PARTICIPATION

OF

UNITED STATES ARMY FORGES

IN THE

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

IN

GALVANIC

OPERATION

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED

i"RMSI^^||Ef^UACIFIC AREA
APO 958

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

FOREWORD

17 June 9hk
At the conclusion of the capture of the Gilbert Islands in the Pacific Ocean (GALVANIC Operation) the various conimanders of Army forces which participated in the battle submitted reports of their operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, in accordance with his directive. Copies of these opera tional reports have no doubt been furnished the V/ar "Department through Navy channels. The report which is herewith submitted was drawn up to sup

plement the operational reports referred to supra, and to make of

record the duties and responsibilities that were assigned to the Corumanding General, United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area, in connection with the operation. It gives in detail the ad ministrative and training responsibilities, and the preparations incident to the plan of operation. It presents an accurate record of the part played by this headquarters in support of GALVANIC,

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Commanding United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area,

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REPORT OF PARTICIPATION OF USAFICPA

IN THE GALVANIC OPERATION
INDEX
SECTION I
II
111
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
xtrai XVIII
XIX
XX
xxi
XXII
XXIII
XXIV
XXV
XXVI
XXVII
XXVIII
XXIX
Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex Annex 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
SUBJECT PAGE 1

Awards,

Introduction
v Personnel:

Procurement, and Burial

Replacements,

3
and Public
7
15
23
31
35
39
41
43
45
55
57
59
61
65
71
73
79
87
91
97
99
127
129
143
145
147
151

Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence,

Organization, Plans, and Training Service Troops, Supply, Movement, Base Planning,
Evacuation, and Salvage Adjutant General Artillery Officer Bomb Disposal Officer > Chaplain Chemical Warfare Officer Engineer Exchange Officer Finance Officer Inspector General Judge Advocate Ordnance Officer '.^Provost Marshal

Relations

Quartermaster Signal Officer Special Services Officer

Surgeon Tank Officer Seventh Air Force Army Port and Service Command
27th Infantry Division
Canton Task Force
Baker Task Force
Assistance Rendered Navy and Marine Corps Summary and Conclusions

Selections

from Observers

Reports

Map of CPA Map of Makin

10

11

Organization Diagram of Task Forces T of 0 7th Garrison Force T of E 7th Garrison Force Base Development Plan Makin Galvanic Operation Supply PX Supplies Initial Bacillary Dysentary, Pacific Island Bases Statistical Survey of Casualties Makin Operation Operations Report 27th Infantry Division

(submitted separately)
Operations

Annex 12

(submitted separately)

Report Seventh Air Force

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SECTION IINTRODUCTION

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A. SUBJECT AND PURPOSE OP REPORT.

1. The subject of this report is the participation, by United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area, in the Galvanio Gilbert Islands, in November, 1943. operation against the Japanese-held
2. Army forces physically present in the Gilbert Area during the operation were attached to Naval or Marine commands for operational control* Successful accomplishment of Galvanic Operation resulted in no small degree from the cooperation and support of the Army head quarters and commands in the Central Pacific* This report has been prepared to show in what way tiie operation was supported by the acti vities of USAFICPA. It will show how the troops were designated, what equipment they received, how they were trained, what precautions were taken to insure security, and particularly, how the logistical support was planned and accomplished* al chain of command; and therefore it is not intended herein to present an operational report, or to treat of the activities of Naval and Marine forces also engaged in Galvanic operation* Observers* comments are in cluded only where they pertain to the planning, organization, training, equipment, or logistic support rendered by Army forces. 4* The value of such a report as this is two-fold:

3. Operational reports are rendered directly through the operation

a* It makes possible a clearer understanding of the scope of the effort required to support offensive operations in the Central Pacific.

b* Itrecords factual data which may be helpful in preparing to support future operations in this area. 5. Similar reports will be rendered to show the extent of par ticipation, by United States Army Forces in the Central Facific Area, in future operations* B* PLAN OF RETORT.

1* In order to facilitate analysis, this report has been prepared in twenty-nine sections. These sections relate to the fields of re sponsibility which are assigned to general and special staff sections of this headquarters and to the major echelons of command the Seventh Air Force, the 27th Infantry Division, the Army Port and Service Command, and the task forces at Baker and Canton Islands.

2* Each section of the report presents a factual summary of the activities of the staff section or command concexnjpd-jjijfcflofar as those

hi. f activities relate to preparations for the operation, support of the operation, or rehabilitation following the operation. Marine Corps* A section summarises the assistance rendered to the Navy and This included early review and collaboration on oper ations and administrative plans ,provision of specialized training for certain personnel, and the furnishing of materiel and certain personnel for the operation*

4.

The final section of the report includes a summary and con

clusions based upon the principal lessons learned from participation

in support of Galvanic Operation.

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SECTION II PERSONNEL: PROCUREMENT, REPLACEMENT, AWARDS, BURIALS, ADMINISTRATION.

A, PROCUREMENT. All Army personnel required for this operation was procured from units present in the CPA.

1* Problem* G-l was confronted with the task of procuring per sonnel for the assault and garrison foroes* The 27th Infantry Division furnished the bulk of the assault troops. This was augmented by the attachment of certain troops from tactical units in the CPA For a complete list of the assault troops see Section IV B-l of this report. The total strength of this force consisted of 384 officers, 14 warrant officers, and 6047 enlisted

men*

b. The garrison force (7th Garrison Force) was composed of certain combat troops and attachments from service troops necessary to defend and administer MAKIN after its capture. 2. force* Procurement
plans*

Two plans were considered

in connection

with the assault

(1) The original plan called for bringing units from the
27th Infantry Division up to T/0 strength by trans ferring personnel from the 6th, 33d, and 40th Infan try Divisions in the numbers grades, and ratings required, and was considered necessary at first due to the fact that the replacements required were not expected to arrive from the mainland in time for this operation* This plan, however, was abandoned request of the Commanding General, 27th at the Infantry Division*

(2) The second plan, and the one adopted, was

to fill any shortage of personnel by transfer or attachment within the division. Since only a portion of the 27th Infantry Division was required for this oper ation this plan was quite satisfactory. A shortage of 8 officers and 138 enlisted specialists still existed after these personnel shifts, and the re quired fillers were furnished by G-l from. other units present in the CPA*

b. The strength and composition of the combat elements of the garrison force having been decided upon, this figure was furnished the services by G-l, and under his direction tables of organization for the provisional detachments were drawn up and submitted for the

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approval of this section. After approval, the services were required to subnit to 6-1 rosters of the personnel showing grades and ratings necessary to fillthese 1/o*3.

B. REPLACEMENTS. Two plans for the replacement of personnel were drawn up. First, the replacement of battle casualties suffered by the assault forces and second, the losses incurred by the garrison force*

1. After the capture of MAKIN, the assault troops were directed to return to Oahu. Here needed personnel were furnished them from the 13th Replacement Depot.
2* The garrison force was directed to submit requisitions
peri

odically specifying grade and specification serial numbers desired. Emergency requisitions by radio were authorized, and replacements were
to be sent by the first available transportation. The 13th Replace ment Depot was designated as the source from which this personnel would be procured*

C* AWARDS.
decorations

The Army force was furnished the following supply of for the Galvanic operation: 700 Purple Hearts
100 Silver Stars
5 Soldiers* Medals

These medals were issued primarily for the purpose of battlefield awards; however, general hospitals were authorized to award Purple Hearts to casualties evacuated to them. Higher decorations were awarded by Headquarters, Central Pacific Area within four weeks after the conclusion of the operation. D* BURIALS. Graves registrations
details. and burials were handled by two

1* The 27th Infantry Division furnished and trained a graves registration detail which accompanied the assault force*
2* The garrison force was provided with a similar detail. Upon landing on MAKIN this detail relieved ttie one from the 27th Infantry Division, and was charged with the collecting, preparing, and burying of dead* Climatic conditions and the presence of numerous insects caused rapid decomposition of bodies, and therefore especially prompt burial was necessitated in the interest of health, sanitation, and morale. E. ADMINISTRATION All units and personnel of the garrison force were placed on detached service from parent organizations in Oahu. The garrison force commander was authorized to promote enlisted men

who were members of units organized under a table of organisation* This could only be done to fill vacancies created within that unit by reduction in grade, death* or other loss. Recommendations for promotions of officers were ordered forwarded to this headquarters. Provisional T/Os for personnel for the garrison force headquarters and for service detachments were furnished him as a guide only, and did not authorize the vacancies listed* Separate specific allotments were made available to him for that purpose.

F. LESSONS LEAENED MD CORRECTIVE ACTION IAKEN. Corrective action is being taken to apply the following lessons to future operations: "oTiow

1. Staging facilities large enough to house adequately all elements of the garrison force were not available near ihe port of embarkation. This caused delay and confusion at the time of em barkation.
2. In order to have a smooth working team, personnel and units should be assigned and assembled not less than six weeks prior to embarkati on 3.

graves registration details in rapid interment of the dead* operation 80 troops would have been sufficient*

There were not aiough labor troops available to assist the In this

4* A military police detachment should be assigned to prevent looting and souvenir hunting and the resultant destruction of valuable military information.

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liUfitASSIFIEQ

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION 111

INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, AND

PUBLIC RELATIONS.

A. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE,

1. Intelligence training*
a. Prior to attachment to Central Pacific Force, units of the Infantry Division plus attached units and the 7th Garrison Force 27th received intelligence training supervision, and distribution of training aids, maps, and aerial photographs* The supervision exercised by this headquarters consisted of: (1) Assistance in establishing intelligence (2) Periodic intelligence training inspections; (3) training programs; by selected officers on subjects such as security, counter Lectures intelligence, Japanese equipment, etc; and (4) Arranging for personnel to attend schools on specialized subjects such as aircraft recognition* During all stages emphasis was put on amphibious landings. b Subsequent to the attachment of these units to the Central Pacific Force, this very close liaison was maintained with both the 27th Infantry Division and the 7th Garrison Force* As soon as the training plan of the Central Pacific Force for these units was published, this office made available maps and aerial photos of the training areas that were to be used* Copies of the objective folders on the GILBERT Islands were distributed to appropriate echelons* A liaison officer was appoint ed who accompanied the 27th Infantry Division throughout the training period and during the operation* All possible assistance was given to the division in the matter of organization and presentation of special ised training* On 29 October 1943, an intelligence training inspection was made to determine the status of training of the 7th Garrison Force* The results of this inspection were made available to the Commanding Officer of the Garrison Force in order to assist him in correcting de ficiencies noted* After each phase of training, a report of observations by the Liaison Officer was likewise given to the 27th Infantry Division* 2* Dissemination of enemy information*

Objective folders were prepared, printed and distributed

to staff sections* organizations to be engaged in the assault, and to
the 7th Garrison Force*

b*

Orientation lectures

on the Pacific islands were given to

General and Special Staff officers conearned with the occupation and supply of the objectives* These lectures covered the geography, topo
graphy, climatic conditions, hydrographic conditions, natives, health conditions, enemy installations and available facilities, etc., on Central Pacific islands*

c. Staff sections, commanders of advanced bases proximate to objective, and assault forces were advised of the current enemy the situaticai as knom to this headquarters based on intelligence received from available sources.

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d* Prior to the operation the facilities of the 64th Topo graphic Engineer Company were taxed to the limit to reproduce enor mous quantities of maps, aerial mosaics, and intelligence data re quested by JICPOA for the use of Army, Navy and Marine forces engaged in the operations ,as well as to print training aids and maps for use in training. Priorities on requests were coordinated by G-2. 3. Liaison during operations

When the Seventh Air Force established its Advanced Head quarters under operational control of COMAIRCENPAC, an officer and an enlisted man from the G-2 section were attached to the 7AAF Advanced Headquarters for the purpose of stimulating the flow of intelligence and obtaining information of the enemy by direct contact with air force personnel engaged in combat* That liaison servioe was of tre mendous assistance in obtaining detailed information desired by this headquarters as well as that desired by G-2, War Department. b. An officer from G-2 accompanied assault forces on prac tice landings as well as during the operation. The primary mission of this officer was to observe intelligence functions for the purpose of assisting in the training of units scheduled to participate in sub sequent operations. In addition, he was made available to the division duty as necessary during the operation, he secured special G-2 for such intelligence of enemy defenses, weapons, and tactics, and he checked actual enemy installations against photographic intelligence in order to improve the caliber of subsequent photo interpretation information.

c. G-2 officers were utilized to maintain direct and contin uous liaison with CinCPOA Headquarters during actual operations to obtain information as desired by this headquarters and War Department.
4 Prisoners of War.

Japanese and civilian Korean POW*s were questioned by G-2 a* personnel after POW f s had been turned over to Army jurisdiction by JICPOA* Information from Korean personnel of construction units in dicated that there was impending a general draft of Koreans for Jap anese military units.

55 Captured materiel

Ey direction of CinCPOA all captured materiel was to be forwarded to JICPOA* In order to secure captured weapons for subse quent training of army troops in this area and for forwarding weapons and intelligence thereon to the War Department, arrangements were made with JICPOA for a division of weapons between Army and Marine units. A board of officers consisting of a representative from JICPOA, a Marine officer and one officer from G-2, CPA, was selected to ooordi nate the division of captured materiel returned to JICPOA* Actually

little captured materiel was returned due to the action of souvenir hunters from all services* b. The captured materiel that was returned was examined by the Ordnance Intelligence Officer attached to G-2* and reports there on were submitted to the War Department Materiel having unusual features or containing substitute materiels was forwarded to the War Department; standard items were re tained for use in intelligence training. A model 2595 (1935) Japanese light tank was reconditioned and is used for training*
c*

d. Ordnance marks end serial numbers were obtained from over 200 items of captured materiel, for forwarding to the War Department* 6*
Captured documents*

Available translators were used to translate captured documents received by G-2 from combat units, and to supplement JICPOA personnel in the translation of documents received by that agency*
7. commanders radio*
Reports

to 7far Department.

Information from liaison personnel and from task force as collated and transmitted to War Department in a daily

b. A G~2 Periodic Report was forwarded each week to the

War Department
B. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

1* Security education* lectures by unit commanders

commanders were directed to arrange for on security* G-2 personnel lectured to special groups on the subject*
stressing Major echelon

b Material in the form of posters , cartoons security was made available to organisations
Censorship.

and bulletins

concerned*

2*

Especially rigid censorship of the press, commercial radio messages, and mail was instituted during the period prior to

"D11

Day.

b* Personnel of units involved in the operation were for bidden to send radiograms or place transpacific telephone calls for

of 60 days prior to their departure from Oahu. Exceptions were made In critical emergencies if approved by major echelon com manders

period

c. An officer was trained to act as a part-time Base Censor for the 7th Garrison Force now located at APO 459 This officer is now serving in a dual capacity as a Postal Officer and Base Censorship Officer.
d* Necessary restrictions and directives were prepared for publication by the 27th Infantry Division covering censorship oper ations from the time of departure until return*
c* Constant liaison was maintained with the G-2 of the 27th Infantry Division and the S-2 of the 7th Garrison Force in order to assist them in every -way possible with their censorship problems.

f* Conferences were held with the Area Postal Officer and the Postal Officer of the 27th Infantry Division to insure that all mail of the task force would be collected for censorship in a manner that would minimize the delay caused by censorship action and still be consistent with security.
g. Liaison was maintained between G-2 of the 27th Infantry Division and the Officer-in-Charge, Telephone Division, Cable snd Radio Censor's Office, regarding the control and censorship of TransPacific telephone calls permitted to be filed by members of the task force

h. Periodic reports were prepared for the G-2 of the 27th Infantry Division regarding violations found in the mail of the task force units with a view to correcting same and maintaining the securi ty of the operation. i. Upon completion of the campaign, a Base Censor was dis patched to APO 240, and subsequently another offioer was sent to sur vey existing conditions in that area with a view to improving censor ship and facilitate the handling and expediting of the mail. As a result of this survey one additional officer and two enlisted men were ordered initially to that area to assist in censorship control.
j. No censorship of stories by war correspondents accompany ing assault forces was done in the field. The stories were returned under military or naval control to CinCPAC Public Relations Office at Pearl Harbor for censorship and release. There they were censored by an officer from the G-2 Public Relations Section of the CPA, subject to final censorship by the Navy* Those articles pertaining to more than one service were censored jointly* Die chief objective was the release of the greatest amount of information consistent with securi ty in the shortest possible time*

10

3.

Surveys of counter-intelligence

security!"

measures "" "

and violatiens of

During a 14-day period prior to departure of assault Oahu, counter-intelligence surveys were conducted at forces from critical locations such as recreation centers, bar 3, docks, supply areas, and officers* clubs* surveys
4,

b. Recommendations for remedial action were instigated when necessity therefor. indicated the
Investigations

of reported violations of security.

Immediate investigations were made of all instances of security violation reported to G-2, CPA# While it was reco^iized in advance that this procedure would require the investigation of many i items I*lch would prove to be unfounded rumors, it was deemed neces sary to insure the apprehension of any personnel violating security.
/

b. Reports of violation were promptly forwarded to responsi commanders for disciplinary action. ble C. PUELIC RELATIONS.

1* Primary responsibility for public relations activities rested with the Fleet Public Relations Office. It assigned all correspondents to all phases of the operation and issued all communiques and press re leases following collaboration of Army, Navy and Marine public relations officers in preparing them.
2. Public Relations for the Army's phase of the operation was a joint enterprise of the 0-2 office (Public Relations Section) of the CPA, and the G-2 section of the 27th Infantry Division. An officer from the CPA Public Relations Section was placed on temporary duty with the 27th Infantry Division specifically for public relations work. He already was acquainted with the correspondents and became acquainted with key personnel of the division by accompanying it on maneuvers prior to the operation.

3. In this instance the PRO took over all public relations work at the request of the division, witti the assistance of a sergeant from the division. Close liaison was maintained with the 6-2 of the division, thus enabling him to known the status of correspondents at all times and enabling the PRO to keep the correspondents informed of the progress of the overall operation. This served to remove entirely public relations problems from the division G-2, and to save the correspondents a great deal of time in individually asking questions on the situation* The in formation gained by this liaison was relayed to correspondents along with all available information as to where they were likely to find the best feature combat stories* This gave the correspondents an up-to-the-minute

11

picture of the fighting and left them free to choose any part of it they desired to cover.

4. The correspondents wrote their stories on the spot, then turned them over to the PRO for transmission to the release point, which was the Fleet Public Relations Office, CinCPAC, Pearl Harbor. The PRO, through the division G-2, kept informed of the movement of all planes out of the area to Pearl Harbor and saw to it that copy and photographs were placed on the planes. Hospital planes proved the speediest and, in fact, only air transportation* 5. Prior to departure from Oahu, the PRO assisted correspon dents in obtaining necessary military equipment (helmets, etc). During the voyage to the Gilberts, the PBQ arranged for correspon dents to attend all briefings and arranged further special confer ences with key staff officers so that their orientation would be as complete as possible. 6. No attempt was made by the PRO to cover and write stories during the operation. When it was completed and all major stories were cleared, the division itself assigned personnel to write followHowever, the PRO did utilize Signal Corps ups for home-town papers. photographers to the fullest and released their photos to the Photo Roto Pool and local publications. D. LESSONS LEAHJED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. 1. The most outstanding lesson learned was the need to estab lish more rigid control of captured materiel and documents in order to prevent the loss, because of souvenir hunters 1 activities, of valuable intelligence and enemy weapons needed for training our troops. Through conference with JICPOA arrangements were made to request CinCPOA to emphasize the necessity for returning captured materiel and documents to JICPOA* The seme subject was emphasized by G-2 Training Section in all contacts with intelligence officers of this command, so that further instruction would be disseminated to personnel of all units on the subject of captured materiel and documents.

2* The following lessons pertaining to censorship were learn ed from the operation and tentative plans have been formulated for the establishment of procedures which will correct the noted censor ship deficiences.
A complete set of censorship regulations must be pre pared for use by the assault forces. These regulations should con detailed instructions covering the following periods: tain

(1) From issuance

of warning order to time of departure

12

(2) While en route and prior to official announcement

participation

of

of the unit*

(3) After announcement

of participation of the unit but prior to return to Hawaiian area.

(4) Return to Hawaiian area. (5) After arrival in Hawaiian area but prior to lifting
of restrictions*

(6) After the restrictions are lifted*

b* Detailed censorship instructions ing units and groups must also be prepared: area.

applicable to the follow

(1) Bear echelon of assault forces remaining in Hawaiian (2) Garrison forces and assault units temporarily detail
ed to remain with garrison forces.

(3) Casualties evacuated

of the assault force.

to Hawaiian area prior to return

(4) Observers accompanying the assault force.

o. Censorship detachments should be attached both to the assault force and to the garrison force to act in an advisory capacity on censorship problems* with the Adjutant General, of both official and non official letters of condolence, and to control the mention of battle casualties in personal correspondence prior to their official release by War Department* d. Liaison must be established
CPA, in order to ocntrol the proper release

c. Close liaison with the Fifth Amphibious Corps with regard to the publication of censorship regulations is essential*

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SECTION IV A

PLANNING, ORGANIZATION, ASP TRAINING,

The planning phase for Galvanic operation is presented It will readily be seen that while the responsibility for overall planning rested with the Naval and Marine headquarters, close liaison between the Army, Navy, and Marine planning groups was highly essential.
PLANNING,

chronologically in the following paragraphs.

1. Planning by the Commanding General. The initial planning in the Central Pacific Area for the use of Army troops in the Galvanic operation was done by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, and the Commander in Chief of Pacific Ocean Areas. On 4 August 1943 ComGenCentPac sent a memorandum to CinCPOA requesting that information be furnished the Commanding General 27th Infantry Division (then tentatively designated as the Army assault force) upon which the latter oould base a study for the reorganisation of the Division for future operation. On 8 August 1943 a reply was re ceived and forwarded to the Commanding General 27th Infantry Division directing him and officers th* he selected from his staff to proceed to CinCPOA 1 s staff to secure information necessary to familiarize him self with the assigned mission.
2. Planning by the Genera 1 Staff. On 6 August 1943 planning by the CPA General Starr for the Galvanic operation was actively initiat ed upon the receipt of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatch 202204 July. Ihis dispatch set forth the tasks, aims, concept of operations, avail able forces, command, target date and assumption in formulating plans. From this date until departure close liaison was maintained through frequent conferences held by CinCPOA, in which ComGenCentPac and his representatives took an active part in planning the use of Army troops, both ground and air. 3. Request for units from CG 27th Infantry Division. Based upon
objective data furnished by CinCPOA and ComGenCentFac, the Commanding
General of the 27th Infantry Division submitted a request on 29 August 1943 for the following units to assist in the landing operations and support the development: Special weapons group (automatic AA weapons), Marine Airdrome Battalion; 2 companies of light tanks (less personnel); 1 company of medium tanks (less personnel); reinforcement of the 727th Ordnance Company (97 EM from Department Ordnance, and 44 EM from the 4th Tank Group); Aviation Ehgineer Company; port company; and a field hospital. This and succeeding requests were studied carefully by the General and Special staffs with the view of furnishing the Division all that was possible, as directed by the Commanding General, CPA. 4Army Air Forces.

On 11 August 1943 CinCPAC Serial 001009 presented an air plan "Land Based Aviation." Following study of this plan representa tion was made to the War Department for the assignment of 2 additional

15

fighter squadrons, and for an increase in strength of the Eleventh Bombardment Group (E) from 35 to 48 planes and crews, and for pro riding the necessary Air Service Support Squadrons

b. In order to facilitate better coordination of Air Force units for the operations, units of the Seventh Air Force, Major Gen eral Willis H. Hale commanding, were attached to the Central Pacific Force effective upon departure for advanced bases. 5 Garrison Force.

At a joint conference CinCPOA held the first part of October a decision was reached to send an Army Garrison Force with the 27th Infantry Division instead of the Marine unit that was to have been replaced later by an Army unit. The 7th Garrison Force was immediately constituted and assigned the mission of garrisoning liakin island after its capture* In addition the automatic, weapons batteries of the garrison force furnished the antiaircraft protection for the assault troops*
b. The size and composition of the 7th Garrison Force were determined by ComGenCentPac upon the recommendations of the General and Special Staff after a thorough study of the defenses required. c. The base development plans for the 7th Garrison Force were drawn up by the Garrison Force Commander and representatives of the General and Special Staff for ComGenCentPac, and were submit ted to CinCPOA to be included in the final plans*

6* Attachment of Army units to the Fifth Amphibious Force. In order to facilitate both the training and planning and to avoid con flicting demands, the 7th Garrison Force, the 27th Infantry Division, and attached units were attached to the Central Pacific Force for tactical employment and advanced amphibious training on 11 October 1943. Since the attachment was only for tactical employment and for final training, the planning was continued by the staff of ComGe n
B. ORGANIZATION.

1* The 27th Division Task Force under the command of Major Gen eral Ralph Smith, organized and constituted to accomplish the mission of capturing the Makin atoll, consisted of the following units:
Det Hq & Hq Co, 27th Infantry Division. b. c. RCT 165. Cos I, X and L, 105 th Infantry.

16

d* c. f
g

Det I, Yit Z. 3d Bn 105 th Infantry. Prov Clearing Co, 102 d Medical Battalion* Det 27th Signal Company* Det 727th Ordnance
Company. Company.

h* Det 27th Quartermaster

i. Co C and Det Hq &Hq Co, 102 d Engineer Battalion. U j. 152 d Engineer Battalion () k. 1 Plat sth Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance less Co B).
m,

Company.

Tank Battalion (less Hq Co, less Serv Co (less det), 1. 193 d Det 75th Signal Company. Det 232 d Bomb Disposal Unit.

o. Signal Photo Section.

p. Det AAF q. Navy Fire Control Parties.

r Observers.
Correspondents

2. The garrison force organized to develop and defend the island was designated the 7th Garrison Force and was commanded by Colonel Clesen H. Tenney, CACo Composition of this force was: Provisional Force Headquarters. b. Hq and 2 platoons, c. Provisional Hospital No* 1.

Attached Medical Detachment.

d* Ordnance Detachment*
c. Quartermaster Detachment*

f. 2d Bn, 47th Engineers (less Co F).

g*

CWS Detachment*

17

h. Signal Detachment* i. D, 376 th Port Battalion. Co

j. 3d fti, 111th Infantry, quarters

k. Ist fti, 98th CA (AA) (Provisional Ground Defense Head 1. Btry A, 98th CA (AA) Sit.

m. Btry B, 98th CA (AA) 90mm. n. Btry C, 98th CA (AA) 90mm*

o. Btry D, 98th CA (AA) 9Omni.
p. Btry X, 93d CA q. Btry L, 93d CA

(AA) 37mm. (AA) 37mm.

r. Btry A, 57th CA (SC) 155mm*

Btry D, 57th CA (SC) 155mm.

t. 804 th Engineer Battalion (Aviation).

3* The 7th Garrison Force was attached to the 27th Infantry Division Task Force* Antiaircraft elements of the garrison force were charged with furnishing antiaircraft protection to landing craft, beaches, troops, and installations during the assault. 4. She 3d Bn, 165 th Infantry was directed to remain with the garrison force until relieved by the 3d Ba, 111th Infantry, the in fantry component of the garrison force.

5. 804th Engineer Battalion (Aviation) was directed to com plete airfield construction on Butaritari.
6. 152 d Engineer Battalion (jj^, the shore party for the assault troops, was directed to remain on Butaritari Island to develop the road net, fortifications, and permanent establishments required to maintain the permanent garrison*

7* Air units participating are shown in Section XXIII.

C. TRAINING.

1. Plan of training.

18

a. Training of the Army ground forces for Galvanic operation was conducted with the objective of preparing troops for successful attack on atoll-type islands and for operations in tropical jungles. First, an intensive period This training consisted of three phases: of training for land operations; second, pre-shipboard amphibious train ing; third, shipboard training and final ship-to-shore rehearsal exer cises with the Central Pacific Force. To obtain maximum use of train ing centers and time available, the first two phases of training were conducted concurrently. b. To accomplish this training, ComGenCentPac provided train ing centers and areas, supervised the construction of special training aids, prescribed the objectives to be attained, and coordinated all phases of the training outlined in following paragraphs.
Troops were concentrated in 2. Training for land operations. training centers and areas on Oahu, and, for a period of nine weeks, intensive training was conducted to prepare units for operations in tropical jungles* This training included a review of basic training, qualification, familiarization, and field and combat firing of weapons, hand grenade training, small unit problems, and battalion combat team exercises in jungle terrain.

Prior to concentration in training centers and areas, training tests were conducted by commanders and the deficiencies dis closed by these tests were made the basis of review classes, schools for specialists, and instruction on new subjects considered pertinent for operations in tropical jungles. This program was continued and coordinated with other training after concentration in the training Every effort was made to familiarize each man with the causes areas. and effects of common tropical diseases and with the hygienic and sanitary measures to be observed in their prevention and cure. Pre vention and control of malaria, fungus diseases, and intestinal in fections were stressed* Although facilities for teaching jungle lore and woodcraft were not completely developed at this time, troops were instructed in methods of adapting jungle materials to their use for the construction of shelter, bedding, and rafts, and in making use of non-poisonous nuts, fruits, and plants for emergency food and water supply. Scouting and patrolling were reviewed with special emphasis on enemy activities to be expected in jungle terrain* Personnel was put through battle conditioning courses consisting of infiltration, close combat, and combat in cities courses. Classes and practioal work were conducted in the execution of simple demolitions, the con struction of simple booby traps and the precautions to be observed in avoiding them. Individuals were taught to recognize immediately the more common types of United Nations and Japanese aircraft. b. Weapons training, and practice with live hand grenades were emphasized for all combat troops. Field Artillery units con ducted numerous firing exercises both in daylight and darkness. The

19

tank battalion and infantry components

conducted range firing of all

weapons to qualify as many men as possible with their primary and

secondary weapons and to familiarize all men with all other weapons with which their unit was armed.

c. Small units problems received special attention. Platoons and smaller units conducted numerous problems in all phases of small unit jungle fighting including stream crossing expedients for men and equipment; maintaining orientation, direction, contact, and liaison in thick jungles; night defense against raids and infiltration; patrol ling; water discipline; teamwork in use of squad and platoon weapons in clearing out pillboxes and emplacements; and preparation, defense, and attack of road and trail blocks.

d Battalion and regimental combat team exercises were con ducted to mold all units into a hard-hitting, aggressive team* These exercises involved daylight attack in close terrain, hasty and pre pared defenses of a position* night operations, perimeter defense, day and night withdrawal, attack of fortified positions in jungle terrain, and elimination of snipers* All phases of the battalion and regimental combat team exercises were conducted in terrain and under circumstances similar to those expected to be encountered in actual operations*
3* Pre-shipboard
amphibious training*

Prior to assignment of mission and concentration in train ing centers, the 27th Infantry Division conducted an indoctrination and transport quartermaster school on Oahu for officers and key non-com missioned officers* Following this school, battalion landing teams were rotated through one week of dry- land mock-up training and one week of training with floating equipment practicing embarkation, debarkation, formation of boat waves, and organized landings both in daylight- and darkness* Supplies and equipment were handled in the organised landings and conferences were conducted on supply problems involved in amphibious operations* The latter phase of training was conducted at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center on Oahu. b#
Upon concentration

in training centers and areas,

the bat

talion landing teams received an additional week of amphibious training with floating equipment at the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center on
Oahu* Much the same type of training was conducted here as at the Waianae center, with special emphasis on shore party duties and other subjects as determined during the first such period of training* As LCIf s became available, landings were conducted on the outer islands of the Hawaiian Group by all of the battalion and regimental landing teams to take part in the Galvanic operation* c. An intensive swimming program was conducted as an. auxilia ry to amphibious training* Every effort was made to teach all men to swim at least fifty yards; men who could not be tau^it to swim in the

20

time available practiced traversing one to two hundred yards with the aid of life jackets. Swimming and staying afloat fully clothed and wearing an infantry pack were practiced by combat troops. 44
Shipboard training aid rehearsal

axe reis es

For operational control and final amphibious training Army were attached to the Central Pacific Force on 11 Ootobor 1943, approximately one month prior to departure for the operation. The Central Pacific Force conducted shipboard training and supervised landing exercises on the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group* This phase of training included loading and lsnding of the assault units and establishment of an initial beachhead under conditions approximating those anticipated for the initial attack. Tactical exercises were con ducted inshore following the landings.
ground forces

b. Final ship-to-shore rehearsals were conducted just prior to departure for the operation* Naval gun fire and bombing by air units were conducted in conjunction with shore fire control parties to make the rehearsal approximate the actual operation as closely as possible. D. LESSON'S LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKBI 1.
Planning*

Adequate time must be allowed for joint operation Constant liaison between all particpating elements must be maintained throughout. The available time for planning this operation was known to be rathar limited; more time was allocated to the preparation of succeeding operations.

planning in detail*

2* Organization. Units participating in operations of this type, particularly provisional garrison units, must be organised under fullstrength if they are successfully to accomplish their mission. Several units which had been skeletonised had to be strengthened at a later date.

T/O's

3. Training. No changes in fundamental training policies or doctrines were indicated as a result of the Galvanic operation. a Ihe necessity for more adequate Tank- Infantry and Air-Ground training as combat teams was confirmed. Increased emphasis was placed on these phases of combined training for units undergoing training for Flintlock operation. The action at Tarawa (Marine units) indicated the necessity of application of basic doctrines of assault of fortified areas to the assault of fortified beaches* Added stress was placed on this in the training of units for subsequent operations. b.

21

yiMUSSIFIEQ
i

ij

illli

uiniii

SECTION V A.

- SERVICE

TROOPS,

SUPPLIES, MOVEMENT, BASE DEVELOPMENT T,

EVACUATION, AND SALVAGE.

GENERAL.

1* The report of the G-4 section, USAFICPA, confines itself to

overall matters of planning and policy pertaining to the logistic
support of Galvanic Insofar as possible, details have not been in cluded, as the complete reports of the technical services appear in other sections of this report.
2. Throughout the preparatory phases, this section worked di
rectly with both the J-4 section of the staff of CinCPOA, and the G-4
section of the Fifth Amphibious Corps. Decisions as to supply levels
to be shipped with assault forces, and levels to be maintained at the objectives were reached by joint study, and all policies affecting the Army and Navy were implemented by inter-staff planning. Full cooper ation ws.s extended to, and received from, all other staff sections
involved.
B. DETERMINATION OF SERVICE TROOPS REQUIRED. 1. The limited number of Army assault troops available at the time for use in the Central Pacific Area, the necessity for recom mittment of these troops at a later date, and the nature of the objec tive itself, indicated that a new concept was necessary, insofar as it pertained to the troops required to hold the objective after the as sault had been completed. 2. Thus, in mid-August, the concept of the Army garrison force was developed. In many ways similar to the Marine Defense Battalions, the Army garrison force possessed one striking difference; each com ponent unit was a standard, or a self-sufficient non-standard unit that could be withdrawn from the garrison force and used independent ly on another mission. 3. To form the garrison forces, and to give them the desired flexibility and adaptability, detachments from all services were in cluded. The quartermaster detachments were designed to provide laun dry, bakery, and shoe repair facilities; the ordnance detachments in cluded 3d and 4th echelon automotive maintenance facilities, as well

as facilities for small arms and artillery repair; the engineer units doubled in brass as combat and general service units; similarly, the chemical, medical, and signal units performed dual functions. In add! tion, each service unit was also designated to function as a storage and issuing agency for supplies pertaining to that service. 4. The 7th Garrison Force was activated in early October, and assigned the mission of garrisoning the objective. The reports of the services discuss in detail the formation and training of the

23

service detachments for this force. In order to effect economy in the use of personnel, the Garrison Force engineers were utilized as the assault shore party, in direct support of the assault operation. C. DETERMINATION OF INITIAL REQUI REMUS TS FDR SUPPLIES OF ALL CLASSES.

For assault

troops.

a. At the outset of planning for the assault phase of Gal vanic, it became apparent that the T/E equipment of the 27th Infantry Division was deficient in many respects, when considered in light of Many major items of t/e equipment were badly the mission assigned. -age, and there were also serious shortages of controlled worn and over items of T/E equipment which could not be filled from theater stocks* In addition, it speedily became apparent that the tactical task at hand, in many respects unlike any previously faced by a unit of the United States Army, called for special equipment, to be used in a special manner.
b, A showdown inspection was held to determine, accurately, the t/e shortages, and requisitions were prepared on mainland sources for all supplies and equipment which could not be furnished by the local services.

c. Increasingly detailed study of the objective resulted in the development of many special requirements. These included, to name a few, additional bulldozers, water distillation units, pack howitzers, extra 500-series radios, flame throwers, and chemical mortars* The re ports of the several technical services cover these additional require ments in detail. 2 For ga rrison troops
a*

It became evident, during "the planning stage, that life on a coral atoll required more than the supplies and equipment provided by T/E for seacoast artillery batteries, antiaircraft artillery battalions, infantry rifle companies, or engineer companies. Dispersion of units by platoon, section, and squad over wide distances involved additional requirements for housekeeping, signal communication, and other activi ties. In addition, there were insufficient service troops in the area to permit organic service units to be utilized as the service detach ments of the garrison force. It was -therefore necessary to take ser vice personnel from existing units,, and equip and train than as self suf.fic i t de ta chnwiit e en b. As a result of considerable study, determination was made equipment required in excess of t/e for the standard units, as of the well as equipment needed for the service detachments* Special t/E'l garrison forces were drawn up and published* A copy of this for the table of equipment for the 7th Garrison Force appears as ANNEX No. 6 to

24

thi report. It will be r.oted that data on weight and cubic measure ment is included on each item, for the convenience of units moving into forward areas* D. DETERMINATION OF MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS.

1* The maintenance supplies to be carried by assault troops was determined jointly by this headquarters (in conjunction with the 27th Infantry Division) and by the staffs of CinCPOA and CcmGenFif thFhibCorps* A covering directive was promulgated by CinCPOA (Annex "A", CinCFOA Operation Flan 13-43) In brief, requirements were as follows:

Class I I

30 days. B rations (mcl. PX supplies) C or K-5 days (27th carried 3C, 2K). D -2 days. 2 gal/man/day fo; Water in cans and drums 5 day a.

Class II II

30 days essential 30 days. 30 days* AA SC Others

maintenance.

Class 111 111

IV Class IV Class V V

-
10 units -
5 units -
5 units. -

2. The maintenance supplies to be carried on initial movement of the garrison troops, as well as the levels to be. established and maintained at each captured base, were prescribed by CinCPOA con fidential letter, serial 02248, dated 20 September 1943, subject: "Advanced Base Logistic Supply Policy Promulgation of." Copy of this letter has been furnished to the Chief of Staff, U.S.A., and the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Details of this policy were also worked out jointly by members of the staff of this head quarters, and that of CinCPOA and Fifth Amphibious Corps. E.
PROCUREMENT,

1. To meet requirements for assault forces, for initial issue of t/e shortages and replacement of unserviceable t/e equipment, as well as requirements in excess of T/e, a project letter, subject: "Immediate Requirements for Certain Alerted Units," file AG 400.5, d*tftd 26 August 1943, was forwarded to the Army Service Forces, with copies to the Operations Division, 77ar Department General Staff, and the Comrcandir.g General, San Francisco Port of Qnbarkation. This letter inclosed 60 requisitions, and requested delivery by 30 Septem ber 1943 of all requirements. This project was approved by the War 943, department on 3 September. l substantially as submitted, and

25

assigned project number 3202* To secure the additional equipment re quired for the 7th Garrison Force, as well as for knovn future garri son forces a project letter was forwarded on 8 September 1943, to the "Equipment for Army Commanding General, Army Service Forces, subject: by the War Department, Defense Battalions." This project was approved and assigned the project number 3166. Only a relatively short time was available for planning inso special requirements were concerned, and but 5 weeks could be far as allowed for procurement of such equipment from the mainland. Also, relatively large quantities of equipment, of a critical nature, notably engineer tractors and radios, were ordered. In instances of delayed supply problem was solved by withdrawing necessary equip delivery, the ment from other troops, and replacing with new equipment received frcm the mainland. Operational requirements for LVT's were filled by the arrival of a shipment only a few days before departure of the task force* However, as a result of operational projects and other requirements sub mitted since Galvanic, it is anticipated that difficulties in procure ment will be considerably decreased in the future.
2,

F. STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION.

1. The storage of incoming supplies on Oahu, prior to their dis tribution to combat units, seriously strained storage facilities* In view of this experience, and the increasing magnitude of future oper ations, covered storage facilities have been considerably expanded.

