 rounds expended*
12^5 - Love Battery fired on enemy field piece in TA 21S-0 (8). Missioncom pleted at lU^O. 37 rounds expended. ,
1H20 - Mike Battery fired harassing fire in TA.219-U, Mission completed at
* 1^5- 7 rounds expended.
lkk$ - King Battery registered on Check oint 12 in TA 219-W, Registration
completed at 1500, 9' rounds expended,
1700 - Battalion registered in TA_ 219-P. Registration completed at 1715. 15 rounds expended.
1720 - Battalion registered in-TA 219-0. Registration completed at 1755*
3 rounds expended,
1S00 - Ammunition on hand kOSk. 567rounds expended.'
Ical5 - Love Battery registered normal barrage in TA 21S-T. Registrationcom ; pleted at IS30, 13 rounds expended. " i :(
IS30 - Mike Battery registered on normal barrage in TA 21>-K (Stf). Registration
.
completed at 1S55 9 rounds expended. 1915 / King Battery registered forharassing fire in TA 219-U. Registration
completed at 192O. 19- rounds expended,
1920 - liove andMike Batteries fired on rockets in TA 21S-T. Mission completed
at 1955* ^3 rounds expended.
2O3O-2UOO - King andLove Batteries'fired harassing fire on TA 219-U ("0),
. ' '
TA 21S-T .{m) andTA 21S-P. , During the *day Love Battery forward observer t earn relieved by new
forward observer team.
6 March, . 3

OOOO-O6OO - Harassing f i r e . 3S2 rounds expended.

ort, Iwo Jima Operation

(continued)

0800 - Battalion fired preparation in $A Zl^V* "S IV < , and/wV Preparation 4 completed at 093^* 17.^2 rounds .expended, . " O H King Battery fired harassing f i r e in IA 219-T (W) # -Harassing f i r e 9O completed at- I3U0*. 513rounds expended; * 1030 - Love Battery fired on enemy field piece in IA 2lS-! (SB). Mission com-* pleted at lO^S. k13 rounds expended* 1050 - love Battery ired on enemy activity in 5A 219-K ( $ 0 Mission-completed at 11Q5 22 rounds escpended, H30 ~ Mike Battery registered on Check Point 12 using high angle fire in TA 219^ kegistration completed at 1230. 13 rounds expended-. A IUI40 - Battalion fired preparation in $ A, 219-L (tf), E 219-P (B), and $A 219-7 00., preparation Completed at 1*4*? 33^ rounds expended. 1515 - King i a t t e r y fired harassing f i r e ' i n 5A 219^7 and tf. Harassing fire ? completed at 1533* 72 rounds- expended^ A 1600 - Mike Battery registered on Check Point 12 in T 219~TJ# Registration completed at l658 25 rounds expended, - l60b - Love Battery fired on enemy mortars in $A 219-P ( ^ ) using high angle fire.. Mission, completed at 1630, 23 rounds expended. 1655 - Love Battery fired on mortars in I A 219-(it Mission completed at 165S. ' S 3 .rounds expended, 1706 - King Battery fire4 harassing fire in TA 219-TT (iTlf).^ Harassing fire com pleted at 1710* U rounds expended, 1800 - Love Battery registered, normal "barrage in tA 21&-E (SB). Registration completed at 1330. IS rounds expended 1O0 Ammunition on hand kO"J%m 2227 rounds expended, ^ I8 -^ Mike Battery registered normal "barrage in TA 21?rP (It). Hegistration completed at 1846# 7. rounds expended. - King Battery registered normal "barrage in T& 218~C ' Eeg^stration conw pleted at 195^. 17 rounds expended. During the day Mike Battery relieved forward o"bseryer teams with now teams. * - . ' , ' . ' 0010 - King Battery fired harassing fire in UA 219-L ( ^ . Harassing fire com pleted at 0012, 12 rounds expended, 1800-Ammunition on hand U277 rounds, 5^ rounds expended. 1800 * Love Battery registered normal "barrage in TA 219r^# Registration coin ploted at 1820. 11 rounds expended 1820 Mike Battery registered on normal "barrage in HA ?1.9*L ? tration completed at 1830* 29 rounds expended, I83O King Battery registorcd on normal "barrage in T 219-F. Registration A completed at 18H0. Uo rounds expended, 1900 - King Battery registered emergency "barrage in $A 219-3P ( W ) , Segis* tration completed at 193O 5 rounds.expended. SO0-2l*00- Mike Battery fired harassing fire in EA 2J6-W, Til 219-CT, H, and S# 8 March> 3 - Harassing fire, '297 rounds expended, w
07^0 -Battalion fired preparation in tDA 219-I*i R and V, Preparation com pleted at 0800. 69O rounds expended,
O83O - King Sattcry registcited "by air spot on Check Point 12 in. TA 219-W with
high angle fire. Registration completed at lOOQ* 2k rounds expended,
1100 - Love Battery registered "by air spot on Chock Point 12, Registration
completed at 1222, 12rounds1 expended, .
1300 - King Battery fired on enemy mortars in $A 21SMT, Mission completed at
13O5, "US rounds expendpd. '
1321 King Battery fired on enemy mortars inTA 219-H, Mission completed at
1325, 12 rounds expended,
- Battalion fired on enemy mortars in TA 219-D. Mission completed at
1^30, 73 rounds expended, ,
^ ^ w o men were killed and one wounded on Mike Battery forward observation
team.
1500 - Love Battery fired on suspect rocket launcher on Kama Rock. Mission completed at 153^* 20 rounds expended,
- - b

ort, Iwo Jima Operation (continued)

17^3 - love Battery registered on normal "barrage in TA 219~B (S), Regis tration completed at I9U8. 6S rounds expended,
1800 Ammunition on hand 2393 rounds. 12U5 rounds expended.
X95S --Mike Battery registered on normal "barrage in TA 219-3 (S), Regis tration completed at ^SllO. h rounds expended,
2030 - Battalion fired on enemy rockets in TA 219-S, Mission completed at
20^5. ^0 rounds expended.
2656 . King Battery registered on normal "barrage in TA 219-V (B), Regis tration completed at 2100. 2k rounds expended.
- King and love Batteries fired harassing fire in TA 219~S, C, and

. H. ' '

- King and love Batteries report rockets falling in are#. Ho damage as

rockets did not explode.
During the day love Battery forward observation team was relieved "by
2d Battalion, 12th Marines.
9 March,
0000-0600 - Harassing f i r e . 227 rounds expended,
OHIO - Slash Red.
0^56 ~ Hash Blue* Condition reen.
0510 ' Hash ^ i t e ,
* O7OO- Battalion fired preparation in TA 236-U, TA 219-G- and 3. Preparation
completed at 0710. 33^ rounds expended.
O736 - Battalion fired on rocket in TA 219-0. Mission completed at 0807. 33I4.
rounds expended.
09^5 - Message from love Battery, 'five rocket "bombs which fell in area at
contained no explosive; just firing mechanism,
1125 - love Battery fired on rocket in T*i 219-'^. Mission completed at
63 rounds expended.
1330 - King Battery fired on enemy mortars in Til 21S-T (3). Mission completed
at 13^0. 73 rounds cxpended,
l'33O - Mike Battery fired on enemy mortars in TA 236-I. Mission completed at
13^0. 58 rounds expended,
llfOO - King Battery fired on enemy mortars in TA 219-2) and B, Hission com pleted at 1U3O. 28 rounds expended.
lUOO . love Battery fired harassing fire TA 236-A. Harassing fire completed
at 1S00, Ul2 rounds expended.
1^15 - Mike Battery fired harassing fire in TA ?51WP. Harassing fire com- ' pleted at 1500. .U rounds expended.
IU30 - Mike Battery registered in TA 219-0. Registration completed at 1500.
26 rounds expended.
I63O - Mike Battery registered on normal "barrage in TA 219-0. Registration
completed at 1700, 10 rounds expended,
1702 Mike Battory registered on emergency "barrp.ge in TA vjG-'U* Registration
completed at 1717* 7 rounds expended.
1730 - King'Battery registered on normal "barrage in TA 2^6-X (S^O, Registra tion completed at .I7U5. 13 rounds expended.
1S00 - Ammunition on hand 2926 rounds. 1252 rounds expended.
1SOO-*2UQO - Battalion fired harassing fire in TA 219-D, Tii 235-?, TA 236-A, 0,
1, U t -W and X. . ' . . " . ' ' " '
Two remaining forward observation teams relieved by 2d Battalion, 12th
Marines.
10 March, T 0000^0600 - Harassing f i r e . U21 rounds expended. O75O-'Battalion fired preparation in T 235~C r-n& $ "Preparation completed A at 0S20. U73 rounds expended. 0805 - Battalion fired preparation in TA 202-tf (SB) and (IE), and T 1S5-E. A Preparation completed at 0S20. ^77 rounds expend.ed. 0S50 -* King Battery fired normal barrage In TA 236-X^and TA ,219^-. Mission -completed at OS55* 11 rounds expended.

#JHeport, Iwo Jima Operation (continued)

O915 - King Battery fire'd emergency "barrage in TA 219~B. Mission completed

at 0932* 37 rounds expended*
I6U9 - Love Battery fired normal "barrage in TA 235~^ Mission completed at
1709. 10 rounds expended.
1800 - Ammunition on hand 2^03 rounds. 1U39 rounds expended,
2200-2U00 - King Battery fired harassing fire in TA 235-B and C.
2223-2U00 - Love Battery fired harassing fire and normal "barrage in TA 235-2.
11 March, 19U5
0000-0600 - Harassing fire. US2 rounds expended.
?A 235-C, D, H, I, L, !r, and IT. Prepar
0S20 - Battalion fired preparation "in 5 tion completed at 0855 85S rounds expended.
OS5S ~ King Battery fired harassing in TA 235-A. Harassing fire completed at
0920. 101 rounds expended.
1730 - King Battery fired, normal barrage in TA 236-G. Mission completed at
1800. 76 rounds expended. '
1800 - Ammunition on hand 2055 rounds. 1UU3 rounds expended,
20U5-2U00 - Mike Battery fired harassing fire in TA
12 March, 19U5
0000-0600 ~ Harassing fire. 35 1 rounds expended.
O63O - Love 3attery fired harassing fire in TA 250-'^ Harrassing fire completed
at IO3O. 69 rounds expended.
1635 - Love Battery fired normal "barrage in TA 251-K. Mission completed at
16U0, U rounds expended.
I70U - King Battery registered for defensive fire in TA 23&-G. Registration
completed at 1720. 13 rounds expended.
1SO0 - Ammunition on hand 12W+ rounds. 53-3 rounds expended.
1SU0 - King and Love Batteries fire* harassing fire in TA 251-K and TA 236-L.
Harassing fires completed at 2215. 110 rounds expended.
2100 - King Batter:- fired on enemy activity in T^ 236-L (ITW), Mission completed
at 2103 8 rounds expended.

13 March, I9U5
3
0130 - Love Battery fired on enemy activity in TA 2^1~IC and TA 2^6-L, Mission
completed at 0137 2U rounds expended.
lUOO - Mike Battery fired harassing fire in TA ?51~0u. Harassing fires completed
at 1700, U3 rounds expended.
1710 - King Battery registered normal "barrage in TA 236-L. Registration
pletcd at 1725. l6 rounds expended.
1730 * Love Battery registered on normal barrage in T A 219-D. Registration
* completed at lfU5- 5 rounds expended.
1S00 - Ammunition on hand 1?UU rounds, 206 remds expended.
1900-2U0O - King and Love Batteries fired harassing fire in TA 219-D.
lU B-larch, I9U5
OOOO-O63O - Harassing fire. 10S rounds expended,
1300 Battalion commander and reconnaissance party on reconnaissance in
TA 199, T A 200f and.TA 217 for new battalion position rvrca.
1S00 - Ammunition on hand II3S rounds. 100 rounds expended,
15 March,
1S00 - Ammunition on hand 3^5^ rounds. I o rounds erpendec1.,
T 20^8 - Island of Iwo Jima officially declared secure nt 1200, lU March, 19U5:

16 March, I9U5

0710 ~ 3attalion fire preparation in 3JA_251-^. Preparation completed at 0825,

I3OO rounds expended, .
I73O - This battalion was ordered to relievo the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines
of direct support of 21st Marines. Liaison was established with
?lst Marines by the battalion liaison officer. One forward obser ver and one liaison officer was assigned to Gm)mmLi^mtTy^battalion.

ort,

Iwo Jiraa Operation (continued)

Communication of the ?d Battalion, 12thKarines to the 21st !'nr inos

b was taken over " y this "battalion.
1S00 - -dBurranition on hand Ui^o rounds. 1300 .rounds expended.
IS55 ~ Registration of normal "barrage in TA 51~E 3 rounds expended. Regis , * ,
tration cancel; led,

1,7 March, 19U5

OSOO - Three officers and 100 enlisted men of this "battalion embarked for Guam.
There were no fire missions assigned this "battalion during the. period.
IS March,
OSOO Liaison officers with the infantry battalions were released " y 21st
b Marines, 21st iarines began patrol operations. One forward observer

was attached to each "battalion. There were no fire missions assigned this battalion during the peridd.
19 March, I9U5
There were no fire missions assigned this "battalion during the period. 20 March, 1ft Iff . . . There were no fire missions assigned this battalion during the period. . < 21 harch, 19 U5 1550 This battalion released of direct support of 21st Marines, reverting to
general support for the division. All forward observers and liaison
officers were secured* Trunk line to the 21st Marines relayed to
the 9^h Marines switchboard. . .
There were no fire missions assi/ned this battalion during the period.
22 March, I9U5 - gg March,
Battalion in general support of the division. Ho fire missions assigned.
26 March, I9U5
1500 - Received division operation order,31-^5 directing"this battalion to or ganize a ?00 man mobile reserve to be emnloyed as infantry in case of
enemy breakthrough, !5ach battery organised a 50 nan platoon with an
officer in charge. King battery Commander was assigned as officer in
charge. Reconnaissance was made to routes into forward areas,
Battalion in general sup-oort of division. He fire missions assigned.
27 March, ff B a t t a l i o n in general support of d i v i s i o n , . 28 March,. I9U5 B a t t a l i o n in' general sup-nort of .division, 2005 - Plash Red; " 201U ^ Plash '"Elite, . 29 Karch,
Battalion in position,

Fo f i r e missions assigned. lTo f i r e missions assigned, .

30 March,. 19U5

Battalion in position,
2000 - Plash Red.
2010 - Plash White.
31, liarch, 2100 - Received nessasge from CO, 2d Echelon, 3& Marine Division releasing this
battalion from tactical artillery sup-port of ground defense force, and
to begin preparation for embarkation. KoT^ile reserve was maintained.
Battalion in position. '"'

Report, Iwo Jima Operation (continued.)

0800 - Began embarkation of equipment for return to Guam.

IV. A. Comments
Administration

(1) This "battalion suffered 23 casualties during the operation

Three persons were killed and twenty wounded. Casualties Here reported to the
R-l " y the Bn-1 as they occurred, and personnel strength reports were subritted
b daily with the Unit Report. Initial dispatches were, prepared by (r-l and ampli fying airmailgrams prepared " y the rear echelon.
b (2) Morale of troops was excellant throughout the operation.
Mail was received shortly after landing and continued to be received every second
or third day. A number of books, playing cards, candy, etc, was received from
the Division Athletic and Morale Section and the American Red Cross, and distri buted to personnel of the battalion. The movies furnished in the later phases
of the operation provided needed entertainment and were certainly appreciated.
(3) ^ o prisoners, natives or civilians were handled by this
" battalion.
B. Intelligence

(1) Maps and photos furnished before the operation. (a) Special air and gunnery target map, 1:20,000, 2 sheets, 10 copies. (b) Special air and gunnery target map, 1*10,000, 10 ; "", copies. (c) Situation map, 1:10,000, 5 Copies. (d) Special M r .and gunnery target map, 2 n 1 nautical mile 2 copies* (<$) 0-2 special mat>: Areas suitable for vehicular r v * operation. 5 copies. " (f) Enemy installations map, l?10000, 3 sheets* Photos '"' < 'tiy 10 February, 19^5. 10 copies, (g) Mosaic with TA grid, 1:20,000, 1U conies, (h) Hosaic w/o TA grid, 1:20,000, 10 copies. (i) Mosaic with TA grid, 1:10,^00, 9 copies, (j) Mosaic w/o TA grid, 1:7,000, 2 copies. (k) Verticals, Sortie CV9-5Y, 33 photos, (1) Verticals, Sortie VD5-3E, 10 photos, (ra) Verticals, Sortie S19BS^A67^-^3CVS6, U photos.
(n) High obliques, Sortie CVIO-35, 8 photos.
(0) High obliques, Fo Sortie on prints, UU photos (Land . * ing beaches).
(p) Rubber relief map*
(q) Plaster relief map,
(r) Air and gunnery target folder, 1:10,000, 3 copies.
(2) This battalion was not furnished enough 1:20,000 maps to
supply firing charts for battalion and battery fire direction and maps for for ward observers. $en more- copies, for total of twenty, would have been much
better. Other maps and photos were adequate in amount,
(3) A 1:^0,000 TA map, in a binding, or a several sheet small
bound 1:20,000 TA map would have be,en best for forward observers, The 1:20,000
TA map was satisfactory as a firing chart both horizontally and vertically.
(h) The 1:20,000 mosaics were too dark for good details.
They were not suitable for fire adjustment.
(5) The air and'gunnery target folder, though awkward for for ward observers to handle because of its lack of binding, was a useful photo map
with its convenient size and large scale,
(6) Some forward observers, complained that enemy installations
overprinted in black made the max>s difficult to read.
- 10

rt, two Jima Operation (continued)

(7) $o n^psor "photos were furnish this battalion during the
operation,
(S) Intelligencedissemination.
(a) The regimental two section furnished the battalion
with location of ourown front lines, /the location of enemy weapons and troop
movements, enemy capabilities, andother information*
(b) These data were both timely and sufficient for bat talion requirements with the exception of information on ourownfront lines
during the day,
(9) Captured documents andmaterial,
(a) One intelligence man in each battery proved suffic ient to gather captured documents andmaterial,. Items recovered were marked inW.
the battalion two section and sent to theregimental two section. In this oper ation thebattalion recovered fewenemy 'documents andlittle materiel.
C, Operations and training.

(1) It wasnecessary before going aboard ship to familiarize

key personnel with thedetails of theoperation. If was also necessary to draw
up thebattalion plan forlanding as thebattalion wasembarked on four differ ent ships.
(2) Once aboard themenwere indoctrinated by lectures, using
the maps, aerial photos and intelligence summaries furnished by the regimental
two section,
D. Supply,
(1) Adequacy of mounting out supplies,
(a) Class I *
(1) Two rations per man were sufficient. (2) Two gallons of water per man was sufficient. (3) Stetra components.of "3" rations for coffee was sufficient. (ty) Hospital rations were sufficient. (b) ClassII.
(1) field -ranges and extra equipment for setting up
galleys should have been included foran oper ation that lasted as long as this one.
(2) The remainder of theorganizational equipment was
adequate,
(c) Class III. . . .
.. (1) |*uel carried wasadequate.
(d) Class IT,
(l) Class IV gear was.adequate.
(e) Class V,
(l) Ammunition carried was adequate since a good source
of supply was established upon landing.
(2) Resupply of all classes of supplies was adequate for this
battalion. Palletized ammunition facilitated the handling,
(3) Ho palletized cargo except ammunition wasused by this . battalion. (k) Shore based supplyfabilities were efficient. (5) Considerable clothing andJB2gear was salvaged in this
battalion's position. Most of this gear hadbeen abandoned by units who had
previously occupied thearea,
(6) One enemy 37 m m field piece had been abandoned in the
position. It was badly damaged andregiment ordered thebattalion to bury it.
(7) Transportation. ' (a) Transportation for this battalion was adequate. (b).The H29C carrier (teasel) was most efficient for oper ating in the loose sand Vfgre improvements were made on the roads. - 11

Report, I wo Jima Operation

(continued)

was an adequate supply of spare parts and accest

ories for" ell wheeled vehicles. There was a great
lack of all classes of parts for the M29C carrier-. (d) Maintenance facilities were excellent.
E. Artillery.
(1) Loading.
(a) The personnel and equipment of the Uth battalion, l?th
Marines were loaded aboard four transports, the USS
Feland, USS O'Hara, TTSS Alhena, and the USS Hercules.
The principle of dispersion was followed " y putting
b the firing "batteries on separate transports and divi ding Headquarters and Service Battery into two command
groups, each loaded on different transports.
(b) The personnel and equipment were loaded as follows:

USS

Officers Men

"52 117

2 3 17 1 h h 1 3 2 1 MS

3try H&S "i I"

kk "M" _^^ 271 Total Iquipment T&-9, t r a c t o r , iir/ad Truck, 2l-tori, 6x6, dump Howitzers, 105mm Truck, -^-ton, radio Truck, 1-ton, ^teU, cargo T r a i l e r s , 1-ton, 2 wheel, cargo T r a i l e r , 1-ton, 2 wheel, water USS O'HARA
Men

Junction
Command group and drivers
Firing "battery, drivers, and
reconnaissance party.
Reconnaissance party and extra
personnel. Reconnaissance p a r t y and e x t r a personnel.

Officers

Biz

H&S Officers * USS Kon Btr 12

Function
Command group. Function Drivers and mechanics. Firing "battery and drivers 3try "L" L" "L"
11

S3 Total Equipment 1 Tractor, #!D~9, w/ad 1 Tractor, TB-9, w/ad ty Truck, 2|*-ton, 6x6, dump k Howitzers, 105mm 1 Howitzer, 105mm 2 Truck, 1-ton, kxkt rfedio 2 Truck, 3-ton, kxk, radio 3 Trailer, 1-ton, cargo 2 Trailer, J-ton, cargo 1 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, water 1 Truck, 1-ton, hxk, cargo 2 Carrier, cargo, M29C (Tfeasel) 1 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, grease 1 Ambulance, -J-ton 2 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, cargo 1 Truck, |-ton, cargo 2 Truck, -J-ton, cargo - 12

E&S H&S "I," H&S "I" "L "L" H&S H&S H&S

Iwo Jina Operation

(continued)

Officers

Men

USS HMCULSS
Function
3t

0 0

E&S

1 U U 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2

SO Total Equipment

Tiring "battery and drivers.

Drivers,
driv
rs

Btry

Tractor, TD-9, w/ad ~~ffft* Truck, 2^*tonf 6x6, dump Howitzers, 105mm "M" Truck, i ton, radio Truck, ^-ton, radio di "X" Truck, ^~ton, cargo Truck, -J-ton, cargo Truck, 1-ton, cargo Truck, 1-ton, cargo "X" turn Trailer, 1-ton, . wheel,-cargo 2 Trailer, 1-ton, 2 whe.el, cargo Trailer, 1-ton, 2 whoel, water Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, water Trailer, i~tonf cargo Trailer, -J-ton, cargo

( c) All battalion gear was loaded aboard the vehicles-, ex-* cept the seabags for the men aboard the USS 0!H?>ra and USS Peland, which were put into cargo spaces. These seabags were transported from the battalion area to the ship's cargo area and loaded aboard ship by loading parties. (d) All vehicles and trailers were moved to their respec tive ship's vehicle parks. There was no particular trouble experienced in loading the vehicles. (e) Personnel of the battalion were marched to the staging areas and then to their respective ships. (2) Landing. (a) The landing of the battalion was not satisfactory as i t took a total of four days before all vehicles were ashore. This was largely due to, the unavail ability of landing craft and the rough surf. The per sonnel raid eqTiipment were unloaded from the transports into LCI's, LCTs, and LSTs, and landed from them, (b) All of the equipment from the USS Feland came in the f i r s t d.&y. -?ho equipment from the USS Alhena and USS Hercules came in very slowly. The personnel from the USS O'Hara came in the first day, (c) It was planned and generally followed to have the. TD-9 tractor land first with one howitzer. The firing batteries, fire direction gear, and essential com* munication gear was given highest priority. The priority of debarkation was not strictly followed but no serious consequences resulted. (d) No particular difficulty was experienced at the beach. : The prime movers could not be loaded with a howitzer in an.LCM. All ships managed to get one or more prime movers ashore before the howitzers so that prime,movers were usually available when the howitzers came ashore. (e) The availability of the shore party tractors, made i t possible to get all equipment off the beach and on the road-quickly-, ., .... (f) The, efficiency of the shoratiftrfc&.J.SL to_ be commended.

t, Iwo Jima Operation

(continued)

(g) The available prime movers of the battalion shuttled

back and forth from the beach to the position getting
the trailers and howitzers off the beach quickly.
(h) Ho equipment was lost due to pilferage aboard shin or
to accidents or enemy action in landing.
(i) Loaded LCMs were held up by the control boats for sev eral hours the first day while array garrison equi-o ment was landed on black beach. This contributed
to further delaying the landing of the battalion and
to the fact that some material remained1 in LCMs all
night.
(j) One howitzer had the traversing hand wheel bent and. a
sight bracket bent by the rough surf while it re mained in an LCM overnight. One jeep frame was
cracked in the unloading. One 6x6, 2j?-ton truck,
had the front drive shaft bent when the surf tossed
the LCM just as the truck was driving off. No other
damage was experienced "oy this battalion.
(3) Survey.
(a) The battalion survey section was divided in two partic
one going with each reconnaissance party. Each team
carried one aiming circle, two tapes, one set of
arrows, and one aiming stake. On reaching the bat talion position it was found that survey control had
been established " y the regimental survey section.
b The control was good and the battalion position area
survey was quickly established. The aiming circles
were declinated, and found to be about 20 mils less
than what was computed before landing.
(U) Fire adjustment.
(a) Adjustments were made by both air and ground observers
The initial registrations were made by air observer
on three check points on the afternoon of 2J Febru ary, 19^5 Check registrations were made frequently
throughout the operation by aerial observers. C-round
observers made the majority of the adjustments on
mortar, artillery, and rocket positions* however,
ground observation was difficult due to the irregular
terrain features in the division zone of action. The
majority of the rounds expended by this battalion
were fired by preparations and were for the most
part Z transfers; however, when possible the prepar ations were adjusted by forward observers.
(5) Fire direction.
(a) Standard fire direction procedure as outlined in IT'
' 6-UO was used throughout the operation. There are
no recommended changes in this procedure.
(b) All missions fired by this battalion were fired
through the fire direction center. The fire direc tion equipment did not arrive at the battalion posi tion until late the first day. The fire direction
center was able to operate with makeshift equipment
which vas carried in dispatch cases by members of
the section.
( c) The majority of the missions fired by this battalion
were fired with mixed fuses (delayed and super quick),
the nature of the target being "prepared positions".
(d) In a number of instances ammunition was wasted by fi ring massed fires on cnplaced artillery and -oill
boxes. This type target should be brought under fire
^bir precision methods; however, often times this was
impossible because of lack of observation.

or.t, wo iTijna Operation

(continued).

(6)

(7)

(S)

(9)

(10)

(11)

US1T ; 1 . 0 , 11 Ammunition supply.

(a) See.paragraph ? ( 2 ) . (12) Motor transportation. .' ;
(a) The number and-type of vehicles used by this battalion
- .
during this operation were as follows?

(o) tight artillery was misused in.some cases against con crete emplacements which' could.have "been handled with
better results by heavy artillery.
Organization and tactical emplo:,*mentf
(a) The Uth Battalion, 12th Marines was embarked aboard
four transports, Qh one transport was placed a re connaissance grotto headed by the battalion commander
and one firing battery, ^ e battery commanders and
their reconnaissance parties were also aboard this
ship.. Two transports carried a firing battery apiece,
The fourth transport carried another reconnaissance
party headed by the executive officer. In this man ner maximum dispersion was obtained without sacri ficing control,
liaison.
(a) This battalion as a general support battalion, had no
liaison, ' . i n placed in direct support of"the 21st
.le Marines a liaison officer was sent to the 21st regi ment ,
Communications.
(a) Wire communications were normal and no great difficult
ty was experienced in maintaining them* Messenger
service with regiment was maintained and was adequate.
Normal radio nets were established and no difficulty
-general
was experienced in gupjrding the net. As a support battalion it was necessary for this battalion
to furnish forward observer teams to the direct sup port battalions. The SCB-SlOs were set on the bat* talion channel and the emergency channel. This made .
it necessary to take over the radios of the battalion
whose'forward observers were relieved. It is felt
t egeneral support battalion should carry the
that . h crystals for the channels of the direct.support bat talions since it is frequently called upon to furnish
relief forward observation teams.
Observation.
(a) The observation on this operation was very'difficult.
The forward observers found little high ground from
which to shoot. In many cases they advanced with the
company commanders without observation in hope of
finding an OP. This seriously limits- the useand
effectiveness of artillery, but under the"circumstances
it was necessary,
personnel,
(a) The forward echelon of this battalion consisted of the
following personnel: ."'Officers Warrant Officers Snlisted = USMC ~pS " " : C"

NUMBER
1
5

'

kxh, ^-ton, kxk, |**ton, kx^f 1-ton, kxht 2^-rton, 6x6

J-ton,

- -g

6
". 12

ambulance;" cargo radio cargo (prime mover)'

- 15 -

(1/ lf||C

IPL

iport, I wo Jima Operation

(continued)

(13)

OTffiER TITO 2 Carrier, cargo, i'29C

9 J-ton,' 2 wheel* trailer
7 1-ton8 2 wheel trailer
k 1-ton, 2 wheelj water, 300 gal, trailer,
(b) The vehicles of this unit were loaded into three
shi-DSo Four days were reojiired for unloading "be cause of heavy surf and difficulty in obtaining lan ding craft.
(c) The beach was soft coarse sand and tractors were nece ssary for pulling vehicles off landing craft and on
to the improvised "beach road*
(d) An assigned area for the truck park was organized into
separate battery areas. Bach "battery was responsible
for the dispersing and digging-in of vehicles within
its area. Vehicle pits were about seven feet deep
and wide enough to accomodate the vehicle. The ve hicles were then camouflaged b r nets.
j (e) All waterproofing material and tire chains were re moved from the vehicles as soon as they were unloaded,
To aid the 2j-ton, 6x6, durcp, and the l-ton* UxH,
cargo trucks in overcoming the loose sand, tire pres sures were decreased, thereby giving more flotation
to the tires.
(f) Throughout the operation the 2^-ton, 6x6, dump (prime
mover) was employed for hauling ammunition and work ing parties. Until improvements were made on the
roads, the tractors and the H29C carriers were used
for pulling water trailers and 2 wheel cargo trailers.
The l-*ton, HxU, cargo trucks were used later in place
of the track equipment. The 1-ton trucks were also
dispatched for carrying forward observation teams to
and from the forward elements of combat. The -|-ton
UxU, trucks (jeeps) were sent only on short trips;
however, it wa.s found that they performed very effi ciently in the sand.
(g) Kb vehicles were lost or1 damaged beyond repair. One
1-ton truck struck what was believed to be an anti personnel mine which destroyed a tire, fender, and
hood. This truck was repaired, .
Material used. (a) All material loaded and landed by this battalion was
used to .advantage,
(b) Particular mention should be made of the fact that
insufficient galley equroment was brought for the
length of this operation. An effort was made to
operate a battalion bakery with what equipment was
available,
(c) The M29C, carrier, was the most reliable transpor tation in the sand during the first few days.after
landing,
(d) The thirteenth howitzer was used to replace the one
damaged in landing as well as being an excellent
source of sury ly for miscellaneous ordnance spare
part s.
(e) The five extra 1-ton trailers without prime movers
were necessary for displacing and moving,
(f) The 1-ton truck per battery was kept busy transporting
forward observation teams to and from the front and
making the miscellaneous battery runs.

- 16

Iwo Jima Operation

(continued)

(15)
(16)

(17)

(IS)
(19)

(g) The bulldozers were indispensable for digging in and

making water nans with the trailers.
(h) All prime movers were kept "busy hauling ammunition.
(i) The twenty thousand sand "bags carried ashore on the
vehicles were ample for one battalion position.
Training deficiencies.
(a) It is felt that the communication section and forward
observers of this battalion need further training in
the establishment and maintenance of the communica tions of a direct support artillery battalion.
Maps and photos,
(a) See paragraph I? B.
Enemy action against our artillery.
(a) The enemy fired no effective counter-battery against
this battalion. The few harassing rounds and rockets
which fell in and around the area Were ineffective.
There was no other enemy action against this bat talion.
Supply,
(a) Ammunition supply has been commented on in paragraph
1(2). '
(b) Rations were automatically drawn on the basis of the
strength of the battalion. Baring the first three
weeks on Iwo Jima nCh
rations and "10 in 1" rations
were supplemented by f'3'f components of fruit and
fruit juices, as well as ingredients for making
pastries in the battalion bakery. Old type "C"
rations and "K" rations were supplemented by "B"
rations during the last few weeks. Several meals
of fresh chow was received from the division com missary. The inadequancy of the lard supply impaired
the functioning of the bakery.
(c) Water was adequate mainly because it was possible for
the men to bathe and wash clothing at the beach. The
battalion was limited to approximately two gallons
per man per day. Consideration should be given to
the fact that it requires about 100 gallons of water
per day for cleaning the howitzers of the battalion.
This ration of water would have ''oeen insufficient if
the galleys had been set up.
(d) Extra clothing was available for those men who needed
it.
(e) Salt water soap and candles were drawn with automatic
supplies and were adequate during the first three
weeks after which time salt water soap was not avail able.
(f) Sufficient post exchange supplies,were drawn so that
there was no shortage of cigarettes or toilet articles
initially. The accessory components were very closifey
rationed during the last two weeks.
Summary of ammunition expenditures by item and type of
of mission.
(a) See annex "A".
Effectiveness of artillery.
(a) Rough rocky terrain limited the effectiveness of
light caliber artillery fire by affording the enemy
covered and concealed caves and crevices, and by
restricting the observation of the forward observers.
(b) The many strong pillboxes were virtually unharmed by
direct hits with the 105mm M^JS shell using the .05
second delay fuze. While was shock and haras sing effect on the

~ 17~

t, Iwo Jima Operatio.n

(continued)

.there was little casualty, effect. Those times when

the enemy was in relatively open positions, the casu alty effect was good,
(d.) live adjusted cither day or night at the sound of an
. unseen enemy nortar or field piece nearly always sue*
. qeeded in silencing it for as long as our fire con ?. . : tinued. ?he normal barrages were particularly effec tive as the infantry was most cooperative in desirings
them, close-to the lines. It is Relieved that night
harassing fire had a material effect < n restricting
5 the enemy*s night movement.
(d) The lack oi? exact knowledge during the day as to the
location of the front lines of the units directly
supported and of adjacent units restricted firizg.
(e) forward observers reported that the infantry's failure
to move out under preparations los t much of their
1 effect.
(f) In this typo of terrain and with the enemy in elabor ately prepared defensive positions, a short intensive
preparation has a maximum effect for the .105 and
lighter calibers.
(g) A concrete piercing shell with a longer delay might
increase effectiveness of the 105 against the kind. _
of pillboxes found on Iwo Jima,
(h) She large number of.forward observers shooting into a
small area made it difficult to follow a particular
adjustment. Colored smoke would have aided the for ward observer in identifying his own rounds.
(2.0) Effectiveness of enemy artillery.'
(a).In the one instance where forward observers saw massed
time fire, the height or burst was about fifteen
yards and the fire was very effective. 7ired singly
/by direct or indirect laying, enemy artillery fire
was accurate and difficult to Locate,
(b) !5nemy harassing fire in rear areas was too- sporadic
to be effective in sectors observed by this bat talion.
(2l) -Tactical employment of enemy artillery.
(a) Generally, the enemy used his artillery singly from
prepared'defensive loositions and made little attempt
: to mass fires. In one case the Uth battalion for ward observers am what was apparentl:r a battalion
of enemy light caliber guns massing timed fire on a
hill..
(b) "i.l firing no organized counter-preparation, the
..Tie enemy frequently opened fire on our lines when our
preparation lifted.
(c) In the rear areas around the battalion position, the
only harassing firo was sporadic and ineffective.
?here was no effective counter-batter;/ fire.

Ordnance (l) Weapons. ' ,' '

. '

(a) Number,; type and caliber of weapons, used:

10 Howitzer*, and; carriage, 1.2, 105mm
3 Hovdtser, and carriage, !J2*i2, 105mm:
'".. . S.Gun, machine, caliber .50 (H3)
... ,.',. 0 Launcher, 'rocket, 2.3b, I f9 .
, . - ' U91 Carbine, caliber ,30, Ml
1 : "-' 22 browning automatic rifle-, 15191-3 ' '
" 2 Pistol", c a l i W ".%, ,!:1911
^! A-"L, -machine0, caliber .30 '

- IS

I wo Jima Operation

(continued)

MALSJWCglON Traversing shaft collar U frozen.

