Garces vs.

Estenso

Facts: The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".

Issue: Is the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, valid and constitutional?

Held: Yes. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

Manosca vs. CA

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: The expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born, valid and constitutional?

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the

expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Yap vs. CA

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?

Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail. Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR no. 88211 September 15,1989

FACTS: The petitioner are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.

Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING:

Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of discretion in determining that return of former president Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to returned to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated power of the president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the president to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Manotoc Vs Ca Digest

FACTS:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel

abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD:

NO.

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel.

A court may prohibit an accused from leaving the Philippines even if he was admitted to bail necessary consequence of a bail bond

TAADA v. TUVERA

Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

Held: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.

Judgment: Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect.

Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of genl application & provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers.

The generality of law (CC A14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.

Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the

government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

Gonzales v Narvasa

Facts: On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through amandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officialsholding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.Ratio Decidendi:The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen.

Petitioner didnot in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does notpresent to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted fromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. Thepetitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest.With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may invoke before the courts the right to infAormation. When a mandamus proceedinginvolves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by themere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.The Supreme

Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent ExecutiveSecretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

Valmonte vs Belmonte

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information

HELD: The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG and other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated vs. HON. PERFECTO LAGUIO JR

A "mass action" was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought

to the latter's attention. The petition alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction.

ISSUE: Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?

HELD: Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law.

Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike, which is illegal for them.

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA, FACTS: the defendant-appellant John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered on August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30,000.00, with costs against him. The fatal weapon, a shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the government. 1 The defendant-appellant interposed this appeal from said judgment alleging that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES CRISTINA SOLEDAD, ENRICO ACRE AND MARIO GASCON. ISSUE: WON the testimonies of the witnesses are admisible against the accused. HELD: By and large, the Court is not persuaded that the appellant's claim of contradictions and inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses puts into serious doubt their credibility, Different persons who witnessed an incident from different angles and situations could not be expected to give uniform details of what they saw and heard. Such minor discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be expected because of the human differences in perception. Such contradicting statements are on minor details, as hereinabove discussed, and rather than affect the credibility of the witnesses, the same are badges of candor. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the offended party is increased to P50,000.00, with costs against the appellant. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chairman of the Philippine National Police for his information and appropriate action on the actuations of the law enforcement agents hereinabove discussed. 2. People vs. Duero Facts:Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death for the killing of his grandmother after robbing her. His conviction was based on a testimony of the Chief of Police that the defendant voluntarily confessed to him to the killing and robbery, although he refused to sign a statement. HELD: In Miranda v. Arizona, it was held that in custodial investigation the suspect must be given the following warnings: 1)He must be informed of his right to remain silent, in order to make him aware of the right, to overcome the inherent pressures of interrogation atmosphere, and to assure him that his interrogators are prepared to respect his privilege should he choose to exercise it; 2) He must be warned that anything said can and will be used against him in order to him aware not only of the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it; 3) He has a right to counsel and that if is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. These warnings were not given to defendant. His oral confession, therefore is inadmissible. 3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO LAYUSO FACTS: On or about the 14th day of October 1980, in the municipality of Pateros, Metro Manila, robbed the house of Cesar C. Avila, and on the said occasion, assault and stab one Lucresia R. Dagsaan with bladed weapons (knives), which directly caused her death. Upon arraignment on April 22, 1981, the accused assisted by a counsel-de-oficio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY." The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution has failed to prove that the articles allegedly stolen were in fact in the house of Cesar Avila and it was the appellant who took them. He states that the finding was based on his extra-judicial statement which he claims was extracted through the use of force and intimidation.

The appellant admits that the confession was taken in the presence of counsel, a certain Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. However, he states that the counsel was not present during the custodial interrogation which preceded the taking down of his statement. He also questions the sufficiency of the lawyer's representation. He states in his appeal that the lawyer should have participated by also asking him questions. HELD: We rule that the constitutional requirement on assistance of counsel was fulfilled. There is no claim or showing that the accused asked for a lawyer from the moment he was apprehended or that he was not informed of his right to counsel from the time that the warning or information should have been given to him or that the alleged earlier questioning was already part of his confession. The appeal is hazy on these points. What is established was the presence of counsel during the taking of the confession. The attempt to now discredit him has no merit. If the lawyer decided against advising the accused not to admit the crime, he was only complying with his oath as a lawyer to abide by the truth and with the expressed desire of the accused to unburden his conscience of the load it was carrying. This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extra-judicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. 4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.DAVID LOVERIA y SANTOS FACTS: On or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney; that on the occasion of said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, if not for the timely and able medical attendance rendered to him which prevented his death. Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The defense offered by the appellant is summarized by his counsel as follows: The accused David Loveria, 25 years old, a volunteer worker of the Share and Care for Poor Settlers Pastoral (SCAP for short) declared that on February 18, 1985, he was attending a live-in seminar at the Communication for Asia in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The duration of the seminar was from February 18 to February 22, 1989. Between 8:00 and 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1985, upon permission from their training officer, he went to the Farmers Market in Cubao to ask money from his mother for transportation fare for the following day. When he failed to meet his mother, he decided to go back to the Communication Foundation for Asia. Fortunately, at the loading zone for passenger vehicles bound for Sta. Mesa, he met his father who gave him money. After that, he went back to the Communication Foundation for Asia and stayed there the whole evening After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal. The first issue raised by the appellant pertains to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Cerilo Manzanero, the driver because of its improbability. HELD: The contention is without merit. It is true that Manzanero could have been stabbed by the appellant while the former was at the driver's seat. But neither was it improbable for appellant to have stabbed Manzanero in the manner described by the latter and corroborated by witnesses Apolinario and Bales. The motive which impelled the appellant and his companions in pulling Manzanero out of the driver's seat and stabbing him at the inner rear portion of the jeepney is known only to them. The Court will not speculate as to why the appellant and his companions executed the crime in the manner that they did. Crimes are known to have been executed in odd and unusual ways. But in the instant case, the Court is of the considered view that there was nothing strange nor improbable in tile testimony of Manzanero. Moreover, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. 5. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO TAYLARAN FACTS: At about 10:00 P.M. of November 5, 1976 accused called at the house of deceased Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing located in barrio Binliw, Ubay, Bohol for the purpose of submitting himself to the latter for treatment of his snake-bite located at this left foot. His announced purpose being good, the deceased opened the door for him. Once inside, the deceased took her medicine paraphernalia (she being a local quack doctor) and started treating the accused. Then all of a sudden the accused drew his small bolo and stabbed the deceased several times causing her to fall on the floor dead. After killing the deceased, accused proceeded to the house of the son of the deceased for the purpose of killing him and his wife but accused did not accomplish his purpose because the deceased's son refused to left him enter his house. After that the accused surrendered himself with his bolo to policeman Demetrio Basilad who was then on guard at the municipal hall of Ubay. When asked why he killed the deceased who was also his grandmother-in-law, accused answered, 'because she promised to kill me with a 'barang', hence killed her first. Appellant has also invoked the provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution in trying to block the admission of his declaration to Pat. Basilad that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her alleged vow to kill him by witchcraft, contending that the safeguards therefor have not been made available to him. The cited provision reads: Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against himself. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

