Martin Heidegger

Studies in Continental Thought

GENERAL EDITOR

JOHN SALLIS
CONSULTING EDITORS

Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)

Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly

William L. McBride J. N. Mohanty Mary Rawlinson Tom Rockmore Edward S. Casey Calvin 0. Schrag Hubert L Dreyfus . tReines Schiirmann Don thde Charla E. Scott David Farrell KrelI Tharnas Sheehan Lenore Langsdorf Robert Sokolowski Alphonso Lingis Bruce W Wilshire . David Wood

Robert Bemasconi Rudolf Bemet John D. Caputo David C a n

Indiana University Press

Bloomington 6 Indianapolis

Contents
Publication of this work was supported by funding from Inter Nationes, Ronn.

Translators' Foreword ~cknowledgments

XV

xliv

This book is a publication of

Indiana University Press
601 North Morton Street Bloomington, Indiana 47404-3797 USA

I. Preview The Public 'lStle: Contributions to Philomphy and the Essential Heading:
From Enaoning I. Cmfributionsto Philosophy Enact the Questioning Along a Pathway . . .
2. Saying from Enowning as the First Response to the Question of

Tdephonc orders 800-842-6796 Fax orders 812-855-7931 Orders b c-mail iuporder@hdi.edu y Published in German as %Wage mr Philosqhie (Vmn HreignisJ edited by FriedrichWilhelm von Hemnann O 1989 by Virtorio Klostermann, Frankfun am Main English translation O 1999 by Indiana University Ress All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical. including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system. without permission in writing from the publisher. The Assodation of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-In-PubllrratfonData

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. [Beitriige zur Philosophie. English] Contributions to philosophy : from enowning I Martin Heidegger : translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. p. cm. - (Studies in Continental thought) Includm bibliographical references. ISBN 0-253-33606-6 (cloth :atk, paper) 1 . Philosophy. I. l7tle. R. Series.
B3279.HMB44513 1999

193-dc21

99-34597

Being 3. From Enowning 4. From Enowning 5. For the Few and the Rare 6. The Grounding-Attunement 7. From Enowning 8. From Enowning 9. A Glance 10. From Enowning I 1. Enowning Dasein Man I Z. Enowning and History 13. Reservedness 14. Philosophy and Worldview 15. Philosophy as "Philosophy of a People" 16. Philosophy 17. The Necessity of Philosophy 18. The PowerIessness of Thinking 19. Phikosophy (On the Question: Who Are We?) 20. The Beginning and InceptuaI Thinking 2 I. Inceptual Thinking (Projecting-Open) 22. Inceptual Thinking 23. InceptuaE Thinking:Why Thinking from within the Beginning? 24. The Wayward Claim on Inceptual Thinking 25. Historicity and Being 26. Philosophy as Knowing Awareness 27. Inceptual Thinking (Concept) 28. The Immeasurability of Inceptual Thinking as Finite Thinking 29. lnceptual Thinking (The Question of What Is Ownmosr) 30. Incepaual Thinking (As Mindfulness)

vi

Contents

Contents
65. What Is Not Ownmast to Be-ing 66. Machination and Lived-Experience 67. Machination and Lived-Experience 68. Machination and Lived-Experience 69. Lived-Experience and "Anthropology" 70. m e Gigantic 7 1. The Gigantic 72. Nihilism 73. Abandonment of Being and *Sciencew 74. ' n t a l Mobilization" as Consequence of Originary Abandonment of Being 75. On Being Mindful of Science
36. Propositions about 'Science" 77. ~xperiri-Expdmha-wmmhlm-"Experimentu-&-faExpm'en~-Probe

vii
91

31. The Style of Inceptual Thinking 32. Enowning. A Decisive Glance after the Enactment of Echo and P aying-Forth E 33. The Question of Be-ing 34. Enowning and the Question o Being f 35. Enowning 36. Enthinking Be-ing and Language 37. Be-ing and Reticence in Silence (The Sigetic) 38. Reticence in Silence 39. Enowning 40. The Work of Thinking in the Epoch of the Crossing 41. Every Saying of Be-ing Is Kept i Words and Namings n 42. From 'Being and Time" to "Enowning" 43. Be-ing and Decision 44. The *Decisionsa 45. The 'Decision" 46. Decision (Fore-Grasping) 47. What Is Ownmost to Decision: Being and Not-Being 48. In What Sense Decision Belongs to Be-ing Itself 49. Why Must Decisions Be Made?

