The Argument from Evil

Two forms
1. The Logical argument from evil tries to prove that the existence of evil is inconsistent with the existence of a perfect being 2. The Inductive argument from evil tries to prove that the amount of evil in this world is more than we should expect if God exists

The Logical Argument from Evil

This argument is due to the late Australian philosopher J. L. Mackie It tries to show that essential parts of theism are inconsistent with the existence of evil If successful, this argument refutes classical theism the belief in a God with the classical perfections

Lucifer Franz von Stuck, 1863 1928

The Logical Argument from Evil: Preliminary Statement

Suppose the God of classical theism exists
Since God is omniscient, God knows of any possible evil Since God is omnipotent, God can eliminate any evil Since God is omnibenevolent, God would want to eliminate any evil

Why Logical?
This argument is supposed to show that
If we assume that the God of classical theism exists, then It follows by strict logic that there cant be any evil

Therefore, supposing God exists implies that evil does not exist Since evil clearly does exist, God doesnt exist

If the reasoning is correct, then the existence of evil doesnt just make God unlikely; If the reasoning is correct, the argument proves Gods non-existence

Validity
An argument is valid if its conclusion follows strictly from its premises That means: it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false As stated, the Logical Argument is not valid
It needs additional premises to fill in missing steps

Extra Premises
Mackie suggests adding:
There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can

Alvin Plantinga argues that problems remain:

What if eliminating some evils requires permitting greater evils or eliminating great goods?

However, Mackie was aware of this

Plantingas Extra Premise

Plantinga thinks Mackie needs a premise like this:
A good thing eliminates every evil that it knows about and can properly eliminate

Responses: Theodicies and Defenses

A theodicy says why evil exists A theodicy claims to be the best explanation for evil Defenses merely argue that evil is compatible with Gods existence Every theodicy rests on a defense
The theodicy must claim that it explains a way that evil could exist even if God does

Properly here means without making things worse Mackie might insist: its within Gods power to properly eliminate all evil Theists like Plantinga will say: this isnt obvious, and there are good reasons why God permits some evil

A theodicy is a defense plus an argument that a particular defense is the best or most plausible defense

Some Theodicies
Following are several well-known theodicies Each would have to show that the claim can logically reconcile evil and Gods existence Each would have to argue that it offers the best explanation However if any theodicies are at least plausible, that would weaken the argument from evil
The punishment theodicy: evil is a punishment for sin The counterpart theodicy: good cant even exist without evil The contrast theodicy: we couldnt grasp the concept of good if we never knew any evil The vale of soul-making theodicy: evil exists so that by overcoming it, we can become better fit for relationship with God The free-will theodicy: Good is the result of human free-will

The Punishment Theodicy

Could it be true that all evil is a punishment for sin? Only if sin itself isnt an evil. (But let that pass) It could be true that all pain and suffering is direct punishment for sin That is, this is a logically consistent view However, a theodicy must be likely and not just consistent

Continued
In the real world, pain and suffering often dont seem proportional to sin
The Afghanis are no more sinful than the Swiss, but have suffered more

Some suffering (of infants, of animals) punishes creatures who arent responsible for their actions

The Counterpart Theodicy

This theodicy may be based on a confusion:
The concept of goodness may require the concept of evil, but It doesnt follow that the existence of good requires the existence of evil

Continued
Further: even if the existence of good requires the existence of evil, it doesnt follow that it requires the existence of vast quantities of evil For example: it wouldnt seem to require the Black Plague (a natural evil) or the Holocaust (a human-made evil)

Compare:
the concept of being a physical thing may require the concept of being a non-physical thing, but It doesnt follow that the existence of physical things requires the existence of non-physical things

The Contrast Theodicy

This may be the idea behind the confusion of the counterpart theodicy It may be that we couldnt grasp the idea of goodness if we never experienced evil It also isnt obvious that we need so much evil to grasp the concept of good
Compare with our criticism of the counterpart theodicy

The Vale of Soul-Making

It is true: confronting evil can make us better Perhaps it is the only way that limited, material creatures can become better, but Suffering can also incapacitate people, or destroy them The pattern of suffering may not suggest that those who need to improve are the ones who suffer The suffering of animals doesnt obviously serve the purpose of improving souls

Be sure you understand the difference between the counterpart and contrast theodicies

The Free-Will Theodicy

Probably the most popular theodicy Planting points out: it is an adequate defense:
For example, all evil could be the result of Satans free choices

The Underlying Idea

Free will is valuable for its own sake It is a good thing that there be free creatures who can decide between good and evil However, if creatures can decide between good and evil, there is a real chance that some (many?) choices will be evil If God intervened to prevent all evil choices, we wouldnt really be free

