Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3, After Communism: What? (Summer, 1994), pp. 1-19 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027248 . Accessed: 24/10/2011 17:48
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press and American Academy of Arts & Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Daedalus.
http://www.jstor.org
Tony Judt
Every epoch is a sphinx that plunges soon as its riddle has been solved.
as
?Heinrich
Postwar
Europe was
erected
upon
is not as cynical This forgetting. and helpful, there was appear; the myths were often positive to be forgotten, much that needed and the results, especially in the western were are such exer half of the continent, impressive. Nor cises in collective treaties Years self-construction which and ended ity. The Thirty necessarily the wars of foredoomed to futil the the Reformation, wars all depended
War, upon ambitious the past away and all of comparably in some measure; them succeeded their effects are with us still. But to the shape of twentieth-century for reasons peculiar the history settlement has proven peculiarly post-1945 illusory, something which was already clear in Eastern Europe by the early 1980s and which one. The has now to every have brought home subsequent developments of this essay is to try to understand the era which purpose in its historical context closed and to sketch an outline of terms in which the think of itself as it enters a new Europe might stage in its history. 1989 and
and distinctive
Judt
Remarque
Professor
of European
Tonyjudt
means, the memory of more than a decade of dictator
domestic
I and its
the resentments and injustices occasioned resolution; by of Versailles; the economic debacle of the interwar
tion and proof of the ultimate decline of European civilization. By May 1945 itwas not only Europe's great cities which lay buried in
it was the very spirit of the continent rubble, a new, to imagine To put all that behind, alone. Marshall, nationalization struction but itself. better Europe was a
myths
civil wars
governments postwar ries of fascist crimes sentiments politics consigned common jectives and since the
which had shaped European suspicions were late nineteenth denied century expression, were now plain and by to a past whose outcomes ugly consent The only acceptable collective ob unacceptable. national Europe were now social (in the form of egalit?r
in Western
itwas
resentments The bitter of the small characteristically expressed. or Saint served at Versailles countries of the region?inadequately or abandoned in the course of diplomatic truncated Germain, cases a competent thereafter, maneuverings lacking inmost political class, economic short on social recently benefits?were nal or the means to exploit them resources, or the means to express discontent, justice the chief victims of a war from which they would an obligatory (partially Here rationally, and most derive no
too potential civil or prewar were divisions snuffed out was a retribution it was mostly and where from above, applied more to ensure the firm implantation undertaken cynical business, than to root out those responsible of communist for authority place.
collaboration with
republican and others ters were represented ern Europe, change?geared institutions?but took The break of precedence. need for no
the Nazis
reasons, administrators, Italy, for analogous policemen, who had served the old regime and its foreign paymas often left in place, the reality of the continuity they overlain of renewal and by a myth as inWestern there was Europe, to redistribution, here, too, the such a radical production, foundation break with revolution. indeed and new myths In East real, radical international came first and
less than
the moment.3
a political InWestern
one?lay Europe
the past?a discursive in the special circumstances the whole process was driven
by a French search for security. After 1945 the French were doing what they had sought to achieve after 1918, but this timewith more
success. French After a series of false starts realized that policymakers to their own the existing Franco-German ing antagonism but in "Europeanizing" their problem: tage, incorporating its resources with and potential, into a European Germany, in the years from 1945 to 1947 their best hope lay not in pursu advan West com
munity where the Germans would be bound to the French and the
4
French dow ascribe
Tonyjudt
would cease countries to fear the Germans. was, such in this context, as Schumann to France's The addition little more of Italy and than a win sought In this, on At to the each
the Benelux
dimension
not wholly
illusory.
