Chapter 5: Non-Registrable Properties REPUBLIC vs. ROSEMOOR MINING Facts Bureau of Mines issued License No.

33, subject to PD 463 (decree on disposition of mineral lands), to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation stockholders Dr. Pascual, Dr. Pedro de la Concha, Alejandro de la Concha, and Rufo de Guzman permitting them to exploit marble deposits discovered in Mt. Mabio forming Biak-na-Bato mountain range. DENR minister Ernesto Maceda cancelled said license because it allegedly violated Sec. 69 of PD 463 or the allowed maximum area of Quarry License. Pascual and company then filed petition with the trial court which ruled in favor of them, maintaining that the privilege granted under respondents license had already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled without notice and hearing. CA upheld this decision, hence this petition. Issues (1) Whether or not License No. 33 is valid (2) Whether or not Proclamation No. 84 is valid Held (1) License No. 33 is NOT VALID for violating Sec. 69 of PD 463 which mandates a maximum area of 100 hectares for Quarry License. The license covered 330 hectares. Also, it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining rather than the four petitioners. It contravenes the basic postulate that a corporation has a separate personality from its stockholders. (2) PN 84 which proclaims that public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park, is VALID. In line with jurisprudence (Southeast Mindanao v Balite Portal; Tan v Director of Forestry), license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. This further confirms the legality of the cancellation of the quarry license. Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals G.R. 129682 March 31, 2002

Facts: Getulio Pagkatipunan and his wife Lucrecia Esquires (predecessors-of-interest of petitioners) were granted by the CFI a title over a piece of land in San Narciso, Quezon. 18 years later, the State filed to declare the said proceedings null and void, cancel the Original Cert of Title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. The State claimed that at the time the petitioners filed for registration, the subject land was classified as timberland; hence, inalienable and not subject to registration. Petitioners reiterated that the said land was agricultural because it was possessed and cultivated as such long before it was classified as timberland by the Bureau of Forestry, and that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation as far back as the Spanish regime (more than 30 years already). Further, that their title to the same land became incontrovertible and indefeasible 1 year after the decree of registration was issued. Issue: WON subject land is registrable. Held: No. The title issued to herein petitioners were considered void ab initio, and the subject land was reverted to the State Ratio: Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain (Regalian Doctrine). To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is inalienable or disposable. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. No imperfect title can be confirmed

over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land, there must be an express and positive act form the govt. It cannot be presumed. The cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the land from forest/timber land to alienable agricultural land. The State has evidence (a cert by Bureau of Forestry) on record showing that at the time of petitioners filing of application for land registration, the same land was timberland and formed part of the public domain, and this fact was even admitted by petitioners. Petitioners failed to prove that the land is alienable public land. Further, prescription does not run against the state so, the fact that it took the State 18 years to assail the petitioners occupation does not bar the former from questioning the validity of the cert of title. Collado v. Court of Appeals G.R. 107764 October 4, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Edna Collado (descendant/successor-in-interest) applied for registration of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal with the land registration court. She attached a technical description of the Lot stating this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their predecessors-in-interest2 as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate taxes. The RTC found that the petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot, and granted them the title. But the CA annulled the said decision of the RTC. Issue: WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. Held: No. CAs decision was upheld. Ratio: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant for registration of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report. Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073 (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration). When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva (predecessor-in-interest) had been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State. Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, the said statute reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public agricultural land and not to forestlands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forestlands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. Lastly, the most important product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most important human necessities. The State recognizes the need to protect watershed areas because it is a natural resource and to ensure adequate water supply for future generations, and for the control of flashfloods. Menchavez v Teves Facts: Petitioners Jose S. Menchavez et al. (Menchavez) entered in a contract of lease with Florentino Teves, Jr. (Teves). Menchavez was the lessor and Teves was the lessee, with the subject property in question being a fishpond in Cebu City. City Sheriffs of Cebu subsequently demolished the dikes constructed by Teves, and delivered the property to third parties. Teves filed a case with the RTC of Cebu, seeking damages from Menchavez. The RTC found that both Menchavez and Teves were in pari delicto, thus, their contract of lease was void. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed and damages were awarded to Teves. Hence the petition at hand.

Issue: Whether or not Menchavez and Teves were in pari delicto in relation to the contract of lease executed between them Held: The petition had merit. Both parties were in pari delicto Ratio: The Supreme Court, in its findings, held: The parties do not dispute the finding of the trial and the appellate courts that the Contract of Lease was void. Indeed, the RTC correctly held that it was the State, not petitioners, that owned the fishpond. The 1987 Constitution specifically declares that all lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural resources belong to the State. Included here are fishponds, which may not be alienated but only leased. Possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership. Being merely applicants for the lease of the fishponds, petitioners had no transferable right over them. And even if the State were to grant their application, the law expressly disallowed sublease of the fishponds to respondent. Void are all contracts in which the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, public order or public policy. The Supreme Court also held that no misrepresentation or bad faith was present in the execution of the contract between Menchavez and Teves. As both parties were at fault, neither may recover from each other. Republic v Naguiat Facts: Respondent Celestina Naguiat (Naguiat) acquired parcels of land in Zambales from the LID Corporation and its predecessors-in-interest. Naguiat subsequently filed an application for registration of title. The petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assailed the title, asserting that Naguiat and her predecessors-in-interest failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the lands for 30 years since June 12, 1945 as well as asserting that the lands in question where in fact public lands and not private lands. The RTC ruled in favor of Naguiat. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the findings of the RTC were affirmed. Hence the petition at hand. Issue: Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain. Held: The petition had merit. The lands in question remained inalienable lands of the public domain. Ratio: Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. Forests do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. All lands not appearing clearly to be of private dominion presumptively belongs to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for an alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. Spouses Labaradura v LRA

Keyword: non-registrable property , role of the LRA, Judicial determination of the status of the property Point: Content-neutral legislation Facts: Petitioners applied for the registration of land in Mandaluyong City. The trial court, acting as a land registration court, confirmed and ordered the registration of the land in favor of the Petitioners. However, the LRA refused to issue the registration for the piece of land, citing that the land was already covered by another title, and would thus result in duplication of titles over the same parcel of land. The petitioners filed mandamus to compel the court to issue a certificate of title. Issue: WON the LRA may be compelled to issue a certificate of title for a piece of property that has an existing title? Held: No Ratio: 1. Final Judgment is not yet executory - Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment that they seek to enforce is not yet executory. A judgment of registrable does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of judgment. 2. A void judgment is possible That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree in registration is understandable. Considering the probably duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and purpose , and thereby destroy the integrity of the Torrens system of registration 3. Issuance of a decree is not a ministerial act It is part of the judicial function of courts, involving the exercise of discretion and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled by mandamus. Ruling: Petition dismissed, but the case is remanded to the court of origin.