HELD: The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the print where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. What was testified to is only what appellant told the police why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrendered is already "under investigation within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: "If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked." In any case, as previously pointed out, another witness, Juanita Busalla, who is not a policeman also testified to appellant telling her when he was already in jail, that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft, the same declaration he supposedly made to Pat. Basilad, upon surrendering after the killing. The constitutional safeguard invoked can have no application to Juanita's testimony on what appellant told her not in the course of a police investigation. Verily, the issue is one of credibility. The lower court gave more of it to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of the opposing witnesses. Moreover, appellant having admitted the killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he has invoked in his defense calls for clear and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses as that of selfdefense. This, he failed dismally to fulfill. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs. 6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. BERNARDINODOMANTAY FACTS:Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in abamboo grove with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen wascompletely lacerated on the right side, though found fully clothed in blueshorts and white shirt. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and was sentenced to death.Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza andCelso Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellantconfessed to the killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was submitted as evidence for the prosecution.According to him, appellant waived assistance of counsel but the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. On the other hand,Manuel declared that appellant, in an interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the nearest policemen wereabout 2-3 meters from him and that no lawyer assisted appellant during theinterview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill, medico-legalexpert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the lacerations onthe victim could have been caused by something blunt other than the maleorgan. ISSUE: W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which appellant claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible. HELD: The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived only in writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissions obtained in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this prohibition does not apply to confessions or admissions made to private individuals, such as radio reporters. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the followingrequirements: (1)it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with theassistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express;and (4) it must be in writing.In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiquipolice station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect,in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was,therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed inArt. III, Sec 12 (1) of the Constitution applied to him. . . . But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made inthe presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and hisconfession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In holding the confession admissible,despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of theConstitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. 7. People vs. Tan FACTS: Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him. HELD: No. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel." Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 8. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANILLO PONCE HERMOSO FACTS:The Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, finds accused-appellant Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, alias Allan, guilty of rape with homicide. On September 11, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, was arraigned during which the information was read to him in the Cebuano dialect which he confirmed to have understood. He then entered a plea of not guilty. He was informed by the trial court of the names of the five prosecution witnesses and their respective addresses. Then the case was tried.. On March 17, 1997, the defense manifested in open court that accused-appellant was changing his plea from not guilty to guilty. Defense counsel Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr. informed the trial court that he had prepared for trial but accused-appellant insisted on changing his plea even after being told of the consequences of pleading guilty to the charge, including the probability that he would be sentenced to death should he be found guilty. Accused-appellant maintains that, based on the evidence of the prosecution, his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Reiterating the grounds for his demurrer to the evidence, he contends that while Josephine Gonzales said she saw the victim and accused-appellant and other children pass by her house as they went towards the house of her neighbor Helen Rabasol, there was no testimony showing that he was the perpetrator of the crime. Accused-appellant also denies the testimony of Naciansino Hermoso who claimed to have found the wallet belonging to accused-appellant while looking for Glery P. Geoca. Accused-appellant avers that the wallet does not constitute direct evidence to link him to the crime. Naciansino Hermoso and accused-appellants father are brothers. Accused-appellant claims that Naciansino had a grudge against accused-appellants father because the latter had been occupying and cultivating the agricultural land of their parents to the exclusion of Naciansino. Accused-appellant alleges that Naciansino sought revenge towards accused-appellants father by testifying against accused-appellant. Accused-appellant alleges that the testimonies of Joveniano Pansacala, Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos, and Ireneo Geoca are hearsay evidence and do not prove his guilt. He argues that his confession is inadmissible in evidence because it was given without counsel while he was under custodial investigation by Barangay Captain Sonny Boy Altamera. HELD: These contentions are without merit. To be sure, a perusal of the records show that the trial court accepted accused-appellants plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea. In the present case, the records show that the trial court did not observe these safeguards to ensure that the plea of guilty is not improvidently made. There was no affidavit presented nor statement made in court to show why accused-appellant changed his plea from Not guilty to guilty. The records merely contain an order, dated March 17, 1997, allowing accusedappellant to be arraigned anew, the Certificate of Arraignment, dated March 17, 1997, and the order, likewise dated March 17, 1997, making accusedappellants plea of guilt of record. This last order states: Accused Ranillo Ponce Hermoso alias Allan having manifested in court duly assisted by his counsel to change his plea of Not Guilty to one of Guilty, the Court arraigned him anew by reading the Information in Cebuano dialect, and in open court, duly assisted by Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr., his counsel de oficio, accused entered the plea of Guilty, changing in effect his original plea of Not Guilty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and the Court having been satisfied on the voluntariness of the change of plea of Guilty from one of Not Guilty by accused Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, consider the above-entitled case as deemed submitted for decision. 9. People vs. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714 Facts:Jungco and several others, appellants herein, were charged, tried and convicted with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. In convicting the accused, the trial court relied heavily on the extrajudicial confessions executed by them and the pictures taken during the reenactment of the crime. Appellants contend that the said extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence because they were extracted from them during the custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and after they had been subjected to different forms of maltreatment, threats and intimidation.

ISSUE: W/N the evidence were admissible. RULING: NO. The Court is convinced after going over the records that the extrajudicial confessions in question are inadmissible in evidence, the same having been executed by appellants during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, particularly when the confessants manifested the waiver of their right to counsel. The Court also finds that the pictures taken during the reenactment of the crime, are inadmissible since the reenactment was based upon the defendants' inadmissible extrajudicial confessions. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible. 10. People vs. Olvis, Facts: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. Olvis, the alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted. The three accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case, and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the killing. HELD: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.