stage?in
project terms
or possibilities to it. To do less would purposes originally assigned an acknowledgment like failure, that "Europe" was have seemed interests of its members. and could only be the sum of the separate
Like a middleweight
the "European
idea" put
offered hope and prosperity to any and all states who qualified for inclusion. The reputation of the myth of "Europe" depended upon
it never being later) posed put to the test. The the resources inclusion of three poorer countries relied
from Southern Europe (Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal five
years threats bent were For the stretched of an entity which upon
steady economic growth and great collective wealth. After 1989 the
of communism exceeded the absor by the collapse at a time when Western its economies of Europe capacities no longer expanding. The myth burst. some time Western idea." have had their doubts about Europeans was happy to first postwar generation of their faith in the thirty-year miracle long The to share in the benefits children, of while so forth. Their "Euro-travel," dismissive of in the
"European in it, to put believe and sustained growth, "Euro-fashion," and in economic
national
inherit
faith
1960s they found it aesthetically unappealing and emotionally un satisfying; after 1973 (and especially since 1987) they find it deeply
unconvincing. currency, had begun the Despite impending all the chatter about a common 1992, removal of frontiers, from European and all that, a
5
even
and from to a
and distinctly "socialism." too, Here, dysfunctional myth, was a myth, a language, but itwas part of a strategy for "Europe" to Europe" from a hopeless past: Poland, escaping by "returning and their neighbors could not only over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, come economic retardation with help from Brussels, and Adenauer but could had of find
the strength to fight and defeat the forces of darkness in their own
national What illusions traditions?much we have seen as de Gaulle since 1989 sought these
their present dilemmas. The French would not be suffering the short
interest rates and the long term realiza of high German in which that their Europe, France was the primary beneficiary no longer exists; the Germans economic of German would strength, not be facing, for the first time since 1950, the prospect of a tion the and, with it, the need to rethink to being should attach degree importance they "Europeans" rather than Germans, given that the two may no longer be compat ible. This Franco-German dilemma has not only damaged the Euro seriously troubled economy of pean idea, inWestern merely it has revealed today it as vulnerable rings cynical, Europe naive.5 when and mythic. "Euro-talk" it does not sound term effects
Meanwhile, the alacrity with which Western Europeans (notably the French) backed away from their earlier enthusiasm for a liber
ated Eastern the former Europe has seriously communist lands who the position weakened of those in are pro-Europe. Since the European
Tony Judt
to admit Romania, countries or Slovenia) increased more a result, or like Hungary into its midst,
is in no hurry Community Poland (much less Lithuania, low-wage grant" tattered economies labor), in Prague, the
from
"immi little same
intellectual
dissidents
ideals
naive and out-of-touch with local seemingly for a foreign, of being accused spokesmen they to the needs is antagonistic of the interest which are to the Western in most community of Eastern Europe, is now but the affection only for
of the European idea, reduced now to pragmatic other postwar and administrative uniformity, practice economic miracle was have been shattered. The European on non-European labor. The (or at any "open door"
World War Iwas mistakenly supposed to sured postwar illusions. If war "to end allwars," World War II did indeed seem have been the
been just that, at least as far as Europe was of NATO, the creation of nuclear disaster, a to forever exclude seemed of Soviet power and the imposition to this to intra-European crises. Rare exceptions response military occasioned norm were either to domestic attributed by instability for many concerned. years The to have threat quasi-colonial crises (as in France or Greece), or to misapprehen
in of global (as in Hungary power come to blows over such traditional or ethnic territorial claims seemed do so in ways uncannily redolent of
have
to
the extent
which Europe has been unable to escape its past, but how hollow
of the continent's collective and for sustained the newly myths: action. We have not come clear that there them. That there was acquired capacity to an end of intra is little that a place ever any reason
it is now was
can do about
otherwise
a myth a time, from sustained during in fact, happily when Europe was, powerless, States or the Soviet Union was the the United by in international United "reunited" never being
* *
politics.8 The broader promises Nations' reiterated desires to see collective European to the test. action?
