Yufan Hao Ying Hou University of Macau

New Governance

Chinese Foreign Policy Making: A Comparative Perspective

Yufan Hao is a professor of political science and dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Macau. He earned his PhD from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1989. He has published widely on Chinese politics, Chinese foreign relations, and U.S.China relations in such journals as Asian Survey, Asian Perspective, Journal of Democracy, Journal of Contemporary China, and China Quarterly. His latest books include Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power (University Press of Kentucky, 2009) and Chinese Foreign Policy Making: Societal Forces in Chinese American Policy Making (Ashgate, 2005). E-mail: yhao@umac.mo Ying Hou is a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Macau. She obtained her bachelors degree in French language and literature from Nanjing University in 2001 and a masters degree in international relations from Fudan University in 2004. She has published articles on international relations theory, Chinese foreign relations, and Chinas information, industry as well as MacauU.S. and MacauEuropean Union relations. Her dissertation focuses on the role of media as a societal force on Chinese foreign policy making.

As one of the fastest growing economies in the world, many wonder what kind of international behavior an increasingly powerful China will demonstrate in the future. Will it be a responsible state on the world stage? The article aims to understand Chinese foreign policy making from a comparative perspective. By using the neoclassical realist approach, key features of Chinese foreign policy as well as possible future alternatives for its implementation are outlined. The essay concludes that signicant changes in Chinese foreign policy in recent years are remarkably similar to those of other major powers.

quo power, as China currently appears to be? How should the world respond to this newly emerging great power? Understanding Chinese foreign policy making and its possible changes is increasingly important. For a long time, Chinese foreign policy was regarded as mysterious. Factors normally believed to be aective (such as public opinion) are viewed as irrelevant in the study of Chinese foreign policy. The purpose of this paper is to understand Chinese foreign policy making from a comparative perspective. By taking a neoclassical realist approach, it aims to help readers understand the features of Chinese foreign policy making and possible trends in the foreseeable future. The paper argues that tremendous changes in Chinese foreign policy making have made it similar to that of major powers. What to Compare? A Neoclassical Realist Approach What might be the best way to investigate Chinese foreign policy making? This paper aims to gain an insightful view of the virtues, shortcomings, and features of Chinese foreign policy making by comparing Chinese foreign policy making with that of the United States. The question, however, is what to compare, and how to compare the two countries?

he rise of China is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable phenomena in international relations of the twenty-rst century. With its spectacular growth rate, China has overtaken Germany to become the third-largest economy in the world, and it is expected to surpass the United States as the largest economy in 25 to 30 years, if it maintains the current rate of economic growth.1 Within the span of a single generation, China has moved from being an almost isolated state to being a hub of the globalized economy, from having an obsolete and bloated army to having a professional military force possessing a certain degree of high-tech excellence, and from having a hostile attitude toward global institutions to taking an active part in multilateral organizations.

Domestic factors are generally believed to be an important determinant on Chinese foreign policy While China has become the fastest growing economy making, but relying solely on such factors may risk in the world, many wonder what kind of international missing the forest for the trees because of insucient behavior an increasingly powerful China may demon- material, thus leading to a biased understanding. For instance, many scholars strate in the foreseeable future. tend to use factionalism to Will growing power eventually explain Chinese foreign policy lead Chinese leadership to chalWhile China has become the as a result of political conict lenge the existing international fastest growing economy in among top leaders during the norms, rules, and institutions? the world, many wonder what Cultural Revolution (Garver Or will Chinas integration into kind of international behavior 1982; Nathan 1973; Whiting the international economy, its an increasingly powerful 1979; Zagoria 1962). However, growing middle class, and its more studies show that these increasing participation in interChina may demonstrate in the so-called factions did not take national institutions lead it to foreseeable future. a consistent stand in foreign become a continuing the status
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policy making, and that there were more debates on foreign policy issues among elites in order to gain internal consensus than real foreign policy behavior directed at the international system (Ng-Quinn 1983, 21213). On the contrary, the neorealism of international relations theory emphasizes the international system as the ultimate cause of state behavior, which helps to understand Chinese foreign policy making in a relatively consistent and regular way (Waltz 1979). But it risks making a reductionist mistake by attributing all of the foreign policy decisions of a state to the eects of the international system (Ng-Quinn 1983; Rose 1998). In this case, the neoclassical realist approach, as gure 1 shows, starts from systemic forcesthe relative power of a stateas an independent variable, and incorporates the unit level as an intervening variable. This may be a relevant way to analyze the foreign policy making of a state (Rose 1998; Schweller 2004; Taliaferro 2006).