(b) Humber of days battle employment: 3^

(c) Fumber, type and caliber of weapons lost: Hone
(d) Malfunctions.
(l) Most malfunctions occurred imnediately after a
long period of sustained rapid fire (three to
five rounds per minute). From a material stand point the following schedule is considered to be
"the maximum rate of fire within the capabilities
of the present 105mm howitzer:
5 rounds per minute for 3 minutes
U rounds per minute for 5 minutes
3 rounds per minute for 3O minutes
2 rounds per minute for 60 minutes
Firing in excess of the above schedule should be
punctuated by cooling periods in which water may
bo used. REASON AC? IOH 1/8n hole drilled through traversing Failure of set screw to hold shaft and collar. Improvised pin made after repeated from 12d nail and driven in hole. tightening. (This had happened in one other case during practice firing.) Unknown. Firing case replaced by one from s-nare gun. lTo further trouble.

Breechblock developed excessive drag ( f a i l u r e to close with round i n chamber af t e r six rounds had "been f i r e d , ) Operating handle catch screw AS128 sheared off (twice on same gun).

Unknown

Stub drilled out and screw replaced from s"oare fun. Second screw replaced by stove bolt and edges of catch recess were slightly peened over the top of catch.
Replacement part made from piece of
welding rod.

Operating handle sleeve pin SEDX6US sheared off.

Unknown

Piston stop AI5762 cracked and parts found in cradle. Vertical level bubble on i-121 sight
mount broken.

Believed due to excessive heat from firing.

Re-olaced Uy part from, s-oare gun.

Broken in landing. Replaced by bubble from spare gun.

Difficulty in depress- Unknown ing from high angle

fire (two hands required).

ICqui libra tor springs adjusted.

Four sights pan H12A2 JToriaal wear and Spare sight issued while original
became temporarily combat conditions, sights were cleaned and adjusted,
unserviceable due to
moisture on prisms,
dirt and wear,
Six tear drop biilbs in night lighting
devices on range
quadrant burned out.

?orn out in service. Replaced by spare bulbs.

n Report, I wo Jina Operation

(continued)

All of the aforementioned malfunctions occurred

to guns which had seen service in a previous
operation. Fo trouble was experienced with the
three new H2A2 howitzers drawn prior to combat,
(e) One spare gun_ and two spare sights K12A2 are an ab solute necessity on any operation where long periods
of fire are desired from all guns of the "battalion.
Spare parts are not available in themselves, and
much time is saved by having a spare gun readily
accessable at the battalion.
(f) Recommendations;
(l) Aiming, stake lights should be equipped with a cen tral control switch for each battery, thus elimi nating the danger of personnel moving from the
gun to the aiming stake for each fire mission at
night, and resulting in a saving of the all too
'scarce flashlight batteries,
(2), The tear drop bulb in the various night lighting
devices should, be redesigned on a more rugged
pattern or a greater quantity of the existing
type should be issued each unit for replacements.
(3) A more durable and effective shield should be pro vided for the protection of the cross level bub bles on the sight mount and range quadrant of
the howitzer. 3ubbles have been broken in each
of the three amphibious operations this unit
has participated in, and never have sufficient
spare bubbles been available,
(2) Ammunition.
(a) Rounds expended:
12,506 rounds Shell, HE, Ml, w/f MHS-M^-SAI & VM$A2 9,275 rounds Shell, H3, HI, w/f H5^ 1,611 rounds,Shell, Smoke, > H60, w/f !T57 $ 21 rounds Shell, EVA?, K67, w/f H R 6 (b) Methods and problems of supply. (1) ?he problem of ammunition sup-oly from shi-o to position xiras very slow and enn hardly be con sidered adequate. Many times the supply on hand at the firing batteries was so low that had an an emergency arisen, no sustained fire fron the howitzers would have been available. In t h i s , as in the two other operations in which this bat talion has participated, the majority of the how itzer ammunition was unloaded vn.d. hauled at night which in i t s e l f tends to slow up sup-ply. I t is suggested that whenever possible ammunition' ac tually be given f i r s t p r i o r i t y in daylight hours, (2) During the f i r s t week of the operation ammunition was hauled from the beach to the division dump, a distance of about one thousand yards, in am phibious tractors. IThere i t was reloaded on trucks and hauled another thousand yards to the battery positions, resulting in a great loss of time and much unnecessary labor. (3) A more easily discernablo method of marking how itzer ammunition boxes should be used. Frequent ly the hauling from shore to position is under taken at night irhen no lights of any king may be used and fr.ilure to identify the t".*pe of ammu nition being handled often resulted in large

- 20

p r t , I wo Jima Operation (continued)

quantities of A? shell "being- hauled to the
battalion position when E3 was most needed.
liho grey marking on the end of boxes of smoke
shell was easily identified by starlight and
a similar system for all howitzer ammunition
is suggested.
Hethods and prob1ems of storage,
(Is- .ammunition was stored in trenches dug by a bull dozer. There was excellent drainage because of
sandy soil and no storage problem developed,
Adequacy, typos' and packaging.
(1) Jfany rounds of the ammunition packed in the indi vidual steel container required as much as c n
a hours work per shell in order to remove the -pro jectile* This was because the steel containers
had been docoly dented and in some cases it was
.necessary to cut the container in half with a
hack saw, A removable cap on each end of the
container is suggested as a remedy,
(2) All aranunition packed two-rounds per box was in
excellent condition. Only twelve .unserviceable
rounds were found in the twenty-three thousand
rounds fired,
Recommended changes in TX/51.
(l) A larger proportion of Shell, HE, w/f I'US is
suggested in the unit of fire because of the
demand for a fuze delay setting. This has also
been the case in the two other operations,
Few types desired,
(l) An incorporation of a fuze delay setting on the
<K5^ fuze would result in a much more versatile '*
. shell. I o other demands for new types have
? .arisen.

(c)

(d)

(c)

( f)

Medical
(1) Embarkation. (a) Personnel,
(l) One medical officer and eleven enlisted medical .
corpsmen were carried in the forward echelon,
2h?.y were transported by four different ships,
Material.

(l) Material was divided into two duplicate compon ents and 'transported by two ships,
(2) Aboard ship,
(a) Sickness. .
(1) 0-eneral recurrence of chronic dermatologie fungus
infections.
(2) High incidence'of upper respiratory infections.
(3) ITonaal malarial recurrence rate,
(b) Sanitary.conditions xfere excellent,
T (3) Debarkation, ' ':. .". -" ' -^
(a) personnel was landed in various groups in LCHs from
cargo nets, on 27 and 23 February, I9U5,
Material was landed from ICIIs by means of trucks on
27 and 29 February, 19U5.
(c) l o losses of personnel or material occurred during
l
landing.

- 21

Hcport, Ivro Jima Operation ore.

(continued)

(a) Hodical installations.

(1) The "battalion aid station was set up on 28 ?ebru-_
a ry, 19^5> and was located peripherally in the
battalion area "because the site chosen was lo cated on a main traffic artery and "because it
, was in good defilade position. The personnel
of the "battalion aid station were poorly dis persed. She aid station was close to the fire
direction center, command post, and other criti cal points.. It was downgrade from most of the
"battalion area.
(2) The battalion aid station was located next to an
embankment. Several guard and machine gun posts
overlooked the area. The area was open to the
sky, but was dug in about three or four feet.
Dugouts two to three feet d.Qiyp were "built within
the pyramidal tent which housed the aid station.
They were largo enough to accomodate all attached
personnel in case of emergency. Th^ tent, ambu lance, and small medical supply dump were camou flaged with nets.
(3) T'?hen blackout precautions are necessary a blacked
out vestibule to the tent should be constructed
large enough to accomodate a litter.
(b) Hospitalization.

( l ) Cases requiring hospitalization were transferred to one of several hospitals in the general vicin? i t y . "3" Medical Company, 3d Fedical battalion, "Sn and "Cn Com-oanies,t n ? iiinphibious Corps hos p i t a l , "3" Company, 5 Medical ^ t t a l i o n and Corps Evacuation Hospital ft were a l l available. Disposition was made according to type of case.
(c) Evacuation.
(l) Cases requiring evacuation were transferred to
"3" Medical Company, 3d Medical Battalion where
further disposition was made, facilities for
evacuation were entirely adequate. Gases were
transported by ambulance jeep.
(d) Casualties treated:
(1) Retained - 13
(2) Evacuated 0
(3) Died 0
(U) Type:
(a) Hemorrhagic, or ruptured tympanic membrane 7*
' 7
(b) *'round, fragment (c) Blast concussion 3
( h cases with multiple diagnoses)
* (5) Walking wounded < 13
(6) Stretcher cases - 0
(e) Sanitation.
(l) Eeads were constructed from oil drums and pre fabricated covers. They were adequate for the
battalion, located away from centers of activity,
and not malodrous. They were moved twice a week,
limed, and burned out every other day. They were
sprayed once with a solution of DDT. Urinals
were made from ammunition cases and limed every
other day. Soakage pits were not necessary be cause of loose, sandy soil.

- 22

ort, Iwo Jima Operation

(continued)'

(2) Pood: (a) Canned and packaged rations were eaten through out the battalion. Galleys made only coffee and pastry. (b) quantity of food was adequate to sustain men in combat.

(c) Garbage and other refuse was thrown in bomb

craters, covered daily, and marked.
(3) Vfater;
(a) Chlorinated at central water Doint and dis tributed,
(b) Adequate for drinking purposes, but limited
for washing of body. Fone for washing clo thing, but salt water soap was -provided for
bathing and washing clothes in ocean.
(f) Disposal ofdead.
(1) Own: Fone.
(2) Snemyj Eleven. ?h,e enemy dead were buried be fore-we arrived in .the area.
(g) !jpidemics or-tinusual diseases introops:" Fone.
(h) Dental service.
(1) One man was treated for dental caries at "3"!redi cal Company, rr Amphibious Corps T-Tosr>ital. Dental
facilities appeared to be adequate for dental re quirements.
(i) Medical organization was suitable.
(j) Hedical personnel.
(1) Hore'-than adequate.
(2) Fo losses.
(3) Hates vary from Phi lie toHAlc. They are in differ ent phases of training depending onrates, but
all are fairly well trained for combat emergen cies,
(k) Pield medical equipment.
(1) 50$ ofallowance carried into combat.
(2) Folosses.
(3) Adequate and suitable.
(1) 11 ediGal supplie s.
(1) 75/' ofallowance carried into combat.
(2) Fo losses. .
. (3) Adequate.
(U) Resupply adequate. .
(m) Iiotor vehicles. . . .
. . -(l) One jeep ambulance.
.(2) Fo loss,
(3) Used for evacuation ofwounded and transfer of
sick tohospital. . (k) The..ambulance.is unserviceable. ;
(n) Malaria and epidemic control equipment.and su-oplies.
, (ii All of. allowance carried. . . .
.
(2) TTsed inconstructing heads and arraying area.
(3) Folosses.
; :(^) Suitable*.
(5)
Hecommendations.
(a) Blackout pyramidal tent beprovided for battalion aid

' ;
. ; station.. , . , .

(b) ?hat roads be sprayed industy areas.

-
(c) Dimethyl phtholate nnd DD^J be provided in quantity
for spraying heads and .area,

n Report, Iwo Jima Operation (continued)

(1) This "battalion encountered no frequency interference.

(2) The radio circuits were adequate,
I* Communications during operation.

(1) The radios used vrero T"BX, SCR-6OS, SGR-61O and TCS.
(2) The-SCR-60S was satisfactory. The SCR-61O was not sat isfactory'. Tho SCR-61O did not have sufficient range and was, in particular,
a difficult radio to carry. The BA~39 has a very short operational life, last ing about six hours. The one long antenna made til*'radio a conspicuous target
and drew enemy fire as soon as it was put up.
(3) TCS and SCR-6lOs woro waterproofed with waterproofing
compound and shellac. This proved effective in ^11 "but one case. In this
case the ca"blc (thcoratically not in need of watorproffing) rusted through,.
(U) SCR~6OSs were waterproofcd with waxed paper and shellac,
This was effective in all cases.
(5) Other comrunications used woro wire and message center.
They were adequate and no difficulties were encountered,
J. Motor, transport.
(l) Organic notor transport was adequate. E (12))
Personnel casualties.
(1) the operation: KILLED IN ACTION Off I/O Bnl 0 2 1 0 0 0 V O 3 D B IN ACJION /INED Off Bnl 2 0 1 0 MISSING 1 T ACTION S Off Bnl VO J 0 0 0 0 0 0 (Sec paragraph

K.

This "battalion suffered the following casualties during

USKC USN TOTAL L.

17 0

17
Comments, o-pinions and recommendations:

(l) It is recommended that the concrete piercing fuse " e in b corporated in the unit of fire for 105mn howitzer. In this operation, the type
of target was often concrete pill "boxes and the present types of fuses were in effective against these targets. I Such ammunition was wasted in attacking such
targets.

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ENCLOSURE G

SERVICE TROOPS

ACTION REPORT

, 3D I^ARINS DIVISION, FMF,

C/O FL33T *OST 0FFIC2, SAM FRAHCISCO.
21 April, 1945,
Serial: 328-45
From: To- :
Subject: Reference: Enclosures: The Commanding Officer,
The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division,
Action report#
3d MarDlv General Order' No 137 dated
3Feb45.
(A) Action report of 3d Service Battalion.
(B) Action report pf 3d Motor Transport Bn
(C) Action report 6t 3d Medical Battalion,

1 In accordance with instructions contained

in the reference enclosures A, B and C are submitted
herewith,.

h. A. HOHN.

3D SERVICE BATTALION/ .OOPS, 3D KARINE DIVISION, P1IP,

POST

orriCE, SAN FRANCISCO.

4 April, 1945,

From: To:

Subject;
Reference: Enclosures

CO.
CO, SerTrs,.
Action report, Iwo Jima Operation.
(a) 3dKarDiv 00 #137, dtd 3 February, 1945.
(A) Captured Japanese ordnance equipment.
(B) Ordnance salvage report.
(C) Ordnance repair work completed.
(D) Salvage Section report.

In compliance with reference (a), the following

1* report is submitted.
Part Ii Summaryt
A. This report covers the- period from 7 November, 1944,
to 16 March, 1945 when the island was officially announced as
secured.
B. During the past operation this unit carried out its
normal tasks of supply, salvage, and ordnance repair. Due to
the fact that the 3d Karine Division was in reserve and a short
operation contemplated the bakery section and its heavy equipment
was left behind with the rear echelon. Nine Officers and sixty-
three ' enlisted men of this battalion were initally assigned to
the Division Shore Party"Organization, one officer and seven
enlisted men operated with each battalion landing team shore party.
In this operation all water \;as either brought along with the troop*
in drums, cans, and trailers or was distilled on Iwo Jlma. Due to
this fact all water was issued through the Division Quartermaster.
The Division Quartermaster delegated this speGial job to the
Battalion Quartermaster, 3d Service Battalion, and his staff.
Part II. Preliminaries. A, The composition and strength of this command upon
leaving Guam was as follows:
1. Headquarters Company
2 off a. Co Ka b. Div QK Sec 3 off c. Bn QK sec 1 off d. Bn Ha 2 off Bn Ked Sec 1 Off' - 13 enl - 0 enl - 4 enl 5 enl 9 _enl 22 "enl m3 enl ,

(USN)

Toff

2 off US!" - 1

Jvlce and Supply Company

I Co Hq.
frSer & Sup Sec c. Chem Sec d. Grave Reg Sec

2 off
2 1 1 0
off off off off 1 off 1 off 8 off

e. Salv Sec
f. Comsy S?c

~ 16 - 70 - 13 - 52 - 10 -100

enl enl enl enl

enl (USN)

Ordnance Company

enl enl - 16 -267 enl - 10 enl USN

a. Co Hq
b. Ammo Sec

4 off 2 off

c. Sup Sec
d. Small Arms Sec

e. T K Haint Plat t. HTrans Sec

Arty Sec

1 off 1 off 2 off

1 off

1 off
12 off

- 11 -.-14 - 15 - 21 - 38 - 16 - 22 -137

enl enl enl enl enl enl enl enl

* Includes three watch repairmen and three

optical instrument men.
Note: Pour ammunition technicians were
temporarily attached to each infantry regiment
for duty throughout the operation.
B. The activities of tiiis unit during the planning and
training stage consisted mainly of carrying out supply-, maint enance, and repair work in preparation for the coning operation.
The movement of'supplies from the division dumps at Yona to the
equipment staging areas at Cabras Island and Sumay was super vised by the division quartermaster personnel of this battalion*
Limited training was carried out as time and division work per mitted. Aside from specialized- training, such as ordnance
repair, salvage, baking, etc., training w s carried out in local
security, protection of dumps, camouflage, ship to shore move ment, and protection of the individual !rarine. Uine officers
and sixty-three enlisted men from this battalion participated .
in all rehearsals and training problems of the various battalion
landing team shQre parties.
C. Our iuission in the past operation was essentially
the same as it is in a rest area only under less favorable
circumstances and conditions. Jt is fourfold: (1) To establish
a division dump, or dumps if need be, ashore, so as to control
the issues of all types of supplies to rear and front line units
and to provide adequate protection for these vital supplies
ashore; (2) To set up ordnance repair shops ashore, so that an
adequate amount of first cl^ss ordnance equipment,'from optical
instruments to medium tanks, can be kept in the hands of the
fighting troops at all times; (3) To establish a salvage collect ing point ashore, capable of taking in and handling all typos of
clothing and equipment; (4) To establish and oiJolSiibe^a division
2

) as
cemetery ashore, s o T s to provide prbper registrotion and burial
for our dead. Mission number or*e is handled both in- the rear
and forward areas by the personnel of Headquarters Company and
Service and Supply Company undew the direct supervi of the
Division Quartermaster. Mission number two is han ' the
personnel of the Ordnance Company under the direc
of the Division Ordnance Officer, Mission number t
by the personnel of the Salvage Section, Service and
Company, under the supervision of the Division Quarterma
and G-4. Mission number four is handled by the personnel of
the Graves Registration Section, Service and Supply Company,
under the supervision of G1.
D# On D-day, 19 February, 1945, this battalion was
boated off Iwo Jirna as follows:
Co:

1 7 1
9

0 0 0 0 0

.OT-.
0 31 0 31

UBS Doyen

USS Cape Johnson USS Freemont Total .

S&S Co: I O EHL / 0 0 0 3 1 0 7 1 . 0 7 1 0 95 0 1 81 1 7 0 0 1 7 35 0 0 0 1 7 0 21 1 0 0 7 4 4 267 Ord Co: 0 WO 3 1 1 0 2 2 2 0 8

PART III,

US8 Freemont USS Jackson USS Fayette USS Cape Johnson USS Feland USS Knox 1 USS Adams USS Doyen USS Bolivar USS Calloway USS Leedstown Total ;

ENL
107 0 30 0 137

USS Jferry Lee

USS Leedstoxm USS Harrick USS Calloway

Chronological account of action from 19 February, to 16 March, 1945.

19 and 20Feb45 All personnel of this unit were ehroute to

or off I\fo Jima awaiting orders to go ashore.
21 Feb. 45 S&SCo. 1st Lt, Baxter debarked from the USS
Pres. Jackson at 1500 and came ashore, attached to
the 2nd Bn, 21st Mar. with six S&S i^tion men and
' '- 3

al Section man.
Corp* Turpin and two men left the Cape
|y as boat riders for LCH #4. taking
Q11PA Mortar ammunition ashore. Motor trouble on
return trip caused LCH to drift all night in heavy
sea.
S&SCo. 1 s t Lt. Baxter and his seven shore party
personnel assisted the beach unloading parties,
2nd Bn, 21st Mar. CWO McBee debarked from the USS
Bolivar, with six S&S Section men and one Chemical
Section man attached to the 3d Bn, 21st liar, and
reported to the 3-BLT shore party commander on
beach. Seven enlisted further reported to the Bn 4 at the Bn dump and assisted in handling supplies.
CWO McBee assisted shore party commander in cleaning
beach and supervised beach and dump unloading parties
from 22nd to 24th inclusive. WO Lanham debarked from
USS Pre8. Adams with six S&S Section men and one
Chemical Section man and reported to the 1st Bn,
21st Mar. shore party for work.
OrdQo. -<- Four men (ammo personnel w/21st Mar)
disembarked and went ashore at beach Red 1, remain ing* with the 21st Mar. throughout operation.
23 Feb. 45 Hq Co. PC picked up Corp. Turpin and
two men from drifting LCM #4 fourteen miles south
of-Mt. Suribachi at 0600 and returned them to Cape
Johnson at 1100, Major Cullen came ashore at 0915
and reported to Div. CP. Lt.Col- Chandler came
ashore, made reconnaissance for division dump site
and then stayed a c division shore party CP,
* S&SCo. Lt, Baxter's seven shore party personnel
reported to 21st Mar. RTB for x^ork in regimental
dumps, Lt. Baxter remaining on beach.
24 Feb. 45 HqCo Division Supply Dump established
at 148 - Item and HOT* by Lt.Col. Chandler and Major
Cullen.
S&SCo. 1st Lt. Nilan debarked from the USS Knox
with six S&S Section men and one Chemical Section
man and reported to regimental short party commander,
9th Mar. Worked on beach the night of the 24th and
the morning of the 25th. 2nd Lt. Hatcher debarked
from the USS Fayette with six S&S Section men and
one Chemical Section man and reported to the regi mental shore party commander, 9th Mar. During the
night the enlisted personnel worked under the super vision of the Bn-4. ist'Bn. 9th Mar. Lt. Hatcher
served on the beach. Sgt. Carey and five men from
WO Lanham's shore party detail reported to the Di vision Quartermaster at the Division Supply Dump.
OrdCo Four men (Ammo personnel w/9th Mar) de barked, from the USS Knox and went ashore at beach
- 4

remaining with th< 9th liar. tTIroughout the

2nd Lt. 'Sova debarked from the USS
went ashore at beach R ^ 2, Ship's
d p3at0on, USS Harry Lee, comiPen'-jed unloading ship,
1 0 Denno and five men, hatch oheckere USS Varrick,
7 commenced unloading ship.
25 Feb 45 S&SCo. 2nd Lt. Bros'coff debarked from the
Cape Johnson at 1130 and landed on beach yellow 2
with Lt. C. F, McCreary ( C S ^ r ; and sixty-three men
DUlfT from the G-raves Registration Section. Lt, Brostoff
reported to Division CP and reoe3ved Instructions
from G1 to set up 3d liarDiv Cemetery along present
located 4th llai-Div cemetery in target area 165-Victor.
Arrangements made through X51 to have two trucks, 2j$
ton and one bull dozer report daily at cemetery for
xjork* Corp, Oviedo brought G . R* Section from beach
yellow 2 to 165-Victor and bivouac area set up. G . B.
truck, containing equipment, not yet ashore. Lt. Nilan
was released from regimental shore party, 9th liar, and
reported with his seven shore party men to the bat talion commander at the Division Supply Dump. Lt
Hatcher and his seven shore party men reported to the
battalion commander*at the Division Supply Dump.
Lt. Hatcher took over his normal duties as Division
Fuel, Officer and made arrangements for fuel pits and
lurking parties, CIJO KcBee released from 3-BLT
shore party and reported to the battalion commander
at the Division Supply Dump. WO Lanham and one'
runner reported to the battalion commander at the
Division Supply Bump and prepared to commence his
normal duties as Division Salvage Officer.
OrdCo. Major Carlson, ls\; Lt, Broderick, and four
men (ammo personnel w/division) debarked from the
USS Harry Lee and went ashore at beach Red 1, Officers
proceeded to Target area lS4~Dog to 'spot company
b,ivouac and work area. Ammunition men proceeded to
3d MarDiv Ammunition Dump at 164 - Tare and 165 Peter.
Major Carlson returned to USS Harry Lee and Lt.
Broderick remained at 164-Dog.
26 Feb. 45 Hq Co. Jeep driver brought jeep ashore and
"reported to battalion commander at Division Supply
Dump.
S&SCo. Lt. Baxter assisted Division Quartermaster
in Division Dump and also served as battalion sani* tatlon officer. Lt. Uilan served as officer in
charge of the temporary ration dump. CWO HcBee took
over- his normal duties as Division Cemetery Officer.
Sgt. Cruzat and thirty-four men from the Salvage
Section came ashore from the USS Doyen and set up
the division salvage collecting point at the Division
Supply Dump. The G. R. Section surveyed the ceme tery area and bull-dozer commenced dlJfiliriK-j?i.ts

"* O **
* *

common foundation for burial of twenty-

a row* This type of burial necessary
the loose sandy terrain incapable of being
hand dug1!"* Two trucks sent out to collecting stations
of 9th and 21st Har; Bodies brought back and remained
exposed over night as cemetery rexvs not; ^eady for
burial,
OrdCo. 2nd Lt. Reed and -forby-one men (ammo and
tank maintenance personnel'* debarked frou USS Harry
Leo and sent ashore at beach He-i 1, Ammunition men
proceeded to 3d KarDiv Ammunition Dump and Tank
1'aintenanoe men proceeded tc company area '164-Dog.
Seventeen men (Tank Maintenance e-.nd. ITotor Transport
personnel.)werr+; ashore at beach Bed . . . n proceeded
1'ad to company area.
27 Feb, 45 Hq Co. At 1200 Major Worledge, Capt. Smith,
Capt, Harter, Capt. Wright, Dr Poote, Chaplain
Uoffsinger and twenty men landed on Black Beach and
reported to the battalion commander at the Division
Supply Dump*' Sgt. Scarpace and ten men remained
aboard the Cape Johnson to help unload the ship. At
1500 the battalion CP was set up at 148-1tem. PhK3/c
Schuraate reported to 2nd Lt. Bartozek at the 3d llarDiv
Ammunition for duty. . '
S & S C o . G,R. Section divided into x^rorking groups,
consisting of collecting details and processing
groups. . Daily records being kept of each burial and.
FHF PAC form 9 executed in duplicate; also an alpha betical cross index file institued. Seventy-five
Bodies buried and seventeen bodies exposed,
OrdCo. Major Carlson, CW-0 Whitaker, 0. Draper and
sixty-two men (Co Hqs, Small Arms, Supply, Instru ment and Watch Repair Sections; debarked from the
USS Karry Lee and T r n a'shorc- at Leach Red 1 and pro vet ceeded to the company area, 1st Lt Kennedy, 2nd Lt.
Starck,CWO ^orsey and seven men from the motior trans port section debarked from the USS Warrick an,d went
ashore at boach Red 1 and proceeded to the company
area. Work shops set up and- routine repair, supply,
and Maintenance work started, ^our ammunition men
wounded (two while on temporary duty with 9th Mar.).
28 Feb 45 Hq C o . Major Worledge and the battalion
quartermaster personnel took over the control,
issuing, and re-supply of water to the division.
Chapla'in Noffsinger and one man began working at
the evacuation station, Black Beach and also held
services at 3d liar Div Cemetery.
S&SCo, Routine'supply and salvage work* G-.R.
Section buried 120 bodies. WO Coulson debarked
from the USS Feland at 1000 and reported to the
battalion commander at the Division Supply Dump,
OrdCo. Work shops completed and routine Ordnance
work carried out.'
1 March 45 Hq Co. Routine.work. Sgt. Scarpace came
ashore and set up the battalion post office* Sgt.
Cos.tea took over ship unloading detail on Cape
Johnson.
S&SGo. Fifteen commissary and thirty-seven

salvage personnel under SupSgt. RotJjffifeipArked from

at 0530 land landed on Black Boach.

ficd to the Division -Supply Dunp, the
eft starting work with uho -Salvage Section
an:"1, the commissary personn: .T
y'c-cGip^s and
peraonnel a;: the ration du:n,:v, Section sent
1&SU33 cf rations continued ten men to ':he division vs '.:w oirp; Lt. ill J.an
*< designated as personal effect:- e " csr. G-, "., Section
i
buried thircy bodies, twenty-foa reposed, Lt. Brostoff wounded but returned to .uty#
OrdCo. Routine ordnance work. 1st Lt. .E. Foster
and 1st Lt* G*. Foster debarked from the USS Galloway
and went ashore at beach Red 1 and proceeded to the
company area. One truck driver debarked from the
USS Warrick and went ashore at Beach Red 1 and
proceeded to the company area.
2 March 45 -- Hq C o . - Routine \fork. QMSgt. Block, Sgt
Robinson and ten man detail from Salvage Section
established a water supply dump on Purple beach.
S&SCo. Routine supply and salvage work* G.R.
Section buried sixty-three bodies, five bodies
exposed. Regiments handling identification of de ceased efficiently and accurately.
OrdCo. Routine Ordnance work. One ammunition man
wounded and evacuated. Relieved from^temporary duty
with 9th Map,
3 March 45 - - Hq Co. - Routine work. 3dMarDiv evacuation
station at Black Beach secured temporarily due to
surf conditions. Chaplain Noffsinger and enlisted
helper moved to Purple Beach and assisted at Coi*ps
evacuation station.
S&SCo, Routine supply and .salvage work. G%H.
Section buried forty-seven bodies, twenty-seven ex posed. Cemetery being planned to have a rock fence .
around the flanks and a Marine emblem made of large
round boulders at front, tip with a flag pole in the
center of the emblem. Capt# Nutting, 4th Har'Div.
G.R. Officer has been giving perfect assistance and
cooperation. *
OrdCo Moved personnel and equipment-to hew. bivouac and work area located at 165-Able, Tank
maintenance platoon (2nd Lt. Reed, WO Draper and
thirty-eight men) to temporary duty with 3d Tank Bn.
One man evacuated (sick),
4 March 45 H q Co. Routine work. Sgt. Costea and ship
unloading detail of nine men came ashore at purple
beach and report-cd to the company at the Division
Supply Dump. Went to work on the water supply
detail under Major Worledge. Chaplain Noffsinger
moved to.Co "B", 3d Medical Bn. and assisted in the
evacuation stations at "A W and "B M Medical Companies.
Chaplain Noff singer continued to woifrjikere until
19March, 1945. " f

 Routine supply and salvage work* Capt.

d thirty-three men debarked from the USS
son an,d reported to the battalion commander
y.at the Division Supply Dump. G-.R. Section
bur I ecf seventy-one bodies, four bodies exposed* The
Division Chemical Dump was set up \irithin the Division
Supply Dump and operated as part of same. Chemical
warfare supplies were checked and counted by the
Chemical Section as they came ashore. When not
occupied with chemical duties, men worked with other
supply details, including rations, fuel, clothing, etc,
OrdCo, + Routine Ordnance work. Four ammunition men,:
temporarily attached to the 3d Mar. debarked from the
USS Funston and went ashore at beach Red 1 and pro ceeded to the 3d HarDiv Ammunition Dump. Hen no longer
attached to Sdllar, WO Denno and five men (assistant
loading Officer and hatch checkers) debarked from
the USS Warrick and oame ashore at beach Red 1 and
proceeded to the Company area.
5 March-, 45 Hq Co* Routine work*
S&SCo, < Routine supply and salvage work, G-.R.
! Section buried twenty bodies, twentyseven bodies
exposed* G.R# truck came ashore with equipment.
Crosses being repainted and assembled, stencils cut,
containing names, etc, of men buried*
OrdCo. Routine Ordnance x/ork.
6 March 45 ' Hq Co. Routine work.
S&SCo. Routine supply and salvage work* G-.R.
Section buried thirty-six bodies, none exposed.
Detail assisting 4th itarDiv in landscaping cemetery,
bringing in rocks and brown clay from quarry,
painting stones making up Marine emblem, Detail
also out burying Jap dead.
OrdCo. * Routine Ordnance work. One man from sick
evacuation returned to duty.
7 March 45 Hq Co* ~ Routine work.
S&SCo. . Routine supply and salvage work. (KR*
Section buried seventeen bodies, none exposed.
Those exposed have been sprayed with pennite. Also
sprayed are the pits and the ground area wherevthe
dead had been processed. Twenty unfit stretchersn'
burned.
OrdCo* Routine ordnance work.
8 March 45 Hq Co, Routine work.
S&SCo. Routine supply and salvage work. G.R.
Section buried thirty bodies, nine bodies exposed.
Two men from section temporarily assigned to* Slst
Mar for duty. Because of the increased burial's,
more than contemplated, the G.R. bivouac area has
twice beesn altered. Working facilities are difficult
and bulldozing stymied at times.

ft

ftgutine ordnance work..

q Co, Routine work.
- Routine supply and salvage work, G.R.
Section buried forty bodies, seven bodi-es exposed.
Mounds now being erected on every grave in front
of cross.
OrdCo, Routine ordnance work.
10 March 45 Hq Co* - Routine work,
S&SCo* Routine supply and salvage work* G * #
-R Section buried ten bodies, none exposed.
OrdCo. Routine ordnance work. One ammunition man
returned to company for duty from temporary duty with
9th Mar. One man to 3d KarDiv FldHosp.(sick)
11 March 45 Hq Co. --Routine work,
S&SCo.. Routine supply and salvage work, "G-.R.
Section buried twenty-one bodies, none exposed.
OrdCo* Routine ordnance work* One man sent to
3dliarDiv FldHosp. (sick).
12 March 45 HqCo Routine work. Major Cullen left
Iwo. Jima for G-uam by air transport.
S&SCo. Routine supply and salvage work. WO
Coulson left for Iwo Jima for Guam by air transport.
G.R, Section buried seventeen bodies, twenty-six
exposed. One salvage man wounded and evacuated.
0 Lanham wounded but remained on duty.
OrdGo. Routine ordnance work. One man sent to
3d HarDiv FldHosp. (sick).
13 March 45 Hq Col Routine work.
S&SCo. Routine supply and salvage worjt. G-.R.
Section buried fifty-tx^o bodies, none exposed.
. Fifty unfit stretchers buried.
OrdCo. Routine ordnance x^ork. One man sent to
3d HarDiv FldHosp. and evacuated same date.
14 March 45 HqCo. Routine work.
S&SCo. Routine supply and salvage work, G.R.
Section buried eleven bodies, none exposed.
Fifteen rows of crosses erected so far and ten *
rows of mounds completed*
OrdCo. Routine ordnance work. One man sent to
3d KarDiv Fl-dHosp.(sick)
15 March 45 Hq Co. Routine work,
S&SCo, Routine supply and salvage-work, OrdCo, Routine ordnance work.

, *

16 March 45 Hq Co. Routine work.

S&SCp. -- Routine -supply and salvage work.
OrdCo. -- Routine ordnance work.
1800 Island secured.
. 9 ~ . .. .
.

reports were submitted in accordance

with inst?cfifl&#tf contained in General .Order No. 133, dated
25Jan45. Casualties "suffered by this Battalion to 16 March
were as folloi\rs
27 Feb. 2 Enl. WIA
1 Mar. 1 Off. WIA
12 Mar. 1 WO. WtA
" 12 Mar.' 1 Enl.