continent
and put
%
Perhaps
has taken sign that a profound telling change is the unsuitability, the irrelevance of many of years to make sense of description conventionally employed
affairs. It no longer makes any sense to describe European someone as a "socialist," in Eastern Europe for example; the term
is heavily polluted
countries undergoing
and political still operate under that label, parties who nor their audience attach any historical they significance
to the word. The Labour Party in Britain is struggling to free itself from an association with labor, though to date it has lacked the courage of the Italian Communists who, like the Italian Christian
Democrats, associations. But very terms have changed than and their name in an effort In Eastern what to erase past the did,
it ismore "Left"
8
and nents
Tonyjudt
seen by their oppo under those who them are often operate as and even by their own electorate somewhere else belonging on the spectrum. The older usage of and "Westernizer" "Populist" or Slovakia in places to capture the historical like Hungary cleavage between national conservatives no and urban-liberal modernizers lines are as blurred by conservative parties as they are for Euro-membership by former religious, provincial, and neo-Slavophile
sense?the longer makes with rural roots pressing communists trading on prejudices. This problem
acute in Eastern Europe, is especially where for nearly fifty years collective national in large identity was measure determined the nature of one's relations with the Soviet by Union: how friendly and if they were punctuated they were, when revolts and with what in matters of autonomy outcome, by degrees of categories of religion, economic policy, and foreign relations, etc. Since 1989
all that is gone (and consigned to a limbo between history and memory whence itwill only be retrieved with difficulty). In a region
whose it is past offers no clear social or political descriptors to erase from to the the public record any reference tempting communist it were but an unhappy and transient era, as though as a source its place we find an older past substituted interlude?in recent and reference. 1939 had This is deeply misleading. In Eastern inWestern in Europe, important something happened to 1989; to explain or Serb the Czech-Slovak as "timeless as though historical the antagonisms"
identity as Europe,
of
to get its revenge the upon just been waiting as attributing is as meaningless interlude the resur illusory postwar to some extra-historical in Germany skinheads gence of neo-Nazi of "Germanness" inclination could past. as a mere to treat post-1989 revival of Europe sense if one satisfactorily demonstrated only make reaching deep into the unresolved
of little use; they are are, as I have suggested, now closed, era which has and their current part of the vacuum. to the present Where the points political languages, the past, however distorted, is all that
in the name ideas and people of Instead of mobilizing to come, national and ethnic leaders invoke times past. things is that Reactionaries has changed always did this, of course. What own now its terrain both "reaction" and that of the occupies erstwhile Croatia.9 In the matter of defunct eras we are dealing today not only with radicals. This is as true for France as it is for Slovakia and
1945-1989
1917-1989.
or of Hitler, under the sign of the Holocaust, does recently operated or precisely not sufficiently came apart in 1989. For what explain after 1945, both parts of Europe (communist, just as for Europe the crucial reference was Lenin's and liberal) before 1939, fascist, Revolution. our This was the event which new but also gave century tion of revolution. Because 1917 the prospect action and in our not only shaped geopolitics in to the nineteenth-century life tradi in St. Petersburg of what in happened of revolution made sense as an and
life and
the communist
and provided eschatology at least until 1968, with a shared language, however distorted. them, Without that language and that reference is no radical project there in European political thought, and its absence has shaken European
most
into national
their ambitions kinds, or else had moderated the mainstream of liberal politics in fact if not in name.
center engendered by the shift of the revolutionary to Frankfurt was overcome and thence to Moscow by nineteenth-century claims would association of revolutionary legitimized.
