Goodmorning. ImgratefultotheKingdomofThailandsNationalAnti CorruptionCommission,alongwiththeWorldBankand TransparencyInternationalsThailandChapter,forinvitingme toparticipateinthisconferenceandtoaddressyoutoday.The topicofthisconferenceEvidenceBasedAntiCorruption PoliciesisofvitalimportanceinThailandandaroundthe world,andtheconferenceorganizershaveassembledatruly remarkablegroupofexpertstodiscussthistopicoverthenext twodays.Iamhonoredandhumbledtohavebeenincluded. Indeed,thebreadthanddepthoftheexpertisereflectedbythe groupofpeopleassembledinthisroomisbothinspiringand daunting.

Itsinspiringbecauseitisareflectionofhowfarthe internationalcommunityhascomeinfocusingsustained attentionontheproblemofcorruption.Ofcourse,awareness ofcorruptionasaproblemisnotnew.Indeed,itisancient. Butitwasnotthatlongagothateventhougheverybodyknew corruptionwasaproblem,itwasnotreallyatoppriorityinthe internationaldevelopmentagenda,oracentralfocusof academicresearchineconomicsorpoliticalscience.Thathas clearlychanged,andthisconferenceisareflectionofthat change.

Atthesametime,givenhowfarwehavecome,deliveringan addresstoanaudiencelikethisisquiteadauntingtask,asI fearthereslittleIcansaytoyouthatyoudontalreadyknow. Still,myhopeisthatIcanusetheseremarkstoreflectonwhat seemtometobesomeofthemoreinterestingdevelopments andinsightsinthestudyofcorruption,andtosuggestsome aspectsofthisproblemthatmightbenefitfromfurther sustainedattentionbyexpertslikethoseinthisroom. Letmestartwithsomebadnewsfirst.Corruption,asIm sureyouknow,remainsahugeproblemthroughouttheworld. Justhowmuchofaproblemisquitedifficulttosay,inpart becauseaconsistentdefinitionofcorruptioniselusive,inpart becausemeasuringtheamountofcorruption(howeveritis defined)isextremelydifficult,andinpartbecausemeasuring theadverseeffectsofcorruptionismoredifficultstill. Butitisclearthatinmanycountriesincludingsomeofthe poorestcountries,whereeffectivegovernmentismost essentialofficialcorruptionisdeeplyembeddedinthefabric ofnationallife,tothepointwhereitiswidelyaccepted,though perhapsnotcondoned,asnormalratherthandeviant, whatevertheformallawsmightsay.Suchpervasive,endemic publiccorruptioncaninfectallaspectsofnationallifeand officialconduct,fromthethousandsofpettybribesthatmust bepaidforthemostbasicgovernmentservices,tothe
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willingnessofgovernmentofficialstotoleraterampantand sociallydestructivelawbreakinginexchangeforillicitpayments orotherfavors,tothehighestreachesofthestateandsociety, whereunscrupulousnationalleaderstreatthestatetreasuryas apersonalATM,extractingandexportingnationalwealthona scalethatisbothbreathtakingandheartbreaking. Thissortofpervasivecorruptionhasprovenincredibly difficulttorootout,oreventocontain.Partoftheproblemis thatcorruptioncangenerateanumberofrelatedvicious circles,inwhichpervasivecorruptionbecomesaself perpetuatingphenomenonthatisdeeplyresistanttochange. Inotherwords,societiescanfindthemselvesstuckin corruptiontrapsthataredifficulttoescape. Onetypeofcorruptiontraphastodowiththetypeofperson whochoosestopursueacareeringovernmentservice.Public corruptiontendstothrivewhendishonestpeopleenterpublic life,andtorecedewhenhonestmenandwomenarepresentin greaternumbers.Buthonestpeopleareattractedtoother honestpeople,andtoworkperceivedashonest.Ifapublic agencyisperceivedasabastionofcorruption,honestpeople willavoidit,whiledishonestpeoplewhoviewpublicofficeas ameansofaccruingpersonalwealthwillseekitout.This,of course,meansthattheagencybecomesevenmorecorrupt.