91
92 93 93 94

96
96

98
100

100
100
110

7 . Expmiri (kplmpfa) 8 -'BxperiwrciFIgg 79. Exact Sdence and Experiment 80. ExpmmriExper'tntia-Expenmmentum- "Experiment"

1x1
114 114

m.Playing-Forth
8 1 . Playing-Forth
119 119 120

1 . Echo 1
50. Echo

82. Playing-Forth

f 83. The View o All Metaphysics on

Being

51. Echo 52. Abandonment of Being 53. Distress 54. Abandonment of Being 55. Echo 56. The Lingering of the Abandonment of Being in the ConceaIed Manner of Forgottenness of Being 57. History of Be-ing and Abandonment of Being 58. What the Three ConceaIments of the Abandonment of Being Are and How They Show Themselves 59. The Epoch of TotaI Lack o Questioning and Enchantment f 60. Whence the Lack of Distress as Utmost Distress? 8 1 . Machination 62. Self-Dissembling of the Abandonment of Being by Machination and "Lived-Experience" 63. Live-Experience 64. Machination

84. A Being 85. The Originary Coming-into-Its-Own of the Pisst Beginning Means Gaining a Foothold in the Other Beginning f 86. What the History o Metaphysics Keeps Ready and Thus "Plays 87.
88.
89.
90.

120

120
122

91.
92.

Forth" as Still Unyielded and UmemgnizabIe by This History History of the First Beginning (History o Metaphysics) f The 'Historical" Lectures Belong to the Sphere of This Task Crossing to the Other Beginning From the Fist to the Other Beginning: Negation From the First to the Other Beginning Setting into Perspective the First and the Other Beginning

123
123

124
125 125 130

93. The Great Philosophies

94. Setting Apan the Other Beginning
95.

131
131

The First Beginning 96. The Inceptual Interpretation nf Being as @lo15

97. 5 (~xw) 98. Projecting Beingness Open unto Constant Presence

132
133
133

134

viii

Contents
132. Be-ing and a Being

Contents

99. "Being" and "Becoming" in Inceptual Thinking

100. The First Beginning 101. Prom Early on Musr, Clearly, and i a Secure Light. . n

133. The EssentiaI Sway of Be-ing

102. Thinking:The Guiding-Thread of the GuidineQuestion of Western Philosophy

103. On the Notion o German Idealism f

134. The Relation o Da-sein and Be-ing f I 35. The Essential Swaying of Be-ing as Enowning (The Relation of Da-sein and Be-ing)
136. Be-ing 137. Be-ing 138. fluth o Be-ing and U~derstanding Being f of

104. German Idealism 105. Hiilderlin-KEerkegaard-

Nietzsche

106. The Decision about AII Ontology in Enactment: Contention

between the First and the Other Beginning 107. Responding to the Guiding-Questionand the Form of Tkaditional Metaphysics 108. The Basic Metaphysical Positions within the History o the f Guiding-Question and the Interpretation of Time-Space That BeIongs to Each of Them
109.

139. The Essential Swaying of Be-ing: l h t h and lime-Space

140.
142.
144.

The Essential Swaying of Be-ing The Essential Sway of Be-ing

Be-ing and the Originary Strife (Be-ing o r Not-Be-ing in the Essential Sway o Be-ing Itself) f Be-ing and Nothing Be-ing and Not-Be-ing The Essential Swaying of Be-ing (IE Finitude) A Being Is Beingness of Beings Differentiated According to t k m v and [ 671E m v
Being

141. The Essential Sway of Be-ing

143. Be-ing

i@a 1 10. Wa,Platonism, and Idealism

145.

I l l . The "ApriuriUand@fh5

146. 147.
148.

112. The "Aprion" 113, m a a n d o 4 d a 1 1 4 . On Nietzsche's Basic Metaphysical Position

149.

