INTRODUCTION

1. The Second World War was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. It has much to teach us not only about the profession of arms but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war. The war was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The Sittang Disaster was one of a series of campaign designed to introduce us to one of the army's significant military feats from that war.

2. In 1940 Japan took advantage of the German invasion of France to cut both supply lines to China. In June 1940, Japanese warships moved into French Indochina. A month later, Japan secured an agreement from the British government to close the Burma Road to war materials temporarily. The Burma Road reopened in October 1940 which was the sole lifeline to China. By late 1941 the US was shipping lend-lease materials by sea to Rangoon, where it was transferred to railroad cars to Lashio in northern Burma and carried by truck over the 712-mile-long Burma Road to Kunming. Over this highway, trucks carried ammunitions and materials to supply the Chinese Army. Consequently, Japanese strategists decided to cut the Burma lifeline, gain complete control of China, and free their forces for use elsewhere in the Pacific. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941, the US declared war on Japan and became an active participant in the Second World War, but it was an earlier American commitment to China that drew the US and the Allied forces into the Burma Campaign of 1942.

3. Japan's first major objective in 1942 was the seizure of Singapore, key British air and naval base. Their tactics which was simple and effective in character, consisted in the main of infiltrating the defenders' lines on the Malay peninsula with troops carefully trained for jungle warfare and then executing enveloping actions. As a result the Indian, British, and Australian forces were unable to do more than fight a series of rearguard battles. The Japanese superiority in tactics was accompanied by absolute superiority in the air.

4. In numbers there was no great disparity. However, Japanese forces were concentrated, while Imperial troops were spread over the peninsula, giving the invaders the advantage at most points. The defence suffered also from the apathy of almost the entire native population and the treachery of a few who served the Japanese as guides

and spies. After the fell of Malaya and the Singapore garrison surrendered, the Japanese were planning to attack Burma through Siam.

AIM

5. The aim of this paper is to analyse the Sittang Disaster and highlight the lessons learnt from the campaign that are relevant to the Malaysian environment in the present era.

SCOPE

6.

The scope of this paper will cover the following:

a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.

The background of the battle. Area of the battle. The strategy and plan. The Battle of Sittang. Analysis of the battle. Factors that contribute to the defeat. Lessons Learnt. Aftermath Conclusion.

BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

6. Burma is bordered by India, China and Thailand. The mountain ranges is covered by jungle. It is divided by four of Asia's largest rivers the Irrawaddy, Chindwin, Sittang and Salween. There is also a dry plain in the centre of the country. The tropical monsoon turns many of the country's primitive roads into swamps. Such a climate also produces threat of diseases and infection. The harsh climate and terrain often presented as a great threat as the enemy.

The map of Burma 7. Burma had spent a comparatively uneventful history during its 50 years as part of the British Empire. After being annexed by Britain, Burma had been attached to India. Almost all trades and traffics between India and Burma went through Rangoon. As a result, the importance of this town was more than just than of a capital city.

8. Following the loss of Malaya and Singapore it was obvious that Burma would be the next Japanese target. Lt-General T.J. Hutton was sent to take command and tasked to defending Burma, particularly Rangoon. He had only two divisions for the defence of Burma, the 17th Indian and 1st Burma.

10. The Japanese invaded Burma with elements of the Japanese Southern Army. They moved first, crossing the Kra Isthmus from Chumpon with a single battalion encountering no opposition. The Japanese 15th Army had completed it preparations for the invasion. The Japanese 55th Division left Raheng in Thailand at the beginning of January 1942. It was joined by 33rd Division and by 10 January they drove west over the Burmese border. 143rd Battalion, 112th Regiment crossed the frontier on 15 January and captured the town of Tavoy including its airfield on the 19th January, forcing the evacuation of the Mergui Garrison to Rangoon the next day.

11. The Japanese arrived at Moulmein on 30th January and the next day were already threatening Martaban and the road to Sittang and Rangoon, both of which were already suffering from heavy Japanese air raids. They now had the control of three airfields Victoria Point, Tavoy and Mergui. They had everything in their favour because by that time the Allies were in complete disarray in South East Asia after Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies had fallen.