2* Storage in the forward areas was limited to minimum facilities. A shortage of tarpaulins for early storage of perishables in the forward areas was averted by emergency shipment from Oahu.
G. PREPARATION FOR MOVEMENT,

1. A formal warning order was issued 3 September 1943 alerting the 27th Infantry Division and all attached units. This order provided notice also to "the various Central Pacific Area supply services to take all necessary action to fill shortages of equipment and to repair or re place unserviceable articles of equipment.
2. Movement order number 94044 was published 31 October 1943. This order indicated the final composition of the assadt force, set forth instructions applicable to the preparation for embarkation, and stated that the tactical employment of the force would be prescribed by the Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force.

3. Administrative Order No. 1 was published 1 November 1943, to accompany Field Order No. 97, which had attached the assault troops to the Central Pacific Force for operational control and training. This administrative order set forth all necessary supply, evacuation, and administrative instructions applicable to the 'assault and garrison forces

26

4. The fact that air strikes prior to D-day by the Seventh Air Force were conducted from Ellice Islands bases necessitated a some what different supply procedure for those units. Movement orders on shipment numbers 54130 through 54135 were published covering movement of the necessary tactical and service units of the Seventh Air Force. Administrative details were published as Administrative Order Wo. 2, dated 7 November 1943. 5. Movement of the 7th Garrison Force from Oahu to Makin was covered in movement o~der, shipment number 94029. 6. Based on reports from other theaters, it was decided to adopt palletizing as the method of combat loading, for assault troops, and for initial movements of garrison supplies. Because of the lack of knowledge of beach conditions at the objective, both the toboggan and two-runn6r sled type pallet were utilized, in order to afford a com parison. The assault force palletized virtually all supplies with the exception of 55-gallon drums; the garrison force palletized ammunition, water and gasoline in 5-gallon containers, and critical supplies of other services which were to be unloaded in top priority. The pal letizing "as most successful, and the two-runner sled type pallet was adopted as standard for future opera tiers, principally because it is more economical of lumber, weight and space than the toboggan type pallet. The principal difficulty encountered in palletizing was a shortage of the steel strapping (or banding) utilized to fasten the loads to the pallets. Considerable effort was made to locate supplies locally, and all ITavy and commercial sources were exhausted. Require ments processed to the mainland were apparently passed back and forth between the Bagineers and the Quartermaster, without results. It was finally necessary to secure some of ihe loads with wire, vfoich was un satisfactory. In this connection, it is desired to emphasize that one and one quarter inch (l^rt ) steel strapping was found to be the most satisfactory size* Approximately 800,000 feet will be required to move each division on amphibious operations in this theater, and appropriate long-term requisitions have been forwarded to the mainland. H. BASE DEVELOPMENT.

1* The development of the base, after capture, was the subject of considerable study,, A final base development plan was submitted to CinCPOA, and the recommendations were adopted by CinCPOA with only minor changes. A copy of the approved plan appears as ANNEX No, 7to this report* Periodic progress reports are required from the base, written in terms of the program set up in the base development plan. I. SUPPORT OF BASES.
Resupply support of the Galvaiic bases was as set forth in CinCFOA serial 02248, In general, this plan required each of the ser vices to make automatic shipment to the bases in such a manner that by
1,

27

D plus 60 each base would have on hand a minimum level of 60 days supply plus an operating level of 30 days. In order to accomplish the above, it was planned to make one shipment at an undesignated date to arrive at the bases at about D plus 15. This shipment was to comprise 75 days of supply of all items for which the Army was responsible and would therefore provide the initial 60 days minimum reserve and take care of the 30-day oper ating level, assuming that there would be further shipping each 30 days. b. Plan as outlined was not put into effect due to lack of shipping. Thirty (30) days supplies went forward at approximately plus 15, with a second 45 days of supply following very closely. D 2. In effect, the mission to establish the necessary levels prior to D plus 60 was accomplished. Tabulation of the tonnage of the various classes of supply which were made to the three bases in volved appears below: AUTOMATIC SHIPMENTS TO GALVANIC TO BUILD UP REQUIRED LEVELS Class Measurement Tonnages Apamama Tarawa Tb Ma: ass I

Quartermaster nB"n B" w/px nB"n B" only

ass I ass II cal Engineer Exchange Medical Ordnance

1811 906

2932 1675

1923 939

6666 3520 93 76 760 w/force 64 14 665 276

58 34 461 64 11 381 Quartermaster Signal 136 Special Service 90 days Tota ass II ass IV Air Force (IVE) 1025 Ordnance 125 Engineer 3388 Tota ass IV ass V Ordnance 662 Total Class V 662 TOTAL 9062

w/force

18 17 21 21 203 96 90 days w/force 90 days 1 2 92 92 39 101 90 days w/force 90 days 521 119 64 153 S3 5774 314 314 4500 873 122

w/force

2419 366 3388 1129 1129 19336

28

a. In this connection, it should be noted that. the Army is charged with the supply of rations to all personnel (Army, Kavy, and Marine) in the forward areas.

detaTTby the report of the Surgeon, Central Pacific Area.

J.

HOSPI TALI ATION A>TD EVACUATION. N

This subject has been covered in

K. REHABILITATION OF R^TUaiED ASSAULT UNITS. Concurrent with planning for support of the assault, and with a view to future operations, con siderable thought was given to the problem of rehabilitation of units returning from amphibious operations. Considering the relatively short duration of actual combat, amphibious warfare is a most expensive type of operation. This factor, nlus the ever present possibility of ship sinkings, with the consequent return of units lacking all but the cloth ing on their backs, presented a special problem. To rehabilitate such large groups with Class IIsupplies from maintenance stocks is an im possibility, if supply of the local garrison is to be maintained. Ac cordingly, and in accordance with conversations held with Lt, General Somervell during his visit here in early September, it was decided to request a special stock of essential equipment, over and above normal maintenance levels, which could be used to replace the minimum expected losses of two infantry divisions. Under date of 13 October 1943, a project letter: "Increased Stocks of Essential Equipment, Central Pa cific Area," was forwarded to the Commanding General, San Francisco Port of lilnbarkation, requesting the necessary items, by staggered delivery through 31 January 1944, This project was partially approved on 6 No vember 1943 by War Department radio 7800, and assigned the project number 3007, As a result of the supplies received under this project, it has been possible to rehabilitate troops returned from Galvanic, with out special requisition on the mainland, and to continue maintenance of the remainder of the garrison from normal levels. The desirability of such special stockage has been greatly enhanced by the recent War Depart ment reduction of theater stock levels. L. SALVAGE. 1. The collection and disposition of enemy salvage was in accord ance with standard procedure as prescribed by the War Department. The usual amount of difficulty because of souvenir hunting was encountered. 2. The collection of friendly salvage was facilitated by use of service units of the garrison force, Useable or repairable items the were placed in garrison force stocks, and requisitions on Oahu decreased accordingly. Equipment which could not be repaired at the objective was returned to Oahu, repaired, and readied for reissue. M. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKItf

1. A continuing study is in progress on the subject of equipment required for future operations. T/A 11-60 is under analysis, and recom

29

mendations for additions or deletions thereto will be forwarded from time to time. The scope of Galvanic, insofar as 13ie Army was concern ed, was not suff iciently broad to justify firm recommendations for additions to the t/e of an amphibious division. Seme brief general remarks, however, are believed pertinent: The bulldozer was one of the two most valuable pieces of equipment. Diesel powered machines are preferable. The D-7, with a blade small enough to fit in an LCM, is the preferred hsavy tractor. The D-4, by virtue of diesel power, is preferred to the R-4. Requi sitions have been submitted for both of these items for future oper ations. b The LVT is the other item of equipment which was outstand ing* When fitted with a stern ramp (LVT-4), self -sealing tanks, and armor plate, this vehicle should meet all cargo and personnel carrying requirements. It is understood that the above modifications are being made. c. Ihe remarks of the Quartermaster, on the deficiencies of the X ration, are of importance. The biscuit should be eliminated, or markedly improved. A report to this effect has been submitted to the Quartermaster General. Standard d. Extremely large quantities of explosives are required. engineer explosives proved satisfactory.

Hiiemy burials proved a major problem. It is a full-time job, and a unit must be provided for that task alone, on -coral atoll operations. In this climate, dead bodies decompose rapidly, and pre sent a tremendous sanitation and morale problem even before a short campaign is concluded. Experiments and continuing study are being made on special organizations and equipment required for burial work.

f. Special ammunition requirements included cannister of all types, heavy mortar shell, and offensive hand grenades. Action has been taken to procure additional quantities of these items for future operations. 2. Resupply of captured bases presents a problem of handling in coming equipment. Although the initial automatic supply shipment did go forward to Makin as planned, the successive shipments of 30 and not 45 days of supply seriously taxed available labor and cargo handling facilities at the base. It was found that the destruction wrought by bombing, naval bombardment and artillery firs is go great that aerial considerable time is required for clean-up of the area and preparation for receipt of supplies. In future operations, in order to build up desired 90-days supply, it is planned to make an initial shipment the of 30-days supply to arrive at the base at D plus 15. Thereafter, 30 days supply will be shipped to arrive at 20 day intervals, until de sired stock levels have been reached.

30

ADJUTANT i GENERAL

UUGUSSIFIEI
USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION VI- ADJUTANT GENERAL;

A. PLANNING.
garrison
organized and particular

Administrative details for all units in general were problems were clarified for both assault and

forces.

1. Planning for the 165th Regimental Combat Team. Since the 1 165th Regimental Combat Team was under the direct control of the Com manding General, 27th Infantry Division, throughout the planning and training stages, the Adjutant General, 27th Infantry Division, in practice handled nearly all of the administrative details for the team during the preliminary preparation for the operation. Assistance was given by this headquarters, however, in three" specific instances as follows: a. Two complete sets of locator cards were furnished by the" Machire Records Unit, Central Pacific \rea, for the 27th Infantry Division, including all of its attached units, which proved to be' ex-" tremely valuable as an aid to the division in 12ie expeditious organi ' zation of the 165 th Regimental Combat Team with all its various com- 1 ponents. b. The prompt, accurate reporting of casual tieisV both "battfe and non-battle, in strict compliance with Circular Number 195, 7ar De partment, 1943, was stressed. The great value of "and necessity for accuracy in the application of these procedures was further emphasized by detailed' explanation of the exact procedure to be followed in for warding casualty reports to this headquarters.
1

c. A supply of medals for awards of the Silver Star,, the pui^le^Hera'rt estimated t a. meet .al,1 n'aedsr was SdlWier^W ?liteftaf ?arrd i&ei furnished to the Commanding General, 27th Infantry 'Divisicti,^and pro
;

cedure governing the award of these medals was clearly interpreted in order to obviate any possible confusion or 'misunderstanding." 2. Planning for the- garrison- force. A conference "with 'the garri son force commander and his staff', at which' representatives' 1 of the 'Ad jutant General f s office were in attendance, resulted in instruction on and clarification of many necessary administrative procedure's concern ing difficulties which it was considered might' possibly arise. Insofar as practicable all needs were anticipated and bhe following services rendered to the garrison force:

'

a. A "new unit" file was provided to equip the force complete ly both- as to War Department publications including Army Regulations, Circulars, Field Manuals, Technical Manuals, and the like, as well as all pertinent publications of this headquarters. In addition, a three months 1 supply of all necessary T*D AGO forms was provided to cover any eventuality.

31

b. The Machine Records Unit assisted materially in the pre paration of this force by devising a practical morning report and a weekly strength report form both of which were specially designed for greater accuracy and for simplification of the reporting of all per sonnel on detached service with the force. In addition, five complete sets of locator cards and various rosters for both commissioned and enlisted personnel were provided* c. The proper handling of classified documents in strict compliance with AR 380-6 (Safeguarding Military Information), 28 Sep tember 1942, was emphasized and the standardized procedure to be used was carefully explained by the Classified Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, this headquarters. d.
Special personal

direction was given to the garrison force

adjutant regarding the handling of various administrative matters in connection with officer records, procedure for the promotion and de
motion of officers, reclassif ication, and efficiency reports; procedure governing the requisitioning of replacements; reassignment; preparation of sailing lists; and the preparation of various periodic reports. B. POSTAL PREPARATIONS. The following preparations handling of postal matters : were made for the

1. For combat elements. With the exception of the 3d Bn, 165th Inf,which had mail service during the time it was temporarily attach ed to the garrison force, the 165th Regimental Combat Team did not re ceive mail until the operation was over. This was pursuant to the ex pressed desires of the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division. 2. assisted For the garrison force. as follows: The garrison force was equipped and

a. Personnel furnished included one postal officer (a second lieutenant) and two enlisted men (postal clerks), one of whom was a technician fourth grade and the other a technician postal clerks were bonded enlisted men. b. Postal supplies, operation over a considerable c.
including necessary

fifth grade.

The

forms for complete

period of time, were supplied.

cases,

two bag racks, and two cash drawers,

Adequate postal equipment to the extent of two sorting was also provided.

d. The postal section was initially supplied with three thousand dollars (3,000.00) in fixed credit. This credit was later augmented by an additional two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) to cover all possible demands that might be made on the service. c. V-Mai3 change of address
cards were completed

for all

32

personnel prior to departure as efficient as possible.

in

further attempt to make the service

f In the interests warded by air transportation, transportation

of morale, all letter type mail was for while all other mail went by surface

C.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Instructions must be issued specifically outlining how each type of casualty is to be reported to insure -that brief uniform and complete reports will be submitted with all possible speed consistent with accuracy. Such instructions have been prepared and a form pro vided to insure speedy accurate reports in future operations. 2. A separate section of the Adjutant General 1 s office should be established to handle all matters pertaining to casualties. This has been accomplished* 3. A supplement to, or a revision of, the original check-list would be helpful in rounding out and completing administrative details. Information pertaining to processing OCS applicants, classification procedures, and postal instructions should be included. This check list is now being revised. 4. Insufficient emphasis was placed upon garrison force classi fication personnel and their functions. To requisition personnel adequately and to assist staff officers in the garrison force it was proven that at least 1 Classification Specialist (SSN 275)' could be Also, 2 Model W B" Record Cases and instructions used advantageouslye procedures should be provided. Potential Classifi in classification cation Specialists assigned to garrison forces are now receiving instruction at the Classification Training School and the units are being provided with the necessary equipment, records, and forms.

33

-
OHV *fiLASSIF!i

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION VII

- ARTILLERY OFFICER.

A. PLANNING. 1. 'In planning for the Galvanic operation, requirements of the garrison force c? oramande.r were carefully studied and maximum effort rendered to" prepare the force for all contingencies. The entire fa cilities and services of the Hawaiian Antiaircraft Artillery. Command and the Hawaiian Seacoast Artillery Command were made available and used to the fullest extent for the careful and thorough preparation of respective antiaircraft and ssacoast units assigned to the force. The challenge, issued to every officer of the conimabd that noth ing, was to be overlooked' In prepaj-atiori for the movement was n\st with): QU.tr standing efficiency and cooperation although lack of time and nP. nH. availability of important equipment imposed serious problems...
:

...

2. . . Although the responsibility of the. Hav/aiian Artillery {JorcjnarVd ended upon attachmert of units to task forces, many staff conferences were held to determine requirements for the successful accomplishment" , Stud .iea were made by specially of probable and assigned missions asslgjneTd officers to outline all assistance tha.t 1 could be, / given" to prepare properly every individual and. element; to. me,et any, ,, .,.. contingency.. Maps. **r"d photographs of Jtfakin Island wsrJe obtained and. 1 carefully studied * From those a preliminary distribution of anaamejxt was made for maximum defense of the island.

B. MISSION. The mission of Coast Artillery troopfl-fc-r-tiiV^a Ivanie operation yms twofold j first,, antiaircraft .projection for the assault troops by out oma tic 'weapons unrbs y second, to.. as.is,t in/ g.arxj.spning. . and def ending Is land ?,' For tbe.sejponft mis&ion,' Coast Artillery troops were' assi^ne^ to^.'and compriVed a. major pprti.pn of., th.er.7th:. '' ".'".'. . 7 .-'.-, .-. '' i. , ."'.'-..,... ;.,,.:-.. Garris'pn' Force.' !/"/''' [.
?

. -''-

11,

pn uff,a x.iza ti

a. Coest Artillery troops under the command of Colonel Clesen Tenny, CAC, were organized as. a part of the 7th, (}.arri.son Force to meet the requirements' of the defensive mission and' consisted of J^d^ .- , ' ' ''.".' following units : ?' .

'.'.'.
-r

(1) Ist Battalion, 98th Coast Artillery (Provisional . .. .-. Ground Defense Headquarters.).

..

(%)\
'
%

Battery A,;;9Bth

Coast Artillery., (AA)'slt v

Coast

,
.&

In^(s) "Bat^ry '%' 98th

C, 98th

Artilier>''tAA) SOimr."

g qa s t iArtiI ry.. (i^J ', 90wnu ", : Ke

Coast Artillery (aa) 90mm.

("SJ" Battery

D, 98th

35 4>.

(6)

Battery X, 93d Coast Artillery (AA) 37mm,

(7) Battery L, 93d Coast Artillery (AA) 37mm. (8)

Battery A, 57th Coast Artillery (SC) 155mnu
D, 57th Coast Artillery (SC) 155mm.

(9) Battery

The Provisional Force Headquarters from the antiaircraft and seacoast

consisted primarily of officers artillery.

b. Several factors entered into consideration in determin ing the size and composition of Coast Artillery units. Among these factors were; minimum number of antiaircraft and seacoast batteries considered sufficient to accomplish the mission; and the maximum num ber of units available in the Hawaiian Islands not committed to other defense battalions or vital to the defense of installations on Oahu. Final approval of the composition of this force rested with ComGenCentPac#
C, TFAINING. The original selection of units was made to include, insofar as possible, those urits having had previous combat experi ence and/or maximum amount of training. In addition, all troops were subjected to a thorough and intensive training and physical fitness program.

1. Amphibious training.
First consideration was given to training necessary to insure smooth and uninterrupted ship-to-shore movement. To accomplish this the Central Pacific Area amphibious training centers were made available. All troops received a minimum of four hours training in landings designed to approximate actual landings as closely as possible. In addition many lectures and demonstrations were given. Specially selected crews were trained in handling equipment for ship-to-shore movement. b* Automatic weapons units which were designated to partici pate in the assault were attached to the 27th Infentry Division for shipboard training, and supervised landing exercises were conducted on outlying islands. 2. Unit and individual training. Until assembled for staging, antiaircraft and seacoast troops were subjected to.a vigorous training program under the direction of the Hawaiian Antiaircraft Artillery Com mand and the Hawaiian Seacoast Artillery Command, respectively.
HJvery effort was made Individual training was stressed. to familiarize each man with the cause and effects of diseases common to tropical climates. An effort was made to qualify each individual

36

with the arm with which he was equipped and familiarization firing was accomplished by nearly 100$ of all troops. Swimming instruction was given continuously to non -swimmers in an attempt to qualify every man. identification of aircraft received particular emphasis. Types of air craft, friendly and enemy, likely to.be seen in the area were reviewed. b. TJr4ts were drilled in terrestrial fire to include firing or/ the antimechanized range and landward firing., In addition fach unit conducted target practices ednsistent with missions. Frequent tests were conducted to determine" proficiency of personnel manning crewserved weapons. Individuals itfio did not meet requirements were trans ferred "from the ir organ izations and r;er.;lab ad by quliiif sohnel
;

'nolfmai

3^ The exiti^e izlsure thorougn"nSss of training ' ':': ' of the" 'operation.
""";
;

;:

rentier staff , Hawaii an 'Af^illery Command, ;^aV utiiifced^to

'

an 4preparation
....

-:.

:_

for; the final. success ' '

''

>

a. tosts were conducted fitness of individuals for corabai: duty. b. L>.

%jr slaff
.

' "^

offi cers td determirie "'Z\'"'- r. V- .^ .' 7

insure the 'proper

Systeniafcic checks >/ere made "to determine the sisa^u,g and equipage 6t individuals 'and units.

INDIRECT 3UFPOHT.

Although, not a p'B rt "bjf .the CJalvaiVic operation the Hawaiian ArtilXery Command furnxshed antiaircraf t 'troops for the crp-tection pt an advance air base at Baker Island supported indirectly this'oper '' ;^-.-i.j;-o.">-'-': : '..- ?--.:: o vfc-.-.s ation.'
' ' '
:
;

,1

'.i

>;.

a.
appropriate

consisted

September 1943, antiairjcfaft witii, On I lAir Corps. and service troops occupied Balcer Island. Antiaircraft units of:

(T)

Provigicnal

Headquarters Ba.ttai .ion ,

...

.._.,.

][.

(2) Ba;tt*y F ? S4Vn Cbast

( s);^;;Ba tte'ry I3, 95d .I^srt
;I3;
t

Axtm^ry/^

Artnter^
:

'( Ai|?g%n * '!.-.'l*'"'.

"

l
r*

{*l

'i,^Sth
v^^3ry m|

Coan t

; ::Ift^-- '--fj

''

rr '

Coast

: A>^ff3ry"(AXK;pp;

iW,'.ss%'>* i] ty
o

.^^

(6) Ist Platoon,

Battery k, 97th Coast Artillery (AA) sit.

2. This operation '//as in effect a preliminary for the Galvanic operation. The experience gained proved invaluable in planning and training for Galvanic.

37

E.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1* Cargo space. The cost, time, and effort required to place equipment on a landing beach is tremendous, and can be conceived only by a person having experienced it. A survey is being made in an attempt to eliminate from initial landing all items of equipment non essential to immediate and efficient operation. For future operations the number of motor vehicles will be reduced to a minimum* This is accomplished by combining and coordinating the use of transportation and prime movers among the various units. 2. Combat loading. LST's were used for transporting AA materiel. Ships were loaded from stern to bow in the following order: T/E arti cles; gas and oil; food and water; four units of fire for all weapons; SCB-268's; searchlight power plants and searchlights; 90mm range equip ment; 90mm guns, including one unit of fire, combat loaded; 37mm guns, including one unit of fire, combe t loaded* This priority of loading proved correct with a few exceptions* Communications, spare parts, and mess equipment should be loaded so as to be available before reserve ammunition* The LST is adequate for transporting AA materiel ,but a steep beach is necessary if it is planned to land equipment directly onto the beach, otherwise, shuttle from LST to beach becomes necessary. 33 Debarkati on It was found that the conditions imposed in training for
debarkation were mild in comparison with the hazards experienced in
actual operations. To impose such conditions in training results in
damage of a considerable amount of equipment* loss and It is planned
operations to obtain a maximum amount of
in preparation for future ahip-to-ahore training from barges or cargo ships, simulating as near
ly as possible, actual conditions.

a*

b* In the hurry and confusion of unloading, the regulating point was abandoned* The result was that truck loads of equipment for one unit were sent to other unit positions* Five days were required to straighten out the resultant confusion. Also some equipment was overlooked and not unloaded because of the hurry of the ship's captain to clear the area* For future operations in an attempt to alleviate this condition, an officer of correspondingly high rank, preferably the unit executive officer, should be assigned the duty of liaison for unloading equipment* This offioer must know where every item of equip ment is located on the ship and be prepared to dispatch this equipment in proper order*

38

BM^P
i

ttlUiLASSlflti
l!

i
i

111 II

SECTION VIII A.

BOMB DISPOSAL OFFICER.

30MB DISPOSAL.

1. The mission of the Bomb Disposal Squad. The mission of the Bomb Disposal Squad with Galvanic operation was to remove all unex ploded bombs which might impede the progress of the attacking force. It was contemplated that a certain amount of unexploded shells and other types of unexploded muriticns, both Japanese and American would be encountered. 2. Personnel, The personnel required for the mission consisted of 1 officer and 6 enlisted men selected from among those members of the 232 d Ordnance Bomb Disposal Company who had considerable range demolition experience. 33
Training

a Training of personnel on the peculiarities of amphibious warfare was conducted with and under the command of the tactical unit to which the squad was attached.

(1) All members of

the squad were giver; intensive swimming training- with s cress placed on swimming with full field equipment. All personnel were able yards. to swim at least 50

b. All members were thoroughly trained in general demolition technique necessary in coping with miscellaneous explosives in special training peculiar to bomb disposal alone, having gained such train ized ing by actual range experience over a period of 1 year. ?. o new equip ment had appeared within the year which might have necessitated addi tional specialized training.
T

4. Equipment. 3omb Disposal Intelligence, particularly fron the South West Pacific Area disclosed that no Japanese bomb fuzes involving anti-withdrawal, anti-handling, or other similar booby-traps were being used. However, a complete set remote control equipment was taken in addition to the general demolition equipment in order to be prepared in case new types of fuzes were encountered. The special bomb disposal equipment needed was drawn from the 232 d Ordnance Bomb Disposal Company. Other equipment and explosives were requisitioned through normal supply channels

B. LESSONS LSAHMED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKE?!. An operation of this type results in many large caliber Naval duds which must be neutralized. As a result of Galvanic operation this unit studied large caliber >laval shells and fuzes and developed special equipment and technique for neutralizing than in preparation for later operations.

39

CHAPLAIN

UMCLASSIFIED

IMIMill

SECTION IX
A,

- CHAPLAIN.

PLANNING. Four conferences were held during the planning period for the attack from the 12th of October to the 26th of October, 1943, inclusive.

1* The first consideration was the distribution of chaplains. This was planned in conjunction with Navy chaplains so that a Protes tant and a Catholic chaplain might be assigned to each hospital ship, troop ship, or other transport. Four Catholic and two Protestant chaplains of the 27th Infantry Division were assigned to the assault force* One Protestant chaplain of the HAAC and one Catholic chaplain of the Seventh AAF were assigned to the garrison force. Due to the limited number of Jewish chaplains, capable enlisted men were select ed to conduct religious services for each ship and each unit that went ashore.
2. Refresher courses were conducted on grave registration, burials, identif ications, records, and a similar course on map reading and orien tation.
>

3. At the last conference, about two weeks prior to departure, there was a final summation of all plans. B. REHABILITATION. Redistribution of chaplains for the return voyage was made to compensate for the loss of one chaplain casualty and also to provide both a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain for each hospital ship and transport, in as far as could be done. C. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1, Chaplains who are to serve garrison forces should accompany the first contingent* Recent operations especially proved the necessi ty of this as combat chaplains had to remain to serve the garrison force after their units returned from the theater of operations.

2* Each chaplain should remember to keep a personal record of each of his burials, regardless of unit of deceased, and check with Master Locator for accuracy of report. 3. The Gilbert Islands have had the services of missionaries for several generations and the natives are very religious-minded, so much so that the chaplain can be used to a great advantage as liaison officer. 4. Action has been taken to benefit from the lessons learned by conferences with the Chaplains who have participated in these operations and also with other Chaplains who are scheduled to participate in such operations in the future. 5. A digest of the lessons learned is also being included in the regul&r monthly bulletin sent to all the Chaplains of the Central Paci fic Area. 41

OFFICE*

uiCUssiHta
USAF
/

IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION X

- CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICER.

A. PREPARATION FOR THE OPERATION, ! Training Under the supervision of this headquarters, troops of the 2Yth Infantry Division were given chemical warfare training in defense against chemical attack, in the use of flame throwers in the assault of a fortified position, and in the tactical employment of Selected mortar troops were given specialized training in the smoke. employment of -the 4.2 chemical mortar by the 91a t Chemical Company (Mtz). Additional training allowances of smoke producing'itfateriel, fuel pil and gasoline for flame throwers, and 4,2 chemical mortar shell were made available.
2, Supplies, All units of the 27th Infantry Division were given special serviceability tests which resulted in the exchange of many unserviceable or excessively worn articles of CWS equipment. All flame throwers, including pressure cylinders (hydrogen and nitrogen) were test ed just prior to departure, A special allowance of smoke pots was made available for the operation.

5. Army Garrison Forced Troops of this force were given special training and serviceability tests. CWS All CWS supplies were made avail able from local depot stocks. Logistical support included a ninety (90) day level of supply of all CIVS materiel. Prior to departure, the Garri son Force Chemical Officer conducted a special CWS training "spot check" to insure -that all garrison troops had received adequate CW training. As a result, mirior deficiencies were corrected. B. SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION. Logistical tables for automatic resupply were prepared and shipments forwarded in accordance therewith to the garrison force and to the floating supply base established at Funafuti.
C,

Equipment lost or rendered unserviceable REHABILITATION the operation was replaced from depot stocks.

during

D.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAK3I. 1. Flame throwers.

a. Allowance of flame throwers was inadequate. This was in creased from 24 to 192 per division for the next operation and the in fantry troops of the division were trained in their use. b. The 55 gallon containers of fuel mix were too cumbersome for amphibious operations. Fuel mix is now carried in 5 gallon cans. c. Supply of fuel mix must be carefully coordinated both afloat and on the beachhead. CWS men will be placed in charge of floating re serves and all beachhead refilling points in future operations to coordi

43

nate fuel supply. d. Pressure cylinders must be tested just prior to oper ational use, A small service kit has been devised and supplied to accomplish this. c. Flame thrower of larger range and greater volume in stalled in LVTs and tanks would be very valuable. War Department advises that these will be available soon. 2. Smoke.

More smoke should be provided for the protection of assault forces* To accomplish this one chemical weapons company was attached to the assault division for the succeeding operation; this headquarters assisted the Navy and Marines in designing a special rack permitting landing craft to carry smoke pots (Ml and M4); and troops were issued Ml white phosphorus grenades. 5 b. It was also recommended to the Navy that carrier based planes with smoke tanks should be available to blanket enemy instal lations and prevent aimed fire during the initial assault
phase.
3, Waterproofing* All CWS equipment which will be affected by sea water must be waterproofed. Steps have been taken to accomplish this.

4. Intelligence# A centralized control over all captured CWS equipment is essential as many new items of enemy equipment may be lost as a result of looting. It has been recommended to G-2 that intelligence teams accompany the assault troops for the express pur pose of collecting and evaluating enemy equipment.

44

f.MfIINKEM

HtuKifi"

OFFICER

4H^-

ttNOUSSIFtEB USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XI
A,

-
ENGINEER.

ASSAULT FHA3E.

Special operational requirements for engineer supplies and On 19 August 1943 the 27th Infantry Division submitted the following estimate of special engineer equipment in excess of T/S 'which would be required for the accomplishment of the assigned mission:

equipmentT

4 15 54 4 21

D-7 tractors w/angle dozer

R-4 tractors w/angle dozer
barco hammers
pneumatic chain saws 5000-gallon per day water distillation units.

"Hie requested items not being available locally a special requisition was prepared and forwarded with requisitions of other services by a special covering letter to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces on 28 August 1943, As more definite information was received ccncern ing" the objective, and plans for the operation were developed, these requirements were modified* Time not permitting the requisitioning of additional equipmoat the necessary items were withdrawn from other units on Oahu to fillthe total requirements. The 165 th 2CT and attached units were ultimately furnished a total of 14 R-4 tractors w/angle dozers; 4 D-4 tractors w/angle doser; 11 D-7 tractors w/angle dozer; 9 D-8 trac tors, 6 w/angle dozer; 3-10,000 gpd distillation units and 5-2,000 gpd distillation units. 2. Shore party units. The 27th Infantry Division requested the assignment of an extra engineer combat battalion to be used as a shore party battalion o The only available battalion of this type was the 152 d Engineer Combat Battalion at that time located on the islands of Kauai and Hawaii* On 15 September 1943 on the recommendation of the Engineer, CPA this entire unit was ordared to Oahu for attachment to the 27th Infantry Division. The battalion moved within 48 hours of re ceipt of orders and was attached to -the 27th Infantry Division for in tensive training as shore party troops. Owing to the short length of time available prior to the actual shipboard rehearsal exercise, the 152 dEngineer Battalion had only one week of amphibious training at the 7<aimanalo Amphibious Training Center, The battalion performed very creditably, however, in the landings made during this training cruise and upon return to Oahu was given several days more of intensive train ing in weapons firing. 3. Pallets for handling assault supplies. The 7th Infantry Divi sion had recently arrived in the Hawaiian Islands from the Aleutian Islands and had reported very favorably on the handling of assault supplies loaded on 4* x6* pallets which are towed by tractors. The pallet used in the Aleutians had been of the smooth bottom or toboggan type due to the soft mud encountered in that theater. The 27th Infantry

45

Division requested the construction of 6,000 pallets of this design for its use. It was felt by the Engineer, CPA that a pallet of the runner type would be more satisfactory for use on coral islands, would be more economical of materials and could be constructed much more rapidly. Sample designs of the toboggan type and sled type pal lets were made and tested on the beaches around Oahu. The toboggan type was found to be more satisfactory on rough coral iihile -the sled type was better on sand and finger coral. 1,500 pallets of the to boggan type and 350 of the sled type were constructed together with towing bridles and cargo handling slings. All locally available stocks of strapping material were used and radio requisitions were transmitted to the mainland for additional quantities. Due to the large quantities required, efforts to obtain the entire amount were not successful and it was necessary to secure the loads to some of the pallets with wire. 4. Water distillation units. !Ihe objective being a coral is land where potable ground water was not expected to be found, it was necessary that the assault units be furnished water distillation units to furnish drinking water on the basis of 2 gallons per man per day. Five 2,000-gpd, trailer-mounted, Cleaver Brooks water distilla Engineer Battalion for this pur tion units were furnished to the 152 d pose* Operators for these units were given 8 days of intensive train' ing in the operation and maintenance of the distillation units in a special school under the direction of the Engineer, CPA, This school was staffed with instructors who had from 6 months to a year's experi ence in the operation of similar units at Christmas and Canton. 5. Engineer equipment for amphibious training. In order to per mit the assault units to carry out amphibious training, including a training cruise on APA's with actual landings on other islands of the Hawaiian Group, and at the same time permit proper breaking-in and waterproofing of new equipment being furnished for the actual oper ation, approximately 20 medium and heavy tractors with angledozers and a number of tractor operated cranes (cberrypickers) were with drawn from engineer construction work on the island of Oahu and fur nished to tiie assault units for training* 7ftiile it would have been preferable to have trained with the very equipment to be taken on the actual operation, the late arrival of the necessary equipment on mainland requisition did not permit of its actual use in preparatory training. 6. Waterproofing equipment* The 13th Engineer Battalion of the 7th Infantry Division had developed methods of waterproofing engineer tractors in its preparation for the Aleutian campaign. With the as sistance of personnel from the 13th Engineers the 102 dEngineer Bat talion and the 476 th Engineer Maintenance Company waterproofed all tractors which were to be taken on the Galvanic operation. At the same time the CPA Searchlight Repair Shop developed methods for the waterproofing of searchlight equipment and processed all of this type

46

of equipment which was to be taken on the operation. 7. Explosive and demolition materials. Necessary demolition materials of all types wer furnished to the 27th Infantry Division for training. The following major items were furnished from depot stocks for the assault operations
Bangalore torpedoes, 5* sections INT, lbs. Ammonium nitrate, lbs. Caps, blasting, electric Caps, blasting, non-electric Detonating cord, ft. Fuse, time, ft. Lighters, fuse

490
8,491 6,020

4,670
4,600

16,500 7,350
1,800

Thirty days Class IIengineer mainte 8. Maintenance supplies* nance supplies for all units comprising the assault and garrison forces were assembled and packed by the CPA Engineer Depot and furnished to the units for loading aboard ship. The lists of maintenance items were compiled by the Division Engineer of the 27th Infantry Division and the CPA Engineer Depot using local experience factors. These lists were generous in spare parts and tools and eliminated many miscellaneous items not essential for combat.

9. Preparation of maps and charts. The majority of charts used in the Galvanic operation were drafted by the Topographic Company from photographs provided by JICPOA* reproduced either by the 64th Engineer Topographic Company Engineer Map Reproduction Plant. Maps were reproduced in quantities: a.
By the 64th Engineer Topographic Company:

the maps and 64th Engineer The maps were or the CPA the following

Apamama, Nauru, Gilbert Island Area Map 1" 1 nautical mile in 2 colors Gilbert Island Chart Gilbert Island maps and photographs Landing Chart in 3 colors Gilbert and Marshall Booklet Submarine Flotting Chart Tarawa, Betio Island Tarawa Air Target Folder Makin Special Map Scale 1/10,000 in 9 sheets md 4 colors Makin Mosaic in 3 sheets and 2 colors

2500 copies n 250 n 6400 M 21000 It 500 II 4100 tl 1700 It 500 II 12000 500
It

49450 copies

47

b.

Ejy the

CPA Engineer

Map Reproduction

Plant?
2800 copies 250 " 1600 n 900 29700 1025 2800 2400 1150 150 1335 1000

Chart Atoll Island Ocean and Nauru Island 20,000 in 9 sheets and Kourbash, 4 colors Makin Atoll Makin Chart Tarawa Chart Tarawa Atoll Special Maps portion of Makin Island: H Scale 1 a 2000 yards in 3 colors Scale 111I 11 1300 yards n a 250 yards Scale l
Apamama Apamama Gilbert Gilbert

" "
n n

l/

" "

" "
M

45110 copies The combined total of maps and charts reproduced by the two CPA organizations amounted to 94,560 copies. B. DEVELOPMENT PHASE. 1* Planning of garrison forces. In August 1943 when the gen eral overall plan for operations in the Central Pacific Area has been formulated, the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area de veloped Army organizations similar to Marine defense battalions for the garrisoning and local defense of Central Pacific islands. It was assumed that no major new airfield construction would be under taken by these forces, but ttiat if a new field were necessary an engineer aviation or general service battalion would be furnished for the initial construction of the airfield. The mission of the engineer component of the Army garrison force was to be the re habilitation of a captured Japanese field and its maintenance there after or the maintenance and emergency repair of a field which had been constructed by engineer aviation or general service troops. The engineer component of the garrison force would also perform field fortification and general housing construction for ifoe Army garrison force, operate water distillation units to furnish drink ing water for all units in the force, operate and maintain all It refrigeration facilities and electrical generating equipment. was also to be an integral element of the ground defense force of the island. Based on this mission a special Table of Organization and Equipment for an engineer garrison force company was drawn up. The major items of equipment for such a separate company were as follows : 4 D-8 tractors w/angledozer

48

3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 10

8 yd, carryalls 10-ton # 3 wheel, rollers Graders, road, motorized, D-12 yd, i shovel w/attachments Crane, tractor operated, 20-ton Welder, electric arc Concrete mixer, 7-S Rooter, '6 tooth Trucks, 2jg- T Dump.

2. Organization of garrisoo force* After further development of the requirements at specific locations, it was decided that two engineer companies would be necessary at some of the objectives. Accordingly, an allocation of the various companies of the 34th Engi neer Combat Regiment and 47th Engineer General Service Regiment was made to the various garrison forces. The individual line companies were reinforced by the attachment of selected specialists from the Headquarters & Service Companies of the two regiments and detachment of a like number of basics or lower grades. A special requisition for the equipment in excess of the T/E of these units was prepared and submitted to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces on 14 September 1943. A study of the requirements for the engineer com ponent of the 7th Garrison Force which was to occupy Makin Island resulted in the assignment of two engineer companies as the engineer component, plus the 804th Engineer Aviation Battalion for the initial airfield construction* The garrison force companies were D and E Companies of the 47th Engineer Regiment.
3, Specialized training of garrison force units. The engineer component of 7th Garrison Force as well as those of the other garri son forces then set up were given intensive training in all special missions which they could be expected to encounter. Schools covering the following special subjects were organized and operated under the Commanding Officer, Provisional Engineer Group:

a b. c. ice plants. d. c.

Operation of water distillation units. Operation and maintenance Operation and maintenance

of electric generators. of refrigeration units and

Assembly of Navy type pontoon barges.