IV.Leap I 1 5. The Guiding-Attunement of the Leap

116. Being-History

150. The O i i of Differentiation o the What and the That of a rgn f

15 1. Being and a Being

152. The Stages of Be-ing

117. Leap
1 18. Leap

153. Life
154. *Life"

1 1 9 . The Leap into Preparation by Asking the Grounding-Question 120. Leap

1 55. Nature and Eanh

I

121. Be-ing and Beings 122. Leap (The Thrown Projecting-Open) 123. Be-ing 124. Leap 125. Be-ing and Time 126. Be-ing and a Being and Gods 127. Cleavage 128. Be-ing and Man 129. The Nothing 130. The 'Essential Sway" o Be-ing f 131. The Overflow in the Essential Sway of Be-ing (Self-Sheltering)

156. Cleavage 157. Cleavage and 'Modalities" 158. Cleavage and 'Modalities"

1 59. Cleavage
160.

Being-toward-Death and Being

16 1. Being-toward-Death 162. Be-ing-toward-Death

163. Being-toward-Death and Being

The Essential Swaying et Re-ing 165. Essential Sway as Essential Swaying 166. EssentiaI Swaying and Essential Sway
164.

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167. Advancing into Essential Swaying

' t 4 V Grounding . &.-& a) Da-sein and Projecting Being Open T A - , - 168. Da-sein and Being
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201. Da-sein and Being-Away

'1P *227
227 228

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202. Da-sein (Being-Away) 203. Projecting-Open and Da-sein

c) The Essential Sway of a u t h 204. The Essential Sway of m t h

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169. Da-sein 170. Da-sein 171. Da-sein

205.

The Open

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172. Da-sein and the Question of Being

173. Da-rein

206. From d3111&1~ to Da-sein

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174. Da-sein and Inabiding

175. Da-sein and Beings in the Whole 177. Being-Away

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c!

207. From &kqt9aato Da-sein 2 208. Truth . - 209. &fpFna- Openness and Clearing of Self-Sheltering-Concealing *2 10. On the History of the Essential Sway of Truth
21 1. Emanation and TotaI Collapse &kflha: Crisis of 1 s History in Plato and Aristotle, the last The 1

232

232
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178. "Da-sein Exists for the Sake of Itself"

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179. 'Existence" (Being and Time [GA 2, pp. 56-57]) 180. Be-ing and Understanding of Being 181. Leap
182. Projecting Be-ing Open: Projecting-Open as Thrown

--?
,

2 12. T h ~ t h Certainty as 2 13. What the Question of Thrth Is About

214. The Essential Sway o ' h t h (Openness) f

234

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21 5. The EssentiaI Swaying of 'Ruth

216. Approaching the Quenion of ' h t h 217. The Essential Sway of Wth 218. me hnounmment of the Essential Swaying of Thth

183. Projecting-Open unto Be-ing 184. The Question of Being as Question Concerning the Truth o Be-in f
18 5. What Is Called Da-sein?

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-

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186. Da-sein

$ b) Da-sein

h - bf,*

187. Grounding 188. Grounding r 189. Da-sein 190. On Da -seb 191. Da-sein 192. Da-sein * , [,by 193. Da-sein and Man 194. Man and Da-sein 195. Da-sein and Man 196. Da-sein and the People 197. Da-sein-Ownhood-Selfhood 198. Grounding of Da-rein as En-grounding 199. nansmndence and Da-rein and Be-ing 200. Da-sein

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219. The Jointure o the Question o T h t h f f 220. The Question o TYuth f

22 1. l h t h as Essential Swaying o Be-ing f 222.

rnth

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223. What Is Ownmost to h t h (Whar 1s Nor Its Ownmost) 224. The Essential Swag of Truth 225. The Essential Sway of Truth 226. Clearing of Sheltering-Concealing and &AfpYaa 227. On the Essential Sway of h t h 228. me Essential sway or m t h Is Un-Truth
'

,
.
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229. n u t h and Da-sein

I*/0

r-I&

230. Truth and Correctness 23 1. How Truth, &fitha, Becomes Correctness 232. The Question of l h t h as Hisrorically Mindful Deliberation 233- Enjoining the Interpretation of the Simile o the Cave (193 1/32 f and 1 933134) to the Question of W t h 234. The Question Concerning Truth (Nie~rsche) 235. Truth and Genuineness

xii

Contents
266. Be-ing and *Ontological Difference"

236. Truth 237. Faith and Truth

Js ,q
d) Time-Space as ~ b - & u n d

"Differentiation"
267. 268. 269. 270. 271.