12. Within just more than four months (from January until the beginning of May, 1942) Japan completed the campaign of conquest initiated at the end of 1941. When the drive was over, a large part of the world's colonies lay under a new master. The British and American public was beginning to ask whether the old colonial system could ever be revived. The new Japanese empire represented a very powerful combination of territories and resources. The seizure of this vast wealth benefited Japan directly by helping to support its war machine.

AREA OF THE BATTLE

13. Sittang Bridge was an impressive piece of engineering, more than 600 yards long from shore to shore, below which the river swirled at an impressive rate. Upstream of the bridge there was an old-fashioned ferry, adequate only to carry the occasional vehicle or bullock cart from shore to shore. Sittang Bridge is about thirty miles from Pegu and about eight mile from the bridge was a small village called Abya.

14. Overlooking the bridge was a hill, and 500 yards further on, looking east, there seemed to be nothing but jungle. There was a track running through the jungle but it was only usable in the dry weather, and solely by bus, truck or cart. Bilin is 35 miles east of Sittang Bridge and about a mile away is Mokpalin while Rangoon is about 60 miles away.

THE STRATEGY AND PLAN

The British

15. Although Britain and the US strategic goal of defeating Japan, but the two disagreed about Burma's role in attaining that goal. Their leaders agreed that Burma should be defended against the Japanese, but their motives differed. For the British, Burma provided a convenient barrier between India and China with its Japanese military

occupation. The Americans saw Burma as the lifeline that could provide China the means to throw off the shackles of Japanese occupation and become a viable member of the international community.

16. Despite the Allies' determination to hold Burma, but their plans for the defence of the region were incomplete. The Allied forces did not apply a specific tactic in their determination to hold Burma other than a defensive tactic. Their main reason to hold Burma was due to the problems that they will anticipate if the Far East were under the Japanese dominance.

The Japanese

17. The Japanese invasion on Burma was to begin in mid-January 1942. Driving up the Irrawaddy River in the west, where the British were defending Prome, and up the Sittang in the east toward Toungoo, the Japanese took full advantage of the British failure to establish effective military cooperation with the Chinese.

18. In the Burma campaign, the Japanese planned was to surround and annihilate the Allied forces near Mandalay by moving three of their divisions north along separate axes of advance. One division would advance along the Irrawaddy Valley through Prome and Yenangyanug; another would drive up the Rangoon-Mandalay Road in the Sittang Valley through Meiktila; and a third would move east to the vicinity of Taunggyi and head north toward Lashio. The fourth division would remain in reserve in the Sittang Valley where it could react to assist any of the three advancing divisions if needed.

19. Among other thing, the Japanese short-term strategy and plan in the campaign were to:

a. b. c.

To cut the Burma Road supply route to China; To seize Mandalay; Threaten the Eastern states of India;

d. e. f. g.

To cut British links between India and Malaya;

Isolate the Chinese Nationalist Forces from their allies; Secure the Burmese oil fields; and Destroy the British forces.

20. Whereas their long-term plan called for the establishment of a firm base in Burma. The Japanese leaders also viewed Burma as critical to their overall strategy for the war. Since the occupation of Burma would set the stage for a possible invasion of India that could link up with a German drive out of the Middle East, and once and for all close the Allied supply line along the Burma Road into China. The Japanese applied the simple tactic of jungle warfare and encirclement to trap and defeat the Allied forces. SITTANG DISASTER

A terrible decision had to be made by Smyth. If he blew the bridge he sacrifices the bulk of his division. If he failed to blow the bridge and it was secured intact by the enemy, the way to Rangoon lay open with nothing interposing. General Smyth blew the bridge. In my opinion a heroic and inevitable decision.