policy making may be possible. If we take systemic force as a given, comparing the internal factors in each country may help us get a clearer view of the characteristics of Chinese foreign policy making as well as the changes it is undergoing. Comparison of Chinese and American Foreign Policy Making As two major powers in the contemporary world, China and the United States have enjoyed dierent levels of relative power in the international system. China, as mentioned earlier, is a rising power with swift growth in its economic and military capabilities, while the United States has been the only superpower since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, with respect to internal factors, China and the United States are diverse, with dierent party systems, legislativeadministrative relationships, electoral systems, political cultures, and statesociety relationships.

First, the party systems of the two countries have their own charIn gure 1, systemic forces refer to the relative power of a state. acteristics and exert dierent eects on foreign policy making. In According to neorealism, the structure of the international system China, as the sole legitimate party in power, the Chinese Commuthat is, the distribution of power among unitsdecides the nist Party (CCP) has always played a dominant role in foreign policy behavior of the units (Waltz 1979). Therefore, the relative power of decision making by framing the strategic and macro-level guidelines, the state undoubtedly inuences decision makers calculations when principles, and policies on the basis of the ideology and political they make foreign policy. But just as the neoclassical realists argued, theories of the CCP, including Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong relative power, even though existing objectively, will not inuence thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and the discourse of the Three foreign policy making until it is translated by internal factors such as Represents. Despite its changing functions and structure from time the perceptions and misperceptions of political elites and the public to time, the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Foreign (Rose 1998; Schweller 2004). Power here means the capabilities of Aairs Leading Small Group, which include the chairman/general a stateincluding both the material and the spiritual resources the secretary of the CCP, are the de facto foreign policy-making institustate can possess and mobilizeto push other states to do as it wills. tions. The organizations of the CCP exist widely in departments Internal factors, as the intervening variable, consist of three groups at all levels in charge of foreign aairs; under the principle of party of items: political institutions, political culture, and the statesociety management of cadres, the personal appraisal, appointment, and relationship within the state. Political institutions refer to the regime dismissal of diplomats are controlled by the central and local CCP arrangement, such as the party system, and committees. However, in the United States, the legislative-administrative relationship the Democrats and Republicans have to com unlike the [Chinese within a state. The political culture refers to pete for power through election every four Communist Party (CCP)], which years. And, unlike the CCP, which claims to the sum of the fundamental values, senticlaims to represent the interests ments and knowledge that give form and subrepresent the interests of all the Chinese peostance to political process (Lipset 1995, 965). ple, the Democratic and Republican parties of all the Chinese people, the The statesociety relationship mainly denotes represent dierent interest groups and diverge Democratic and Republican the interactions between government and parties represent dierent interest in their general policy attitudes, thus resulting civil society, especially the impact of the latter in partisan conict in foreign policy (Peterson groups and diverge in their on political elites. And nally, foreign policy 1994). From this point of view, compared general policy attitudes, thus making is a dependent variable resulting from with the American two-party system, Chinas resulting in partisan conict in systemic forces (independent variable) and regime is more conducive to the continuinternal factors (intervening variable). ity of foreign policy. In fact, every time an foreign policy. American president with a dierent party Using this neoclassical realist analytical background from his predecessor comes into framework, a comparison between Chinese and American foreign power, Chinese leaders face the problem of what foreign policy the

Systemic Forces
(Independent variable)

Internal Factors
(Intervening variable) Political institutions Political culture Statesociety relationship

Foreign Policy Making

(Dependent variable)