11. People vs ROMAN A. CRUZ, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Norte FACTS: The petitioners were charged with having committed the grave crime of murder upon the person of one who in life was called Julio Nalundasan. Upon receipt of the information and being apprized of its contents, the respondent judge examined under oath the two witnesses presented by the fiscal, named Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, and having convinced himself that the offense complained of had been committed and that the petitioners, as the accused, were probably responsible therefor, issued the warrant of arrest and the petitioners were arrested. The investigation thus conducted by the respondent judge was in accordance with the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, as the first was last amended by Act No. 4178. When the petitioners were brought in court, they asked that they be placed on bail. The fiscal objected and this brought about prolonged incidents which culminated in the filing by the petitioners of a petition for certiorari before this court which was decided in the sense that the petition to bail be set for trial at which the prosecution as well as the defense should adduce evidence so that the court may determine if the offense was bailable and if the petitioners were entitled to bail. In view of this result, the fiscal preferred to see the petitioners at liberty on bail to avoid discovery of all the evidence which the prosecution had in support of the information. The petitioners put up the bonds thus fixed and were accordingly released. Thereafter the petitioners insisted four times on a preliminary investigation under Acts Nos. 194, 1450 and 1627. After argument on this new incident, the court denied the petition on the ground that the preliminary investigation demanded by the petitioners had already been granted and conducted, being included in the preliminary investigation which had taken place in the manner above narrated under the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58, and forthwith set the case for trial on the merits. HELDWe are persuaded once again that the right of an accused to the preliminary investigation in criminal cases, as we interpret it, is in no wise impaired; nor is the accused exposed to a greater danger of possible excesses on the part of judicial officers. If the Legislature has seen fit to place the said preliminary investigation in the hands of the members of the city fiscal's office in the City of Manila and in other cities with special charters, we find no logical or persuasive reason to conclude that the right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is less safeguarded when the said preliminary investigation is conducted by judge of first instance in the manner above stated. On the other hand, to alter the doctrine now would be to unsettle the laws and to give currency to the possible belief that there is discrimination and unequal protection before the law. We, therefore, conclude that the petitioners, as the accused in criminal case No. 7447 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, are not entitled to the preliminary investigation prayed for because the same was already granted to them when the respondent judge conducted the summary investigation in the said case under sections 13 and 14 of General Orders No. 58. In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is denied and the resolution of March 13, 1939 is adhered to. 12. PEOPLE V. PACITA ORDONO FACTS:The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy on the bases of their extra judicial confession. An interview with a radio announcer was also done where the 2 accused accepted responsibility for the crime. They now assail their conviction as their confession was attended by infirmities, mainly, the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation. HELD: The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible. The presence of the mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not cure the defect. However, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to a news reporter on televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible.

The interview was not in the nature of an investigation, and thus, the uncounselled confession did not violateaccuseds constitutional rights

13. People vs zuela FACTS: The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br. 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. Issue: Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution? Held: The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender.. In other words, the moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to rule that Maximo Velardes extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants sworn statements did not leave a void in the prosecutions case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court stating that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to Romualdas testimony. 14. People vs Tawat Facts: Felicito, in the presence of Leo, confessed to Ogalesco that they were taking refuge in his secluded hut because the night before they had killed

at Sitio Banog, Barrio Agban, Baras an old woman and two boys, one of whom was Andrea Siao's son.
Felicito recounted that they were drunk. As they passed Siao's hut, a dog barked. Felicito killed the dog. This provoked an old woman to shout at Felicito. He stabbed and killed her. The two boys shouted also. Felicito killed one while Leo killed the other. They took the dead dog, chickens, pork and other belongings in the hut and proceeded to the house of Julio Tawat, father of Leo, in Barrio Agban, and from there they repaired to Capipian. that was the story narrated in court by Ogalesco, linking Felicito and Leo to the robbery with triple homicide committed on the evening of January 22, 1980. The accused's confession to Ogalesco is in part corroborated by the sworn statement of Alejo Tawat, father of Felicito. Alejo declared that at about eight o'clock in the morning of January 23, 1980 he and his brother, Julio (father of Leo), went to their abaca plantation in Sitio Calabiga. He found Felicito and Leo cooking chickens in a kettle. He saw a mosquito net in the hut. A pig had been killed and was about to be cooked. After Felicito and Leo had finished eating, Alejo and Julio accompanied their sons to the forest of Capipian. Alejo and Julio left them there and returned to Barrio J. M. Alberto, Baras. From his neighbors, Alejo learned that the mother-in-law of Jovito Siao, his son Lito and his wife's nephew Jose were killed and that the pig, blanket, mosquito net, kettle and chickens of Jovito Siao were stolen ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in relying on that admission of Felicito in his confession which he later repudiated WON the confession during custodial interrogation cannot be admissible in evidence. HELD: We agree with the learned trial judge that the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is competent evidence. "The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him". What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance." "Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused." 15. Sebastian vs garchitorena FACTS: Some employees of the post office were investigated by the chief postal service officer in connection with missing postage stamps. During interrogation, they submitted sworn statements. The prosecution presented the sworn statements as evidence. Accused claimed that their sworn statements were not admissible in evidence since they were not assisted by counsel. HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers.

16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CABILES FACTS: Accused-appellant David Cabiles, Sr., and his sons, David, Jr., William Nolito, alias Lito were charged with murder of Constancio Demesa. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. His co-accused were not apprehended and have remained at large up to the present time, for which reason the trial proceeded only against accusedappellant. Thereafter, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty in a decision dated February 16, 1994.