There were no' personnel killed in actioji in

this battalion.
2, The morslfc of this battalion during this
operation was very good* Contributing factors were:
1. The use of outfit, cooking, pack which enabled the mess
officer to provide hot coffee and some hot food at every
meal. 2 The early arrival and rapid distribution of
arriving mail plus availability of V-Mail blaks to all
personnel for outgoing letters. ' 3. The distribution of
fresh stores in the later stag.es of the operation.
3. This battalion handled no prisoners, natives
or civilians during the operation*
B. Intelligence,
1. The types of map.s and photos and the amounts
issued to this unit before the operation were adequate for
all needs.
C. Operations and Training. ' . . "
1. The indoctrination of troops In the .details
of the Iwo Jima operation yae left up to the various officers
in charge of each group of men aboard ship. This had to be
done due , o the fact $hat-this unit was* embarked aboard
t thirteen different ships. Troops aboard the Cape Johnson
were brie.ed by the Individual company commanders and also
by the staff of the troop commander. Officers who had small >
detachments aboard other ships -were. able to obtain fi6m.sthe
troop commanders adequate;.material for briefing of all their
personnel. '
Supply*
1. Mounting out supplies, loaded in quantities
prescribed by Administrative'Plan 1-45, were adequate for the
operation, with the exception of Class II. Supplies were
loaded on six AK f s, as equally distributed as practicable.
As only two of the AK'S were unloaded, only an approximate
ten days of Class II supplies were available. This figure,
was further reduced by diversion of supplies to other than
3d Marine Division Dumps while unloading which were not wholly
recovered. No particular hardship resulted except in the
case of clothing. All Class III supplies belonging to other
units unloading over the same beaches as the 3d Marine Di vision were apparently diverted to the 3d Division Dump, which
has acted as the distributing point throughout 'the operation
for practically all units on the east coast of this island,
less the 4th Marine Division.
- 10

IIT1
tactically no resupply of clothing was
t ^ division. On liarch 12, 1945 a requisition
x^as 'subMffe3^td: the 8th Field Depot, but field shoes was the
only item axt^lable for supply. Ten thousand pairs of cotton
socks, five hundred utility coats and one thousand utility
trousers were obtained from the 5th llarine Division.
Stock of landing rations vas augmented by
salvage of abandoned ration dumps. Practically no issue of
nexj individual equipment x*as necessary, all requirements
b^ing met from salvaged stock, Resupply of Class III items
has not been necessary.
3. Palletized cargo, particularly of rations and
clothing, xtfas particularly difficult to handle in division
dumps due to lack of proper unloading equipment, necessi*
tating breaking of pallets on trucks in order to unload. At
night, xtforking under black-out conditions, this procedure
seriously delayed return of trucks to the beach. Serious
losses, due to diversion of trucks to other dumps and non~
recovery of cargo, alsoocturred in greater amounts in the case
of critical items and choice components of the Baker ration
than x/ould have been experienced if these items had not been
palletized. A truck containing two pallets of lard sub stitute, a particularly critical item on this operation, pre sents a much greater temptation factor for diversion from its
proper destination, than does a truck loaded with assorted
cases of various components*
Wilson drums were not used for division; cargo,
but examination of several drums brought by various units of
the division disclosed that their contents were perfectly dry
and undamaged after several'days of exposure.
4. The 3d liarine Division Salvage group, con sisting of one xrarrant officer, 15 Salvage men, and 85 shoe
and textile personnel embarked for the I wo Jima operation.
a Salvage operations began on the 28th of
February, 1945.
b* Fifteen men were employed in the Division
Salvage dump to receive, and sort equip ment.
c. All serviceable items were retained for
reissue, all unserviceable items x;ere
scrapped.
d. Salvage groups x/ere taken in to the field
as required to assist regimental salvage
teams in the collection of items of
special interest. .
e. !!en not engaged in salvage operations
were used for working parties by the
Division Quartermaster and the Division
Commissary Officer.
E; Engineer.
1. General
a, Uater supply and equipment.
(1) The initial supply of water con sisted of 100,000 gallons brought
-11 \

ashore in drums. Distilling apparatus was set up as follows? Six Badger units on yellow beaicfi on February 24 ancl twenty Badget* units and two Cleavebrook units" on Purple Beach March 2nd. DuV to surf conditions full use, o$ th units on Purple Beach was not p^s ble until March 15th and until /'. that date an average of only four teen to sixteen thousand gallonsw*s distilled daily against a d 'f n': penditure of twenty three thousar. gallons, but since the 15th our ' : distillation rate has- increased to approximately 25,000 gallons per day. Of the six units on the east coast, four were in operatic a nd of the 20 Badger units on the west coast, four were unserviceaf and four were taken apart and c cleaned daily leaving twelve smal units and two large units to carf? the load. (2). Since the 16th of March, approxi mately 10,000 gallons per day wer distilled in excess of division requirements which was stored in . drums as a reserve supply for future use. (3). Water was issued in trailers at the distillation plants. Two wat points were established for drums and 5 gallon can issue, one at the Division Supply and one at t c f top of road from Purple Beach, ea' of which used ten men for filling and exchanging cans and drums, at Yellow Beach. * > (4). Additional water (about 2,000 gallons per day) was obtained aft March 12 from the 8th Field Depot water point as they did not have need for the full capacity of their plant, and when the 4th D i vision embarked they turned over to us on March 18th approximately 25,000 gallons of water, which was hauled to the Quartermaster Dump for issue. F, Ordnance 1. The supply section handled and issued, from :
replenishment, all ordnance material Required by the variov
organizations throughout the division. DfriiLx contact was
- 12

:h these orgaBzations as to their needs^h ordnance material

and also as to the available salvaged equipment to be turned in
to the su-pply section.
a. The supply section also received all enemy
ordnance equipment.
Ordnance replenishment was sufficient to
meet all demands of the division,
"From uDil day to security date, the ammunition
section's primary duty was the storage and issue of all types
of ammunition needed through out the division. Four ammunition
personnel were attached to each infantry regiment to maintain the forward ammunition dumps for the regiment concerned. TheY
balance of the section set up the division ammunition dump, re ceived all ammunition from the beach, and issued it out t o ths
. regimental ammunition dumps, which in turn issued the amraunitic
to the individual companies,
G-. Medical. . 1. Embarkation .
a. Personnel embarked 12 February, 1945.
b. Material was loaded 10 February, 1945.
2. Aboard Ship - .
a. There was practically no sickness aboard
ship. There were no communicable diseases.
Skin diseases were Minimal due to cool
weather and adequate-washing facilities.
b. Sanitary Conditions.
(1) Adequate in number and well policed,
(2) Living quarters were not crowded but
well ventilated and clean.
(3) Messes. Troops ate in crew's mess.
It was adequate in size, cleanliness
and facilities for washing mess gear
satisfactory,
(4) Galleys. Only one large galley ifas
used for both ships company and
troops. It was kept clean and sani ' tary.
(5) Cooks and Messmen. Marine cooks and"
messmen were assigned to work with
the llavy chief cooks. This ,was a
satisfactory arrangement.
3. Debarkation.
a. Personnel. All were debarked 27 February,
1945 in one LCM about 1400..
b, Material came ashore 5 days later with
organizational gear, except for one med ical chest.
4. Ashore - Assault Phase,
a. Medical' Installation.
(1) Aid station was set up on landing at
the Division Ration Dump. . r
(2) Protective Measures included location
at side of a hill within Bn. Defenc
perimeter, with liberal use of sand bags,

' i

c.

d.

e.

Evacuation.
(1) All patients VTQTQ evacuated to Div.
Fidi Hospital,
(2) Adequate*
Casualties Treated.
(1) Nu'mber
(a) retained -tx^o
(b) evacuated - nonp
(c) died - none
(2) Type. Wound, fragment - two
(3) Walking wounded'- txro
(4) Stretcher cases - none
Sanitation.
(1) No special measure's'-were necessary.
(2) Food. lf Usual landing rations. Type "C"
and !lK also "10 in one" Rations were
used for two weeks. Each man re sponsible for disposal of refuse.
After being ashore .about two weeks
a galley was set up and hot "B"
rations were served three times a
day. Galley and mess halls con-,
sisted of storage tents. Tables
were constructed of planks on up ended barrels. All food xvas served
as soon as it was opened and ; .
prepared. - No refrigeration was avail able. One barrel of boiling water
was available at the head of the choxj
lin.e and three barrels (one soapy,
two rinse) for x^rashing mess gear. All
garbage was buried.
(3) All water Was draxvn from Division
water points, where it was distilled
and chlorinated from salt-water.
Disposal of dead.
(1) Ofer Doad.
(a) At the outset of the campaign for
this unit (D plus 6 ) , one truck
was dispatched to each of the tw
regimental collecting stations.
An. average of eight to twelve
bodies were carried on one 2Q
ton (6X6), The trucks returned
to the Division cemetery, and
after the bodies were placed
upon the deck, a detail con sisting o corpsmen and Marines,
processed each body prior to
burial.
By processing is meant, first
the identifications tags were
sought for and if two were found
one was removed aad the other
left around the wSkxif the de~

^ceased. Information was then'

nfo:
relayed from the I.D. tag to
to two copies of FMF Pac Form
9 and also on these forms, when
possible, one fingerprint
(preferably right index finger)
was taken. . M
(c) Personal effects were removed
and placed in a personal effect
bag along with a card con taining the identity of its
owner. At the same time, a
shipping tag was entwined
around the shoe string.or there
abouts of the deceased, which
tag contained the man's name
and grave and r x r to be buried.
o< The stretcher detail then broup
the body into the arranged pit
at which the NCO in charge in structed the detail as to the
~ exact location for burial of
that body.
(d) If a body did not contain I.D.
tags or perfect means of ident.1
fication, regardless of seem ing identification by letters,
stencil marks, etc., all finger
prints were taken, and other
identifying marks recorded.
In this case, a copy of Form 9
(third copy) was burled with
the body,
(c) Because of the sandy terrain,
common excavation for burials
was necessary. The area was '
surveyed and markers placed
north-south and east-west.
I/hen a pit was completely
filled with burials,' the earth
would be bulldozed over the
bodies allowing a depth of ove-i
six feot from person to top
side,
(f) Each grave had a personal cross
(or Star of David) affixed just
to the r%ar of the head, had
the body been placed on topside
A mound was also made, indi- ;
vidually, in front of each
grave marker,
(g) Not only were bodies picked up
from regimental collecting,
stations, but at any put of the
- 15

way location where called upon

to do soi
(h) Prior to burial, military ecuip ment (782) and ammunition was
removed, stacked and then deliver^
ed to the Division Salvage or
Division Ordnance Officers.
(2) Enemy, ,
(a) This unit did send forth two Jap
burying details, under the supers
vision of the medical authority,
and the enemy dead were buried
at or near the place where found,
(3) Sanitary precautions taken.
(a) All men were furnished a pair of
rubber (medical) gloves.
(b) Bodies were buried and covered
with dirt as soon as possible.
(c) Where bodies were in a contaminated
condition, such were immediately
sprayed with Pennite,
(d) When bodies had to remain exposed
over night, all bodies were then
sprayed and, tightly covered.
(o) Each night, fiie deck upon which
the bodies had lain was sprayed
as well as the area within the
open pit,
(f) Contaminated stretchers were
destroyed by fire,
lledical Organization.
(1) The present type of medical organ ization is satisfactory.
(2) No changes are recommended.
1'edical personnel.
(1) adequate (22^ over strength of corps men) .
(2) Two assigned to Ord. Co*, one assigned
to Ammo, ^ump. Six Corpsmen with
lledical Officer operated sick bay
for Hq Co. and S & S Co. at the ,
Division Dump.
(3) No losses,
(4) Adequate.
(5) No specialities needed.
h. Field Hedical Equipment.
(1) Ninety percent carried.
(2) One case broken open but nothing miss ing.
(No Losses).
(3) Only Units # 5 A , #5B and a chest of
miscellaneous gear were used. All
other units were unnecessary under
the circumstances of this campaign.

(4) Presdnt type entSely suitable.

(5) No improvements recommended*
(6) Equipment carried was sufficient. No
resupply was necessary*
Medical Supplies.
(1) Amount carried was that allowed for
Bn. Aid Station plus 10 days Back '
up. '
(2) No pilferage and no losses,
(3) Supplies carried were far more than
adequate.
(4) Mo resupply needed.
(5) No Block shipments received by this
unit.
PART V, Recommendations.
1. It is strongly recommended that personnel of the Ser vice Battalion not be assigned to ship's unloading platoons
or to the Shore Party. Three operations have demonstrated
that lack of service personnel in the initial stages of the
operation have seriously handicapped the efficient operation
of dumps, ordnance repair shops and graves registration.
Sufficient personnel from the shore party must be provided
for dump labor to insure unloading and safeguarding of
supplies, and it is contended that the assignment of Service
Battalion personnel to their regular duties at the outset of
the operation will- greatly increase the efficiency of the
shore party as well as provide"trained personnel to segregate a
issue supplies.
2. That all members of this division have the Diamond
insignia* with the regimental, battalion and company numbers
within such diamond, stencilled on dungarees jacket, leggings,
and any other outer clothing.
3. That the Graves Registration Section be supplied
with two (2) artillery aiming devices prior to an operation,
for use in alligning graves.
4. That a medical officer (besides the dental officer)
be assigned'to the Graves.Registration Section to make Form
N o n all men about to be buried who have no Form N displayed
on their person.
5. That all men of this Division be instructed as to the
necessity of description by notes that should accompany each
body where it can be seen that such body is incapable of
physical identity; i.e., charred bodies removed from a tank,
description should follow as to what body was removed from
what part of the tank, etc*, tank nane, number, etc.

P. Gr. Chandler.

- 17

DNANCiJ COHPAKY* 3D SilRVJCS. BATTALIpW, PS, 3D LAHIi^ DIVISION, F&F, s T&S F I J L D . JA?AuSJ (During" period 19Feb45 to I6Mar45 incl)
HO* RC>TV^D

29
10
13
12

4
3

2
1

3
8

1.

Rifles, cal. 503 5

Light Ilachine gun;> Cal. 303 , 4
Heavy Machine gun. Cal. 303 , 5
Heavy Machine gun, Cal, 51, AA/AT 5
, Gun, 20mm, AA/AT 1
o
Gun, 47mm, A/T Grenade dischargers 0
hortar, 81mra 1
Gun, 70mm 0
Gun, 75mm 1
Howitzer, 105mm 0
Cannon, aut omati c, 25mm, AA/AT ' 0
0
Rocket launchers, 8 inch Lewis machine gun, Cal, 303 , 4
Flame thrower * 0
Li^'ht Machine ^xin.C al.503,f/tank 1

(fiNCLOSUM "A")

ORDANCE COMPANY ,
3D SERVICE BATTALION,
00P3, 3D MARINE DIVISION, FMF.
IN THE FIELD.
SALVAGE

L A T Z

ITEM
Carbine, Cal. 30, Ml BAR, Cal, 30, M1918A2. Rifles, Cal. 30, hi Bayonets, M1905 BMG, Cal 30, M19A4 Mounts, tripod, 3K0, Cal,30, M2 Magazine assembly f/carbine Magazine assembly T/BAR Scabbard, Bayonet Launcher, rocket AT, K9A1 Mortar, 80mm, M2 Mounts, mortar, 60mm Belts, magazine, M193? Pockets', magazine, double web f/carbine BMG, Cal. 30, M1917A1 Mbunt, tripod, BMS, Cal, 30, P1917A1 Rifle,, cal./30, M1903, fitted for
telescopic eight. Carbines, Cal. 30, Ml B A H , Cal.30, M1918A2 Rifles, Cal. 30, Ml Bayonets, M1905 ' BMG, Cal. 30, M19A4 Mounts, tripod, BM, Cal. 30, M2 Magazine assembly f/carbine Magazine assembly f/BAR Scabbarct, "bayonet Launcher,, rocket AT,' ;viAl Mortar, 60mm. M2 ' Mounts, mortar, SOmm Sight, telescope; sniper Carbines, Cal.30,'Ml 3AR, Cal. 30, Ml918A2 Rifles, Cal. 30, Kl Bayonets, M19O5 3M0, Cal;30, M19A4 . Mounts, tripod, BMG, Cal-, 30^ M2 Magazine, assembly f/carbineMagazine, assembly f/BAR Scabbard, bayonet . Launcher, rocket AT', \-M9Al . , 139
31
220
139
2
2
41
258
160
3
3
3
12
70
1
1
1
55
23
94
55
1
2
18
261
66
2
1
1
1
49
14
89
56
3
3
9
286
51
2

tf

28Feb45

lMar45

2Mar45

- '

(ENCLOSURE X*.

B")

SALVAGE(Cont'&J

2Mar45 Mortar, 60mm, M2

Mounts, mortar, 60mm
Pockets, magazine, double web
3MG, Cal. 30, M1918A1
Mouttt, trinod, 3MG, Cal. 30, M1917A1 Barrels, saare, BMG, Cal. 30, M1919A4 Case, .carrying, M14 Launcher, grenade M7 Chest, water Ml ' Chest, steel M5 Sight, M4 Clinometer, Ma, Ml91? Flame thrower, portable M2-2 Launcher, grenade M8

1
5
1
1
5
5
1
5
6
4
4
3
7
18
3
2
70
90
35
16
56
1
1
1
1
5
1
5
' 3
1
12
14
20
4
2
5
5
3

3Mar45,

Carbines, Cal. 30, Ml BA?., Cal. 30, M1918A2 Aifles, Cal. 30, Ml Bayonets, M1905 3Ma, Cal. 30, M19A4 Mounts, tripod, 3M&, Cal. 30, M2 Magazine, assembly f/carbine Magazine, assembly f/3AH Scabbard, bayonet Belts, magazine,. iU.937, BAH Pockets, magazine, douole web f/carbine Barrel, spare, BMG, Cal. 30, M1919A4 Chest, water, Ml Chest, steel, M5 Clinometer, MG, Ml917 Launcher, grenade, M8 Cover,'tripod, Mount M2 Sling, carrying, MG, & Ammo Bandoleer, BAH .. Compass, lensatic , ,Device, steam condensing f/3MG,M1917Al Case, f/device, steam condensing f/BMG
M1917A1. fellers, Oval, 3 ounce Oilers, rectangular, 1, ounce Pliers, side cutting Roll, tool, M12 Roll, spare parts, Ml3 Case, cleaning rod, J L O

(SNCL03URS "B")

SALVAaElGdntld)
NO
3Mar45
Rod, cleaning, Ml Bag, ammunition, M2 Pad, shoulder, M2 Carbines, Cal. 30, Ml BAR, Cal* 30, M1S18A2 Rifle, Cal. 30, Ml Flame thrower, portable M2-2 Carbines, Cal. 30, Ml BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 Rifles, Cal.30, Ml Bayonets, Ml905 BMG, Cal.30, M19A4 Mounts, tripod, 3MG-, Cal,30,M2 Magazine assembly f/carbine Magazine assembly f/BAR Scabbard, bayonet Launcher, rocket AT, M9ip. Pocket, magazine, double web, f/carbine Case, carrying, M14 Launcher, grenade, M7 Sight, M4 Launcher, M8 Mortar, 81mm, Ml Carbines, Cal, 30, Ml Rifles, Cal.30, Ml BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 3arrel, spare, BMG, Cal.5O,M2KB Bayonets, M1905 Scabbard, bayonet Barrels, spare, BM3-, Cal.30, M1919A4 Launcher, grenade, M8 Case, carrying sight, Ml4 Magazine, assembly f/BAR Flame thrower, portable, M2-2 Launoher," rocket AT, M9A1 Pockets, magazine, double web f/carbine
Cal.30,Ml
Carbines, Cal.30, Ml Case, carrying sight, Ml4
BMG, Cal.50, M2, M14
Mount, mortar, 81mm, Ml
Barrels, spare, BMG, Cal.30,Ml919A4
Magazine, assembly, f/3AR
Magazine, assembly, f/carbine
Rifle, Cal.30, M1903
1
8
9
1
1
1
1
57
27
133
91
4
3
20
348
100
4
28
1
2
1
4
1
35
140
12
1
52
77
2
2
1
84
2
1

4Mar45

5Mar45

5Mar45

7Mar45

13
1
1
1
4
225
55
1

(ENCLOSURE "Bn)

-3

3 '"V

''

ITS!

Launcher, grenade, M8
Bayonet, 111905 *
Scabbard* bayonet
Rifle, Cal;3Q> HI
BAR, Cal.3Q> H 1 9 1 8 A 2
Sight, H4
Mount, tripod, BMG,Cal.30, K1917A1 Flame thrower, portable\ H2-2 Mortar, 60mm, H2 Launcher, grenade, 8Kar45
Magazine, assembly f/BAR TSMG, Cal.45, M1928A1 Bayonets, M1905 Scabbard, bayonets Rifles, Cal.30, HI Hounts, tripod, BMG, Cal,30, H2 Carbines, Cal.30, HI BMG, Cal.30, H1917A1 87
36
3
1
1
1
1
2
30
1
17
29
51
3
18
1

9Har45

8
BAR, Cal.30, H1918A2 1
TSMiG, Cal.45, ?I1928Al 25
Carbines, Cal.30, Kl 86
Bayonets, 3*1905 97
Scabbard, bayonets Rifles, Cal.30, HI 86
Magazine, assembly f/carbine 6
Magazine, assembly f/BAR 130
Flame thrower, protable, M2-2 1
Mortar, 60mm, 112 2
Mounts, mortar, 60mm 2
Mounts, tripod, BMG, Cal.30,H2 10
BHG, Cal.30, M1919A4 8
Barrels, spare, BHG,Cal.30,M1919A4 7
Sights, H4 3
Case, carrying, sight, H14 3
Sight, telescope, sniper 1
Launcher, grenade, II? 1
Mortar, 81mm, Ml 1
Mount, mortar, 81mm, Ml 1
Bayonets, M1905 Scabbard, bayonets Shot gun, riot, 12 gauge Flame thrower, portable,.M2-2 Mounts, tripod,BMG, Cal.30,112 Barrels, spare, BHG, Cal.30,M1919A4 , p ,
Rifles^ C';1.30, HI
Carbines, Cal.30, HI
BAR, Cnl.30, K1918A2
Magazine,1 assembly, F'BAR BMG, Cal.30, H1919A4
BMG, Cal.30, K1917A1
40
45
1
2
7
3
62
16
11
32
3
2

10Mar45

SALVAGS (ContU)

Case, carrying) sight, hi4

Clinometer, MG, M1917
Chest, water, hi
Ilkar45
Rifles, Cal.30, Kl
Carbines, Cal.30 241
Belts, magazine, M1937, f/BAR
Bandoleer, BAR
Cover, tripod, Mount M2
Case, cleaning rod, Ml
Pad, shoulder, M2
Case, f/device, steam condensing
f/BMG, Cal.30,. M1917A1
Bag, ammunition, M2
Carrier, grenade, hand, M1S18
BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 .
Shot, gun, riot, 12 guage
Launcher, grenade, M8
.Bayonets, M1905
Scabbard, bayonets
Rifles, Cal.30, Ml
Carbines, Cal,30, Ml
Flame thrower, portable, M2-2-
BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2
BMG, Cal.30,- M1919A4
Mounts, tripod, BMG, Cal.30, M2
Launcher, rocket AT, M9A1
Bayonets, M1905
Scabbard, bayonats
Magazine, ass.embly, f/BAR
Belts, magazine, M1937, f/BAR
Bag, ammunition, M2
S l i n g , c a r r y i n g , fclG & Ammo Pad, shoulder, M2
Roll, tool, M12
Launcher, grenade, M8
Sight, M4
Case, carrying, sight, M14
Barrel, spare, BMG, Cal.30, M1919A4
Mortar, 60mm, M2
Mounts, SOmm mortar, H2
Rifles, Cal.50, Ml
Carbines, Cal.30, Ml
BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2
Mortar, 60mni, M2
Mounts., mortar, 60mm, M2
BMG, Cal.30, M1919A4
Mounts, tripod, JBMG, Cal.30, M2

3
3
2
6
36
16
7
2
1
2
1
1
. 1
2
1
1
2
13
19
88
27
1
20
3
4
2
44
50
77
8
9
15
1
1
3
1
1
1
3
3
190
22
23
5
5
4
3

12Mar45

13Mar45

SiiLViGE(Contffl)

ITEM

WO. RECEIVED

2
2
4
17
3
1
19
74
85
404
65
1
2
1
500
8
5
1
1
1
65
2
22
12
6
1
3
13
11
4
32
1
1
1
41
1
4
17
16
2
1
12
1
2

Sight, M4 Case\ carrying, 84-ght^ Ml4 Launcher, rocket, AT, M9A1 Pockets, magazine, double web,f/carbine Extension, sight, f/60mra, mortar Clinometer, MG, Cal.30, M1917 Launcher, grenade, M8 Bayonets, M1905 Scabbard, bayonet Magazine, assembly f/BAR Magazine, assembly f/carbine Launcher, grenade, M7 Chest, steel, M5 Grease, gun, alemite, 6 ounce iJling, gun leather, M1907 Flame thrower, portable, M2-*2 Filler, magazine, f/BAR BUG, Cal.30, 141917^1 Mount, tripod, BMG, Cal.30?K1917Al
Chest, water, M4
Case, oiler & thong
Quadrant, gunners, Ml (Mils)
14Mar45 Rifles, Cal # 30, Ml Carbines, Cal.30, Ml BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 Launcher, grenade, M8 Barrel, spare, BIiG, Cal.3O, M1919A4 Bayonet, M1905 Scabbard, bayonet Carbines, Cal.30, Ml Rifles, Cal.30, Ml BMG, Cal.30, M1919A4 Mount, tripod, BMG, Cal.30, M2 BAR,. Cal.30, M1918A2 Magazine, assembly f/BAR Barrel, spare, f/BMG, Cal.30, M1917A1 Launcher, grenade, M8 Bayonets, M1905 Scabbard, bayonet Flame thrower, portable, M2-2 Bipod, assembly, f/BAR Belts, magazine, M-1937 Bag, ammunition, M2 Machine link, .loading, Cal.50, M2

15Mar45

(ENCLOSURE "B")

NO. RECEIVED

16Mar45 Rifles, Cal#30, Ml Carbines, Cal#3Q, Ml BAR; Cal3O, M1918A2 BUG, Cal.3Q, K1919A4 41 29 5 17 4 11 1 6 2 5 2 1 1

Mortar, 81mm, Ml Magazine, assembly f/BAR Magazine, "assembly f/carbine Bayonets, K1905 . Scabbard, bayonet Launcher, grenade, M8 Mount, tripod, BMG, Oal.,30, K2 Launcher, rockett AT, M9A1 Barrel; spare f/3MG, Cal.30,K1919A4 Flame throwerl portable, M2<- Mortar, 6Omn5, M2 Mount, mortar, 60mm

Included in the above figures are items that will

be declared unserviceable. Serviceability will be determined
by physical inventory and inspection. !

(ENCLOSURE "B")
-.7

3D 3 ^ R V I C I - BATTALION, OP3, 3D toARIAeJ DIV13I0H, 'FK Itf TH FI^LD,

DATE ARTILLERY SECTION

wO.

27Feb45 TAUK 27Feb45 ARMS 28Feb45

Gun, 37mm AT, (Stripped for salvaged parts)

SSOTION Tanks (Repaired) ' ' Carbines, Cal. 30, Ml Rifles, Gal, 30,HI BKG, Cal. 30, K1919A4 Mounts, tripod, BUG-, Cal.$0,142 2
18 1 1

ARTILUIRX 28Feb45 Howitzer, 105mm, (Repaired)

KOTOR TRANSPORT S;CTlOxl 28Feb45 | ton, 4x4 2| ton, 6x6 a SECTION 28Feb45 Tank (Repaired)

SI^ALL ARKS 30TI0H' lKar45 Carbines, Cal.30, Ml Rifles, Cal. 30^ Kl BAR, Cal, 30, ia918A2 BMG, Cal.30, M1919A4 Mortar, 60mm, H2 founts, mortar, 60mm Kortar, 81mm, M2
57 62 19 2 2 2 1

OPTICAL IHSTRUM^T 55CTI0H Iliar45 Quadrant, range, K4

KOTOR TRANSPORT- SECTION H'Iar45 t ton, 4x4 2k ton, ,6x6

HORK COKP

W. REPAIRED
SECTION
Ihar45 Tank (Repaired)

ARI43 .SECTION
Carbines, Cal.30, Ml Rifles, Cal,30, Mi
BiiR, Gal.30, M1918A2
BMG, Cal.30, M1919A4
B ' G . Cal.30, J41917A1
IiMounts, tripod, BUG, Cal.30, M2
AFCE LECTICN
Tank (Repaired)
3aar45 Set up workshops in new area.
bECTIOK
4nar45
C a r b i n e s , G a l * 3 0 , Ml Rifles, Cal.30, k l Bi,R, Cal.30, hl918ii2 h o r t a r , 81iiim, M 2 Launcher, rocket, i<i9ivl

54
50
9
4
1
2

42 66 4 1 3

MOTOR TR^NbPOKT SECTION 4i-iar45 . Half track

Hixlik i^iUHTEii/U^CE SECTION

4 M s r 4 5 DiiALL

Tanks (&tripping for salvage parts)2

5i-iar45

Carbines, Cal.30,, 111 19 Rifles, Cal.30, Ml * ' .29 3iiR, Cal.30, M1918iv2 21 B14G, Cal.30, Ml9l9i,4 3 aounts, t r i p o d , BwG, Cal.30, t\Z 4 lieohanisrn, elevating 'a traversing B G Cal.30 M , . 3

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

1 ton, 4x4 t ton, 4x4

1 1 (ENCLOSURE " C " )

WORK CQKPLTD
HO,.REPAIRED
TANK MAINTENANCE SECTION
5kar45 Tanks (Continued stripping for parts) Tanks, (Under repair) 2
2

SHALL ARHB SECTION

6Har45 Carbines, Cal.30, kl BAH; Gal.30, M1918A2 . BMG, Cal.30, kl9l9A4 Mortar, 60miaA M2 kounts, mortar,.60mm 'Launcher, rocket, K9A1 Kechanism, elevating <k traversing
BMG> Cal.30
19
18
4
1
4
4

ABTILLSRY 30TION
6Ilar45 Howitzer, 105mm, (Repa.ired)

l^OTOR TRANSPORT SC?IQ^

6Kar45 2j ton, 6x6

6kar45

Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts) Tanks, (Continued under repair)

2
2

ARI43 3ECT10N ?I:ar45 Carbines, Cal,30, Ml R i f l e s , Cal.30, 1O. BAR, Cal. 30; K1918A2 Hount, tripod,BMG, Cal.30, k2 P i s t o l , automatic, Cal.45, fcQ.911Al 16 93 1 1 1

ARTILLERY 5ECTI0II 71iar45 Howitzer, 75mmj (Repaired) J^CJ itiCTION

7Mar45 Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts)
Tanks, (Completed repair job)
Tanks, (Experimental armor plate)

UQRK COMPLETED (CO^-T'D)

BATE SMALL ARKS SECTION
\
Carbines, Cal.30, Ml
8Mar45
Rifles, Cal.30, Ml
BMB, Cal.3O, M1919A4 "
Mortar, 60mm, M2
Mounts, tripod, BMG, Cal.30, M2
Mechanism, elevating and traversing
Cal.30 TANK KAIHTSNAIK& SECTION
8Mar45 Tanks., (Continued stripping for parts)
Tanks, (Stripping for salvage)
Tanks, (Continued repair work)
2
1
1
HO, REPAIRED

55
53
1
2

SMALL ARMS SECTION

9Mar45 . Carbines, Cal.30,Mi
Rifles, Cal.30, Ml
BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2
BMC-, Cal.30, M1919A4
Mounts, tripod, BHO, Cal.30, M2
Launcher., rocket, M9A1
Kechanism, elevating and traversing
BMG-, Cal.30 N
Pistol, automatic, Cal.45, M1911A1
11
38
23
12
7
7
1

MOTOR TRAI^SPORT SECTION

9Mar45 1 ton, 4x4

TAI^K MAINTENANCE SECTION

91fe,r45
Tanks, (Continued stripping for Parts)
Tanks, (Completed repair work)
3
2

SMALL ARKS SECTION

10Mar45 Carbines, Cal.30, Ml

Rifles, Cal.30, Ml
.BM&, Cal.30, M1919A4
Mounts, tripod, BMG-, Cal.30, M2
Tube, mortar, 81mm, Ml
Mechanism, elevating and traversing
BUG-, Cal.30
Launcher, grenade, M7
Flame thrower, portable, M2-2
(ENCLOSURE
1
53
2
7
1
1
6
1

COMPLETED (COHT'D)
NO. REPAIRED
TANK MAINTENANCE SECTION
10Har45 Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts)
Tank, (Stripping for salvage) Tanks, (Repairing) ' .
1
47
1
2
2
o
1
2

SMALL ARMS SECTION llMar45

Carbines, Cal.30, Ml Rifleo, Cal.30 HI BMG, Cal.30, K1919A4 Mechanism, elevating & traversing
Bi-ia, Cal.30 Launcher, rocket, M9A1

ARTILLERY SECTION
HMar45 Gun, 37mm AT, (Stripped for .salvage)
Worked on Japanese fielg pieces.
OPTICAL INSTRUMENT SECTION
ilMar45 Sights, M4

MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION

HMar45 TAI^IC Illiar45 ton, 4x4
a SECTION
Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts) Tanks, (Repairing) . * r
2
89
1
1
4
2

SMALL ARliS 3ECTI0N 12Mar45 -

Carbines, Cal.30, Ml Rifles, Cal.30, Ml BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 3M&, Cal.30, K1919A4

ARTILLERY SECTION
12Mar45 Worked on Japanese field pieces.

TANK MAINTENANCE SECTION

12 Mar45 Tanks, (Repaired)
Tank, (Continued repairing)
Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts)
Tank, (Completed stripping foV parts)
2 1 3 1

LSURS"C")

-5

W R . COiffLSTEP (CONT'.rQ OK ^ SMALL A M SECTION R S Carbines, Cal.30, Ml R i f l e s , Cal.30. ffi BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 3MG, Cal.30, M1919A4 P i s t o l , automatic, Cal45.M1911Al ARTILLERY SECTION 13Mar45 Worked on Japanese field, piecefey 13Mar45 3 83 1 1 1 ; ' { "' < NO, REPAIRED

T N I-IAINT^NMCE SECTION AK 13Har45 Tank, (Completed salvaging for parts) Tanks, (Salvaging for parts) Tank, (Completed repair job) SHALL ARMS. SECTION
Carbines, Cal.30, Kl Rifles, Cal.30, ia BAR, Cal.30, M1918A2 1
3
1
1
93
3

14Mar45

ARTILLERY SECTION
14Mar45 Worked on Japanese field pieces.

TANK I^AIHTENAHCE SECTION

14Mar45 Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts) Tank, (Completed repair job) Overhauling engine sets
!> I I I I .

3
1
2
1
73
SI

SHALL ARI13 SECTION

' ' "" ' m HIM

15Mar45

Carbines, Cal,30, HI Rifles, Cal.30, Ml BAR, Cal.30, H1918A2

TAN2C HAINTENANCE SECTION

15Har45 Tank, (Completed stripping for parts) Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts) Tank, (Completed repair job) Completed overhauling engine set Overhauling engine set 1
2
1
1
1

-6-

(ENCLOSURE "C")

U B 001-gIgTgD QK
NQ>

16Mar45

Oarbines, Cal.30, Ml Rifles. r Gal.30, HI 3^R, Cal,30, ia918A2 Launcii3rs, rocket, 11 A -9 3IOTI0H

91 9 1? 4

16Uar45

Tanks, (Continued stripping for parts) Overhauling engine sot

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MOTOH 2!BAHSH>RT *#^ *.* w, , 3D KABI3O DIVISIO1I, UTTKS ^ I 3 L D .

13 April,
ACTION K3PQET Off 3 2 110203 THAHSPQBT ^ fOR IW J I l i i QPSRAJIOHi PAR3J.I* Suiiimary

A The period covorod V this report is fron 15 Doccnbcr,

^, to 7 April, I U 5
B# PART II* Soc p/iS5? Ill, Paragra^i A* below*

Preliminaries*

This battalion is organized in accordance with T*0 #F60*.

4V. with tho addition of the -Sr^ator^TrnAlor Platoon* $his platoon consist's
of eightoon (18) light tractors raid cightocn (IB) Athoy trailers of six
(6) ton capacity* All of tho abovo pint don wr.s employed on the subject
ox>oration#
fifty poreont (50^) of tho battalion1 s trans*
portation and ropair and naiateannco units were liftsd for the oporationt
Seventy-eight percent (78$) of tho jkcrooanol woro onbarfcod*'
B The period,fron 15 Opoc^ibor, 13-Mt to 20 January, 19^5, was
spent in preparation and planning Ilia first tr.sk confronting this unit
^rd was the novement of ell supplies ..i oquipnont for the Division to tho
various eargo assembly nyoas This required m. ivcrago round trip of
approxijhatoly twenty (20) nilos, -."bout hrlf of it being over a vary poor
r*4 'During this pho.se all trucks of two ra& DIIG hrlf (2j) ton capacity
or over in the Division functioned under tho diroct control of the BOTO.
Movenont of- supplies'"was conneacod on 20 January, 19^5 n-ad by 6 February,
19^5 all bulk1 supplies a^d oouiviaont -/ore in the cnjrgo \assenbly areas*,
, ' throughout ovorhaui v/as instituted accomplished by placing which had boon selected schools v;orc held which tho Division*

the aoovo period r. plairicd systen of complete

for all voMeloa to bo lif.to.d* Tho abovo was
in tho shop daily a percentage of the vehicles
for onbarkatioii, Iv/p (2) vehicle wator-*proofing
woro attoaddd by rapronontatives of all units of

On S February# 19^5, ship loading v/as connonced and again

largo transportation donands woro placed upon the battalion* However, as
the loading out was accomplished by StOTts, it was possible to deadline in
succession the vehicles of tho rpspoctivo conpanios in time to pernit
a final nechanical chock and wator*-j?roofino prior to loading. On 15
Fobruafy, 19^5, the Division conplctocl loading.
0* , Ho coment* . . . '

D One conpany was attached to and oabarlsod with each BCOV

Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters cziS. Sorvico Gompany eobarkod
and functioned under Division control*

E Ho connent. , '.

PAST III. Chronological acoount of tho action.

A The letter corrprjiies, logs^ Ooripaiiy "0*, landed as part of
their respective EOT and..-functionod in tao*nornrCL nannor-in support of
the operation. On 28 fobrunxy, 1 ^ 5 , t;\o Swf.v.^co echelon of Battalion
Headquarters landed and established its 0#? ashore. Unloading of
personnel .fti& equipment prococdod siowiy thvou^iout the next few days*
On 3 March,1 19*+5, the ropair ;aad r.iaintotxr^co oouipment of Headquarters
and Service Company and Qbapany *A* wero consolidated in one area.

