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August 2012
Vol 1
Business Monitor Internationals monthly regional report on political risk and macroeconomic prospects
THAILAND
REGIONAL INDICATORS
2010 South East Asia Indicators Nominal GDP, US$bn Population, mn GDP per capita, US$ Real GDP growth, % Inflation, % Goods Exports, US$ Goods Imports, US$ 1,805.9 2,095.9 2,192.3 2,461.3 542.9 7.8 4.1 549.1 4.8 5.4 555.3 4.4 4.2 561.4 5.2 4.4 1,411.9 3,326.1 3,816.8 3,948.2 4,384.3 2011e 2012f 2013f
Notes: e = BMI estimates; f = BMI forecasts. South East Asia = Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Weighted by nominal GDP. Source: BMI.
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ISSN: 1470-7810
VIETNAM
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RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK
ECONOMIC RISK
Q209
Q309
Q409
Q110
Q210
Q310
Q410
Q111
Q211
Q311
Q411
VCB
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Tourism Recovery
Visitor arrivals in Vietnam grew by a robust 13.9% y-o-y in H112, with the country attracting more than 3.3 million visitors, according to the General Statistics Office. Vietnam 's largest tourism markets include South Korea , Thailand , Malaysia , Japan , France , China and the US. We expect growing incomes across the South East Asian region to have a positive impact on the industry's outlook over the coming years. Furthermore, we also expect the Vietnamese government to introduce further measures to attract more foreign direct investment into the sector going forward.
Our business environment rating stands at 53.1.
Bankruptcies Not Reflected In NPLs Yet The recent surge in bankruptcies, brought about by high lending rates and tight credit conditions, continues to pose as a serious threat to the stability of the banking system. Although reported data on non-performing loans (NPL) for the banking as a whole appears to remain benign and stable at under 1.5% of total assets, various reports and surveys suggest that actual NPLs could be higher at around 3.0%. We believe that current NPLs do not accurately reflect underlying economic conditions in Vietnam, especially given reported estimates of more than 17,000 small- and medium-sized (SME) companies that have either declared bankruptcy or have ceased operations since the beginning of the year. We see increasing anecdotal evidence that actual NPLs are rising and we expect this trend to be reflected
CTG
Figures published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development showed that seafood exports grew 10.6% year-on-year (y-o-y) to around US$2.9bn in H112. The unfolding sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone has had a significant impact on demand for Vietnamese exports to the region, with shipments to Germany, Netherlands and Italy falling by 26.4% 11.0% and 16.0% y-o-y, respectively. We expect exports of other goods to the eurozone to register a similar slowdown and we believe that external demand will only begin to see signs of a pickup in late 2012.
450
Favouring Strong Balance Sheets And Superior Risk Management Back in June 2011, we did a similar comparison and said that EIB would be in a better position to cope with an economic slowdown due to its strong balance sheet and superior track record for managing risk (see our online service, June 2011 'Reassessing The Impact Of Vinashin's Default'). As the accompanying chart shows, despite EIB's relative smaller size (in terms of its total assets) compared to its larger peers VCB and CTG, EIB has managed to generate the highest return-on-assets (ROA) among the group. In terms of returnon-equity (ROE), EIB also ranks the second highest, behind CTG. Therefore, by looking solely at returns and size of the company, not only does EIB hold a superior track record in generating return for its shareholders, the bank also has better opportunities for growth given its relatively small market share. We note that EIB's relatively higher ROA and ROE is partly due to higher leverage, which is explained by its high debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio of 3.9. However, EIB's higher leverage has not been accompanied by higher NPLs, which are presently at a benign 0.8% of total assets. We believe that the early stages of the government's restructuring process will take at least a year to be implemented and that banks that are more fundamentally sound in terms of their profitability and risk management system such as EIB will perform well during this period.
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Q112
(SBV) has outlined key policies that will be undertaken throughout the restructuring process. These include a reorganisation of ailing small- and medium-sized banks through mergers and acquisitions, addressing the build up of bad debts in the banking sector by allowing profitable banks and companies to refinance, and longer-term initiatives to improve the efficiency of banking operations and strengthening risk management systems. We expect smaller banks that tend to compete in the relatively less profitable and saturated segments of the market, and those with weaker balance sheets to undergo a painful adjustment process as a result of the restructuring. However, on the whole, we are convinced that addressing the banking sector's weaknesses will be positive for the economy in the long run. Indeed, banks that manage to survive and emerge from this long adjustment process should prove to be more competitive and resilience to future economic shocks.
in reported NPLs over the coming quarters. Looking at the financial ratios of the four largest Vietnamese commercial banks listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, including Vietnam Export Import Commercial Bank (EIB), Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (VCB), Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Bank (STB) and Vietnam Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (CTG), there are significant differences within the group in terms of profitability, leverage and prudence in risk management.