General Davis

21. The situation at the Sittang on the morning of 21st February was that the 33rd Japanese Division had been kept at bay by the rearguards, but other Japanese forces had outflanked the British in the race to Sittang Bridge. At this time, the bridgehead was held by 3 Burma Rifles (BURIF), only about 200 strong, and one company of Second Duke of Wellington Regiment (DWR) which was in reserve on the west bank, with orders to counter-attack across the bridge if required. The 4/12 Frontier Force Rifles (FFRif) arrived to strengthen the bridge defences. By evening, Smyth's HQ

reached the bridge, set up defence posts and the transport of the division streamed across while three battalions of Gurkhas' fought off ferocious attacks by Japanese forces closing in from all sides.

22. At 0830 hours on Sunday morning, 22 February a detachment of the Baluchis, was to take up positions west of Sittang Bridge. The Japanese had arrived and were within an ace of cutting off Smyths retreat. Symth at that time was east of the bridge, inspecting 1/4 Gurkha Rifles defences. He was only half way back across the bridge when firing broke out as the Japanese attack ed from the north-east.

23. The climactic battle for Burma begins at this railroad bridge. The Japanese attack the 17th Indian Division at the only crossing of the Sittang River on 22 February 1942. The attacked caused a state of total confusion that continued for the next forty-eight hours. No one knew what was happening. The Japanese, who had been driven forward by force marches along jungle tracks were in better position.

24. At this moment some 300 sampans and three power-driven ferries were collected on the west bank of the river to help in the withdrawal. Transport was set on fire and many made a mad rush for the bridge. The 2/5 Gurkha Rifle fought their way through the jungle and they were shortly joined by 1/3 Gurkha Rifles. The 4/12 FFRif were moved up to take key position at Pagoda Hill nearby when the Japanese launched their attack. The Burma Rifles broke almost immediately. 4/12 FFRif had to fight hard to retake the Pagoda Hill. 7/10 Baluch were then brought up to strengthen the bridgehead so as the 1/4 Gurkha Rifles were also brought back cross the Sittang to strengthen the bridgehead.

25. On the same day, Brigadier Joness 16th Brigade had marched at dawn for the Sittang. They were slowed down by Japanese air attack. It was late afternoon that they reached Mokpalin to find fighting in progress thus preventing any farther movement towards the Sittang Bridge. The 46th Brigade had become separated from 16th Brigade due to the need to wait for a company which had been out on patrol. The Japanese, following the flanks, rapidly established a road block. Fighting failed to dislodge the enemy.

26. The scene on that Sunday night was one of the confusion, with Brigadier HughJones fighting hard to retain the bridgehead against repeated Japanese attacks. 16th and 46th Brigade were cut off at Mokpalin which is one mile away. Communications had failed, truck were burning. Men were trying to work their way through the thick scrub to the bridge, officers were searching for their soldiers, soldiers were looking for their units. 17 Divisions artillery sometimes firing over open sights, in an attempt to blast a way through to the bridge. Smyth had moved back to his advance headquarter at Abya about eight miles from the bridge. He had placed Brigadier Hugh-Jones in command of the bridgehead, impressing on him that the Japanese must not be allowed to capture the bridge.

27. The battle raged throughout the night. Enemy pressure on the bridge increased, at one stage causing 3 BURIF to break and run for safety across the bridge, but the rest of the line held firm. At 0330 hours on 23 February, the Japanese infiltrated onto the railway line, resisting all attempts by 1/4 Gurkha Rifles to dislodge them. Hugh-Jones had no knowledge of what had happened to the other two battalions in his Brigade, the 1/3 and 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, tried to make contact with the other two brigades but without success.

28. As dawn approaches Japanese pressure on the bridgehead increase. There were almost continues firing by mortars, machine guns and light artillery. The troops would had no chance in defending the bridge due to the Japanese attack and its intensity. Because during this time, the troops holding the bridgehead were only one British company, one Indian and one Gurkha battalion, all exhausted, hungry and thirsty, with very little fire support and fast running out of ammunition.

29. At this point, General Smyth was informed that the bridgehead on the east bank could hold out no longer and the Japanese were almost on the bridge itself. He was tasked with a very difficult decision whether to risk the bridge falling intact into the enemys hand or to blow it up, leaving a large part of his force cut off on the other side. With confused reports at the time and the garbled information that being passed to him, he gave the order to blow the bridge. The tasked of demolition of the Sittang Bridge was given to Malerkotla Field Company and at 0530 hours on Monday 23 February, Major Orgill and his Sappers blew the bridge over the River Sittang. There was a colossal explosion as one span collapsed into the river.