Figure 1 The Neoclassical Realist Approach

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new president will adopt and how best to deal with this new president. From Bill Clinton to George W. Bush, although both eventually adopted a pragmatic attitude toward Beijing, it was inevitable that both experienced a grind-in period in which Sino-American relations encountered diculties (Lampton 2001a). Second, unlike Chinas unitary legislature and administration, the separation of powers in the United States provides an opportunity for the executive and Congress to compete in foreign policy making. In China, although the National Peoples Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power according to the Constitution, it is the Standing Committee of the Politburo, in which the chairman of the NPC is a member, that makes the foreign policy. Since the 1990s, Chinese leaders have paid attention to the increasing role of the NPC in foreign aairs, which mainly consists of the appointment of plenipotentiary representatives abroad, the approval or abrogation of treaties and important agreements, and the adoption of parliament diplomacy in elds such as human rights, international judicial assistance, and arms control and security. But under the principle of unitary legislature and administration arrangement, the relationship between the executive and the NPC is cooperative rather than competitive. And the NPC mainly acts as a rubber stamp for Chinese foreign policy making. In the United States, [t]he Constitution does not assign the foreign policy power to any branch, but forces them to share responsibility by breaking foreign policy power into pieces and assigning various portions to Congress and to the executive. Since the U.S. Constitution does not specify which branch is to lead, it provides the governmental branches with an invitation to struggle (Wittkopf, Kegley, and Scott 2003, 323). Thus, [t]he president is commander in chief, but without congressional support (or at least acquiescence) he nds it hard to sustain protracted military combat abroad. The executive branch implements trade law, but the Congress sets tari levels. The president negotiates treaties, but the Senate must ratify them (Lampton 2001b, 289). This kind of institutional arrangement undoubtedly has its own advantagesit enables the American president to play a two-level game in dealing with foreign aairs. If the president does not really want to accept a treaty that he negotiates, congressional disapproval of the treaty may be a good excuse in responding to international pressure. Conversely, if the president is eager to push the approval of a treaty, international pressure may be used to press Congress (Meyers 2004). Furthermore, the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches in foreign policy making makes it possible for American political elites to realize the conicting interests of the United States. For example, the normalization agreements signed by the Jimmy Carter administration with the Chinese government in 1978 and the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979, despite their dierences, supplemented and reinforced each other and served Americas conicting interests in that period (Hao 1997). Nevertheless, there are also some disadvantages to the American foreign policy making system resulting from congressional involvement. On the one hand, the participation of Congress in foreign policy making leads to inconsistency and incoherence in American foreign policy. The Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979 contradicted that of the normalization agreement signed by the president, and it not only upset the PRC, but also confused
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both friends and foes in many countries. The extensive congressional modication of the administrations proposed bill raised questions about the stability, continuity, and dependability of American policy as dened by the executive branch, in a way potentially damaging to U.S. credibility. Moreover, foreign policy making often needs to take advantage of opportunity, but deliberative procedures make Congress sluggish, with a lot of time spent in public debates and counting yeas and nays. On the other hand, parochialism leads members of Congress tend to take a short view of foreign policy. As David Mayhew (1974) has suggested, a principal motivation of almost all members of Congress is to seek reelection. Therefore, members of Congress are motivated to a large extent by competing regional and parochial interests, which may naturally inuence the way they see the world. This congressional parochialism is reinforced by the congressional committee system, in which most of the congressional business is done. According to this committee system, every member of Congress, at least in theory, can block a bill by oering unacceptable amendments, and there are a great many small groups and individuals able to obstruct, and possibly defeat, a bill. This makes it extremely dicult for Congress to plan and initiate actions, so Congress usually responds to executive initiatives instead. In contrast, the president has a nationwide constituency and a much broader perspective on national foreign policy problems. Consequently, there is the possibility that congressional involvement in foreign policy making may damage long-term eorts made by the executive branch. From this point of view, the American system of institutional checks and balances is less eective than Chinas centralized regime during noncrisis periods. Third, the dierent electoral systems make political leaders in these two countries act in dierent ways when making foreign policy. In the United States, electoral politics not only tends to make congressional members parochial, as mentioned earlier, but also aects the presidents performance in foreign policy. Normally, for the purpose of winning the campaign for the White House, a presidential candidate often consciously proclaims some dierent foreign policy positions than those of the incumbent president, which more or less inuence his attitudes on foreign policy issues when he becomes the new president. Particularly if the new president lacks experience in foreign policy, the rst year of his term will be an adaptive phase in which he tries to make his own foreign policy framework with the assistance of his advisors and political appointees. American foreign policy thus inevitably appears to uctuate on many sensitive issues during this phase. When a new president tries to enact foreign policy after one year of learning and training, the midterm election kicks in, distracting most of his attention. During the remaining half of the term, the president has to prepare for reelection, which tends to make him cautious and conservative on foreign policy. If he is reelected, the second term will be the period in which the president can really develop foreign policy with his rich experience and authority and without the restraints of electoral politics. Compared with the American president, the paramount leader in China does not need to worry about electoral politics when making foreign policy. From the era of Mao Zedong until today, there has always been a leading nucleus that plays a key role in Chinese foreign policy making.2 Undoubtedly, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao are, respectively, the leading nucleus of the four generations of the CCP. This leading nucleus may or may

