Wesleyan University

Towards an Integrated Model of Historical Explanation Author(s): Jerzy Topolski Source: History and Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Oct., 1991), pp. 324-338 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505561 Accessed: 08/12/2008 20:10
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wesleyan University and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History and Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATEDMODEL OF HISTORICALEXPLANATION

JERZY TOPOLSKI

of As is well known, philosophers historyin the past thirtyyearshave increasingly turnedtheir attentionfrom the questionof explanation,conceivedin a The typicallytakesthe positivistmode, to that of narrative. praxisof historians form of narrative,and philosophicalreflectionon it openedmanynew lines of by whereasthe discussionof explanation coveringlaws appeared investigation, to be exhausted. of are Sincenarratives not, on theirface, explanations the classicaltype, there and betweennarrative explanation.I believethat is an apparentcontradiction there is no inevitableoppositionbetweenthem; but before I can substantiate that conviction, I must inquirewhy interestin historicalexplanationper se appearsto haveflagged.'It has not been merelya sui generisboredomwiththe topic. Discussionsof historicalexplanationhave sufferedfrom being isolated on of reflection the structure the past- the processof historyfromtheoretical and from analysisof the changingpraxisof historians.Reflectionon historical if can explanation be revitalized it is linkedto the theoryof the processof history and to the real problemsof historians' technique.
II

The covering-lawmodel of historicalexplanationdirectedattentiontowards that knowledgeof the processof history.It presumed there general(theoretical) facts in history;that is, one can only speak are no singularand unrepeatable about classesof facts, processes,actions, and so on. Marxisthistorians,used realities,give pride to construinghistoricalrealityas governedby "objective" of placeto explanationby laws, even if they recognizethat thereis a so-called

(Poznasi,1983) Knowledge] [Theory Historical of 1. Onthis see my Teoriawiedzyhistorycznej historic History](Warsaw,1978).A. A. van den Braembussche's [Understanding andRozumienie Method:Towardsa Theoryof the Historyof Explanationand Comparative recent"Historical Historyand Theory28 (1989), 1-24 raisesthe possibilityof a returnto the problemof Society," withouta repetitionof the old schemata. explanation

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF EXPLANATION

325

On subjectivefactorin history.2 the otherhand, most thinkerswho responded to the positionof Hempeland Popperdeniedthat coveringlaws, even if there and explanation; they emphawereany, couldprovidea modelfor all historical ontology. sizedthe roleof humangoalsandactions.Theirswasan intentionalist for are Thus,J. Kmita,whosearguments of essentialimportance us, claimsthat of (interpretation) humanactions(not only in the case of historical explanation of consistsof the reconstruction the goals of action, the knowledge research) at the disposalof the agents, and their systemof values.3
III

that the way historiansexplainthe past dependsmore or less It is self-evident that on directly howtheyunderstand pastin its mostgeneralshape.I havecalled that visionof the processof historythe ontologicalspaceof the historian;and consciousnessof the historian,informedby I havetermedthe methodological thatlinkthe elementsof the processof history,the spaces a senseof the relations Thus the ontologicalspaces of the historianconvincedof the of influences.4 vision of the world are filled with other of the psychoanalytical correctness contentsthan those which fill the spaces of the historianused to its Marxist In interpretation. the ontologicalspacesof some historiansthereis a place for whereasothersleavethat placefor the lawsof nature.Some DivineProvidence, willinglyrefer to Max Weber;others to Marx. For some historians,changes begin in the sphere of the economy; for others, in the sphere of culture or life, religion.Somearesatisfiedwiththe visionof the worldformedin everyday in in seminars,or in participation publiclife, whileotherswantto replacesuch common-senseideas of reality by a theory drawn from sociology, political economy, or some other discipline, or possibly by a theory constructedby themselves.5 Ontologicalspacesand spacesof influencedifferfrom one anotherin historians'consciousness.All historianshave such spaces at their disposal, even though theirvisions of the world may not be coherentor fully realized. in explanation whois interested historical Inviewof allthisthe methodologist has two possiblepaths to follow. One of them is to endeavorto reconstruct

Erklarungsprobleme Erklarungen: are 2. Exceptions H. P. Jaeck,"Geschichtswissenschaftliche in der Formierung Gesellschaft," Gesellschaftstheorie Theorieder historischen und die Marxsche ed. W. undgeschichtswissenschaftlicheErkldrung, Kittler(Berlin,1985),151-288andW. Wachter, in Erklarung," ibid., 107-150. der "ZurMethodologie historischen [Methodological humanistycznej 3. Cf. J. Kmita,Z metodologicznychproblem6w interpretacji (Warsaw,1971). Interpretation] Issuesin Humanistic of knowledge the rulesof the research reflects consciousness methodological 4. Thehistorian's beingapplied,and of why these and not otherrulesshouldbe applied.Cf. my Teoria procedure 19-51 and Rozumieniehistoric,57-75. wiedzyhistorycznej, of 5. J. Rutkowskiis a good exampleof an historianwho recognizedthe indispensability J. research J. Topolski, 0 nowy modelhistoric: Rutkowski,1886-1941[Warsaw, (see theoretical as a He 1986]). tried,amongmanyotherthings,to construct theoryof thefeudalsystem a foundation

