UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500
MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT
Docket Number(s): Caption [use short title]
Motion for:
Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:




MOVING PARTY: OPPOSING PARTY:
9 Plaintiff 9 Defendant
9 Appellant/Petitioner 9 Appellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY: OPPOSING ATTORNEY:
[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]




Court-Judge/Agency appealed from:
Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND
INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:
Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has request for relief been made below? 9 Yes 9 No
9 Yes 9 No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? 9 Yes 9 No
Requested return date and explanation of emergency:
Opposing counsels position on motion:
9 Unopposed 9 Opposed 9 Dont Know
Does opposing counsel intend to file a response:
9 Yes 9 No 9 Dont Know
Is oral argument on motion requested? 9 Yes 9 No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has argument date of appeal been set? 9 Yes 9 No If yes, enter date:__________________________________________________________
Signature of Moving Attorney:
___________________________________Date: ___________________ Service by: 9 CM/ECF 9 Other [Attach proof of service]

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion is GRANTED DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE OHAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court
Date: _____________________________________________ By: ________________________________________________
Form T-1080 (rev. 7-12)
11-1924
Additional 90 days for reconsideration motion
We wish to file motion for reconsideration and for a
Jury Trial on the merits. We were flooded out by
USA v Karron
superstorm Sandy and lost all work in progress. We
seek to solicit assistance of counsel. Brief appended.
Karron

USA

348 East Fulton Street

Michael Byars
86 Chambers Street
Long Beach, NY 11561 New York, NY 10003
Telephone (516) 515 1474 Telephone: 212 637 2793
e-mail : dbkarron@gmail.com e-mail: Michael.Byars@usdoj.gov
SDNY/Buchwald

pro se

/s/ D. B. Karron Nov. 13, 2012

A
Certificate of Service
Uu|Icd 'IaIco <oa|I o| Jppca|o

Daniel B. Karron,
Defendant-Appellant,

v.

United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellees.


I, D. B. Karron hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on April 12, 2012, I
served a copy of the Corrected Appeal Reply Brief by
___ United States Mail
___ Federal Express
___ Overnight Mail
___ Facsimile
_X_ E-mail to michael.byars@usdoj.gov
_X_ Hand delivery
on the following parties

For the United States of America
Michael J. Byars, Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York
86 Chambers Street, 3rd Floor, New York, New York 10007

Signed, November 13, 2012 in Long Beach, New York

/s/__________________________
D B. Karron,
pro se
348 East Fulton Street
Long Beach, NY 11561

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11-1924-civ

11-1924
To be argued by:
D. B. KARRON
Uu|Icd 'IaIco <oa|I o| Jppca|o
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Docket No. 11-1924



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANIEL B. KARRON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FOR Extension of
time for RECONSIDERATION










DANIEL B. KARRON
pro se
348 East Fulton Street
Long Beach, New York 11561
(516) 515- 1474
drdbkarron@gmail.com

1
Uu|Icd 'IaIco <oa|I o| Jppca|o
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Docket No. 11-1924

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANIEL B. KARRON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FOR Additional
time for RECONSIDERATION


Preliminary Statement
The Defendant-Appellant begs this honorable Courts for additional 90 days time with
which to make an argument for reconsideration of the fact in this courts adverse Summary Order
of Sept 26, 2012. The Defendant-Appellant requests this court to remand this case back to the
District court for a jury trial. The purpose of this jury trial is to decide the single matter of fact
the District Court summarily judged as a undefendable matter of collateral estoppel for which
there was no triable issues. This is incorrect prima facie these matters were not in evidence in
the prior criminal trial to be summarily decided or much less estopped as triable issues.
This additional time is required because of the extraordinary events of the past two weeks
with the inundation of the Defendant-Appellants home of Long Beach, New York in Super
storm Sandy. The computer were rescued but City of Long Beach was rendered uninhabitable,
with no water, sewerage, power for almost two weeks. The Defendant-Appellant has lost almost
everything again. The Defendant-Appellant has had to move in with her surviving computer
with a friend in Brooklyn but lost all works in progress at the time of the flood. This additional
time has not been previously requested. The Defendant-Appellant has been unable to access the
internet and cell phone service in Long Beach until today. The Defendant-Appellant is also
soliciting friend of the court opinions and reviewing legal issues central to the courts
reconsideration.