SP02T 3&nALI0F, DATED 13 APRIL,

On 6 Karch, 19H5, Companies "A11 and B 3 tt
reverted to batt-lion control.
At tills tine a "battalion maintenance and rcroair shop w<as established
under tlie control of the "battalion maintenance officer,
OHiroushout tho ronaindor of the operation this "battalion
provided .transportation and maintenance and repair facilities as called
upon in'support of the Division* During the period of the operation
tills "battalion effected repairs'to over two hundred (200) vehicles* On
26"Karch, 19^5, Company "A11 was attaches. *to the Second Echelon of the
division and the "battalion, less Companies "A" and "C", "commenced loading
aboard ship. On 29 Marchf 19^5| Headquarters and Sorvice Conpanjr and
Conpnny B* loft the target aroa as part of the First Echelon. Qonpany
''A* as part of the Second 3cholon em"barkcd and sn.iled on 7 April, 19^-5
17, Cor4inonts. - .

A Vlhoelcd and trailer transport at ion onbarked was adequate*

The Cargo Carrier, M29G (Woasol), proved a very efficient vehicle
throughout the; operation and functioned particularly well over tho
terrain encountered*: Ihis vehiclo proved invpJLua"blo in the evacuation
of the
Spare parts enbarked v;ero adequate with the exception of
those required for the Cargo Carrierf 1290 (Weasel)., Adequate spare
parts for this vehicle were not available to this unit.
PARE V* Conclusion and recoiiiiondations.

A. As stated a"bovo this unit has in it a tractor-trailer

platoon consisting of eighteen (!&)' li^it tractors and eighteen (IS)"4
Athey trailers of six (6) ton capacity, la-throe operations (Bougain* ville, G-uan, rnd Iwo Jina) over totally different types of terrain, this
platoon has proven invaluable* In view of tho above, it is reconnonded
that the 5!.O. for Motor Transport Battalion be changed to include a
tractor-trailer platoon of eighteen (lo) units. Hpwovor, it is
od that tractor, heavy, be authorized as prino novcr i:i lieu of
'tractor, liglit^ It is further recommended that a least three (3) of the
nbovo tractors be equipped vith anglodozbr* .

OJD/dbm rial1 045174

3D MEDICAL BATTALION
3D MARINE D I ^ I O N , FMF.
IN THE FIELD
L7 April 196.5

From: To : Subject: Reference:

The ComraancHM^Officer.
The Commanding Officer, Service Troops,
Action report, ,
(a).Cf*G* #137

PART I. Summary*
A. Period covered: 2 November 1944 to approximately 16 April 194 S

B, The Medical Battalion is composed of Medical Companies and

H&S Company, Medical: Companies were attached to RCT's as follows:
"A11 Company, 3<fflfed~ - - ' -21st RCT
B" Company; 3dliod9th RCT
C Company, 3dMed~ 3d RCT
"D n Company, 3dMed> Attached to Amph, Corps for th:1.?

.
u !f

o p e r a t i o n .

E Company, 3dMedH&S Company, 3dMed- ~

Intended for Division Hospital

Intended for Division

"A" Company, 3d Medical Battalion departed Guam 16 February.

1945 with Transport Division 32 and arrived off Iwo Jima 19 February,
1945. Disembarked 24 February 1945 and started receiving caualties
26 February 1945.
. "B" Company, 3d Medical Battalion departed Guam 17 February,
1945 with Transport Division 31 and arrived off Iwo Jima 20 February,
1945* Disembarked 24 February, 1945 and started receiving casualties
26 February 1945. ^:
, , "C" Company, 3d Medical Battalion departed Guam 17 February,
1945 With Transport Division 33 a n ~r:.ived off Iwo Jima 26 February,
1945 and ,r,e/mained aboard ship,
"DM Company, 3d Medical Battalion was attached to V Amphibious
' . ' .
Corps for this operation,, ' "E" Company, 3d. Medical Battalion departed Guam 17 February,
1945 with Transport Division 31 and arrived off Iwo Jima 20 February,
1945 and remained aboard-ship.
H&S Company, 3d Medical Battalion departed Guam 16 February,
1945 with Transport Division 32 and arri ed off Iwo Jima 19 February,
1945* Disembarked 26 February 1945 and assumed control of evacuation 27
February 1945*
The Medical Companies of the Medical Battalion ashore functioned
as aid stations Until late in the campaign. Casualties were &iven addition al attention and immediately evacuated to Hospital Ships or AP's, The Med ical Companies began surgical work approximately 15 March when Hospital
Ships were no^longer available.
- H&S Company functioned as evacuation control and as a pool for
hospital corpsmen replacements.
During most of the combat phase the units of the Medical Batta lion ashore were periodically under enemy mortor, artillery and rocket
fire. .;-.
PART II. Preliminaries.
A. ,^The Medical Companies ace composed of a hospital section (6 officer
36 enlisted corpsmen, 2Q marines, en?;' sted) and 3 collecting sections (13
: enlisted corpsraen and 1 enlisted marinel
;* Page 1 of 9 -g .a<

Sub
H&S Company is composed of 14 officers, 54 enlisted corpsmen and
36 enlisted marines. This Company was reinforced with 29 enlisted ho spit a.,.
corpsmen and 15 enlisted marines from "D" Company, 3d Medical Battalion,
The men were used as replacements on Iwo Jima
B. At the time the mi'ssion u?as assigned a Training Order was piib
lished and weekly training periods were carried out until embarkation I. tures were given on Combat Medicine and Combat Technique. Physical tr: 1.,", ; .
and field exercises were carried out.
C* The mission of the Medical Battalion was to administer to the ;
and wounded and to accomplish their evacuation.
D. and* 33.
.The Medical Battalion was embarked on Transport Division 31 J'^

PART III, Chronological account of tiiu action.

A. "A" and nBYt Companies, 3d Medical Battalion reverted to Medical
Battalion control on 26 February 1945 and began receiving patients the sane
date. "A11 Company was "sot U P -^ Target Area 165F, flBlf Company was set up
at Target Area 181X and moved to Target Area I63 J on 20 March 1945 and
took over the functions of "B" Medical Co. VAC Hospital. "A" Medical
Company functioned until 25 March 1945 when camp was struck for reembark
ation, n B" Company, 3d Medical Battalion functioned until 31 Mardh 1945
when camp was struck for reembarkation.
PART IV. Medical.
A. Medical Companies wore attached to RCT ! S for the Iwo Jima camp aign therefore complete consolidations of this report is not practicable-,
1. EmbarkationJ
: . A. Personnel:
H&S Company, 10, 11, and 12th February, 1945*
U.SS. Cape Johnson:
5 officers.
1 A.R.C.
80 Enlisted men.
U.S.S. Bolivar:
5 Officers*
U.S.S* Jupiter?
1 officer*
10 enlisted men.

n n

. . ..

Company* 11 February 1945.

U.S.S*Cape Johnson?
2 officers
38 enlisted men

U.S.S.. President Adams:

1 officer
15 'enlisted men.
U.S-S. President Jackson:
0- officers
14 enlisted men.
U.S.S*. Bolivar:
5 officers
30 enlisted men.
Page 2 of 9

UNCLASSIFIEI

B Company, 9 February 1945

U.S.S. Fayette:
6 officers
53 enlisted men.
U.S.S. Know:
0 officers
15 enlisted men.
U.S.S. Leedstovm:
0 officers
14 enlisted men
U.S.S, Warrick:
1 officer,
10 enlisted r;.3n.
"C" Company, 9 February 1945
U.S.S. Calloway:
4 officers,
54 enlisted men,
U.S.S. Funston:
2 Officers
15 enlisted men.
U.S.S. O'Hara:
1 officer
15 enlisted men.
U.S.S. Hercules:
0 officers
11 enlisted men.
"D" Company, 7 Februr: 7 1945 (Attached to VAC for this
campaign)
U.S.S. Ozark:
7 officers
50 enlisted men.

fJ

E" Company, 9 February 1945.

U.S.S. Harry Lee:
4 officers
73 enlisted men.
U.S.S..Uarrick:
3 officer's*
20 enlisted men*

b. Material:
H&S Company:
U.S.S. Jupiteri
90$ of mat;:-ials, supplies and combat loaded vehicles
USS.S. Cape Jon.: on*
1Q% ,of materials, supplies and combat loaded vehicles,
:. Note - H&S Company lifted all ffDu Company vehicles,
"A" Company:
U.S # S # Bolivar:
- All materials, supplies, including combat loaded
vehicles of hospital section were loaded from the
loading assembly area except one - J ton 4x4
ambulance, comb .t loaded accompanied each Batt alion aboard their respecijitti ahips,
Pass 3

Subject: Action Rep

"B" Company:
U.S.S, Warrick:
" All medical supplies, equipment and vehicles,
loaded, "were lifted aboard this vessel,
C" Company:.
U.S.S, Hercules:
All medical supplies, equipment and vehicles5 co'!.1
leaded, were . iffeed aboard this vessel.
"D" Company:
U.S*. Ozark:
All medical supplies and equipment were loaded abor.r-J.
f br use on the -ship by "D" Company, 3d Medical Bait aliono No vehicles were loaded,

fl n

E Company?
U,S.SC Warrick: v
All medial supplies, equipment and vehicles, combj..v
loaded, were lifted aboard this vessel.

2,

Aboard Ship:
a* Sickness:
There were no epidemics aboard ship The health . '
/ the Medical Battalion personnel was excellent* SL<k
bay facilities were adequate.
b. Sanitary conditions:
(1) Heads: Adequate for all personnel and well cles.-:ic\
(2) Living quarters: In general good. A few instances
of overcrowding and inadequate
ventilation were encountered,
(3) Messes: Very satisfactory as to quanity and quality
(4) Galleys: Excellent.
(5) Cooks nr.' Hessmen: Clean with all sanitary pre cautions complied with in
preparation of food,

3. Debarkation:
a. Personnel:
Lledical Battalion less "E11 Company and detachments
landed on D Plus 7 (26 February 1945.)
b. Material:
(1) Transported o the Target Area by AP f s and AK's*
(2) Time of landing: Medical Battalion Supplies began
landing on D plus 6 (25 February 1945) and con tinued to land periodically until 26 March,, Some
medical equipment forrtB" Company never landed
but equipment of "C n and lfEn that reached the bea?.h
was utilized*
(3) Landed on DIMES,' LCVP'S, LCM'S, AND LSM'S.
c Losses of personnel and material:
(1) Personnel: 1 \.arine enlisted - Fractured foot,
1 Navy enlisted - Dislocated elbow.
(2) Material: "A" Company^ 3dlled. - All bio^ogicalsc
"B" Company, 3dMed. - Hold loaded cargo
was not unloaded,.

1 teorb".?al compan^s a t t irhea t ?

reverted to Medical Battalion control 26,

February 1945 "A" and "B u companies,,
3d Medical Battalion evolved from an air1.
station to a Company hospital. The gr?.;.-ja.':
evolution was due to different times r>i Lu- i
ing of personnel and material. The fi^co
casualties were received 26Feb45*
(2) Location with regard toj
a Roads or trail ~ i H" Company Target Area 16f "? '-\
j j revetment west of N~S runway of f - . y>/ Jy. .
# ] It was acessible by road .Cv'c.a , .
.. . . and south, !IBM
Company Initi-.117
Target Area 181Z. directly on suypl/
rood and along natural line of ari../"
On r.C March 1945 moved to Target arfT
16.3 J just off the main supply read.-.
b* Cove:,?1? K^r' Company - Situated in a'revetment and utilised
two conci ite water storage tanks for covers of '.i^
treatment station
"B" Company - Situated south west of high cr-hrr^'
ment which afforded good cover from flat tiai- ory weapons. 9th and 21st evacuation atai-ics:
utilized trenches and sand bags for cover.
c. Dispersions
w lf
A and n B " Company dispersion was limited du
to the confines of the area assigned.
d Other Medical Installations:
"Bff Company, 3d Medical Battalion was situate
apnroximately 500 yards due west of HA" Ccn:.p::..r;,
3d.Medical Br.ttalicn., Regimental Aid Stations
varied from 100 yarris to 3 miles north-of the
Medical Comj ^nies as the campaign progressed.,
e.Proximity to critical points': . ,;*
" r Areas were : -11 chosen because of the direct
flow of casualties and from the stand pbint of
cover.
Natural line of drift of walking wounded:
The medical companies were well located along
natural line of drift. Very few walking wounded
were encountered because of the availability of
ambulances.
(3) Protective measures taken:
a. Local security:
Outposts were established by the medical compandor
in conjunction with other nearby units
b Cover:
The location of the medical companies plus fox
holes provided adequate cover. ~ " . ' '
c. Concealment:
The locati n of nodical companies afforded good
concealment.
d. Shelters and dugouts:
Fox holes were the only shelters available,
e. Black Out precautions:
Medical companies were adequately blacked out ..;. ?:..
discipline was go

Subject: Action Report;

b, Hospitalization:
(1) Fuhctinning:
7 f * and, "B n medical companies functioned u." iad
JU and screening stations during the assault phase.
Major surgery was first undertaken on 16 March,
1945 by "A11 Medical Company and 21 March 1945
by nB* Medical Company. "C" Company aboard an AP
off Iwo Jina assisted the ships medical officers
care, for 2$0i casualties "E" Company assisi ed
the ships medical officer care for 170 cauraltio and continued to care for the wounded upon "."rival
at Quarn.
(2) Adequacy: ^capitalization was considered adequate:
(3) Number of patients:
"*" Company- U B Company- - - 925
- 1741

(4) Equipment: Equipment was considered adequate.

(5) Operations performed:
General surgery was performed by the Medical L
alion after 15 March 1945
c Evacuation:

(1) How affected:

By Division Evacuation Officerl
(2) Adequate or inadequate:
Evacuation was considered adequate.
d. Casualties treated:
(l) Number: 2064
(a) Retained 92
(b) Evacuated:
"A" and "B" Companies (c) Died "25.
(2) Type: Medical and Surgical.
(3) Walking wounded 1117
(4) Stretcher cases:
947
.
e. Sanitation: (l) Special measures:
Local policing, barres type heads and tube
urinals were helpful in contruling flies. The
Malaria Control Unit sprayed all fly breeding
areas with DDT.
(2) Food:
During the greater part of the campaign the
Medical Battalion subsisted on individual canned
rations. Although this was primarily a matter of
military expediency, it, also acted as a factor
in preventing the onset of food-borne disease.
Galleys were operated the last two weeks of the
campaign. These were inspected daily.
(3) Water:
Drinking water was derived in sufficient
quanity from the following sorces:
a. Ships: This water was obtained from the Island?
of Guam and Saipin and transported in suitable
containers to the scene of action by ships, 5
gallon expiditionary cans were refilled from
beached LST's.
b. Distil"1 |tion Units: Were available approx
imate"; w [ . u 10,,.;Water i^fe|furnished to the:
. '.s Medical Battalion }:y ^C. H

1947

f. Disposal (1) (2) (3)

of Deads
Our: To 3<* Division Graves Registration Section.
Enemy: None, . .
Sanitary precautions taken:
As soon as Form "N" was accomplished bodies were
removed iv: Division Cemetery.

g. Epidemics or unusual diseases in troops;

(1) Our Troops:
There, were no epidemics or unusual prevalence
of any disease among the Medical Battalion
personnel.
(2) Civilian: None.
(3) Enemy forces: None.
(4) Insects:
By f T f most important insects encountered
were flies, (several species). They were con trolled satisfactorily by policing areas and spray ing DDT.
h. Dental Service:
There was no dental service other than Emer gencies. Each medical company dental officer did
occassiT.al emergency dental treatment.
i. Care of Civilians: - .
Ho civilians were encountered.
j. Prisoners of War:
None were cared for by-this Medical Battalion.
- k. Medical Organizations r. (1) Suitability of .present type:
It is recommended that medical companies not
be attached to RCT f s for-' combat but remain under
control ci the Commanding Officer, Medical Batt alion with the advice of the Division Surgeon.
(2) Suggest changes:
The mobility of the medical companies would
be greatly increased by the addition of jeep
trailers and amphibious trailers with'the necess ary prime movers.
1. Medical Personnel:
(1) Adequate or inrv1 equate:
Adequate**
(2) Employment:
The Medical personnel were divided into 4
groups, Hospital Section (6 officers, 36 corps men, and 20 marines) and 3 collecting sections
(13 corpsmen and 1 marine).,
(3) Losses and replacements:
n n
k Company: 35 casualties, 18 were evacuated.
25 replacements received for medical company and
collecting section. "B11 15 casualties, 9 'evac.
(4) State of training:
Considered good.
(5) Specialties needed:
None.
m. Field Medical Equipment: . ,
(1) Proportion of allowance carried. ' .
All field medical equipment was lifted,
(2) Pilferage and losses:
. . 2 Unit #5.
of

Subject: Action
(3) Adequate, inadequate and overage; ,
Adequate, except for blankets and litters*
(4) Resupply.: . . .
Very good from division Medical Supply officer,
n. Medical Supplies:
(1) Amount carried:
A thirty day supply for each medical company was
carried. Only combat loaded supplies were landed
with exception of A medical company which landed
all medical supplies. 2D% of the supplies were
used,by * and W B M medical companies. The medical
'" Supplies of MClf Company were landed but not used,
(2) Pilferage and losses:
No pilferage was noted, however H&S Company's
blankets, litters and plasma was not received
ashore. (3) Adequate, inadequate and overage:
Adequate (
(4) Resupply frc*.. Division Medical Supply Officer:
Blankets were obtained from salvage and the
Division Quartermaster* Other supplies were
readily supplied by Sth Field Depot*
oi Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock:
(1) Number and type carried:
30 i ton 4x4 Ambulances
6.J ton 4x4 Ambulances
3 5 ton 4x4 Cargo
6 1 ton 4x4 Cargo
6 2j ton 6x6 Cargo
5 1 ton 2 wheel trailers, 300 galv water
5 3 ton 2 wheel trailers, sterilizer, shower.
5 Generators, 9.4 KVA, Trailer mounted.
(2) Losses:
I i ton 4 x 4 ambulance, 'enemy action.
II ton 4 x 4 Truck, enemy action.
(3) How utilized and maintained:
Vehicles were all combat loaded. When in the
target area they were used for the evacuation
of patients and the procurement of food and water.
Maintenance was accomplished by personnel of the
Medical companies with the exception of lubri cation and major repair done by the Division
Motor transport repair section.
(4) Adequacy:
Vehicles and rolling stock available for the
operation was adequate. The addition of 6ne
jeep trr H e r to each Company would facilitate
movement.
p. Quartermaster Equipment' and Supplies:
(1) Allowance Carried:
Only class II equipment in the amount necessary
for the operation of the field hospital and
evacuation stations was taken forward. 4 portable
O.R.fs were carried but only one was utilized.
(Only 2 companies landed).
(2) Availability ^of:
Most of the equipment was combat loaded. Field
cots and pads were palletized and easily obtain . . able on the beach.

e 8 of 9

Subje

No equipment was replaced during the operation

Automatic supplies and clothing were obtained
from the Division Quartermaster.
(4) Re-clothing of patients:
Adequate quanities were on hand and available.
(5) Adequate or inadequate:
(6) Suitability:
q. Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment and Applies:
(1) None.
5. Ashore-After completion of Assault Phases
a. Hospitalization:
Adequate; the 3d Medical Battalion remained in the target
area only a short time after the Island was officially
secured.
b. Medical Supplies and QM Supplies and equipment:
Adequate.
c. Food and Water:
Adequate. Galley facilities and some fresh food was
available.
d. Sanitation:
Improvement was noted in the latter part of the campaign.
e. Sickness Epidemic or unusual diseases in Medical Battalion.
There was no epidemic or unusual diseases in the Medical
Battalion. 6. Recommendations: '
(a) A medical company be embarked intact with all equipment
aboard a single ship.
(b) Priority be raised on medical gear.
(c) 6 amphibious trailers be assigned to the Medical
Battalion for operations.

A. E.

Page 9 of 9 pages.

ENCLOSURE H

3D TANK BATTALION

ACTION REPORT

1975 G-rtL: ml s

QIJia^AS, 3D T*uK BATTALION, 3D liaaifcE" DIVIblOi , FUST I.ilfc3 FORCE, C/O PL^ET POST OPF^G^, I 9 A p r i l , 1945.

Serial

Prom: To : The Commanding General, 3d Karine Division. Action Report. (a) 3dliarDiv General Order No. 137. (A) 5d Tank Bn Action Report for. the I O JIliA W Operation.

Subject: Reference: Enclosure:

i* In accordance with the provisions of reference

(a), enclosure in) is submitted herewith.

, 33 mm. BATTALION,

iVISIOl!, iLBHD MARIHE FORCE, OST OFFICE, SA1T FBAHCISCO.

y>y- <

2 April
'

ACTIOII REPORT - IWO JIKA I. SUMMARY: 7 Kovembor, 1 9 ^ - 27 March,

&i I* This report covers the 3& Tank Battalion^ activities in planning,
training, logistical preparation, and embarkation relative to the XWO JIMA.
ri3?S&ATIQlT for the period 7 November, Vjkk to 12 February, I9U5.
2 This report includes a narrative resume of this unit's activities
enroute to, and while on the objective for the period 12 February, I9U5 to
22 March, ^
3. This report further contains a ffplay by play* narrative of important
events from the beginning of this battalion.1 s action to recmbarkati on-for
the period 23 February, 19^5 to 27 March, ^
$* Narrative Summary (for detailed.account see Part III)
1 ' The 3& Tank Battalion, having begun embarkation on 12 February, 19^5*
was completely embarked upon 2 LST ! s and 2 AKA's by 16 February. All
convoys sailed that date. .
Maps were issued and officers and men were briefed as thoroughly
as possible on all aspects of the operation,
>. . . On 21 February the LST convoy was attacked by a squadron o f "
*suicide bombers" just off lIIltAtil- IWO, and LST #^77 \^as 'rammed11 about
f if toon feet aft of the starboard magazine, bomb and plane penetrating iJito
the tank deck. This unit suffered three men killed, ton wounded and var ious tank equipment damages. ,
Elements of this Battalion (ttBM company, parts of *Q* - 8 tanks, and
one retriever - and B&S companies) wore landed on 23 February, 19^5-* Tieso
twenty-five tanks reported to the Fourth Tank Battalion, but were subsequently
attached to CO, |*ifth Tank Battalion as Reserve for a unified tank attack
to be made on Ho. 211Airfield on 2k February. Actually only two n011 company
platoons and one "B company dozer tank were employed, and late 2^4 February
!t lf B company was attached to the 21st Marines (attached ^thMar3)iv).
The above tanks wore debarked from LST 6^6; "A* company, remainder
of B&S and nCtr companies debarked LST %77 late 2^ February and eventually
reported to CO, 3dM&rDiv, On the night 2k - 25 February all units Ashore
revorted to Battalion Control, assemb|od in 21st RCT zone of action.
On 25 February, Jd Tank Battalion S^as attached to 9th ECT for an
attack on, and north of, Airfield ITo. 2. This was the lf only occasion that
this battalion was employed as a battalion, "A* and HB companies preceded
the Second Battalion across the airfield after a concentrated air, HGF, and
artillpry strike.
The battalion remained attached to the 9^h RCT for a continuation
of tho attack on 2(? February, B but only *$* company (attached First Battalion)
was employed. 27 February, n B company replaced nG" company (attached First
Battalion).
As a result of these actions, the companies were greatly depleted
(see 2, bolow). Consequently, when the RCT subsequently attachod "companies11
to two or more assault battalions, they were actually two or more "platoons11*
Tho outstanding characteristic of these actions was that tanks wore
boing thrown against artillery and AT:fire in an effort to roach the high
ground beyond the airfield. Undoubtedly, the bulk of tho tank weapons
accomplished much* But it is questionable that they accomplished a s much,
or saved enough infantrymen to warrant such tactics against known AT
emplacements*
On 28 February the tank action bc^an to resolve into the typo of
warfare in which Marine Tank Units, haVo proven most effective. The tanks
wore used in small but sufficient numbers in direct support of infantrf^
Where possible the tanks preceded tho infantry against limitedaad dofinod '
objectives; where this was impractical the infantry took tho load. There
wpre countless situations whore the tank ra^chine-guns and flamethrowers
were employed to destroy strong, though 4 snail, pockets of^jresistance (caves,
mounds, etc). " c

of tanks wasattached to a platoon of infantry

ers, and ether strong points. ,V
and ffAn companies respectively gave direct
overhead 7 5 ^ **re support to the21st ZQT* tfhese were theonly 'concentra ted" torx^es that the tanks laid down as such. Once the high ground in
the northern part of theisland was attained, tanks were placed on the
cliffs firing &own into the depress!one leading to thenorthern "bache/%
..*Th remaining phase of the IWO JE-IA Operation gave the tanks.limited,
"but essential opportunities. Host of the "special weapons* - smalland
large capacity flamethrowers, rocket launchers, 75mia HE ammunition with
2-105 fuses - were used continuously and effectively on isolated pockets of
to
resistance. .' . ' ,. , . , .. ,

The "battalion, less "A* company, reembarked on 22 March,, X$k5and

sailed forGuam. f*A* company remained attached to the9th EOT (Hone:One
platoon "A* company regained with 21st BC$ until Hth Karch),
2. Thefollowing chart is a report of tanksrused, available,and
operative throughout the campaign:

01>2HAirini A B 0
A

riTB

IITCEE

HI:

(Maintenance)
B
0

tSestroyed
A 1 1 3
0

A
0

B
x

2k 5
26
27
ZZ 1 llarch
2 llarch 3 March k March 5 llarch 6 llarch 7 March g llarch** 9 i'larcn l 10 Iferch ,
11 March . 12 March 13 llarch 14 Inarch
15 March lo March 17 March IS March 19 March 20 March 21 March 22 March*** .2} March 2k March" 25 March 26 March 27 March

11

11

15
g 11

11 10 10 10 10 10

11

crv

I
g

*5
li

10
10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 10 12 12 12 12 12 12

6
7
3 5 6 7
7

3 l

5
2

6 ,
0
l it 2

1
1

2 3
l
r-l

k k

3
3

o
0 0 0 1

13
12

3
3

.3
3

xo 10
7 g 7
9

7 7

7 10 g

2 2 1 1

.2 2

1 2 1 1 1 1
0

3
3

I5

9 2 9 9 9 9 10 9 10
9 10

10 7 10
7
10

2 2 2 2
1
1

1 3

4
2"

3
2

1
3
l l

2 2
0 0 0

3 k

0 2 1 2 0 0 0

0
0

13 13 13 13

1 2 2 1
1

0:

1 1

2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2

7 7
7 7
7 7 7

3 11
0
3
0 0
3 6 3
3 3 12 o 3 12 3 0
3

0 0

6
lk< 0
6
0
15

3
2 2

os
0 0

3 .

3
0 1

g g g g g g g g g

r 5
5 5 5

9 3
0 1 0

3 3

6
0 l . 0
0
0 0 0 0

0 6 0
3
1

0
1

5
5
5 " 5 5 5

2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

6
10

2 0 0

9
g

"A* Company's tanks were damaged enroute as a result of enemy action, !** H3& tank plus ono diesel tank acquired f rom *4-th 3k Bn was attached to "B1* company* ( * One flamethrowing tank acquired from l*th 3?k Bn was attached to "A* - company.

PAET II, A, The Preferred Operation Plan (22 January, 19*f5 2J0P SSCRSff) assigned this oattalion the following mission: liand on order on 'baches to Tie desi^na^ed prepared to support the Division as directed^ This was no departure from the mission that had been assigned this* "unit in the i)iv

,w<r JS received their mission in the Bn Opn Plan

1-45 (29. Januaryr,'r1945, %3pfp3GRET) and, since the Division was in Reserve,
nothing more specific was assigned as an order.
Two LST*s had been allotted for the transportation of the tanks (and five
4x4 radio trucks). It was possible to embark approximately one and one-half
tank companies on each LSI. Since the 9*k aa<* 21st RCT's were to land first,
f f f f A and lfBff companies (respective normal support tank companies)* wore each
assigned one I>ST, and ''0* company was divided, elements'on each LSI. The
other equipment was assigned to AKA's (See Part IT, E, "Transport Quarter master). .
B # It was decided that this unit would be composed of the following per sonnel and equipment for the assault phases of the IWO JIMA. Operations
Personnel

USKC . *

USE

B&S "A" i r f f

OFF
11

7
b

WO T 0
0 Q

~25
154
160 - '

2SJL

OFF
2

"TT*

2
2
10

mL

2 .

OTAL

31

If5 553
Equipment
B&S Co.

~ ,

' (2 Officers >>

Marine replacements joined during 13 - 16 March)

39

Air C o .

"B Co.

*C Co.

TAKE, M4A2
SANK, retriever TRUCK,', cargo, 6x6

15
1

15
1

15

2
1
2

4
.1

4
1

4 .

TRUCK, 1 ton, 4x4 TRUCK, 1/4 ton, 4x4 w/radio TRUCK, 1/4 ton, 4x4,
TRUCK, 2 l/2 ton, 6x6, water

3
1
1
1 1 1

AMHJLAttCS. 1/4 ton, 4x4

TRAILERS

1 ton, cargo 1/4 ton, cargo 1 ton, water ARC WELDER, 1 ton 2 tbn, stockroom 1 ton, Lubor 1 ton, stockroom

3
1 1 l
:

2 1

1
1 1

0 .
1

l
1
1

1
0

C. The following: is a brief account of all activities of this unit in pre paration for the op oration.
1. S-l. Although the IfrearH and wforward0 echelons of personnel were ^
assigned in January, the actual preparation began on 2 February. A* that
time companies began compiling personnel data sheets. Concurrently, tho' S-l .
prepares briefs of SOPrs and embarkation rosters. The Rear Echelon was
activated on 12 February as the Porw<?.rd Bchclbn embarked. Billeting,, ad ministrative orders, and casualty rep#rts (soo Air Attack, above) wer.e
effectively handled aboard ship.
2* S-2. Having be cm. assigned the mission, Intelligence material was
immediately assembled, and briefing conducted for Staff Officers and
Company Commanders.. Aerial Photographs wore "grid&od'1.to facilitate study.
Aboard ship, S-2 conducted school on Intelligence Material (soo IV, 3 ) .
3r S-3. Having been alerted by the .tentative plan, most of the necess ary training had been conducted before the actual mission was assigned (see
IV, C, Operations and Training). Operations andEmbarkation orders were
immediately formulated after conferences among, Battalion^and Company Comtiand ers, Staff Officors, and Special Staff Officors.
4. S-4. Furnished individual equipment and clothing , as available, to
i for
personnel of the battalion; requisitioned supplies to

nces* <$! personnel were briefed j^^J on combat supply prbbleSsT^ Administer,.vo Plans wero drawn up to accompany Bn SnB 0 and Opn 0 {see IV, 35, below). 'K t 5* Transport Quartermaster - After shipping space had toon assigned the Battalion, allotments wore* given to the companies in accordance with existing Division orders. Submitted UP.& TO?16,. loading plans and manifests to Dlv T($4. Made changes as advised, i l l material was moved to staging area as per instructions (see IV, E, "below), i l l loading completed,"by l6 February, X^l+5. , ^

6. Ordnance.
A. Combat Vehicles - Immediately following the. Guam Operation, all
vehicles were completely inspected and necessary maintenance performed.
Battalion welding machines and maintenance personnel, augmented 3& Crdnanco
Company's Tank Maintenance Platoon vftile adding extra turret and eponson armor,
and installing Deep Water Fording Kits. Operation of first and second
echelon maintenance Was continuous during the training period. Preventive
maintenance school was^ conducted regularly for all tank crews.
B** Weapons - All tanks Wore inspected to ascertain the condition
of 7 5 ^ gunc, machine guns. Gyro-stabilizers, and Hydraulic traverse units*
All necessary repairs and adjustments were made. Thirteen (13) 3ftB
Flamethrowers wore installed in tanks and intensive training was given
operators and assistant operators on filling, charging, and firing.
periments were conducted in mixing HaPaln fuol. All CO-2 fire extinguishers
were checked andrefilled. Tanks were issued organizational spare parts.
C. Ammunition - The following is an approximate resume of all
typos of ammunition embarked in each tank:
.30 Cal. (tracer l-in~5) . 9,000 rds.
75mm
*K) rds.
APC M6l w/fuze BD K66A1 w/traccr 50 rds.
HS UkS w/fuze PD 1&8 suporquick- --*---.-.-C 10 rds.
Smoke WP X O II w/fuzo PDUk6 G-r qnados, incendiary - . - - - - - - - 2
Grenades i fragmentation- - . - . - - - - - - - - h
Grenades, smoke, HC^ - ^ ^ - -. ^
7 Chemical Vforfare - Training coiisisted of schooling for all personnel
-in recognition of various chemical agents, protective measures, first aid,
ir m dpcont&aination, and use of Graphic Aid 3-2 card", llasks were fitted,
* . v *
tested, and ro~cratod for transportation. S. Medical - Tetanus, typhoid, cholera, plague, and typhus innoculations
wore completed for all personnel, including replacements, prior to embarka tion. - Clothing was impregnated with JDinethylphthalato an*d DDT as a protect ion against Tsutsugamushi and Typhus Covers. Two (2) percent of the
Battalion porsonnel wero instructed as litter bearers.
SI. Signal - SCR-50H, 528 radios were installed during the period 19
ITovember - 3 Docember, 19*4i. During this time mountings for tho SCR 300
radios woro prepared and installations of the Tanto-Infantry telephones wore
made. SCR-300 installations were Completod and realigned in time to aid
Tank-Infantry training. SCR 5^0 radios woro made available just prior to
January 19^5 Waterproofing of radio f gear was completed prior to embarkation.
Porsonnel had participated in.all CPX s and Tank-Infantry training. In tensive study was devoted to SOI, SOP, and all aspects of the operation.
10, Battalion Chaplain - Arranged for initial welfare and morale equip ment which was embarked with troops. Communion services were conducted
aboard ship, and chaplain landed with unit.

JII

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT Of TH3 ACTIOH

minus ten (k) time, Sf.st longitude time).

ent embarked aboard USS LI3RA and USS JUPITER

12 February 1945
Troops, tanks, and five radio kxk % - ton trucks embarked aboard

LST #^77.

'

13 February
Troops and Tanks embarked aboard LST &4-6. Embarkation complete.
16 February ,
Convoy sailed. Maps issued to personnel.
2Q February
Three and one-half (3#) miles off shore IWO JIKA.
21 February-
Convoy sailed about thirty fivo (35) miles off shore. 1720
Enemy air attacic launched against Convoy. One enemy plane hit LST #^
(see I, B, above).
23 February
Received orders to beach and unload elements aboard LST #Uj7 ( J
t pmy "AntGoixpMiy r-0li
less two platoons, Staff tank). Due to damage from the
air attack tiis was impossible* The tanks were needed for a coordinated tank
att'ack on 2k February. CO, 5thTk3n was to coordinate all tank., in a drive
across airfield #2* Since LST $4?7 could not beach, the orders were trans mitted to LST #646. Company "3" and t / platoons plus two Company Headquart vo ers tanks of Company "C'f disembarked accordingly, and Tank 3attalion Executive
Officer reported to CO, 5th Tank Battalion.

Remained aboard LST # f 7

3"
Received orders to land on IWO-JIMA. Company landed at approx imately 1500. Ordered to report to Fifth (5th) Tank Battalion. Tracks on
three tanks were broken as they attempted to execute sharp turns on the sandy
beach. Company Mvouacod at TA l6U Queen.

fl

LST #646 beached on "Beach Yellow". The track of- one tank
was broken while making a turn in 'the loose sand. The equipment landed from
this LST was as follows: eight(8) tanks and ono (l) retriever, "Upon landing
.the retricVer was tali en over by the Bn-X to be used as a Battalion Command

Post.

1700 - Reported to and attached to 5th Tank Battalion, 5 * Marino

*1 Division. Moved tanks from "Beach Yellow" to assembly area at TA-16UQ on
SW edge of airstrip #1.
183Q - Received heavy enemy artillery fire throughout the night.
1930 - Condition "Jled".