10
If we
Tonyjudt
have reached then we the end of the revolutionary sense in an important have era set in motion also closed the era
by Lenin, come as no
in France who have been proclaiming surprise to many some time now; but whereas the end of this epoch for their claims in France, rested on domestic transformations the termi including decline firmed on
nal
own Communist of France's Party, they are now con a pan-European scale by the collapse of the Bolshevik incarnation of the European the institutional regime, revolutionary are startling in that both the language The implications and epoch. life rest squarely upon the terms of European the projects political
of reference in which
hitherto features been of Left
has
more without the signif importantly, to "1789," the building blocks of European polit of the revolutionary the other great heritage ical liberalism, era, lose theorists and philoso their form. It is for this reason that political icance accorded in Hungary, France, Poland, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in recent years been turning to the somewhat different Anglo to see what might American of liberal political be tradition thought stem. on to the faltering continental grafted phers have Revolutions, Events since of of course, 1989 are not suggest nation-state. The demise the nineteenth-century in recent decades, too hastily announced the presumptive state was outcome of Eurofication and the successful of a globalized economy at least against would the Western Maastricht half and of the continent. the postcommunist an altogether suggest after the If anything, backlash too the reaction in the East that another the only mileposts era is coming of the past. to a close, that of the nation
a reference, the distinctive as they are already to do blur, beginning of revolution, the eschatology "social
of presence healthy are German the rise unification, all, and the of Czechoslovakia breakup
if not the
revivals? national of rampant it confuses is misleading national because evidence identity nation-states of the last cen The European the nation-state.10 with of an the successful expansion tury came into being either through state into linguistically contiguous territory, dynastic early-modern
11
or else through of an old empire?or the breakup both, as in the case of Germany formed and Italy. Whether (i.e., Greece, early and Italy) or in the last bout of state construction Serbia, Belgium, after World via, War the Baltic I (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Austria, were states, etc.) these countries Poland, Yugosla never ethnically, so in the of them became
postwar popula the point that such states were, underscored shifts. This merely of Great Power diplomacy in almost every case, the products (or its are now breaking are the states which The new These up. failure). is consistent. From Spain to Bel fault lines vary, but the pattern from Italy to Yugoslavia, from Czechoslovakia to the United into re the sedi
gium,
states are dividing case), European (a marginal Kingdom of Europe, itself settlement The nineteenth-century gions. ment is cracking.11 of shifting imperial plates, The era to which these events signal an end is the one
that began
in 1848, following the failure of the revolutions of that year. From then until 1945 nationalism and industrial progress substituted for
revolution nationalist nation-states conflict and social transformation and sentiment did not of the new the ultimate of Europe. That of European configurations account for the domestic helps across much
Polish, Hungarian, from the perceived inadequacy of unwanted minorities presence II and the enforced settlement disputes, but also contributed of the newer
always match states and their angry quarrels with neighbors? and Italian nationalism took their cue German, of that within area and the their geographical their territory. World War followed put an end to such of the undermining Soviet internation
to a radical states?between
Once
of Europe their raison d'?tre seemed elusive. to pursue case to take in the Western their own ends?or free of a transnational of the promise advantage Europe?Slovenians, accept restrictive Flemings, the terms than Lombards, of earlier and Catalans settlements which saw no good reason to now seemed more
Croats,
Another century
liberating. of thinking about the collapse of the nineteenth way to have ended settlement the nineteenth (here taking century
with the defeat of the Central Powers in 1989) is to note the alacrity with which the intelligentsia of much of the continent has thrown in its lotwith the notion of extraterritorial identity. Until 1919, the
12
Tonyjudt
intellectual" An was almost unheard of and some intellectual theorist the was, almost by definition, of a nation the case of new (in a political or cultural a stream within In the most were extreme cases (i.e., the or the nation; or nobility
representative, spokesman, or aspirant or of nations) nation (as in the French case). Czechs while tion. From not or the Croats) peasants Intellectuals lacked the
intellectuals collective
national great
intellectuals international
concerned
Jaur?s were
reputation.
After 1919, and with growing effect after 1945, intellectuals were
else attached themselves (as in disastrously or Romania) to an aggressively fascist aesthetic. France, Germany, for the sort of nationalism which The European idea, as a substitute internationalized?or was thought to have produced 1914 and its heritage, acquired a
intellectual was, the progressive, after 1945, replaced by of course, defunct socialist, or communist vision was necessarily intellectual whose nonnational, the more lectuals so because were spent exiles abroad so many Eastern and Central European in their own home lands, often returning as refugees authoritarianism from domestic in Eastern critics of took on Europe the Soviet-imposed and a new regime and intel after and
In Eastern
the nationalist
13
history.
intellectuals men
interest argument to deny the very real presence of "nation or Serbia, apologists inHungary for the retrench
constrained
intellectual II.Most of
community
crisis, may despair For this reason experiencing began or 1789. We 1815, European proposition. life cultural critical French sensibilities Industrial political
intellectuals, but it is all they have. "Europe" crisis we it may be that the era whose not are in 1945, nor in one in 1917, nor even special sense, surface this may of with
living, On the Enlightenment. is still a continent After all, Europe by we the dream associate
Revolutions?