2
Proposed Argument
1

The Defendant-Appellant intends to bring to the Court attention for reconsideration this
fact
2
:
The only evidence exhibited that was not rejected to the Buchwald Court (The
Claim) presented by the Government Plaintiff was not in evidence at the
foundational criminal trial of the Patterson Court.
It is simple matter of record; it is a fact. It is easy enough for an independent
reviewer of facts to verify;
o the exhibits presented to the Buchwald court bore no Patterson court trial
exhibit identifiers or Bates Stamps.
o They were presented de-novo
o They were sworn too de-novo
o had this material been previously presented, it would have been noted in
the documentation, supporting declarations (affidavits in criminal
procedure, of which there were none), and touted by the Government in its
briefs. No mention of prior submission of any of these documents was
made by the Government.
o This material summarily held as clear evidence of a False Claim same
transaction under 31 U.S.C. 3731 (e) False claims procedure. As such it
was un-defendable and grounds for Summary Judgement.
o This is logically impossible because it was never in prior evidence.
o There can be no same transaction if the transaction was never in
evidence to have been decided, adjudicated, or facts found upon in a prior
finding of fact.
o Without a same transaction, there can be no False Claims Act liability by
estoppel.
o Without estoppel under 31 U.S.C. 3731 (e) Summary Judgment should
be voided and a new trial on the merits warranted
Significance to this case
What does this fact have to do with this case; and how, if this issue of fact were
considered, and not overlooked, it would change the outcome of this honorable courts decision?
The foundation evidence of the Buchwald Court decision to invoke estoppel and grant

1
The Defendant-Appellant made many supporting complex and detailed arguments that should go to a jury
for consideration not afforded by Summary Judgment; Only one point of fact and law is being proffered for
reconsideration by this court to establish the merit of this one argument of many others without surrendering
consideration on merit for on those other arguments.
2
With full references and documentation into the case record, statute and case law.

3
Summary Judgment was introduced de novo by the Government Plaintiff. It is new evidence.
These items of evidence, consisting of documents signed by Karron to support the governments
payment of funds from the US Treasury to CASI and indirectly, Karron were not in evidence at
the Criminal Trial.
Without the invocation of 31 U.S.C. 3731 (e) and Summary Judgment, this case should
have gone to a Jury Trial, for a full hearing on the volumes of exculpatory facts and law
crammed into the Defendant-Appellants Brief and Reply Brief.
It is our central contention of law that new evidence (The Claim) cannot be used to
support Collateral Estoppel. This is if it is not already in evidence in the prior Criminal trial and
part of a decided issue it cannot be a foundation for Collateral Estoppel.
3
<<Collateral Estoppel
treatise>>. The evidence cited at the Buchwald Courts opinion was not used as part of the prior
Patterson court adjudicated issue, or a adjudicated as fact by the prior Patterson court.
Therefore, it cannot be a foundation for estoppel by any stretch of legal interpretation.
Argument
Consider the reverse argument as a means to clarify the implication of this logic:
Had The Claim been directly, adjudicated at the prior criminal trial as false, then an
argument for estoppel would necessarily be automatically triggered as a matter of statute and
law.
Had The Claim been in evidence in the foundational criminal trial and
Had The Claim been adjudicated as a false transaction or claim on the U. S.
Treasury,
then the collateral civil attack citation of that evidence would be clearly sufficient
to invoke the statute 3731(e) estoppel (Statutory Collateral Estoppel)
The Claim same transaction evidence would have had to be something decided as false
in some fashion by the prior court decision.
Consider the following modification of the above obverse argument:
Even if The Claim had been in evidence and

3
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). To apply collateral estoppel, the following elements must be
established: (1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior
action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or
in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1198.

