BRANDENBURG DURING NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN 1941-1943 by Avro Vercamer -------------------------------------------------------------------------------The first Brandenburger Tropeneinheit commando team arrived

in North Africa in June of 1941. Their initial task was one of reconnaissance; i.e., determining where exactly the British were located along the front lines and what forces were available to same. I/(Sonder) Kompanie and the II/ Kompanie/III Battalion/Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 800 were temporarily redesignated as Sonderverband 287. This unit was subordinated to Sonderstab F (Wstenbrigade Felmy, commanded by General der Flieger Felmy). During their initial deployment in northern Africa, their (offensive minded) hands were tied a bit because Rommel had a strong aversion to "the war in the dark". Rommel wanted proof that the British Long Range Desert Commando teams (Colonel Stirling commanding) were indeed fighting in such a manner. The "proof" for Rommel came shortly in September of 1942, right before he was to go on vacation when German troops had located six "lost" German officers in Tobruk. One of the German Afrika Korps officers, Leutnant Zeller, while walking down a side street of Tobruk, had recognized a German officer, Leutnant Gromann, as being none other as his friend and schoolmate from Berlin. But then it also quickly donned on Zeller that his schoolmate had emigrated to the United Kingdom towards the end of 1938 (he was of Jewish heritage). A small scuffle ensued, an Italian soldier was wounded, but neither Gromann or Zeller were harmed. Five other German soldiers, whose origins were dubious at best, were also quickly identified as being British. As a result of further interrogation efforts, Rommel was advised that these six "British" Germans were actually a diversion of Operation "Springtime" (all six British commando team members were actually Germans who had departed Germany before the war because of their Jewish backgrounds). Further German investigation efforts uncovered many time-bombs at key German harbor and supply facilities in Tobruk. These were all defused by the Germans; a few additional British commando team members were also uncovered in the process. A second component of Colonel Stirling's plan was to send a team of British Commando's through Tobruk and on to Rommel's headquarters - Rommel was to be taken alive, but the rest of his headquarters staff was to be shot. Rommel was quickly whisked away to safety by the Germans. The nephew of General Alexander was captured by the Germans as the Germans intercepted his commando team on its way to Rommel's headquarters. Interestingly, this entire undertaking was repeated in principle in 1944 when the British were able to successfully kidnap General Kreipe in Crete along with the commander of the German 22nd Infantry Division. A third component of Colonel's Stirling's plan was to destroy as much of Tobruk's harbor system as they could through a seaborne invasion/infiltration attempt. Because the Germans were now appraised of the situation, surprise was lost on the British. British ships carrying the commando teams hoisted German and Italian flags shortly after entering the headwaters of Tobruk. But the Germans were now expecting this. They damaged the British command ship and effected many casualties onto the attacking British, forcing Sterling to abort his mission (taking high losses as a result). After this incident, Rommel gave the Brandenburger Tropenkompanie in Africa a free hand in their operational activities with one exception. Rommel stuck to his order on German commando teams wearing enemy (British) uniforms - that was strictly verboten. During the month of October 1941, two attempts were made by the Brandenburger's to infiltrate Cairo. The goals of these mission were to make contact with Arab nationalists and help them to mount an insurrection against the British. The first attempt to reach Cairo was made via a sea borne infiltration operation. This attempt failed, the team returned to its bases in Libya. The second attempt was to land a team via parachute near Cairo. This too ended in failure. A final mission was indeed successful in making contact with key Arabic leaders. A team of Brandenburgers set out by car and truck, crossing Egypt in the center. They crossed the Nile near the town of Asyut (about halfway from today's Aswan Dam and Cairo). But an insurrection never came. These German-Arab talks included the late Anwar Sadat - who told the Germans as to why he would be willing to help the German war effort: The enemy of my enemy is my friend. On 16 May 1942, the Brandenburger's in Africa probably undertook one of their most successful operations in Cairo - the covertly met with the Grandmufti of Jerusalem. The goal of these talks was the same - an Arab insurrection against the British. Agents Hans Eppler and Gerd Sandsetter (left) who were part of a detachment sent to Cairo with