Perhapsevenmoreimportantly,thepervasivenessof corruptionalsoaffectsthestrengthofthesocialnormsagainst corruption.Mydescriptionamomentagoofhonestand dishonestindividualswasanobviousoversimplification. Mostpeopleareneithercompletelyhonestnorcompletely dishonest.Mostpeoplearesomewhereinbetween,andtheir perceptionofrightandwrongwillbeinfluencedbywhatother peopledo.Ifveryfewpeopleinasocietyarecorrupt,then corruptionwillbeperceivedasdeviantbehavior,andmost normalpeoplewillavoiditthesamewaymostnormalpeople dontshoplift.Ifcorruptioniswidespread,however,thenorms againstcorruptionweaken,becauseoftheperception everybodydoesit.Thisleadstofurthererosionofthenorm, andhencemorecorruption.Again,theresultisaself perpetuatingcycle. Yetanotherwayinwhichcorruptioncanfeedonitselfhasto dowiththeprobabilityofdetectionandpunishment.When corruptionlevelsarerelativelylow,thenifthegovernment devotesamodestamountofresourcestocorruption investigationandprosecution,theoddsthatanyindividual engagingincorruptionwillgetcaughtandpunishedarefairly high.Thiswilltendtodetercorruption,thoughtherewill alwaysbesomedishonestrisktakerswillingtobreaktherules. Whencorruptionispervasive,however,evenifthegovernment devotessubstantialresourcestoanticorruption,the
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probabilitythatanyoneindividualwillbepunishedfor corruptionmayremainrelativelylow.Therearesimplytoo manypotentialtargets,sothelikelihoodthatanyoneofthem willenduppunishedisquitesmall.Thismeansthatdeterrence isnotveryeffective,andcorruptionlevelscanremainquite high. Theseselfreinforcingdynamicsmeanthatpervasive corruptioncanbeextraordinarilyhardtorootout.Pervasive officialcorruptionleadsrelativelydishonestpeopletoselect intopubliclife,erodesnormsagainstcorruption,andweakens deterrence.Whenasocietyfindsitselfcaughtinthissortof corruptiontrap,itcanbeverydifficulttoescape,particularly throughincrementalmeasures. Thatsthepessimisticversionofthestory.Buttheresa moreoptimisticperspectiveonemighttake.Themirrorimage ofthesortofviciouscircleIjustdescribedisavirtuouscircle,in whichrelativelylowlevelsofcorruptioncanbemaintained.Ifa countrycanfindawaytogetpervasive,endemiccorruption undercontrol,theninthelongtermkeepingcorruptionata manageablelevelmaybeeasierthangettingtothatlevelinthe firstplace.Oncewecangetpastthetippingpoint,once corruptionbecomesdeviantratherthanpervasive,thenmore honestpeoplewillbeattractedtopublicservicecareers,norms againstcorruptionbecomestronger,anddeterrencewillbe
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moreeffective.Thesevirtuouscircleswillhelptokeep corruptionatrelativelylow. Tobesure,theproblemwillnevergoaway.Thereisno countryintheworldnottheUnitedStates,notSweden,not Singaporethatdoesnothavesomeproblemwithcorruption. Butthereisalsoreasontobelievethat,nomatterhow intractabletheproblemappears,itspossibletocontainitand keepitatmanageablelevels. Andheressomemoregoodnews:Despitealltheproblems andchallengesfacinganticorruptionefforts,theresstrong evidencethatstraightforwardanticorruptionenforcement audits,investigations,andcrediblesanctionscaninfactbe effectiveinreducingcorruption.Ofcourse,thefactthat monitoringandenforcementcanbeeffectiveinreducing corruptionisperhapsnotallthatsurprising,butitsworth emphasizing.Sometimesrelativelysimpleandstraightforward approaches,ifbackedbyresourcesandpoliticalcommitment, canbequiteeffective,atleastindealingwithcertainkindsof corruption. Oneexampleofthedramaticeffectsofenforcementon corruption,aswellashowenforcementinteractswithcultural andotherfactors,comesfromoneofthemostentertaining corruptionstudiesIknowof,aboutillegalparkingbyUnited NationsdiplomatsinNewYorkCity.Heresthestory:Foryears,
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manyUNdiplomatsfloutedNewYorkCitysparking regulations.Theywouldparkwherevertheywantedandthen notpaythetickets,andtheNewYorkCitygovernmentwas powerlesstodoanythingaboutitbecauseofdiplomatic immunity.Thisisnotexactlycorruptionasmostpeople conventionallyusetheterm,butitisaformofabuseofa positionofpublicauthoritytheprivilegesofdiplomaticstatus forpurelyprivategain:theabilitytoparkinaconvenientspot evenifitimposescostsonothers. Itturnedout,however,thattheparkingviolationrateswere notconstantacrosscountries,oracrosstime.Firstofall, diplomatsfromcountriesratedashighcorruptioncountriesby TransparencyInternationaltendedtofloutNewYorksparking lawsmuchmorefrequently,whilediplomatsfromlow corruptioncountriestendedtofollowtherules,atleastfora while.Thisseemslikeevidencethatcorruptbehaviorhasan importantculturalorhabitualcomponent:afterall,allofthese diplomatswereoperatinginthesamelegalenvironment,but theyseemedtoexhibitattitudestowardtheobligationof governmentofficialstofollowthelawthatmirrorthoseintheir homecountries. Furthermore,theratesofviolationforindividualdiplomats changedovertime.Inparticular,thediplomatsfromlow corruptioncountriesstartedtoviolateNewYorkparkinglaws
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morefrequentlythelongertheyhadbeenpostedinNewYork. Thisissomethingofadepressingfinding.Onemighthave hopedthattheoppositewouldhaveoccurred:onemighthave hopedthatofficialsfromhighcorruptioncountrieswouldhave absorbedtheculturalnormsoflawabidingbehaviorafter havingbeenstationedintheUnitedStatesforawhile.Butthat didnthappen.Rather,itseemsthatonceotherdiplomats startedtorealizetheycouldbreaktherulesandgetawaywith it,theystartedtodoso.Acultureofintegrity,itseems,can eroderatherquicklyoncepeoplefigureoutthattherulesthat theyhadbeenfollowingoutofhabitnolongerapplied. Buttomethosearentreallythemoststrikingresultsofthe study.Themoststrikingresultshavetodowithwhat happenedaftertheexasperatedmayorofNewYorkreceived permissionfromtheU.S.DepartmentofStatetostripthe licenseplateandimpoundavehicleiftheregisteredownerwas foundtohavemorethanthreeunpaidparkingtickets.Inother words,NewYorkfoundawayaroundthediplomaticimmunity problemandstartedenforcingitsparkinglaws.Sowhat happenedafterthecitystartedimposingsignificantsanctions? Ratesofviolationforalldiplomatsfromallcountries plummetedquicklyandsubstantially.Again,thatsprobably notsurprising.Butitsevidencethateffectiveenforcementcan work,evenforatargetpopulationthathadalready
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demonstratedaculturalorhabitualpredispositiontoa particularkindofcorruptbehavior. Now,theresonlysomuchonecanlearnfromNewYorkCity parkingticketsaboutthekindsofcorruptionthatareourmain concern.TheNewYorkparkingstudyisclever,andfuntotalk about,butquitelimitedinitsapplicability.Fortunately,theres plentyofotherevidencefromavarietyofcountriesand contextsthatshowshowsimple,straightforwardinvestigation andenforcementcansignificantlyreducecorruptionlevels. Forexample,researchersworkingwiththeIndonesian governmentsdevelopmentagencyrecentlyconductedan experimentinwhichanumberofruralvillagesweregiven developmentfundsforbuildingroads.Someofthevillages, randomlyselected,werealertedinadvancethattheirroad projectswouldbeaudited;otherswerenot.Theresearchers theninvestigatedtheextentofcorruptionintheprojects,and foundthatthevillagesthatknewtheywouldfaceanaudithad dramaticallylowercorruptionlevels.Itsnotjustthatthe auditsthemselvesfoundlesscorruption.Rather,independent evaluationsbytheoutsideresearchers,whichtookcore samplesofthecompletedroadsandcomparedtheresultsto thequantityofmaterialsthevillagereportedpurchasing, verifiedthisresult.

Inanotherstudy,awidelypublicizedcrackdownon corruptioninArgentinadramaticallyreducedtheinflatedprices thatpublichospitalshadbeenpayingforbasicsupplies.The artificiallyhighpricesthattheyhadbeenpayingbeforethe crackdownwerelikelyduetokickbackpaymentsfromthe suppliers,andtheanticorruptioncrackdownsubstantially curtailedthisbehavior.Andarecentstudyofanticorruptionin theUnitedStatesfoundthatsimplyincreasingthenumberof federalprosecutorsinagivenjurisdictionsignificantlyreduced publiccorruptionlevels. AsIsaid,thiscanbeviewedasgoodnews.Sometimes,the moststraightforwardformsofanticorruptionmeasures investigations,audits,andimpositionofsanctionscanhavea realeffect. Anadditionallessonthatseemstobeemergingfrom researchnotonlyonanticorruptionbutoncriminallaw enforcementmoregenerallyisthatalthoughitsimportantto havemeaningfulpenalties,itsmuchmoreimportanttohave regular,consistent,timely,andpredictableenforcementof anticorruptionrules.Thesefactorsseemtomattermuchmore thanthemagnitudeofthepenalty,solongasthepenaltiesare sufficientlyhightobemeaningful. Thisobservation,ifaccurate,isimportantforanticorruption efforts,becauseonemighthavethoughtthatsolongasthe
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penaltiesforcorruptionweresufficientlydraconian,thenit wouldntmatteriftheprobabilityofdetectingcorruptionwere relativelylow.Indeed,ithassometimesbeensuggestedthat, particularlyforgovernmentswithlimitedresources,itmakes moresensetodeterunlawfulbehaviorthroughverysevere punishmentsthanthroughextensiveenforcement.Afterall, punishingafewpeopleisrelativelycheap,comparedto investigatingandpunishingalotofthem.Andsomecountries haveindeedemployedquiteseverepunishmentsfor corruption.ThePeoplesRepublicofChinahasevenimposed thedeathpenaltyinextremecases. Butwhilesufficientlyseverepunishmentsmightworkif everyonebehavedlikethesimplerationalagentsofclassical economictheory,theavailableevidencefromseveralareasof criminallawenforcementseemstoindicatethatalthoughthe severityofthepunishmentdoesmatter,itdoesntmatter nearlyasmuchastheprobabilitythatapunishmentwill actuallybeimposedinatimelyfashion.Ifthatiscorrect,then unfortunatelyonecannotmakeupforscantyenforcementwith severesanctions. Partofthereasonthattheprobabilityoftimelydetection andpunishmentseemstomattersomuchmorethanthe severityofthepunishmentisthatpeopletendtoignore