Erection of bunkers using Marston mat of all equipment,

particu

f 3d and 4th echelon maintenance larly diesel powered equipment. In addition, personnel

from antiaircraft searchlight

units were given

49

intensive training by the CPA Searchlight Repair Shop in the mainte nance of searchlight equipment. 4* Preparation of base development plan. After the composition of the garrison force had been determined the Commanding Officer of that force, and the various CPA special staff officers and the Com manding General, Seventh Air Force submitted their respective require ments for construction at the objective* Biese requirements were consolidated by the Engineer, CPA and the construction section of the base development plan was prepared for submission to CinCPOA* This plan listed in detail all of iiie construction to be provided for the development of the base. Complete construction details were furnished Deputy Chief of Staff for inclusion in the overall plan or. to the 1 October 1943; these data included the estimated toncage of construc tion materials required broken down by the three priorities of construe tior as determined by Cir.CPOA.
5, Assembly of construction materials and equipment* The T/E eauipment of Hie 804th Engineer Aviation Battalion which was to perform the airfield construction was reinforced with additional heavy equip ment withdrawn from construction projects on Oahu. The list of equip ment taken by the 804th Engineer Aviation Battalion, including its T/E equipment, follows :

TOTAL 6 3 1 4 6 1 2 4 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 20 2

OVER AND ABOVE

T/E

Tractors, D-8, w/blades ) Tractors, D-8, wo/blades (1-w/crane mounted on top) Crane, tractor operated, 20-ton Tractor. D-4, Scraper, carryall, 8 yd o Rooter, 3 tooth Shovels, yd. complete w/equip Graders, mtzd, D-12 Rollers, 3 wheel, 10-ton 2 10 T substituted for 2 Rollers, sheepsfoot, 2 sections 750 gal. trailer w/pump Compressors, mtzd, 105 cfm Compressor, trailer, 315 cfm Lubricator, truck mtd. T/E allows trlr mtd. Ditching machine, 24 M Pump, 4" Wisconsin, C.H. & Welder, arc Mixer, concrete, 14-S Mobile Shop A
Mobile Shop B
Trailer, 16-ton
Truck, dump, 4-ton, 6x6
Truck, dump, 2^-ton
Truck, tank, 750 gal.

w/blade

-0 2

T/E allows 8 D-7's 0 1 1 0

8 T 0 0 1 0

50

TOTAL 1 S 1 1

OVER AND ABOVE 1 0

0

T/E

Truck, 4-ton, wrecker Generator sets, SKVA, w/floodlights Generator set, 3KVA, w/floodlights Crane, tractor operated, 10-ton, long boom, 30*

In order to economize on equipment and shipping space, arrangements were made for subsequent transfer of the majority of this equipment to the two engineer companies of the garrison force for maintenance of the field and the base upon completion of initial construction and the withdrawal of the 804th Engineer Aviation Battalion. 16 x 20* Generators, refriger buildings were preout and bundled for shipment* ators and prefabricated cold storage buildings were taken frcm CPA Engineer stocks and prepared for shipment. Detailed lists of all con struction materials and maintenance supplies nhich would be required for the first 90 days were prepared in collaboration with the Garrison Force Engineer and the Commanding Officer of the 804th Engineer Aviation Battalion. !Diese materials were assembled and prepared for shipment. 6. Eooking of cargo space. Detailed lists of materials and equip ment to be furnished in each priority having been determined, the weight and cubic measurements were computed and materials were booked for ship ment with the Army Port and Service Command, 7 Maintenance supplies. 30 days engineer Class II maintenance supplies were furnished the garrison force units for initial shipment and an additional 90 days maintenance was assembled and packed by the Engineer Depot for shipment in second and third priority. 8.
Loading of construction supplies

and equipment

All construction equipment and the initial or first prior ity construction materials and supplies as well as the initial 30 days Class II maintenance were delivered to the garrison force for loading with troops. Second and third priority construction supplies were de livered to the Army Port and Service Command for loading with support shipping.
tons. b. First priority construction supplies This ca*rgo was broken down as follows: totalled 960 ship

(1) Field fortification materials

for the construction of 17 gun emplacements, 1300 rolls of barbed wire for initial defense work, 200,000 sandbags for gun emplacements, splinterproof s, etc.
Riareng cell gasoline tanks were furnished for initial gasoline storage, The Mareng cells were provided by the Seventh Air Force.

(2) One 10,000 gallon gasoline tank and 194

51

(3) Material for initial housing for Air Corps flying personnel, signal coirmuni cat ions and certain ad
ministrative facilities were provided for by the shipment of 649 16 ? x 20 precut buildings. Water supply was furnished by three 10,000 gallon distil lation units in addition to the five 2,000 gallon units taken by the assault forces* Six 10,000 gallon redwood water tanks were provided for water storage* Four 30KW generators were furnished for electric power.

(4) Camouflage material consisted of 2,000 yds. of

burlap, 3 drums of paint, 75,000 yds. of garlands and 117 camouflage nets.

(5) 600,000 sq. ft. Marston mat was furnished for airfa eld construction. c. Second priority construction supplies totalled 2,380 ship tons and were delivered to the Army Port and Service Command between 27 November and 3 December* This cargo consisted of the following: 10 each 250 cv* ft. reefer boxes 3 each 1800 cv. ft. prefabricated refrigerator warehouses 188 each 16 x 20 precut buildings 1 fire truck 5 each -g-ton ice making machines 2 each 30KW electric generators 4 water pumps Lumber, cement, plumbing materials and hardware for the construction of showers, kitchens and other living facilities. d. Third priority construction supply amounted to 2,110 ship tons with 33 ship tons of engineer Class II maintenance supplies bring up to the 90 day maintenance level* These supplies were to delivered to the piers between 21 December and 1 January* These supplies consisted of the following:

500,000 sq* ft Marston mat for runway extension 90 each 16 x 20 precut buildings 300,000 bd. ft. lumber Nails and screen wire for the construction of floored and screened tents for all permanent personnel. 180 Crolls barbed wire and pickets for completion of the fortification work.
9.
Emergency supplies.

Radio requisitions

were received from

52

the base during the early days of development for additional materials required by the special conditions that were encountered. These requi sitions consisted mainly of spare parts, additional Marston mat, screen wire and roofing paper, additional barbed wire and 10,000 heavy steel staples of the type used by the Japanese for fastening coconut logs together in the construction of field fortifications.

C. LESSONS LEAWSD MD CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. In order to coordinate the activities of all engineer to be employed in development work at a base they must all be commander who is a member of the staff of the base commander* dations have been made that this policy be followed in future 2.
troops
under one

Recommen operations.

Each unit should take its own equipment to the base and retain

this equipment vtien it is withdrawn from the base, thus insuring ade
quacy of equipment as well as continuity of responsibility for its Transfers of equipment between units will be held to a minimum in future operations.

maintenance^

3. Each shore party company must have two pieces of heavy lifting equipment. In future operations they will each be provided with one crawler crane and one tractor mounted crane* In addition each shore party battalion will have one 20 T tractor operated crane (cherrypicker)
Thorough training must be given personnel who are to operate such specialized equipment as generators, refrigeration units and dis tillation units. Additional schools have been organised to accomplish this.
4,

5. All supplies and equipment must be carefully packed, marked, Packing methods are being and waterproofed to prevent loss or damage. improved through further experimentation. 6. Much time was saved in the initial base development by the pre cutting of latrines and buildings. Ihis practice will be continued. 7. Larger reserves of equipment and supplies must be available on Req Oahu to meet "%r.expected changes in plans and last minute requests. uisitions have been submitted to accomplish this. 8. Large quantities of hand tools such as shovel 3, picks, axes, saws and hammers are necessary in order that all personnel maybe effec tively employed in the initial phases of the base developmert. In creased quantities of such tools will be furnished future forces. 9. It is essential that task force units sutanit -their estimate of requirements as early as possible in order to permit the. orderly pro cessing of requisitions and assembly of the materials and equipment prior to the mounting period. Every effort is being irads by the Engineer, CPA, to anticipate future requirements.

53

EXCHANGE

>"""""

AMM

wwuwhei
i

il;

SECTION XII

-
EXCHANGE.

A. GENBRAL PROBLEMS OF EXCHANGE, Several problems alter into estab lishing exchange service ror rorces in advance bases, such as personnel, climatic conditions, water supply, availability of electric power, re frigeration, warehouse facilities, shelter, and frequency of shipping for resupply. In this operation an experienced exchange officer' was attached to the forces several weeks in advance of departure and a selected cadre of enlisted men was attached to tiie force* These enlist ed men were given a course of instruction in exchange operations, book keeping, and accounting procedures, and accompanied the forces The Exchange Officer was sent by air transportation several days after the action had taken place in order that he might supervise the unloading of exchange property. The exchange merchandise arrived at Makin 15 Decem The exchange ber 1943 and was entirely unloaded by 24 December 1943. opened for business 5 January 1944. On 10 December 1943 three field exchanges accompanied by officers were dispatched to extend exchange services to troops of the Seventh Air Force. They were to proceed to Funafuti and there to receive instructions from the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, as to final destinations. These exchanges were trans ported aboard a Navy vessel. January these exchanges were located In at Funafuti and had not been unloaded. Instructions were sent for them finally arrived at to proceed to Nanomea, Tarawa, and Apamama. destinations in February and began operations. B. DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF EXCHANGE SUPPLIES.

1. Initial supply. Ihe initial supply dispatched was for sixty days and amounted to $140,300.00 worth of march and ise, consisting of the items listed in ANNEX No. 8 The quantities were based on consump tion experience with previous task forces.

? Resupply. Resupply is based partly on requisition and partly on automatic supply. Bulky items are being automatically supplied direct from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. Critical items are being supplied from the Exchange Depot at Honolulu.
C. PROCUREMENT, ASSEMBLY, AND LOADING OF EXCHANGE SUPPLIES. All initial supplies were furnis Rom the Exchange Depot in Honolulu. The responsibility for assembly and loading of supplies was delegated to the Task Force Exchange Officer who was furnished the necessary labor and transportation to accomplish the mission. D. ARRANGEMENT OF FACILITIES AT CAPTURED BASES FOR THE POST EXCHANGE. 1- Make-shift exchange arrangements. A native style building was erected with native labor The building consists of a framework of woven palm leaves supported on native logs and has a thatched roof. 2.
Warehousing.

The merchandise

was for the most part stored

55

under canvas but a small Jap-made hut was also used. Suitable ware houses were ordered to be constructed as soon as possible since perishable merchandise suffered bacause of lack of proper protection. E. LESSONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTON TAKEN. Experience gained from these operations indicates that the initial supply of exchange items arrived at destinations "too much too soon," Lack of facilities necessitated open storage which resulted in considerable pilferage al though guards were furnished. To correct this condition, future ini tial supplies will consist of absolute necessities. After troops are somewhat settled and proper facilities provided complete exchanges will be forwarded at "the request of local commanding officers.

LEARNED

56

mints

OFFICER

UMGUSSiFIE!

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XIII

-
FINANCE OFFICER.

A. PRINCIPAL TOPICS. 1. Problem of pay in general. The 7th Garrison Force, which accompanied the taste force, and which remained at Makin Island, was composed of units which did not have any authorized Finance Depart ment personnel. Makin Island is approximately 2,000 miles from Head quarters, USAFICFA, and is approximately 1,000 miles from Canton Island, on which is established a small accountable disbursing office. tfo other disbursing office being any nearer, and realising the prob able lack of air transportation, it was decided that an accountable disbursing office should be activated and accompany the garrison force. 2. Personnel requirements. Determination of the number of per sonnel required to erriciently man "ttie proposed installetion was based on availability of personnel and the size of the force to be serviced. Local demands on finance personnel made it necessary to send a reduced force although it was realized that additional personnel would be re quired later, especially after the Finance Office began to furnish finance service for other Gilbert Island defense battalions. As thus reduced, the following personnel were furnished: 1 Captain, 1 Techni cal Sergeant, 2 Technicians Fourth Grade, and 2 Technicians Fifth Grade. This force is too small for continued operations. 3 Source of personnel (grades, individuals, etc.,). There was no reserve of Finance Department personnel in the Central Pacific Area. Therefore, it was necessary to withdraw from existing installations the necessary grades and individuals, and require existing installations to operate at reduced strength until additional grades and individuals could be secured. Specially selected officers and enlisted personnel were taken. 4. Fund requirements. In determining the amount of funds required for the payment of the garrison force, computation was made on the basis of the known strength, and funds to cover the normal requirements for a 3 month period accompanied the Finance Officer* This was deemed necessary in the absence of any information as to when facilities would be available for future fund shipment s. 5. Emergency obligation of funds. The Commanding Officer of the garrison force was authorized by this headquarters to obligate such fund a as he deemed necessary in "the accomplishment of his mission and sufficient credit was set up in this headquarters to cover such emer gency obligations until conditions were stablilized. 6. Disposition of cash surpluses exchange and postal. The Finance Officer was ins true o accep cash from the Exchange and Postal Officers and, in exchange therefor, issue his check. This pro cedure accomplished a dual purpose:

57

a. It provided the Exchange and Postal Officers a convenient medium for the transmission of their daily receipts to their home offices. b. It augmented the cash available to the Finance Officer for disbursing purposes to such an extent that future transfers of cash to him were greatly decreased.
Type of currency to be used. The restrictions placed on the use of.American currency in Territory of Hawaii, and the restric tions on removal of Hawaiian currency from the Territory, made it imperative that definite provisions be made to cover this and all subsequent operations within the Central Pacific Area. Upon the insistence of this office that a decision be rendered, "the Foreign Funds Control Agency in Honolulu made a radio telephone report to the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury which issued verbal instruc tions to use Hawaiian currency on islands involved in this operation. Biese instructions were confirmed 2 days later by radio from the Joint Staff in Washington to use Hawaiian currency in all islands in the Central Pacific Area,
7,

The establishment B. LESSONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEM and operation of the Finance Office in the Gilbert Island group has proceeded according to plan and no serious problems have been encount ered. Given the approximate strength and location o future forces of this nature, no difficulty in furnishing satisfactory finance service is anticipated.

LEARNED

58

SECTION XIV

-
INSPECTOR

GENERAL.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS. Administrative inspections of the head quarters, service, and ground defense units of the 7th Garrison Force in volved in the Galvanic operation were made by this section prior to their departure from this staging area. 1. This inspection included the following records a. nel concerned. b. The use of the new type Morning Report Form was carefully explained and constructively criticized. c. The importance of the proper maintenance of the Daily Sick Report was impressed upon personnel maintaining same. Reports already in use were constructively criticized. d. Fund records of units having funds were inspected. Unit fund property which could not be carried with the unit was stored, sold, or turned over to post, camp, and station authorities in accordance witn War Department directives* Unit funds were converted to cash or the equivalent thereof. c. Property records were carefully inspected to insure that personnel were fully clothed and equipped, and that each unit had on all hand, in serviceable condition, all items of equipment called for in Special Tables of Equipment. f. Messes, Mess Records, Duty Roster^ Punishment Records, Qualification Cards (Forms 20 and 66-1), and files of Correspondence, Army Regulations, War Department Circulars, and Central Pacific Area directives were inspected to insure -that all regulations were being com plied with and that all records were complete. 2. Inspections of units under the jurisdiction of Inspectors Gen eral of the Hawaiian- Antiaircraft Artillery Command, -the Army Port and Service Command, and the Seventh Air Force were coordinated by this section. Units of the Hawaiian Seacoast Artillery Command were inspect ed by this section. a. Their inspections were similar in nature and coverage that outlined in paragraph A-l above. to Particular emphasis was placed on the status of immuniza pay, and completeness of the service records of person

tion, insurance,

3. Reports of minor irregularities and deficiencies, which could not be corrected prior to the completion of the inspections, were fur nished the commanding officers concerned for corrective action.

59

4. Assistance was offered and furnished in solving administrative problems arising in the organization of this new type of unit, e.g., or ganization of personnel sections, safeguarding and handling of classi field documents, conservation of subsistence and supplies.

60

UK

SECTION XV

- JUDGE ADVOCATE.

A. ADMIN S TRATlON OF CLAIIiS Inasmuch as the Galvanic operation con I templated the occupation of British territory held by the Japanese, certain arrangements became necessary to effect the settlement of claims of inhabitants arising as the result of the operation.

G-4 that task force commanders prior to departure appoint a qualified

officer, preferably one with legal or investigative experience, as Task Force Claims Officer under the provisions of AR 25-20 and Par. 2, Cir. 72 HHD, 31 May 1943, such officer to be responsible for "the prompt and complete investigation of all accidents or incidents in the nature of potential claims. It was recommended, that Claims Officers of organi zations constituting an integral part of the task force continue to function for their units under the Task Force Claims Officer and that
all Claims Officers prior to departure confer with the Claims Section
this office for instructions and advice. These recommendations were
carried into effect by the following action: Paragraph 16, Letter of
the Commanding General this headquarters, 8 November 1943 to the Com
manding Officer, 7th Garrison Force, subject "Letter of Instructions'*
provided as follows:

investigation of all accidents or incidents in the nature of potential

claims this office on 23 October 1943 recommended in a memorandum to

1-

Appointment of Task Force Claims Officers.

To insure prompt

"16. CLAIMS. Provision will be made by you to insure the prompt and complete investigation of all accidents or incidents in the nature of potential claims arising in occupied territory. A qualified officer will be appointed as Force Claims Officer, by this headquarters prior to your departure. He will operate under the provisions of AR 25-20 and paragraph 2, Circular No. 72, HHD, 31 May 1943.
The Force Claims Officer will be responsible for the prompt and complete investigation of all accidents or inci dents as described above and will forward all evidence pertain ing thereto to this headquarters. b. Prior to departure the Force Claims Officer will confer with the Claims Section, Judge Advocate Office, this head quarters, for advice and assistance. c. Claims officers of organizations constituting an integral part of the task force will continue to function for their units under the Force Claims Officer, to whom their report of investigation will be delivered upon completion.." On 12 November 1943, Ist Lt. Frank J. Steinberger, 0379483, Infantry was appointed in Special Orders No. 9, 7th Army Garrison Force Claims Officer; he reported to the Claims Section of this office for

61

instructions and advice and was furnished with pertinent Army Regula tions , text material and forms. 2* Procedure for the settlement of claims* As ihe letter of the Adjutant Genera territory occupied by September Army Forces of the United States" provided that higher authority would determine whether or not claims would be processed as a part of the costs of occupation or by a Foreign Claims Commission and there being no expressed statement of the War Department as to the processing of foreign claims in the Gilberts (British) this office sponsored radio No. W 8953-13, 12 January 1944, to War Department* The answer radio No* 9863, 29 January 1944 advised that claims arising in the Gilbert Islands should be processed under AH 25-90, which regulation provides that Army claims may be referred to a Navy Claims Commission. After conferences with representatives of the Navy, it was determined to refer any claims arising under AR 25-90 to a Navy Claims Commission, if available, otherwise such claims were to be processed by Foreign Claims Commission, 29, this headquarters, which commission was appoint ed by the War Department at the request of this headquarters on 27 Jan uary 1944, two of the members also being designated as one mac foreign claims commissions. On 7 February 1944 the Commanding General, Seventh Air Foroe. APO 240 and the Commanding Officer, 7th Army Garrison Force, APO 459, were so advised. B* RENDITION OF LEGAL ADVICE* The legal advice rendered by this office to the units concerned in the Galvanic operation largely involved pro cedural matters in the fields of foreign claims, civil affairs and courts -martial jurisdiction* The joint operation of all services gave rise to certain jurisdiotional conflicts all of which were resolved by numerous conferences with Army and Navy representatives. C. ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE.

1* The nature of the operation and units involved dictated "the propriety of general instructions regarding the exercise of general courts -martial jurisdiction* Under date of 13 October 1943, COMGEN CENTPAC addressed to the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force the following instructions:
nl* In the forthcoming military operations charged to your undertaking in the areas of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, it is desired that the exercise of general courts -martial juris diction with which you are empowered, pursuant to the eighth article of war, be inclusive of all individuals and units con currently operating therewith but not otherwise forming a part of or attached to any organic commands exercising like power to appoint general courts -martial*

2* For the purposes of military discipline such indivi duals and units will be considered attached to your command*

62

3. jji the interest of expediency and efficient adminis tration of military justice, individual cases requiring the action of courts -martial may be disposed of by interchange of jurisdiction upon mutual consent of appropriate commarding * officers concerned. 11

All units concerned were advised accordingly.

The Commanding Officer, 7th Garrison Force was instructed as to the foregoing and of "the dis ciplinary power he was expected to exercise under AW 9 and 10.

63

"

UIGLXSSIFIEI USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION X7I

ORDNANCE OFFICER.

A. PERSONNEL, The 727th Ordnance 1. Division Ordnance Company reinforced. Company (LMJ was augmented by the attachment of 56 additional trained enlisted men, and 65 enlisted men of the orignal company were perman ently transferred out of the company and replaced by more suitable men. To further strengthen the company 1 officer and IE enlisted anti-air craft mechanics from the garrison force, 2.officers and 26 enlisted tank maintenance men from the task force tank group, and a bomb dis posal squad of 1 officer and 6 enlisted men were attached for the oper ation. These additions were made to meet anticipated requirements be yond the capabilities of a Division Light Maintenance Company in oper ations of this type* Schools and special refresher courses were con ducted prior to the operation to assure that ordnance personnel would be familiar with the latest developments and be capable of meeting all operational requirements. Since this operation made necessary the use of minimum personnel and shipping facilities, the neces maximum sity for each individual and his capability was carefully analyzed. 2. Garrison force Ordnance Detachment formed. The Ordnance Detachmen Garrison Force, consisting of 3 officers and 34 enlisted men, was formed at Fort Hase 1 month before sailing date. Personnel were drawn from existing ordnance units and were well trained The issuing of ordnance supplies and neces as individual specialists* sary preparations for departure left little time f or training as a unit. With but few exceptions however, personnel proved to be capable and Recently ithas been necessary to strengthen the origi conscientious* nal Ordnance Detachment by the addition of 1 officer and 29 enlisted men. This was done because "the detachment was charged with the maintenance of more vehicles than originally anticipated, and the continual exposure of motor equipment to salt water and dust resulted in increased maintenance requirements per vehicle. The supply section was increased to insure sufficient personnel to handle the supply of cleaning and preserving materials and parts for all Air Force ground equipment. The present ordnance section of 4 officers and 63 enlisted men is believed to be capable of providing ordnance maintenance and supplies for any further increases which might normally be expected at this base. B.

ARMORED VEHICLES, ARMAMENT, AND GENERAL SUPPLY.

1. Problems encountered.

LVTs for this operation were received from the mainland

without armament since this is normally issued to the Amphibious Tank or Tractor Battalion. In addition they were equipped with only 1M35 machine guri mount. This necessitated much additional work in determ
ining requirements

which apparently had not previously been established.

65

Since no amphibious tractor battalion was present to operate this equipment it was necessary to issue machine-guns from maintenance and other stocks* Shortage of gun mounts was met by removing mounts from available half-track equipment, and by employing cradles from ring mounts from trucks. Each LVT was equipped in this manner with 1 caliber .50 MG and 2 caliber .30 MGs instead of the authorised 1 caliber #50 MG and 3 caliber ,30 MGs. However, this armament was satisfactory to the using organizations. b. Determination of requirements for special equipment did not become firm until too late to obtain it from the mainland. Many difficulties were encountered in the supply of requirements resuit of the short notice given. Prior planning must be thorough to the point of including all items, accessories and appurtenances in order that they may be obtained from the mainland and be available when called for* One example of failure to do this was a last-minute requirement for deep-water fording equipment for tanks. Fortunately this equipment could be manufactured locally, and the requirement was met*
c* Equipment in the hands of troops was given a careful in spection* That which was serviceable for use in garrison or training but was of questionable combat serviceability was replaced in so far as existing stocks permitted* That which needed replacement, but which could not be replaced due to shortage of stock ms thoroughly overhauled to insure its combat serviceability. This taxed existing shop facilities to their utmost due to limited time available.

2*

Determination of requirements*

Requirements for major items of ordnance were calculated by the units involved in cooperation with CPA General and Special Staff sections* Ordnance officers of tactical units maintained close liaison with the Ordnance Office for technical advice, for necessary improvi sation of nonavailable equipment, for adapting materiel for special re quirements and conditions, and for determining modification of levels of maintenance supplies for all equipment under the anticipated condi tions to be met.

b* A 30 day supply of cleaning and preserving materials, based on theater consumption experience, was issued to the assault forces* This supply was augmented by approximately 20-50^ for some materials in anticipation of increased demand occasioned by amphibious landings and extreme climatic conditions. The quantity of this typo of supplies proved adequate, from all reports, to maintain the assault forces until resupply was effected. Upon relief of assault forces by the garrison force all remaining cleaning and preserving materials, except that quantity required for maintenance of assault force equip ment during the return voyage, were turned over to "the garrison force.
c*

Maintenance

requirements

for both assault

and garrison

66

forces were determined by estimates of consumption based on experi ence and tempered by cargo space and maintenance facilities available, and not by SNL addenda. This wws elective, 30-days maintenance" was adequate in all cases. Uie "selection" process resorted to reduced quantities of 3d and higher echelon parts due to time, space, and facility factors and because of the specific nature of this operation. Unit replacement rather than repair was stressed. Materiel ordinarily evacuated to 3d and 4th echelon shops was of necessity returned to this base for rehabilitation* Tank maintenance presented the greatest pro blem because of salt water corrosion. Although all ordnance materiel employed on the Galvanic operation was subjected to thorough anti-cor rosion treatment before being shipped, all tanks committed to the oper ation required complete overhaul upon their return, and in most instan ces tank engines required replacement. C. VEHICLES. AND AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY.
!

Inspection for serviceability. The vehicles of the 27th Infan try Division (Galvanic operation) were inspected by the Ordnance Inspec tion Teams under supervision of G-4, and a full and comprehensive report of the condition of all vehicles inspected together with remarks and recommendations was forwarded to the division commander for his infor mation and desired action. Vehicles requiring more than minor repairs were replaced with new vehicles from existing stock. In additicn, all vehicles which accompanied the movement were completely lubricated and necessary minor repairs were completed.

2. Waterproofing In order to waterproof vehicles for this oper ation it was necessary to fabricate exhaust and intake stacks and to employ whatever waterproofing materials were available throusi issue and also through local purchase, as the approved kits for this type of
processing had not been received in this area. This work was perform
ed within the division* Experience revealed that makeshift waterproof
ing is not desirable, because the damage to vehicles on this movement
was considerable.
3.

Tires, tools, spare parts.

a. All tires showing effects of wear were replaced by new tires. Organizational tool and spare parts sets, and all vehicular tools , accessories, and spare parts kits were carefully inspected, all shortages were filled, and all unserviceable items replaced. b. A 30-day supply of maintenance spare parts, unit assemblies, and sub-assemblies for all vehicles accompanied the movement. The list of supplies so furnished was prepared by ordnance. 4. Coordination by liaison agent. A liaison agent of wide experi ence in all types of automotive supply and maintenance worlr ws ri.aTo> automotive suddlv and maintenance ypes work was desig nated to coordinate the allowance of supplies prescribed in applicable

67

desired by the assault and garrison forces, and the allowance judged necessary by the CPA Ordnance Office in the light of previous experience, and knowledge of conditions to be en countered. Subsequent reports have indicated that the supplies fur nished were adequate for the requirements developed. D. AMMUNITION SUPPLY. 1. Allowances Ammunition allowances were based on the origi nal CinCPOA plan which authorized five CPA units of fire for all ground weapons and ten units of fire for all antiaircraft weapons. Later a total of fifteen units of fire for all antiaircraft weapons was authorised. 2.
age

SKFL's, the allowance

break"3own

Allocation by type.

es, of types, requested

Ammuni'tioii Ammuni'tioii

Variations from prescribed CPA percent approved by the division and approved by G-4 CPA SOP Ga vanic

CPA* were as follows:

reap on capon
lmm Mortar:
Mortar:

Shell HE M43AI, Lt. Shell HE.MS6, Hvy. Shell Smoke W.P W.P
37mm Gun Tank and AT:

70# 20?2 lOfo

30^ 30^

7C$ 7C$
0%

Shell, HE, M63 Shot, AP, M5l Canister, M2

105 mm Howitzer H2AI:

10^ (AT) 50%

(TK)

Q5% (AT) 60# (TK) 5% (AT) 10JS (TK)

55%
25#
11%
60# 35#

Shell, HE, Ml, w/m4B Fuze Shell,, HE, Ml, w/fas4 Fuze tk Shell, HE AT, M67 Shell, Smoke, W.P., M6O
75mm Gun (tank)

22^ c of
10 Fuze

nt\J-rrf

C\<tf

% %

if &0% zo% V?o 10% 100# 0 %

\J/t>

Shell, HE, M4B Pro;}. APC, M6l

At 60mm Mortar

0% s/c w/Tracer Proj. APC, M6l S/C w/BDF, M66A144.3 % Shell, Smoke, IP, MXII,u/c 20 6 %
#

s/c w/i4B

35.1

Shell, HE, M49A2 tk Shell, Illuminating, MB3

97 3

% %

tt Type not available at time of staging operation. Substitute Standard Type,

68

Four hand grenades per man were furnished, ten percent of "which were the offensive type. 3. Quantity handled. The required ammunition was made available from CPA depots to the Ordnance Officer, 27th Infantry Division for re issue to the 165th Regimental Combat Team and the 7th Garrison Force. 3he 27th Infantry Division furnished men and trucks for movement of the ammunition to the Fort Kam staging area when box cars were not avail able. Because of lack of shipping space it was necessary for Ordnance to remove and return to depots five units of fire or approximately two hundred tons of 90mm ammunition from the staging area after the units had departed. Total weight handled in issuing and shipping the ammuni tion for this operation was 2400 (short) tons. Ihe equivalent shipping space was 2280 measurement tons. 4. Returned to stock. Approximately 80 tons of ammunition was re turned to ordnance depots after the operation was completed. This ammu nition required a one hundred percent inspection prior to repacking and placing in stock. Many containers were badly broken up. 5. Advice and information.
ations, Ammunition Division, CPA Ordnance

formation on technical matters E.

During ihe preliminary staging oper Office was available for in pertaining to ammunition and components.

LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Ordnance Detachment of 7th Garrison Force was too small to handle the volume of automotive maintenance work resulting from contin uous exposure of equipment to salt water and dust*. Strength of detach ment was increased by 1 officer and 29 enlisted men. 2. Prior planning did not include all items, accessories, and appurtenances; requirements on special items were not definitely set in sufficient time to allow procurement from mainland sources. Some items were manufactured locally, others improvised; recommend earlier establishment of firm requirements for future operations.
Requirements for equipment, once set, should be adhered to. troops should not be burdened with equipment in excess of that Assault required to insure accomplishment of the mission. The normal tendency "take it along because it might be needed" must be guarded against. to

3.

5. Assault forces are initially overburdened with maintenance supplies and cleaning and preserving materials, part of which are lost, jettisoned, ruined through lack of proper care, or left for garrison forces. Recommended that when the garrison force is to arrive within a week after landing of the assault forces the level of such supplies in terms of days of maintenance carried by assault forces be reduced to only organizational spare parts and equipment, supplemented as deem ed necessary, plus cleaning and preserving materials required until

69

relief by the garrison force is effected; the level carried by the garrison force to be raised to include the initial stockage of main tenance parts and equipment and cleaning and preserving material to supply the assault forces until their departure and on the return voyage

6, Neglect of material exposed to salt water during the combat phases was responsible for much subsequent corrosion and attendant increase in required maintenance and spare parts after return to the base. Prompt, efficient preventative maintenance by troops upon re turn from an operation is required.

7. Additional tank periscopes and spare periscope heads are re quired, enemy sniper action destroying many of these. Additional units have been requisitioned for future needs. 8. Makeshift waterproofing is not satisfactory, but had to be used in this operation. Proper waterproofing kits and trained per sonnel to apply and instruct in the use of this material have been secured.

70

VOST MARSHAL
Wt
w
*4w

MIUSSIEIED

-lit5

: ... ,

..\ #-.^.WlMbluylH

#^

dmr
4

4|

-^fj*^
ii^^feimt
,

* ?

.v

'

liJ

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XVII

-
PROVOST

MARSHAL.

*>

A. MOTOR COT7VOYS. 1 Military Police escorts accompanied all convoys. The Provost Marshal, 27th Infantry Division, prior to the movement of the task forces by motor convoy to the point of embarkation f conferred with the Provost Marshal, Central Pacific Area and a representative of the 810th Military Police Company, The Provost Marshal, 27th Infantry Division, provided information as to number of trucks in each convoy, time of departure for staging area and routes of travel. The Commanding Officer, 810th Military Police Company furnished military police motorcycle es corts for all convoys including those of the garrison forces.
Military Police traffic control men were placed at key inter sections along the route travelled by the convoys. Traffic men were stationed so as to facilitate movement of vehicular traffic through busy intersections and also to prevent civilian traffic, other than trucks hauling from the piers, from entering the area adjacent to titie piers.
2,

B. PRISONERS OF WAR. 1 The Navy receives and processes all prisoners of war* These prisoners of war are then transferred to the custody of the Army upon completion of interrogation by the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor and are held at the Honouliuli Internment Camp. The Provost Marshal furnishes the necessary guard and transporta tion for transfer of the prisoners*.
2, When transportation transferred to the mainland. examination for communicable fever and small pox. He is overcoat and other necessary

is available the prisoners of war are The prisoner of war is given a medical diseases and vaccinated against typhoid then outfitted by the Army with a wool clothing for the trip to the mainland.

71

QUARTERMASTER

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XVIII

-
QUARTERMASTER.

A. PLANNING PHASE. 1. Selection of personnel. The first consideration was to deter mine how many personnel were needed and what qualifications they should have. The needs had to be based upon many factors including; (1) size of the territory to be occupied by American forces; (2) possible utility facilities present in the territory, such as water supply for laundry operations; (3) climatic conditions which would affect the type of ware housing necessary for supplies and subsistance; and (4) strength of garrison force and other occupying forces for which quartermaster ser vies would have to be provided. Upon determining these factors and the number of quartermaster services which would be required such as storage and distribution of supplies, mobile laundry, field bakery, shoe repair, clothing repair and graves registration, steps were taken to select the personnel and prepare them for their task. A table of organization of the composite cellular type was devised for the Quartermaster Detachment of the 7th Garrison Force. This T/O called for 5 officers and 159 en listed men trained in thirty eight different types of jobs including bakers, shoe repairmen, laundrymen, warehousemen and clerks of various types. This detachment was selected from bakery, laundry, salvage re pair and truck companies and was capable of handling all special quarter master services except graves registration. Since there was no graves registration company in the CPA or any personnel under the jurisdiction of the CPA Quartermaster who were trained in this type of work, person nel were selected from the 27th Infantry Division to form a Graves Regis tration Detachment. 2.
Special equipment required.

Beginning a. Standard equipment in addition to TE allowances. in August and continuing through October 1943 special RRR requisitions were submitted to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation for the follow ing items :
3,000 Buckets,

15,000 Cans, water, 5 gal. 11,000 Canteens

'adio follow
ups

watering, canvas,

18 <qtfc.

10,672 Machetes

1,000 Ropes,

and covers were submitted on 20 Au

straps Saws, crosscut, 100

w/shoulder

2 man, 6 ft.
st 1943 for the following:

750 outfits, cooking, 20 man, gasoline

Pockets, magazine, double web, for carbine caliber 300 Slings, carrying, machine gun and ammunition.
These items were received on 31 September

#30 M-l.

1943 and issued at that time.

73

b. Equipment manufactured locally. Two thousand grenade carriers and three hundred immersion type hot water heaters were manufactured locally for issue to the assault and garrison forces, Hie Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot manufactured the grenade carriers, suitable for carrying four grenades, from salvaged canvas cots, tents, and tarpaulins. Ihe hot water heaters were constructed by the CPA Bagineer. c.
Equipment purchased locally.

(1) Upon request of the 27th Infantry Division 7000

half -ounce metal containers were purchased locally to provide individuals with means to carry salt 19,480 waterproof envelopes were also tablets. purchased locally for use in accordance with Stand ing Procedure for Overseas Movement.

(2) On 21 October 1943 the following items were pur chased locally for the commanding officer of the
garrison force to be used for bartering, payment of native labor, and sale to the natives

Item Item Tobacco

Amount Amount

Description Descrip ion

250 lbs. lbs.

Twist, 1-lb. strips.

strips. Ist choice, Beaconsfield 2d choice, Bnu.
Bnu.

Twist, Twist,

Combs Fish hooks

50 each each 250 each each

BW,8 W fancy, colored, half coarse, half fine.

Assortment of lj" to 2W2 W barbless, Hawaiian style hooks and a few barbed hooks.
Fairly heavy trolling line, 50 to 100 ft. hanks.

Fish lines Galvanized buckets Needles

Pipes

50 lbs. lbs. 100 each each

pkgs. 20 pkgs.

12 to 18 quart, with handles. Coarse eyes, size to use ONT 10 or 20 thread. Corn cobs and similar styles.
Sturdy, 1 or 2 blade, with a view toward utility rather than attrac attractiveness.

100 each each 100 each each

Pocket knives

74

Item
Sewing cotton Soap

Amount

Description

(1 oz spools)
1,200 lbs.
50 each 12 lbs.

7 doz

ONT 10 or 20; colors to match calico purchased.

Highly perfumed, colored bars.

"Tn Shirts
Twine, binder

All white, cotton, medium size.

l/4-lb rolls.
Fancy prints, red, yellow, blue, green, mixed.

Calico Perfume Mirrors B.

1,500 yds.
1 gro. 1 gro.

Small bottles, inexpensive.

Small, inexpensive.

TRAINING PHASE.

1. Garrison Forco Detachment, In order that officers and key en listed men would have knowledge of the problems to be faced by task force personnel, the Quartermaster Task Force School was established at the Quartermaster Depot, APO 950 The faculty of the school consisted of officers assigned to organizations and installations under command of the Quartermaster, Central Pacific Area. Students were likewise members of such organizations and installations and were detailed as students by letter order from the Office of the Quartermaster, Central Pacific Area. a. Organization of school. The first school was established on 27 August 1943 and was organized to include five courses of six afternoons each to run consecutively from 27 August 1943 through 2 Oc tober 1943, A total of 59 officers, from second lieutenants to majors, and 40 key enlisted men were thus given instruction in the basic tech nique and fundamental principles involved in the operation of quarter master services peculiar to task forces in the Central Pacific Area. The school is continuing at the present time in order that trained personnel will be readily available for future operations. b. Specialized field training. Besides the school, continuous training was sponsored by various quartermaster units in operations peculiar to those organizations. The bakery company commanders were responsible for the training of Iheir men in field bakeries, this being accomplished by actually setting up field bakery ovens and baking bread under conditions similar to those faced by task forces. Each company had some men who had gained valuable experience on the earlier task forces at Canton and Christmas Islands and these men were of utmost aid in the training programs. Laundry companies had in operation laundry continuously used for actual laundry operations on Oahu. vans which were

- 75
-

This practice kept the laundry personnel trained in ihe operation of the mobile units and provided training for inexperienced men. c. Unit training Upon completion of the specialized field training the Garrison Force Quartermaster checked the records of the officers and enlisted men assigned to him and was given an opportuni ty to obtain replacements if not satisfied with the personnel. The detachment was then assembled and developed into a workable unit while in the staging area. 2. Graves Registration Detachment. This detachment was given a two weeks course of instruction at the U S. Army Mortuary in Honolulu. This instruction consisted of a study of pertinent forms, standard plot plan for temporary Army cemeteries, manuals, regulations and circulars; fingerprinting of deceased military personnel; attending military fun erals; and close contact with mortuary matters during the entire period of training. Ihe 27th Infantry Division Graves Registration Officer, in cooperation with the CPA Graves Registration Officer, formulated the specific plans for further training of "the mm and the actual operation of the detachment. C. INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT IN HANDS OF TROOPS. An inspection team consisting of five quartermaster officers was organized to inspect quartermaster equipment in the hands of the 27th Infantry Division to determine its serviceability. Items such as helmet liners, mess gear, shelter halves, shoes, HBT suits X and barracks bags were found to be most in need of repair or replacement. About 80^ of the unserviceable equipment was repaired and the remainder replaced. D. SUPPLIES.

