ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. POTENCIANO ILUSORIO FACTS: Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11, 1942.

.They had six children. Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He was also the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. In 1972, the spouses were separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium Manila and when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club. Erlinda lived in Antipolo city. On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda at Antipolo after his arrival from the US. Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead of the 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by the latters doctor in New York. Because of the overdose, Potencianos health deteriorated. On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for the guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced aged, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo city after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio city. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati. On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondents prevented her from visiting her husband and from going home going home to Antipolo. Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writ of habeas corpus. However, the CA granted visitation rights. The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife. On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus? HELD: NO. The essential object of the writ of habeas corpus is to release a person illegally detained. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition of Erlinda because a writ of habeas corpus is only granted when there is an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In the case at bar, it was Potencianos choice not to return in Antipolo city. He did not request the administrator of Cleveland Condominium to prevent his wife from visiting him. Even at 86 years old, he is still of sound mind which means that he can make decisions for himself. He should not be the subject of visitation rights as it will violate his right of privacy. 2. Was the order granting visitorial rights proper? HELD: NO. The petition of Erlinda did not include the prayer for visitation rights. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the issue involved is between husband and wife, not between children or minors and parents. The husband or the wife has the liberty to refuse to see each other. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Under Article 68 of Family Code Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/13978 9_ilusorio.htm CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA FACTS: Francisco Comille and Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa and Rosario in Zamboanga del Norte on January 1956. Zosima died on October 3, 1980. Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. Juliana waived her share consisting of the property to Francisco. Since Francisco had no children, he asked his neice (Leticia), his neices cousin (Luzviminda) and a widow (Cirila Arcaba) to take care of his house as well as the store inside. When Leticia and Luzminda got married, only Cirila was left to take good care of Francisco and his house. Erlinda Tabancura testified that the source of income of Francisco solely consisted of rentals from lots. Francisco did not pay Cirila her wages but her family received free board and lodging from him. On January 1991, Francisco executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos wherein he donated 150 sq. meters lot and his house to Cirila. The latter accepted such donation. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the faithful services that Cirila had rendered over the past ten (10) years. On October 1991, Francisco died. On 1993, the nephews, nieces and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco filed a petition for the nullity

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of the deed of donation inter vivos. They alleged that the donation violated Article 87 of the Family Code because Cirila was the common law wife of Francisco. The court granted the petition in favor of the heirs based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and the documents showing that Cirila was the common law wife of Francisco (Signed documents bearing the name Cirila Comile). Cirila filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the Court of Appeals erred in stating that she was the common law wife of Francisco based on the misapprehension of facts. According to her, the presented evidences were only hearsay.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan amounting to P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Alfredo Ching, PBMs Exec. Vice President, executed security agreements (Dec. 1980 and Mar. 1981) making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. On July 1981, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of money against PBM and Alferdo Ching. The court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests While there was an appeal to the decision of the civil case, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Sr. Deputy Sheriff Magsajo issued a notice of sheriff sale to the Ching spouses on three of their conjugal properties. The Ching spouses filed a case of injunction alleging that the judgment cannot be enforced against their conjugal partnership. According to them, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. ISSUE: 1. Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of debts that redound for the benefit of family? HELD: NO. The loan obtained by PBM and Mr. Ching is a corporate loan, not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the following: The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he guaranteed;

ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the donation was void. HELD: YES. The donation made by Francisco to Cirila was void because it was not in accordance with Article 87 of the Family Code. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Cirila was a common law wife of Francisco based on the following evidences: The application for business permit to operate a real estate business where in Cirila used the surname Comile instead of Arcaba. The sanitary permit also showed Cirila Comile as signatory. The death certificate of Francisco was signed by Cirila using the surname Comile.

In Bitangcor vs. Tan, the Supreme Court ruled that cohabitation is more than sexual intercourse especially when the spouses are already old and may no longer be interested in sex. Under Article 87 of the Family Code Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683 .htm

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The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan obtained; His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan.

