Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982 (En Banc), J.

Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president. Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion. After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion. Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986) FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs Pres. Aquino G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986 FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate? HELD: Yes RATIO: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: 1. the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;

2. it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and 3. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs Pres. Aquino G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986 FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate? HELD: Yes RATIO: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: 1. the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; 2. it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and 3. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )

10AUG Immunity from Suits Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers to. Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief? Held: It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC ) More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner. R E S O L U T IO N

PER CURIAM: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Claiming that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action. Prescinding from petitioners lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first

regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]) For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and VicePresident of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

In RE Bermudez [GR 76180, 24 October 1986] Resolution En banc, Per curiam: 7 concur Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, Saturnino V. Bermudez, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the 7 February 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May 1992." Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 5 (not 7) of Article XVIII of the Transitory Provision of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to. Issue: Whether Aquino and Laurel are the legitimate President and Vice President of the Philippines. Held: The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of 30 June 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the

government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government."

Saturnino Bermudez

Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government Bermudez as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . . ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous. HELD: No. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being amatter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009 De Leon vs Esguerra Facts: Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986 signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen. Issue: Whether or not designation of successors is valid. Held: No, memoranda has no legal effect. 1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986. 2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended. 3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution. e Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987 (En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x." Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. G.R. No. L-13250: Collector vs Campos Rueda Definition of State Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira.. ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes. HELD: Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial

1.THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, VS. ANTONIO CAMPOS R U E D A , respondent. The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of TaxAppeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for theacquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answeredthe question in the negative. Facts: Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late EstrellaSoriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for thetransfer of intangible personal

properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been aresident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption. However,r e s p o n d e n t d e n i e d t h i s r e q u e s t o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e r e w a s n o r e c i p r o c i t y [ w i t h T a n g i e r , w h i c h w a s moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of theN a t i o n a l I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e C o d e , r e f e r s t o a g o v e r n m e n t o f t h a t f o r e i g n p o w e r w h i c h , a l t h o u g h n o t a n international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangiblepersonal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from suchtaxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order toentitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code. Issue: Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of aninternational personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of theNational Internal Revenue Code Held: Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling. If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be apolitically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legallysupreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under agovernment with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising bym e a n s o f i t s g o v e r n m e n t i t s s o v e r e i g n w i l l o v e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n i t a n d m a i n t a i n i n g i t s s e p a r a t e international personality. State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allot t e d a r e a a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power entrusted to its governmentto maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With thelatter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in the AmericanUnion was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreigncountry within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardlyan international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category

Political Law Definition of State

Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda,

as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira.. ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes. HELD: Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial. ***