326

JERZY TOPOLSKI

the modelsof explanationwhich are actuallyappliedby historians.These are generatedwithinthe historian'sgeneralconsciousnessof the world and issue in methodologicaldirectives-though the exact processby which this occurs practiceof the the remainsto be seen. The attemptto reconstruct explanatory historianis descriptivemethodology;if combinedwith proposals for better models, it becomesnormativemethodology,the second possible explanatory path. It should be noted that these have often been confused. I would like to whichmightbe calledintegrated of proposea procedure historicalexplanation explanation;but first I shall analyze a sample of Europeanhistoricalworks from the secondhalf of the twentiethcenturyto see how these historianshave made portions of the past comprehensible-at least relativeto the cultural Onlyon thebasisof thisanalysisof actualhistorioof standards thesehistorians. graphicalproblemswill it be possible to link descriptiveand normativeapproaches.
IV

in onwardhaveusuallyexplained the process Historians fromthe ancientGreeks of narration.Narratives maybe seen as a continuum,fromthose almostpurely Annals (suchas Tacitus's concerned relatewhathappened how it happened to or to concerned establishwhy or Le Roy Ladurie's Montaillou)to those primarily
things happen (such as Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire or The

It Worldin Depression1929-1939by C. P. Kindleberger). mustbe emphasized that even those narrativeswithout an overt orientationtowards explanation have a more or less latent explanatorysense. The very descriptionof the sequenceof eventsor of humanmotivesis at the sametime an explanation,even of of thoughin the formof a by-product the description the past;and of course to explainone has to know exactlywhat is to be explained. Narrativeswhich show the way of life of a certainsociety, like Ladurie's connarratives-are not particularly Montaillou-let us term them structural with reconstructing course of events. Those which do report the cerned the courseof events, as in politicalhistories,we can call dynamic.These refer, in to an articulated manneror enthymematically, humanmotives, as both causes and effects. For example, a rise in pricesmay be the cause of dissatisfaction in who, to obtainan increase pay, organizea strike.Thisin turn amongworkers may give rise to a wave of strikes,causingfurtherpolitical changes. are Historicalnarratives full of such shorteror longerchainsof causesand such sequencesare narratives or effects,whetherintersecting not. In structural of lesserimportance,becausethe historiangraspscertaintypes of behavioror betweendyratherthan unique;but the difference action which are recurrent

on (see [On for his own research late feudalism his Wokdlteoriiustrojufeudalnego the Theoryof the FeudalSystem],ed. J. Topolski[Warsaw,1982]).

MODELOF EXPLANATION AN TOWARDS INTEGRATED

327

namic and structural narratives is one of degree, not kind. Both have a dated chronological scale, though the structural narrative may emphasize the timing of recurrent events (like the reduction of the time it took to cross the Atlantic by ship as maritime technology improved).6 The sequence of causes and effects in narratives differs in the degree of precision with which the various links in the chain can be specified. Sometimesthough not always - the historian fills in the gaps in the continuity of that chain (where the sources are lacking) with very loose assumptions and hypotheses. Either way these causal chains have as an essential feature the intertwining of causes interpretedas motives and causes interpreted as external events; and both can figure as both effects and causes. This can be illustrated from a passage of an historical narrative drawn at random from among several hundred other passages from historical works, some more description-oriented and some more explanation-oriented: (1) This victoryof democracyproveda false dawn. (2) Many of the countrieswhich in freedom democratic 1919didnot remainso for long. (3) Organized becameapparently neededhabits of toleranceand orderwhich were rare outside westernEurope. (4) It elite,whichwasalso in shortsupply.... (5) In Germany middle-class neededan educated there was an elite which had been powerfulin the days of the empire, and it never had republic a precarious acceptedthe new order.(6) As a result,the Weimar genuinely converts. and onlyby the SocialDemocrats a few middle-class existence,fullysupported was (7) Stresemann the chief of these, perhapsthe most typicalfigureof the 1920s.(8) aspiredto makeGermany Stresemann Thoughan ardentpatriot,indeedan imperialist, great again within the frameworkof democracy,just as he practicedfulfillmentand affairs.... (9) The greatestset-backfor democracy peacefulrevisionin international to socialist,Mussolini,usedthe opportunity createthe wasin Italy.... (10)A renegade the Fascistparty-a movement actionwhichbrought methodsof warintocivilpolitics. of (11) The Fascistsprovokeddisorderso that they could then claimto put it down, and himself to in 1922Mussolini exploitedtheconfusionamongthe politicalparties establish as authoritarian rulerof Italy.... (12)Manymenwereobsessedby fearof Communism who hadshowntheircleverness the andsawin Fascism salvationof society.(13)Writers in discovered Fascismthe answerto theirwit. (14)EzraPound by railingat democracy FabianSocialist,followed becamea Fascist.(15) BernardShaw, though an inveterate him close.7 In this passage, as is usually true of historical narratives, statements of fact occur jointly with explanations, and-another characteristic-the articulated part is superimposed upon numerous strata not articulated by the historian, who assumes them more or less consciously. Sentences (1) and (2) state that the victory of democracy in Europe after World War I was precarious. The following sentences seek to explain that fact and its consequences for the process of history and for human actions. Sentences