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entirelyeventsthathaveanextremelylowprobability,orthat areunlikelytooccuruntilthedistantfuture. Asecondandrelatedreasonthatconsistentandpredictable enforcementmaybemoreimportantthanthemagnitudeof thepenaltyisthatcorruptionpunishmentsworknotonly throughtheirdeterrenteffect,butalsobyreinforcingsocial normsagainstcorruption.Whencorruptactionsarepunished onlyrarelynomatterhowseverelythepunishmentsseem morelikerandombadluckforthetargets,ratherthanthe legitimateconsequenceofviolatingasocialandlegalnorm. Moreover,wheninvestigationandpunishmentareextremely rare,itiseasierforthoseraresevereenforcementstobeseen asdrivenbypolitics,orpersonalgrudges,orsomethingsimilar. Aperceptionofconsistent,evenhandedenforcementofthe lawisimportanteverywhere,andmaybeparticularly importantinanarealikeanticorruption. Acloselyrelatedpointisthattheevidencesuggeststhatto beeffective,anticorruptioneffortsneedtobesustained steadilyovertime.Highprofileanticorruptioncrackdowns cansometimesbeeffective,butinmanydifferentcountries andcontextsthereisevidencethattheeffectofsuch crackdownsisfleeting.Corruptofficialslearntotakethe occasionalcrackdownaspartoflife,muchascriminalslearnto laylowwhentheheatison:itsanannoyance,butnotareal
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disruption.Evenworse,acycleoftemporarycrackdowns, followedbyareturntobusinessasusual,canbreedcynicism, andfurthererodeorimpedenormsofanticorruption. Takentogether,whatIwanttosuggestisthatthemost effectiveanticorruptionenforcementeffortsarenot necessarilythosethatmakethesplashiestheadlines,eitherin theformofmajorcrackdownsoroccasionalhighprofile prosecutions.Rather,themosteffectiveanticorruption campaignsarelikelytobethosethatarebroadandsustained thatis,thosethatachievethegreatestdegreeofconsistency acrosstimeandacrosstargets. Itsalittlebitlikelosingweight.Thereareallsortsoffad diets,popularizedbysplashybooks,thatwillhelpyoulose weightintheshortterm,butyougainitallbackwithinafew months.Ultimately,toloseweighttheresnosubstitutefora healthybalanceddietandlotsofexercise,eventhoughthat advicedoesntsellalotofbooks.Sotoo,agreatdealof effectiveanticorruptionpolicyamountstothelaw enforcementequivalentofabalanceddietandlotsofexercise: regular,steady,consistentenforcementofpredictableand legitimaterules,withsustainedpoliticalandfinancialsupport. Theresnothingmagicalaboutit,butitshardtosustain. Anotherlessonthathasemergedfromthestudyandpractice ofanticorruptionisthatsomeofthemostimportantfeatures
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ofanticorruptionstrategiesarenotdirectlyaboutcorruption atall,butratheraboutotherfeaturesofthelegalorpolitical systemthataffecttheprevalenceorseverityofofficial corruption. Oneobviousexample,whichhasgottenagreatdealof deservedattentionfromscholarsandpolicymakers,concerns theroleofthemediaandcivilsocietyincombatingcorruption. Theimportanceofthemediaininvestigatinganddisclosing corruptactivitieshasbeenwelldocumented.Atthehighest levelofgenerality,crosscountrycomparisonsrevealastrong negativerelationshipbetweenmeasuresofpressfreedomand measuresofcorruption.Inotherwords,societiesthatare ratedashavingarelativelyfreepresstendtohavelowerlevels ofperceivedcorruption,whilecountrieswithlesspress freedomseemtohaveabiggercorruptionproblem. Thatcorrelationbyitselfmaynotbeallthatmeaningfulas evidencethatafreepresscausesreductionsincorruption:Its possiblethathighlycorruptsocietiestendtorestrictthepress, orthatsomethirdfactor,suchaspovertyorauthoritarianism, explainsbothcorruptionandrestraintsonthepress. Buttheresconsiderablymoremicrolevelevidencethat aggressivemediawatchdogscanmakeabigdifference.For example,astudyinUgandaafewyearsbackfocusedontheft ofcentralgovernmentgrantsintendedforlocalschools.Theft
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ratesinthisgrantprogramweredepressinglyhigh.Insome areas,asmuchas85%ofthefundsintendedforlocalschools werestolenoutrightbythelocalofficialsresponsiblefor administeringtheprogram. Then,newspapersbeganpublicizinginformationaboutaid providedtolocalschools,includinginformationabouthow muchmoneythecentralgovernmenthadprovidedtoeach village.Corruptionoveralldeclinedmarkedly,whichbyitselfis evidencethatmediacoverageandprovisionofinformationcan havesignificanteffects.Perhapsevenmorenotably,the amountofthedeclineincorruptionineachvillagedependedin partonthedistancebetweenthevillageinquestionandthe nearestnewspaperoutlet.Thosevillagerswithgreateraccess tonewspaperreportingoncorruptionintheschoolfunding programsawmuchlowerlevelsofcorruption.Otherstudiesin othercountrieshavefoundsimilareffectsoftransparencyand mediacoverage. Indeed,corruptofficialsthemselvesseemtoviewavigorous freepressasaseriousthreattotheirenterprises.Someofthe bestevidenceforthiscomesfromtheFujimoriregimeinPeru. FujimorissecretpolicechiefwasamannamedMontesinos. MontesinoswasinchargeofmaintainingFujimoriscontrol throughanextensivenetworkofbriberyandotherformsof corruption.Remarkably,Montesinoskeptmeticulousrecords
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ofthebribesthathepaid,evengoingsofarastohavesigned contractsinmanycases,andsometimeseventovideotapethe bribetransactions.Asaresult,Montesinossrecordsprovide someofthemostdetailedevidenceavailableoftheeconomics ofcorruption. Oneofthemoststrikingthingsthattheserecordsrevealis thatalthoughMontesinosbribedallsortsofpeople,including legislatorsandjudges,hishighestpriority,asreflectedinthe exorbitantbribeshepaid,wastobuyoffthemedia,particularly thebigTVstations.Montesinossview,whichheexpressedto associates,wasthatthemedia,andTVinparticular,wasthe mostimportantpotentialthreattotheFujimori administrationssubversionofPeruviandemocracy. Thecodatothestorysuggeststhathewasright:The downfalloftheFujimoriregimecameafterMontesinosjilted oneofhismistresses.Thespurnedwomanmanagedtoget holdofMontesinossstashofvideotapesandprovidedsomeof themtotheoneTVstationinPeruthatMontesinoshadfailed tobuyoffacablestationinLimathatMontesinoshad thoughtwaspoliticallyirrelevant.Thatstationstarted broadcastingoverandovervideoclipsofMontesinosbribing politicians,judges,andothers.Atthatpointthegovernment, despiteallitsbribes,couldntmaintainitsholdonpower.