30. The plan of withdrawal was to cross the river by raft and swimming under cover of darkness. But the planned was later modified as the Japanese shelling and mortaring

increased. At 1430 hours Brigadier Jones decided that withdrawal must take place at once, issuing orders to fall back to the river. The men got away by raft, by boat or by swimming across the river under cover of 2 Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI), 3/7 Gurkha, 5/17 Dogras and 8 BURIF composed about 200 strength. They held out until nightfall. Some escaping across the river after dark, other going into Japanese captivity.

31. The battle fought on the River Sittang on 23 February 1942 can be ranked as being one of the most decisive battles fought during the decline and fall of the British Empire in Burma. The Allied defeat at the Sittang Bridge, effectively left the path to Rangoon open to the Japanese advance. After the withdrawal, the Japanese light infantry and the Engineer Regiment repaired the bridge. It took them about six hours to complete. After the completion, the Japanese carried along with them about one-third of the war materials left by the British upon their withdrawal. They crossed the river enroute to Rangoon where it finally fell on 8 March.

ANALYSIS OF THE DISASTER

32. General Smyths decision to blow the bridge was a terrible dilemma for any commander because it was one that not only condemned by hundreds of his men to death but earned him censure in the eyes of his superiors. He was not given any active field command again during World War II.

33. The loss of Burma was a serious blow to the Allies forces and the Japanese successes completed the blockade of China. Without Allied aid, China's ability to oppose the Japanese invasion was extremely limited. Militarily, the Allied failure in Burma can be attributed to unpreparedness on the part of the British to meet the Japanese invasion. As an example, the defence of Sittang Bridge was poorly coordinated. All round defence was not implemented whereby the Japanese applied their encirclement tactic wiping out the British defence and their support units nearby.

34. In the larger picture, however, the conflicting goals of the countries involved made the loss of Burma almost inevitable. Neither the defenders nor the invaders saw Burma as anything other than a country to be exploited. To the British, Burma was simply a

colony and a useful buffer state between China and India. In the eye of China, Burma was the lifeline for national survival. And to the US, Burma was the key to keeping China in the war against Japan which in turn would keep large numbers of Japanese tied up on the Asian mainland and away from American operations in the Pacific. The wishes of the local population remained unaddressed and local resources therefore remained untapped.

35. The Japanese had an advantage from the beginning of the campaign. They were under a single command with one goal, that is, the capture of Burma. Their unity of purpose and unity of command were complemented by the commitment of adequate resources to accomplish the agreed-upon task. Their air superiority gave their ground forces significant advantages, such as confirming Allied troop dispositions and denying the same information to the Allied troops.

36. For the Allies forces, China, Burma, India (CBI) theater still remain a low priority list throughout the whole war. After the humiliation in Burma, the Allied planners began preparations for their next campaign, drawing on the lessons they had learned from the 1942 disaster. Their strategy during the next phase of the war in the CBI theater would centre on recapturing of Burma to reestablish a supply line into China.

FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFEAT

37. The Sittang Disaster was a hell of a beating to the Allied forces in Burma. They were humiliated due to their fault mainly on the unpreparedness to face the invading Japanese forces. There was no comprehensive plan to defend the country. Insufficient troops deployment and few Allied planes available to save the ground troops from constant Japanese harassment. Listed below were among the factors that contribute to the defeat at Sittang Bridge.

a. Ill-trained and Ill-equipped for Jungle Warfare. The 1st Burma and 17th Indian defended Sittang Bridge were poorly trained and lack of equipment. The Junior leadership was lacking in experience and they knew nothing of improvisation. The 17th Division was trained for desert warfare and the 1st Burma Division was made up of three brigades which had no collective training and were short of artillery, engineers and transport and aircraft. Furthermore, their overall standards of training were second-rated and no match for the tactics employed by the Japanese. Their

equipment was poor and they were heavily reliant on the Burmese road system. In short, the British, Indian, and Gurkha troops were no match against the Japanese army as far as jungle warfare is concerned.