6. See D. C. North, "Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping 1600-1800," in The Reinterpretation of American Economic History, ed. R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engerman (New York, 1971). 7. A. J. P. Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam (London, 1965), 80-81.

328

JERZYTOPOLSKI

(3) and (4) give the necessaryconditionsfor democracyto flourish:habits of present elite, all insufficiently toleranceand orderand an educatedmiddle-class elite in GerWesternEurope.But therewas an educatedmiddle-class outside many, and sentence(5) reportsthat it neveracceptedthe post-warorder.The the passagedoes not explainwhythis was so. Leavingthis gap in the narrative, authorpasses to sentence(6) in which he explainsthat becausethe German Republic the middleclassdidnot defenddemocracy, foundationsof the Weimar wereweak. It was supportedonly by the Social Democratsand a few middle(sentence7) was the most typical of class representatives, whom Stresemann representative. middleclasswas a functionof the German The relativepowerof the German social structure,and is thus in a way an externalfactor; but its motives, and is in those of Stresemann particular,are emphasized.Stresemann said to have pursuedimperialistambitionsthroughdemocraticmeans;at this point in the Taylor does not articulatean importanttheme in the narrativeas a narrative ideologyin practicedid not favor democracy whole, namelythat an imperialist (sentence9). analyzesthe situationin Italy, where- priorto 1933The authorseparately for drivenout. The explanation this differsfrom was democracy most radically that given for the weaknessof the WeimarRepublic,since hereTaylorrefers only to Mussolini'sactions, whichare treatedas externaleventsto Germany's development.Nothing is said explicitly about Mussolini'smotives; Taylor simplystatesthat he succeededin exploitingthe situationand createda Fascist the partywhich (sentence11) destabilized countryin orderto claim later that it had restoredorder. This sentenceintimatesthat Mussolini'sactions were motivatedsimplyby a desireto seize power. In sentences12-15 the motivesof peoplewho (likePound and Shaw)adheredto Fascismare revealed:obsessive to a fearof Communism (for the writers) furtheropportunity appearclever and raillery. by anti-democratic in This passageshows how typicallyhistoriansmingleexplanations termsof humanmotivesand externaloccurrences,seldombotheringto makethe relaclear.Theyusuallyassumethatthe knowledge tionsbetweenthe two sufficiently to at the disposalof theirreadersis sufficient makethese relationscomprehensible, or even self-evident.
V

If we assume,takinginto consideration findingsof theoreticalpsychology, the that a motiveis all that induceshumanbeingsto act, andis moreor lessrealized in by them, then we have to indicatethe variouskindsof motivesencountered historicalnarratives,even though these are often difficultto isolate. We are those most often facedwithtwo kindsof motive,not alwaysclearlyarticulated: which may be identifiedwith the goals of action, and those which generally the characterize emotionalstate of the agent. When the ItalianFascist party took actionscalculatedto let them seize power, then the motive of reachinga