Develeraging Set To Continue
Vietnam Total Debt To Total Equity, % (RHS)
EIB STB CTG VCB 600
500
400
300
200
100
VIETNAM
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
in Q212. Prices for condominiums, landed units and serviced apartments registered average declines of 0.7%, 4.0% and 1.8% respectively. From a broader perspective, the Vietnam Real Estate Index (VREI), which tracks transaction prices of highly liquid apartments in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, has fallen by 4.0% quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q) in Q212 and 12.3% from the index's inception in July 2011. Given that we have yet to see signs of a slowdown in the magnitude of quarterly declines in property prices, this reinforces our view that prices will only pick up in 2013. We believe the cooling property market represents a healthy adjustment of investor expectations and signals the end of a misallocation of capital towards real estate investment. Large inflows of foreign capital into the real estate market in recent years have fuelled
concerns that valuations could be near bubble territory. The recent decline in property prices has brought down valuations toward more realistic levels and tamed speculators' interest in the market, reducing the risk of a property bubble. The lack of infrastructure investment in Vietnam, which continues to undermine the country's competitiveness in terms of its business environment and longterm economic growth potential, is a clear sign of severe misallocation of capital into the speculative real estate market. The build up of bad debts related to the real estate sector in recent years is also becoming a serious threat that could potentially destabilise the banking system. According to a recent report published by the National Financial Supervisory Committee, nonperforming loans linked to the real estate sector ballooned to around VND56.8trn (US$2.7bn) by end-2011. Various estimates also suggest real estate loans presently make up a worrying 50-60% of total loans issued by commercial banks. We see increasing risks that further declines in property prices could risk triggering a surge in mortgage defaults, putting the broader banking sector and economy at risk. Nonetheless, we see this adjustment in the property market as a necessary outcome for a more balanced economy in the long run.
pled with a structural improvement in the country's macroeconomic fundamentals, we believe that the Ho Chi Minh Index could outperform regional indices over the coming months.
2012f 2013f
Population, mn [3] 87.8 88.8 89.7 90.7 Nominal GDP, US$bn [4] 103.5 121.3 136.1 154.6 Nominal GDP, VNDbn [4] 1,980,914.0 2,506,055.4 2,862,077.7 3,216,086.2 GDP per capita, US$ [4] 1,178 1,367 1,516 1,706 Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [4] 6.8 6.7 4.7 Q212 5.2 6.9 Industrial production index, % y-o-y, ave 14.1 10.9 8.0 12.0 [1,5] Budget balance, VNDbn [6] -87,725.0 -64,300.0 -116,486.9 -152,228.8 Budget balance, % of GDP [6] -4.4 -2.6 -4.1 -4.7 Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [2,5] 11.8 18.1 6.9 Jun 4.2 6.0 Central Bank policy rate, % eop [7] 9.00 15.00 10.00 Jun 10.00 9.00 Exchange rate VND/US$, eop [8] 19,498.00 21,035.00 20,885.00 Jun 21,035.00 20,800.00 Goods imports, US$bn [9] 79.3 95.4 9.9 Jun 107.7 120.4 Goods exports, US$bn [9] 72.2 86.6 9.8 Jun 98.2 111.0 Balance of trade in goods, US$bn [9] -7.1 -8.8 -0.1 Jun -9.6 -9.4 Current account, US$bn [9] -4.3 -6.0 -6.9 -7.0 Current account, % of GDP [9] -4.1 -5.0 -5.1 -4.5 Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [9] 17.5 18.9 19.6 20.5 Import cover, months g&s [9] 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 Total external debt stock, US$mn [10] 35,139.4 38,362.9 41,577.6 45,065.5 Total external debt stock, % of GDP [10] 33.9 31.6 30.6 29.1 Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. 1 at 1994 prices; 2 Base year 2000. Sources: 3 World Bank/UN/BMI; 4 Asian Development Bank, General Statistics Office; 5 General Statistics Office; 6 Ministry of Finance; 7 State Bank of Vietnam; 8 BMI; 9 Asian Development Bank; 10 World Bank.
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THAILAND
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RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK
data are increasingly supportive of our view that Thailand's economy will grow at a more moderate pace of 4.0% this year (see our online service, June 4, 'Manufacturing Data Points To Stalling Recovery'). Accordingly, we believe that the government will increase public spending and introduce further tax incentives over the coming months in a bid to support growth, resulting in a widening of the fiscal deficit in 2012. We expect additional flood relief programs introduced by the government to come in the form of tax cuts for businesses and incentives to rebuild their capital stock. Meanwhile, we expect the government to boost spending on flood warning and protection infrastructure projects over the coming years.