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Soitseemsthatafreepress,aswellascivilsocietyNGOs thatperformsimilarwatchdogfunctions,canbepowerfuland perhapsindispensibleforcesinthefightagainstcorruption. That,inturn,meansthatlawsthataffectpressfreedomand freedomofinformation,suchasdefamationlawsand governmentsecrecylaws,canbequiteimportanttothe struggleagainstcorruption,eveniftheselegalissuesarenot aboutcorruptionperse.Lawsthatfacilitatethefreeflowof informationcansometimesconflictwiththosethatmakeit unlawfultospeakorwritecriticallyaboutgovernmentofficials, ortorevealinformationabouthowthegovernmentoperates. Whiledefamationandgovernmentsecretslawsserve importantends,concernsaboutcorruptionhaveledmany governmentstorethinkwhethertheirapproachtoprotecting publicofficialsfromdefamationandtomaintaininglegitimate secrecyneedsrevisiontoreflectthepublicinterestin combatingcorruption. Theroleofthemediaandexternalmonitoringinturn implicatesamoregeneralsetofquestionsquestionconcerning thecomplicatedandnotespeciallywellunderstood relationshipbetweenpubliccorruptionandpolitical democracy. Aswithpressfreedom,whenonelooksacrosscountries, thereseemstobearoughnegativecorrelationbetweenthe
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degreetowhichcountriesaredemocraticandthelevelof perceivedcorruption.Inotherwords,onaveragecountries thatareratedbyvariousNGOsasmoredemocraticalsotendto havelowerlevelsofcorruption.Countriesthatareless democratictendtohavemorecorruption. Theideathatpoliticaldemocracymightbeaneffective constraintonofficialcorruptionhasalonghistory,andis animatedbyasimplelogic:AsLordActonfamouslyremarked, Powertendstocorrupt,andabsolutepowercorrupts absolutely.Politicaldemocracyisacheckonthepowerof governmentofficials:Thevoters,ifdissatisfied,canthrowthe rascalsout.Inotherwords,ifvotersdislikecorruption,orif corruptiontendstoleadtobadoutcomesformostpeople,they canexpresstheirdispleasureattheballotbox.Thisbothallows voterstochoosebetterrepresentatives,andcreatesathreat thatdetersincumbentsfromabusingtheirpositionsofpower. Forthisreason,manytheoristshavearguedthat democratization,inadditiontoitsothereffects,maybea potentanticorruptionmechanism. TheChineseprotesterswhooccupiedTiananmenSquarein 1989certainlythoughtso.Thoseprotestsareremembered, particularlyintheWest,asprodemocracyprotestswhich theywere.Butwhatissometimesforgottenisthatthey startedoutasanticorruptionprotests.Theyevolvedintopro
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democracyprotestsduetothebeliefthatsomeformof democratizationwasthebestway,orperhapstheonlyway,to combattherampantofficialcorruptionthataccompanied Chinaseconomicreforms.Thetragicoutcomeofthe TiananmenprotestsmeansthatmostChinesecitizensdont makethisargumentpubliclyanymore,butIknowfirsthand thatmanyofthemstillbelieveittobetrue. Morerecently,manyoftheprodemocracyproteststhat emergedoverthelastyearintheMiddleEastthesocalled ArabSpringemergedinlargepartfromdisgustwiththe rampantcorruptionoftheincumbentgovernments.Thesepro democracyprotests,liketheTiananmendemonstrations,were alsoanticorruptionprotests.Sotheideathatdemocracyisa potentialantidotetocorruptionhaswidespreadappealand potentiallyenormousconsequences. Thatsaid,therelationshipbetweendemocracyand corruptionisquiteabitmorecomplicatedthanthesimplestory Isketchedabovewouldsuggest.Theevidenceisalsomore mixed. Whilethereisindeedanegativecorrelationbetween democracyandcorruption,withmoredemocraticcountries tendingtobelesscorrupt,itsnotatallhardtothinkof countriesthatdontfitthisgeneralpattern.Indiaistheworlds largestdemocracy,anditalsosuffersfromaseverecorruption
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epidemic.Singapore,whichhasbeenadefactooneparty stateformostofitshistory,isoneofthebiganticorruption successstories.Andinsomecountries,likeRussiaand Indonesia,thereisevidencethatthecorruptionproblemgot worseafter,andarguablybecauseof,democratization. Thatlastobservationhighlightsafeatureofthecross countrydatathatcangetlostifonelooksonlyattheoverall correlationbetweendemocracyandcorruption.Althoughthe overallcorrelationisnegative,thedataactuallyrevealakindof invertedUshape:asonemovesfromundemocraticcountries tomoredemocraticcountries,thelevelofcorruptionfirstrises andthenfalls.Corruption,thatis,tendstobehigherinnewer orlessconsolidateddemocracies,orincountriesthatarepartly butnotfullydemocratic,butcorruptionislowerinmore established,consolidateddemocracies. Moreover,thecrosscountrycomparisonsdonotreallytell usallthatmuchaboutwhetherorhowpoliticaldemocracy affectsthelevelofcorruption.Imentionedasimilarproblema fewmomentsagowithrespecttothenegativecorrelation betweenpressfreedomandcorruption.Therearesimplytoo manyothervariables,andtoomanycomplicatedpotential causallinksbetweenthem.Itsvirtuallyimpossible,incross countrycomparisons,toteaseoutthedegreetowhich