238. The-Space 239. nme-Space (Preparatory Consideration)

240. Time and Space: Their "Actuality" and 'Source"
241. Space and Time-Time-Space

Be-jng (Enowning) Be-ing (Differentiation) Be-ing The Essential Sway of Be-ing (The Essential Swaying)

Da-sein

242. Time-Space as Ab-ground

272. Man

243.
244.

245.
246.

247.

e) The Essential Swaying of Truth as Sheltering Sheltering Truth and Sheltering Truth and Sheltering Sheltering of Truth in What Is 'Ihre Grounding Da-sein and 'Ttajeaories of Sheltehg Truth

W. Ones to Come The

248. The Ones to Came

273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280.

History A Being and Calculation A Being Be-ing and Language "Metaphysics" and the Origin of the Work o Art f Origin of the Work of Art What about Gods? The Question of Crossing 281. Language (Its Origin)

249. The Grounding-Attuneemnn of the Ones to Come 250. The Ones to Come 25 1. What Is Ownmost to a PeopIe and to Da-sein 252. Da-sein and the Ones to Come Who Belong to the Last God

Editor's EpiIague

VII. The Last God

253. TheLasz 254. Refusal 255. Turning in Enowning

256. The Last God

257. Be-ing
258. Philosophy

259. Philosophy 260. The Gigantic 261. The Opinion about Be-ing
262. "Projecting-Open" Be-in$ and Be-ing as Projecting-Open 263. Every Projecting-Open 1s a Thrown One 264. F'rojeding Be-ing Open and Understanding of Being 265. En-thinking of Be-ing

TransIatorsrForeword

with this publication of CmlTibutiomto Philosophy (From E n m i n g ) , Martin ~eidegger'ssecond major work, Ba'triige mr Philosophie (Kom Ereignis), kmmes available for the first time in English. Known in phiIosophica1cirdes as Beifrage, this work had been awaited with great expectation long before its publication on the centennial of Heidegger's birth in 1989. &itrage mr Plrilmophie ,'m Eseignis) opens the third division of Heidegger's +o Gesamtausgabe, which is devoted to the publication of book-length manuscripts and treatises. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enavning) was written almost a decade after Being and Time. Like Being and I'?me, it is a treatise that was not originaIly presented as a university lecture course. But unlike Being and Time, It is the first treatise whose maturation and unfolding are not reflected i any o the lecture courses of the years 19 19 to 1937. Even n f the university Iecture text Basic Qr.festions of Philosophy: Selected "FrobI m " of "Logic," though it was written at the same time as Contributions, involves some o the same language, and also deals with the question of f truth, still does not reveal anything of the maturation and unfolding of Conrrib~tions. Thm, as far as the interrelation of Heidegges's treatises and university lecture texts is concerned, Contributions to Philasuphy (From Enowning) stands alone. Perhaps the "prolonged hesitation" spoken of in the e p i ~ a m Contributions reflects the inaccessibility to any to form of publicness-and not only the pubIicness of the university lecture course setting. That is, perhaps the thinking that goes on in this work could not find a proper hearing anywhere-until now. The singular importance of Contributions to Philosophy(From Enawning) consists in its being Heidegger's first fundamental work in which so-called *being-historical thinking" is enacted. In six "joinings" -not to be mistaken for "chapters"-called "Echo," "Playing-Forth," "Leap," "Grounding,"'The Ones to Come," and "TheZast God," Beidegger enacts "being-historical thinking" as a thinking that is enowned by being in its historical unfolding. Whether we consider the echo of being, the way in f which the first Greek beginning o thinking plays forth into the other beginning, the manner in which thinking leaps into the essential swaying of being, or how this thinking is engaged in the grounding of this swaying as the ones to come who receive the hints of the last god-in any case we witness the gradual, systematic, cohesive, and closely interrelated unfolding of a thinking that presents ConFributionc as a