Brandenburg troops as part of Operation Salaam in 1942. Towards the end of 1941, the front lines in Africa began to take on a more stable shape. Sonderverband 287 was ordered to operate in the most southern regions of the German lines - in exactly the same area as Britain "Long Range Desert Group" operated under the command of Colonel Stirling. On 05 December 1942, two half-strength companies of Brandenburger commando's, both falling under the command of Hauptmann Fritz von Koenen are flown by the Luftwaffe to Hammamet in Tunisia. They immediately are given orders to spring into action against the Americans and the French. On 26 December 1942, von Koenen's Brandenburger commando team (30 men) departed from the Bizerta airfield in Libya loaded onto three gliders. After mid-air release close to their target, they slowly glided towards their destination in central Tunisia - the railroad bridge near the village of Sidi bou Baker spanning the Wadi el-Kbir. The bridge was about 120 feet long, it was protected by French troops. The Germans were successful in their mission, the bridge was destroyed. The commando team then destroyed its gliders and started their 120 mile long track back to the Italian garrison fortress of Maknassi. and returned by foot to German lines (walk at night, rest at day; assisted by many local pro-German Arab tribesmen). On that same day, a second team of 10 Brandenburger commando's under the command of Leutnant Hagenauer completed a similar mission against a bridge near Kasserini in southern Tunisia. They arrived as planned and destroyed their target (the bridge). As this team was returning towards the German lines, an armored reconnaissance platoon of the Free-French army intercepted them. All 10 German commando team members were captured by the Free-French. On 18 January 1943, a team of Brandenburger's led by Leutnant Fuchs destroyed the bridge over the Wadi el-Melah in southern Tunisia. The arrived at their target via ground transportation; i.e. trucks. This bridge supported a key Allied supply line in Tunisia, but because of the military situation, the loss of the bridge did not seriously hamper the Allied offensive in Tunisia. Brandenburg troops in a commandeered British Bedford Truck. In the desert the use of captured vehicles was widespread by both sides and suited the Brandenburgers style of covert warfare. One of the most daring undertakings attempted by the Brandenburger's in Africa was "Unternehmen Dora". This most ambitious plan was to disrupt the Allied supply roads emanating from the Gulf of Guinea to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. These roads were of vital importance to the British 8th Army. Specifically, Leutnant von Leipzig was ordered to take a Brandenburg commando team and begin a reconnaissance effort of today's Niger and Chad to determine if German efforts could indeed be channeled to disrupting this supply line. Lake Chad and its surrounding areas were selected as being the most effective zones of disruption. About 100 Brandenburger troops were made available for "Dora". They were equipped with 24 British military vehicles, 12 40mm armed trucks, 4 British Jeeps with AA MG's, a command sedan, a signals truck, a gasoline and a water supply truck and a small mobile mechanical service truck. All participants had a solid command of either English or French, three also spoke fluent Arabic. The team departed Tripolis in either June or July of 1942. The convoy drove via Hun and Sabbah bound for Marzuq (an Italian garrison in south eastern Libya). A "Feldflugplatz" was constructed about 35 miles from the town of Al-Qatrun (south of Marzuq). The idea was to deploy a number of refurbished Spitfires there (they were to be flown by Brandenburger pilots). Al-Qatrun was to serve as the primary base of operations. In July of 1942, von Leipzig divided his 100 man team into three smaller teams. He took charge of the first group. The first group proceeded to advance towards the Tassili plateau in south-eastern Algeria. From there, the Brandenburger's proceeded to build another forward staging base. No sooner had they reached the Tassili mountain region, they were discovered by a French armored unit which immediately opened up fire. Over the course of the next few days, the Germans worked hard to stay one step ahead of the French. The French then proceeded to set up a trap for the Brandenburgers in a small Arab village located about 35 miles from the town of Ghezehida (Algeria). The British and the French reacted in total panic - they had not expected to see German troops in that part of Africa. Additional French troops, British Colonial troops, special commando units, etc., were now ordered to converge on the Brandenburgers. To better effect their escape, the Brandenburgers now switched over to wearing French uniforms; having buried their German uniforms deep in the sand. The Brandenburgers did something cool and calculated - they drove right up to a French unit and told them that they were one of the many parties sent to the region to catch the dreaded German infiltrators. Because of their French language skills, the ruse worked. The local French commander gave them food and supplies. But then disaster struck. A French commander gave one of the Brandenburgers an order - to the only Brandenburg team member who spoke no French. Von Leipzig quickly took advantage of the confusion, ordered his men to their