2 1 February
* Tank Battalion (less Company "B" and two platoons of Company UC")
disembarked at 13^-5 0 1 Beach Green and reported to Fourth Marine Division
* according to instructions from CC-, 3diiarDiv. 3n assembled TA lUSC. Received
orders to report to CG-, 3clMarDiv at 1200. At this time orders were received
attaching Tank Battalion to 9th Marino for attack on 25 February passing
through 21st .Ilarines. In the meantime those elements attached to 5^h Tank
Battalion were employed in the attack on Airfield Ho. 2. Company "3" loss
bulldozerr was held in Reserve, while one-platoon of Company n C" was further
attached to the 21st i-iarinos, and another platoon was attached to 27th Ilarines,
, . All units assenbled vicinity 16^3 by 2^00 prepared to revert to 3n
control at O7OO, 25 February, ^
"A*
Landed at 1330, moved immediately to TA l^S 0 (SE end of Airfield
llo. X) and "dug intt for the night. At 2230 recoivod o
D ( T end. of Airfield Ho. l); arrived at 2^00 and remained
I of night, so as to be available for support of 9th. CT onj

Conpany ?B r ^Id^i4f<3) platoons of Conj&ny "C* were attached to

Jifth (5th) Tank Battalion to bo employed in support of the 21st Roginont in
a drive across airstrip-#2, Conpany ffBrf was held in reserve, The bulldozer '
was employed with tho leading plenehts of the 5th Tank Battalion, This t&nk
was hit by a nortar sholl causing that tank to run into a hole. Crow evacuated
safely and rovumed to canp. This occurred in vicinity of TA 181 Tare, At
I63O the conpanv was detached fron the 5th Tank Battalion and attached to tho
21st Regiment.;
"C"
0730 The Ibcocutivo Officer, Conpany <rCff reported to CO, 5th Tank
Battalion. She units of Conpany fl0u were placed in reserve,*
1530 - '?hc 3d Platoon with tho Sxccut.ivo Officer*s tank, upon order
of C0| 5th Tank Battalion, nov.od up to the edge of Airstrip #2 } where they
wore net by the 00, 2nd Bn, 21st Marines and orders issued for their
enploynent*. l l e e units were to.bo in support of Co ?rJPirf 2nd 3n 21st
iis Marines* but tho infantry was able to rnrcoDo the resistance holding up the
advance and ttjfc. wero not employed. While standing by in. this area tho tanks
drew oxtr.cnely. heavy artillery f iret ,
15^5 ~ h e 4th Platoon was used in support of Co frB", 2nd Bn, 27th
Marines in-TA-19&1 i i W .They attacked in this area-with close infantry support
f&. dnd destroyed nur.crous caves a n bunkers, .d
2jj February
The Battalion was attached to the 9th Marines, Company ffAr' (11 tanks)
and Conpany 'ff]Bir (13 tanks) were further attached to the 2d Bn, 9th Marines
for the attack across Airfield #2, Conpany "Cff renaincd in B.eminental
Reserve. '

"A"

0800 - 11 tanks sent in support of 2d Bn, 9th Marines in $ittack

across S end of Airfield ITo, 2. Targets of opportunity were engaged, Pour
inoperative tanks were repaired and sent*to join others. The heavy fires
encountered resulted ins two tanks being burned up; 1 bogged down in loose
sand, broke a track, and was tcnporarily.abandoned; 5 ethers had to withdraw,
all of which had received hits on the suspension systen, 1 had a punctured
radiator also, I;1lanethrowors nountod in "tanks proved invaluable against
pillboxes which ^QTO in defilade fron our flat trajectory.fire,,

Conpany lr3:J was attached to the 2nd Bn, 9th Martnes. This "battalion
wae to.continue the attack in a northerly diroctionpassing through the
2d 3n, 21st with- + a l Companies Able and 3akor attachod to tho 9th Roginont.
,n" Conpany Baker vjas onplo;"od in the right zone of action, The loading olononts
of the infantry woro~held up " y terrific artillery fire in TA 195 33AY,
b I' 0910 - Conpany U > ' tarJ^s woro to precede the infantry in an effort to neutralize
the gunfire that was holding up the advance. 1010 ~ One fourth platoon tank
was hit by artillery fire. The crow was safely evacuated by another tank. * *r
10^0 - A first- platoon tank was hit on the turret but no serious danagc
was done. 10^5 ~ larks that had expended all of their ammunition return ed to bivouac area for nore annunition, 1300 - Conpany lfB" was relieved by
CQnpany

0700> The Conpany was attached to 9th Marines and held Iti Reserve. /
26 February
The Battalion remained attached to the 9^n Marines and Conpany "0" (15
tanks) was further attached to the 1st Battalion, 9 * brines for tho
^1 norning attack across the northeastern end of airfield #2. , J>rt 12^+5 Conpany
"A" (11 tanks).was attached to the 2nd Bn, 9th Marines, Conpany "3" was
held in Reginental Reserve*

f 9th Marines for close-in support mission; returned at 1500 i f f c l f f S more tanks to 2d Bn, 9th marines; returned at 1630. Total of 6 tanks inacTion* 2 of which were partially disabled by AT and arty fire* 3 645 - 15 minute enemy a r t i l l e r y concentration was layed on tank assy ares at jtf end of Airfield #1; 1 tank was partially disabled. v- ; Company """ was held in Re^iciental Reserve*
ff

0630 - Company C was attached to 1st Bn, 9-b Marines far the day*s attack* 0730 - Company wBtf requested a platoon or tanks to cssist them in seizing the h i l l and high ground jn vicinity of TA-300P* 0750 - Conpany OoFE^rd ta.uk and one platoon raovsri out to report to CP&pany W M B AttccTc coordinated with the infantry MD! coi:arer,!ed<f ?ho fcar>ks and infant ry moved arcnind the h i l l firing into caves anl de.itrc7.u1p; pillboxes and bunkers* A flamethrowing tank T>ias used to burn out a cive ^rom 7mich enemy infantry were emerging or. the base of the reverse side. The flamethrower exploded the ammunition in tiie cave*. 0815 - The tv^c\ of one of the tanks was broken by an a r t i l l e r y shftll believed to be a friendly short round I t was requested that our a r t i l l e r y barrage be iiftec! soo yards which was done. The crew remained in the tank and continued firing at the enemy fortifications* > 3? February The Battalion was attached to the 9th Marines. The Battalion (loss Com pany tfBsf) remained in Regimental Reserve. Company WBW (11 tanks) was further attached to 1st Bn, 9th Marines and preceded the infantry attack across the northeastern end of Airstrip No. 2. "A"
Attached to 9-:;h M-rines. No tanks committed.
Coiupany "B" <"s attached to the 1st Bn, 9th Marines and VILS. to precede tt ff L advacolng in a NE direction* The line of departure was in the vicinity of TA SCO 0, 0730 - Elevca (1A) tanks moved out in the advance* 0750 - Third ;ola':oon leader's tank was disabled by a m?.ne, Three (3) nore tanks were disabled b^ mines in an attempt to maneuver around tanks that had been hit and knock-ad out.. Only throo (3) tanks were successful .in passing the line of departure and t-wc (S) of these v;ere immediately knocked jut by M! fire* 0822 - A l l tanks F^r-e ordered to withdraw'by the CO, l^t Bn, 9th Marines. During t h i s bried ac^'cLi of approximately twenty (2^'; ainutes, si:: (6) tanks were knocked out and feu: msn ^ers killed* Ton (,".C) non and tLree crffiaers were wounded and o:*e i^~a i s missing in action* Bscelidnt work waa 'ioce by the tank crews in evaeurt!r>:3 the wounded men* 0630 - Coopany {fC': in regimental Rcsorvo ^6 February The Battalion wat. attached to the Slst Marines cffoc.tivo ylyin that ment prepared to pass through the 9th Marines* Company ftA" (8 tanks) and com pany ttCrt (11 tanks) nor-Q attached to the 1st and 3rd Bns. 21st Marines* resi>oct ively. The Tank Battalion (loes Comj?anies wAtt k rtG*ff vias in Regimental Attached to 1st Bn, 21st Marines* 3 tanks cor*r<uttcd against heave concen tration of oaves and .bunkers with 'excellent results obtained., using 75ttm HE AP HS to blow up and seal caves at 200-A, B & 217-3T. Company ttBw was not employed*

Ctt

0700 - C3on58yH^jM^IAiPcli#d to 3d Battalion, 21st Marines and r e f i n ed in the assembly OTfaJjfeJgb. to support the Infantry as ordered* 1530 - The eleven (11) opeSSftoijal tanks displaced forward to target area 199 X & J #hero they had the mission of covering bott. r-unvrays of a i r strip #2 ' . 1 March The Battalion was attached tb the 21st Regiment, company "AM (11 ) was further attached to the 1st Bn# and Company wBt? (7) tanks) was attached to t h e 2 d Bn, 21st Marines* The Battalion (less companies rtAw and ^B*) remined in Regimental Reserve. However, at 1500 one platoon of Company tfCw reinforced Company wB{ffs tanks.
'
"A*

Attached to 21st Marines. Three (3) tanks committed with 1st

Battulion* Fair results norc obtained on* caves by using T-105 (armored)
fuses with 75mm H E shells* These fuses penetrated too deep in earth
fortifications, however, their performance was'excellent against
stone and concrete* One man wounded in action by mortar burst near
Company CP. * <
'

O 0630 - C of company nB* &n& platoon leaders reported to C of O 2d Battalion 21st Marines a t TJ 200 potor. The direction of attack was in a northerly direction in the vic-r inity of l a 217 W The infantry was encountering machine ^un and mortar fire and the tanks were called to aid the advance at T 217W A and X. 1030 "- The second platoon moved out to support Company "E*, 2d Battalion 21st Marines. The Company Comnia.nder of Comixmy nBrt used the pack set (SCR 510) carried by Reconnaissance aen to direct the tanks.' 1100 - Second platoon of tanks received h i t s from a un of un-1 kriown caliber but were unable to spot the gun. All tanks were receiving heavy fire from rockets and mortar. 1102 - Jap tanks wore spotted beinr, used as emplacements. Tho infantry save our tanks*close support in keeping the enemy away from our.units. , 1115 - The tanks effectively attacked Jap tanks and infantry. v 1255 -vTtoc t^ird platoon vras brought up to aicl the second platoon which was running. Ion on arinunition. 1355 - The tJiird platoon leader 1 s tank was h i t . After the crevj had evacuated the Japs attempted to blow up the tank by placinc dynamito under i t . Thpy \vere cut dovm by machine &un f i r e . M

1510 - Six (6) tanks were employed in this action. Three of them
were knocked out " y enemy fire and remained on the front lines. During
b the night two (2)-of these tanks were "burned " y the Japs? The three re b maining tanks returned safely to the bivouac area.
As a result of this action eight (8) of the enemy's tanks were de stroyed and one (l) truck, and numerous pillboxes and emplacements. One
officer and three of our men were wounded.

0700 - Company "C" stood by in assembly area prepared to support the

infantry as ordered.
1500 - One (l) platoon was detached from the Reserve and was attached
to Company ffBw
, 3d. Tank Battalion, While moving up to join Company "B",
3d Tank Battalion, in TA 217-W and passing through the defile at TA-2OOD,
one (1) tank was hit by a high explosive projectile presumably fired from
a dual purpose AA. gun. The traversing nechanisiu of this tank's turret was
slightly damaged*
^ - Company n C n
was attached to 9th Marines.
2 March
Battalion reverted to Division Control; Company "3" was attached to the
21st uarinos and Company n C M was attached to'tho 9th Rcgincnt ifor attack
this morning. Company'W3n was further attached, to 3& Battalion, 9*h Mar ines (also attached to the 21st), Company W C" attached platoons to both
the 1st and 2d 3attalions, 9th.

"A"

Ccnpany M A W tanks WQTC not employed this date. Tho bulldozer was
called by the 2dBn, 28th Regiment, 5th Division. This Battalion was held
up .by the Japs because the tanks working with the "battalion were unable
to cross the A. T. ditch located at TA 2l6 iTan. The "bulldozer success fully filled in this ditch, under fire, end: the infantry v/as able to ad vance.
"B"
attached to the 21st Regiment. 5 tanks in action with 3d3n, 9th Marines
using both close-in J 5 m firo on "bunkers and caves, and medium range over head fires in area of Airfield 17o. 3# at 217 J m& o n high ground at 235 V.
Infantry reported excellent results. 2 tanks hit land nines and were a bandoned at TA 217X. 1 1 i O jeep put out of action.
-A
itcn

O63O - Company "C" attached to 9th Marines.

1100 - Two (2) tanks moved up to assist Cotipany &*, 2dBn, 9th i i r -a incs in TA-218U. By firing on ridge at 218M&R, they destroyed a gun of
unidentified caliber and several pillboxes and caves.
1300 - These two (2) tanks expended their unit of fire and were re placed by two (2) more tanks, who again supported Company "G-", 2d3n, 9th
Marines. They assisted the infantry by knocking out several pillboxes and
automatic weapons in TA-21SV. Thc^c two (2) tanks completed their mission
and returned to the assembly area.
1600 - The 3rd platoon moved out to support Company "A", lstBn, 9^h
Marines. The platoon leader contacted the company commander and the tanks
were employed to place fire on several enemy nc.ciiinc gun positions and caves
at TA-201C.

3 March

The 3d Tank Battalion (loss two companies) rcnaincd in Division Reserve.

Company M 3 W was attached to the 21st Regiment and held in Reserve; ono
platoon was used for a direct overhead fire nisoion against Eill 3&2
(TA 219U). Company "C" was attached to the 9th Marines and the Company
(loss two platoons) was further attached to the 2cD:i, Two platoons of
Company "C" were attached to the 1st Battalion,

, ' "A"
Division Roscrvo. I o tanks comnitt
T

The Company was attached tp the 21st Regiment, This regiment was
advancing in an easterly direction toward Kill J62, located in TA 219 Unit.
The second platoon fired on the hill as the 21st advanced.

O63O - Company "C" attached to 9th Marines.

O725 - The 4th Flatoon moved up to support Company "A11, lstBn, 9th
Marines, in TA-201D.. There, by firing into TA-2O2J\&3, they destroyed several
bunkers and caves."* '
0815 - One (l) tank was hit l y a gun of unidentified caliber, wound a ing one crew member. All other crew members safely evacuated the. knocked out
tank.
fr* O73O - The 2d Platoon moved up to support 'tJcfepanloG*M&n a a f *^*Jo,
2nd3n, 9^h Marines in TA-21SR. There they destroyed numerous caves, pillboxes,
and bunkers.
1050 - The Headquarters Platoon moved up to assist ^fepe&jr^E'1! 2dBrj.,
9th Marines in TA-21SW. *dhilo passing through the defile at 200D our tank ;
dozer less blade sustained a hit^from a gun of unidentified caliber with the
result that a track was-"broken, The disabled tank continued to fire. The
% two (2) remaining tanks continued on their mission and assisted tfonn3^, 2nd3n,'
9th Marines, by firing on ridge at 218G&M. Two (2) emplacod enemy tanks, one
pillbox and numerous enemy infantry1 were destroyed,
11^5 - The 1st Platoon moved up to assist 'Sfr^W, lstBn, 9th Marines
in TA-201C. There they assisted our infantry by firing into the ridge at
202D. They destroyed,one pillbox and several automatic weapons. One (l) of.
jcf tanks (knocked out" in 2A-201C) was destroyed by one of the tanks ,of the fio 2nd Platoon after friendly infantry had reported seeing Japs getting inside.
k March
The Battalion (loss two companies) was in Division Reserve pre*
pared to support either assault Regiment on order. Company ttjLH (10 tanks)
was attached to the 21st Marines, and Company "C" (10 tanks) was attached
to the 9"kn Marines (further attached to 2nd Battalion)
"A"
Attached to 21st Marines for direct overhead fire mission on Hill
362 TA 219-U. Unobserved results due to extremely low cloud formation,

B"

Company "3" was not employed.

O63O - Company "C" attached to 9*h Marines*

O725 - The Uth Platoon moved out to assist Company "G", 2d3n, 9th
Marines in TA-21SRW.
^825 - While moving into attack, positions one (l) tank of this p a s l- toon was #it by an enemy AT gun. Three (^ members of this tank were able to
safely ovacuate even thougl). one of .those was slightly wounded.

5 March ^ Battalion ( l e s s SwbpftnloB-^A^.an'a'^C*) cliango in attachments* ' " "A"

in

Division Reserve. ITo . ,

Attached to 21st Marines, lTo tanks' committed.

Company "3" was not employed. Remained in Battalion Reserve,

O63O ** Ho operations. Attached to 9th Regiment

6 March
Battalion (less Companies "A" and HC") in Division Reserve. I o
T change in attachments.
rrAn
Attached to 2lst Regiment, Ho tanks committed.
Company "Btt was not employed. Battalion Reserve,
"C"
O63O - Company n C" attached to 9th Marinas.
0S00 - The 1st Platoon moved out to support the 1st bn, 9*h Karines
i l TA-201C, They were used to fire on ridge at 2011 and assist the advances
l of the infantry by destroying several "bunkers, pillboxes, and automatic weap ons.
O915 -(0ne (l) tank hit a mine witli the result that a track was
"broken. Jour (h) of the crew members were safely evacuated from the tank but
the fifth crew member was killed by enemy sniper fire as he attempted to come
up out of the turret.
1015 - Another tank of this platoon hit a mine and broke a track.
All crew members of this tank were able to safely evacuate it.
0S15 - The 3d Platoon moved out to support Co' W 2d Bn, 9th Mar ines in TA-21S2, There, by overhead fire placed on ridge at 21SSX they sup ported the attack of our infantry.
0900 - One (l) tank was hit in the right sponson with an AT gun..
Two crew members were killed and the other three wounded' in this tank,

7 March .

Battalion" (less Companies "A" and nCn) In Division Reserve. I o

T change in attachments,

Attached to 21st Harinos, I o tanks committed.

T "3"

Company was not employed.

Battalion Reserve.

"C"
0630 - Company "C" attached to 9th Marines.
0655 - The 2d Platoon moved out to support Company "3 W , 2d Bn,
Marines in, TA.-218B.WSk This platoon was employed to blast caves in this area.
They destroyed a gun of unidentified caliber in TA-218T*
1^-02 - This platoon moved out to support Company "P1', ;2dBn, Jill b r ines-and was released by Company n/3n * In moving up through a narrow defile one
(l) tank hit a mine breaking a track. All of the crew safely evacuated the
tank. This tank blocked the approach for the other two tanks of the platoon
to tjonpany.."3111* As a result they were ordered to return to Company "3".
I6OO - Due to the fact that Company "7" whs surrounded and pinned
down another two (2) tanks of the 1st Platoon wore ordered to nnkc their wc.y
to the "company.
1700 - This platoon was unable to find an avenue of approach into ,
"P" Company due to the extremely rugged terrain.
g Harch
> Battalion (less Companies "A" and "C" In Division Reserve. I o
T change in attachments.

"A"

'

'

Attached to 21st Regiment. 9 tanks committed* in bcac.'i sector of 2d3n,

21st Marines against caves and pillboxes which wore holding up advance to beach

at 219A.

Company M 3" was not employed. Battalion ~oserve.

wJ^SWW^ttod^

0700 - Company *C" attached 9th Marines. 2 o T

3attalioiffliN.l3fcppiiics "A1* riul nCM) in Division Reserve. Ho

change in attachments; hoi^ever, .Company n G" was further attached to tho 3rd
Battalion, 21st Marines which was also attached to the 9th Regiment. At 1100
two platoon of Company n B n
were released from Division Reserve and attached to
the 9th Marines to " e further attached to the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines,
b "A*
Attached to 21st Marines. 6 tanks, corxiitted, 3 of which fired a
mission for 2d Bn; the other towed a rocket sled to firing point, then fired
20(rockets with fair results at 235T. ' .
Edq's platoon worked with Conpanies Grddg6 &nd 2Jasy, 3d-Bn > 9th
in TA-219 Xray. The infantry pointed out targets for the .tanks to fire on.
In this way numerous emplacements that were holding up the tidvance of the in fantry were olimine/ted. It was found that "o'y taking the infantryman into the
tank turret better results were detained tlian " y any other method of target
b designation. The 2d Platoon worked with the 3d 3n, 9th and knocked out mor tars and pillboxes in the same type work;

O63O - One tank section equipped with flamethrowers moved out to

support rtKn
Company,3& Bn, 21st Marin s against.Hip pocket of .resistance
in TA-201D.
0900 The tanks and infantry jumped off in'a coordinated attack
and moved ahead about 225 yards. At this point the enemy employed smoke a gainst our tanks, apparently in preparation for attacking us with demolitions.
This disorganized -the ^replacement infantrymen and caused them to beat a -hasty
withdrawal. After the infantry withdrew, some 50 yards, the entire ground pro*
viously held became active. It was necessary to establish a new r-.dio obser vation post and in doing this a reconnaissance man was killed by sniper fire.
The tank section was forced to withdraw to the lines of the infantry, where
they expended their remaining ammunition in an effort to cover the reorganiza tion.
1330 - This section was replaced by the 2d Platoon.
10 March
Battalion (loss Companies "A" and "B")in Division Reserve* Company
W U
B (S tanks) relieved Company M C" which was attached to tho 9th Marines..
n B" was further attached to the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines.

"A" Attached to 21st Regiment.. 6 ; tanks committed with 1st and 2nd Bn.'s against heavy rock and concrete emplacements along beach, Ithcccllent r e s u l t s were obtained from use of T-105 fuzes*
"3"
Hdq's platoon worked in support of Companies'Gsor^eOand Hasyf 9tfr
Marines. The second platoon worked with Conpany I L * . 3d 3n, 21st Marines
'', at 201D. During tho morning both platoons fired*into emplacements, pillboxes,
etc. The 2d Platoon loader's tank was fired on by an unknown gun which" later
was discovered to be a Company "C" tank manned by a Japy The gunner, in the
assault tank was killed, A bazooka was called and knocked out the Company.nClr

tank. , . . '

"Cn
O63O - Company "C" in Division "oscrve with Tank Battalion'in ass embly area in TA-199X.
11 March
Battalion (less Companies "A" r i "3" and one platoon of Company *Cir)
ad was attached to 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines in Division Reserve. Company "Aw
was attached to the 21st Regiment.% Company "3" was attached to the 9th Regi ment with platoons further attached to tho 1st and 3rd 3attalions. One pla toon of Company" "C" was attached to the 9th Ilrrinos and further attached to
the 3rd Battalion, lst Marines (also attached to 9th Ma]

Attached to " 1 'm\jg CT at 219A with 2nd1Battalion,

Tanks in action- in beach sector of 21st

' .

"B" '
HdoJ s and 2d platoon supported 9th regiment.
0905 - Hdq's platoon laid down fire on ridge in TA-202CTH in pre paration for attack by Able Company, 1st Bn, 9th Marines,
O935 - ^Q infantry movc-d out across an open field toward the ridge,
moving in a northerly direction. The tanks preceded the infantry about twenty
five yards. A successful crossing of the field was made in that, manner, Hone
of the infantry was wounded in moving across the field,
1*030 - Able Company'infantry was held up by fire fro:;; the ridge. The
tanics fired at alj caves and suspected sniper positions.
1200 - The Second platoon moved out to aid the 3& 3 i 9th. In order
ii to get into-a position to aid then it v~s necessary that an armored bulldozer
be used to build a road for the tanks. This was successfully accomplished and
the 2d Platoon moved into position. .They fired into the other side of the ridge
on which the K&q.fs platoon was firing.
1550 - HdqTs platoon joined the 2d Platoon and both platoons laid
down a barrage on the ridge in order that tho 3^ Bn, 9 ^ could advance and
take the ridge. ' \ v
. l62O - All tanks ceased firing and the infantry moved out in the at tack. Tho Hdqfs platoon returned to Able Company, 1st 3n, S t and shielded
'h this company with their tanks- in order that the wounded could be evacuated an.3
the rest of the company could withdraw,
1900 ~ All tanks were released and safely returned to the bivouac
area.

nc.i

0600 r Company "Cn in Division Reserve.

O63O/~ The 1st Platoon moved out to support the~$a.3n 21st marines.
Only one (l) tank of this platoon was employed and it was used to t ow a rocket
launcher into position where it could eliminate ITip resistance located in TA 201P. iTearly 20 of the 7-2" rockets were thrown into this pocket and still our
infantry was unable to go in and occupy the ground.
12 March _ '
Battalion (less Company "A" and "3" and one platoon of Company "C")
attached to 2d Bn, 9th Marines in Division Reserve. Company t!A" attached to
21st Marines, Company |;3" att chod to 9th Marines with platoons further att ached to the 1st and 3& 3ns. One platoon Company "Cff was used as Rcginental
Reserve for tho 9^h.
"A"
Attached to 21st Regiiront. ITo action.

0730 Hdq/s platoon moved out to support Company "C", 1st 3n, 9th,
located in T^-20llJ* The tanks wei-o guided to C : i a i CWVS c ? ^ in:fantrynon.
o.piy ,.During the morning and afternoon ilip positions were accurately pointed out .by
he infantry and successful work in. clininating tho.se positions was done by the
tanks. The terrain was cxtrencly rou/vh causing groat difficulty in maneuvering
the tanlcsr
1255 - The 2d platoon moved out to support "I" Co, 3d 3n, 9th. The
tanks noved out approxinateley one thousand yards from TA-21SC to TA-21SX to
meet the infantry who were attacking in a westerly direction. Their mission was to knock out a machine gun that was holding up the advance of the infantry.
The tank a were moving "cross ground that was s-till occupied by Japs and extreme
difficulty^was experienced in crossing the very soft terrain. It was also very
difficult to maintain'direction because tlje tanks, were being directed by remote
controy through their'radios.

HQtt

O63O - Co "C lees one (1) platoon in Division Reserve.

O7OO - One (l) platoon in reserve with the 9th ii -.

13 March
Battalion (loss Conpanyics "A" and "3" and one platoon of Company
n C") attached to 2d 3n, 9th Marines in Division Hcsorve. Conpany "A" ro nained with the 21st Marines; the dozer tank was attached to the $lh *aak
Battalion, Company "3" plus one platoon of Company "C'f was attached to the
9th Marines. At O73O two Conpany ffC" tanks reinforced Conpany n 3 " .
"A"
Attached to 21st Marines, Bulldozer tank sent to 5th Division to
"build a road for the flamethrower tan^s. Results were good.
Kdq's and 3d platoon worked in support of the 1st In, Jth. The
enemy was strongly entrenched in a "pocket" located in TA-201D formed T y a
b stone wall raid enplacenents dug into ridges. This pocket was holding up the
advance of the infantry, who were attacking in a westerly direction. The
tanks had to operate over terrain that was very rough. They were at>le to move
only short distances at a tine and then with the aid of an armored "bulldozer.
When certain positions proved too "hot" for the Japs they would throw a gren-r
ade and change positions,
1500 - Because of ricochets from the 75mm gun it became necessary
to secure permission to fire the 75mn fron the CO of the 1st Sn, 9th.

0600 - One (l) platoon of f.lamothrowing tanks moved out to report

to Company rr3", 3<Wk3:i, to whom they were attached in TA-201D. One of those
tanlcs was employed to turn out an eneny sniper position*
O73O - Two tanks moved out to assist Company "3", 2r Sn, 9^h i I r *
-l -a* ines " y knocking out a machine gun position. Duo to the fact that the fire
b of the tanks was masked by our friendly troops, they were unable to fire?
These tanks returned to the assembly area at 1030.
Ik March
Battalion (less Company "A", "13" and one platoon of "C") in Division
Reserve. Attachments no change. Two Conpany "C:r traits reinforced the- Conpany
"C" platoon attached to Company "3".
"A"
Attached to 21st P.egiuent. bulldozer attached to 5th Division on
sane mission as on 13th. 31r.de hit r rirc and broke the hydraulic jack. The
. .i. blade was becked out of range of flat trajectory fire and released, to be
retrieved Liter. Ho damage was done to tank, which returned to the assembly
area. ,
"3"
O7OO ~ Kdq's 2d and 3& platoons again supported the 1st 3n, 9th
Karines in t i attempt to clear the !fpocl.ct" (TA-201D) of Japs. The use of
ic our flamethrower tanks, proved successful 0 1 this occasion. One tr.nk was hit
: by a riflo grenade. T . . caused a &.ali eirplosion in the tank, slightly
h'c wounding tho driver -.d assistant driver.
^i 17^5 ^-10 infantry moved out to attack.
C"
0600 - Co "Cn less one (l) platoon in Division Heserve.
O63O - Five (3) tanks attached to Co "B", 3dTk2n.
O9OO - These tanks assisted Company "3" in mopping up operations.
15 Harch
'Jo change* The reserve conpany (C) v/as employed by 2d'3n,
Marines in attack against enemy picket i i TA 201D.
:

"A"

Attached to 21st Marines. 'Jo action.

Company "3" attached 9th Marines. Hot employ^

0530 - Co "C11 H^Efl to 2d 3n, 9th Larinos, to support attack

against enemy pocket in TA-201D.
0545 - ^on (10) tanks accompanied by one (l) armored bulldozer of
the engineers moved out of assembly area to 2d B:i, 9th Marines.
0720 - While moving up to the infantry lines one (l) tank-hit a
land nine breaking the track. Tho crew safely evcuated and,the Company
Commander moved into another tank.
0S00 - One (l) platoon of tanks plus tho tank-dozer and the ar mored Bulldozor moved up to the Infantry lines. The tank-dozor was used to
breach a sto-ne v/all .behind which the ITips were firing at our troops onch tine
they tried to scale the wall. After "broaching tho wall a tank section moved
through and with flamethrowers and tank guns destroyed numerous pillboxes' and
caves in the area. As the terrain prohibited noving the tanks more than
twenty five (25) yards through the wall the armored bulldozer was used to
build trjak approaches and cover and fill the mcuiy caves, trenches and bunkers.
1300 - The armored bulldozer was attacked with a satchel charge
which caused, a leaky radiator. . It was pulled "back to fill the radiator at
which time the operator was killed by sniper fire. This deprived us of its
further employment that day.
1500 - The tanks continued firing on the enemy positions and \Mhcn
their ammunition was expended they wore replaced by another platoon.
1600 - A large capacity fIanothrowing tank was secured from the 5th
Tank.Battalion and used against the pocket with good results. Many enemy
infantry were caught by our guns running rwr.y from tho fire with cartridge
belts exploding about their waists.
16 March
Battalion (less Companies "A" and n C") ronr.ined in Division Pucservo
prepared to support 21st "Regiment (which had relieved elements of the 5til
Marine Divitr.on) Conpony UAI! was attached to 21st l.'r.rines for the attack,
while Company irC" vas .attached-to the 9th II rincs rod further attached to tho
2d Bn, 9%h R.gircnt, for "aepping up" : n
. A"jtachel to 2J.st Bo^inent. 9 truiks-committgd on terraces and cliffs
overlooking beach in 21st sccbor. Excellent results were obtained on dug-in
enemy strongroints "by tho neutralizing fires of 7 5 m 'n-n^ flamethrowers.
Company i;j3'; was not employed.

ifCn

OGOO - Co |:C", attached to 2d En, 9th iMarines to continue attack

against encay pocket in TA-2OI3.
064-5 - One (l) platoon of t"."iks plus the armored bulldozer, of the
Engineers moved cut .f .t.hc asaenbiy area and into position shortly behind our
lines in TA-HG.'D, "
*0'/^5 - xtc r.rmorcc*. bulldog or cover ec. by ru suction of tanks and in fantry breaLtioc .. 2t1.ro tnl] c-.i'd v.ddciiod it irvto a t^.nk,approach,
? 06'CO .ax ?.c.r^o zr.r.p.^ity fLanothrowing t : i - from hth Tank Battalion
r.i: Wcis employ .d, The fl^ziethrowing tank moved r, short di stanco through tho wall
and burned thj enemy defenses in tho draw.
0^?13 - The flariothrowing t^.nk \i/ithclrew and v/-s sent back to be re
charged. One of cur tank sections moved through the wall and down the draw
blasting the charred positions and the regaining dofonpos thr.t wero not affect ed by the flamethrower.
tfow 93O - Tlio 5th Tank Battalion f lane throwing tank returned and was
enpToyed this tino in tho aroa whore wo made our deepest J
yesterday. It' "bumed out tho onony trenches and caves in t h i ^ ^
fire to tho ru^iunitioii or. the ground and explosive charges, ot'e.
1100 - Another platoon of tanks" moved from assembly area to support
Company uG;i on the right 'of- Company H ? H .