in the century between the British and the if you like, between and the the Scientific or, to the extent that the characteristic Indeed, Enlightenment more than was ever enlightened des
potism?of
and Louis
in the glow of the is "Brussels," idea. What after all, if not a renewal of Enlightenment the goal of efficient universal shorn of particularisms administration, and driven by rational calculation and the rule of law, which the great eighteenth-century monarchs strove unsuccessfully to institute
14
Tonyjudt
sees in Brussels an escape which from hidebound intelligentsia as eighteenth-century and particularisms, much practices lawyers, over to enlightened monarchs the and writers traders, appealed sense the and diets. In this limited heads of reactionary parliaments
European Enlightenment
Delors.
the lessons
we should not premises of social and political modernity?though too hastily dismiss the notion that there are influential thinkers in
Europe do today who would in the air and Enlightenment important. is the crisis of the European obvious these the most Among In a functional This may be read in two ways: intellectuals. sense, are redundant to be so. In Eastern and feel themselves intellectuals just that. But its symptoms there are is a new counter
is at a low ebb; they are perceived influence their political Europe a reminder as culturally marginal of a time and an embarrassment, to associate with them did not wish of their audience when most of the dissident conscience with annoying prolongation most Hungarians, and others had, which Slovaks, Poles, Czechs, In their marginality little in common. and still have, they speak have lost their role as self neither for the state nor to it. They and the only role they for imprisoned peoples, spokesmen appointed ever truly had in Central and in societies where and Eastern Europe, there is no integrated subcommunity they are adrift. cosmopolitan an
or Hungarian have intellectuals Czech Today, speak to the world. no such base and thus speak to the world This is not from nowhere. or sustainable a comfortable pose. are also of Western In a similar sense, the intellectuals Europe adrift. In Paris, still the intellectual agonized role of debate heartland over is interminable, classic als. The there of the continent, the lost role of the intellectu intellectual, as a surrogate
the Western
authority for both the prince and the people, has been lost. The identity and importance of the state have been blurred by the
apparent Europeanizing of power and the privatizing of resources,
15
does not exist. Intellectuals Thatcher, "society" and write and make ethical pronouncements, may important speak no longer have a theory of but they themselves should why anyone listen to them.
This is the second element in the decline of the intellectuals. The Enlightenment bequeathed an ideal of knowledge, the belief that
the natural, realms was within social, and spiritual understanding the human grasp, and that those who grasped it?scientists, philos a special claim on the attention social theorists?had of ophers, control come under attack of European ling vision modernity?has from so many directions that we have forgotten how crucial it is. It has been condemned in itsMarxist form as a hubristic and danger ous assertion of human power; in its scientific form as a naive and no less dangerous of the mysteries of nature; in misunderstanding its economic form as a monstrous and self-destructive in confidence now rulers and the ruled alike. This fundamental notion?the
inheritance
is contradictory
Heideggerians
of discursive are no but their own arguments stepchild rationality, less steeped in post-Enlightenment assumptions; neo-Heideggerians of the Left an almost be a case in point) (Havel might express distaste for the political and economic mystical damage wrought by thoughtless, individual overconfident freedom but set against it ideals of modernity and civic values which took their modern form era.