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democracyitself,asopposedtosomeotherfactororfactors, causescorruptiontodecrease. Thatsaid,thereissomemicrolevelevidencethatdemocratic accountability,whencoupledwithsufficienttransparencyand effortsbythemediaandcivilsocietygroupstomonitorand exposecorruption,doesseemtoconstrainotherwisecorrupt officials.Arangeofstudieswithinindividualcountriesseemto showthatcorruptionlevelsgodownwhenofficialsaremore concernedaboutreelection,andthatelectedofficialsareless likelytobereelectedwhentheyareperceivedasmorecorrupt. Thatevidence,then,seemstocorroboratethetraditionalstory. Ontheotherhand,thereisadarksidetodemocracy.Firstof all,innewdemocracies,ordemocracieswithoutstablepolitical competitionbetweenestablishedparties,politicaltime horizonscanberelativelyshort.Thatmeanstheresan incentiveforofficialsandpoliticianstotakeadvantageofa temporarypositionofpowerasmuchastheycan,whilethey can.Thistendstoencouragegreatercorruption,anditmay provideanexplanationfortheinvertedUshapeofthecross countrydata.Italsosuggeststheimportanceofdeveloping strong,stablepoliticalparties,builtaroundpolicyplatforms ratherthanindividualpersonalities. Furthermore,elections,particularlymodernelections,canbe incrediblyexpensive,andtheneedforpoliticalpartiestoraise
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thecashtowinelectionscanbecomeamajormotivationfor corruptactivity.IntheUnitedStates,manycriticshaveargued thatwhathasemergedintheU.S.isaformoflegalized corruption,intheformoftheexchangeofcampaigndonations forpoliticalfavors.Ofcourse,theresplentyofsimpleold fashionedillegalcorruptionintheUnitedStatesaswell.But whethertheexchangeofcampaigndonationsforfavorable treatmentisnominallylegalorillegal,itisahugeproblem. Furthermore,electoraldemocracyalsocreatespressureto rewardsupporters,oftenwithprominentofficialpositions, whichmaythemselvesbevaluedpreciselybecausetheycanbe asourceoflucrativecorruptrents. Anothersignificantformofcorruptionassociatedwith democraticelectionsisvotebuying,inwhichitisthepolitician doingthebribing,ratherthanreceivingthebribe.Votebuying inmanycountriesisarampantproblemthatisnotonlyitselfa formofcorruption,butonethatmakesdemocracyless effectiveinconstrainingotherformsofcorruption. Sopoliticaldemocracy,andthepressuresofelectoral competition,canbebothacauseofandacureforofficial corruption,dependingonhowthedemocraticsystemis structured.Overall,theevidencedoessuggestthat democratizationseemstobeanimportantfeatureofalong termanticorruptionstrategy.Atthesametime,the
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relationshipiscomplicated,andfeaturesofthedemocratic system,suchastheelectoralsystem,thepartysystem,andthe rulesoncampaignfinance,maythemselveshaveimportant implicationsforanticorruption,eveniftheselegaland institutionalfeaturesarenotusuallyconceivedashavingtodo withcorruptionspecifically. Whilewereonthesubjectoftherelationshipbetween democracyandcorruption,letmetouchonanotherconcern, particularlyinsocietiesthataredemocratic,thathastodowith thepoliticalindependenceandaccountabilityofanticorruption lawenforcementefforts. Oneunfortunatefactisthatalthoughaggressiveanti corruptionenforcementcanbequiteeffective,itcanalso becomequitepoliticized.Particularlyincountrieswithdeep politicaldivisionswherecorruptionispervasive,corruption investigationsandprosecutionscanbecomeatoolwhereby onepartyorfactionharassesitsopponents.Sometimesthis happensonalargescale:Therearenumerouscasesinwhicha victoriouspoliticalparty,havingwrestedpowerfromits opponents,initiatesananticorruptioncrackdownthatquickly becomesapoliticalpurgetheopposition.Thiscandegenerate intoadestructivecycle,particularlyiftheformeropposition partyeventuallymanagestotakecontrolandthenunleashes

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itsownwaveofpoliticallymotivatedanticorruption prosecutionsinretaliation. Evenwhenthingsdontgetquitethatbad,thereisplentyof evidencethatanticorruptioneffortscanbecomepoliticized, bothinthesensethatlawenforcersmaygoeasyontheparty currentlyinpower,andinthesensethatanticorruption enforcersmaybemoreaggressiveagainstopponentsofthe rulingparty.Thiscanoccureveninmaturedemocracies. RecentevidencefromtheUnitedStatesindicatesthatthe federalgovernmenttendstomoreaggressivelyinvestigateand prosecutecorruptionallegationsagainstmembersofthe oppositionparty. Therealorperceivedpoliticizationofanticorruptionefforts hasanumberofundesirableconsequences.Thefirstandmost obviousisthesimpleunfairnessofselectingtargetsonthe basisoffactorsotherthantheseriousnessofthecorruption involved. Itsclearlyaproblemwhentheanticorruptionenforcersgo easyon,orcompletelyignore,corruptionbythegovernmentin poweroritsallies.Thatsafamiliarconcerninvirtuallyevery countrythathasstruggledwithhighlevelpoliticalcorruption. Itsalsoaproblemwhenanticorruptionenforcersgoafter politicalopponentsformarginal,orevennonexistent, infractions.
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Politicizationofanticorruptioneffortscanalsohavefar reachingdeleteriouseffectsonanticorruptionnormsmore generally.AsInotedearlier,effectiveanticorruptionefforts dependnotonlyonadirectdeterrenteffectbutalsoonthe cultivationofstrongsocialnormsagainstcorruptionasense thatcorruptioniswrong,andthatpunishmentsforcorrupt activityarefairandlegitimate.Realorperceivedpoliticization ofanticorruptionenforcementunderminesthoseperceptions. Onenaturalwaytoaddressconcernsaboutexcessive politicizationofanticorruptionenforcementistoinsulatethe mainanticorruptionagenciesfromdirectcontrolbythe government.Thatis,onemightwanttoensurethepolitical independenceoftheanticorruptionenforcementapparatus. And,indeed,thisiswhatmanycountrieshavetriedtodo. Thereare,however,somedifficultieswithcreating independentanticorruptionagencies. First,itsnotentirelyclearhowtomakesuchagenciestruly independent.Legalorofficialindependenceisnotthesameas trueindependence.Forananticorruptionagencytohaveboth trueindependenceandrealauthority,powerfulpolitical factionsincludingthosethatmightbenefitfromcorruption, orfromusinganticorruptionasatooltoharasstheir opponentsmustbewillingtocommittotheindependenceof

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theanticorruptionagency.Itsnotclearhowtoachievethis, however. Second,theremaybeatradeoffbetweenananticorruption agencysindependenceandtheamountoffinancialand politicalsupportforthatagency.Aseveryoneinthisroomis wellaware,oneofthebiggestchallengesfacinganticorruption agenciesaroundtheworldisalackofresources.Another challengeisalackofcooperationfromotherdivisionsinthe government.Anindependentandinsulatedanticorruption agencymaysometimesfindthesechallengesevenmore daunting.Thereasonisthatpoliticianstendtospendmoney whentheycanalsoexerciseinfluence.Iftheycantexercise anyinfluence,theymaybestingywiththeirfinancialsupport, andotherformsofsupportaswell. Third,andperhapsmostimportantly,makinganticorruption agenciesindependentofelectedgovernmentofficialshascosts aswellasbenefits.Decisionsaboutanticorruptionpolicyare oftenthemselvespoliticaldecisions.Notpoliticalinacrude partisansense,butpoliticalinthesensethattheyinvolvebasic strategicandvaluechoices,aboutwhichreasonablepeople mightdisagree.Inademocracy,itsdangerous,bothin principleandinpractice,totrytoremovefundamentally politicaldecisionsentirelyfromthepoliticalprocess.