trucks and escaped with all his men - now bound for the Libyan border again. The French were so dumfounded that they waited until a more senior French military officer had arrived to help make sense of what just happened. Of this team, only four were killed in action (in a firefight with French forces on a mountain top). The second group under the command of Feldwebel (!) Stegmann proceeded to advance over the Tibesti mountain range in northern Chad and from there proceed towards Lake Chad. Their assignment was to operate in French Equatorial Africa and cause as much havoc as possible. Two days after departing, the team was "attacked" by Bedouins. Feldwebel Stegmann however maintained his composure and ordered every Brandenburger to remain perfectly still. It turned out that the "attack" was a Bedouin test of courage and allegiance. The Tibbu Bedouins also hated the French and they were very willing to help the Germans. With help, the Germans were able to infiltrate the ancient caravan town of Bardai. It was held by only a company sized unit of French troops. It did not take the Germans long to ascertain the fact that a strong contingent of French troops were on their way. A decision was thus made to return to Libya. 14 days later, all German Brandenburgers arrived safely in Marzuq. The third group under the command of Leutnant Becker was to advance towards the Libyan town of Ghat (south-western Libya) and penetrate southern Algeria. They were to avoid combat situations if possible. After crossing the border town of Ghat, they ran into a village occupied by French forces. Through a series of clever subterfuges, the Brandenburgers were able to create a condition of medical quarantines in the region. This worked, and no additional French forces dared to enter a quarantine area. The local Arab people were willing participants to this ruse, as it made the hated French look as foolish as possible. The third group too returned unharmed to German lines in Libya. After being recalled from Marzuq due to the British attack at El-Alamein, the Brandenburg commando's reported back that it would take at least a few divisions worth of men to successfully complete the designed mission. On the day that the Brandenburger's were recalled to Tripoli, the promised Spitfire a/c arrived. A few reconnaissance missions were flown, the resulting reports were however not encouraging. But it was too late, "Dora" was then canceled. Operation "Dora" was separate from the 1944 undertaking of KG 200 when it used B-17's in a planned aerial attack against the Allied supply depots in Lagos Nigeria. Shortly before the capitulation of all German and Italian forces in north Africa, the surviving members of the Brandenburger's in Africa were withdrawn and brought back to Brandenburg in Germany. Their next missions would take them to the Balkans. IN 1943, with the war turning against Hitler, and with the exploitation of the occupied countries virtually complete, the tempo of Nazi plunder slackened. Incalculable riches had been secured and were now pouring into Germany. The material purchased for Linz was being received and registered at Munich, in the Fhrerbau, one of the group of colossal buildings erected by the Nazi's to "dignify" the Party capital. The more valuable loot, however, was being stored in safe places far removed from the urban centers. These repositories, for the most part, were situated in thick forests or inaccessible mountain fastnesses. For the Einsatzstab Rosenberg alone, six great estates were requisitioned, and the loot -- brought in by the trainload -- was deposited there from 1941 on. (A document of July, 1944, records 29 separate shipments into the Reich during the period between April, 1941, and December 1943.) The fabulous castle of Neuschwanstein, jutting crag-like from the lower reaches of the Bavarian Alps, held the booty from France. An island monastery in the middle of the Chiemsee, the enchanting lake which lies midway between Munich and Salzburg; a former royal Austrian summer residence in the hills of the Salzkammergut; the hunting lodge of the Grand Duke of Luxembourg in South Bavaria, isolated magnificently in a huge game preserve -- these were secondary caches, illustrating the diversity of the sites chosen. Not by the widest stretch of the imagination would any of the repositories have been subjected to air attack. First, their very isolation and their natural camouflage enhanced their immunity. Second, they were in themselves "cultural monuments" and would have been ignored by Allied bombers. Yet hysteria in the Reich Chancellery had become so intense by the end of 1943 that Hitler ordered a wholesale evacuation of the repositories in favor of a still safer refuge. In February, 1944, with the snow blanketing the country, truck convoys began to move south with their precious cargo, in the direction of Linz itself. Just east of Salzburg, however, they turned off and began to climb laboriously into the mountainous region of the Upper Danube. Their destination was a fourteenth-century salt mine, high above the picturesque village of Alt Aussee. Few undertakings of the war were more painstaking or futile. The road to Aussee climbs over two