TOTAL

OFFICERS KIA WIA MIA DOW Total 0 g 0 0 SLTLISTED KIA 19 WIA MIA

Total

llg

A* mumi
1* The essential function of this section was the reporting of casual ties* Each company, at the end of each day, submitted a casualty report
for the proceeding 2k hour period, "based on front line information submitted
by company commanders, platoon leaders and tank commanders* In addition,
the company first sergeants and corpsmen often contacted infantry battalion
aid stations to ascertain the identity and nature of wounds of our casual ties evacuated by them* livery effort was made to learn the type of wound
and prognosis in time to include such information on the initial reports*
Shi* procedure facilitated more prompt preparation of airmail briefs by the
rear echelon administrative section*
2. Casualty reports were submitted in accordance with division instruct ions. The upper half of $erspnnel data sheets contained administrative
information, the lower half (mimeographed casualty report fora) contained
the following information: name, rank, serial number, organization, type
f casualty (VIA, KIA, KIA, DOtf), space for remarks, the date forwarded,
specification number, the Identifying number of the report, and a space fr
the signature of the authenticating dffleer* The original, or initial cas ualty report was detached and submitted to division, a second copy was re tained, and the third dispatched to tne rear echelon administrative section.
The rear echelon forwarded amplifying airmail briefs and prepared staff re turns on casualties*
3 The 5-1 section arranged for the displacement of battalion head quarters and was also charged with the security of headquarter1 s area*
The staff sections were placed in a position to facilitate staff function ing.
km Mail service was executed at battalion headquarters by the STavy
mail clerk. Incoming mail was delivered to the company aail orderlies each
evening, and outgoing mail was submitted each morning. V44ail and stamped
envelopes were obtained for personnel of this unit*
5* Post exchange supplies were made available to all personnel* Candy,
athletic material and magazines were obtained from the Division Athletic
and Morale office and distributed* Additional reading material and station ery were available to all hands at the nearby division library. Hews
broadcasts and latest battle news and information were a daily feature*
Hot food facilities were set up as soon as conditions allowed/and hot
coffee was available throughout the day.
6. This section and the medical section co-operated on all sanitation
measures. Adequate heads were dug, utilising discarded oil drums and pre viously' prepared seats. Sanitary measures, including DDT spraying of the
area and the sprinkling of lime around and in heads, were effected daily*
Daily inspections were held,
7* Burial procedure was in accordance with Division orders and. SCP's.
Prior to the inauguration of Division raves Service, fatal casualties of
this unit were delivered to the area designated for tfre Division Cemetery.
\. Marine dead found in o j r area were delivered to the cemetery by direction
of this section. Several enemy dead were buried. Upon activation of
Division Burial Party, this section co-operated in
collection and delivery of our own casualties*

1, A e r a T M i | t ^ | l M o t O 8 , varjrijag from 1:5,000 >to 1:20,OOp, wore

furnished before this %fi&tion* Mosaics and low angle obliques were also
provided as well as official maps of the 1:10,000 scale. In all cases, an
adequate supply was provided, The completeness of both the photos and the
maps loft a lot to be desired* She aerial photos, of course, were taken be*
fore the intense aerial and naval "bombardment, and, consequently, could not
show road nets, etc. exactly as they w^ero at the time of landing* The.maps
were inaccurate in their terrain features* and their road nets* Contour
lines showed level areas and plateaus,-where* actually, very cut-up and
irregular areas existed* Koad nets,shown did not conform to those existing
when we landed.
& Hydrographic information furnished before tho campaign, proved accurate
and sufficient for our needs. Plans for landing our equipment, which was
based on this information, proved to be accurate.
3. Intelligence disseminated to this unit by G-2 proved to be timely
in all cases. In quite a few cases, it. proved to be quite effective, namely
in giving us information as to probable mine fields. Some of these we
knew of in advance and were able to make plans accordingly* Under the
existing conditions, it was felt that <J~2 disseminated sufficient intellig ence material during tho campaign to fill all of our needs*
. k* In this battalion, tho following procedure was set up for the re covery of captured enemy documents and material. An intelligence team of
three men was designated in each, of the three line companies* These were
general duty men, and had to be given special intelligence schooling."before
the campaign* Daring tho campaign, they handled all onemy material and. documents found by men of tho company* This proved to bo very excellent,
as they were always at tho company GP and available to collect this material*
this material was thon turnod in to the S-2 each evening - or its location
reported to him*
5 Present J/O doos not give the Battalion Intelligence,Section any
enlist04 personnel. Heedless to say, with only ono poxion in the section,
this did not allow close r liaison between the S-2 an^ G-2. Provisions
for at least two enlisted personnel as assistants in the section would make
for a much closer liaison, and also permit the S-2 to get aore first hand
observation.
6. Beforo tho campaign, all officers in the battalion wore addressed
by the battalion commander on tho quosiion of security of classified
material connected with the operation* The officers then addressed tho 00*
listed mon under their command, and this apparently s topped the "loose talk1*
which had boon quite prevalent before this time* In combat, only the
official 1:10,000 map was taken forward of company OP'a in tanks and then
only by platoon sergeants and above* and by officer!*
7* During this campaign, tanks received tho heaviest mortar fire yet .
encountered by 3d Division Tanks in Pacific fighting* Hits were sustained
by our tanks from mortars estimated to be up to 90mm without serious
damage* In other cases; the enemy attempted to hit our tanks with even lar gor caliber mortars, but was never successful in doing so. During tho
early stagos of tho campaign* the tanks always Arow heavy concentrations of
mortar and artillery fire whenever they approached or withdrew from the
front linos* This fir0 was so intense that accompanying infantry often
asked the tanks to withdraw temporarily* In other words, tho enemy socmod
to regard his mortars and artillery as effective anti-tank weapons at the
early stagos of tho campaign*
Another tactic cnployod by the onomy was tho use of<air bursts
against advancing tank and infantry teams to eliminate the infantry and'
allow the tanks to pro coed into AT gun traps alone* Whon tho advance would
start, enemy artillery would "adjust* a fow air bursts, so that they wore
exploding from ten to fifty feet above the tanks* As tho advance continued,
this air-burst barrage grew in intensity until it had all tho accompanying
infantry pinned to tho ground and unable to support tho tanks in any way.
The tanks would keep moving forward trying to eliminate onemv^resistance,
and would soon find thomsolvos forward of our infantry

At this time', the dflky ^7mm AT guns would opon up aHj-proceod to knock out
any interference from infantry who would still be pinned down
tg tho campaign, enemy suicide squads attempted to
^ fbFng large charges of explosives on and under the
vehicles* This"~waT*cT6ne without any cover of smoke or screening device.
The squads of four or five men would jump up from holes and attempt to rush
the tanks Before being cut down by our fire.
In one area, smoke was used extensively against our tanks a s enemy
tank destroyer squads rushed forward under this screen and destroyed the
tank. In this instance, the tank had to enter a narrow defile, and each
time it attempted to do so, the enemy would t r t f out smoke grenades and the
hot tank would withdraw. Finally, the tank pushed into the defile without any
smoke appearing, bu,t, as soon as it got well within the defile, the enemy
smoked it again very heavily, and it stopped momentarily. At this time,
a group of the enemy, estimated to be about twenty five, swarmed out of holes
and attacked tho tank with, pole charges and "Molotov Cocktails".
In one instance, enemy troops entered one of our crippled and
abandoned tanks ahead of our lines at night, and b*ecame familiar with the
firing mechanism of the tank. In the morning, as our tanks again advanced,
the enemy fired the "J^mn cannon in this abandoned tank and succeeded in
knocking out one of our'.tanks before being knocked out by bazookas.
'Enemy medium and light tanks, mounting h~lim and 5"fm& cannon, were
encountered. These were buried in the sand and used as pillboxes, primarily.
However, they operated as AT guns too: they were extremely difficult to
locate.
Minos of various types were encountered, and were usually located
as anti-tank weapons. The "Yardstick Mine" placed over a 130 lb. bomb was
the most common typo. "Terra Cotta" mines of the 6 m d 9 lb. variety were
found. Covering these minefields wore k~(mia A3! guns which attacked the t ank
once the mines had stopped it. Those AT guns woro generally placed on the
flanks of the limited avenues.of approach that the tank could use and fired
into the sponson (side) of tho tank, penetrating up to four inches of armor.
One coastal defense gun and emplacement had several rings of wooden box mines
around it, apparently to prevent the tanks from over running and crushing
the position. Quite a few single and double horn kettle mines were also
encountered, as were a few type 97 magnetic minesj but no new or unusual
use of them wa's employed.
Japanese artillery attempted to register on our tanks numerous times
but never caused extensive damage, n i obtained few direct hits.
;d C. OPS3ATIOITS
1, Rehearsal Bxercises
A* Training in preparation for the operation was covered in a
little more than three .months. The time element was considered to bo ado-,
quatc. It was the practice to hold classroom study on material pertinent
to ail operation, thoa field demonstrations. Of immediate concern were
lessons learned during the Guam Operation. Each company criticized the
campaign in classroom* discussing tactics rnd organization; on CXfs
following, tanks were considered close "support infantry weapons" until the
first tank-artiliery-infantry problem. Tho following subjects were covered
satisfactorily before tho operation!
Passage of tanks through minefields.
Study of enemy AT weapons. .
Camouflage of vehicles and equipment.
Employment and use of.flamethrowers.
Tactics of platoon and company.
Intelligence reviews*
Passive choaical defense.
Armored reconnaissance.
Small arms firing.
Care and waterproofing of vehicles.
Preventive maintenance.
Gyro stabilizer and hydraulic'traverse.
Communications (radio, telephone)
Gas decontamination*
Air defense.

itry-artillery-tank problem was conducted. Tanks

moved to the liT&^ffi^j&faJoked, several hundred yards by infantry. Time
fire was placed over*im$&$$.s when they were on the objective.,
C. When it was atfinitely known the operation would be over open
terrain every effort was made to get tanks in open areas to train. This was
possible after the Battalion moved to Yona. Armored force tactics were used
thereafter in Tank Maneuver Area ITumber One with the Hinth Marines. All Tank
Personnel were specifically. schooled on the following:
Assistance between tanks by fire.
Employment of platoon and. company over favorable tank terrain.
Assault and reduction of a fortified position.
Over-running and defending a fortified position.
Covering reorganization of attacking infantry*
Assembling on rallying or alternate rallying points.
D. The majority of Headquarters personnel were schooled on tho
following in tho latter part of the training phase:
. ; . CP displacement
Camouflage discipline
Reconnaissance

E. Each officer conducted classes^whilc enroute to the objective.

Each man-was thoroughly instructed as to details of the operatic:*, pertaining
to the Tank Battalion.
2. Methods used to guide tank, across reef to beach.
(Sinco the 3^ Division was in Corps Reserve, there v/as no problem .
of ship*-to~ shore movement. Landings were made on well-established beach heads from LST's).
3 Weapons (including amaunition and fuze setting) most effective against
fortifications;
'A. Tiyrrct Installed Tank iTlamoth.rowers (CB-H-l). This flamethrower
nadc it possible to cover large areas whore there were numerous caves and do-.
prcssions. The weapon was very offectiyc against large, underground caves, and
when special 75mm gun ammunition was not available, tho flamethrower gained .
good results against tho largest pillboxes and bunkers.
3. 7*2" Rockets. Rockets were used against pockets of resistance
consisting of numerous enemy "spidertraps". Often tho rocket launcher was thi
only weapon that could bo used'effectively. Indirect fire v s necessitated
by a high mask. Effect was sustained against fortified positions such as
blockhouses. .
C T 105 concrete fuzes for 7 5 ^ H.3. These fuzes were used a gainst pillboxes with satisfactory effect. Pillboxes that were fired on by
tanks could not withstand this fire. All tank personnel were highly impressed
with res-tilts.
Efficiency and Employment of Flamethrower (tank mounted).
A. The (sfe2-5Rl) flame thrower Vs installed in our tanks were upp&
effectively in some instances gainst enemy personnel, pillboxes, and caves.
Thoir efficiency is undermined by tho short range and the narrow field of
fire. . . . .
3. A turret installed flamethrower tank was borrowed from tho Ufch
Division. Zxtcnrive areas could be covered by this weapon and the great range
made maneuver easier for the tanks.
C. The policy of this Battalion was to reserve the flamethrowers
for targets that could not bo reduced effectively by any other ncans.
I). The mechanical efficiency was considered adequate.
)ccial U'se of Tank (i.e. as supporting artillery, assault guns).
; used as supporting artillery on problems held preceding
c mt this practice was not encouraged.
[wo Jima Operation one tank was equipped with spaced
armor on both sldc^ and sandbags protected., tho final c.rivc and the turret*
There were no AT guns encountered after completion of this/tank, so effective ness is undetoTmind^fcHowever it is-believed 47mm A^S&re will not, penetrate*
h.

6.

A. While -subjects enumerated In paragraph 1 were being studied,

numerous problems were conducted with the infantry teams. Orientation
courses were given, acquainting the troops with potentialities and limit ations of our tanks in maneuveringt firing, and communications,
3. Close infantry-tank support problems were executed over varied
terrain. Enough time was given, to the majority of the infantry squad* to imparts*
them ijlth the importance 6f close support in closed terrain,
C. There was not enough firing done on problems to acquaint in fantry teams with our firing limitations.
D. Communication between tank and infantry was stressed on each
problem. Telephones were installed in each tank for use by the infantry*
SCR 300*8 were used between, command tanks and infantry company commanders*
If communication failed entirely, tank crews and fire teams relied on hand
signals.
E. Coordination between tanks and. infantry was highly developed
(using Armored Porce tactics).
7# Enemy Anti-tank Measures (see B, Intelligence, above).
9SDHPLY y ,

1.. Adequacy of all typos of mounting out supplies:

Class X The availability of Class I supplies was sufficient.
Rations and water were readily furnished and issued as called for. The
system of filling empty water drums from 5th Field Depot locations nearer to
Sumay embarkation points was very efficient and avoided loss of timo that
would have been necessary if water drums had been filled from points nearer
' . . . . '
Division area and transported to Sumay. Class II. A continued shortage of certain items of individual equip**
ment was in effect for quite some time and wore hurriedly furnished just
prior to movement to staging areas. Clothing othor than service sunmor re quired for combat w*s in the hands of personnel in amounts necessary before
embarking* Generally clothing needed for combat has boen available. How-*
ovor, there has boon a persistent shortage of small or odd sizo service
summer trousers, garrison caps, and chevrons. Transportation used for
movement to dock areas was organic and sufficient. Rolling stock to be em barked was in good condition, as was proved in conbat. Vehicle shortages in
this battalion wore; l-2jton 6x6, 75 gallon, gasoline truck, 2-1 ton * W car^o
trucks, 1-Jton ambulance, 2rJ;ton cargo trailers, 5"*ltn cargo trailers*
1-K16A1 machine shop truck, 3 grease trailers, 2 water trailers*
Class III. All types of fuel were available when mounting out and
wore drawn and movod to dock areas In good order and before troop and organic
equipment movement started* This avoided oongostion of vehicles in dock areas*
Class IT. All items were available as required and were preloaded
into vehicles.
Class Y. An approximate 5 additional units of firo of caliber .30
AP&T belted was drawn for tanks and was available. All othor type.s of
ammunition was available and furnished when required.
2. Adequacy of resupply*
Class ! Rations were available in sufficient amounts and supply of
same appeared to be grcator than that for the: Guau oporatlon, Water supply
was very limited, many tinojs to a maximum of 1 gallon por man. Water fron
drums was drinkable. Limited amounts of frosh foods w^i^e available for th$
last 5 0* 6 days of the operation*
Class II. Clothing replenishments were available in limited amounts*
Planncl shirts and utility jackets" wore insufficiently furnished.
Class III. Estimated fuel allowance for tanks was over consumption
because tank novenont was not as groat as estimated. G-asolino was not used
in as great amounts as anticipated* Special weight oils, othor that SAJ 50,
available when needed*
3 Jifficicttcy of all shore based supply facilities.
In general, supply facilities wore tavorabj^jtfitha few exceptions*
Initially, I^nn* BE, Super Charge, w/lHiso M^S ox Hj

needed 1 i f f r IT l t f | j i i j IjfyiiijfJ to locate in established dunps because a l l types of atL iiwtiitio^fe4^(j&jpxhGr One specific type of o i l , SAU 5O not available after iM days and i t was aiocoesary to drew same from 4th Division dm3p3~ 3*\D?. was difficnl,b to load Into trucks, >v.o to the fact that i t was i*i sxicil holes and i t w~.s r.ocoss'.try to l i r s t get druns on ground level and *;ho:\ load into tvu&s. i. c.:ano would 3i?,vc expedited nishing fuel to a l l units. H. Salvage and salvage collection* i l l organizational and individual oqulpnuit found in CP areas of this "battalion were collected and t.u^nod. into the Division Salvage Section,. Gas nasks wcr,o picked up by Division Salvage truck. All uj^scbXe aiiErunit-* ion (75fl&i cal.3^ "b^ltod-danaged rounds, rusted snail arras JMUEIO) was turnod into Corps Annunition Bump as directed t y G-4. 5 Transportation. '

A very narked shortage in track laying oquipnont was the TD-1S Tractor that this organization i s authorized, "but was nob allowed to take on the XMO JIM** operation. ' illl other transportation enbarked was sufficient, with the exception of one ^ton nabulanec. Sparc parts and naintonanco f a c i l i t i e s were always availabler and were called for and used as required* I n i t i a l l y , repair work on tanks ras acconpiished by Tank Bnttalion personnel as Ordnance Conprx.y i^is not established for maintenance.

1. The tine required to load LST ^77 and 6^6 was two hours each* four norc hours wero needed to secure tanks. This1 was done underway- "ino r e quired to load A2A-12 was approxinatoly twenty^two (22) hours. This ship was attached to Transport Division 32 and carried lty pieces of Tank lion wheeled oquipaont, in addition to 21st ilr-rines ECT equipnont and supplies. 2* Ti:ne required to unload IiST^ U77and 646 was one hour each. LS2 646 used an L8T beach oat to expedite unloading of tanks on the beach* This was vory helpful. AEAr-12 unloaded Irak Battalion vciaiclcs irregularly* duo to lack of appropriate landing craft. Last vehicle of Tank Battalion disonbarked 27 February, ^ 3 Snail land crr^t wore very difficult to load into fron transport area, Eough seas and strong winds shifted landing craft position very often and, in sone cases, caused danagc to landing craft and qquipnent "being lowered. The nain difficulty Was insufficient large landing craft such as LCT*s or LSI's, The so could "be tiod up to the larger ship in a way that afforded stability to a certain extent and could hold no re equipment The LStf was the nost favorable type of landing craft used. I t s length poraits an A& or APA to discharge froxi oorq that one hr.tch at a tino and thui oxpodito delivery ashore. k* One inrprovqaent would have "been to have each piece of whoolod nont nount i t s own sling or neane of l i f t i n g fron the ship into landing craft so that ship*s slings would not have to "bo recoverod fron each lift* 5, A chart, showing this u n i t ' s vehicles embarked, follows:

5
n o

a>
8
OJ
r*4

o o

I
LST 477

o u o 0 bQ -a o

o.

CM

1
USS-LIEHA

s
29 25

X3

H9
XI

0SS-J0PITSR

S09WS

is

3.

?,

0RD1IAITCE , aad the foXXowing

p
A. $his unit lnndod witli
weapons were nountod:

X70 X3

3O mchinc ftancthroyer* anas

Q

Iho folXowing
2XS

carried:

313 Cal,
3.

M X

5?he ocXow Xii9te<i weapons wer Xost in conbat;

, . ; * ' . .

X5 HJ

ft i^ 5
7

7 5 ^ guns

SO MI919A.U aaeiine guns

20 guns
15 Cal . 63 CaX^^agXXiX pistols C GencraXly, there wcro vory few naif unctions of any type* OccasionalXy thoro woro loading difficulties with thor 7$m gun which wore characterized " y broken rounds in the tube* Actually, this can be attribut b ed to unclean tubes rather than faulty acinunition* . . - - . .-. Hm 3>ue to eneny ar\ti-tank eiff ectivenoss, thO. battalion ordnance section had to porforn third* fourth, and fifth echelons of maintenance upon landing, , '.-,- ';. .. S# The weapons this unit us'oU were effective and presented few difficult!oi* Xt i s arcconraonded that" twenty-four (2*) ^R2^5R1 flaste throw ers be mounted in the Tank Battalion 1 s tank?- It is further r,ec.oi3nndcd ^ that this battalion be equipped wiih': . * A platoon of pi ^ X sufficient nuobor of T*2.* rocxpt launchers* (See 7 below for detailed rcco:xioridations)#

'

f If I f l l C (

tn Seciioa nasaed and fired t*e f#fp reckete twice duriag the operation* there was difficulty in. getting the launcher into pesitioa, eincc i t was neuatod oa ft elod with fixed elevation of M$ lo&oon* Sue to the rua-*do*a fc*ttorior ihere wore severe^n%m^it*** t efeclfc
tfunber ead type used <oe* f t , % *%***)*
1 . J t o * * of day* b a t t l e cqpltjtoeal ( f l

DM*

6
15

Q repairs 15 t*akt
KalfuactUo^ nad
e and f iro dutciiof on mt tnnk, 2 Ton. track* Ijrokoa troyed Bogie wheels 4cstroyd oa and final driro vat* ooapletqly

oil
tw

aid

- f iv# cae* whr fsroat off V hittiaj;

3* O n o t 8 ^ ixit laad nino loft fwat f teu^c T>lowtog final drivt, front 'bogie bracket nad B vral toctio^a of trackf completely off, ?pre of axploioa uadr floor nrb\iad oairollod differpniial tlew in floor of tctnk conrplotoly dostroying power train -unit, trtmaaisgion, driver> controls JUplftcod fivo support
propollo*

f9
throe fiaft! drlro hibi vitA drJvo t i x radiftto* uniti dostroyod >y tHoll frn^aeoti carat *ira# loplnccd four oofio gudgooa ftraa* p htctt pi 5. Iq^ioilon froa ninot destroyed two Tloor aroor hcatM and flow: of tank witU cso^po hatch iw\ad aot ftt* Thyottlo linjca^o and i h d ofeapo hatch repaired and refitted, clutch eroM shaft raaligaod. out. Uaot 6 3 a*9dttary gonorators or,rTmxtorf park ?lufc cleaned and adjutoA, turiacd iap* 7* Jifiht la^lS volt Vittoriot charged aad rohar<&od, $ O tank on 1ST ^7f ^ | t | ^ divo ooabejr - plajio hit tank on n right earner nenr oontw of tiirrot riai # inr.toly clx inch hole inrp*nsonplating* roiulting in fire centering around tho tank. Tank had "been thoroughly vaterproofod; tnit salt water ued to oxtin^uiih fire entered texk through hole ta amer f f i l l i n g tank approxioatoly ix inehof aoovo turret paekct floe?. Domtraction of tho Dattcriet, rq^ula tore, wiring and aceoctorlos in lower fighting coapartncat# 5ank wa# thorough ly cloanod and ropairod aud oack in action fivo days *&%** landing, 9 4k %Jfcreh, 15U5, one dicsol task acquired frep nC* \\h Sank 3attallcnf elutchott were ropairod, cnginot tuaat **& radio installed frm destroyed tank m& put in operational use on 10 March, 10, Whcoled Vehicle* - Ali -vohielof coarpletely cheekod and ser viced * two radiator* roplacod m ^*Ua 4x^ duo to fhrapnel, 3 tiro$, tubot, and vheoli 600x1^ deef rayod by hrpnl and ghell firoj Z "battori o xecharged, fi 5-ton ^ whoolt totally doitroyod *y

endntions (aoo V "below)

"mM~MM>-w-mmmH>9iFe Squipaont*

A. 3.

f^mJfffoM^Mec IV", 2, I, above and V below), Rockot L o f t t ^ p (See IV, T, I, above* and V below)*

C. Tank nountod b u l l d o z e r s - >$hrce wore usod on several occasions and proved to bo e f f e c t i v e i n c l o s i n g caVcs and f i l l i n g s h e l l h o l e s to permit other tanks to pass through* There wore no mechanical f a i l u r e s . km Enemy Materiel .. . A. Weapons Uonc salvaged, B* Combat Vehicles * One Japanese Light Tank, Model 95 w ^s salvaged* I t i s in excellent condition and runs very well* 0 . Ammunition - XTonp salvaged.
D* Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment - Itfoae salvaged.
G> CHEMICAL 1, A. Planning Phase - Individuals wore given training in recognition . of oneny agents, in protection (both individual and c o l l e c t i v e ) , and i n decontamination. Orders for the gas sentry wero discussed and momorizod* Masks wore f i t t o d ?md t e s t e d f6r each- individual. B* Loading Pfcaso A l l gas masks were crated raid carried aboard g&ip on tho rear of the tanks. Here they wero immediately available at a l l tines* decontamination oquipnont was loaded l a s t aboard trucks and was a v a i l a b l o a t any tine* . $ Landing Phase* - Masks were Issued to the troops and t e s t e d tho day before debarkation. Consequently, everyone had h i s mask when ho de barked, and i t was i n e x c e l l e n t condition. Instructions were issued to each individual to r e t a i n h i s nask u n t i l n o t i f i e d otherwise. J>. Island Phase - In accordance with ordors issued by the Division Chemical Officer a l l ciaslcs .yrotp turned in< The individual turned h i s i n to h i s Company Chemical HCO, who i n turn gave then t o the

2* Bnemy use of Cncaicals - The encny usod snoko against our tanks onco
during the canpaiga* At that tine our tanks were ondoavoring to force a
defile, and each tine a tank attempted to enter the defile, the oneny
snokod tho tank with snokc. grenades. (Tank crow boliovod they wore snolco
grenndoq a nd not snokc pots). The tajik withdrew each tine, and finally
was able to enter the defile without being snokod. As soon as tho tank
got well within the defile the enony snoked it again and halted it nonon tarily* At this tlno an ostinatod 2Jof ^ o eneny swarnod on the tank and
destroyed it with *Molotov Cocktails11 and polo charges* The snokc fron tho
grcaados was described by the tank crow as being cxtronely thick and of a
"ntlky, grey, white color*.
3* Salvage - A crcv/ of throe non was detailed la each company as In telligence toans* These nen wore to handle all crgptured oacny natorial,
and if any enqny chemical gear appeared, they wero to turn it over to the
Company Chemical 2TC0, vho was to f orward it on to the 3n Chemical Officer*
^
Ho chonical gear was found. H. "

1. Medical department personnel who boarded the tTSS LST ^77 consisted
of the Battalion Surgeon and five corpsmon. Abonrd the USS LS3J 6U6 wore
five corpsmon.

2 . Unit8 #*hk and 1^-5 with l i t t e r s were crjrried aboard tho two LSTf s . Tho reminder -of tho nodical supplies and equipment and the ambulance jeep wore cibdftjrd th USS Jupiter and the USS Xibra* 3ach eorpsnan carr a u n i t ^3 with hin and tho Battalion Surgeon carried h i s unit #1*

3* Sanitary conditions of both ships wore very good. Other than a colds and one crisp of Catarr^al Jevort Acute, health of a l l the porsoanc was excellent* Tho heads wero clean and sanitary AS were living quart< and galleys* Koat of the cooks and nossmon were detailed from ships . __^ company with a few men frou the battalion helping out* C^9 U. Eoutine sick call was held nt 0900 each morning on both LST's, ^^^^

5 0 the 17th of yebruary orders wero roeoived to havo clothing rinsed with fresh or salt water* Ordors word complied

oro hold daily aboard both L$Tf8* 7. At i?l5 21st of foFruary there was a suicide tanning, of the hip by Japanese airplane. A largo firo resulted cad part of tho tfQpn ecnuai tion cxplodod. Kino ncn, throo Marines nnd six ship% conpany enlisted nen nagazine and disonbowelcd, killing hin instantly. The remainder of the cnsur.ltics consisted of one Diagnosis TJndotdraiiiGdt (fracture, skull), ono Diagnosis Undetoninod, (fracturo, vortobrn), ono Diagnosis Undotcrnined, (fracture, left shoulder), and one nultiplc fragmentation wounds. JPhofro four noxx wore transferred on February 22nd to the tfSS Siblsy, ta addition thoro wero seven anbulatory cases, including such injuries as abrasions, contusion*, and lacerations. There wore also nany ainor casualties of ships conpany of which we havo no record. All dead wore buried at sea in cluding two Japanese. S, After landing, there wore two corpsnen with o4sh cocipany oi tanks* Pour corpsnon wero at the Battalion Aid Station with tho Battalion Surgoon* The nodical equipnont, other than nedical units #5-^ and #5-3 wore not land ; ed until two to four days later. ' 9 Iho Br.ttalion Aid Station wsa$ got up in tho Battalion C and con P sisted of a large fox holo reinforced by sand bags. J t was well protected C and had good cover*. Medical unit* wore scattered ovef the area in fox holes. Our Battalion Aid Station was located about eight hundred yards to tho north of *BM Medical Conpany to whon were sent all evacuation cases* In tho early stage critical cases were sent to tho Spach Bmcuatlon Station. W wero on tho nain road to the evacuation points cihd because of our o proxinity to then, walking cases did not stop at o\ar Battalion Aid Station* 10. Casualties troatpdi Jtabor kZ . Retained 19 * Svacuated 2^ * Pied 0 . Type-fragncntation wounds, abrasions> cohtuslona, lacerations, h T V d and burns* talking wowidod 21 . fcitt of. cases Vy . 11. After canp area wvas established, heads were iixiediaioly nado frou lii^^^J-P^^f 1 ^!! * $9Q& consisted of canned rations andthe wntor supply was adequate. A galley vas sot up in a gun onplaceiiont on the third day after our establishment of canp. Water wafi rationed to one gallon per day per nan. Upon arrival in the aroa i t was policed 'and nine dead Japanese were found nnd buried. Our own dond wor$ innodiatoly ronoved to tho 3d Ifetrine Division Conetory after identification *ft established. Jllos wore rather plentiful in the beginning but after the liland was sprayed with #DT# they soon disappeared* 12* Ihoro wore several cases of Jaundice, Acute, Infective which wero evacuated. A few colds were present anong the nan, but prophylactic ther* apy with sulfadiazino cut down tho incidence. 13. "B" Medical Conpany handled onorgoncy denial treatnont. Tho

1^. fhoro wore no lossos Or roplacononts of ncoUcal personnel, nuraber was adequat-o .and they wero always in a stato^of readiness*

15. yield Medical equipnont was adequate* tfhere-was no pilferage or losses. However a l l units should bo1 replaced, /including tho anbulaneo# bocauso they have been through thrde ckipaigns ai>d aro in, poor condition* In addition a fly and a pyranidal tent .should bo carr4 od in a l l future operations* The sinbulanco and all oquipnpnt should be brought ashoro no later -than thirty-siz hours after landing. The systen of rosupplying was satisfactory* I. SIGNAL 1. Sone intorf orenc'o on our assigned radio frequencies was encounter od. It occurred principally on the 37k Bn Cond ffet (26*2 ixs) by -Anbition" C^i,fe?A ^^?a fe) and rejiuirqd repetitions thdt would otherwise not havo boon necessary*. The aseigned no wore xnEdoquate to controx conoat traffic within the separate conpanles* * Tank platoons should b^ assigned separato frequencies that-con bo used. The volune of conbat traffic loaded the assigned channels and platoon eontrol and f thoreby.

were used as well aa radio. ire

facilities carried about 30^o the communication between the TkBn CP*s,
the Tk Bn liaison officers (at infantry battalion CP's), the company offi cers in the field, and the infantry regiments, with the TkBn CP itself.
Many direct installations were required that bridged;'existing switching
centrals and duplicated facilities previously installed by other units. The
Tk Bn has no personnel training in the installation, maintenance, and
operation of wire communication facilities. Thus an added load was borne
by radio and general duty personnel. This condition was remedied only in .
part by the "loan" of two to four qualified linemen from the Div Sig Co.
3# In the early phases of the operation communication delays resulted
from the fact thatvwiremen were inexperienced and too few in numbers to
maintain the system, which was under heavy artillery and mortar fire*
Combat experience showed that the range of the SGR-509, 510 is less than
had been originally thought. This necessitated the establishment of
relay stations and slowed down radio communication to some extent. The
SC31-5O9* 510 is prone to go out of alignment when transported over rough
terrain. xhis cause delay in that radios situated on'the front lines
had $0 be sent to the rear for realignment and another set had to be dis patched as a replacement. The' lack of remote control equipment frequently
made it necessary to set up the SCH-5O9, 510 radio in positions unfavorable
for officient operation. Delay was often encountered in finding suitable
locations, (see V conclusions and Eecommendations).

PAE5 V
A.

CQITCLUSIOrS AED

Coordination.

1. It is the responsibility of the Tank 3attalion and (r~3

to indoctrinate all infantry Unit Commanders ivith the inherent
capabilities and limitations of tanks. One of the outstanding
doctrines to be considered is that this theatre of operations-
recognizing terrain and Japanese tactics - does not foster
sustained ^panzer attacks", ffven though the, occasion does^ not
deny an echeloned tank drive, a sufficient reserve must be
maintained to support the infantry in the close-in, inch-by inch advance into yhich every Marine Corps Amphibious Operation
in the Pacific has ultimately resolved itself*
2, It would be a tactical improvement if Infantry Commanders
were imbued with the doctrine of employing the tank platoon
as a unit with which to team an infantry company, rather than
accepting the tank company as the smallest combat tank element*
This will not only make for economy of force, but will increase
effective coordination. Unit commanders must consult tank unit
commanders on matters of tactical employment, reconnaissance,
and coordination. '
3"Xt is reconaonded that communication representatives
from each tank battalion, Signal Company, and infantry Regiment
'combine efforts to increase the effectiveness of Tank-Infantry
communication .techniques and equipment.
i+. It is.suggested that Tank companies bo rotated in training
with RCTls rather than be attached as abnormal compliment" to a
specific Regiment*
5. It is recommended that at least three Marines from each
infantry platoon receive training as "tank guides* to facilitate
passage of linos.
6* It is rccoiEiended that much closer coordination be develop ed between Taiiks and (A) Artillery, (3) Aircraft, and (C)
A. It is suggested that tanks and artillery be assigned
a direct radio channel* Tanks drawing heavy calibre
fire now must remain at the mercy of these weapons-
with or without accompanying infantry - until sufficient
channels are negotiated for direct artillery support.
further training should be conducted using Forward
Observers in Assault Tanks.
B. It would be advantageous to assign at least one air craft ^spotter* to observe tanks during training and
atta,ckst thereby locating the source of the largo
, calibre fire that tanks inevite.bl

;tention should be given tke.study of toch methods of nine detection and removal, *
loval of mines at night and >under smoke
screen,
7 It is suggested that tho UJhird .JSngiaocr Battalion Be
equipped with three armored bulldozers similar to the two
" y that unit during the last operation. Hoy/ever, it is recom- b ~
mended that these "bulldozers have periscopes and mounts, addit-:Ili*
ional armor protection, andmdios (SCR-51O) to protect the
operator and increase tactical efficiency,
8 , It is recommended that a greater number of personnel
. in this Battalion be allowed Transport Quartermaster Training
conducted'by Div T J - . QIi . ' -.
' B. . Cbmmiini cat ions- Training and Equipment.

1. It is recommended t'hat the frequencies assigned to this

Battalion be. increased to eighteen (IS) in number. If the allo cation of channels be as follow, it is 'anticipated that an im proyement in channel load, platoon control, and flexibility will
be made: - Div Comd, Div Smerg, Tk Bn Cmd, "A1* Co Comd, R B W Co
"C" Co Comd, and twelve, (12) other frequencies to be assigned to,
platoons."
2. It was found that the SGR-51O radio did not have the
transmission distance anticipated, numerous relay stations were
necessary thereby. It is strongly suggested that five (5) SGH-52
radios, mounted in jeops (truck, i ton, kxk) or "weasels" be added
to our allowance and that five (5/ M&0 radios bo subtracted there from. .
3* A remote control unit such as the RM-29 (operates with
SCEW6lO) would have been of invaluable service in the last operation
It is recoYamondod that the possibility of adopting it for use with
the SCR-509,510 be investigated with tho view of adding it to our
allowance. Advantageous tactical emplymcnt could frequently have
been made of this unit during the last operation
h. The tank-infantry radi SCH-300 (now model An/VRC-3) =
should be installed in each tank. .
5. It is suggested that the SCR-522 radio be considered for
installation, witli tho view of establishing tank-air communica
6. It is reoommended that a mobile truck-mountod repair
and maintenance unit, equipped with a 110-volt power source, be
added to the T/A.
7. A wire section of seven (7) to ten (10) trained personnel
including a wire chief is needed to install, maintain, and operate,
such wire facilities as have proven to be necessary. It is recom mended that this section be added to the T/0.
8. It is rccoa^ended that the Tank Battalion bo assigned a
channel for tho SCE-300 during each operation thereby increasing
the mobility and effectiveness of liaison teams, and decreasing
traffic on the Infantry channels.
C. Ordnance.
1. Because tank maintenance cannot be divorced from effective
tank operation, it is recommended that The Tank Ordnance Platoon of
the Third Ordnance Company become:
"* " {a) An organic part of the ihird Tank Battalion, or
(b) Permanently attached to the Third Tank Battalion.
Such an arrangement would foster more effective tank maintenance
in this Division by:
(a) Centralizing control and rcsponsibility in the
Tank Battalion where it belongs:
(b) Allowing a coordinated tank maintenance - tank
training program during preparatory phases
(maintenance and training should have differ ent schedules); *
(c) Giving the Ordnance Platoon a. higher landing
priority because the platoon should land with
the tank company maintenance
can help maintain tank

(d) Promoting greater interest in the tanks of thve

personnel who are supposed to work on the
vehicles,
(e) Allowing the Battalion Maintenance Officer the
perogative to shift company maintenance sections;
(thus, the best>mechanics are doing higher
ski H o d work).
The present (Dank Ordnance system is the result of the mis conception that tank maintenance can arbitrarily "be segregated
into first,' second, third, and fourth echelons during combat.
It has "boon the experience of this, "battalion during throe
operations, that in order to keep the maximum numbor of tanks
in the line at all times, echelons' of maintenance must "be dis regarded'to a great extent. Every available man and tool must
"be kept working continuously whether they are performing second
or fourth echelon of inainteiuvaco. In combat the prime question
each day is trhow many tanks do you have ready to go?*1 These
divisions are useful only in a relative degree. Xt should "be
the r asponsibility of the Tank 3a.t tali on Maintenance Officer
to decide what maintenance is to "be done and who ir to do it.
This will result in 1) elimination of duplication.of work,
and 2) peak operating efficiency. At present, the Ordnance
company is responsible for the movement forwr.rd of tank spare
. parts, ith our transportation, it is "believed that with
coordination we could have t;mk replacement parts ashore on
D plus 1 day. The Ordnance Company cannot,
2. It is further recommended that the Tables of Organ/
ization for cither the H&S Company or the Ordnance Pic.toon
be revised .to allow an additional Trnk Recovery Vehicle for
use of Tank Ordnance. The companies1 recovery vehicles are
usually in action or well forward. Consequently, when it is
necessary to recover a disabled tank, pull a turret, or re place engines there is an unnecessary shortage or delay.
3* In the event that the subsequent.recouaendations re garding reorganization and ure-equipment11 for this Battalion
be considered inexpedient or impracticable, it will be nec essary to imaedictoly deris? increased araor protection for
the K^A2 Medium Tank (i.e., additonal spaced armor, welded
track blocks). Also, it would be expedient to line the fighting
compartment with white abestos to reduce the fire hazard.
D. Organizational Equipment.
It is obvious from our previous operations that the present
Marine Corpc TanI: Battalion is insufficiently armored, equipped,
and manned, It i's rocommoiiuod that the Ilarino Corps organize an
"Armored Battalion", using the present "Tank Battalionfr as a found ation with tho following organization:
1. Three (3) i-iodium Tank Companies of eighteen (IS) M26(l+5 ton)
tanks per company.. *
' 2* One (l) Light Tank Company of eighteen-M2U tanks.
3. Six (b) Ii2o tanks in Battalion Headquarters and Service,
Company. Pour (k) of these will be large capacity flame .throwing tanks, and three of these four will have jett .
isonable Rocket L'vx..cher (7.2lf) mounts. The remaining two
tanks wili be for staff personnel.
U, Two (2) tank-dozer mounts and blades per company.
5. Sight (o) small capacity flame throwers per tank
company be retained r.s per present T/A.

ENCLOSURE I

3D ENGINEER BATTALION

ACTION REPORT

^ 3D ENGINEER BATTALION, 3D^LAHINH! DI FMF, c/o FLSSTT POST o m c s , SAN FHAJJCISCO.

17 April, IH5. ing Officer. The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division. Subject: Action Report* (a) 3dMarDlv Confidential G0# 107*

ftef erence:
1.

In compliance with reference (a), the action Report for the Iwo Jima operation i s submitted: : PART I ~ S M A Y U MR; (A) The fferiod, covered by this report i s from
? November, 1944 to 16 March, 1945. Zone minus tert. (10)
(k) time, east longitude date, was in effect (B) The 3d Sngineer Battalion participated in the Iwo Jima operation with Headquarters and Service Companyattached to Division Headquarters, Company "A" attached to the 9th Marines, Company "B* attached to the 21st Marines, and Company C" attached to the 3d Marines. H&S, "A" and "B11 Companies landed with the units they were attache^ to and carried out engineer missions. Sixty (60) men from Company "C" landed with about half of the company's heavy equipment, although the 3d Marines did not land* The detachment from Company rtCrt assisted H S Company to perform, & engineer missions for the Division, All other units, of th Battalion remained attached to the organizations to which they were originally assigned throughout the operation with the exception 6f Company VCH PiiHT II P33LIMINABI3S: ^he reporting Command was composed of the 3d Engineer 3attalion only. No other troops were attached for the operation.
(A) ....