b. Mobility. The Japanese were able to move for several days at a time through the jungle which the British regarded as impenetrable. This was because the Japanese had local Burmese guides and they travel lighter than the British did. Nearly all British transport was mechanical, and stretched their columns for miles along a single road through the jungle, vulnerable everywhere from air and ground.

c. Insufficient Combat Units and Equipment. Combat unit defending Sittang Bridge were below strength as well as equipment. Casualties, especially in the 17th Division were heavy. Desertion in the Burmese units was increasing. The British had no prospect of replacing losses. There was no communication with India except by air and they had a small number of transport aircraft. The British also suffered incurable wasting disease and the death toll was on the increase.

d. British Intelligence was Extremely Bad. The British intelligence was weak, they had no information that the Japanese were steadily increasing their forces in the country and had developed plans which would soon outflank these defences. There were no Burmese intelligence organization, either behind the enemys lines or in their own territory. The British knew nothing of the enemy. Reasons being they had no Japanese prisoners to extract information from. Their only source of information was the identification of enemy dead and the study of their documents. In the whole corps, they only had one Japanese interpreter. He worked day and night, the inevitable delay in translation often made what they discovered was an out of date information. It is not an overstatement to say that the British had practically no useful or reliable information of enemy strength, movements, or intentions. They lacked appreciation and photo cover, because the air reconnaissance was insufficient and unreliable. The Allied codes had been cracked. It can assume that the British were like a blind boxer trying to strike an unseen opponent and to parry or dodge blows they did not know were coming until it hit them.

e. The Morale of the Allied Forces Was Threatened. Low morale in the fighting troops, can be the most serious danger of all. The effects of the Sittang disaster on the fighting troops were the evident. They had fought well, but they had no success. Furthermore, the constant retreat and the stories of Japanese supermen in the jungle

from the Japanese propaganda machine of the myth of the Invincible Jap, combined with the obvious shortages of every kind, could not fail to depress their morale.

f. Air Superiority. The Japanese had increased their air strength in the theater during March. They conducted a massive raid on the unprotected Magwe airfield and destroyed many of the Allied aircraft on the ground. To prevent further losses, the RAF moved its planes west to Akyab and the American Volunteer Group (AVG) went north to Lashio and Loiwing. Further raids followed, ultimately forcing the Allied air forces completely out of Burma. Without opposition in the air, the Japanese enjoyed virtually unlimited air reconnaissance which, when coupled with a growing number of sympathetic Burmese on the ground, provided them with detailed information on Allied troop dispositions and movements.

g. Poor Deployment. When the Japanese commenced their offensive, panic broke out amongst the British. The 17th Indian Division was poorly deployed to meet the onslaught and gradually withdrew behind the Sittang River. Disaster after disaster occurred. The bridge was ordered destroyed by General Smyth, as the 48th Brigade was crossing it leaving two-thirds of the brigade to swim across.

h. The British Did Not Received Local Support. Little had been done to prepare the people to cooperate against the invader because it had been feared to create alarm, despondency and possibly disaffection by admitting the possibility of British withdrawal. The civil administrative was showing signs of collapse. Most of the Burmese were uninterested and terrified, they wanted to avoid becoming involved with the Japanese or the British. The Burmese were not consulted the defence of Burma and they had little reason to fight the Japanese. Therefore, the Allied forces were left with no local support. On the other hand there were few who served the Japanese as guides and spies.

i. Gap between the Allied forces in the Sittang Valley and Irrawaddy Valley. Second Burma Brigade which was responsible for the defence of Sittang Bridge was at Nyaunglebin which was about 100 miles away. The Chinese and the Allied forces were separated by eighty miles of roadless, few tracks and jungle-covered hills of Pegu Hills.