1. Class I. Both the assault force and the garrison force were issued 30 days of Typ B, 5 days Type C, 5 days Type X and 2 days Type D rations on 8 October 1943* The garrison force was furnished a re supplies on 27 November 1943 and supply of 45 days and 30 days Class I 4 December 1943 respectively. 2. Class 11. Both the assault force and the garrison force were issued 30 days of Class IIsupplies prior to the operation. "ViJhen time permitted these supplies were marked for shipment by quartermaster per sonnel at the warehouse area otherwise they were marked by the using troops at the palletizing area. The ground force and air force troops were furnished a resupply of 75 days and 45 days of Class IIsupplies respectively by 4 December 1943.

3. Class 111. Quartermaster activities regarding Class 111 sup plies for this operation were closely tied in with the Navy. Prior to 20 October 1943, -tiie Quartermaster had the responsibility of fur nishing these supplies to all Army troops- but on that date CinCPOA issued instructions that the Navy would furnish Class 111 supplies

76

(initial and resupply) for the operation.

This necessitated several conferences between Army and Navy representatives to establish a work ing procedure for obtaining the supplies prior to issuance of an SOP by the Navy, E. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKQJ

1. Garrison Force Quartermaster Detachment. The organization training of this detachment proved to be generally satisfactory. 2. Graves registration service.

and

a. Disposition of enemy dead is an enormous tesk requiring many troops and a considerable amount of planning. This problem is being given further study in preparation for future operations. b. Reports of death, reports of internment and medical re This will be coordinated by the ports leaving a division must agree. Division Adjutant Generals 1 Office in the future.
supplies. 3. Class I The f*KM ration was generally satisfactory but many of the men discarded the biscuits either because they had enough to eat without them or because they considered them unpalatable. The "C" ration was considered but it was believed that the 10 in 1 ration will become more popular for use during the consolida n tion phase when sanitary conditions preclude the use of type "B rations. supplies. 4. Class II The following items of equipment were found to be unsuitable or in need of improvement and recommendations have been submitted to War Department to that effect:

a. The outfit, cooking, 1 burner is highly satisfactory but could be improved by devising a burner cover which could be used as a container to heat food. b. The handle of the intrenching shovel is too long render ing it bulky and uncomfortable when carried. It also interfered with firing positions and is difficult to use when forced to prepare a fox hole while in the prone position. It should be shortened about three inches. c. Metal portions of web equipment do not remain serviceable under amphibious conditions since they deteriorate very rapidly when exposed to salt water or spray. d. The side pockets demned by all troops. on the herringbone twill suits were con

c. Troops invar '.ably place the sun glasses in their pockets when not in use thereby causing much breakage. A tough case of com position or plastic material should be provided.
77

l!

IIJIII:

SECTION XIX

SIGNAL OFFICER,

A. PLANNING. In planning the signal phase of this operation, it was necessary to consider the communication facilities "which would be re quired for an infantry division, augmented by certain specialized units,
in an amphibious operation. This required a close check of additional channels peculiar to amphibious operations and the necessary equipment to place the channels in operation* As a corollary to this consider ation, there arose the problem of assigning the additional necessary troops* The complete signal plan was based upon the assumption that the normal T/0 signal units of the task force, augmented by a JASCO, would provide sufficient communications personnel. It was anticipated that much additional equipment, particularly radio, would be required. The organizations of the assault and assigned thereto were studied, with a view towards ihe implementation of the operation with ihe neces sary signal personnel and materiel. Frequent conferences were held with the Signal Officers of the 27th Infantry Division, Seventh Air Force, FifthFhibCorps, FifthFhibForce, 7th Garrison Force, and signal repre sentatives on CinCPOA staff. For conveniaaoe of discussion, the require ments of the assault forces and the garrison forces are considered separ ately* However, it should not be assumed that in practice these two forces can be separated, as a complete integration had to be made of the garrison force and assault force communication plans.
garrison rorces

B. ORGANI2A TION IND EQUTOISN T

and the tactical missions

1.

Assault force communications.

A studjr was made of the equipment needs, including that over and above T/BA and T/E required by the assault forces of an amphib ious operation*

(1) Full

and T/E were furnished to all Army assault units. At times, it was necessary to "borrow" equip ment from other tactical units to equip the assault elements of the 27th Infantry Division. All such "borrowings* were of short duration and only pending delivery of equipment from the mainland. that the noraal T/BA or T/E of a division was inadequate to implement an amphibious operation. With the addition of the provisionalized JASCO detachment to the assault elements, the problem of additional equipment was increased. The following is a list of the major items of equipment over and above and t/E issued to the Army assault forces. Included are remarks indicating the units to which the equipment was assigned and the purpose for which intended. The Army was required to furnish additional equipment to bolk the Marines and Navy, and all such

T/BA

(2) It was determined

T/BA

79

equipment has been included in this list with proper remarks

No,

Equipment

Unit or Serv to which Asgd

Navyn
it

Purpose

1
3

Radio Sets SCR-188

Ship to Shore Communication.

14 10 18 45
2

" "

" "

SCR-509 SCR-510 TG 97

-)
)

Installed in
LVT's for con trol purposes.
Headquarters ships.

Teletypewriters

"
27th Div)

Radio Sets SCR-511

n
11

"

"
"

SCR-536 SCR-610

"

To supplement normal t/bA for w ) Regt and Bn nets.

Supplement Arty t/EA for fire control.

Div Arty

SCR-233

27th Div

Air Ground In.

(3) A complete AACS station, including a radio range

was provided and installed. now in operation. These facilities are

and.T/E

b. Not only was the problem of "supply over and above equipment" a severe one, but so was the matter of "over
operation.

signal personnel requirements for an amphibious study was made of this subject.

A complete

T/BA T/0M

(1) This was the first amphibious operation of any magni

tude for this command. The communications problems were still in the planning and imaginative stage. Signal personnel available for the strictly amphibious portion of the operation were the personnel of the 75th Signal Company Special. It was fully realized, however, that a Signal Company Special organized under T/o & E 11-517S would be entirely inadequate for the mission. A detachment of a Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) was provisionalized and assigned to the 27th Infantry Division. Five officers and 100 enlisted men of the 75th Signal Company Special form ed the nucleus for this JASCO. The T/0 & E 11-1475, which is the present War Department approved form of T/0 for a JASCO, is very close in its organization to

80

that provisionalized for Galvanic. the two T/O's follows: Section

Comparison

of

Prov JASCO T/0 & E 11-147S NAVY ARMY NAVY ARMY off wo m Off EM Off I/TO EM Off EM 2
i

.) Hq .Sect

69

1 85

b) Bn Shore
Party and Beach Party- 10
Sec

190

0 108

10

200

(10
9 13 45 39 9 0 9 13 90 78

teams) c) SFC Sec (9 Parties) d) Air Ln Sec Parties)

TOTAL

(13 Air Da

34 34

113

It is believed that the provisional t/0 shown above, though still not the final answer, is more nearly that desired by all assault elements in amphibious operations. Note particularly the doubling of the size of the shore fire control parties from five to ten men. It is impossible for five men to accomplish the work which devolves upon the SFC parties in a landing. Also rote the doubling of the size of the air liaison parties. Three men per party are pro vided in the JASCO 11-1475. These three men must operate three radio sets (SCR-193, SCR-542, SCR-284), drive a jeep in which some of this equipment is mounted, and generally maintain control and knowledge of the air support requirements of troops advancing in the most difficult of all operations an amphib ious landing. It has since been determined that a total of five mer is the minimum allowable for an AGL Team. A slight increase was made in the battalion shore party and beach party teams* This increase is essential.

(2) A great portion of the special equipment used in the

amphibious operation, such as radio sets SCR-299, 610, and 500-series, were entirely new to Marine and Navy personnel. It consequently devolved upon the

81

Signal Officer to provide instructors in the use of A crew of Army equipment for the other services. highly trained instructors complete with SCR four 299*5, 610 f s, and other Army equipment was assigned to the Marine staging area at Barbers Point for a period of one month for the purpose of instructing Marine and Naval personnel in the proper use and maintenance of Army signal equipment.

Two photographic

teams

were assigned

to -the assault

Complete coverage was made of the operation and the results have already been sent to the War Department. A total of 3,000 feet of color, 1,600 feet of black and white noving pictures, and 250

forces.

still pictures were taken. 2. Garrison force communications.

a. Pursuant to instructions given by the Commanding Gener al, CPA, the Signal Officer was ordered to design a complete T/0 & E for a signal detachment of an Army garrison force, which would garri son and defend the islands taken. This signal detachment was to be responsible for the installation, operation, and maintenance of the communication facilities required by the garrison force, to include all trunking and main telephone exchange facilities, point-to-point administrative radio circuits, and operation of a base signal center.

(1) The signal detachment

was organized substantially as follows: A headquarters section consisting of 1 captain as detachment commander and 4 enlisted men to handle the administrative work of the de tachment; a message center section of 2 officers and 9 enlisted message center chiefs, clerks, and cryptographers; a wire section of 1 officer and 11 enlisted wire chiefs, linemen, switchboard oper ators, and installers; a radio section of 1 officer and 16 radio operators, radio maintenance men, and powermen; a radar section of 2 radar repairmen. The total strength of this detachment was 5 officers and 42 enlisted men. However, this was later in creased by 4 radio operators upon directive of CinCPOA that Army would be responsible for guard ing the FOX JUMP broadcast. This signal detach ment is the basic one around which all future de tachments are designed. This basic T/0 (see 5) is increased or decreased, depending ANNEX No. upon the geography of the target and the mission assigned.
objective, a base communication plan was developed

(2) Prior to departure of the garrison force for its

82

and submitted to CinCPOA. It was planned that the signal detachment would provide the main trunking facilities for all of the major echelons of the defense battalion, for the air force units, and for the Navy and Marine establishments located at the base. It would also provide, install, and operate a point-to-point island base radio station. It would set up, operate, and maintain the signal center for the task force headquarters. This signal center was later converted to a Joint Communications Center per instructions in CinCPOA directive 0347, which lays down the policy with regard to all com munications and Joint Communications Centers at ad vanced bases. In general, the communications were installed as planned.

(3) The major items of equipment furnished to the signal

detachment 1 SCR-399 Radio Set.
1 -: Radio Transmitter BC-447 complete with associat
ed antenna, power, and mast equipment 6 Hammerlund Super-Pro Receivers 2 Central Office Telephone Sets TC-4 Typewriters MC-88 6 Teletypewriter Sets EE-97 4 150 mi. W-110 Wire 10 mi, CC-345 Rubber Covered Cable 1 TC3 Switchboard, and all of the necessary mis cellaneous tools and equipment required for any signal unit.

to accomplish its assigned mission were:

b. In addition to its function of being the sigial detachment for the Army garrison force, the signal detachment had the following temporary missions:

(1) Operation of the island base radio net station for

the assault force. wire communications radar. assault forces.

(2) Participation in the installation and maintenance

of a tanporary assault net.

(3) Installation of the seacoast

(4) Participation in the set up and operations of the

signal center for the combined

(5) Burial of the dead.

c. In conjunction with the signal officers and representatives

83

of HAC, HSAC, HAAC, the Surgeon CPA, and the Engineer CPA, T/Es were developed for ihe special T/O units designed for the garrison force. These special units included:

(1) (2) (3)

Seacoast

Battery.

AA Gun Battery
Searchlight

Platoon

(4) Engineer Company. (5) (6)

Task Force Headquarters. CA Battalion Headquarters.

Each of the above units was modified from its approved (See ANNEX No. 6.) status.

T/O

&E

d. In the formation of the signal detachment, it was neces sary to draw the personnel from the combat and service units under the control of the Signal Officer, CPA. Although -the War Department had approved the t/0 of the signal detachment and had indicated that it would furnish the necesrsary personnel, they were not due to arrive in the theatre until December 1943. Personnel actually were required in September 1943. Special and intensive signal and amphibious train ing was given to the signal detachment personnel in order to weld them into a highly trained, cohesive, specialized unit. The personnel for this detachment, as is noted, came from all of the various units under command of the Signal Officer, CPA, and, as such, required training other than that normally given to a T/O unit. The entire detachment was .sent out into the field with its basic equipment for a period of one week and subsisted entirely on its own resources, with the excep tion of provision of rations, for that time. It was assigned to ihe amphibious training center for another week, where it underwent am phibious training such as landing boat exercises, cargo net climbing, loading of equipment from ships to boats, visual signaling, and other specialized amphibious training. It engaged in extensive CPX*s. Addi tional code practice and instruction were given to all radio personnel. Officers and men assigned to the message center were given brush-up courses in all cryptographic systems employed by the Army. It is be lieved that this signal detachment was well qualified to perform its mission prior to its departure. c. Of great importance, was the planning of the embarkation and debarkation of all signal personnel. These two matters were de veloped in conjunction with Navy, Marine, and garrison force commanders. Though not actually responsible for such plans, the Signal Officer, CPA, was actively interested in and coordinated the efforts of the assault and garrison signal personnel.

84

f The assignment and correlation of call signs and frequen cies for use in the assault and consolidation phases were accomplished in conjunction -with CinCPOA. The basic communications plan, as devised for this operation by CinCPOA, FifthFhibCorps , and the 27th InfantryDivision, has been developed into a standard plan for use in all simi lar operations. Its title is "Central Pacific Area Communication Plan and Doctrine" (short title, "CENTCOMONE"). C. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

. 1. Sufficient time must be available prior to the operation to permit intensive training of all troops in their specialized missions and, further, to permit the section and team training necessary. Sig nal detachments for future garrison fortes will be assembled as soon as required personnel are available.
2. Sufficient supplies of all types of equipment must be includ ed to permit changes in the communications plans as dictated by cir cumstances. Every effort will be made to furnish sufficient equipment to future task forces to provide this flexibility. 3. The Joint Assault Signal Company T/0 required further study and experimentation in order to successfully meet the requirements of an amphibious operation. This study is being continued. 4. Army, Navy, and Marine signal personnel who will work together in an operation must be staged and trained together prior to the oper ation. Staging. and training areas have been established to accomplish this.

85

SPECIAL SERVI OFFICER

IKCLISSIFIEI
i i

ilJif

SECTION XX A.

- SPECIAL

SERVICE OFFICER.

TASK FORCE.

1* The library furnished 17 bags of assorted magazines and pocket books, approximately 200 magazines and 200 pocket books to each bag.
2. The second quarter allotment of athletic equipment on a basis
of 25^ per man per quarter was issued on 4 October 1943 and the third
quarter allotment, on the same basis, was issued on 16 December 1943.
Hie task force was not allowed a quota of athletic equipment to be
taken, but articles such as bats and baseballs were stowed by men in
barracks bags. 25 Coca-Cola game sets for use on board ships were
supplied and one all-wave radio for use at destination was furnished.
3. Film service was furnished from regular circuiting schedules
of the Overseas Motion Picture Service.
4. 4
a. Live show entertainment sisted of the following shows:

furnished prior to departure con

(1) (2)

Jamboree. On the Air.

(3) Traveling Troubadors (2 shows). (4)

The Pipers (Dance Orchestra).

b. Since return of ihe task force provision has been made for live show*, films and free admittance to professional football games. B. CxARRISON FORCE,

1. Overseas Motion Picture Service furnished films for 12 show ings before departure. 10 films, one 16mm Victor Projector Kit, com plete with spare parts and one generator, lj hp, were furnished the 7th Garrison Force Special Service Officer. The garrison force is now being serviced from the film library maintained at Tarawa. 2.
Library material was furnished upon departure Magazines

2) Council Books

---------

as follows:

2440, assorted. 7200, assorted 1000, assorted

titles. titles.

3) Pocket Edition Books 4) Portable Libraries

5, (20 books each).

87

b. Presently furnished monthly:

(1) Council Books (2) Mftgasines

(3) Pocket Edition Books

-------- - .- - . -

2400, assorted 560, assorted* 1000, assorted

titles.

titles.

c* 1200 bound books including technical, fiction and non fiction have been forwarded since departure.

3* Live show entertainment furnished before departure consisted of the shows "Requisitions of 1943* and the G. I* Buckaroos. No live shows have been sent to the garrison force base to date.
4. the Army newspaper, Midpacifican, forwards fifty (50) free copies each issue, (semi-monthly).

5.
parture

the following additional supplies were furnished upon de

97 Hit Kits One box (50) records, blanks, reproducing 20 each records, phonographs 14 each, Kits, Recreation, type nnn Bn 4 each. Kits, Recreation, type *A* 38 each, cases, cigarettes 12 each, Kits, fishing 5 all-wave radios*

b. Since departure 23 Hit Kits, 2217 song books with words, and 60 song books without words have been forwarded* C* LESSONS LEAR*ED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKBJ.

1. Supplies and equipment furnished were found to be sufficent For future except for radios, motion picture films, and magazines* operations it is planned to increase the supplies and equipment fur nished as follows;

25$ more radios.

b. c.

50$ 100$

more phonographs* more phonograph records including new V-diso sets.

d. 25% more 16mm film* Steps will also be taken to expedite

initial replacements*

Arrangements

will be made to expedite shipments of current

88

magazines

and

newspapers*

2* The Athletic and Recreation Kits type "A" were found to con tain a number of articles of athletic equipment that were unusable due to the terrain at the advanced bases* Athletic equipment will be issued in bulk for future operations and will include only those articles which could be used at the destination* 3* Supplies and equipment must be waterproofed to prevent damage during landing and prior to the time that suitable shelter is available* They should also be packed to prevent pilfering during the period immed iately after landing* Steps are being taken to pack everything in water proofed paper and to seal all supplies and equipment with metal bands in preparation for future operations. Red Cross supplies will be shipped with special service supplies and will be packed to conform to CPA Speoial Service packing and crating standards*

89

IIJllI:

SECTION XXI

-
SURGEON,

A. GENERAL* The following paragraphs set forth the activities of the Surgeon CPA, in the preparation for and during the Galvanic operation* Since this was our first amphibious operation into Jap held territory and without precedent as to type of target, >. efforts were directed to prepare against any eventuality*

B. MEDICAL SERVICE

COMBAT TROOPS,

1, Reinforcements furnished* Based on a plan of using the 27th Infantry Division, reinforced, as the combat unit, division medical unit was reinforced by attaching 1 provisional clearing company (T/0 & E 8-18, 15 July 1943) and 2 provisional portable surgical hospitals (T/0 & E 8-572-S, 4 June 1943 ) Personnel for the provisional clearing company were furnished by 27th Infantry Division* The organic unit medical detachments were not changed*

2.

Reinforcements

ploying only 1 reinforced regimental combat team, only "the provisional clearing company (capacity increased to a 400 bed field hospital, stan dard) and 1 provisional portable surgical hospital were used.
C. MEDICAL SERVICE

used*

Due to the changed plan of operation em

- GARRISON FORCES.

1. Attached medical* A medical detachment consisting of 6 offi cers and zt> enlisted men was attached to the garrison foroe to furnish medical care for the separate batteries and service detachments having no organic attached medical personnel* A task force surgeon in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel was assigned to the Garrison Force Head quarters *
2. Hospital* Due to uncertainty regarding arrival fran the main land of a station hospital unit for this task force, itwas necessary to organize a provisional field hospital for this garrison on the basis of T/0 8-510 dated 8 April 1943 <> Accordingly, pursuant to GO 131 9 HCPA. 1943, the Ist Provisional Field Hospital was organised on 1 September 1943 from personnel in the hospital ization forces present in the area at that time* Additional enlisted personnel, Medical Department, were used in lieu of nurses. The headquarters and 2 hospitalization sections of this unit were considered adequate to support the garrison* The first hospitalization section was therefore detached for use elsewhere* 300 hospital beds were provided by this unit when established on Makin Is land* D. MEDICAL SUPPLY AND EQUIFMENT. 1* Initial Equipment of Units. Individual and organizational
equipment of the organic

- 91 -

attached medical detachments the assault frames forces and the

was unmodified, except that improvised ton i trucks were provided with litter

pack carriers were provided for some of the attached medical with

b. Additional equipment was furnished the provisional clear ing company as follows:

(1) Extra instruments* (2) Cots and blankets* (3) Electric portable suction apparatus. (4) 1 eight cubic foot kerosene
based on a
operated refrigerator*

(5) Organic supplies necessary for 10 days operation

20#

casualty rate for attacking forces*

The provisional portable surgical hospital was furnished

equipment on the basis of a 25 bed portable hospital equipped to have 2 surgical teams functioning*
d. At the time the Ist Provisional Field Hospital was being equipped, the November 1943 Equipment List for Medical Department Item 97227 (Field Hospital. 400 bed) was not available* mien this list was received later, itwas found that the provisional unit was equipped as contemplated by the Equipment List, except that supplemental instru ment sets and X-ray equipment were not duplicated in the two hospital ii aation sections* Facilities for Ist Provisional Field Hospital were provided as shown below: HOUSING FOR 200 BED HOSPITAL

tTent
Building
Surgery Laboratory* Pharmacy Dental, EENT, X-Ray Wards

tTent
8

Si te
x 48 x 48 x4B x 60 x4B 16 x 50
20 20 20 16 20 48 48 16 16 50

Cappaoity aci aci

Quonset
Huts 1 1 2

Frame

(Ward)

Frames

Pyramidal

Kitchen, Storehouse Mess Receiving, OP Clinic 20 x Clothing Rm. 20 x Administration 16 x Enlisted Quarters 16 x Officers Quarters Storage 16 x Totals Totals

16
1

IS
2 1 1

6 2-4 2 17
92

22 6 28

(*) Wherever tent frames are designated, portable hutments are more desirable, especially where building is to be used for storage*

Latrines, refrigeration, electricity, showers, and laundry to be provided in accordance with base development plan*
2. Medical maintenance

assault forces.

a. ttie administrative order directed provision of 30 days of medical maintenance, which was packed in 2 sections t

(1) 10 days of supply to be carried with each battalion combat team, consisting only of "essential* items. Each lot was packed so as to be loaded on one pallet
and to be carried on each APA.

(2) 20 days of supply to be carried for the regimental

combat team containing a larger variety of items than were included in the BCT maintenance* All un necessary items were deleted from the June Medical Maintenance Packing List utilised as a basis for Class 4 and 5 items were deleted en computations. tirely. These 20-day supplies were to be oarried on AKA's.

b For ease in handling, all medical supplies were packed in special packing boxes of 5 cubic feet capacity with rope handles on each end, and so packed that the weight of no box would exceed 100 pounds
c. For use by individuals, a 3 day supply of Hala zone tablets and a 30 day supply of salt tablets were issued to each officer and en listed man* The Quartermaster Corps furnished the necessary salt tab lets* 3* Medical maintenance
accompany

garrison

force*

30 days of medical maintenance supplies were packed to the movement* Automatic shipments of medical maintenance supplies were made later in suoh a manner as to theoretically allow the force to have on hand, at the end of 90 days of operation, supplies sufficient for another 90 days* operations* After this period, no fur ther automatic shipments were to be made* The garrison force commander was instructed to submit requisitions for sufficient supplies to main tain the 90-day level of supply set by CinCPOA as the authorised level for this base. The first requisition was to be submitted not later than D plus 60 to allow for requisitioning and receiving time, and to main tain the 60-day minimal and 30-day operational level, maximum level of 90 days* b. The general overall plan had been decided for supply of

93

the garrison foroe prior to its departure in accordance with instruc The Force Surgeon had been informed of exactly what he was carrying with him and what he should expect to receive in future automatic shipments , so that he was highly conversant with the supply situation from the beginning of the operation.

tions from CinCPOA.

E.

SANITATION AND .RELATED MATTERS.

1* Medical intelligence had been gathered and charted by the Office, CPA, relative to the Gilbert Area. The available in formation revealed the following pertinent factors which might influ ence health and sanitation of troops entering this area:
Surgeon's

Diseases

present.

(1) The enteric diseases (typhoid, paratyphoid, amoebic and bacillary dysentery) and the common diarrheas are endemic (2) Yaws is widespread in the Gilbert Area and has be come much more so in the past 2 years due to lack of treatment facilities.
(3) Venereal disease
is prevalent*

(4) Epidemic typhus does not exist.

Endemic typhus may exist but has not been verified. Troops entering the area, however, are supplied with n flea n powder and instructed in the measures to be taken against lice, fleas, ticks, and mites.
anopheles

(5) Malaria is not known to occur in this area and the

has not been found.

(6) Plague is not found in the Gilbert Area, neverthe

less, troops are instructed in rat control.
aegypti, is widespread.

(7) Yellow fever is not reported but its vector, aedes (8) Ankylostomiasis is prevalent and troops are instruct ed in the necessary precautionary measures.
b. Water supplies are limited, are all considered unsafe, and not used for cooking or drinking* Improvised water test sets were carried.

All troops are instructed in regard to poisonous plants*

2.

Medical intelligence data was disseminated

to the troops

94

concerned and interchanged between the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. (A survey was made immediately following the occupation of the Gilbert Islands which substantiated the data listed in paragraph E 1 above.) 3. Conferences were held with the camaanding officers and surgeons The of the assault and garrison forces concerning field sanitation. subjects thought to be of importance were compiled into a check list per mitting an easy check for the unit surgeon. The points covered were re sponsibilities for sanitation, water supplies, disposal of waste, insect and rodent control, mess sanitation, and personal hygiene. 4. Since bacillary dysentery was expected to be a problem on atolls, a circular was prepared on that subject by the Surgeon, CPA, and distri buted widely within all commands concerned (see ANNEX No. 9). Early in the assault phases unforseen difficulties arose which required prompt attention. Promiscuous defecation by troops during "the early assault stages, plus the already existent unsanitary condition of the island, re sulted in extensive fly breeding and a dysentery out-break. The careless disposal of partially consumed rations contributed to the fly breeding. 2 laboratory teams, each consisting of 1 officer and 4 technicians, each fully equipped, were sent by air transport to Makin to augment the labo ratory facilities of the Ist Provisional Field Hospital in the control of this out-break. A complete report submitted by the officer in charge of these teams is included in ANNEX No. 9. 5. Burial of the dead becane a serious problan because of the dif ficulties connected with it in this terrain and the early decomposition of bodies. The seriousness of this problem was increased inasmuch as the troops had to live in the same area which several hours before was battle field. 6. Dengue became after the occupation. for 48 to 72 hours and Hawaiian Area from the spread of this disease. F. EVACUATION.
epidemic among the troops in the Gilbert Area soon Although of a mild form, many were incapacitated control was difficult. Troops returning to the Gilberts were closely observed to prevent the local

Casualties were evacuated for treatment to the transports off shore. The casualties were then evacuated by these transports to the fixed hos pitals on. Oahu for further care and treatment. One Air Evacuation Squad ron was available for employment during this operation. As soon as con ditions permitted, casualties were picked up by seaplane and returned to an intermediate base where they were transferred to planes of the Air Evacuation Squadron for return to fixed hospitals on Oahu. After the installation of air strips in the Gilbert Area, air evacuation by land based planes was accomplished.
G. STATISTICAL STUDY. For a complete analysis see ANNEX No. 10. of the statistical data

95

H. LESSONS LEARNED AM) CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. This operation was not considered a fair test or the medical support in -that neither the resistance nor the large number of casualties which were anticipated were experienced. However the following conclusions were made and in dicated corrective action taken. 1. The organic clearing company of an infantry division is ade quate to support a regimental combat team, reinforced, in this type of amphibious operation. In addition to the organic clearing company, two field hospitals are considered adequate support for a reinforced division in an amphibious operation. 2. The equipment for the assault force was adequate but not as adaptable as it could have been had greater consideration been given to ease of handling and mobility of individual items. Organic equip ment is being studied to eliminate unnecessary items and make the equipment more portable. 3. Medical detachment and collecting company equipment should be pack-carried and should consist only of the items absolutely essential to the treating of shock and hemorrhage and the application of sterile dressings* This will be done in future operations. 4. The 3/4 ton ambulance is not suitable for amphibious oper ations. It will be replaced by 1/4 ton litter carriers in future operations. 5. All packing cases carried by assault forces must be water proofed. Steps have been taken to accomplish this. 6. An individual kit such as Medical Department Item #97109 (Kit, Jungle, Medical, Individual, M-2) should be issued to all mdi viduals. Requisitions have been submitted in an attempt * this item for future operations. to procure

7. Bodies must be treated prior to burial to prevent fly breed para ing. A sodium arsenite spray will be used for this purpose, dichlorbenzene will be used in pit latrines to further control fly breeding. 8. Effective mosquito control must be instituted early on these atolls where heavy mosquito infestation is found. Two sanitary com panies have been trained in mosquito control measures since this oper ation and are available to be dispatched to advanced bases.

96

SECTION XXII

-
TANK OFFICER.

A. PREPARATION FOR OPERATION. Wiea. the 193 dTank Battalion (less 1 platoon, Company B) was attached to "tilc 27th Infantry Division on 23 September 1943 in preparation for Galvanic operation immediate steps were taken to prepare the battalion to accomplish its assigned mission. It was brought up to T/O strength, and issued the best equipment avail able. This headquarters also coordinated training between the tank battalion and the division, acting in an advisory capacity and wherever possible assisting in the training.

1. Training. One platoon of tanks was attached to each of the battalion landing teams for the training period, 23 September 1943 to Special 9 November 1943, and remained with the BLT for the operation. emphasis was placed on Tank- Infantry team training in addition to train The tank battalion had ing in loading and unloading from tank lighters. instructions to organize and train a detachment to operate 48 LVT? s prior to the operation but the vehicles did not arrive until three days before the practice run. This was just time enough for the 177 men in this detachment to service them* During the four day practice run they received training in loading and unloading the vehicles and learned the fundamentals of driving them. There was no opportunity for further training of the LVT crews before they embarked for the operation.
2. Preparation of vehicles for combat. All vehicles were given a third echelon check and waterproofed just prior to being loaded aboard The Ordnance Field Service Technical Bulletins 700-89, the transports. 800-13 and 10-1000-28 dated 16 August 1943 were followed in the water proofing of wheeled vehicles except for minor changes based upon experi ence during the amphibious training period. !t No Oxide" grease was used around all taped places, and the gun turret. The gun mounts were packed with the "No Oxide' 1 grease and all nuts and bolts were sprayed with it. 3. Supply. Immediately after the tank battalion was attached to the division each organization conducted a show-down inspection to de This list was submitted to G-4, CPA, and the termine all shortages. necessary items were immediately shipped to the organization. Thirteen 1/4 ton trucks were taken with the battalion on the operation to haul supplies. Some maintenance and armament spare parts and cleaning and preserving material were carried by each company but most of this type of supply was carried on the transport with a complete refill of fuel and ammunition* 4. Communications The communications section consisted of 5 teams each equipped with a 1/4 ton truck and an SCR-510* The radios were waterproofed by means of "Gryptol" and rubber tape and set to oper ate on two channels d The liaison officer used an SCR-509 mounted on a mountain pack to maintain contact between Company A, 193 dTank Battalion and the infantry battalion* The 27th Infantry Division Reconnaissance Troop furnished 3 communication teams each equipped with an SCR-509 to

97

maintain contact with Oompwny C, 193 dTank Battalion. The equipped with SCR-508 sets. Spare equipment consisting of sets, crystals and batteries were radios, dynamotors, tool 3 cases and were to be issued as needed for replacement or B. LESSONS LEARNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

LVT's were complete carried in repair.

1. Waterproofing of the radios was not completely satisfactory Further tests have since been conducted and the method of waterproof ing the sets improved. 2. Communication between tanks and infantry was not satisfactory. This subject is being given further study in preparation for future operations. A tank telephone wired in series with the inter-phone is being developed to mount on the outside of Ine tank. The infantryman *
willbe able to use this phone to give the tank commander instructions or information. 3. Some method should be provided for tho tanks to deal more effectively with enemy pillboxes. Experiments are now being conduct ed on mounting flame throwers in the tanks to accomplish this. A standard flame thrower gun was cut down to the length of the receiver on the light machine gun and a special collar fitted over the combus tion nozzle to allow the gun to fit in the ball mount without modifi cation of the mount itself. To increase the fuel supply the .30 cali ber ammunition boxes were removed from the right side of the tank and a 25 gallon flame thrower fuel tank substituted. This tank was con nected to the gun and replaced the standard fuel tank. It was also necessary to increase the supply of igniting gas so a bracket was de signed to hold three of the standard hydrog,en cylinders. This flame thrower has worked very satisfactorily in experiments conducted thus far.

98

SEVENTH AIR FORCE

mcLissitui

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XXIII A. GIKERAL.

-
SEVENTH AIR FORCE.

1. Objective. Objectives of the Galvanic operation were the at tack and occupation of the Japanese held islands of Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama, in order to deny these atolls to the Japanese and provide bases The major effort was directed for future operations of our own forces. against the island of Tarawa where a Jap airfield was located. 2. Air Force mission.1 The primary mission of the Seventh Air Force was to prevent use oi the airfields at Makin, Tarawa, Mili,Nauru, Jaluit, and Maloelap by Japanese air units prior to and during the oper ation.
3,

Task Group 57.2 formed.

a. To insure maximum coordination with other participating units, designated air units of the Seventh Air Force were assigned to CTF 57, under command of COMAIRCENPAC* for operational control, and designated as Task Group 57.2. As commander, TG 57.2, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, also commanded all land-based aircraft strike units participating in Galvanic. b. Although the land-based strike units were under operational control of the Navy, their successful participation was largely due to the planning, preparation, training, security precautions, and logistic support of the Seventh Air Force and its associated agencies. 4. Unusual problems presented. The Galvanic operation was diffi cult in that the entire Seventh Air Force, less certain defensive units for Oahu, was committed. Over-all plans for committment and general operations of the campaign could not be made by the Seventh Air Force staff. Therefore itwas necessary to be prepared to carry out all types of missions on extremely short notice. Support of the task group units in their forward areas required much ingenuity and specially form ed provisional organizations. Because of lack of adequate maintenance and supply facilities in these forward areas, detailed plans were made to meet all conceivable emergencies. Facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot, the Air Force Service Command, and mainland supply agencies were utilized to the maximum. B. ACTIVITIES OF A-l. The primary responsibility of A-l was to pro vide the staff and personnel necessary to support air units assigned to CTF 57 for operational control.
1,

Organization

of provisional units.

a. The staff for CTG 57,2 was formed by selecting key person nel from the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons of the Seventh Air

99

The Adjutant General, A-l, Force and VII Air Force Service Command, A-2, and A-3 made up the Air Force Commander's staff; the A-4 section operated under control of the Service Commander. b. Part of the service organization of the VII Air Force Service Command had to be changed from a permanently based defensive force, organized under a manning table, to a group of highly mobile units suitable for island operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, The number of tactical organizations, ranging from one to three squad rons, that could be based on any given island determined the size of these units.

(i) On 12 August

1943, the Ist Provisional Air Service Support Squadron was formed to occupy Baker Island in the Phoenix Island group. This composite unit, set up on a manning table basis, consisted of 20 officers and 200 enlisted men selected from the various Air Force arms and services.

(2) The 2d Air Service Support Squadron was formed 21 September 1943, to occupy the Makin, Betio, and
Apamama atolls in the Gilbert Island group. This unit of 42 officers and 745 enlisted men was con stituted early to insure proper ground and amphibi ous training, as it was to follow the assault forces.

(3) The 3d Provisional Air Service Support Squadron, formed 26 September 1943 to occupy Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Nanomea atolls in the Ellice Island
group, had a strength of 43 officers and 747 en listed men*

(4) The Advance Headquarters

of the Seventh Air Force and the VII Air Force Service Command was consti tuted 21 October 1948, as indicated in paragraph B 1 a, and comprised approximately 48 officers and 140 enlisted men.

(5) Provisional Signal Air Warning units were drawn

from the Fighter Command and attached to each "ASSRCN" in numbers necessary to perform their mission. On completion of the Galvanic operation there were 28 Signal Air Warning officers and 319 enlisted men in the forward area.

(6) The 804th Engineer Battalion Aviation was contin uously employed during the Galvanic operation un
til completion of the Makin airstrip.
personnel,

(7) Signal construction

14 officers and

100

237 enlisted men, were furnished from the 443 d Signal Construction Battalion.

(8) The 809-th Medical Air Evacuation

Transport Squadron, statiored at Hickam Field and Canton Island, evacu ated sick and wounded*

2.

Total troops employed

Officers

EM 3425 2697 6122

Tactical
Service Total C. ACTIVITIES OF A-2. 1
organization at ADVON. Functi ona l
a*

627 154
781

An advance party from A-2, Seventh Air Force, arrived at Funafuti on 16 October 1943 wiih the responsibility of coordinating with the VII Air Force Service Command the construction of the advanced headquarters of the Seventh Air Force (ADVON). By 13 November 1943 all ADVON A-2 personnel (9 officers and 13 enlisted men) had arrived and the section was prepared to perform its functions. b. There were also 3 officers and 5 enlisted men in the Photo Interpretation Detachment which was controlled by A-2, and a Technical Crash Intelligence Team, consisting of one officer and one enlisted man, previously secured from Washington. This was the only Technical Crash Intelligence Team from the Central Pacific present immediately after Makin and Tarawa were occupied. Personnel from the Public Relations Section and the Combat and Documentary Photographic Unit, operating under A-2 control, completed the A-2 group; 2.
Intelligence planning.

a. All possible intelligence of the enemy and his capabilities was obtained and evaluated in preparation for tiie Galvanic operation. Liaison officers were sent to the South and Southwest Pacific for a period of three months to collect and return pertinent information. Much information was obtained from JICPOA. Other current intelligence was obtained from adjacent and higher commands in this and other areas. Considerable information had been obtained from long range combat and photographic missions flown at irregular intervals by the Seventh Air Force from December 1942 through October 1943, A Photo Interpretation Unit had been procured from Washington, b.
Special reports

on the Gilberts were prepared.

Briefing

101

material and target charts of enemy objectives were prepared in advan oe by JICPOA, 64th Topographical Engineers, Objective Data Section of the Seventh Air Force, the Photo Interpretation Detachment, and A-2 of the Bomber Command, and reproduced in quantity* Terrain, weather, flying conditions to be expected, characteristics of the Pacific theater, distances, geological construction of its islands, and many oilier important items of intelligence were disseminated to combat crews. Immediately upon arrival at ADVQN a safe-hand intel ligence pouch service between ADVON and A-2, Rear Echelon, was es tablished, resulting in rapid dissemination of mission reports, photo graphs, and similar intelligence material.

3. Combat intelligence.
n

The A-2 section at ADVON maintained a War Room and fur Commanding General with intelligence necessary for plan nished the ning, and decisions as strike commander* In addition to intelligence obtained from photographs furnished by Commander, Task Group 57.3 (Search and Reconnaissance Group), considerable photo intelligence was obtained from strike aircraft of the Seventh Air Force of idiich approximately one- third were equipped with cameras* Briefing and target charts with up-to-date information of what remained to be destroyed on each particular target were furnished participating units for planning and executing missions. b* All preliminary and flash radio intelligence reports were submitted direct to COMAIRCEtJPAC (information strike commander) by island air commanders* As the camp of the Bomber Command was adjacent to the Air Force and the Force Flagship of COMAIRCBNPAC was based in the harbor at Funafuti, communications between these -three agencies were ordinarily satisfactory* Ho separate net was available to the Bomber Command and all radio communications were handled by joint communication centers; the flow of intelligence was often hin dered to a considerable degree by excessive traffic on available circuits*
Briefing and interrogation of our combat crews were done by Army Air Force squadron intelligence officers* The weather initially was furnished in brief reports from Navy sources to island air commanders* These forecasts were unsatisfactory and later Seventh Air Force personnel were procured to furnish this information*

4*

Training*

Training in the use of additional navigational aids and the use of air pilot guides over long over-water flights was an abso lute necessity for combat crews with little experience other than that obtained in over- land flying in the Ttoited States* A supply of navigation maps and charts was procured from the Maps and accurate Charts Division, Washington, D* C*

102

b Particular stress was placed on training in recognition Although sorely handicapped by lack of aircraft and surface vessels. of equipment, all personnel received adequate training. c. Combat intelligence officers were given additional train ing during the period that units were in training in Hawaii to include the lessons learned by the intelligence officers in the South and South west Pacific, of ASSRONS (Air Service Support were thoroughly trained prior to their departure from Hawaii. In addition to special lectures given these personnel, they were furnished a guide which outlined in detail their functions of furnishing current intelligence of the enemy to their commanders, supervision and execution of counter-intelligence measures, and obtaining adequate publicity for the personnel and accom* plishments of their units.