As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the court said that signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family received benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is no presumption that when a husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would be benefited. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Chings common shares must not be levied because he is not the sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership. Under Article 121 of the Family Code Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844. htm CLEODIA and CEAMANTHA FRANCISCO vs. JORGE and PURIFICATION GONZALES FACTS: The petitioners are Cleodia and Ceamantha Francisco. They are the children of Cleodualdo and Michele Francisco. Mr. and Mrs. Francisco got married on June 12, 1986. Their marriage is governed by the conjugal partnership of gains (under the Civil Code, before the Family Code). In November 2000, the marriage of the spouses was declared null and void. They entered into a compromise agreement wherein one of the provisions is: Title and ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old, respectively. After signing the compromise agreement, Michele Francisco cohabited with George Matrai at Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang Village. Spouses Jorge and Purification Gonzales filed a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment against Matria and Michele Franscisco. The Metropolitan trial court ordered Matrai and M. Francisco to pay back the rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorneys fees.

However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. Under Article 121 of the Family Code Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305. htm ALFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). Alfredo Ching together with two other persons executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally liable for the PBMCI obligations. The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos. PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges.) Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to Alfredo Ching. Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common shares. According to her, the shares were purchased out of the conjugal funds. She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family). ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable. HELD: YES. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to the name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Chings name appeared as the sole registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp doesnt mean that it is his exclusive property and not to the conjugal partnership.

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A notice of sale by execution was issued by the sheriff covering the house and lot property located at Ayala Alabang. The grandmother (guardian) of Cleodia and Ceamantha filed in the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by Execution but this was denied. The motion for reconsideration was also denied to the petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The arguments of the petitioners are as follow: a. They are the rightful owners of the house and lot as it was donated to them by virtue of the Compromise Agreement entered into by their parents. b. Their parents already waived their rights on the said property. c. The obligation of Michele did not redound to the benefit of the family. d. Michele Franciscos obligation is a joint obligation between her and Matrai.

The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis. Under Article 124 of the Family Code Full text: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisio ns%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067 470223 HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961. The couple resided in Manila but they operated a machine shop in Lucena City. This business was managed by Rafael Ayuste. The couple purchased on August 1982 a parcel of land with an area of 180 square meters on which a residential house was built situated at Lucena City for Mr. Ayustes temporary residence. A deed of sale was executed and signed by the parties and filed with the Register of Deeds of Lucena City. The property was purchased from spouses Pedro and Aida David. On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, with the consent of Mrs. Ayuste sold the said parcel of land for P40,000 to Malabonga. Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Ayuste found out that the parcel of land was sold by her deceased husband without her knowledge or consent. In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name of private respondent and for the payment of moral, exemplary and actual damages. In her complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was forged. The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste. Both parties appealed in the Court of Appeals for the decision rendered by the RTC. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste? HELD: The trial court erred in giving due course to the action for annulment of sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed on February 27, 1987 by and between defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellants husband is declared VALID and BINDING upon the plaintiff-appellant. The only issue which remains to be resolved is whether petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property. HELD: YES. The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property. To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored that the property in question is in the name of "Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco." On its face, the title shows that the registered owner of the property is not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to Michele. The liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Notice of Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001, there was already annotated on the title the following inscription: Entry No. 23341-42/T-167907 Nullification of Marriage: Title of ownership of the conjugal property consisting of the above-described property shall be transferred by way of a Deed of Donation to Cleodia Michaela U. Francisco and Ceamantha Maica U. Francisco, as co-owners when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) yrs. old to the condition that Cleodualdo, shall retain usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches the age of 65 yrs. Old. From the foregoing, it is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners.