not include the state president and/or the hand, it has made Chinese leaders sensitive to chairman/general secretary of the CCP and/or security and sovereignty issues and urged them Although the real role of the the chairman of the Central Military Comto strive to restore Chinas pride and prestige, leading nucleus in Chinese mission. Although the real role of the leading as well as its rightful place in the world (Zhao nucleus in Chinese foreign policy making may 2005, 133). On the other hand, nationalism foreign policy making may be diverse according to the dierent posts they is a double-edged sword for Chinese leaders be diverse according to the undertake and the dierent levels of prestige today, which can be used to mobilize enough dierent posts they undertake they enjoy, the leading nucleus arrangement resources to make foreign policy and to and the dierent levels of and the cooperative relationship between the strengthen state cohesion, on the one hand, prestige they enjoy, the leading government and the NPC enables them to but may be the strongest challenge to Chinese nucleus arrangement and have substantive inuence in Chinas political foreign policy and may undermine the legitilife, and thus possess ultimate foreign policy macy of the regime, on the other. the cooperative relationship making power. Moreover, compared with the between the government and American president, the core status of the As for the United States, the theory of Amerithe NPC enables them to have leading nucleus enables Chinese foreign policy can exceptionalism holds that the American substantive inuence in Chinas making to have more a personal impact. In people are Gods chosen people living in political life, and thus possess Maos era, responsibility for major foreign the promised land, which tends to make ultimate foreign policy making strategic decision making was ultimately in American leaders idealists, liberalists, and even Maos hands, and Chinese foreign policy, to adventurists with a sense of mission to expand power. a great extent, reected his personal will. For American values and democracy to other example, it was Mao who nally decided to parts of the world (Wang 2000; Zhou 2000). invite the American table tennis team to visit China in 1971, which Inspired by this political culture, Woodrow Wilson strived for the became a historic breakthrough for Sino-American relations and laid establishment of the League of Nations to safeguard world democthe foundation for the later reconciliation between the two states. In racy. Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated the foundation of the United Dengs era, the personal eects of Deng Xiaoping were still obvious Nations in order to ensure peace after World War II. Ronald Reagan in his nal policy decisions, such as the return of Hong Kong and launched the controversial National Endowment for Democracy Macau to China under the arrangement of One Country, Two Sys- in the Cold War era in order to share democracy with all mankind. tems. Chinese foreign policy making in the post-Deng era tends to Moreover, the idea of American exceptionalism enables American show more collective characteristics, but the role of individual policy leaders to have a moral superiority complex and believe that, if makers remains crucial in some major foreign policy areas, especially necessary, it is reasonable for the United States to establish a new in solving crises. Much research now shows that Jiang Zemin has world order and act as a referee to judge the behavior of other states made great eorts in promoting U.S.China relations since 1989 in spite of existing international norms and rules. This served as the (Lampton 2001a). In the course of dealing with the incident of basic philosophy for the neoconservatism of George W. Bush. the SinoU.S. plane collision, for example, Jiangs instruction that (American government) apologizes(Chinese government) release In addition, realism is another characteristic of the political culture of American foreign policy making, which not only means that the pilot to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Aairs laid the basis the goal of American foreign policy is to serve American national for solving the crisis (Wu 2007). interests, but also includes the isolationist implications that so Fourth, dierent historical experiences and cultural backgrounds long as foreign governments dont endanger American interests on determine the dierent political cultures in China and the United the geopolitical chess board, their domestic aairs dont concern States. In China, the traditional wisdom of harmonious philosophy us (Wright 2006). If the former kind of realism was the basis for enables Chinese leaders to respect the political systems and ways of the calculus of American foreign policy makers during the Cold life of other countries and nations instead of seeking to liberate War era, the latter seems to have been revived in American foreign them by spreading their own patterns of development (see Chu and policy considerations after the 9/11 attacks (Kessler 2007; Wittkopf, Jin 2008, 2930). Drawing on the ve basic principles of peaceful