Squadrons) utilized in the Galvanic operations

d.

Intelligence personnel

D. ACTIVITIES OF A-3. 1.
Planning

a. Planning of the Galvanic operation was done by Joint Army

Intelligence information was fairly complete
and Navy Staff personnel. on the enemy situation, showing that a number of airfields were avail
able to the enemy in the Gilbert and Marshall groups which could cause considerable difficulty to our forces in accomplishing their mission. Striking units in sufficient strength to deny the use of these airfields to the enemy was of primary importance to success of the operation. In planning the operational role of the Seventh Air Force, based on its assigned mission of neutralization of enemy airfields within supporting range, two important factors entered the picture: First, the size of force available for such an operation and its capabilities; second, the force necessary to adequately defend Oahu during this operation. The entire planning of Galvanic had to be aggressive, bold, thorough, and based on the shortest possible time schedule. It was necessary to strike the enemy with all force available, coordinating the action of all units concerned for maximum concentration. b. Most difficult operational problem solved was the tremendous distance to enemy bases which required pinpoint navigation and offered few, if any, intermediate check points. Length of flights varied from 926 to 2,408 nautical. miles. 2.
Organization.

a. The task force under the command of Major General Willis H. Hale, organized and constituted to accomplish this mission, consisted of the following units.

103

Headquarters Seventh Air Force, ADVON Headquarters VII Bomber Command, ADVON Headquarters 11th Bomb Group 42d Bcmb Squadron (H) 431st Bomb Squadron (H) 98th Bomb Squadron (H) 26th Bomb Squadron (H)
Headquarters 30th Bomb Group
27th Bomb Squadron (H)
38th Bomb Squadron (H)
392 dBomb Squadron (H)
531st Fighter Bomber Squadron 46th Fighter Squadron 45th Fighter Squadron

b. Iftider operational control of COMAIRCSNPAC, the Command ing General, Seventh Air Force, was designated Commander, Task Group 57.2, with above units as a striking force. c. C-47 and LB-30 type aircraft of the 19th Troop Carrier Squadron were utilized for air transportation of personnel and emer gency supplies. d. One heavy bomber squadron, four medium bomber squadrons, and seven fighter squadrons were retained in the Hawaiian Area for its defense. 3. Advanced Headquarters and operation bases.

a. Major General Willis H Hale, Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, and staff arrived on Funafuti Island on 6 November 1943 and immediately set up advanced headquarters. Allunits participating in the operation were in place and ready to operate on schedule. b. Our operating bases
1)

were located on the following islands Advanced Headquarters and the 42d and 431st Heavy Bomber Squadrons, 27th and 38th Heavy Bomber Squadrons.

Funafuti Funafuti

2) Nanomea Nanomea 3)
Canton Canton

4) llukufetau llukufetau 5)
Baker Baker

Heavy Bomber Squadrons. 26th and 392 d

98th Heavy Bomber Squadron. 45th Fighter Squadron and staging point for heavy bombardment aircraft based on Canton. of

c.

These bases, with the exception of Canton, consisted

104

small runways approximately nut groves. 4. Training, varying problems.

6,000 feet in length, carved out of coco

groups presented widely

Training of bombardment

a. The 11th Bomb Group had previously distinguished itself in combat in the Solomons area. Upon return to Hawaii, with the ex ception of a few cadre personnel, it was completely reconstituted with new personnel and airplanes. New crews had to be thoroughly trained by the Seventh Bomber Command, their instruction including the Seventh Air Force Gunnery School and additional training in navigation, bomb ing, and long over-water flights. b. The 30th Bomb Group which arrived on Oahu 11 October 1943 had less than six weeks in which to complete its training before leav This group initially, however, consisted of ing for the forward area* much more experienced crews than the rehabilitated 11th Bomb Group so that although their training period was short the combat crews were well trained for the operation. E. ACTIVITIES OF THE A-4. 1.

Joint staff arrangement.

a* The Commanding General, VII Air Force Service Command was not provided with a separate staff, but utilized the Seventh Air Force staff jointly with the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, This arrangement made the A-4 responsible for the preparation of supply plans, orders to execute the plans, and supervision over the execution of orders for both the tactical and service commands. Special staff sections of the Seventh Air Force were utilized by both commanders in the same man ner as the A-4. In effect, ths special staff supply sections actually executed that portion of the supply plan which was fixed as the respon sibility of the Seventh Air Force.

(ADVOtf) of A-4 was established at Funa b A futi, operating as a joint A-4 for Headquarters Seventh Air Force and Headquarters VII Air Force Service Command, The ADVON made all neces sary arrangements, and prepared orders to make adjustments in the supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments in the forward area to fur nish adequate air service support to meet changes in tactical disposi tions directed by COWAIRCENPAC. The rear echelon A-4 mounted all troops, equipment, and supplies for the forward area and advised ADVON A-4 of their routing, time of departure, vessel, and tire of arrival, then disengaged from further responsibility. Upon receipt of this information ADVON A-4 assumed responsibility for supervising the placing of troops, equipment, and supplies on positions. Close contact was maintained be rear 3chelon A-4 and ADVON A-4 throu^i weekly summary reports. tween

forwarl^chelon

105

2.

Procurement

of supplies and equipment.

a. Upon receipt of information concerning Galvanic, an estimate of the situation concerning equipment and supplies was made, and requisitions covering the required maintenance supplies for 90 days, and ASSROM organizational equipment to support the Air Force Upon completion of this estimate, it was ascertained were prepared. (1) Equipment in possession of the 17th Base Headquarters that: and Air Base Squadron was of the wrong type, and inadequate to equip the ASSRONS, and (2) USAFICPA stocks were inadequate to supply both the Air Force and Garrison Force requirements. Certain items were available, but the time element precluded processing the Air Force requisitions through USAFIGPA supply depots. b. Because of this situation, all Air Force requisitions on requirements for the Galvanic operation were forwarded through Headquarters Army Air Forces to Headquarters Army Service Forces and Headquarters Air Service Command to be filled and deadlined in San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 1 October 1943. In view of the in dividual characteristics of each supply arm and service, the magni tude and unusual nature of the requisitions, and the fact that items requisitioned were not included in the General Schedule of Supplies, supply representatives from the Air Depot, Ordnance, and Signal Corps were sent to Washington to expedite shipment, make spot decisions, and coordinate the shipment of the supplies and equipment requisi tioned. c. Headquarters Army Service Forces, Headquarters Air Service Command, and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation made special efforts to effect delivery of the supplies and equipment at the Port of Honolulu by the deadline date. As an operational pro ject, Army Service Forces had assigned this shipment a project num ber, Honolulu port authorities expedited the movement of this material to Hickam Field, where it was broken down, re-boxed into organization equipment and maintenance supply packups, and marked by Seventh Air Force supply services, in accordance with instructions issued by the A-4.
3,

Allocation of supplies and equipment.

a. Based on recommendations of observers who had been sent to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas for the specific purpose of observing air service operations and constant study of the type of air service unit and supplies and equipment required for atoll war fare, tentative Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment had been prepared for an ASSRON prior to assignment of Galvanic, In planning for Galvanic, correlation of the ASSRON with the garrison force (GARFOR), and information that adequate air transport service would be unavailable initially made several changes in the ASSRON organization, and consequently the ASSRON T/E, necessary. Other

106

minor changes necessitated continuous revision of the with the changing orgarization of the ASSRDI.

t/e

to keep pace

b. On Army Service Forces information that certain supplies and equipment would be unavailable before the deadline date, or were not available at all, USAFICPA depots supplied such articles as were available in their stock; these items to be returned to USAFICPA stocks on receipt of the Air Force shipmmt from Array Service Forces, In many cases the Navy or the Marines had equipment available which we were short, or which was superior in design to our own. Full cooperation was obtained from these services in exchange of equipment. 4. Location of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments.

Based on a recornaissance of the Ellice Islands and study of available information on the Gilbert Islands, locations of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments we re determined, consider ation being given to: (1) Disposition of tactical units, (2) Avail ability and disposition of service installations of the Navy and Marines, (3) Anchorage and unloading facilities, (4) Size of the island and airdrome, and availability of suitable area, and (5) Centralized loca tion to facilitate service to the outer area. b. To avoid initial congestion in unloading ships at destina tion, supplies, troops, and construction supplies for installation of maintenance establishments were echeloned by priority in movement to
positions.

c. A forward supply reserve of 30 days Class IV (E) supplies for all Air Force aircraft was established in a supply barge afloat at Funafuti, This reserve, under the control of the ADVON A-4, Head quarters VII Air Force Service Command, was utilized in the ElliceGilbert area as emergency supply. 5.
Transportation

of organizations

and supplies.

To expedite movement, equipment and supplies were preloadEd on spotted freight cars and held awaiting call of the port regulating officer. Each car was carefully tallied to expedite checking at the pier. Ifctit Liaison Officers were assigned to coordinate movement of their organization to the port and supervise loading aboard ship.

b. An Air Force Cargo Booking Agency was established under the A-4 to book all supporting supplies not moved by COMFIFTRPHIBFOR with the GARFOR and AS3RON to Ihe destination. This agency in turn booked its cargo with the Army Port and Service Command, which issued instruc tions for movements of cargo to the port when bottoms were made available Organization movements were handled directly by tiie A-4 *
c.
Tonnage requirements

for water movement

of organizations

and

- 107
-

supplies were made known to the Navy Joint Shipping Control through TJSAFICPA. Daily conferences with the Joint Shipping Control were held to secure allocation of bottoms for movement. Due to shortage of bottoms, priorities had to be established to insure that the organizations and supplies which were of the greatest importance to guarantee the success of the operational plan were placed on posi tion in time to accomplish their mission. This shortage of bottoms caused air echelons of tactical units to operate from airdromes in the Ellice Islands without effective support from ground echelons and air service units for a short period of time.

6.

Construction

of airdromes.

a. Based on information available from A-2, the Air Bagi neer under supervision of the A-4, prepared plans for the construc tion of the air strip at Makin. These plans included taxiways, re vetments and hardstandings. The BO4th Aviation Efagineer Battalion Upon com was assigned to GARFOR at Makin for this construction. pletion of the air strip the Aviation Engineer Battalion was with drawn, to Oahu for rehabilitation. b. Assembled bulk fuel systems were furnished where re quired. These systems consisted of the Army Air Force bulk fuel system (canvas Mareng cell, portable pipeline and dispensing system) 1,000 barrel prefabricated steel and the Navy bulk fuel system (10 5,000 gallon tanks revetted above ground, portable pipeline, 4 ready banks, and dispensing system). systems were installed at Both Filling was accomplished from a Makin Island and interconnected. single submarine pipeline tied into a tanker anchorage 2,000 yards offshore, or from a barrel dumping stand which was actually a suc tion assembly to fillthe bulk storage or gasoline trucks from the drummed gasoline reserve in an emergency.

c. Air Force technical, administrative, supply, mess, and latrine construction at advanced bases was planned by the Air Engi neer under the supervision of A-4, the work being done by ground force engineers furnished to the Fakin CtARFOR. Construction require ments were set up by type unit in order to keep pace with tactical decisions effecting changes in dispositions of tactical units. Plans included blueprints of buildings required arid complete bills of mater ial for each type building. All construction was of the prefabricated type, designed to be torn down and moved to a new base when required. Full use was made of mainland prefabricated buildings, such as Quonset Huts and the Army Air Forces tropical type. The requirements were bound into book form and published as "Seventh Air Force Construction Requirements at Advanced Bases." d. Public utilities were planned jointly with GARFOR and ASSRON at the bases concerned. In most cases joint use of utilities was limited, as it was necessary for the AS3RON to remain independent

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of GARFOR due to the probability -that it would be leap-frogged new base.

to

7. Mobility,, In order to effect a rapid landing and set up air service as rapidly as possible, a major effort was extended to provide To effect this, ASSROMS with the greatest degree of mobility possible. equipment and shops were procured or manufactured locally. motorized 8. Bombs and ammunition.

a. Seventh Air Force requirements for bombs and ammunition at advanced bases were planned by the Air Force Ordnance Officer under supervision of the A-4. Types of bombs and ammunition ratios recommend ed by VII Bomber Command and VII Fighter Command were given high consid eration in computing requirements. These requirements were submitted through channels to CCMAIRPAC to COMSERVFOR who was charged witii placing the bombs and ammunition on position. Bombs and ammunition approved by COMAIRPAC to accompany assault and GARFOR to positions were supplied by the Seventh Air Force and moved to position by COMFIFTHPHIBFOR. Support shipments were moved to position by COMSERVFOR. b. Full cooperation was obtained with the Navy and Marines in had the

utilizing types of bombs and ammunition which were common to all ser vices. A single agency, Army, Uavy, or Marine, was designated to supply
bombs and ammunition for the base where i2ie service concerned greatest concentration of tactical and service units. 9.
Hospitalization,
sanitation, and evacuation

of casualties*

a. ASSSON dispensaries were provided with a flight surgeon in charge, who was charged with assisting tactical unit flight surgeons in removal of casualties from aircraft, or in case of an emergency landing, with removal of casualties. Evacuation was direct from squadron aid stations and ASSRON dispensary to the base hospital. Upon arrival of Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons and assignment of 5 C-54 type aircraft to the Air Transport Command for primary use by the Seventh Air Force, the medical air evacuation system was placed in operation. Casualties were evacuated from the Gilbert area by Navy PB2Y type ambulance plane to Funafuti where the medical air evacuation collecting station was located and from there to the Hawaiian Area by C-54 air craft
?

b. ASSRON flight surgeons were charged with sanitation of the Air Force area on the bases. Provision was made to meet the unusual sanitary, insect, rodent, and disease conditions encountered in Pacific atolls by sending the necessary supplies and equipment. Extreme empha sis was placed on keeping latrine and refuse pits above the water line of the extremely low islands. 10.
Assignment of supply, technical

and labor troops. were required to

Troops of all supply arms and services

109

operate the General Air Force Assembly and Intransit Depot set up to facilitate staging and preparations for Galvanic. The Seventh Air Force had no complement of labor troops, so supply troous were with drawn from the Air Base Detachments in "the Hawaiian Area, whose re quirements fluctuated dependent upon the rate of flow of supplies As the dead from the intransit depot, to operate this installation. line loading date approached, the overload placed on the Air Force supply services by eighteen hour a day operation of the intransit depot caused an acute labor situation* This labor shortage was re lieved by disbanding the Air Base Security Battalions which were considered as a nonessential unit, and forming aviation squadrons to supply labor to meet the deadline date.
I

b. Sufficient aircraft repair personnel in the mechanical classifications were not available to effect the desired distribution to ASSRONS. Because this shortage might seriously effect the ASSROIT ability to produce effective aircraft repair service, it was neces sary to place these troopjs in ASSRCTIS located where the major repair effort would be required. 11.
Salvage of unserviceable supplies and equipment.

a. The unavoidable probability that supplies and equipment would continually be damaged and lost in the difficult amphibious operations required that every man be imbued with a personal interest in property responsibility. During the formation of ASSRCNS, supply officers were continuously reminded of the importance of supply dis cipline. All supply directives repeatedly emphasized the importance of supply discipline to the proper implementation of the supply plan. Both ASSRON and tactical units were very conscious of wastage before their departure from Oahu. b. Repairable and serviceable parts were salvaged from dam aged aircraft and other major items of equipment. Exchange of a re pairable or non-serviceable part for a serviceable part was directed as standing procedure for all supply arms except in emergencies. Parts not repairable by A3SRONS were returned to Oahu. 12. Captured supplies and equipment. Captured supplies and equipment which were of value for study were forwarded to Oahu. All airborne equipment was turned over to the Air Depot for careful analy sis and report. -A large quantity of enemy bombs was captured, and are now under study to determine the possibility of their use against the enemy. All captured bulk supplies were utilized in the forward area. A considerable amount of enemy av^as, low in octane rating but suitable for use as motor fuel, is available in the forward area obviating the necessity of making motor fuel shipments from Oahu. Captured enemy oil is utilized for road stabilization. 13.
New types

of equipment

and modification of standard

types.

110

Standard types of equipment were constantly studied to determine modi fications required to better equipment for field conditions. Modifi cations known to be required were made prior to departure of units from Oahu. Other modifications were made in the field as necessity was de termined. New types of equipment were service tested in the field. Administrative order. Administrative orders covering all ad ministrative instructions and the supply plan applicable to Air Force units were prepared* Supplementary administrative instructions were covered in the Base Development Plan for the island concerned. F. ACTIVITIES OF THE HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT.
14,

During the preparation for and 1. Engineering Department. throughout the actual campaign, this department modified aircraft, trained and supplied engineering personnel for the ASSRONS, and aug mented and supplied engineering personnel and equipment.

a. Aircraft were modified to meet special requirements of Some of the situation or better adapt -them for intended operations. these changes were standard modifications, others were original develop ments

(1) Heavy bombers

50 modifications were made on each plane, initial combat and replacement, as listed on Inclosure No. 2. Rate of processing was 2- planes per day. 23 modifications were made on each plane, as listed on Inclosure No. 3, Rate of processing was 3 planes per day.

(2) Medium bombers

(3) Fighters

38 P-39Q1 and P-39Q5 aircraft were modified to facilitate launching from a carrier. Other changes to these planes and 12 P-40's are listEd on Inclosure No. 4. Ed 13 A-24's were assembled No modifications were made. and test-

(4) Fighter-bombers

b. The Signal Section trained and furnished 1 officer, 1 warr ant officer, and 20 enlisted men; assembled and packed Signal Corps equipment and supplies for T/E plus 90-day maintenance level, totaling over 800 packing cases; and fabricated the following special equipment:

(1) 2 Invasion type combination Early-Warning and GCI

radars (Navy' SC-2 installed in AA

S/L

trailer).

(2) 2 VHF sets (SCR-522 with aircraft generator) installed

in Radio Command Cars.

111

(3) 4 combination air-borne radio and radar test benches

ASSRONS,

c. 5 officers and 251 enlisted men were furnished for 3 and special repair trucks were manufactured for use by the

ASSRONS. d. 3 officers and 150 enlisted men were furnished for air craft maintenance and repair work at the 422 dSub-Depot which was Through its operation, many airplanes of all established at Canton. types were quickly returned to combat; emergency repairs were made on others enabling them to return to the Control Depot for completion of repairs. c. Approximately 180 enlisted men, the majority from Air Force squadrons, were trained in specialized work and returned to their units, 49 Navy personnel were given training, mainly in sheet metal fabrication pertinent to aircraft modification.
ed bases

f Civilian mechanics and supervisors were sent to advance on call for third and fourth echelon work.

2. Supply Department. The supply department of the Hawaiian Depot took a continuous part in all phases of the Galvanic oper Air ation from the inception of the earliest preparations up to and in cluding re-supply and procurement in the operation of the establish ed bases and base detachments. The following summary highlights the coordinating functions of the supply department in the combined operations of the several departments of the Hawaiian Air Depot with the Seventh Air Force and the Air Force Service Command. a. In the initial planning stages of the ASSRDNS involved, supply department selected from its personnel 7 officers suffi the ciently experienced to serve efficiently as Supply Officers in "the First, Second, and Third Base ASSRCNS and their detachments. During preparation of the Table of Equipment for the ASSEDNS, the entire resources of the supply department organization were devoted to ana lytical and fimdamental research work for the determination of oper ational excellence of the t/e Equipment. As the T/E was prepared locally and modifications were necessary as preparation of the T/S progressed, the supply department organization and personnel were made available day and ni^ht for complete cooperation with the Com manding Officer and the Supply and Engineering Officers of each ASSRCN. All decisions with respect to changes in the T/E were coordi nated with A-4 of the Seventh Air Force. b. The t/e necessary for the operational success of Galvanic having been determined, the supply department be^an the immediate issue and procurement planning for the many items of supply and equipment tab ulated therein. Having been advised that the Galvanic operation would

112

Include a definite number or quantity of tactical squadrons of certain types, the Depot Supply Officer coordinated the t/e v s and computed the amount of equipment and supplies required for the operation, for both tactical and service squadrons. All balances of Air Corps supply stock availability and obligated for the Galvanic involved were checked for operation* Emergency requisitions were instituted for those items not on hand* Balances on hand and available for issue accounted for about 84% of the Air Corps items required by the final approved t/E's for the ASSRONS and tactical squadrons. About 1,888 items, or approximately 16$ of the required items, had to be requisitioned from the mainland. Every priority procurement means was used to carry on procurement oper ations in accordance with the addition or deletion of articles of equip
ment as caused by modifications to equipment. By constant initiation and close follow-up of emergency radios and requisitions over 500 items of equipment and supply were secured from the mainland to fillshortages resulting from such modifications*

(1) To maintain extreme secrecy throughout preparation for this operation, the plans and ultimate purpose of these
involved detailed supply activities were divulged to only -three individuals, the Depot Supply Officer, the Property Control Officer of the Supply Department, and the Chief Clerk of the Property Control Branch of the Supply Department* Because it was necessary to make a deadline of 8 days from tbe starting time of prepar ation of balance check and procurement requirements, tills portion of -the supply departments work was most difficult. The supply department organisation of the Hawaiian Air De pot geared itself into a day and night working program for most of its personnel over the month of October, 1943* Deadline set for the de livery of requisitioned equipment and supplies at the Port of Embarka tion on the mainland was 15 September 1943, with arrival at Honolulu set at 1 October 1943* As these Air Corps items arrived at the Port of Honolulu, they were received by the Steamship Dock Section of the Ship ping and Receiving Branch of the Supply Department, and transportation by trailer, truck, and railroad flat car was arranged to dear all cargo from the docks* The deadline dates for completion of packing and crat ing of all items were set for eaoh ASSRQN. Coordinating the hand ling of this equipment and supplies received from the mainland with the program of packing and crating of Air Corps equipment and supply on hand as required by the for Galvanic, presented no little difficulty. Most of these supplies from the mainland were received in one huge influx at the Honolulu docks. Storage space was, as always, a pertinent factor, making dispersion througiout the island of Oahu a necessity. This dis persion was so planned as to coordinate with requirements for packing and crating to make deadline dates for the Galvanic operation.

T/B

t/E

d.

In -the classification

and preparation of equipment and sup

113

plies for movement, a system was magu rated and followed involving preparation of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) for eaoh using ser vice and organization (ie; Signal Ist Base ASSRCN) listing all items of it's equipment and supplies, followed by issue and packing or crating in accordance with these shipping tickets* Preparation of these forms required 9,844 pages of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) upon which were typed 87,031 items for issue, packing and crating, and took 1600 man hours*

(1) Many difficulties were encountered

during the issue, packing, and crating, since these oper ations were being carried out while the shipping tiokets were still in process of typing* For example, supply for the ASSBDNS was prepared for a period of ninety days and issue, packing, and crating were made up in 3 30-day increments. Considerable re-planning and much additional work was occasioned when destination or consignee point of one of these increments was changed after tfie supply department had completed fully one-half of the shipping tickets involved, both as to typing and issue and packing* Also, the tactical squad rons' positions were moved from time to time throughout the preparation so that by -the time the supply department was ready to prepare certain materiel for shipment the bases and their number had actually changed, resulting in the necessity of compiling the equipment and supplies going out into a different collection of supplies because of the change in tactical organization*

c*

Speoial precautions

were taken to insure that no time

would be wasted in segregating materiel upon arrival at destination Materiel was marked for each section of each ASSROT for each oper
ation as follows
j

Engineering Section Supply Section Transportation Section Defense and Operations Weather Section Medical Section.

Section

tickets were cross referenced in their marking to the which supplies were packed, and further cross referenced boxes in to the sections for which they were made* The boxes were each mark ed in code for the section to which they belonged in eaoh ASSRON. Copies of idie shipping tickets applicable were not only affixed to the outside of the boxes but were placed inside the boxes along with the materiel listed thereon*

All shipping

114

As part of the training program for the enlisted personnel of the ASSBONS the complete facilities of the Supply School were made available to the commanding officer of each ASSRCN. Many enlisted men designated as supply personnel attended the regular classes carried on concurrently at the Supply School. The following outline of the con centrated course in supply procedure for enlisted personnel illustrates the thorough fundamental training given these men before their departure* CURRICULUM OF STUDY IN SUPPLY PROCEDURE I* Orientation II Review of Organisation of Amy Air Forces lII* Sohelons of Maintenance, Supply , and Recla mation (Stress laid on Echelons of Technical

Supply)

IV* Army Air Force Classification of Material

(T*o* 00-36-A-l)

V. Status of Army Air Force Equipment and Supplies VI. Army Air Force Stock List (T.O. 00-35A-6) VII* General Provisions for Storage of AAF Equipment and Supplies (AAF Regulation 65-19) Regulations VIII. IX. Army Air Force Vouchers X. Army Air Force Supply Forms. In addition to the Supply School classes throughout October, the supply personnel of the ASSRCNS were given practical, demonstrations and exhi Property Control bits by the Hawaiian Air Depot supply organization. personnel and Warehouse Branch personnel of the supply department Unit worked with the ASSRON supply enlisted personnel on practical solutions of detailed problems.
g. Ifhen the equipment and supplies required for the Galvanic operation were boxed and crated, the shipping organization of tiie sup ply department was held in readiness to move equipment and supplies to the port of embarkation upon call* Calls for delivery to piers for vessel loading came at all hours of the day and night, necessitating immediate organization of personnel and automotive equipment for load ing and transporting equipment and supplies to the port designated. Many nights, long hours of overtime were completed to meet the vessel sailing deadline* Inasmuch as the depot supply of automotive vehicles for heavy transportation is barely adequate for normal transportation requirement, a considerable strain was put upon the use of this equip ment* Dispersion of these vehicles, especially throughout the day when they were dispatched on sundry routine tasks, created many problems in securing immediate servioe for loading to meet sailing time.

h. The following pertinent statistics summarize the work done in preparing and moving equipment and supplies into the port of embarka tion for Galvanic operations

115

(1) 10,000 boxes of supplies were moved. (2)

(3)
6,000 drums of aviaticn gasoline were moved to Baker*

Total weigit of general equipment and supplies

moved for shipment to Baker: General Vehicles and Gasoline Total

1,884,672 pounds 185,400 2,070,072 pounds

"

(4) Weight for Galvanic operation in Norember 1943:

General
Vehicles Total
through 15 January 1944:

1,363,136 pounds B 1,058,410 2,421,546 pounds

(5) Weight for Galvanic operation 1 December 1943

General Vehicles Total

351,900 pounds 476,300 828,200 pound 8 3,599,708 pound 8 1,720,110 5,319,818 pounds

" "

(6) Total General

Grand Total

Total Vehicles

(7) Summary and Grand Total Weights:

Baker November Dec 1 Jan 15

2,070,072 pounds 2,421,546 828,200 5,319,818 pounds (*)

"

(*) Approximately 9,850 measurement

tons.

i. Ihe supply department gave immediate attention night and day to the earliest possible shipment of re-supply items *hich were ordered from the Depot Supply Officer on priority and routine requisitions, both on standard Air Corps forma and by radio from the several bases and base detachments in the Galvanic area of operations. Of the total requisition items thus received, for re supply by the supply department, 89$ were supplied by immediate

116

shipment to the destination* j. Lathes, shapera, grinders, milling machines, and similar equipment were furnished by the supply department to provide for third and minor fourth echelon maintenance at the advance depot* Inspection, Property Control , and Warehouse Branch personnel of long experience in handling such organisational and operational details were also dispatch ed to assist in putting the advance depot in proper shape to receive and set up the equipment.

G. ACTIVITIES OP IHE COMMUNICATION SECTION, 1. Planning for Joint Communications Centers A committee was formed under the direction of the Communications Office, CinCPOA, to establish a Joint Communication System by which all communications would operate utilizing a minimum amount of equipment, number of per sonnel, and number of frequencies* A representative of the Seventh Air Force Signal Office was a member of this committee which drew up a policy to govern communications for the Galvanic action* Although there was not complete agreement in all matters, a compromise was made and the policy was published by CinCPOA. Based upon this policy letter (Inclosure No* 1) a communications plan was prepared with the assist ance of all the communications officers of the Seventh Air Force, VII Fighter Command, and the VII Bomber Command* This communications plan was published with CinCPAC operations order number 1-43, and provided for Joint Communications Centers to be established at Canton, Baker, Funafuti* Nukufetau, and Nanomea. These centers were to be manned by Army* Navy, and Marine Corps personnel, utilizing equipment already at those bases. Additional equipment was to be supplied by the Navy for Baker, and by the Army for Canton* 2* Functional organization at ADVON.

To provide personnel and equipment to carry out the Army El]ice Islands, the Third ASSBON was formed, with a communications section of 152 officers and men to be divided between the bases of Nanomea* Funafuti* and Nukufetau* Baker communication system was already organized with Army Air Force personnel of the First ASSRCN* A section of the Seventh Air Force already at Canton operating a Canton to Hickam circuit was combined with Army and Navy units al ready at that base to form a Joint Communications Center* Air circuits were set up to handle communications between these bases for all tacti cal units* The major air tactical net included Funafuti* Baker, Canton, and Tarawa. The Ellice air tactical net linked Funafuti, Nanomea, and Nukufetau. A radar telling circuit was established between all bases but was used very rarely* The Gilbert air tactical net was set up at Apamama, Tarawa, and Makin after capture of -those three bases* Primary responsibility for the establishment of the bases at Tarawa and Apamama rested with the Navy; at Makin with the Army. Secondary responsibility for air circuits at Apamama and for internal telephone trimking communi

Air Force job in the

117

cations between the airfields at Tarawa was assumed by the Seventh Air Force. Air Warning and Fighter Direction for Canton, Baker, and Hakin was also the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force, The operation of the SCR- 588 at Funafuti again was under the jurisdic tion of the Seventh Air Force. Bomber strike and air search and re connaissance stations were set up at the Joint Centers at each base. Radio aids to navigation such as radio ranges and low frequency homing transmitters were installed by the AACS. Radar and YG beacons were installed by the Navy.

b. Headquarters of the Seventh Air Force and the head quarters of the VII Bomber Command were established adjacent to each other at Funafuti and were served by the Funafuti Joint Communica tions Center and were linked to the center by teletype. A single switchboard consisting of two TC-2O*s was installed to handle both headquarters telephone systems, with a field wire end cable link installed between the USS Curtis and the switchboard providing con tact with COMAIRC13?PAC. To coordinate the telephone system on the island of Funafuti, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the various services. At Nanomea and Nukufetau, the wire sections of the ASSRON detachments installed field cable and field wire for radio key lines and for trunk telephone circuits between headquarters on the island. The internal communications systems at Baker and Canton were already However, additional teletype circuits were added at established. Canton to expedite the delivery of messages to tactical organisations.
c. The operation of communications from November 13 to December 6 through Joint Communications Centers was not entirely This may be attributed to the fact that the idea was satisfactory. new, construction of Joint Centers was continuing throughout the action, and personnel were not accustomed to the new system of com munications. There were many delays in the transmission of oper Aggressive corrective action was taken by communi ational messages* cations officers of the Seventh Air Force to speed traffic in this Through these efforts time delays decreased communications system* continually but never reached a condition considered satisfactory* d. A small signal section was established at Funafuti for the supply and repair of radio and radar equipment. The Sub-Depot repair and supply depot for work which at Canton provided an advance could not be handled by the small section at Funafuti* The operation of this section was hampered by delay in constructing a suitable building for housing the repair equipment. Radio aids to navigation were also provided. A radio range was established at Funafuti, but operated intermittently to a range of about 200 miles due to technical and physical difficulties. The homer which was established at Funafuti was not satisfactory due to transmitter and antenna difficulties. These difficulties were

118

remedied but not in time to be of maximum use for the Galvanic action. A radio range was established at Nanomea on the 4th of December. A radio homer was operating at Baker Radio range and radio homer wore both available at Canton. These last ranges and homers worked very satisfactorily throughout the action. YG equipment was installed at Nanomea. YH homing equipment was installed at Funafuti, Baker, and Canton. The AACS established circuits between Canton, Funafuti, Nanomea, and Baker. Ihe station at Nukufetau was not available for this action* Ihe vital communications circuits for "ttie Gilbert group were installed by December 6. f Air Warning and Fighter Direction was provided at Canton utilizing one SCR-270, one SCR-271, and one SCR-588 with VHF communi cation equipment and VHF homer. At Baker an SC-2 was mounted in a searchlight trailer to provide Fighter Direction and one SCR-270-D was provided for Air Warning. V#F communication equipment and homer were provided for Fighter Direction communications. These VHF communica admirably and operated in an excellent manner. tions worked On Novem ber 30 the 45th Fighter Squadron moved from Baker to Nanomea and it was necessary for the Seventh Air Force to establish VHF homer and VHF equipment at Nanomea for this squadron, since the Argus unit at this base was not equipped for VHF operation. At Makin two SC-2's with associated VHF equipment went in with the attacking troops and one was operative 20 November. One SCR-270-D was operative 28 November and reporting to Ihe SC-2. Ihe complete VHF SCS-3 system, the second SCR 270-D, and the Air Defense Command Post were operative at a later date. H. LESSONS LEADED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. 1. Personnel. Air Service Support Squadrons were not furnished sufficient labor troops to perform nan-technical duties, resulting in highly trained technical personnel being employed as laborers on docks and barges, ration details and sanitary details during initial phase of operations. Labor troops are being assigned to ASSRCNS, to be released when no longer required. 2.

Intelligence.

a. As ADVON moves forward, the A-2 section, ADVON, with its entire physical equipment, should be set up and ready to operate on arrival of A-2 personnel, to eliminate difficulties of setting up camp and carrying on intelligence operations simultaneously. Action is be ing taken to insure that, if at all possible, complete duplicate A-2 physical equipment is forwarded in advance to each new ADVON head quarters. b. It is essential that an estimate of the enemy air order (1) of battle be furnished to lower units for the following reasons: loading may be prescribed (if estimates indicate So that proper bcmb strong concentration of enemy aircraft on the ground at a particular

119

target, specific types of bombs and fuses are required); (2) Number and types of enemy aircraft expected at each specific target deter mines the size and type of formation that our commander will pres cribe, the altitude of attack, and the tactics utilized; (3) So that crews will be particularly alert when, new types of enemy aircraft are expected over a particular target; and (4) Reliable estimates of enemy air order of battle at the specific and alternate targets build up morale of combat crews*

(1) It was impossible at ADVON to furnish lower units

with this information on the enemy air order of battle because of two factors: (1) Failure on the part of COMAIRCENPAC after repeated requests, to furnish information necessary to make a fairly re liable estimate as to the enemy air order of battle; and (2) poor facilities for rapid dissemination of known information. Proper security measures can be taken to permit furnishing the enemy air order of battle by radio at least to group commanders. c. Number of photo interpretation officers was insufficient to adequately furnish flash photo intelligence* Action is being taken to furnish VII Bomber Command with a team of photo interpretors in addition to placing on detached service with each photo laboratory unit at least one photo interpretation officer* d* Routine air transport service is not always satisfactory for delivery of photos and routine intelligence reports* It is plann ed that the Bomber Command, Fighter Command, and groups be furnished appropriate liaison aircraft* An urgent need existed for a radio intelligence unit in the* ADVON area similar to (but on a smaller scale) the one at Pearl Harbor; since the unit at Pearl Harbor, which covers land, sea, and air, cannot furnish desired intelligence information as timely and as completely as a unit at ADVON concentrating only on intelligence essential for decision by the strike commander of land based aircraft* A unit of this type has since been allocated to this theater*

3. Planning and operations

An advance detail should precede the main unit and estab the necessary operating agencies and construct the unit camp site* lish Air echelons reached their operating bases in advance of their ground echelons which necessitated the use of combat crews to set up the camp* Corrective action will be taken in future movements. b* Due to the extremely long flying distances to the targets, a definite policy regarding the total number of missions to be flown by each combat crew is essential. Rest periods after a certain number

120

of missions 4.

is also necessary.

Such

policy has been placed in effect.

Service units and supply.

a. ASSRON detachments are not required at each base and are not properly organized to provide an effective degree of air service. One or two tactical squadrons operating from an airdrome are self suf ficient providing there is an ASSRON in the area to provide third eche lon repair &ud supply service on call or requisition. Future ASSRONS dispatched to the forward area will be complete units, assigned an air service area in which they will be responsible for all air service. This method of operation introduces the following additional require
ments:

(1) Tactical units should be provided with reefers, mobile Air Force repair units, and additional power

and water distillation units to increase their selfsufficiency when operating on a base away from an Tactical units based on island airdromes ASSRCN inhere there is no ASSRON will be made as self-suf ficient as possible by issuing each unit this Class IV equipment. Tactical units will request supplies and repair service direct from the ASSRON charged with air service in the area.

(2) ASSRCNS should be assigned transport aircraft to

effect priority deliveries of supplies and repair personnel to airdromes within the ASSRCN service area, to facilitate immediate temporary repairs on economically repairable aircraft so that such planes can be flown to the main base for completion of re pairs. ASSRONS are being assigned transport aircraft for this purpose. b. The method of marking supply shipments for the forward area and identification at destination was excellent; the advance copies of shipping tickets effectively facilitating the identifi cation of a box in which a specific item of supply was located* Recommended that this method be continued. c. Initial maintenance stocks should be shipped in 30-day , increments until ihe supply is built up to the authorized level, to alleviate the initial congestion upon landing, reduce initial ship ping requirements, facilitate rapid and orderly establishment of sup ply dumps, and release units from loading details for the establish ment of camps, maintenance, and supply installations. This change has been made. d. The rapid and unpredictable tactical development in the Central Pacific Area requires maximum mobility in the movement of

121

aircraft spares (Class IV (E)) to meet changes in dispositions of tactioal aircraft. When these supplies are land-based, it is prac tically impossible to effect movement to a new position in time to be of value to the tactical units before the next move* These main tenance supplies should be kept afloat in barges as much as possible, with a working level of 10 to 30 -days supply for all aircraft based in the ASS RON service area land based in the ASSRON supply, and a 60-day level maintained in the barges* Instructions have been issued to maintain 10-days Class IV () supplies ashore and 60- days afloat for all aircraft within the forward area. Hie barge supply will make issues to all ASSRONS in the forward area*

(1) Although the barge supply system was not establish

ed in sufficient time and was inadequately equipped to be of effective value in Galvanic, it was ascer tained that to properly implement the barge supply system, the following features are necessary: (1) One barge for each type of bombardment aircraft and one barge for all types of figiter aircraft oper ating in the area; (2) Barges to be equipped with anohor and hoisting gear, ventilation, watertight bulkhead doors, adequate hoisting gear for cargo loading and discharge, proper bins of the wood type, sufficient installed power for lighting and power equipment, watertight hatches similar to a ship hatch, and proper sanitary and office arrangements; (3) Barges organised to effect proper storage, shipping and receiving, issue and stock control; (4) When barges are not tied up to piers, harbor boats (LCMt s) must be permanently assigned to each barge; and (5) Personnel not subject to recall by a parent unit from which they are on detached ser vice must be assigned to man the barges. Necessary action has been taken to equip and modify barges now on procurement in accordance with these require ments

If the ASSRON is too closely correlated to the 6AKFOR, it becomes impractical to leapfrog the ASSRON to a new base without reduc ing the service ability of either the ASSRON or GARFOR. ttie ASSRON should be made as independent of the GARFOR as possible in order to preserve its mobility without sacrificing its efficiency* Plans are being made to make the ASSRON as independent of the GARFOR as possible in order to guarantee this mobility*
f Where a base is strictly temporary for air operations, and is not to be extensively developed, construction for air units should be limited to strictly essential construction only* The origi nal Air Foroe construction policy is being revised to eliminate non essential construction and revise priorities*

122

g. To provide proper air service upon the initial landing of tactical aircraft on a new strip, facilities for aviation gasoline and oil, third echelon aircraft repair, and bomb and ammunition supply should be installed concurrently with the construction of the air strip, The aviation engineer battalion should remain at the airdrome until all aviation facilities have been completed. Premature removal of the 804th Engineer Battalion from Makin Island delayed the construction Aviation of the above facilities* Recommendation has been made that the aviation engineer battalions not be relieved from an advanced base until released by the Air Force Commander.

h. On islands where sufficient land mass exists, the Air Ser vice Center can be more effectively employed than ASSRONS. Plans are being formulated to replace ASSRONS with Air Service Centers as the Central Pacific offensive moves into islands where sufficient land mass exists to facilitate their employment* i. To supervise the execution of air service plans in the for ward areas an advanced echelon of the Air Service Command headquarters should be established in a central location in the forward area. With out an adequate staff arrangement within the forward area, the Air Ser vice Commander is placed in the position of trying to execute his re sponsibility without the means to exercise his authority* Plans for the organization and operation of an advanced echelon will be placed in effect when completed. 5. Hawaiian Air Depot.