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 Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wifes consent, subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that: The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time. The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material. Under Article 173 of the Family Code Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/118 784.htm HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR REYES v. CIPRIANO and FLORENTINA MIJARES FACTS: Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but had been separated de facto since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property (lot) to spouses Mijares for P40,000 on 1983. She also found out that Vicente misrepresented her in the MTC declaring that she died on March 22, 1982 and that the heirs left are him and the 5 minor children.

On September 1983, the court granted guardianship over the minor children to Vicente and authorized the latter to sell the estate of Ignacia on October 1983. On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses. In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold to the spouses was only his share. On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of lot void with respect to the share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent spouses. Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983. Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merely voidable? HELD: Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the time the assailed sale was contracted, provide: Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conjugal property of Ignacia and Vicente. Therefore, the sale

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of said lot to the Mijares spouses, without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia Reyes, is voidable. The action to annul the sale made on 1983 was filed on 1986 which is within the prescriptive period under Article 173. The Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. They already know about the discrepancies and irregularities in the death certificate presented by Vicente. The said errors should have prompted them to question the sale and pertaining documents. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed of Sale executed by Vicente and respondents was annulled. The guilty husband is asked to pay damages to Mijares spouses and to his children (petitioners). Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/143826 .htm ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and ROMULO NICOL FACTS: Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners. The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_145222_2 009.html DAVID and LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI PEREZ FACTS: David Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural land located in Panabo to Melki Perez on January 1988. The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Loreza Pelayo, wife of David, and another one whose signature is illegible witnessed the execution of the deed. Mrs. Pelayo signed only the third space in the space provided for the witnesses. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages but the latter refused. As a result, Mr. Perez instituted an action for specific performance. Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in consideration of his services as his attorney-in-fact to make the necessary representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants-defendants in the ejectment suit

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Defendant Pelayo said that the deed was without the consent of Mrs. Perez and invoked Article166 of the Civil Code to support his argument.

HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ SR. vs. PLARIDEL and DOLORES MINGOA FACTS: The petitioners are the heirs of Domingo Hernandez namely Sergia Hernandez (surviving spouse), Domingo, Jr. and Maria Leonora Wilma (children). Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez were awarded a real property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHCC) by way of salary deduction (Central Bank.) The real property was later awarded to Dolores Camisura who then sold the said property to the Mingoa spouses. In April 1983, Mr. Hernandez died intestate. When Mr. Hernandez died, his heirs found out that the title of the property was already registered to the respondents. On February 1994, the petitioners filed a complaint against respondents. They are praying for the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of the Dead of Absolute Sale of Real Estate. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the title of the subject property in the name of respondent Mingoa may still be reconveyed to the petitioners. HELD: Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for annulment of a contract entered into by the husband without her consent within ten (10) years from the transaction questioned. Petitioners filed the action for reconveyance in 1995. Twelve (12) years have lapsed since such discovery, and they filed the petition beyond the period allowed by law. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of the latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners action has prescribed. In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the subject property were validly transferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. Since the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period, she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof. And more so, she is precluded from assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa.

ISSUE: 1. Did Mrs. Pelayo expressed his consent in the deed of sale executed by Mr. Pelayo? HELD: The Supreme Court said that the petitioner expressed her consent to the Deed of Absolute Sale when she fixed her signature on the document. The consent need not be expressed. It can be implied. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale. Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Said provisions of law provide: Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal property without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained. The petition of Mr. and Mrs. Pelayo was denied.

Under Articles 166 and 173 of the New Civil Code. Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/ 141323.htm