Kegley, and Scott 2003; Wright 2006). coexistence and the peaceful rise theory,3 China has always tried Finally, as to the statesociety relationship, policy makers have to prove that it is not a threat to the peace of the world. Although dierent sensitivities to public opinion in the two countries. In the Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought endowed Chinese United States, the inuence of public opinion on foreign policy foreign policy during Maos era with much ideological color, their impact today is embodied in the principles that the Chinese govern- making is complicated. On the one hand, in general, the public is believed to be ignorant, indierent, and vacillating on most foreign ment proclaims, which advocate for a world free of aggression and policy issues, which enables political elites to guide public opinion exploitation of capitalism, imperialism, and colonialisma world and retain much leeway in foreign policy making. On the other free of power politics, bloc politics, and hegemonism (Zhao 2004, hand, public opinion is unwavering and has a direct inuence on 61). In addition, the rising nationalism of Chinese civil society often leads the rest of the world to consider China a revisionist state. some salient foreign policy issues, such as the Vietnam War in the 1960s, which may force political leaders to modify their foreign Actually, nationalismwhich derives from a mixed feeling of pride policy. In addition, electoral politics require politicians to pay much for the splendid historical civilization that the country has created and bitterness for the countrys humiliating experience in its modern attention to the opinions of voters and to resort to all kinds of opinion polls to feel out voter preferences. historyis a more complicated issue in China today. On the one
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In China, the reform and opening up strategies have profoundly changed the relationship between the state and society in China. The relatively loosened control of the state toward individuals and social groups, and the development of the market economy, in tandem with globalization and informatization, have triggered great social transformation in the past three decadesthe diering interests of social strata, the emergence of some independent social groups such as nongovernmental organizations,4 and so on (Liu and Su 2005; Pang 2006; Wang 2003). Moreover, the growth of the Internet not only facilitates information ow among the public, but also provides a platform for them to express their views or debate many domestic and international issues, including Chinese foreign policy (Lagerkvist 2005; Liu 2006; Yu 2006; Hao and Lin 2005). More and more cases, such as the demonstration against NATOs bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, and the anti-Japan tide, show the publics enthusiasm for foreign aairs. In this context, Chinese foreign policy makers today have to pay more attention to public opinion, as they do not enjoy the same prestige and charisma in China as Mao Zedong did during his era. On the other hand, although the growth of civil society and the development of the Internet compel top leaders to be concerned about public opinion, the focus and purpose of Chinese leaders are dierent from their American counterparts. As Susan L. Shirk has pointed out, unlike democratic politicians who care about the median voter for the purpose of winning elections, Chinese politicians pay more attention to the extreme views of the public, which often appear on the Internet. Because it is this group of people who are most likely to hit the bricks, participate in, or organize mass protests or demonstrations, which will undoubtedly jeopardize the regime stability, they are the focus of Chinese politicians concern (Shirk 2007, 6061). Nevertheless, foreign policy making in these two countries demonstrates some similarities. First, the distinction between foreign and domestic policies becomes so blurred that the external consequences of domestic policies become more signicant, just as the domestic eects of foreign policies become more pronounced (Morse 1976, 8384). Second, the role of the individual policy maker is prominent in making foreign policy. Without Nixon and Mao, the Sino-American rapprochement may not have been possible. After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, both George H. W. Bush and Deng Xiaoping made eorts to break the deadlock in Sino-American relations. In the late 1990s, Clinton and Jiang Zemin, together with Zhu Rongji, made Chinas entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) possible. Moreover, the political leaders of both countries make their foreign policy choices under international and domestic constraints, playing a two-level game when making foreign policy. Just as Lampton has pointed out, Political leaders in China, like their American counterparts, have limited political capital with which to inuence key domestic institutions and constituencies. In each country this capital can be spent or accumulated on both domestic and foreign policy issues. Therefore, whether it is Deng Xiao-ping or Jiang Zemin, George Bush or Bill Clinton, the political leader must be engaged in a ceaseless process of calculating how much scarce political capital to spend on foreign policy versus domestic policy and where in each domain to spend it. (Lampton 2001b, 281)