Cuts In Wages And Consumption Will Be Needed
Thailand Breakdown Of Fiscal Expenditure, % Share
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Puea Thai Party (PTP) coalition government to deliver on its campaign promises will entail enforcing the minimum wage for fresh university graduates working in the public sector. Thus, a majority of the spending cuts will have to come from reducing grants to government entities and public consumption of goods and services. This significantly reduces the number of options available to policymakers in terms of implementing spending cuts.
Where To Cut From?
Thailand Share Of Fiscal Expenditure (2011), %
Other Expenditures, 10.5 Wages and Salaries, 36.2
Grants, 20.6
ECONOMIC RISK
Wages and salaries Consumption of goods and services Corporate And Social Subsidies Grants
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Looking forward, however, we note that the government has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to observe its spending limits and guidelines, and has promised to undertake efforts to address the fiscal deficit. Furthermore, given that a significant portion of the expected increase in public spending will go to one-off reconstruction efforts and flood relief programs, we believe that there is significant room for reducing spending from 2013 onwards. In this respect, we remain optimistic that Thailand's fiscal position will gradually improve towards achieving a fiscal balance by around 2016. We also see downside risks that could delay efforts by the government to balance its fiscal budget over the coming years. Looking at the breakdown of the fiscal budget for 2011, we note that corporate and social subsidies make up a modest 1.9% share of the total expenditure. This is dwarfed by civil servant wages and public consumption of goods and services combined, which amount to a dominating 67.0% share of total expenditure. Political pressure on the ruling
According to a report published by the IMF, the government's rice price guarantee scheme introduced in October 2011which effectively provides a promise by the government to purchase the output of rice farmers at above market priceis estimated to amount to a cost of around 1.0% of GDP. As a result of the rice price guarantee scheme, we caution that that the government's finances have become highly exposed to the risk of higher rice prices (although this is not our core view). Although the government has the option of withdrawing the scheme should rice prices climb to a level where farmers will be profitable enough to operate without a subsidy, we note that this would be a politically unfavourable choice for the PTP. The fragile political situation in Thailand further compounds the ruling government's fear of losing voter support should plans to withdraw welfare subsidies such as the rice price scheme be considered. Taking into consideration the factors mentioned above, we nonetheless believe that plans to address the fiscal deficit are achievable given that we expect economic growth to pick up in 2013 and 2014. Thus, tax revenues should see a steady expansion over the coming years, while one-off reconstruction spending tapers off. Accordingly, we expect the fiscal deficit to increase from 1.5% of GDP in 2011 to 2.5% in 2012, followed by a steady reduction in the deficit before achieving fiscal balance by around 2016.
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THAILAND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
outlook for 2012. Imports of intermediate and capital goods should also begin to moderate as damaged operating capacity come back online. Looking at the main components of the current account, we note that the balance of goods and services has rebounded from a US$1.8bn deficit in Q411 to a mild surplus of US$0.4bn in Q112.
At A Multi-Year Low
Thailand Breakdown Of Current Account, US$mn
10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 -2,000 -4,000
Q106 Q206 Q306 Q406 Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109 Q209 Q309 Q409 Q110 Q210 Q310 Q410 Q111 Q211 Q311 Q411 Q112
ter registering strong 19.4% growth in March while total trade imports also slowed significantly from 25.6% y-o-y to 7.8% over the same period. Trade exports also contracted by 6.6% and 3.7% y-o-y in March and April, resulting in trade deficits of US$4.6bn and US$2.9bn, respectively. We believe that the recent uptick in imports of intermediate goods and manufacturing production activity were mainly due to efforts to replace inventories damaged by the floods and do not reflect a genuine pickup in demand. Unless we start to see a sustained pickup in export orders, we believe that manufacturers will avoid ramping up production too early and risk building up excessive inventory. Looking ahead, we expect trade exports to continue to recover towards levels prior to the floods, albeit at a slow and gradual pace given the backdrop of a depressed external demand
Although we expect the trade balance to run surpluses over coming quarters, we expect the full-year surplus to come in at 6.6% of GDP for 2012, compared to 6.8% of GDP in 2011 and significantly below the average 8.8% of GDP recorded over the past five years (2007-2011). Overall, we expect the current account surplus to come in at 3.0% of GDP in 2012.
the currency. Accordingly, we expect the Thai baht to remain in its depreciatory trend and we are maintaining our year-end target of THB33.00/US$ for the unit.