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Therefore, title to the subject property cannot anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches. The issues of prescription and laches having been resolved, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition. Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/decemb er2009/146548.htm ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ FACTS: Judie and Gilda Corpuz were married on December 1968 in Bacolod City before a judge. Mr. and Mrs. Corpuz purchased a lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato. In April 1988, the couple sold one half portion of their lot to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Guiang. Gilda Corpuz went to Manila on June 1989 to search for employment abroad but she became a victim of an illegal recruiter. While she was in Manila, Mr. Corpuz (the husband), sold the other half of their residence to spouses Guiang (petitioners). The daughter of Mrs. Guiang sent a letter to Gilda and the latter replied that she does not consent the sale. In March 1990, Gilda went home. She lived in their residence with their children but the husband disappeared. The children said that Mr. Corpuz had a new wife already. As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Guiang filed a complaint against respondent for trespassing. Gilda field for the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale. The trial court held that the deed of transfer of rights and amicable settlement are void. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the deed of transfer of rights was validly executed, or it not, ratified by the execution of the amicable settlement. HELD: The disposition or encumbrance is voidable. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void. Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the amicable settlement they executed on March 16, 1990. The position is not well taken. Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jun1998/125172. htm THELMA JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA FACTS: Thelma Jader-Manalo saw an advertisement in the classified ads section of the newspaper Bulletin Today (April 1992 issue). The advertisement was about the sale of the ten-door apartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Camaisa. Thelma was interested in the purchase of lot so she negotiated to purchase the property through a real estate broker Mr. Ereno. The parties agreed in a hand-written contract. The mode of payment agreed was installment. The following day, both the parties met and signed the typewritten contract. Manalo issued UCPB checks. After one day, Norma called Thelma Manalo and said that they are cancelling the sale because the spouses need spot cash and not checks. Thelma filed a complaint to compel Norma to sign the contracts to sell. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the husband may dispose of a conjugal property with the wifes written consent.

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HELD: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. The properties subject of the contracts in this case was conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. The Supreme Court said that being aware of the transaction is not consent. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought. Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/147978. htm

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO FACTS: Miguela and Marcelino Dailo were married on August 1967. During the marriage, the spouses purchased a lot situated in San Pablo City from Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the husband (exclusion of his wife). On December 1993, Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount ofP300,000.00 from petitioner (Homeowners Bank). As security, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. All the two transactions were made by Marcelino without the knowledge and consent of Miguela Dailo. The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. HSLB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. The said bank was the highest bidder. In December 1995, Marcelino Dailo died. Her wife found out that the house and lot in San Pablo city was already mortgaged. As a result, she filed a petition for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Deed of Sale and damages against petitioner. The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the husband. HSLB also contended that the loan obtained by Marcelino redounded to the benefits of the Family. ISSUE: 1. Was the disposal of the property executed by Marcelino valid? HELD: NO. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.

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Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). On the issue about the loan redounded to the benefit of the family, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not assert such contention when they filed their complaint in the lower court. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802 .htm PATROCINIA and WILFREDO RAVINO vs. MARY ANN VILLA ABRILLE

made improvements such as poultry house and annex. In 1991, Pedro had illicit relations with another woman and neglected his family. As a result, Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family. Pedro sold the property (house and two lots) to Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravino without the consent of Mary Ann. While Mary Ann was out, Pedro and armed members of the CAFGU transferred the properties of the family from the house to an apartment. Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mary Ann Villa Abrille (sale of share is valid, payment for damages). When the petitioners appealed, the CA modified the decision.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the property covered by TCT No. T88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property. Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent. HELD: There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. The house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court. The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.

FACTS: The respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille is married to Pedro Villa Abrille. The spouses have four children. In 1982, the spouses purchased a parcel of land in Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao city with an area of 555 square meter. The property is registered under their names. Adjacent to the said lot is a parcel of land owned and acquired by Pedro before the marriage. Mr. and Mrs. Villa Abrille built a house on Lot 7 (owned by both spouses) and Pedros lot. They also