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF EXPLANATION

329

goal was involved. When Taylor mentioned that Pound and Shaw joined the Fascist movement and pointed to the fear of Communism experienced by such persons, he then referred to their emotional state as the motive. (Of course they also had a goal: to use Fascism as a barrier to Communism. This was not articulated in the narrative, but can readily be inferred.) In historical narratives we encounter not only the goals of human actions, but also attempts to identify the origins of these goals. When Taylor refers to the fear of Communism, he takes for granted that we know some rational grounds for such a fear. Often it is difficult to decide whether the motives by which human actions (and states of mind) are explained are correctly linked to the goals that people wanted to achieve, or values they wished to embrace. It does seem pertinent to make a distinction, for both motives treated as goals and those as emotions, between knowledge-oriented actions and value-oriented ones. Let us consider the behavior of Joseph Chamberlain in 1938. Why did he not seek an alliance with the Soviet Union against Hitler? K. Robbins explains: "He did not seek alliance with the Soviet Union for two reasons. Like most Conservatives and many Liberals, he was suspicious of the Soviet Union and disliked Communism."' This explains Chamberlain's actions with reference both to knowledge and values. His suspicion (one may infer) arose either from knowledge of past actions of the Soviet Union, or perhaps from inadequate knowledge of the disposition of Soviet diplomacy at the time (or both). His dislike of Communism was a value judgment. Thus the goal that explains his motives (not to let Great Britain be linked by alliance with the Soviet Union) is explained by reference to two deeper motives originating from his knowledge (or perhaps lack of it) and his system of values. It is important to note that Chamberlain's motives are not treated as merely individual ones, arising idiosyncratically from his consciousness. They were shared by "most Conservatives and many Liberals." This is a distinctive form of explaining motives, by placing them in the context of larger structures of consciousness. We shall return to this important distinction. We shall analyze one more passage full of motivational explanations: (1) ColonelBeck did not intendto be left in the cold. (2) On August27th, fearinga attack,he orderedfull, but not general,mobilization.... (3) German possiblesurprise profoundlyworriedBeck. (4) He feared Hitler was no longer militarypreparations in bluffingand was anxiousto pleasethe British.(5) He decidedto let his ambassador Berlin,Josef Lipski,see FieldMarshalGoring.... (6) The Poles hopedto use Goring to restrainHitler.... (7) The same day he authorizedLipskito seek out the German to Ernstvon Weizsacker, discusspossibilitiesof reducingtension. (8) State Secretary Both Polish gesturesproved of no value. (9) Lipski was invited to Goring'sBerlin residencefor an hour's cordial but fruitlessconversation.(10) The meetingplanned placedhighhopes, betweenLipskiand Weizsacker, upon whichthe Britishgovernment in nevertook place. (11) Lipskiwas not ableto findWeizsacker Berlin.(12) Henderson had to inform the Polish ambassadoron August 24th that the State Secretarywas spendinghis time in Hitler'sentourageat Berchtesgaden.9
8. K. Robbins, Munich 1928 (London, 1968), 158. 9. S. Alster, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London, 1973), 347-348.

330

JERZYTOPOLSKI

Beck'sactionswereguidedby two intentions:to avoid war, and at the same time to avoid a Germansurpriseattackon Poland. When on August 27, 1939 he ordereda mobilization,but not a generalone, the goal of avoidingwarin articulated the narrative arisesfroma value,the preferwhichis not directly ence for peace over war, whilethe goal of avoidinga surpriseattackis related to anothervalue, defendingthe mothercountry.His pursuitof this lattergoal and dependedon his knowledgeof Germanmilitarypreparations Hitler'sbehavior (sentences1-5). He also wantedhis actions to be positivelyviewedby and the British,which accountsfor his seekingnegotiationswith Weizsacker The G6ring, intendedto reduce tension and restrainHitler (sentences5-7). historianfeels that he can discernBeck'sgoals, even though his actions failed to accomplisheither of them. In historicalnarrativeswe also find explanationsof human action and beno-based eitheron common-sense haviorwhichwe may term psychological theory. Herethe agentis judgednot to have clearly tions, or on psychoanalytic thought out motives for action, but to have respondedirrationally,based on in The mechanisms. psychohistorian, particular, of an innerstructure psychical ratherthanfreelychosen arecompulsive seeksto showthatsomehumanactions throughwill and consciousness. often explainedhumanactions by traits such as Traditionalhistoriography goodness, cruelty, envy, courage, or cowardice.N. Karamzinexplainedthe behavior of Ivan the Terribleby his inborn cruelty. More often, however, or dispositionsas qualifying(reinforcing treatpsychological modernhistorians weakening)motives, and makinggoals more or less difficultto attain. When biologicalfactors are introduced,such as the failing health of a statesmanor disposition these are mediatedthroughthe psychological militarycommander, of such agents.
VI

external I havecalledthe secondcomponentof the generalmodelof explanation established the mathematical by events.Theweightof thesecanonlybe precisely techniqueof factoranalysis.Thishas becomefamiliarfromthe New Economic Historians.In his well-knownstudy of the role of railroadsin Americanecoassumptionnomic development,R. W. Fogel made a single counterfactual -and then had transportation been used insteadof railroads that water-borne computedwhat the gross nationalproductwould have been (almostthe same, he claimed).'0 or whichuse factor analysis,counterfactuals, simulationsdo not Narratives differ from all others in that they employ notions of causality. They claim, however,to be betterableto establishthe logicalnexusbetweenfactorsas causes and effects. Most historiansdo not pay much attentionto the nature of this
10. Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History (Baltimore, 1964).