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Third, either in China or in the United States, social and political pluralism adds complexity to foreign policy making. In both countries, the competition among dierent departments within the executive branch aects foreign policy results. For example, in the matter of Chinas accession to the WTO, there were some who were for it and some who were against it in the two countries, ranging from political leaders, central departments, and provincial governments to dierent industries and interests groups (Lampton 2001b; Yang 2007). Social pluralism contributes to the dierentiation of all kinds of interests, which try to meet their own needs by directly or indirectly inuencing the making of foreign policy. In the United States, societal forces such as interest groups and nongovernmental organizations have established a sophisticated relationship with policy makers and have systemically inuenced American foreign policy making through their own channels. Similarly, in China, the emerging nongovernmental organizations and the swift development of the new technology provide an opportunity for the masses to voice their feelings and opinions about Chinese foreign policy, which Chinese political leaders today have to take into consideration when making foreign policy. Conclusion According to neoclassical realism, the way in which unit-level factors translate the relative power of a state aects the states foreign policy. More than 200 years ago, both the Chinese emperor of Qing dynasty Quanlong and the British envoy Macartney refused to compromise with each other on formalities and rituals, believing that they represented the greatest nation in the world. Later, since it was obliged to open its door to the Western powers after the Opium War, China has gradually tried to become integrated into a world dominated by Western values. Especially since Chinese leaders launched the strategies of reform and opening up in 1978, China has changed rapidly from a planned economy to a market economy under governmental macro regulation, from ideological dogmatism to a more pragmatic approach, and from isolationism to active participation in the international community. Meanwhile, Chinese foreign policy has also undergone signicant changes. The countrys foreign policy making has become less personal, less radical, less ideological, and more pragmatic and sophisticated. Chinas national interests are more specically dened, and the pursuit of those interests has become more realistic and exible. Especially since it joined the World Trade Organization, China has signicantly increased its participation in the international community and integrated itself into the global economy at large. An emerging civil society pays increasing attention to Chinas domestic and foreign aairs. In this context, Chinese foreign policy makingwhich has long been considered politics reserved for a small number of leadersis giving way to a more pluralized practice. With Chinas continuous integration into the world, it is reasonable to believe that Chinese foreign policy making will continue to change gradually along the lines of pluralization, institutionalization, and professionalization. In this course, the role of paramount leaders may still be important, considering the centralized characteristics of Chinas political system. But globalization and the development of science and technology will continue to enable a more and more pluralist society to exert itself on Chinese foreign policy making through every possible channel. In this sense, Chinas foreign policy making may be more similar to that of most other

democratic powers. However, it is hard to assert that Chinas political development will be the same as the Western countries. Just as the neoclassical realist analytical framework shows, Chinas internal factorsits peculiar culture, historical experience, and national characteristicswill make Chinese development as well as foreign policy making unique with Chinese characteristics. Notes 1. Financial Fallout, Foreign Aairs, January 2009. 2. Deng Xiaoping rst put forward the concept of the leading nucleus in dierent generations of the CCP when he talked with Standing Committee members Li Peng and Yao Yilin in 1989 (see Lu 2000, 89). 3. Although some research reveals that this term has been restricted within the scope of academic inquiry and that it would not be used by the Chinese leaders publicly any more (see Suettinger 2004, 110), this theory reect the inuence of the traditional harmonious culture on contemporary diplomatic thought in China. 4. According to some statistics, there were 100 national mass organizations in China in 1965, whereas in 1989, the number of national mass organizations was more than 1,600, and that of local ones more than 200,000 (Liu and Su 2005, 171). References
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