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Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are not buyers in good faith. The sale of the conjugal property was annulled while the sale of Pedros exclusive property was valid. When a contract is declared void, there must be a restoration of the subject of the said contract. Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_160708_2 009.html MANUEL and LETICIA FUENTES vs CONDRADO ROCA FACTS: Sabina Tarroza owned a 358-sq. m. lot in Zamboanga city. In October 1982, the said lot was sold to Tarciano Roca (her son) but the latter did not transfer the registry of title to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. The parties entered into an agreement to sell prepared by Atty. Plagata. The said agreement was to take effects six months after April 29, 1998. In the agreement, Tarciano required the Fuentes spouses to pay for a down payment of P60,000 for the transfer of lot title. Within six months, Tarciano was to clear the structures and occupants of the lot. At the same time, he needs to get the consent of his estranged wife to agree with the sale. The petitioners agreed to pay the remaining P140,000 or P160,000 upon Tarcianos compliance to the agreement. Atty. Plagata met Rosario (Tarciano) and asked her to sign the agreement of sale. The contract of sale was perfected and the Fuentes spouses became the owner of the said property. In 1997 (after 8 years), the children of the Roca spouses filed a complaint against petitioners praying for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged; Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale. HELD: The Court of Appeals found out that the signature of Rosario was forged. The Supreme Court held the same. There is dissimilarity between the specimen signature of Rosario and that of seen in the agreement of sale. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 by Tarciano T. Roca, executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are declared void. The Fuentes spouses are buyers in good faith. Therefore, they are not required by law to pay any amount of damages to the Rocas. However, the Rocas are indemnified to reimburse the cost of improvements made by the Fuentes to the property. Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_178902_2 010.html

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JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER vs. ISMAEL and FLORA FERRER FACTS: Josefa is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer. Alfredo Ferrer is the half brother of respondents Manuel and Ismael Ferrer. Before Alfredo got married, he purchased a piece of lot and applied for a loan with the Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements on the property (residential house and two-door apartment). The loan was fully paid during the marriage of Alfredo and Josefa using conjugal funds. According to the petitioner, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer asked Alfredo to sign his last will and testament which turned out to be a contract of sale. The sale involved the property acquired by Alfredo before the marriage but was fully paid using the conjugal funds. Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for the Annulment of the said sale against respondents. The RTC dismissed the petition because it found out that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrart to law, morals, good customs and public policy. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Alfredo died on September 1999. Josefa filed a petition for the reimbursement for the cost of improvements in Alfedos lot. ISSUE: Whether or not Josefa Ferrer must be reimbursed by the respondents. HELD: No. Petitioner failed to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not violate her right. The Supreme Court ruled While we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120[22] of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the

improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code. What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed. In the case at bar, the respondents has not obligation to pay any cost of improvements to Josefa Ferrer. Therefore, the petition is denied. Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/1 66496.htm ELENA MURRER vs HELMUT MERRER FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany on September 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by the parents of respondent. In 1992, the spouses decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. During that time, Helmut Muller inherited the house of his parents which he sold. The proceeds of the sale were used to purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of the house (P528,000 and P2,300,000 respectively). The Antipolo property was registered under the name of Elena Murrer. Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 1994,Helmut Muller filed for a separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon city. On August 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the spouses Muller. The court also decreed the separation of properties between the spouses and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country excluding those acquired by gratuitous title. Helmut Muller said that he is not praying for the transfer of ownership of the property but of the reimbursement of his personal funds.

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ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to the reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property? HELD: NO. Mr. Muller is not entitled to the reimbursement of the funds used to purchase the Antipolo property. The Constitution prohibits alien from acquiring private lands in the Philippines for the conservation of the national patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he purchased the property despite constitutional prohibition.

ISSUE:

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. Partial settlements are as follows: - P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the parties. The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided equally by the parties; - The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for te defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof. - The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant; - The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof; - The house and lot shall be to the common child. The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the said agreement. The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr. Maquilan.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2 006.html VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN FACTS: Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful married life. They were blessed to have one son. Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour. The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private respondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour. Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on 2001.

1. Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid. HELD: YES. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner said that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code. To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. These arguments are specious.

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Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/june2007/15540 9.htm

Case digest prepared The Law Chic. Facts and rulings were taken from the full text of the case.

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