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF EXPLANATION

331

logicalnexus;thoughit canoftenbe hypothetically reconstructed fromwhatwas enthymematically assumed not always fully consciously in the narrative. The causes, conditions,and so on in narratives most often conceivedby are historiansin the followingways:(1) as necessary conditionsfor the eventbeing conditionsfor it; (3) as necessaryconditionsonly in explained;(2) as sufficient the situationbeinganalyzedby the historian;(4) as conditionsconduciveto the its occurrence theevent;or (5)as conditionspreventing occurrence. of Reverting its do nowto thepassagefromA. J. P. Tayloranalyzed earlier: firstsix sentences of to not referdirectly humanactions.To explainthe precariousness democracy afterWorldWarI, Taylorproceedsindirectly,by notingthe conditionsnecessary to a democracy.(Doubtlesshe did not mean democracyat any time in human history- Athenian democracy,for example but only democracyin modern societies.) He cites two: the habit of tolerance and order, and the of existence a developed elitewithina strongmiddleclass.We maysupposethat for or for himthecoexistence both factorswassufficient the existence survival of of democracy,for therewas a strongand educatedmiddleclass in Germany, but not the habitof toleranceand order.In Italy, as Taylorsees it, therewere in in conditions(not described detail)conduciveto the use of terrorism political fromsurviving. life, andthuspreventing democracy Instead,the politicaldestaactionsof the Fascists, bilizationof the country,strengthened the deliberate by was a necessarycondition for establishingFascism(sentences10-11). Tayloralso mentionsanotherconditionconduciveto the slide from democThis was both racytowardsFascismafter WorldWar I: fear of Communism. a motivefor the actionsof peoplelivingat the time and an objectivefact which was then a new elementin social consciousness. The search for necessaryand sufficientconditions requiresa comparative analysis.If an historianstates that the existenceof democracyis conditioned by the existenceof a certainmentalityand social attitudesand also of an educatedmiddleclass, an historicalrelationship formulatedwhichis something is morethanthe statement a singularfact, eventhoughit is not a strictlygeneral of that if (or if and law withoutdeterminants time and space.Yet the statement in only if) thereis the habit of toleranceand ordercombinedwith the existence of a middleclass, democracycan exist has the form of a law which reflectsa certainregularity found by the historian. It is not essentialthat, consideringthat it refersonly to a certainperiodin humanhistory,we callthisregularity law. Thepointis thatthereis no absolute a oppositionbetweenhistoricaland theoreticalstatements.The theoreticalcontent of statementsencounteredin historicalnarrativesvaries;11 there is a sui generiscontinuumwhich at one end has statementswhich are predominantly in historical character (suchas "Thefirstpartitionof Polandtook placein 1772") and at the other predominantly theoretical(such as "Underthe feudal system

11. See J. Topolski, "The Concept of Theory in Historical Research: Theory versus Myth," 13 Storiadeltastoriografia (1988), 67-79.

332

JERZY TOPOLSKI

the generallevel of prices is determinedby the movementof the prices of agricultural produce"). In historical worka comprehensive effortto assessthe importance different of factorsis seldommade. I shallcite one whichreferred the deductive/nomoto logical model of explanation.I referto the tentativeexplanationby Jan Rutkowskiof the emergence and developmentin Poland in the sixteenthcentury of the manorialserf economy which replacedthe medievalsystem in which peasantspaid rent to their landlordsin specie or in kind. Rutkowskiconcludedthat this development could only be explainedin comparativeperspective.He distinguished betweenprincipalfactors, whose presence was necessaryfor the flourishing the manorialeconomy, and collateral of ones, whichaccelerated processbut whichwould have been unableto prothe duceit by themselves.The principalfactors,he claimed,werethe abilityto sell agricultural products,especiallygrain, and the serfdom of the peasants(still existingin medieval Poland),which,alongwiththe development the manorial of serf economy,becamemoreand moreharshbecauseof growingcoercedlabor corveee). Thesehadto occurtogether:"Theco-occurrence the facilityof sale of and the serfdom of peasantswas a necessaryand at the same time sufficient conditionof the emergenceof the manorialserf economy."12 Hereis Rutkowski's in argument expressed the deductive/nomological model: (1) If and only if there is the co-occurrence the facility to sell agricultural of produceand to reducethe peasantsto serfdomwill a manorialserf economy develop (the coveringlaw: part one of the explanans);(2) In Poland in the sixteenthcenturythere were both the facility to sell grain and to reducethe peasantsto serfdom (parttwo of the explanans);(3) In Poland the manorial serf economydeveloped(the explanandum). Most historicalexplanations not havethis form, but are ad hoc, bringing do togetherwhateverfacts the historianconsidersappropriate the light of his in or her specificknowledgeand generalvalue system. Here are some examples: "TheFranco-Russian Ententeof 1891, ripenedinto the Allianceof 1894, was the naturalresult of the suspicion,the feeling of isolation, and the irritation against Germanywhich existed in both countries.""3 "The Reformationproduced a great movementin the landed market, most strikinglyin England, wherethe dissolutionof monasteries conveyedsomethinglike one-fifthof the nation'slandedincomeinto new hands,but also in those areasof Germany and Scandinavia whereReformationmeant secularization land."114 of "Thespread and internaldevelopment Protestantism those years[after1530]had been of in only madepossibleby the postponement the generalcouncil."15 author of The
12. J. Rutkowski, Historiagospodarcza Polski [Economic History of Poland] (Poznaii, 1946), 125-127. 13. Sidney B. Fay, Sarajevo: The Origins of the World War, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, 1966), 105. 14. G. R. Elton, "Introduction," in TheNew Cambridge ModernHistory(London, 1975), II, 15-16. 15. E. Bizer, "The Reformation in Difficulties," in ibid., 270.