2012f 2013f 69.2 374.0 12,156.6 5,404 4.4 5.0 -231.2 -1.9 2.8 2.75 32.00 224.3 248.1 23.8 10.6 2.8 188.4 7.9 109,678.4 29.3
Population, mn [1] 68.1 68.5 68.9 Nominal GDP, US$bn [2] 318.6 345.7 347.2 Nominal GDP, THBbn [2] 10,104.8 10,540.1 11,319.7 GDP per capita, US$ [3] 4,675 5,046 5,042 Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y [3] 7.8 0.1 0.3 Q112 4.0 Industrial production index, % y-o-y, ave [2] 8.8 -9.3 4.5 Budget balance, THBbn [2] -150.8 -156.4 -285.4 Budget balance, % of GDP [4] -1.5 -1.5 -2.5 Consumer prices, % y-o-y, eop [2] 3.0 3.6 3.0 Central Bank policy rate, % eop [3] 2.00 3.00 2.75 Exchange rate THB/US$, eop [5] 30.03 31.55 31.58 Jun 33.00 Goods imports, US$bn [2] 161.9 201.9 19.8 Apr 205.6 Goods exports, US$bn [2] 193.7 225.4 16.9 Apr 228.5 Balance of trade in goods, US$bn [2] 31.8 23.5 -2.9 Apr 22.9 Current account, US$bn [2] 13.2 11.9 10.3 Current account, % of GDP [4] 4.1 3.4 3.0 Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [6] 167.5 167.4 171.7 May 177.7 Import cover, months g&s [4] 9.7 8.0 8.2 Total external debt stock, US$mn [3] 96,912.8 101,373.9 105,848.5 Total external debt stock, % of GDP [4] 30.4 29.3 30.5 Notes: e BMI estimates. f BMI forecasts. Sources: 1 World Bank/UN/BMI; 2 Bank of Thailand, BMI; 3 Bank of Thailand; 4 BMI calculation; 5 BMI; 6 IFS/BMI.
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CAMBODIA
POLITICAL OUTLOOK
RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK
ECONOMIC RISK
suggest that discontent over the issue of land disputes is fast becoming the main threat to political stability in the country. Growing opposition to foreign investors taking over rural land forced the government to suspend new land concessions to foreign firms in May in a month that saw 13 women sentenced to two and half years in prison for protesting their eviction from the land where their homes once stood. Although a CPP victory at the upcoming general election is almost guaranteed, the opposition could be set to make some inroads. Leaders from the two main opposition parties are set to meet in the Philippines in late June to discuss a merger ahead of next years elections. Respective presidents Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy have tried unsuccessfully to unite the two parties in the past to no avail, and serious ideological differences make such a union difficult. If successful, a united opposition may chip away at the CPPs dominance, although we still expect the CPP to maintain its stronghold over Cambodian politics.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
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MYANMAR
POLITICAL OUTLOOK
RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK
ECONOMIC RISK
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
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ASIA
POLITICAL OUTLOOK
introduced a minimum wage law in early May, marking the first time the country has ever looked to regulate the labour market. A similar story holds true for Thailand. While ranking alongside Malaysia as one of the freest labour markets in the region, with limited regulation preventing businesses from hiring and firing, we believe recent changes under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's new government have been a step in the wrong direction. Minimum wages have been increased markedly in an attempt to support the rural poor, which threatens the country's business environment at a time when regional developments are positing their own threats. End of China's Competitive Dominance: We have argued for a number of years that the clock is ticking on China's global export competitiveness. Indeed, foreign investors are increasingly turning to other areas of the region in the face of sharply rising labour costs on the mainland. China itself faces a major structural obstacle in this respect. Its labour market is one of the least flexible in the region. Not only does the economy still face a shift away from export good producing industries as competitiveness is further eroded, but also away from investment industries and towards domestic-focussed goods and services. The 2009 stimulus threw a major spanner in the works in terms of rebalancing. The demand for construction labour surged owing to the stimulus measures that triggered a infrastructure boom, and the industry now faces a permanent downsizing. The recent surge in minimum wage rates will serve to undermine a smooth transition of the labour force. It seems as though, in some cases, politicians are using minimum wage increases as a means of encouraging domestic consumption, which could lead to an unemployment crisis if aggressively pursued. One major positive breakthrough for the Chinese business environment would be easing hukou restrictions to allow much more flexibility. Although we are optimistic that progress in this area will take place, the options are all very costly and progress seems to have died down in recent months. As such, we expect China's unemployment situation to deteriorate in the coming years and foreign direct investment growth to slow sharply if not contract.
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