high passes, virtually unassailable in the dead of winter. With frantic determination to conceal the loot in the very earth of the last redoubt, tanks and even oxen were used where trucks failed to scale the slippery barrier. For thirteen months, through the winter and summer of 1944 and into the winter of 1945, the convoys limped over the mountains and left their cargo at the entrance to the mine. The Steinberg mine is a labyrinth with a single outlet. A tunnel little more than six feet in height -so that a tall man negotiates it with difficulty -- cuts two kilometers horizontally into the mountainside and, winding around, links a series of mammoth caverns, from which salt has been mined through the centuries. A miniature gasoline engine can proceed through the tunnel on narrow-gauge rails at snail's pace, hauling a tiny flat car. There is not other access to the mine's interior. For "Dora" (code name of the secret deposit) workmen transformed these grotesque subterranean vaults into model storage rooms, fitted with clean wooden floors and specially constructed racks, dehumidification equipment, and modern lighting fixtures. Dora was surely the most fantastic manifestation of the last-ditch Nazi stand. Here, Hitler planned literally to go underground. In 1944 and 1945, Dora received 6755 old master paintings, of which 5350 were destined for Linz, 230 drawings, 1039 prints, 95 tapestries, 68 sculptures, 43 cases of objects d'art, and innumerable pieces of furniture; in addition, 119 cases of books from Hitler's library in Berlin, and 237 cases of books for the Linz library. The last convoy arrived at the mine less than a month before V-E Day. An appropriately dramatic postscript to Operation Dora was written by Gauleiter Eigruber, who, as administrator of the entire Oberdonau region, was the official ultimately responsible for the contents of the mine. In 1945, with his province wedged alarmingly between the Russians, advancing from the southwest, and the Americans, descending on him from the north, Eigruber ordered demolition charges set throughout the mine. Not merely the evidence of Berman plunder, but the priceless accumulation of Europe's treasure itself, was to be destroyed at the moment of Allied entry. Eigruber's orders were countermanded by the Reich Chancellery, but the advanced chaos of the situation permitted him to ignore headquarters, and he persisted in his fiendish plan. The Gauleiter fled into the mountains before the American advance, taking with him a select SS bodyguard. But the Austrian workmen, who had been given specific instructions for the demolition procedure and who had been threatened with a firing squad for noncompliance, simply filed out of the mine on hearing that the Americans were approaching. The destruction of some of Europe's greatest masterpieces was thus narrowly averted -- by the fundamental decency of a few simple men. On entering the mine, the Americans found the world-famous van Eyck Adoration from Ghent, the Dirk Bouts alterpiece from Louvain, and the Michelangelo Madonna from Bruges -- among the greatest national treasures of Belgium; the paintings and sculpture from Naples via Monte Cassino seized by the Hermann Gring Division; and almost the entire Rothschild holdings from Paris and Vienna. Everywhere, throughout seven vast caverns, were the ominous demolition charges, armed and in place, yet the loot was unharmed. Examination of Hitler's personal library prompted further speculation on a question which may never be answered -- the true state of the Fhrer's health at the end. Every word of correspondence read by Hitler in the closing war years came to him from a special oversized typewriter. The letters were an inch high. This startling evidence gives rise to the belief that the Fhrer, with all his other ills, must have been almost totally blind. The process of restitution is going well. Alt Aussee, although the most important repository, was not the only one. The contents of the Gring Collection at Carinhall, for instance, were discovered in a cave at Berchtesgaden. In the work of tabulation, the Allies actually enumerated over four hundred places of safekeeping throughout Germany, not all of them, to be sure, containing loot. Operation Dora was reversed by the American Army and the mine has been emptied. From several "Central Collecting Points" in the American zone, the loot is being returned gradually to the countries of origin -- a laborious process involving painstaking research and careful handling. Meanwhile, the major living culprits are in Allied custody, awaiting trial at the termination of the Nuremberg proceedings, and the liberated countries are taking action against those of their own

nationals who helped the Germans strip their lands. The looting of Europe was not merely an official and expert operation designed to enrich the Nazi state and increase the prestige of Hitler and Gring. By contributing to the impoverishment of the occupied and satellite countries, and by exalting Germanic art (while banning all liberal work of the last hundred years), the looting machine remained within the framework of National Socialist philosophy. The failure of German arms must not blind us to the lasting implications of Hitler's attempt to corrupt the culture of Europe and to reduce all art to the Nazi formula.