ISSUE: WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF ACCUSED COUNSEL TO POSTPONE THE CASE TO GIVE DR. SY THE CHANCE TO TESTIFY ON THE EXTENT OF THE WOUNDS SUFFERED BY WILLIAM CABILES. HELD: Accused-appellant's arguments are untenable. He was not deprived of his right to procedural due process for he was given ample opportunity to be heard and to present evidence for his defense. Moreover, the putative testimony of Dr. Sy is completely irrelevant as accused-appellant did not claim that he acted in defense of his son; he invoked self-defense. Thus, his son William's alleged injuries are immaterial. Worse yet is the circumstance that William was not called to the witness stand as he has, even up to the present time, refused to submit himself to the jurisdiction of lawful authorities. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronouncement as to costs. 17. PEOPLE v. ENDINO FACTS: The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-appellant Galgarin. Galgarin was arrested and convicted for the crime of murder qualified by treachery, while on the other hand Endino remained at large. HELD: Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao 18. PEOPLE VS. GALIT FACTS:Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the occasion of a robbery.He was detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days.He consistently maintained his innocence.There was no evidence to link him to the crime.The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human waste.The prisoner then admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit.He then signed the confession they prepared.The trial court convicted him of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of Death. Hence this appeal. ISSUE:Is the confession is admissible in evidence. HELD:At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute grave violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. 19. PEOPLE vs. BAGANO FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the RTC of Cebu City, finding Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot and Pablito Caete guilty of murder. Bagano and Caete were charged with murder qualified by conspiracy and aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation in an Information dated 3 July 1995. On 1997 the trial court convicted both accused of murder for the killing of Jeremias Montecino and sentenced Bagano, a recidivist, to reclusion perpetua, and Caete to seventeen reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The court a quo rejected the defense of alibi and denial raised by accused Bagano and Caete on the basis of the following findings: About 3am, Jeremias Montecino and his wife Merlinda were sleeping in their home, when they were awakened by someone repeatedly calling Jeremias' name. The call came from outside. Jeremias went to the window to see who it was and thereafter left their room to go outside. Merlinda remained in their room, but peering through the window she saw Canete suddenly embrace Jeremias as the latter was opening the gate. Thereupon, Bagano with ice pick in hand stabbed Jeremias on the chest. Jeremias struggled to free himself from Caete's clasp and ran, but Reynaldo Bagano gave chase. Upon hearing Merlinda's screams for help Bagano withdrew and fled with Canete following him. Merlinda rushed Jeremias to the Cebu City Medical Center but he succumbed to severe hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the left side of his chest. He died upon arrival at the hospital. ISSUE: Whether there conspiracy in the commission of the crime RULING: Conspiracy is attendant in the commission of the crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Proof of an actual planning of the perpetuation of the crime is not a condition precedent. From the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, and as can be inferred from their acts, it is evident that

Bagano and Caete were one in their intention to kill Jeremias Montecino. Hence, in accordance with the principle that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the fact that it was Bagano who delivered the fatal blow on Montecino and Caete's participation was limited to a mere embrace is immaterial. Conspiracy bestows upon them equal liability; hence, they shall suffer the same fate for their acts. Decision of the court a quo of 15 October 1997 in Crim. Case No. CBU-39045, finding accused-appellants Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot a.k.a. Reynaldo Friolo and Pablito Caete guilty of murder is AFFIRMED with the MODICATION that both accused-appellants shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 20. People vs. Linsangan Facts: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a buy-bust operation. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved from him. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were submitted for examination. After finding these positive for marijuana, a case was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied the charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the marked bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS. HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the marked bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellants denials. That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so. 21. People v Mahinay Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions contending that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights on custodial interrogation. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond reasonable ground and WON his rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated. Held: The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven in the case.The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was within the requirement of Miranda rights and within lawful means where his confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.

22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN JEREZ FACTS: Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren Bola (at large), were charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide. Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On June 25, 1990, in the presence of Atty. Augusto Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or not appellant understood the consequences of his confession. Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his defense and that the extra-judicial confession was allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence, coercion and intimidation. Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the extra-judicial statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his constitutional rights and interests. HELD: We affirm appellants conviction. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy all four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. Appellant argued that the first and second requirements were not complied with. The records of the case, however, reveal otherwise. It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If indeed his confession were obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation by policemen at the police station, he

could have informed the Mayor of the maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. The presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise. Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an independent counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the time the extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as he is due to depart for Manila on the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty. Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available in Jose Panganiban, appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation and the latter answered in the affirmative. 23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN, AMADO B. BELANO, DANILO OBENIA and RUFINO VALERA, JR., accused, PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN and AMADO B. BELANO, accused-appellants. FACTS: The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte, Branch 40, Daet[1] finding accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, of Renato Cuano. On February 26, 1991, accused Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan and Amado B. Belano were arraigned. They pleaded not guilty. Accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valero, Jr. were not arraigned because they remained at large.Accused waived the pre-trial conference and trial ensued. The trial court declared the case submitted for decision. On September 24, 1992, the trial court found the accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Delano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged. On October 28, 1992, the decision was promulgated. However, accused Basilio M. Baybayan was not present, despite due notice. On October 30, 1992, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of accused Basilio M. Baybayan. The warrant of arrest was returned unserved as he could not be found. On November 11, 1992, accused Pedro G. Taliman filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. On May 26, 1993, we resolved to accept the appeal. We state at the onset that while counsel for accused represents all five accused in this appeal, the benefit of this appeal is only accorded accusedappellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan and Amado B. Belano. The other two accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr., were not arraigned. Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The rule on trial in absentia cannot apply to Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. Accused-appellants submit that the extra-judicial confessions on which the trial court relied were inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. We agree with accused-appellants on this point. The extra-judicial statements alone cannot be a basis for conviction. HELD: Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides: Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel (underscoring ours). Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their custodial investigation. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte, Branch 40, Daet, dated September 24, 1992 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayab and Amado B. Belano are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 24. Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

25. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCOS P. JIMENEZ and ROBERT JIMENEZ, FACTS: The failure of the police authorities to observe the constitutional safeguards governing custodial interrogation impels rejection of the extrajudicial confession ascribed to one of the appellants and consequent reversal of the Trial Court's verdict of conviction chiefly based thereon. On August 13, 1985 the police officers at the Ginatilan, Cebu station received a report that one Pelagio Jimenez had been found dead. On the 16th of September, 1985, the police invited Pelagio's widow, Albina Jimenez, and her sons, Marcos and Robert Jimenez, for questioning about their father's killing. The circumstances attendant upon and subsequent to the questioning Marcos Jimenez are succinctly narrated in the People's brief as follows: ... At first, ... (Marcos) denied any participation on the death of his father. However, after Lt. Bancog confronted Marcos Jimenez of his observations during the ocular inspection, the latter admitted that it was his brother Roberto who hacked their father on the right leg. Thereafter, they (Marcos and Roberto) carried their father near the balite tree by the cliff and left him there . Initially, Lt. Bancog took down appellant's confession in a piece of paper. Thereafter, Lt. Bancog gave the draft to Pat. Cavalida to enable the latter to type the same. Pat. Cavalida continued the investigation conducted by Lt. Bancog in the presence of Ex-Judge Jabagat who acted as counsel for appellant Marcos Jimenez. He typed appellant's confession which was contained in the draft prepared by Lt. Bancog while at the same time, injecting some questions of his own. Appellant was unable to sign his confession since Judge Calderon, before whom the confession was supposed to be sworn to and signed, had earlier left. Hence, appellant agreed to come back the next day to sign his statement. The next day, appellant Marcos Jimenez failed to come back as promised, and the authorities were unsuccessful in fetching him since they were informed that appellant had left for Cebu City. Marcos Jimenez returned thereafter, but refused to sign his statement. HELD: The Constitution explicitly declares that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right, among others, "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice" and if he "cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one;" and that said right "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 1 The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial investigation should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case, former Judge Jabagat was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers' choice; she did not ask Marcos if he was willing to have her represent him; she just told him: "I am here because I was summon(ed) to assist you and I am going to assist you." This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the Constitution. In one case, the confession of an accused was rejected there being no showing that the lawyer of the Citizens' Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) called by the National Bureau of Investigation to assist the accused was his counsel of choice. 2 In another case, the confession given during custodial investigation was invalidated where it appeared that the lawyers called to be present at the interrogation were members of the police organization investigating the suspects and did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. 3 In still another case, the confession of the defendant was disregarded upon a showing that he had been assisted by an assistant fiscal (public prosecutor), who "cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during custodial investigation," and to allow such a practice "would render illusory the protection given to the accused." 4 Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Judge Jabagat was not present at the critical time that interrogation of Marcos Jimenez by the police was actually taking place. She came only after the questioning had been completed, and the handwritten record of Marcos Jimenez' answers already typewritten; and all she did was to show the typewritten document to Marcos and ask him if he had voluntarily given the statements therein contained. This is far from being even substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial interrogation. It follows that neither the handwritten summary of Marcos Jimenez' answers made by two investigating officers nor the typewritten statement based thereon is admissible. The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the handwritten notes from which the former was derived. The confession was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos Jimenez as riot reflective of his own perceptions and recollection, but as containing only what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, had instructed him to tell the police "under threat of punishment." Hence. the supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice is void. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Trial Court dated November 21, 1986 is REVERSED, and the appellants, Marcos P. Jimenez and Robert Jimenez, are ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio. 26. PEOPLE VS. LUCERO FACTS: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board aMercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA. Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero.

The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged. Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time. Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation. After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.

Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession. Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible. The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed. 27. People v. Tampus FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado. In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following issues: ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const) 2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify 3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary

HELD: 1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation. It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. 2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right 3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304). The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense. 28. People vs Marcos 147 scra 204 29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY ALBERCA FACTS: This case is here on appeal from the judgment dated August 11, 1994 1 of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Jimmy Alberca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide to Felipe Climaco and Physical Injuries 2 and sentencing him to death. After the incident, the group dispersed. Accused-appellant stayed in his house until 4:00 in the morning and then left for Pasay City. On April 13, 1994 he proceeded to Barrio Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, where NBI agents eventually found him. Accused-appellant claimed that he signed the confession because he had been "threatened" with harm and that Atty. Abrenica, who assisted him in the execution of the confession, was not his counsel of choice but had merely been provided him by NBI Special Investigator Ramon Yap. 14 Accusedappellant claimed that he could not have committed the crime because at that time he was in San Miguel, Bulacan, having gone there on April 10, 1994 to visit an aunt. 15 The trial court dismissed accused-appellant's alibi. It held that even without the extrajudicial confession of the prosecution's other evidence established beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's guilt. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION EXECUTED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT. HELD: 1. Art. III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution provides in part: "Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Accused-appellant signed a document which consists of two parts. The first part, marked Exhibit shows that accused-appellant was informed that he had a right to remain silent and not to give any statement; that any statement he gave could be used against him in court; that he had a right to retain counsel of his choice and that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he would be given a competent and independent one. After being thus informed, he said he was nonetheless willing to give a statement and tell the truth. Accused-appellant claims that, contrary to what is

recited in the document, the rights not read to him and that Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica, who assisted him in waiving the constitutional rights, was not his counsel of choice. But this first part of Exhibit was signed and thumbmarked by accused-appellant, apart from the second part, which is his confession. He did so in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica, and of his wife Noemi Jatulan Alberca. Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was not presented by the prosecution. He is joined in this regard by a dissenting member of the Court who contends that Atty. Abrenica should have been presented in order to testify on the extent of services he had rendered to accused-appellant. But beyond seeing to it that the suspect in custodial investigations had been informed of his constitutional rights and that he understood these rights before he waived them and thus insure that the waive was knowing, voluntary and intelligent the assigned counsel does not have anything more to do. In this case accused-appellant does not claim he did not understood what the document states. What he claims is that the constitutional rights stated in the document were not read to him because he was merely forced to sign that document. This is improbable, given the fact that, as already stated, this document was signed not only by him but also by his wife. Additionally, accused-appellant affirmed the document before the Assistant City Prosecutor. There is therefore no basis for the plea of accused-appellant that his extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Art. III. Accused-appellant also claims that he signed the extrajudicial confession because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did not. He made this claim twice in his testimony in the trial court, once during his direct examination and again in his cross-examination. If true, this would render his confession inadmissible under paragraphs (2) and (3) of Section 12. However, apart from saying that he was "threatened," he did not elaborate as would naturally be his wont had he really been coerced to him if he refused to sign the confession. Neither did he say who allegedly made the threat. WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, so far as it finds the accused-appellant guilty of robbery with homicide is, AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed on him for lack of the necessary votes to affirm the death sentence. SO ORDERED. 30 Aballe vs people FACTS: At around 7PM of Nov.7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril,Davao City, Quirino Banguis, a 42-year old driver,attended a birthday party at the residence of hisneighbor Aguilles Mora. He brought along his wife andother children, leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jenniealone in their house. Upon their return at around 8:30that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lyingprostrate, bathed in her own blood with multiplewounds on different parts of her body. There were noeyewitnesses to the bizarre killing.- The postmortem report disclosed that Jenniesustained a total of 32 stab wounds. Cause of deathwas attributed to hemorrhage secondary to multiplestab wounds.- At daybreak of the following day, Nov. 8, acting oninformation furnished by the victim's father, a policeteam headed by Sgt Marante sought the accused forquestioning. They found him just as he was coming outof the communal bathroom in Saypon and wearingwhat appeared to be a bloodstained Tshirt. Uponseeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyoneasking him, orally admitted that he killed JennieBanguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril police station for interrogation.- While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 yearsold, a school dropout (he finished second year highschool) and next door neighbor of the victim, broughtthe police to his house and pointed to them the pot atthe "bangera" where he had concealed the deathweapon which was a 4-inch kitchen knife. Also takenfrom Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped Tshirt which he claimed he wore during thecommission of the crime. Aballe also made anextrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing Jennie while under the influence of liquor andmarijuana. ( Pls. see original copy re sworn affidavit) Thereafter, an information was filed against Aballe,charging him with homicide penalized under Article 249of the RPC. At his arraignment on Apr. 13, 1981, hepleaded not guilty. He also disavowed his extrajudicialconfession on the ground that it was obtained throughcoercion and in the absence of counsel.Notwithstanding the repudiation of his earlierconfession, Aballe was convicted of the crime of homicide. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in giving full weight toAballes extrajudicial confession taken during custodialinvestigation and in imposing a penalty which was notin accordance with law.2. WON the guilt of the accused has been establishedbeyond reasonable doubt HELD 1. YES- Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have beendisregarded by the lower court for having beenobtained in violation of Aballe's constitutional rights. Throughout the custodial interrogation, theaccused's parents and relatives were almost alwaysaround but at no stage of the entire proceedings was itshown that the youthful offender was ever representedby counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicialstatement was admittedly made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de parte, and the waiverof counsel was not made with the assistance of counselas mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IVof the 1973 Constitution, said confession should havebeen discarded by the lower court.- Equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife recoveredfrom Aballe after his capture and after the police hadstarted to question him. Together with the extrajudicialconfession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of aconstitutionally infirmed interrogation and mustconsequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt,however, is admissible, being in the nature of anevidence in plain view which an arresting officer maytake and introduce in evidence.- The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "anofficer making an arrest may take from the personarrested any money or property found upon his personwhich was used in the commission of the crime or wasthe fruit of the crime or which might furnish theprisoner with the means of committing violence orescaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trialof the cause. . ."2. YES- It is well to note that even before the taking of theextrajudicial confession, the accused, upon beingpicked up in the morning of Nov. 8, 1980 as he wascoming out of the communal