Organizations were over- equipped with heavy machinery. Recommendations for future operations have been forwarded to the VII Air Force Service Command.

b.

Construction

soon enough for the preparation of facilities.

future operations

and engineer troops were not made available Recommendations for have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

c. A small number of repair troops should have been trained and available for the commencement of operations. Recommendations for future operations have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command. d. Mobile repair shops, such as the Depot manufactured sheettruck, furnish ample facilities for third echelon maintenance; metal however, a greater supply of raw material, particularly sheet aluminum and bar stock, should accompany the vehicles. Recommendation for future operations has been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command. c. Field repairs should be definitely limited to third echelon; repairable items should be forwarded more quickly to the repair base. Recommendation for corrective action to be taken in future operations has been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

123

f Automatic supply of Technical Data for the advanced bases from the mainland was too slow to arrive on schedule for use in the Galvanic operation, for which itwas intended. Requisitions were en tered at once by the Air Depot Supply Department for emergency handling from the mainland to this Depot followed by immediate shipment to the bases involved*

necessary

g. The first reports from the advance bases indicated it was to pack all AAF material with only one classification in a box, as due to lack of storage space, material is often stored in the original boxes; making no segregation of classes possible without un packing the boxes. Allfuture packing, therefore, kept AAF classifi cation material separate, even though such a method required additional packages*

h. It was necessary to include many additional items of mater ial over and above the original estimate, because of subsequent losses through accidents, theft, and ordinary deterioration caused by inade The automatic quate storage facilities at the disposal of the ASSRDNS* supply increased to cover these abnormal supply conditions. i. In many cases planned manufacturing operations such as the generation of oxygen breathing gas could not be depended upon, due to failure of equipment to function on occasion. The reserve supply of material thus affected was increased.
j. The quantities and variety of Aircraft Spares and Supplies in Prepared Combat Tables from the mainland were not sufficient listed in this theater, proving short in variety as well as in quantity of many items* New and improved tables which were built up by the supply department based on experience reported in this theater are now being used.

k* Full company and E's are essential for tactical combat operations, with all teams self-sufficient in every detail possible* All communications teams were dependent upon the ASSRON headquarters for and administration and mess* Companies are now being sent with full E*s, the standard set-up being a Signal Headquarters (with a Major as Signal Officer, one Lieutenant as assistant, and three clerks) and two companies: one Aircraft Warning Company, formed under and E 11-400, and a Signal Communications Company, formed under and E 11-500* The total number of officers and men is 337 for future assignments*

t/o

t/o

T/o

t/o

1* Personnel should be trained, as nearly as possible, in all jobs of the Joint Communication Center to provide flexibility* When ever possible all Seventh Air Force personnel are given diversified training so that they may filldifferent positions if required*
procedure is necessary for the Joint Com m* A standardized munication Centers, to eliminate differences in procedure and terminology

124

The Joint Communication and speed up the message handling process* Center personnel from all services should be trained together before they land on an enemy beach* A suggested Standard Operating Procedure has been prepared and included in the Advanced Base Officer's Guide as suggested means of standardization*

n. Pre-fabricated equipment for the Joint Communications suoh as operating tables and radio receiver position^ should be made in the rear area* Plans are being prepared for the Joint Com munications Center building and the furniture for it is being built*
Center,

o. Certain radio circuits which the Joint Communications Center cannot provide are necessary for internal communications within the Seventh Air Force. A radio circuit from ADVON Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, to its rear echelon has been installed, and a functional VII Bomber Command circuit was installed recently and is now being tested*
p. All radio equipment should be set up and operated prior to shipping to an advanced base, as many radio sets are damaged in shipment from the mainland* All radio equipment, no matter how well packed, is now opened, set up and operated, then carefully repacked and in some cases covered with water-proof paper and then double packed* This double packing, in addition to better protection, also gives additional lumber that is always needed after landing*
q*

Radio equipment

assigned to a net must have sufficient

equipment would not tune to assigned frequencies* now set up and operated before leaving this area* in use have extended frequency coverage*

frequency coverage to accommodate all frequencies which may be assigned to that net* During Galvanic operation it was found, too late* that
Alltransmitters are

All transmitters now

r. AACS radio circuits, ranges, homing beacons* control tower equipment and personnel are needed early in the operation* These fa cilities were not planned to be installed until D plus 15 and D plus 20, as they were not believed necessary until then* This plan was correoted by sending in mobile radio transmitter and radio receiving stations, portable radio ranges and temporary radio homers* This equipment is be ing improved for future operations.
s. To provide for quick and dependable switchboard installa tion, one (1) TC-4 and one (1) TC-12 should be installed in a K-19 trailer. This was done at Funafuti, using two TC-20s in a K-19 trail er, with great success. This was not done at Makin and resulted in slow installation of telephone switchboards. Trailers are being built for future operations* t* Radar efficiency is greatly reduced by tall palm trees in the vicinity, making 100 foot towers a necessity to get radar antennas above the palm trees, as well as to inorease the range.

125

v. Sufficient spare parts must be readily available for all signal equipment including an abundance of spare parts for units where trouble is known to occur. This applies mainly to electric power plant equipment and to special radar installations* v. A large bulldozer should be available to ASSRON com munications section upon landing to assist in full revetment of all equipment* A bulldozer has been assigned from the Engineers to the communications section for the initial installation of radar, radio, and telephone equipment. w. Deviations between Army and Navy cryptographic practices when working on joint systems tended to give away the organisation enciphering the message. CinCPAC in collaboration with the Seventh Air Force, drafted a letter for submission of the differences to the Combined Communications Committee in order that the deviations might be overcome*

x Both officers and enlisted men should be trained in the operation of the ECM, and officers should be trained in all crypto graphic devioes* Thorough instruction is now being given to all cryptographic personnel*
y. Navy personnel are not always familiar with the Army that are available in the Joint Communication Centers, which in many unnecessary "services The Cryptographic Security results at ADVON Seventh Air Force, has sent a letter to the Joint Officer Communications Centers on checking Army system and Army indicators before sending "services*" in addition, all new cryptograph officers are instructed to keep Navy personnel conscious of the presence of Army systems in the Joint Communications Centers* systems

"

126

Cfticpac File
R*c-j35-crf

A6-2/A6-1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 6 Ootober 1943

SerialO2392

CONFIDSITIAL From: To: Sub j s ect Commander In Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas PACIFIC FLEET and PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, Communications Policies for Joint Operations Pacific Areas. in the Central

References:

(a) Joint Action of the Army and the Uavy, 1935. (b) CinCPOA File Pac-01-Ye Iy4l Ser. 02258 of 21 Sept. 1943.

(c) CinCPOA File Pac-J4-Es

L/tlB Ser.

02248 of 20 Sept. 1943.

The following principles shall be observed in the formulation of communications plans for, and the conduct of communications at newly established Central Pacific island bases, plus CANTON, BAKER, FUNAFUTI, NUKUFETAU, NANOMEA, and others whioh may later be designated.

(a) Hie Commanding Officer of each base shall establish a

joint communication center which shall conduct all communications for all services (Army, Navy or Marine Corps) operating at such base. He will be assisted by <a base communication officer from the Army, Navy or Marine Corps, vftiose selection will be dictated by the situation existing at the base* Selection of each base communication officer shall be approved by CinCPOA after consultation with the interested Services. The base communication officer will be responsible to the com manding officer of the base for the operation of the joint communication center through which all communi cations from the facilities necessarily separated may be channeled to responsible commanders*

(b) The base communication officer shall have as assistants communication officers of the various services involved
who will be responsible for advising him on the conduct of and requirements for communications for their ser * vices.

(c) Normally, all operational dispatches

between island bases and external commanders or higher echelons will be transmitted via operational or tactical circuits

Incl. No. 1 to SECTION XXIII

established

or authorized by CinCPOA.

(d) In accordance

with a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to avoid duplication of circuits and facili ties, fixed circuits shall be established only as authorized by CinCPOA. This principle applies only to long range circuits employing frequencies below 20 mcs. Internal tactical circuits required by as sault or defense forces, tactical circuits required for air-amphibious operations, and circuits employ ing low power on frequercies above 20 mcs, are ex cluded from the provision.

(1)

Circuits or facilities, when authorized in ac cordance with (d) above, which ere peculiar to the needs of one service usually shall be pro vided and operated by that service.
having paramount interest shall provide and operate such circuit or facility.

(2) Ttfhere circuits are employed jointly the service

(c) Ihe respective services

shall provide the material necessary to meet their own internal communication telephone, telegraph, and teletypewriter require ments* All wire communications at the base shall be coordinated by the Senior Signal Officer to avoid duplication or confusion, and will be install ed and maintained under his supervision* Visual and harbor control communications under the joint communication center shall be in stalled and operated by the Navy.
shall, upon installa tion of aircraft operating facilities, pres cribe the approach and recognition procedure to be employed by aircraft.

(f) (1)

(2) The base air commander

(s) Communications

for the Filter Warning Services are under the of the local air commander and with base joint communications er.

Director and Air operational control shall be coordinated by the base command

00

An airways communication service way be established by the Navy, or Army Airways Commurication Service as required at island bases in ihe Central Pacific Area as part of the joint communication center to provide any or all of the following services:

(1) Point to point circuits for aircraft movements

and other messages service.

relating to the airways

(2) Air-ground communication for

on non-combat missions*

itinerant, trans port, and combat aircraft moving between bases

(3) Airdrome local air traffic control* (4) Seadrome

traffic control*

(5) Radio Aids to aerial navigation.

(6) Instrument
landing systems

as required.

Tiiless absolutely essential these services shall not be duplicated and will be utilized by both Amy and Navy aircraft insofar as may be practicable*

(i) Permanent equipment, once provided, shall normally

remain in place regardless of changes in command Every effort shall be made between the services* to avoid duplication of personnel, equipments, and circuits* 2.

(a)

Communications plans for island bases shall be form ulated in accordance with Chapter XI, Subsection V of reference (a)* Communication facilities shall be planned in the order of establishment as required by the operation plans*

(b)

3* The following rules governing the expression of time of origin, and time in message texts, shall be observed*

(a) The time of origin will be expressed as six figures, followed by a zone suffix letter, the first pair of
digits denoting the date, the second pair hours, the third pair minutes except that the first two digits denoting the date may be omitted ifnot required* Time of origin will be expressed in teims of G*C*T* (G.M*T*) unless considerations of security expediency require otherwise.

and/or

(b) All times in the text of messages

will be expressed with a zone suffix letter except that in the text of messages involving a large number of times, a covering expression such as "all times zone Baker"

may be used instead of appending letter to each.

zone suffix

(c) When referenoe is made to a message by its time of

origin, the method of expression of that time of origin will be preserved in its original form. The year may be added if necessary. month

and/or
t

Example

"Your 161412Z DEC 42."

(d) A major task force commander may prescribe a partic

ular zone time to be used in message texts for his force regardless of the fact that more than one time zcne may be involved in the area of operations of his force.
Cryptographic aids to be employed at advanced base shall 4* be determined by each service to meet its needs, within the limitations to be prescribed by CinCPOA. No. E.C.M. (SIGABA) shall be landed at any base until approved by CinCPOA* Commanders of all services shall be kept apprised of the class (category) of cryptographic aids held by island bases.

5.

(a) All services should maintain adequate levels of

equipment and personnel initially in the Hawaiian
Area, readily available for immediate

employment

wherever they may be required, as directed by para graph 6 of enclosure (A) to reference (c). Upon the replacement of mobile equipment by permanent base equipment material replaced shall be made available for reassignment by the material pool or depot of the appropriate service o

(b) Each, service shall be responsible for the supply

of spare parts aid replacements of its own types of equipment regardless of the use to which it is put. 6. All base communication services shall be directly under the operational control of the local Officer in Tactical Command*

C. W. NIMITZ.

DISTRIBUTION: (13BT-43):

LIST II P, SP, MC, HTS, XI, 2, 3, 4, 5, V, Z.

873, 3V, 11. 23, KS3, 4,
NAll54, NBIB, 49, NDll-15,

HYB-10,

Special: C.G. Centpao C.G. Sowespac

C6* Sopac
C.G. Samoan Def. For* C.G. 7th A. F. C.G. sth A. F.
C.G* Army Air Forcea
C.G. 11th A. F. C.G. 4th A. F.

P. V. Mercer,

Flag Secretary.

B-24 Modifications

1. Remove lagging from winterized engines 8 July 43).

2. Install 3

(T*o. 02-1-44, dated

CO2

fire extinguishing system to engines (Mod, No. 53).

Comply with T.O* 01-5-65, dated 5 October 43 (gas vent line when needed).

4. Install tail wheel (Mod. No. 13A). 5.

6,

Install waist gun crash belts.

Install top hatch deflector (Mod. No* 42)*

driftmeter next to navigator's cable (Mod* No* 42)*

7. Relocate

8. Install scanning windows in nose. 9. Relocate navigator to flight deck (Mod. No. 42)* 10. Relocate radio compass indicator LH. front corner of navigator's table (Mod* No 0 42)* 11. Make one additional droppable bomb bay tank installation (as per drawing No. 44D417). 12. Install navigator's instruments on flight deck (Mod. No. 42)*

13. Install bottom hatch deflector (Mod. No. 36). 14. Modify life raft release mechanism

(Mod. No. 37A).

15. Install SCR-522 antenna mast (Mod. No. 52). 16. Install handrail alongside ball turret* 17. Install heavy duty elevation stowing cable in nose turret. 18.
19,

Install reinforcements

to bomb bay door tracks (U.R. 43-249).

Install supports for pitot tubes (discontinued due to redesign)* Install astral compass dome stowage (Mod* No. 42). Install fuel transfer hand pump system (Mod. No. 17).

20. 21*

22. Relocation of camera vacuum valve (Mod. No. 47).

1 Incl. No* 2 to

SECTION XXIII

23. Modify wiring in bombardier *e panel with rheostat switoh (Mod. No. 5). 24. Install new azimuth lock on nose turret. 25. Install camera mount (Mod. No* 36).

and dimming

26. Install cal. .30 guns in nose side windows and stop* 27. Install stowing containers for cal* .30 ammunition*

28. Install relief tube in nose section (Mod* No. 42). 29. Install ammunition roller guides for waist
guns*

30. Bistall modified A-2 bomb releases and synchronise control box with racks (11-5-46, dated 28 November 43 and T*o. 11-5-23, dated 2 March 43). 31. Install upper turret Pelorus pointer and calibrate turret* 32. Install cover for ball turret.

33. Install metal cover in Astral dome (Mod* No. 42).

34.
35,

Install suspension cables for waist gun ammunition chutes. Install shoulder harness
#

for pilot and co-pilot*

36.

Install sun deflector top turret sight (T.O. 11-35-14, dated 14 September 42)*

37. Safety pitot static selector in off position and check for lines being open (Mod. No* 42). 38. Relocate oxygen bottles over bomb bay (to provide additional stowage space). 39.
40,

Modify emergency hydraulic pump handle (U.R. AD APO 953

44-36).

Install SCR 521 (Mod. No. 42).

41. Install galley kit. Type C-2 aft of 42.

rieit waist

gun.

Remove tail turret and install twin 50*8 (Mod. No. 31A).

43. Replace Carburetor jets (Install No. 700-3 B jets as per ASC Radio No. 1298, dated 8 Dec 43). 44* Modify Propeller Feathering Switohes

(UR HAD 44-28).

45. Install blister window for Pilot and Co-pilot and widen the open ing and equip for emergency release (Mod. No. 69). 46. Install quick release
baggage

racks.

47. Relocate pilot's seat lock handle (to opposite side of seat)* 48. Install wind deflector for lower ball turret. 49. Install deflector and braces for nose turret when needed*

50. Remove relief tube near bomb bay door handle and reinstall in back of pilot* s seat near right front leg of navigator * table (Mod. No. 42).

B-25 Modifications

1. 75mm gun firing switch installed an the pilots wheel. 2. Remove miscellaneous airplane*
de-icer lines and equipment -throughout the

3. Remove all lines to rear fuselage heater. 4. Install twin bottle C0 2 engine fire extinguisher
No,

system (Mod,

58).

5. Remove canvas

cover from battery.

6. Install the N6A gunsight in front of the pilot in place of the

N3B sight (Mod. No. 59, part B).
7. Replace stocking boots that cover the nose wheel strut and elbows with boots that cover the shock strut only (Mod. No. 60, part B). 8. Install safety wire on mounting bolts for upper turret. 9. Install turret stop for protection of tail from own fire when
necessary.
10 Comply with T.O. 01-60G-63, and install tf6A gunsight. 11. Install oil tank sump bottom self sealing, part No. 82-47083, for left side and part No. 82-47083-1, for the right side (Shortage of parts). 12. Cover wing openings into Navigators compartment in the airplane that did not come so equipped (Mod* No* 60, part A). 13. Install SCR-522 and frequency crystals

(T.O. 08-10-105)*

14. Comply with T*o* 01-600*45, and install buffer plates on nose wheel door and nose as per drawings Nos. AP0953AD44D438, -443, and -458. 15. Modify fuselage hood at hinge point (UR APO 959 43-481)* 16. Install G.S.A.P. camera gun and mount in nose. 17. Install K-21 or K-25 camera mount (Proposed Modification)* 18. Comply with NAA Modification Center Report No. A-18, Structure Reinforcement plus additional APO 953 reinforcement (Mod. No. 65).

Incl. No. 3 to SECTION XXIII

19. Move Waist gun to middle of window, and install spoiler in front of waist gun window. Install N6A sight (Mod. No. 64 )? 20* Beaded trailing wire antennae APO 43-387).
Modification)*
from reel to transmitter

(UR AD

21. Install "Push to Talk11 switches 22* Install extended blast tubes.

on waist and tail guns (Proposed

23. Strengthen bulkhead blast plate for package guns (Same as Item
No,

18).

Fighter Aircraft

Modifications

1* Launching, tow-holdback, installation, P-39 series aircraft (NAF). 2. Supercharging of V-1710-81 engine ignition systems and P-398-5-BE series aircraft (Mod. No. 63) in P-39Q-1-BE

3. Supercharging of ignition systems of V-1710-73 and -85 engines Installed in P-40K-1 and P-40N-SCU aircraft (Mod. No. 62).

Incl. No. 4 to SECTION XXIII

fIIGIASSIFIED

ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND

-' : - :

U S AF IC P A P AR TI I AT I N C P O

TfTkLVI OP EIO N
NiC ATI

SECTION XXIV

-
ARMY PORT iSND SERVICE

A. PREPARATION This command assisted the troops in the preparation for Galvanic operation with every means at their disposal. 1 Supplies furnished. The packing and crating section furnished prefabricated boxes and crates, dimension lumber for palletizing and all dunnage, strapping materials, tool stencils, brushes and other equipment for cargo crating* 2. Equipment furnished. Ihe transportation division furnished all available low-bed and flat-bed trucks to assist in the movement of the organizational equipment to the staging area and to the piers. The fol equipment was also furnished for use at the Navy docks: 4 3-ton lowing lift trucks, 4 hi-lifts, and 4 jitneys. 3. Personnel furnished. Ihis command provided personnel for the technical supervision of cargo crating, Port troops for loading person nel and equipment aboard transports, and Military Police to convoy Army and Marine troops from staging areas to piers, direct traffic and main tain security guards prior to and during loading. An officer from this command with previous task force experience also furnished advice and assistance in loading the transports and cargo vessels. B. SUPPORT.
1, Company D, 376th Port Battalion consisting of 4 officers and 220 enlisted men was assigned to the 7th Garrison Force which had th* mission of defending the island after the assault troops left.

COMMAND.

2* The staging and billeting section furnished the requisite bil lets for the entire garrison force prior to its departure from Oahu.

127

MHH^^y

SECTION XXV

-
27TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

A. ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION. 1. Objective. On 4 August 1943, the Commanding General, USAFICPA, notified the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, that his divi sion was to participate in the Galvanic operation. Details were not then available, but the general directive authorized direct contact with the Navy, as this operation was to be an amphibious action in the Gilbert Islands. Within 48 hours, the planning section of CinCPOA, represented by Colonel Mandell and Colonel Ferrin, informed the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, that the Divisions objective was to be the Island of Nauru, with the target date tentatively about 15 November. It was planned to employ 9 BLT's, with an impressive number of Naval vessels supporting the action. All information in their hands was made available to the 27th Infantry Division* This information as to the enemy, terrain, and logistical data, however, was inadequate for the detailed preparation of an operational plan. Further details were to be transmitted to the division as they became available* 2. Chain of command. During the months of August and September, Headquarters for the Central Pacific Force, Fifth Amphibious Force, and Fifth Amphibious Corps, were in the process of organization. Channels of command were non-existent, and direct contact was maintained by the 27th Infantry Division with all these Naval echelons. This situation caused considerable confusion as to the delivery of orders but did bring about a close association between all the staffs concerned. B. TPAINING PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION.

1. Staff Amphibious School. The 27th Division had been conducting preliminary amphibious training over a period of approximately c ight months prior to assignment to the Galvanic operation. In December, 1942, two officers were detailed to attend an amphibious school conducted by the Marines at San Diego. On the return of these officers to the divi sion, a school on amphibious operations was inaugurated. This school was conducted during the period 7 April 1943 12 May 1943, and was attended by regimental and battalion commanders, their executive officers, S-2 f s, S-3*s, S-4's, and other officers and key non-commissioned officers of artillery battalions and separate units. This school accomplished its purpose in that it properly indoctrinated the organizations as to the requirements of amphibious operations.

2. BLT amphibious training Schofield Barracks. During the period 2 May 1943 24 July 1943 each BLT was assembled at Schofield Barracks for one weeks training. Here instruction was given in the use of ropes for guide-lines and the tying of knots, cargo-net climbing and descending, boat team drill, handling supplies from a platform (including the lower ing and stowing in mock-up boats), debarking and deployment from mock-up boats, passage through wire entanglements and other obstacles. BLT

129

commanders and their staffs prepared boat assignment tables, boat diagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams, debarkation and approach schedules. In addition, officer schools were ccnduct ed by the BLT commander to complete the indoctrination in amphibious training.
During the week follow 3. BLT amphibious training Waianae. ing the training at Schofield Barracks each BLT received one week f s training at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center. Here a pier was used to simulate a transport with the necessary booms and nets and a specially constructed barge was anchored off shore to give personnel the experience of embarking and debarking from a listing vessel. Winch operators were also trained with the existing equipment. Dur ing the training period at TiTaianae, each BLT received instruction in the embarkation and debarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies. Three landing exercises were conducted as follows:

a. A daylight landing "where the mechanics of debarkation, operation of the shore party, and handling of supplies were stressed. b. c. A night landing involving the same problems.

A dawn landing covering all phases of the landing oper clearing the beach, reorganization, advance to the objective, operation of shore party, handling of supplies and The final exercise was made as realistic as possible with equipment. the use of simulated strafing and bombing by planes, bangalore tor pedos, barbed wire obstacles, smoke, and explosives.
ation, debarkation,

4. Physical ccnditioning. During the period from the Ist of January to the end of July, special attention was given to physical conditioning. Vehicles were used only when necessary for the trans portation of troops* Every individual not required to participate in strenuous training was required to run a mile a day as a step toward proper conditioning. C. TRAINING AFTER ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION.

1. Subjects to be stressed. It was most apparent that prior to employment in amphibious action, the division required further train ing and equipment. A complete study of the equipment required to accomplish the assigned mission was initiated. Efforts to obtain definite information as to the personnel and cargo transports to be assigned were continued. Training was commenced, stressing rifle marksmanship, battle conditioning, and small unit training, vihile efforts were being made to obtain sufficient ships for the final phases of amphibious training in ship-to-shore movement. 2. Training camps. At the time the division was assigned to the Galvanic operation, three RCT training camps were made available

130

to the division. These camps made training aids available so that the units could complete basic training, known-distance firing, battle courses, specialists l training and team work in the employment of oom bined arms. In addition, each BLT was given one week of amphibious training at the VTaimanalo center; this training was similar to that conducted at Waianae. The 165th RCT conducted ship-to-shore exercises during the period 3 October 22 October, employing the 20th Transport Division. Shore Fire Control Parties were trained by the Division Artillery for the purpose of directing Naval gunfire after arrival on the beach.

3. Transport Quartermaster School. A school was conducted for Transport Quartermasters, commencing on 17 September and continuing until the troops embarked for the Galvanic operation. Under supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Ferris, G-4, 27th Infantry Division, the course stressed the following:
measuring

a. Familiarity with APA's and AKA's by visiting Pearl Harbor,

the ships and observing the loading of ships.
b.
Study of stowage plans used in the Attu operation.

c. Preparation of stowage plans, using the concepts prepared

by G-4 and based on tentative operational plans.
This school was of immense value. Itnot only trained transport quarter masters for the assault troops for the Makin operation, but also made possible the detail of officers in Vnis capacity for ships transporting the defense battalion* D' PIANNIFG. As previously stated, the original objective assigned the 27th Division was the Island of Nauru. On 2 October, this objective was changed to Makin Atoll. Because of this change, the planning phase by the 27th Division was divided into two parts. 1.
Objective;

Nauru.

Intelligence. In obtaining information on Nauru, every effort was made to preserve security. All available information on Nauru was obtained from the planning section of CinCPOA* Aerial photo graphs, objective reports, photo interpretation reports and studies were obtained from the Seventh Air Force. A feigned interest in guano and phosphate was successful in locating three information sources, namely, National Geographic Magazine, December, 1921; Ocean and Nauru Islands by Ellis; the Year Book of the South Pacific, 1942. A study of this data made possible a good informational foundation of Nauru prior to the establishment of Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps and Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Force.

(1)

A request was made to Admiral Nimitz to obtain the aid

131

of an inhabitant of Nauru with the result that Mr, Bott, an employee of the British Phosphate Company, arrived on Oahu about 18 August. He brought with him printed data on Nauru, pictures (both still and moving), and a large scale company map of the plateau on the island. This data, plus other ver bal information, proved extremely valuable, Mr. Bott remained with the division for approximately 3 weeks* During this period, his time was employ ed as follows:

(a) Discussion of the characteristics

relief map of Nauru. craft on Nauru.

of Nauru,

(b) Advice to PRISIC in their construction of

(c) Study of possible use of types of landing (d) Advice to G-2 during his preparation of a
terrain study of Nauru.

(c) A thorough reconnaissance

of Oahu with G-2 in quest of examples of reefs, cliffs, and vegetation with such characteristics as those found on Nauru.

(f) Correction of Engineer topographical map (2) By the middle of August, PRISIC had prepared a
relief model of Nauru from the information they had at hand but the scale was too small to give more than a general impression of the island, A second model was requested on a scale of 5,000, exaggerated 2-g- times vertically. This relief map, though not accurate in detail, was declared amazingly true -when seen by Mr, Bott, A third relief map of the same scale was Ihen prepared under Mr, Bott*s supervision. It was planned to make sufficient copies of this re lief map so that every troop ship in the oper ation would have one available during the voyage.

l/

(3) The large scale map of ihe plateau area, furnish ed by Mr. Bott, was used in the preparation of a 1/20,000 topographical map by the 64th Engineer Topographical Company. This map, as originally
prepared, was unsatisfactory due to the method of 20,000 map was over-printing grid lines. Ihe l/

132

later corrected and satisfactory maps are now

available*

(4) About the middle of September, a submarine reconnais

sanoe of all GalTanic objectives was ordered by the Navy* Captain Donald Neuman, an assistant G-2, 27th Infantry Division, was designated to accompany this reconnaissance* Since Nauru was removed from the objectives for Galvanic, this reconnaissance list of of the Gilbert Islands was accomplished and valuable pictures of Makin secured.

(5) In addition to Mr. Bott, the following listed men and officers of the Australian Forces assisted in
the preparation of information on Nauru:
Captain William Brom, Engineer, A.I.F. Lieutenant Norman H* Cooke, Engineer, A.I.F. Warrant Officer Frank L. Mcae, A.I.F* Sergeant Winston X* Tingman, R.A.A.F.

These men arrived on Oahu at about the time the objective was changed and caused some embarrassment as no one was available to supervise them in their mission of producing more information on Nauru* These men were thoroughly familiar with reef, beach, and cliff conditions with which Mr* Bott had no intimate knowledge* They were most conscientious in their efforts and corrected and added to the data They also thoroughly which we had already obtained* analyzed and corrected the 1/20,000 engineer map prior to its final printing* Their efforts have made available an extremely complete data file on the Island of Nauru* b Tentative plan for attack* Due to the increasing infor mation concerning the physical characteristics of the island, it was possible to prepare a tentative plan of attack, employing 2 regiments in the assault, with 1 regiment (less 1 battalion) in floating reserve* Due to the prevailing winds, reef conditions, width of beach, cliff conditions, and location of the phosphate pits, the plan called for an attack on the northwest portion of the island* This plan was never crystallised due to the ever-changing assignment of vessels and the ultimate change in objective*
Logistical plans* In adapting the division for amphibious it was necessary to obtain considerable logistical support* Additional medical assistance was needed as well as combat engineers for shore party employment* A large amount of non-TBA equipment was also necessary.
c*

operations,

133

(1) Non-TBA Engineer Equipment required. (a) Barco hammers. (b) Additional explosives. (c) Water evaporators.

(d) 3 H-10 and 1 H-20 bridge and pneumatic equip

ment (which was contemplated for jetty and floating stage across the reef).

(c) 29 bulldozers with blades, including 2 D-7's

and 4 R-4's for each shore party company to handle supplies ashore.

(f) 6,000 pallets for ship-to-shore movement of supplies, and miscellaneous additional equip
ment.

(2) Ordnance*

(a)

During the period from 8 August to 30 August, a complete physical inspection of all ordnance in the division was made and deficiencies noted were reported in a detailed letter to CPA with a request for replacement of defective items. This included: Replacement of 60mm and 81mm mortars found defective. Replacement of 1918, 155mm Howitzer with new Ml Howitzer. 585 trucks (to make up shortages). 7 Athey trailers. Replacement of lj*ton dumps for dumps

J-ton
T/o

t/e

2^-ton

(b) Permission

was asked from CPA to alter Ordnance Company to permit inclusion of the follow ing elements: Ammunition men to operate a supply point. Specialists for tank maintenance, (AA) armament, and director equipment. An increased small arms section, artillery section, instrument section, and service section, to make the organization compar able to a medium maintenance company, normally a corps establishment.

134

(c) 50 LVT*s and as many DUKWs as could be obtained

Late in October, infor were also requested. mation was received that the LVT 2 f s which had been requested, would be available for employ This equipment actually ment in the attack. arrived and was delivered to the 27th Infantry Division on 30 October. A provisional organiza tion, composed of members of the 193 dTank Bat talion had previously been organised to operate these vehicles* This detachment, under command of Major Inskeep, performed an outstanding piece of work in the servicing prior to combat and operation during combat*

(3) Signal.

(a) A request for signal/ items, including portable

radios for communication from company to platoon, 1 280 radar, 1 274 radar, K5l and K52 (truck and trailer) and SCR 299 radios as well as radios for tanks and ship-to-shore communication*

(b) The CPA Signal Officer offered the use of detach ments* 75th Signal Company, which had participat
ed in the operation at Attu and had recently arrived here*

(4) Filler personnel.

At the time information was receiv ed that the 27th Infantry Division was to participate In Galvanic, the division was under strength over 1,000 men* G-l, CPA, made plans for the reduction of this deficiency by the assignment of troops from other combat divisions in the area* Due to the limitations on personnel caused by the size and number of trans ports available, it was at all times apparent that a full table of organizational strength could not be employed* The Division Commander requested that he be allowed to remain under strength* This request was approved*

(6) Graves registration* The attachment of quartermaster graves registration troops was requested but not pro vided by higher headquarters due to their unavailability. A graves registration section, consisting of 1 officer
and 2 enlisted men from the 27th Quartermaster Company, augmented by 5 enlisted men from participating units was organized for the operation* This section was trained under the direction of the Division Quartermaster and functioned adequately during combat in the disposition of American dead. However it was insufficient to cope

135

with the problems of hostile dead. An assistant G-4 of the division was given the responsibility of the burial of enemy dead -which he accomplished by the employmait of the 165 th Infantry Band in conjunction with native labor detail of approximately 50 men.

(6) A bakery unit was requested but refused. (7) Mail* It was apparent that in the event the oper
ation progressed as planned and the troops were with drawn from their objective immediately after its capture that delivery of mail to the participating troops would be impractical* On the other hand, prompt delivery of mail to troops remaining on the island was an essential morale factor It was there fore necessary to determine the exact units that were to remain on the island before definite arrangements could be made When the island had been captured and air evacuation of wounded commenced, the division G-l requested that mail be forwarded by plane at once. Through his efforts, arrangements were made with USAFICPA for prompt mail delivery. The operation of the mail service when once begun was conducted in a most superior manner. All Christmas packages were delivered to the troops on the island prior to Christ mas and with the return of the remaining combat troops to Oahu deliveries were stopped in time to prevent the unnecessary voyage to Makin and return* The men were outstandingly impressed by the fact that they had re ceived their Christmas packages and the fact that the delivery of mail for them to Makin had been terminated so that upon their arrival at Oahu, their current mail was awaiting them* This matter of mail delivery can not be over-emphasized.

(8) QM Supplies and equipment requested and obtained.

(a) 30 days

maintenance from which the 27th Infantry Division on its own initiative deleted a number of such non-essential items as stationery and protective clothing*
1

(b) Requested 2 machettes

per squad (obtained 600).

(c) 12 days* combination "C", "D", and "X" ration*, (d) 30 days'
M fl ration, B salt tablets, cigarettes pipe tobacco* and p

(c) One additional canteen

and cover per individual.

136

(f) Eh trenching tools for all personnel* (g) 1 set of HBT's for each man in place of one set
of cotton khaki clothing.

(h) 2 5-gallon water containers (9) Medical.

per individual*

(a) During "the month of August, the Division Surgeon

and the G-4 visited the Surgeon CPA, CinCPAC, and the Naval Surgeon, PH, obtaining information regarding expected casualties in the type of operation contemplated*

(b) Numerous

conferences were held with General King, CPA Surgeon, regarding the supporting hospital ization units for "the task force but General King was unable to supply the Field Hospital inhich we requested. However, he did furnish the following assistance:

Medical officers to fillvacancies

existing in the 27th Infantry Division. Additional medical officers necessary for 2 portable surgical teams* 66 trained medical EM for the portable surgical teams, to be replaced from personnel of the division from the best of limited service people of any branch. The division therefore actually had to furnish its own enlisted per sonnel for an additional Clearing Company and 2 Surgical Teams*

(10) Regulating Point.

In the last week of September, it became evident that a regulating point would have to be established for the assembly of supplies which were required for loading on shipboard. The assistant G-4 made arrangements with higher authority to use certain portions of Fort Kamehameha for such a regulating point and operating procedure was drawn up accordingly, ttie division special staff was instructed to ship materiel to the regulating point for palletizing. The division experienced considerable difficulty in obtain ing necessary equipment for the palletizing operation and for handling pallets*

2. Ob j ti ; Makin ec ve The change in target was confirmed the first week in October. Although the objective had been changed to Makin Atoll, all the planning during the previous two months had not been wasted*

137

Valuable staff contacts had been established, the training preparations remained unchanged* and supply requirements (including reequipping) were changed only by reduction in the number of items required.
Intelligence*

(1) 3y 1 October, several officers of the Australian

Forces,

who had intimate knowledge of Male in, had arrived at Fifth Amphibious Force Headquarters* Lieutenant Commander Heyen, of the Royal Australian Navy, remained with the Fifth Amphibious Force Head quarters during the entire operation and was con stantly available to the division for information.

(2) On 15 October, Private Fred C. Narruhn, Ist Fiji

Infantry, a native of Makin, reported to the divi sion for duty and was assigned to the G-2 section. By this time. Battalion Commanding Officers of the 165 th Infantry, 105th Field Artillery, and 193 d Tank Battalion had been informed of the mission assigned to the division and were familiar with the tentative ground force plans for the operation. Since Narruhn had played as a child over all parts of Butaritari Island, he was well informed as to the conditions of the reefs, taro pits, swamps, and lakes even to a greater extent than the Englishmen who had lived there* Thus he was of greatest value to the commanders who were to be in immediate charge of the BLTf s.

(3) The submarine which had been dispatched to reoon

noiter the Galvanic objectives was informed of the change from Nauru to Makin and was able to obtain panoramic pictures of the west and south shores of Butaritari Island as well as some previously unknown hydrographic information. Every effort was made to obtain all observations made by the submarine offi cers as well as by Captain Neuman, Headquarters, 27th Infantry Division, iflio had accompanied the ex pedition*

(*) Excellent air photographs were available, including

air observer's reports nhich, together with the in terpretations of the photographs, were invaluable in the preparation of the plan of attack*

(6) A team of 10 Nisei (American soldiers of Japanese ancestry) was received from the mainland approxi mately 4 weeks prior to departure* Due to the tacti
cal plan, it was necessary
initially to divide the

138

group into several teams so as to accompany each land ing unit* Plan 8 were made by which Ihe section was re united in division headquarters as soon as practicable after arrival ashore*

(6)

Maps of Makin

l/20,000,
quarters

Atoll were prepared on a scale of with sufficient sets for issue to all head and all officers and platoon sergeants*

(V) During the month of October, a great amount of infor mation data was received from the Fifth Amphibious Corps, Fifth Amphibious Force, JICPOA, and Head quarters, Central Pacific Area. Regimental and Bat talion Commanders received single copies of all avail
able data. The general distribution of this informa tion was finally made as follows:

(a) Maps, Makin Atoll,

l/20,000

indicated above*

(b) Aerial

mosaics,

Butaritari and Kuma Islands

all officers*

(c) Intelligence snnex and terrain studies

organizations officers* aquade

all every squad and all to include

- to

(d) Information folder, Gilbert Islands

- one

per

(c) Aerial mosaics, stereo pairs

- one

talion and higher headquarters organization*

set per bat and each separate and higher

(f) Submarine panoramic strips

headquarters

- battalion

and one per LVT driver.

(8) Due to the flatness

of Butaritari Island, large handdrawn maps showing terrain features cf the island and anticipated enemy installations were substituted for relief maps* These maps were drawn to a scale of approximately and were distributed to each troop ship.

l/500

b*

Plan of attack*

(1) Based on enemy information and terrain study, a plan was prepared whereby the task force (less one BLT

(reinforced) was to land on the western shore of Butaritari Island beginning at nH"-hour, which was
to be set according to tidal conditions and time

139

required for preliminary naval, and air bombardment, 1 BLT, reinforced, was Initially held as a floating reserve with the intention of landing on the lagoon side of Butaritari Island in the center of the organ ised Jap positions at "If-hour, which hour was to be determined dependent upon the success of the initial landing.

(2) In order to insure the success heavy naval gunfire bombardment ment were employed. The naval fully prepared by the Division

of landing troops, and aerial bombard gunfire plan was care

Artillery Commander

in conjunction with the appropriate staff officers of the Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth Amphibious Corps* The air strikes were coordinated with the bombardment and the approach of the initial waves of the landing forces.

(S) An officer of the Division General Staff was given

the assignment of coordinating the preparation of the Air Plan with Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth Amphibious Corps* At the time this assignment was given, the Air Officer of Force had already prepared a draft of a plan which had not been approved by the Corps Commander. A plan was finally worked out nhich proved satisfactory to all units and was issued e by tii Fifth Amphibious Force. The principal pro blems which had to be solved were:

(a) Targets to be hit on "D"-l strike and MD"-day

strike.

(b) Type of bombs which would be most effective against the Japanese installations* (c) Safety factor*
(d) Planes to be available for direct support of the
ground forces and for reconnaissance.