To be an adequate theodicy, we need to make the defense plausible

An objection
Some philosophers have argued: if God is almighty, God could make free creatures who always choose the good This seems to rest on a confusion It is true: free creatures might as a matter of fact (good luck?) never choose evil, but Creating creatures guaranteed never to choose evil seems to mean creating creatures incapable of choosing evil, hence not free to choose evil

In More Detail
The idea of free will is not simple and clear Free will is often opposed to determinism to the idea that all our actions are determined by external conditions and laws of nature Some philosophers say: free will and determinism are compatible. This view is called compatibilism Believers in free will who reject compatibilism are called libertarians

Free Will and Evil

If compatibilism is correct, God could create free beings who never do wrong. (Or so it seems.) If compatibilism is incorrect, then its in the nature of free will that theres no guarantee that free beings wont commit evil acts In that case, asking God to create (libertarian) free beings who are guaranteed never to do wrong is asking God to perform a pseudo-task.
That is, a task that nothing would count as performinga logically impossible task.

But
Deciding which view of free will is correct is not easy, and Some philosophers doubt that there really is such a thing as free will If not, the free will defense wont work. Suppose, however, that we have libertarian free will

Another objection
Most believers believe that sometimes God intervenes in human events That suggests: God sometimes prevents evil deeds But some evils (the Holocaust, the killing field, the Rwandan genocide) are so horrible that its hard to see why God would allow them Even if it is normally better to allow us to act freely

Natural Evils
Some evils (some kinds of suffering) such as disease, results of unpredictable disasters dont seem to reflect free choices It is hard to see how free will can explain those kinds of evils

One Suggestion:
Some philosophers say: a good God would create a world with stable, predictable natural processes. That means: if God saved us from the natural consequences of our choices, nature wouldnt be stable But this reply can be challenged.

Two Challenges
First, many bad things that happen naturally are not things we could have avoided anyway.
E.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, plagues
This is not a strong reply; arguably we end up in hurricane zones, etc. by free actions

Second, believers believe that God sometimes intervenes, e.g., to heal people. So we can ask
If God would cure Marys disease, why would God permit so many people to die in the plague?

Disjunctive theodicies
A disjunction is a set of alternatives: X and/or Y and/or The believer might say: free will accounts for only some evil. Other theodicies (punishment, soul-making) also have a role to play If so, the right approach to evil would be a disjunctive approach: each evil is accounted for by one or more theodicies, but not necessarily the same theodicies

The Question
If evil can be explained, it will most likely be by a disjunctive theodicy. But We can ask if there are some evils that just cant be explained

Rowes Inductive Argument from Evil

William Rowe argues: we have inductive reasons to think some evils cant be explained. Rowes argument starts deductively: 1: Morally unjustified (pointless) suffering exists 2: If God exists, no morally unjustified suffering would exist Conclusion: God doesnt exist

Establishing Premise #1
Rowe argues for premise 1 by facts about the world. The actual example is fictitious, but it is safe to say that somewhere, something like it has happened. Rowe then argues: no good we can think of, after considering many possibilities, justifies the suffering He concludes that this gives powerful evidence for saying: No good we might consider could justify the suffering

Rowes Example
Suppose in some distant forest lightening strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire, a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawns intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawns suffering would require the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse.

How do we know there is no greater good?

Rowes idea: consider various possible goods. We might consider (my examples)
Righting some moral wrong The need for a stable nature Developing compassion in human beings

You should try to add to the list

Some Reasons Reviewed

1: Righting some wrong
Very difficult to imagine what it could be

Rowes Claim
Adding to the list will not turn up anything new. We have examined enough possibilities (add your own) to have good reason to think: no justification will be found This is inductive reasoning: we generalize from what's true of a (hopefully representative) sample

2: The need for a stable nature

If God can intervene to prevent or alleviate human suffering, why not the fawns?

3: Developing compassion in human beings

By assumption, none of us are aware of the fawns suffering

A Question: (Wykstra and HowardSnyder)

There are some things we would expect to be aware of if they are true
Example: an elephant in the room

The NoSeeum Reply

There are other things we would not expect to be aware of

Example: a flea egg on a very large carpet.

We need to ask: if there is a reason for the fawns suffering, could we be expected to see it?

As the diagram suggests: Gods knowledge is immense compared to ours This suggests: we wouldnt expect to know the reason even if there is one If so, Rowes inference is faulty; his argument fails

Assessment
The NoSeeum reply is coherent, but...
It seems to allow any question about God to be brushed off by saying that were too ignorant

Summing Up
The problem of evil is a serious challenge for theism, but It probably doesnt amount to a full-blown proof of atheism Reasonable people will come to different judgments about how to respond to the problem of evil

In spite of that, suppose the believer has other grounds for belief in God Those grounds could be strong enough to outweigh the argument from evil. In that case, the NoSeeum reply may be a reasonable fall-back position