(B) At the time the mission was assigned, the 3d Engineer Battalion was involved in the construction of the Division's 3ase Camp* Due to the fact that units of the Division were occupying camps outside the Division area, very l i t t l e curtailment of the camp construction was possible. All the Battalion's personnel and equipment were needed on camp constructlpn in order to complete the camp ao that units could move in by the time specified. Essential train ing in technical subjects such as mine detection and removal , and demolitions we're given priority. The Engineer Battalion conducted a school in demolitions, mine detection and removal for other units of the'.Division* A demonstration was held on the removal of mine fields for a l l 'Division officers* Companies participated in training exercises with the infantry regiment to which they were attached. (C) The mission of the. Engineer Battalion w^s to support the three HCT!s by the performance o engineer missions and to produce water for the.Division. I t was assumed that no source of fresh water would be found on Iwo Jima, conse quently sufficient distillation/eauipffl.ent was made r^ady and personnel trained to supply'water by d i s t i l l a t i o n of salt water. CD) At the outset of the action' the platoons of the lattersd companies were aboard ti^uiSBLQrAs with each BLT,

- 1

Subject:

Action Report.

(Cont'd)

The H S Company was embarked on ships with4 the **}vision & Headquarters and the 9th ^CT/ 3ach engineer unit landed with the fcit i t supported except Company H0n "which landed wltjiiut the 3d &CT' as set forth in Part I , paragraph (B). FART I I I CH-ONOLI&CAL >CCOlTNT OF TF3 ACffiON:

(A) Company "Btf landed with the gist H T on Zl February, C 1945 and proceeded to execute eneineej* missions. On% February, the Battalion Command Poet wae landed and set up adjapent to the division (JP. On 26 February, the "ngineer P Battalion C was displaced 200 yarda west to allpw more room for expansion. Qn tb February, Company "A" landed and poved to the assembly area with the 9th KC7 prepared to execvts engineer m i s s i e s . The remainder of n&$ Company landed 6n 6 February-and made a reconnaissance for a water ppint s i t e . Company " 3 " placed a water point in operation on 2^ February, This consisted of six Badger D i s t i l l a t i o n Unit* and0n$ portable purification u n i t . 21 events of Coivipa-ay H C began landing on 1 March and sixty (60) men from fife different ships were landed on 1, 2, 4pd 3 karch. On % ilarch, M3 Company completed i n s t a l l a t i o n of a wafer point on the west side of the island consisting of nineteen \19) Badger Dis t i l l a t i o n Units and one portable purification unit (for chlorination only). Another Badgar Unit was added to the water point on 3 March and two (2) 5000 gpd Clever-Brook d i s t i l l a t i o n Uriitd were added on 9 Ilarch. Lements of the Engineer Battalion remained attached to the HCT's until the island was secured* ft IV ' CCIS.-33NTS*

(A) Administration:
(1) The following casualties occurred!
K1A: *.-9
DO'^HlA:^ 4
T flAi 4 81
*
(2) Ths Division administrative plan of reporting c a s u a l t i e s and personnel k i l l e d or missing proved to be far more effective than i n any previous operations. I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y noted by administrative personnel in the Rear Echelon that such r e p o r t s were more accurate and much f a s t e r than in previous experiences. (3) The morale of troops throughout the Battalion was high. Items of fresh, foods obtained were extremely welcomed by a l l personnel and Here of great value to high morale* (B) Intelligence:

(1) Maps and photographs furnished the Engineer Battalion before the operation were very complete and adequate for a l l engineer purposes.

) Maps were furnished to the Sngineer Battalion

Vy VAC engineers during the operation showing roads and. mine
fields in the sectors of all fthree divisions*
ation disseminated to this Bait tali on by
of sufficient intelligence value.

. that more eaaoufl&lge personnel wimar "be trained and that camouflage aieciplinejae enforced on future operations. J ^ . k
V
o

-v. m*. - * . 1

(1) Sec Part II, paragraph(3) above# .

Supply: . . .

(1) This unit considers that an adequate amount of

Class I, II, ill,IV,V supplies -were embarked, *
(2) The 3d Engineer Battalion experience'd no diffi culty in the re-supply of Class I, II, III,IV> and V items.
A

(3) Distillation units in operation" produced an av'v:*

average daily output of 21,000 gallons*
(4) lio mobile water purification units were taken
on the operation: two of the portable units embayed WjSre--'
used for chlorination only. . ...- (5) Thiifi unit furnished equipment ;to .the Division
Shore Party ras specifled in Annex n&n to 3d Marine Division
Administrative Plan #1-46*
(6) ,n.mple wheeled and tractor transportation was
available at-all times.'Spare parts for minor repairs'on
motor vehicles and engineer equipment were available on D plus 13. . ' .
(E) .Engineer:
l

(1) Tactical Employment. a. The.3d Engineer Battalipn was employed

with the lettered cojupanics attached -to,the infantry fl r^gimtmts.
Company ttA" was attached to 11 9th Marines, Company B" to the
the 21st Marines and Company "C to the t3&, liarines. The "
companies wore further broken.4own;,and one.platoonattached
to each battalion of the inf^ntry -regiment/ the-Company hoad-,,
quarters remaining with tho infant^ regimental hindquarters. ,
Headquarters end Service Company Was attached to Division
Headquarters .; . * - - - "

. * , * . * '

(2) Principal aissiojia'assigned to 'thu Engine ors.

a. Location, removal or destruction of enemy
mines and booby traps* -..;..
b. demolition of ^tiemy caves, pilltjoxos;-and
other installations, , '_** '
' .
- c. Production of water; . " d. Construction, repair 'and maintenance

of supply roads. "...

e Assistance in the construction ofthe

Division Cemetery. . . -
v f. Operation of bulldozers, tractors, trucks
and cranes for the Shore Party . -r-;.
.g. ^ssistanco in the burial of'enemy dee,d# *
h, Coiapilation of completo information on
enemy installations, including loc^.tion of the istallatidns
on tho map, details and dimensions with photograph.
i. assistance in -the removal of our wounded
from forward to rear area6 . .
". j. .assistance, in the construction-of fiold
A fortifications. ' ' " ' . , _..; --.v " '
' k; assistance in thei removal o f onemy- animunit ion?sadd-explosivos

Subject:

Action Report*

(Cont'd)

(3) Adequacy of equipment parried,

ff a. Companies ."A", W B W and C"each carried

tte. following
One (1) 3/8 cu.yd. shorel. T o (2) TD-18 t r a c t o r s w Four (4) bulldozers (all heavy except two T)..1 4 ) . Seven (7) dump trucks. One (1) TD-9 tractor crane. Seven (?) Badger distillation unite. . Throe (3) portable water, purification unite* Other items of smaller equipment* b. H& Company carried the following <8 One (l) 3/4 c'u.yd. shovel. Three (3) TD~18 bull dozers. One (1) TD-9 tractor crafte, lline ( ) dump trucks , (9) p One (1) 105 cu.ft. &ir compressor. () (1) . One (1) M h O (1) Machine
^ ^
One flp Parts Othor itojas of amallqr equipment.
c. Based on expericwnue gained in this
operation, certain additions to andchange inthe
Tables of Organiza ion and Table of Basic Allowances'
.
are recommended, ^he recoramendations are contained f In Eart V of this report.
(4) Quantity of explosives, AT and AP mines,taken
and used.
a.Exploeives, AT and A? were taken by the
Landing Teams, Combat Teams and Division. Following is a
list of thetotal amount ofexplosives,taken on the operat* .
ion list of thetotal amount of explosives trken on the
operation: .
1711. ..Mine, A?, M2*l &-.M3 .
1 9 2 1 . . . . ...'.Minor A T . M 1 A 1 - 4 C - </, ; 10500...,,..Cap, Blasting, spec* olec,
40000.......Gap, blasting, spec, non elec*
155000..,...Cord, detonating, ft.#
1100..*.....Detonator, 15,.sec. delay ' ,
7150........Device, firing, Ml, pull*
1940........Device, firing, Ml, push,
3670,.......Pevice, firing, Ml, release,
115..........Charge* demolition, 55, lb.
13804, &+%\mExplosive, comp* C2 t lb.
31000 ...... islxplo s ive TI^, lb"f
1648. *.Block, demolition, M3
1162..;.....Block, demolition, chain. M l .
346...,.....Charge, shaped T3, . .
,8 Charge, shaped IIJS.
108000 .Fuae,.blasting, time, ft.
25036* Lighter, fuze.
2000.... *.; .Torpedo,, bangalqre..
b. This amount,of. exjflosives proved adiquate
to meet all needs. Hone of he mines taken were placed by
^UfcSome anti-personnel mines were used by the in sfDooby traps toprotect out ^osts at night. Pract-
K "* of the explosives other than mines, were used. The
attalion alone expended approximately twenty-five
- 4 ^
.

UHCLAS

Subject:

Ration Report.

A COont*d)

(5) Types of underwater and beach obstacle

a The Division landed in reserve over beaches
peration, consequently no underwater or beach
obstacles"were encountered.
(6) New and unusual beach and inland defenses
encountered. ' a# Most of the defensea encountered were of
types in general use by the enemy and very similart *
o installations observed on previous operations* The caves
were generally more elaborate and much larger than those
previously observed. The bunkers and pillboxes were built
low, almost level with-the ground, and covered with volcanic
sand# Keeping the installations low and covered with sand
effectdd an almost perfect camouflage. The earth covering
of enemy defenses blended perfectly with the surrounding ;
ground because of the almost total absence of vegetation/
b. Timber was used to a slight extent -only,
probably due to the scarcity of trees on the island.
The small amount of timber used was\ generally employed as
a support for the top of the installation. The timber
was covered with sheet metal and this covered by four or
more feet of earth.
c. Stone blocks were extensively used as
side walls for the enemy emplacements. The bifceks were
cut from lava rock to an average size of sixteen by
sixteen by twenty-four inches. The stone or concrete side
walls wore covered by either timber and earfch or concrete
slabs up to four feet thick. TJhere concrete roof slabs
were used the concrete was covered with earth. . ' . .
. .
' . ' ' ' . , ' . . '

d. One type of defense; was observed that

this Division had not previously encountered. This was '
an anti-tank barrier formed bv stone walls about throe
feet wide by three feet high and forty feet"long, >These
walls were staggered and;placed acrpss draws or easy slppes
where the natural te^raStt^waa favorable for tank movement
The stone wall barriers were covered by anti~tank guns. - * ;

' , * ' ' . . ' , ' ' . ? . [

e. Many of the enemy positions were cut" .; into solid rock.* , Underground living quarters were generally adjacent to gun positions and concrete or stone cisterns were built ciose by for catching rain ,tfate*. <7) Enemy mine fields; effectiveness.and methods. used to neutralize them. a. The enemy made mu,eh more extensive use of mines on Iwo Jima than in any other operation in-which.this Division has participated. The mine" fields encountered indicated that the'enemy forces there had a full knowledge of mine t a c t i c s and adequate training in placing them for the feest effect. The fpllowingnexj" types of mines and methods of placing them were observed: . .. , * *

(1) Terre cotta They had a case of viiJlftfied cl,ay than the conventional metal case*.:' v i l l not indicate the presence, of ts made of metal* - , *!

minxes were ^encountered* ' or "terra cotta rather ' Our\ SCR^625F .mine detectors a,mittejunless the mine ^ . .'"** " .

*~) .Box mines" frore' %ifeeav> The explosive ***w of Hhis mine i s a- wood box so that the absence of metal Prevents our SCK-685F mine detector from indicating it*s .presence.

Subject;

Action Report

(Cont'd)

. J) Terra cotta mines with pull type?

ignitors were found in controlled fields, usually around
the sides and rear of emplacements... The mines were inter connected with pull wires leading into the installations so
that the entire field could be exploded in case of attack.
(4) Yardstick mines irn combination1" aerial bombs were widely used by the enemy. The bomtys were planted in a field according to a regular pattern and the yardstick minass were placed over the nose of the bogb to act as ' a detonator.
(5) The character of the soil &nd the
presence of an extremely large amount of bomb and shell frag ments made the detection of mines- very/difficulty Rocks in
the wo il caus ed the AN/Prs-1 n in #e tec tor to llitdi cate the lr
i presence and also gave false indications to probing* Metal
fragemtns alsd couse^d mine dstectdj^ to give false indicatione
and were a hindrance to probing* Very easeful prpblng was
the only successful method nadd iri locating ainea* The Presence
of racks and fragments made probing ari even ftore slow and
painstaking process but no other raethdd could be relied upon*
(6) In practically all cases where mines ,
were found the engineers disarmed and removed them. Only when
the mines were damaged were they exploded in place. \
(8) Availability of spare parts.
a. Considerable difficulty was experienced by
the platoons and companies in getting spare parts. All spare
parts were carried by Headquarters and Service Comfany in the
only parts trailer taken on t^e operation; The fact that
higher echelons landed after the companies made it even more
difficult for them to get spare parts because parts were needed
before the trailer was disembarked from the ship.
b. In the confusion of the initial stages of
a landing especially, and advantage would be gained by having
parts for the first and'.second echelon maintence carried
by the platoons or companies* It is recommended that a
small supply of'much used parts such as spark plugs, fuel
and oil filters, be carried on each piece of equipment.
(9) 'fater supply and water supply equipment.
. a . There were no streams or other sources of
fresh water on the-island. The Division was supplied with .
water produced from sea water by distillation.: .Two wter
points were set up, one on the east side and another on the
west side of the island. The .water-point on the east side
consisted of six (6) Badger distillation .units and one (1)
portable water purification unit." ,ThQr.pQint on the west dide
consisted of twenty (20) Badger &s^ili-atio.n units, t w (2)
five thousand (500|)gpd Clever-Brook, distillation units and
one (1) portable water purification'. uriit> * "
. b. Both of these water points produced an average
of about twenty-ono thousand (21,000) gallons of water per day*
The principal difficulty encountered in the production of water
tfas in getting a salt water -intake installed so that the intake
pipe would, not fill up with sand. The heavy surf and erosive
action of the waves carried away several intake lines before a
Spendable one was set upV . .
_ - 6

Subject:

Option Report.

(Cont'd).

. c. A sump was dug In the sand about fifty a froin the water 1 8 edge in an attempt to get 'rest water that would not be inte'rf ersed wjth by wave action. Brackish 6ulphur water was found in%he sump but due" "to geological conditions on the island th^ water was too hot and the sulphur content too high to be rufl through the d i s t i l l a t i o n units. The hot water was fresh enough to be'used for bathing and showery were set up and supplied frofu a convae tank, f i l l e d from the vsump, by a two inch booster pump. The water was retained in the. t&*& Idng enough to cool down to suitable temperature for showers, ' . . . ' , In t h i s manner showers w^re provided for the Division. There was no other water available on the island for bailing purposes'.

d. The water supply equipment was adequate and no unusual d i f f i c u l t i e s were experienced wlt& i t . t i s believed that a one ton, two wheel t r a i l e r ahould be provided with every'three (3) d i s t i l l a t i o n unit6 for t r a n s , portation of hose, canvas tanks and other "accessories; The 5,000 gpd -Cleaver-Brook d i s t i l l a t i o n units should be mounted on wheels to f a c i l i t a t e movement* material, (16) Use made of enemy equipment and construction

a. The only captured equipment or material of any value to the engineers was nails. (F) Medical: (1) Embarkation.

a. Embarked one (1) medical officer and seven

. . . . .
(7) corpsmen on 8 February, 1945. carried. b. r Twenty (20) prescribed medic-4 ,units were
'

(2) Aboard Ship,

* a. b. Sickness aboard ship was njagligable. ' Sanitary- conditions were as follows: Heads were adequate.
Living quarters were crowded but. adequate
for a short period of time. ' Ilesses were very good. . Galleys were adequate. Cooks and messmen met sanitary requirements. . , c. Special.^precautions consisted of daily sick call and sanitary inspections. (3) Debarkation. Personnel-. . " (1). liadical personnel landed ori 26 February, (2) Medical Personnel landed from LGll's with elements of H S Gompany.' ' & Haterial. (1)' Medical material was carried aboard H S Company dump trucks and ambulance. & (2V Material-was1 landed about 1500 on 7 February. - 7^ b. a.

Subject:

Action Report*

(Oont'd)

sees of- personnel or oaaterial were not encountered" (4) Ashore - AsSualt Phase. a. Medical Installations.
(1) Medical installations were set up on

27 February.

(2J The aid station was set up in the

Battalion CP
area.
(a) Adequate road net in the vicinity*
(b) Cover was limited to fox holes$.
and craters.
(c) Personnel were dispersed in grougs
of three.
(d) VAC hospital and Co UB", 3dMedBn
were located within 300 yards of
aid station,
(e) Proximity to critical points varied
from 600 yards to three miles.
(3) Protective measures were as follows;
Medical personnel depended upon
security set up by the Battalion CP. Cover
limited to fdx holes and craters. Very
little concealment, some camouflage nts
were used. Supply of sand bags was inadequate
for construction of shelters. Blackout
% precautions were observed dur?ng the hours
of darknese*
(4) Special features or comments*
(a) The medical personnel of this organQ
ization functioned as a Battalion Aid Station,
This arrangement was quite adequate. The
equipment, supplies and personnel were adequate
for the mission.
(b) Ten patients were treated, nine ill*
nesses and one minor casualty. No operations
were performed. . -x .'
(c) Evacuation was effected by Jeep am bulance to an evacutation hospital. This
method was adequate.
(d) There were two (2) casualties treated,
one of which was evacuated. No casualties
died* - One case was a contusion of back due
to spent bullet; the other multiple con tusions and abrasions of face. There were
no stretcher cases.

< '

(e) Sanitation was adequate, no special

measures were taken. No dead were encountered.
There- were no epidemics or unusual diseases
among the troops.
(f) Dental service was obtained at Co"Bn,
3d Me&Bn," 0n<$ case of impacted molar was
treated. ' , v .
(g) There were no civile of war to c a l M ^ W | | risoners

-a

Subject: r

n Report*

(Confr'd r ~

h) It is believed that the present

type of organization, isnot suitable in
regards to the Engineer battalions. During
combat this organization is broken into
so many small independent units that it
is impossible for the medical officeFrto
Keep i i contact with/them and it is not;
r practical %o send patients from these Units
to him. He is-in contact only with H&5
Company, which xisually sees up close,to Pivision
Headquarters.
(i) It % suggested $ t ^ ^ g , ^ ^ ^
the medical pfficer: be";temporarily transferred
to the Medical 3attalion, or be retained in
the rear echelon to treat returning patients.
(jj Medical Personnelfi^readequate whila*
in base camp but over adequate for combat.
They are not employed enough to warrant a
medical officer* We experienced no losses
and no specialities needed,
(k) This organization carried . full
a allowance of Field Medical Equipment on
the operation, There were no losses, or
pilferage encountered. The Fesupply^ was
ample for aur small requirements.

* . ^

(l) Units #1 -2.0 were oarried in the

Medieal supplies. NO losses were sustained
from pilferage and>ihe resupply was adequate-
for our needs. . ;"'
(m) One^ ^ tonri 4x4. ambulance was carri ed
by the Battalion.'"! It was used for the '
transportati.on^of- meQ.ifd,al gear and patients
and was maintained oy H&S, Company.-*, This
vehicle proved adequate for all needs ex perienced. ........
' (n) T h e ^ l i " allwn&W;^
supplied^were carried and.j c i . unit met " o
fhs n necessity to re-clothe ii%p*

() Oe ui o o n nt f

equipment and supply was carried,"'but- it was..

not necessary to use thia. The supply of
DDT was inadequate for our needs! " * "
(5) Ashore - After completion"6f Assualfc phase,

v(a) Hospi-talization was adequate and a
sufficient supply of medical and.quartermaster
.equipment was available.. * Food arid-water were
adequate and sanitation fa^iliti-es-were. good.

PART V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION:

(A) It is recommended that the following additional

equipment be furnished thefehgineer Battalion and.be in cluded in the Tables of Organisation*.

9 *

- 10

ubject:

Action Report,

(Cont'd) '

(1) One (1) self propelled road grader for the-MB

Company making a total of four (4) in the Battalion.
(2) One (I) leaning wheel road ferader for tiie H&S
Company making a total of four (4) in the Battalion*
(3) One (1) low bed /nachinery seml-trailef of
tons capacity with tractor truck for H&S Company making a total
of one (1) in the Battalion* ,
(4) One (1) Five ton, 4 wheel machine shop trailer
for each lettered company, 'the present allowance of two i2
machine shop trailers for H&S Company could Vhen be cut TO'
one (1) making a total o.f four (4) for the Battalion*
(6) One (1) Qnfc ton, two wheel gt-easing trailer for
each lettered company, f'he present allowance of three (3
greasing trailers per H&S Company could then be cut to two
12) making a total of five (5) in the 3attalion*
(6) One (1) battery charger, SCR 169 for each
company including H&S, making a total of four (4) for the
.,
Battalion, (7)'.-One (1) .heavy duty cabl operated ripper for
each lettered, company* 'line present allowance of one (1
ripper for H&S Company would bring the total "Co four (#),
for the Battalion; fbe ripper furnished infcftepast
(Bucyrus-arie Model CR-1) has oeen too light f*>r.the class
of work done and'it is recommended that the ne^ ones furnished
bp heavy duty (Gar *ood C ~8G or equal) and capable of with standing the heaviest pull by a TI>-18 tractor without damage.
"(6) #our (4) one ton, -two wheel cargo trailers per
company, including H&B Company. Xhis-would bring the total t
for the Battalion to sixteen (1<S). The present allowance is
eight; (3) for the 3at tilloh* .
(9) 'Two -(2) floodlights, trailer mounted, cvmpLete
with five {&) 200 watt floodlight-s and 2 KW gasoline engine
drifen generator'(Engineer Uo, f^-^271 >.' 'No equipment a| this
. class is now carried by the Engineer Battalion, (
" (10)' One ^i)/4 fire pump complete with suction
hose, per H&S";Comp&ny, -Jo fire pumps are carried by the
Engineer Battalion at present. . ?
' ( 1 1 ) TwelVe' (12) 3rowfiJ.ng jautjOmatic, Rifles per
company making.a total of- forty eight (48) for the Battalion.
Ho BAR 1 s are-npw carried in'the organization.
i3). t t o f , . j i -4x4, trucks for H&S Company for
use by the Comiftunica^ibn d'nd refrigeration sections. The.se
two in addition* to-tii twenty-four (24) allowed at present would
bring the total of ths-|at.talicito twenty-six'(26).
(B) Recommendations for .changes in-tractors held by

Engineer Battalion! .[].*".*..

;

(1) T&ble" of^'Grgarjization" >Ptt provides the follow _.- ^, -^-vAL.i.,. B^itailon, Marine' Division.
tractors with angle dozers:
company and three (3) per H&S Company,
Heavy'tractors with do^Dle' dum power con*
lirol untt; ti^ fa) per H&S Company and- S -(2-1 P e r lettered
company.

tern* (CoM'd).

c. "TWSvy tractors with angledozers and SJ cu.yd. back dump&ng scraper; Two (2) per H S Company and & one (1) per lettered company, d. Heavy tractor with 2. wheel 15-20 ton crane; One (1) per H&S Company. (2) I t Is recommended that a l l of the above tractors be deleted and the following heavy tractors (TD-18) be furnished: a. Heavy tractors with hydraulic operated angledozer and double drum power control units; Three (3) per company including fi&3 Company. (One tractor for H S Company & to be equipped with two wheel 15-20 ton crane). (3) If this recommendation i s carried out, the Engineer Battalion will have a t o t a l JI rt twenty-eight (28) of heavy (TD-18) tractors. The present F Tables of Organ isation provides for a total of twenty-five (25) heavy tractors. (4) I t is recommended that two of the TD-18 angle dozers with single drum winches per company, including H S & Company, be proveded with an improved type of armor that will allow the driver maxium v i s i b i l i t y and protection. The ' armor should be detachable* If armored tractors are provided, i t i s imperative that the operators train with infantry and tank teams so that projection may be given by infantry and tank troops when the tractors are working in close proximity to enemy forces* A two way radio should be provided for the armored dozer so^ that the operator may receive instructions without exposing himself by getting outside the*armor. (C) I t i s recommended that the foilowing^equipment be eliminated from the Engineer Battaliont (1) Five (5) 54 cu*ydi back dumping scrapers* (2) Six (6) portable gasoline hammers. (D) The 15-18 ton machinery t r a i l e r furnished th& Engineer Battalion i s too l i g h t . The t i r e s are too small, the hitch and tongue assembly too l i g h t , and the frame con struction too light for Carrying the 3/4 cu.yd. shovel, TD-18 tractors, and other heavy pieces of equipment. I t i s recom mended that t r a i l e r s of twenty (20) tons rated capacity be furnished in place of the 15-18 ton t r a i l e r . If the t r a i l e r s are not replaced by t r a i l e r s of more capacity; the size of the t i r e s and rims on the present t r a i l e r s should be increased to 8.25: 20. (E) I t i s recommended that twelve (12)} demolition snaked be released to the Engineer Battalion per year for training purposes, with a view to using them in combat operations* (F) The following increases in personnel over, the proVisions of the Table of Organ! zati'oii UF'* are recommended: - 11

'Subject:

Action Report,

(Corit'd*

(1) If additional equipment is proveded, a

mended above * two operators for each piece of heavy equipment
jjhould be authorized*
(2) The present authorization allows nine (9
privates or privated first vlpss for heavy truck drivers for
each lettered company* It is recommended that the number
be increased to fourteen (14j*. The present allowance of heavy
truck drivers in the H&S Company is eighteen (18), and it
is recommended that the allowance be increased to twenty-seven
(27). Thl$ recommendation ia made in order to provide drivers
for each heavy tr&ek0 Th3 total increase in truck drivers fo3?
the battalion would be twenty-four (24)4
_ (3) The number of Ccrpotals, Mechanic/ General (31$
in the iJngineer companies should be increased by two (2) ar:&
in the H&S Company increased by three (3), This increase
would add a total of nine (9) men to the Battalion and it is
recommended in order to provide mechanics for water equip ment and to provide mechanics in the approximate ratio of one
to e,ach four (4) pieces of motorized equipment,
(4) The present authorization for water supply men
in the Engineer Battalion is as follows:
Staff Sergeant
Sergeant

Engineer Co* 0
.1

H&S '(&.
X

i '

:
Corporal 3 I PPC or Pvt, 3 3 . ; - :" . . r .
t v It is recommended that the above authorization
be changed to the following:

Engineer Co Staff Sergeant Sergeant Corpoayal PFC or Pvt. 0 1 3 12

.H&S Co-.
1
1
5
11

The above increase in water personnel would total *'

thirty*seven (37) men for* the Battalion.
(5) The total increase in personnel recommended in
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above is seventy (70) men for the
Battalion. " S. CM^PBSLL.
/

%'.*.<

--:^

'

'

ENCLOSURE J

3D PIONEER BATTALION

ACTION REPORT

3D

3D I-kHlUE DIVISION,
0/0

MaRISB .FCKCJ5#

.POSJT

amen,
10 A p r i l , I9U5.

(Co : Subject: Beference: Enclosures:

Officer.
The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division*
action Eeport for Iwo Jima Operation,
(a) 3d Marine Divisioa Confidential General Order 137
(A) Annex Able to 3d Marine Division administrative Plan
1-1*5 - Shore Party Plan.
(B) 3d Marine Division Shore Party Situation Map*

1, Th.Q period covered by this report is from time mission was

assigned, J November, I9I&, to endt.of operation, 16 March, 19*+5 Zone
minus ten (k) time, east longitude date was in effect for the Iwo Jima
operation.
BCT 21 Shore Parfry landed oa Iwo Jiaa D plus 2 and was
used to supplement the ^th Marine Division Shore Party, The 3 d &nlne
Division Shore Party Headquarters and BGT 9 Shore Party were committed on
D plus 5. EOT 9 a n & SOT 21 Shore Parties were under the control of 3d
Marine Division Shore Party Headquarters T>y 1600 on D plus 5 ^ e ^s^
and 3d platoons of Co ltC11
, 3d Pioneer Battalion landed and joined the
3d i^iarine Division Shore Party on D plus 10# On D plus 13 the 3^ Marine
Division Shore Party was designated as landing Force Shore Party. The
Iwo Jima operation was declared secured on D plus 25, and the 3& Marine
Division Sliore Party continued to operate as Landing Terce Shore Party.
2* as follows;
The composition of the 3& Marine Division Shore Party was
3& Pioneer Battalion,
attached1
Detachment 3d JASCO*
28th Emplacement Draft.
3^th Eeplaesment Draft.
Hoinforcing elements:
Detachment 3d hotcr Transport Battalion.
Detachment 3d Engineer Battalion.
Detachment 3d Military Police Oompaay*
Detachment Headquarters Companyt Headquarters Battalion,
3d Kari&e Division*
Detachment supervisory and labor elements, 3d- Marine
Division.
Detachment* JJavy ("beachmastera).
Between time mission was assigned i*n.& the beginning of the
action; shore p^rty training, procurement and preparation of shore party
equipment and supplies were accomplished. Shore party training was
Conducted for all personnel comprising the Division Shore Party (less
naval platoons) by commencing with lectures on organization, fuaetioning
and duties of the shore party, fallowed "by Bltf shore party demonstrations.
After the above training had "been completed shore party
exereises were conducted for each BXI shore party of the Division using
simulated Teaches and actual landings oa >eaehes from DUKWs, ICM and
Token loads were used for all exercites except for- the last which was a
complete logistical problem.
Page X of 10 Pages

SubjectT

" M i % 4 i i l ^ i o r Ivo Jima Operation, (Continued)

One (1) CPX was held for each EOT hore party involving
landing over "beaches from'LCHs* The Division Shore Party parti* >ted
.- .. *
in a Division CPX, jporms, records and other data necessary .for administration
and operation of the shore &rty were accumulated. The composition, and
duties of the Bear 3chelon were determined* The Division Shore Party
plan, Unit Personnel and Tonnage Tables and unloading priorities were
prepared.

. ' *

The training period was concluded on 3 February, Embarkation began on 7 February, ^ For mission, plans and assumptions refer to Enclosure ( A ) *
Blfl? and HOT aliore parties embarked with units they were
reinforcing* The shore parties were composed of attached units and
reinforcing elements as stated above. Disposition of forces were as
shown above and on Enclosure *B",
At 1130, D plus 2 (ZlZebtyj), the shore party of Blfl?,2
3. of BCT 21 landed and supplemented the Uth Marine Division Shore Party
"by operating Boadh Tollow 1* . .
By 1100, D plus 3 approximately ^40^ of SOT 21 Shore
Party was ashore under the control of the ^th Marine Division Shore
Party, and w^s reassigned to operate Beach Yellow 2 6o# of EC!T 21
Shore Party was ashore and functioning by 1800,
On D plus Ut 200 men from beach unloading details of SOT
21 Shore Party were withdrawn by ^th Marine Division Shore Party for use
on Beach Blue* Comparatively small amounts of supplies were landed over
Beach Yellow 2 until 1200 when more lighterage was made available* Due '
to the nature, of thebeachr amphibian tractors were used exclusively for
movement of supplies from lighters to ^th ferine Division dumps* Wheeled
vehicles when landed, were towed by tractors approximately ^0 feet to a
beach matting road* Salvage material and dead wore-collected to alleviate
the extent of congestion on the beach* The first terrace near the water- .
line was eliminated by bull-dozers in order to construct a lateral road*
Further congestion was caused by artillery installations which prevented
the construction of a lateral beach road further inland.
In the morning of D plus 5# BCT 9 Shore Party and 3d
Marine Division Shore Party Headquarters landed on $each -Yellow 1. The.
northern half of Beach Bed 2 and the southern half- tf Yellow 1 were assigned
as 3d Marine Division beaches and redesignated as Beaches Black 1 and 2*
SOT 21 Shore Party was directed to revert to 3d Marine Division control
and to establish a shore party on Boach Black 2* By l600, HOT 9 Shore
Party and EOT 21 Shore Party were established, consolidated and functioning
on Beaches Black 1 and Black 2 respectively under the control of the 3d
&arine Division Shore Party Headquarters, .amphibian tractors were
obtained from Ianding l*orce Shore Party for movement of supplies from
lighters to dumps*
On the morning of D plus 6,; the Division dumps were under
the control of the Division Quartermaster and the Division Ordnance Officer,
Unloading of Division supplies was progressing over Black Beaches on a 2^
hour basis* J^mm howitzer, 105mm howitzer and 31mm mortar ammunition was
given highest priority. (This situation continued for entire duration of
the operation). Surf conditions permitted unloading with craft no smaller
than XCMs and as extremely rapid unloading of JUJMa was 'necessary, only
vehicles were carried by tjaem. ^11 materials other M b
Page 2 of 10 Pages

Subject; action Seport for K o J i m Operation, (Continued).