Transfer of forces from one point to another would be difficult and slow. The gap would leave the Japanese an opportunity for their favourite tactics of encirclement.

j. Rift Among Allied Forces. The international tensions existing among the nations defending Burma had confused the entire campaign. Abrupt changes of mind by Chinese leadership, such as his reversal on the Chinese lend-lease policy, were a constant source of irritation for American and British officers. They were differences between the British and American policies regarding China. The British were fighting for the future of their empire in the Far East and had little concern for China. Whereas, the Americans sought to make it a more equal member of the Alliance.

LESSONS LEARNT

38. The first phase of Burma Campaign which ended in the retreat had been a military defeat. The decisive battle at Sittang was one of the good example to be learnt especially in the operational aspect. The operational reasons for failure can be grouped as follows:

a. b. c. d.

No Strategic Direction. Not Enough Preparation. Operational Level. Leadership

i. No Strategic Direction - No one in the military chain of command had expected a Japanese invasion of Burma until it was too late. Those who were responsible might have been concerned with strategic matters in other parts of the world and no one took firm responsibility for the defence of Burma. There was no military strategic guidance from which the commanders on the ground could develop operational and tactical level plans for the coming onslaught. Because of this lack of strategic direction resulted in an errors in campaign plan. In any campaign, without an overwhelming superiority of troops and materials, that campaign bound to fail. This lack of direction continued during the actual fighting. For example, when General Alexander had arrived in the

theatre, he had orders to hold Rangoon. On his arrival he found the decisive battle of the campaign, the Sittang Bridge, had already been lost.

ii. No Enough Preparation. - The troops chosen for the operation were lacking in numbers and had not been properly prepared for the operations that they were to undertake. As an example, the 17th Division had been equipped and trained for the desert. The 1st Burma Division was made up of raw, inexperienced and unreliable Burmese troops. Neither of these Divisions had been adequately trained to fight in the jungle. On the other hand, the Japanese used the jungle to their advantage.

iii. Inadequate Air Support. The air force was also not prepared for the Japanese assault. The Japanese air force quickly dominated the skies. The main destruction of the British Air Force happened on the ground, at Magwe, owing to bad dispersal on the airfield. The skies over the battlefields belonged solely to the Japanese. This resulted in inadequate air support for the army on the ground. The British had lost one of their most important combat functions. This lack of air support contributed to the overall defeat. On top of that, the air force could not be relied upon to provide information about the enemy. The army did not have light mobile reconnaissance units that could live in the jungle and report on the movements of the Japanese.

iv. Operational Level - Preparation for the withdrawal was not properly catered for therefore, there were no clean break during withdrawal. The defence of Reserved Demolition was weak. There were insufficient mines used to blow up the Sittang bridge resulting to minor destruction to the bridge. Due to confusion and lack of communication, alternative measures to open crossing lanes were not carried out.

v. Leadership - The most disastrous aspect had been the contrast between the Allies leadership and the Japanese. The Japanese leadership was confident and so aggressive. Their objective was clear and definite. The destruction of the Allied forces because their leaders failed to foresee their lack of training in jungle warfare, thus they could not ensure a clean break from enemy during their withdrawal to the Sittang Bridge.

39. Deriving from the Factors that contribute to the defeat coupled with the abovementioned points we can extract some of the points that are relevant to Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and Malaysian environment as a whole. Among them are:

a. Training. On the geographical aspect, there is not much different between Malaysia and Burma. About 70 per cent of Malaysia are covered with jungle. Therefore the importance of jungle warfare to the MAF must not be neglected and at the same time we must not forget about the important of conventional warfare because the training for the preparation for war must suit its situation. Other than that, since Malaysia consist a lot rivers, perhaps the MAF should also consider the needs and importance to emphasis on river crossing operation and training for it personnel.

b. Equipment. Purchasing of war materials/equipment for the MAF must take into consideration on Malaysian terrain and climate. The important of getting the right equipment for the right environment is paramount important. Not forgetting the equipment to be purchased must also take into consideration its states-of-art so that our personnel are not equipped with out-of-date equipment. Proper training on how to use the equipment and minor repairs to the equipment must be ensured.