xvi

Translators' Foreword

Translators' Foreword

xvii

work which -as no other work of Heidegger's- shows the active character of "being-historica1 thinking." If we fail to consider this active character and if we do not question the traditional pattern that structures a philosophical work (a presupposed thesis, its development and demonstration), we may be misled into assuming that Contributions to Philosophy{From Enowning) is a collection o "aphorisms" or that it pref sents Heidegger's "working notes." Both assumptions are wrong. The appearance in the text of Contributions of a number of sentences that, seen from the outside, look like "notes" should not mislead us into believing that Heidegger is making certain notes to himself. The sentences in Contributions that look like "notes" are virtually all formal indicators of the paths to be taken or paths that have already been taken in the course o "being-historical thinking." When, for example, close to f the end of Contributions, and after a focused discussion and analysis of the work of art, Heidegger lays out a series of questions and issues and addresses the views of the Berlin architect K.F. Schinkel-questions and issues that at firstglance look like "notesm-he shows in a formal-indicative manner that each and every word used by Schinkel is open to a "being-historical" interpretation. Moreover, Heidegger's own understanding o and relation to Contrif butions is such as to leave no doubt that he did not consider this work to be a collection of "aphorisms" or "notes." Indicating that "be-ing and only be-ing is and that a being is nat,"%eidegger makes cleat that statements made on behalf o "being-historical thinking" are not to be f confused with assertion as "a subsequent expression in the language o a re-pre~entation."~ f Rather, these statements emerge from and return to what shows and manifests itself, i.e., an6@-vmq of be-ing. Thus, Heidegger's own understanding o this work comes from the f non-representational apophantic origin of 'being- historical thinking." A characterization of Contributions as a coIlection of "aphorisms" or as "working notes" is only possible when we ignore what defines this work and structures it, namely be-ing's self-showing and manifesting. Heidegger's concern with the cohesive character of Conh-ibutions is clearly manifest in the close attention that he paid to the process of the typing of the manuscript, in his checking the typed copy against the handwritten original, and, equally imponantly, in the rneticuIous cross-references throughout the Contributio~s.~ When carefully followed through, these cross-references show the path that thinking has traversed or is about to traverse. Cross-references are given in order to f facilitate the engagement o thinking in what is formally indicated: They are not there for demonstrating what a preceding stage of discussion has already established. As translators of this work, we had to face the necessity of reflecting its singularity. We aIso had to he constantly aware of its unusual syntax,

remaining always fully aware of the source from which this transIation receives guidance and directive. In our attempt to Iet the singularity of Corrrributions be reflected in its ~nglish translation, we tried to keep in mind that "being-MstoricaI thinking" is not a thinking about being. For being is not an object and cannot be treated as a delimitable and objectifiable topic. For us as translators this meant that we could not use an objectifying approach to the language and word-structure of this work. Throughout Contributions to Philosophy (From En~wning)-in the course of a "preview," six "joinings," and a concluding section entitled *Be-ing" Heidegger takes a new approach to the question of being by enacting a thinking that is "enowned by being." The singularity o this work comes through in f translation when translation mirrors 'being-historical thinking" as a thinking that is "enownedby being." It has been one of our goals ta let this happen throughout the transIation. It is the enactment of this thinking that molds the unusual syntax of Conrn'bufions.'Ikanslating this work into English, we faced the necessity of corning to terns with this syntax, since we realized that it is only by understanding and interpreting this syntax that the singularity of this work can come through in translation. We were thus called upon to characterize and appraise this syntax. A careful reading of the Contributions shows that its unusual syntax is neither extraneous to the work nor an insurmountable obstacle. Thus the unusual syntax cannot be set aside as having no impact on translation. The unusual character o this syntax shows itself in two ways: in the f incompleteness of some sentences and in an occasionaI ambiguity with respect to German grammar. We found that both must be accounted for in our translation. We came to terms with the unusual syntax o the f work by making minor additions to the text (they appear within square brackets [ I). These additions are meant to enhance the readability of the text. What we have added to the text within square brackets is in each case either an interpretation of a certain punctuation mark or derived from the immediate context. This device leaves the reader free either to use or to ignore the additions. The reader who opts for the latter needs only to overlook what stands between the square brackets. We decided to implement this device in spite of the fact that HeidegRer opted fox leaving the syntax o the Contritt~fions f intact. Indeed. the f enactment of a new approach to the question o being, which is what Conh.ibutions is all about, does not depend on a detailed unfolding of its syntax. I a note written at the same time as Contributions, Heidegger n points out:

I its new approach this Contributiom to Philosophy should render manifest the n range of the question of being. A detailed unfolding here is not. necessary,