4
Had been peripherally or tenuously involved in the Criminal Trial Courts
justification for culpability
Then Statutory Collateral Estoppel could be triggered, no matter how distant or
tenuous the relationship with the guilty verdict and the trial courts finding of fact.
sina qui non conditions for estoppel
The Buchwald Court grant of a Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff-Appellee was based
on Collateral Estoppel. The False Claims Act 3731(e). False claims procedure spells out two
sina qui non conditions for a judgment estopping defense: Both of which must be true in order
for the axe to of Summary Judgment to fall (and condition):


5

(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or the Federal Rules of Evidence, a final judgment rendered in favor of the United States in any
criminal proceeding charging fraud or false statements, whether upon a verdict after trial or upon
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, shall estop the defendant from denying the
[1] essential elements of the offense in any action
[2] which involves the same transaction as in the criminal proceeding and
[3] which is brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730.
[ 3731(e) enumeration inserted]
The defendant appellants right to a trial to adjudicate the facts was abrogated by the
Buchwald Court decision to grant Summary Judgment to the Government.
Question of Law: Are 3731(e) clauses 1,2,3 are dependent and or independent or
related, or a combination of both or and and ?
The other foundation on which the Buchwald Court sustained the Governments Motion
for Summary Judgment was the Courts sui generis invocation of Same Facts. This Same Facts
issue seems to be construed from clause item [1] in 3731(e) paragraph.
Distinguishing United States ex rel Feldman v. Van Gorp
In United States ex rel Feldman v. Van Gorp, at the District Court trial the defendant
admitted making misstatements on its quarterly technical report forms. These points of evidence
were admitted to and in evidence in the prior civil trial. van Gorp admitted and the court
accepted that van Gorp had not not providing minimal number of AIDs neuropsychiatric
patients for its fellowship training program<<CITATION>>, and then misstating to the
government that it had the required type of AIDS patients that in fact Van Gorp had not done so.
Citations to follow.
This court rejected this argument in that case. That is not the argument made in this case
at all.


6
Issue Presented for Reconsideration
Can Summary Judgment under FRCP and FCA be sustained under Statutory Estoppel
without the identification of a prior courts finding of a proven false transaction claim on the US
Treasury?
Standard of Review for Reconsideration
The standard for granting motions for reconsideration is strict; motions for
reconsideration "will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court."
4
Motions for
reconsideration will not be granted where the party merely seeks to relitigate an issue that
has already been decided.
5
The three major grounds for granting a motion for
reconsideration in the Second Circuit are:
(1) an intervening change of controlling law,
(2) the availability of new evidence, or
(3) the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
6

7


The matter of The Claim not being in evidence in the prior criminal trial is
a manifest matter of record. If it is not in prior evidence, introducing The Claim at
the Buchwald Court as a matter of summary judgment without a trial and
precluding any defense under 31 U.S.C. 3731 (e) Estoppel is a manifest
injustice.
Conclusion
False Claim Act culpability requires, at the very least, one specific claim on the treasury
of the U.S. that is proven false
8
, and that the person who presented that claim
9
knew it is false.
10

If no specific false claim can be identified, there is no culpability. The Patterson Court only

4
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
5
Id.
6
Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing 18 Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure 4478).
7
Reconsideration Motions Second Circuit Standards; From Bank of New York v. Bell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3850 (D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2011): http://www.josephnyc.com/blog/?blogID=1589
8
A-480, Karron Oral Argument at 3, Line 12
9
31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1) (2000). False Claims Liability
10
31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(1) (2000). False Claims definitions knowing and knowingly

7
looked at Check and American Express Credit Card disbursements.
11
The Buchwald Court only
admitted The Claim on the U. S. Treasury. There are no common elements or exhibits
between The Claim and the Patterson Court findings.
12
If this Court finds no common basis
between culpable checks and credit card receipts made with funds from The Claim, this
judgment must be vacated.
Signature

D. B. Karron, pro se
Dated: November 13, 2012 in Long Beach, New York

11
A-70, A-361 footnote
12
A-492, Karron Oral Argument at 15, Line 17 et seq.