c. Line of Communication (L of C). In the case of Sittang Disaster, we have seen the important of L of C in a campaign. In the case of of Sittang Disaster in Burma Campaign, we saw the rough terrain and routes in Burma was rather bad, especially during the rainy season which caused a lot of problems to the Allied forces. There were not enough transportation both land and air. Perhaps our commanders should also consider to improve the L of C between East and West Malaysia, its effect on deployment, resupply etc. The same consideration should also be emphasised within West Malaysia as well ie between east and west coast.

d Intelligence Gathering. In modern conventional warfare, intelligence gathering and the utilization of Electronic Warfare (EW) is very important. At present, our MAF personnel are still lacking in EW equipment and experts. On the aspect of jungle warfare, basic intelligence is also an important matter. Intelligence personnel must be conversant with the geographical aspect of the country. The importance of maximum used of local resources to gain information must also be thought to the personnel involved and they must also be expose to the IPB process especially combat units and combat support units. The failure of British intelligence in the battle at Sittang was obvious. There were no observation point and patrols deployed to warn the defending troops.

e. Air Power. The important of air power can be considered as one of the decisive point in a campaign. The British had lost one of their most important combat functions. This lack of air support contributed to the overall defeat in Burma. The MAF can learnt from the defeat of the Allied force forces was due to their lack of air superiority.

f. Propaganda Machine. Even though propaganda is not considered as the decisive factor but it had played an important role in demoralizing the morale of the Allied troops in Burma. The myth of the Invincible Jap had taken it tolls. The MAF also applied this tactic during the insurgency. Therefore its roles must not be neglected in winning a battle.

AFTERMATH

40. It was later found out that after the Sittang Battle, of the twelve original battalions of infantry what remained were only 80 British officers, 69 Indian and Gurkha officers and 3,335 other ranks. This represent the deficiency of approximately 5000. Their armament totalled 1420 rifles, 56 light machine guns and 62 tommy guns - a loss of about 6000 weapons. 17th Division had lost many of its men, nearly all its guns and most of its transport. It had virtually ceased to exist as a fighting formation.

41. Till this date, it was not known how many men died, drowned, or just disappeared for ever after being trapped on the wrong side of the river. But some books gave the figure as thirteen thousand killed, wounded and missing, plus the loss of the tanks, most of the guns and transport, was a highest price to pay and this could well have undermined the confidence of men and some commanders.

CONCLUSION

42. The battle at Sittang Bridge was from beginning to the end a succession of blunders. The failure to provide a strong bridge garrison for the defence of the bridge was the beginning. The blowing of the Sittang Bridge, with two-thirds of 17th Division still to cross, will long be one of the most controversial decisions taken by a British general in the whole of the Second World War. The British lack of strategic direction

and operational preparedness and poor defence tactics, resulting to their being outmanoeuvred and outfought which finally contributed greatly to their defeat.

43. We can now observe the importance strategic and operational preparedness in a campaign. Proper training for those involved in the campaign, sufficient manpower and right equipment in a defence are essential. Since Malaysia is mostly covered with jungle, the important of jungle training should be stressed to the men. Always emphasis that jungle is neither impenetrable nor unfriendly. Once he has learned to move and live in the jungle, he can use it for concealment, covered movement and surprise. The men must be thought to patrol in the jungle, boldly, widely and offensively. The personnel attended the training must achieved a certain level required by the services.

44. Up-to-date intelligence data on the enemy, their strength, movements and intentions need to be correctly analyse in order to conduct the countermeasures. In this aspect the importance of EW plays it role. Intelligence personnel must be able to utilise local resource for intelligence gathering in order to assist their commanders in assessing the enemys capability, planning purposes and others.

45. The Malaysian Armed Forces must also take into consideration the importance of air power in a battle. Without air superiority we have lost one of our essential combat functions which in the long run will determine the success or failure of a campaign. We had seen in Burma campaign, the Japanese had an advantage once they controlled the air space. Their air superiority denied a lot of Allied movements. The Allied were pinned down and harassed which demoralize the morale of the fighting men.