The Fifth Amphibious Force had the additional problem of lack of information as to the name and number of aircraft carriers vhich would be available for the operation. This so retarded the preparation of de tailed plans for the execution of the air support that the final plans of the carrier task force com manders were not received until the day of sailing.

(4) Air-ground liaison parties, furnished by the Fifth

Amphibious Corps, were assigned

to the division just

140

prior to the last training cruise and too late for combined training, Ihese parties were immediately assigned to and lived with the units with which they were to operate, so that close personal contact might be obtained. The greatest difficulty in the employ ment of these air-ground liaison groups was due to the lack of any combined training with the carrier groups which were eventually assigned to support the operation.

(5) Initial information indicated that the communications

personnel for the support aircraft commander ashore would be furnished by the Fifth Amphibious Force, It was not until just prior to the operation "that this decision, was changed and itbecame neces3ery to organ ize and train the communications group from personnel in the division. This was finally accomplished through the assistance of the Division Signal Officer, Force Air Communications Officer, and the Garrison Force Sig nal Officer. In spite of their hasty organization, the communications functioned very satisfactorily during the operation.

c. Logistical, plan. TAlhen the initial logistical planning was changed to conform to the new directives the greater part of the pallet izing had been completed. The assignment of Transport Division No. 20, for employment in practice cruise, made possible the actual assignment of troops to ships in conformity to the then tentative plans for attack. During the period 9 October 17 October, the 27th Infantry Division Task Force participated in a practice cruise for training in ship-to Immediately following the return of the task force from shore movement. its training cruise, the ships were reloaded for the actual expedition. By 30 October, all equipment and personnel had been loaded on Transport Division No, 20, and during the first week of November, rehearsals for the actual operation were conducted at Maui and Kahoolawe, The task force returned to Pesrl Harbor and for several days devoted their time to rehabilitating equipment and correcting faults noted in "the rehearsals. On 10 November ths task force departed Pearl Harbor on its historic mission.

E.

LESSONS LSATiNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

1,

In the lowest echelons (rifle companies, platoons, and squads and tank platoons and individual tanks) there was no communication agency available to link the components of the infantry-tank team* This dis crepancy is being made the subject of intensive study and test by this division. 2. The waterproof containers provided for communication equipment were not entirely effective. Further experimentation is being done by

141

signal agencies equipment*

in an effort to provide better protection for this

3. Promiscuous firing by "trigger happy" individuals is a serious danger to our own troops. Strict discipline for offenders is necessary but prior training should eliminate a large percentage of this.
4. Full advantage in the employment of tanks was not obtained due to lack of training in conjunction with small infantry units* This training is being stressed in preparation for future operations* 5. It is believed that the lightly armored LVT is the vehicle that will insure landings being successful against the heavy opposition that can be expected in future operations* 6. Shore Fire Control Parties and Air-Ground Liaison Parties must train with the units which they will support in the operation* 7* Observers should be attached to the organisations of the task force so that full use may be made of their professional qualifications by the commanders concerned*

142

imeussiFiE!

UK

SECTION XXVI
A,

-
CANTON TASK FORCE.

SUPPORT OF OPERATION.

Task Force Headquarters. In support of this operation the Headquarters acted as an agency for coordination of Canton Task Foroe Galvanio tactical units stationed here. Assistance rendered these units was essentially in matters of supply, maintenance, quarters and communications

1*

2.
<v

Air Base facilities.

a* Two squadrons of B-24s conducted strike and search missions from this base in preparation for Galvanic* Search missions were con ducted daily and a total of sixteen strikes were made*
N

b. One Navy reconnaissance squadron conducted photographic missions over the Gilbert-Marshall area in order to provide the task forces with the latest photographic intelligence* Complete facilities were established here for reproduction and distribution of prints* One medical air evacuation squadron brought patients to this base for hospital isation or evacuation to Oahu depending upon the type of casualty* B* LESSONS LEAMED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKBE. Many times radiograms were reoeived which referred to orders which had not yet arrived. This resulted in many questions and answers which placed an unnecessary load upon the communication facilities* The commanders concerned have been notified of this in an attempt to avoid a recurrence in future oper at ions.

143

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XXVII
A,

BAKER TASK FORCE.

PREPARATION FOR GALVANIC.

1. Organization, This task fore was formed by direction of the Commanding General, USAFICPA, on 11 August 1943 with the mission of occupying Baker Island, establishing thereon an air base with suitable facilities for the operation of fighter and bomber aircraft and defend ing the island and all of its installations against attack by land, sea or air. The task force nhich consisted of a headquarters, an engineer aviaticn battalion, a provisional antiaircraft artillery battalion, a provisional ASSRON, a fighter squadron, and the necessary service de tachments l aided on 1 September 1943 with full equipment and supplies sufficient to operate and maintain the base for 90 days.
2. Construction. The engineer aviation battalion assisted by other task force units immediately cans true ted a Mars ton-mat runway 150* x 5500*, and twenty six hardstandings to accomodate fully loaded B-24 f s with ample taxiways and turning areas. The field was ready for fighter operations on 8 September 1943 and the entire base was ready to support the Galvanic operation by 12 September 1943. B. SUPPORT OF OPERATION. uring the ninety day period following estab lishment of the base Army and Navy aircraft conducting heavy bombardment

strikes, and photographic, reconnaissance, search and transport missions were serviced at this base using nearly 400,000 gallons of fuel and 4,000 gallons of lubricant. Three thousand officers and men of the air crews were fed, quartered and in sane cases clothed. Casualties were expedi tiously handled by the medical section, the more seriously wounded being kept here until definite improvement was noted.

145

ASSISTANCE RENDERED
TO NAVY AND ill ARINES ARINES

4r

J*

Wjlfc

yxcLASsm[Q
i

iuiiiiiii

SECTION XXVIII A. BY G-2.

-
ASSISTANCE

RENDERED TO NAVY AND MARINE CORPS.

1. First priority was given on all requests and objective data for Galvanic.
B. BY G-4.

from JICPOA for maps

1* This section worked very closely with both the 4th Section of the sth Marine Administrative Command and the J-4 section of CinCPOA fs staff. A representative of G-4 assisted the J-4 in formulation of joint logistic policies, including the Advanced Base Logistic Policy, and the logistic annex to the operational plan.
2* G-4 supplied constant advice and information on the ability of CPA to fillrequirements in excess of TBA which were approved by the sth Amphibious Corps. C. BY CHEMICAL OFFICER.

1. 1600 selected officers and enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps were given specialized training in defense against chemical attack and in the employment of smoke during the three CWS schools and one chemical field maneuver. 2. 700 pots, smoke, floating, HC, M4, were transferred for this operation* D* BY ENGINEER. to the Navy

1. 94,560 maps secret plans, and navigation oharts were reproduced for the Navy and Marine Corps. 2* Supplies such as explosiyes, barbed wire, pickets and sandbags were furnished upon request* 3. The engineer procured the land and constructed a division train ing camp on Hawaii which was turned over to the 2d Marine Division upon their arrival in the Hawaiian area after Galvanic* E* BY FINANCE OFFICER. The disbursing officer assigned to the garrison force has made to all Navy and Marine personnel applying therefor*

1. payments
F._

BY ORDNANCE OFFICER.

1* During the planning phase exchange of advice, experience and logistic data between the Ordaance Office and the Ordnance sections of

147

the V Amphibious Corps and the Sixth Base Depot proved mutually advan tageous 2. Approximately #175,000 worth of maintenance parts and acces sories were issued to Marine units preparing for this operation* 3. G*

5,500 tons of aircraft ammunition was furnished to Navy units.

BY QUARTERMASTER.

1* The Quartermaster furnished items of Army equipment required by the Navy or Marines upon authentication of the requisition by the Naval Supply Depot. Several immersion type hot water heaters, over 1000 pair 8 of shoes and various other items were supplied in this man
ner*

supplies were furnished to Navy and Marine Corps units 2. Class I during the support phase of the operation.

H.

BY SIGNAL OFFICER.

1* Personnel were provided to instruct 125 Navy and Marine person nel in the operation and maintenance of Army signal equipment* 2.

Following items of equipment were furnished to the Navy

3 14 10

SCR-509 radios.
SCR- 510 radios. Teletypewriters TG 97.

! BY SURGEON. 1* There was little assistance rendered to other servioes in matters pertaining to sanitation during the planning stages, however, with the occupation of the Gilbert Area close liaison between Army and Navy officers for sanitation became essential* Several conferences were held by ihe Navy medical personnel and the Surgeon, CPA, for the purpose of obtaining information on field sanitation. Copies of Field 8-40 were provided for the Navy and Marine Corps units and gen Manual eral sanitary measures were discussed with them* Naval officers were shown how to flyproof pit latrines and were given plans of concrete impervious latrines to be emptied by a portable cesspool pump* Infor mation was given on mosquito control, garbage disposal, burial of the dead, and mess sanitation. The matters discussed at these conferences were later incorporated in sanitary orders published by the Navy* 2. Medical intelligence concerning the Gilbert Area was exchanged with the Navy and Marine Corps Medical Officers*

3* Naval personnel were assisted

in their air evacuation activi

148

ties by the Army Air Force evacuation

4,

squadron.

Plans were made to assist the Navy in the hospitalisaticn of 1,000 beds (in Army hospitals on Navy casualties if it were necessary* Navy casualties but they were not needed Oahu) were made available for for this purpose. Naval units returning to the Hawaiian Area for re habilitation were served by Army hospitals on -the islands of Hawaii and Maui. Naval medical personnel assisted in the care of these patients by working in the Army hospitals.
J. BY SEVENTH AIR FORCE.

1. 599 photograph negatives obtained on strike and reconnaissance missions against the Gilbert, Marshall, Ocean, Nauru, and Wake Islands before and during the operation were furnished to JICPOA. Other assist ance and information was given direct to Navy and Marine intelligence officers. 2. 4,563 navigation maps and charts were furnished to Navy and Marine units from Air Force stock. were used to augment the daily search program for 4 missions per day were flown for 21 days, for a total of 84 sorties. 3. B-24 bombers which Navy was responsible. 4. Three C-47 transport planes and crews were assigned to the Marine transport units (CESTCATS) for operation between advance bases. 5. 1/Shen available, Navy and Marines were furnished items of Air Force and Engineer equipment superior to their own standard types. 6. During occupation phases, equipment of all units in the field employed for the benefit of all services on a "borrow and return 11 was basis. 7. Items of general supply were furnished the Navy and Marines "when the request was considered justified and available stocks permitted. 8. Marine and Naval aircraft requiring repairs which could be fur nished at Air Force installations were handled by the ASSRDNS. Air Force welding, propellor, electrical, sheet; metal, and technical shops were used by all services. 9. ASSRQN trucks were taken from low priority work to move high priority Navy and Marine supplies and equipment. 10. Seventh Air Force medical air evacuation and Marine casualties between Funafuti and Oahu.
11,

system carried 14 Navy

Passengers

and freight with a CENCATS assigned priority were

149

moved on the same priority by Air Transport Command, 12* ASSRONS assisted CENCATS in the operation of air terminals Makin, Funafuti, Nukufetau, Nanomea, and Tarawa* 13 at

The Canton Sub-Depot maintained 13 PB4YI airplanes for approx

imately two weeks* Four PB4YI ball turrets were repaired by the Hawaiian Air Depot.
14* Assistance was given Naval Supply in securing Air Corps items needed by them, particularly B-24 spares and equipment, whenever call ed upon.

15* A mutual pool of oxygen cylinders was established

ward
areas*

at the for

16. Material, technical personnel, ed by all services in the establishment warning services*

and information were contribut of joint communication and air

17* 49 Navy personnel were trained in sheet metal fabrication per tinent to aircraft modification*

150

SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS

SHI

UIJCUSSIEIEI

USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION

SECTION XXIX

-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

A. SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL LESSONS LEARNED IN THE GALVANIC OPERA HON. 1.

Preparation.

The time allotted to plan this operation and to train the troops in the particular jobs they were to perform was insufficient. In the preparation for future operations the maximum time must be allotted to this important phase. b. At least one complete prior to the operation. c Tank- infantry training and realistic rehearsal combat must be held

teams must be stressed.

d. Individuals must be given additional training in the hand ling of captured supplies, materiel, and documents to prevent loss or
damage by looting or souvenir hunting.

c. Complete and detailed censorship every contingency should be provided.

regulations

covering

f. An operation of this type results in a large number of enemy dead. A detailed, workable disposal-plan must be provided.
g. Plans must be provided for early and effective mosquito control in areas where heavy mosquito infestation is expected.

22

Equipment

a. The unavoidable probability that supplies and equipment would be continually damaged and lost in a difficult amphibious oper ation requires that every man be imbued with a personal interest in property responsibility. b. All equipment susceptible spray must be completely waterproofed. communications equipment and weapons.
to damage

by salt water or salt This applies particularly to

c. All radio equipment arriving from the mainland should be set up and operated prior to shipping to an advanced base. No matter how well packed, many radio sets are damaged in shipment o d. The number of flame throwers allotted to a unit involved in an operation such as this should be materially increased above the T/E allowance.
angle-dozers.

The shore parties should be equipped with D-4 and D-7 Ihe D-7s should have a blade narrow enough so that the

151

assembled

tractor and blade can be easily disembarked

from an LCM*

f. The LVT is excellent for this type of operation, but the LVT4 with the ramp should be a big improvement*
g. Cannister ammunition can be used very effectively against personnel by AT guns, SP guns, and tanks.

h. Suitable signal equipment must be provided to facilitate communication between small groups of infantry and individual tanks* and collecting company equipment pack carried and should consist only of items absolutely should be essential to the treating of shock and hemorrhage and the application of sterile dressings*

i. Medical detachment

cal tit*

j. Individuals should be issued the Individual Jungle Ifedi

to suit the terrain* Additional radios, phonographs records should be provided* 3.

Organisation*

k* Athletic and Recreation Kits type nnAtt should be revised

and phonograph

Garrison units must be organised under full strength Tables of Organization if they are to successfully accomplish their
mission* b Engineer troops employed in base development must all be under command of the Base ihgineer to insure maximum efficiency in the use of engineer troops and equipment*

The ASSRON should be as independent of the Garrison Force as possible in order to preserve its mobility without sacrificing its efficiency*
d* Additional labor troops must be assigned to the ASSRDN during the initial phases of base development* 4*
Logistics*
a*

of all elements

Staging area facilities must be adequate for the housing of the garrison force prior to embarkation*

b* Large stockpile reserves of supplies and equipment must be available to meet unexpected changes in plans* because
c* Assault units must avoid the tendency to "take it along * it might be needed 1 in computing their supply and equipment

152

requirements.

d. Precut buildings should be provided to speed up con struction during the base development phase. establish base. An advance the necessary detail should precede the main air unit to operating facilities at a newly constructed

f To meet the requirements of rapid tactical development in the Central Pacific Area 60 days of Class IV (E) supplies for all aircraft in forward areas should be kept afloat. B. CONCLUSION.
Army troops in the Central Pacific Area were given their first test in amphibious operations when they engaged the Japanese in the Galvanic operation* The small cost in casualties, the rapid success of these troops, and the battle lessons learned have provided excel lent groundwork material for future operations. Providing adequate time is allotted for the planning phase, future operations of a much larger scale requiring and using all facilities available for the organization, training, and equipping of the troops can be supported by USAFICPA.

1 Incl: Letter, ComGenCentPac to CinCPOA, 6 Dec 43, "Lessons from Galvanic,"

153

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA APO 958
In reply refer to: KG 093/61

6 December

1943

SUBJECT: Lessons TO:

from GALVANIC.

Conimander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

As a result of conferences with the Commanding General, 7th subsequent to the GALVANIC operations, I wish to present for Air your consideration some of the deficiencies in planning for and execu tion of those operations, with a view to their elimination in the future. It is realized that mistakes will occur, but it is essential that we learn from those mistakes and take the actions indicated as necessary to improve both planning and future operations.

1*

Force,

2. Landbased Aviation. The efficient operation of land based aviation requires that complete ground echelons be in place and ready to function prior to the start of the operations. Air echelons should not operating bases until the ground echelons are ready to arrive at their function. This is a fundamental requirement, equal to that which dio tates that a carrier be completely equipped before participating in oper ations. The matter of the readiness of ground echelons was discussed at length with members of your staff in the plans being prepared, and it was felt that there was reasonable certainty that the required troops and equipment could be delivered on time to Funafuti. There was apprehension that shipping would not be available for the transfer of supplies from Funafuti to Nukufetau and Nanomea. Inclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4, show the status of the supply echelons of the 7th Air Force during the operations. At Funafuti the situation was satisfactory, although the "HERCULES'* did not arrive and was not unloaded until 18 November, two days before the attack, but three days after the first air bombardment mission* Class IV supplies were not unloaded until 21 November, after the attack had begun. The essential ground supplies were not delivered by the "HERCULES" and the "ANACAPA" at the other bases until after the attack had been complet ed. This failure to have the ground echelons ready prior to the attack affected adversely the efficiency of the operations of the 7th Air Force. It is recommended that bases for landbased air operations be prepared to receive the air echelons before the scheduled date of the attack and that provisions be made to insure the arrival of the ground echelon at each base several days prior to the arrival of the air echelons.

3, Employment of Aviation, A study of the strikes made by ele ments of the 7th Air Force indicates that there was an undesirable dissipation of air power. Targets were dispersed and only a fraction of the air force available was assigned to each objective* Inclosure 5 shows that during the preparations for the assault there was hardly The sound an objective that was attacked by more than one squadron* tactical doctrine of the Army Air Force prescribes the use of air pow er to concentrate it or one objective. Better results will be obtain ed if all of the available squadrons are assigned to the attack of one target, such as Mille or Jeluit. After the return of these squadrons to their bases for a few days rest and reorganization, they should be used again to strike the same objective if such procedure is necessary to annihilate that objective. Upon completion of that mission, the same air power should then be used on another objective. In other words, it is felt that in the GALVANIC operation there was a violation of the principle of mass by dispersing the striking power of the 7th Air Foroe.

4.

Support of Assault Units.

a. At Makin, there was very close air support by the carrierbased aviation at the moment the assault was launched. All observers agree that this support was most effective. At Tarawa, the perimetrical defense, consisting of group of rifle and machine gun emplacements, was not destroyed by the unusually terrific naval and air bcmbardmoit. Thus, during the assault by our Marines, these ground fortifications,
still intact, permitted the Japanese to inflict many casualties 0 No
time should be lost in studying ways and means of destroying such beach defense positions, -which otherwise will again result in large casual ties* The fact that at Tarawa these defenses were not destroyed by at tacks parallel to the shore line points to the utilization of frontal attack perpendicular to the beach by carrier aviation equipped with rockets, or by land based aviation equipped with 75mm guns and machine guns. It is probable that such attacks, permitting direct fire into the embrasures, willbe quite effective. The one drawback is that such fire is necessarily spasmodic and temporary. In addition, it re quires the closest possible timing, and for that reason there is the danger that it willnot be entirely reliable* It has beer suggested that 500-pound, gasoline-filled bombs be used and that, if dropped along the fortified beach line, they will create heat of an intensity sufficient either to bum the occupants of the emplacements or mini mize the effectiveness of the hostile shore weapons. In order that there may be indicated the effectiveness of the above types of attack, experiments are being planned by, and will be carried out under the supervision of, this Headquarters. b.

practically continuous

5. It is urged that:

a. In the employment of land based Amy aviation, there be no deviation from the principle of mass* b. Serious thought be given by the offioers of your eomfeflfed to methods by which beaoh defense installations may be eliminated prior to the assault*

C. Richardson, Jr. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON* Jr., Lieutenant General* U. S. Army* Commanding.

/s/Robert

5 Inolst

Incl #1 3rd Ass ran Sup Pos Rpt, Funafuti* Incl #2 3rd Assron Sup Pos Rpt* Hukufetau* 3rd Assron Sup Pos Rpt t Nanomea.
Incl #3 Inol #4 Unit Personnel and Bqpmt Report*
Inol #6 * Adron 7th Air Foroe, 27 Hot 43*

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iKuwron

ANNEX NO. 1 SELECTIONS PROM OBSERVERS REPORTS A. PLANNING, 1. Instruction of the individual and of urits assigned to an operation must be based on the situation as known and estimated for the terrain and enemy dispositions, and must be detailed ir every phase that can be foreseen (ComFifthPhibForce). 2. Future plans for attacking che hostile shoreline should envi
sion the use of medium tanks in the leading wave followed by LVT's.
This practice will allow the fullest employment of high caliber weapons
without the danger of causing casualties in our leading waves (CPA G-3

observer).

3. I believe the evacuation of the assault troops was premature

in view of the many tasks left unfinished including unloading and stor
age of supplies, burials, collection of captured materiel, salvage and
the like (CPA G-4 observer).
B. ORGANIZATION.

1. A combat engineer company employed as the basic element of the BLT shore party, makes available sufficient experienced personnel to organize the bsach and execute the necessary engineer functions (CG 27th Inf Div). C. TRAINING. 1.

Training and instruction in basic amphibious operations is not specifically toward the accomplishment of the operation intended (ComFifthPhibForce).
sufficient; it must be directed

2. Promiscuous firing by "trigger happy" individuals is a serious danger to our troops. It is a great temptation for men in battle for the first time to fire and ask questions later. Strict discipline for offenders is necessary and prior training can eliminate a large percent age (CG 27th Inf Div). 3. Something must be done to ccntrol rifle and machine gun fire at night. Training in night operations should continue (CPA G-3 observer). 4. stressed The use of cover, and advance by creeping and crawling must be (CG 27th Inf Div). in all training activi

5. The value of dispersion must be stressed ties (CPA G-3 observer).

- 1
-

6. Combined training with tanks and infantry must be stressed. The Tank-Infantry Team assumes the same importance as the InfantryArtillery Team (CG 27th Inf Div). 7.
Infantry-Tank liaison was not satisfactory

(CFA G-2 observer).

8, Shore parties, Beach Parties, Transport Quartermasters and unit supply officers need more training in coordination of interests (CPA G-4 observer).

D. EQUIFM!2?T. 1. Army, Navy and Marine authorities should agree on curtailed Tables of Allowances of equipment and supplies for ground troops and shore based air units, appropriate for atoll warfare (ComFifthPhib

Force).

2. One of the major lessons to be derived from the operation is the inadequacy of landing craft for operation on these coral islands. To them the ever-present reef presents an almost insurmountable obstacle. This was not true for the LVT's since no difficulty was experienced in landing these vehicles (CPA G-2 observer). 3. Alligators and DUKV/1 s were found to be of immense value both combat vehicles and for landing supplies (CG 27th Inf Div). 4. An effort should be made to secure armor plated LVT1s for use in the next operation (CPA G-3 observer). 5. Grenades were used extensively by assault mopping-up activities (CG 27th Inf Div). 6. forces and in

observer).

The supply of hand grenades

was not sufficient (CPA G-3

7. Because of the unexpected advance through water on foot, many of our radios were wet and would not function (CG 27th Inf Div). 8. The combat pack is not necessary. The individual can carry a loose in his pockets. This will last until resupply is es X ration tablished if the operation is successful ( Bn CO, 27th Inf Div). 9. Salt tablets should be issued prior to Ihe assault

(CPA G-4

observer).
10. Pallets proved extremely successful

(CPA G-4 observer).

of transportation

11. The "jeep'1 proved "the most valuable means (CPA G-4 observer).

- 2
-

E.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

1 It seems essential to reduce the combat loaded cargo to actual requirements. The problem of what to load and what not to load is far from being solved (CinCPOA).
2,

base requirements

Trained officers familiar with unloading problems and advance will greatly facilitate loading and unloading (CinCPOA)

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UNCLASSIFIED

BASE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

MAKIN

OMCUSSIFItI

ANNEX NO. 7 CinCPOA File Pac-J-44-Fn NB UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS Headquarters of the Commander in Chief October 16, 1943.

Serial
From: To
:

001328 The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas* The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area* The Commander Central Pacific Force*
The Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet*
The Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet*
The Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet*
The Commander FIFTH Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet*
Base Development Plan

Subject:

MAKIN

- GALVANIC Operation*

Reference:

(a) CinCPOA Conf* serial 02258 dated Sept* 21, 1943.

Subj: Planning and Preparation in connection

with the establishment of facilities at Advanced
Bases*
CinCPOA dispatch 142247 of October.

(b)
Enclosures:

(A) Base Development Plan

1943*

MAKIN

- dated

(B) Advanced Base Logistic Supply Policy Central Pacific Area* CinCPOA Conf. serial 02248 dated Sept. 20, 1943 (omitted). (C) Policy governing Construction, Housing an<3 Priori
ties for Central Pacific Bases, CinCPOA Conf* serial 02259 dated Sept. 21, 1943 (omitted).

October 16,

1* Enclosure (A) is the Base Development Plan for MAKIN* 111is plan is furnished as a guide to those responsible for the work of developing this base and is subject to revision by responsible com manders as necessitated by local conditions. In developing the details of the plan, attention is invited to Enclosures (b) and (C).
2* Naval components, listed in Annex VIII of Enclosure (A), have been ordered shipped from the West Coast and will be assembled at Pearl Harbor by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, at Iroquois Point (see reference (b))* /s/c. H. McMorris, C. H. MCMORRIS, Distribution: Chief of Staff. ComGenCentPac (12) ComsthPhibFor (4)
(2) ComsthPhibCorps (4)
ComsthPhibCorps (
ComAirPac (2)
(2) ComCanPac ComServPac

BASE DEVELOPMENT PLAN MAKIN

PART I PART II PART 111

ANNEX I Aviation Facilities ANNEX II Defense Force

ANNEX 111
ANNEX IV AMNEX V ANNEX VI ANNEX VII

ANNEX VIII ANNEX IX

INDEX
Development Plan

PAGE lb
and Material 5
9
13
15
17
21
25
31
33
35

Summary of Personnel

Priorities and Echelons

Harbor Defense and Harbor Facilities Communication Plan

Construction Details
Supply Facilities

Medical Facilities

Naval Functional Components

Topographical Description with

Pertinent Photographs

and Diagrams

37

ANNEX X

General Layout Plan of Base (Tentative)

(Omitted).

1a

PART I BASE DEVELOPMENT PLAH 1* The Directive* An advanced Air Base will be established at MAKIN to support further operations against enemy bases to northward in the Marshall Islands. It is imperative that fighter planes be operated from the field to be constructed at the earliest moment after assault* b. Tasks

(a)
Garrison*

(1) Army*

1* Provide ground forces and defend the base ""

against

sea and air attacks.

2. Construct and maintain field fortifications. 3* Construct air field and facilities*

4* Provide and construct, administer and operate ~~ base hospital facilities 5* Provide, construct* administer and operate base ~" radio station and internal communication systems. 6* Provide and construct base facilities including buildings for storage of perishable items, re frigeration, power* light and water supply* ex cept that Navy will provide materials for tank farm. 7.
"

Provide construction personnel material for the base*

equipment

and

Provide, install and operate piers and cranes*

except that Navy will provide materials for construction of pontoon wharves as required by
Army.

Provide* install and operate public utilities*

(b) Air.

1b

1. Provide 2F, and IFB squadrons ""

for reoonnais sauce and for air defense of the base against and air attacks* and air ground com

2. Administer and operate aviation facilities, in

~"

eluding air warning systems munications.

case of enemy attack*

3* Provide from service forces a oombat reserve in "~

(2) Navy. (a) Provide, install and operate harbor entrance radio
station and visual signal stations*

(b) Provide, install and operate boat pool and repair

unit, harbor patrol unit and rescue boat \mito

(c) Provide port direotor and appropriate administrative

unit*

(d)

Provide, install and operate an ti -torpedo nets and

Underwater Detection Unit*

(c) Provide avgas tank farm, ready tank, pontoons, tugs and miscellaneous gear* (See Annex 111 for details.)
/

(3) Marine. None.

2. Base Development Planned* In support of assigned tasks, the following Base Facilities are planned for development*

(1) Aviation Facilities.

for (See Annex X for layout, Annex I

(a) Initially one airfield with runway to accommodate two Fighter squadrons (50 planes) and one Fighter- bomber squadron (25 planes)* (b) If reconnaissance (2) Shore Defense*
on ground shows that an additional air strip can be constructed this will be done*

(See Annex X for layout, Annex II for de

(a) Installation of
Beach Defenses*

A/A and

Coast Defense Batteries and

(3) Harbor Defense*

details

(See Annex X for layout and Annex 111 for

Underwater Detection devices*

(a)

a/t nets,

(b) Patrol vessels. (4) Harbor Facilities* (a) Port Director. (b) Signal Communications* (See Annex 111 for details.)

(c) Boat moorings and maintenance

(d) Harbor boats*

facilities*

(c) Tanker moorings witn pipe line to avgas tank farm* (f) Tugs, barges, pontoons*
(g) Dispensary and camps (5)
Communication Facilities* plan and details )

(See Annex IV for Communication

(a)

Base Radio station*

(b) Air Warning service* (c) Air Ground Communication Facilities* (d) Internal Communication System* (6)
Supply Facilities*

Annex Vl*

(a)

Tank farm for aviation gasoline near airfields with pipe and hose connection to tanker moorings* Navy to furnish equipment and Army to install*
Storage facilities for perishable items*

(b)

(c) Refrigerated storage*

(d) Ammunition storage (Magazines)* (c) Ordnance
& Transportation Maintenance Facilities*

(f) Aviation ready gasoline tanks (4-5,000 gal* tanks)*

(7) Medical

Facilities,

(innex VII.)

(a) Base Hospital Facilities*

(b) First Aid and Decontamination (8) Base Utilities. (Annex V.)

Stations.

(a) Necessary water, power and light systems*

b. Priority List of Construction.

(Suggested*) (To be usable D plus 25

(1) (a) Fighter strip construction* days )

(b) Water supply system (distillers)* (o) Gun emplacement

So

(d) Base communication.

(*) Temporary camp for base personnel and filter squad rons, screened tents, galleys, me s snails, latrines
and foxholes*

(f) Gasoline drum dumping arrangement*

(2) (a) Initial repairs to pier*

(b) Taxiway and hard stands. (3) (a) Bomber strip

* extend runway to

6.000* length*

(b) Hards tands for 25 FB. (o) Camp for FB squadron. (d) Gasoline tank farm*
(c) Revetments
for 25 FB.

PART II SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL 1. Personnel Ifait Surcma

Off*
152 199 8 359

EM 2890 2313 206 5409

Aggregate

I>.

a.

7th Army Defense Battalion Air Force tfaits Total NOTTS:

"c. Naval Units

3042 2512 214 5768

See Annex II for detailed composition of units*

2.

Summary of initial shipping requirements

,including
Long Tons

30 days
Ship Tons

Tliit 7th Defense Battalion General equipment Armament & Special equipment Vehicles B. Page Class I (water) Class I Class II Class 111 Class V Total

Aggregate Pers onnel

3042 950 412 738 119 315 178 157 387 882 3042 3206 2695 4957 285 443 200 447 667 791 13691

4138

]> Air Force T3bits (1) Aviation Engineer Battalion Vehicles T/E & 11, Class IV & V (ground) Class I (water) Class I Class 111 Class IV (Marston Mat)
Total 807 1788 60 77 43 129 2000 807 4097 5502 105 115 49 172 666 6609

Aggregate

Unit

Personnel
316

Long Tods

Ship
Tons 1017 277 45 19 68 1426

(2) Fighter Bomber Squadron Vehicles T/E & 11, IV & V (ground) Class Class I (water) Class I Class 111 (less air)
Total

172 70 31 17 51 316 582 344 140 62 34 102 582 807 1411 682 341

(3)

2 Fighter Squadrons & Vehicles Class 11, IV & V (ground) Class I (water) Class I Class 111 (loss air)

T/E

2034 554 90 38 136 2852

Total

(4)

Air Service Support Squadron & Vehicles Class 11, IV, 4 V (ground) Class 111 (air) Class V (air) Class I (water) Class I

T/E

Class 111 (less air) Total

8092 919 2166 598 115 49 172 12111

(5) Summation of all air force

units listed in (1), (2), (3) and (4) above

T/E and

Vehicles

Class I

Class Class Class Class Class Class

(water) I

11, IV & V

111 (less air) IV (Marston Hat) V (air)

111 (air)

(ground)

16645 365 155 1855 2166 548 666 598 22998 4390

Total Naval Units

Aggregate

Halt d. Base development supplies construction

Personnel
0

Long Tons

Ship Tons

2760

4060

Summation of (a), (b), (o) & (d) above (1) 7th Defense Battalion (2) Air Force Units (3) Naval Units (4) Base Development construction supplies GRAND TOTAL Less personnel to fly in Less units in assault Echelon Less infantry battalion initially in the assault echelon

3042

2512
214 0 5768 98

4138 9058 1990 2760 17946

13691 22998 4390 4060 45139 1225 955

291
829 4550 17946

BALANCE, INITIALPERSONNEL AND SHIPPING

3. Maintenance
Requirements

42959

for 30 days*

7th Army Defense Battalion Basis: 3042 Personnel

Class I
Class Class Class Class II 111 IV V

!> Air Force Units ~"

Basis: Class Class Class Class Class I

1705 Personnel

111 (air) 111 (less air) V (air)

11, IV & V

(ground)
1093 282 316 2007 1628 376 299 3135

NOTE:

Aviation engineer battalion has been omitted from the maintenance requirements on the assumption their mission will be accomplished in 30 days* Otherwise, allowance must be made for 807 more personnel*
Long Tons Ship Tons

Naval Units Basis s 214 Personnel

Class Class Class Class

I II 111 IV Class 7

24 12 31 58 1 126

36 36 52 132 1 257

d* "" Summation of (a), (b) and (c) above by classes Class Class Class Class Class
I 11, IV, and V (ground) 111 (air) 111 (less air) V (air) 509 1200 1093 700 316 3818 729

2413
1628 1095 299 6164

c. Base Development Material, to be req

~"

uisitioned but assumed GRAND TOTAL, Maintenance

to be approximately for 30 days

1300 5118

2000 8164

4,

None of the figures given in these summaries losses*

allow for storage

PART 111 PRIORITIES AND ECHELONS

1* General*
This Base Development Plan outlines the final development contemplated and the total material and equipment required Part 111 indicates the priorities in vdiich this material, equipment and personnel shall land and the order of construction.

Echelons are arranged to accomplish the following: Dto D plus 2 day*

Land personnel and equipment tot

(1) Provide unloading facilities.

(2) Survey and start construction of airfield. (3) Establish communication circuits. (4) Establish Air Warning units,
(5) Provide An ti -Aircraft (7) (8) (9) (10)
Defense, control,

(6) Establish temporary filter director

(11) (12)
(13)

Operate boats. Provide initial medical facilities, Locate site for camps and supply dumps. Locate road net* Land 5 days supply of rations, water, fuel* Land, and set up distillers for initial water supply, Land initial construction materials.

b. D plus 2 to 5 day*

Land personnel aad equipment

tot

(1) Improve communications

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Land additional ammunition, fuels, rations, water* Maintain floating equipment* Increase distiller capacity Land additional construction materials* Provide gun defense against sea-borne vessels*

installations

c, D plus 5 to 15 (or when tactical situation permits). personnel and equipment tot

Land

(1) Start installation of permanent communication system. (2) Install permanent air warning and fighter direction
system.

(3) Install tBnk farm for avgas, (4) Install permanent camp facilities and buildings*

(5) Install splinter proof dugouts for hospital, dispen

saries, operations rooms, etc* (6) Land all remaining equipment and material not previously
landed. 2. Detailed Breakdown.

(See following page)

9

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ANNEX I Aviation Facilities

1.

Two (2) FITEEDN and one (1) FITERBOMRON Squadrons will be

Repair, operation, maintenance,

based on Makin.

all aviation facili The following aviation

ties are considered

air force responsibility.

details are required:

Runway a.

One runway for operation of the FITERONS and FITER

BOMRONS.
p

Initial dimensions 4,000 feet by 150 feet marston If recon

mat.

Extend to 6,000 feet for bomber operations.

naissance

on the ground shows that an additional runway can this will be done*

be constructed b# Taxiways

Connecting opposite ends of strip be located on

However, either extremity of the

Northwest of harbor side*

runway is bordered by areas plane dispersion

which may prove to be suitable for

Taxiways to these points

and hardstandings*

may prove desirable*

2.*

Hards tands*

Hardstands

initially for approximately 60 Fighters

Revetments for 25

and 25 Fighter Bombers with coral surface*

Fighter Bombers eventually*

ji Air Base Headquarters

(Administration).

To consist of three

(3) 16 feet by 40 feet units.

Combat Intelligence Center and Command Post*

by 20 feet units, revetted*

Two (2) 16 feet

Air Base Operation.

Housing and Messing*

One (1) 16 feet by 40 feet unit.

All personnel to use tentage initially.

13

with ten (10) 16 feet by 80 feet messing units to be construct cd. h Aircraft Maintenance and Technical Suppty Buildings. To consist of one (1) 16 feet by 40 feet

i. First Aid Station.

unit to be located in vicinity of control tower.

Pilot Ready Rooms.

units, revetted*
aircraft dispersal

To consist of three (3) 16 feet by 40 feet One to be located adjacent

area*

to each squadron

k. Fighter Director Control ? vetted. Located adjacent

One (1) 16 feet by 20 feet unit, re to Fighter Pilot Reao^y Rooau

14

ANNEX II
DEFENSE FORCE DETAILS

!?

The following units will provide the air defense Ground Til t i 2 Fighter Squadrons 1 Fighter- Bomber Squadron 1 Air Service Support Squadron 1 Aviation Engineer Battalion Total

for MAKIN:
Aggregate

Off. E.M
10 5 51 31 97

Flight Off E.M

336
168 756 776 2036

68 34

168 109

582 316 807 807 2512 are in

102

277

NOTE: Air warning units and air signal communications eluded in the air service support squadrons

2 The 7th Army Defense Battalion willprovide the ground defense for MAKIN. This Battalion will be composed of the following units:

Unit

Major Weapons
Hq*

Off?

E.M

Total
95 146 31 37 164 369 4 51 225 1122 59 226 178 346 280

Island Command

Field Hospital (200 bed) Attached Medical Ordnance Detachment Quartermaster Detachment Engineer Ba, less one company Chemical Warfare Detachment Signal Detachment Port Company

15 80 14 132 25 6 3 34 5 159 11 358 13 46 5 221 4 64 1058 45 216 173 336 268

Total, Headquarters
Ground Defense Hq. 2 Btry 155mm Guns
Searchlight Battery

and Service TBiits Guns 155 mm MG 50 Cal. AA Searchlights, 60 SCR-268 MG .50 Cal. AA Guns, 90mm MG .50 Cal. AA SCR-268 Guns, 37mm 16 MG .50 Cal. AA 8 8 12 4 12 12 12 3 16

14
10 5 12 12

3 Btry 90mm Guns 2 Btry 37mm Guns

15

Major Weapons Infantry Battalion (initially from the assault echelon. To be relieved 75 days

Off, E.M.

Total
829

later).

Mortars, 81mm MG, Cal. 50 14 MG, Cal. 30

88 152 1832 2890 1920 3042

4 9 6 7

Guns, 37mm Mortars, 60mm

35

794

Total Defense Units Total Defense Battalion

3.

Naval services willbe provided by the following Naval units:

Ifcit Port Director

Off E.M
3 5 0 16 1 83 0 10 1 12 1 28 13 17 0 28 0 14 8 206

Aggregate

Visual Signal Station

Boat Pool Boat Repair unit Anti-torpedo net unit Harbor patrol Mobile Dispensary Aircraft Rescue crew Camp unit Detection unit

8 16 84 10 13 29 4 8 28 14 214

4*

The service units of the 7th Defense Battalion will constitute the primary ground defense reserve. b. Air force units will constitute the secondary ground defense reserve when unable to perform their normal air missions*

5.

Tentative locations

of defense

units are shown in Annex X*

16

ANNEX 111 HARBOR DEFENSE & HARBOR FACILITIES 1. HARBOR DEFENSE Underwater Detection Unit to consist of Two Asdic Heralds* 6 Miles Shore Cable.
Tropical Type Shore Hut and Equipment.