XgDs. - t 1SOO three (3) LSTs and one (l) LOT - '
i * Squadron 11 (3& inline Division ships) .. for
. . ship to shore* This amount of lighterage was
inuous fie- of supplies.
Until D plus 7 Beach Black 2 did not possess a "beach-master,
therefore, comparatively little unloading could be accomplished over this
beach.
The lighterage situation vas further aggravated on D plus S
when only one (l) LCT and one (l) LSI were furnished for unloading Transport
Squadron 11. During this period a lateral beach road of Marston batting had
been layed approximately 50 yards inland by V .amphibious Corps engineers,
which facilitated the use of wheeled vehicles along the beach Sowever,
it was still necessary to use amphibian tractors for the movement of a
greater part of the supplies from lighterage to dumps due to deep volcanic
sand and steep gradient encountered throughout entire beach area.
Personnel of the Replacement Battalions, less ship platoons, were landed
from Transport Division 33 o r u s s a s
battl* replacements.
Conditions remained the same throughout D plus 9
lack of a sufficient number of landing craft larger than ICMs still
impeded rapid unloading over Blade Beaches* The flow of supply had
increased but not to the desired decree which would utilize the entire
efficiency of the shore party.
^ On D plus 10 all perroan el and equipment of the 3 - Pioneer
Battalion were ashore, less company headquarters and one (l) platoon of
Company "0rt which remained embarked with HCT 3 on TyanspOrt Division 33,
Personnel and equipment of the two platoons landed from Company ttC", 3&
Pioneer Battalion were assigned equally to the shore parties of BCT . and
9 &GT 21 By this time lateral traffic on the sand was possible for wheeled
Vehicles 50 yards inland from the beach.
Unloading operations continued on a 2k hour basis throughr A _ out D plus 11.
On D plus 12 a 315? shore-party was assigned the mission of
unloading LCTs on Purple Beacft. Slmm mortar, f^mn. and lO^mm howitzer
ammunition still received highest priority. Unloading continued on Beach
Black*
At 0700 D plus 13 one (l) officer and fifty (50) men were
assigned to Purple Beach to control dioembarkation of personnel from USS
Jupiter* All of Beaches Hed 2 and lellow 1 were designated Beach Black
for operation by 3d liarine Division Shore Party and redivided into Beaches
Black 1, Black 2 and Black 3 However, Beach Black 1 was not utilized clue
to obstructions caused by wrecked LCHs and LVTs# Replacement Battalion
personnel functioning as ship, platoons from Transport Division 33
w e r e
landed over Purple Beach, ^ t 1800, D plus 13 the 3d. iiUrine Division
i Shore Party was designated as Landing porce Shore Party and commenced
unloading supplies for V ^jnphibious Corps and garrison forces over Blade
Beach. 3four (4) generators and eight (S) flood lights were supplied by
Landing Force Shore Party to aid in night unloading.
D plus lk Transport Divisions 31 and 32 were given
priority in unloading.
During the period D plus 13 to D plus VJ, the 3d Marine
Division Shore Party continued general unloading of supplies for V
.amphibious Corps and garrison forces. Transport Squadron 11 was under way
Page 3 of 10 Pages

Subject:

for Xvo J i m Operation, (Continued).

for tho Marianas Islands "by plus 15. Transport Division 33 had unloaded
all supplies loss organizational equipment of troops still embarked and
sailed on i) plus lk, Transport Divisions 31 and 32 had unloaded all troops
and supplies roquirod ashore and sailed on D plus 15*
-it 1S30, D plus Ifi the 3d Pioneer Battalion, loss reinforcing
and attached units, was placed on a thirty minute call to form a Division
<
He serve line,. SVom D plus IS to D plus 25 the 3d liirine Division Shore
Party operated Beach Black for the unloading of 7 ^japhiljious Corps and
garrison force supplies*
Intermittent enemy mortar and artillery fire fell in the
area of Beach Black during the period from D plus 5 to D plus 9 Several
"beached ISTs were hit causing slight damage to ships and casualties to
personnel* On D plus 11 one large caliber shell fell on Beach Bladk
causing slight damage to "beach matting road, Numerous mines and duds
were located and marked by shore party personnel throughout the period
covered "by this report; removal "being accomplished by "bomb disposal units.
Unloading percentages of Transport Squadron .11:

mm*mmmmm

Date

Time
1500 0*00 1330 1500 1800 0800 1000 I63O 1200 1700 l600 1000 1S00 1S00 1800

Trans Div 31

Trans Div 32
20* 20$

Trans, Div 33

D plus 5 . D plus 6

Of.
0$ 0^ 0$

2U$ 32^
41$

2O/o

oi

20/S

D plus 7* ' , D plus 6 D plus D plus D plus D plus D plus D plus 9 10 12 13 1^ 15

23 26

27^

of,
0^
0^0

05J

HS
5S$

6o#
72/J

6l# 10$
Sailed

52^

^9/^

' 0*$ 09^ 23^

51)9 Sailed

v$

Sailed

in in

^. iipproximately six (6) weeks prior to tho operation two (2)

Heplacement Hrafts containing 115 officers and 2575 m ^w ere attached to the
3d Pioneer Battalion for administration, supply 'and training.
In conjunction with a representative from the Division
Classification Section, the Pioneer S-l inventoried all personnel for
available engineer, pioneer and ordnance skills. Those persons having
special skills were temporarily assigned to the Pioneer, Engineer and
Ordnance units.
The remaining r>ersonnel of the drafts were organized into
nine (3) BLT shore party labor teams and these teams were given extensive
training as a unit with the Pioneer Battalion. None of the personnel were
allowed to b e permanently assigned to any unit of the Division, the general
policy being to have both drafts as intact as possible in order that they
.b* .. available to.the whole Division as battle reple
. prior to the embarkation all personnel" on temporary duty
Engineering units reverted back to their BLiP shore party
k of 00 Pages ,

Subject;

action Heport for Iwo Jima Operation, (Continued);

group attached to it upon its organizaTion, Bfo'feiiFWfcfiaceBent Draft

made up an administrative group from qualified personnel within that
draft.
purposes of handling personal effect3. administrative
records and report3, a forward administrative group and i\ rear administrative
group were established under tile supervision of the P:loneer Battalion* During
the oper/at-ion the. forward, sect ion was concerned wi*;h submit* ing change
sheet- lata, casualt / data and other information to the rear echelon and also
;1 handled the distribution of mail to forward tracpe^1 The ie<.\x echelon took
care of the m l k of the administrative work* .all records. property and
verc handled by the rear administrative gsoup*
"Upcat i Tiding, the Replacement- Zro.fzs wore us'vd ;>- shore
:s pazvry elementn ur.til j) plus 10, when personnel, were wit-idrawr. and assigned
to unit.a of the !Jiririot5a From then until 3 p..- ??<? personnel were
";'s withdrawn daily on:l assigned to various unit3 oi tl*e Division, This was
handled "by directives fron the G~l to the Classification Officer assigned
to the Pioneer Battalion who submitted a list of personnel by .ISils to the
Pioneer S~l* The S~l withdrew the personnel from the various shore party
details, assembled them and sent them to the units designated,
Transfer orders on replacement personnel were written T>y the
Division Adjutant from information supplied by the classification section
attached to the Pioneer Battalion*
In the forward area 2277 officers and enlisted replacement
personnel were assigned to the Division*
Upon return to the rear area, those replacements who had
not been assigned in the forward area were allocated to units of the
Division and the drafts were closed out*
Ho difficulties were experienced in reporting casualties
on this operation* ^11 casualties were reported to Battalion Headquarters
and from there direct to Division Headquarters by means of Casualty Data
Sheets. These clata sheets were prepared in duplicate in advance of the
Operation and retained by company 1st sergeants* They shoved each man's
name, rank, serial number, organisation, SSN and a date entry was made
in the appropriate W L A , KI.V, M I A or D W X A column according to the man's
status. . A combat card -was made on each man containing all information
likely to be needed by the Battalion in the forward area. This card
was retained in Battalion Headquarters, A S casualties occurred, the 1st
sergeants filled out the duplicate casualty data sheets, kept one., copy
for record purposes and sent the other to Battalion Headquarters,
Battalion Headquarters recorded the information and sent all casualty
slips received to Division,
In the Heplacoaent Drafts, casualty data sheets were made
up for each man. This data sheet accompanied him to the unit to whieh he
was assigned* This was a simple method of Joining personnel to the infantry
battalions and expedited casualty reporting as no additional paper work was
required of units reporting the casualties*
Division made the Initial report to the Secretary of the Kavy
from the casualty data sheets. Amplifying reports were made by the rear
echelon administrative section. Tnis system was excellent and made quick,
accurate casualty reporting with an absolute minimum of record keeping*
Page 5 of 10 Pages

Iwo Jima Operation, (Continued), Korale \*as no problem daring tho operation as many of .the troops had boon in action before. 4,8 soon as the tactical situation permitted, galleys were set up to serve hot B rations, Drinking and wash water was adequate. Mail service throughout was prompt and frequent. unit* Ho prisoners, natives or civilians were encountered by this
.. ..

Seaoh "studies of east and west beaches with the beach profiles
were excellent for,this unit which i s primarily interested in beach
conditions. The pliotos furnished were valuable for orientation of a l l
personnel and the beach obliques wore found to be nost effective. 3y far
the most valuable map received for briefing of personnel was the Terrain
Model relief iaapf however, i t was found that this nap must be studied in
conjunction with-a contoured military map otherwise a distorted idea of
terrain say exist.
fto maps or photos were received during the operation, .A
nap of the beach ^rca, scale 1/2500 was drawn by the Jd. Pioneer Battalion
intelligence section for use on the beaches as a situation nap. This
scale was more suitable for shore party situation map work thaS the
l/lO,000 nap which was furnished.
Sydrographic maps received prior to embarkation were quite adequate. ' G~2 information received by this unit was excellent. Personnel of this unit turned-in many valuable documents. It is suggested that the system of quotas for collecting enemy material .be modified to include a l l material of the type needed as personnel are able to withhold enemy material until restrictions are lifted. Intelligence liaison was excellent. Enemy counter-intelligence measures were neglected as to
destruction of maps and documents many of vrhich were marked top secret.
Mines on beach areas were buried in many places an deep as' three (3) feet. Whether this was a deliberate attempt by th enemy to destroy our heavy earth moving equipment, the result of shifting sand^, or naval gunfire could not be.determined. The allowance of Plorescent Satin,ttConti->Grlo"was
entirely inadequate. This unit requires a minimum of nine (9) complete
sets, plus sufficient cloth to make up all colors of beach flank and
center markers.
The supply of mesh type beach matting was adequate but this type proved highly unsatisfactory. The deep sandy soil oh Iwo Jima offered no means of tying this type mat down. Bundles of hinged type Harston Mat or equal i s recommended for future operations of this unit* Shore party,labor was organized into labor units of one (l) officer and twanty-f-ive (25) men including two (2) HCOs. all. labor elements pax'ticipatod in five (5) shore party exercises before embarkation. Control^and efficiency of labor elements was stressed in this training. Disembarkation of shore party labor letoents was'nade In groups no smaller than one shore party labor unit or multiples thereof. Previous training stressed necessity for the offiaer in charge of a labor uj^ to^repprt to Shore Party Command Post upon laiid^ng. .all units of the 6 of 10 Pages

Iwo Jima Operation, (Continued)*

assigned "bivouacs in. the beach area "by the Shore Party Commander, and
instructed to remain there on call. Labor "was divided into twelve (12)
hour shifts as the situation permitted. Control of shore party labor
throughout the operation was excellent*
Personnel and weapons of the Pioneer Battalion plus twanty four (,2k) labor teams consisting of one (l) officer and twenty-five (25)
men each were employed by the Division Sio re Party for "beach defense.
Eighteen (IS) similar dump unloading teams were available as reserve and
were assigned assembly areas,

Master brid2.es for towing of pallets were efficiently employed.
Slings and chokers for hoisting pallets, 50 gallon druffia and miscellaneous
cargo were used extensively* Previously prepared lengths of wire rope up
to one (1) inch in diameter and fifty (50) feet long were used effectively
as tow lines, and were attached to tractors in order to hold LOT a, LSMs
and LOTs on the steeply inclined beach* These lengths were also utilized
for other tows as required* One (\) rigging trailer was available in each
Pioneer Company for maintenance, repair and replenishment of slings, bridles
and tow lines. Traversing cranes with booms up to thirty (30) feet were
used extensively but should not* be considered as a substitute for man p$wer
.*t approximately D plus 20, twenty (20) ton ^Ii Toumeautt cranes were
necessary in order to unload heavy cargo belonging to garrison forces*
Tractors with blades were adequate and extensively used. Tractors without
blades were used as temporary prime movers in unloading.
Bouipment and personnel furnished the Division Shore Party
were adequate. 3d Marine Division Shore Party and equipment employed were
as listed in .annex .%ble to General Order 116 - 3d Marine Division SOP on
Shore Party and **jmex .able to 3& Marine Division Administrative Plan 1-ty) ~
Shore Party Plan (EnclosureB & " ) .
Replacement flrafts lumbers 28 *and 3^ were trained as labor
elements for BLT and HOT shore parties and were highly satisfactory. See
above for use1 as battle replacements*
Dumps and the distribution of sapplies therefrom, were
placed under the supervision of the Division ^aartermastor and Division
Ordnance Officer when the Division Shore Party was activated* This procedure
places the responsibility upon the officers best qualified and has
repeatedly proven successful.
Military police and guides were posted at strategic points
for proper direction of traffic. Properly planned traffic routes and dump
organization reduced congestion to a minimum. (See Enclosure *3a for traffic
diagram).
Division T<$ remained aboard the flagship of Transport Squadron
11 and controled priorities of ship^to-shore movement of cargo as requested*
Delivery of high priority items requested ashore generally required twslve
(12) hours from receipt of request, due to the shortage of necessary lighterage.
In some cases cargo designated for 3& ^rine Division beaches
was landed elsewhere due to misunderstandings between beachmasters and control
vessels.
Cargo tickets showing the amount and type of cargo loaded
from the ship into landing craft Were made out in triplicate by the Troop
of each ship, one (l) copy of which he retained, one \X) of which was
designated for,tthe control vessel, and one (l) to be delivered to the shore
party commander, actually in most cases the cog^o-l vessel nover accepted
Page 7 of 10 Pages

Iwo Jima Operation, (Continued) and/or received i t s copyf and two (2) copies arrived at the-beach. Cargo
ticket a in some cases were made, out improperly and no re training in this
procedure i s necessary* AS this Division landed in reserve, the use of
floating dumps ana. the procedure of placing a MUtt section representative
on the control Vessel was not inagurated.
Wheeled transportation embarked was adequate for shore
use. However, only limited use wasmade of wheeled vehicles "by the shore
party initially "because of the soft sand. DOKWs were notassigned to this
Division except forcasualty evacuation from shore-to-ship. Some trouble
was encountered in negotiating soft sand near thewater's edge, "but others-
wise theDUKtf proved to "be an'excellent vehicle forcasualty evacuation.
LVT(l+)s allocated .to theDivision Shore Party were excellent andtheiruse
greatly simplified movement of cargo from landing craft, to dump areas.
Transportation supplied was as specified in Enclosure "A". In addition
approximately forty (^40) amphibian tractors were furnished the Division
Shore Party "by Landing Jorce Shore Party,
In many cases pallets were loaded in landing craft athwart
ship instead of fore andaft making it difficult to tow pallets from
lighters.
Some ships of Transport Squadron ll didnot have slingsfor
proper handling of sled type pallets* *is a result Borne pallets were
received on the 'oeacii damaged to such an extent that it wasimpossible to
move thorn "by mechanical means.
In eone cases vehicles and engineer equipment were damaged
in unloading from ship to lighterage so that they were unserviceable when
received ashore, i.e., a, "bulldozer "being improperly slung so that hydraulic
'lines were damaged prohibiting the use of theblade; a new3/S cubic yard
Bay City crane being dropped approximately four (k) feet into an LOT
damaging the crane to the extent that it wasinoperatable when received
ashore* Some of these difficulties might "be eliminated if equipment
operators aboard ship would seethat their equipment is properly slung
before it is unloaded into landing craft.
The chemical warfare defense of this unit consisted of
individual protective equipment in the possession of troops; trained
decontamination squads and-gas alarms, alltroops were well indoctrinated
in chemical warfare defense. This unit wasready to and capable Of
decontaminating itsownequipment andarea.
Decontamination equipment wascarried with company shore
party property which was high priority gear.
Gas masks were collected by 8~kon D plus 6, 1095 g a e masks
were collected during assault phase and no servicing was undertaken at
this time.
dumps.
n tt

Chemical warfare equipment was stored in company property

.

Salvage of chemical warfare equipment wasconducted by unit

section and chemical warfare UCOs.

Medical personnel andmaterial were embarked with respective

. * .
BLT andROT shore -parties. Sanitiation was good aboard ship.
Pago ''**f- 10 -Pages

on Iwo Jima Operation.4 (Continued)*

giiombarked with respective BLT and RCT shore
es; three (3) corpemen per BLT shore party and one (1) doctor and
corpsmen per &d$ shore party*
RCT 21 SP - 1 doctor, 1 dentist, 11 oorpsmen landed D plus 3*
RCT 9 S? - 1 doctor, 1 dentist, 12 corpsmen landed D plus 5*
RCT 3 SP - 6 corpsmen landed D plus 10.
There were no losses of personnel or material*
ROT 21 Shore Party - one (1) doctor, oae (1) dentist and
eleven (ll) corpsmen landed at 0800, P plus 3 on Beach Yellow 2* Set up
and assisted the Hth Marine Division evacuation station on Beach Yellow 2*
^t I6OO, D plus 5 moved to north end of Beach Black under 3d Marine
Division Shore Party control and established evacuation station* This
station was located on lateral beach road, 100 feet from main inland
road to first air field* Beach exits and unloading points were adequate*
The station consisted of one large receiving tent directly on the seaward
iide of the lateral road; a shock tent was set up on the terrace nearest
the water1 edge* and a holding and treatment tent set up on the inboard
side of the lateral road* All locations were adequately dug in with bull dozere and sandbag protection was used at entrance and sides* Cots and
stretchers were used for patients* Bed lights were used for illumination
at night when necessary*
0$ 9 Shore P*rty - one (1) doctor, oae (1) dentist and
twelve (12) corpsmen landed at 1^00, D plus 5 oa southern end of Beach
Black and established an evacuation station on the lateral beach road*
Tents similar to RCT 21, consisting of receiving, shock and holding tents
were set up and properly protected with sandbag revetments*
RCT 3 Shore party - Six (&) corpsmen landed at 1000,
D plus 10 and assisted the RCT 21 Evacuation Station*
On D plus 17 RCT 9 Evacuation Station secured and joined
HOT 21* RCT 21 secured all evacuation on D plus 26 at 1J06*
RCT 21 Svacuation Station evacuated 3196 casualties*
RGT 9 Svacuation Station evacuated 597* Personnel evacuated were from
the 3d, kth and 5th Marine Divisions and V Amphibious Corps* A total .
of ten (10) &ibd at evacuation stations* Approximately 65fS of all
patients were stretcher cases* Casualties were evacuated by LCMs, BUXWs,
LSTs and LSiis depending upon surf conditions* Shis proved to be adequate
t ransportation*
Sanitation was maintained by constant policing of the area,
Water was supplied by 50 gallon drums and 5 gallon expeditionary cans*
Dead were taken to cemetery area for burial* Dental service was adequate*
, There were twenty-two (22) enemy prisoners evacuated*
Medical organisation of evaouation staff was suitable*
Medical personnel was adequate*
There was no pilferage of supplies or losses* Supplies
were adequate except for blankets and stretchers*
Page 9 of 10 Pages

Subject:

Action Heport for Iwo Jiaa Operation,

It i s recommended that larger and more adequate suppliesof "blankets and stretchers "be assigned to evacuation stations as they tend to act as medical depots in the initial phase of assault. Communication personnel and equipment'supplied were adequate for operation. shore party was organized and equipped fotf this operation in accordance with 3& Marine Division general Order 116 - SOP, Shore Party and -innex Able-to 3^ Marine "Division uidmini st rat ive Plan 1-^5 {Enclosure "A*1)* This organization and equipment was considered adequate with the exception that a minimum of ten (10) (Bay City type.) cranes with thirty (30) foot "booms and twelve (12) tractor cranes with traversing "booms should "be furnished for future shore party operations involving landing in the assault, . One (1),cargo oarrier M29C (weasel) per letter company and one (l) per H S Company, Pioneer Battalion would "be useful as & command vehicles for the purpose of rapid transportation to assist in coordination of activities in beach and dump areas. Bundles of hinged HfcrSton imtting (50* sections) should be substituted for the typo of beach matting now furaiehecL the Pioneer. Battalion. Steel toboggan type cargo sleds approximately 5f * H 1 should be added to shore party equipment in the number of twenty-seven (27) per . Pioneer Battalion. It i s further rocoomonded that in the event this Division i s assigned a& assault landing at least two (2) complete logistical shore party relaov;-rs^ls..be! held.

JEDiiUKD M. 'VXLLLOtS

Page 10 of 10 Pages \

JDH-sjw Ser.^OOOUU M FORCE, Iff THE 7I2LD. 23 January,

go
1.

a, Directives from higher authority require that this

Division be,prepared, in Corps Reserve, to land in rear of assault units
and execute a passage of lines and also to be prepared to execute an
assault landing on Corps order,
2.

a, In the event of an assault landing, Division Shore Party w i l l be organized and w i l l function as prescribed by General Order ~ 116 - SOP Shore Party, In the event t h i s Division lands over "beaches on which shore party units are functioning, the 3& Division SP w i l l relieve or augment established shore party unit's as ordered. 3# SHOflB

a. In the e v e n t t h i s Division lands over previously established beaches:

(l) Initial supplies will be obtained from established

supply installations,
(2) EC3!s will not establish floating dumps.
(3) BI# and HC!P SPs will be landed on beaches prescribed
by Division SP Commander,
b. In the event this Division lands in assault:
(1) Initial supply installations will be established in
accordance with General Orde* 11$ - SOP - Shore Party.
(2) 3VH SPs will be landed as ordered by BIT Commanders,
(3) Hoating dumps will be established by BKPs for the
emergency supply of critical items during the initial landing phase,
(a) !Ehe floating dump will be maintained in the
vicinity of each Segimental control Vessel. A representative of the
regimental k Section will "be on each Regimental control vessel and will make'
request for dispatch of boats from floating dumps to appropriate beach.
(b) Bequests for supplies from floating dumps will be
routed through SP Commanders to the Regimental control vessel* JSaeh 503?
floating dump will consist of the following: ,
1 I>OVP - lOJmja ..1.,., 110 rounds
1 LCTP - 75mmM.*
# ,.225

rounds

Page 1 of 5 Pages
3HCL0SUHB *A*

aBLS to AdJninfsiSiwM Plan I-U5.

in

5H0H3 P^BTY PLaE. (Contd). rounds rounds rounds each rounds rounds

...6,900 1 LCVP - Carbine 7.500 M~l , . . . . Machine (ton . . 1 2 , 0 0 0 Grenades 325 37mm .,..'IHO 75mm tank , . . . * . . . I3S

1 LCVP - 60mm mortar . , . . , . . . . hlk rounds 81mm mortar . 306 rounds Bazooka . . . . . . . . . . . . * 1 2 0 rounds 1 LOVP - Water v . 1 * expeditionary ^0 cans (700 gals)

1 LCVP - Fuel, flame thrower, gasoline 97 cans (U65 gals) Juel, flame thrower, Napalm , , lU6 pounds Nitrogen cylinders **. 16 Ignition cylinders . . 108 (<S) Ploating dumps to be maintained at the l e v e l prescribed in the above sub-paragraph until ordered discontinued by SCT Commanders, at which time supplies remaining in the floating dump w i l l O . . be landed a s directed by H T Commanders. (d) AS the necessary number of LCTPs return from the f i r s t trip to the beach they w i l l be u t i l i z e d for the floating dumr>s. (k) Trip Tickets. (a) Transport Quartermasters on board a l l ships embarking t h i s Division w i l l dispatch cargo ashore and v/ill maintain record thereof, as follows: !* i* trip ticket w i l l be orepared in t r i f p l i c a t e , showing nature and quantity of cargo and unit for which loaded. Tickets w i l l not show destination. Two (2) copies u i l l . b e furnished the Coxswain, who w i l l then proceed to the BegimerAtal control v e s s e l . *vt the Begimental control v e s s e l , one ( l ) copy w i l l be delivered t o the Regimental ll U" representative, whop, thfrcOntroX oftioo* directs the craft to a designated beach." The, remaining cot>y w i l l be given to a SP representative upon arrival
At tae Deacii ox- ..

(b),The Division Transport v-),i.v.rtermaster will prepare and distribute the necessary trip tickets prior to embarkation, (5) 12th i-Iarines will transport artillery ammunition from beach.and will unload artillery ammunition at inland dumps, (6) DIOTB and LVTs, i f assigned for ship-to-shore movement of supplies, will operate as direct6d by Division Shore Party Commander. (7) Division wotor Transport Officer will establish a vehicle refueling point (gas and diesel) on each E O C?

Page 2 o f 5 Pages 2LTCL0SUBE

A 1-45.

SH0H2S P^IST PLaH, (Cont'd),

a. Sach BLT SP w i l l be equipped HLth: 1 - Athey Tractor-trailer, Motor Transport Bn) (lurnished "by 3&

2 - t r a c t o r s , l i g h t or medium, with angledozers. (Furnished by 3d Pioneer Bn), 1 - 2jt*ton, 6x6 truck, dump, (burnished by 3d Pioneer Bn). 2 - 2|*-ton, 6x6 trucks, dunrp. Engineer 3n). 5 - 2j*-ton, 6x6 trucks, cargo, Motor Transport Bn). (Famished by 3d (burnished by

b. The following equipment w i l l be assigned to each BC$ SP Headquarters and w i l l be in Addition to that prescribed for the Biff Shore Parties: 2 - Tractors, hea-ry (TD-18) with angledoaer (Jpurnished by 3d 3ingineer 3n). 1 - Tractor, heayy, with DD/PTO. (Furnsihed by 3^ Engineer Bn) ,

2 - Tractors, heavy, with 360 degree traversing

crane (Furnished by 3d Pioneer. 3n).

1 - Tractor, l i g h t , with TY-9 crane attachment. (3\irnished "by 3d Sagineor Bn). 1 - Shovel, gasoline, motorized, 3'/8 * 3/^" c u * T&* capacity, with attachments, {lurnished by 3d Engineer Bn), 1 - Tractor, medium, w/dozer a'lovel. 3^- Pioneer Bn). ton, RGTs). 2 (Generators and lighting equipment per beach, i f available, (Furnishocl by 3d Pioneer Bn). Cranes are to be rigged with boom attachment, prior to landing. c. The following w i l l be assigned to Division SP Headquarters; 1 - Trailer, l*-toa, 2-wheel f greasing. by 3d Pioneer Bn). 1 - Set, equipment* welding, electric* by 3d Pioneer Ba) (Furnished (Furnished (Furnished by

UxU. (Furnished by respective

Page 3 of 5 Pages
ENCLOSURE

ABLE to administrative Plan 1 - ^ . d Miscellaneous equipment:

SH0H2 P--2ET PLdN, ' (C*4t ! d).

(1) [Removable pallet towing bridles vill "be distributed

on the following basis:
1 - Each Athey tractor, under RCT control.
1 - 2a,ch tracked share party vehicle*
1 - Bach shore party wheeled vehicle,'
1 - Bach artillery prime mover.
10- Per ROT, to be distributed as directed by ECU Commander.
units will institute necessary measures to prevent loss
of assigned removable towing bridles. Bridles will be procured from Div SP
Commander prior to Embarkation.
(2) ^11 units will moke necessary distribution of bolt cutters for use in cutting steel straps on p a l l e t s .

5.

a. Division (Quartermaster and Division Ordnance Officer be prepared to assume direction of dumps on order. b. Beach matting will be landed prior to landing of wheeled vehicles. c. Units will promptly return a l l cargo nets to SP. d. ALI vehicle tolling-hitches will be inspected and lubricated prior to embarkation., e. All SP vehicles will be water-proofed. Water-proofing materials will be removed from a l l vehicles promptly after landing. f. A I I pallet8 will be placed in lending craft in a foreand-aft position, with bridles forward. g. Pallets will not be stacked in landing craft. h. Bach SP crane will land with necessary v/ire rope replacements, barrels slings, and oallet slings. i . 3<i i'iotor Transport -Battalion company commanders will function as directed by respective E U SP commanders, for the control of SP C? transportation. j . Division SP Commander will be prepared to furnish one tractor with blade for use of Division Graves-Registration Section. . k. SP labor elementp will be landed in complete organizationa "units of one (l) officer and twenty-five (25) men, or combinations thereof. 1, Prior to beginning of debarkation, the assistant
(Shore Party) will proceed to and report at V Phib Corps Shore Party OP,
as Shore Party Liaison Officer for 3d iiarine, Division.

Page k tf 5 Pages
MCLOSUBE

SHOES P-iJRTT Fluff;.

(Cont'd),

m. SP report fora showing status of1 SP supply as of 1800,

will "be submitted "by BC5 SPs direct to the Division S? Commander, "by 1900.
Thia report will be consolidated "by the Division SP Commander and submitted
direet to Corps; duplicate copy of all SP reports to Or-k, 3d Marine Division,
Division SP Ooamander will be responsible for distribution of SP report forms*
n. Telephonic SP report tr< SP transportation and supply* 3T COKMuED OF

R . 3 % K C , Colonel, llo S* iurine Corps-. Chief of Staff,

<K> O/J 190C, giving statue of

Same as administrative Plan

s / j . 35, HIMtJ J . D. HITTLE,

I t Col, US*JO,

G-k,

Page 5 of 5 Pages EIICI.OST1HB

76

-i Atr 2, Gunnery

t Map.' iwo'Ji^a. 1:10,0

ENCLOSURE "B

ENCLOSURE K

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

ACTION REPORT

JUKPDB DIVISIOil,

$ KmtMltOW

C/O PUBST POST ttnftOB, Satf JR*30X$OO,

7 April,

ding Officer,
anding General, 3d Marino Division*

Subject; fieference: Action BepOrt, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands* (a) 3d Marine Division General Order No* 137* (b) 3d Marine Division Staff Memo &o, * (A) *ctioa report, 3d Joint assault Si^ial Company. (B) Motion report* 3d war Dog Platoon* (a) Period covered from 7 November, 19*& to 16 March*

Enclosure* 1.

(b) The participation of this unit in the operation for the

capture of Iwo Jima* Volcano Islands, was primarily limited to the function*
ing of the Division Command Pott in a static situation*
2. (a) This command was composed of the following Unitst
Headquarters Company*
Signal Company.
Reconnaissance Company*
Military Police Company*
(0) The following units were attached for administrative
purposes:
3d Joint 3d War 7th Wat Signal Company,
Platoon,
Platoon, (attached on 13 March,

(c) The training m& participation of this /battalion in the

Iwo Jiaa campaign departed in no manner from that normal for an amphibious
operation on a small island, or for limited 'beach head operation. Planning
and training was based on the assumption that either an assault landing or
the landing of the division in reserve might 00 required* Ship loading and
embarkation of personnel wore planned accordingly, Tho training period
covered the period to 8 February* 19^5. wiien tiae first porsonnel Wore' eia-
Marked aboard ship. She training for the units of tho battalion was normal.
One Division CStJC was held using a situation based on assumptions similar to '
those expected at Iwo Jimaj all personnel participatod and theQp was dag ,
in. Ho rehearsals wero held*
J* Units of this battalion began landing on Iwo Jic# at Q90Q*
2k February, 1^5. Tho Division Cosa&iand Poat was established on the northern
end of Airfield Ifuabor One, and began operation tho same day* On 5 March.
191*5* tho Division Command tost wae moved four hundred yards to the north betwoon
Airfields On and Two, and remained in that location, for the remainder f th$
operation. No further movement was necessary because of tho limited area in volved. The central location of the command ost served to facilitate com monications with higher echelons and subordinate unite* iTo Serious effects
from enemy firo were suffered and no attempt at infiltration by the enemy was
experienced* Normal functions were per formed by all units from central
location, and reduced distances simplified communications, supply* and evac uation. On 4 Mnrch, 19U5, tho Hooonnftissance Company .was attached to the
^Ltt Marines and reverted to division control on 13 Maroh, 19^5? normal'
duties of a refle company in regimental, resorvo were performed in this period*
Sections of the 3d War Dog Platoon were attached to infantry regiments on
several ocas ions for security and patrolling missions.

(over)

*U<m depart, Iwo Jim&t Volcano

>>.T: T- *

The foliowin^ oasualtios wore incurred dvurin^ the

m
0
i

a
I

o o o
37

THIRJ5 WAR DOG- PLATOON,

BATTALION, THIRD MARIN*fVISION,
F0RC.2, IH THE IJIEUD.
C/O FLEET P^ST OFFICE, SAN FRANCESCO, O A L I F .
21 April, 1945,
From
To Via Subject: Reference 1.
Jhe TJ<5ffla1fflH*tg*t*IM!ral, 3d Marine Division. The Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion,

er.

Action Report, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands,

(a).3d Marine Division aeneral Order No # 137.
a. Period covered from 7 November, 1944 to .
16 March, 1945.
b. The duties of this unit in the operation for the
capture of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, were:
1. Providing night security for front line troops
and outposts.
2. For ambushes.
3* Daylight patrols.

Training of this unit consisted of scouting and 2. patrolling with dogs., and the uso of War Dogs on night security.
Personnel were trained in all ph-^es of conbat using dogs, and
in>egular infantry tactics. Lectures of personnel of infantry
units were given to explain the proper utilization of War Dogs in
connection wi;;^ Infantry. The training period covered the
period to 9-February, 1945, when the first personnel were embarked
aboard ship.
a. Personnel of this unit; were loaded on two ships.
3. Twenty-three dogs and their handlers were aboard the U.S#S, Warrick;
c^enty-one men without dogs were aboard the U.S.S. Harry Lee.
f ursonnel began landing on Iwo Jima on 24 February,, 1945. Initially
clogs were used for security around the Division CP. and on forward
outposts. During the period of organized resistance ho use was made
of'Iwar dogs with infantry units. As soon as organised resistance
sensed, extensive use of war dogs T-rith infantry patrols was institut ed,. 411 battalions were assigned dogs for this purpose. On 6 March,
all men who were without dogs were temporarily attached to the
Marines, and reverted to Headquarters Battalion control' on 18
March, 1945. Normal duties of riflemen were performed in this period
On 12 March, 1945, fourteen dogs and handlers were assigned to the
Ninth and Twenty-first Marines', seven being assigned to each regiment..
Dogs were used for night security with rifle companies, for night
ambushes, as point on patrols and as security on outpost.,
b. (1)* On numerous.occasions dog"s assigned on night
security alerted to Japanese attempting to infiltrate into the posit ion. In many of the cases the Japanese were killed by the dog
handlers. During the period, to 23 March, ..twelve of the dogs in the
platoon were instrumental in the killing 6f Japanese.
(2). On 14 March a dog alerted to two Japanese tryir
to entsr a company area from the rear and the handler killed them.
(3). On 15 March two dogs alerted to several enemy
soldiers attempting to infiltrate into a company area; three of the
enemy were killed.
(4). On 16 Marck a dog alerted to a group, of tiie
enemy as they attempted to enter A company area. Two,of the enemy
we>e killed and the remainder were driven away.
(5). On 19 March a 46g serving with an ambush gave
advance notice of the Approach of the; enemy and a number of the ene
were killed. Another dog alerted to the approach of an e,neay group
and in the ensuing fight the dog azid bla handlerpwe^fi-jwounded and oni
Japanese was killed. ' "

1945,

eport, Iwo Jlma, Volcano Islands. 21 April,

(Third War Bog Platoon. Cont'd;

,{6}. fcn 22 March a dog on patrol alertod to three

separate enemy ambushes. The dog handler billed one Japanese in. aol
o$ the first two ambushes. In the third instance both the dog and th
handler were killed in the fight*
> 4. ' operation.
The following casualties wfcrlfr incurred during the

KU

0.
0 0

e c
1 4

5"
0

6\

IF*

, . The. -terrain; atc Iwp^&lina was jwty

us? of dogs on daylight patrols but they proved to be j At
ho-time were they detrimental, to he sucess pt a $*atrol or amfcuh
During the operation it was noticed.that dogs wer# ineffective in
searching out caves and deep emplacements and their use in such
situations is not recommended* Bogs can be used in night security
and will prove effective. At all times when dogs were aeeignedtb
:rpop8 the morale of the troops was increased. Infantry units ^ ,
requested their assignment on patrols. It is recommended that tbe
usf of dogs be continued with .this division.

W, T.

B to A c t i o n Report"of Headquarters Battalion," 3d Marine

Division". -\ -.vir '<..' '** ' -* * "

'

21 April, 1345. llMjaMtofc-a, 3d Uarin Division, Subject; Reference; action report, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, Ca) 3d Marine Division u-eneral Order Ko. 137 (a) Period coverod i s from 7 November, l$kh t-o l6 March, (b) Shis unit furnisliod Shore Party Conraunications, Air Liaisbn P a r t i e s , and Shore Fire-Control P a r t i o s for ITaval Gunfiro durin^ the occupation . and capture of Iwo Jima Volcano Islea&a. 2k (a) The following soctions comijoso t h i s command* Company H3adquartcrs . Shoro Party Comounications Section (10) P a r t i e s , Shore Pire Control Soction (13 P a r t i e s ) . Air Liaison Section (13 P a r t i e s ) ,
^

, -

("0) She throe major soctions of t h i s compnny woro ^iven a genera communications training,, followed by specializ^d section,trainin ,. Personnel of the 3PUS ondorwont training conducted "by tho 3d Pionoor Battalion with whom th^y o^jrated durin^ the occupation. ' Officers and Scout Ser&oaats of the S underwent a six woeks training pro0r;?;n dt tho W advanced 4Ir^iniii._v and ounfire Shore Bombardment School, ro&rl Harbor, 2he peraoiuiol of the x returned 9 iTovaabor, 1 9 ^ from toapora-y duty with Cin.0i3Wj?A whore they ticipated in the landings at aorotai md. Leyte, J'or six \ie\jfc& ~>xioT to erabarkation, air liaison prooloas wore conduot.od usin^ aircraft furnished the local iiarino Air u-roup. All sectior-i's participated in. a clivisioa OxX, a situation based on the assaui 0. xployaant of the division at Iwo (c) x-rlor to locwm jv^ai, txia teacia of the AJI tmd. SPO Sections wore assigned to eacii Ji/x and ji\?x for unbariiation and'operational oniployiaont* She SJTO teams wore aabarked with 3L2!s out reverted to the control of the Division'Shore.Party Oojjiraarider upon l^adin^* .
' . ' . / : ' . ' " ' " ' '. ' .

3. * Blomonts of the SFC, SPG, and At Sections embarked with.BCT-21 betjan landing on I**o Jiraa with t h a t regiment on 21 February, 19^5* <W0 elements with tho Division Headquarters ^foup and JLC2~9 landed with those organizations on 2^ February,: 19U5. -ill SPC teaaa attached to SOE-3 were landed a few days "late* and used a s replacements ajid r e l i e f s for tho teams with HQ2l and BC$*9. 5?wo of tho SPG toaiaa wore landed a t t h i s timo and furnished t h e personnel required by tho Corps Shore p a r t y , Throp S P toftfas 3C were temporarily attached t o BCT~9 and HCT-21 as dOianwnication personnel replaccaaents. ' Horiaal omployiaQnt was made of the *TASOo teanls* Detailed ,4onnaent on t h i s onQ)loyiaent i s incorporated i n tho 3d Marine Division, .action RopQ^t; Par IV, paragraph ( F ) , ( ^ i r ) ; p a r t IV, Paragraph (a)(2Tavftl Ounfiro); and P a r t XV/ Paragraph (II), ( S i g n a l ) , by the Division A I P , Haval Chinfira and Signal Officer, Casualties were incurred during the operation as followst
WIA

ow
SirCS SFOS

om
10

OFJ?

2JSL

5L.

Sotal

22

Subject;

Action report, Iwo Jima,

5. She following transportation wets taken forward and proved ade<juato for the operation
CoHq 3ach SSP team l i n e (9> SFO11 >*1 ton W * t l*"2j t o n 6x6 l*4iZ 1-300 gal water t r a i l e r l ~ i t o n truck, 1 - ^ t o n t r a i l e r . 1 - ^ t o n truck, 1-$ t o n t r a i l e r * ^

/ In addition the Division and each ROT SF team had *t t ton, 3C , and the Division SFC team an K2 She Division AL Seam was equipped with a radio equipped personnel carrier. y 6. Eepair fand replaoement of most signal oquipaent WAS handled % J^SCo, Heplaceaent material was drawn from teams not committed and utilised in th section required, failures and oattle losses of signal eqaipaent.wore saall 7, Conclusions and recommendations for eaoh aection are included in the aforementioned paragraphs (7), (G) and (M) of Part IT, 3d Karino Division

112)

n tt

A to Action Report, Headquarters

6SE 16*00 S69I

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