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF EXPLANATION

333

goes on to explainwhy the pope did not convenesuch a councilby pointingto his variousmotives for not wantingone. allianceto suspicionof All the relationships cited above- Franco-Russian Germany,livelyland marketin NorthernEuropeto dissolutionof the monasteries, spread of Protestantismafter 1530 to non-occurrenceof a general council-are singularones. What authorizedhistoriansto make these causal attributions not others?All thesephenomena and could havehad othercauses. We areaskedto believethat it was just theseones that werecausal,in the given historicalsituation,becauseof the knowledgeand convictionof the historians. But their reconstructions be hypotheticalonly. can Theseexplanations dependon such statementsas that states strivefor security, that an increasedsupplyof land stimulatesthe market,and that negotiations can sometimespreventschismaticmovementsfrom developing.None of in conditions.They and/or sufficient thesecanbe formulated termsof necessary are qualifiedby such termsas "usually" "often."A ceterisparibusclauseis or in effectattached,withthe authorclaimingthattherewereno conditionswhich unclearwhether It prevented usualcourseof eventsfromoccurring. remains the all the regularities which historiansconsciouslyor unconsciouslyrefer can to be formulatedwithout such conditions.
VII

This methodologicalanalysis of the explanatorypraxis of historiansshows that it dependson their conceptionof the processof history. Sometimesthis conceptionis a consciouslychosen theory or philosophy, such as Marxism, economictheory.In this contextI am less interor psychoanalysis, neoclassical or estedin thesethanin conceptionsthat originatein commonknowledge in the professionallife of the historian. I am interested hereonly in the mostgenerallevelof theseconceptions,which vision of the world. I shalluse this vision as the mightbe calledthe operational for point of departure outlininga conceptionof the processof history, which in turn generatesmethodologicaldirectives.I hope thus to suggest a model outlineof a more integrated approachto historical whichcan be a preliminary explanation. of My view of the operationalmodel of the processof historycharacteristic the praxisof historiansis rathersimple.The agentsare a more or less ordered set of humans,all with personalitystructures psychologicalstates as well and as motivations.History consists of the actions performedby these humans (eitherindividuallyor in groups)-some proactive,willed by the agents, and some reactiveto externalevents of various kinds-including the actions of one otherhumans.Actionsandreactionsinevitably influence anotherandform and structural of systems sequences causesand effects(let us call them genetic) (functional)as well as systemswhich are both functionaland genetic. with This meansthat in historicalnarratives humanactions are intertwined "objective" factors which cannot be interpretedin terms of human actions.

334

JERZYTOPOLSKI

The model I suggest, taking into account the frequentlyintuitivetheoretical assumptionsmade by historians,can be stated as follows: (1) Historicalreality,whichis an ontologicalunity, is createdby actions of humanbeingsin definedphysicalconditions. (2) Humanactionsare locatedat the intersectionof the materialworldand the world of consciousness. (3) Historicalreality should be examinedas the process of human goalorientedactions, of actions not guidedby goals of which the agents are conof scious, and of the impingement externalevents. It is thus full of the unintended consequencesof human actions. The results of human actions, both intendedand unintended,as well as the actions themselves,are the subject matterof historicalresearch. (4) Humansact freely, but to achievetheirgoals they must take into account the context createdby past human actions, as well as the naturalconditions underwhich they live. (5) The conditions of human action are mediatedby the knowledgeand value systemsof the agent, which alone make it possiblefor humansto select alternative coursesof action from among those allowed by the naturalcondiresponses,dependingon tions. Thusthe same conditionsmay lead to different the consciousnessof the agent. the Thisway of interpreting processof historytreatshumansas rational,but does not assumerationalityto be absolute.Humanactionsmay be viewedon a spectrumat one end of which are non-rationalactions, those at variance with the agent'sknowledgeand/or value commitments(that is, deformedby emotions)and at the other rationalones, those which allow agentsto achieve their goals most easily, or (in a weakerformulation)to achievethem at all.
VIII

for follow fromthisvisionof the historical The followingdirectives explanation process: in (1) Thedeepestexplanations historyareto be soughtin humanmotivations and actions, becauseit is only humanbeings who make history. (We do not factors;but this conceptionis not inconsiderthe possibilityof metaphysical compatiblewith the existenceof a world inexplicableby humancognition.) in (2) A distinctionmust be made betweenexplanations whichwe are interested in the subjective(motivational,psychological)aspect of the process of in historyand those interested the objective(wherewe do not use the language of motivations,decisions,emotions,and actions). Hence a questionlike "why did human beings develop industrythat makes use of machines?"must be from one like "whatwere the causes of the IndustrialRevoludistinguished tion?"- even thoughthe two types of questionare connected.In fact we must striveto link the answersto such questionsif we are to constructan integrated model of historicalscholarship. I shall look at each model of historicalexplanation the motivationaland