Items Included In B3

Tools & Spares* Communication Personnel or 2c b. Two 24 Panel Individual Ship Nets with
moorings

- 14 men,

Equipment* including CRT & RTlc

(15 fathoms water) for use as

baffles. Pontoon Net Tending Barge,

Buoy Boat.

JI2B

Depot Handling Equipment*

Tools &
Personnel

Spares*

1 Officer, 12 Men, including

1 CBM & 1 BMlc* c. Patrol Craft* Three PC's Four Picket Boats. 2. HARBOR FACILITIES
Moorings.

17

Items Included In

(1) One Fuel Loading Mooring (2) Two Aux Ship Type Standard Fleet
Moorings.

HI4C

Riser Type, (15 fathoms 848

water)

(3) Ten Standard MTB boat moorings, or

similar Moorings for small craft*
(4) Six Pontoon Piers
3 with 3 with 848

BSA
B4C

*> Floating Equipment

(1) Boat Pool to consist of 1 Officer &
83 Men BSA
Amphib. Force Amphib, Foroe

(2) 6 LCM's (3) 1 LCV(P)

(4) 1

26 Motor finaleboat ordered

BSA

Not included in any component, as additional equipment.

(5) 1

- 14

Wherry

BSA

(6) 60 Ton self -propelled pontoon barges

Additions to BSA

(7) 2-50 Ton barges (one with

5 ton crane)

Additions to
Additions to Additions to

BSA BSA
BSA HIOC

(8) 2 Pontoon Tugs (9) 4 Spare propulsion Uiits

(10)
o. Boat 1 Aircraft Rescue
Repair

Boat

- 18 -

It 8 Included In em

(1) One Boat Mobile Repair Uiit

d* Navigational Aids.

E9

(1) Port Directors Unit to consist only

of office equipmait, supplies, light

848

truck, moorings as listed in Para. 2a

and the following Channel Marker Buoys:
4 Standard Steel Nuns 2 Class*
4 Standard 8 Standard 8 Standard Personnel

Steel Cans 2 Claw.

Steel Nuns 3 Class*
Steel Cans 3 Class*

3 officers, 5
men*

(2) Tiro Small Visual Signal Stations*

(2) C 8

19

ANNEX IV

PART A

- ASSAULT AND CONSOLIDATION PHASE

PURPOSE Beachmaster to Attack Force Naval Vessels PERSONNEL 27th Div.

COMMTKICATIQN PLAN

A* To be landed D day: CIRCUIT

EQUIFMBJT

1. Beachmaster

Personnel and

2. Gunfire Support

Naval Fire Control

party to Fire Sup port Group

3. a Air Support
b Air Support 4* Operational Command

Air Liaison to Air Commander Ground to VF and VB Bases to Task Group Comnanders

sth Phib. Corps* sth Phib. Corps * 27th Div.

equipment for circuits 1 to 4 inclusive are an integral part of the Amphibious forces and will be landed with the assault troops

"" Ship to Shore

Administrative

Lan Far 27 th Div,,

B. To be landed Dor D plus 1 da

5* Air Support

Ground to VB and VF Base to Shore Based Air CVs

AAF

SCR-399 (AAF) (Replaces SCR 193, Item 3 b) SCR-399 (AAF) (Replaces Item
3 a) Use Receiver from SCR-399 in Item 6*

6 Air Command

AAF

7# Air Operational Intelligence 8. Operational Command

Air Search Reports

AAF

Bases to Task Group Commanders

27th Div.

Div.) from
Item 4*

SCR-399 (27th

21

CIRCUIT 9.

PURPOSE

PERSONNEL

EQUIPMENT

Air Warning

Bases-Air Commander AAF to Task Group Commander

SCR-188 (AAF)

* Radar ""

Reporting Gilbert Groups

Radar Reporting
Gilbert Group

AAF

SCR-188 (AAF)
Use Item 9 Equipment*

10. Fighter Direction and Air Warning

Control of VF

AAF 2 Navy

Fighter Officers
to be

SC-2 (AAF) SCR 193, 522, and 233 in 3/4 ton truck (AAF).

attached
to each SC-2

11. Visual Tfcit (Portion)

C. To be landed D plus 2to D cast
lua 6

4 (H)
days:

C-8 (X)

12. Fox Reception (JUMPS)

13. Island Base Net

Island Base broad-

(A)

Receiver from Item 13 (A),

Inter- Base Communi- 7th Defense SCR-299 (A) (to cations Battalion be replaced by

SCR-447)* 14. Task Force

Commanders
Intercept of Oper
ational Traffic

Receiver 1 SCR-270
%

(A)

Landed for early installation

D To be landed D plus 6to D plus 16 days AAF

15, Fighter Direction

and Air Warning

l-SCR-270, SCR 573, SCR-674, SCR-575, SCR 399 (All AAF) from Item 6

16. Remainder of Visual Oiit E#

4 (N)

To be landed D plus 15 to D plus 30 dayst Base Air Command

17. Gilbert Air Tactical

Net

SCR-197 299 combination (AAF)

22

This equipment and personnel ication facilities* PART B 1* Consolidated Echelons

forms part of permanent base commun PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL

- SUMMARY OF

D to D plus 1
Officers Enlisted Men Weight (Long Tons)

Def* Ba. 3 12 0 0

AAF 3 43 28 235

Na^y

Total 8
59
28
235

2
4

.15

.1

(Meas. Tons)
b. D plus 2 to 5 Ehlisted Men Weight (Long Tons)

Officers

(Meas. Tons)
c#

2 34 9 95

7 72 62 474

2
6
1
2

11
112
72
571

D plus 6 to 15
Officers Oil isted Men Weight (Long Tons) (Meas* Ton 8) 0 0 24 118
3

55 93 556

1
11
IS
41

4
66
132
711

d.

D plus 16 to 30

Officers
Enlisted Men Weight (Long Tons)

(Meas* Tons)
PART C

0 0 9 54

2 31 462 850

0
8
17
40

2
39
488
944

PERMANENT BASE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES PLAN

during period D plus 15 to D plus 30 days

To be established SHIP TO SHORE CIRCUITS

EQUIPMENT
TDF: RBG (N-C9) TCF: RBG (N-C9)

1* Harbor Small Craft 2* Offshore Patrol

FIXED CIRCUITS

3. Island Base Net

4,

BC 447 (A)

Fox Reception (JUMPS)

23

AIR CIRCUITS 5. 6.
7,

EQUIPMENT
SCR 197-299

Gilbert Air Tactical Net Bomber Strike Air Search and Reconnaissance
Airport Control MF Airport Control HF

Combination

(AAF)

SCR 399 from Item 5, Part A (AAF)

SCR 399 from Item 6, Part A (AAF)
BC 329 (AACS)
BC 329
BC 329
AACS
Crash boat transmitter MRL or SRA (AACS)

8 9.

10. Airport Control VHF 11* Seadrome Control

12
13,

Air Rescue and Crash Boat

Range

(AAF)

14* 15.
16. 17* 18 19* 20*

Beacons Beacons
Homing

(Radar)
(Sector)

AACS AACS AACS AACS AACS

(IF)

Airways, Point to Point Airways

*

Air Ground

Air Operational Intelligence Radar Reporting Gilbert Group

SCR-399 (AAF)

SCR 188 (AAF) Use equipment from'

Item 9, Part A

WEATHER CIRCUITS 21 Weather Intercept 22. Weather Collecting AACS

SCR 399 from Item 5, Part A.

UTTRA-ISLAND 23 24

Teletype
Telephone

AAF
AAF
C-8 (N)

25.

Visual Station

24

ANNEX V CONSTRUCTION DETAILS 1.

Fighter Strip Construction. New runway 4,000 ft. length initially at approximate location shown on drawing Annex X. Usability, D plus 25 to 30*

b. Cross Section of runway shall be 150 ft., marston mat with 125 ft, compacted shoulders to be developed. Over all width to be 400 ? with 150 f clearing on each side. Prolongation of runway on each end to be cleared to a 40 to 1 glide angle.
c<
the north side with a 50 marston mat surface and a 200

Taxiway.

Connect

each end of runway with a taxiway on

clearing* Kards tan dings along the taxiway for 50 fight ers and 25 fighter bombers.

d. Revetments * Bunkers for fighter bombers at lower prior ity to be built, possibly out of pierced steel runway plank* 2. Structures

(temporary).

a. Installation of forty (40) 1,000 gallon Mereng cell type aviation gasoline tanks with two (2) dispersing stands. b. Gasoline drum dumping platform with four (4) 5,000 gallon ready tanks This unit is to be supplied by the Navy* Pending arrival of Navy unit Army supplies one 10,000 gallon tank*
c*

Tents for immediate

operations

as directed by commanding

officer* Temporary camp and mess facilities*

3. Structures

(Permanent).

Control tower, timber, 16* x 16* top platform size, 80* higi, actual height to be determined on site* Generator shelter 8* x 10* ( splint erproof) coconut logs. b. Runway lighting (portable units)* c. Revetted buildings.

(1) Combat intelligence center snd command post two 16*

x 20

buildings.

25

(2) Pilot ready rooms.

in each squadron

Three 16* x 40' buildings, cne area.

(3) Fighter director center 16* x 20*. '.te (4) Three transmitter buildings each 16 x 20
Force, two joint communications
f

Air each with 6* x 10 T

- one

generator

shelter. 8 f x 12.

(5) Two receiver buildings 16* x 20' with generator

shelters ators.

(6) Splint erproof ing of two SCR 270's to include gener (7) Telephone exchange 16' x 20*.
(8) Operating room and 50 beds splinterproofed. (9) Base and defense force C.P. (dugout) 16* x 40.
d. Dugouts for field personnel as required using logs and other local materials* 4. Camp sites. a. Air base headquarters b. Air base operations three 16 x 40 f units. one 16* x 40 '

c. Ground and Service Force Administrative Headquarters 20' x 100. d#

Housing and messing facilities. Initially tentage.

(1) 31 screened combined mess hall and kitchens x 80' for the following units:
3 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 10 5 1 Total

- 16'

- 90mm btries 37mm -- 155mmbtries btries Btry - S/L Cos Bagr - Port Co - Force Hq & Service --- Hospitals units Air force Infantry - Navy
Bis

detachments

"51

26

(2) Screened and floored tents (ultimately) for 350 officers and 5,000 enlisted men. (804 th Ehgr. Bn*
will be withdrawn before this phase is reached) 3 officers or 6 enlisted men per pyramidal tent.

(3) Latrines.

Screened latrines, either pit or over water type based on one seat per 10 officers or 20 enlisted men.

(4) Showers.

Brackish water shower buildings based on one head per 10 officers or 20 enlisted men. Shower requirements for various units to be con solidated to reduce total number required. Build ings to be roofed but sides to be made of palm matting. Floors of coral concrete* Wash troughs to be provided on basis of 15 men per faucet*
shipping permits, for housing flying personnel*

(5) 32 each 16' x 20* buildings will be provided, a

5. Water supply. Distillation units to be provided on basis of 5 gallons rated capacity per person per day for 6,000 persons. Provision also to be made for guttering all sizeable buildings and collecting rainwater to be chlorinated and used in place of distill ed water* One 10,000 gallon redwood storage tank to be provided for each 5,000 gallon of still capacity.
sary.

6 Water front facilities*

Repair and improve piers as neces

7. Fuel storage facilities (Permanent). Install H-14-C gaso line storage unit (to be provided by Navy) 504,000 gallon capacity with submarine line to tanker mooring and two truck fillstands. 8. as

Ammunition storage.

Construct bunkers

of local materials

necessary*

9. Communications. Install wire and radio communication facilities as required* Buildings for this purpose listed in para graphs 3, 4 and 10. 10. Storage facilities. Initially tents and tarpaulins* The following buildings will be constructed in appropriate priority as shipping permits 1 1 2 3 1

---

16* 16 20* 20* 16*

x x x x x

30' for signal supplies 20 for Air Force signal supply 75 for PX supplies 100* QM 20' Chemical

27

1 1 1 1 2

-
-
-

16 f 20 16* 20 f 16

x x x x x

10 f Chemical ammunition 100 Engineer 40 f Ordnance automotive 50 f Ordnance Armament 40* Medical.

Reefers or refrigerated warehouses will be ultimately provided on basis of 1 cv* ft* per man for 6,000 men* Ice making machines will be pro vided on basis of .75 lb* per man per day. ies.

11* Gun emplacements.

Construct

Construct Panama mounts for 155 mm batter sandbag and log emplacements for all other weapons*

12. Hospital facilities. Construct 200-bed field hospital with two splinterproof operating rooms each 20* x 20* and 50 beds in s/P wards. Balance of beds screened and floored tents. Two 20* x 80* screened kitchens and mess halls* One 16 f x 100 1 building with parti tions for clinics. Operating rooms , splinterproof wards, and clinics will be Quonset Huts revetted, if available.
13* Electric lighting* Electric power will be provided for neces sary shop facilities, cold storage and for lighting radio buildings, squadron and base operations buildings, plotting rooms CPO and hospital only. No electric lighting will be provided initially for living quarters or warehouse areas*
14. Laundry Facilities* available. Portable laundries will be set up

15. Maintenance and repair facilities will be provided as follows

Air force sheet metal

b. Parachute

shop 16

x 20

building 16 x 40*. shop 16' x 40 1 *

c. Air force Ordnance

d. Air force Armament shop 16* x 40 ? * 2d Echelon automotive maintenance Ifait AA Inf. Bn. Engineer Hq & Serv Dets. Ground Hq and Seacoast Air force units Size
shops

(3 sides only).
Grease 1 1 1 1 1 rack

60"~x~27'
30* x 27* 40* x 27* 60* x 27' 30* x 27* 60* x 27

28

f 3d Echelon automotive maintenance grease rack.

g. Ordnance Armament Shops 20* x 50*

shop 80* x 30* and 1

16.
building.

Bakery for 6,000 men will be provided in one 16* x 40*

29

ANNEX VI

Supply Facilities

The attention of the Base Supply Officer is

invited to the Advanced Ease Logistic Policy.

1.

Aviation gasoline to be stowed in drums and augmented by 4

5000 gallon ready tanks until tank farm (Navy HI4C unit of 12 barrel capacity) is installed (see Annex V). 2.
Storage.

-
1000

Provisions, medical supplies. Post Exchange supplies,

and parts, part of aviation, clothing and tents and under tar

delicate technical equipment motor maintenance

supplies will be kept in storage

paulins until warehouses

shown in Appendix V 3* eu b.

are built.

Warehouses

will be provided as

Other Supply Facilities will be provided as follows:

Bakery unit for 6,000 men in 16 ft, by 40 ft, buildings, Refrigeration unit composed

of 24 each 250 cv. ft. reefer will be provided on the basis of

boxes*

Ice making machines

75 lbs. ice per man per day. c. Distillation plant, composed of three each 10,000 gallon per

day water stills and six 10,000 gallon redwood tank.

d.

Maintenance Annex V.

and repair shops, as shown in paragraph

15,

c*

Waterfront facilities as shown in paragraph

6 of Annex V

31

ANNEX VII
MEDICAL FACILITIES
1* Field Hospital Headquarters and two (2) platoons which will
t

provide a 200-bed hospital, including

a. 50 beds in splinterproof buildings b. 150 beds in tents (ward) with screened frames and floors.

c. 2 each 20 ft, by 20 ft* operating rooms, splinterproof ed* d. Screened mess halls for Medical personnel and patients* Two

(2) buildings 16 ft. by 80 ft.

c. One building, 16 ft. by 100 ft. with partitions to provide

Outpatient and Receiving Clinics, Pharmacy, Clothing Storage, X-ray room, EEJTT and Dental

Clinics.

f. Two storehouses
g*

for Medical supplies, 16 ft* by 40 ft. each*

Items a, c and d will be Quonset huts, if available. Attached Medical aid? Force Surgeon plus five (5) officers and twenty-five (25) enlisted men attached to combat units*

2*

b. Three (3) first-aid stations each 16 ft* by 20 ft. building* 3. Mobil dispensary, 10 bed, Favy.

33

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ANNEX IX TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION MAKDT ATOLL Lat General* The Atoll encloses a large lagoon -which is about 14 miles long on its Southeast side, 12 miles on the West side and 17 miles on the North side. The largest island, Butaritari, extends along the South side of the lagoon o

03 02N

- Long. 172

48'B

Land on the South and Southeastern side of the Atoll is continuous except for a break about three quarters of a mile wide, -which forms a passage, said to be only waist deep at low tide. The islands are form ed of coral sand and debris upon a platform of coral rock.
The Western side of the Atoll consists of several scattered islets lying on the main reef. Breaks in the reef provide three ship passages and several boat passages. The Northern side of the Atoll is composed almost entirely of reef which dries for most of its lsrgth* The land area on the Southern part of the Atoll is densely wooded with pandanus and cocoanut trees.
Openings.

There are only two passages to the lagoon suitable for use by large ships. One of these is Main Entrance Channel which lies between Hitrance Island and Flink Point on the Southwestern part of the Atoll* It is approximately 600 yards wide and has a reported depth of 13 fathoms. Three ship channels lead from the Main Bitrance Channel to the anchorage areas* North Pass is the main channel and has a depth of five to fifteen fathoms" Middle Pass and South Pass are not favored since navigational hazards are numerous in them. The North of is about in order lee side second passage to the lagoon suitable for use by large ships is Nabuni Island* It is reported to have a depth of ten fathoms, 800 yards wide and may be used by ships coming from the North to avoid the strong Westerly set usually experienced along the of the island. that are suited for

There are several shallow or narrow passages

37

small boats located at various parts of ifoe Atoll,

Anchorages.

Outside anchorage for ships of any size may be found West of Flink Point where there is a sunken reef with 4 to 12 fathoms depth. There is also an anchorage off the Southeastern side of the Atoll near the gap at Tanimaiaki, but because it is exposed to prevailing Easterly winds and the swells, it is seldom used. Destroyer anchorage in 18 to 20 fathoms can be found outside the lagoon near the boat passage through the Northern reef at brantakoto Island, except in Northerly weather. Inside the lagoon, about 1,300 yards North of King's Wharf , there is a beacon located on Rokai Ni Bitau, a drying reef. There is anchor age room for a number of large vessels in 4 to 10 fathoms, anywhere North and Northwest of this beacon. Winds and Climate, Winds are light in this area with

70^

from the Easterly quadrant.

Makin and Lit.tle Vakin lie within a dry equatorial zone where rain fall averages about 35 inches annually. However, the rainfall in 1936 at Makin. was 154 inches, Th rainfall at Makin is greater than other islands of the Gilberts and droughts are unknown.
Currents,

Off Bitaki Island, the Western extremity of the Atoll, strong tide rips are experienced. It should be given a wide berth. Tides have a rise and fall of 6-l/2 feet at springs and 3-1/2 to 4 at neaps.

Tidal streams in Main Entrance Channel set obliquely across the

entrance and passages, rates of springs of from 3 to 4 knots.
Population.

About 1,700 natives, mixed Melanesian and Polynesian, including a few Marshall Islanders, live on the Atoll, In peace tiTie there was a The chief villages, European population of about 15, and a few Chinese. Butaritari and Tanimaiaki, are located on the largest and southermost island. The natives were extremely friendly toward the Marines during the raid of August 17-18, 1942. They gave warnin *of enemy movements, brought food and water, and assisted in the destruction of enemy instal lations Water Suppl;

38

houses use rain water collected in cis every native hut has a well with water described as Almost "good tasting," however, all well water in the Marshall Group is brack ish.
Many of the foreiga-style

terns.

Usually 50 tons of good clear rain water were available terns*

from cis

Health and Sanitation. Sanitation well kept. conditions are considered

good, with the island being

Before the war there was a native hospital located here. Malaria is unknown in the Gilberts, and Filaridsis and Elaphantidsis are rare. Syphilis has Yaws has declined and leprosy is strongly controlled. Chickenpox and been unknown, but there are a few cases of gonorrhea. dysentary are endemic. Dysentary is kept in check by a system of drop latrines over the reef flushed by the tide. There are no landing s trips and none have been observed under con However, there is sufficient land on the south side of the struction. lagoon to allow for the construction of a runway, as shown on blue prints in Annex X.
Seaplane

Base.

The Japs have used Makin as a seaplane base since the beginning of the war. A seaplane ramp has been built at the end of Kings U?harf It is approximately 75 by 150 feet and is about 770 ft. from the beach. There is almost unlimited space for anchorage- of planes and small tenders in 10 to 20 fathoms, but there are a number of dangerous shoals and coral patches. Take off runs from in front of On Chong's HTharf and are two miles Northeast-Southwest, two miles Horthwest-Southeast, and quarter miles East-Fortheast/West-Southwest. two and a The anchorage area, which is inside the lagoon is fairly well sheltered from prevail ing winds. Defense. The most highly developed defense area on Butaritari Island lies between two 150 foot clearings which cross the island just west of On Chong T s 'tfharf and east of Stone Pier. The main concentration of anti aircraft and machine guns is located in this area. It is also protect ed by a fairly extensive trench system, log barricades, tank traps, road blocks, rifle pits and barbed wire.
Troops.

39

The present strength of the garrison at Makin is believed to be about 400, In the event of urgent need, reinforcements for the garrison n?ay be flavm in by air from the Marshall Islands Bases Jaluit and Mili Islands being only an hour and a half removed by air from Makin.

Recent reports indicate that is stationed here. Radio.

detachment

of Naval Civil Engineers

A pair of slender towers, or masts, at the foot of On Chong f s Wharf indicates the likelihood that a radio station has been re-established at this point. An old station was destroyed here during the Marine raid. Piers. Four wharves on the lagoon side of Butaritari Island offer only poor facilities for the lighters which handle all cargo. On Chong's Wharf, the western most of the four, includes pier about 150 ft. by 25 ft. but dries at low water.
Kings Kharf, 1,000 yds. northeast 1,000 ft. long and 12 ft. wide.

a loading

of On Chong's Wharf, is about

Stone Pier, 500 ft. long and 15 ft. wide, is about 800 yds farther in a northeast direction from Kings Iflharf. Government Yilharf, 1,250 yds. northeast of Stone Pier, appears to be in poor condition. It is 1,760 ft. long and about 12 ft. wide.

40

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!

ANNEX No 9

ANNEX NO. 9

PART I

HEADQUARTERS TWITED STATES ARMY FORCES

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
APO 958

AG 710 (Surg) SUBJECT : Baclllary Dysentery

Prevent

29 October 1943

it/

,Pacific

Island Bases, and Rules to

TO:

See Distribution*

1* Bacillary dysentery is in your area* No doubt there are healthy carriers among your men* Your force may be reduced fifty (50) percent or more in effectives within a week by bacillary dysentery un less sanitary rules are followed*
2* Dysentery results from faulty sanitation primarily* It occurs especially during intensive military activities when sanitary measures cannot be, or are not, strictly enforced* So-called "common diarrhea** is usually a form of bacillary dysentery* 3* . Symptoms usually appear in two to three days after infection The germs causing the disease are in the fecea* Whatever the infected person touches becomes contaminated latrine seats, clothing* bedding, food, water, and equipment* One fly can carry many million bacteria on its feet and body*

(swallowing the germs) but may be as late as seven days*

4.

Rules:
a*

Chlorinate all water its safety be doubtful*

FM 21-10)

-
Including water

taken ashore if
par*

b* Teach every person how to chlorinate Baphaeize individual chlorination.

water (see

20,

o Do not soil the ground with feces or urine* If no latrine is available, cover each deposit with several inches of earth*
ately*

d* Deposits in straddle trenches should be covered immedi Oil the trenoh daily if conditions permit*
Fly-proof latrines should be built as soon as possible*

- 1-

f
g*

Protect food from flies.

Dispose of garbage (kitchen method based on the immediate situation*

waste) by some acceptable

(See par* 34 to 36, FM 21-10*) h. Prevent fly breeding* principles by teaching all soldiers to eliminate breeding Apply these places in their immediate ricinity.
permit.

i. Destroy adult flies by trapping as soon as conditions

j* Keep your mess clean*

(See

par*

36 to 45, FM 21-10.)

(1) Keep flies and dirt from all foods and mess equip
ment*

(2) Sterilise mess gear and kitchen utensils in boiling

water eaoh time they are used*

(3) Personnel with diarrhea or intestinal diseases must

not work in the mess* Daily observation and question ing of mesa personnel on illness is required*

(4) Any man who has had dysentery (amoebic or baoillary)

must not be a food handler* k* Keep clean* Bathe frequently* Change and wash underwear at least twice a week* (See par* 104 to 112, FM 21-10*)

latrine*
the

1* Always wash hsnds before eating and after going to the This should be strictly complied with*
Every person with diarrhea must be reported at once to

m* surgeon*

5* Teach men to apply the rules of sanitation fully as is possible, even under combat conditions*

and hygiene

6. On cessation of combat, the most vigorous aotion should be taken to put the camp and surroundings in the best sanitary conditions* condition 7* Emphasise and re-emphasize to every member of the command that he gets dysentery only by swallowing food or drink containing the feces of a dysentery patient and insist that each individual do his part to prevent this by developing personal initiative in devising methods for effective application of the rules of sanitation and nygiei

- 2

8,

For principles, see FM 21-10.

cownand of Lieutenant General RICHARDSON:

/s/0

N Thompson, 0. H. THOMPSON, Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

"Special"

ANNEX NO. 9

PART II

LABORATORY
CHITRAL PACIFIC AREA
APO #958, % Pob tanas ter
San Francisco, California 1 February 1944 SUBJECTS T0
Sanitary Survey, APO 459, With Special Reference

to Dysentery,

The Surgeon, Headquarters,

USAFICPA, APO

958*

1. During the first week of January 1944 a large number of cases of diarrhea were reported among the holding force at APO 459. The out break of dysentery in this command is thought to have been due to the original combat troops* The garrison force arrived four days after the opening attack and the can bat troops were then withdrawn* It is real ized that sanitation must be secondary during active hostilities, but apparently no attempt whatever was made to regulate the disposal of fecal material during the few days that the combat troops occupied the island* Feces deposited indiscriminately on the ground and the pre sence of unburied dead caused a tremendous increase in the fly popula tion* Diarrhea broke out among "the holding force within a few days, and increased rapidly until corrective measures were given a high prior ity* The island natives and enemy forces used drop latrines built over the water on the lagoon side* The holding force used these for a few days until pit latrines could be provided*

2* The Commanding Officer of the Army Task Force requested lab oratory assistance in -the control of the outbreak* The command is large, approximately seven -thousand men, so it was decided to send two field laboratory units* Each unit consisted of one officer and four enlisted men plus equipment to set up a complete bacteriological lab oratory* Each unit was provided with enough material to examine 500 men per day by the rectal swab method* The two units, therefore, would be able to examine the entire command in one week* A third officer was provided to coordinate the work* Hie coordinating officer and the first unit left APO 958 on 6 January 1944 and arrived at APO 459 on 9 January 1944* Ihe second unit left APO 958 on 9 January 1944 and arrived at APO 459 on 11 January 1944. 3* A single central laboratory was established in tents* one large pyramidal tent serving as the main workshop* a smaller tent con taining the field incubators and hot air sterilizers, and a third one
storing the crates and chests*

Heat for the incubators

and hot air

oven 8 was supplied by bun sec type alochol burners, and for the auto claves, media making, and hot water by two-burner gasoline stoves* 4* In previous assignments of this type it was found that the quickest way to stop an outbreak of baoillary dysentery was to examine the entire command until all personnel had proven negative on three consecutive oultures* This practice was inaugurated at APO 459. Cul tures were obtained by means of rectal swabs* 5* Laboratory methods consisted of culturing on SS agar, trans ferring suspected colonies to Russell's double sugar agar, and spot agglutinating all cultures positive on the latter with specific anti sera. The first examinations were made on 12 January 1944* Results indicated that the outbreak was due to Shigella paradyaenteriae. Routine examinations were begun on 15 January 1944 and continued at the rate of one-thousand per day* The first examination of the entire command was completed on 21 January 1944* The coordinating officer left APO 459 on 24 January 1944 and arrived at APO 958 on 26 January 1944* The second examination was scheduled to start 24 January 1944 and was expected to be completed within six days* The third examina tion was scheduled for the following week*

6* While the total number of cases of diarrhea cannot be accurately given it is estimated by the Surgeon* APO 459* that they However, on arrival of the labora were in excess of seven-hundred* tory units* the outbreak was definitely under control and the inci dence curve was rapidly approaching zero* This had been accomplished by providing every unit with screened kitchens and messhalls* Prac tically all latrines had bean screened and all were in excellent con dition* The number of flies was not excessive* Sanitation throughout the command was excellent*
FIRST EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE COMMAND

7* In the first survey 5691 mm were examined* In similar sur veys of other commands an incidence of 12-15^ carriers was found fol lowing an outbreak* In contrast to this very few carriers were found at APO 459* Of the 5891 men examined only 56 (0.95) proved to be positive for Shi gella paradysenteriae* The explanation for this is not known Every step in the bacteriological method* was oheoked and re
checked, and the conclusion was reached true one*
that the low incidence was a

8* It was noted early that a large number of organisms were isolated which gave the cultural reactions of Shigella but gave sero logioal reactions which were apparently aberrant* They failed to agglutinate with specif io antisera of Eberthella typhosa and Shigella dysenteriae, alkalescens, sonne, madampensis* newcastle, ambigua, and Boyd 88 and Boyd Pi19. Morphology and paradysenteriae-polyvalent, cultural and biochemical reactions were as follows:

Non-motile, Gram-negative,

non-spore forming rods* Typical Shigella colonies on SS agar. Acid butt, alkaline slant, and no gas on RuBsell*s double sugar agar* Aoid and no gas in dextrose, maltose, mannite, xylose, arabinose, levulose, dulcitol, and inulin broth* Negative in sucrose broth* Negative in lactose broth, but occasional cultures foment it slowly0 Slightly acid in litmus milk, then alkaline* No liquefaction of gelatin* Production of indole and ammonia* No production of hydrogen sulf ide*

9. Cultures of the aberrant organism were sent to the CPA Lab oratory for study and to the Army Medical School* This organism has been identified tentatively as Shigella ceylonensis or alkalescesn*

10* It was not know whether the outbreak of dysentery was due to Shigella paradys enteriae the aberrant Shigella, or both* To ea tablish the cause, sera were obtained from 15 men with recent histor ies of diarrhea* Previous stool cultures had established that these men represented three groups, viz*, (1) Shigella paradys enteriae iso lated, (2) aberrant Shigella isolated, (3) no Shigella isolated* Sera from 14 gave positive agglutination up to 1:320 against Shigella para dysenteriae. No serum agglutinated the aberrant Shigella* It was con eluded that the organism causative of the outbreak was Shigella para dys enteriae*

11*

The hospital laboratory officer and a technician are being

trained in methods of isolation and identification of dysentery bacil li. With so few carriers it is believed that the hospital laboratory can carry on this work* The mission of the laboratory units should be completed during the week of 7 February 1944* The return of at least one unit to APO 958 at that time is anticipated*

12* Die most satisfactory method of handling carriers is to place them under quarantine in the hospital zone and to treat them They are discharged from quarantine upon prov with sulfaguanidine* negative on three consecutive stool cultures* This procedure was ing followed at APO 914 with excellent results and negligible toxic reac tions* In another study at APO 457 carriers were treated with sulfa guanidine but were allowed to continue their daily routine* Many toxic reactions resulted. It was felt that these were due to exposure to the sun and exoessive loss of water* In the present outbreak at APO 459, however, it was not possible to place carriers under quaran tine beoause of tactical considerations* Instead the men were to be They treated in the unit dispensaries and restricted to quarters* would thus be available for duty in case of emergency*

DYSENTERY AMONG THE NATIVES 13* There are about two-thousand natives on the island most of when live in two villages at one end of the island* At high tide this end is separated from the remainder of the island and can then be reach ed only by boat* At low tide a vehicle may be driven to the native settlement. In addition to the principal settlement some natives live in small villages scattered throughout the command and are employed as laborers*

14* Diarrhea among the natives was reported and investigated* It was evident that -the diarrhea was of a severe type, the feces being largely blood and mucous* Two native deaths from diarrhea were known to have occurred early in January* Amebic dysentery was suspected* Eight natives with diarrhea were examined and numerous motile Ehdamoeba bistolytica were found in every case* So numerous were -these parasites that 5-6 could be found per microsopic field* 15* The native settlement was immediately placed under strict quarantine and made "off limits** for all troops* It is hoped that by prompt and strict measures spread of -the infection to the troops can be prevented* 16* It is known that many more cases of diarrhea exist among the natives. Amebic dysentery seems to be epidemic* From information

available it appears that the infection was brought into the island by the Japanese* Plans were laid to examine all natives with diarrhea, bacillary and amebic dysentery* Cases positive for either are for both to be hospitalised and treated in the native settlement*

17* In addition, as many of the natives as possible are being examined for the detection of carriers of bacillary dysentery* Special attention is directed to detecting the presence of Shigella dysenteriae (Shiga organisms)* Of the first 30 examined all results were negative*
OTHER NATIVE DISEASES

18* Yaws is extremely prevalent among the natives* Throughout the period of Japanese occupation no treatments were given* The medical officers of the base hospital make weekly trips to the native settle ments and are treating all cases of yaws. 19* Tuberculosis seems to be quite prevalent* Ithas been esti mated that 10$ of the natives have aotive tuberculosis*
20* Fungus infections of the skin are also prevalent* One case of chicken pox was found in a native child* There were no signs of

filariasis; typhus, or plague* Die practicability of vaccinating the natives for smallpox and typhoid should be considered*

MOSQUITO-BOME DISEASES

21* There is an extensive epidemic among the troops which re sembles a mild form of dengue. Die disease presents a varied picture: Temperature around 103 F, post orbital pain* headache and backache* Recovery usually takes place in two or three days* However* enough
cases have presented typical signs of dengue with rash and secondary rise of temperature* Screened wards are now in use and as rapidly as practicable screened quarters are being provided*

22* Mosquitoes are abundant and widespread* Collections were made at various times during the day and night* The most prevalent species is Culex fatigans. This vector of microfilaria probably breeds in the swamps whicn" are numerous on the island* The only other mosquito found was Aedes varlegatus* This species is closely related to Aedes albopictus a known vector of dengue fever* It is possible, but unlikely, that the island contains other species of mosquitoes* So many cases of dengue have occurred that obviously the vector must be numerous* Since the only species of Aedes found was variegatua it seems likely that this form can be added to the list of dengue vectors. Attempts are being directed at mosquito control* This will be difficult because of the numerous breeding places*
RODENTS & PARASITES 23* The common rat of the island is the usual Polynesian rat. Rattus cone o lor, These live in the trees and up to the present time have not been a nuisance* A rat control program is being formulated* A few large rats probably 11. norvegicus. were seen but none w%s cap tured* Rats examined were""found to be harboring a blood sucking mite, laelops sp* and a blood sucking louse, Hoplopleura sp Ho fleas were found* WATER

24* Drinking water is obtained by distillation of sea water and by rapid sand-alum filtration of brackish water* Both types are chlor inated* Tests were run on samples from the stills and filtration plants* All were found to be free of coliform organisms*
25, Tests were also run on various brackish waters used primarily for bathing* All those examined were heavily polluted with intestinal organisms and the possibility of contamination with amebic cysts must be recognized* Plans are being made to super-chlorinate the sources*

26* One of the first problems facing the Surgeon was the possibili ty of contamination of ground waters with toxic agents* The first water plants in operation were the filters* Filtration followed by chlorina tion guards against bacterial contamination, but this treatment is not effective against all toxic agents* To provide for such exigency the

CPA Laboratory has a NS chest for testing waters in the field for toxio agents* Biis chest and a nan trained in its use should accompany all such forces* DISPOSAL OF HASTES at

27* Garbage is oolleoted on trucks, loaded on barges and dumped a. This system seems to be functioning efficiently*

28* Kitchen wastes are run through grease traps* the fat skimmed off and burned, and the effluent drained off into the ground. Modifi cations of the standard grease traps were necessary, the best type be ing made from two 50-gallon drums connected by a pipe* 29* Most latrines are of the pit type* It is not possible to dig more than a few feet below the surface without striking water* There* fore the latrines must necessarily be shallow* It was found that if large mounds of dirt were built up, with inclined walks leading to them, fairly deep pits could be constructed without flooding* Pit latrines are well built, kept in repair, and almost all are enclosed in soreened buildings* They are oiled frequently and in some instances yeast is used in addition* Ho fly breeding was seen* 30* A few native type drop latrines are still being used* These are usually built over the lagoon and the fecal material drops direct ly into the water* Most of it is carried away by the tides but some of the material is washed ashore* Latrines of this type are not desirable* However, careful examination did not disclose any fly breeding along the shores near these latrines* If large numbers were in use it is be lieved that the amount of fecal material present would be great enough to allow fly breeding*
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

31* Epidemics of dysentery are best prevented by efficient sani tary facilities* During initial stages of occupation under oombat con ditions sanitation must play a secondary role of necessity* Promptly thereafter sanitary measures should be given the highest priority prao tioable, with emphasis on construction of efficient latrines and pre fabricated screened kitchens and messhalls* 32* As operations proceed into territory long mandated to the enemy and about ifcieh little is known from the health viewpoint, prompt recognition of potential sources of disease is essential* Therefore, a trained group should follow the garrison force. This group should study insect rectors of disease, water supplies, and especially diseases of the native population* If important diseases are discovered early among the natives, preventive measures can be immediately inaugurated among
the troops* For the Commanding Officer:

JAMES E* WEISS, Major. Sanitary Corps*

6

/s/ James

E* Weiss,

'^CLASSIFIED

ANNEX No 10

ANNEX NO. 10

STATISTICAL SURVEY OF CASUALTIES -.MAKE? OPERATIONS

TOTAL CASUALTIES

Killed in Action Died of Wounds Wounded In Action Total Battle Casualties

NonNon- Battle Total

58 8 152 162 216 216

35 35
253

TABLE II CASUALTIES CLASSIFIED BY BRANCH No*

Infantry Tank Corps Engineers

/ag

Medical
Field Artillery Coast Artillery (AA) Signal Marine Corps Air Corps Uqidentified Total

178 25 21 9 6 3 3 2 1 5 253

70.3

9.9 9.9
8.3
3.5
2.4
1.2
1.2
0.8
0.4
2.0

IOO.CS

TABLE 111 CASUALTIES CLASSIFIED BY LOCATION OF HDWDS Died Head Chest 36 20 8 4 6 73 Wounded 23 24 5 68 66 185

Total
58 44 13 72 71 258

fee
22.48

Abdomen
Upper extremity Lower Extremity

17*05
5,04

27.91

Total

27.62

IOOoO^

Indicates multiple wounds.

UNuLASSIFIED
Nov. 20th Not. 21st Hot* 22nd
Not,

TABLE IV DISPOSITION OF CASUALTIES

Held
Died 25 18 6 12 5 66 TABLE V

* Duty
18 11 8

Ship

Total
105 44 25 57 24 253

23rd
7 7

12
8 57

Not* 24th

62 15 9 33 4 123

Total

CLEARING STATION DISPOSITIONS

Rec'd Nov. 21st Hoy* 22nd Not* 23rd Nov. 24th
Duty Ship

Pled

Held

UMCLASSIFIED

r-4 CM Ui CM

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C4 CO CO to

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UNCLASSIFIED

Battle Casualties frcn Makin Admitted to Hospitals on Oahu:

NO.

0 26.9

Died after arrival at General Hospital!

Returned to duty within 30 days Returned to duty within 60 days Returned to duty within 90 days Hospitalised over 120 days Hospitals for further observation Transferred to and treatment: within 30 days 10 60 days 1 within 90 days 7 within within 120 days 0

0 32 25

15
29

21*0 12*6
24*4

m/l

18
119

ld.l 100*00

TOTAL

DISPOSITION OF PATIHITS WIIHIS THIRTY-SIXTY-NINETY-ONEHUNDRED

TWENTY-DAY PERIOD
No* of
Patients

25 20

15
10

5
0
S /

\ \

* PATIHJTS HOSPITALIZED OVER ONE HUNDRED TWHTTY DAYS

Returned to Duty

Trfd to Mainland Hospitals.

da: 29

-.

-,

Ay

SIW

.-*""

00512 1264