bathroom and wearing a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to coverwith his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt beforeSgt. Marante and confessed that he killed JennieBanguis. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oralconfession is competent evidence to positively link theaccused to the aforesaid killing. ( Pls see orig copy retestimony)- The declaration of an accused expresslyacknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may begiven in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to thesubstance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in itssubstance. Compliance with the constitutional procedures oncustodial investigation is not applicable to aspontaneous statement, not elicited throughquestioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. - Inappropriateness of penalty discussed

31.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.RODOLFO CAGUIOA, SR. FACTS: Rodolfo Caguioa, Sr. was charged with two counts of rape against his own daughter in two separate Informations reading as follows: In Criminal Case No. L-4494: That on or about the first week of April 1991 in Barrio Bunagan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by making Aurora Caguioa smell some sort of a chemical causing her to lose consciousness did then and there wilfully and feloniously lie and had carnal knowledge of said Aurora Caguioa while unconscious against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. In Criminal Case No. L-4495: That on or about the second week of April 1991 in Barrio Bunagan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by then and there threatening Aurora Caguioa with a knife, which he was holding at the time, should she not agree to submit herself to her criminal design, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and had carnal knowledge of said Aurora Caguioa against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. After trial, the court a quo found the accused guilty on both counts in a decision dated April 7, 1992, the dispositive of portion of which reads: In Criminal Case No. L-4494, the court finds and holds the accused Rodolfo Caguioa, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape charged in the information filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and conformable thereto, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) and its accessory penalties and to pay the costs of the proceedings. In Criminal Case No. L-4495, the court likewise finds and holds the accused Rodolfo Caguioa, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape charged in the information filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and conformable thereto, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), its accessory penalties and to further pay the costs of the proceedings. The court further orders the accused to acknowledge and support the child, Babellin Caguioa, as his own spurious child and to indemnify the offended party the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The penalty imposed by the court against the accused should be served successively or one after the other. From said decision, the instant appeal has been interposed on the catch-all argument that no strong evidence exists which would link accusedappellant to the crime, his Sinumpaang Salaysay being inadmissible. In a further bid at exculpation, accused-appellant assails the admissibility of his Sinumpaang Salaysay in which he admitted having raped his daughter. There is no necessity to delve into the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay. Excluding from consideration the Sinumpaang Salaysay, there is more than ample evidence to establish the guilt of accused-appellant. The testimony of the victim, Aurora Caguioa, stating that her father, accused-appellant, raped her on April 10, 1991, is sufficient to convict accused-appellant. Her testimony is clear, positive, and candid. HELD: Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation. Clearly, the facts of the case show that accusedappellant is guilty of having raped his own daughter on April 10, 1991. However, as to the alleged rape committed on April 5, 1991, it is our considered opinion that there is no sufficient evidence to prove the same. The only piece of evidence adduced to prove it is the testimony of the victim that accused-appellant allegedly told her that he wanted to repeat what he had previously done to her. In fact, she was even candid to admit that she did not know who raped her the first time. We believe that her testimony that the accused told her that he wanted to repeat what he had previously done is merely a conclusion that she made, considering that her father raped her on April 10, 1991. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in regard to accused-appellants conviction in Criminal Case No. L-4495, but REVERSED as to Criminal Case No. L-4494, in which accused-appellant is hereby acquitted. The last paragraph of the decision of the trial court is thus DELETED. 32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant. FACTS: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED "KNOWLEDGE" OF THE CRIME MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT. appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. He posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.

HELD: We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was merely the date,when Rondon and Batin executed their respective affidavits,narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence negating appellant's protestation, to wit: (1) after having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the crime scene;(2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night; and (3) Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police Station. At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 33. LITO C. MARCELO vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo from a decision of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] convicting him and two others of qualified theft. The information against them alleges That on or about February 17, 1989, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, ARNOLD PASICOLAN, a public officer, being then an Emergency Laborer assigned as bag opener at the printed matters section of Makati Central Post Office, and taking advantage of his official position by having access to the mail matters in conspiracy with accused RONNIE S. ROMERO and LITO MARCELO, both private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owners thereof, take, steal and carry away from the Central Post office of Makati one bag containing assorted mail matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the aggregate amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the amount of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the different addressee or the government in the aforesaid mentioned amount. On March 8, 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified theft Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON the Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioners guilt the letters signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right. HELD: Article III, Sec 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. .... (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accuseds names was not a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination. Petitioners counsel presumably has in mind the ruling in Beltran v. Samson to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention, so it was held. However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioners admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. 34. DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated September 9, 1998 rendered by the former Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals 3. The assailed Decision affirmed the judgment dated October 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, finding petitioner David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended, (for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs) as charged. The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY SEIZED; THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT; THE CHEMISTRY REPORT; ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. HELD: We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.

Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence, which are the Receipts of Property Seized, considering that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The said Receipts for Property Seized, which described the properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant, contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the said evidence were obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount to having been derived from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of the poisonous tree. We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized are not admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is prohibited by the Constitution. Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property Seized are inadmissible in evidence, it follows that the Physical Science Reports and Chemistry Report) finding the said items seized to be positive for marijuana and shabu, are also inadmissible inasmuch as they are mere conclusions drawn from the said Receipts and hence a part thereof. We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized are inadmissible in evidence does not render inadmissable the Physical Science Reports and the Chemistry Report inasmuch as the examined materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or taken from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally and validly done. Hence, the said Reports containing the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of the prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession. In other words, even without the Receipts of Property Seized the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial investigation when his urine sample was taken and chemically examined, which are the respective Chemistry and Physical Reports, both dated March 9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 35. People Vs Deniega Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and the basis of the lower courts conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on their extrajudicial confession. Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing. The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession speaks the

truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Thus, because of these defects in observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial investigation
the accused-appellants were acquitted. 36. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SABAS CALVO, JR., and RODOLFO LONGCOP, accused-appellants. FACTS: On or about September 26, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with JOSE BALSOLASO Y TUBINO who has already been charged for the same crime before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and one whose true name, identity and whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence, that is, by strangling with a piece of cloth IGNACIA MAULEON Y JOPIA and stabbing her several times with bladed instruments, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away one bag containing P1,150.00 in cash, among other things, owned by said Ignacia J. Mauleon against the latter's will, to the damage and prejudice of said Ignacio J. Mauleon in the same sum of P1,150.00, Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the occasion of

the said robbery, herein accused, with intent to kill, inflicted fatal stab wounds upon the said Ignacia J. Mauleon which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter." Now before us pleading for his acquittal, appellant assails the admissibility of his alleged extrajudicial confession, as well as the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. HELD: Anent extrajudicial confessions, this Court reiterates that "under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing." The "irregularities" which appellant claims to have attended his extrajudicial confession principally relate to the second requirement. The first "irregularity" concerns the competence of Atty. Alfredo Ferraren, the CLAO lawyer who assisted appellant in the preparation of his extrajudicial confession. Appellant claims that Atty. Ferraren utterly failed to protect his rights during the custodial investigation as shown by the following advice given by said lawyer which, to borrow appellant's counsel's words, "threatened the accused and further pushed him deep to the mud." We cannot see how this kind of advice rendered Atty. Ferraren incompetent, or could ever be considered as telltale sign of the involuntariness of the confession. It was nothing more than a straight-forward exhortation for appellant to tell the truth as to his participation in the crime, if he indeed had something to do with it. A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because defendant was told that he should tell the truth or that it would be better for him to tell the truth. Stated elsewise, telling the accused that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth does not furnish any Inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied. These threats or promises which the accused must successfully prove in order to make his confession inadmissible, must take the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of reward or leniency. Atty. Ferraren's proposition that appellant may be suspected of merely fabricating facts if he does not execute a confession hardly qualifies as a "threat" or "promise" as herein contemplated. Surely then, no temptation to appellant to falsely accuse himself can be found in the tenor and language of Atty. Ferraren's advice. The other "irregularity" apparently relates to a denial of the right to have an independent counsel of one's own choice, inasmuch as appellant claims that the police authorities ignored his initial request to wait for his mother who was scouting for a lawyer. Having been cleared of any irregularity, we therefore uphold the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession which, by itself, is sufficient basis for his conviction. A confession, to recall, constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise. In fine, appellant's conviction for robbery with homicide as charged, is in order. 37. People vs lising Facts: In March 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman, asked Felimon Garcia, his townmate, if he knew somebody who could allegedly affect the arrest of Robert Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili. On April 21, 1990, Garcia called up Manalili and informed him that he already contracted a policeman to help him. On April 22, Garcia introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and another man to Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili offered to pay them P50K for the job. On April 23-24, Lisings group met with Vic Lisboa and conducted a surveillance on the Castaos residence in the hope of seeing Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to return the next day. On April 25, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise Bernabe, 26 years old and a new graduate of the UP College of Law, and Beebom Castaos, 22 -years old and a graduating student of the UP College of Mass Communication, leave the Castaos residence in a green box type Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and Lisboa and Garcia in a motorcycle. The Lancer car stopped at Dayrits Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle. Alighting from the car, they were accosted by Dizon and Manga. On June 21, two security guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano, both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a man and a woman in their warehouse. On June 23, Raul Morales was picked up and told his story. On June 25, the body of Cochise was exhumed. The cause of his death was multiple stab wounds. The next day, Beeboms body was exhumed from a shallow grave, 2 kilometers from where Cochises body was found. One by one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise & Beebom fell into the hands of the authorities. Lising, Garcia & Manalili executed extrajudicial statements. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 2 vital witnesses: Froilan Olimpia, who witnessed the abduction of the young couple at Dayrits Ham and Burger House; & Raul Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of Cochise. In their defense, the accused policemen allege that there was insufficient evidence to sustain their conviction. Each one also presented an alibi. On July 1, 1992, the Court held Manalili, Lising, Garcia, Manga and Dizon guilty of the crime of double murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by premeditation and abuse of public position by Lising, Manga and Dizon. The Court also held Lising, Dizon and Manga guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention aggravated by use of a motor vehicle. The accused were acquitted of the crime of kidnapping, since the use of the car was done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of slight illegal detention Issues, Held and Ratio: 1. WON the extrajudicial statements of appellants Manalili, Garcia and Lising were admissible. Yes. Extrajudicial statements are, as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. ? Based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. ? The respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were assisted by a counsel and properly sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on their extrajudicial statements and did not take the witness stand. ? Lising claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial statement. However, he did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative charges against his alleged tormentors. ? The following are indicators of the voluntariness in the execution of Lisings extrajudicial statement:

It contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have known without the information given by Lising.