over what its critics find unattractive exactly our world, and why, which to see at first makes it harder how much the common theme is one corrosive of the just since practiced society on rational discourse dismissive the least of whatever important Not many the eigh itself, al itmeans because people of are
under which we have assumptions teenth century. The direct attacks though they are the most obviously to be "enlightened," are probably their marginal and self-refuting
quality.13
16
listening
Tonyjudt
to the extreme Derridians, including Derrida himself. But
the broader, shallower claim that there is nothing big left to believe
is an illusion, and that that progress in, that ideals are a sham, is the only sustainable self-interest short-term (there private goal no public from the sphere of public has now moved ones) being man in the cant into that of cultural The free-thinking discourse. vision of the Enlightenment?still exists; that sphere?Kant's public to perform an intellectual his is. But for such a person is what sense of speaking in the Habermasian role?in crucial rationally a common must to a public share with his audience and sphere?he sense of what constitutes be an agreed There must epistemology. sense to it makes ends and for what collective rational projects pursue and them. Today is truly the European intellectual cannot credibly offer
was not the first to note, has more as Marx imagination History, in Europe will lead some is now happening than men. Whatever to make in this essay is that "somewhere" The point Iwish where. since from the Europe we have known look very different will It already will Yugoslavia 1945. is a fact; of Europe dislocation regional nor will never be the same again, Italy. The recent came very close to giving the Catalan nationalists elections Spanish to a veto they would have exercised a veto over national legislation, a near monopoly Such regionalization, of its resources. give Catalonia does. The
17
resentment in of nostalgic the politics juices, will further exacerbate the latter region. the end of This does not signal a return to the past. Between in historical per (itself now recognized, growth steady economic spective, as a moment to be repeated) and unlikely ideas alike, we can reasonably able future fortune and contingent of peculiar good and great the retreat of Great Powers for the foresee expect to experience and with in our it domestic era?human and convince and interna social
situation, with
post-Enlightenment mentary organs
ideas which
shaped
to that of the rudi is thus comparable Europe, wrote in the Origin Darwin of which of Species: still retained in the serve as
[they] may be compared with the letter in a word, spelling but become useless in the pronunciation, a clue in seeking for its derivation. At best
but which
will
at home and abroad, for social behavior, such guidelines as myths, as rule-utilitarian to be reconstructed premises in a world where most dismiss for human practice people would on stilts." This, however, as "nonsense ambitious anything more have fails to address authority codes enforce, and to what inheritance from the the question of authority. Who in Europe to intellectual, (moral, political) of collective behavior? Who, ends and with what limits? the Enlightenment?indeed less teach, in short, has power, is an unresolved This itwas the space opened today much has
18
Tonyjudt
of course, but and unpleasant for most experience. people
new for the old continent, is nothing it will come as a novel alive today
ENDNOTES *See Tony Judt, "The Past isAnother Country: Myth andMemory in Postwar Eu rope," Dcedalus 121 (4) (Fall 1992): 83-119. 2For the Italian case see themagisterial work of Claudio Pavone, Una Guerra Civile. Saggio storico sulla moralit? nella Resistenza (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992). 3Which is not to deny that many
changes, but to no effect.
4The relationship between France and the Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1949-1990 curiously echoes that between Austria and Prussia after the Congress
of Vienna. other Prussia the senior ically In both to participate could partner associate. of cases one and as both a resource partner, ostensibly a guarantee?in strengthen longer control the the Austrian to use the one, sought case by encouraging to dis Confederation?only senior the ambitions of its econom
in and no
cover, in the fullness of time, that the power relationship had reversed itself and
superior
and
the
In Eu
relevance united
or without.
ory was shared by Hitler and even by some of the intellectual critics of democracy of the 1930s. It has been revived by neo-fascists and "new Right" intellectuals in
Germany, 7At least Germany France, in those and Italy that in recent have years and their appears doors to to be thriving. and countries opened refugees?Austria
in particular. ex-colonies relative outside autonomy?but of Europe, where Britain or France or France, might which still un
precisely
as Britain
the point.
9A number of prominent
and Jean-Pierre Debray, tions of a sort of national
French left-wingers,
Chev?nement, republicanism, have quite
among
recently literally
them Max
taken
Gallo, R?gis
selling of Europe and the demise of an international radical project. 10Fora fuller discussion of this theme, see Tony Judt, "TheNew Old Nationalism," New York Review of Books, 26 May 1994.
nIn the case of Belgium, the national settlement is coming apart as a result of pres
are splitting
19
in so many of "Bel
their national
understanding
tendency to undermine them, while the opposite is typically true of ideological beliefs, for example. This is a truth, admittedly far from clear, at the heart of the Enlightenment enterprise." Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993), 216 n. 52.
14Witness the general reaction to the work of John Rawls, including his most recent
attempt to devise a theoretical basis for liberalism?that extent that it describes the sort of liberal societies where
Hence, import
air of even disembodied the best-informed too, the rather such Anglo-American into continental terrain. speculation