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Iwanttoemphasizethis,becausetheresacommonidea, particularlyamongexpertsinsomefield,thatifonlywecould takethisissueawayfromthepoliticiansandgiveittothe experts(thatis,tousortopeoplelikeus),wedbeabletosolve theproblem.Butthatsoftenanillusion.Yes,thereare technicalaspectsofanticorruptionpolicythatarebestleftto theexperts.Andyes,excessivepoliticizationofanticorruption canhavedevastatingeffects,renderinganticorruptionefforts ineffective,orevencounterproductive.Yetwealsovalue,or shouldvalue,politicalaccountabilityandpoliticalsustainability. Ourfrustrationwiththepoliticalprocessandourlegitimate concernsaboutthepoliticizationofanticorruption enforcementsometimesleadsustotrytoplaceanticorruption policyoutsideofpolitics,orabovepolitics.Butanticorruption effortsmustworkthroughthepoliticalprocess,andwiththe politicalprocess,iftheyaretobeeffectiveinthelongterm. Theycannotbeentirelyaboveoroutsideit. Thatsaid,somedegreeofinsulationforanticorruption enforcersislikelynecessary.So,oneofthebigchallengesin designingeffectiveanticorruptionagenciesisstrikingtheright balancebetweenpoliticalindependenceandpolitical accountability.Theresnosimpleformulaoreasyanswer,but thisisoneareathatneedsmoreattentionthanithasreceived.

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Sofar,Ivebeenfocusinginmyremarksonvariouswayswe mighttrytocombatcorruptionbyinvestigating,exposing,and punishingit.Butanothervitalelementofanyanticorruption strategyistoreducethemotivationsandincentivesfor corruptionthatmayexistwithingovernmentorganizations. Inthisregard,itsworthkeepinginmindthatinsome circumstances,pervasivecorruptionistheconsequenceoflaws andrulesthatarethemselvesinefficient,orelseofsufficiently lowvaluethatthegovernmentwouldnotreallybewillingto bearthecostsofenforcingthemconsistently. Inthesecases,theinefficiencyoftherulescreatesan overwhelmingpressurefindwaysaroundthem.Furthermore, informalnormativeconstraintsonviolatingsuchrulesare relativelyweakbecausetherulesthemselvesmaybeperceived asarbitraryandillegitimate.Theresultisthataninformal systemofcorruptiondevelops,inwhichpartiesbargainaround therules,essentiallysubstitutingashadowmarketsystemfor theinefficientnonmarketsystemestablishedbytheofficial rules.So,althoughinsomecircumstancescorruptionisitself themainproblem,sometimescorruptionismorelikea symptomofadifferentproblemthecorruptionisthefever, butthebadrulesaretheunderlyinginfection. Itwasthispossibilitythatledsomeprominentscholarsinthe 1960sand1970stoconcludethatcorruptionwasnotonlynot
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bad,butwasaffirmativelygood,atleastforeconomic development.AsthedistinguishedpoliticalscientistSamuel Huntingtononcequipped:Intermsofeconomicgrowth,the onlythingworsethanasocietywitharigid,overcentralized, dishonestbureaucracyisonewitharigid,overcentralized, honestbureaucracy. Itsacleverquip,buttheevidenceisoverwhelmingthat Huntingtonwaswrongaboutcorruptionbeingagoodthing,for acoupleofreasons. First,hisargumentonlyholdsupifthegovernmentrulesin questionareinfactinefficient,tothepointthatanillicitmarket allocationsystemwouldbesuperior.Huntingtonsperception thatthiswasgenerallythecasemayhavebeeninfluencedby prominentexamples,liketheSovietUnionand1950sIndia, whereonecouldplausiblyarguethatsomeformsofcorruption wereindeedsociallyandeconomicallybeneficialwaysof evadingheavyhandedgovernmentregulation.Butitsnot generallytrue. Tothecontrary,thegovernmentrulescircumventedby corruptionareoftenincrediblyvaluable.Letmeoffertwo examples,bothinspiredbyrecentstudiesofcorruptionin Indonesia.Governmentlimitsonthemaximumweightof trucks,ifenforced,wouldpreservethelongtermconditionof Indonesiaspublicroads.Likewise,governmentlimitson
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timberextractionpreservethelongtermsustainabilityofthe countrysforests.Inbothcases,therestrictionscreate economicpressuresforcircumventionoftherulesviabribery, whichindeedoccursinIndonesiawithdepressingfrequency. Butitisnotbecausetheserulesareinefficientforsocietyin general.Rather,itisbecausetherulesimposecostson individualstruckersorloggerswhowanttogetaround them. ThesecondflawinHuntingtonsargument,originallypointed outbyGunnarMyrdalinhisclassicbook,TheAsianDrama,is thatthedynamicHuntingtondescribesinwhichpeoplewill paybribestogetaroundinefficientrulesinfactcreates perverseincentivesforpublicofficialstocreateandmaintain thoseinefficientrules,preciselysotheycanextractthebribe revenue.Inotherwords,itsnotjustthatinefficientrules causecorruption,butalsothatopportunitiesforcorruption causetheentrenchmentofinefficientrules. Still,theflawsinHuntingtonsanalysisshouldnotblindusto thekerneloftruthattheheartoftheargument:sometimes, theunderlyingsourceofcorruptionisthesubstanceoftherule itself.Asaresult,sometimesthebestwaytodealwiththe problemboththecorruptionproblemandtheunderlying inefficiencyistochangethesubstantivelaw.Doingsomay havecosts,particularlyiftherearesomebenefitsassociated
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withthelaw,butthosecostswouldhavetobeweighedagainst thecostsofcorruption. Arelatedpointherehastodowithbureaucratic organization,andinparticularthedegreetowhichdifferent sortsofgovernmentdecisionssuchasthedecisiontogranta licenseorpermitarecentralizedordecentralized.Certain formsofdecentralizationmayhelpamelioratecorruption, whileotherformsmayexacerbatecorruption. Toillustrate,thinkaboutasimplebaselinecaseinwhich theresonegovernmentofficialwhohasthepowertogranta licensetoengageinsomeactivity,suchasstartingabusinessor harvestingtimber.Thelawspecifiessomecriteriathatthe officialissupposedtoapply,buttheofficialmightdeviatefrom therulesinexchangeforabribe.Forexample,theremaybean applicantwhomeetsthelegalcriteriaforapermit,butthe officialmayrefusetoissuethepermitunlesstheapplicantpays abribe.Or,theremaybeanapplicantwhodoesntmeetthe legalcriteriaforapermit,buttheofficialofferstoissuethe permitanywayinexchangeforabribe. Thisisasimple,stylizedexampleofastandardcorruption problem.Butwhathappensiftherearetwoofficials,bothof whommustgivetheirapproval?Well,nowthereeffectively twomonopoliststwoofficialseachofwhomwilltakethe othersbehaviorasgiven.Economictheorypredictsinthiscase
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thateachapplicantwillhavetopayalargertotalbribetoget thepermit,thougheachindividualbribewillbesmaller,and therewillbefewerpermitsissuedintotal. Alternatively,wemightwanttothinkaboutwhathappensif wehavetwoofficials,eitherofwhomcangrantthepermit withouttheothersconsent.Inthiscase,economictheory predictsthatsolongastheofficialscannotcolludewithone another,bribeswillbelower,becausetheofficialswillcompete onthepricefortheillicitservice,andthetotalnumberof permitsissuedwillbelargerasthebribepricedrops. Whethertheseeffectsaregoodorbad,andwhichsortof systemwemightprefer,dependsonwhetherwethinkthe biggerproblemiseligibleapplicantsneedingtopayabribeto getsomethingtheyshouldhavegottenforfree,orineligible applicantspayingbribestogetsomethingtheyshouldntget. Ifweremoreworriedaboutofficialsdemandingbribesfor servicesorpermitstheyshouldbegranting,thencreating multiplecompetingbureaucraciesisagoodidea,butrequiring theapprovalofmultiplebureaucraciesisadisaster.Thisbasic findingisconsistentwithevidence,particularlyfromRussiaand anumberofLatinAmericancountries,thatcomplexprocedures forstartingorrunningabusiness,whichrequirethe independentapprovalofmultipleregulators,tendtodepress lawfulcommercialactivity,inpartbecauseofthenumberof
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bribesthathavetobepaid.Andthereissomesuggestive evidence,thoughhardlyconclusive,thatcompetitionbetween regulatoryjurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,China,and elsewhere,hasplayedapartinconstrainingbriberylevels,at leasttosomedegree. Ontheotherhand,ifthebigproblemisthatgovernment bureaucraciesareprovidingapprovalswhentheyshouldnt, thendrivingdownthesizeofbribes,whileincreasingthe overallnumberofbribesandunjustifiedapprovals,isabad thing.InIndonesia,forexample,whenanyofseveral bureaucratscanbebribedtoallowillegaltimberharvesting, totalillegalharvestinggoesup,aseachbureaucratiswillingto acceptasmallerbribe.Inthissortofsituation,paradoxically, wewouldbebetteroffifpeoplepaidhigherbribes,because theywouldpayfewerofthem. Anotheraspectofthesubstantivelawthatmayaffectthe extentofcorruptionhastodowithwhetherofficialshave broaddiscretioninmakingparticularkindsofdecisions,or whethertheirdecisionsarecoveredbystrict,relativelyrigid rules. Hereagain,therelationshiptocorruptioniscomplex.Onthe onehand,broadopenendeddiscretioncanbearecipefor rampantcorruption.Again,onethinksofLordActonsremark thatabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely.Hemmingin
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governmentdecisionmakerswithclearrulesmayhelpreinin corruption,inthatitiseasiertomonitorwhethertheseofficials areinfactfollowingtherules. Butrigidrulescansometimescontributetocorruptionas well.Thereareafewreasonsforthis. First,recallHuntingtonsobservationthatrigidrulescanbe inefficient,andcancreatepressuresforcircumvention.Ifthe applicationofarulewouldrequireagovernmentofficialtodo somethingthattheofficialherselfviewsassillyormisguided, shemaybemoresusceptibletopersuasiontodosomething elseifshecangetawaywithit. Rigidrulesmayalsoalterthekindofpersonwhobecomesa governmentofficial,attractingpeoplewhoarelessinvestedin themissionoftheorganization.Afterall,itsnotallthat satisfyingorinterestingtobeafunctionary.Itsmore rewardingtohavesomesayinhowthingsgetdone.Overly rigidrulescancontributetopublicservantsfrustrationand alienationwiththejob,whichinturncanfosteranattitude conducivetocorruption. ThatlastobservationrelatestooneothersuggestionIwant tomake.Ithinkweneedtopayrelativelymoreattentionto thepsychologyofcorruption.Letmesayabitmoreabout whatImean.
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Therearetwomainwaysthatmostacademicandpopular discoursedepictsthecorruptofficial.First,theresthe languageoftraditionalmoralism,inwhichcorruptindividuals areimmoralindividualsdishonest,scheming,andgreedy. Corruption,onthisaccount,isamoralfailing. Then,theresthelanguageofclassicaleconomics,inwhich corruptindividualsarerationalactorsrespondingtotangible materialincentives,primarilythesizeofabribe,theriskof gettingcaught,andtheexpectedpenalty. Neitheroftheseaccountsiswrong.Indeed,bothareclearly correct,asfarastheygo.Corruptionisbothamoralfailureand arationalresponsetoaparticularsetofincentives. Butneitheroftheseperspectives,atleastintheirtraditional form,issufficientlyattentivetowhatwemightthinkofasthe psychologyofcorruption. Mostpeopledontthinkofthemselvesasbadorcorrupt people.Mostpeopledontliketothinkofthemselvesasbador corruptpeople.Thereareexceptions,ofcourse.Somepeople stealbrazenlyandwithoutconscience.Butmostpeoplearent likethat. Forcorruptiontoreachepidemicproportions,asithasin manypartsoftheworld,itmustbethecasethatlargenumbers ofpeoplewhothinkofthemselvesasbasicallydecent,honest
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peopleandwhoprobablyare,inmostotherareasoftheir life,decent,honestpeopleareengaginginfundamentally dishonestconduct.Howdoesthathappen?Howdopeople rationalize,orjustifytothemselves,thissortofbehavior?How arepeoplesnaturalinhibitionsagainstdishonestbehavior eroded? Ithinkthatunderstandinghowthatpsychologicalprocess occursmaybequiteimportantindevelopinglongtermanti corruptionstrategies. Theressurprisinglylittleresearchonthistopic,butletme hazardafewconjecturesabouthowbasicallygoodpeoplecan becomecorrupt. First,asIvementionedseveraltimesoverthecourseofmy remarks,socialnormsagainstcorruptionmaybeprofoundly affectedbyperceptionsofwhatisnormaloraccepted.When weseerulesflagrantlyviolatedallthetime,welearntoaccept certainviolationsastolerated,andtoviewenforcementofthe ruleasbizarre,unexpected,andillegitimate. Totakeanexamplefrommyownexperience,thespeedlimit onmosthighwaysnearwhereIliveintheUnitedStatesis65 milesperhouronthehighway.Ineverdrive65milesperhour, andnooneelsedoeseither.Iusuallydrivearound7075.I dontthinkofmyselfasalawbreaker.Rather,theresatacit understandingthat65isntreallythespeedlimit,nomatter
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whatthesignssay.IfIweredriving70andacopweretopull meoverandgivemeaticket,Idprobablybereallymadatthe copforactingunreasonably. Isuspectsomethingsimilarhappenswithrespecttoofficial corruption.Insomecountries,eventherethoughthereare officialrulesthatsaynooneiseversupposedtotakebribes, virtuallyallgovernmentofficialssolicitandacceptillegal paymentsforallsortsofservices.Despitetheofficialrules againstbribery,thegovernmenttacitlyandhypocritically condonesthisbypayinglowsalariestocivilservants,withthe implicitbutobviousexpectationthattheyllmakeupthe differenceinillicitbribeincome.Itsnotsohardtoseehow peoplelivinginsuchcountriescouldstarttotreattherules againstpettycorruptionthewayItreattheofficialspeedlimit. Second,peoplemayrationalizecorruptbehaviorbynoting howtheyrebeingunfairlytreatedinsomeotherrespect.Ijust mentionedlowsalaries;thatsoneaspectofit.Whencivil servantsfeelthattheydontgetrespect,thattheirsuperiors dontcaremuchaboutthequalityoftheirwork,whentheyare frustratedintheirabilitytomakeapositivecontributionto society,whentheyfeelunderpaidandunderappreciated,they aremorelikelytoviewillicitincomeasakindofcompensatory entitlement.

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Third,thedegreeofcorruptioninanorganizationmaybe relatedtohowmuchthemembersoftheorganizationidentify withthemissionoftheorganization,andhowmuchthe organizationitselfseemstobeorganizedalongprofessional lines. Thisobservationrelatestoanimportantstrainincriminology researchoverthelastseveraldecadessometimesknownas BrokenWindowstheory,afterafamousarticlebyJames WilsonandGeorgeKelling.Therearemanystrandsofthe theory,buttheonethatismostrelevantforpresentpurposes goeslikethis:Theappearanceofdisorderinaneighborhood brokenwindows,graffiti,litter,publicdrunkenness,andso forthcanleadtomoreseriouscrime,becausetheappearance ofdisordersendsthesocialmessagethatnobodycaresmuch aboutthestateoftheneighborhood.Thecontroversial suggestionofthetheoryisthatcleaninguptheneighborhood fixingthebrokenwindowscanbeacriticalelementof combatingmoreseriouscrime,becauseitcreatesaperception oforderandcommunitycommitmenttotheneighborhood. Thetheoryiscontroversial,andIcertainlyamnotexpert enoughtoevaluateitfully,butwhatIwanttosuggestisthat thebasicidea,ifsound,mayhavesomeapplicationtocertain formsofbureaucraticcorruption.Thinkaboutagovernment office,suchasamotorvehicleregistry.Imaginethattheoffice
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isdirtyanduncomfortable,visitorscrowdtogetherratherthan standinginacue,officialsappearunkemptandrude.Now imagineasimilargovernmentofficethatperformsthesame function,butitlooksandfeelsdifferent.Theofficeiscleanand wellmaintained.Officialsaredressedincleanuniforms,and areprofessionalandcourteous.Peoplestandinline. Inwhichofficearepeoplemorelikelytooffer,or governmentofficialsmorelikelytorequest,smallbribe paymentstodeviatefromlegalpractices?Manypeople instinctivelyassumethatthissortofcorruptionismorelikelyin thefirstoffice. Wedonot,tomyknowledge,haveanyevidenceasto whetherthatisactuallythecase,orifitis,whetherthereisany causalrelationshipbetweentheseothersignsofdisorderand corruption.ButIwanttosuggestsucharelationshipisatleast plausible,becauseoftheideathatcommitmenttothemission ofanorganizationmayinhibitengaginginactivities,like corruption,thatunderminethatmission,andalsobecausea perceptionofprofessionalismmaydiscourageactivitiesseenas unprofessional,suchasofferingorsolicitingbribes. Again,thissuggeststhatacomprehensiveanticorruption strategymayinvolvemeasuresthatarenotnecessarilyabout corruptionassuch.Indeed,thisisoneofthemainmessagesI wanttoimpartinmyremarkstoday.Whetheritssomething
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big,likedemocratization,orsomethingsmall,likemaintaining normsofprofessionalism,allsortsofpolitical,institutional,and legaldecisionsmaybearontheextentortypeofcorrupt activitythattakesplace.Directanticorruptionisimportant andpotentiallyquiteeffective,asInotedearlierinmytalk,but theseotherelementsareimportantaswell. Ibeganthistalkbynotinganumberofreasonsthatwemight bepessimisticaboutcombatingpervasivecorruption.Such pervasivecorruptionmaygenerateanumberofviciouscircles, makingescapefromthecorruptiontrapseeminglyimpossible, oratleastextraordinarilyunlikely. Idliketoendmyremarkstodaybynotingtwothingsthat makemyhopefulabouttheprospectsformeaningfulprogress inthestruggleagainstrampantcorruption,despiteallofthe reasonsforpessimism:thehistoryofwarfareandthescience ofbumblebeeflight. First,astowarfare:Warusedtobeconsideredanatural, inevitable,evengloriouspartoflife.Statesmadewarthats whattheydid.Andtheykilledthousandsuponthousandsof peoplewhiledoingit.Acenturyortwoago,anyonewho suggestedthatwarmightbecomearareevent,viewedas illegitimateexceptinextremecircumstances,wouldprobably havebeenridiculedasastarryeyedoptimist.

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ButasStevenPinkerhasdocumentedinhisrecentbook,in factpreciselythishasoccurred.Dowestillhavewars?Yes,of coursewedo,andtheyarestillhorrible.Buttheirfrequency andcumulativeimpacthavedeclineddramaticallyina relativelyshorttime.Noonetodaydescribeswarasnormalor acceptable,letalonegloriousordesirable.Warisaproblemto becontained,notanormalandacceptedfactofeverydaylife. Perhapsaswithwar,sotoowithcorruption.Perhapsovera similartimeframesay,50to100yearswecanmake corruptionarareandillegitimatedeviationfromanormof integrity,muchasoffensivewarhasbecomearareand illegitimatedeviationfromanormofpeace.Eventosuggest thisistoinviteridiculeasastarryeyedoptimist,butPinkers accountofthehistoryofwargivesmesomehope. Now,astobumblebees:Inthe1930s,asthenewscienceof aerodynamicswasemerging,someofthepioneersofthis sciencemadearemarkableandtroublingdiscovery:Itwas impossibleforbumblebeestofly.Thiswasnotaproblemfor thebumblebees,whocontinuedtoflyastheyalwayshad.The problemwassimplythatthesciencehadnotyetbecome sophisticatedenoughtoaccountforbumblebeeflight.Today, ithas.Scientistsunderstandperfectlywellhowbeescanfly, butittookthemawhiletofigureitout.

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ThehopefullessonthatIdrawfromthisisthatwedont needtobetoopessimisticwhenoursocialscienceandpolicy analysistellusthataparticularproblem,suchaspervasive corruption,isimpossibletosolve.Maybeitsimpossible,but maybeourunderstandingjustisntgoodenoughyet. Thebigdifference,ofcourse,isthatthebumblebeesnever neededthescientiststohelpthemtofly.Thebeesweredoing justfineontheirown.Butfightingcorruptionisahuman enterprise,sotheneedtofigureouthowtosolvetheproblem ismuchgreater. Thisconferenceispartofthatenterprise.Imhonoredtobe apartofit,andImverymuchlookingforwardtolearningfrom allofyouoverthecourseofthenexttwodays. Thankyouverymuch.

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