It bears corrections duly initialed by Lising. It tends to explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili. Extrajudicial statements can also be used as evidence against several persons charged with the same offense when the statements are in all material respects identical and there could have been no collusion among the parties. ? interlocking confessions ? In this case, the statements were independently executed and rather identical with each other in their material details. The trial courts decision in convicting all the accused was based not merely on the extrajudicial statements of the accused alone but mainly on the eyewitness account of the two witnesses, which the trial court gave weight and credence as true. 2. WON the prosecution witnesses Froilan, Olimpia and Raul Morales were credible. Yes. The testimony of Raul Morales satisfied the trial court beyond reasonable doubt, as being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the accused for the crime of murder. ? He testified positively. ? The ocular inspection conducted by the trial court supported Morales narration of the events. The inconsistencies & discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witness credibility. These consistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. The initial reluctance of the witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility. A sworn statement or an affidavit doesnt indicate the complete details of the event. It is a matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete & often inaccurate. Discrepancies between the sworn statement & the testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness. In case of discrepancy, the latter prevails over the former. When it comes to the issue of credibility of the witnesses, the appellate courts give much weight to the findings of the trial court since the latter had the capacity to examine and observe the witnesses.

38. People vs Encipido 39. People vs Pamon 40. People vs. Nicandro Facts: The appellant was prosecuted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The prosecution witness, Pat. Romeo Joves testified that he saw her sell marijuana cigarettes to the police informer because the sale was done in a place where there were persons passing by. When told it was impossible to sell prohibited drugs openly, he said it was done secretly. Joves also said that at first he saw her hand a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves but later corrected himself, saying it was marijuana cigarettes. Joves testified further that after informing her of her rights, she admitted selling marijuana to the police informer and that the marijuana belongs to her. The police informer was not presented to testify. The trial court found her guilty. HELD: The Constitution in requiring a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. The degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Where the subject is unlettered, a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights. Appellant acquitted.

1. FLAVIANO B. CORTES vs. JUDGE SEGUNDO B. CATRAL FACTS: A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed as follows: 1. He granted bail in murder cases without hearing; These two cases are being classified as heinous crimes and they are supposedly unbailable; 2. On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castanedas Criminal Case No. 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm was raffled and assigned to his sala. The provincial prosecutor granted a bailbond of P180,000.00 but it was reduced by Judge Segundo Catral for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no hearing has been made from 1995 to the present because according to his clerks, he is holding it in abeyance. This Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda is one of the goons of Julio Bong Decierto his nephew who has a pending murder case; 3. Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto; 4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siribans house to get the envelop; In his comment dated August 16, 1996, respondent judge branded the complainant as a self anointed concern citizen of Aparri, Cagayan who has gained notoriety as a character assassinator, a public nuisance and most often called speaker for hire during election time. Respondent further

laments that a ghost lawyer is taking advantage of the notoriety of Mr. Flaviano Cortes by manipulating him like a robot and letting him loose like a mad dog barking on the wrong tree and biting everybody including the other members of the bench. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant that would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against respondent judge. HELD: We do not agree. Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction. Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive.Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicants character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice. When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Consequently, when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine P20,000.00 with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. 3. Basco vs Rapatalo THE FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecutions witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995. Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva which stated: No objection: P80,000.00, signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995. Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutors option not to oppose the petition as well as the latters recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainants motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration.Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing. ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING EVIDENCE? HELD: Nope. If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release. It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action. To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judges individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by wellknown rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94. Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecutions declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondents assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latters familiarity with the case due to his

having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor. 5. Almeda vs. Villaluz Facts: The accused was charged with qulified theft of a motorcycle. He filed a petition to post a surety bond for his provisional release. The respondent judge denied the petition and rendered a decision that he will only grant a bail bond if it will be in cash. The amount is P15,000.00.I: Did the judge gravely abused his discretion?D: Yes. The purpose of bail bond is to secure the apperance of the accused during the hearing or whenever his presence is required by the court. Bailbond is neither penalty nor revenue for the government. A bailbond generally presupposes asurety to whom the body of the accused can be delivered. It is only becuase it is provided in our law that bailbond in the form of cash is accepted by our courts, otherwise, it is unacceptable. 6. Comendador vs. De Villa Facts: The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who are facing prosecution for their alleged participation inthe failed coup d etat on December 1-9, 1989: G.R. No. 93177 -petition for certiorari, prohibition,mandamus- questioning the conduct of the pre-trial paneland the creation of General Court Martial (GMC No. 14)G.R. No. 96948 -certiorari against the ruling denyingthem the right to pre-emptory challenge (or that the Membersof general or special courts-martial may be challenged bythe accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated tothe court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validitythereof.) G.R. No. 95020 -certiorari- against the respondent judge on the ground that he has no jurisdiction of GCM No. 14and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail toprivate respondentsG.R. No. 97454 -certiorari- against the decision of RTCin a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of theprivate respondents . Jurisdictional objection are also raised.Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming anofficer and a gentleman, and various crimes in relation to murder The pre-trail investigation (PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the petitioners for counter-affidavit and of the affidavits of their witnesses. All were moved to delay and the petitioners contendthat there was no pre-trail investigation doneIn G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it wasdenied by GMC No. 14. The RTC granted him provisional liberty buthe was not released immediately, pending the final resolution of theappeal to be taken. Then the RTC ruled that the right to bail coversmilitary men facing court-martial proceedings Issues: Whether there was violation of due processWhether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus,WON there was a violation of the right to bail Held: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were givenseveral opportunities to be heard when they were asked to submittheir counter-affidavits to the PTI. They cannot claim that they weredenied due process. Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence.""even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does notdeprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction."We find that the right to bail invoked by the privaterespondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not beenrecognized and is not available in the military, as an exception tothe general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. However, a right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in themilitary, where the right to bail does not exist.Solicitor Generals explanation of the exception:The unique structure of the military should be enoughreason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverageon the right to bail. soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, areallowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of dulyconstituted authorities,Neither does it violate equal protection because the military isnot similarly situated with others.Dispositive part of the case:As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No.93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or withoutor in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Courtand the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we findthat the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied,and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondentsshould not have been ordered released. ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition isDISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition isGRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow thepetitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitionsare also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for therelease of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. No costs.

8. Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149 1. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. In said cases he was admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. He is also involved in a case pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2. The SEC requested the Commissioner on Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure pending disposition of the case involving him. The same was granted by the Commissioner. 3. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled motion for permission to leave the country stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, relative to his business transactions and opportunities. 4. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which also denied the same. Petitioner brings the matter to the S.C. claiming his constitutional right to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty. HELD: Petition denied. a. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. b. x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.(People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (l935) c. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason would place him beyond the reach of the courts. d. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, Feb. 13, 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. The S.C. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. Unlike the Shepherd case, petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel. e. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. He must however convince the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, and that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel.