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PBM Employees Asso.

v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973) Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in protest for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent dismissed the petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith. Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the petitioners.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. MMDA vs Garin GR No. 130230 April 15, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.: FACTS:Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE:Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature. Balacuit vs CFI Facts Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio YU caral, managers of Mayor and Dalisay theaters, the crown theater, and the Diamond theater, respectively, aggrieved by the effect ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, praying that the Ordinance No. 640 be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and uncomfortable.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. Del Rosario vs. Bengzon (December 21, 1989) Facts: Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No. 62. The law specifically provides that All government health agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name. The petitioners main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation. In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctors prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their prices. Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by the government. Held: Petition Dismissed. The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.

The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice The court ordered temporary restraining order, as regards to its officials from enforcing ordinance No. 640. Respondents filed their in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law. answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their corresponding process. Issue Whether or not the ordinance No. 640 must be declared null and void? The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be Held Yes. The decision of the trial court in special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby reversed and acts aside and new judgment is toothless. hereby declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and therefore null and void, this decision is immediately executor. The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if the court assumes that, on its face, the interference was reasonable from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under their brand name counterparts. The effect of the drug does not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it contains. the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987] Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility. Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea). Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007) Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void. Held: A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras (Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise} De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA [20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.Lcharacterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than 24693; 31 JULY 1967] by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of Facts: Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go cabarets.