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF EXPLANATION

335

the causal-separately, and then (in the next section)suggesthow they may be integrated. When it comes to explainingprocesseswhich are not human actions, the aboutthe cause(s)but at least explanation shouldincludenot onlythe statement one general statementabout the class of processesof which the cause is a a particular instance.It is only by subsuming putativecauseundera generallaw that it can be identified in fact the cause. This generallaw must be a strictly as and moreover,it mustpointto the generalstatement not a meregeneralization; closestnexusbetweenthe causeandthe effect.Thismeansthat it shouldinclude a descriptionof both the sufficientcondition(s)and also the necessarycondiof tion(s) for the occurrence the effectin question.Identifyingonly a sufficient conditionis inadequatebecause, since other processescould have causedthe effect, one may still wonder whetherthe real nexus has been grasped;and because,sincea necesidentifying only a necessary conditionis also inadequate to saryconditionneednot be sufficient producean outcome,one maystilldoubt whetherthe purported causewas in fact the causeof the effectin question.The upshot of all this is that in the ideal case causal explanationsrequiregeneral laws whichidentify both the necessaryand sufficientconditionsfor a specific process. This, of course, is only the ideal case. In practicemost historiansdo not seek to uncovergenerallaws or to invoke them in their causal explanations. model can serveas a standardand as Nevertheless, deductive-nomological the an heuristicinstrument attentiontowardsthe formulation directinghistorians' of more generalrelationships -that is, towardstheory. In explaining humanactions,the bestmodelcallsfor the historianto identify the goal of the action and the agents'knowledgeand values. This can be exthe presseddeductively: agent havingat her or his disposal knowledgeof the conditions for action and the appropriatevalues, when strivingto attain a certaingoal should act in a definedmanner.The agent did want to attainthis goal, and thereforeacted in that manner.
IX

Now that I have presentedideal types of the two models of explanation,it remainsto suggest how they may be integrated.Obviouslythe motivational modelshouldbe modifiedin the directionof the deductive-nomological model, that and viceversa.It can easilybe established whenwe askwhyan agentwhose actionswe haveexplainedby certainmotiveshad those motivesand not others, we have passedbeyondthe frameworkof the motivationalmodel. It will only referus to the knowledge,values, emotions,and mentalstate of the agent, not was content.If fearof Communism the motivefor some explaintheirdistinctive afterWorldWarI to embrace Fascism,we still needto knowwhat intellectuals was the source of that fear. the For this the causal model is required.We have to reconstruct state of in socialconsciousness Europeafterthe OctoberRevolution,whichcould only

336

JERZYTOPOLSKI

comhas be done, as Van den Braembussche correctlystressed,by appropriate parativestudies.'6When we want to explain individualactions, like why a painterpaintsin one way ratherthan others, the first step would be to locate that painter,so far as is possible, withina more generalartistictrend(impressionism, for example).We could then try to locate that artistictrend within and broadercontextsof historicalconsciousness searchin turnfor theircauses. procedures,we often referto In the processof developingsuch explanatory and structural explanation,locatinga givenelementwithina structure studying its role in it, as well as to genetic explanations(such as a demonstrationof the developmental stages of a type of social consciousness).We can expanda in type deductive-nomological of explanation two ways. Onewouldbe to establish even more general laws underlyingthe one we have applied. Thus the statement"Underthe feudal systemthe generallevel of priceswas determined products"might be deducedfrom the by the level of prices for agricultural by more generallaw "thegenerallevel of pricesis determined changesin the compositionof the total amountof commoditiesin the market."But more to the point for us is the second type of expansionof the deductive-nomological of model, in the directionof a searchfor substantiation causesand laws in the origin of the entire historicalprocess, human actions and their motivations. correlatedwith theoreticalformulationsof causes Only such substantiations, and laws, can yield a better-integrated explanatorysystem. to Substantiation reference humanactionsand motivesanswersquestions by of the type: why (or how) did the generalrelationshipor law containedin the model become relevantfor the particularissue being deductive-nomological explained?When A. J. P. Taylor stated that an educatedmiddle class was necessaryfor the existenceof democracyafter WorldWar I, he specifiedthat he was referringto aspectsof its disposition(tolerance,inner discipline).His explanationmay be acceptedas sufficient,for it is not necessaryto stipulate model. An that everyexplanationmust conformto the deductive-nomological explanationof the causes for the emergenceof the educatedmiddle class in Europewas not the task of A. J. P. Taylor,thoughit is a task for the historical professionin general.
x

It may make my position clearerif I returnto the example of Rutkowski's of of explanation the emergence the manorialserfeconomyin sixteenth-century Poland. It will be recalledthat he undertooka comparative analysisof condiin manorialserf economiesand necessaryfor their suctions regularlyfound 17 cessfuloperation, and concludedthat favorableconditionsfor sale of agricul16. See footnote 1. 17. A similar explanation was advanced by, among others, Robert Brenner ("Agrarian Class Structure and European Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70 [1970], 30-78), but in the course of his explanation he modified the original question. He did not

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF EXPLANATION

337

tural productsand the capacityto reducepeasantsto a harshserfdomwere, together, sufficientfor the rise of a manorialserf economy in general. These were essential,althoughthere were many conditionsconduciveto the rise of such an economy, such as convenientaccessto marketsfor grain. The relationshipbetweenthese two sufficientconditionsand their result is law-like,but it may be only a specialcase of a moregenerallaw, as "Allstones is thrownupwardfall to the ground" of the law of gravity.The absenceof this claimto haveidentified moregenerallaw inevitably castsdoubton Rutkowski's causes. the two sufficient two by We mightaddressthis difficulty formulating moregenerallaws:"Dea exceedingone'sown needsrequires marketin which velopmentof production the surpluscan be sold," and "All developmentof productionexceedingone's the proceown needsrequires laborpower."Butthoughdeveloping explanatory We dure,this is unsatisfactory. still do not knowwhythesetwo conditions,and to onlythese,"gaverise" the manorialserfeconomy.Whyweretheseconditions Herewe mustexpandthe deductiveinoperative? not left dormantor rendered nomologicalmodelin the directionof the motivationalone by posingthe quesmanorsbased tion of whythe Polish nobilityin the sixteenthcenturyorganized on serf labor, thus taking advantageof the two favorableconditions. Here is a sketchof my answerto this question.1 The Europeannobilityin the eighteenthcenturywantedto increaseits incomes, which had been falling since the late MiddleAges; they could achievethis only by economicactivity, becauseother coursesof action (such as feudal robberyor confiscationof the property the church)wouldnot havesufficed.Takinginto accountthe forms of of economicactivitymadepossibleby naturalresources,laborsupply,and the market,the Englishnobility engagedin sheep breeding;the French, without it changingthe type of production,reorganized by developingthe meitayage On the Iberianpeninsulathe nobility, besides sheep system. (crop-sharing) breeding, starting seeking income through developing production in Latin America, and the nobility of Eastern Europe engaged in various types of activitywas made posfarming,mainlyproducinggrain. This labor-intensive the virtuallycost-freelabor suppliedby the serfs. (In England,where sibly by which the landlordshadto pay for laborpower,they engagedin sheep-raising, is severaltimes less labor-intensive.)

answer the question why manors based on serf labor developed in Eastern Europe while they did not (at the same time) in Western Europe, but rather the question why in Eastern Europe the peasants were not in a position to prevent the nobles from organizing such manors. He claimed that peasant villages had less internal cohesion than in Western Europe (which is doubtful, as empirical studies have not confirmed this). Thus he merely pointed to one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of a manorial serf economy. Such conditions, of course, can be listed by the dozen. 18. Here I give the main ideas of my book Narodziny kapitalizmu w Europie XIV-XVII wieku [The Birth of Capitalism in Europe in the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century] [1985] (2nd ed., Warsaw, 1987); Italian translation, La nascitd del capitalismo in Europa (Turin, 1979).

338

JERZY TOPOLSKI

The goal of increasing incomearose from the nobles'values. The incomeof the burghers rising,and that of the peasantry at least not falling. The was was noblesthus felt theirpositionin the societywas threatened.The form of their action was suggestedby their knowledge:the graduallyincreasingawareness that if they could producea lot of grain, they could sell it, and they could produceit if they could use the virtuallyunpaidlaborof the serfs. Theirvalues not did not opposeserfdom;peasantswerecertainly the socialequalsof nobles, in exchangefor the land they cultivated. and owed labor to the nobles We couldexpandthis explanation inquiring by whythe incomesof the nobles werefallingwhilethose of othersocialgroupswerenot. This wouldrequirean for of explanation the deductivenomologicalsort;but this is not necessary my argumenthere. one The motivationalmodel and the deductive-nomological can be linked togetherby more than expansionswhichintertwinethem. Anotherway to do so would be to recognizethat both motivesand externaleventscan be found in the historicalprocess.The objectiveconditionsexplainedby the deductivein modelin the nomologicalmodelshouldfindtheirreflection the motivational way that agentstake cognizanceof these conditions.But (unlikethe situation of of the Polish nobility,who wereableto act on theirknowledge the favorable marketfor grainand the availability serf labor)agentsseldomgain an undeof formedknowledge theseconditions.Thatis whyhumanactionsoften do not of yield the expectedresults. Universityof Poznan'